

AD-A074 832

LINTON AND CO INC WASHINGTON DC  
A REVIEW OF CIVILIAN MANPOWER MOBILIZATION PLANNING, (U)  
SEP 79 W A LINDSAY

F/6 15/5

MDA903-77-C-0151


UNCLASSIFIED

NL

| OF |  
AD  
A074832



END  
DATE  
FILMED  
11 -79  
DDC



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART  
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

act 2

LEVEL #

ADAU74832

6  
A REVIEW OF CIVILIAN  
MANPOWER MOBILIZATION PLANNING  
by  
10  
William A. Lindsay

Prepared for the  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Program Management)

15  
Contract MDA 903-77-C-0151

DDC  
RECEIVED  
OCT 10 1979  
A

Linton & Company, Inc.  
1015 18th Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20036

DDC FILE COPY

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A  
Approved for public release  
Distribution Unlimited

11  
September 1979

12 29

410680  
79 10 10 009

1B

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle)  A REVIEW OF CIVILIAN MANPOWER MOBILIZATION PLANNING		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED
7. AUTHOR(s) WILLIAM A. LINDSAY		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS LINTON & COMPANY, INC. 1015 18TH STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s) MDA 903-77-C-0151
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS DIRECTOR, SPECIAL STUDIES, OASD(MRA&L) ROOM 3B919, PENTAGON WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office) N/A		12. REPORT DATE SEPTEMBER 1979
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 25
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE, DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) MOBILIZATION OF CIVILIAN MANPOWER, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PLANNING FOR CIVILIAN MOBILIZATION, INTERACTION OF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY MOBILIZATION, WARTIME CIVILIAN MANPOWER, INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION, MOBILIZATION REQUIREMENTS OF DE- FENSE INDUSTRIES, COMMUNITY IMPACTS OF CIVILIAN MOBILIZATION, CIVILIAN MO- BILIZATION POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, FEDERAL AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES FOR (over)		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) THE REPORT EXAMINES THE IMPACT UPON THE NATIONAL WAR EFFORT OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PLANS FOR MOBILIZATION OF RESERVE UNITS, INDIVIDUAL RESERVISTS, HIRING OF ADDITIONAL CIVILIANS AND INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION. AS A FIRST PHASE OF A LONGER TERM EFFORT, THE FOCUS IS ON THE SCOPE OF THE CIVILIAN MOBILIZATION PROBLEM, AVAILABLE PERTINENT DATA, ADEQUACY OF POLICIES AND (over)		

DD FORM 1473  
1 JAN 73

EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

ITEM 19.(Cont'd)  
CIVILIAN MANPOWER MOBILIZATION.

ITEM 20.(Cont'd)  
COMMUNITY IMPACTS. THE REPORT REVIEWS WORLD WAR II HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE;  
CURRENT MOBILIZATION PLANS AND PROCEDURES; INTERACTION AMONG FEDERAL  
AGENCIES; COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA ON RESERVE FORCES MOBILIZATION,  
DOD CIVILIAN MANPOWER MOBILIZATION AND INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION;AND POTENTIAL  
IMPACTS UPON SELECTED LOCAL COMMUNITIES. THE REPORT CONCLUDES THAT THE  
IMPACT OF SUDDEN WARTIME DEMAND AND SUPPLY ON THE WAR EFFORT, NATIONAL  
ECONOMY AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES MAY BE SEVERE AND DETRIMENTAL IF NOT CAREFULLY  
ORCHESTRATED BY DOD AND OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES; AND RECOMMENDS SPECIFIC  
ACTIONS TO CLARIFY AND STRENGTHEN THE MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING OF CRITICAL  
WARTIME CIVILIAN MANPOWER.

↑

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE	1
A. Background	1
B. Purpose and Scope of the Project	2
II. HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE	4
III. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR CIVILIAN MOBILIZATION MANPOWER	7
A. The Dynamics of Mobilization	7
B. Military Reservists and Retirees	7
C. Draftees and Volunteers	10
D. DOD Wartime Civilian Manpower	11
E. Requirements of Defense Industries	12
1. National Estimates	12
2. Local Community Assessment	15
3. Industrial Mobilization Summary	17
IV. CURRENT MOBILIZATION POLICIES AND PROCEDURES	19
A. DOD Responsibilities	19
B. Other Federal Agencies	22
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	24
A. Conclusions	24
B. Recommendations	24

Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DDC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	<input type="checkbox"/>
By _____	
Distribution/ _____	
Availability Codes	
Dist.	Avail and/or special
A	I

## I. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE

### A. BACKGROUND

Recent Defense Department planning efforts have focused strongly on the capability of the mobilization process to support U.S. forces in a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict. Current plans for the U.S. reinforcement of NATO are based upon a full mobilization -- the expansion of the active forces resulting from action by the President and the Congress to mobilize all units in the approved force structure and all individual reservists, and the provision of the material resources needed to support and sustain the forces. A series of mobilization studies and exercises have revealed organizational, planning and resource problems that required remedial action by defense managers at all departmental levels. A new Directorate for Mobilization and Deployment Planning has been formed in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to coordinate a multi-faceted action program designed to overcome deficiencies in U.S. mobilization capability.

Most of the studies and analysis conducted by DOD so far have tended to concentrate on the military aspects of the problem -- call up of reserves, airlift and other transportation enhancement, military manpower shortfalls, etc. But mobilization means the interaction of military and civilian resources in a wartime environment and civilian support is necessary for every aspect of military activity. Further, the potential impact of mobilization upon the U.S. civilian economy, political structure and social fabric must be evaluated to preclude confusion and misapprehension detrimental to the successful prosecution of the war effort.

Recognizing the gravity of these problems, the OSD Mobilization and Deployment Planning Directorate sponsored a study of Civilian Mobilization Manpower Planning as part of the Linton & Company (L&C) program of studies and analysis of DOD mobilization planning. This is the final report of findings and conclusions of that project.

B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE PROJECT

The purpose of this project as agreed to in the L&C study plan approved by the sponsor is to provide a basis for determining the impact upon the national war effort and upon local communities of DOD plans for mobilization of reserve units and individual reservists, hiring of additional civilian employees and industrial mobilization. As a first phase of a longer term effort, this project concentrates on the scope of the problem, the collection and analysis of available data and the investigation of potential impacts upon one or more selected communities. Tasks to be accomplished were:

1. Review of literature on historical experience and recent applicable studies;
2. Review of current mobilization plans and procedures;
3. Collection and analysis of data on reserve forces mobilization, DOD civilian manpower mobilization data, and industrial mobilization;
4. Local community impact analysis;
5. Identification and review of potential problem areas;
6. Final report with conclusions and recommendations.

C. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT

In general, this report follows the outline of the task schedule above. First, there is a brief review of pertinent experience for the U.S. in World

War II. Next, the requirements for wartime civilian manpower are described with a discussion of the problems arising from attempting to use these data for analysis of mobilization capabilities. Then, we review current DOD and other agencies' mobilization policies and procedures, including the results of two 1978 exercises -- NIFTY NUGGET and REX. Next, there is a report of field investigations of potential local community impact. Finally, we present a summary of findings and recommendations for solution of the problems identified or for further research where available information is not sufficient for analysis.

## II. HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

The major planning scenario for mobilization envisions a conflict similar in many respects to World War II. It is therefore useful to review what some authoritative historical studies have to say about U.S. civilian mobilization capabilities and deficiencies in that setting.

Mobilization planning actually preceded the onset of World War II by several decades. In the 1920's a joint Army and Navy Munitions Board was charged with the development of an Industrial Mobilization Plan (IMP). There were to be four versions of the IMP: 1930, 1933, 1936, and 1939.<sup>1/</sup> The basic document was general but appendices covered unit mobilization plans, functional plans, studies, recommendations and other comprehensive data. These plans formed a blueprint for the actual mobilization and most of the major features were implemented during the war. Among others, the concept of "M-day" was first developed to permit an orderly time schedule for mobilization.<sup>2/</sup>

Pearl Harbor did not burst upon a nation totally unprepared for war. There was an 18-month "defense period" of gradual build-up of military capability beginning in June 1940. This experience clearly indicated the need of establishing a balanced schedule of military and civilian requirements and clear lines of administrative authority. It also showed the need for closer coordination between Army and Navy planning. Under Secretary Forrestal became coordinator of the Navy's portion of the mobilization program.<sup>3/</sup>

---

1/ R.E. Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, U.S. Army in WWII series, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1959, p. 74.

2/ Ibid., p. 81.

3/ R.H. Connery, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II, Princeton University Press, N.-J., 1951, p. 109.

After the U.S. entry into the war, President Roosevelt directed the Army and Navy to determine total manpower requirements. LTC A.C. Wedemeyer of the Army staff estimated Army requirements at 8.8 million -- this turned out to be only 500,000 short of the actual peak strength of May 1945. This was based on estimated availability of manpower, not on any specific strategic plans, as was the case with most wartime planning.<sup>4/</sup> Overall service requirements exceeded 10 million and President Roosevelt feared that would wreck the civilian labor force. However, in general, the U.S. possessed sufficient resources to satisfy military needs without undermining civilian living standards.<sup>5/</sup>

At first, manpower appeared as the largest single production bottleneck, but by 1943, production caught up with the surge demand for new equipment and replacement flows became the guide to procurement.<sup>6/</sup>

In early 1945, American losses of men and material in the Battle of the Bulge caused a simultaneous step-up in the draft and war programs. As a result of these and other surges, there were temporary and local civilian manpower shortages and problems. The government responded with some occupational deferments and temporary releases for servicemen with critical industrial skills.<sup>7/</sup>

Most civilian manpower problems were eventually resolved by large additions to the labor force from unemployed persons (8 million in 1940; 1 million in 1943), women, aliens in some agricultural areas and blacks, who had previously been limited to unskilled jobs.<sup>8/</sup>

---

<sup>4/</sup> Bryan Fairchild and Jonathan Grossman, The Army and Industrial Manpower, Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1959, p. 45.

<sup>5/</sup> R.E. Smith, op.cit., p. 210.

<sup>6/</sup> Ibid., p. 212.

<sup>7/</sup> Fairchild and Grossman, op.cit., p. 180.

<sup>8/</sup> Ibid., p. 155.

Despite various attempts to allocate manpower, there was strong political resistance to such a drastic step and no effective system was ever established in spite of the problems that arose. Manpower became increasingly critical, not because the U.S. lacked adequate manpower, but because it lacked an efficient control system to deal with localized and temporary shortages.<sup>9/</sup>

---

<sup>9/</sup> Connery, op.cit., p. 309.

### III. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR CIVILIAN MOBILIZATION MANPOWER

#### A. THE DYNAMICS OF MOBILIZATION


As indicated earlier in this report, the SecDef Consolidated Guidance (CG) prescribes a full mobilization in support of a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict as the major planning scenario. This report will follow that scenario with regard to planning guidance and assumptions.

Upon mobilization, a series of interactions takes place between the military and civil sectors. This is depicted in Chart 1. First, a large number of civilians who are reservists, military retirees, or draft-eligible persons are called (or recalled) into military service. At the same time, Defense agencies and installations commence hiring additional civilian employees to handle wartime workload and to replace military personnel deploying to combat theaters. Third, at the same time that individuals are being withdrawn from the labor force for defense service, additional demands are being placed on industry for wartime levels of goods and services. There may be some additional manpower resources added, however, in the form of previously unemployed persons, housewives (about 50 percent are presently in the labor force), retired persons still able to work, and aliens who are able to obtain work permits. The problem for mobilization planners is to attempt to establish some control over this potentially confusing process and assure that the right schedule of priorities is understood and observed. As a first step, we will review the available data on each manpower category.

#### B. MILITARY RESERVISTS AND RETIREES

Full mobilization will result in the call to Federal service of three major categories of military reservists: the Selected Reserve (which includes

# DYNAMICS OF MOBILIZATION



the National Guard), the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), and the Standby Reserve. If war occurred now this would mean the following in gross numbers.<sup>10/</sup>

			(000)	
	<u>Total</u>	<u>Selected Reserve</u>	<u>Individual Ready Reserve</u>	<u>Standby Reserve</u>
Army	766	530	190	46
Navy	204	82	86	36
Marine Corps	92	33	47	12
Air Force	233	145	42	46
Coast Guard	<u>20</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	1315	801	273	141

The exact number that report for duty would depend upon the number actually required and called and the number actually reporting as ordered because some will be ill, not located by the Service seeking them, exempted for hardship causes, etc. So these numbers are only a rough approximation of the loss to the civilian labor force at mobilization through reserve component membership. In addition to reservists, military retirees are also subject to recall to active duty in a national emergency. There are almost a million persons in this category.<sup>11/</sup>

			(000)		
	<u>Total</u>	<u>Regular Enlisted</u>	<u>Reserve Enlisted</u>	<u>Regular Officers</u>	<u>Reserve Officers</u>
Army	293	198	3	28	64
Navy	254	194	4	52	4
Marine Corps	47	34		12	1
Air Force	<u>360</u>	<u>271</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>44</u>
Total	954	697	10	136	113

<sup>10/</sup> Official Guard and Reserve Manpower, RCS: DD - m(m)1147/1148. Feb 1979.

<sup>11/</sup> W.G. Stewart, Mobilizable Inventories of Military Retirees, Linton & Company, Inc., Washington, D.C., April 1979.

The actual number used, considering age and time away from service would probably not exceed 300,000 (author's estimate).

It would be extremely useful to know the civilian occupations of these reservists and retirees in order to determine what skills are being lost by the civilian labor force. Unfortunately, that information is not currently available except in very general terms.

In 1975, the DOD Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve made an effort to obtain the names of the employers of all National Guard and Reserve members. This effort, Project NOTE, was only partially successful and obtained a 52 percent response. It is being repeated in 1979 with hopes for better results. The 1975 survey showed:

<u>Employer</u>	<u>Members</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Federal Government	48,244	10
U.S. Postal Service	5,915	1
State Governments	17,165	4
Self-Employed	13,373	3
Unemployed	14,320	3
Student	14,514	3
All Other	<u>363,755</u>	<u>76</u>
Total	477,286	100

Unfortunately, there is no further breakdown of the All Other category.

C. DRAFTEES AND VOLUNTEERS

DOD wartime planning assumes that the draft would be reinstated immediately after M-day. The Defense Department has stated a requirement for 650,000 draftees to be delivered to Armed Forces Entrance and Examining Stations (AFEES) by M+180.<sup>12/</sup>

---

<sup>12/</sup> Congressional Budget Office, The Selective Service System: Mobilization Capabilities and Options for Improvement, November, 1978, p. xii.

With regard to occupations, the Department of Labor shows the following for 18 and 19 year old males, the prime group for early conscription.<sup>13/</sup>

	(000)
In civilian labor force	2,803
Unemployed	373
Unemployment rate	13%
Not in labor force	1,176
Going to school	1,042

The short-run impact on the labor force will not be very great since few of those employed are experienced enough to be critical.

Another group that must be considered as possible mobilization manpower assets are young veterans not currently in any obligated pool. Recent wartime manpower program analyses have revealed a possible near-term requirement for as many as 100,000 Army veterans.<sup>14/</sup>

D. DOD WARTIME CIVILIAN MANPOWER

The classified annex to this report shows Service estimates of the additional civilian employees they would need to hire after mobilization.

These are estimates based upon data available at national headquarters. For the most part, they have not been validated and are not time-phased. At best, they are rough orders of magnitude of additional demand on the civilian economy from the wartime defense sector.

---

<sup>13/</sup> U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, December, 1978, Table A-3.

<sup>14/</sup> Statement of the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), before the House Armed Services Subcommittee, March 1979, p. 20.

The Annex also provides tables of occupational and geographic distributions of civilian wartime manpower for each of the Services. When they have been adjusted to reflect the necessary validation and time-phasing, these data may be compared with estimates of supply in order to identify potential shortfalls by skill or locality.

E. REQUIREMENTS OF DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

1. National Estimates

Industrial production to support the war effort will be greatly increased early in a national emergency. Many producers currently furnishing defense goods and services will be called to increase their production and others not currently doing business with the government will be awarded contracts to begin defense production. It is presently not possible to estimate the total civilian manpower that will be devoted to that effort because manpower information is not routinely collected from defense contractors and suppliers.

Employment in "defense products industries" was 1.2 million in January 1979 according to Department of Commerce (DOC) Defense Indicators data.<sup>15/</sup> This is probably not a very accurate measure of employment associated with total DOD purchases in the industrial sector because it includes only the following industries:<sup>16/</sup>

Ordnance and accessories,

Communication equipment,

Aircraft and parts.

Not only does this exclude some major industries providing defense-related production, such as shipbuilding, but it reports only the prime

---

<sup>15/</sup> DOC, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Business Conditions Digest, Vol. 19, No. 1, January 1979, Chart D2, p. 55.

<sup>16/</sup> DOC, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Defense Indicators, Vol. 11, No. 6, June 1978, p. 2.

contractor or final assembler of the finished product. Many producers are involved in defense production as subcontractors or secondary suppliers and they are scattered through nearly all industrial categories and geographic areas of the country. Some major weapons systems have literally thousands of firms involved in their manufacture and even smaller products require numerous producers.

One especially critical ammunition item, already in short supply, is the 155 mm. Improved Conventional Munition (ICM). Figure 2 shows that no less than 24 plants located in all regions of the country, some government-owned and some private, are required to produce the ICM. Of these, only the government plants are required to furnish mobilization manpower data. Of those listed in Figure 2, the following is the estimated wartime manpower requirement. (These are total plant requirements and should not be considered only ICM related.)

Plant	Manpower			
	Government Employees		Contractor Employees	
	Peacetime	Wartime	Peacetime	Wartime
Lone Star AAP	85	156	1,805	10,777
Kansas AAP	38	92	855	4,477
Holston AAP	43	73	1,060	1,113
Indiana AAP	42	147	1,280	20,000
Louisiana AAP	38	131	746	3,948
Riverbank AAP	11	59	119	2,480

NOTE: AAP -- Army Ammunition Plant

Source: U.S. Army Material Development and Readiness Command,  
RCS, DD I&L(A) 1272, Dec. 1977

These plants are Government Owned-Contractor Operated (GOCO) and it is obvious that the major expansion would take place with the hiring of contractor employees. We made a field trip to two of these plants to determine the validity of these requirements and the capability of the local labor force to support them.

Figure 2

List of Active Facilities Required to Produce 155mm Improved Conventional  
Munition for Artillery M483

<u>Commodity/ Operation</u>	<u>Plant</u>	<u>Location</u>
Load, Assemble, & Pack	Lone Star AAP	Texarkana, TX
	Kansas AAP	Parsons, KS
Explosive Fill Comp A-5	Holston AAP	Kingsport, TN
Propelling Charges	Indiana AAP	Charlestown, IN
Propellant	Radford AAP	Radford, VA
Metal Parts Projectile	Chamberlain Mfg	New Bedford, MA
	Norris Ind	Vernon, CA
	Louisiana AAP	Shreveport, LA
Grenades	Heckethorn	Dyersberg, TN
	Amron	Waukesha, WI
	Etowah	Gadsden, AL
	Kisco	St Louis, MO
	Riverbank AAP	Riverbank, CA
	Poloron Corp	Scranton, PA
Fuzes (M223)	Etowah	Gadsden, AL
	E. Walters	Elk Grove, IN
	Dayron	Orlando, FL
	Twin Cities AAP	New Brighton, MN
	AVCO	Wilmington, MA
	REDM	Wayne, NJ
Fuzes M577 Mechanical Time	General Time	Peru, IL
	Hamilton Tech	Lancaster, PA
	Bulova Watch	Valley Stream, NY
XM724 Electronic Time	Honeywell	Hopkins, MN

Source: Department of the Army, ODCSRDA, January 1979.

## 2. Local Community Assessment

The Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant in Texarkana, Texas, was built during World War II and has been operated by the present contractor since 1951. During the Korean War, the plant force was brought from a non-producing, caretaking status to a workforce of 7000. By 1958 it had been reduced to 607 and then, for Vietnam, it expanded again to over 11,000 in 1969 (See Figure 3). Plant officials are confident that they could handle a new emergency in similar fashion.

Lone Star AAP had developed a mobilization plan based on wartime workload requirements developed by the U.S. Army Armament Material Readiness Command (ARRCOM). Assuming only a caretaker status, the plan shows the following buildup:


M-day	315
M+3 months	1,835
M+6 months	3,617
M+12 months	8,259
M+18 months	9,908
M-24 months	10,777

Since the current workforce is actually 1,900 the first few months would not be a problem. Plant personnel officials have determined a position-by-position expansion for each department and have placed a standby order with local State Employment Commission for immediate implementation in an emergency. A large part of the expanded workforce would be unskilled labor from nearby rural counties of Texas and Arkansas. There is very little competition from other industry in these areas and most workers are women or men over military age. Plant officials are aware of how many employees are military reservists and are prepared to lose them upon mobilization without interrupting their buildup.

FIGURE 3

MANPOWER HISTORY OF LONE STAR ARMY AMMUNITIONS PLANT, TEXAS

**DAY AND ZIMMERMANN, INC.**  
**LONE STAR DIVISION**  
**PERSONNEL STRENGTH**



Source: Day and Zimmerman, Inc., Plant Contractor Operator.

The Louisiana Army Ammunition Plant at Shreveport, Louisiana, has a similar history of rapid buildups. For Vietnam, the expansion was from 2,000 in 1965 to 9,000 in 1969. Plant officials here anticipate no difficulty in getting unskilled labor to support a new expansion -- their mobilization plan shows them growing from 850 to 2,400 -- but possibly some problems with skilled personnel, such as machinists and engineers. There is some competition for such personnel in the Shreveport area.

In addition to these two plants, we also visited Longhorn AAP in Marshall, Texas, Red River Army Depot in Texarkana, the City Manager and Civil Defense Director of Texarkana, Texas, and several reserve units located in the tri-state area. Our overall conclusions were that this area is one that could stand up very well in a full mobilization and may be a model against which to compare others with a heavy concentration of defense activity. The government plants all had mobilization plans that included provision for hiring new employees from the local labor force. They felt they would be successful in spite of large-scale military inductions. The reserve units said they had few difficulties with their member employers and anticipated none in a mobilization. The City government was organizing an auxiliary police force with members not vulnerable to military service and Texas has a State Guard organization that could perform disaster relief work in the absence of the federalized National Guard.

### 3. Industrial Mobilization Summary

The foregoing discussion highlights a serious lack of data with which to make an assessment of the capability of the industrial sector to support mobilization. While some analysis can be conducted with regard to government-

owned plants, these constitute only 120 of 8,993 producers listed in the Register of Planned Emergency Producers.<sup>17/</sup> Certainly, it is not necessary to collect manpower data from all of the 8,993 firms listed. It should be possible to identify those with critical roles to play in the early months of the war, require them to provide manpower plans to support their Production Planning Schedule (DD Form 1519). Data from this source could then be combined with data on DOD employee hirings and military reservists occupational data (also not presently available) to permit a comprehensive wartime manpower supply and demand analysis.

It is unlikely that the movement of two or three million people in a labor force of over 100 million is likely to have much impact on a national scale. The problems are more likely to appear in critical occupational areas such as medical, transportation services and ordnance manufacturing and in local areas where competitive demands are focused. Therefore, occupational and geographic demand data are needed so that additional local area impact analyses can be conducted.

---

<sup>17/</sup> DOD 4005.3H, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) April 1978.

#### IV. CURRENT MOBILIZATION POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

##### A. DOD RESPONSIBILITIES

The basic regulation outlining responsibilities for civilian manpower mobilization is DOD Directive 3005.6, Civilian Personnel Procurement and Manpower Control During a Mobilization, March 20, 1962. The date of this directive, which has not been amended, makes it of questionable value as a guide to action in today's mobilization environment. Nevertheless, it is the existing directive and would be followed to some extent in an emergency.

The first part of DOD 3005.6 outlines the basic responsibilities of civil agencies for mobilization of civilian manpower. There have been significant reorganizations of some of these agencies, so little of this section is currently applicable. Current agency responsibilities are discussed later in this report.

Section IV of the directive is Development and Submission of Total Civilian Manpower Requirements and it reads as follows:

Upon request, the Military Departments and other DOD agencies will submit total phased mobilization requirements for direct-hire civilian employees to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (M). The Secretary of Defense subsequently will issue appropriate authorizations to the Departments and other DOD agencies. These agencies will, in turn, issue authorizations to the local installations in a manner deemed most effective for meeting their respective missions.

It is doubtful that this process would serve the intended purpose for today's rapid mobilization process. Authorization would probably reach local installations much too late to permit hiring for early surge requirements. Section III. D, above, discussed the existing estimates of DOD wartime civilian manpower and indicated that they are largely unvalidated and not time-phased. If this validation were accomplished in peacetime, the first month's requirements could be authorized immediately upon M-day to permit quick filling of high priority positions.

Section V of DODD 3005.6 is Guidance for Meeting Civilian Direct-Hire and Contractor Manpower Requirements. This section describes procedures to be used for Manpower Procurement, Relative Urgencies and Manpower Priorities, Manpower Controls, Utilization of Manpower, and similar actions requiring coordination with other Federal agencies. Like the earlier section, it does not reflect current agency organization and procedures and should be updated in order to provide useful guidance for mobilization and wartime resource management.

Before a new DODD can be written, there needs to be a clear delineation of responsibilities for planning and management of civilian manpower mobilization. DODD 3005.6 says that OASD(M) has responsibility but that entity, now greatly expanded as OASD (MRA&L), has many deputies and directorates, none of whom is specifically charged with civilian mobilization planning. This becomes clear during the recent NIFTY NUGGET exercise when civilian manpower received very little play for lack of information on critical issues.<sup>18/</sup>

Defense agencies, such as the Defense Logistics Agency, are employers of large numbers of civilians. A recent review of Defense agencies headed by MG Antonelli (USA Ret.) indicated a need to improve those agencies' readiness and responsiveness for war including personnel staffing and manpower planning.<sup>19/</sup>

With regard to industrial preparedness, the General Accounting Office pointed to a need for restructuring of DOD planning with private industry for mobilization production requirements.

---

<sup>18/</sup> Computer Network Corporation Evaluation Report of Mobilization and Deployment Capability in Connection with Exercise NIFTY NUGGET, March 1979, p. 34.

<sup>19/</sup> Report to the Secretary of Defense of the Defense Agency Review, Washington, D.C., March 1979, p. 61.

There can be little assurance that the contractors' projected production capacity figures can fulfill the projected national emergency requirements because production projections generally are not based on adequate analysis. Prime contractors often obtain no input from the key subcontractors and they generally assume that key ingredients, such as Government-owned production equipment, raw materials, and skilled labor will be available.<sup>20/</sup>

DOD has initiated new programs and procedures in industrial preparedness but there is presently no process for identifying industrial manpower requirements and dealing with potential problem areas. There is a federal system under development which translates DOD industrial requirements and essential civilian needs into demands upon the civilian labor force in terms of skills. DOD participates in this system through development of expenditure patterns by budget categories under scenarios provided by the NSC. Currently underway is some finer tuning of the budget category data inputs. There needs to be closer coordination between the Office of the Undersecretary for Research, Development and Engineering and OASD (MRA&L) in developing information and policy toward this end.

Production is not the only civilian industry of concern to mobilization and deployment. Transportation agencies, facilities and firms play a vital role in moving men and equipment in CONUS and overseas. NIFTY NUGGET revealed that transportation planning is critically time-dependent, requirements change quickly and manpower and material compete heavily for transportation resources.<sup>21/</sup> The transportation industry is labor intensive and little is presently known about wartime manpower demand and supply.

---

<sup>20/</sup> Comptroller General's Report to the Congress, Restructuring Needs of Department of Defense Program for Planning with Private Industry for Mobilization Production Requirements, GAO, May 1977.

<sup>21/</sup> Computer Network Corporation, op.cit.

Still another critical problem area is medical personnel. There is a recognized shortfall in wartime medical manpower for the Armed Forces and some civilian medical facilities have contracted with DOD to help by treating casualties. In addition, the Department of HEW is concerned about adequate care for the U.S. population in national emergencies. Consequently, some medical personnel are being double-, and even triple-, counted in the plans of these agencies.<sup>22/</sup>

In summary, then, DOD needs to update policy directives and clearly fix the responsibilities for planning of wartime requirements and supply policy for civilian employees and critical industrial manpower.

B. OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES

DOD does not function alone in national emergencies. Many other Federal agencies have key roles to play in mobilization and support of the war effort. The major coordinating role is assigned to the Federal Preparedness Agency (FPA) now a part of the General Services Administration, but soon to become part of the independent Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). In wartime, FPA becomes the Office of Defense Resources (ODR) if so directed by the President, and institutes resource mobilization programs complete with necessary procedures for claimancy, allocation, system control, and enforcement. The Director, ODR, will chair the cabinet-level Defense Resources Board which will resolve major issues on national resources or recommend possible resolutions to the President.

With FEMA/ODR playing the major coordinating role, other Federal agencies have important wartime functions with regard to manpower planning and management.

---

<sup>22/</sup> Ibid.

These agencies include:<sup>23/</sup>

Department of Labor  
Civil Service Commission  
Department of Commerce  
Department of HEW  
Department of Transportation  
General Services Administration  
National Science Foundation  
Selective Service System  
U.S. Postal Service

Perhaps the most important of these agencies from a DOD manpower point of view is the Department of Labor (DoL). Among that agency's wartime functions are:

- o Assess manpower available to meet critical military and non-military requirements;
- o Promulgate a list of critical occupations and act as Federal resource manager agency for manpower priorities, allocations and controls;
- o Limit workers to priority activities;
- o Oversee recruiting, training and allocating of civilian manpower according to established priorities for governmental and industrial jobs.

Carrying out of these functions by DoL will depend upon a timely identification of requirements by DOD in such a manner that they can be readily translated into demands upon the civilian labor force in terms of skills and geographic areas. DOD capability requires improvement, as pointed out earlier in this report.

---

<sup>23/</sup> BDM Corporation, Mobilization Roles of Federal Agencies, BDM/W-78-185-TR, April 1978, pp. 2-3/4.

## V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### A. CONCLUSIONS

1. Civilian manpower is an essential part of DOD mobilization resources. Civilians are required early in a major national emergency to fill Defense Department and other Federal agency wartime positions and to meet surge demands by defense industries.
2. The impact of sudden wartime demand and supply upon the war effort, upon the national economy and upon local communities and industries may be severe and detrimental if not carefully orchestrated by DOD and coordinating Federal agencies.
3. DOD currently lacks a clear line of organizational authority to plan for, direct and coordinate wartime civilian manpower authorization, hiring and priority control.
4. Existing DOD regulations regarding civilian manpower mobilization are outdated and inadequate to fill today's needs.
5. Data on DOD civilian manpower requirements is neither validated nor time-phased and cannot be used to estimate labor force supply sufficiency.
6. There is practically no data at all on wartime industrial manpower demands.
7. There is presently no data available on military reservists' or retirees' civilian occupations.

### B. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. OASD(MRA&L) should establish clear organizational responsibilities for wartime civilian manpower planning and management.
2. DOD regulations and directives concerning civilian manpower mobilization planning and management should be updated and made fully supportive of other aspects of mobilization planning.

3. The military departments and defense agencies should validate their time-phased requirements for wartime civilian manpower hired by the departments and submit them to OASD (MRA&L).
4. OASD (MRA&L) and OUSD (RDE) should cooperate in developing methods for estimating wartime demands for critical industrial manpower.
5. OASD (MRA&L) should use approved civilian manpower requirements -- government hires and industrial needs -- to conduct labor force supply analysis in conjunction with FPA/FEMA, DoL and other Federal agencies. In addition, plans and procedures should be developed for a rapid, standby mechanism for allocation of scarce civilian manpower skills to defense needs upon identification of bottlenecks. The series and the relevant Federal agencies should plan that mechanism jointly.
6. OASD (MRA&L) should speed up the collection of data on reservists' civilian occupations and initiate a similar effort on retirees. Resulting data should be incorporated in wartime demand and supply analyses.