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
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PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND DETENTE:  
THE SOVIET QUEST FOR SECURITY IN THE POST-WAR ERA

by

Paul John Ryan

June 1979

Thesis Advisor:

J. Valenta

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Peaceful Coexistence and Detente: The Soviet Quest for Security in the Post-War Era

Master's Thesis, June 1979

Paul John Ryan

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European security, the Sino-Soviet conflict, economic problems, and bureaucratic politics. Two common elements thread their way through each of the detente periods: Soviet security concerns and opportunism. Each period of detente countered a number of threats to Soviet security, lessened the free world's perception of the Soviet threat, allowed Soviet access to western technology, and permitted the Soviet Union to improve her "image" through peace propaganda. U.S. policymakers must be aware of the factors influencing the Soviet Union to pursue a policy of detente, and manipulate them as needed.



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Peaceful Coexistence and Detente:  
The Soviet Quest for Security in the Post-War Era

by

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Lieutenant, United States Navy  
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1973

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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### ABSTRACT

The cyclical nature of Soviet interest in peaceful co-existence and detente is demonstrated by the 1955 Geneva summit, the 1959 "spirit of Camp David," the 1963 Moscow accords, the detente of the SALT I period, and the renewed Soviet interest in detente as a prelude to the signing of the SALT II agreement. The Soviet Union's continual return to detente with the West results from the confluence of such factors as: the strategic balance, concerns for European security, the Sino-Soviet conflict, economic problems, and bureaucratic politics. Two common elements thread their way through each of the detente periods: Soviet security concerns and opportunism. Each period of detente countered a number of threats to Soviet security, lessened the free world's perception of the Soviet threat, allowed Soviet access to western technology, and permitted the Soviet Union to improve her "image" through peace propaganda. U.S. policymakers must be aware of the factors influencing the Soviet Union to pursue a policy of detente, and manipulate them as needed.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION -----	8
	A. VARIOUS APPROACHES TO ANALYZING SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY -----	9
	B. THE FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS -----	16
II.	PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND DETENTE -----	20
	A. LENIN ON PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE -----	20
	B. STALIN AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AS A TACTIC ----	22
	C. KHRUSHCHEV AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AS A STRATEGY -----	26
	D. BREZHNEV AND DETENTE -----	30
III.	THE GENEVA THAW -----	35
	A. THE DEATH OF STALIN -----	37
	B. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE STRATEGIC BALANCE -----	40
	C. EUROPEAN SECURITY -----	43
	D. IMPROVING THE SOVIET "IMAGE" -----	48
	E. THE CHINESE FACTOR -----	49
	F. THE SOVIET ECONOMY -----	51
	G. BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS -----	52
	H. OTHER FACTORS -----	54
	I. SUMMARY -----	55
IV.	THE SPIRIT OF CAMP DAVID -----	58
	A. BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS -----	60
	B. EUROPEAN SECURITY -----	63
	C. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE STRATEGIC BALANCE -----	66
	D. THE ECONOMY AND DEFENSE -----	68

E.	THE CHINESE FACTOR -----	69
F.	SUMMARY -----	70
V.	THE MOSCOW ACCORDS -----	73
A.	FOREIGN POLICY AND THE STRATEGIC BALANCE -----	74
B.	THE SOVIET ECONOMY -----	76
C.	THE CHINESE FACTOR -----	78
D.	EUROPEAN SECURITY -----	80
E.	BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS -----	83
F.	SUMMARY -----	85
VI.	DETENTE AND SALT I -----	87
A.	THE SOVIET ECONOMY -----	88
B.	FOREIGN POLICY AND THE STRATEGIC BALANCE -----	94
C.	SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. DOMESTIC PROBLEMS --	97
D.	SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE EFFECTS OF DETENTE ON WESTERN EUROPE -----	98
E.	THE CHINESE FACTOR -----	102
F.	CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND FUTURE EASTERN EUROPEAN UNREST -----	105
G.	THE FEAR OF NUCLEAR WAR -----	106
H.	SUMMARY -----	106
VII.	CONCLUSION -----	108
	BIBLIOGRAPHY -----	113
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST -----	120

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## I. INTRODUCTION

I cannot forecast to you the actions of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.<sup>1</sup> [emphasis added]

The purpose of this study is to identify and analyze the political, ideological, economic and military factors which have motivated the Soviet leaders to pursue foreign policies of peaceful coexistence and detente during discrete periods over the past twenty-five years. These discrete periods of heightened Soviet interest in peaceful coexistence can be identified by certain key events which appeared to embody this interest: the Geneva summit meeting of 1955, the trip by Khrushchev to the U.S. in 1959 and the resulting "spirit of Camp David," the signing of a group of tension reducing agreements by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in Moscow in 1963, and the period of the strategic arms limitations talks and the signing of the SALT I agreements in 1972.<sup>2</sup> While the purpose

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<sup>1</sup>Winston Churchill, Radio Broadcast on the Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression Pact, October 1, 1939. Reprinted in The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1948), p. 449.

<sup>2</sup>While the periodization in this study is unique. I must give credit to the following authors for their earlier attempts at periodization of Soviet interest in detente: Thomas Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970); Malcolm MacKintosh, "Three Detentes 1955-1964," Detente: Cold War Strategies in Transition, edited by Dulles and Crane, (New York: Praeger, 1965); and Albert Weeks, The Troubled Detente (New York: NYU Press, 1976).

of this analysis is not to predict future Soviet behavior, it is hoped that by developing an understanding of the factors which affected Soviet foreign policy formulation in the past, the reader will gain an insight into how these factors might be utilized to encourage the Soviet leadership to follow policies more compatible with the western understanding of how nations ought to live and work together.

A. VARIOUS APPROACHES TO ANALYZING SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Many outstanding scholars have written on the subject of why nations act the way they do. Variables have been identified, models have been developed, and numerous theories have been expounded.<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately, there are no confirmed theories, and there is no general agreement on the universal validity of any specific approach to analyzing a nation's foreign policy. Whereas in the physical sciences researchers usually develop a hypothesis and then collect data to either confirm or disprove it, in the social sciences the opposite is more often the case: the data is history, and analysts are faced with the problem of developing a framework within which to explain what has already happened. The interest shown by the Soviet Union in detente over the past twenty-five years is a case in point. The facts are history. The underlying motivations are waiting to be discovered.

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<sup>3</sup>For example, see Daniel Bell, "10 Theories in Search of Reality: Problems of Predicting Soviet Behavior," World Politics, April 1958, pp. 315-353.

There are a number of different general schools of thought which deal with the question "why nations act,"<sup>4</sup> each of which has been applied to the Soviet case. The realist school is concerned with the interaction of nation-states in their pursuit of power, the system theorists strive to identify the nature of the international system in an attempt to understand the actions of the individual actors, and the foreign policy analysts try to explain variations in a state's foreign policy output by examining domestic factors. Unfortunately, there is no grand conceptual framework which can be applied universally, and the selection of a suitable framework for analysis becomes dependent on the type of behavior being analyzed, the availability of data, and the preconceptions of the analyst.

Historically, three models of analyzing Soviet foreign policy behavior have received extensive use: the ideological model, the totalitarian model, and the historical Russian (national interest) model.

The ideological model assumed that since all Soviet decisions were couched in terms of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, therein lay the key to understanding and predicting Soviet

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<sup>4</sup>For several explanations, see Maurice East, et al., Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Policy Studies (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1978).

foreign policy. One had only to study the writings of Marx and Lenin in order to find the motivating principles.<sup>5</sup>

The totalitarian model viewed the Soviet Union as a country with an absolute dictatorship, with all decisions emanating from the top. This model attempted to psychoanalyze the dictator, establish his cultural and environmental conditioning factors, and then use the sum of this information to analyze the dictator and his decisions.<sup>6</sup> While this model found limited applicability during the one man rule of the Stalinist era, the collective and consensus leadership styles of Khrushchev and Brezhnev seemingly invalidate this approach.

The historical model assumes that there is a high degree of continuity in foreign policy goals, and that by understanding the events of the past predictions can be made about future actions of the Soviet Union. This model also implies that regardless of the form of government (tsarist or

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<sup>5</sup>A sample of writings stressing the importance of ideology as the motivating factor in Soviet foreign policy include: Fred Schwarz, You Can Trust the Communists (To Do What They Say) (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960); R.N. Carew Hunt, "The Importance of Doctrine," Problems of Communism, March-April 1958; George Kennan(X), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, July 1947, and Nathan Leites, A Study of Bolshevism (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1953) and The Operational Code of the Politburo (New York: McGraw Hill, 1951).

<sup>6</sup>See Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), and Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953).

socialist), Russian national interests are basically unchanged and Soviet foreign policy continues to pursue these same basic goals.<sup>7</sup>

These models served Soviet foreign policy analysts for a number of years, but increasing dissatisfaction with their inadequacies led to the development during the 1960's of a number of more sophisticated approaches. Eric Hoffmann and Frederic Fleron, in The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, proposed a multi-factor, multi-level form of analysis which considered inputs, process, and outputs.<sup>8</sup> Vernon Aspaturian, in his landmark book Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy, enlarged upon the concept of multiple variables interacting to affect foreign policy output, and developed what he considered to be a "simple partial checklist" of variables which includes well over one hundred items in the general categories of motivations/purposes/intentions, capabilities/power, risks, cost/benefits, and opportunities.<sup>9</sup>

At the same time that multifactor analyses were being developed, the increasing openness of Soviet society after

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<sup>7</sup>See R.S. Tarn, "Continuity in Russian Foreign Policy," in Robert Goldwin, et al., ed., Readings in Russian Foreign Policy (Chicago: American Foundation for Political Education, 1959); and Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Ideology and National Interest in Soviet Foreign Policy," in Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971).

<sup>8</sup>Erik Hoffmann and Frederic Fleron, The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: Aldine, 1971), pp. 7-9.

<sup>9</sup>Vernon V. Aspaturian, Process and Power, pp. 67-81.

the death of Stalin enabled western scholars to begin appreciating the role of domestic forces in Soviet foreign policy formulation. Aspaturian's "Internal Politics and Foreign Policy in the Soviet System,"<sup>10</sup> Sidney Ploss's "Studying the Domestic Determinants of Soviet Foreign Policy,"<sup>11</sup> and Alexander Dallin's "Soviet Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics: A Framework for Analysis,"<sup>12</sup> are some examples.

At the same time as all of the above, increasing interest was being shown in the field of decision-making theory and analysis.<sup>13</sup> The Cuban missile crisis then became a catalyst, leading Graham Allison to publish what has become a classic study in foreign policy analysis and behavior modelling: "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis."<sup>14</sup> In this work Allison described three basic models for analyzing

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<sup>10</sup>Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Internal Politics and Foreign Policy in the Soviet System," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966).

<sup>11</sup>Sidney Ploss, "Studying the Domestic Determinants of Soviet Foreign Policy," Canadian Slavic Studies, Spring, 1967.

<sup>12</sup>Alexander Dallin, "Soviet Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics: A Framework for Analysis," Journal of International Affairs, (Vol. XXIII, No. 2, 1969).

<sup>13</sup>For example, see Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision-Making (London: Oxford University Press, 1963).

<sup>14</sup>Graham Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," American Political Science Review, September, 1969, pp. 689-718.

foreign policy output: the rational process model, the organizational process model, and the bureaucratic politics model. In terms of the rational policy model, analysts "attempt to understand happenings as the more or less purposive acts of unified national governments. For these analysts, the point of an explanation is to show how the nation or government could have chosen the action in question, given the strategic problem that it faced."<sup>15</sup> The organizational process model analyzes foreign policy acts and choices as "outputs of large organizations functioning according to certain regular patterns of behavior."<sup>16</sup> The bureaucratic politics model focuses on the internal politics of a government, classifying foreign policy outputs as "outcomes of various overlapping bargaining games among players arranged hierarchically in the national government."<sup>17</sup>

In recent years, the number of effective models for analyzing Soviet foreign policy has been narrowed down to two: the totalitarian-rational choice model and the organizational process/bureaucratic politics model.<sup>18</sup> Unfortunately,

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<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 690.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

<sup>18</sup>In a later refinement of his three models, Allison combined models 2 and 3 (organizational process and bureaucratic politics). See Allison and Halpern, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," Theory and Policy in International Relations, edited by Richard Ullman and Raymond Tanter (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972).

neither of these models can completely explain the continued Soviet interest in peaceful coexistence over the past quarter of a century. The decisions by the Soviet leaders to pursue policies of peaceful coexistence were rational choices on their part, given the alternatives of arms races, increasing domestic discontent, and a return to the cold war, or worse. We now know enough about the Soviet decisionmaking process to realize that major foreign policy decisions are not made solely by the General Secretary of the Communist Party, but rather by majority vote or consensus among the members of the Politburo. Thus, in Soviet politics, the Politburo itself sometimes must be considered as the rational actor, with the internal debate of the members likened to the mental debate a single leader would engage in prior to any major decision.

The bureaucratic politics approach may be the best approach for analyzing a single decision or specific event, such as Graham Allison's analysis of the Cuban missile crisis,<sup>19</sup> and Jiri Valenta's analysis of the Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia in 1968.<sup>20</sup> However, when analyzing Soviet interest in peaceful coexistence, a series of decisions which evolved over a period of twenty-five years, the bureaucratic politics model becomes an unwieldy, less than satisfactory

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
<sup>19</sup>Graham Allison, op. cit., and, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971).

<sup>20</sup>Jiri Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968; An Anatomy of the Decision (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1979).

approach: clearly defined decisions to follow a policy of peaceful coexistence are hard to identify, and the data necessary to document bureaucratic infighting, if existent, is certainly unavailable in the West.

#### B. THE FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

For the purpose of this study, Soviet foreign policy output is considered as a dependent variable, changing as the result of changes in several independent variables, both external and internal. Examples of the types of variables affecting Soviet foreign policy output are: rivalry with China, Soviet economic performance, the strategic balance, European security concerns and Soviet bureaucratic politics. The Soviet foreign policy of peaceful coexistence has not remained at a constant level, but rather, is a series of spikes, rising above the level of other Soviet foreign policy activity. If one were to graphically illustrate the magnitude of Soviet interest in peaceful coexistence over time, it would appear like this:



The peaks represent the obvious detente overtures of 1955, 1958-60, 1963 and 1970-72. The variations in the magnitude of Soviet interest in peaceful coexistence is caused by the changes in the number of variables operating at any one time, and their importance as perceived by the Soviet leaders.

The following variables have been identified as playing a major role in Soviet interest in peaceful coexistence:

1955: The turmoil and uncertainty caused by the death of Stalin, the Soviet desire to resolve the German question, concerns about improving the Soviet "image" abroad, the lopsided strategic balance, relations with China, Soviet economic problems, and Soviet desire for a recognition of the status quo in Eastern Europe.

1958-60: Khrushchev's need for a foreign policy success after the unsuccessful coup against him in June, 1957, European security, the growing Sino-Soviet split, the development of strategic weapons by the Soviet Union, and Soviet economic problems.

1963: The Cuban debacle and the need for increased Soviet defense spending, Soviet economic problems, the Sino-Soviet dispute, the proposed German inclusion in the NATO multilateral force, and Khrushchev's need to reinforce his leadership position after the Cuban missile crisis.

1970-72: Soviet economic problems, the achievement of strategic parity, Soviet perceptions of U.S. domestic

problems, Soviet perceptions of the effects of detente on Western Europe, Soviet apprehensions of China, the possibility of future Eastern European unrest after the Czechoslovakian uprising, and the fear of nuclear war.

This analysis views the pursuit of a policy of peaceful coexistence as a purposive act of the Soviet leaders given their perceptions of the problems facing them in each of these periods. Sometimes the Soviet leaders acted in concert, and sometimes there was a divergence of views. The "given" in each situation was the foreign policy output: a policy of peaceful coexistence. This study analyzes the variables which brought about this policy.

All states, to some degree, act on the basis of national interests, and the ultimate national interest is survival. The Soviet Union (Russia) has been threatened and invaded so many times that the Russians have developed a "neurotic view of world affairs" based on a "traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity."<sup>21</sup> Indeed, by one author's count, the Soviet Union has been invaded over 160 times, and has participated in 17 wars since the founding of the U.S.<sup>22</sup> This resultant concern for security was evident during all four periods of heightened Soviet interest in peaceful

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<sup>21</sup>George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston: Atlantic Little, Brown and Co., 1967), pp. 549-560.

<sup>22</sup>Morton Schwartz, The Foreign Policy of the U.S.S.R.: Domestic Factors (Encino, Ca.: Dickenson, 1975), p. 75.

coexistence. The Soviet leaders perceived certain threats (internal as well as external) to their national security, and they then sought to minimize these threats through a foreign policy of peaceful coexistence. Throughout this study peaceful coexistence will be analyzed as a tactic of the Soviet Union to ensure her continued existence and growth in a hostile world.

## II. PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND DETENTE

Peace and peaceful coexistence are not one and the same thing. Peaceful coexistence does not mean a temporary and unstable armistice between two wars, but something more complex.<sup>23</sup>

While the terms "peaceful coexistence" and "detente" are often used interchangeably in the West, the subtle differences between the Soviet and western interpretations of these two terms are frequently overlooked. In addition, there is a history of meanings associated with the term "peaceful coexistence," such that Stalin's use of the term does not carry the same implications as when used by Khrushchev. These nuances are extremely important and must be completely understood before starting an analysis of their implementation in Soviet foreign policy.

### A. LENIN ON PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

Peaceful coexistence is the literal translation of the Russian words mirnoe sosuchestvovanie, and although there are numerous references in Soviet literature to the "Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence," these references are nothing more than ex post facto creations of Soviet ideologists. For Lenin never advocated a policy of peaceful coexistence. He

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<sup>23</sup>H. Dona, Peaceful Coexistence: A Basic Principle of the Foreign Policy of the Rumanian Peoples Republic (Bucharest: State Publishing House, 1963), p. 2. Cited in Richard Allen, "Peace or Peaceful Coexistence?" Detente: Cold War Strategies In Transition, edited by Eleanor Dulles and Robert Crane. (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 29.

analyzed the world situation and saw that the infant socialist state was unable to spread revolution because of its terribly weakened condition. This necessitated a short period of consolidation and rebuilding on the part of the Bolsheviks prior to spreading revolution by means of the Red Army.

There can be no doubt that our army is absolutely in no condition at the present moment...to resist a German offensive. Further, there is not the slightest doubt that the peasant majority of our army would at the present juncture unreservedly declare in favor of an annexationist peace, and not of an immediate revolutionary war; for the Socialist reorganization of the army...has just begun.<sup>24</sup>

References by Lenin to peaceful coexistence can only be found on five separate occasions in his extensive collection of writings and speeches, and none are more than passing comments of insignificant importance describing existing conditions and the need for a period of consolidation of revolutionary gains. In addition, not even once did Lenin use the official Khrushchev formulation of peaceful coexistence mirnoe sosuschestvovanie, but rather, peaceful cohabitation mirnoe sozhitel'stvo.<sup>25</sup> For Lenin believed that:

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<sup>24</sup>V.I. Lenin, "Theses on the Question of a Separate Peace with Germany," January 20, 1918. Robert Goldwin, ed., Readings in Russian Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 109.

<sup>25</sup>V.I. Lenin, Collected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 4th ed., 45 vols., 1960-70), XXX, p. 365; XXXII, p. 317; XXXIII, pp. 385-387; XLII, pp. 195-196; Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 17, 1919, p. 1. Paul Marantz, "Peaceful Coexistence: From Heresy to Orthodoxy." Paul Cocks, et al., ed., The Dynamics of Soviet Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 294.

...the existence of the Soviet Republic beside the imperialist states during a lengthy period of time is inconceivable. In the very end either one or the other must win. And before this result, a series of most horrible conflicts between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states is unavoidable.<sup>26</sup>

Throughout the years of the Russian revolution and into the early 1920's, Lenin and his closest followers waited patiently for the proletariat of Western Europe to revolt, for they knew that Russia was industrially backwards and could not achieve the creation of a socialist society until joined by the more advanced states. Unsure of the reliability of the Soviet armed forces, the Bolsheviks encouraged revolution in Europe via propaganda and the control of local communist parties by the Comintern. Simultaneously, they began construction at home of the base needed for the spreading of revolution by means of the Red Army. During this period coexistence was not a choice, but a forced necessity.

#### B. STALIN AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AS A TACTIC

Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, et al. were revolutionaries, and they shared a vision of the victorious proletariat of Russia uniting with the dissatisfied and exploited workers of the capitalist West to create the new socialist world order. However, at the time of Lenin's death in January, 1924, the world revolution seemed no closer than it had six years

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<sup>26</sup>V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, XXIX, p. 133. Cited in Wladyslaw Kulski, Peaceful Coexistence: An Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: Regnery Co., 1959), p. 131.

earlier when the Bolsheviks initially seized power in Russia. Cognizant of Russia's weakened economic condition and reluctant to try to spread Marxism-Leninism by means of a Red Army of dubious reliability, Stalin, in the Fall of 1924, began proclaiming what was later to become the doctrine of "socialism in one country," that is, a socialist Russia, temporarily coexisting with capitalist neighbors, building socialism inside her own borders while waiting for the revolutionary consciousness of the western workers to develop. This doctrine was based on Stalin's "extreme skepticism about world revolution and confidence in the reality of a long truce between Russian and the capitalist world."<sup>27</sup> Indeed, Stalin became so skeptical of prospects for world revolution that he stated, in a speech at Sverdlov University in June, 1925, that the "victory of Socialism in the leading capitalist states might be delayed for 10-20 years."<sup>28</sup>

The first documented use of the term "peaceful coexistence" by Stalin occurred at the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1925, when he acknowledged the fact of peaceful coexistence and its forced nature as the current state of international affairs:

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<sup>27</sup>Isaac Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 391.

<sup>28</sup>J.V. Stalin, Sochinenia (Collected Works) (Moscow: State Publishing House, 1947), Vol. 7, p. 166.

The fundamental and new, the decisive feature, which has affected all the events in the sphere of foreign relations during this period, is the fact that a certain temporary equilibrium of forces has been established between our country...and the countries of the capitalistic world; an equilibrium which has determined the present period of "peaceful coexistence."<sup>29</sup>

Soviet Russia was still in no condition to spread revolution by force, and the West, after a long and bitter world war, did not have the motivation or foresight to take action against the Soviet Union. Thus, the state of affairs referred to by Stalin as peaceful coexistence emerged more by weakness and default than by any Soviet grand design.

Soviet writers are always careful to distinguish between strategy and tactics, and peaceful coexistence was initially conceived of as a tactic, a device with which the young Soviet state could buy time until she was strong enough to vigorously export revolutions abroad. As explained by Stalin in 1924,

Strategy deals with the main forces of the revolution and their reserves. It changes with the passing of the revolution from one stage to another, but remains essentially unchanged throughout a given stage.

While the object of strategy is to win the war... tactics pursues less important objectives, for the object of tactics is not the winning of the war as a whole, but the winning of some particular engagements or some particular battles.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup>J.V. Stalin, Political Report of the Central Committee to the Fourteenth Congress of the CPSU (Moscow, 1950), p. 8. Cited in Vernon V. Aspaturian, Process and Power, p. 340.

<sup>30</sup>J.V. Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism," in Problems of Leninism (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953), pp. 83-84.

Peaceful coexistence was Stalin's tactic for ensuring the survival of the Soviet Union in a hostile international environment. As described by Stalin at the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1927,

..our task is to pay attention to contradictions in the capitalist camp, to delay war by "buying off" the capitalists and to take all measures to maintain peaceful relations...Our relations with the capitalist countries are based on the assumption that the co-existence of the two opposing systems is possible.<sup>31</sup>  
[emphasis added]

Called the "peace policy" in the 1920's, the need for coexistence was rooted in Stalin's view of the world and his perception of the prospects for a long delay until the world revolution. The transitory and self-serving nature of Stalin's interest in peaceful coexistence becomes extremely evident when a search of his writings and speeches reveals only three references to peaceful coexistence during the twenty-five year period between 1928 and 1953, and the fact that peaceful coexistence was not once mentioned at the party congresses held in 1930, 1934, 1939, and 1952.<sup>32</sup> In addition, peaceful coexistence was not even defined in the Soviet Diplomatic Dictionary published in 1951.

Thus we have Lenin referring to coexistence as a descriptive state of affairs. Stalin, going one step further, promoted

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<sup>31</sup>J.V. Stalin, Political Report of the Central Committee to the Fifteenth Congress of the CPSU (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950), pp. 26-27.

<sup>32</sup>Paul Marantz, "Peaceful Coexistence: From Heresy to Orthodoxy," p. 297.

peaceful coexistence as a temporary tactic in order to strengthen socialist gains in Soviet Russia prior to the forceable export of revolution. Now we move on to Khrushchev who fundamentally changed the policy of peaceful coexistence into what we know it as today.

#### C. KHRUSHCHEV AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AS A STRATEGY

The Stalinist era was one of forced and uneasy coexistence, particularly after the Second World War when the anti-western, xenophobic influence of Zhadanov reached its peak. The occupation of Eastern Europe, the Berlin blockade of 1948, and the Korean War of 1950-1953 all contributed to a growing hostility between West and East. Stalin died on March 5, 1953, and soon thereafter his successors demonstrated a more peaceful line towards the West. On March 15, ten days after Stalin's passing, Malenkov, who then headed the Soviet government, proclaimed to the Supreme Soviet: "At the present time there is no disputed or unresolved question that cannot be settled peacefully by mutual agreement of the interested countries. This applies to our relations with all states, including the United States of America."<sup>33</sup>

Between Stalin's death in 1953 and Khrushchev's emergence as the leading figure at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, there was a painful period of reappraisal of the events of

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<sup>33</sup>Pravda, March 16, 1953.

the Stalin era, and a careful reevaluation of the global power position of the Soviet Union. The development of nuclear weapons technology in the U.S.S.R., culminating in their first thermonuclear blast in 1954, and the prospects for an early marriage of rocket technology and nuclear weapons, led Khrushchev to a very optimistic evaluation of the world situation. Soviet thinkers determined that the balance (or correlation) of forces in the world was shifting in favor of the socialist camp, and that due to the increasing might of the socialist camp and the decrease in the power of the capitalist camp, that war was no longer inevitable, as taught by Lenin. This change in Communist doctrine then enabled Khrushchev to declare:

The simultaneous existence of two opposite world systems, the capitalist and the socialist, developing according to different laws and in opposite directions, has become an indisputable fact...the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems has always been and remains the general line of our country's foreign policy...And this is natural, for there is no other way in present day conditions. Indeed, there are only two ways: either peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war in history. There is no third way.<sup>34</sup>

The awesome prospect of nuclear warfare and a cautious optimism concerning trends in the development of advanced weapons systems combined to cause a change in the Leninist doctrine on the inevitability of war, and while one Leninist doctrine was being repudiated, a new one was being created.

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<sup>34</sup>N.S. Khrushchev, "Speech to the Twentieth Party Congress" Pravda, February 15, 1956.

Henceforth Soviet writings were to be full of references to the "Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social system."

As with most communist doctrines, the meaning of a new policy becomes much clearer with successive interpretations and explanations. Shepilov, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, explained away the apparent contradiction between a policy of peaceful coexistence and the support of national liberation movements in the Third World this way:

Peaceful coexistence is not a conflictless life. As long as different social-political systems continue to exist, the antagonisms between them are unavoidable. Peaceful coexistence is a struggle, political, economic and ideological...coexistence means that one does not fight the other, does not attempt to solve international disputes by arms, but that one competes through peaceful work and economic and cultural activities. But we would cease to be Marxist-Leninists if we forgot the elementary laws of social life, the laws of class struggle.<sup>35</sup>

One of the clearest and perhaps the most forceful declaration on the policy of peaceful coexistence can be found in the Statement of the 81 Communist and Workers Parties of December 1960:

The policy of peaceful coexistence is a policy of mobilizing the masses and launching vigorous action against the enemies of peace. Peaceful coexistence of states does not imply renunciation of the class struggle...The coexistence of states with different social systems is a form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism. In conditions of peaceful coexistence favorable opportunities are provided for

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<sup>35</sup> Pravda, February 13, 1957. Cited in Wladyslaw Kulski, Peaceful Coexistence: An Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: Regnery Co., 1959), p. 133.

the development of the class struggle in the capitalist countries and the national liberation movement of the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries. In their turn the successes of the revolutionary class and national-liberation struggle promote peaceful coexistence. The Communists consider it their duty to fortify the faith of the people in the possibility of furthering peaceful coexistence, their determination to prevent world war. They will do their utmost for the people to weaken imperialism and limit its sphere of action by the active struggle for peace, democracy, and national liberation.<sup>36</sup>

While Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence was heralded by western observers as a welcomed break in the tensions of the cold war era, there was great opposition within the Communist world to the literal meaning of this new policy. As a result, the theoretical journal Kommunist published an editorial in 1962 telling party members exactly what peaceful coexistence was not:

First, peaceful coexistence does not weaken, but contributes to an intensification of the class struggle of the proletariat; second, peaceful coexistence does not weaken but strengthens the position of fighters for national independence; third, peaceful coexistence does not mean refusal to fight imperialism--on the contrary, it champions and permits an intensification of the ideological, political and economic struggle against imperialism; fourth, under conditions of peaceful coexistence, there are real possibilities for the development of socialist revolution and all forms of revolutionary movement.<sup>37</sup>

This explanation of peaceful coexistence makes even more sense when placed in the perspective of Khrushchev and

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<sup>36</sup> Statement of the 81 Communist and Workers Parties Meeting in Moscow, USSR, December 1960, p. 16. Cited in Eleanor Dulles, Detente: Cold War Strategies in Transition, p. 28.

<sup>37</sup> Kommunist, No. 5, 1962, p. 121.

the emphasis that he placed on the intensification of the struggle in the Third World. Peaceful coexistence would be the official policy towards the West, but the former colonial and Third World areas were to be fair game for revolutionizing. Thus, Khrushchev could speak of peaceful coexistence and revolutionary movements in the same breath.

Initially, peaceful coexistence was an expression of the need of the new Soviet state to obtain time to recover from the strains of World War I and the civil war. Then Stalin used a policy of peaceful coexistence as a tactical maneuver in order to gain time to strengthen and fortify the Soviet Union before its inevitable clash with the capitalists. Khrushchev and his ideologists finally determined that due to the changing correlation of world forces war was no longer fatally inevitable, and peaceful coexistence became a long term strategy.

The Marxist-Leninists do not understand the policy of peaceful coexistence as a tactical maneuver designed for some limited span of time, but as a strategic line designed for the whole period of the transition from capitalism to socialism on a world scale.<sup>38</sup>

#### D. BREZHNEV AND DETENTE

Khrushchev, the architect of the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence, was deposed in October, 1964, and almost

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<sup>38</sup>"For the Unity and Solidarity of the International Communist Movement," Pravda, December 6, 1963. Cited in Richard Allen, Peace or Peaceful Coexistence (Chicago: American Bar Association, 1966), p. 77.

immediately the Soviet Union began to follow a harder line towards the West. In Brezhnev's speech on foreign policy at the Twenty-third Party Congress in 1966, the section on peaceful coexistence sounded much more hostile than in the past:

At the same time that we expose the aggressive policy of imperialism we consistently and unswervingly pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence...while...the Soviet Union...consistently advocates normal, peaceful relations with capitalist countries and a settlement of controversial issues between states by negotiation and not by war...Naturally there can be no peaceful coexistence when it comes to internal processes of the class and national-liberation struggle in the capitalist countries between oppressors and the oppressed, between colonialists and the victims of colonial oppression.<sup>39</sup>

Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence envisioned the Soviet Union and the United States as co-rulers of the world: "We believe that countries with differing social systems can more than exist side by side. It is necessary to proceed further to improve relations, strengthen confidence between countries, and cooperate."<sup>40</sup> On many occasions Khrushchev stressed that "history has imposed upon our two peoples a great responsibility for the destiny of the world," and that in regards to Soviet-American relations,

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<sup>39</sup>L.I. Brezhnev, "Address to the Twenty-third Congress of the CPSU," cited in Marshall Shulman, "Recent Soviet Foreign Policy: Some Patterns in Retrospect," Vernon Aspaturian, ed., Process and Power, p. 812.

<sup>40</sup>N.S. Khrushchev, Report of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union to the Twentieth Party Congress (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950), pp. 40-41.

"our interests do not clash directly anywhere, either territorially or economically."<sup>41</sup> Khrushchev, seeing the relative improvement of the strategic power of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the United States, was apparently satisfied with the prospect of being the junior partner in a two power world. His successors, however, were not.<sup>42</sup>

Communists, in general, are very precise in the terminology they use. This being the case, it is interesting to note the decrease in the use of the term mirnoe sosuschestvovanie (peaceful coexistence) by the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership, and the increasing frequency of the use of the term razryadka (loosely, detente). Razryadka, although frequently translated to mean detente, is a weapons-oriented term which means to unload a weapon, much the same as the French term "detente" originally meant the reduction of the tension on a crossbow string as a gesture of good faith. While Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence described a long-term strategy, containing elements of confrontation and cooperation, the Brezhnev-Kosygin line stresses only a lessening of tensions within the general framework of peaceful coexistence. The competition implied in the Soviet formulation of peaceful coexistence still exists, but the

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<sup>41</sup>Pravda, December 31, 1961, in an address to the Supreme Soviet.

<sup>42</sup>For a further development of the condominium/dyarchy theme, see Vernon Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign Policy Perspectives in the Sixties," in Process and Power.

Soviet leaders are trying to reduce the potential for conflict, and hence, they stress detente. According to Brezhnev, the current period of detente (1975) renounces "the form and methods [of the Cold War era] and not the ideological struggle...During the transition from cold war toward detente and the development of cooperation between East and West, the ideological struggle, far from subsiding, has gained in scope...Detente in no way annuls the battle of ideas."<sup>43</sup> While this formulation sounds very similar to Khrushchev's pronouncements on peaceful coexistence, the change in terminology implies a deeper commitment on the part of the current leadership to the policy of coexistence and detente. The inclusion of peaceful coexistence in the new "Brezhnev" Constitution of the U.S.S.R. (1977, Article 28) as a goal of Soviet foreign policy is significant in this respect because it reflects the goals of the current leadership for the present and near term future.

The pronouncements of Stalin and Khrushchev on peaceful coexistence sounded superficially similar, but Stalin was speaking of a tactic and Khrushchev of a strategy. Brezhnev's explanation of detente sounds similar to Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence, but again there are subtle differences. The current Soviet leadership has not engaged in

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<sup>43</sup>L.I. Brezhnev, Pravda, October 15, 1975. Cited in Y. Zakharov, "International Cooperation and the Battle of Ideas," International Affairs (1-1976), p. 88.

the brinksmanship of the Khrushchev era, nor has it been satisfied with the strategic inferiority which caused some of Khrushchev's gambles. The Soviet leaders now prefer to talk of razryadka, or a relaxation of tensions, while continuing to increase the military strength of the Soviet Union. Peaceful coexistence and detente will no longer be forced necessities for the Soviet Union, but rather a policy chosen from a position of strength.

### III. THE GENEVA THAW

The Russians went to Geneva saying that what they wanted was a "relaxation of tensions." During a single momentous week there, although no agreement was reached on any of the vital issues at stake, the impression was conveyed to the world that the cold war was over and that a new era of peace was at hand...

Tensions relaxed immediately all over the world, and along with them, efforts to build strength and unity against the Communist threat, which is what the Russians were after.<sup>44</sup>

After a quarter of a century in power, Stalin died on March 5, 1953. An era had ended. Without a clearly defined path of succession, Stalin's former assistants were now thrust into positions for which they had no prior training. As a result, Malenkov as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Molotov as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Beria as the Minister of Internal Affairs began formulating foreign and domestic policies in a cautious, conservative manner.

The first hints of a Soviet desire to relax tensions in East-West relations were contained in the speeches given at Stalin's funeral. Malenkov stressed the need to settle disputed or unresolved questions peacefully.<sup>45</sup> Beria stressed that the principle task then facing the Soviet Union was

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<sup>44</sup>Averell Harriman, "The Soviet Challenge and American Policy," Atlantic, April, 1956, p. 45.

<sup>45</sup>See p. 26.

to prevent both the preparation and the unleashing of world war, and Molotov assured his audience that the Soviet Union harbored no aggressive aims.<sup>46</sup> These refreshing references to peace were well received in the West, and on April 20, 1953, Churchill, in a speech to the House of Commons, proposed a summit conference to attempt to feel out the minor indications of change that were evident in the acts and proclamations of the new Soviet leadership. While differences between Washington and London on the format of the conference were being discussed, the Soviet Union came out in favor of the conference, provided that "the parties come to it without any fixed preliminary demands."<sup>47</sup> (The U.S. had wanted a preliminary meeting between the Americans, British, and French to form a common front.) This initial proposal led to a Foreign Ministers' conference in 1954, and finally to the Geneva Summit in 1955.

Soviet foreign policy actions supporting a relaxation in international tensions were enumerated by Premier Bulganin in his opening speech at Geneva: "the termination of the bloodshed in Korea and also the cessation of hostilities in Indochina," "the concluding of the state treaty with Austria, the normalization of relations between the U.S.S.R. and

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<sup>46</sup> Albert Weeks, The Troubled Detente (New York: Union Press, 1976), pp. 86-87.

<sup>47</sup> Pravda, May 24, 1953. Cited in David Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1961), p. 130.

Yugoslavia...the success of the conference of...Asian and African countries in Bandung, the visit to the Soviet Union of Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru...[and] the proposal made by the Federal Republic of Germany to establish diplomatic, commercial and cultural relations between the U.S.S.R. and F.R.G."<sup>48</sup>

In July, 1955, after the preliminary attempts by the Soviet leaders to change their public image as noted above, the heads of state of the United States, the Soviet Union, France and England met in Geneva, Switzerland for very cordial and highly publicized talks about international relations, disarmament, European security, and the German problem. Although few concrete results emerged from this meeting, it visibly contributed to a lessening of international tension. The press aptly dubbed this lessening of tensions and increased East-West dialogue "the spirit of Geneva."

What motivated the Soviet leaders to shift to this new, more peaceful policy? Were they being influenced by the so-called "peaceful forces" in the West, were they buying time to develop a nuclear arsenal, or were there different reasons? The following factors are considered the most significant elements.

#### A. THE DEATH OF STALIN

Due to the lack of established lines of succession in the Soviet government, the death of Stalin threw his

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<sup>48</sup>N. Bulganin, "Relaxation of International Tension" Speech delivered at the Geneva Conference, July 18, 1955. Vital Speeches, vol. 21, August 1, 1955, p. 1384.

immediate subordinates into a turmoil. Stalin was only the second Soviet leader to pass away. In addition to the lack of formal machinery to handle succession, Stalin had held the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for over a quarter of a century, periodically purging the top party leadership of those men by whom he felt threatened. There was no one person with the charisma and base of support who could fill the void left by Stalin's passing, nor was there anyone who felt sure enough of his own position in the ruling hierarchy to try to immediately assume Stalin's mantle. The three strongest competitors for the top position at that time were Malenkov, Molotov, and Beria. Malenkov was the presumed heir apparent because of his position as Stalin's most trusted aide, and head of Stalin's private secretariat. As of yet, Khrushchev was not one of the major actors, and he was given the less visible post of head of the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

Due to Stalin's passing and their own lack of experience in decisionmaking and exercising power, the new Soviet leaders felt threatened. They were afraid that the capitalist enemies of the Soviet Union might exploit the temporary weakness in the Soviet leadership in order to retake Eastern Europe or possibly something worse. In addition to fearing internal dissent and intraparty problems, they were also afraid of each other.

The early twentieth century witnessed the blooming of anarchistic tendencies among the Russians. In January, 1905, there was a mass demonstration outside the Tsar's Winter Palace, protesting the domestic deprivations caused by the Russo-Japanese War. The repression of this demonstration led to bloodshed, and "bloody Sunday" became the first of a series of antigovernment demonstrations during 1905-1906. The hardships of the First World War led to a resurgence of anti-government agitation, and the overthrow of the tsarist regime in February, 1917. The Provisional government continued to support the war effort, and it, too, was overthrown in October of that year. Dissatisfaction with the inability of the Bolsheviks to solve the nation's problems then led to the Kronstadt uprising in 1921. After Stalin's death, the collective leadership was afraid "First, of the people, then of each other. To them it was not inconceivable that free of Stalin, the Russian people would remember their revolutionary tradition...Constant repetition of the theme of unity and firmness incongruously combined with a plea for 'prevention of any kind of disorder and panic.'"<sup>49</sup> In order to concentrate their attention on domestic matters, the Soviet leaders needed to divest themselves of external problems. It is not coincidental that the Korean armistice was signed in July, 1953, only four months after Stalin's death.

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<sup>49</sup> Adam Ulam, The Rivals (New York: Penguin Books, 1971), p. 197.

On the intraparty level, the Soviet leaders were just as concerned about uprisings in the satellites as they were about uprisings in the Soviet Union. The "little Stalins" of Eastern Europe (Ulbricht in E. Germany, Rakosi in Hungary) had lost their prime supporter in the Kremlin. In June, 1953, uprisings occurred in East Berlin, various other towns of East Germany, and in Pilsen, Czechoslovakia. While these demonstrations and strikes were initially prompted by local economic gripes, they developed from simple protests into anti-Soviet and anti-Communist rallies. This gave the Soviet leaders a feeling of uncertainty concerning their ability to control the populations of the satellites and the Soviet population as well. This, coupled with the "containment" and "rollback" doctrines being espoused by the new Eisenhower administration in the U.S., contributed to the perception of the Soviet leaders that they were threatened, and became a factor in determining the new, more conciliatory course towards the West.

#### B. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE STRATEGIC BALANCE

Rushing to occupy Germany in the final weeks of World War II, the Soviets gained access to a large part of the available German rocket technology, the further development of which became a high priority item in the Soviet Union. Although the United States held an atomic monopoly in the immediate post-war era, the Soviet Union was not far behind, exploding their first atomic bomb in 1949, and their first

thermonuclear bomb in 1953. The Soviet leaders apparently foresaw the tremendous potential of long-range rockets with thermonuclear warheads, and simply needed time to bring about the union of these two relatively new technologies.

The spectacular Soviet missile achievements of 1957, including the first successful launching of a multistage ICBM in August, the Sputnik I launching in October, the Sputnik 2 launching with an 1100 lb. payload in November, and the appearance of a MRBM in Red Square on November 7, all had to have had their research and development work done in the mid-1950 period. Thus, Soviet behavior during this period was aimed at securing a "breathing space" during which the Soviets would be free to develop their own position of strength. In so doing, and by adding rockets to their arsenal, the Soviets might be able to stand up to the West at a later time. First, however, it was necessary to "walk softly while fashioning a big stick."<sup>50</sup>

While definite, strong internal forces were compelling the Soviet leaders to establish an era of lessened tension, the Soviets were also looking for a period of detente as a counter to U.S. arms programs. During the Korean War the U.S. carried out a large expansion of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), giving the U.S. the power to attack the U.S.S.R. with a bomber fleet of about 400 aircraft which

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<sup>50</sup> Albert Weeks, The Other Side of Coexistence (New York: Pitman Publishing Co., 1970), p. 166.

were capable of two-way attack missions, and a total number of U.S. bombers capable of executing an atomic strike on the Soviet Union in the vicinity of 1350. The corresponding figures for the Soviet Union were about 40 and 350, respectively.<sup>51</sup> This period also saw the deployment of nuclear armed carrier task forces to the Mediterranean, directly threatening the Soviet Union. Additionally, by 1955 the advanced B-52 manned bomber had completed the development cycle and had been placed in series production. Thus it was in the best interests of the Soviet Union to put on a peaceful face and try to influence opinions in the West in order to effect a slowing of the American arms buildup, and perhaps even a cutback in Western defense expenditures. This Soviet concern for security was clearly evident in a speech given by Molotov at the tenth anniversary meeting of the United Nations in June, 1955:

Some countries have of late become the scene of an unprecedented armaments race that lays on the masses of the people an enormous burden of military expenditure. Also in progress is the constant stockpiling of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

Large scale construction of military bases is going on in foreign territories. That these bases are being built up for purposes having nothing to do with defense can be deduced from the mere fact that they are to be found thousands of miles away from the countries constructing them.

New military blocs and alliances are constantly being formed in Europe, in Asia and in other parts of the world. Things have reached such a pass that agreements have been concluded to remilitarize Western Germany and

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<sup>51</sup>Zbigniew Brzezinski, "How the Cold War Was Played," Foreign Affairs, October 1972, p. 188.

integrate her into military groupings the aggressive character of which is well known.<sup>52</sup>

### C. EUROPEAN SECURITY

In June, 1955, U.S. Secretary of State Dulles met with Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Molotov in San Francisco to discuss the upcoming Geneva summit. When asked by Dulles what problems the Soviet government most wanted to discuss, Molotov replied: disarmament, European security, and economic cooperation.<sup>53</sup> What threats did the Soviet Union perceive in the current European status quo, and what were their solutions?

During the immediate post-war years, and extending into the 1950's, the question of German reunification was a major point of contention in East-West relations, and also caused disagreement among the Soviet leaders themselves. Stalin's last position on German reunification was put forth in a note on March 10, 1952, in response to the imminent establishment of the European Defense Community with West Germany a member. Stalin reiterated his demand for the speedy signing of a German peace treaty which would safeguard "the legitimate national interests of the German people." An "all-German government" was to be established, and the united Germany

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<sup>52</sup>Vyacheslav Molotov, Establish Trust Among Nations, "Pass From Words to Deeds," Speech delivered at the tenth anniversary meeting of the U.N., June 22, 1955. Vital Speeches, July 15, 1955, pp. 1346-1347.

<sup>53</sup>Louis L. Gerson, John Foster Dulles, The American Secretaries of State, Vol. XVII (New York: Cooper Square Pub., 1963), p. 226.

was to have a limited armed forces establishment, and be prohibited from joining any alliance against any member of the former anti-Hitler coalition.<sup>54</sup>

The conditions attached to German reunification precluded Western agreement, and nothing happened. However, shortly after the death of Stalin, the Soviet government agreed to a four power conference on the German question to be held in Berlin in January, 1954. (This was to be the first meeting of the foreign ministers of the three Western powers and the Soviet Union in five years.) Meanwhile, a power struggle was going on in the Kremlin which involved the status of East Germany.

As noted before, immediately after Stalin's death Beria obtained control of the combined Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security. He was ambitious, ruthless, and clearly a threat to his colleagues. One of Beria's maneuvers to enhance his popularity among the masses was through liberalizations which would be noticed by the public and gain him the reputation of being somewhat liberal. Thus, he curbed the powers of the secret police, released prisoners of the Stalin era, and advocated a general political relaxation. Along these lines, Beria supported a "new course" for East Germany which was a repudiation of Ulbricht's Stalinist policies. The "new course" envisioned greater emphasis on

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<sup>54</sup>Victor Baras, "Stalin's German Policy After Stalin," Slavic Review, June, 1978, pp. 260-261.

the production of consumer goods, a relaxation of the political pressure on the population, and demanded self-criticism and reform from the party hierarchy in the G.D.R. This program contained no references whatsoever to building socialism in East Germany.

After Beria's arrest in June, 1953, he was accused of high treason and executed. Later it was claimed by Khrushchev that Beria had been advocating faulty policies with regard to Germany.<sup>55</sup>

Very few facts are known, but it may be postulated that Beria was planning to pursue an attempt at German reunification for his own political purposes. If he could liberalize the incumbent regime enough to satisfy the East Germans, he might be able to risk free elections in an attempt to foster East-West detente and to bolster his own position. The literature on this development is full of innuendo, and short on fact.<sup>56</sup>

Regardless of what Beria had planned, the June, 1953 uprisings in East Germany demonstrated widespread popular dissatisfaction with Communism and Soviet domination, and probably forever destroyed the possibility of free elections for German unification. It became extremely obvious to the

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<sup>55</sup>Victor Baras, "Beria's Fall and Ulbricht's Survival," Soviet Studies, July, 1975, p. 393 and notes 38 and 39.

<sup>56</sup>For example, in Michel Tatu's Power in the Kremlin (New York: Viking Press, 1969) there is a note which states "Beria and Malenkov had allegedly been tempted to sell out East Germany after Stalin's death." (p. 314) The sellout to whom, how, and why are left unanswered.

Soviet leaders how the vote would go, and controlling half of Germany was probably better, in Soviet eyes, than controlling none at all.

All illusion of free elections having been destroyed, the objective of Soviet German policy became "not the unification of Germany, but the prevention of West Germany's entry into the Western alliance."<sup>57</sup> Each and every time West Germany was about to move closer to the West via the European Defense Community proposal or the NATO agreements, the Soviets would try to entice them into delaying their decision by means of a renewed offer for reunification. Frustrated at Soviet intransigence and the lack of progress at the January-February 1954 Foreign Ministers' Conference, the NATO allies agreed upon West German rearmament as a part of the NATO strategy. Traditional Russian animosity for the Germans and the threat the Soviets perceived from a rearmed West Germany led Premier Bulganin to state at the Geneva Conference that the rearming of West Germany and her entry into NATO "would make pointless any discussion on the unification of Germany."<sup>58</sup>

Another reason for Soviet displeasure over West Germany's joining NATO was that it limited future options for the Soviets to exercise pressure on Germany. Had the Russians

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<sup>57</sup>Victor Baras, "Stalin's German Policy after Stalin," p. 262.

<sup>58</sup>Vital Speeches, August 15, 1955, p. 1412.

been able to keep Germany out of NATO and relatively neutral, subversion might have been a successful means to extend Soviet influence over the whole Germany. However, the Soviets correctly saw that once West Germany was a NATO member, the costs and risks of an attempt to subvert her were exceedingly high.

The Soviets may have been willing to give a little more on the issue of Germany, but their asking price was a drastic reduction of U.S. influence and military power in Europe. The Soviets wanted a non-aggression pact to be signed between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, followed by the development of an all-European security system and the abolition of defensive alliances. This was envisioned to involve the removal of U.S. strategic bombers from the European theater (forward based systems) and a general pullback by both the Soviet Union and the United States. However, since the Soviet Union herself was a European power, she would be represented in this European security arrangement and the U.S. would not. The effects of this proposal would have been a severe relative power imbalance in Europe, heavily weighted towards the Soviet Union due to her geographical proximity and the limited ability of the U.S. to threaten nuclear retaliation without forward basing areas. (Recall that this is the era before ICBM's.)

Having been invaded twice in less than 50 years from Western Europe, the Soviet Union wanted to do all it could to erect a secure barrier between herself and the West.

Soviet references to European security and a solution to the German problem during this era were attempts to minimize the possibility of future threats to Soviet security from the western flank.

D. IMPROVING THE SOVIET "IMAGE"

Stalin and the recollections of "Stalinist Russia" gave the Soviet Union a bad image. His iron rule, the excesses committed under his direction, and his use of terror made the Soviet Union feared, and also looked upon as somewhat backwards. One of the goals of Soviet foreign policy at this time must have undoubtedly been establishing a greater respectability for the Soviet regime in the post-Stalin era.<sup>59</sup> The Soviet leaders no longer wanted to be considered as a group of scheming backroom revolutionaries, but rather as statesmen. At the same time, fear of a further expansion of Soviet power, as had taken place under Stalin in the post-war period, was contributing to the maintenance of a large U.S. military presence in Europe, and if the image of the Soviet Union could be improved, they hoped that the U.S. presence in Europe could be reduced and thereby allow greater Soviet influence in European affairs. As explained by Malenkov in a foreign policy speech on August 8, 1953, "if the North Atlantic Bloc is being now, in a tense

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<sup>59</sup>Albert Weeks, The Troubled Detente (New York: NYU Press, 1976), p. 95.

international situation, rent by internal struggle and contradictions, the situation might deteriorate, with the reduction of that tension, as far as the disintegration of the bloc."<sup>60</sup>

#### E. THE CHINESE FACTOR

Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence in this period was not just aimed at the West. Khrushchev wanted to heal the growing rift in Sino-Soviet relations, and to attempt to offset Mao's growing influence in Far Eastern affairs.

While the Chinese claim that their differences with the Soviet Union arose from the destalinization movement and change in the doctrine of the inevitability of war enunciated at the Soviet Twentieth Party Congress, the following factors were irritating Sino-Soviet relations at this time: "Maoist chauvinism," different revolutionary experiences, different political environments, economic differences, military inequities and separate revolutionary interest.<sup>61</sup>

Only three and one half weeks after Stalin's death, an agreement on trade and economic assistance was signed between China and the U.S.S.R. In September, 1954, Khrushchev and Bulganin travelled to Peking to visit with Mao, thus acknowledging the importance the Soviet leadership placed on

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<sup>60</sup> Pravda, August 9, 1953. Cited in Wladyslaw Kulski, Peaceful Co-Existence, An Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: Regnery Co., 1959), p. 168.

<sup>61</sup> Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 14-19.

Sino-Soviet relations. These wide-ranging talks ended with the return of Port Arthur to China's control, the dissolution of joint Sino-Soviet companies which had been exploiting the resources of China, and a further increase in the scope of Soviet technical assistance to the Chinese. The new Soviet leaders were prudently removing sources of irritation to the Chinese, and trying to ensure continued Chinese cooperation by means of assistance rather than threats.

The estrangement between Mao and Stalin had led the former to begin emphasizing his own communist and national interests in the Far East. The Chinese gave support to the North Koreans, the rebels in Indochina, and called for the repatriation of Quemoy, Matsu and the island of Taiwan, without regard for the desires or advice of the Moscow leadership. The Chinese acknowledged the Soviet Union as the "core" of the Communist world, but not as the supreme leader.<sup>62</sup> Accordingly, the Soviet offers to help develop China's industry and armed forces, to educate Chinese students in the Soviet Union, etc., were not magnanimous gestures, but rather, shrewdly calculated attempts to establish a basis for Soviet influence in, and eventual control of, Chinese affairs. If there was no dependence, there could be no control, and the Soviet Union, then, as now, wanted

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<sup>62</sup>Malcolm MacKintosh, The Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 196.

to exercise a certain degree of control over "fraternal" Communist states.

#### F. THE SOVIET ECONOMY

Analyzing the renewed Soviet interest in peaceful co-existence during an interview in July, 1955, John Foster Dulles, the U.S. Secretary of State, expressed his opinion that:

The Soviets are overextended and now they are seeking for new policies, policies which will grant them some respite against strains which they have been under in trying to do all of the things which they felt they needed to do in order to keep up with the pace which has been set by the free world...They have been constantly hoping and expecting our economy was going to collapse...on the contrary, it has been their system that is on the point of collapsing and our system is going along strong and vigorous.<sup>63</sup>

Dulles felt that economic problems were one of the major reasons for Soviet interest in a relaxation of tensions at this time, and this is seemingly affirmed by Molotov's statement to Dulles in San Francisco that the Soviets wanted to discuss disarmament, European security and economic cooperation at Geneva.<sup>64</sup>

Although Soviet civilian industrial output was growing at an annual rate of 10-11% between 1954 and 1957,<sup>65</sup> Soviet

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<sup>63</sup>U.S. News and World Report, July 15, 1955, p. 19.

<sup>64</sup>See page 43, note 53.

<sup>65</sup>Rush Greenslade and Phyllis Wallace, "Industrial Production in the USSR," Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power (Washington: GPO, 1962). Cited in Lincoln Bloomfield, et al., Khrushchev and the Arms Race (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), p. 227.

agricultural production was experiencing problems, necessitating the import of wheat from Canada, meat from France and sugar from Cuba (note: this is before Castro's time). Given the Soviet achievements in rocketry in 1957, this period undoubtedly required a great increase in investment for the development of rocket and nuclear weapons technologies. Malenkov, a proponent of increased investment in light industry and agriculture to raise the standard of living of the Soviet people, resigned in February, 1955, when it became clear that the investment required by heavy industry for rearmament precluded the further development of light industry. While Bulganin replaced Malenkov as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Khrushchev was increasingly acknowledged as the strong man in the Soviet leadership. Khrushchev proceeded with the development of heavy industry and rearmament while attempting to keep investment in light industry about constant. He could manage the increased investment in advanced weapons by cutbacks in the rubles allotted for conventional forces, only if he could keep the army happy. In order to be successful in this budgetary juggling, an era of low threat was needed.

#### G. BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS

The policy of peaceful coexistence, the question of the inevitability of war, and the resultant implications for defense spending and economic development were major factors in the bureaucratic power struggle between Malenkov and

Khrushchev which occurred between 1953 and 1955. Malenkov and his supporters believed that mutual deterrence was the best guarantee of peace and that if a nuclear war did take place it would lead to "the destruction of world civilization." Their reliance on deterrence implied minimal expenditures on strategic nuclear weapons and the ability to use scarce economic resources to raise the standard of living of the Soviet people. Khrushchev and his supporters, on the other hand, viewed the reliance on a policy of deterrence as a policy of complacency which could lead to disaster. Khrushchev favored the more expensive policy of superiority, and, while admitting that both sides would suffer extensive destruction in a nuclear war, he felt that the war was still winable.<sup>66</sup>

Malenkov was demoted from his position as Chairman of the Council of Ministers in February, 1955, and immediately his views on mutual deterrence came under open attack. Khrushchev and his supporters stressed the need to build a strong nuclear-armed military force and maintain high rates of investment in heavy industry. However, after Khrushchev had gained the upper hand in the power struggle and reinforced his position by means of the Geneva summit, his views on nuclear war evolved to such an extent that they were virtually indistinguishable from Malenkov's: "...war must be prevented because, if it breaks out in this day and age, it will bring disaster to the

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<sup>66</sup>Herbert Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1959), pp. 18-23, 71.

whole planet...War would do as much harm to the socialist countries as it would to anyone else."<sup>67</sup>

Khrushchev and Malenkov were both impressed by the destructiveness of nuclear weapons and the need for the Soviet Union to peacefully coexist with the West. Khrushchev's victory in the power struggle was not determined by his adherence to or rejection of the general line of peaceful coexistence, but on how he manipulated the military and heavy industrial sectors to back his policy of peace through strength.

#### H. OTHER FACTORS

With all of the U.S. election rhetoric about containment and rollback, and lacking official recognition of the satellite status of Eastern Europe, the Soviet leaders were hoping that an era of relaxed tensions would help them to obtain Western acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe. This would lessen the Soviet fear of Western intervention in their sphere of interest in the event of any future uprisings like those in East Germany in June, 1953.

Another possible cause for increased Soviet interest in peaceful coexistence with the West (and East) was the Soviet desire to put more of their emphasis and resources into supporting national liberation struggles in Asia, Africa and

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<sup>67</sup>N.S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: the Last Testament (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1974), p. 530.

Latin America. The cost and risks of attempting to spread Communism into Western Europe were too high, and the prospects for success appeared much brighter in the Third World.

#### I. SUMMARY

The post-Stalin leadership of the Soviet Union perceived a number of internal and external threats in the period under consideration. They were inexperienced in international affairs and unsure of their ability to control their own population and those of the satellites. The United States was engaged in a significant arms buildup as a result of the Korean War and the perceived Communist threat, and the U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, was calling for a policy of "containment" and "rollback" of Communism. West Germany, the larger and stronger portion of Russia's historical enemy in Europe, was going to be rearmed and integrated into the NATO alliance. A significant number of differences had arisen between the Soviets and the Chinese, and the new Soviet leaders were worried about preserving the appearance (and reality) of unity in the Communist camp. The Soviet economy still had not recovered from the deprivations of World War II, and the Soviet leaders were questioning the need, and their ability, to continue heavy investment in the defense sector. These threats to the stability of their system significantly contributed to the interest of the Soviet leaders in pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence. This interest was specifically manifested in the Soviet disarmament

proposal of May 10, 1955, the Austrian peace treaty, signed on May 15, 1955, and the attitudes of the Soviet delegates at the Geneva talks in July 1955. Peaceful coexistence and a change in the Soviet doctrine of the inevitability of war were major themes of the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU in 1956.

The concern of the Soviet leaders for maintaining the image of cooperation with the West waned in late 1956 as a result of the Hungarian uprising, unrest in Poland, and the Suez crisis. At the same time, there were differences in the Soviet leadership concerning Khrushchev's policies, leading to the June, 1957 expulsion of the "anti-party group" of Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Shelipin for opposing "the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence," relaxation of international tension, and of "catching up with the United States."<sup>68</sup>

In August, 1957 the first Soviet ICBM was tested and in October of that year Sputnik I was launched, demonstrating the Soviet achievement in long-range rocketry, and containing a veiled threat to the West. In 1958 there was an increase of tensions over the Mideast, Far East and Berlin, the latter resulting in Khrushchev issuing an ultimatum on November 27, 1958 giving the West six months to sign a final treaty on the German question. As the Soviet leaders became more sure

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<sup>68</sup>David Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin (Philadelphia: Lippincott Co., 1961), p. 453.

of themselves, and militarily stronger and more confident,  
the "spirit of Geneva" began to appear as just a temporary  
pause in the Cold War.

#### IV. THE SPIRIT OF CAMP DAVID

The renewed Soviet interest in promoting peaceful co-existence during the 1958-1960 period has often been overlooked, or combined with the detente approach which culminated in the signing of a number of agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1963. However, this period merits its own analysis. Because the "spirit of Geneva" faded so rapidly, it is interesting to note the reasons for Khrushchev's quick return to the soft line of peaceful coexistence.

On March 31, 1958 Khrushchev became Premier, once again uniting the position of head of the Soviet government with that of head of the Soviet Communist Party. One of his first gestures towards the West in 1958 was contained in a letter to Eisenhower, dated 2 June, in which Khrushchev explains that he is striving to expand the supply of consumer goods and housing for the Soviet people, and that he would like to see a "considerable increase in U.S. - Soviet trade" to help bring this about.<sup>69</sup>

Khrushchev's second major interaction with the West in 1958 occurred on November 27 when he tried to use a crude form of nuclear blackmail by issuing an ultimatum to the

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<sup>69</sup>U.S. Department of State Bulletin, August 4, 1958, pp. 200-201.

Western Powers that they had six months to find a final solution for the problem of a divided Berlin. The West responded by agreeing to a Foreign Ministers' conference on Germany and the Berlin situation that was held between May and August 1959. When it appeared that nothing would result from this conference, Eisenhower sent a personal note directly to Khrushchev inviting him "to pay a friendly visit to the United States."<sup>70</sup>

Premier Khrushchev spent two weeks touring the United States in September 1959, ending his trip with a three-day conference with Eisenhower at Camp David, Maryland. The amicable exchange of views during this conference led to an apparent relaxation of tension that was called the "spirit of Camp David." At the same time, Khrushchev published an article in the October issue of Foreign Affairs (released in September, just prior to his visit) entitled "On Peaceful Coexistence," in which he attempted to explain the peaceful intent of Soviet foreign policy to the American intellectual community.

The Camp David meeting was intended to act as a weather-vane to determine whether a meeting of the heads of state of the Big Four would be worthwhile. Khrushchev's attitude, as perceived by Eisenhower, showed hope for successful

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<sup>70</sup>N.S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, The Last Testament (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1974), pp. 368-369.

high-level diplomacy, and after Camp David a Big Four summit meeting was scheduled for May 1960 in Paris.

Khrushchev's renewed interest in peaceful coexistence was the result of a number of latent threats that he and the other Kremlin leaders perceived at this time: bureaucratic politics, European security problems, the strategic balance, the state of the Soviet economy, and the growing Sino-Soviet rift.

#### A. BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS

Khrushchev was nearly ousted from power by his Presidium colleagues in June, 1957. The vote was 7-4 against him, but Khrushchev managed to remain in power by his appeal to the Central Committee which had been quickly assembled by his supporters. Khrushchev then turned the tables against his opponents, and the leaders of the "anti-party group," Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich, were ousted for opposition to the party line, especially in regards to the policy of peaceful coexistence.<sup>71</sup> However, Khrushchev's victory was not complete, because the members of the anti-party group lost only their current Presidium positions. When Khrushchev attempted to have these men stripped of their party membership at the Twenty-first Party Congress in January, 1959, his desires were ignored.

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<sup>71</sup>Lincoln Bloomfield, Walter Clemens, and Franklyn Griffiths, Khrushchev and the Arms Race (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), p. 164.

Another indication of the tenuousness of Khrushchev's position was the fact that the Central Committee membership was not changed at the Twenty-first Party Congress. Central Committee membership usually reflects a certain amount of patronage on the part of Presidium members: each Presidium member has his own group of supporters in the Central Committee, and when a Presidium member is dismissed, his proteges in the Central Committee are usually dismissed also. Thus, Central Committee membership usually reflects the balance of power among factions in the Presidium. The fact that Central Committee membership remained the same after the Twenty-first Party Congress was a significant indicator of the weakness of Khrushchev's position. While 22 of the 122 voting members of the Central Committee were out of favor at this time, they still maintained and exercised their perogatives as Central Committee members.<sup>72</sup> Khrushchev's position was not nearly as secure as he would have liked it.

Khrushchev's reputation and tenure in office was heavily dependent on his ability to maintain the situation of peaceful coexistence, the policy adopted by the leadership at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956. The Chinese were questioning the correctness of this course and the revision of the Leninist doctrine on the inevitability of war. The seven year plan for 1959-1966 called for massive increases in

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<sup>72</sup>Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin (New York: Viking Press, 1969), p. 22.

consumer goods output in order to catch up and surpass the United States. This, tied with nuclear weapons and ICBM production, necessitated Khrushchev's decision to reduce the size of the Soviet armed forces by 1.2 million men between January, 1960 and late 1961.<sup>73</sup> In order to bring this all about, Khrushchev needed the support of the ranking military personnel and a successful policy of peaceful coexistence.

Although Khrushchev had apparently overcome the challenge to his position, he was not firmly in control. He desperately sought a summit meeting with the leaders of the United States, England and France to engage in high-level, publicity generating politics. Khrushchev's trip to the U.S., the first by a ruling Soviet leader, was highly publicized both in the Soviet Union and in the satellites. This undoubtedly was to assure the Soviet public, Presidium and leaders of the bloc countries that Nikita Sergeievich was a statesman, respected by the leaders of the capitalist West, and a man who deserved to represent the Soviet Union both at home and abroad. It is common political practice to use summitry to raise the public opinion of a leader at home, and this was of the utmost importance to Khrushchev at this time. His position in the leadership was insecure, and the reinforcement

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<sup>73</sup> Khrushchev's speech to the General Assembly of the U.N., September 23, 1960. Current History, November 1960, pp. 299-300.

of the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence by means of a summit meeting would lessen the political threat, and more firmly entrench him in the Soviet power structure.

#### B. EUROPEAN SECURITY

Being the largest state in Europe which twice in the course of one generation was subjected to invasion over its western borders, the Soviet Union, naturally, cannot but show unremitting concern over security in Europe which is inseparable from its own security.<sup>74</sup>

Prior to and during the Geneva Summit in 1955, the Soviet Union was willing to discuss German reunification. The final document of the Geneva Summit included the following:

The Heads of Governments, recognizing their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the re-unification of Germany, have agreed that the settlement of the German question and the re-unification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security.<sup>75</sup>

However, when the Soviet Union, in December, 1957, started calling for another summit meeting, German reunification was not on the agenda. What concerned the Soviet Union then was the possible transfer of American nuclear weapons to the NATO allies, especially West Germany. The Soviets therefore proposed a nuclear free zone which would

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<sup>74</sup>Note from Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister to the American Ambassador, on European Security, July 15, 1958. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, Documents on Germany, 1944-1961 (Washington: GPO, 1961), p. 325.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid., p. 184.

consist of the FRG, GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia.<sup>76</sup> The U.S. response was a stressing of the need for German reunification. In February the Soviets responded to the U.S., proposing a German peace treaty as part of the summit, but stating that "the question of unification cannot be the subject of consideration" at the summit.<sup>77</sup> The Soviet stress was on security from atomic threats from NATO, and a western ratification of the status quo in Germany.

The German question became a sticking point in the summit preparations. Although Khrushchev desired (needed) a summit at almost any cost, the reunification of Germany was just too much to ask. Out of a sense of utter frustration Khrushchev issued an ultimatum on November 27, 1958, giving the West six months to sign a final treaty on Germany.

Khrushchev, speaking in Leipzig on March 7, 1959, explained the Soviet interest in solving the German problem this way:

Why then do we nevertheless attach such great significance to the German problem? Because it is the focal point of the problem of war and peace, one of the principal sources of international friction and conflicts. Great armed forces of the countries of the West and East are concentrated in Germany. And when two armies stand ranged against each other, are in direct contact, any spark might touch off the conflagration of war...This must be prevented. This is why we are pressing, and will continue

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<sup>76</sup>Ibid., pp. 253-257.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid., p. 276.

to press consistently for the normalization of the situation in Germany.<sup>78</sup>

The temporary period of bitterness over the German question passed relatively quickly, and a Foreign Ministers' conference in preparation for a summit convened in Geneva in May, 1959. Each side held to their respective positions on Germany, and little progress was made. Attempting to break the deadlock, Khrushchev was invited to the United States to converse with Eisenhower, where "an exchange of views took place on the question of Germany including the question of a peace treaty with Germany, in which the positions of both sides were expounded."<sup>79</sup> Unfortunately, there was no easy solution to the differences between East and West, and the prospects for an agreement on any aspect of the German problem at the Paris summit in May, 1960, appeared dim.

The arming of West Germany with nuclear weapons was a direct security threat to the Soviet Union, especially given the proximity of Soviet forces to the West German border. Khrushchev's respect for nuclear weapons and fear of the consequences of a nuclear war are well known.<sup>80</sup> Thus, the Soviet response to western calls for a reunified Germany

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<sup>78</sup> Ibid., p. 421.

<sup>79</sup> U.S. Department of State Bulletin, October 12, 1959, p. 499.

<sup>80</sup> For specific examples, see N.S. Khrushchev, For Victory In Peaceful Competition with Capitalism (New York: Dutton and Co., 1960), pp. 12, 144, 180-181, 375, 478.

is understandable as a result of the Soviet obsession with security.<sup>81</sup> The best solution, from the Soviet point of view, would be a united, communist Germany subordinated to the U.S.S.R. A satisfactory solution would have been the creation in central Europe of an "atom free zone" which incorporated both German states. The most unsatisfactory solution would have been a reunited, western-oriented Germany, or a West Germany armed with nuclear weapons and closely allied with the West. Part of the motivation for this period of peaceful coexistence was Khrushchev's attempt to achieve the best solution of the German problem which was still compatible with the security considerations of the Soviet Union.

#### C. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE STRATEGIC BALANCE

A new threat to Soviet security emerged in 1957 when the United States, at meetings in Bonn in May and Paris in December, proposed to place nuclear weapons in Western Europe as a part of the NATO arsenal, and to establish bases for intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM's) on the territory of the NATO allies. This was a major contributing factor to a second aspect of the peace offensive which started with Bulganin's note to President Eisenhower dated December 10, 1957, in which Bulganin decried western over-reaction

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<sup>81</sup>Noted earlier, p. 18.

to the success of the Soviet Sputnik program and called for a summit conference to ease international tension.<sup>82</sup>

The Soviet space successes of 1957 and the implied superiority it gave them in ICBM technology stimulated the development of a harder foreign policy line by the Soviet Union, and more and more frequent references to the shift which they saw occurring in the "correlation of world forces." Additionally, Soviet writers began to stress the theme that Soviet advances in strategic rocketry nullified the strategic advantages formerly held by the United States. According to Soviet propagandists, the United States had lost its traditional advantage of relative invulnerability to direct attack; the importance of strategic aviation, on which the U.S. was said to rely, was sharply reduced by the advent of ICBM's, which could deliver nuclear weapons to distant targets more efficiently and were invulnerable to existing means of defense; and United States overseas bases, which could now be destroyed quickly and easily by Soviet rockets, had lost their former military value.<sup>83</sup>

The Soviet leaders, seeing that the effect of the Sputnik and Luna space shots on the U.S., began a program of believable

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<sup>82</sup>U.S. Congress. Senate. Documents on Germany, 1944-1961 (Washington: GPO, 1961), pp. 251-258.

<sup>83</sup>Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 48. See also, Herbert Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1959), pp. 215-257.

exaggeration and overstatement concerning their strategic capabilities in order to deceive the West and extract concessions because of their presumed advantage.<sup>84</sup> Thus Khrushchev delivered his ultimatum on the need to solve the German question, hoping that Soviet advances in rocket technology would cause the West to be more yielding. The Soviet leaders, concerned about threats to their own security by the nuclear arming of NATO, were trying to play a deadly game of bluff in order to discredit the United States in the eyes of her allies, foster U.S. acceptance of peaceful coexistence on Soviet terms and further Soviet influence in continental Europe.

#### D. THE ECONOMY AND DEFENSE

While earlier in the 1950's the Soviets were having to spend significant amounts of money on research and development for nuclear weapons and rocket systems, by 1959 both had proven successful and were ready for full-scale production. Therefore the need for increased military expenditures continued to grow at the same time that overall Soviet economic growth was slowing from an annual rate of 10.7% (1954-1957) to a lower annual rate of 6.7% (1959-1962).<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>84</sup>Horelick and Rush, op. cit., make an excellent argument for the Soviet Union engaging in a conscious effort to make the West believe that the Soviets had more operational ICBM's than they actually did.

<sup>85</sup>Greenslade and Wallace, op. cit. p. 46.

The western notion of Soviet superiority in ICBM's (the missile gap) thus played directly into Khrushchev's hands. If he could maintain an atmosphere of peaceful coexistence, he could continue supporting the development of the Strategic Rocket Forces at the expense of the rest of the military (especially the army) and continue publicly emphasizing the civilian sector of the economy. This was incorporated into Khrushchev's Seven Year Economic Plan of 1959, which was designed to enable the Soviet Union to overtake the U.S. in consumer goods. While this plan was adopted at the Twenty-first Party Congress in January 1959 (prior to the Camp David meeting) Khrushchev must have certainly been able to use his Camp David success to persuade his colleagues of the correctness of this line.

#### E. THE CHINESE FACTOR

It is difficult to unravel all the intricacies of the Sino-Soviet dispute, but it appears that in 1959 the secret arguments between Moscow and Peking were growing hotter (even while Khrushchev was telling Eisenhower at Camp David that he and Mao were the best of friends) and the Soviet leaders were attempting to play their "American card" against the Chinese.

In 1953 the Soviets had signed trade and cooperation agreements with the Chinese, and in 1957 a secret agreement was apparently reached in which Moscow promised to give Peking atomic "know-how" and a "sample" atomic bomb.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>86</sup>William Griffiths, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1964), p. 351.

In June, 1959, the Soviets changed their minds about giving nuclear weapons technology to the Chinese because of the aggressiveness of Mao's attitude towards the West and Soviet fears of being dragged into a war by Mao's policy. Mao was declaring that the East wind was prevailing over the West wind, and that the socialist camp ought to utilize this new superiority and take decisive actions against the capitalists. This was completely opposed to Khrushchev's fear of a nuclear war and his program of peaceful competition with the West. While Mao advocated increased aggressiveness, the realities of nuclear weapons counselled prudence to Khrushchev. While Eisenhower's memoirs indicate Sino-Soviet relations were not discussed at Camp David,<sup>87</sup> the timing of Khrushchev's visit to the U.S. was sufficient to arouse increased Chinese ire and accusations of revisionism and collusion between the Soviet Union and the United States.

#### F. SUMMARY

Soviet achievements in the fields of nuclear weapons and delivery systems gave them an increased measure of self-confidence in their dealings with the West. However, the Soviet Union, under Khrushchev's influence, once again returned to a policy of seeking a relaxation of tensions in East-West relations. This search for detente was motivated by certain

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<sup>87</sup>Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (New York: Doubleday, 1965), p. 445.

threats perceived by Khrushchev himself, and the rest of the Soviet leadership. Khrushchev was not secure in his position within the leadership and needed a major success in either foreign or domestic policy to bolster his position. At this time a renewed emphasis on better East-West relations promised to give him the success he needed, and at the same time enable him to appease his domestic supporters by continuing heavy investment in the military (Strategic Rocket Forces) while reducing expenditures on conventional forces. This was to enable him to finance missiles and a small, but nonetheless significant, increase in consumer industry investment. The fear of nuclear weapons in the hands of the West Germans was also a significant factor in motivating the Soviets towards trying to establish better relations with the West. Also, the Soviet Union was just starting an arms buildup, and the Soviet leaders were afraid they would lose in any sustained arms race and thus wanted to use the propaganda value of peaceful coexistence as a tool to prevent a corresponding U.S. arms buildup.

Khrushchev's fear of nuclear war is well documented (see note 80) and the adventuristic policies being proposed by Mao alarmed him lest the Soviet Union be unwittingly involved in a war not of their own choosing. This led Khrushchev to seek better relations with the West, as insurance against potential damage that Mao might cause.

The detente of 1958-1960 was built on a narrow base which subsequently crumbled in the Spring of 1960 when an American

U-2 was shot down while on a mission over the U.S.S.R.

The Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting in Vienna in 1961 was followed by the surprising erection of the Berlin Wall, the resumption by the Soviet Union of nuclear testing, and the emplacement of offensive missiles in Cuba. The "spirit of Camp David" was only a momentary pause in the Cold War.

## V. THE MOSCOW ACCORDS

The Soviet Union had failed to intimidate the West into accommodation by a show of force over Berlin in 1961 and by the installation of offensive missiles in Cuba in 1962. Caught up in a hopeless dispute with Communist China, suffering from a sense of strategic inferiority vis-a-vis the U.S., and struggling with a slowing economic growth rate and poor harvests, the Soviet Union, in late 1962 and early 1963, once again began to pursue a much more conciliatory and cooperative line towards the West.

The first indication of change was in a letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy on December 19, 1962 (after the Cuban crisis) which showed a definite softening of the Soviet line in the area of arms control. In this letter Khrushchev modified the traditional Soviet policy against on-site inspections and agreed to "two or three" such inspections per year as a part of a disarmament agreement.<sup>88</sup> In June 1963 the hot-line agreement was signed, and the jamming of Voice of American broadcasts ceased. On August 5, 1963 the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain signed a limited nuclear test ban treaty. This was followed by a series of other minor agreements and accommodations which indicated to the

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<sup>88</sup>U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament, 1962 vol. 2 (July-December 1962), (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 1241.

West the the U.S.S.R. was serious about becoming more cooperative, i.e., an agreement to refrain from orbiting nuclear weapons in space, a multi-lateral treaty, sponsored by the U.N., on the rights of all states to explore outer space, the dropping of a Soviet call for the reorganization of the U.N. Secretariat along "troika" lines and the acceptance of U Thant as the new U.N. General Secretary, and finally a pledge by the leaders of the Soviet Union, United States and Britain to cutback the production of fissionable material. This lessening of international tension and increase in East-West cooperation lasted up to Khrushchev's ouster, and was the Soviet response to a combination of external and internal factors as described below.

#### A. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE STRATEGIC BALANCE

The Soviet emplacement of medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba in the Fall of 1962 was an attempt by the Soviet Union to quickly and inexpensively alter the strategic balance in their favor. The spectacular missile crisis, the real danger of a nuclear war, and the Soviet capitulation in the face of a determined U.S. response made a very real and deep impression on the Soviet leaders. The following period "marked the lowest level of tension between the Soviet Union and the United States of the entire postwar period."<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> Marshall Shulman, "Recent Soviet Foreign Policy: Some Patterns in Retrospect," Erik Hoffman and Frederic Fleron, The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1971), p. 456.

The missile gap, which had figured so prominently in the 1960 presidential campaign, suddenly ceased to exist in September, 1961 when it was revealed that the Soviet Union, rather than possessing "on the order of 200" operational ICBMs, actually had "well under 50".<sup>90</sup> This, however, did not slow the American strategic buildup which began with Kennedy's assumption of office, and contributed to the Soviet gamble of placing missiles in Cuba. An MRBM or IRBM in Cuba would have the same strategic impact as an ICBM based in the U.S.S.R.

The backing down of the Soviet Union in the face of U.S. military superiority in October, 1962 deeply frustrated the Soviet leaders, and led Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov to declare: "Never will we be caught like this again."<sup>91</sup> Their inability to militarily back their foreign policy became a contributing factor to this new era of detente. The Soviet Union had two choices: to compete in an all out arms race with the U.S., or to attempt to slow the competition while continuing to build up their own military forces at a rate they could more easily afford. Not having the ability or the resources to match the U.S. in an all out arms race, the Soviets chose the latter course, attempting to slow U.S. and NATO defense efforts by a lessening of the apparent

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<sup>90</sup> Joseph Alsop, Washington Post, September 25, 1961.

<sup>91</sup> John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), p. 68.

threat. In April 1964 the Pentagon released their best estimate of the strategic balance at that time, showing the U.S. to possess 540 long range bombers compared to 270 for the Soviet Union, and 750 ICBMs compared to a Soviet total of 188.<sup>92</sup> This gave the U.S. a 4:1 advantage in the strategic balance, and the gap showed no signs of becoming narrower.

In addition to the reassuring political moves made by the Soviet Union throughout 1963, in December Khrushchev announced a 4 1/2 percent reduction in the Soviet defense budget for 1964,<sup>93</sup> and the resumption of troop cutbacks - moves intended to influence public opinion in the West, and allow greater emphasis on the economic problems at home.

The widening gap in the strategic balance between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and the inability of the Soviet Union to militarily support her foreign policy were threats which the Soviet Union could not long endure. The 1963-1964 period of detente was the Soviet answer to these threats.

#### B. THE SOVIET ECONOMY

Soviet economic performance in 1962-1963 was worse than in any other period in the postwar era. Poor weather led to a severe contraction in the agricultural sector, producing 10 percent less in 1963 than in 1962. Using Soviet statistics, the rate of industrial growth fell to 8 percent (it had

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<sup>92</sup>U.S. Department of Defense Statement of U.S.-Soviet Strategic Balance, April 14, 1964, New York Times, April 15, 1964, p. 1.

<sup>93</sup>Pravda, December 16, 1963; Izvestia, December 15, 1963.

averaged 10 percent or better since 1950), the investment in heavy industry only increased 9 percent (compared to 11 percent or better since 1950), the investment in consumer goods increased only 5 percent (compared to 7 percent per year for the past three years), and the Soviet GNP, again using their figures, only increased 5 percent, the lowest rate in ten years.<sup>94</sup>

A CIA analysis of the same period indicated that the growth rate of the Soviet economy in 1962 and 1963 had fallen from the postwar average of 6-10 percent per year to a low of 2.5 percent, and attributed this decline to: a shift of investment priorities away from heavy industry to more technologically demanding areas such as chemical and fertilizer production and a diversified mix of consumer goods, "a very large increase in military and space spending" (which is anti-growth in that it takes resources and personnel away from productive investment), and the serious decline in agricultural output in 1962 and 1963. Soviet food production in 1964 was expected to be only 3 percent greater than in 1956, while on a per capita basis it was 7-8 percent less than in 1956 due to the growth of the Soviet population. Additionally, wheat output in 1963 was 10 million tons less than in 1962.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>94</sup>Central Statistical Agency of the U.S.S.R., cited in Howard J. Sherman, The Soviet Economy (Little, Brown and Co.: Boston, 1969), p. 109.

<sup>95</sup>"CIA Report on the Soviet Economy," New York Times January 8, 1964, p. 1.

The combination of a decreasing rate of economic growth, agricultural failures, the rising expectations of Soviet consumers, and the perceived need to bolster defense spending in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis led to another internal debate on resource allocation in the Soviet economy. Khrushchev adopted the view that military expenditures should be held back to allow the civilian sector of the economy to grow:

Whereas during the period of the first five-year plans and in the postwar years we laid chief stress on the development of heavy industry as the basis for building up the economy of the entire country and on strengthening its defense capability, now, when we have a mighty industry, when the defense of the country is at a suitable level, the Party is setting the task of more rapid development of the sectors of the economy that produce consumer goods.<sup>96</sup>

An economic crisis was developing in the Soviet Union, and necessitated that the leadership make specific hard choices. Khrushchev came out in favor of restraining defense spending to concentrate on the agricultural and consumer sectors, and this necessitated an era of peaceful coexistence with the West.

#### C. THE CHINESE FACTOR

Despite Khrushchev's assurances to Eisenhower at Camp David in 1959 that he and Mao were the best of friends,<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>96</sup>N.S. Khrushchev, "Main Directions for Drawing Up the Plan for Development of the National Economy in the Period Immediately Ahead," *Pravda*, October 2, 1964. Cited in Thomas Wolfe, "Impact of Khrushchev's Downfall on Soviet Military Policy and Detente," Detente: Cold War Strategies In Transition, ed. by Dulles and Crane, p. 285.

<sup>97</sup>Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 445.

they were not, and the differences between the U.S.S.R. and China continued to worsen, culminating in an open break in mid-1963.<sup>98</sup> Besides the animosity over the Soviet reluctance to fulfill a promise to China to provide them with a sample atomic weapon and the technical plans for production,<sup>99</sup> the Chinese disagreed with destalinization and its implications for the Communist world, and they accused the Soviet Union of "revisionism" in Khrushchev's "tampering" with the teachings of Lenin on the inevitability of war. Added to this were Chinese accusations of Soviet faintheartedness and lack of revolutionary fervor after backing down over Cuba in 1962, and generally failing to support a more adventurist line in confronting the imperialist states in the current era. Minor differences which existed before Stalin's death were exacerbated by Khrushchev's destalinization campaign, Soviet claims that their's was the only true road to socialism, and the different social conditions in the two communist giants. There was also a factor of hegemony in the dispute: the Soviets were attempting to gain/maintain control over China's foreign and nuclear defense policies through military aid to China and non-proliferation treaties with the West, and the Chinese, with a recent past history of foreign

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<sup>98</sup> See William Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1964).

<sup>99</sup> "The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves," Peking Review September 13, 1963, p. 12.

hegemony and exploitation, wanted nothing to do with Soviet control. At the same time, China was making her first incursions into Africa, and encouraging Eastern European countries, such as Albania and Rumania, to pursue a more independent foreign policy line.

Soviet aggravation with China was both a cause and a result of the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence with the West: a cause of the Soviet turning towards the West in that the Soviets did not want hostile neighbors on both her eastern and western borders and it was easier to placate the West than the Chinese; and a result in that the revision of the Leninist doctrine on the inevitability of war and the Soviet desire to peacefully coexist with West directly contradicted Chinese interpretations of what Marxism-Leninism was all about. Khrushchev feared that Mao would get the Soviet Union involved in a confrontation with the West, and therefore sought to reduce the possibility of this occurrence by establishing better relations with the West.

#### D. EUROPEAN SECURITY

Through all the phases of Soviet foreign policy since the October revolution Germany has been of primary importance...the hope of winning over Germany, fear of Germany, alliance with Germany, war with Germany...For Russia the German question is 90 percent of her foreign policy.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>100</sup>G.F. Hudson, "Soviet Soft Line Towards the West," Current History, October 1963, p. 234.

The Soviet actions in erecting the Berlin Wall in August 1961 showed their frustrations over attempts to solve the postwar German problem to their satisfaction. In early 1963 the U.S. defense planners began talking of a NATO multilateral nuclear force, in which allied states would be provided with nuclear weapons under U.S. control. This was an attempt to appease French and German ambitions for nuclear weapons, and yet guarantee the Soviets that the Germans would not have possession and control of nuclear weapons.

Throughout the Fall of 1963 the Soviet press was full of articles decrying the possibility of West Germany obtaining control of nuclear weapons. One example will suffice to show the seriousness of the Soviet concern:

One cannot, on the one hand, declare one's readiness to continue the search for peace, to turn the present pause in the "cold war"...into a period of fruitful cooperation...while on the other hand meeting the West German revanchists halfway and gratifying their nuclear appetite through the creation of multilateral nuclear NATO forces, which would open the doors of the nuclear arsenal to the West German militarists.

Soviet leading circles are naturally obliged to take into consideration the dangerous consequences of the nuclear armament of the FRG...Thought should also be given to the fact that the dangerous steps undertaken in NATO are bound to exert a negative influence on the still weak shoots of mutual understanding and trust among states, and consequently, to have an unfavorable effect on searches for a solution to the problem of strengthening general peace.<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>101</sup>"Do Not Give Bonn Revanchists Access to Nuclear Weapons," Pravda, October 22, 1963, p. 3. Current Digest of the Soviet Press, November 13, 1963, p. 21.

The specter of nuclear armed Germany, regardless of who actually controlled the weapons, contributed to Soviet interest in detente at this time.

Using the momentum of the East-West agreements signed in the Fall of 1963, on January 28, 1964 the Soviet delegation to the Geneva disarmament talks submitted a list of proposals "aimed at slowing down the armament race and further lessening international tension." An analysis of these proposals reveals much of the underlying Soviet concern for security. They called for "withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries," saying that "of particularly important significance would be the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of European States." A "reduction of the total numbers of armed forces of States," and "reduction of military budgets" was called for, recommending that the Western Powers follow the lead of the unilateral military and defense cutbacks Khrushchev announced for the Soviet Union in December 1963 (which were apparently motivated by economic, not idealistic goals). The Soviets placed "special importance" on the "establishment of denuclearized zones...in those regions where the danger of nuclear conflict is greatest, and first and foremost in Central Europe." Under the proposal on the "prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons," the Soviets said it was "particularly important...to close all channels...through which nuclear weapons could come into the hands of those who twice during this century have caused the conflagration of a world war

and who are now actively striving to obtain nuclear weapons," (i.e., West Germany). The Soviet Union specifically noted that weapons or information transfers should be prohibited both directly, and "indirectly...for example, through the so-called multilateral force of NATO."<sup>102</sup>

This reveals the primal Soviet fear of a nuclear-armed West Germany, and was a strong factor in the Soviet desire for a lessening of tension during this period. At the same time, the Soviet Union continued making overtures towards de Gaulle, trying to use the forces of reduced international tension and French nationalism to hasten the destruction of NATO from internal rivalries.

#### E. BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS

The Cuban missile crisis was a terrible blow to Khrushchev's position within the party leadership, and the significant lessening of international tension which followed can be viewed as his attempt to recover some amount of stature after such an embarrassing setback. Indications of differences among the Soviet leaders and the changing power balance in the Politburo occurred on the very first day of the crisis, as evidenced by Herbert Dinerstein's comparison of editorial articles in Pravda, Izvestiia, and Red

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<sup>102</sup>Soviet Memorandum Submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Measures for Slowing Down the Armaments Race and Relaxing International Tension, January 28, 1964. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament, 1964 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 12-17.

Star.<sup>103</sup> Reports on government functions in Pravda no longer carried Khrushchev's name in a place of honor, but rather, in alphabetical order with the other Politburo members. While a December, 1962 report of a Moscow conference was entitled "Talks of N.S. Khrushchev with Josip Broz Tito," in November, 1963, after the crisis, report titles read more like "Meeting of comrades Khrushchev and Suslov with comrade Zhivkov," stressing that the collective leadership was superior to any one person. Michel Tatu, a noted Kremlinologist, has thoroughly researched this period and concluded that "the mere opening of the Cuban crisis caused Khrushchev suddenly to lost ground within the collective leadership. Although the grave situation and the danger to the country might have been expected to enhance the chief's stature, the result was the exact opposite."<sup>104</sup>

After the Cuban missile crisis there was a renewed emphasis on collective leadership in the Soviet Union, a slowing of destalinization, an attempted rapprochement with China (February-March 1963), and a slight stiffening of attitudes towards the West. All of these moves were contrary to the policies favored by Khrushchev, and indicated that his influence was decreasing.

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<sup>103</sup> Herbert Dinerstein, The Making of a Missile Crisis: October 1962 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1976), pp. 219-223, and 239-273.

<sup>104</sup> Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin (New York: Viking Press, 1969), pp. 274-275.

In April 1963 Khrushchev's main opponent in the Party leadership, Kozlov, suffered a stroke and disappeared from the political scene, leading to a resurgence of Khrushchev's authority, increasing hostility towards China, and a new accommodation with the West (the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of August 1963). Khrushchev reached the zenith of his career at the June 1963 Party Plenum when the resolution on China mentioned "for the first and last time in the Khrushchev era, the 'Presidium of the Central Committee Headed by Comrade Khrushchev.'"<sup>105</sup>

#### F. SUMMARY

As described above, there were a number of significant threats perceived by the Soviet leaders during this period. First and foremost of these was the overwhelming military superiority of the United States and the Soviet inability to militarily back their foreign policy as demonstrated by the Cuban crisis. The momentum of the U.S. arms buildup had to be slowed to a rate which would allow the Soviet Union, with its growing economic problems, to first of all, prevent the gap from widening, and secondly, to start to close the gap. The stationing of nuclear weapons in West Germany added more fuel to the traditional Soviet (Russian) fear of Germany, and was considered another threat to Soviet security. The Sino-Soviet rift of the 1950's developed into

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<sup>105</sup>Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin, p. 353.

an open break, contributing even more uncertainty to the deliberations of the Soviet leaders. And finally, in the aftermath of Cuba, Khrushchev's policies were discredited and he started losing control. The illness of his primary opponent, Kozlov, enabled Khrushchev to salvage his position by once again capitalizing on his reputation as a supporter of peaceful coexistence. He attempted to do this by encouraging and joining in another period of relaxed East-West tensions.

Khrushchev ran into increasing opposition in the Fall of 1964 on such topics as economic priorities, a possible rapprochement with the Federal Republic of Germany, and the China problem. He was ousted in October 1964, and immediately the Soviet Union began to follow a harder line towards the West. Further attempts were made to better relations with China, and increased Soviet aid was offered to Vietnam. In Brezhnev's speech on international relations at the Twenty-third Party Congress in 1966, peaceful coexistence was not even mentioned in the section dealing with America.<sup>106</sup> The Soviet Union also continued courting de Gaulle, succeeding in July 1966, when de Gaulle announced France's termination of military cooperation with NATO.

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<sup>106</sup> Albert Weeks, The Other Side of Peaceful Coexistence, p. 225.

## VI. DETENTE AND SALT I

There was more to the detente of 1972 than just the strategic arms limitation agreements. Three years of U.S.-Soviet negotiations had contributed to a perceptible lessening of international tension, and resulted in a significant number of other intergovernmental accords which were signed during President Nixon's May 1972 visit to Moscow: the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) agreement, an agreement to limit offensive weapons, an enumeration of the basic principles of relations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., and agreements covering trade, incidents at sea, scientific and technological cooperation, joint space ventures, health, protection of the environment, and cultural exchanges. At the same time, five declarations of cooperative intent were signed, covering Europe, the Middle East, Indochina, disarmament, and measures to strengthen the U.N.<sup>107</sup> A true and lasting detente relationship between the U.S. and Soviet Union appeared in the offing.

There were a number of factors which led to a renewed Soviet interest in detente in the late 1960's, not the least of which was the fact that the 20 year treaty establishing NATO was set to expire in 1969, and, having succeeded in coaxing de Gaulle to terminate French military cooperation

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<sup>107</sup>U.S. Department of State, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Volume 8, Number 23, June 5, 1972, pp. 934-981.

with NATO (1966), the Soviets were hoping to use a new detente to hasten NATO's demise. Additional factors which contributed to a renewed Soviet interest in detente were Soviet economic problems, security concerns generated by U.S. strategic innovativeness, Soviet perceptions of U.S. domestic problems, Soviet perceptions of the effects of detente on Western Europe, and Soviet apprehensions of China.

#### A. THE CONDITION OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY

While American scholars have disagreed over the relative importance of economic factors as a determinant of Soviet interest in detente, most scholars agree that economic factors were important. This is corroborated by frequent references in Soviet literature to the economic benefits derived from detente.<sup>108</sup> The following paragraphs examine the state of the Soviet economy during the period of the SALT I negotiations.

Agricultural productivity has been and continues to be the most significant and persistent problem of the Soviet economy, dating back to the early Communist drives to collectivize the peasants. It is a demonstrated fact that farmers produce more working for themselves than for the collective. For example, almost all farmers working on a collective farm

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<sup>108</sup> For example, see G. Arbatov, "Soviet-American Relations and their Prospective Development," Vil'nyus Kommunist Number 9, September 1975.

have their own small garden plots which they are allowed to tend on their off-duty time. These small plots, vestiges of the free enterprise system, while occupying less than 10 percent of the arable land, account for over "one-quarter of the total agricultural output, including one-fifth of the crops...as well as one-third of the livestock products."<sup>109</sup>

In addition to motivational factors, the collective farms are too large and suffer from diseconomies of scale, while the private plots are too small for efficient economic production. Fertilizers, a necessity for intensive agricultural production, were in short supply, and farm equipment was and is not as plentiful as in the West. Weather, a problem for all farmers, is an even more significant factor in the U.S.S.R. because of its northerly orientation (more than 80 percent of the U.S.S.R. is north of the latitude of Maine). It is interesting and instructive to note that while 4 percent of the U.S. labor force more than meets domestic food needs, 24 percent of all Soviet workers are engaged in food production and fulfill their planned objectives only erratically.<sup>110</sup>

Another problem, allied to the problem of grain production, is the lack of animal protein for human consumption. The Soviet Union does not grow enough grain to feed the animals

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<sup>109</sup>U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee, Soviet Economy in a New Perspective, (Washington: GPO, 1976), p. 592.

<sup>110</sup>Morton Schwartz, The Foreign Policy of the USSR: Domestic Factors (Encino, Ca.: Dickenson Publishers, 1975), p. 31.

required to satisfy the public's demand for meat. While in the past this scarcity of meat has been alleviated by the catches of the Soviet fishing fleet, many of the world's prime fishing areas have been overfished by the Soviets, reducing current and future catch sizes. The diet of the typical Russian, although adequate and improving, is not up to the standards of other developed countries, and is a source of some domestic dissatisfaction.

The low quantities and inferior quality of Soviet consumer goods is another problem of the Soviet leadership in as much as it limits the value of monetary incentives for the workers (since there isn't much to buy), and contributes to a significant amount of low-level discontent among the shoppers. For example, the general shortage of, and high prices paid for automobiles in the Soviet Union is well documented<sup>111</sup> and led to the construction of the largest automobile plant in the U.S.S.R. at Volgograd, managed by FIAT, with the core technology and three-quarters of the production equipment supplied from various U.S. firms.<sup>112</sup>

In the industrial sector, the underlying problem is the inability to mass produce goods incorporating high technology without sacrificing quality. The U.S.S.R. has demonstrated

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<sup>111</sup>Hedrick Smith, The Russians (New York: Ballantine Books, 1976), Chapter 1.

<sup>112</sup>Anthony Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development 1945-1965 (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1973), pp. 200-201.

its ability to manufacture ICBMs and large hydroelectric turbines, but is unable to meet consumer demand for automobiles, food and other domestic items. What the Soviets lack is "the know-how to manufacture in quantity at acceptable cost and quality, and that is what they want from U.S. industry...In meetings with U.S. government officials and businessmen, Soviet officials have consistently stressed their desire to import production technology."<sup>113</sup> The Soviets have gone so far as to admit that "the U.S.S.R. still lags behind the U.S.A. in certain types of processing - in the products of the instrument and electronic industries, plastics, synthetic fibers, and electric power, and in the level of automation of production and introduction of computers."<sup>114</sup>

Computer technology is another area in which the Soviet Union is keenly interested in Western assistance. While the U.S.S.R. has developed highly sophisticated computers for military applications, the civilian sector (civilian industrial production, financial transactions, stock control, etc.) is mired down in a growing morass of paperwork.

The efficiency and productivity of Soviet industry was another area the Soviets admitted problems in. Demographic analyses indicate that the manpower reserve in the U.S.S.R. is virtually nonexistent, and that the number of youths

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<sup>113</sup>John Oliver and Elliott Weiss, "Is Selling Technology to the Soviets Dangerous?" Harvard Business Review (January-February 1975), p. 18.

<sup>114</sup>V.M. Kudrov, "Some Questions on the Economic Competition Between the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A.," SShA, (No. 9, 1975), p. 7.

available for the workforce (and the military) will be decreasing in the future. It has been Soviet policy in the past to increase production by increasing their least expensive asset - people - while letting their productivity remain relatively constant. This can no longer be done. Brezhnev himself has realized this and said that "the principal task today is to bring about an abrupt change in orientation, to shift emphasis to intensive methods of running the economy, and thereby to bring about a serious improvement in its efficiency. The point is to generate economic growth more and more by increasing labor productivity."<sup>115</sup>

Soviet oil problems, recently receiving much news, were clearly evident in Soviet literature prior to 1974. Insufficient long-range planning, inadequate capital investment, and short-sighted extraction techniques headed the list of problems. The Soviets realized that the net result of these factors would be a change in their status from that of an oil exporter to that of an oil consumer by the early 1980's. "The Soviet Union is apparently not able to handle the development of her resources and the requisite industrial base. Thus the Soviet Union is faced with a profound problem of finances for economic expansion - which is well above her means and which is forcing her to seek credits, technology,

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<sup>115</sup>L.I. Brezhnev, Speech on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Formation of the U.S.S.R., in Kudrov, op. cit., p. 9.

and assistance in the West." "Soviet publications clearly show that the recent Soviet push for long-term, low-interest credits for the acquisition of Western high technology, equipment, and technological and managerial expertise has been motivated primarily by economic necessity."<sup>116</sup>

The overall significance of economic problems to Soviet interest in detente is not the goal of this analysis, but more simply to indicate that the shortcomings of the Soviet economy were a definite factor. Detente, as envisaged by the Soviets, was seen to mean greater access to Western technology and a decrease in military spending in the U.S.S.R.

The need for military detente is also determined by a number of major and pressing problems that mankind faces at the present stage of historical development...such problems as those of food and certain natural resources, the development of medicine and education, space exploration, the use of the resources of the World Ocean... Clearly, these problems cannot be dealt with successfully under conditions of military tension and the senseless squandering of material resources and man's creative energy for military purposes.<sup>117</sup>

Between 1966 and 1973 the dollar value of total U.S. exports to the U.S.S.R. increased from \$42 million to \$1.2 billion,<sup>118</sup> and while no figures are available for the U.S., the Soviets readily admitted that "machinery and equipment

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<sup>116</sup>Marianna Slocum, "Soviet Energy - An Internal Assessment," Technology Review (October-November 1974), p. 31.

<sup>117</sup>A. Svetlov, "The Soviet Union's Struggle for Military Detente," International Affairs (No. 2, 1976), p. 98.

<sup>118</sup>U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs, Detente (Washington: GPO, 1974), p. 248.

make up almost 40 percent of the socialist countries imports from the West European countries."<sup>119</sup>

The Soviet leaders were aware of their economic problems and of consumer dissatisfaction, and detente seemed a promising answer to both of these problems. "Rather than face the politically painful choice of instituting substantial economic reforms, the Soviet leadership has opted for a massive effort to overcome its shortages by increasing the flow of trade, advanced technology, and capital from abroad."<sup>120</sup>

#### B. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE STRATEGIC BALANCE

The achievement of parity with the United States has both lessened the perceptions of immediate danger to the U.S.S.R. and provided the basis for the detente process. It should be emphasized that despite the unprecedented military threat now posed by the Soviet buildup, parity and political equality, in Soviet perceptions, are the ritual underpinnings for detente. They could not deal as a political equal with the United States from a position of inferiority.<sup>121</sup>

From the Bolshevik Revolution to the Cold War, the Soviet Union has always been the underdog. Victory in World War II gave the Soviets a large psychological boost, and left them as the second strongest nation in the world. However, while the Soviet Union maintained an enormous standing army, the

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<sup>119</sup>Y. Shiryayev and A. Ivanov, "Detente: Economic Implementation," International Affairs (No. 11, 1975), p. 26.

<sup>120</sup>Marshall Shulman, "Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy," Soviet Naval Strategy, ed. by Michael MccGwire, p. 6.

<sup>121</sup>Lawrence Whetten, ed., The Political Implications of Soviet Military Power, (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), p. 2.

United States took a qualitative lead in the power game by the stockpiling of atomic and then nuclear weapons. The Soviets, however, were not far behind, and gaining rapidly. The first chain reaction in the U.S. was in December 1942, a feat not duplicated in the Soviet Union until December 1947. The first U.S. atomic weapon test was in July 1945, and the first Soviet one in September 1949. The Soviets then took the lead and tested the world's first hydrogen bomb in August, 1953, the U.S. hydrogen bomb first being tested seven months later (March, 1954). Thus while the Soviet Union was initially about five years behind the U.S. in nuclear weapons development in 1942, by 1953 they had surged slightly ahead.

The year 1957 saw the Soviet Union testing its first ICBM, with the U.S. 6-8 months behind. Besides having broken the nuclear monopoly, the U.S.S.R. quickly developed the delivery systems necessary to threaten both Europe and the United States.

During the early 1960's there was a great debate in the United States over the utility of nuclear weapons and the question "How much is enough?" The Soviets must have watched this debate with great interest, because while the U.S. was questioning its policy of deterrence through superiority, the Soviet leaders were making decisions to accelerate their arms programs. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations, under the tutelage of Robert McNamara, gave up the doctrine of U.S. superiority and adopted a mutual assured destruction/parity formula, the results of which then allowed the Soviet

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
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Union to approach rough strategic parity with the United States in the late 1960's.

Towards the end of the 1960's U.S. technological innovativeness in the fields of anti-ballistic missile defense (ABM) and multiple reentry vehicles (MRV and MIRV) began to worry Soviet leaders.<sup>122</sup> Their GALOSH ABM system was primitive by U.S. standards, and would be completely overwhelmed by U.S. MIRVs. At the same time, a significant U.S. ABM deployment would necessitate a large increase in the size of the Soviet ICBM force if the same effectiveness were to be maintained. Both U.S. developments were strategically unsettling, and threatened to set off another round in the already expensive arms race. The Soviet Union seized upon SALT as an economical means to counter these U.S. advances.

The Soviet arms buildup had already caused an unequal development of the military/heavy industry and consumer/light industry sectors of their economy, and the achievement of parity was seen by many Soviet intellectuals as an opportunity to obtain from the West assistance to correct this deficiency. One Soviet commentator wrote that "for socialism, international tension and the related threat of imperialist aggression, constant economic and political pressure and various kinds of subversive actions from outside mean a forced necessity to switch a substantial portion of resources

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<sup>122</sup>See John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), pp. 167, 174.

to defense purposes," and that under detente this would not be so.<sup>123</sup>

A constant theme in Soviet writing was that the lessening of international tension and detente were required by the socialist states "for the successful construction of socialism and communism, (and) for the development of their economies and culture."<sup>124</sup> The "historic shift" in the world correlation of forces, the achievement of parity with the U.S., and the limits imposed by SALT, enabled the Soviet leaders to turn more of their attention to other problems.

#### C. SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. DOMESTIC PROBLEMS

There are many astute Soviet students of U.S. affairs, the most well-known of which is probably Georgi Arbatov, currently the Director of the Soviet Institute of the United States and Canada, and a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Dr. Arbatov perceptively analyzed developments in the U.S. and attributed part of the reason for this detente to "domestic social, economic and political problems" in the U.S., and "shifts in the sentiments in the USA" leading to a "reevaluation of certain values and to new

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<sup>123</sup>G. Shakhnazarov, "Peaceful Coexistence and Social Progress," Pravda December 27, 1975. Cited in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, January 28, 1976, p. 1.

<sup>124</sup>A. Sergiyev, "Leninism on the Correlation of Forces as a Factor of International Relations," International Affairs (No. 5, 1975), pp. 103-104.

approaches and priorities."<sup>125</sup> A. Svetlov, another frequent commentator on American affairs, goes as far as saying that "detente is a result of the moral, political, and military decline in the West."<sup>126</sup>

Perceiving this loss of American purpose and will, the Soviets were more than happy to accommodate U.S. interest in an easing of international tensions. At the same time, the Soviets were not sure if the American retreat from world leadership was only a temporary result of the Vietnam experience, or the beginning of the long awaited exacerbation of the internal contradictions of capitalism. Thus, by visibly pursuing a period of detente, the Soviet Union could lull the U.S. into a comfortable sense of security, and continue working towards their goals, carefully avoiding any direct threat to the West which might have the effect of causing a resurgence of American determination and interest in world affairs.

D. SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE EFFECTS OF DETENTE ON WESTERN EUROPE

While it is difficult to ascertain what the specific Soviet intentions towards Western Europe were, there is

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<sup>125</sup>G. Arbatov, "Soviet-American Relations and Their Prospective Development," op. cit., pp. 5-7.

<sup>126</sup>A. Svetlov, "USSR-USA: Possibilities and Realities," cited in Whetten, The Political Implications of Soviet Military Power, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

little doubt that the Soviets saw detente as an opportunity to lessen tensions in Europe, reduce American influence, and hopefully, fracture the NATO alliance. This they planned to accomplish, as explained by Dimitri Simes, by trying "to improve the Soviet image abroad."<sup>127</sup>

The detente momentum was growing in the mid to late 1960's, and culminated in the June 27, 1968 announcement by the Soviet Union that they would participate in strategic arms limitation talks with the United States. While SALT is not exactly synonymous with detente, it was the visible embodiment of the detente process. However, at this time the Soviets were becoming increasingly alarmed over events in Czechoslovakia, and there can be no doubt that the Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia in late 1968 was a painful one, not only because of its effects in Communist countries and on non-ruling communist parties, but also because it demonstrated to the West and NATO the capabilities of the Soviet armed forces in Europe. As a result of the Soviet desires to ease tensions in Europe, and undoubtedly in an attempt to negate the impressions caused by the 1968 crisis, the Soviet Union, in 1969, proposed an all-European security conference, later dubbed CSCE, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The apparent Soviet goals of their CSCE proposal were expressed by Brezhnev in a speech

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<sup>127</sup> Dimitri Simes, Detente and Conflict: Soviet Foreign Policy 1972-1977 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977), p. 79.

in April 1970 in which he proposed a "realistic program to strengthen European peace by providing for rejecting the use of force or threat of its use, recognizing the territorial status quo in Europe as it has formed since World War II, developing mutually advantageous trade, economic, scientific, technical, and cultural relations between all nations and states in Europe."<sup>128</sup>

By lowering tensions in Europe, appearing less hostile, and encouraging cooperation, the Soviets hoped to obtain for themselves a larger voice in European affairs, and at the same time, lessen the American role in that area. The new Soviet image was intended to cause questioning in the European capitals of the necessity for large defense expenditures, and weaken (and ultimately destroy) the NATO alliance. The Soviets then hoped to make this process irreversible through trade and cooperative development agreements.

Particular emphasis should be laid on the emergence of a principally new form of contracts: cooperation on a compensation basis. It consists of expanding the output of certain goods in socialist countries with credits provided by their Western partners in the form of plant and materials with subsequent payment of these credits... by deliveries of produce...for long terms...ten, twenty, or more years.<sup>129</sup>

East-West cooperation has already developed along these lines in the natural gas and chemical industries, and the Soviet Union went so far as to propose combining Western

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<sup>128</sup>Kurt L. London, "The Soviet Union and Western Europe," Current History (October 1970), p. 200.

<sup>129</sup>B. Pichugin, "East-West: Economic Cooperation," International Affairs (No. 8, 1975), p. 63.

Europe's nuclear technology with Eastern Europe's power transmission technology to construct a vast nuclear/electric grid supplying power throughout the whole European area.<sup>130</sup> This in effect would have given many Western European countries a serious vested interest in the maintenance of detente. One could easily imagine the intense lobbying efforts that would ensue from a Soviet threat to renege on this type of agreement!

Besides the security and economic aspects of detente in Europe, there was also the ideological. In times of heightened East-West tensions, non-ruling communist parties have, in the past, suffered from governmental persecution and a general lack of popularity. Under conditions of detente, however, local communist parties have flourished in Europe and elsewhere, and have been legalized and often recognized as major political powers. This has made things much easier for communists to infiltrate and subvert existing governments. It is hard to distinguish between intentions and by-products, but Soviet writers note that "The East-West detente and cooperation are creating favorable conditions for the working class struggle in the industrialized capitalist states, and for the national liberation movement."<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>130</sup>Y. Shirayev, and A. Ivanov, "Detente: Economic Implementation," International Affairs (No. 11, 1975), p. 29.

<sup>131</sup>Y. Zakharov, "International Cooperation and the Battle of Ideas," International Affairs (No. 1, 1976), p. 89.

Soviet interest in detente in the European area also seemed to be inexorably linked with the Sino-Soviet dispute, which will be discussed in the next section.

#### E. THE CHINESE FACTOR

While U.S. Secretaries of State and National Security Advisors speak of playing the "China card," there are virtually no references in available Soviet literature on the relationship between Soviet desire for detente with the West, and the Soviet need to counterbalance her problems with China in the East. The majority of existing analyses are the result of scholarly speculation.

There is a deeply rooted historical animosity between the Russians and Chinese which is expressed in terms of the "mongol-Tatar yoke," the "yellow peril," and "unequal treaties." The modern Sino-Soviet dispute traces its origins to Khrushchev's destalinization campaign and the Soviet revision of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on the inevitability of war between the capitalist and socialist systems. In the late 1950's the Chinese challenged the Soviet model of socialist development through the "Great Leap Forward," and the simmering Sino-Soviet differences were exacerbated in 1960 when Khrushchev cut off Soviet economic aid to China. The Chinese loudly denounced the Soviet Union's handling of the Cuban missile crisis, and called it "another Munich." Small-scale border skirmishes in the early 1960's were given increased significance by a 1964 statement of Mao that China

had "not yet presented its account" for the Chinese lands taken by Russia during tsarist times.<sup>132</sup>

The detonation of the first Chinese nuclear weapon in October 1964 seemed to increase the intensity of the polemics associated with the differences between the U.S.S.R. and P.R.C. While the animosity between the two countries simmered during the period of the Cultural Revolution, the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia "alarmed Peking more than anything that Moscow had done to date."<sup>133</sup> The Chinese saw the Brezhnev Doctrine as a direct threat to their pursuing their own path of socialist development and were deeply affected. Late in 1968 the Twelfth plenum of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee met in preparation for the Ninth Party Congress of April 1969. These events announced the end of the Cultural Revolution, the consolidation of Mao's rule, and the "impending return of China as an active force on the world stage - with an undiminished attitude of fanatical hostility towards the Soviet Union."<sup>134</sup> The Chinese ambush of a Soviet patrol along the Ussuri River

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<sup>132</sup> Morton Schwartz, The Foreign Policy of the U.S.S.R., p. 158.

<sup>133</sup> Harold Hinton, "East Asia," in Kurt London, ed., The Soviet Impact on World Politics (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1974), p. 122.

<sup>134</sup> Richard Lowenthal, "Changing Soviet Policies and Interests," in Soviet-American Relations and World Order: the Two and the Many (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970), p. 20.

in March 1969 was an indication of Peking's concern and desire to show the Soviets that they were not easily intimidated, and led to a devastating retaliatory attack by the Soviet Union, and the massive Soviet arms buildup along the 4500 mile Sino-Soviet border.

The full intensity of the Soviet fear of the Chinese can be seen in the attempts by the Soviet Union, starting in 1969, to "enlist the United States in an agreement to take joint action with the Soviet Union in the event of 'provocative action' by a third nuclear power - presumably China."<sup>135</sup> The Soviet leaders apparently saw a greater danger on the Eastern front than on the Western front, and thus wanted to do everything in their power to stabilize conditions in Europe in anticipation of difficulties with China. The Chinese not only posed a military threat to the Soviet Union, but what may be more important is the ideological threat because the Chinese were competing with the Soviets for influence in developing areas and for the allegiance of other Communist states. The Soviet leaders viewed China as an ascending power, with tremendous material and human potential. Combining these factors with the Communist's inherent faith in the inevitability of growth and development, Soviet doctrine readily justified the Soviet fear of the Chinese.<sup>136</sup>

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<sup>135</sup> Marshall Shulman, "Toward a Western Philosophy of Coexistence," U.S. Congress. House. Detente, p. 547.

<sup>136</sup> Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Moscow's Options in a Changing World," Problems of Communism (July-August 1972), p. 14.

#### F. CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND FUTURE EAST EUROPEAN UNREST

There is a great deal of resistance in Eastern Europe to Soviet control, as amply demonstrated by the independent policies of Yugoslavia, Romania and Albania, and the uprisings in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. The two major Soviet interventions in Eastern Europe demonstrate the importance that the Soviet Union places on the maintenance of her satellite empire. Eastern Europe has always been a rather volatile area, and the pressures of industrialization, nationalism, and the desire for increased standards of living will continue to grow in the future. There was great uncertainty among the Soviet leaders both in 1956 and 1968 concerning the possible responses of the West, and on both occasions the Soviets gambled on Western non-interference and won.

The Soviet leaders perceived three major external sources of possible interference in Eastern European affairs: the United States, West Germany, and China. Detente and SALT have tended to lessen, if not completely eliminate the prospect of direct U.S. intervention in this area. Rapprochement with West Germany in the early 1970's and the CSCE agreements together met Moscow's goal of legalizing the status quo in Eastern Europe and lowering the threat from West Germany. What the Soviet leaders intend to do about Chinese meddling in this area remains to be seen.

#### G. FEAR OF NUCLEAR WAR

One of the major fallacies to avoid when trying to explain the actions and motivations of the Soviet leaders is the mirror-image approach, which means ascribing to the Soviet leaders the same thought patterns and reasoning processes as their western counterparts. Nevertheless, it appears that the Soviet leaders were, and continue to be just as concerned about the consequences of, and need to avoid, nuclear war as the leaders of the United States. Brezhnev, evaluating the results of SALT and the follow-on Vladivostok agreement, stated that their main significance was that "they greatly reduce the danger of a nuclear war erupting."<sup>137</sup> The use of detente as a method for limiting the possibility of nuclear war can probably be taken at face value: rational men hoping to avoid irrational destruction.

#### H. SUMMARY

Khrushchev ousted Malenkov in 1955 by siding with the heavy industry/defense "lobby" and then advocated a slightly more hard line policy towards the West than did his predecessor. However, once in firm control, he became an outspoken advocate of peaceful coexistence. Similarly, immediately after Brezhnev replaced Khrushchev there was a

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<sup>137</sup> K. Georgiev, "Strategic Arms Limitation," Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, September 3, 1976. Cited in Strategic Review, Spring 1977, p. 108.

return to the Soviet hard line policy towards the West. And once again, after consolidating his position in the leadership, like Khrushchev, Brezhnev became a firm supporter of the need for detente with the West. The factors militating in favor of a renewed emphasis on relaxing tensions between the Soviet Union and the West were: the growing Soviet economic problems and the hope that detente would enable the Soviet Union to solve their problems by means of western technology and credit; the Soviet achievement of parity in nuclear weapons and their desire to utilize detente to prevent a renewed arms race and thus be able to direct more resources to the solution of chronic economic problems; the Soviet desire to utilize detente propaganda to support isolationist and anti-defense sentiments in the United States in the aftermath of the end of U.S. involvement in Vietnam; the Soviet desire to promote their concepts on European security by lessening the apparent "Soviet threat;" the increasing tensions in Sino-Soviet relations and the Soviet desire to isolate China and seek tacit understanding with the U.S. to either side with the Soviet Union or remain neutral in the event of a Sino-Soviet war; and finally, the desire on the part of the Soviet leaders to avoid war or crisis situations which might lead to an all-out war with the United States.

## VII. CONCLUSION

After the signing of the SALT agreements in 1972 and the Vladivostok accords in 1974, outward manifestations of Soviet interest in detente again began to wane. Perhaps thinking that the U.S. had been lulled into passivity, the Soviets became deeply involved in supporting revolutionary groups in Africa and thwarting American sponsored peace plans for the Middle East. However, now as the second round of the SALT talks are about to reach fruition, again the Soviet Union is advocating detente and a decrease in international tensions.

The ultimate goal of Soviet foreign policy is the destruction of capitalism and the triumph of Communism on a world scale. This was the goal of the Bolsheviks in 1917 and remains the goal of the current leaders of the Soviet Union. The difference between the approach of 1917 and that of the post-war era was the means of achieving this goal. The original revolutionary ideology espoused by the Bolsheviks called for militancy, spreading of the revolution by force. This remained a part of the Marxist-Leninist heritage until the post-Stalin leaders (especially Malenkov and Khrushchev) came to the realization that nuclear weapons had increased the risks of spreading Communism by several orders of magnitude. Attempts to spread Communism by means of the Red Army might now result in the nuclear destruction of the

cradle of the revolution. This realization contributed to a change in Soviet tactics which was embodied in Khrushchev's espousal of a policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the West.

"Peaceful coexistence," however, was far more complex than its contextual simplicity indicated. While having great appeal to the ears of a world tired of war and struggling under the expenses of defense, it really meant a rechanneling of the competition between capitalism and socialism into less visible, but nonetheless extant spheres. This redirection of Soviet policy was first manifested in 1955 when the Soviet Union became involved in the sale of arms to Egypt, the first Soviet arms supplied outside of the Communist bloc. Seeing that the risks of confrontation with the West were too great in Europe, the Soviet Union began its policy of challenging the West in the peripheral areas of the world.

Each period of detente between the Soviet Union and the West was the result of a combination of factors. The Geneva detente of 1955 was motivated by a Soviet desire to direct their attention towards internal and bloc problems while at the same time neutralizing security threats from the U.S. strategic arms buildup and the efforts to include West Germany in NATO. The Camp David detente of 1959 was in large measure motivated by Soviet fears of West Germany coming into possession of nuclear weapons via NATO, and the basing of U.S. IRBMs in Europe as a part of the NATO defensive deployment. Sino-Soviet differences were growing at this

time, and Khrushchev, recovering from the anti-party coup of 1957, needed a foreign policy triumph to bolster his position. The Moscow detente of 1963 was a direct result of the Soviet failure to change the strategic balance by placing missiles in Cuba. Unable to effect a "quick fix" to remedy their strategic inferiority, suffering from an economic slowdown and worried about West German "militarism" the Soviet Union again felt it in their favor to seek a lessening of tensions in their relations with the West. The detente embodied in the 1972 agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States was likewise the result of the confluence of a number of factors: Soviet economic problems, the need to counter U.S. technological advances which might affect the strategic balance, the need to come to an understanding with the West which would allow the Soviet Union a free hand to deal with China, Soviet perceptions of the effects of a lessening of tension on the cohesiveness of the NATO alliance, and the opportunity the Soviet Union saw to exploit U.S. domestic unrest caused in large part by the unpopularity of the Vietnam war.

There are two common elements which thread their way through each of these four periods of detente: security concerns and opportunism. Each period of detente countered a number of threats to Soviet national security: threats from arms racing with the U.S., threats from NATO and fear of West Germany, and threats from Chinese activism. Each period of detente also gave the Soviet Union the opportunity

to lessen the perception of the threat to the free world inherent in Communist ideology, gain access to Western technology to correct problems in the Soviet economy caused by the overemphasis on the military sector, and to lull the general public into a false sense of security through peace propaganda and the Machiavellian use of terms like "peaceful coexistence" and "detente" which are not nearly as innocuous as they are made to sound. These terms are more like the fabled wolf in sheep's clothing. They have enabled, and continue to enable the Soviet Union to extend her influence into Third World areas and support indigenous socialist and communist movements with little or no western interference. How can anyone be against "peaceful coexistence?" It is almost contrary to human nature. Unfortunately, the terms "peaceful coexistence" and "detente" do not mean the same in the West as they do in the Soviet Union. To the Russians, these terms imply a continuation of the struggle to subvert the West; to Westerners these same terms are mistakenly understood to imply not only a relaxation of tension, but a joining together for the common good, an entente.

The common factors described above, security threats and opportunism, may provide a tool for policymakers attempting to affect Soviet actions. The Soviet leaders understand power and its military manifestations, they also seek to exploit any weaknesses they can find in the free world alliance system. The implications are clear: the Soviet

Union can be challenged by a determined Western (U.S.) military effort incorporating high technology and qualitative advances, and the West must maintain a cohesiveness unparalleled in its history.

This study has analyzed the factors contributing to Soviet interest in peaceful coexistence and detente over the last twenty-five years. It is hoped that the reader has gained a better understanding of the variables affecting Soviet interest in peaceful coexistence and detente, and the real meanings of these terms as used by the Soviet leaders. Regardless of whether these policies are a tactic (Stalin) or strategy (Khrushchev and Brezhnev), they are aimed at the eventual destruction of our western systems of government and the fundamental freedoms which we possess. We must look beyond the words of the Soviet leaders, and focus on their motives, intentions and actions.

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