Defense Industrial Planning for a Surge in Military Demand
Abstract
In the wake of post-Vietnam reductions in expenditures for military hardware, a concern arose that these reductions, together with certain supposedly perverse characteristics of defense business (such as purportedly low profitability) were eroding the lower tiers of the defense industrial base. As a consequence, DoD buyers were said to be having trouble getting adequate supplies of some products, to be paying monopoly prices for others, and to be in a position of extreme risk should demand increase in a crisis. For our study of the issue of surge capability--the capability of lower-tier industries to make quick responses (one year or less) to increased demands--we first undertook a more detailed examination of DoD's current approach to assessing industrial capability, the Industrial Preparedness Planning program. Although the IPP program has emphasized mobilization more than surge planning, it does not provide very useful information for either purpose, because of what is chosen for planning and how the planning process is carried out once these choices are made. About 6000 end items are selected for data collection and planning. Manufacturers of these products are then asked to provide data about their ability to increase production. Information furnished usually has no direct input from lower-tier firms, and it is often based on a number of questionable assumptions about availability of inputs to the production process.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 01, 1978
- Accession Number
- ADA067627
Entities
People
- Alvin J. Harman
- Geneese G. Baumbusch
- Michael D. Miller
- Patricia D. Fleischauer
Organizations
- RAND Corporation