SALT and the Reality of Detente.

Abstract

The conclusion reached in this study is that the United States is in danger of weakening its nuclear weapons posture as a result of accepting a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the USSR in the SALT negotiations. In our eagerness to secure an arms control agreement we are ignoring the fact that the Soviet Union is and will remain inherently hostile to the United States; a fact that is quite evident from their ideological statements as well as from their manipulation of detente. Thus, by the acceptance of this weakened posture (as this paper will show), the United States could conceivably be subjected to Soviet nuclear blackmail. The purpose of this paper is to present a realistic appraisal of SALT and detente in light of Soviet ideology.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Mar 01, 1975
Accession Number
ADA071528

Entities

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  • John H. Lobingier

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Cyber
  • Ground and Sea Platforms
  • Space
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Agreements
  • Arms Control
  • Cold War
  • Explosions
  • Foreign Policy
  • Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
  • International Law
  • International Relations
  • Launchers
  • New York
  • Nuclear Explosions
  • Nuclear Weapons
  • Security
  • Space Systems
  • Treaties
  • United States
  • Ussr

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