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
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
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PROJECT NUMBER 902

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PEAK SEASON MOVEMENT OF  
HOUSEHOLD GOODS.

LOGISTICS STUDIES OFFICE  
PROJECT NUMBER 902

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FINAL REPORT.  
11 JUL 1979

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BY  
HUNTER W. TYLER  
CAPTAIN PETER L. MENTIS

LOGISTICS STUDIES OFFICE  
US ARMY LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT CENTER  
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## ABSTRACT

This report examines DA individual personnel assignment and volume move policies and procedures that generate PCS actions requiring the movement of household goods which contribute to the "peak season" surge of such shipments between mid-May and mid-September of each year. During this period in excess of 46 percent of Army PCS moves involving the shipment of household goods occur along with a similar condition within the other services and the civilian sector. The data analyzed by the report were obtained by personal and telephonic interviews of knowledgeable key personnel of the DA staff, selected activities and installations, and the data bases of the U. S. Army Military Personnel Center and the Military Traffic Management Command. Recommendations are made regarding the establishment of control and suspense measures at appropriate organizational levels to facilitate outprocessing of personnel and regarding study of the feasibility of leveling household goods movements throughout the year.

Report Title: Peak Season Movement of Household Goods

Study Number: LSO 902

Study Initiator and Sponsor: Director of Transportation, Energy  
and Troop Support (DALO-TSP-P2)  
Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics,  
Department of the Army

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Authority for the Study: This study was conducted at the direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics by letter, HQ DA, 22 December 1978, DALO-TSP-P2, subject: Peak Season Movement of Household Goods (Operation Smooth Move). It is Phase I of the "Seasonal Surge Study" and concerns those things that impact on requirements (DA individual personnel assignment policies and policies generating volume moves). Phase II is to address those things that impact on capability (rate structure, quality control, and carrier capability). The seasonal surge study is Element 4 of Operation Smooth Move, a DA-mandated program.

2. Statement of the Problem: During the period mid-May through mid-September of each year, in excess of 46 percent of Army permanent change of station moves involving the shipment of personal property occur (the peak season phenomenon). Simultaneously, a similar situation is occurring within the other services and in the civilian sector. These conditions place a demand on the moving industry that strains its existing capability. Many factors such as personnel assignment policies, military and dependent school schedules, budget constraints, and military necessity/requirements contribute to this condition. The DA has recognized these problems in the past, and solutions have been proposed. However, it has been generally believed that the severe impact of the proposed solutions upon service member (SM) morale would render them infeasible. Despite efforts to reduce

the impact of the peak season moves on the SM and his family, many shipments of personal property suffer late pickups, late deliveries, loss, and damage. Therefore, it is necessary to determine how the Army can make adjustments to reduce the impact of the peak season surge.

3. Objectives:

a. Study the impact of current Department of the Army individual personnel policies on the peak season.

b. Study actions that generate volume moves impacting on the peak season.

c. Provide recommended actions the Army can take to reduce the adverse impact of the peak season movement of household goods.

d. Provide to the Department of the Army any identified factors outside of its control that impact on the peak season and warrant further study.

4. Scope of Study: This report is limited to an analysis of DA individual personnel assignment and volume move policies and actions that impact on the peak season shipment of personal property. It also recognizes operational problems beyond its scope that impact the peak season surge and that warrant consideration in Phase II.

5. Methodology: The analyses in this report are based on review of related research, study of DA personnel movement and volume move policies and procedures, and personal and telephonic interviews with knowledgeable personnel at all Army command and installation levels.

6. Findings and Conclusions:

a. The peak HHG shipping season creates a severe surge in workload at the installation transportation offices which strains their capability. Not only does it create serious difficulty in obtaining carrier service to meet Army requirements, but limited ITO staffing renders it very difficult to accomplish the administrative functions involved in HHG shipments (counseling, inspections, quality control, etc.). DA-promoted programs to improve the SMs life in the military (i.e., the Junior Enlisted Transportation Entitlements Program (JET)) have created a significant increase in HHG shipments with no increase in ITO resources (spaces and funds) to support them. Reporting of SMs late in the outprocessing procedure to arrange shipment of HHGs and SM lack of knowledge relative to their entitlements, options, and responsibilities in connection with their shipment compound the ITO problems. Problems experienced in outprocessing procedures elsewhere in the system also contribute to ITO problems.

b. Current DA regulations and policies concerning individual personnel PCS actions generally provide the means to reassign personnel with minimal impact on the transportation function. However, the DA could significantly improve the outprocessing procedure by:

(1) The provision of realistic timeframes relative to each type of action involved in the outprocessing procedure.

(2) Specifying a control system at all installation levels to insure a timely, orderly, and an evenly distributed workload through each work day.

(3) The indication of the type of specific personnel data needed for special assignments (NATO-SHAPE) to eliminate the current excessive time consumed in off-line message traffic.

c. DA regulations, policies, and procedures pertinent to unit moves, activations/deactivations, and base closures/reductions which create volume PCS moves adequately provide for forecasting, planning, and execution. However, worldwide military requirements/necessity coupled with political and special interest group pressures and public opinion will not always permit execution of resultant moves during the off peak season. From the overall HHG shipping viewpoint, the impact of this type move is inconsequential as it comprises less than one percent of the total shipments. Despite this, volume moves do create severe workload surges at affected origin and destination installations.

d. Implementation and administration of DA regulatory documents and policies relative to the reassignment of individual SMS by the US Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) are generally adequate. Although full implementation of the centralized assignment procedure (CAP III), DA PAM 600-8-10, by the installations has not been attained and problem areas have developed (e.g., data base errors and processing deletion/deferments), MILPERCEN is aware of the short-comings and is pursuing corrective actions.

e. Computer processing time at the installation levels (Military Information Systems Offices and other computer facilities) is at a premium and often inadequate. Computer time-sharing with logistics,

financial, and other functional areas, coupled with frequent down time, often causes the CAP III processing to be seriously delayed. Computer activities at the installation levels require augmentation and improved utilization.

f. Military Personnel Office staffing problems, namely a shortage of MOS-qualified clerks and the exceptionally heavy workload, reduce the ability to process personnel assignments during the peak season. Shortcomings exist in the MILPO assignment interview and entitlements briefings. MILPO clerks lack an expertise of the transportation function, thus inadequately preparing SMs for their move. Available visual aides are not being fully utilized to fill this void. The significant number of overseas moves (60 percent of all moves in FY 77) with their protracted processing time (which is not always compatible with prescribed DA PAM timeframes) and their special assignment message traffic delay the planning and execution of HHG shipments.

g. The high volume of deletion/deferment requests and the lengthy processing time required at the installation and higher levels create an administrative backlog and reduce ITO planning/reaction time.

h. The problems surfaced at the installation are indicative of low command priority of the personnel assignment process, which has led to non-enforcement of prescribed procedures and poor coordination. This situation is evidenced at both the installation and unit level.

i. The peak season surge and its adverse impact on the personnel and transportation functions could be substantially reduced by distributing PCS moves throughout the year.

7. Recommendations: It is recommended that:

a. DA take the following actions:

(1) Modify Procedure 3-1, DA PAM 600-8-10, to provide that a control system be developed and implemented at installation levels to better control, facilitate, and evenly distribute the outprocessing workload throughout each work day.

(2) Expand DA PAM 600-8-10 to include outprocessing requirements for personnel being assigned to special overseas assignments (e.g., NATO, SHAPE) so as to reduce message traffic.

(3) Determine adequacy of time allotted in Procedures 3-1 and 4-1, DA PAM 600-8-10, for the processing of assignments and deletions and deferments.

(4) Paragraph B-15, Appendix B, AR 310-10, be changed to read:

"If you plan to ship personal property at Government expense, contact your local transportation officer within \_\_\_\_ working days (number of days to be determined by DA) of receipt of these orders to arrange for shipment..."

(5) Establish a timeframe for MILPERCEN approval/disapproval actions concerning deletion/deferment requests.

(6) Expedite the processing of the 1st Personnel Command pinpoint assignments in European locations to facilitate earlier notification to the losing command.

(7) Educate the installation level chain of command on the mechanics and interplay of the PCS process and the need for emphasizing command compliance and assist local commanders in evaluating their MILPO staff adequacy, training, and utilization in relation to workload processing.

(8) Monitor computer utilization at the installations to determine what management techniques and/or equipment are required to efficiently service support activities.

(9) Initiate efforts to augment personnel resources at the field installations to adequately accommodate recently approved programs such as JET.

(10) Continue in its public relations campaign to educate SMs on their entitlements and on the advantages of moving in other than the peak season; publicize the expanded use of DITY moves as a means of reducing the peak season surge impact on HHG carriers; and increase efforts to publicize the positive aspects of overseas assignments as a means to overcome SM apathy.

(11) Insure the adequacy of, promote the usage of, and provide visual aides to all servicing MILPOs to insure all aspects of PCS moves are adequately understood by SMs (e.g., "It's Your Move - CONUS," TF 55-4872, and "It's Your Move - Overseas," TF 55-6058).

(12) Distribute the PCS moves throughout the year, as described in paragraph V.B.9., below, to reduce the peak season adverse impact on transportation and personnel functions.

b. Phase II of this study include analyses of the following problem areas:

- (1) Low tariff rates and their effect on quality of service received.
- (2) Limited carrier capability.
- (3) Dissatisfaction with the CERS system.

## MAIN REPORT

### I. Background.

A. The Chief of Staff of the Army, on 13 July 1978, directed commanders and staffs at all levels to do a better job of moving service members' (SM) household goods on permanent change of station moves. On 8 November 1978, the Department of the Army Inspector General confirmed, among other things, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics' contention that the summer surge or peak season shipping season is one of the root causes for the deficiencies in the Army Personal Property Program. Over 46 percent of Army permanent change of station moves take place between 15 May and 15 September each year. Moves of other services' personnel follow the same pattern. Additionally, most civilian sector moves are also concentrated in the same timeframe and, therefore, it is not uncommon for the carrier industry to increase its business volume 70 to 80 percent during May through September over the level of the other months of the year. The industry does not have adequate capability to handle this surge. This results in late pickups, late arrivals, poor performance, and loss and damage, all of which add up to inconvenience and frequent hardships on the soldier and his family. The bottom line to this intolerable situation is the deleterious effect on morale and on the retention of trained and qualified service members.

B. In an effort to reduce the impact of the peak season surge, "Operation Smooth Move" was initiated. There are four elements in

"Smooth Move":

1. Increased automation. The "TOPS" system (Transportation Operational Personal Property Standard System) is being developed to improve the overall personal property shipping procedure.

2. Personal property upgrade program. This will include both civilian and military personnel policies, updating the DA staffing guides, and development of better training programs.

3. Program visibility. A program to improve publicity to better inform personnel of their entitlements.

4. Seasonal surge study. This is a study to be conducted in two phases. Phase I analyzes those things that impact on requirements. Phase II is to examine those things that impact on capability (rate structure-quality control-carrier capability).

C. This report, entitled "Peak Season Movement of Household Goods", covers Phase I of the seasonal surge study. It addresses DA individual personnel policies impacting the peak season and DA policies relative to actions generating volume moves of personnel. Additionally, Phase I identifies factors beyond its scope which warrant consideration in Phase II.

II. Objectives.

A. Study the impact of current Department of the Army individual personnel policies on the peak season.

B. Study actions that generate volume moves impacting on the peak season.

C. Provide recommended actions the Army can take to reduce the

adverse impact of the peak season movement of household goods.

D. Provide to the Department of the Army any identified factors outside of its control that impact on the peak season and warrant further study.

III. Limits and Scope. This report is limited to an analysis of DA individual personnel assignment and volume move policies and actions that impact on the peak season shipment of personal property. It also identifies operational problems beyond its scope that impact the peak season surge and that warrant further consideration.

IV. Methodology: The analyses contained in this report were based on:

A. A search of documentation in the repository of the Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange pertinent to the shipment of personal property, base closures, and preparation for overseas movement of units.

B. Detailed study of:

1. Current Department of the Army individual personnel policies that impact the peak season surge in personal property shipments.

2. Department of the Army policies and procedures governing unit moves and base closures/reductions which generate volume moves impacting the peak season surge in personal property shipments.

3. Data obtained from personal and telephonic interviews with knowledgeable key personnel at the following offices, activities, and installations.

a. Office, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army

- b. Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
- c. Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
- d. Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
- e. U. S. Army Military Personnel Center
- f. Military Traffic Management Command
- g. Joint Personal Property Shipping Office, Washington Area,

Cameron Station, VA

- h. U. S. Army Claims Service, Fort Meade, MD
- i. Fort Bragg, NC
- j. Fort Dix, NJ
- k. Fort Hood, TX
- l. Fort Leavenworth, KS
- m. Fort Lee, VA

V. Analysis and Discussion.

A. General: The interface between transportation and personnel functions is comprised of the personnel assignment policies and their implementation. Analysis relative to the personnel processing procedures for PCS actions provided the means to isolate those deficiencies that contribute to the Installation Transportation Office (ITO) problems experienced during the peak season surge. Correction of the deficiencies should serve to significantly improve the shipment of household goods (HHGs). To obtain an adequate assessment of the problems associated with the peak season surge and the impact of assignment policies upon that surge, DA (DCSPER, DCSOPS, and MILPERCEN), installation, unit, and soldier

level observations were made. The installations contacted represent low, medium, and high volume household goods shipping workloads. A substantial degree of commonality of problem areas exists at each field activity contacted. Accordingly, the findings below the DA level are presented by organizational elements within field activities and are not related to specific locations.

1. The MILPOs of Forts Bragg, Dix, and Lee were visited by study team members for data collection. Also, the MILPOs of Fort Hood were telephonically interviewed to collect data on personnel assignment policy implementation. In addition to commonality of problem areas which impact upon the personnel assignment policies, the larger divisional installations, such as Forts Bragg and Hood, had problems not encountered by smaller TRADOC installations, but which also impact upon personnel assignment policies.

2. In accordance with the limits and scope of the study effort, contact with the ITOs was limited to examination of problems emanating from personnel processing - transportation interface. However, during the interviews, ITO personnel revealed and discussed in detail many problems which warrant in-depth consideration during Phase II of the smooth move study. The problem areas are discussed later in the report. The ITOs contacted were performing in an excellent manner despite significantly adverse conditions which inhibit their efforts. All individuals contacted were acutely aware of peak season problems, displayed a high degree of enthusiasm, and indicated an excellent state of morale.

3. The abbreviated flow of assignment procedure implementation (Figure 1) is keyed to the presentation contained herein and is provided as a visual aid to the assignment process. It outlines the outprocessing procedure, step by step, and reflects the organizational elements at the installation participating in the process. Additionally, the prescribed processing timeframes are also indicated.



B. Discussion of Peak Season Statistics: During the period of mid-May to mid-September, the military establishment experiences a personnel and transportation surge, herein called "the peak season." In order to identify the contribution of each category (accession, training, operational, rotational, separation) of PCS move to the peak season surge, requests for movement data were made to both the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) and the Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN). MILPERCEN provided the study agency with PCS data by month, to include projected and reported PCS moves by category. The data identified the months of May through September as "peak" months and identified the categories having the greatest impact on total PCS moves. However, it did not provide a separation of personnel with household goods (HHGs) from those without, as desired for this study. Therefore, similar data which did provide the necessary breakout was requested from MTMC. The MTMC data provided the monthly PCS shipping data by Movement Designator Code (MDC) (category) and mode for FY 77. Unfortunately, MTMC was unable to provide data for FY 78 or FY 79 due to computer utilization and system time lags. A recap of MTMC FY 77 data is provided in Table 1.

1. An MDC 1 move, Accession, occurs when military personnel move from their home or commissioning source to their first permanent duty station or to a course of twenty weeks or longer. Accession moves comprise 7.08 percent of the total moves and follow the general trend of few moves in October (213 in FY 77) and a peak number of moves in

TABLE 1  
MDC DATA RECAP

Month	MDC 1		MDC 2		MDC 3		MDC 4		MDC 7		MDC B		MDC P		MDC N		Monthly Total	
	# Moves	% of Total	# Moves	% of Total	# Moves	% of Total	# Moves	% of Total	# Moves	% of Total	# Moves	% of Total	# Moves	% of Total	# Moves	% of Total	# Moves	% of Total
October	213	2.64	61	.81	159	2.08	2,964	4.37	760	3.44	297	36.49			1	12.5	4,455	3.91
November	447	5.54	259	3.42	329	4.31	4,184	6.18	1,253	5.67	159	19.53					6,631	5.82
December	505	6.26	824	10.89	551	7.22	3,737	5.52	1,298	5.88	124	15.23					7,039	6.18
January	453	5.63	412	5.44	552	7.23	3,942	5.82	1,409	6.38	59	7.25			1	12.5	6,829	6.00
February	547	6.79	264	3.49	501	6.57	3,997	5.90	1,416	6.41	36	4.42					6,761	5.93
March	674	8.36	406	5.36	562	7.36	4,993	7.37	1,669	7.55	38	4.67					8,343	7.32
April	600	7.44	306	4.04	456	6.00	4,661	6.88	1,421	6.43	13	1.60			3	37.5	7,462	6.55
May 1-15**	333	4.12	189	2.50	276	3.64	2,726	4.02	813	3.68	3	.37					4,342	3.81
May 16-31**	542	6.73	308	4.07	453	5.94	4,449	6.57	1,326	6.00	5	.61					7,083	6.22
June	1,143	14.18	2,026	26.77	1,299	17.02	9,177	13.54	3,176	14.37	21	2.58			1	12.5	16,844	14.78
July	907	11.25	1,468	19.40	937	12.28	8,425	12.43	2,631	11.91	3	.37			1	12.5	14,372	12.61
August	881	10.95	697	9.21	807	10.57	8,461	12.49	2,826	12.79	31	3.81					13,705	12.03
September 1-15**	456	5.66	195	2.58	418	5.48	3,382	4.99	1,174	5.31	14	1.72			1	12.5	5,640	4.95
September 16-30**	359	4.45	153	2.02	328	4.30	2,658	3.92	923	4.18	11	1.35			0	0	4,432	3.89
Total for FY 77	8,063	100.00	7,568	100.00	7,632	100.00	67,756	100.00	22,095	100.00	814	100.00	2	100.00	8	100.00	113,938	100.00
% of FY 77 Total	7.08		6.64		6.70		59.47		19.39		.71		.00+		.01		100.00	

\* Number of shipments data provided by MTRC/Percentage of FY MDC by month, rounded.

\*\* May and September breakout - A daily breakout of shipments by MDC by day was not available. However, daily data was available for months of shipment 1 and 4. This data was broken down into two groups for each month--1 through 15 and 16 through 31. The percentage of each group against monthly totals was determined. Assuming that these percentages are constant for all monthly data, they were applied to May and September MDC data as shown above.

MDC 1 - Accessions  
MDC 2 - Training  
MDC 3 - Operational Moves

MDC 4 - Rotational Moves  
MDC 7 - Separations  
MDC 8 - Unit Moves

MDC P - Permissive Moves  
MDC N - No Cost Moves

June (1,143 in FY 77).

2. MDC 2, Training Moves, represents movement of individuals to or from a training site to attend a formal course of 20 weeks or more. There is no duplication of HHG shipments with MDC 1. Two peaks were identified in this category in FY 77, one in December and the other in June through July. With the exception of December, MDC 2 figures followed the general trend of low in October (61 moves) and high in June (2,026 moves). June and July figures represent a quantum jump in training moves.

3. An Operational Move, MDC 3, occurs when there are individual transfers within CONUS or within the same overseas theater from one PCS station to another (no transoceanic travel involved). The average number of monthly MDC 3 moves during the peak season in FY 77 was double the average number of moves per month in the non-peak season. Seventeen percent (17%) of all FY 77 MDC 3 moves were made in June and forty percent (40%) were made in June through August. Again, October was low with 159 moves and June was high with 1,299 moves. The number of moves in June was more than double those of any month outside the peak season.

4. MDC 4, Rotational Moves, represents movement to and from a permanent duty station involving transoceanic travel. Nearly 60% of all FY 77 moves were transoceanic (MDC 4). The trend of low in October and high in June was again apparent; three times the number of moves were made in June (9,177) as in October (2,964).

5. Separation moves, MDC 7, occur when individuals leave the service. Again, June, July, and August had more shipments than other months.

Interestingly, there was nearly a 3 to 1 ratio of separations to accessions. Whether this was due to personnel acquiring HHGs while in service and/or due to a reduction in total strength and/or early separation from service is not known.

6. MDC 8 represents an individual move directed as part of an organized unit move. Less than one percent of FY 77 moves fall in this category and less than two percent of FY 79 moves are projected by the ODCSOPS to fall in this category.

7. MDCs P and N, permissive moves and no cost moves, respectively, represented an insignificant portion of FY 77 moves.

8. MTMC was unable to provide data either for FY 78 due to a lack of computer processing time or for FY 79 due to system time lags. Therefore, the ODCSOPS was contacted relative to projections for FYs 78 and 79. Table 2 provides data furnished.

TABLE 2  
PROJECTED PCS MOVEMENT  
DATA FOR FISCAL YEARS 1978 AND 1979

	FY 78	FY 79
Total number of PCS moves	531,080	565,605
PCS moves involving HHG shipments	153,293	187,774

As shown in Table 1, the total number of HHG moves in FY 77 was 113,938. The projected figures above show an increase in the number of moves in

FY 78 and again in FY 79. Although not identified in Table 2, it is assumed that the number of peak season moves in those years would also increase. Thus, the need is demonstrated to analyze those factors that complicate the movement of HHGs during the peak season months.

9. The FY 77 data provided by MTMC clearly identified the sharp increase in personnel movement during the summer months and the sharp decrease in movement in October through April. Documents provided by the ODCSLOG verify the existence of this peak season since at least 1967. MTMC data reflected that 50% of the FY 77 HHG shipments were made during the peak season. Based on limited data available, it is estimated that 25% of the Army strength is moved during the peak period in any given year. The only way to reduce the impact of the peak is to reduce the number of moves made during this period through a distribution of moves throughout the year. No small task, this will require an analysis of Army-wide requirements, leveling of the number of moves over the fiscal year, and the scheduling of schools and personnel to meet the management by leveling technique. It also will impact on ARs 614-5, 614-6, 614-30, 614-101, and 614-200.

a. A program of leveling moves throughout the year would produce the desired environment of reduced peak season HHG shipments. For example, averaging the total number of FY 77 MDC 4 moves produces a monthly mean of 5,646 moves. A comparison of this mean with FY 77 movement data for June, July and August reflects 9,125 MDC 4 moves which, with leveling, might have been made outside the peak season. Using a

similar procedure for MDCs 2, 3, and 4 (FY 77) identifies over 12,500 (38% of June through August) Department of the Army HHG moves which could have been made outside the peak season. (See Appendix A for computations.)

b. As part of an overall effort to evenly distribute moves throughout the year, careful scheduling of schools and personnel would reduce the peak and provide for better ITO planning and management. Currently, multiple Basic and Advance courses are conducted by all branches, facilitating a leveling of officer personnel. By programming equal numbers of students for each class and concentrating reserve military in the summer classes, the volume of peak season HHG shipments could be reduced. Additionally, senior Army schools, e.g., the Command and General Staff College, could be scheduled to commence in January and terminate in late October or November, avoiding peak season shipment of HHGs. The result of rescheduling schools would have a domino effect upon replacements which would lend itself to a uniform distribution of moves.

c. Leveling has its greatest impact on requirements determination and procurement (especially European) and, therefore, will require the combined efforts of ODCSOPS and ODCSPER. Conceptually, it is not difficult to formulate a plan whereby the number of HHG movements would be equal in each of the four quarters of the year after a stated number of years of plan execution. Realistically, the achievement of a mathematically equal number of moves in each quarter is improbable. However, some effort is indicated to level out the current difference between peak and non-peak season loads. The following is presented as an example

of one possible way to equalize quarterly loads. This particular example would require a five-year execution period. The strategy is to develop a transition from the unequal percentages of yearly moves currently made in each of the four quarters to the objective value of 25 percent in each quarter. For each quarter determine the difference between the current and the objective rate; then reduce this difference by 20 percent in each of the next five years. A specific program of lengthened/shortened tours for a portion of the service member population each year plus changes in military school schedules might be required to thus reconcile the current and objective quarterly rates.

d. Although not a currently popular alternative to the peak season move, distributing moves throughout the year provides definite advantages:

(1) The turbulence in personnel created by the large number of moves made during the peak is a detriment to the readiness posture of Army units. Leveling the number of personnel moves over a 12 month period reduces the impact of the high peak season turbulence.

(2) By reducing the peak, the load on both personnel and transportation functions is reduced with little change in staffing.

(3) Budgeting for resources should be simplified once a transition to leveling has been completed.

(4) By leveling the movement of personnel the carrier industry will be better able to manage its resources, increase its level of worker professionalism and be encouraged to improve and increase its equipment.

(5) These efforts will increase the possibility of smoother moves

for the SM and a reduction in the aggravation and inconvenience currently endured by SMs.

(6) The current thought in Congress is to reduce the number of dependents in Europe. A reduction in the number of dependents will undoubtedly lead to an evaluation and change in European tour lengths, presenting an opportune time to incorporate leveling.

e. As in all programs, leveling also has its disadvantages:

(1) Such a program will require intense management and, until fully implemented, will create overages and shortages within major commands with respective impacts on readiness.

(2) Such a program will require computer programming not currently in existence. Further, it may also require computer hardware capability beyond present asset capability.

(3) Many service members have become accustomed to moving in the summer. Often, SMs who receive PCS orders to report during the mid-school year will proceed to their new duty station, arranging for their families to be moved when the school year terminates (a peak season move). This practice would need to be discouraged if leveling is to be effective.

C. Department of the Army Level:

1. Department of the Army level findings concern reassignment policies and programs that affect the soldier as an individual or unit member. The study team evaluated DA level personnel assignment policies and processes in regard to any possible impact upon transportation functions. Based upon a review of applicable regulations and interviews with members of the

DA staff (including MILPERCEN), it was determined that the current assignment procedures provide an adequate framework within which to assign personnel with minimal impact on transportation functions, except for control of the outprocessing procedure, processing timeframes, and TWX traffic relative to special assignments to SHAPE and NATO. Although the regulatory documents are adequate for reassignment purposes, they contain no requirement that local commanders establish a control system to insure timely outprocessing at the installation levels.

2. Interviews with members of the Office of the Chief of Staff, U. S Army, and ODCSOPS, in conjunction with an examination of regulations, policies, and procedures relative to volume moves (unit moves - unit activation/deactivation - base closures/reductions) revealed an adequate means to accomplish all volume moves resulting from such actions. Additionally, the statistical analysis revealed their impact on the overall shipment of household goods (less than 1 percent) to be minimal. Further, SMs affected by actions generating volume moves who ship HHGs must be processed within the same military personnel channels and procedures presented elsewhere in this report. Because of the minimal impact HHG shipments generated by volume move actions have on the overall program, no further discussion of volume moves will be presented.

3. The DA has promoted programs to improve the SMs life in the military. The Junior Enlisted Transportation Entitlements PROGRAM (JET), for example, is designed to provide more equitable transportation entitlements to SMs, grade E-4 and below. It provides for increased weight allowances and wider eligibility for movement of personal property for

SMS assigned overseas. This program has resulted in a sharp increase in the number of moves processed by the ITOs each month with no corresponding increase in personnel or financial resources. The impact of this program on the ITOs will be discussed later in this report.

D. Military Personnel Center Level:

1. The officer assignment process is primarily a manual system at the DA level. Officers are selected for worldwide assignments to fill validated requisitions. The MILPOs and officers are normally notified by telephone or AUTODIN. Once the MILPO has been notified and eligibility of the officer verified, the procedure is basically the same as that of enlisted personnel which is discussed below. MILPOs indicated a desire for more timely receipt of notification for officers, but stated that generally officer assignment policy did not create a problem.

2. The Military Personnel Center exercises supervision and control of the reassignment of enlisted personnel on a worldwide basis. The reassignment regulatory guidance used Army-wide is DA Pam 600-8-10, The Centralized Assignment Procedures III System (CAP III). The details regarding the implementation and problems of the CAP III system are presented later in the report.

3. DA Pam 600-8-10 contains the following description:

"The centralized assignment procedures III system (CAP III) is an automated centralized enlisted assignment feature which uses field-submitted requisitions to determine requirements and the enlisted master file to determine fill actions. Through the automated process, the CAP III system is used at HQ DA (MILPERCEN) to:

a. Receive, edit, and record on a master file requisitions for enlisted personnel received from the field.

b. Nominate enlisted personnel for worldwide assignment to fill validated requisitions.

c. Distribute assignment instructions through SIDPERS channels to receiving MILPO.

d. Posting approved deletion and deferments from HQ DA (MILPERCEN) assignment instructions."

4. Assignment distribution is accomplished through a weekly transmission from the MILPERCEN to the installation Military Personnel Offices via the Management Information Systems Office or similar computer facility.

E. Installation Level:

1. Military Information Systems Office. Computer time at the military information system office (MISO) is at a premium. The computer time is shared with logistics, financial, and personnel programs at the installation level. Thus, the CAP III is often late in arriving at the MILPO due to computer sharing or breakdown. The COSCOM at Fort Bragg, for example, is allocated only eight hours of computer time three days per week due to sharing and this is often reduced due to computer failure. The MILPERCEN is aware of this problem and has requested DA assistance.

2. Military Personnel Office. The bulk of personnel policy implementation is conducted by the Personnel Management Officer and his staff at the Military Personnel Office (MILPO). It is logical, therefore, that the greatest research efforts were directed toward this activity. The policy document for assignment procedures is DA PAM 600-8-10. The document supplements ARs 614-200 and 612-2 and provides procedure, timeframes, and

formats. Changes to the DA PAM were introduced in November of 1978, are relatively new, and have not been totally implemented. Not all forms, suggested techniques, organization, and requirements prescribed have been implemented. Thus, a full evaluation of the procedure and its implementation is not presently possible. The following observations of MILPO activities are relevant to CAP III implementation and to the study effort.

a. Although the MILPOs have not fully implemented DA PAM 600-8-10, they have voiced (specifically the larger FORSCOM installations) a common problem of short and unrealistic timeframes (Procedure 3-1, DA PAM 600-8-10). This criticism may be premature. First, not all aspects of the DA PAM have been implemented, precluding a valid criticism of the system. Second, the problems may be caused, in part, by other shortcomings. Late transmissions from MILPERCEN, inadequate computer time, computer time lag, the heavy workload on clerks, the untimely processing and submission of documents by units and SMS, and the failure of SMS to meet scheduled appointments conjunctively create a time backlog partly attributed to the DA PAM published timeframes. The impact upon the transportation functions is, however, the same--reduced planning and reaction time.

b. The CAP III is a computerized system and as such has inherent problems:

(1) The weekly list of personnel reassignments transmitted from MILPERCEN to the installation has had numerous errors as a result of an

inaccurate data base. The resulting time loss and delay in issuance of orders adversely impacts the processing of PCS, the movement of personnel, and the timely movement of personal property. This shortcoming has been recognized by DA. MILPERCEN has sent out questionnaires and messages with the intent of correcting inaccurate data. History, however, has shown that reviewing and correcting a data base of that magnitude will require a great period of time. Also, due to the human error in submission of data and keypunching, it is highly improbable that the system will be purged of all data errors. The computer utilization problem at the installation level, discussed earlier, has a snowball effect which can have impact upon the shipment of HHGs. The CAP III is transmitted to the installation on a weekly basis (currently every Tuesday afternoon). Upon receipt by the Military Information Systems Office (MISO), or other computer service activity, the data is processed during a reserved time period. Then, the printouts are distributed to the MILPOs. If the MILPERCEN transmission is late (Wednesday or Thursday), it is processed by the MISO as time is available that week or the following week. The processing time, as allowed in DA PAM 600-8-10, is then reduced substantially. Further, the ability to process the notifications has not been increased to compensate for the reduced time or enlarged list, creating a backlog. Thus, a one-day slippage may create a two-week backlog in notification of personnel, publishing of orders, and movement planning. Individual MILPOs can reduce the impact of computer problems through fully appraising the command of these problems, especially in light of the peak

season surge. Also, closer coordination with its supporting MISO or computer activity prior to and during the surge can reduce the impact of computer problems in peak months. Intra-installation coordination during the peak season cannot be over emphasized.

(2) Procedure 3-1, DA PAM 600-8-10, allows the MILPO five days from date of receipt of assignment instructions to conduct eligibility screening and verification. Within two days of completion of this, the MILPO must notify the SM's command of the impending reassignment. Notification of reassignment is accomplished by Disposition Form, which provides the commander with specific data, instructions, and requirements and a scheduled reassignment interview appointment for the SM. (Samples provided in Appendix D.) IAW Step 6, Procedure 3-1 of the CAP III, the MILPO must interview each reassigned soldier within 14 days of the receipt of assignment instruction by the Personnel Management Officer. The interview requirements vary with the area of assignment. However, all SMS are provided a PCS entitlements briefing which includes personnel, transportation, and finance entitlements.

c. The notification/interview process is currently hampered by several problems which hinder the PCS process.

(1) The MILPOs have expressed staffing problems which impact on their ability to process PCS moves. The problems appear to fall into two categories--authorization and assignment of clerks/specialists and their utilization once assigned. Firstly, the level of staffing is being reduced constantly as a result of manpower reductions. Each

MILPO specialist at the COSCOM of Fort Bragg processes an average of 77 personnel per week, and the MILPO is experiencing backlog problems. The 82d Airborne Division has a MILPO workload ratio of 1 staffer per 45 personnel processed each week and has less of a backlog problem than the COSCOM (and a smaller workload). Secondly, there exists a shortage of MOS qualified personnel to fill vacant positions. The result is the inefficient and untimely processing of PCS moves and issuance of orders, delaying ITO reaction.

(a) The office manpower is further reduced by additional duties, company responsibilities, and associated absences. However, the study team was led to believe this problem is sporadic with its greatest impact in the peak season when the office strength is often reduced to 50 percent and the number of levies have substantially increased; and command interest was not evident until the staffing situation caused numerous workload problems.

(b) The manning problems observed may be indicative of poor communication between functional and command elements. This also indicates unawareness or possible apathy on the part of both functional and command elements. Unit training, special duties, etc., can be better managed to maximize MILPO workload output from May to September. Better communication and management may produce a more effective and efficient assignment policy implementation.

(c) The workload problem of MILPO clerks may be reduced through a locally implemented control procedure which distributes the workload to

clerks by day. Such a control procedure would allow local commanders to identify workload shortcomings caused by authorization inadequacies. Further, if coordinated with a similar control procedure at the ITO, it would allow installation commanders to control the outprocess procedure and identify work areas requiring augmentation.

(2) A second problem stated by the MILPOs is the failure of units and SMS to comply with regulatory guidance in a timely manner.

(a) There is a failure of units to insure individuals notified for overseas assignment are POR (Preparing Individual Replacements for Overseas Movement) qualified prior to reporting for their MILPO interview and briefing. An excessive number of personnel are not qualified prior to the interview and require an inordinate amount of time to complete qualification. The PCS process is slowed and orders are not requested until POR qualification is completed.

(b) DA PAM 600-8-10 requires that reassignment notification be forwarded by the MILPO, through the PSNCO/Battalion Personnel Administration Center, to the unit commander. Figure 3-1-14, DA PAM 600-8-10, Para 1-10, DA PAM 600-8-1, and the SIDPERS User Manual place personnel management responsibility upon the commander and unit first sergeant. The PSNCO assists the commander and, through personal liaison, the first sergeant and unit clerk. However, since the consolidation of unit clerks at the battalion level, this PSNCO-unit commander relationship may have deteriorated. There is evidence that the commander is often by-passed in the notification of personnel, often not being aware of the PCS status until late in the process. This situation would only aggravate the command

control problems already existing and make it increasingly difficult to insure a timely outprocessing.

(3) The assignment interview and entitlements briefing are conducted at the same appointment. The assignment interview determines eligibility for reassignment and insures that the soldier understands information concerning the assignment, i.e., reporting date, location, tour length, restrictions, and benefits related to the assignment. Special assignment instructions and deletion/deferment requests are also discussed at that time. The PCS Entitlements Briefing is used to insure the soldier receives and understands his PCS entitlements, including the movement of dependents, transportation of personal property, and finance entitlements.

(a) A common problem lies in the failure of service members to attend scheduled briefings. In one instance, as many as five telephone calls to a single commander were required to provide the initial briefing to an SM. The rate of failure to attend these briefings when scheduled is as high as 50 percent.

(b) Some of the MILPOs conduct individual briefings. The mass briefing is utilized by MILPOs servicing larger troop concentrations. Efforts to provide a coordinated briefing with ITO and finance representation have reportedly been unsatisfactory. The MILPO specialist is ill-equipped to present the transportation entitlements briefing. The transportation knowledge of the briefing MILPO clerk is sometimes derived only from personal experience and transportation pamphlets. The lack of briefer expertise can have an impact on the ITO. The SM makes preliminary

movement plans based upon this briefing. No further transportation guidance is provided until the SM reports to the ITO. If the initial briefing was incorrect or incomplete, the SM may make changes requiring amendments to orders. The transportation functions then cease until the amendment process has been completed. Visual aides have been prepared to fill this void, but are not widely used. Two such films are "It's Your Move - CONUS" and "It's Your Move - Overseas". These films adequately discuss the points required in the transportation portion of the Entitlements Briefing and should be used by all MILPOs.

(4) The subject of deletion/deferment requests warrants independent consideration. MILPO staff interviewees indicated that high-volume posts are faced with an administrative burden created by deletion/deferment requests. Fort Hood reported 710 requests for deletion/deferment in October 1978, 406 in November 1978, 547 in December 1978, and 877 in January 1979. Fort Bragg indicated that nearly 90 percent of the Special Forces notifications for reassignment resulted in requests for deletion/deferment (operational and compassionate). The high number of deletion/deferment requests appears to have a great impact on the assignment process. The reasons for the large numbers of deletions/deferments vary from the undesirability of overseas assignments to the shortage of MOS-qualified personnel. It is not the reason for the requests, but their processing that has bearing on this study. The bulk of deletion/deferment requests originate either with the individual or his unit. The requests must be fully documented, forwarded to the MILPO for processing, then through the

AG office to MILPERCEN for review and approval/disapproval. Associated timeframes are stated in Chapter 4, DA PAM 600-8-10, except that there are no suspense dates for MILPERCEN action. Both SMs and units are untimely in their submissions to the MILPO. (Forts Bragg and Hood indicate that at least 25 percent of the requests are submitted late.) The MILPOs likewise are often late in forwarding the requests to DA (MILPERCEN). The lengthy processing time at the installation and lack of control over DA processing results in an excessive slow down in the PCS process and often very short ITO reaction time. The causes of this problem can be narrowed to three areas. The occurrence of late submissions, despite published suspense dates, is indicative of low command interest, emphasis, and control. Further, the apathy of SMs is displayed in their unwillingness to conform to policy. Third, the lack of control over the time required by DA (MILPERCEN) has resulted in an average one-month turn-around time (installation-DA-installation). The composite of these three shortcomings creates an ill-affordable lag during the peak season with obvious results upon the transportation function.

(5) Overseas transfers unavoidably require lengthy processing time. With the large numbers of overseas assignments, it is imperative that this area remain as efficient as possible.

(a) To insure an SM notified for overseas reassignment understands dependent travel entitlements and information required by overseas commanders, the SM is given an Overseas Movement of Dependents Briefing. Subsequent to this, a soldier with dependents may opt to take his family.

The request for concurrent travel, housing requests, and special requests (e.g., special health or school requirements) must be processed through command channels to the overseas command for review and approval/disapproval and returned. PCS orders are not published until this process is complete. MILPOs have stated that the process is lengthy and often creates a short-fused move of dependents.

(b) Special assignments (e.g., NATO, SHAPE, etc.) create heavy message traffic. The MILPOs of Forts Bragg and Hood indicated that personnel assigned to specialized assignments in Europe have greater processing requirements than other European assigned personnel. The gaining commands initiate message traffic to ascertain qualifications and other data. The current CAP III procedure does not require the forwarding of this data in the degree and timing the gaining commands require it. Therefore, responses to the message traffic require "off-line" handling and this increases processing time at the MILPO. The addition of these requirements, in appendix form, to DA PAM 600-8-10 would reduce time required to answer message traffic and direct it toward actual processing.

(c) Present concurrent travel policy and quarters availability in Europe create additional moves. Concurrent travel of dependents for those SMs assigned overseas is based, to a great extent, upon quarters availability. If projected availability is greater than 140 days, the SM is authorized dependent relocation within CONUS. The family is authorized a second move to the overseas location when quarters become available. Often, the projected quarters unavailability period is

incorrect and after the CONUS relocation the dependent overseas movement actually occurs within 60 days of the SMS arrival. An evaluation of concurrent travel/housing policy to eliminate this problem and reduce the processing time will not only reduce the number of moves during the peak season, but will improve the morale of SMS and their dependents being assigned overseas.

(d) Improving the timeliness of the pinpoint assignment process may reduce processing time and would definitely have a positive impact on transportation functions. Pinpoint assignments allow SMS to make better PCS decisions and plans, allow MILPO clerks to more accurately brief and outprocess SMS, would reduce the handling of HHGs, and would reduce shipping time, thus having a positive effect on SM morale. Presently, European assignments for individuals E-6 and above are to the 21st Replacement Battalion. The 1st PERSCOM determines pinpoint assignment and notifies the losing command of this assignment. (Only centrally selected battalion and brigade commanders and U. S. Army Military Academy graduates are provided a pinpoint assignment from DA.) This procedure is lengthy and the losing command is often notified after the individual has outprocessed. EM assigned to areas other than Europe are provided a pinpoint assignment (to unit identification code) from MILPERCEN. In light of the benefits provided by pinpoint assignments, DA should evaluate a system to increase the timeliness of the pinpoint process and a possible extended use of centralized pinpoint assignments.

d. It is the objective of DA to complete the notification and

issuance of orders process 90 to 120 days prior to the PCS of any individual. The ITO cannot begin processing an individual move until the SM reports with his reassignment orders. ITOs indicated that a 30 to 60 day prior notice was quite adequate for planning purposes. The 90 to 120 days objective, therefore, does not adversely impact upon transportation functions. However, the timeliness of the process is dependent upon the responsible actions of the chain of command, the MILPO, and the service member. At present, the ITOs are faced with the problem of SMS reporting to the ITO at a late date, reducing planning and reaction time. Experience has shown that PCS orders are published six months to one week prior to the "Will Proceed" date. The required ITO reaction time is greater than that offered at the shorter end of the orders time span, resulting in inadequate time for the member and ITO to plan the move. Also, the study team observed no policy requiring SMS to report to the installation transportation office (ITO) within a specific timeframe once the orders are received. Further, there is no control to insure that SMS report to destination ITO in a timely manner. Appendix B, Additional Instructions for Travel Orders, AR 310-10, provides the following general instructions used by most installations: "If you plan to ship personal property at Government expense, contact your local transportation officer after receipt of these orders to arrange for shipment." This instruction is general in nature and with a lack of command emphasis and control, SMS tend to visit the ITO late in the process. The impact of this situation is obviously negative.

e. Implementing DA assignment policy at the installation requires the cooperation, coordination, and priority of the MILPO, the unit, and the service member. Current problems are, to a great extent, the result of three basic shortcomings: A lack of control procedures, low command priority, and service member apathy.

(1) As stated earlier, there is no suspense or control procedure to insure SMs report to the ITO within a specific time period upon receipt of orders.

(a) The problem areas discussed above have in many cases reduced the possibility of achieving DA objective of order issuance 90 to 120 days prior to the PCS date. Further, SM apathy and insufficient command interest play against the active and timely participation of individuals and units in the PCS process. Therefore, some form of control is needed to insure individuals report to the ITO early.

(b) Any suspense procedure should be outlined by DA and implemented and controlled at the local level. A logical course of action would include a DA established suspense period from receipt of orders to reporting to the ITO. This suspense could be incorporated into AR 310-10, Military Orders. PCS orders could include the statement "If you plan to ship personal property at Government expense, contact your local transportation officer within five working days (or suitable time-frame established by DA) of receipt of these orders to arrange for shipment." Actual implementation and control would be the responsibility of and at the discretion of the local command. However, without command

emphasis (installation and unit), which is currently lacking, no program can be expected to survive.

(2) The chain of command is not fully aware of the impact of the PCS process and the importance of timely processing. Due to the myriad of responsibilities placed upon the chain of command, PCS oriented personnel actions receive low priority. The only alternative to this situation is to educate the installation level chain of command on the mechanics and interplay of the PCS process and their responsibilities to it. In the past, command attention has been management by exception, focused on the program when something went wrong with an individual PCS. Command and supervisory emphasis must begin earlier, focusing on planning and coordination to reduce the impact of the surge during the summer months.

(a) Installation/Division commanders must be made aware of the need for computer time and coordination between transportation, finance, and personnel activities required to outprocess SMs. They must be made aware of the responsibilities of subordinate/supported commands and insure cooperation from them. The installation commander must be made aware of the workload performed by his staff elements to implement DA assignment policy. He must understand their limitations and support efforts to increase capabilities proportionate to the increasing tasks. This is especially true of ITO tasks as will be discussed in paragraph F below.

(b) Battalion/company commanders must also understand their responsibilities in the reassignment process. The failure of units to comply

with regulatory guidance and to insure its members outprocess in a timely manner is indicative of shortcomings in this area.

1 Enforcement of regulations and directives and control of suspended actions are key issues. The outprocessing of personnel has been relegated to such a low priority for so long, its enforcement has become enforcement by exception. The failure of SMs to report to interviews, late submission of reports and documents by both SMs and units, non-POR qualified SMs, and the failure of commanders to be informed of PCS activity are every day occurrences. The chain of command must uniformly control the process and enforce it. The member must understand that the process will be enforced and that its efficiency is to his benefit as well as for the good of the Service.

2 Commanders of Personnel Management companies must focus on planning and coordination prior to the peak season to reduce the impact of company administration on functional duties.

3 Program/implementation improvements, new programs, and other efforts to alleviate the adverse impact of the surge upon service members are often negated by SM apathy and lack of knowledge.

a Many service members notified for overseas assignment are reticent to move. The dollar exchange rate, the high cost of living, the quarters availability problem, and other problems currently publicized portray an unattractive environment. Therefore, the soldier is often apathetic toward outprocessing, creating an administrative backlog and short ITO reaction time.

b There is also evidence that the SM is not fully aware of his privileges/options and responsibilities. SMs sometimes fail to understand these areas in spite of MILPO briefing efforts. As a result, there are numerous changes and amendments to orders. The DA campaign to educate SMs is directed at this problem.

c The best tool against apathy is positive motivation, good management, and enforcement of regulations.

F. Installation Transportation Offices:

1. As previously discussed in paragraph A.2., the ITOs are performing well. However, the deficiencies discussed relative to PCS outprocessing create two problem areas that impact severely on the ITOs planning time: (1) Reporting of SMs to the ITO late in the processing procedure; and (2) SM lack of knowledge concerning his entitlements, options, and responsibilities relative to HHG shipments.

2. Significant staffing problems exist within the ITOs: (1) The loss of qualified civilian personnel is quite extensive because of the lack of an adequate career program and advancement opportunities; (2) Manpower cuts are levied without proper regard to mission assignments (i.e., inspector personnel); (3) Additional TDA spaces are not being authorized to accommodate newly developed programs such as JET (Fort Hood alone predicts a monthly increase of 500 shipments in HHG shipments because of JET). Staffing shortages are causing the expenditure of significant overtime and its resultant costs. As an example, Fort Bragg, for the period 20 August 1978 to 30 November 1978 utilized 690 overtime

hours (costing \$6,049.56) and 1,919 temporary manpower hours.

3. A personal property civilian career field with an adequate training program is currently being developed by the Logistics Evaluation Agency at New Cumberland Army Depot, and reclaims to manpower cuts have been made but have not been favorably considered at the major command level (TRADOC and FORSCOM). Requests for increased TDA spaces to accommodate such programs as JET have been made with no favorable consideration at major command level.

G. Subjects To Be Considered in Phase II of the Study of the Peak Season Movement of Household Goods: In discussing ITO problems emanating from the PCS outprocessing, problem areas outside the limits and scope of this study were identified. The problem areas were carefully analyzed for commonality. Those listed below constitute a consensus of the ITOs contacted and need in-depth attention in Phase II of the study:

1. Low Tariff Rates. It was unanimous among the ITOs contacted that low government rates were inhibiting the procurement of carriers. Additionally, ITO personnel strongly suggested that the low rate structure caused the government to buy poor service, particularly during the peak season. It was further stated that the low rate structure was causing the number and cost of loss/damage claims to increase significantly. Another point made by ITOs was that the carrier liability was extremely limited when handling government shipments, thereby encouraging poor service. Since such conditions involve loss/damage claims and could result in increased inconvenience to SMS and excessive cost to the

government, the US Army Claims Service was contacted and furnished the following information:

a. On an overall basis, the number and cost of property loss and damage claims is increasing. A comparison of the worldwide personal property claims data only (number of shipments involved was not available) for fiscal years 1977 and 1978 indicates a 10 percent increase in the number of claims and a concurrent 26.6 percent increase in cost to the government. Table 3 is based on approved and paid claims, not the total claims submitted, and reflects an increase in personal property claims. US Army Claims Service expects the fiscal year 1979 claims to increase significantly over fiscal year 1978.

TABLE 3  
COMPARISON OF PERSONAL PROPERTY CLAIMS  
FISCAL YEARS 1977 AND 1978

	FY 77	FY 78
Number Claims	39,613	43,645
Cost to the Government	\$16,136,699	\$20,431,171
Average Cost Per Claim Paid	\$ 407	\$ 468

b. To substantiate the increase in the number of claims and their cost, the following information was also furnished by the US Army Claims Service relative to loss/damage claims emanating from personal property shipments arriving in Germany during FY 1979.

"There is an upward trend in damage to personal property arriving in Germany. The dollar devaluation vs current replacement costs is also increasing claims costs. An additional \$2.7 million will be needed to pay claims."

c. The Chief, US Army Claims Service, Europe, has advised that:

"Transportation officials have reported an unusual amount of damage to HHG and HB being received in USAREUR from CONUS. It appears that the cost-per-claim will increase this FY on that basis alone."

d. According to the US Army Claims Service, the DA Inspector General is interested in the increased claims resulting from personal property shipments. Currently, the DAIG has required Fort Hood, Texas, to record the number of GBLs for a specified period and compare the number of shipments to the number of claims for those GBLs submitted.

2. Limited carrier capability (especially during the peak season).

3. Dissatisfaction with the CERS System. Listed below are specific areas of dissatisfaction considered by ITO personnel to result in average or below-average service by carriers:

a. Must select the low-rate carrier.

b. Suspension not effective (2 months is too short; 2 years would be more effective).

c. Due to volume of business, the carrier is not penalized by the government suspension; only the local agent is penalized.

d. Despite the need to suspend ineffective carriers, the government needs agents/carriers during the peak season and hurts itself by suspension.

4. Late payment of GBLs by the government.

VI. Findings and Conclusions:

A. The peak HHG shipping season creates a severe surge in workload at the installation transportation offices which strains their capability. Not only does it create serious difficulty in obtaining carrier service to meet Army requirements, but limited ITO staffing renders it very difficult to accomplish the administrative functions involved in HHG shipments (counseling, inspections, quality control, etc.). DA-promoted programs to improve the SMs life in the military (i.e., the Junior Enlisted Transportation Entitlements Program (JET)) have created a significant increase in HHG shipments with no increase in ITO resources (spaces and funds) to support them. Reporting of SMs late in the outprocessing procedure to arrange shipment of HHGs and SM lack of knowledge relative to their entitlements, options, and responsibilities in connection with their shipment compound the ITO problems. Problems experienced in outprocessing procedures elsewhere in the system also contribute to ITO problems.

B. Current DA regulations and policies concerning individual personnel PCS actions generally provide the means to reassign personnel with minimal impact on the transportation function. However, the DA could significantly improve the outprocessing procedure by:

1. The provision of realistic timeframes relative to each type of action involved in the outprocessing procedure.
2. Specifying a control system at all installation levels to insure a timely, orderly, and an evenly distributed workload throughout each work day.
3. The indication of the type of specific personnel data needed for

special assignments (NATO-SHAPE) to eliminate the current excessive time consumed in off-line message traffic.

C. DA regulations, policies, and procedures pertinent to unit moves, activations/deactivations, and base closures/reductions which create volume PCS moves adequately provide for forecasting, planning, and execution. However, worldwide military requirements/necessity coupled with political and special interest group pressures and public opinion will not always permit execution of resultant moves during the off peak season. From the overall HHG shipping viewpoint, the impact of this type move is inconsequential as it comprises less than one percent of the total shipments. Despite this, volume moves do create severe workload surges at affected origin and destination installations.

D. Implementation and administration of DA regulatory documents and policies relative to the reassignment of individual SMs by the US Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) are generally adequate. Although full implementation of the centralized assignment procedure (CAP III), DA PAM 600-8-10, by the installations has not been attained and problem areas have developed (e.g., data base errors and processing deletions/deferments), MILPERCEN is aware of the shortcomings and is pursuing corrective actions.

E. Computer processing time at the installation levels (Military Information Systems Offices and other computer facilities) is at a premium and often inadequate. Computer time-sharing with logistics, financial, and other functional areas coupled with frequent down time

often causes the CAP III processing to be seriously delayed. Computer activities at the installation levels require augmentation and improved utilization.

F. Military Personnel Office staffing problems, namely a shortage of MOS-qualified clerks and the exceptionally heavy workload, reduce the ability to process personnel assignments during the peak season. Shortcomings exist in the MILPO assignment interview and entitlements briefings. MILPO clerks lack an expertise of the transportation function, thus inadequately preparing SMS for their move. Available visual aides are not being fully utilized to fill this void. The significant number of overseas moves (60 percent of all moves in FY 77) with their protracted processing time (which is not always compatible with prescribed DA PAM timeframes) and their special assignment message traffic delay the planning and execution of HHG shipments.

G. The high volume of deletion/deferment requests and the lengthy processing time required at the installation and higher levels create an administrative backlog and reduce ITO planning/reaction time.

H. The problems surfaced at the installation are indicative of low command priority of the personnel assignment process, which has led to non-enforcement of prescribed procedures and poor coordination. This situation is evidenced at both the installation and unit level.

I. The peak season surge and its adverse impact on the personnel and transportation functions could be substantially reduced by distributing PCS moves throughout the year.

VII. Recommendations: It is recommended that:

A. DA take the following actions:

1. Modify Procedure 3-1, DA PAM 600-8-10, to provide that a control system be developed and implemented at installation levels to better control, facilitate, and evenly distribute the outprocessing workload throughout each work day.

2. Expand DA PAM 600-8-10 to include outprocessing requirements for personnel being assigned to special overseas assignments (e.g., NATO-SHAPE) so as to reduce message traffic.

3. Determine adequacy of time allotted in Procedures 3-1 and 4-1, DA PAM 600-8-10, for the processing of assignments and deletions and deferments.

4. Paragraph B-15, Appendix B, AR 310-10, be changed to read:

"If you plan to ship personal property at Government expense, contact your local transportation officer within \_\_\_\_\_ working days (number of days to be determined by DA) of receipt of these orders to arrange for shipment..."

5. Establish a timeframe for MILPERCEN approval/disapproval actions concerning deletion/deferment requests.

6. Expedite the processing of the 1st Personnel Command pinpoint assignments in European locations to facilitate earlier notification to the losing command.

7. Educate the installation level chain of command on the mechanics and interplay of the PCS process and the need for emphasizing command compliance and assist local commanders in evaluating their MILPO staff adequacy, training, and utilization in relation to workload processing.

8. Monitor computer utilization at the installations to determine what management techniques and/or equipment are required to efficiently service supported activities.

9. Initiate efforts to augment personnel resources at the field installations to adequately accommodate recently approved programs such as JET.

10. Continue in its public relations campaign to educate SMs on their entitlements and on the advantages of moving in other than the peak season; publicize the expanded use of DITY moves as a means of reducing the peak season surge impact on HHG carriers; and increase efforts to publicize the positive aspects of overseas assignments as a means to overcome SM apathy.

11. Insure the adequacy of, promote the usage of, and provide visual aides to all servicing MILPOs to insure all aspects of PCS moves are adequately understood by SMs (e.g., "It's Your Move - CONUS," TF 55-4872, and "It's Your Move - Overseas," TF 55-6058).

12. Distribute the PCS moves throughout the year, as described in paragraph V.B.9., above, to reduce the peak season adverse impact on transportation and personnel functions.

B. Phase II of this study include analyses of the following problem areas:

1. Low tariff rates and their effect on quality of service received.
2. Limited carrier capability.
3. Dissatisfaction with the CERS system.

APPENDIX A

EFFECTS OF LEVELING OF SHIPMENTS OF HOUSEHOLD GOODS THROUGHOUT THE YEAR\*

MDC 2:

- a. Total MDC 2 moves (7,568)  $\div$  12 months = 631 average.
- b. Difference between June through August moves and computed average.

June	2,026 - 631 =	1,395
July	1,468 - 631 =	837
August	697 - 631 =	<u>66</u>

2,298 moves which could have been made outside of peak season with leveling.

MDC 3:

- a. Total MDC 3 moves (7,632)  $\div$  12 = 636 average.

- b.

June	1,299 - 636 =	663
July	937 - 636 =	301
August	807 - 636 =	<u>171</u>

1,135 moves which could have been made outside of peak season with leveling.

MDC 4:

- a. Total MDC 4 moves (67,756)  $\div$  12 months = 5,646 average.

- b.

June	9,177 - 5,646 =	3,531
July	8,425 - 5,646 =	2,779
August	8,461 - 5,646 =	<u>2,815</u>

9,125 moves which could have been made outside of peak season with leveling.

APPENDIX A (Cont'd)

Total moves which could have been made outside of the peak season with leveling:

	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>August</u>	<u>Totals</u>
MDC 2	1,395	837	66	2,298
MDC 3	663	301	171	1,135
MDC 4	<u>3,531</u>	<u>2,779</u>	<u>2,815</u>	<u>9,125</u>
	5,589	3,917	3,052	12,558

\*Calculations made utilizing FY 77 data as provided by MTMC.

APPENDIX A (Cont'd)

Total moves which could have been made outside of the peak season with leveling:

	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>August</u>	<u>Totals</u>
MDC 2	1,395	837	66	2,298
MDC 3	663	301	171	1,135
MDC 4	<u>3,531</u>	<u>2,779</u>	<u>2,815</u>	<u>9,125</u>
	5,589	3,917	3,052	12,558

\*Calculations made utilizing FY 77 data as provided by MTMC.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
UNITED STATES ARMY LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT CENTER  
FORT LEE, VIRGINIA 23801

DRXMC-LSO

9 August 1979

SUBJECT: LSO Project 902, Peak Season Movement of Household Goods

SEE DISTRIBUTION

Forwarded herewith for your information and retention are copies of completed LSO Project 902, Peak Season Movement of Household Goods.

FOR THE COMMANDANT:

Incls  
as

*Virginia W. Perry*  
VIRGINIA W. PERRY  
Acting Director  
Logistics Studies Office

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APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AG - Adjutant General  
AR - Army Regulation  
CAP III - Centralized Assignment Procedure  
CERS - Carrier Evaluation Reporting System  
CONUS - Continental United States  
DA - Department of the Army  
DAIG - Department of the Army Inspector General  
DA PAM - Department of the Army Pamphlet  
DITY - Do It Yourself HHG Movement (rental truck or trailer)  
FY - Fiscal Year  
GBL - Government Bill of Lading  
HB - Hold Baggage  
HHG - Household Goods  
IAW - In Accordance With  
ITO - Installation Transportation Office  
JET - Junior Enlisted Travel  
MDC - Movement Designator Code  
MILPERCEN - Military Personnel Center  
MILPO - Military Personnel Office  
MISO - Management Information Systems Office  
MTMC - Military Traffic Management Command

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
ODCSOPS - Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans  
OJT - On-the-Job Training  
PCS - Permanent Change of Station  
POR - Preparing Individual Replacements for Overseas Movement  
PSNCO - Personnel Services Non-Commissioned Officer  
RFO - Request for Orders  
SHAPE - Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers - Europe  
SIDPERS - Standard Installation/Division Personnel System  
SM - Service Member  
TCS - Temporary Change of Station  
TOE - Table of Organization and Equipment  
USAREUR - United States Army Europe

APPENDIX C  
BIBLIOGRAPHY

- DOD Directive 1315.7 - Permanent Change of Station Policy and Stabilization Criteria
- AR 55-113 - Movement of Units Within Continental United States
- AR 220-9 - Projected Intra-Command Unit Moves
- AR 220-10 - Preparation for Overseas Movement of Units (POM)
- AR 310-10 - Military Orders
- AR 612-2 - Preparing Individual Replacements for Overseas Movement (POR)
- AR 614-5 - U. S. Army Tour Stabilization Policy
- AR 614-6 - U. S. Army Permanent Change of Station Policy
- AR 614-30 - Overseas Tours
- AR(O) 614-31 - Assignment and Travel Restrictions (U)
- AR 614-101 - Officer/Warrant Officer Assignment
- AR 614-200 - Enlisted Personnel Assignment
- AR 640-2-1 - Personnel Qualification Records
- DA Pamphlet 600-8 - Military Personnel Office Management and Administrative Procedures
- DA Pamphlet 600-8-1, Volume 8 - SIDPERS Users Manual, Commander and Staff
- DA Pamphlet 600-8-10 - Centralized Assignment Procedure (CAP III - Enlisted Personnel Automated Procedure)

**DISPOSITION FORM**

For use of this form, see AR 340-15, the proponent agency is TAGCEN.

S: \_\_\_\_\_

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL	SUBJECT		
AFVC-AGP-M	Reassignment Notification		
79THRU BN PAC/PSNCO	FROM CDR, 82d Abn Div	DATE	CMT 1
TO COMMANDER	ATTN: AFVC-AGP-M	1LT RUPP/che/6-5901	

1. Reassignment instructions have been received for \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ with an arrival month/reporting date of \_\_\_\_\_. Service member is being reassigned for duty in MOS \_\_\_\_\_. Service member (is) (is not) (NA) eligible for movement of dependents to the (CONUS) (OVERSEAS COMMAND). Assignment instructions include: TDY enroute at \_\_\_\_\_ to attend \_\_\_\_\_ for a period of \_\_\_\_\_ with a reporting date of \_\_\_\_\_.

2. Request the following actions (items g through m, if checked) be accomplished:

a. Inform the service member of reassignment instructions and furnish the soldier a copy of this DF. If soldier is no longer a member of your organization return this DF by CMT 2 immediately.

b. Instruct member to report to \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_ for reassignment interview and processing. If soldier cannot make this appointment, call (6-8088/2478/5901) to schedule another interview time. Personnel arriving at a time other than scheduled will be returned to the unit.

c. Notify this headquarters immediately, ATTN: Personnel Management Branch, if member is subject to suspension of favorable personnel actions under AR 600-31.

d. Advise member of the criteria and procedures for requesting deferment or deletion from assignment instructions. (Chapter 3, AR 614-30, and Chapter 2, AR 614-200 apply.) Request for deferment or deletion with complete justification will be forwarded to reach this headquarters, ATTN: Personnel Management Branch within 20 days after receipt of these instructions.

e. Request verification of eligibility for assignment under the provisions of Chapter 8, AR 614-30 and Chapter 2, AR 614-200, by completion of paragraph 10, CMT 2.

f. Conduct a clothing showdown inspection in accordance with paragraph 9-1, AR 700-84.

g. Furnish the individuals the attached Overseas Movement Dependent checklist with instructions to complete Part I of the form and to bring the form when reporting to the MILPO for the Reassignment Interview.

h. Have individual complete Voluntary Retirement in lieu of PCS Statement. Attach original and one copy of statement to CMT 2.

D-1

APPENDIX D (Cont'd)

AFVC-AGP-M

SUBJECT: Reassignment Notification

i. Individual must be processed in accordance with provisions of AR 50-5 or AR 50-6. Parts II and IV of attached DA Form 3180 (Personnel Screening and Evaluation Record) must be completed and forwarded to reach this headquarters, ATTN: Personnel Management Branch no later than above suspense date.

j. Individual requires \_\_\_\_\_ security investigation for assignment. Initiate request for security investigation. Copy of DD Form 1879 (Request for Personnel Security Investigation) will be forwarded to reach this headquarters, ATTN: Personnel Management no later than the above suspense date.

k. Request recommendation as to qualification required in Table 8-2, AR 614-200.

l. Request recommendation as to qualification required in Table 8-4, AR 614-200.

m. (Enter other recommendation(s) of special instructions/qualifications required if appropriate)

n. Complete CMT 2 and return to this headquarters, ATTN: Personnel Management Branch no later than the above suspense date.

Incl  
DA Form 3180  
Overseas Movement of Dependents  
Checklist  
Voluntary Retirement in Lieu of PCS  
Statement

DALE S. RUPP  
1LT, AGC  
Asst AG

APPENDIX D (Cont'd)

SUBJECT: Reassignment Notification

THRU BN PAC/PSNCO

TO Commander 82d Abn Div FROM DATE CMT 2  
ATTN: AFVC-AGP-M

1. Individual has been informed of interview, furnished a copy of CMT 1, this DF, and will report as scheduled.
2. Individual is no longer assigned to this unit. Records show reassignment to \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_ per \_\_\_\_\_ or other \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_ (if applicable).
3. Individual  is  is not subject to suspension of favorable personnel actions under AR 600-31. If so, give date suspension will be lifted if known \_\_\_\_\_.
4. Request for  deferment  deletion  is  is not being processed for the individual.
5. Request for operational deferment  is  is not being processed.
6. Individual  is  is not qualified for assignment in accordance with Table 8-2, AR 614-200. (If not qualified, enter reason in remarks.)
7. Individual  is  is not qualified for assignment in accordance with Table 8-4, AR 614-200. (If not qualified, enter reason in remarks.)
8.  Individual has been furnished Overseas Movement Checklist, given instructions to complete Part I, and to bring form to reassignment interview.
9.  Individual has completed Voluntary Retirement in Lieu of PCS statement; original and one copy of statement are attached.
10. Individual  is  is not eligible for assignment under Chapter 8, AR 614-30, and Chapter 2, AR 614-200, for the following reasons: (Explain further, if appropriate, in remarks section).
  - a.  Individual has a record of sale, unauthorized possession, or use of drugs and punitive action or appropriate rehabilitative action has not been taken. (Para 8-1w, AR 614-30.)
  - b.  Individual is awaiting trial or result of trial by Special/General Court Martial or Civil Court. (Para 8-1c, AR 614-30.)
  - c.  Individual is being processed for elimination in accordance with AR 635-200. (Para 8-1e, AR 614-30.)
  - d.  Individual is undergoing investigation for subversion or disaffection in accordance with AR 604-10. (Para 8-1g, AR 614-30.)

APPENDIX D (Cont'd)

SUBJECT: Reassignment Notification

e.  Individual is undergoing investigation by a criminal investigating activity. (Para 8-1h, AR 614-30.)

f.  Individual is not physically qualified to perform in the MOS in assignment instructions. (Para 2-25d(2), AR 614-200.)

11. Clothing showdown inspection in accordance with para 9-1, AR 700-84, was conducted.

12. Individual desires \_\_\_\_\_ number days leave. Leave address is: \_\_\_\_\_

13. Remarks: (Response to para 2m, CMT 1, if appropriate).

Incl  
Voluntary Retirement in  
Lieu of PCS Statement