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
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
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## THESIS

THE INFLUENCE OF MINORITIES  
ON THE SOVIET MILITARY

by

Roger A. Bossart

June 1979

Thesis Advisor:

J. W. Creighton

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The value of this study is to suggest possible Soviet reaction to demographic shifts, effects of growing nationalistic tendencies in the outlying republics, and consequences of dissident action as they might all influence Soviet combat readiness.



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The Influence of Minorities on the Soviet Military

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

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## ABSTRACT

There are changes occurring in the demographic composition of the Soviet population, particularly in the Soviet armed services which could generate significant internal stress and hamper effective and efficient military command and control. The resultant potential consequences could be decreased morale, lack of troop cohesiveness and decreased combat readiness with an overall effect being a decline of the Soviet Union as a world military power.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

The Soviet Union sprawls across eleven time zones, occupies one-sixth of the earth's land surface and contains more than 100 ethnic strains of people. In 1970, twenty-two ethnic groups claimed more than one million members each. It is interesting and appropriate to note that there have been recent changes and new emphasis in Soviet society that reflect prior dormant attitudes of the numerous ethnic and cultural groups. That emphasis is the equality of all people under existing law and in the purest form of Marxist/Leninist philosophy rather than the interpretation of that philosophy under the current regime. A prevailing counter-emphasis, however, is Moscow's continuing policy of Russification of the various national groups, of cultural assimilation toward the creation of a singular "Soviet man", and outright demonstration of individual and group inequalities under existing law as interpreted by the current regime.

Amalrik (1978), states that there are five areas of opposition today in the Soviet Union among both the intellectuals (intelligentsia) and the general populous. First is national opposition, among such nationality (or ethnic/cultural) groups as Lithuanians, Georgians, Jews and Ukrainians whose fundamental goal is to preserve the national culture and customs within each of the social,

regional, or religious groups. Next religious opposition, is one in which there is a sizable population of people who want to profess and propagandize their religion. Statistics reveal that greater than 30 percent of the Soviet population are followers of various religious beliefs. Although the political system (i.e. the Soviet Constitution, Articles 34 and 52, Atch 2) permits freedom of religion, the policy is hardly operationalized. Economic opposition is one which Amalrik perceives as a resistance of the majority of workers to their difficult economic situations which sometimes result in the outbreak of violence. Cultural opposition is a movement conducted primarily by the intellectuals for the purpose of enlarging their freedom of creativity. Some openly challenge the system (the "system" here is defined as the all encompassing government structure under full control of the Communist Party) with resulting consequences of loss of job, lengthy imprisonment, exile, or mysterious disappearance. Others try to enlarge their liberties while staying within the limits of the system. The consequences to this group operating within system constraints is often the same as for the group operating outside the system. Finally, the movement for human rights, emphasizes respect for the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and calls for a protest to the persecution of people for political, religious, social, or philosophical opinions. Respect for the worth of the individual, the belief in an aim that is

above the individual (a belief in certain values outside our own individual experience. Amalrik, suggest that perhaps this is, God) and the freedom of choice, to choose one's fate or destiny, to choose one's own work, political party, where one wants to live and how one wants to live, are the basic principles of the human rights movement. (4)

This thesis maintains that it is significant to consider the cultural opposition and human rights movement not only in the macro-sociopolitical sense, but also in the micro perspective, especially in the Soviet armed forces. It is significant because there is a potential issue developing within the country and within the military organization that has its foundation rooted in cultural and ethnic differentiation which in the broadest sense could impact the whole of Soviet society, or in a more confined and narrow view, affect the morale, cohesiveness and the resultant combat readiness of the Soviet military structure.

This research will substantiate the notion that significant decreases, or at least severe inefficiencies in Soviet combat readiness may be expected in the near future. This idea is predicated on the following evidence. First, because of demographic changes occurring within the Soviet Union, there will be a significant number of non-Russian (minority group nationality) recruits joining the Soviet military arms. These new recruits are expected to have anywhere from little to no ability to communicate effectively in the primary language, Russian. Language, as a significant

component of one's culture with obvious impacts to effective command and control will be used as the cornerstones in discussing future Soviet combat readiness. Building on these cornerstone ideas, however, is the second, more complete subject of cultural oppression and ethnic discrimination as it is manifested today in the Soviet Union.

This paper will consider two separate nationality groups in the USSR, the Ukrainians and Central Asians. Three areas will be explored in each group. Nationalistic movements, in an attempt to preserve cultural heritage and language; the continuing struggle for freedom of expression, civil and political liberty, and the open challenge to the Communist Party based on its professed values, principles and methods of operation. By examining these areas in contemporary Ukrainian and Central Asian society, by assuming that similar actions are occurring to varying degrees in the other 12 Soviet Socialist Republics and by using Leavitt's theory or organization (figure 2) this research will conclude that the young 18 year old recruit who represents a non-Russian, minority nationality group will bring into the military structure from his homeland environment attitudes and feelings of repression and of discrimination against him personally and against his whole set of cultural values and norms. In addition, due to his exposure to various undercurrents of the human rights movement throughout his country, any actions by the military organization that would tend to suppress or retard his concept of human worth

and dignity and his capability for future growth and development would certainly influence his day-to-day peer and superior/subordinate interactions to a point that may severely erode overall cohesion. This would lead eventually to an ineffective or an inefficient readiness posture.

Language differential by itself and its relationship to various dissident activities within the USSR will have a direct impact on the new, multinational cross section of recruits, their peers and superiors, and they in turn should have an impact on the Soviet military's technology, structure, and mission-goals leading finally to a questionable state of morale and combat readiness.

A statement by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs at Columbia University, 1968, is perhaps an appropriate introduction for the following sections of this thesis.

"The Soviet Union is a multinational society. Fifty percent of the Soviet people are non-Russian. Among these, the Ukrainians are the most numerous and potentially the most powerful. It is not inconceivable that in the next several decades, the nationality problem will become politically more important in the Soviet Union than the racial issue has become in the United States. If that happens, it will combine the current quest for freedom of the intellectual community with a greater self-assertiveness of the non-Russian peoples. While

it is impossible to predict where these demands  
may lead, the combination of literary ferment  
and national self-assertion will be a most potent  
one." (11, p.7)

## II. THE ETHNODEMOGRAPHIC DILEMMA OF THE SOVIET UNION

### A. ETHNODEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES

There are changes occurring in the composition of the Soviet population, particularly in the Soviet armed services, which could generate significant internal stress and hamper the future and growth of the Soviet Union as a world military power. The changes that are occurring are in the ethnodemographic orientation of the population.

The dynamics and structure of the population of the USSR show a disparity between the growth rates of the country's "European" (Slavic and Baltic) nationalities and the growth rates of its "non-European" (Transcaucasian and Central Asian) nationalities (figure 1). The current and projected growth rate for the USSR shows an average increase of approximately 1.1% per annum while the growth rate for the republics has risen from 11.5% in 1959, to approximately 17% in 1977 and is estimated to level off at 13-16% by the end of this century. (Appendix A identifies the separate and distinct geographical republics that constitute the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Appendix B maps these regions).

B. IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION GROWTH RATE DIFFERENTIALS  
TO SOVIET SOCIETY AND TO THE SOVIET MILITARY

There are several profound implications which might be derived from this rate differential. First, by the late 1980's and certainly by the year 2000, there will not be enough "European" entrants into the industrial workforce to replace those that are retiring. Complicating this issue, there is substantial evidence that there is no mass migration of "non-Europeans" from rural areas into the cities. The essence of this situation is that in the absence of migration the sizable labor force reservoir lies in Central Asia, which is remote from where most of Soviet industry is now located.

Unless there is a dramatic increase in labor productivity, which is unlikely, the country will either have to shift its industrial inertia eastward toward the semi-developed republics of Central Asia or mobilize the presently non-migratory natives of those republics for work in other regions. Either choice of action will result in significant national changes affecting not only economics and politics but society as well. Industrializing the outer republics, or mobilizing them toward the existing industrial centers could certainly have immediate and perhaps long-lasting ethnic, cultural and organizational effects leading to social evolution or, if dramatic enough, social revolution.

Another implication of the slowdown in growth rate is the conscription of able-bodied males (defined by the Soviets

as 18 year olds) into the armed services (Table 1). There are three points to consider here. First, to maintain existing manning levels considering current/projected retention rates and the current two year/three year service obligation, the Soviets will have to recruit heavily from Central Asia. Second, this particular group is also in demand by the general economy, and projections indicate there will be insufficient able-bodied males to go around if the military maintains current manning levels. Third, the probability of heavy recruitment from Central Asia implies a significant military population of poorly educated, unskilled peasants that have insufficient command of spoken Russian. The potential cultural and racial issues involving these latter variables are the primary issues to be addressed by this research.

This research appears to be somewhat original in approaching some anticipated racial and cultural issues that will confront the Soviet armed services in the approaching decades. Recognized authorities in Soviet affairs predict little likelihood that protests of emergent minority nationalities will rise to unmanageable levels. These authorities feel that future society-wide reactions will be characterized by "more numerous acts of individual and small group terrorism, more massive protest demonstrations and more extensive public dissent. There will be no large communal uprisings or national insurgencies." (6) From this and other such statements, it is inferred that

Western observers should not expect significant societal effects at the macro socioeconomic level. These same authorities, however, do not appear to consider the minority implications at a more micro organizational level, especially within the armed services. This research will illustrate the cause and effect relationships of racial tension and confrontation to Soviet military effectiveness and efficiency and justify the conclusion that protests and demonstrations will in fact be significant at least with respect to military readiness.

Considering the emergence of ethnic or national consciousness, the decreasing population growth rate, military manning levels and general economic and political requirements, the Soviet Union, and especially the Soviet military, can expect racial conflict and confrontation of perhaps extraordinary proportion if they do not develop a healthy organizational climate and an integrated pool of satisfied and motivated human resources.

#### C. DATA: SOURCE AND DERIVATION

All of the population growth rates through 1970 are based on current and corresponding census volumes. All estimates and projections of population demographics were based on data by the Foreign Demographic Analysis Division of the U.S. Census Bureau. Their estimates were based on the age-sex distributions from the 1959 and 1970 censuses

and official figures for total population, births and deaths for the years 1950-74. The projections for the years 1975-2000 were based on the assumption that fertility will decline by seven percent between the years 1975-2000, that mortality will decline by an amount equivalent to an increase in life expectancy at birth of approximately 2.5 years, and that net migration from outer republics will be insignificant.

The actual size of the Soviet armed forces remains a vital question. Table 1, reflects a constant figure of 4.5 million (see note for computing value of column 6, Table 1) obtained from the International Institute for Strategic Studies of London, England. (Estimates range from a low of three million to as high as six million or more). Since the 1950's, the Institute's estimates of manning in the armed services for all countries has been the most authoritative available.

The retention statistic used to build the hypothetical model of available 18 year-olds for the military and for the economy (Table 1) was obtained from an unpublished manuscript entitled, "Soviet Military Compensation and Conscription: An Economic and Statistical Analysis," University of Wisconsin, 1973.

D. AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTIONS AND SOME POSSIBLE SOVIET REACTIONS

By the end of this century, between 20 and 25 percent of the Soviet population and almost 40 percent of its teenagers and young adults will be "non-Europeans" of whom the vast majority will be Central Asians (Table 2). Combined with these data, Table 1 reflects the availability of able-bodied males for conscription into the armed services and the "leftovers" available for the economy. (The ethnodemographic makeup of the Soviet economy is a separate consideration for evaluation beyond this research; however, much of what is evaluated and concluded for the Soviet armed services would be applicable to the general economy).

The fact that by the year 2000, forty percent of the teenagers will be "non-Europeans" with poor command of the Russian language is one issue. (6, p5) What makes this problem so acute now in the Soviet armed forces and perhaps later in resolving the overall labor force composition is the growth of ethnic or national consciousness. The people are developing pride and loyalty to their heritage, to their republic and/or autonomic regions. Attempts at ignoring, not acknowledging and responding, or reducing this consciousness by acculturation and assimilation into the dominantly nationalized, Russified, military structure may well affect discipline, esprit, training, and overall military effectiveness. For example, in fulfilling their service commitments, the new draftees may encounter for

the first time in their lives a living and working relationship with other nationalities. Feelings of inferiority and social isolation to his "European" counterpart may well result from not being able to communicate with poor or non-existent knowledge of Russian. As an additional consequence of the language barrier, the "non-European" recruit will have difficulty in learning military regulations, acquiring a military speciality, and responding to an officer corps made up of primarily the dominant Russian speaking nationality. These feelings of being "second-rate citizens" may well be the catalysts of ineffectiveness and possible confrontations between the "non-European" and "European" nationalities in the near term and may well color individual racial attitudes, on both sides for life. The ultimate and immediate consequence here would be the resulting decrease in cohesiveness one would expect in the armed services in times of crisis. (32, p4)

#### E. THE SOVIET AWARENESS OF LANGUAGE DIFFERENTIALS

Sheehy (1978), put into historical perspective Soviet internationalism with respect to language differentials in the military. "Language was apparently not a major problem in the Red Army during the first two decades subsequent to the Russian Revolution. At that time, many non-Russians served in so-called national military formations, which had come into being during the civil war. In these units, the commands were given in Russian, but mass propaganda

work was conducted in the native language of the majority. The situation changed on March 7, 1938, when the national units were abolished and it was decided that all units should in the future be multinational. Soviet sources imply that this move was part of a reorganization of the armed forces following the adoption of the Soviet Constitution in 1936. The real reason was probably Stalin's doubts about the ultimate loyalty of the national units in face of the growing threat from Nazi Germany. In any event, their abolition took place at the very time when Hitler was in the process of swallowing Austria. Six days later, in a move that ran directly counter to Lenin's view that other nationalities should not be compelled to learn Russian, the teaching of Russian was made mandatory in all non-Russian schools. (Emphasis supplied by this author).

Little more than three years after it had been introduced, the new policy of ethnically-mixed units faced a severe challenge when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in June, 1941. Knowledge of Russian was still extremely limited in certain areas, and in the emergency conditions of wartime, Moscow found itself forced to reestablish the national units, particularly in the Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan. It was, however, mainly those whose Russian was minimal or non-existent who were drafted into the national units, the rest going into ordinary regiments.

The national units did not survive the war and doubts about the loyalty of Soviet citizens following the experiences of World War II, combined with the rise in national consciousness among the non-Russian peoples of the USSR in recent years, effectively preclude the possibility of their ever being revived by the present Soviet Regime.

Today, the Soviet military authorities have a vital stake in the effectiveness of Russian language teaching because of their acute awareness of their policy of universal conscription, a future deficiency of able-bodied recruits, and the trend toward ethnically mixed units. Their campaign to make Russian the "second mother tongue" has involved extending the teaching of Russian even into the kindergartens. The efforts expended in the school system seem not by themselves to have produced the desired results. Sheehy, continues to examine the Soviet effort outside the school system.

"Efforts to remedy conscripts' lack of Russian have not been confined to the school system. The resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council

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**NOTE:** Emphasis supplied by this author is based on Sheehy's historical data that during the war over a million Soviet citizens, both Russian and non-Russian, who were taken prisoner, deserted or found themselves under enemy occupation, enlisted for various reasons in military formations of the Whermacht. Perhaps one reason for the cross-over of loyalty was due to cultural and ethnic discrimination, and in general lack of perceived level of necessary civil liberty.

of Ministers of July 20, 1964, "On Measures for Further Improving the Preparation of Young People of pre-Draft and Draft Age for Service in the Armed Forces of the USSR" called on the Union republics not only to improve the teaching of Russian in non-Russian schools but also to offer the utmost assistance to those of pre-draft age with a poor knowledge of Russian by organizing circles, seminars and tutoring facilities for the study of Russian at their places of work.

Eleven years later, a resolution of the Uzbek Central Committee on the teaching of Russian recommended that short Russian language courses be organized for those of pre-draft age. In 1972, the Ministry of Defense itself took steps to improve the Russian of serving soldiers by publishing a Russian primer "for soldiers with very little or no knowledge of Russian." This aimed to provide the minimum needed to understand commands and orders and the expressions most commonly used in military life, and to read and conduct simple conversations in Russian. At the same time or earlier, groups were organized in units to study Russian for one or two hours daily, and Komsomol activists were detailed to assist individual soldiers whose Russian was weak.

To judge by the state of affairs described in the latest issue of Russky yazyk v natsional'noi shkole, Abuzyarov indicates that neither of these efforts nor the measures taken in schools have as yet borne much fruit.

Abuzyrov, bases his findings on: the answers to questionnaires filled in by army officers and officials of military enlistment and registration offices; the personal observations of a member of the institute's staff during his own period of military service in 1975-76; and tests of the vocabulary and comprehension of draftees from remote villages in Ural'sk Oblast and of soldiers with secondary education after three, six, and twelve months service. His findings indicate that the Russian of some draftees is at best rudimentary, that it improves little, if at all, in the forces, and that this state of affairs certainly does not improve morale. Sheehy quotes Abuzyarov:

"The study showed that graduates of national schools that lacked a Russian language environment enter the army with inadequate linguistic preparation. Most of them are not always able to name such simple words as rank", "column", and "right marker", which are frequently encountered in the elementary training handbook. Given ten words encountered in the elementary military training handbook, each of the raw recruits composed sentences averaging two or three words, but not always correctly.

Servicemen were also found to have insufficient comprehension of such words and phrases as "oath", "obey unquestioningly", and "honorable duty". Having learnt certain articles of regulations by heart, soldiers in their first year of service cannot always explain a given point of an article. Typical of the mistakes such servicemen make: "Guard commander, stand fast; remainder, advance!" instead of "Guard Commander, advance; remainder, stand fast!". It takes a long time before graduates of national schools can be given responsible assignments and as time goes on there is a tendency to try and push them into ancillary units.

This is bound to affect the morale of servicemen; poor knowledge of Russian often leads to depression and sometimes engenders a negative attitude towards military service."

Indeed, one can expect somewhat dramatic organizational consequences to language barriers in such obvious areas as communication (i.e. the time involved from the issuance of an order or directive to its accurate execution), problem solving and decision making. One might also speculate on more subtle organizational issues such as peer relationships, team emphasis, team coordination, work facilitation, support, supervisory/subordinate relationships, personal development and growth, and overall individual satisfaction to his work. Combine these feelings with an external environment that is beginning to emphasize the issue of human rights, cultural heritage, and full self-expression of beliefs and values, and a volatile situation could be created.

Sheehy, thoroughly summarizes the issue of language differentials, mixed ethnic military units, and minority discrimination. "The effect of demographic developments on the ethnic composition of the draft is aggravated by the fact that it is precisely among those nationalities who are providing an ever increasing proportion of draftees that knowledge of Russian tends to be least adequate. An analysis of the 1970 census data for various age groups shows that at that time only 24 percent of Georgians, 28 percent of Azerbaijani, and between 30 and 35 percent

of Uzbeks, Turkmans, and Tajiks in the 16-19 age group claimed a good knowledge of Russian. It is true that these findings include both sexes, that many more may have had some knowledge of Russian, and that Soviet ethnographers have maintained that knowledge of Russian among at least some of the non-Russian nationalities is greater than the census data would suggest. Even so, it is clear that the number of draftees who start their military service without adequate Russian must be considerable."

#### F. WHAT LIES AHEAD

Demographic statistics of current and projected manpower resources for the Soviet economy and armed forces clearly show a deficiency in available 18 year olds, at least from the "European" republics with Russian speaking ability. To fulfill future military manning requirements, and perhaps overall civilian economic requirements, the Soviet Union will probably recruit great numbers of non-Russian speaking men and women into service of their country.

It is perhaps appropriate to introduce Leavitt's theory of organization to gain a perspective on the interrelationships between an organization's task and goals, its structure, its technology and its people (figure 3), as theory is applied to the situation that is beginning to exist in the Soviet Union.

Affecting all of these organizational mechanisms is the environment in which the organization exists. A modification is added to Leavitt's model by creating the additional dimension of, output, or in the case of the military, combat readiness.

If one considers the effects of a dominant, language-peculiar hierarchy of authority (i.e. the Soviet officer corps and senior enlisted) in control of a subordinate force made up of people with varying degrees of inability to communicate in the "power language" and living in an environment that is beginning to stress an importance on human rights and cultural heritage, several dynamic and profound impacts may be felt in the area of organizational structure and combat readiness. For example, without a common language base the volumes of military rules, regulations, technical publications, strategies and Party doctrine and propaganda efforts, may have to be translated into numerous languages and dialects. There would perhaps be a requirement to completely reorganize the military's operational and administrative hierarchial structure to accomodate the new majority, i.e. a return to military federalism. The idea is suggested even though it is apparently threatening to the centralization of Party power politics by the current administration. Because of the two to three year active duty service commitment combined with a current 75 percent attrition rate, more new people will constantly be in the basic and skill training

pipeline. Another potential complication considering this issue might be a commensurately longer time allocated for such orientation and indoctrination because of more time required by the recruit to read, translate and absorb the new materials.

Of equal, or perhaps greater concern is the affect of people, these minority nationalities, on the Soviet military organization. A new recruit living in a foreign culture, surrounded by extremes in authority and discipline, not being able to fully understand all the subtleties in communication, unable to express himself, and experiencing various forms and degrees of ethnic and cultural discrimination, may be expected to demonstrate a wide range of psychological and emotional mal-adjustments, resulting in overall organizational inefficiency and ineffectiveness. One would expect for example a Central Asian to have low morale, little motivation (intrinsic at least), little team coordination, poor peer relationships, and his individual needs greatly conflicting with organizational needs. He perhaps would also experience little job satisfaction, have little opportunity for personal growth and development, have poor promotion potential, and might even experience disproportionate punishment or reprimands, all resulting from his new military relationships, his inability to fully communicate, and his being a product of a different environment.

These emotional or psychological feelings have a great potential to be operationalized especially when one considers the envelop of "environment" (figure 3). Considering the dissident movement in the Soviet Union that campaigns for civil, political and overall human rights, the growing nationalistic consciousness in the outlying republics and their emphasis on cultural and ethnic autonomy, future growth and development, what might happen if the traditional military structure attempts to acculturate and Russify their new recruits, under traditional means when this population of human beings represents almost 50 percent of the entire force and thinks in terms of civil rights, cultural freedom and full self-expression?

Russification of nationalities in a macroperspective will be examined in the next section by drawing on the Hungarian Revolution and the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Moscow's invasion of human rights and resultant national discord will also be examined in Chapter three by studying the Ukraine and Central Asian regions of the Soviet Union.

### III. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

"History always brings things into clear waters...experiments with the undercutting of roots, experiments with the silencing and intimidation are unfit and historically irresponsible."

V. Chornovil

#### A. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PEOPLE AND NATIONS

"One of the most significant gains of socialism is the solution of the nationality problem in the USSR. The first step in this direction was the establishment of legal equality of all nations, nationalities and ethnic groups inhabiting the country. On November 15, 1917, the Soviet Government adopted a "Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia". It declared the basic principles of the national policy of the first socialist state - equality and sovereignty of the nations, their right to free self-determination to the point of seceding and forming independent states, abolition of all national and national-religious privileges and restrictions, and free development of the national minorities and groups.

The right of nations to self-determination established for the first time in history, a fundamentally new type of relations between nationalities based on equality, friendship and fraternal cooperation of all nations and nationalities." (40)

The principles of fraternal friendship and cooperation, of equality and sovereignty of nations and free development of national minorities and ethnic groups are but a few of the ideologies expressed by V.I. Lenin and reflected in the Soviet Constitution of 1924. The new constitution (1977) defines the USSR as "an integral, federal, multi-national state formed on the principle of socialist federalism as a result of the free self determination of nations and the voluntary association of equal republics". The new constitution continues to reflect appropriate Marxist/Leninist doctrine and considerably extends the sovereign rights of the Union Republics and strengthens their guarantee to exercise those rights. For example, the 1977 constitution permits any republic to retain the right of free secession from the USSR, and to have their own constitution, corresponding to the Constitution of the USSR. They have the right to ensure comprehensive economic and social development, enter into relations with foreign states, and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives (Atch 2).

It is the existence of these individual rights and freedoms and their outright, flagrant violations by various levels of Soviet Government, especially the enforcement arm of the state, the KGB and the court system, that provide a causal relationship and catalytic force to the human rights movement within the Soviet Republics. Further, the emphasis on human rights, on an individual's civil and political liberty and on the growth and development of

national cultural heritage and traditions are the environmental factors which help develop the basic notion that all of this could lead to a Soviet version of the Kitty Hawk/Constellation incidents, isolated to a company or brigade level or perhaps contribute to the overall demise of troop cohesion, combat readiness and overall status of world Soviet military power.

This chapter will discuss some contemporary minority discrimination issues within Soviet society which are assumed to be pervasive in the military structure also. Specifically this chapter will emphasize the Kremlin's attitude and philosophy towards two significant populations, the Ukrainians and Central Asians, and, on historical incidents, primarily the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, that will confirm the suspicion that the Soviet bureaucracy does not practice exactly what it preaches. It will show that this dichotomy of policy versus action-performance is actually responded to and manifested not only in dissident action, but even in the behavior of the Slavic soldier as was demonstrated during the Czech invasion.

Before exploring the activities and events in section C, the next section will introduce the thought and evolution of discrimination in America and parallels in the Soviet Union.

B. DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA AND THE SOVIET UNION:  
A COMPARISON

Ethnic discrimination can be avoided in societies if the oppressed acquiesce in their status, if the oppressors go about the business of oppression with untroubled conscience, and if the techniques and institutions of oppression function efficiently. However, let the exploited no longer accept their lot as legitimate or unalterable, let the powerholding elite no longer affirm the legitimacy of discrimination, or let the machinery of suppressing discontent become inefficient and a societal reaction results that has the potential of permeating throughout all economic, cultural and political institutions and processes. (20)

The black-white conflict in the United States is an example of this process in action. Blacks have no longer accepted low economic, social and political status and limited opportunities for personal growth and development. Their resistance has therefore brought to an end the apparent equilibrium between those subject to repression and those imposing it. The result has been social conflict manifesting itself in incidents ranging from slum riots, black revolutionary groups and voter registration drives in the South to struggle over community control of schools in the North, Black Studies programs in many schools, and more pressures for ethnic quotas in business,

industry and military establishments. The affirmative action programs are examples.

To a degree, there is a parallel between the Black movement in America and the dissident reaction in the Soviet Union with respect to the dichotomy between cultural values and actual practices of discrimination and repression. The Constitution of the United States affirms and promises equality of opportunity for all, when in fact until the early 1960s, it permitted federal, state and local bureaucracies to commit flagrant violations towards Blacks of this most basic American cultural value. The Soviet Constitution also mandates such cultural value by clearly stating the "citizens of the USSR are equal before law, regardless of their origin, social status and property, nationality and race, sex, education, language, attitude toward religion...or other particulars" (Article 34). As will be shown, however, there is a glaring discrepancy between constitutional guarantee and practice in the Soviet Union, as there was in America. When there is such conflict between the ideal and the actual conditions, the difference has a great tendency to undermine the authenticity of the entire value system and the social and political institutions supposedly based on it.

#### C. REPRESSION IN UKRAINE

In the Soviet Union there is no group comparable in accumulated disadvantage as the Black American and no long

standing victimization of any ethnic group on the same scale. There are however, numerous examples of minority discrimination. For example, the government demands unconditional loyalty toward the Union and the slightest tendency toward nationalistic self-assertion or even consciousness is viewed and treated with much severity. Also, Russian peoples are encouraged to move into non-Russian republics or autonomous territories to "improve the overall state of social and political affairs". The result, however, is disharmony and ethnic imbalance. Perhaps one of the most significant examples of Soviet discrimination of a particular nationality group is the attitude and treatment of the people in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The Ukrainian population of the Soviet Union numbers some forty million; of these about thirty million reside in the geographical area of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Like the citizens of other Soviet Republics, the people of the Ukraine are guaranteed by Article 50 of the Soviet Constitution freedom of speech, press, assembly, meetings, street processions and demonstrations. In the 1960's however, numerous Ukrainian intellectuals suspected of concern with the future interests of Ukrainian cultural and ethnic identity were subjected to various forms of punishment. Since then it has been demonstrated time and time again that the political authorities in Moscow and in Kiev, the capital of the Ukrainian Republic, do not

fully share the same perspectives on cultural and political life in Ukraine today which guide the actions of writers, journalists, teachers and scientists. Government harassment has taken the form of house searches, threats, interrogations, official propaganda campaigns against "bourgeois nationalism", secret and semisecret trials and sentences to corrective labor camps located on the territory of the Russian, rather than the Ukrainian Republic (emphasis by V. Chornovil).

Chornovil notes that "whenever someone criticizes the current nationality policy for its deviation from Lenin's standards (even if erroneously), he is fully entitled to do so by the Constitution of the USSR. On the strength of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR, however, this person can and is often banished to a hard labor camp because his criticism may be interpreted as 'propaganda for the purpose of undermining or weakening the Soviet rule' (although in actual fact, the moral health of this very rule is at stake)."

Fredrick Barghoorn of Yale University notes that the dissident Ukrainian intellectuals defend their actions not in terms of "bourgeois" principles but in terms of Leninism and the Soviet Constitution. The dissidents argue that both the laws and the procedures employed against them by the KGB and the courts violate what they perceive as Lenin's conception of the rights of all people to cultural freedom and civil liberties.

It appears that the Ukrainian intellectuals have a three fold purpose in their dissident effort. The central feature of their movement is to preserve the Ukrainian culture heritage and language (e.g. Dissenting Ukrainian intellectuals have identified the unequal and limited opportunities for Ukrainian children to study their own language, to the declining number of Ukrainian schools, and to the relegation of the Ukrainian language to a secondary position in higher education. (20, p346) In addition, their struggle is a contribution to the nationwide fight for freedom of expression and civil rights, and a challenge to the system based on its professed values, principles and actions.

Barghoorn, in his prefacing remarks to The Chornovil Papers, makes several interesting comments that relate to Leavitt's diamond (figure 3), specifically the affects of the environment (government) on the organization (society). "The rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution are nullified by some of the most basic facts of Soviet political life. Although on paper the Soviet Union is a federal state, in practice it is a rigidly centralized dictatorship, in which control is exercised by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, a national rather than a federative organization, with headquarters in Moscow." Specifically regarding the treatment of the various national groups, ". . . in the post-Stalin era, up to about 1958, Moscow's controls over the non-Russian nationalities were

relaxed. There was a resurgence of use of the native languages in education and administration. However, in 1958-59, Russification policies were again accelerated in the schools and political leaders who had apparently opposed such policies and generally sought to champion minority interests against Moscow were removed from office. The program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, adopted in 1961, promised the continued economic and cultural development of all peoples of the Soviet Union. However, it seemed to strike a centralist, anti-pluralist note, especially in its statement that the boundaries between the constituent republics were increasingly losing their former significance and its emphasis upon the significance for all of the Soviet peoples of Russian language and culture." (11, pXVI)

Chornovil, thoroughly reviews and examines his and other Ukrainian dissident efforts and government reactions from data accumulated a decade ago. Discrimination goes on today such as in the case of Yosyp Terelya, a 34 year old dissident poet whom Anderson describes as a Ukrainian, proud of his culture and traditions and as a devout member of the Ukrainian Uniate Church which places God as head of the state. The biographical sketch continues by detailing

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NOTE: The Uniate Church is an Eastern Rite Catholic Church which is differentiated from the orthodox church in that it recognizes the Pope as the head of the church.

Terelya's imprisonment that occurred as a result of his advocacy of an individual's worth and dignity and expressing the growing sentiments of Ukrainian nationalism. (5)

Another example of discrimination and feelings of nationalism is the case of General Samuel A. Jaskilka, former assistant commandant of the United States Marine Corps. Jaskilka, though not exactly a Ukrainian dissenter, has a Ukrainian heritage and implies that there is a significant division among the peoples of the Soviet Union, based on a growing national consciousness in the various republics. The anecdotal evidence is said to have originated in a Washington meeting between Jaskilka and a Soviet official, Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin. The General's point during the ensuing conversation was that if you go to Lithuania or Estonia or a "hundred places and ask a man or woman what they are, they won't tell you they are Russian." (38) Jaskilka, Terelya, Chornovil and others emphasize that efforts at nationalistic discrimination and repression of cultural heritage and tradition through programs of Russification of the republics is viewed as an infringement upon civil rights and the freedom of full self expression.

Chornovil, reflecting on the human rights movement in Ukraine, and perhaps the entire country, asks a rhetorical question of the reader. "Is it possible that non-Marxists have absorbed better than our leaders the Marxist-Leninist thesis that revolutions and social-economic changes are

not exported, that an idea can be implanted on new soil only when all the social, economic and political prerequisites are completely ripe for it, and that to forbid the spreading of ideas is to increase their strength and attractiveness?"

What additional momentum might be expected in the socio-political environment of the country if the government continues to stifle a perhaps growing nationalistic and human rights emphasis? The same question may be asked considering the affect of such movements and such repressive government reactions on the future effectiveness and cohesiveness of the Soviet Armed Forces. One would expect the non-Russian recruit to bring into his new work and new associations a belief and value system that was a product of his former environment. A continued policy of in-service Russification, of cultural repression and ethnic discrimination in a force composition representing a near 40 percent minority cross section could well lead to a troubled and volatile situation.

"History has more than once refuted the Jesuit principle of, 'the end justifying the means'. The most equitable society cannot be built by terror and suppression of people's civil impulses. The dialectics of history are implacable; improper means distort the end, and the result that is achieved becomes only a rachitic shadow of the intended."

V. Chornovil

#### D. MOSCOW ATTITUDE TOWARD CENTRAL ASIANS

"The ability to communicate is not a linguistic matter entirely. Communication by words depends to a great degree on common language, but many other factors are involved. Two dialects of the same language may be mutually incomprehensible, depending on social, political and historical factors.

Russian is the first language of Kazakhstan and in every case it is the second language of each of the non-Russian nationalities of Central Asia . . . there is little doubt that political considerations have supervened in the division of Central Asia into nationalities each with separate republics and languages." (22, p.46)

Language differential is again used as the foundation for identifying a more inclusive and comprehensive social reaction to political, cultural and ethnic discrimination within the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union.

The national groups in the Central Asian bloc are the Kazakh, Turkmen, Uzbek, Kirgiz and Tadzhik Soviet Socialist Republics. They constitute a population of Soviet citizens that has accepted and benefited from government collectivization of agriculture, greater industrialization and standard of living benefits, but they have in the past and continue today to resist acquiring a complete and true Soviet cultural perspective. Their attitudes and behaviors are still strongly influenced by years of tradition and heritage,

and their social and cultural estrangement from the Russians has even been accompanied by a new (or renewed sense of hostility) toward other asian groups. (19, p.274)

Bacon (1966) concludes that although great changes have occurred in Central Asian cultures within the last century, the Central Asian peoples have not lost their sense of ethnic identity, nor are they likely to become merged with the Russian people. "There has been an evolution of the traditional cultures, with selective borrowings of new elements and modifications congenial to the traditional patterns and interests of the area." (7)

Harnstone (1970) clearly indicates that the "new Soviet Tadzik" (or perhaps Uzbek, Kirgiz, Kazakh, Turkmen, or any nationality group) has begun to emerge within the culturally aware elite, but differs greatly from the "Homo Sovieticus" of Lenin's dream. His loyalty to the All-Union goals is weakened by his sense of separate identity (emphasis by author) which also makes him feel different from his brothers in other parts of the USSR . . . and, as far as Russification and the degree of acculturation is concerned, the price is usually alienation from the traditional community.

The people of Central Asia do not have ownership i.e. the need, want or understanding, of the belief and value system imposed on them by Moscow. They don't have ownership of the Russification idea and they can't identify with the system, its content or its processes. If a

planned change effort is to ever be successful the client system, in this case the Central Asians, must develop internally the concept of ownership of the planned change, i.e. Moscow's attempts at Russification. They have however, accepted and adapted to Soviet policy, rules and regulations. They support projects that benefit them, but passively resist those that impose on their well-being or elude their comprehension. Bacon, further elaborates on Central Asian acquiescence to "European" demands: "they have been selective in their borrowings of new elements and have modified these to fit into their own way of thinking and behaving. Such proffered elements as do not fit into their own patterns are rejected. They have learned to follow quietly their own cultural inclinations despite legal enactments and urging of agitators. What is perhaps genuine contempt is veiled by an appearance of outward submission that somehow suggests inner awareness of a culture and an outlook on life vastly older than that of the Soviets."

Further complicating a growing national separatism with respect to Central Asia is the idea of centralized decision making in Moscow. It is the Russians who dominate the decision making bodies of the CPSU and All Union government, and it is primarily the Russians who represent the central Party and government apparatus in the borderlands. Local resentment of centrally determined policies and resource allocation, and for the proverbial All Union disregard for

local needs, requirements, and aspirations blend with elements of ethnic hatred and cultural alienation that perhaps may create a volatile social condition.

What does Moscow think about the Central Asians? Harnstone, believes that the Soviets consider the socialization process (Russification) to be a failure. "It has not succeeded in transforming them into model Soviet men, i.e. it has not made them into good Russians." (19, p.289) One could conclude, therefore that there would be little transfer of economic or political power from Russian to Central Asian hands even within the Party structure because locally determined criteria would certainly take precedence over All Union ones as guidelines in local decision making, and Moscow would experience a perceived or real loss of control over critical borderland republics.

It is the subtle resistance of the people in Central Asia to further Russification efforts and their hostility towards centralized social, economic and political decision making that will perhaps provide an explosive environment to organizational (military) effectiveness and efficiency.

Returning again to Leavitt's diamond, one might expect that the Central Asian recruit's external environment, opposition to cultural oppression, a belief and value system towards Russians which is neither supportive or trusting, plus effects of the recruit's internal environment, i.e. cultural and ethnic hatred and discrimination not only between Russians and Central Asians, but among

the Central Asians themselves in the company, batallion or regiment could result in an action or reaction by the "people" part of the diamond which could affect either in the short or long term, Soviet combat readiness.

"Today in Central Asia there is a new sense of narodnost' identity. (Narodnost' is usually translated as "nationality" meaning an ethnic group, such as Uzbek, Turkoman, or Takzhik), and during the more than forty years of Soviet rule, there has been a drawing together (sblizhnost') of subgroups to create some feeling of nationality. There has been little sblizhnost' between Central Asians and Russians." (19)

#### E. THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

"Our aim is freedom of the individual, sovereignty of the nation and democratic socialism."

the Czech poet, Jaroslav Seifert

Prior to 1968, Czechoslovakia was attempting a major change in the social and political processes of Communism that had evolved under Stalin. Specifically, the country was attempting to create "a socialism with a human face" or in the words of Dubcek (the First Secretary of the Czech Communist Party), "to Humanize Marxism."

The objectives of the Dubcek regime prior to August 20, 1968 were to achieve new levels of personal justice and national freedom, to eliminate national, social and political suppression, to grant the right of dissent, to

promote an unhampered flow of ideas and to create the capability of each national party to make its own decisions.

This particular chapter of history, the build-up and final Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which was designed to quell Dubcek's reforms, is included in this analysis of Soviet discrimination of non-Russian nationalities because it clearly represents one country's reaction to national, economic, and cultural oppression and an overall movement to encourage and develop basic human rights. The philosophy of humanizing, liberalizing, democratizing and nationalizing socialism under the Dubcek regime closely parallels the prevailing dissident movement today within the boundaries of the USSR, and summarizes some of the feelings and attitudes toward Russification as demonstrated by the various nationality groups in the outlying republics.

This section will briefly review three attempts at "humanizing" Communism with emphasis on the causal effects of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

There was much happening in the Soviet sphere of influence in the post-Stalin era, mostly in the concern for humanizing Marxism. In 1957, Bulgaria, the most "reliable" of satellite countries, experienced a writer's revolt where the theme of protest was freedom of expression surrounding cultural heritage and tradition. In 1956, the Hungarians finally revolted against their great and prolonged personal insecurity, affronts to individual dignity and self respect and humiliation of their national ego. The Hungarians wanted

to eliminate entrenched Communist leadership, to introduce greater freedom and democratic practices, to assure greater legal protection against arbitrary persecution and to create a political instrument that would draw the population together in the management of its own affairs. In October, 1957, Moscow sent troops to bring order and control the revolution. After several weeks of confusion and dying, the fighting was over and Hungary was poorer not only by her dead, but also by 160,000 refugees, mainly students and workers who had fled the country. The dictatorship of the Communist Party was re-established and all gains of the revolution were liquidated, one-by-one.

Hungary was striving for national independence, social emancipation and political democracy in 1956. Czechoslovakia had the same goals and objectives in 1968.

In 1962, the Czech government began hearing demands from intellectuals and young Communists to bring Czechoslovakia out of the ideological ice age. They wanted and demanded intellectual and political freedom. In the economic arena, there was worker dissatisfaction and confusion which brought industrial labor productivity down. In agriculture, production fell, shortages grew and inflationary pressures developed. By 1963, the political, ideological, intellectual and economic problems escalated and escaped control of Novotny's regime. According to the Czech writer, Novemesky, "the people had no trust, confidence, understanding or loyalty." Then the call came

from Communists, rather than anti-Communists, seeking to reform the Party back to Marxism and Leninism.

The fundamental split between orthodox Stalinist interpreters of Marxism-Leninism and the new generation of socialists was the definition of justice and freedom and the concepts of the right to dissent, the unhampered flow of ideas and the capability of each national party to make its own decisions. How similar this is to today's attitudes in Ukraine and the Central Asian Republics.

Under Dubcek, Czechoslovakia began a process of intellectual, ideological, spiritual and human evolution that gradually led him along the path of "humanizing Marxism." The people and the government attempted to synthesize socialist concepts of social economic justice with the West's traditions of political, cultural and scientific freedom. Dubcek maintained he was working towards socialism "with a human face" under the purest form of Marx and Lenin ideology. Brezhnev, however, thought Dubcek's actions were "socialist treason."

On 20 August 1968, Soviet, Polish, East German, Hungarian and Bulgarian troops crossed the Czech border to put an end to "dissident foolishness." Several interesting things then evolved.

We know in general terms that deep dissension had arisen within the Soviet establishment over the manner in which the Czech problem had been handled. Many diplomats in Moscow believed that Red Army leaders were sympathetic to the Czech

cause and were therefore reluctant to order their troops to open fire. The point to be made here is that there appeared to be feelings, however small within the Soviet Army, for the concerns over human rights and civil liberties over oppressed minorities. If this was the case, how effective would such an invasion be tomorrow with a Soviet Army made up of 40-50 percent cultural and ethnic minorities that were striving in their homelands for the same freedoms as their "enemies?"

The most powerful and emotional reaction against the invasion came from Communists of all persuasions. For example, the Czech cause won support from the powerful Italian Communist Party, the largest in Western Europe. The British, Swiss, Belgian and Scandinavian parties joined in denunciation of the invasion, and the big French Party was rocked by its greatest internal crisis to date when it forced thru a resolution condemning the attack. This consistency of denunciation seems to indicate that international Party philosophy toward satisfying human needs and nationalistic goals within the constraints of Marx/Lenin ideology, is inconsistent with the prevailing attitudes and concepts in Moscow. Again, presupposing that this is the case, how might another country's political, social and overall nationalistic efforts influence Ukrain, Uzbek, or Azerbaijan Republics attempts at political autonomy and emphasis on national and individual growth and development?

Two years after the invasion the Czech defiance of Soviet dictates, a return to political, economic and cultural oppression, had not ended. And today, "the spirit of the Prague Spring is far from dead and the Soviet Union has been unable to solve the fundamental problem it faces not only in Czechoslovakia but in all of Eastern Europe." (35, p.383)

#### F. SUMMARY

From the preceding review of contemporary economic, political, and social repression in the second largest Soviet Republic (the Ukraine) and the review of Moscow's Russification efforts and attitudes in the Central Asia Republics it becomes apparent that given a population growth rate differential, especially in the 18 year old age group, the Soviet military will perhaps experience a mighty task in organizing, educating and training a force composition of nearly one half ethnic and cultural minorities. The task of building and sustaining high levels of combat readiness begins to appear insurmountable when one considers not only the obvious language barrier in the organizational structure, but also the prevailing attitudes, beliefs and value systems brought into the organization by the new recruit from his environment, i.e., his homeland's attempts at nationalism, emphasis on cultural tradition and new freedoms for the individual, for groups and for the whole of society.

Compounding the problem of building and sustaining high levels of combat readiness to repel aggression on the international scene, Moscow must also consider the traditional role of the army to suppress internal unrest. It would seem apparent that as the country's ethnic composition changes, the army's reliability as a domestic police force will perhaps diminish. Consider an internal policing action with objectives similar to the Czech invasion. With large numbers of non-Europeans in high priority units, language differentials and an undercurrent flow of the idea of basic human rights for all, one might expect an inevitable decline in a unit's efficiency with ethnic rivalry among soldiers taking its toll. It is extremely doubtful that a multi-ethnic unit would be quite as enthusiastic as a wholly Russian unit about say, firing on a group of Armenian student demonstrators.

The next section will summarize affects of regional population growth rate differentials with respect to the composition and anticipated effectiveness, using traditional management and organizational style, of the Soviet Armed Forces.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

"The Soviet Armed Forces vividly express the indivisible unity of the working people, the brotherhood of nations achieved in the USSR and the atmosphere of friendship and cooperation reigning in the country. The servicemen are proud of the achievements of their Motherland and realizing their high responsibility for its defense against aggressors they persistently improve their skill and increase the combat readiness of units and subunits. Constant strengthening of ties with the people is the most important feature in the development and perfection of an army of a socialist state. The very existence of the Soviet Army, which under the leadership of the Communist Party draws its strength from the people, is impossible without vital and unbreakable connection and unity with the working people."

Colonel N. Sedov  
Soviet Army

##### A. THE POTENTIAL FOR SIGNIFICANT MINORITY DISCRIMINATION IN THE SOVIET MILITARY

The analysis behind the demographic changes confronting the Soviet Union thru the end of this century seem to indicate an environment, particularly in the Soviet Armed Forces, that is exactly opposite from the words expressed by Colonel Sedov. That is, as Moscow and the Communist Party continue to repress the republics' moves at nationalistic attempts, to infringe on the personal rights and freedoms of the numerous cultural and ethnic groups, and to perpetuate attempts at country-wide Russification, there appears to be less and less brotherhood among the nations and very little real friendship, trust, loyalty and cooperation among the Soviet people.

In the light of anticipated population growth rate differentials, especially the increases expected in the non-European republics, the CPSU, it would seem, should understand, then operationalize a better response to the cultural demands of its people. Does the Soviet Government expect that continued policies aimed at acculturating her republics toward more Russian-like values and norms will solve or even ameliorate the future cultural and ethnic differences? Do the Soviets realize that culture refers to the cumulative deposit of a peoples knowledge, experience, meanings, beliefs, attitudes, religion, hierarchies of status and concepts of self? Do they realize that culture manifests itself not only in patterns of language and thought, but in forms of activity and behavior, and that these patterns become models for common adaptive acts and styles of expressive behavior? It would appear that they don't have a realistic concept of culture and cannot appreciate the difficulties of intercultural communication. Further, it would seem that continued attempts to rely on the strength of the political system and Communist ideology, as it is currently interpreted, cannot force or even subtly convince a nation and its people to give up years of heritage, tradition, custom, values and norms. Amalrik, points out that Soviet leaders must realize that the various nationality groups are striving to preserve their national culture and customs within the range of the existing system. They are also concerned with enlarging

their freedom of creativity and full self-expression and actively seek to prevent further persecution of people for political, religious, social or philosophical opinions. Continued efforts of national, group and individual persecution and overall attempts at minority Russification will perhaps have short term societal affects with current population distribution patterns and most certainly have widespread undesirable consequences in future distribution trends, especially in the Soviet military.

#### B. WHAT CAN WE PREDICT MIGHT HAPPEN?

Based strictly on the number of available 18 year olds, the percentage of military recruits who are non-Europeans will rise to nearly 30-40 percent by the year 2000. The proportion of non-Europeans may be even higher if, as expected, labor shortages in the general economy force Moscow to exempt many draft age Russians from military service. In any case, it will be just about impossible for the army to continue its present practice of assigning non-Europeans to low priority units (e.g. transportation, supply, construction) and packing the high priority units (e.g. Strategic Rocket Forces) with Europeans. If permitted such assignment policies would create ethnically mixed units that would experience not only language differentials and inefficiencies, but also import from the external environment feelings and actual actions of ethnic

discrimination and hatred. Inadequacies in unit efficiency, morale, team effort and cohesion may be predicted, even expected.

The Soviets could take other steps to ameliorate their problems. Among these are increasing the use of women, a possible reduction in the size of the rear service and support units, decreasing the size of their armed forces, increasing the period of service obligation or improving retention statistics. Except for the decision to decrease the size of the military organization, these steps are anticipated to have only marginal impact. Except in Central Asian republics, women are currently fully employed in the civilian economy and would not be available in large numbers. A decrease in the size of the rear services and support units can only be accomplished by an increase in efficiency to a level for which the Soviet system is not known. Increasing the service time will produce short term, positive increases in enlisted capability, but by no means compensate for the quantitative/qualitative decline in manpower or keep pace with the rapid modernization of equipment.

C. SOVIET MINORITY DISCRIMINATION: ITS IMPACT FOR THE WEST AND THIRD WORLD POWERS

Recognizing weakness in Soviet military response due to the effects of minority dissent and majority reaction has certain implications for the West. In long range strategic

and tactical planning obvious military advantage can be obtained by capitalizing on the potential issues of distrust, lack of group cohesiveness, ineffective and inaccurate communication and poor training resulting from racial tension and conflict. One might expect considerable restructuring of existing military districts, attempts at returning to military federalism, antagonistic political pressures, the genesis of human resource development programs and perhaps large capital outlays in new or reprioritized national budgets.

Additionally, world position and respect of the Soviet Union may be challenged by those non-Western countries whose populations have strong ethnic affinities with resistive nationalities in the USSR. Those countries would include Rumania (Moldavians), Iran (Tadzhiks and Azerbaijanians), and Turkey (Meskhetian Turks and the entire Soviet Turkic population).

Military protest demonstration would also discredit the Soviet model of international integration everywhere in the Third World and would undermine the regime's credibility as a spokesman for the oppressed nationalities in non-communist countries.

#### D. HOW ALL OF THIS GOT STARTED

Lenin suspected that in the long run Communism would prove out to be a stronger force than nationalism. He

disagreed with many of his fellow Bolsheviks, who argued that nationalist sentiments must be crushed by force. Instead, Lenin insisted that the state should "not permit the overriding of any one nationality by another either in any particular region or in any branch of public affairs." He argued that education was the key, that the sooner the Soviet Union's non-Russians became literate, the sooner local loyalties would give way to the creation of a new multinational species called "Soviet man." So, Lenin endorsed the use of native languages as the most rapid means of achieving literacy - fluency in Russian could wait.

Lenin, miscalculated however. His policy has not led to a Soviet man; instead it triggered a renaissance of national cultures throughout the Soviet Union - language, literature even ethnic awareness. The more that the national groups learn about their own cultures, the less they like the idea of the Russians controlling their homelands.

#### E. HOW MIGHT ALL OF THIS END?

The implications of a language barrier and other forms of cultural and ethnic oppression that exist now and the magnitude of those differences projected for the future will certainly tax the imagination, the creative, intellectual, and budgetary abilities of the Soviet Government, military

authorities, sociologists and any disciplines schooled in human resource management and development, if there are any. Suffice it to say that significant leadership and management problems will surely arise, coupled with an overall decrease in military effectiveness if this situation is allowed to develop unchecked, or if it is poorly managed.

"MILITARY SERVICE AND SERVICEMEN'S RIGHTS

Colonel N Vladimrsky

In accordance with the USSR Constitution and USSR Law on Universal Military Service all male citizens of the Soviet Union without distinction of race or nationality, attitude toward religion, education, domicile, social or property status are obliged to perform military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces.

Military service comprises active service and service in the reserve.

Male citizens who have reached draft age (18 years) are called up for military service. Young men can enter military educational establishments at the age of 17. For soldiers and sergeants of the Army, coastal units and the air arm of the Navy, frontier and interior service troops a two year term of service is established. For seamen and petty officers of the naval support coastal units and frontier guard naval units the length of service is three years. Soldiers, seamen, sergeants and starshinas with higher education perform one and a half years' active service.

Call up for military service takes place twice a year: in May-June and November-December.

NOTE: Starshinas, is comparable to the rank of Master Sergeant, First Sergeant or Sergeant-Major.

As prescribed by the Law on Universal Military Service women of the USSR aged from 19 to 40 with medical or some other special education may be registered for military service in peacetime, summoned for training assemblies or enlisted as volunteers for active service. In wartime, according to the decision of the USSR Council of Ministers, women may be called up for an auxillary or special service.

CONSTITUTION

## Basic Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

In 1977, Moscow produced and promulgated a new constitution for the peoples and republics of the USSR. The following are excerpts from the preamble of that constitution and key articles indicating at least the intent of equal human rights.

". . .the Soviet state has become a state for all people . . . the well-being of the people is rising steadily, and increasing favorable conditions are taking shape for the all-round development of the personality. . . the Soviet people have emerged through the drawing together of all social strata and on the basis of the juridical and actual equality of all nations and nationalities. . . the political system assures the effective administration of all social affairs, the increasingly active participation of the working people in state affairs, and the combination of genuine human rights and freedoms with a sense of civic duty."

ARTICLE 20 In accordance with the communist ideal, the free development of each is the condition of the free development of all, the Soviet state strives to expand citizens' actual possibilities to develop and use their creative strength, abilities and talents, encouraging the individual's all-round development.

ARTICLE 27 The state is concerned with protecting and increasing society's spiritual values, and for using them widely to raise the cultural level of the Soviet people.

In the USSR, the development of professional and popular art is given every encouragement.

ARTICLE 34 Citizens of the USSR are equal before the law, regardless of their origin, social status and property, nationality and race, sex, education, language, attitude toward religion, type or character of occupation, place of residence or other particulars.

Equal rights of Soviet citizens are insured in all fields of economic, political, social and cultural life.

ARTICLE 36 Soviet citizens of different nationalities and races have equal rights.

The exercise of these rights is insured by the policy and comprehensive development and drawing together of all nations and nationalities of the USSR, education of citizens in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, and the opportunity to use one's native tongue and the languages of other peoples of the USSR.

Any direct or indirect restriction of citizen's rights or establishment of direct or indirect privileges for citizens on grounds of race or nationality, or similarly any advocacy of racial or national exclusiveness, hostility or contempt is punishable by law.

ARTICLE 46 Citizens of the USSR have the right to use the achievements of culture.

This right is insured by public access to the values of our own and world culture preserved in state and public repositories, by the development and balanced distribution of cultural and educational institutions on our territory, and by the expression of cultural exchanges with foreign countries.

ARTICLE 50 In conformity with the interests of the working people and for the purpose of strengthening the socialist system, citizens of the USSR are guaranteed freedom of speech, press, assembly, meetings, street processions and demonstrations. The exercise of these political freedoms is insured by putting public buildings, streets and squares at the disposal of the working people and their organizations, by the broad dissemination of information, and by the opportunity to use press, television and radio.

ARTICLE 52 Freedom of conscience, that is, the right to profess any religion and perform religious rites or not to profess any religion, and to conduct atheistic propaganda, is recognized for all citizens of the USSR. Incitement of hostility and hatred on religious grounds is prohibited.

In the USSR, the church is separated from the state, and the school from the church.





FIGURE 1  
POPULATION GROWTH RATES  
BY SELECTED REPUBLICS

SOURCE: 1960 Moscow, Statistika 1975, p. 69

1980, 2000: Foreign Demographic Analysis Division Estimates and Projections

FIGURE 2  
LEAVITT'S MODEL OF ORGANIZATION



NOTE: The single and doubleheaded arrows show causal relationships within the organization as conceived by the author.

TABLE 1

HYPOTHETICAL MODEL OF THE POTENTIAL SUPPLY OF 18-YEAR-OLD MALES  
FOR THE MILITARY AND FOR THE ECONOMY (in thousands)

YEAR	MALES 18 YEARS OF AGE (1)	18 YEAR OLD MALES AVAILABLE FOR DRAFT AND ECONOMY (2)	% OF MALE COHORT (3)	PLUS EXPIRED EXEMPTIONS AND DEFERMENTS (4)	TOTAL AVAILABLE FOR DRAFT (5)	MINUS CONSCRIPTIBLES (6)	NET NUMBER OF 18 YEAR OLDS AVAILABLE FOR ECONOMY (7)
1978	2,646	1,861	70.3	225	1,086	1,688	398
1980	2,542	1,757	69.1	236	1,993	1,688	305
1982	2,308	1,545	66.9	240	1,785	1,688	97
1984	2,106	1,361	64.7	230	1,592	1,688	-96
1986	2,020	1,284	63.6	211	1,495	1,688	-193
1988	2,034	1,295	63.7	212	1,507	1,688	-181
1990	2,142	1,390	64.9	210	1,600	1,688	-88

COL 2: Reflects the summation of educational deferments, male deaths, and non-educational deferments and exemptions minus the totals of COL 1

COL 3: COL 2 divided by COL 1

COL 6: At 75 percent of 4,500,000 military with 2 years average service, 1,687,500 per year rounded to 1,688,000

COL 7: COL 5 minus COL 6

SOURCE: Abbreviated model designed by Murray Feshbach and Stephen Rapawy taken from their paper, "SOVIET POPULATION AND MANPOWER TRENDS AND POLICIES."

TABLE 2

## CURRENT AND PROJECTED GROWTH RATES BY REPUBLIC

	Nat'l Population (thousands)		Annual Growth Rate <sup>1</sup> %	Straightline Projection of Population <sup>2</sup>		Percent of Total	
	1959	1970		1985	2000	1985	2000
"EUROPEAN"							
Russian	113,113	129,015	1.12	153,427	180,305	51.2	47.9
Ukrainian	37,253	40,753	0.82	46,061	52,062	15.4	13.8
Belorussian	7,913	9,052	1.23	10,874	13,063	3.6	3.5
Moldavian	2,214	1,698	1.81	3,533	4,626	1.2	1.2
Lithuanian	2,326	2,665	1.24	3,208	3,862	1.1	1.0
Latvian	1,400	1,430	0.19	1,472	1,515	0.5	0.4
Estonian	939	1,007	0.63	1,118	1,219	0.4	0.4
Total	166,159	186,620	1.06	219,693	256,652	73.2	68.1
"NON-EUROPEAN"							
Uzbek	6,015	9,159	3.90	16,250	28,832	5.4	7.7
Tartar	4,968	5,931	1.62	7,552	9,616	2.5	2.6
Kazakh	3,622	5,299	3.52	8,904	14,958	3.0	4.0
Azeri	2,940	4,380	3.69	7,543	12,991	2.5	3.5
Armenian	2,787	3,559	2.25	4,967	6,933	1.7	1.8
Georgian	2,692	3,245	1.71	4,187	5,401	1.4	1.4
Tadzhik	1,397	2,136	3.94	3,811	6,800	1.3	1.8
Turkmen	1,002	1,525	3.89	1,704	4,794	0.9	1.3
Kirgiz	969	1,452	3.75	2,520	4,375	0.8	1.2
Total	26,392	36,686	3.03	58,438	94,700	19.5	25.1
ALL OTHERS	16,135	18,334	1.16	21,823	25,411	7.3	6.7
TOTAL POPULATION	208,686	241,640	1.34	299,954	376,763	100.0	100.0

1. Annual growth rates were obtained by solving the following equation:  $(1+r)^t = P70/P59$  for  $r$ , where  $t=11$

2. Straight line projections for 1985 and 2000 were obtained by  $P70(1+r)^t$ , where  $t=15$  for 1985, and  $t=30$  for 2000

APPENDIX A  
THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics consists of 15 republics. Ten of these are subdivided into Oblasts (Regions), Krays (Territories), Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (S.S.R.) or Autonomous Oblasts. In the largest republic, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (S.F.S.R.) some of the Oblasts and Krays are further subdivided into Autonomous Oblasts and Nationality Okrugs (Districts).


In the text, "European" nationalities refer to people in the republics of:

- 1) Russian S.F.S.R.
- 2) Ukrainian S.S.R.
- 3) Belorussian S.S.R.
- 4) Moldavian S.S.R.
- 5) Lithuanian S.S.R.
- 6) Latvian S.S.R.
- 7) Estonian S.S.R.

"Non-European" nationalities refer to people in the republics of:

- |                       |                     |
|-----------------------|---------------------|
| 8) Uzbek S.S.R.       | 12) Georgian S.S.R. |
| 9) Kazakh S.S.R.      | 13) Tadzhik S.S.R.  |
| 10) Armenian S.S.R.   | 14) Turkmen S.S.R.  |
| 11) Azerbaijan S.S.R. | 15) Kirghiz S.S.R.  |

APPENDIX B  
 ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICTS OF THE USSR



- 1 · R. S. F. S. R.
- 2 · LITHUANIAN S.S.R.
- 3 · LATVIAN S.S.R.
- 4 · ESTONIAN S.S.R.
- 5 · BELO RUSSIAN S.S.R.
- 6 · MOLDAVIAN S.S.R.
- 7 · UKRAINIAN S.S.R.
- 8 · GEORGIAN S.S.R.
- 9 · ARMENIAN S.S.R.
- 10 · AZERBAIJAN S.S.R.
- 11 · TURKMEN S.S.R.
- 12 · UZBEK S.S.R.
- 13 · KAZAKH S.S.R.
- 14 · TADZHIK S.S.R.
- 15 · KIRGIZ S.S.R.

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