

AD-A070 035

ARMY WAR COLL STRATEGIC STUDIES INST CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
TOWARD AN ESTIMATE OF THE SOVIET WORLDVIEW. (U)
MAR 79 D S PAPP

F/6 5/4

UNCLASSIFIED


NL

| OF |
AD
A070035



END
DATE
FILMED
8 -79
DDC

LEVI



STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

15 MARCH 1979

ACN 79023

See 1473

A070035

DDC FILE COPY

TOWARD AN ESTIMATE OF THE SOVIET WORLDVIEW



DDC
RECEIVED
JUN 14 1979
REGULATED

MILITARY ISSUES RESEARCH MEMORANDUM

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT:
Approved for public release;
distribution unlimited.

The views, opinions, and/or findings
contained in this report are those of the
author and should not be construed as an
official Department of the Army position,
policy, or decision, unless so designated
by other official documentation.

79 06 12 063

**STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA**

**TOWARD AN ESTIMATE
OF THE SOVIET WORLDVIEW**

by

Daniel S. Papp

15 March 1979

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT:
Approved for public release;
distribution unlimited.**

DISCLAIMER

The views, opinions, and/or findings contained in this memorandum are those of the author and should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy or decision, unless so designated by other official documentation.

Accession For	
NTIS GR&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DDC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification _____	
By _____	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or special
A	

FOREWORD

This memorandum seeks to develop an estimate of the Soviet worldview. The author contends that it is time to assess the state of the world as the Soviets see it, particularly as the end of the Brezhnev era draws near and the problem of political succession again arises. Although numerous factors influence Soviet foreign policy, the author asserts that the Kremlin's view of the international system and the place it occupies in that system is one of the more significant. The memorandum concludes that it is a critical task to adapt US policy so that it may more successfully respond to the types of challenges the Soviet Union's worldview and policies inevitably create.

The Military Issues Research Memoranda program of the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, provides a means for timely dissemination of analytical papers which are not necessarily constrained by format or conformity with institutional policy. These memoranda are prepared on subjects of current importance in areas related to the authors' professional work or interests.

This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

DeWitt C. Smith, Jr.

DeWITT C. SMITH, JR.
Major General, USA
Commandant

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DR. DANIEL S. PAPP is an associate professor of political science at Georgia Institute of Technology. From 1977 to 1978, he served as a research professor with the Strategic Studies Institute. A graduate of Dartmouth College, he received his doctorate in international affairs at the University of Miami's Center for Advanced International Studies. He has published articles in *International Journal*, *Social Science Quarterly*, *Soviet Union*, *Resources Policy*, and *Parameters*, and has recently completed a book manuscript entitled "Vietnam: The Perspective from Three Capitals."

TOWARD AN ESTIMATE OF THE SOVIET WORLDVIEW

During the 14 years of Leonid Brezhnev's rule, the Soviet Union's international position and the international milieu in which it exists have altered considerably. One of the most significant alterations has been the growth of the Kremlin's international prestige and influence. Soviet leaders have pointed out that few major international issues exist today in which the Kremlin's voice plays no role, an observation with which Western leaders reluctantly concur. As the Soviet Union draws near the end of the Brezhnev era and the problem of political succession once again confronts the Soviet Union, it is time to assess the state of the world as the aging Soviet leader and his colleagues view it.

The Soviet worldview (Mirovozzrenie) has immediate pertinence to the ongoing Western debate over Soviet capabilities and intentions. While it belabors the obvious to point out that numerous factors influence Soviet foreign policy behavior, it must not be overlooked that one of the more significant influences inevitably is the Kremlin's view of the international system and the place which the Kremlin believes it occupies within that system. This essay seeks to develop an estimate of the Soviet Mirovozzrenie.

PROBLEMS AND PITFALLS

When one attempts to determine the Soviet perception of an issue, event, or situation, the question inevitably arises of how "real" perceptions may be separated from propaganda. This is a legitimate and serious concern, and no simple answer is possible. Any attempt to determine a Soviet perception must take into account the foreign, domestic, ideological, and material situations which exist at a particular time, and must additionally involve open Soviet communications, particularly speeches of leaders, articles in major journals and newspapers, and media broadcasts. Changes in Soviet policy—foreign, domestic, military, economic, and so forth—provide one means of observing possible alterations in Soviet perceptions, as do the "clues," as Donald S. Zagoria calls them, which exist within open Soviet communications.¹ Still, changes and clues may be caused by myriad factors other than changed perceptions. Thus, despite one's best efforts, a totally objective separation of "real" perceptions and propaganda is impossible.

A degree of subjectivity is consequently inevitable in any assessment of Soviet perceptions. This limits the accuracy—and consequently the utility—of such efforts. Nonetheless, to declare that "we don't really know what the Soviets think," as one Carter administration planner recently did,² is to overstate the case. It is possible to develop a rough estimate of the Soviet point of view. While this estimate will never be foolproof, it nevertheless will give a better understanding of the Kremlin's perspective on an issue, event, or situation.

The problem of developing an understanding of Soviet perceptions is compounded by the apparent growth of specialized interest groups within the Soviet bureaucracy, each with its own parochial viewpoint. Both Soviet and Western observers have commented on this phenomenon.³ The secretive nature of the Soviet decisionmaking process consequently makes it impossible to know whether and to what degree a particular Soviet policy is influenced by the perceptions of a dominant interest group within the Soviet elite, or by the best perceptual compromise available between or among those interest groups. Thus, an additional degree of uncertainty is added to any Western discussion of Soviet perceptions.

Numerous other pitfalls appear when Soviet perceptions are assessed. Raymond L. Garthoff has listed ten fallacies common to Western analysis of Soviet intentions.⁴ These fallacies may be extended to apply to Western efforts to determine Soviet perceptions. According to Garthoff, these fallacies are: (1) when in doubt, assume the worst; (2) never estimate intentions, only capabilities; (3) the mirror image, i.e., the Soviet leaders' strategic perceptions and intentions are the same as those of the United States; (4) the double mirror image, i.e., the Soviet leaders' strategic perceptions and intentions are necessarily different than those of the United States; (5) the Soviets never mean what they say, or always mean what they say;⁵ (6) US national security means military security against the Soviet Union; (7) Soviet capabilities are larger than needed for deterrence; (8) the Kremlin seeks military superiority; (9) reliance on irrelevant, misleading, or overly-selective quantitative indicators; and (10) "bad news" is public news, i.e., only alarming developments or estimates should be brought to light.

No analyst can avoid all the problems and pitfalls inherent in the analysis of Soviet perceptions. Some subjectivity will inevitably remain, and some interpretations will undoubtedly be influenced by the analyst's own biases. Every analyst, however, if he wishes to contribute to an objective understanding of the Soviet point of view, must keep these difficulties in mind, and seek to minimize their influence on his work.

With these cautions foremost in mind, we now turn to a brief history of the Soviet worldview.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOVIET WORLDVIEW

The Soviet leadership's perception of the international environment and the place the Soviet Union occupies in that environment has undergone considerable change since Lenin and the Bolsheviks began to forge the first socialist state. Lenin himself developed the original "Soviet" worldview in his 1916 work, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, in which he argued that as capitalist states divided the world into colonial areas, competition for colonies would inevitably lead to war between the capitalist states, thereby creating the objective historical conditions requisite for a socialist revolution.

The Bolshevik Party's seizure of power in Russia in 1917 influenced Lenin to update his worldview. Writing in 1919, the Soviet oracle proclaimed:

We live not merely in a state but in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with the imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end occurs, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable.⁶

In essence, Lenin had created the "two camp" thesis—one camp socialist, one camp capitalist—and prophesied that conflict between the two was inevitable. Stalin further elaborated the "two camp" thesis with his theory of "capitalist encirclement," in which the Soviet Union was viewed as besieged by capitalist states intent on its destruction.⁷ Although this thesis fell into disuse during World War II, it was formally readopted by the Soviet Union in 1946 during Zhdanov's celebrated speech at the twenty-ninth anniversary celebration of the Bolshevik revolution. Even so, the postwar two camp thesis was considerably different from the prewar version. Before World War II, the socialist camp was more accurately an outpost occupied only by the Soviet Union. Following the war, the socialist camp had become a "commonwealth of nations," albeit created through force of Soviet arms.

This Soviet worldview essentially remained unchanged until 1956 when Khrushchev declared that war between socialist and capitalist states was not longer fatalistically inevitable, and that socialism could be developed by individual nations following national paths. These revisions were fundamental; according to Khrushchev, socialism could now peacefully coexist with capitalism, with the eventual peaceful rather than violent triumph of socialism becoming a possibility. At the same time, at least in theory, socialist states no longer had to conform to the Soviet model of development. Additionally, newly independent developing states could pursue "noncapitalist roads of development" which, to Khrushchev, placed them in opposition to the capitalist world. Thus, if Khrushchev and subsequent Soviet leaders so desired, nonsocialist states could be defined as pro-Soviet and anti-imperialist.

Since Khrushchev's time, the Soviet worldview has continued to change as it seeks to conform to the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of reality. Unlike their predecessors, however, Brezhnev and his colleagues have not seen fit to codify the transformation of their worldview in a single document or speech. Nonetheless, through analysis of Soviet statements and actions, it is possible to develop a detailed estimate of the current Soviet worldview.

During the Brezhnev era, Soviet spokesmen have defined "world outlook" as "generalized notions of the world as a whole, of human society, and one's place in it, of social ideals, and ways to achieve them."⁸ Especially during the 1970's, it has been argued that the "correlation of forces" has increasingly been shifting toward socialism and the "world revolutionary movement" as the contemporary "general crisis of capitalism" worsens. Sources from all sectors of Soviet society concur in this assessment.⁹ Further, the Kremlin argues that the changing correlation of forces between the two social systems has been "the decisive factor determining the acceleration of the fundamental restructuring of international relations."¹⁰ Brezhnev himself revealed that the Soviet leadership had evaluated the shifting forces and concluded that there was a "real possibility for bringing about a fundamental change in the international situation."¹¹ Peaceful coexistence falls within the rubric of that changing international situation; it is generally viewed as a form of class struggle which excludes direct military confrontation but not other forms of competition—economic, ideological, social, political, and so on.¹²

The broad and sweeping terms that the Soviet leadership regularly uses to describe its view of the contemporary international situation—"correlation of forces," "crisis of capitalism," "restructuring of international relations," "relaxation of tension" (rather than detente), and "peaceful coexistence," to list the more prominent—gloss over and conceal a rather sophisticated matrix of Soviet logic which seeks to explain the international environment in Marxist-Leninist terms. While the more general terms on occasion seem to present a Soviet worldview replete with contradictions, a detailed examination of those terms removes most, if not all, of those contradictions.

THE BREZHNEV "MIROVOZZRENIE:" A MICRO-ANALYSIS

What, then, do the broad terms of the Soviet politico-strategic

vocabulary seek to convey? To answer this question, each doctrinal formula must be examined in turn. Though none of the concepts are new, their meaning and interrelationship is often unclear. Since the "correlation of forces" acts as the driving force behind much of the contemporary Soviet analysis of the international environment, we will begin our examination there.

The "correlation of forces," to the Soviets, is a tool for measuring the relative capabilities of competing forces or groups of forces.¹³ It is a multifaceted concept, and does not refer solely to military forces. Indeed, Soviet sources specifically cite numerous socio-economic, political, ideological, and "international movement" criteria in addition to military factors. Within the economic sphere, per capita gross national product, productivity of labor, and economic growth rates are some of the numerous measures. Within the political sphere, breadth of the social base of government, the procedure of relations between the government and legislative bodies, and the possibility of making operative decisions rank as a few of the more important considerations. In the area of "international movements," the quantitative composition, overall influence, and norms of relations among their component parts must all be considered. Finally, in the military arena, quantity and quality of armaments, military firepower, and the combat and moral quality of the soldiers are some of the more significant factors.¹⁴

This is by no means an exhaustive list of the factors involved, but it does illustrate that both quantitative and qualitative considerations play a role in determining the overall correlation of forces. It must be pointed out, however, that "correlation of forces" calculations takes place on several levels, including (1) the global relationship between the capitalist and progressive worlds; (2) regional relationships between movements, alliances, or other groups of countries; and (3) specific relationships between individual countries.¹⁵ When Soviet spokesmen declare that the "correlation of forces" is inexorably shifting to favor the socialist world, they are commenting on their assessment of the long-term trend of the aggregate of quantitative and qualitative factors in the global arena. Chart I offers a schematic representation of the Soviet interpretation of the international "correlation of forces" illustrating that both quantitative and qualitative factors may be analyzed on national, regional, or global bases.

Chart I. A Schematic Interpretation of the
"Correlation of Forces"

Factors of Analysis \ Area of Analysis	National	Regional	Global
Quantitative (Material)			
Qualitative (Socio-Political)			

When the Soviet leadership speaks of the "correlation of forces," one must be cognizant of the myriad interpretation which the concept may have. Soviet spokesmen point out that when a particular type of correlation is being analyzed—for example, a regional quantitative measure—it cannot be accurately examined in isolation from other factors which may impinge on it.¹⁶ These other factors include quantitative measures on both the national and global level, and qualitative measures on any of the three levels. Thus, uncertainty and subjectivity is injected into all assessments of the "correlation of forces."

This multidimensional interpretation of the "correlation of forces" permits Soviet spokesmen to minimize the importance of events and situations which are unfavorable for the Soviet Union and maximize the significance of events and situations favorable to the Soviet Union. While national or regional correlations may temporarily move against the "Marxist-Leninist tide" on either quantitative or qualitative levels, the aggregate global correlation of forces cannot. To the Kremlin, this is a maxim, an article of faith.

Soviet commentators argue that a significant shift in the correlation of forces has occurred during the Brezhnev era.¹⁷ Some specifically link this shift to the growth of Soviet military capabilities, particularly the attainment of strategic nuclear parity with the United States.¹⁸ According to this view, the Soviet attainment of strategic nuclear parity forced the United States to accept the USSR as its military equal, i.e., as a superpower, and to renounce its policy of acting "from a position of strength." As a

result, the Soviets contend that intersystemic competition shifted from the military to socio-economic, political, and ideological planes.

From the Kremlin's perspective, public US acknowledgment of the existence of strategic nuclear parity and American recognition of parity's impact as a constraining influence on US foreign policy initiatives were as important as the fact of parity itself.¹⁹ Nonetheless, the alleged shift in the global correlation of forces involved more than the growth of Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities. Indeed, it extended beyond the growth of overall Soviet military capabilities and embraced the "intensification of the general crisis of capitalism" and the expansion of the power and influence of the "world revolutionary movement."

These twin phenomena occur independently of each other, but at the same time mutually reinforce each other. In essence, the Kremlin believes that the interrelationship between the capitalist world and the "world revolutionary movement" is a zero-sum game with, in the long term, one side inevitably winning and the other inevitably losing. The global "correlation of intensification" is a measure of that interrelationship.

However, as will be discussed in detail later, the intensification of the "general crisis of capitalism" does not necessarily imply an absolute growth of power and influence for the socialist commonwealth and the Soviet Union. Rather, since the Soviet Union and its socialist allies are only one of three streams within the "world revolutionary movement,"²⁰ losses suffered by the capitalist world may accrue to the accounts of either of the other two streams of the "world revolutionary movement," the national liberation movement, or the international workers and Communist movement. Thus, capitalist losses inevitably strengthen the "world revolutionary movement" in an absolute sense, but may only strengthen the socialist commonwealth and the Soviet Union in a relative sense.

Soviet ideologues view the "general crisis of capitalism" and the "world revolutionary movement" within a broad context. The "general crisis of capitalism" is but the latest stage of development of the contradictions which are allegedly an inherent part of the capitalist system, and includes economic, political, social, and ideological parameters.²¹

The Kremlin's spokesmen point to numerous items within these

arenas as indications that the "general crisis of capitalism" is intensifying. Within the economic sphere, decreased growth rates, high unemployment, unrestrained inflation, the "energy crisis," large-scale resource dependency, more numerous disagreements between labor and management, and growing trade deficits in many Western countries all receive prominent coverage.²² Scandals involving high government officials, including Watergate and the Lance affair; low voter turnout; deadlock and disagreement between different branches of government; and general political apathy are viewed as indications of the political malaise which besets capitalism.²³ Socially, rising crime rates, poor race relations, bourgeois "mass culture," and the difficulties faced by urban areas are a few of the more prominent problems facing capitalist society which the Kremlin regularly lists.²⁴ Finally, in the ideological arena, the undermining of the "Cold War philosophy" and increased doubt about the legitimacy of "anti-Soviet attitudes" are two of the more recent failures of capitalism's ideology, at least as far as the Kremlin is concerned.²⁵

Meanwhile, even as the "general crisis of capitalism" allegedly intensifies, each of the three streams of the "world revolutionary movement" gathers momentum. These streams, again, are the socialist commonwealth, the international workers and Communist movement, and the national liberation movement, all working together "for the defeat of imperialism."²⁶ In the Soviet view, these streams are becoming increasingly unified. This reputed movement toward unity is occurring because of the "common interests" of the three streams and the "need to repel imperialist intrigues."²⁷

Still, this does *not* imply that the three streams of the "world revolutionary process" are coequal. Numerous Soviet spokesmen have made it abundantly clear that despite the "growing unity," the socialist commonwealth and the international workers and Communist movement are the predominant streams of the revolutionary process.²⁸ Brezhnev himself has emphasized that the greatest contribution the peoples of the socialist countries can make to the revolutionary cause is "the development and strengthening of the world socialist system."²⁹ Speaking at the 24th Party Congress, the General Secretary asserted that the struggle against imperialism "largely depends on the cohesion of the anti-imperialist forces, above all of the world Communist

movement.”³⁰ More recently, the Soviet Union and the socialist countries have been described as “the mainstay of the world revolutionary process.”³¹ The national liberation movement may thus be described as a “second class citizen” of the world revolutionary process. Indeed, according to one source, “the role and place of the national liberation movement in the world revolutionary process depends greatly on its interaction with the world Communist movement, the key political force of our time.”³² The rationale for this will be discussed below.

The socialist commonwealth itself, as far as the Kremlin is concerned, is founded on “principles of socialist internationalism, comradely mutual assistance, respect for equality and sovereignty of states, and noninterference in foreign affairs.”³³ Bulgaria, Hungary, Vietnam, East Germany, North Korea, Cuba, Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia are more often than not listed with the Soviet Union as members of the commonwealth.³⁴ Within the commonwealth, the Kremlin argues a “gradual drawing together” (sblizhenie) is occurring which is evening out their levels of development and which will eventually lead to an indefinite form of integration. Nonetheless, despite this sblizhenie, Moscow maintains that national historical experiences play a significant role in building socialism within a particular country.³⁵ This presents a somewhat contradictory picture of a socialist commonwealth theoretically moving toward integration while at the same time preserving national characteristics of its constituent components. The Kremlin unceasingly stresses, however, that following national paths of socialism does not invalidate the universal character of the laws of societal development.³⁶

Not surprisingly, the Soviet Union consistently pictures itself as leading the socialist commonwealth. As the first and oldest socialist state—or the “state of mature socialism” as it is being increasingly called—the Soviet Union is regarded as the foremost ideological, economic, political, social, and military component of the socialist commonwealth. Again not surprisingly, when one examines the second major stream of the world revolutionary process—the international workers and Communist movement—it is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which emerges preeminent.

The international workers and Communist movement consists of anti-imperialist laborers throughout the world. The movement

itself is led by Communist parties, with the CPSU, as the senior and most authoritative party, being viewed as the most powerful entity within the stream.³⁷ Shared class interests serve as the unifying element behind the "proletarian internationalism" which reputedly exists within this stream.

The third and final stream of the world revolutionary process—the national liberation movement—is by far the most diverse and complex.³⁸ Since the national liberation movement is composed of "a fusion of almost all classes and social strata into broad political coalitions,"³⁹ it does not share all the objectives of the socialist commonwealth and Communist parties, but only that of eliminating imperialism. In a sense, the national liberation movement is "impure." Despite its identification with the world revolutionary process, its "impurity" makes it the least significant stream in the process, at least according to Soviet ideologues.

Nonetheless, it is still a fundamental part of that process. Indeed, some Soviet authorities maintain that the national liberation movement is moving increasingly from "anti-imperialism" to "anti-capitalism," thereby becoming more closely aligned with the socialist commonwealth and communism.⁴⁰ Events in Mozambique, Angola, and Ethiopia are pointed to as proof of the argument. Even so, because of its diverse composition, the Kremlin argues that a part of the national liberation movement may abandon the revolutionary line when "some of (a country's) leaders betray the cause of socialist orientation."⁴¹ In these cases, the Soviet Union has a ready-made answer for instances in which a national liberation movement sides with "imperialism." If a movement disagrees with Soviet positions, then the Kremlin may claim that "reactionary pro-imperialist" forces dominate it. On the other hand, if a movement sides with or is influenced by the Soviet Union, then Moscow may assert that "progressive anti-imperialist" forces predominate. Within this construct, Soviet spokesmen maintain they have a dynamic methodology with which to explain the vagaries of political, social, and economic developments throughout the third world.

The ongoing conflict between world capitalism and the three streams of the world revolutionary process takes place on many planes including political, economic, social, ideological, and military ones. In the past, the capitalist world undertook actions against the various streams on any of these planes depending on

time, location, and circumstances. However, the recent changes in the "correlation of forces" have forced the capitalist world to lessen its reliance on military force as the final arbiter of conflict with the world revolutionary process. Capitalism's options for action against the three streams have been reduced, thereby leading to increased possibilities for successes by the revolutionary process. Since capitalism's military strength was used most often against the weakest stream—the national liberation movement—it is this stream which receives the most immediate benefit from capitalism's decreased latitude for use of military force. Indeed, as one Soviet author has said, "imperialism's chances for aggressive action (against national liberation) have been considerably reduced."⁴²

Capitalism's decreased latitude for the use of military force is just one of several parameters which constitute the so-called "restructuring of international relations."⁴³ The concept itself emanates from the objective reality, in Soviet eyes, of the increased power of the socialist world and the decreased power of the capitalist world. According to this Soviet construct, international relations are increasingly being influenced by the socialist commonwealth, with this increased influence gradually assuming a dominant role in defining the scope and method of relations between nations. Thus, when the Kremlin argues that capitalism no longer has great latitude for military action against national liberation movements, it is because "realistic" politicians in the capitalist countries realize that the socialist nations in general and the Soviet Union in particular are assuming a dominant power position. "Socialist might" has in essence "restructured international affairs," according to Moscow.

The Soviet concept of the "restructuring of international relations" extends beyond limiting the utility of capitalist military coercion. It also includes the "gradual reduction in the relative importance of military force in the hierarchy of means of insuring security"⁴⁴ and the establishment of "just international economic relations" in places of exploitation.⁴⁵ In essence, the Kremlin views current successes of the "restructuring of international relations" as including Western nonintervention of Africa, price and product dislocations in the international market place, and Western willingness to cooperate with the socialist commonwealth. To be sure, from the Kremlin's perspective, international relations *have* been restructured, at least when compared to the 1950's and 1960's.

Two final components of the Kremlin's worldview bear direct

relation to the previously-discussed Soviet terminology, and themselves are integrally linked. "Peaceful coexistence" and the "relaxation of tensions" have long been standard Soviet rhetorical terms, but can only be properly understood within the confines of the Kremlin's broader theoretical constructs. Put simply, "peaceful coexistence" refers only to relations between the two opposing social systems. It reduces the possibility of direct military conflict between the two systems, and at the same time permits other forms of competition—economic, ideological, social, political, and so forth—to continue. Inevitably, with the movement of direct intersystemic competition from the military plane to the other planes, a "relaxation of tensions" follows.

Both concepts revolve around the key phrase, "between the two opposing social systems." When direct relations between the two systems are not under consideration, "peaceful coexistence" and "the reduction of tensions" are not operant. More specifically, they "do not extend to relations between imperialism and the peoples' liberation movement."⁴⁶ The USSR consequently draws "a clear line of distinction between the area in which the peaceful coexistence principle operates" and areas where it does not.⁴⁷ Capitalist-socialist relations exist on one side of that boundary; capitalist—Third World and socialist—Third World relations exist on the other. "Peaceful coexistence" "prevents imperialism from openly using force against the emergent states,"⁴⁸ but does not prevent the Soviet Union from extending verbal and material support to selected movements and nations. Both "peaceful coexistence" and "relaxation of tensions" may thus be viewed as limited concepts existing within a much broader theoretical construct.

WORLDVIEW AND POLICY: SOME INTERRELATIONSHIPS

The dynamic relationships, defined in Marxist-Leninist terms, which constitute the basis of the Soviet worldview, give Soviet policymakers considerable room for maneuver in the conduct of their foreign policy. This leeway is evident in Soviet relations with the West, particularly the United States; with Third World nations; and with other socialist states, including China. In relations with the United States and the West, a policy of simultaneous

confrontation and cooperation may be followed. With Third World nations, selective countries may be supported while others are ignored. In the socialist world, varied degrees of dependence, interdependence, and independence may be tolerated; the Chinese case presents the only aberration of significance.⁴⁹

The West. When Soviet leaders first chose to seek improved relations with the major capitalist powers during the early 1970's, they were faced with a task of ideological rationalization which at first glance appeared formidable. How could Brezhnev and his colleagues explain expanded trade with a potential enemy, trade which could possibly strengthen that enemy? How could the Kremlin negate charges that it had "gone soft on capitalism" or "abandoned its revolutionary calling?"

In both instances, the Soviet Union maintained that improved relations with the West promoted the causes of the "world revolutionary movement" more than those of the capitalist world. The possibility of nuclear conflict had been reduced; the political situation permitting Western and particularly US interventions against national liberation movements had been altered; the climate for new successes by progressive forces within capitalist states had been improved; and economic advance in the socialist states could be accelerated since outside capital was being invested. To be sure, capitalist states benefitted in that they could surmount some of the economic problems that confronted them.⁵⁰ However, the Kremlin argued, in light of the overall political-military-economic advantage which the relaxation of tensions added to the accounts of the Soviet Union and the "world revolutionary movement," there was no doubt that such a policy should be pursued. From the Soviet perspective, "detente"—as it came to be called in the West—accelerated the shift in the "international correlation of forces" toward the socialist states.

The Kremlin still had to explain, however, why "detente" was acceptable to Western leaders. If a relaxation of tension favored the Soviet Union, then Western leaders would not accept it unless they lacked intelligence. If they lacked intelligence, then the Soviet claim that capitalists were deadly and dangerous enemies would lose some of its credibility.

The Soviet Union avoided this potential pitfall by asserting that Western leaders for the most part were either "realistic" or "unrealistic."⁵¹ "Realistic" leaders, to the Kremlin, are those who

objectively examine the international situation and conclude that, because of the changing "international correlation of forces," Western nations including particularly the United States no longer dominate the international environment and therefore must adapt their policies to the new reality. The Kremlin maintains that these "realistic" Western leaders realize that Soviet military strength poses great dangers to continued Western "adventurism." These leaders therefore oppose "adventurism" and favor improved relations with the socialist world. Their fundamental class interests remain opposed to socialism, but they realize that capitalist-socialist cooperation is a short-term necessity. Thus, in essence, the Soviets argue that the West has been *forced* to accept detente.

Soviet commentary on the Nixon-Brezhnev summits and the agreements concluded at them regularly stressed that the new American attitude toward relations with the Soviet Union was a result of the "realism" which Nixon had finally adopted because of the growth of Soviet military capabilities.⁵² This "realism" later reduced US "adventurism" in Vietnam, the Kremlin maintained, and also precluded US intervention in Angola.⁵³

This did not mean, however, that "realistic" forces had attained permanent preeminence in the United States. "Unrealistic" forces remained strong despite the ascendancy of "realistic" politicians, and sought to continue traditional "imperial" foreign policy programs relying on military force without taking into account the alleged shift in the "correlation of forces." These "unrealistic" leaders had been discredited by the Vietnamese War, but remained strong. Indeed, according to one Soviet view, opponents of Nixon's "realistic" policy toward the Soviet Union forced him to resign from the Presidency.⁵⁴ The current debate in the United States about the future of Soviet-American relations is proof of the continued vitality of these "unrealistic" leaders, the Kremlin argues. Even more foreboding, from the Soviet point of view, is the realization that such forces may again control US policy. It is this possibility which in part necessitated the continued buildup of Soviet military forces even during the height of detente, at least as far as Soviet ideologues are concerned. "Aggressive, reactionary circles" may "regroup and prepare an attack," *Kommunist* has warned, and therefore the Soviet Union must continue its "modernization of arms and combat equipment."⁵⁵ Since the Soviet Union has not yet categorized the Carter Administration as

“realistic” or “unrealistic,” and is well-aware of the different outlooks on relations with the USSR vying for preeminence within the current administration, this necessity remains. Grounds for continued cooperation and confrontation with the United States therefore still coexist, depending both on the subject at issue and the prevailing attitude within the Carter Administration.

The Kremlin’s explanations of its relations with other Western governments have paralleled its rationales for the USSR’s policy toward the United States. Improved relations have been actively pursued with a number of states, particularly France and West Germany, as the Kremlin has sought expanded trade and access to Western technology, among other things. In all cases, the rationale for improved relations is that “realistic” Western leaders have been forced to accept improved relations with the USSR, and that the socialist world and “world revolutionary movement” benefit more from the improved relations than do the capitalist states. Again in all cases, the Kremlin warns that reactionary elements remain strong in the Western nations, and continue as threats to the socialist world, improved Soviet-capitalist relations, and world peace.

The Third World. More than any other aspect of Soviet foreign policy, the Kremlin’s posture toward the Third World defies categorization. Some Western analysts have looked at the diversity of Soviet policy toward the Third World and concluded that the Kremlin indeed pursues “many foreign policies” toward the developing nations.⁵⁶ Again, however, these “many foreign policies” may be understood within the confines of the broader Soviet worldview.

According to the Kremlin, the attitudes of ruling governments in Third World countries toward the socialist world and the “imperialist world” reflect the “class composition” of these governments. Governments which are truly “progressive” favor close relations with the socialist world; those that are not “progressive” prefer close ties with “imperialism.” As the composition of Third World governments change, Moscow argues, their foreign policies also change.⁵⁷ The USSR in turn responds to these changes, extending moral and material support as individual cases warrant.

Soviet policy toward the Third World consequently appears dominated by pragmatic considerations. However, to the Kremlin,

its worldview provides a ready-made explanation for all contingencies vis-a-vis Third World governments. Sudden reversals in the USSR's policy toward individual states in the Third World may be explained as dependent on changing class compositions of governments within the Third World. The most stunning recent example of such a reversal in Soviet policy was the Kremlin's extreme support for Ethiopia in its war against Somalia, an erstwhile Soviet client.⁴ Other Soviet foreign policy successes in the Third World—Mozambique, Angola, and Afghanistan—may be explained by positing that progressive forces in these societies have come to the fore. Failures of policy—Egypt, Indonesia, Ghana, and the Sudan—may be dismissed by declaring that regressive forces have temporarily regained power.

In recent years, Soviet activities throughout the Third World have expanded considerably. The Kremlin has not confined its interest to any single geographical area or region, maintaining that its "international duty" to support national liberation movements and progressive governments obligates it to undertake a broad scope of action. While its efforts to support such movements and governments have by no means met with universal success, the Kremlin has nevertheless clearly become interested in expanding its influence in areas geographically remote from the USSR. By appealing to its "international" duty to oppose imperialism which is subsumed within its worldview, the Kremlin believes that its presence in remote areas can be justified.

Increased Soviet activity in Third World areas to a great extent may be attributed to expanded Soviet military and economic capabilities. The 1973 airlift to the Middle East, the 1974-75 airlift to Angola, and the 1977-78 airlift to Ethiopia were indications of the new Soviet capability to influence distant situations. It must be realized, however, that neither the Soviet worldview nor the growth of the Kremlin's capabilities exist in a vacuum. Both exist in a setting which must take into account prevailing local factors. The very flexibility afforded Soviet foreign policy toward the Third World by the Kremlin's worldview elicits considerable mistrust of Soviet motives from numerous countries within the Third World, who view the flexibility primarily as a cover for Soviet "expansionism."⁵ Similarly, in some nations, the presence of Soviet military and economic missions are viewed as precursors of Soviet socialist imperialism. Perpetual Soviet denials that the

socialist commonwealth has any obligation to help rectify the worsening economic plight of the have-not nations accentuate this mistrust. While the Kremlin rationalizes its position by claiming that the Third World's economic condition is a product of "imperialist exploitation" and therefore should be rectified by the imperialists, many Third World countries—despite the Kremlin's claims to the contrary—reject the USSR's protestations that the Kremlin has their interests at heart.

The Kremlin is aware of this phenomenon, and actively seeks to reduce the credibility of the charges of "Soviet imperialism." Soviet support for large-scale Cuban involvement in Africa, involvements which furthered both Soviet and Cuban interests, may perhaps be best viewed in this light. At the same time, the Kremlin attempts to resurrect the specter of Western imperialism as a means both to reduce Western influence in the Third World and to offset the Third World's fears of Soviet imperialism.

It is beyond the scope of this essay to assess the degree of success or failure of this Soviet effort. Nonetheless, Moscow's ability to maintain and improve the credibility of its worldview—and perhaps even more importantly, the credibility of the virtually unlimited policy options which can flow from that worldview—may go far in determining the future course of many Third World nations. Machel, Neto, and Mengistu may serve as valuable and persuasive evidence of the legitimacy of the Soviet worldview and the advantages of Soviet support, but Allende, Sadat, and Siad-Barre are just as eloquent testimonies of shortcomings and dangers.

Other Socialist States. Soviet relations with other socialist states present a picture almost as varied as Soviet relations with Third World countries. Although socialist-socialist relations allegedly are based on "proletarian internationalism," i.e., the Marxist-Leninist concept of the unity of interests of workers throughout the world, a startling diversity marks those relationships, ranging from Bulgaria's fawning adherence to the Soviet line on almost all international issues, to China's outright hostility to the Soviet Union and its policies.

The Soviet Union rationalizes these diversities by explaining that the process of building socialist cooperation is a "many faceted process" which is complicated by the "distinctions in the level of economies and social development, in the class structure and in national traditions" which lead to "differing understanding . . . of

internal and external policy” and “dissimilar approaches to the solution of these problems.”⁶⁰ With this rationale, the Kremlin to its own satisfaction justifies the categorization of numerous national economic systems, social approaches, and foreign policies as socialist. The vagaries of Rumanian foreign policy, the liberalism of the Hungarian economic system, the tolerance of Polish Communists for Catholicism, and the nonalignment of the Yugoslavian leadership are all subsumed within this rubric.

However, there are certain limits beyond which socialist states may not go. The Soviet Union argues that it is “essential for each socialist country to be mindful of the common interests of the revolutionary movement.”⁶¹ Awareness of this common interest not only maximizes socialist influence within the “world revolutionary movement,” but also enables the socialist states themselves to cooperate more effectively within inter-socialist organizations such as the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).⁶²

When socialist states place national interests above the common socialist interest, socialist dogma calls for precipitous action to defend the common interest. For all practical purposes, this is what happened in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Who determines when national interest has usurped the rightful leading position of common interest? Although socialist literature regularly asserts that the community as a whole arrives at such an estimate, and determines what actions should be taken, equally frequent assertions that the Soviet Union’s longer experience with building socialism enables it to serve as a model for the socialist community lend weight to the argument that the Soviet Union in fact sets policy for the community. Thus, to many, “socialist cooperation” is little more than a cover for Soviet predominance. The 1975 increase in price of energy resources exported by the Soviet Union to the East European countries, apparently undertaken as a unilateral Soviet initiative and presented to CMEA as a *fait accompli*, is often pointed to as proof of this position, as is the Kremlin’s more recent decision to increase its sale of petroleum to the West at the prevailing world market prices rather than to its East European allies at lower, less financially alluring prices.

However, even though the Kremlin recognizes that “bourgeois nationalism” and “national chauvinism” survive within the socialist world, the Soviet leaders deny that the USSR’s policies are

influenced by either factor. Both must be struggled against since they undermine socialist cooperation and could lead to counter-revolution, the Kremlin maintains. In view of these dangers, the Soviets assert that "nothing can justify antisocialist divisive activities" or "refusal to abide by the coordinated foreign policy line of the fraternal parties."⁶³

Soviet leaders believe that their worldview provides a framework sufficient both to explain the differences of socio-cultural outlook; the disparities of economic development; and the diversities of political approach which exist within the socialist world; and to define the boundaries which these differences, disparities, and diversities may not exceed. Even the challenge to Soviet leadership presented by Eurocommunism may be explained—and limited—within this framework. While the Soviets undoubtedly are not pleased by the independence which the Eurocommunists show, the Soviets have so far seen fit to interpret the phenomenon within their existing worldview.

As difficult as it may be to comprehend, much the same is true of the Soviet attitude toward China. Of all the foreign policy problems and predicaments which confront the Soviet leadership, none is as perplexing as China. At one time recognized as a legitimate socialist state, China has become a pariah within the socialist movement, at least according to Moscow. Brezhnev himself underlined the depth of Soviet-Chinese enmity in his address to the Twenty Fifth CPSU Congress, declaring that "it is far too little to say that Maoist ideology and policy are incompatible with Marxist-Leninist teaching; they are directly hostile to it."⁶⁴ Since Mao's death, this enmity has increased.⁶⁵ Moscow has consequently had considerable difficulty reconciling its worldview with the reality of the Chinese aberration. The Soviet Union consistently denies that it is engaged in a "class struggle" with China, but at the same time observes that the Chinese revolution has retrogressed considerably, even opening the possibility that "a fascist or near-fascist dictatorship" may eventuate.⁶⁶ To the Soviets, China is in fact still socialist even though chauvinistic, anti-Soviet, pro-bourgeois elements have come to the fore in China. The Kremlin, in turn, argues that it is struggling on behalf of the true Chinese Communists.⁶⁷ In light of the antipathy of Sino-Soviet relations, this is an exceedingly weak—and unconvincing—explanation.

It is doubtful that any events in recent times distressed the Soviet leaders as much as President Nixon's 1972 trip to China and President Carter's 1978 recognition of China. Following the announcement of Nixon's visit, Western officials in Moscow described the Russian leaders as "stunned." One can well-imagine the fears of Sino-American encirclement and a potential two-front war which the Soviet leaders conjured up.

Even before the United States recognized China, the similarity of Chinese and US policies toward a number of issues gave rise to Soviet concerns that the two nations "form(ed) a virtual bloc."⁶⁸ With the American recognition of China, these concerns took on a new poignancy. With rumors circulating that various European nations are contemplating arms sales to China, the Soviet leaders must believe that their earlier decisions to continue the USSR's military buildup were wise indeed.

CONCLUSION

At base, the fundamental issue of foreign affairs as seen from the Kremlin remains the contradiction between the socialist and capitalist systems. This, in turn, presents myriad challenges, opportunities, and threats to the USSR. The major challenges include reestablishing Soviet credibility as the leader of the world Communist movement without giving rise to renewed claims of hegemonical intent; supporting its allies and/or sympathizers throughout the world without eliciting a direct military confrontation with either the United States or China; and maintaining economic growth in light of slowed population growth, decreased per capita productivity, and increased resource costs.

How well the Kremlin copes with these challenges may determine the degree of success the Kremlin has in its efforts to take advantage of the opportunities which it has. These opportunities, again as seen from Moscow, center on the possibility for expanded political-military influence which has been brought about by a number of factors, including apparent US retrenchment following Vietnam; the worldwide economic stagnation of capitalist countries; the political disarray of several key European and Third World countries; and a military balance which for the first time is not heavily weighted against the Soviet Union.

Looming over both the challenges and the opportunities are several distinct threats, including Soviet economic stagnation; American and Chinese military action against the USSR, either individually or in alliance; and, perhaps most of all, the appeal of certain aspects of Western politics, economics, and culture to the Soviet population.

Thus, to the men in the Kremlin, the international scene is not as bright as Soviet ideologues or Western alarmists would have us believe. The global picture is if anything as mottled from Moscow's perspective as from Washington's.

Neither can it be argued that the Kremlin's Marxist-Leninist worldview motivates Soviet policy or serves merely as a cover for more pragmatic interests. There is simply insufficient evidence to reach such definitive conclusions. While a reasonable conclusion may be that the Soviet worldview varies from leader to leader and that its impact on Soviet policy is similarly diverse, the paucity of objective information available to Western analysts about Soviet foreign policy formulation renders even this conclusion highly subjective.

Rather, the conclusion which *can* be reached is that the current Soviet worldview presents Moscow with sufficient freedom to interpret ongoing developments so that, in its policies toward the West, the Third World, and other socialist states, the Soviet Union may proceed almost unconstrained by its worldview, *and still be consistent with it*.

This observation requires close analysis. In most cases, the Soviet worldview provides rationale for a range of policy options. These options extend from direct large-scale involvement as took place in Ethiopia during the Ethiopian-Somali War to almost total noninvolvement as occurred in Chile during the months before Allende's overthrow. Both policies were consistent with the demands imposed by the Marxist-Leninist worldview. Indeed, almost any policy would have been.

This does not imply, however, that Soviet foreign policy proceeds unconstrained by worldview. Before the Soviet Union can act in foreign affairs—and regardless of the motivation behind the desire to act—it must first develop a justification for its action within the context of its worldview. Soviet activities in Angola and Ethiopia amply support this observation.⁶⁹ At the very least, a time constraint may develop which delays the implementation of Soviet

policy, a delay which may render the policy ineffective or irrelevant.

It is also significant that Moscow's theoretical global construct provides the rationale for abrupt changes and even about-faces of policy, all without necessarily creating policy contradiction. The USSR may implement different policies at different times toward the same country, or different policies at the same time toward different countries, and still contend that it has not violated its Marxist-Leninist precepts. To those who comprehend the dynamic nature of the dialectic as the Kremlin applies it to foreign policy, this is a legitimate claim.

For American policymakers, the importance of this realization is twofold. First, even though no light has been shed on the question of motivation behind Soviet foreign policy, it should be clear that Soviet policy makers have an opportunity to present their foreign policy to their domestic constituencies as a consistent entity. Whether the effort is accepted as credible is open to debate. Nonetheless, for US policy makers, themselves scarred by the experience of inconsistencies of policy in Vietnam and elsewhere, the advantage of apparent consistency should be well apparent.

Second, from a strictly pragmatic point of view, improved understanding of Soviet perceptions better equips the United States to design and implement policies which can more adequately project US security interests throughout the world. Soviet policies emanate from a worldview that is consistent, not contradictory; comprehensive, not confined to Europe; flexible, not bound by past policy; and perhaps insidious, but by no means perfidious. Although it is a large task to adapt US policy so that it may more successfully respond to the types of challenges the Soviet Union's worldview and policies inevitably create, it is a critical task, one which must be undertaken with a degree of understanding of the Soviet world outlook. This essay has sought to contribute to that requisite understanding.

ENDNOTES

1. For a deeper discussion of these clues, see Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-61*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962, pp. 30-34.
2. Murrey Marder, "US Soviets Seen at Vital Juncture in Policy Conflict," *The Washington Post*, March 26, 1978, p. 1.
3. See, for example, Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1970; Vernon V. Aspaturian, *Power and Process in Soviet Foreign Policy*, Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1971, pp. 555-588; and Samuel B. Payne, Jr., "The Soviet Debate on Strategic Arms Limitation: 1968-1972," *Soviet Studies*, Volume 27, Number 1, January 1975, pp. 27-45.
4. Raymond L. Garthoff, "On Estimating and Imputing Intentions," *International Security*, Volume 2, Number 3, Winter 1978, pp. 22-32.
5. This fallacy is particularly common and is accentuated by analysts who by selecting only Soviet statements or actions which support their argument seek to "prove" that the Soviet Union's intentions toward or perceptions of the West are either malicious or benign.
6. V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniia V. I. Lenina*, 4th Edition, Moscow: Izdatel'stvo, 1941-66, Volume 29, p. 133.
7. See Stalin's report to the 18th Congress of the CPSU, March 10, 1939, in I. V. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1940, pp. 623-30, 656-62.
8. A. Dmitrev, "The Marxist-Leninist Doctrine of War and the Army is an Important Element of the Scientific World Outlook of Military Cadres," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, Number 13, July 1975, p. 9.
9. For just a few of the myriad examples, see D. Tomashevsky "Toward a Radical Restructuring of International Relations," *Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnaia Otnosheniia*, Number 1, January 1975, pp. 3-12 (hereafter cited *MEMO*); V. Matveev, "The Struggle for Peace in the Contemporary World," *MEMO*, Number 13, December 1971, p. 71; G. Arbatov, "On Soviet-US Relations," *Kommunist*, Number 3, February 1973, p. 10; G. Trofimenko, "From Confrontation to Coexistence," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, Number 10, October 1975, p. 38; and A. Migolat'ev, "The Progress of International Relations and the Opponents of Detente," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, Number 21, November 1975, p. 83.
10. N. Lebedev, "The USSR's Efforts to Restructure International Relations," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, Number 1, January 1976, p. 6.
11. L. I. Brezhnev, in *Pravda*, June 15, 1974, p. 1.
12. See, for example, G. Arbatov, "Strength Policy Impasses," *Soviet Military Review*, Number 1, January 1975, p. 47; Y. Zakharov, "International Cooperation and the Battle of Ideas," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, Number 1, January 1976, p. 92. N. Lebedev, "On the Class Character of Peaceful Coexistence," *Kommunist*, Number 4, March 1975, p. 57; and N. Kapchenko, "Socialist Foreign Policy and the Restructuring of International Relations," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, Number 4, April 1975, p. 8.
13. For a detailed view of the international correlation of forces, see Michael J. Deane, "The Soviet Assessment of the 'Correlation of World Forces': Implications

for American Foreign Policy," *Orbis*, Volume 20, Number 3, Fall 1976, pp. 625-636.

14. G. Shakhnazarov, "On the Problem of the Correlation of Forces in the World," *Kommunist*, Number 3, February 1974, p. 86. See also Sh. Sanakoyev, "The World Today: Problem of the Correlation of Forces," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, Number 11, November 1974, pp. 46-49; and N. Kapchenko, "Scientific Principles of Soviet Foreign Policy," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, Number 10, October 1977, pp. 87-89.

15. For a slightly different analysis, see Deane, pp. 627-629.

16. Sanakoyev, pp. 46-51.

17. This is the third radical shift of the correlation of forces since 1917. The first occurred in 1917 with the Bolshevik Revolution and the creation of the Soviet state. The second occurred following World War II with the defeat of Germany and the emergence of a Communist Eastern Europe.

18. G. Trofimenko, "From Confrontation to Coexistence," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, Number 10, October 1975, p. 38; G. Trofimenko, "US Foreign Policy in the 1970's: Declarations and Practice," *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya*, Number 12, December 1976, p. 15 (hereafter cited *SShA*).

19. G. Trofimenko, "The USSR and the United States: Peaceful Coexistence as the Norm of Mutual Relations," *SShA*, Number 2, February 1974, p. 8; and Yu Molchanov, "The Leninist Policy of Peace," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, Number 2, February 1974, p. 5.

20. For just a few of the numerous discussions of the three streams of the world revolutionary movement, see "Toward New Victories in the Struggle for Peace, Democracy, and Socialism," *Kommunist*, Number 9, July 1974, p. 86; N. Kovalsky, "Growing Unity of Revolutionary Forces," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, Number 12, December 1975, p. 56; G. Mirskii, "Developing Countries and World Capitalism," *MEMO*, Number 3, March 1976, p. 43; and N. Lebedev, "Socialism and the Restructuring of International Relations," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, Number 2, February 1978, p. 8.

21. See, for example, D. Kostyukhin, "The Great Depression of the Seventies," *New Times*, Number 26, June 1975, p. 18.

22. See V. Martynov, "The World Nature of the Economic Crisis," *MEMO*, Number 4, April 1975, p. 15; V. Pavlyuchenko, "Energy Crisis: Causes, Essence, Prospects," *SShA*, Number 6, June 1977, pp. 3-16; "Two Roads," *SShA*, Number 1, January 1978, pp. 5-8; and I. Guryev, "The General Crisis of Capitalism: Stages of Intensification," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, Number 3, March 1978, pp. 66-70.

23. See I. Andronov, "Listless Electorate," *New Times*, Number 41, October 1976, p. 13; G. Morris, "USA: The Time of Discontent," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, Number 6, June 1976, pp. 104-112; V. Berezhkov, "The Presidential Election and Detente," *SShA*, Number 6, June 1976, p. 3; and I. Petrov, "The Lance Affair: Scandal in Washington," *SShA*, Number 1, January 1978, pp. 59-63.

24. See "Allies of Socialism in the Anti-Imperialist Struggle," *Kommunist*, Number 6, April 1977, pp. 107-118; A Popov, "Washington and Socioeconomic Human Rights," *SShA*, Number 1, January 1978, pp. 13-22; I. Bestushev-Lada and G. Batygin, "Quality of Life," *SShA*, Number 1, January 1978, pp. 23-35; and "The Iceberg of Racism," *New Times*, Number 13, March 1978, p. 1.

25. For example, see I. Guryev, "The General Crisis of Capitalism: Stages of

Intensification," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, Number 3, March 1978, p. 69; and K. Mikulsky, "The Advantages of Socialism and the Ideological Struggle," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, Number 3, March 1978, pp. 71-73.

26. "Toward New Victories in the Struggle for Peace, Democracy, and Socialism," *Kommunist*, Number 9, July 1974, p. 86; N. Kovalsky, "Growing Unity of Revolutionary Forces," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, Number 12, December 1975, p. 56; and G. Mirskii, p. 43.

27. Kovalsky, p. 58.

28. Y. Zhukov, et. al., *The Third World: Problems and Prospects*, Moscow: Progress, 1970, p. 18; V. Abel and B. Tolan, *La Lutte pour la Paix et le Mouvement de Liberation Nationale*, Moscow: Novosti, 1975, p. 1; and B. Ponomaryov, "Socialism's Role in the Present Day World," *World Marxist Review*, Number 1, January 1975, p. 15.

29. L. I. Brezhnev, *On the Policy of the Soviet Union and the International Situation*, Moscow: Novosti, 1973, p. 51.

30. L. I. Brezhnev, "Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 24th Congress of the CPSU," in *24th Congress of the CPSU*, Moscow: Novosti, 1971, p. 26. See also Brezhnev's speech to the 25th Congress in *Pravda*, February 15, 1976.

31. Y. Solodukhin, "The Fraternal Alliance: From Strength to Strength," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, Number 1, January 1978, p. 79.

32. Y. Tarabin, "The National Liberation Movement: Problems and Prospects," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, Number 2, February 1978, p. 63.

33. N. Lebedev, "Socialism and the Restructuring of International Relations," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, Number 2, February 1978, p. 7.

34. See Brezhnev's report to the 25th CPSU Congress, *Pravda*, February 25, 1976, p. 1.

35. See Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Socialist Internationalism and Eastern Europe—A New Stage," *Survey*, Number 22, Winter 1976, pp. 38-54.

36. Solodukhin, pp. 77-87. Also, B. Kozin, "The Drawing Together of the Socialist Countries—An Objective Regularity," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, Number 10, October 1976, pp. 14-21; and B. Ladygin and Yu Pekshev, "Law of Gradual Rapprochement Among Socialist Countries," *Kommunist*, Number 5, March 1977, pp. 20-31.

37. See, for example, "Allies of Socialism in the Anti-Imperialist Struggle," *Kommunist*, Number 6, April 1977, pp. 107-118.

38. For a detailed Western analysis of the Soviet view of the national liberation movement, see Daniel S. Papp, "National Liberation During Detente: The Soviet Outlook," *International Journal*, Volume 32, Number 1, Winter 1976-77, pp. 82-99.

39. Zhukov, p. 18.

40. Mirskii, p. 40; Tarabin, pp. 59-68; and Ye Dolgoplov, "The Liberation Struggle in the Context of Detente," *Soviet Military Review*, Number 3, March 1978, pp. 52-54.

41. V. Solodovnikov and N. Gavrilov, "Africa: Tendencies of Non-Capitalist Development," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, Number 3, March 1976, p. 32.

42. Dolgoplov, p. 52.

43. For a Western discussion of the "restructuring of international relations, see R. Judson Mitchell, "A New Brezhnev Doctrine: The Restructuring of International Relations," *World Politics*, Volume 30, April 1978, pp. 366-390.

44. D. Proektor, "Socialism and International Security," *Kommunist*, Number 7, May 1977, pp. 109-120.
45. Lebedev, p. 10.
46. *Krasnaia Zvezda*, December 20, 1973; *Izvestiia*, November 29, 1975; and *Pravda*, December 8, 1975; also "Contemporary Imperialism in the Light of Lenin's Doctrine," *World Marxist Review*, Number 3, March 1976, p. 72.
47. A. Sovetov, "Peaceful Coexistence—A Real Factor in International Relations," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, Number 9, September 1972, p. 14; see also G. Kallai, "Main Force of the Revolutionary Process," *World Marxist Review*, Number 11, November 1972, pp. 5-14.
48. D. Volsky, "Behind the Conflict in Angola," *New Times*, Number 38, September 1975, p. 8.
49. The Albanian case also presents an aberration, but it may scarcely be classified as significant.
50. See, for example, A. Gromyko and A. Kohoshkin, "US Foreign Policy Strategy in the Seventies," *Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn*, Number 9, September 1973, translated in *FBIS (Soviet Union)*, September 17, 1973, p. B4.
51. Soviet commentary has long divided Western politicians into "sane" and "insane" categories, or "realistic" and "unrealistic" categories. More recently, the Soviets have become more sophisticated in their analysis of Western political systems, going as far as dividing each of the major US political parties into three distinct categories. See V. P. Zolotykhin, "On the Path to the White House," *SShA*, Number 6, June 1976, pp. 22-23.
52. Georgiev and M. Kolosov, "Soviet-US Relations at a New Stage," *SShA*, Number 3, March 1973, p. 14; and *Krasnaia Zvezda*, December 20, 1973.
53. For Soviet commentary on US "realism" in Vietnam, see *Pravda*, March 9, 1975; April 5, 1975; and April 30, 1975; and I. Andronov, "The Lesson of Saigon," *New Times*, Number 19, May 1975; p. 19. For Soviet commentary on US "realism" in Angola, see *Izvestiia*, December 26, 1975; and January 10, 1976; and V. Pustov, "The Battle of Angola," *New Times*, Number 6, February 1976, p. 8.
54. *Za rubezhom*, Number 32, August 1974, pp. 9-10; and *Znamia*, Number 10, October 1974.
55. "The Leninist Course of the CPSU's Foreign Policy," *Kommunist*, Number 9, June 1972, p. 79; and A. Grechko, "Militant Cooperation of the Armies of the Socialist States," *Kommunist*, Number 15, October 1972, pp. 34-50.
56. Roger E. Kanet, "The Soviet Union and the Developing Countries: Policy or Policies," *World Today*, Volume 31, August 1975, pp. 338-346.
57. See particularly I. D. Ovsyany, *et. al.*, *A Study of Soviet Foreign Policy*, Moscow: Progress, 1975, pp. 87-92. See also K. N. Brutents, *National Liberation Revolution Today: Volume I*, Moscow: Progress, 1975, pp. 123-130.
58. Gerard Chaliand, "The Horn of Africa's Dilemma," *Foreign Policy*, Number 30, Spring 1978, pp. 116-131; and Godwin Matatu, "Ethiopia's Finest Hour," *Africa*, Number 79, March 1978, pp. 19-20.
59. Although it was discussed in veiled terms, this mistrust was quite apparent during the recently concluded Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in Belgrade. It has also been evident at recent sessions the Organization of African Unity.
60. Ovsyany, pp. 40-41.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
62. For an extensive Soviet view of CMEA, see *The Multilateral Economic Cooperation of Socialist States*, Moscow: Progress, 1977.

63. Ovsyany, p. 47.

64. *Pravda*, February 25, 1976.

65. For a detailed view of the Soviet view of China both before and after Mao's death, see Morris Rothenberg, *Whither China: The View from the Kremlin*, Coral Gables: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1977.

66. See, for example, "The Maoist Regime at the New Stage," *Kommunist*, Number 12, August 1975; and "Some Topical Questions in Marxist Sinology," *Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow)*, Number 1, January 1976, p. 11.

67. *Ibid.*

68. L. Dadiani, "Peking's Middle East Policy," *International Affairs (Moscow)*, Number 5, May 1978, p. 49. See also *Pravda*, June 13, 1978.

68. For a detailed analysis of Soviet policy during these crises, see Daniel S. Papp, "Angola, National Liberation, and the Soviet Union," *Parameters*, Volume 8, Number 1, March 1978, pp. 26-39; and Daniel S. Papp, "Eritrea and the Soviet-Cuban Connection," Military Issues Research Memorandum, Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1978.

OTHER RECENTLY PUBLISHED MEMORANDA

Detente, National Security, and Multinational Corporations	AD A013014
Nonconsonant Detente and NATO	AD A013522
Deterrence and Detente	AD A013979
The Impact of Crises on the Evolution of Strategy and Forces in an Era of Detente	AD A014158
The Terror Trap	AD A014159
Collective Defense, Neutralization, and the Balance of Power: Contending Security Policies in Southeast Asia	AD A015464
Precision Guided Munitions: Implications for Detente	AD A015465
Chile, 1964-74: The Successes and Failures of Reformism	AD A015466
International Leadership in an Era of Detente	AD A015467
Detente and the Eastern Mediterranean	AD A016859
Terrorism and the Military Response	AD A016860
The Prospects of Soviet American Alliance	AD A016884
A Fifth Round in the Middle East? Western European Perceptions	AD A017049
Nuclear Strategy for Defending a Border	AD A017050
Being Number One Nation: Primacy and Detente	AD A017794
Interests and Strategies in an Era of Detente: An Overview	AD A019091
The Relevance of Civilian Based Defense to US Security Interests	AD A020178

Copies of any of these memoranda may be obtained from the Defense Documentation Center. The request, indicating title and AD number, should be sent to the following address:

**Defense Documentation Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22314**

DISTRIBUTION

ODCSOPS, DA	6
National War College	3
Naval War College	2
Air War College	4
Air University	3
Command and General Staff College	2
Armed Forces Staff College	1
Industrial College of the Armed Forces	2
Inter-American Defense College	1
University of National Defense	1
Defense Intelligence School	1
US Military Academy	2
Marine Corps Development and Education Command	3
National Defence College	1
Royal College of Defense Studies	1
L'Ecole Superieure de Guerre	1
Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr	1
NATO Defence College	1
Concepts Analysis Agency	2
Intelligence Threat Analysis Detachment	1
Training and Doctrine Command	1
Combined Arms Combat Development Activity	1
Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency	1
Office of the Chief of Engineers	1
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency	1
Defense Intelligence Agency	2
Central Intelligence Agency	3
Department of State	2
Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange	1
Institute for Military Assistance	1
US Army Federal Executive Fellow, Brookings Institution	1
US Navy	2
US Marine Corps	2
US Air Force	3
432d Military Intelligence Detachment	1
434th Military Intelligence Detachment	1
467th Military Intelligence Detachment	1
I ROTC Region Headquarters	1
II ROTC Region Headquarters	1
III ROTC Region Headquarters	1
IV ROTC Region Headquarters	1
National Guard Bureau	1
Defense Documentation Center12
Army Library	1
Military History Research Collection	1
Army War College57

UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER ACN 79023	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
6. TITLE (and Subtitle) TOWARD AN ESTIMATE OF THE SOVIET WORLDVIEW.		9. STATE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Military Issues Research Memorandum
7. AUTHOR(s) Dr. Daniel S. Papp		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS		11. APPROVAL DATE 15 March 1979
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		12. NUMBER OF PAGES 32
12. 37p.		18. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.		18a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Soviet worldview; Soviet perceptions; correlation of forces		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This memorandum seeks to develop an estimate of the Soviet worldview. The author contends that it is time to assess the state of the world as the Soviets see it, particularly as the end of the Brezhnev era draws near and the problem of political succession again arises. Although numerous factors influence Soviet foreign policy, the author asserts that the Kremlin's view of the international system and the place it occupies in that system is one of the more significant. The memorandum concludes that it is a critical task to adapt US policy so that it may more successfully respond to the types of challenges the		

DD FORM 1 JAN 73 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE

UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

390 230

over
DM

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

↙ Soviet Union's worldview and policies inevitably create. ↗

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)