

TIS-
Gen

⑥
**SELECTED READINGS IN GUERRILLA
AND
COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS.**

①
LEVEL



⑪ Jul 67

⑫ 229



DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release
Distribution Unlimited

DDC
RECEIVED
OCT 30 1979
A

UNITED STATES ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL

FORT BENNING, GEORGIA

JULY 1967

DA 075704

DDC FILE COPY

**Best
Available
Copy**

"The short-term objective of the guerrilla is to harass and destroy, to hit and run. His long-term objective is to become a regular soldier. But he cannot become a regular until he has captured enough of the institutions of power to support a regular army. A counterinsurgency program, therefore, operates both by strengthening the institutions of civil society against infiltration and direct attack, and by weakening the guerrilla force, isolating it from local support, starving it, systematically pursuing it, and eventually capturing or destroying it."

Roswell L. Gilpatric
Dep Secy of Defense



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
ARI FIELD UNIT, BENNING

U. S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
P.O. BOX 2086, FORT BENNING, GEORGIA 31905

PERI-1J


8 August 1979

SUBJECT: Shipment of Documents

Defense Documentation Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22314
ATTN: Selection & Cataloging

The Documents in these shipments are approved for public release. The
distribution is unlimited.

FOR THE CHIEF:



ALEXANDER NICOLINI
Major, Infantry
R&D Coordinator

This handbook has been prepared by the Tactics Group, Brigade and Battalion Operations Department, United States Army Infantry School, and is approved for resident and extension course information by the United States Army Infantry School only. The Glossary of Terms and Problems reflects the current position of the Infantry School and conforms to printed Department of the Army doctrine as closely as possible. The views or opinions expressed or implied by those authors not officials of the United States Government are not to be construed as representing the official policies of the Department of Defense.

PARTS	
ONE	INTRODUCTION AND SELECTED READINGS
TWO	GLOSSARY OF TERMS
THREE	BIBLIOGRAPHY AND READING LIST
FOUR	PROBLEMS

Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	☒
DDC TAB	☐
Unannounced	☐
Justification	☐
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Availand/or special
A	

SELECTED READINGS IN GUERRILLA AND COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

Table of Contents

		PAGE NO
PART ONE	INTRODUCTION AND SELECTED READINGS	1
CHAPTER 1	INTRODUCTION	3
CHAPTER 2	UNITED STATES POLICY	5
Section I	The Army's Role in Cold War	6
II	Letter From President Kennedy	8
III	The Secretary of Defense Answers The Third Challenge	9
IV	Prepare to Deter, To Fight And To Build	13
V	A Perspective on Firepower	18
CHAPTER 3	UNITED STATES CONCEPT	21
Section I	The Orchestration Of A Counterinsurgency Program	22
II	Countering Guerrilla Attack	28
CHAPTER 4	COMMUNIST THEORY	38
Section I	Lenin On Partisan Warfare	38
II	Mao On Guerrilla Warfare	43
III	Khrushchev On Wars Of Liberation	54
IV	Giap On Guerrilla Warfare	63
V	La Guerra De Guerrillas	73
VI	Long Live The Victory Of The People's War	76
CHAPTER 5	HISTORICAL SURVEY	89
Section I	Guerrilla Warfare	90
II	What Is Past Is Prologue - The US Army And Guerrilla Warfare	96
CHAPTER 6	CONSIDERATIONS	109
Section I	To Beat The Guerrilla At His Own Game	110
II	Both Sides Of The Guerrilla Hill	117

		PAGE NO
CHAPTER 7	PRE-WORLD WAR I AND WORLD WAR I PERIOD	129
Section I	Guerrilla	130
II	Counter guerrilla Operations: A Case Study	133
III	To Gain The Rear	139
CHAPTER 8	WORLD WAR II PERIOD	147
Section I	Russian Partisan Methods	148
II	East Central Luzon Guerrilla	151
CHAPTER 9	COLD WAR PERIOD	157
Section I	Guerrilla War in Greece, 1946-49: A Case Study	158
II	Indochina - The Last Year Of The War - The Navarre Plan	168
III	Royal Marines - Action In Malaya	179
IV	Bullets Alone Won't Win	191
PART TWO	GLOSSARY OF TERMS	203
PART THREE	BIBLIOGRAPHY AND READING LIST	213
PART FOUR	PROBLEMS	223
CHAPTER 10	INTRODUCTION TO INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOP- MENT	225
CHAPTER 11	FUNDAMENTALS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIC ACTION	227
CHAPTER 12	FUNDAMENTALS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE AND VIET CONG TACTICS	229
CHAPTER 13	FUNDAMENTALS OF COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS . . .	231
CHAPTER 14	INFANTRY BRIGADE IN COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS	233
CHAPTER 15	INFANTRY BATTALION IN COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS	235
CHAPTER 16	ROLE OF THE MAAG ADVISOR IN INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS	237

	<u>PAGE</u> <u>NO.</u>
CHAPTER 17	
BRITISH POSTWAR INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCES	239
CHAPTER 18	
FRENCH POSTWAR INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCES	241

UNITED STATES ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL
Brigade and Battalion Operations Department
Fort Benning, Georgia

**SELECTED READINGS
 IN
 GUERRILLA AND COUNTERGUERRILLA
 OPERATIONS**

PART I

**INTRODUCTION AND
 SELECTED READINGS**

"Liberation wars and popular uprisings will continue to exist as long as imperialism exists... such wars are not only admissible but inevitable... we recognize such wars. We help and will continue to help."

Nikita Khrushchev
 6 January 1961

CHAPTERS	
1	INTRODUCTION
2	UNITED STATES POLICY
3	UNITED STATES CONCEPT
4	COMMUNIST THEORY
5	HISTORICAL SURVEY
6	CONSIDERATIONS
7	PRE WORLD WAR I AND WORLD WAR I PERIOD
8	WORLD WAR II PERIOD
9	COLD WAR PERIOD

50979-Sig 4

TAB
HERE.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"The next twenty years will demand more of America's military men, America's diplomats, and America's political leadership than the last two hundred years of our professions."

President Lyndon B. Johnson
1964

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. **GENERAL:** Guerrilla warfare is probably as old as history itself. The use of guerrillas, partisans, frank tireurs, insurgents or bushwhackers, terms largely synonymous with irregular forces is certainly as ancient a practice as war itself. During recent times, this type of operation has been of great military and political importance. The unpredictable guerrilla does not conform to any hard and fast tactical doctrine or principles in his operations. Fighting with weapons simple in design and limited in number, weapons that achieve deadly effectiveness in the hands of a tough, crafty group of individuals, he spreads a reign of terror over the civilian population of a country.

Success in counter guerrilla warfare is not merely a matter of observing certain rules or applying standing operating procedures that have proved effective in certain instances. It is rather, a concentration upon the careful gathering of all facts for evaluating the guerrilla's command structure, intelligence system, mobility, relationship with the civil population, etc. The more examples from practical experience which are available for analysis, the better prepared will be those called upon to combat this guerrilla. The study of these examples and problems will help to provide you, the reader, with a broad base from which to form ideas of the tactics and techniques that may be employed in the conduct of guerrilla and counter guerrilla operations.

2. **PURPOSE and SCOPE:** This handbook is a guide and reference for the student studying guerrilla and counter guerrilla operations at the United States Army Infantry School. Its scope of coverage primarily concerns itself with Infantry units of Brigade and Battalion size.

3. REFERENCES:

a. This handbook is based on the current doctrine included in FM's 31-15, 31-16, 31-21 and 31-22 and reflects the definitions included in AR 320-5, February 1963 and JCS Pub. 1, Dictionary of United States Military Terms from Joint Usage, 1 December 1964.

b. Part Two contains a glossary of terms for use in reading and understanding this handbook.

c. See Part Three, "Bibliography and Reading List," for a list of supplemental references.

d. Part Four provides a means for indexing and filing those problems presented by the Internal Defense and Development Committee, Tactics Group, Brigade and Battalion Operations Department.

CHAPTER 2

UNITED STATES POLICY

"The force of world communism operates in the twilight zone. Their military tactics are those of the sniper, the ambush, and the raid; their political tactics are terror, extortion, and assassination. We must help the people of threatened nations to resist these tactics by appropriate means."

Secretary of Defense McNamara
February 1962

TAB
HERE

Section	
I	THE ARMY'S ROLE IN THE COLD WAR
II	LETTER FROM PRESI- DENT KENNEDY TO THE UNITED STATES ARMY
III	THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ANSWERS THE THIRD CHAL- LENGE
IV	PREPARE TO DETER, TO FIGHT AND TO BUILD
V	A PERSPECTIVE ON FIREPOWER

CHAPTER 2

UNITED STATES POLICY

Section I

The Army's Role in Cold War

The use of the military to further United States cold war efforts has been expanded from an initial role of deterrence by physical presence to a broader program of counterinsurgency aimed at assisting legally established governments to prevent, suppress, or defeat subversion and insurgency - Communist "wars of liberation."

Counterinsurgency is a mixture of military, political, social, and economic measures used to prevent, suppress, or defeat subversion and insurgency. It is, therefore, a total program to which all agencies of the United States contribute.


Insurgency is an element of land warfare, and counterinsurgency is viewed in the same light. Therefore, in countering insurgent conditions, the doctrine of land warfare prevails; the Army has the primary role to play and must be expected to shoulder the heaviest burdens. Consequently, the Army has been assigned the mission of developing the doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment for Army and Marine Corps ground forces in counterinsurgency operations.

The Army has given much thought to the military role in counterinsurgency and the concept of employment of Army forces. Recognizing that the application of military forces alone will not solve all the problems of a country facing subversive insurgency, it is nonetheless clear that the role of the military force in internal defense is large, and, under proper conditions, may be decisive. The fundamental role of military forces in internal defense is to deny the insurgent achievement of his goal through his use of military force. The Army has a unique ability to establish and maintain stability, to deter or cope with disorder, and to support legal authority. Through the Military Assistance Program the Army continues to advise and assist the Army forces of other members of the free world community in organizing, training, and equipping forces to counter subversive insurgency.

Simultaneously, indigenous military forces are urged and assisted to act directly against subversion and to do what they can to assist the people through military civic action programs. Thus, in addition to their traditional role of assisting in the training and equipping of military forces for purely military tasks, U. S. Army personnel help local military forces contribute economic and social development, particularly in remote or deprived areas.

Military civic action programs are tailored to the expressed needs of the countries being assisted. These programs include providing surveys, technical advice, and training of local military forces for projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. In addition, planning and assistance in disaster and relief work is included in these broad attempts to help the country help itself.

There are three tiers of Army forces upon which the commanders of unified commands may draw for the conduct of counterinsurgency operations.



CIVIC ACTION IN ACTION

The first tier includes deployed special forces teamed up with certain augmentation elements to make up a Special Action Force (SAF). These elements consist, in the main, of medical, engineer, civil affairs, intelligence, psychological warfare, and military police personnel. SAF's are now available to commanders of unified commands responsible for Asia, Latin America, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Numerous mobile training teams are also available within this first tier framework; as are the Army training and advisory personnel in some 45 Military Assistance Advisory Groups and missions around the world.

The second tier includes the general purpose forces and resources available within the theater Army. In the Pacific theater, for example, a force consisting of infantry, artillery, aviation, engineer, medical, signal, and other units, has been designated to provide a balanced capability for reinforcing the Asian SAF. Area oriented and counterinsurgency trained, this backup force could be committed in whole or in part, or serve as the source of additional training teams and advisors.

The third tier consists of the Army forces stationed in the continental United States, to include the training base and schools from which mobile training teams and advisors are drawn. Also in this tier are brigade sized tailored forces which are oriented and trained for employment in specific insurgency threatened areas of the world.



Section II

Letter From President Kennedy

THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington

April 11, 1962

TO THE UNITED STATES ARMY:

Another military dimension -- "guerrilla warfare" -- has necessarily been added to the American profession of arms. The literal translation of guerrilla warfare -- "a little war" -- is hardly applicable to this ancient, but at the same time, modern threat. I note that the Army has several terms which describe the various facets of the current struggle: wars of subversion, covert aggression, and, in broad professional terms, special warfare or unconventional warfare.

By whatever name, this militant challenge to freedom calls for an improvement and enlargement of our own development of techniques and tactics, communications and logistics to meet this threat. The mission of our Armed Forces -- and especially the Army today -- is to master these skills and techniques and to be able to help those who have the will to help themselves.

Pure military skill is not enough. A full spectrum of military, para-military, and civil action must be blended to produce success. The enemy uses economic and political warfare, propaganda and naked military aggression in an endless combination to oppose a free choice of government, and suppress the rights of the individual by terror, by subversion and by force of arms.

To win in this struggle, our officers and men must understand and combine the political, economic and civil actions with skilled military efforts in the execution of this mission.

Extracted from a letter from President Kennedy to the United States Army, April 11, 1962.



Section III

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ANSWERS THE THIRD CHALLENGE

Khrushchev (in a speech January 6, 1961) analyzed three categories of wars: "world wars, local wars, and liberation wars or popular uprisings." This breakdown, he said, "is necessary to work out the correct tactics with regard to these wars."

As to world wars, he declared that "Communists are the most determined opponents" of such wars; and he asserted that "we can forestall the outbreak of a world war." Local wars, he thought, were more likely to occur in the future; but he rejected them also because a local war "may grow into a thermonuclear rocket war."

Excerpted from an address by the Honorable Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, given before the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation, Chicago, 17 February 1962.

But "liberation wars and popular uprisings," he predicted, "will continue to exist as long as imperialism exists... Such wars are not only admissible but inevitable... We recognize such wars. We help and will help the people striving for their independence."

Chairman Khrushchev then asked and answered a series of rhetorical questions about these wars of liberation. "Can such wars flare up in the future? They can. Can there be such uprisings? There can... In other words, can conditions be created where a people will lose their patience and rise in arms? They can. What is the attitude of the Marxists toward such uprisings? A most positive one..."

Then after a description of the horrors of a thermonuclear war, Khrushchev states a significant conclusion. "The victory of socialism throughout the world," he announced, "is now near." But "for this victory, wars among states are not necessary."

Khrushchev is saying here that a major war in the nuclear age has become too dangerous to play the role of "midwife to revolution" which Communist leaders before him had always preached. At the same time, the Soviets wish to keep alive the threat of nuclear war as a means of intimidation, a form of blackmail intended to discourage the Free World from resisting Communist encroachment at other levels.

What Chairman Khrushchev describes as wars of liberation and popular uprisings, I prefer to describe as subversion and covert aggression. We have learned to recognize the pattern of this attack. It feeds on conditions of poverty and unequal opportunity, and it distorts the legiti-

mate aspirations of peoples just beginning to realize the reach of the human potential. It is particularly dangerous to those nations that have not yet formulated the essential consensus of value, which a free society requires for survival...

Our response to this new Soviet threat cannot be a simple one. Clearly the new Soviet posture as announced by Khrushchev gives us no cause to relax our nuclear guard. The Soviet decision to concentrate on wars of covert aggression was not taken in a power vacuum...

What should be our military policy to meet the threat expressed in Khrushchev's speech? How can we contain the Communist threat to the area delineated by Mr. Khrushchev, and within that area, how can we best meet and overcome it?

MEETING THE NUCLEAR THREAT

The first requirement for such a policy is clearly to maintain our nuclear strike power as a realistic, effective deterrent against Soviet initiation of major wars...

But it is equally clear that we require a wider range of practical alternatives to meet the kind of military challenges that Khrushchev has announced he has in store for us. Unless the Free World has sufficient forces organized and equipped to deal with these challenges at what appear to be the highest appropriate levels of conflict, we could be put into difficult situations by the Communists...

An adequate level of nonnuclear military strength will provide us with the means to meet a limited challenge with limited forces. We will then be in a position of being able to choose, coolly and deliberately, the level and kind of response we feel most appropriate in our own best interests; and both our enemies and our friends will know it.

The nonnuclear build-up will increase our capacity to tailor our responses to a particular military challenge to that level of force which is both appropriate to the issue involved and militarily favorable to our side. Not only will it avoid complete dependence on nuclear weapons, but it will also enhance the credibility to the Soviets of our determination to use nuclear weapons, should this prove necessary...

Nuclear and nonnuclear power complement each other... If we strengthen one and not the other, part of the effort is wasted. Our policy is aimed at achieving the best balance of military capabilities -- over the entire range of potential conflict, in the various areas of the globe where the Free World has vital interests, and over the years as far ahead as we can reasonably plan. I firmly believe that the nonnuclear build-up will -- by improving and expanding the alternatives open to the Free World -- reduce the pressure to make concessions in the face of Soviet threats.

This then is the reason for our present urgent emphasis on balancing our nuclear strength with limited or nonnuclear war forces...



...their political tactics are terror, extortion and assassination.

THE LIMITED WAR THREAT

The measures we took last year and those we propose for the coming fiscal year to improve our limited war capabilities follow a number of well-defined lines. Our overall purpose here, as in our strategic build-up, is to augment our forces in a balanced fashion. We have increased the number of combat-ready divisions to meet the military contingencies with which we may have to deal. As we have increased manpower, we have modernized and expanded weapons procurement. We have increased our tactical air power to match our ground forces, and we have launched a program to provide sea and airlift tailored to the men and equipment...

As we develop a balanced, modern nonnuclear force, ready to move rapidly against aggression in any part of the world, we continue to inhibit the opportunities for successful conduct of Khrushchev's "local wars." It is tempting to conclude that our conventional forces will leave us free to compete with Communism in the peaceful sphere of economic and social development where we can compete most effectively.

THE THIRD CHALLENGE

But we shall have to deal with the problems of "wars of liberation." These wars are often not wars at all. In these conflicts, the force of world Communism operates in the twilight zone between political subversion and quasi-military action. Their military tactics are those of the sniper, the ambush, and the raid. Their political tactics are terror, extortion, and assassination. We must help the people of threatened nations to resist these tactics by appropriate means. You cannot carry out a land reform program if the local peasant leaders are being systematically murdered.



...here we must work with companies and squads, and individual soldiers, rather than with battle groups and divisions.

To deal with the Communist guerrilla threat requires some shift in our military thinking. We have been used to developing big weapons and mounting large forces. Here we must work with companies and squads, and individual soldiers, rather than with battle groups and divisions. In all four Services we are training fighters who can, in turn, teach the people of free nations how to fight for their freedom. At the same time that our strategic weapons are becoming more and more sophisticated, we must learn to simplify our tactical weapons, so that they can be used and maintained by men who have never seen a machine more complicated than a well sweep...



Section IV

PREPARED TO DETER, TO FIGHT AND TO BUILD

I now turn to a task which some might say is an additional mission: the Army's role in preventing war.

We might say that, operationally, our military forces exist to deter or to win a general war, a limited war, or a sub-limited war (in which conventional military formations are not employed against each other). We have the strength to do these things. But this is not the whole job. Speaking "to those nations who would make themselves our adversary," President Kennedy in his Inaugural Address offered the suggestion "that both sides begin anew the quests for peace." President Johnson reiterated this idea when he spoke at the Coast Guard Academy's 1964 commencement ceremonies, saying that we had built our military strength "not to destroy but to save... to try to put an end to conflict."



AMERICAN TROOPS IN THAILAND

Extracted from an article by the Honorable Stephen Ailes, Secretary of the Army, entitled, "Prepared to Deter, To Fight and To Build," Army, November 1964.

There is little doubt that our willingness and ability to deploy Army forces do help deter others from starting wars, including sub-limited wars. This was evident in Lebanon, where the 14,000 US ground troops moved there earned a share of credit for averting a potential explosion. Moving a battle group in 1962 for maneuvers into the territory of our SEATO partner, Thailand, undoubtedly helped stabilize a situation of growing danger. In both instances, the forces ran some risk of becoming involved in a shooting war.

If we can believe Mr. Khrushchev's well publicized speech of January 1961, sub-limited wars - or what he called "just wars of national liberation" - will continue. Indeed, during the next few decades at least it is highly probable that most of our professional soldiers will be far more concerned with sub-limited war than with general or limited war.

But if there are ways in which the deployment of combat forces in a crisis to deter sub-limited wars (with the attendant risks) can be avoided, obviously they should be employed.

I am most certainly not advocating that the U. S. Army or any other governmental agency intervene in the internal affairs of other nations. However, for one thing, sovereign nations have in the past requested, and will in the future ask for, US aid in maintaining internal stability against insurgent forces. Hopefully, their request for assistance to meet the threat will be made before the insurgency actually begins. Helping maintain a nation's internal stability in this fashion is more effective and infinitely less expensive than providing what might be needed to help restore a government. When the US Government does respond to requests for assistance, its Army must be ready to provide its share of the response.



... the Army's assistance is usually in the form of military equipment and training.

As might be expected, the Army's assistance is usually in the form of military equipment and training. But this should not blind us to the connection between correcting political deficiencies and strengthening a country's armed forces. For example, the failure to hold free elections may be a sore point, whereas in truth the government may lack strength to control "spontaneous" demonstrations staged by insurgents, or to prevent reprisals against those who vote, or to prevent disorder which discourages voting, or to guarantee a legal and orderly transfer of power to a newly elected official. We of the Army cannot resolve the political problems of sovereign nations, but we can help them provide the internal stability in which their own political system can function. Free political action is next to impossible under conditions of terroristic insurgency.

Perhaps the best recent example of how adequate military strength can help frustrate the political objectives of insurgents is that of Venezuela. There, in spite of communist support from Cuba so blatant that it drew censure from the Organization of American States, internal stability was maintained so that free, competitive elections were held, and governmental power was transferred to the victor with the least confusion. The Venezuelan Army, trained in part by elements of our own, must be credited with having preserved the essential stability through its military police work, riot control, and civil affairs operations, as well as through its generally high state of military training. It is true that Venezuela is building an enviable record of political responsibility.

While other countries may not be able to solve their political problem as effectively as Venezuela has, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge has summed up the matter precisely. At Bonn, on 24 August 1964, he commented to reporters that, in convincing citizens to adhere to their legal government while being menaced by insurgency, "military action is an indispensable aid. People have to be able to sleep at night if they are going to conduct any kind of economic or social program." Adequate, reliable military force, properly used, can let the people sleep.



... the vast differences in standards of living across the world has led to what is sometimes called a "revolution of rising expectations."

Other causes of popular dissatisfaction seized on by insurgents spring from unmet needs or desires. The vast differences in standards of living across the world, and the improved communications which have publicized these differences, have led to what is often called a "revolution of rising expectations." It is impossible for some nations to meet their people's expectations. Resulting discontent leads to demands for political reform, and provides popular slogans for dissident elements. Here again military aid can help remove the causes of discontent and the resulting political "causes." Units and individual members of the national army can support civil affairs and civic action projects that provide roads, communications, medical and sanitary facilities, schools and hospitals, disaster relief -- the list of possibilities is limited only by initiative and imagination.

Recently, the Ecuadorian Army completed 12 projects, including road repair, construction of a farm-to-market road, provisions of tank-trucks to haul potable water to an isolated village, fabrication of ten 1,600 gallon water-storage tanks, and an 11-kilometer irrigation canal. The United States furnished a mobile training team of 10 officers and 26 men and some equipment.



... civic action programs do help combat insurgency

Civic action programs do help combat insurgency. But a point made last year by Brigadier General Oudone Sananikone of Laos is still valid: although in most cases counterinsurgency is the primary motivating force in getting a civic action program started, such a venture would be necessary in underdeveloped nations even if there were no communist threat. In other words, civic action programs help prevent insurgency from ever beginning.

Thus, there appears to be two major roles for the US Army in preventing sub-limited war. We can help a nation's army maintain stability so that governmental functions can continue, and we can help a nation's army plan and carry out civic action programs.

The US Army provides aid in these two fields through our military assistance advisory group (MAAG) and military missions, which now are in 47 countries. They are there at the request of the host country; part of their expense is born by the host nation, and their composition and activities are closely coordinated with the host government. Further, they are only one part of the US country team, which also includes agencies of the State Department, the Agency for International Development, and other military services, with our ambassador as director and coordination of the team.

Our MAAG's and military missions are for the most part small, and may not include all the skilled people necessary to carry out particular US-supported programs. In these instances, mobile training teams are provided on a temporary basis. To furnish the additional manpower and skills needed for these mobile training teams, specially tailored units known as special action forces have been made available to certain unified commands. These units include men with the skills necessary to assist in stability operations. The mobile training teams developed from these units have no set strength or composition, but are tailored for the required job, be it military training or civic action or both. If men with the needed skills are not available within the theater, they may be furnished from within Army's total resources. Even combat support units may be provided, but the usual request is for people skilled in medicine, engineering, signal communications, military police work, intelligence, civil affairs, or psychological warfare. For example, in Mali a 20-man engineer team is training a Malian engineer construction company so as to enhance that unit's civic action capability.

Since 1950, 1,557 mobile training teams have trained more than 113,000 men in more than 90 countries -- some in such fields as sawmill operations and well-drilling, most in more military subjects. Besides contributing to the well-being of people everywhere and helping remove the causes of insurgency by these actions, some 200 divisions of our allies stand guard at the frontiers of the free world.

The Army does have a place in preventing sub-limited war, which occupies our thinking more and more these days. Indeed, our Army's roles continue to multiply. Not too long ago, we considered our primary employment to be in general and limited war. We added emphasis to our capability to win sub-limited wars only a few years ago, making it a third and equally important goal.

Now we must meet the problem of helping those countries which face only the possibility of a threat to their security. The Army will respond; we can and will train our units and individual soldiers to counter even the threat of cold war. We can do this without impairing our capability to help deter or win any hot war we might face, because today the US Army is more versatile than it has ever been.

We face an expanding challenge. As President Johnson has said, "The next twenty years will demand more of America's military men, America's diplomats, and America's political leadership than the last two hundred years of our professions." I can promise him that the US Army will meet the challenges of our times.



Section V

A Perspective on Firepower

In the world today, distances have shrunk and isolation is no longer possible. A glance at the nearest daily newspaper confirms the point that a crisis in one part of the globe creates a reaction in many other parts as well. Tension, turbulence, rebellion and conflict anywhere on earth concern us all. In short, the condition we know as peace is indivisible.

I am not sure, however, that the military implications of indivisible peace have sufficiently penetrated our conceptual thinking and our overall view of the mission and requirements for ground combat. We tend to still think of the Army as a double-purpose tool geared for nuclear warfare and conventional warfare. So called irregular warfare, such as counterinsurgency, antiguerrilla operations, and related actions, appears to be seen by some quarters as exceptional, outside of the real task of the Army and a matter mainly for specialists. The possibility that for some time to come considerable segments of the Army may have to be used largely in antiguerrilla and other peace-keeping operations aimed at establishing and maintaining control and stability deserves a very close look. The time appears at hand to extend our thinking to embrace a triple-purpose concept for ground combat operations in which counterinsurgency operations and other types of US military participation overseas in time of nominal peace are a normal third principle mission of the Army going hand in hand with nuclear warfare and conventional warfare.

A look at both the past and the future bears out this contention. Since the end of World War II the Army has been virtually continuously committed with both people and equipment to protective action overseas against both internal and external aggression. In Greece and the Philippines US Army officers and soldiers helped the legitimate governments as field observers in fighting communist guerrilla insurrections of civil war dimension. The Army bore the brunt of the so-called police action in Korea which in all but name was a conventional war fought by large size regular armies. In Lebanon a United States joint force of about 13,000 men, which included Army troops, stayed for several months at the request of the Lebanese government to help maintain a climate of order, and, as it turned out, except for a few very minor shooting incidents, the mere presence of this force was enough to help Lebanon maintain internal stability. In 1962, several thousand American troops were invited to Thailand to deter the Pathet

Excerpted from an address by General Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff, United States Army, entitled, "A Perspective on Firepower," given at an AUSA Firepower Symposium, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, 25 August 1964.

Lao from driving into the Mekong River valley and the Thai border from Laos. In South Vietnam today we have over 10,000 Army officers and men advising the Vietnamese forces. The nature of their duties is such that soldiers in Vietnam are being shot at by the Viet Cong and are sustaining some casualties.



... In South Vietnam today we have over 10,000 Army officers and men advising the Vietnamese forces. The nature of their duties is such that soldiers in Vietnam are being shot at by the Viet Cong and are sustaining some casualties.

Our attention at the moment, of course, is understandably focused on Vietnam and the particular requirements there but this should not blind us to obvious demands of the future nor warp our assessment of other past experience. While general war is not impossible and we must remain prepared for such an eventuality, I share the general belief that the Communist camp will shy away from a direct confrontation with the US. Instead, I think, the Communist will emphasize efforts to influence and control Free World areas by the more indirect methods of penetration, subversion, rebellion and guerrilla warfare. Khrushchev himself has told us this.

We know from the statements and writings of their leaders that these methods are especially favored by Red China, North Vietnam and by Cuba. Increasingly, Red Chinese support is aiding and abetting revolutionary elements throughout the world in opposing existing order with armed rebellion. Vietnam, Laos and some parts of Africa are areas of such Chinese effort. The recent action of the Organization of American States with respect to Cuba demonstrated that Cuba is a base of foreign support for insurgents in Latin America, although Red China is active there too. In other parts of the world, the degree of political, social and economic instability is such that the communists may inject themselves into local situations with relative ease. In a number of cases where there have been uprisings in Africa south of the Sahara during the past year, the communists have sought to take credit for the uprisings and to insert themselves in the revolutionary picture.

Plainly, the Army needs to readjust its concepts of warfare to recognize the realities of keeping the peace and maintaining stability. It seems clear that in a long time to come emergency situations of a character like Vietnam, Lebanon or Laos will be the norm rather than the exception and so should be considered within the mission of the Army as a whole. In short, the Army should include these stability operations within its concepts and doctrine for prompt sustained combat on land, in proper relationship to the Army and its mission as a whole.

CHAPTER 3

UNITED STATES CONCEPT

"We are dedicated to the proposition that the revolutionary process of modernization shall be permitted to go forward in independence with increasing degrees of human freedom."

Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to
President Kennedy
1961

TAB
HERE

Section	
I	THE ORCHESTRATION OF A COUNTERINSUR- GENCY PROGRAM
II	COUNTERING GUER- RILLA ATTACK

CHAPTER 3

UNITED STATES CONCEPT

Section I

THE ORCHESTRATION OF A COUNTERINSURGENCY PROGRAM

.... Our basic national policy calls for the development of a community of free and independent nations, each evolving according to its own individual character and at its own pace. To protect less-developed societies from the threat to their growth posed by Communist subversion and insurgency, we are seeking better to plan and orchestrate the whole range of military, political, economic and social measures devised to assist the governments of the less-developed world to protect themselves. In this connection we must always remember that the primary responsibility for a country's internal security is that of its own government; we can only be of real assistance to governments that have the will and capacity to help themselves, for no matter how great the magnitude of our effort, it is still that of an outsider.

The main elements of our approach to this problem consist of four principal requirements, each of which embraces a wide spectrum of specific actions and measures:



... First a political and economical appraisal... Only in this way can we suggest practical remedies. This means looking through a society rather than only at its outward forms.

First a political and economic appraisal — a searching and comprehensive analysis of the points of strength and vulnerability in the societies of the less-developed world so that we may see them in their totality as living human complexes. Only in this way can we suggest practical remedies. This means looking through a society rather than only at its outward forms; it means addressing ourselves systematically to the problem of when and how a developing society may be in danger.

Extracted from an article by U. Alexis Johnson, entitled, "The Orchestration Of A Counterinsurgency Program", Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: An Anthology, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D. C. July 1962.

Next is the development of measures designed to strengthen the vulnerable points of the society under attack and to remove or at least ameliorate those grievances and causes of popular discontent which the Communists exploit.

Third is the development of effective police and military capabilities in friendly countries to maintain internal security, to protect the populace from intimidation and violence, and to suppress subversive insurgency wherever found so that a society may develop in an orderly manner. This embraces our whole military assistance effort and the equally important public safety program of AID to strengthen and improve local police forces and constabularies.

Finally there is the mobilization of the local government's resources, effectively employed through political, economic and psychological measures, to support the military and internal security capabilities.

To implement these measures and make them successful requires a utilization of resources and an orchestration of effort to which many branches of our Government can contribute. Each element of an Embassy Country Team has a function to perform in assisting the local government to defend itself.

In most cases, the United States effort abroad will consist primarily of advice, assistance, and the training of local civilian administrators and police, paramilitary and military forces to improve the domestic internal defense capabilities. Because of the peculiar nature of internal warfare, its deterrence and suppression require a blend of military and non-military counter-measures and corrective actions. In a very real sense there is no line of demarcation between military and non-military measures.



USOM (AID) PUBLIC SAFETY INSTRUCTOR DEMONSTRATES
SELF-DEFENSE TACTICS FOR VIETNAMESE COMBAT POLICE

Our civilian agencies have primary responsibility for formulating plans and programs designed to assist in dealing with the basic causes of unrest, to cope with those threats which have not attained military proportions, and to deal with the non-military aspects of those threats which have attained military proportions. The Defense Department and military services have

the primary responsibility of contributing to the military aspects of assisting in the internal defense of friendly nations. The interrelationship of all these aspects is so intimate and, of course, so closely related to our overall foreign policy problems and objectives, as to require careful direction and coordination by the Department of State. We in the Department of State are very conscious of the responsibility which this totality of effort imposes on us.

In the field, the President has made it clear that he looks to the Ambassador fully to assume leadership and responsibility for an integrated and coordinated program of assistance and cooperation in internal defense. It is also the Ambassador's responsibility and that of the field personnel of the Department of State to try to develop a proper understanding of the factors behind any dissidence and unrest in the countries to which they are accredited. In this area, the service attaches also have an important role. Equally important, of course, is the perspective and judgment which we in Washington are able to bring to bear in evaluating the information furnished to us by the field.



THE OLD AND THE NEW MEET IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

With respect to our cooperation in strengthening the military and internal security capabilities of these countries we must utilize our military assistance program to assist in developing the military establishments of these countries into effective instruments for coping with the real threat that may confront them. A country threatened by imminent or even potential insurgency cannot afford to perpetuate obsolete, though perhaps traditional, forms of military organization. In many areas local governments are confronted with the problem of breaking up conscript armies, organized along bulky regimental and divisional lines, into small units armed with modern light equipment which are capable of suppressing bandits and insurgents in remote and inaccessible areas. This is not an easy task because these changes strike at the root of long-established conventions, even at the promotion system. It is also important that the military establishments of these countries not be regarded or used as instruments of oppression. The search for civic-action projects must be carried out in such areas as road and school construction, sanitation, flood control, and communications to develop the unused potential of local military forces and bind them more closely to the population.

Great importance is also attached to the improvement of the internal security capability of local police and constabulary forces. These, of course constitute the first line of defense against subversion, political violence and even insurgency. An effective police force, trained in public service concepts and employing modern technology, should be able to contain popular

disorders without the excessive use of violence and also cope with conspiracy and subversion. Obviously the police and military assistance program in any one country must be most closely coordinated as each must support the other. The successful British operations in Kenya and Malaya were essentially police actions, even though the units on occasion employed military tactics.



...with respect to other programs, those of AID and USIA are particularly important. (South Vietnamese villagers vote on the use of the community development budget. An AID field representative holds a blackboard listing the items voted on.)

With respect to other programs, those of the Agency for International Development and the United States Information Agency are particularly important. In critical areas AID administers such civilian internal defense assistance programs as the policy programs, the installation of village alarm and communications systems, the furnishing of emergency economic assistance and guidance in such fields as transportation and sanitation. These specific measures are accomplished within the over-all AID program for cooperating in the development of economic and social conditions of sufficient strength and vitality to sustain a country's government and institutions. As the coordinator of both military and economic assistance, AID in Washington also exercises the important task of establishing or rearranging priorities, for our resources are limited, and frequently urgent requirements of an internal defense nature must override a carefully worked out economic development plan.

The USIA plays an extremely important role in the internal defense effort by furnishing equipment and technical assistance to the local government in the field of public information and internal communications. One of the primary problems in less-developed countries is to achieve mutual understanding and a community of interest between the government and the populace, especially those living in outlying areas. In some regions, the dissemination of public information programs over the government radio, and the distribution of receiving sets to remote villages, may be the only effective way of countering Communist propaganda. In some critical areas this technical assistance function outweighs in importance USIA's traditional function as the arm of the United States public information activity.

We now come to the most sensitive area of all, which is the mobilization of effort by the local government and its adoption of measures aimed at eradicating or at least minimizing the

grievances and causes of unrest being exploited by the Communists. Here we leave the relatively safe confines of military and economic assistance and enter the delicate province of a country's internal affairs. To bring about some degree of social, economic and political justice, or at the very least to ameliorate the worst causes of discontent and redress the most flagrant inequities, will invariably require positive action by the local government. In some cases only radical reforms will obtain the necessary results. Yet the measures we advocate may strike at the very foundations of these aspects of a country's social structure and domestic economy on which rests the basis of the government's control.



It is therefore our duty and responsibility within the formal limits imposed by diplomatic propriety, to persuade a government under actual or imminent threat of subversion or insurgency to take remedial measures before it is too late. This calls for the utmost skills of our profession for it is always a difficult task and sometimes an impossible one.

It is obvious that to exercise power, direction and control over U.S. programs as complex and diverse as those that I have described, each administered by a separate department or agency of the Federal Government, requires tight coordination both at home and in the field. It is the task of the Ambassador, working in close collaboration with the MAAG Chief, the USOM Director, and the Public Affairs Officer and all other elements of his Mission, to provide such coordination.

In Washington we have the additional task of coordinating our programs in many different countries, as well as department programs within a particular country. Here we continually face the problem of establishing priorities in money, material, and manpower, for our resources are limited.

Despite the hazards and difficulties of dealing with such complex problems, we have one great advantage which the Communists lack. In virtually every country of the earth we are working in a voluntary and willing partnership with governments and societies anxious to preserve their independence and to live at peace in a world community based on respect for the integrity of the individual. We cannot believe that such ideals can be less attractive than the totalitarian images projected by the advocates of a collectivist order.



... We have one great advantage which the Communist lack. In virtually every country of the earth we are working in a voluntary and willing partnership with governments and societies anxious to preserve their independence.

Excerpted from an address by Doctor Walt W. Rostow, given to a graduating class at the Special Warfare Center, 28 June 1961.

Section II

COUNTERING GUERRILLA ATTACK

When the Kennedy Administration accepted the responsibility of government, it faced four major crises: Cuba, the Congo, Laos, and Viet Nam. Each represented a successful Communist breaching — over the previous years — of the Cold War truce lines which had emerged from the Second World War and its aftermath. In different ways each had arisen from the efforts of the international Communist movement to exploit the inherent instabilities of the underdeveloped areas of the non-Communist world; and each had a guerrilla warfare component.



THE REVOLUTION OF MODERNIZATION

Cuba, of course, differed from the other cases. The Cuba revolution against Batista was a broad-based national insurrection. But that revolution was tragically captured from within by the Communist apparatus; and now Latin America faces the danger of Cuba's being used as the base for training, supply, and direction of guerrilla warfare in the Hemisphere.

More than that, Mr. Khrushchev, in his report to the Moscow conference of Communist parties (published January 6, 1961), had explained at great length that the Communists fully support what he called wars of national liberation and would march in the front rank with the people waging such struggles. The military aim of Mr. Khrushchev's January 1961 doctrine is clearly guerrilla warfare.

Faced with these four crises, pressing in on the President from day to day, and faced with the candidly stated position of Mr. Khrushchev, we have indeed begun to take the problem of guerrilla warfare seriously.

To understand this problem, however, one must begin with the great revolutionary process that is going forward in the southern half of the world; for the guerrilla warfare problem in these regions is a product of that revolutionary process and the Communist effort and intent to exploit it.

THE OLD ORDER CHANGES

What is happening throughout Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia is this: old societies are changing their ways in order to create and maintain a national personality on the world scene and to bring to their peoples the benefits modern technology can offer. This process is truly revolutionary. It touches every aspect of the traditional life: economic, social, and political. The introduction of modern technology brings about not merely new methods of production but a new style of family life, new links between the villages and the cities, the beginnings of national politics, and a new relationship to the world outside.

Like all revolutions, the revolution of modernization is disturbing. Individual men are torn between the commitment to the old and familiar way of life and the attractions of a modern way of life. The power of old social groups — notably the landlord who usually dominates the traditional society — is reduced. Power moves towards those who can command the tools of modern technology including modern weapons. Men and women in the villages and the cities, feeling that the old ways of life are shaken and that new possibilities are open to them, express old resentments and new hopes.

This is the grand arena of revolutionary change which the Communists are exploiting with great energy. They believe that their techniques of organization — based on small disciplined cadres of conspirators — are ideally suited to grasp and to hold power in these turbulent settings. They believe that the weak transitional governments that one is likely to find during this modernization process are highly vulnerable to subversion and to guerrilla warfare. And whatever Communist doctrines of historical inevitability may be, Communists know that their time to seize power in the underdeveloped area is limited. They know that as momentum takes hold in an underdeveloped area — and the fundamental social problems inherited from the traditional society are solved — their chances to seize power decline. It is on the weakest nations — facing their most difficult transitional moments — that the Communists concentrate their attention. They are the scavengers of the modernization process.



... Scavengers of the modernization program

SCAVENGERS OF MODERNIZATION

They believe that the techniques of political centralization under dictatorial control — and the projected image of Soviet and Chinese Communist economic progress — will persuade hesitant men faced by great transitional problems that the Communist model should be adopted for modernization, even at the cost of surrendering human liberty. They believe that they can exploit effectively the resentments built up in many of these areas against colonial rule and that they can associate themselves effectively with the desire of the emerging nations for independence, for status on the world scene, and for material progress.

This is a formidable program, for the history of this century teaches us that Communism is not the long run wave of the future towards which societies are naturally drawn. On the contrary. But it is one particular form of modern society to which a nation may fall prey during the transitional process. Communism is best understood as a disease of the transition to modernization.

What is our reply to this historical conception and strategy? What is the American purpose and the American strategy? We too recognize that a revolutionary process is under way. We are dedicated to the proposition that this revolutionary process of modernization shall be permitted to go forward in independence with increasing degrees of human freedom.

We seek two results: first, that truly independent nations shall emerge on the world scene; and, second, that each nation will be permitted to fashion out of its own culture and its own ambitions the kind of modern society it wants. The same religious and philosophical beliefs which decree that we respect the uniqueness of each individual make it natural that we respect the uniqueness of each national society. Moreover, we Americans are confident that, if the independence of this process can be maintained over the coming years and decades, these societies will choose their own version of what we would recognize as a democratic, open society.



... The same religious and philosophical beliefs which decree that we respect the uniqueness of each individual makes it natural that we respect the uniqueness of each national society.

COMMITMENTS TO FREEDOM

These are our commitments of policy and of faith. The U.S. has no interest in political satellites. Where we have military pacts, we have them because governments feel directly endangered by outside military action, and we are prepared to help protect their independence against such military action. But, to use Mao Tse-tung's famous phrase, we do not seek nations which shall stand up straight. And we do so for a reason: because we are deeply confident that nations which stand up straight will protect their independence and move in their own time towards human freedom and political democracy.

Thus our central task in the underdeveloped areas, as we see it, is to protect the independence of the revolutionary process now going forward. This is our mission and it is our ultimate strength. For this is not — and cannot be — the mission of Communism. And in time, through the fog of propaganda and the host of confusions of men caught up in the business of making new nations, this fundamental difference will become increasingly clear in the southern half of the world. The American interest will be served if our children live in an environment of strong, assertive, independent nations, capable, because they are strong, of assuming collective responsibility for the peace. The diffusion of power is the basis for freedom within our own society, and we have no reason to fear it on the world scene. But this outcome would be a defeat for Communism — not for Russia as a national state but for Communism. Despite all the Communist talk of American imperialism, we are committed by the nature of our system to support the cause of national independence. And the truth will out.

THE VITALS OF VICTORY

The victory we seek will see no ticker tape parades down Broadway — no climatic battles nor great American celebrations of victory. It is a victory which will take many years and decades of hard work and dedication — by many peoples — to bring about. This will not be a victory of the United States over the Soviet Union. It will not be a victory of capitalism over socialism. It will be a victory of men and nations which aim to stand up straight over the forces which wish to entrap and to exploit their revolutionary aspirations of modernization. What this victory involves — in the end — is the assertion by nations of their right to independence and by men and women of their right to freedom as they understand it. And we deeply believe this victory will come — on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

If Americans do not seek victory in the usual sense, what do they seek? What is the national interest of the United States? Why do we Americans expend our treasure and assume the risks of modern war in this global struggle? For Americans the reward of victory will be simply this: it will permit American society to continue to develop along the old humane lines which go back to our birth as a nation — and which reach deeper into history than that — back to the Mediterranean roots of Western life. We are struggling to maintain an environment on the world scene which will permit our open society to survive and to flourish.

THE DIMENSIONS OF INDEPENDENCE



... the preservation of independence has many dimensions.

To make this vision come true places a great burden on the U.S. at this phase of history. The preservation of independence has many dimensions. The U.S. has the primary responsibility for deterring the use of nuclear weapons in the pursuit of Communist ambitions. The U.S. has a major responsibility to deter the kind of overt aggression with conventional forces that was launched in June 1950 in Korea. The U.S. has the primary responsibility for assisting the economies of those hard pressed states on the periphery of the Communist block which are under acute military or quasi-military pressure which they cannot bear from their own resources; for example, South Korea, Viet Nam, Taiwan, Pakistan, Iran. The U.S. has a special responsibility of leadership in bringing not merely its own resources but the resources of all the Free World to bear in aiding the long-run development of those nations which are serious about modernizing their economy and their social life. And, as President Kennedy has made clear, he regards no program of his administration as more important than his program of long-term economic development, dramatized, for example, by the Alliance for Progress in Latin America. Independence cannot be maintained by military measures alone. Modern societies must be built, and we are prepared to help build them.

Finally, the United States has a role to play ... in learning to deter guerrilla warfare if possible, and to deal with it if necessary.

A BATTLE FOR THE MIND AND SPIRIT

I do not need to tell you that the primary responsibility for dealing with guerrilla warfare in the underdeveloped areas cannot be American. There are many ways in which we can help — and we are searching our minds and our imaginations to learn better how to help; but a guerrilla war must be fought primarily by those on the spot. This is so for a quite particular reason. A guerrilla war is an intimate affair, fought not merely with weapons but fought in the minds of the men who live in the villages and in the hills; fought by the spirit and policy of those who run the local government. An outsider cannot by himself win a guerrilla war; he can help create conditions in which it can be won; and he can direct, assist those prepared to fight for their

independence. We are determined to help destroy this international disease; that is, guerrilla war designed, initiated, supplied, and led from outside an independent nation.



... but a guerrilla war must be fought primarily by those on the spot.

Although as leader of the Free World, the U.S. has special responsibilities which it accepts in this common venture of deterrence, it is important that the whole international community begin to accept its responsibility for dealing with this form of aggression. It is important that the world become clear in mind, for example, that the operation run from Hanoi



... the guerrilla force has this advantage; its task is merely to destroy, while the government must build and protect what it is building.



against Viet Nam is as clear a form of aggression as the violation of the 38th parallel by the North Korean armies in June 1950.

In my conversations with representatives of foreign governments, I am sometimes lectured that this or that government within the Free World is not popular; they tell me that guerrilla warfare cannot be won unless the peoples are dissatisfied. These are at best half truths. The truth is that guerrilla warfare mounted from external bases — with rights of sanctuary — is a terrible burden to carry for any government in a society making its way towards modernization. As you know, it takes somewhere between 10 and 20 soldiers to control one guerrilla in an organized operation. Moreover, the guerrilla force has this advantage; its task is merely to destroy, while the government must build and protect what it is building. A guerrilla war mounted from outside a transitional nation is a crude act of international vandalism. There will be no peace in the world if the international community accepts the outcome of a guerrilla war mounted from outside a nation as tantamount to a free election.

The sending of men and arms across international boundaries and the direction of guerrilla war from outside a sovereign nation is aggression, and this is a fact which the whole international community must confront and whose consequent responsibilities it must accept. Without such international action those against whom aggression is mounted will be driven inevitably to seek out and engage the ultimate source of the aggression they confront.

ALTERNATIVES TO GUERRILLA AGGRESSION

I suspect that, in the end, the real meaning of the conference on Laos at Geneva will hinge on this question: it will depend on whether or not the international community is prepared to mount an International Control Commission which has the will and the capacity to control the borders it was designed to control.

In facing the problem of guerrilla war, I have one observation to make as an historian. It is now fashionable — and I dare say for you it was compulsory — to read the learned works of Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara on guerrilla warfare. This is indeed proper. One should read it with care and without passion into the minds of one's enemies. But it is historically inaccurate and psychologically dangerous to think that these men created the strategy and tactics of guerrilla war to which we are now responding. Guerrilla warfare is not a form of military and psychological magic created by the Communist. There is no rule or parable in the Communist texts which was not known at an earlier time in history. The operation of Marion's men in

relation to the Battle of Cowpens in the American Revolution was, for example, governed by rules which Mao merely echoes; Che Guevara knows nothing of this business that T. E. Lawrence did not know or was not practiced, for example, in the Peninsular Campaign during the Napoleonic wars, a century earlier. The orchestration of professional troops, militia, and guerrilla fighters is an old game whose rules can be studied and learned.

My point is that we are up against a form of warfare which is powerful and effective only when we do not put our minds clearly to work on how to deal with it. I, for one, believe that with purposeful efforts most nations which might now be susceptible to guerrilla warfare could handle their border areas in ways which would make them very unattractive to the initiation of this ugly game. We can learn to prevent the emergence of the famous sea in which Mao Tse-tung taught his men to swim. This requires, of course, not merely a proper military program of deterrence, but programs of village development, communications, and indoctrination. The best way to fight a guerrilla war is to prevent it from happening. And this can be done.



...the famous sea in which Mao Tse-tung taught his men to swim.

Similarly, I am confident that we can deal with the kind of operation now under way in Viet Nam. It is an extremely dangerous operation, and it could overwhelm Viet Nam if the Vietnamese — aided by the Free World — do not deal with it. But it is an unsubtle operation, by the book, based more on murder than on political or psychological appeal. When Communists speak of wars of national liberation and of their support for "progressive forces," I think of the systematic program of assassination now going forward in which the principal victims are the health, agriculture, and education officers in the Viet Nam villages. The Viet Cong are not trying to persuade the peasants of Viet Nam that Communism is good: they are trying to persuade them that their lives are insecure unless they cooperate with them. With resolution and confidence on all sides and with the assumption of international responsibility for the frontier problem, I believe we are going to bring this threat to the independence of Viet Nam under control.

CHAPTER 4


COMMUNIST THEORY

"A nation fighting for its liberty ought not to adhere rigidly to the accepted rules of warfare. Mass uprisings, revolutionary methods, guerrilla bands everywhere."

Karl Marx
1876

TAB
HERE

Section	
I	LENIN ON PARTISAN WAR- FARE
II	MAO ON GUERRILLA WARFARE
III	KHRUSHCHEV ON WARS OF LIBERATION
IV	GIAP ON GUERRILLA WARFARE
V	LA GUERRA DE GUERRILLAS
VI	LONG LIVE THE VICTORY OF THE PEOPLE'S WAR



CHAPTER 4

COMMUNIST THEORY

Section I

Lenin on Partisan Warfare

The question of partisan actions has aroused great interest within the party and among the workers. We have mentioned this topic repeatedly before. Our present intention is to redeem our promise and summarize our position on this subject.

Let us start from the beginning. What are the basic questions every Marxist must ask when he analyzes the problem of the types of struggle? First of all, unlike primitive forms of socialism, Marxism does not tie the movement to any particular combat method. It recognizes the possibility that struggle may assume the most variegated forms. For that matter, Marxism does not "invent" those forms of struggle. It merely organizes the tactics of strife and renders them suitable for general use. It also renders the revolutionary classes conscious of the forms of the clashes which emerge spontaneously from the activities of the movement. Marxism rejects all abstract thinking and doctrinaire prescriptions about types of struggle. It calls for a careful study of the mass struggle which actually is taking place. As the movement develops, as the consciousness of the masses grows, and as the economic and political crises are becoming more intense, ever new and different methods of defense and attack will be used in the conflict. Hence, Marxism never will reject any particular combat method, let alone reject it forever. Marxism does not limit itself to those types of struggle which, at a given moment, are both practical and traditional. It holds that, due to changes in social conditions, new forms of battle will arise inevitably, although no one can foresee what the character of these future encounters will be. In this field, if we may say so, Marxism is learning from the practice of the masses. It is far from claiming that it should teach the masses tactics elaborated in the abstract by strategists of the pen. We know, as Kaustsky stated when he was analyzing the different forms of social revolution, that the coming crisis will present us with new and unpredictable forms of action.

Second, Marxism asks that the various types of struggle be analyzed within their historical framework. To discuss conflict outside of its historical and concrete setting is to misunderstand elementary dialectic materialism. At various junctures of the economic evolution, and depending upon changing political, national, cultural, social and other conditions, differing types

Extracted from an article entitled, "Lenin on Partisan Warfare," edited by Richard M. Leighton and Ralph Sanders, Summer 1958, ORBIS, the quarterly journal of world affairs published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania.

of struggle may become important and even predominant. As a result of those sociological transformations, secondary and subordinate forms of action may change their significance. To try and answer positively or negatively the question of whether a certain tactic is usable, without at the same time studying the concrete conditions confronting a given movement at a precise point of its development, would mean a complete negation of Marxism.



RUSSIAN "RED GUARDS" - 1917

Our paper is devoted to the study and evaluation of this new occurrence. Although merely a secondary and incidental part of the whole, armed struggle has been pushed into the foreground. What is armed struggle? What are its forms and its causes? When did it originate? What has been the frequency of its occurrence? What is its significance for the general course of revolution? What is its connection with the proletarian class struggle organized and waged by social democracy? After having described the general background of the problem, we shall now address ourselves to these questions.

Armed struggle is waged by small groups and individuals, some of whom are members of revolutionary parties. In certain regions of Russia, however, the majority of the partisans are not affiliated with any revolutionary organization. Armed struggle aims at two different objectives which must be distinguished sharply from one another. The first objective is to kill individuals such as high officials and lower-ranking members of the police and Army. The second objective is to confiscate money from the government as well as from private persons. Portions of the captured money are used for party purposes, other portions for arms and the preparation of the rising, and the rest for the sustenance of persons engaging in the struggle described by us. This type of struggle came into widespread use during 1906, after the December uprising at Moscow. The aggravation of the political crisis to the point of armed insurrection, and especially the ever-growing pauperization, famine and employment in village and cities, were among the most potent causes leading to the emergence of armed combat. The declassé elements of the population, the Lumpenproletariat and anarchist groups, chose this struggle as the main and even only form of the social war. Autocracy answered with tactics of martial law, conscript of younger military classes, Black Hundreds pogroms (Siedlic) and court martials.

III

Armed struggle often is considered to be anarchism, Blanquism, old-style terrorism and, at any rate, an activity perpetrated by isolated individuals out of touch with the masses. The acts of armed struggle are judged to demoralize the workers. Allegedly they divorce broad strata of the population from the toilers, disorganize the revolutionary movement and hurt the revolutionary cause.

It is said that partisan actions disorganize our work. Let us see to what extent this evaluation is justified, especially with respect to the period after December 1905, and to the areas under martial law and suffering from Black Hundreds pogroms. What is it that disorganizes the movement in such an area more: the lack of resistance or the lack of well organized partisan struggle? Compare the situation in Central Russia with that of the Western border regions, such as Poland and Livonia. There is no doubt that in the Western provinces partisan struggles occur far more frequently and have reached a higher stage of development. Counting, there is no doubt that in Central Russia the revolutionary movement in general and the social democratic movement in particular, is far more disorganized than in the West. Certainly we would not think of concluding that because of the partisan struggle the Polish and Lettish social democratic movement has suffered from disorganization less than the movement in Central Russia. No. The point is merely that the partisan struggle is not responsible for the disorganization of the Russian social democratic workers' movement which occurred during 1906.

In this connection, frequent reference has been made to the peculiarities of national conditions. Such arguments disclose the weakness of the customary objections to partisan struggle. If it is a matter of national conditions, then obviously it is not a matter of anarchism, Blanquism or terrorism, but something else is involved; general Russian or even specifically Russian sins. Analyze this "something else" more concretely, gentlemen! You will find that national oppression or national antagonisms explain nothing. These conditions always were present in the Western border regions, yet partisan actions have occurred only in a special historical period. There are many regions where national oppression and antagonisms have been rampant, and yet no partisan struggles are taking place. The fact is that sometimes partisan struggles develop in the absence of any national oppression. A concrete analysis of this question would show that it is not national oppression but the development of the uprising which is decisive. Partisan struggle is an unavoidable form of action at a time when the mass movement has matured to the point of insurrection and when the intervals between the "big battles" of the civil war are becoming shorter.

The movement has not been disorganized by partisan struggles but by the weakness of the party, which does not know how to take those actions into its own hands. Consequently, the indictments against partisan warfare, so customary among us Russians, go together with secret, accidental and unorganized partisan actions which, indeed, do disorganize the party. If we do not understand the historical conditions of partisan warfare, then we shall be unable to eliminate its darker sides. In spite of everything, partisan operations occur because they are created by powerful economic and political causes. Since we are unable to get rid of those causes, we are unable to prevent this type of struggle. Our complaints about partisan warfare are nothing but complaints about the weakness of our party which is incapable of organizing the uprisings.

What we said about disorganization also applies to demoralization. Partisan struggle as such does not produce demoralization, which results rather from disorganization, undisciplined armed actions and from lack of party leadership. Demoralization, which unquestionably has set in, cannot be overcome by disapproving and rejecting the concept of partisan struggle. Such censures are by no means sufficient to prevent events which result from profound economic and political causes. It could be objected that, while we may not have the capability of suppressing

abnormal and demoralizing happenings, no purpose would be served if the party were to use anomalous and demoralizing tactics. Such a non-Marxist objection would be of a purely liberal-bourgeois character. No Marxist should consider partisan warfare, which is just one of the forms of civil war, as abnormal and demoralizing. Marxists favor class struggle and not social peace. In periods of grave economic and political crisis, the class struggle develops into civil war -- that is, into an armed struggle between two parts of the people. In such periods, every Marxist is obliged to endorse the cause of civil war. From the Marxist point of view, moral condemnations of civil war are entirely unacceptable.

In situations of civil war, a combat party is the ideal type of proletarian party. This is indisputable. We admit that one may try to prove, and perhaps may be able to prove, the inadvisability of this or that type of struggle at this or that juncture of the civil war. From the point of view of military expediency, criticism of the various forms of civil war certainly is justified. We agree that the decisive voice in such questions belong to those experienced socialist leaders who are familiar with the practical conditions in each locality. But, in the name of Marxist principles, we must insist that civil war be analyzed seriously and that shopworn phrases such as anarchism, Blanquism and terrorism not be thrown into the debate. Senseless partisan actions, such as were indulged in by this or that organization of the PPS in this or that situation, should not be abused for a scarce argument against socialist participation in partisan warfare.

One must accept assertions that partisan warfare disorganizes the socialist movement with skepticism. Every new form of struggle which involves new dangers and new sacrifices inevitably will "disorganize" organizations unprepared for the new tactics. Our old study group became disorganized when agitational methods were adopted. Later on, our party committees were disorganized when the party took to demonstrations. In every war, new tactics carry a degree of disorganization into the battle ranks. Yet this is not argument against fighting a war. It merely follows that one must learn how to wage war. That is all there is to it.

When I meet social democrats who proudly and self-righteously declare, "We are no anarchists, no thieves, no robbers, we are above such violent forms of struggle, we reject partisan warfare," then I ask myself: "Do these people understand what they are talking about?" Violent incidents and armed clashes between the Black Hundreds government and the people are happening all over the country. This is inevitable at the present stage of revolution. The population reacts to the attacks by Black Hundred troopers with armed coups de main and ambushes. Because they are spontaneous and unorganized, these counterattacks may assume inexpedient and evil forms. I understand quite well that, due to weakness and lack of preparation by our organization, the party may refrain from assuming, at given places and times, the leadership of such spontaneous actions. I understand that this question must be decided by local practitioners and that the strengthening of weak and unprepared party organizations is not an easy task. But if a social democratic theoretician or writer fails to be saddened by such lack of purposeness and, on the contrary, displays proud self-satisfaction, and conceitedly and enthusiastically repeats slogans on anarchism, Blanquism and terrorism which he memorized in his early youth, then I consider this to be a degradation of the world's most revolutionary doctrine.

It is asserted that partisan actions lower the class-conscious proletariat to the level of drunkards and bums. This is correct. But from this follows only that the party of the proletariat never should consider partisan warfare to be its only or even its chief means of struggle. This particular technique must be integrated with other tactics and be in harmony with the most important methods of combat. Partisan warfare should be enabled by the enlightening and organizing influence of socialism. Without this last condition, all -- clearly all -- means of struggle will move the proletariat which lives within a bourgeois society close to various non-proletarian strata, whether they stand higher or lower in social rank. If they are allowed to

develop spontaneously, such techniques will lose their effectiveness and their original form and will become prostituted. Strikes which are left to take a spontaneous course degenerate into "alliances," i. e., agreements between business and labor against the consumer. Parliament becomes a brothel where gangs of bourgeois politicians are bargaining, wholesale and retail, about "people's freedom," "liberalism," "democracy," republicanism, anti-clericalism, socialism and other brands of popular commodities. Newspapers turn into cheap procurers and into tools corrupting the masses and flattering the lowest mob instincts, etc. The socialists know of no universally applicable combat method which would separate the proletariat, as though by a Chinese wall, from those classes of people which socially are situated slightly higher or slightly lower. Socialists use different means at different periods. Those means are chosen in strict accordance with ideological and organizational conditions the nature of which must be determined accurately by the Marxist dialectic method.

The Bolsheviks have been accused frequently of an unthinking party-oriented and positive attitude toward partisan actions. It seems necessary, therefore, to reiterate that the particular bolshevik faction which approved partisan warfare defined in its draft of a social democratic party resolution the conditions under which armed struggle would be permissible: "Expropriations" of private property are entirely forbidden. "Expropriations" of government property are not recommended, but are permitted provided they are accomplished under party control and provided the captured enemy is used for the purposes of the uprising. Terrorist partisan acts against representatives of the violent regime and of active Black Hundred groups are recommended but are subject to the following restrictions: (1) the popular mood must be taken into account; (2) local conditions under which the workers movement is operating must be considered; (3) care must be taken that no proletarian forces are wasted unnecessarily. The only practical difference between the resolution accepted by the unification congress of the Social Democratic Party and our draft resolution is that in the former "expropriations" of government property were entirely forbidden.

The Russian revolution differs from bourgeois revolutions in Europe in that it displays an immense variety in the methods of struggle. Kautsky predicted this in 1902, at least to a point, when he said that the coming revolution (and he added: perhaps with the exception of Russia) will not be so much a struggle of the people against the government as a struggle of one part of the people against the other. In Russia we witnessed a broader development of the second kind of struggle than during the bourgeois revolutions in the West. The enemies of our revolution have but few followers among the people, but as the fight develops the opponents are getting better and better organized and are gaining support from reactionary groups of the bourgeoisie. Thus, it is natural and unavoidable that in such periods, in a period of political general strikes, the uprising cannot assume the traditional form of a single blow, limited to a very short time and a very small area. Under such circumstances it is natural and unavoidable that the uprising assumes the higher and more complicated form of a protracted civil war enmeshing the entire country -- that is, the form of armed struggle by one part of the people against the other. Such a war must be conceived as a series of a few big battles, separated by comparatively long intervals, and a large number of small engagements which take place during these interim periods. If this is so -- and it undoubtedly is so -- then the task of social democracy is to create organizations most suitable to leading the masses both in the big battles and, so far as practical, in the smaller actions. At a time when the class struggle is developing into civil war, social democrats must consider it their task not only to participate in this civil war, but must play the leading role in this conflict. The Social Democratic Party must educate and prepare its organizations in such a way that they will become true belligerents who will not fail to exploit opportunities through which the strengths of the opponent can be sapped.

Unquestionably, this is a difficult task. It cannot be accomplished at once. Similarly, as an entire people is transforming itself in the course of civil war and is learning from the struggle, so our organizations, if they are to fulfill their mission, must be educated and reorganized on the basis of experience.



Section II

MAO ON GUERRILLA WARFARE

What is Guerrilla Warfare?

In a war of revolutionary character, guerrilla operations are a necessary part. This is particularly true in a war waged for the emancipation of a people who inhabit a vast nation. China is such a nation, a nation whose techniques are undeveloped and whose communications are poor. She finds herself confronted with a strong and victorious Japanese imperialism. Under these circumstances, the development of the type of guerrilla warfare characterized by the quality of mass is both necessary and natural. This warfare must be developed to an unprecedented degree and it must coordinate with the operations of our regular armies. If we fail to do this, we will find it difficult to defeat the enemy.

These guerrilla operations must not be considered as an independent form of warfare. They are but one step in the total war, one aspect of the revolutionary struggle. They are the inevitable result of the clash between oppressor and oppressed when the latter reach the limits of their endurance. In our case, these hostilities began at a time when the people were unable to endure any more from the Japanese imperialists. Lenin, in People and Revolution, said: "A people's insurrection and a people's revolution are not only natural but inevitable." We consider guerrilla operations as but one aspect of our total or mass war because they, lacking the quality of independence, are of themselves incapable of providing a solution to the struggle.

Guerrilla warfare has qualities and objectives peculiar to itself. It is a weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may employ against a more powerful aggressor nation. When the invader pierces deep into the heart of the weaker country and occupies her territory in a cruel and oppressive manner, there is no doubt that conditions of terrain, climate, and society in general offer obstacles to his progress and may be used to advantage by those who oppose him. In guerrilla warfare, we turn these advantages for the purpose of resisting and defeating the enemy.

During the progress of hostilities, guerrillas gradually develop into orthodox forces that operate in conjunction with other units of the regular army. Thus the regularly organized troops, those guerrillas who have attained that status, and those who have not reached that level of development combine to form the military power of a national revolutionary war. There can be no doubt that the ultimate result of this will be victory.

Extracted from Special Text "Guerrilla Warfare By Mao Tze-Tung," translated by Colonel Samuel B. Griffith II, USMC, US Army Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, N. C.



... Terrain ... in general offers an obstacle to his progress and may be used to advantage by those who oppose him. In guerrilla warfare, we turn this advantage to the purpose of resisting and defeating the enemy.

Both in its development and in its method of application, guerrilla warfare has certain distinctive characteristics. We first discuss the relationship of guerrilla warfare to national policy. Because ours is the resistance of a semicolonial country against an imperialism, our hostilities must have a clearly defined political goal and firmly established political responsibilities. Our basic policy is the creation of a national united anti-Japanese front. This policy we pursue in order to gain our political goal, which is the complete emancipation of the Chinese people. There are certain fundamental steps necessary in the realization of this policy, to wit:

1. Arousing and organizing the people.
2. Achieving internal unification politically.
3. Establishing bases.
4. Equipping forces.
5. Recovering national strength.
6. Destroying enemy's national strength.
7. Regaining lost territories.

There is no reason to consider guerrilla warfare separately from national policy. On the contrary, it must be organized and conducted in complete accord with national anti-Japanese policy. It is only those who misinterpret guerrilla action who say, as does Jen Ch'i Shan, "The question of guerrilla hostilities is purely a military matter and not a political one." Those who maintain this simple point of view have lost sight of the political goal and the political effects of guerrilla action. Such a simple point of view will cause the people to lose confidence and will result in our defeat.

What is the relationship of guerrilla warfare to the people? Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation, and assistance cannot be gained. The essence of guerrilla warfare is thus revolutionary in character. On the other hand, in a war of counter-revolutionary nature, there is no place for guerrilla hostilities. Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation. There are those who do not comprehend guerrilla action, and who therefore do not understand the distinguishing qualities of a people's guerrilla war, who say: "Only regular troops can carry on guerrilla operations." There are others who, because they do not believe in the ultimate success of guerrilla action, mistakenly say: "Guerrilla warfare is an insignificant and highly specialized type of operation in which there is no place for the masses of the people" (Jen Ch'i Shan). Then there are those who ridicule the masses and undermine resistance by wildly asserting that the people have no understanding of the war of resistance (Yeh Ch'ing, for one). The moment that this war of resistance disassociates itself from the masses of the people is the precise moment that it disassociates itself from hope of ultimate victory over the Japanese.



...all guerrilla bands that spring from the masses of the people suffer from lack of organization at the time of their formation, they all have in common a basic quality that makes organization possible.

What is the organization for guerrilla warfare? Though all guerrilla bands that spring from masses of the people suffer from lack of organization at the time of their formation, they all have in common a basic quality that makes organization possible. All guerrilla units must have political and military leadership. This is true regardless of the source or size of such units. Such units may originate locally, in the masses of the people; they may be formed from an admixture of regular army units intact. And mere quantity does not affect this matter. Such units may consist of a squad of a few men, a battalion of several hundred men, or a regiment of several thousand men.

All these must have leaders who are unyielding in their policies -- resolute, loyal, sincere, and robust. These men must be well educated in revolutionary technique, self-confident, able

to establish severe discipline, and able to cope with counterpropaganda. In short, these leaders must be models for the people. As the war progresses, such leaders will gradually overcome the lack of discipline, which at first prevails; they will establish discipline in their forces, strengthening them and increasing their combat efficiency. Thus eventual victory will be attained:

Unorganized guerrilla warfare cannot contribute to victory and those who attack the movement as a combination of banditry and anarchism do not understand the nature of guerrilla action. They say: "This movement is a haven for disappointed militarists, vagabonds and bandits." (Jen Ch'i Shan), hoping thus to bring the movement into disrepute. We do not deny that there are corrupt guerrillas, nor that there are people who under the guise of guerrillas indulge in unlawful activities. Neither do we deny that the movement has at the present time symptoms of a lack of organization, symptoms that might indeed be serious were we to judge guerrilla warfare solely by the corrupt and temporary phenomena we have mentioned. We should study the corrupt phenomena and attempt to eradicate them in order to encourage guerrilla warfare, and to increase its military efficiency. "This is hard work, there is no help for it, and the problem cannot be solved immediately. The whole people must try to reform themselves during the course of the war. We must educate them and reform them in the light of past experience. Evil does not exist in guerrilla warfare but only in the unorganized and undisciplined activities that are anarchism," said Lenin, in On Guerrilla Warfare.

What is basic guerrilla strategy? Guerrilla strategy must be based primarily on alertness, mobility, and attack. It must be adjusted to the enemy situation, the terrain, the existing lines of communication, the relative strengths, the weather, and the situation of the people.

In guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws. In guerrilla strategy, the enemy's rear, flanks, and other vulnerable spots are his vital points, and there he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted and annihilated. Only in this way can guerrillas carry out their mission of independent guerrilla action and coordination with the effort of the regular armies. But, in spite of the most complete preparation, there can be no victory if mistakes are made in the matter of command. Guerrilla warfare based on the principles we have mentioned and carried on over a vast extent of territory in which communications are inconvenient will contribute tremendously towards ultimate defeat of the Japanese and consequent emancipation of the Chinese people.

A careful distinction must be made between two types of guerrilla warfare. The fact that revolutionary guerrilla warfare is based on the masses of the people does not in itself mean that the organization of guerrilla units is impossible in a war of counter-revolutionary character. As examples of the former type we may cite Red guerrilla hostilities during the Russian Revolution; those of the Reds in China; of the Abyssinians against the Italians for the past three years; those of the last seven years in Manchuria, and the vast anti-Japanese guerrilla war that is carried on in China today. All these struggles have been carried on in the interests of the whole people or the greater part of them; all had a broad basis in the national manpower, and all have been in accord with the laws of historical development. They have existed and will continue to exist, flourish, and develop as long as they are not contrary to national policy.

The second type of guerrilla warfare directly contradicts the law of historical development. Of this type, we may cite the examples furnished by the White Russian guerrilla units organized by Denikin and Kolchak; those organized by the Japanese; those organized by the Italians in Abyssinia; those supported by the puppet governments in Manchuria and Mongolia, and those

that will be organized here by Chinese traitors. All such have oppressed the masses and have been contrary to the true interests of the people. They must be firmly opposed. They are easy to destroy because they lack a broad foundation in the people.

If we fail to differentiate between the two types of guerrilla hostilities mentioned, it is likely that we will exaggerate their effect when applied by an invader. We might arrive at the conclusion that "the invader can organize guerrilla units from among the people." Such a conclusion might well diminish our confidence in guerrilla warfare. As far as this matter is concerned, we have but to remember the historical experience of revolutionary struggles.

Further, we must distinguish general revolutionary wars from those of a purely "class" type. In the former case, the whole people of a nation, without regard to class or party, carry on a guerrilla struggle that is an instrument of the national policy. Its basis is, therefore, much broader than is the basis of a struggle of class type. Of a general guerrilla war, it has been said: "When a nation is invaded, the people become sympathetic to one another and all aid in organizing guerrilla units. In civil war, no matter to what extent guerrillas are developed, they do not produce the same results as when they are formed to resist an invasion by foreigners." (Civil War in Russia.) The one strong feature of guerrilla warfare in a civil struggle is its quality of internal purity. One class may be easily united and perhaps fight with great effect, whereas in a national revolutionary war, guerrilla units are faced with the problem of internal unification of different class groups. This necessitates the use of propaganda. Both types of guerrilla war are, however, similar in that they both employ the same military methods.

National guerrilla warfare, though historically of the same consistency, has employed varying implements as times, peoples, and conditions differ. The guerrilla aspects of the Opium War, those of the fighting in Manchuria since the Mukden incident, and those employed in China today are all slightly different. The guerrilla warfare conducted by the Moroccans against the French and the Spanish was not exactly similar to that which we conduct today in China. These differences express the characteristics of different periods. Although there is a general similarity in the quality of all these struggles, there are dissimilarities in form. This fact we must recognize. Clausewitz wrote, in On War: "Wars in every period have independent forms and independent conditions, and, therefore, every period must have its independent theory of war." Lenin, in On Guerrilla Warfare, said: "As regards the form of fighting, it is unconditionally requisite that history be investigated in order to discover the conditions of environment, the state of economic progress, and the political ideas that obtained, the national characteristics, customs, and degree of civilization." Again: "It is necessary to be completely unsympathetic to abstract formulas and rules and to study with sympathy the conditions of the actual fighting, for these will change in accordance with the political and economic situations and the realization of the people's aspirations. These progressive changes in conditions create new methods."

If, in today's struggle, we fail to apply the historical truths of revolutionary guerrilla war, we will fall into the error of believing with T'ou Hsi Sheng that under the impact of Japan's mechanized army, "the guerrilla unit has lost its historical function." Jen Ch'i Shan writes: "In olden days, guerrilla warfare was part of regular strategy but there is almost no chance that it can be applied today." These opinions are harmful. If we do not make an estimate of the characteristics peculiar to our anti-Japanese guerrilla war, but insist on applying to it mechanical formulas derived from past history, we are making the mistake of placing our hostilities in the same category as all other national guerrilla struggles. If we hold this view, we will simply be beating our heads against a stone wall and we will be unable to profit from guerrilla hostilities.

To summarize: What is the guerrilla war of resistance against Japan? It is one aspect of the entire war, which, although alone incapable of producing the decision, attacks the enemy in every quarter, diminishes the extent of area under his control, increases our national strength, and assists our regular armies. It is one of the strategic instruments used to inflict defeat on our enemy. It is the one pure expression of anti-Japanese policy, that is to say, it is military strength organized by the active people and inseparable from them. It is a powerful special weapon with which we resist the Japanese and without which we cannot defeat them.

The Relation of Guerrilla Hostilities to Regular Operations

The general features of orthodox hostilities, that is, the war of position and the war of movement, differ fundamentally from guerrilla warfare. There are other readily apparent differences such as those in organization, armament, equipment, supply, tactics, command; in conception of the terms "front" and "rear"; in the matter of military responsibilities.

When considered from the point of view of total numbers, guerrilla units are many; as individual combat units, they may vary in size from the smallest, of several score or several hundred men, to the battalion or the regiment, of several thousand. This is not the case in regularly organized units. A primary feature of guerrilla operations is their dependence upon the people themselves to organize battalions and other units. As a result of this, organization depends largely upon local circumstances. In the case of guerrilla groups, the standard of equipment is of a low order, and they must depend for their sustenance primarily upon what the locality affords.

The strategy of guerrilla warfare is manifestly unlike that employed in orthodox operations, as the basic tactic of the former is constant activity and movement. There is in guerrilla warfare no such thing as a decisive battle; there is nothing comparable to the fixed, passive defense that characterizes orthodox war. In guerrilla warfare, the transformation of a moving situation into a positional defensive situation never arises. The general features of reconnaissance, partial deployment, general deployment, and development of the attack that are usual in mobile warfare are not common in guerrilla war.

There are differences also in the matter of leadership and command. In guerrilla warfare, small units acting independently play the principal role, and there must be no excessive interference with their activities. In orthodox warfare, particularly in a moving situation, a certain degree of initiative is accorded subordinates, but in principle, command is centralized. This is done because all units and all supporting arms in all districts must coordinate to the highest degree. In the case of guerrilla warfare, this is not only undesirable but impossible. Only adjacent guerrilla units can coordinate their activities to any degree. Strategically, their activities can be roughly correlated with those of the regular forces, and tactically, they must cooperate with adjacent units of the regular army. But there are no strictures on the extent of guerrilla activity nor is it primarily characterized by the quality of cooperation of many units.

When we discuss the terms "front" and "rear", it must be remembered, that while guerrillas do have bases, their primary field of activity is in the enemy's rear areas. They themselves have no rear. Because an orthodox army has rear installations (except in some special cases as during the 10,000-mile march of the Red Army or as in the case of certain units operating in Shansi Province), it cannot operate as guerrillas can.

As to the matter of military responsibilities, those of the guerrillas are to exterminate small forces of the enemy; to harass and weaken large forces; to attack enemy lines of communication; to establish bases capable of supporting independent operations in the enemy's rear; to force the enemy to disperse his strength; and to coordinate all these activities with those of the regular armies on distant battle fronts.

From the foregoing summary of differences that exist between guerrilla warfare and orthodox warfare, it can be seen that it is improper to compare the two. Further distinction must be made in order to clarify this matter. While the Eighth Route Army is a regular army, its North China campaign is essentially guerrilla in nature, for it operates in the enemy's rear. On occasion, however, Eighth Route Army commanders have concentrated powerful forces to stroke an enemy in motion, and the characteristics of orthodox mobile warfare were evident in the battle at P'ing Hsing Kuan and in other engagements.

On the other hand after the fall of Feng Ling Tu, the operations of Central Shansi, and Suiyuan, troops were mere guerrilla than orthodox in nature. In this connection, the precise character of Generalissimo Chiang's instructions to the effect that independent brigades would carry out guerrilla operations should be recalled. In spite of such temporary activities, these orthodox units retained their identity and after the fall of Feng Ling Tu, they not only were able to fight along orthodox lines but often found it necessary to do so. This is an example of the fact that orthodox armies may, due to changes in the situation, temporarily function as guerrillas.



... guerrilla units formed from the people may gradually develop into regular units.

Likewise, guerrilla units formed from the people may gradually develop into regular units and, when operating as such, employ the tactics of orthodox mobile war. While these units function as guerrillas, they may be compared to innumerable gnats, which, by biting a giant both in front and in rear, ultimately exhaust him. They make themselves as undurable as a group of cruel and hateful devils, and as they grow and attain gigantic proportions, they will find that their victim is not only exhausted but practically perishing. It is for this very reason that our guerrilla activities are a source of constant mental worry to Imperial Japan.

While it is improper to confuse orthodox with guerrilla operations, it is equally improper to consider that there is a chasm between the two. While differences do exist, similarities appear under certain conditions, and this fact must be appreciated if we wish to establish clearly the relationship between the two. If we consider both types of warfare as a single subject, or if we confuse guerrilla warfare with the mobile operations of orthodox war, we fall into this error: We exaggerate the function of guerrillas and minimize that of the regular armies. If

we agree with Chang Tso Hua, who says, "Guerrilla warfare is the primary war strategy of a people seeking to emancipate itself," or with Kao Kang, who believes that "Guerrilla strategy is the only strategy possible for an oppressed people," we are exaggerating the importance of guerrilla hostilities. What these zealous friends I have just quoted do not realize is this: If we do not fit guerrilla operations into their proper niche, we cannot promote them realistically. Then, not only would those who oppose us take advantage of our varying opinions to turn them to their own uses to undermine us, but guerrillas would be led to assume responsibilities they could not successfully discharge and that should properly be carried out by orthodox forces. In the meantime, the important guerrilla function of coordinating activities with the regular forces would be neglected.

Furthermore, if the theory that guerrilla warfare is our only strategy were actually applied, the regular hostilities would decline. If we say, "Let us transform the regular forces into guerrillas," and do not place our first reliance on a victory to be gained by the regular armies over the enemy, we may certainly expect to see as a result the failure of the anti-Japanese war of resistance. The concept that guerrilla warfare is an end in itself and that guerrilla activities can be divorced from those of the regular forces is incorrect. If we assume that guerrilla warfare does not progress from beginning to end beyond its elementary forms, we have failed to recognize the fact that guerrilla hostilities can, under specific conditions, develop and assume orthodox characteristics. An opinion that admits the existence of guerrilla war, but isolates it, is one that does not properly estimate the potentialities of such war.

Equally dangerous is the concept that condemns guerrilla war on the ground that war has no other aspects than the purely orthodox. This opinion is often expressed by those who have seen the corrupt phenomena of some guerrilla regimes, observed their lack of discipline, and have seen them used as a screen behind which certain persons have indulged in bribery and other corrupt practices. These people will not admit the fundamental necessity for guerrilla bands that spring from the armed people. They say, "Only the regular forces are capable of conducting guerrilla operations." This theory is a mistaken one and would lead to the abolition of the people's guerrilla war.

A proper conception of the relationship that exists between guerrilla effort and that of the regular forces is essential. We believe it can be stated this way: "Guerrilla operations during the anti-Japanese war may for a certain time and temporarily become its paramount feature, particularly insofar as the enemy's rear is concerned. However, if we view the war as a whole, there can be no doubt that our regular forces are of primary importance, because it is they who are alone capable of producing the decision. Guerrilla warfare assists them in producing this favorable decision. Orthodox forces may under certain conditions operate as guerrillas, and the latter may, under certain conditions, develop to the status of the former. However, both guerrilla forces and regular forces have their own respective development and their proper combinations."

To clarify the relationship between the mobile aspect of orthodox war and guerrilla war, we may say that general agreement exists that, the principal element of our strategy must be mobility. With the war of movement, we may at times combine the war of position. Both of these are assisted by general guerrilla hostilities. It is true that on the battlefield mobile war often becomes positional; it is true that this situation may be reversed; it is equally true that each form may combine with the other. The possibility of such combination will become more evident after the prevailing standards of equipment have been raised. For example, in a general strategical counterattack to recapture key cities and lines of communication, it would be normal to use both mobile and positional methods. However, the point must again be made that our fundamental strategical form must be the war of movement. If we deny this, we cannot arrive at the victorious solution of the war. In sum, while we must promote guerrilla warfare as a necessary strategical auxiliary to orthodox operations, we must neither assign it the primary position in our war strategy nor substitute it for mobile and positional warfare as conducted by orthodox forces.

The Political Problems of Guerrilla Warfare

In Chapter 1, I mentioned the fact that guerrilla troops should have a precise conception of the political goal of the struggle and the political organization to be used in attaining that goal. This means that both organization and discipline of guerrilla troops must be at a high level so that they can carry out the political activities that are the life of both the guerrilla armies and of revolutionary warfare.

First of all, political activities depend upon the indoctrination of both military and political leaders with the idea of anti-Japanism. Through them, the idea is transmitted to the troops. One must not feel that he is anti-Japanese merely because he is a member of a guerrilla unit. The anti-Japanese idea must be an ever-present conviction, and if it is forgotten, we may succumb to the temptations of the enemy or be overcome with discouragements. In a war of long duration, those whose conviction that the people must be emancipated is not deep rooted are likely to become shaken in their faith or actually revolt. Without the general education that enables everyone to understand our goal of driving out Japanese imperialism and establishing a free and happy China, the soldiers fight without conviction and lose their determination.

The political goal must be clearly and precisely indicated to inhabitants of guerrilla zones and their national consciousness awakened. Hence, a concrete explanation of the political systems used is important not only to guerrilla troops but to all those who are concerned with the realization of our political goal. The Kuomintang has issued a pamphlet entitled System of National Organization for War, which should be widely distributed throughout guerrilla zones. If we lack national organization, we will lack the essential unity that should exist between the soldiers and the people.

A study and comprehension of the political objectives of this war and of the anti-Japanese front is particularly important for officers of guerrilla troops. There are some militarists who say: "We are not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms." It is vital that these simple-minded militarists be made to realize the relationship that exists between politics and military affairs. Military action is a method used to attain a political goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from the other.

It is hoped that the world is in the last era of strife. The vast majority of human beings have already prepared or are preparing to fight a war that will bring justice to the oppressed peoples of the world. No matter how long this war may last, there is no doubt that it will be followed by an unprecedented epoch of peace. The war that we are fighting today for the emancipation of the Chinese is a part of the war for the freedom of all human beings, and the independent, happy, and liberal China that we are fighting to establish will be a part of that new world order. A conception like this is difficult for the simple-minded militarist to grasp and it must therefore be carefully explained to him.

There are three additional matters that must be considered under the broad question of political activities. These are political activities, first, as applied to the troops; second, as applied to the people; and, third, as applied to the enemy. The fundamental problems are: first, spiritual unification of officers and men within the army; second, spiritual unification of the army and the people; and, last, destruction of the unity of the enemy. The concrete methods for achieving these unities are discussed in detail in pamphlet Number 4 of this series, entitled Political Activities in Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Warfare.

A revolutionary army must have discipline that is established on a limited democratic basis. In all armies, obedience of the subordinates to their superiors must be exacted. This is true in the case of guerrilla discipline, but the basis for guerrilla discipline must be the individual conscience. With guerrillas, a discipline of compulsion is ineffective. In any revolutionary army, there is unity of purpose as far as both officers and men are concerned, and,

therefore, within such an army, discipline is self-imposed. Although discipline in guerrilla ranks is not as severe as in the ranks of orthodox forces, the necessity for discipline exists. This must be self-imposed, because only when it is, is the soldier able to understand completely why he fights and why he must obey. This type of discipline becomes a tower of strength within the army, and it is the only type that can truly harmonize the relationship that exists between officers and soldiers.

In any system where discipline is externally imposed, the relationship that exists between officer and man is characterized by indifference of the one to the other. The idea that officers can physically beat or severely tongue-lash their men is a feudal one and is not in accord with the conception of a self-imposed discipline. Discipline of the feudal type will destroy internal unity and fighting strength. A discipline self-imposed is the primary characteristic of a democratic system in the army.

A secondary characteristic is found in the degree of liberties accorded officers and soldiers. In a revolutionary army, all individuals enjoy political liberty and the question, for example, of the emancipation of the people must not only be tolerated but discussed, and the propaganda must be encouraged. Further, in such an army, the mode of living of the officers and the soldiers must not differ too much, and this is particularly true in the case of guerrilla troops. Officers should live under the same conditions as their men, for that is the only way in which they can gain from their men the admiration and confidence so vital in war. It is incorrect to hold to a theory of equality in all things, but there must be equality of existence in accepting the hardships and dangers of war. Thus we may attain to the unification of the officer and soldier groups, a unity both horizontal within the group itself, and vertical, that is, from lower to higher echelons. It is only when such unity is present that units can be said to be powerful combat factors.

There is also a unity of spirit that should exist between troops and local inhabitants. The Eighth Route Army put into practice a code known as "The Three Rules and the Eight Remarks," which we list here:

Rules:

1. All actions are subject to command.
2. Do not steal from the people.
3. Be neither selfish nor unjust.

Remarks:

1. Replace the door when you leave the house.
2. Roll up the bedding on which you have slept.
3. Be courteous.
4. Be honest in your transactions.
5. Return what you borrow.
6. Replace what you break.
7. Do not bathe in the presence of women.
8. Do not without authority search the pocketbooks of those you arrest.

The Red Army adhered to this code for ten years and the Eighth Route Army and other units have since adopted it.

Many people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the enemy's rear. Such a belief reveals lack of comprehension of the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. The former may be likened to water and the latter to the fish who inhabit it. How may it be said that these two cannot exist together? It is only undisciplined troops who make the people their enemies and who, like the fish out of its native element, cannot live.

We further our mission of destroying the enemy by propagandizing his troops, by treating his captured soldiers with consideration, and by caring for those of his wounded who fall into our hands. If we fail in these respects, we strengthen the solidarity of our enemy.



Section III

KHRUSHCHEV ON WARS OF LIBERATION

.....In modern conditions the following categories of wars should be distinguished: World wars, local wars, liberation wars, and popular uprisings. This is necessary to work out the correct tactics with regard to these wars.

Let us begin with the question of world wars. Communists are the most determined opponents of world wars, just as they are generally opponents of wars among states. These wars are needed only by imperialists to seize the territories of others, and to enslave and plunder other peoples. Before the formation of the world socialist camp the working class had no opportunity to make a determining impact on the solution of the question of whether there should or should not be world wars. In these conditions the best representatives of the working class raised the slogan of turning imperialist wars into civil wars, or to exploit the situation that had arisen to seize power.

This kind of situation arose during the World War I and was classically used by the Bolshevik Party and Lenin. In our times different conditions have developed. The world socialist camp is making an ever-growing impact; through its economic might and its armed forces, on the solution of problems of war and peace.

Of course, there also are among the imperialist countries acute contradictions and antagonisms, as well as the desire to profit at the expense of others who are weaker; yet imperialists now must keep an eye on the Soviet Union and the whole socialist camp, and are afraid of starting wars among themselves. They are trying to play down their differences; they have set up military blocs in which they have involved many capitalist countries. Although these blocs are being torn by internal struggle, their members -- as they themselves say -- are united in their hatred of communism and, of course, by the nature and aspirations of imperialism.

In present conditions, the most probable wars are wars among capitalist and imperialist countries, and this too should not be ruled out.

Wars are chiefly prepared by imperialists against socialist countries, and in the first place against the Soviet Union as the most powerful of the socialist states. Imperialists would wish to undermine our might and thus re-establish the former domination of monopolistic capital.

Extracted from the text of Nikita S. Khrushchev's report, "For New Victories of the World Communist Movement", to the Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers Parties, held in Moscow in November 1960, Reprinted in "Selected Readings - Counterinsurgency," US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 1962 Curriculum.

The task is to create impassable obstacles against the unleashing of wars by imperialists. We possess increasing possibilities for placing obstacles in the path of the warmongers. Consequently, we can forestall the outbreak of a world war.

Of course, as yet we are unable to completely exclude the possibility of wars, for the imperialist states exist. However, the unleashing of wars has become a much more complicated business for the imperialists than it was before the emergence of the mighty socialist camp. Imperialists can unleash a war, but they must think hard about the consequences.

I already said that even if the crazy Hitler had realized what a devastating rout was in store for his bloody gamble and had seen that he would have to commit suicide, he would have thought twice before starting a war against the Soviet Union. Then there were but two socialist countries, the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic, and yet we routed the Aggressors, having also exploited the contradictions between imperialist states.

The picture now is quite different: the socialist countries, which represent a mighty force, now oppose the imperialist camp. It would be a mistake to minimize the strength of the socialist camp and its influence on the course of world events and thus on the solution of the question of whether wars will take place. In conditions where a mighty socialist camp exists, possessing powerful armed forces, the peoples, by mobilization of all their forces for active struggle against the warmongering imperialists, can indisputably prevent war and thus insure peaceful coexistence.

A word or two about local wars. A lot is being said nowadays in the imperialist camp about local wars, and they are making small-caliber atomic weapons for use in such wars; a special theory of local wars has been concocted. Is this fortuitous? Of course not. Certain imperialist circles, fearing that world war might end in the complete collapse of capitalism, are putting their money on unleashing local wars.

There have been local wars and they may occur again in the future, but opportunities for imperialists to unleash these too are becoming fewer and fewer. A small imperialist war, regardless of which imperialist begins it, may grow into a world thermonuclear rocket war. We must therefore combat both world wars and local wars.

As an example of a local war unleashed by the imperialists, we may take the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt. They wanted to strangle Egypt and thus intimidate the Arab countries struggling for independence, and also to frighten the other peoples of Asia and Africa. British statesmen, including Eden, spoke quite openly of their desire to deal summarily with Egypt when we were in London. We told them frankly: If you start a war, you will lose it; we will not remain neutral. When that war started, the United Nations formally condemned it, but this did not worry the Aggressors and they went on with their dirty deed and even thought they had almost achieved their ends. The Soviet Union and the whole socialist camp came to the defense of Egypt. The Soviet Government's stark warning to Eden and Guy Mollet stopped the war. The local war, the venture in Egypt, failed miserably.

This was in 1956, when the balance of power between the countries of socialism and the countries of imperialism was not the same as it is today. In addition, the rulers of Britain, France, and Israel reckoned on being able to utilize the difficulties which had arisen in Hungary and Poland. Spokesmen of imperialist states were whispering into our ears: You have your difficulties in Hungary, we have ours in Egypt; therefore do not interfere in our affairs. Yet we gave a due reply to these whisperers. We did not shut our eyes to their bandit deeds. We interfered and stopped their aggression. Here is an example of how a local war started by the imperialist was stopped as a result of the interference by the Soviet Union and the entire socialist camp.

I have already said that local wars are also not excluded in the future. Therefore, our task is to be always on guard, mobilizing both the forces of the socialist camp and the peoples of the world, all the peace-loving forces, for prevention of aggressive wars. If the people of all countries are united and mobilized, if they wage a tireless struggle, uniting their efforts both inside each country and on a world scale, wars can be averted.

Now a word about national liberation wars. The armed struggle by the Vietnamese people or the war of the Algerian people, which is already in its seventh year, serve as the latest examples of such wars. These wars began as an uprising by the colonial peoples against their oppressors and changed into guerrilla warfare. Liberation wars will continue to exist as long as imperialism exists, as long as colonialism exists. These are revolutionary wars. Such wars are not only admissible but inevitable, since the colonialists do not grant independence voluntarily. Therefore, the peoples can attain their freedom and independence only by struggle, including armed struggle.

How is it that U.S. imperialists, while desirous of helping the French colonialists in every way, decided against direct intervention in the war in Vietnam? They did not intervene because they knew that if they did help France with armed forces, Vietnam would get relevant aid from China, the Soviet Union, and other socialist countries, which could lead to a world war. The outcome of the war is known: North Vietnam was victorious.

At the present, a similar war is taking place in Algeria. What kind of war is it? It is the uprising of the Arab people in Algeria against French colonizers. It is being conducted in the form of a partisan war. The imperialists in the United States and Britain render assistance to their French allies with arms. Moreover, they have allowed France, a participant in NATO, to transfer its troops from Europe for the struggle against the Algerian people.

The Algerian people, too, receive assistance from neighboring and other countries that sympathize with their peace-loving aspirations. But it is a liberation war of a people of its independence, it is a sacred war. We recognize such wars, we help the peoples striving for their independence.

Or let us take Cuba's example. A war took place there too. But it also started as an uprising against the internal tyrannical regime supported by U.S. imperialism. Batista was a protege of the United States. The latter rendered active assistance to him. However, the United States did not interfere in that war directly with its armed forces. The Cuban people, under the leadership of Fidel Castro, have won.

Can such wars flare up in the future? They can. Can there be such uprisings? There can. But these are wars which are national uprisings. In other words, can conditions be created where a people will lose their patience and rise in arms? They can. What is the attitude of the Marxists toward such uprisings? A most positive one. These uprisings must not be identified with wars among states, with local wars, since in these uprisings the people are fighting for implementation of their right for self-determination, for independent social and national development. These are uprisings against rotten reactionary regimes, against the colonizers. The Communists fully support such just wars and march in the front rank with the peoples waging liberation struggles.

The Communists regard it their sacred duty to make full use of all possibilities created for the people by the present era to curb the belicose forces of imperialism, to prevent a new war.

The present international Communist and workers movement has attained such might and organization that it poses for itself the practical task of delivering mankind from the casualties of a new war. The statement of the conference says: The Communists see their historical mis-

sion not only in abolition of exploitation and poverty all over the world and in excluding forever the possibility of any war in the life of human society, but in delivering mankind in the current era from the nightmare of a new world war. The Communist parties in all countries will devote all their strength and energy to the realization of this great historic mission.

Liquidation of colonialism and ways for the further development of countries which have liberated themselves:

Comrades, the peoples which achieved national independence have become a new and powerful force in the struggle for peace and social progress. The national liberation movement deals more and more blows against imperialism, helps consolidation of peace, contributes to speeding mankind's development along the path of social progress. Asia, Africa, and Latin America are now the most important centers of revolutionary struggle against imperialism. In the post-war period about 40 countries won national independence. Almost 1.5 billion people have wrenched themselves out of colonial slavery.

The conference has correctly pointed out that the crumbling of the system of colonial slavery under the pressure of the national liberation movement is the second phenomenon of historic importance after the formation of the world system of socialism.

New remarkable pages are opening in the history of mankind. It is easy to imagine what majestic deeds these peoples will perform after they completely evict the imperialists from their countries, when they feel that they are masters of their own fate.

This vastly multiplies the progressive forces of mankind. For example take Asia, this ancient cradle of civilization. What inexhaustible strength lies hidden in the peoples of this continent! And will the Arab people with their heroic traditions, and all the peoples of the Middle East, which have already freed or are freeing themselves from political and economic dependence on imperialism, play any lesser role in the solution of tasks now facing mankind?

A remarkable phenomenon of our time is the awakening of the peoples of Africa. Dozens of states in north and central Africa have already achieved independence. The south of Africa is seething and there is no doubt that the fascist prisons in the Union of South Africa will collapse, that Rhodesia, Uganda, and other parts of Africa will become free.

The forces of the national liberation movement are greatly increasing owing to the fact that one more front of active struggle against American imperialism has been formed in recent years. Latin America has become this front. Until recently that vast continent was identified by one concept: America. This concept greatly expressed its substance: Latin America was bound hand and foot by Yankee imperialism.

By their struggle, the Latin American peoples are showing that the American continent is not an appendage of the United States. Latin America is reminiscent of an active volcano; the lava of the liberation struggle has swept away dictatorial regimes in a number of Latin American countries.

The whole world has heard the thunder of the heroic Cuban revolution. The Cuban revolution is not only repelling the onslaught of the imperialists; it is going deeper and broader, marking a new, higher stage of the national liberation struggle, with people coming to power, with the people themselves becoming masters of their own wealth, solidarity with revolutionary Cuba is the duty not only of the people of Latin America; it is also the duty of the socialist countries, of the entire international communist movement, the proletariat of all areas of the world.

The national liberation movement is an anti-imperialist movement. With the collapse of the colonial system, imperialism has become considerably weaker. Vast territories, tremen-

dous masses of people, have already ceased or are ceasing to serve as its reserve, a source of cheap raw material and cannon fodder. Asian, African, and Latin American countries, with the support of the socialist states and all international progressive forces, are more and more often defeating the imperialist powers and coalitions.

We gladly welcomed in Moscow the participants of the conference from the fraternal communist parties of countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America, stalwart fighters for the independence and free development of peoples. Now communist parties are functioning in nearly 50 countries of these continents. This has broadened the sphere of influence of the communist movement, given it a truly worldwide character.

V. I. Lenin, speaking in 1919 at the Second All-Russian Congress of the Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East, said: If the Russian Bolsheviks succeeded in making a breach in the old imperialism, to take upon themselves the extraordinary noble task of creating new revolutionary ways, then you -- representatives of the working masses of the East -- are faced with still a greater and newer task.

Lenin saw this task in awakening the revolutionary activity, independent action, and organization of the working masses irrespective of the level at which they are in applying communist teaching to the specific conditions in their countries, merging in the common struggle with proletarians of other countries.

When Lenin put forward this task, it had not yet been executed in practice anywhere, and the way it could be executed in concrete form could not be learned from any book. Now the communist parties of the countries struggling for national independence, or those that have already attained it, exist under immeasurably more favorable conditions, for there is the gigantic experience of the application of the theory of Marxism-Leninism in the conditions of countries and areas which had been doomed by capitalism to backwardness for ages to come. This experience, amassed by the world communist movement is a rich treasure house for all communists. The correct application of this experience, the correct determination of which policy should be pursued, naturally can be done only by the actual party functioning in the given country.

These parties have concentrated their attention on what is most important: how to approach their own peoples correctly, to convince the broadest masses that their best future is indissolubly connected with the struggles against imperialism and reactionary internal forces, and also how to strengthen international solidarity between socialist states and the communist advance guard of the world toilers. The renovation of the world on the principles of freedom, democracy, and socialism in which we are participating is a great historic process in which various revolutionary and democratic movements unite and work in concert under the determining influence of socialist revolutions.



... these parties have concentrated their attention on what is most important; how to approach their own people correctly, to convince the broadest masses that their best future is indissolubly connected with the struggles against imperialism and reactionary internal forces.

The successes of the national liberation movement are to a great extent conditioned by the victories of socialism and, in their turn, strengthen the international positions of socialism in the struggle against imperialism. The policy of the communist parties and socialist states aimed at strengthening the close union with the peoples struggling for their independence or those who have already achieved it, is based on this truly Leninist understanding of these historical processes.

Bourgeois and revisionist politicians allege that the development of the national liberation movement is independent of the working class struggle for socialism, independent of the socialist state's support, that it is colonizers who grant freedom to the peoples of former colonial countries. Such inventions are launched to isolate the young independent states from the socialist camp, to prove that on the international stage they should, allegedly, play the part of some kind of third force and not oppose imperialism.

Is it necessary to mention that such reasoning is downright charlatanism? It is a historical fact that before the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution nations were not able to break the shackles of colonialism. History has proved that without the establishment of socialism, if only in a part of the world, there could have been no question of the abolition of colonialism. The imperialist powers, primarily the United States, are exerting every effort to attach to their own system the countries which have freed themselves from the yoke of colonialism, and thus to strengthen the position of world capitalism by providing it -- as the bourgeois ideologists say -- with new blood, to rejuvenate and consolidate it.

If one faces facts, it cannot be ignored that the imperialists possess strong economic inducements for influencing the liberated countries. They are still able to enmesh certain politically independent countries in the net of economic dependence. Now, when the establishment of overt colonial regimes is impossible, the imperialists resort to camouflaged forms of enslaving and looting the liberated countries,



...the policy of the communist parties and socialist states aimed at strengthening the close union with the peoples struggling for their independence or those who have already achieved it, is based on this truly Leninist understanding of these historical processes.

At the same time the colonial powers maintain internal reactionary forces everywhere in the liberated countries. They attempt to implant puppet dictatorial regimes and draw these countries into aggressive blocs. Although the sharpest divergencies are observed among the imperialist states, they often act jointly against the national liberation movement. But if all the factors influencing the fate of the peoples who have thrown off colonialism are taken into consideration, the conclusion is that the trends of social progress opposed to imperialism will eventually prevail. However, these questions are settled in the acute struggle within each country.

The conference statement contains important clauses concerning basic questions of development of the national liberation struggle, whose tasks the communist parties are striving to carry out. Their position in regard to various classes and social groups are also noted there.

Expressing the unity of views of the Marxist-Leninist parties, the statement directs maximum utilization of the revolutionary capabilities of the various classes and social strata, drawing into the struggle against imperialism all, even inconsistent, wavering, unsteady allies. Communists are revolutionaries, and it would be a bad thing if they did not take advantage of new opportunities that arose and found new methods and forms providing the best way to achievement of the ends in view.

Particular note should be taken of the idea in the statement concerning formation of national democracies. The statement describes the basic features of this state and the tasks it is called on to carry out.

It is important to stress that with the immense variety of conditions in countries whose peoples have risen to independent, historic creative work, various forms of settling problems of social progress cannot fail to arise. The correct application of Marxist-Leninist theory in countries which have freed themselves consists indeed in seeking forms for uniting the whole

national (word indistinct) while taking account of the special features of the economic, political, and cultural life of the peoples, in insuring the leading role of the working class in the national front, and in the struggle for resolute extermination of the roots of imperialism and the remnants of feudalism, for clearing the way for an eventual movement toward socialism.

At present, when imperialist reaction is trying to foist a policy of anticommunism on the young, independent states, a truthful explanation of communist view and aims becomes particularly significant. Communists generally support democratic measures taken by national governments. At the same time, communists explain to the masses that these measures are not socialist ones.

To no one are the hopes of the peoples bursting the fetters of colonialism as dear and as comprehensible as to the working people of the socialist countries, to the communists of the whole world. Our very world outlook and the interests of working mankind, for which we fight, urge us to do everything we can so that the peoples follow the right road to progress and the efflorescence of their material and spiritual forces. By our policy we must strengthen the confidence of the peoples in the socialist countries.

The assistance of the USSR and other socialist states to countries which have won their independence pursues a single goal: To contribute to the strengthening of the position of those countries in the struggle against imperialism, to the development of their national economies, and to the improvement of the living conditions of their peoples. Engels, noting the immense interest of the working class and of the leading countries in making colonial countries independent at the earliest possible date, wrote that only one thing was beyond all doubt: The victorious proletariat cannot enforce happiness upon other people without undermining its own victory.

The international duty of the victorious working class is to help the peoples of economically underdeveloped countries to completely break the fetters of colonial enslavement and to give them all-round support in their struggle against imperialism and for self-determination and independent development.

It does not follow from this, however, that the socialist help does not influence the prospects of the further development of countries which have won their freedom.

The Soviet Union has been and remains a sincere friend of colonial peoples and has always stood guard over their interests and aspirations to independence. We will continue to strengthen and develop economic and cultural cooperation with countries which have entered the party of independent existence.

The Soviet Union submitted for consideration by the 15th session of the U. N. General Assembly a declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. As a result of acute political struggle around this proposal, which seethed not only in the United Nations but outside it, the General Assembly adopted the declaration on granting independence to colonial countries and peoples.

The main conclusion of the Soviet declaration, the necessity of speedy and final liquidation of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations, was on the whole reflected in the decision passed by the United Nations. This was a great victory for the progressive forces and for all socialist states which firmly and consistently defend the cause of the freedom and independent national development of peoples.


It is necessary to stress that in the solution of this problem at the U. N. General Assembly colonizers were isolated by socialist and neutralist countries, countries which take the stand for the liquidation of colonial system. Even some of the countries which belong to aggressive blocs, for instance, Norway and Denmark, voted for the liquidation of the colonial system. The colonizers were left among a miserable handful of nine countries which abstained from voting. This is highly characteristic, as it shows to the whole world who stands for the liquidation of the colonial system and what the so-called free countries uphold.

Is it not significant that among those who abstained were representatives of such countries as the United States, Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, and others? Despite being doomed to fail, colonialism still has quite a considerable strength of resistance and will cause much harm to many peoples. Around it there gathers all that is obsolete and reactionary. Colonialism is the direct or indirect cause of many conflicts threatening mankind with a new war.

Colonialism, which more than once has led to bloodshed, still is fraught with the danger of war. Now and again it manifests itself in the outbreaks of vicious madness, which is eloquently proved by the bloody events in Algeria, the Congo, and Laos. It still grips in its tenacious claws tens of millions of people. Not all the peoples who won state independence enjoy its benefits, since in the economies of their countries foreign monopolies continue their domination.

To demolish these last remnants of the colonial system of imperialism, to protect the peoples that are gaining independence from encroachment by colonial powers, and to help these peoples in the implementation of their liberation ideals -- therein the peoples of the socialist countries and communists and progressive people of the world see their duty.

Extracted from "Peoples War, Peoples Army," U. S. Government Printing Office: 1962.



Section IV


GIAP ON GUERRILLA WARFARE

Viet-Nam is one of the oldest countries in Southeast Asia. Stretching like an immense "S" along the edge of the Pacific, it includes Bac Bo, or North Viet-Nam, which, with the Red River delta, is a region rich in agricultural and industrial possibilities; Nam Bo, or South Viet-Nam, a vast alluvial plain furrowed by the arms of the Mekong and especially favorable to agriculture; and Trung Bo, or Central Viet-Nam, a long, narrow belt of land joining them. To describe the shape of their country, the Vietnamese like to recall an image familiar to them -- that of a shoulder pole with a basket of paddy at each end.

Viet-Nam extends over nearly 330,000 square kilometers on which lives a population of approximately 30 million. During their many thousand years of history, the Vietnamese people have always been able to maintain an heroic tradition of struggle against foreign aggression. During the 13th century, in particular, they succeeded in thwarting domination by the whole of feudal China.

The Vietnamese people's war of liberation was a just war. Its aim was to win back the independence and unity of the country, to bring land to the peasants, and to defend the achievements of the August Revolution. That is why it was, first and foremost, a people's war. To educate, mobilize, organize, and arm the whole people in order that they might take part in the resistance was the crucial task.

The enemy of the Vietnamese nation was aggressive imperialism, which had to be overthrown. But the latter having long since joined up with the feudal landlords, the anti-imperialist struggle definitely could not be separated from anti-feudal action. On the other hand, in a backward colonial country such as ours, where the peasants make up the majority of the population, a people's war is essentially a peasant's war under the leadership of the working class. Owing to this fact, a general mobilization of the rural masses. The problem of land is of decisive importance. The Vietnamese war of liberation was essentially a national democratic revolution carried out under military form. It has a two-fold fundamental task: the overthrowing of imperialism and the defeat of the feudal landlord class. The anti-imperialist struggle was primary.




... a people's war is essentially a peasant's war.

Vietnamese Army Weak


A backward colonial country which had only just risen up to proclaim its independence and install people's power, Viet-Nam had only recently developed armed forces. They were equipped with still mediocre arms and had no combat experience. The enemy, on the other hand, was an imperialist power which had retained a fairly considerable economic and military potential despite the recent German occupation. She had benefited, moreover, from the active support of the United States. The balance of forces decidedly showed up our weaknesses against the enemy's strength.

The Vietnamese people's war therefore, had to be hard and long-lasting in order to succeed in creating conditions for victory. Conceptions born of impatience and aimed at obtaining speedy victory could only be gross errors. It was necessary to adopt a strategy of long-term resistance in order to maintain and gradually augment our forces, while nibbling at and progressively destroying those of the enemy. It was necessary to accumulate thousands of small victories and to turn them into one great success, gradually altering the balance of forces, transforming our weakness into power, and carrying off final victory.

At an early stage, our Party was able to discern the true characteristics of the war. By proceeding from these premises during the whole of hostilities and under particularly difficult conditions, the Party solved all the problems of the resistance. This judicious leadership led us to victory.




...it could be used in the mountains as well as in the delta.



Our strategy was, as we have stressed, to wage a long-lasting battle. A war of this type, generally speaking, entails several phases. In principle, starting from a stage of contention, the war goes through a period of equilibrium before arriving at a general counter-offensive. The way it is carried on can be subtle and complex, depending on the particular conditions obtaining on both sides during the course of operations. Only a long-term war could enable us to utilize to the maximum our political trump cards, to overcome our material handicap, and to transform our weakness into strength. To maintain and increase our forces was the principle to which we adhered. We contented ourselves with attacking when success was certain, refusing to give battle likely to incur losses to us, or to engage in hazardous actions. We had to build up our strength during the actual course of fighting.

Guerrilla War Fit Situation

The form of fighting had to be completely adapted to the situation. We had to raise our fighting spirit to the maximum and rely on the heroism of our troops to overcome the enemy's material superiority. In the main, especially at the outset, we had to resort to guerrilla fighting. In the Vietnamese theatre of operations, this method carried off great victories. It could be used in the mountains as well as in the delta; it could be waged with good or mediocre material, even without arms, and was to enable us eventually to equip ourselves at the cost of the enemy. Wherever the Expeditionary Corps went, the entire population took part in the fighting. Every commune had its fortified village. Every district had its regional troops fighting under command of local branches of the Party, in liaison with the regular forces, in order to wear down and annihilate the enemy.



...every commune had its fortified village.

Thereafter, with the development of our forces, guerrilla war changed into mobile warfare (though still strongly marked by guerrilla tactics) which afterwards became the basic form of operations on the main front, the northern front. In this process of development, our army constantly grew and passed from the stage of engagements involving a section or company, to fairly large-scale campaigns bringing into action several divisions. Gradually, the army's equipment improved, mainly through seizure of arms from the French and American imperialists.

From a military point of view, the war proved that an inadequately equipped army, fighting for a just cause, can, with appropriate strategy and tactics, conquer a modern army of aggressive imperialism.

In the management of a war economy in an agriculturally backward country undertaking a long-term resistance, the problem of building bases in rear areas arises. The raising and defense of production, and the development of agriculture, were problems of great importance for supplying the front as well as for progressive improvement of the people's living conditions. The matter of manufacturing arms was not one which could be set aside.

In the building of rural bases and the reinforcement of rear areas, for giving impetus to the resistance, the agrarian policy of the Party played a determining role. Therein lay the anti-feudal task of the revolution. In a colony where the national question is essentially the peasant question, consolidation of the resistance forces was possible only by solution of the agrarian problem.

The August Revolution overthrew the feudal state. Reduction of land rents and rates of interest, decreed by people's power, bestowed on the peasants their first material advantages. Land monopolized by the imperialists and traitors was confiscated and shared out. Communal land and rice fields were most equitably distributed. From 1953, deeming it necessary to promote the accomplishment of anti-feudal tasks, the Party decided to achieve agrarian reform even during the course of the resistance war. Despite the errors which blemished accomplishment of this reform, it was a correct policy crowned with success. It resulted in real material advantages for the peasants and brought to the army and the people a new breath of enthusiasm.

Thanks to this new agrarian policy, the life of the people, during the hardest conditions of the war, generally improved, not only in the vast free zones of the North, but even in the guerrilla bases in South Viet-Nam.

Rural Resistance Bases

The Vietnamese war brought out the importance of building resistance bases in the countryside and emphasized the close and indissoluble relationship between the anti-imperialist revolution and the anti-feudal revolution.

From a political point of view, the question of unity among the people and the mobilization of all their energies was of paramount importance. It was the national united front against the imperialists and their lackeys, the Vietnamese traitors.

In Viet-Nam, our Party carried off a great success in its policy of Front. As early as WW II, the Party formed the League for the Independence of Viet-Nam. During the early years of the war of resistance, we postponed the application of agrarian revolution, limiting our program to the reduction of land rents and interest rates, which enabled us to neutralize part of the landlord class and to rally around us the most patriotic of them.

From the early days of the August Revolution, the policy of broad front adopted by the Party neutralized the wavering elements among the landlord class and limited acts of sabotage by partisans of the Viet-Nam Quoc-Dan-Dang (nationalist party).

Thereafter, in the course of the war, when agrarian reform had become an urgent necessity, our Party made a differentiation within the landlord class by providing different treatment for each type of landlord according to his political attitude toward liquidation of feudal appropriation of land.



... mobilization of all the people's energies is of paramount importance.

The policy of unity among nationalities adopted by the National United Front also achieved great success, and the program of unity with the various religious circles attained good results.

The National United Front was to be a vast assembly of all the forces capable of being united, neutralizing all those which could be neutralized, dividing all those it was possible to divide. The object of this was to direct the spearhead at the chief enemy of the revolution, invading imperialism. The Front was to be an alliance between workers and peasants under the leadership of the working class. In Viet-Nam, an alliance between workers and peasants was backed by a dazzling history and firm traditions. The party of the working class had been the only political party to fight resolutely in all circumstances for national independence. It was the first to put forward the slogan, "land to the tillers," and to struggle determinedly for its realization. However, in the early years of the resistance, underestimation of the importance of the peasant question hindered us from giving all the necessary attention to the worker-peasant alliance. This error was subsequently set right, especially from the moment when the Party decided, by means of accomplishing agrarian reform, to make the peasants the real masters of the countryside.

Worker - Peasant Alliance

The war of liberation proved that, in the face of an enemy as powerful as he is cruel, victory is possible only by uniting the whole people under a firm and wide national front based on the worker-peasant alliance.

To bring victory, it was not enough to have a correct strategic guiding principle. An appropriate guiding principle of fighting was also necessary in order to carry out the strategy. In general, ours was a guerrilla war moving gradually to regular or mobile war combined with partial entrenched camp warfare. Basically, we had grasped that general law -- hence, we were successful. However, we did not thoroughly grasp it from the beginning, only after being tested and tempered in the practice of war.

In the resistance war, guerrilla activity played an extremely important role. Guerrilla war is the form of fighting of the masses of a weak and badly equipped country who stand up against an aggressive army with better equipment and techniques. This is the way of fighting a revolution. Guerrillas rely on heroic spirit to triumph over modern weapons, avoiding the enemy when he is the stronger and attacking him when he is the weaker. Now scattering, now regrouping, now wearing out, now exterminating the enemy, they are determined to fight everywhere, so that wherever the enemy goes he is submerged in a sea of armed people who hit back at him thus undermining his spirit and exhausting his forces. In addition to scattering in order to wear out the enemy, it is necessary to regroup big armed forces in favorable situations to achieve supremacy in attack at a given point and time to annihilate the enemy. Successes in many small fights added together gradually wear out the enemy manpower, while little by little strengthening our forces. The main goal of the fighting must be destruction of enemy manpower. Our own manpower should not be exhausted from trying to keep or occupy land.



... it is necessary to regroup big armed forces in favorable situations to achieve supremacy in attack at a given point and time to annihilate the enemy.

(Viet Minh 174th Infantry Regiment--just prior to battle of Dien Bien Phu.)

Why French Failed

Guerrilla war was obviously in full keeping with the characteristics of our resistance war. In the early period, regular war wasn't possible. When the war started in South Viet-Nam, our plan was to wage guerrilla warfare and in practice, guerrilla war took shape. But when the nationwide war broke out, the policy of mainly waging guerrilla warfare was not clearly set forth. At the beginning of autumn-winter 1947, the Party Central Committee decreed launching and extending guerrilla activities over all the occupied areas. One part of our main force was divided into independent companies, operating separately, which penetrated deep into the enemy's rear area to carry out propaganda assignments among the people, to defend our bases, and to intensify guerrilla activity. The policy of using independent companies concurrently with concentrated battalions was very successful. As guerrilla activities were intensified and widely extended, many enemy rear areas were turned into our front lines.

To cope with our expanding guerrilla activities, great efforts were made by the enemy to launch repeated mopping-up operations with ever bigger forces. The aim of these operations was to annihilate our guerrilla units, destroy our political bases and crops, and plunder our property. The enemy hoped to crush our resistance forces and "pacify" his rear. That is why mopping-up operations and counter mopping-up operations became the chief form of guerrilla war in the enemy's rear. Through the counter mopping-up operations, our people brought to the utmost their endurance of hardships and heroic fighting spirit, creating extremely rich forms of fighting. To maintain and extend guerrilla activities in the enemy's rear our Party cleverly combined the coordination of political and economic struggle with armed struggle. The Party strove hard to avail itself of favorable opportunities to push the people into the armed struggle, develop our forces, annihilate and wear out the enemy forces, turn temporarily occupied zones into guerrilla zones or the latter into our bases. When meeting a difficult situation, our Party cleverly switched the movement in good time to preserve our forces and safeguard our bases. Guerrilla activities in the enemy's rear were the highest expression of the ironwill and courageous spirit of our people, and at the same time were proof of the talented leadership of the Party

From the strategic point of view, guerrilla warfare causes many difficulties and losses to the enemy and wears him out. To annihilate enemy manpower and liberate land, guerrilla warfare has to change gradually to mobile warfare. Through guerrilla activities, our troops were gradually formed, fighting first with small units, then with bigger ones, moving from scattered fighting to more concentrated fighting. Guerrilla warfare gradually developed to mobile warfare -- a form of fighting in which principles of regular warfare gradually appear but still bear a guerrilla character. Mobile warfare is fighting with concentrated troops of the regular army. In this type war, relatively big forces are grouped and operated on a relatively vast battlefield, attacking the enemy where he is relatively exposed, advancing deeply, then withdrawing swiftly. Such fighting is characterized by extreme dynamism, initiative, mobility, and rapidity of decision in face of new situations.

Regular Warfare Expanded

As the Resistance War went on, the strategic role of mobile warfare became more important with every passing day. Its task was to annihilate a bigger and bigger number of the enemy in order to develop our own strength. The task of guerrilla warfare was to wear out and destroy the enemy's reserves. Therefore, mobile war and guerrilla war went side by side. Only by annihilating the enemy's manpower could we smash his big offensives, safeguard our bases and rear areas, and win the initiative. By wiping out more and more enemy, by liberating larger and larger localities one after the other, we could eventually destroy the whole enemy force and liberate our country.

In 1947, with the plan of operating companies separately and massing battalions, we began to move to more concentrated fighting, then to mobile warfare. In 1948, we made relatively large ambush and surprise attacks with one or several battalions. In 1949, we launched small campaigns not only in the North but also on other battlefronts. From 1950, we began to launch campaigns on an ever larger scale, enabling mobile warfare to play the main part on the northern battlefield, while entrenched camp warfare was on the upgrade. This fact was clearly manifest in the great Dien Bien Phu campaign.

Guerrilla and Regular Coordination

Once mobile warfare appeared on the battlefield of guerrilla war, there must be close and correct coordination between the two. This is another general law in the conduct of war. On the one hand, guerrilla warfare had to be extended to make full use of the new favorable conditions brought about by mobile warfare. On the other hand, mobile warfare had to be accelerated to annihilate large enemy forces, and concurrently to create new favorable conditions for further extension of guerrilla war. In the course of the development of mobile warfare, owing to the enemy's situation and ours on the battlefields, entrenched camp warfare gradually came into being. It became part and parcel of mobile warfare, kept developing, and occupied a more and more important position.

The conduct of the war must maintain a correct ratio between the fighting forms. At the beginning, we had to stick to guerrilla warfare and extend it. Passing to a new stage, as mobile warfare made its appearance, we had to hold firm the coordination between the two forms, the chief one being guerrilla warfare. Mobile warfare was of lesser importance but was on the upgrade. Then came a new and higher stage. Mobile warfare moved to the main position, at first on only one battlefield, then on a widening scope. During this time, guerrilla warfare was extended but, unlike mobile warfare, it fell back to a lesser but still important position.



GUERRILLA MORTAR BEING FIRED FROM DEEP WITHIN THE JUNGLE.

Maintaining Balance

On some battlefronts we met with difficulties because we were not determined to advance from guerrilla to mobile war. On others, rashness in speeding up mobile warfare had a bad influence on guerrilla activity, and therefore mobile warfare also had trouble. In general, however, the correct ratio of emphasis was maintained. The Hoa Binh campaign was typical of coordination between guerrilla and mobile warfare units on the northern battlefront. The Dien Bien Phu campaign and the winter-spring 1953-1954 campaign were also successful models of coordination.

Owing to the enemy's situation and ours, there appeared a system of free zones interlaced with enemy-controlled areas, intersecting and encircling each other. In enemy-controlled areas, there were also guerrilla zones and guerrilla bases. These zones and bases expanded as the war progressed, while enemy-occupied areas narrowed.

The strategy of long-term war and the principle of expansion from guerrilla to regular war were successful. Such were the basic strategy and tactics of the people's war in a small and backward agricultural country under the leadership of our Party.

Section V

LA GUERRA DE GUERRILLAS
ESSENTIALS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

*The guerrilla force is the fighting vanguard of the people's struggle against their oppressors and its agent -- the professional army. Strike and flee . . . give the enemy no rest. Their final purpose is to annihilate the enemy and to obtain victory.

GUERRILLA STRATEGY

The first duty of the guerrilla is to keep from being destroyed. Action against the enemy should be constant. A strong base of operations is essential but this may be expanded as the guerrilla forces become stronger. There finally comes the time to advance against the strongholds of the enemy . . . to defeat him and attain the final objective -- victory.

GUERRILLA TACTICS

Guerrilla forces are mobile, use surprise, deception and sabotage. Night operations are normal. They have full knowledge of the terrain and peoples in the area of operations. They rearm with captured stores for many essential supplies.

FAVORABLE TERRAIN

(The rougher and more inaccessible the terrain, the more confident the guerrilla is.) From almost impenetrable refuge he goes out constantly to harass and fight the enemy. The radius of operations depends upon the situation but safe lines of internal communication must be maintained.

UNFAVORABLE TERRAIN

In heavily populated and built-up areas, guerrilla groups must be kept small. Night movement is SOP. Stealth, secrecy, and surprise are commonplace. Security is difficult, and guerrillas use propaganda to sway the masses to their side of the conflict.

*Reprinted from Special Warfare-US Army-An Army Speciality, Office, Chief of Information, Department of the Army, 1962, by Che Guevara.



... the rougher and more inaccessible the terrain,
the more confident the guerrilla is.

SUBURBAN AREAS

Guerrilla forces in suburban areas must not operate independently of others in conflict but must gear their operations to the objectives and plans of other forces in other areas. Forces must be small, must be trained in sabotage, and must maintain extremely severe discipline.

THE GUERRILLA AS A FIGHTER

Idealistic, implacable, nocturnal, and preferably a native of the area, the guerrilla fighter must make maximum use of surprise, weapons, terrain, and his physical stamina to combat and conquer conventional forces.

ORGANIZATION FOR BUSH WARFARE

Flexibility is foremost in the guerrilla leader's mind. Just as the conventional forces commander must be ready to change his tactics - so must the unconventional leader be prepared to reverse his field to stay with the situation.

COMBAT

Vulnerable are the vanguards, and the point men are marked for mayhem by the guerrilla, who also uses encirclement and night attack as morale-breaking maneuvers.

SUPPLY

A guerrilla force is not self-sustaining. Chow, clothing, munitions - all of the requirements of war -- must be obtained by capture or theft and from farmers in areas where the guerrillas are operating.

CIVILIAN ORGANIZATION

Senor Inside and Senor Outside are both important to the guerrilla force which must depend upon, but never trust, civilians within its zone of operations -- and enlist support and supply from outside sources.

ROLE OF WOMEN

Women have abilities as communicators and culinary artists but they are not necessarily deadlier than the male.

HEALTH

Medical care is in direct ratio to the success of the guerrilla force, ranging from primitive in the early days to modern hospitalization as success crowns the revolution.

SABOTAGE

Indiscriminate sabotage has little purpose; carefully planned, it is perhaps the best tool in the hands of determined revolutionaries.

WAR INDUSTRY

Movement and applied firepower are the prime requirements for a successful guerrilla force -- therefore shoe-making and gunsmithing are important war industries.

INFORMATION

Intelligence obtained by any means and Fifth Column activities to sow terror are potent guerrilla weapons.

TRAINING AND INDOCTRINATION

Guerrillas receive basic, too. Weapons firing is fundamental, but they learn other arts of war as well. And "troop information" appears -- even in the field.



CUBAN GUERRILLAS



Section VI

LONG LIVE THE VICTORY OF THE PEOPLE'S WAR

... During the anti-Japanese war our army staunchly performed the three tasks set by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, namely, fighting, mass work, and production, and it was at the same time a fighting force, a political work force, and a production corps. Everywhere it went, it did propaganda work among the masses, organized and armed them, and helped them set up revolutionary political power. Our army men strictly observed the three main rules of discipline and the eight points for attention, carried out campaigns to "support the government and cherish the people," and did good deeds for the people everywhere. They also made use of every possibility to engage in production themselves to overcome economic difficulties, better their own livelihood, and lighten the people's burden. By their exemplary conduct they won the wholehearted support of the masses, who affectionately called them "our own boys."

Our army consisted of local forces as well as of regular forces; moreover, it energetically built and developed the militia, thus practicing the system of combining the three military formations, that is, the regular forces, the local forces, and the militia.

Our army also pursued correct policies in winning over enemy officers and men and in giving lenient treatment to prisoners of war. During the anti-Japanese war we not only brought about the revolt and surrender of large numbers of puppet troops, but succeeded in converting not a few Japanese prisoners, who had been badly poisoned by fascists ideology. After they were politically awakened, they organized themselves into antiwar organizations such as the League of the Liberation of the Japanese People, the Antiwar League of the Japanese in China, and the League of Awakened Japanese, helped us to disintegrate the Japanese Army, and cooperated with us in opposing Japanese militarism. Comrade Sanzo Nosaka, the leader of the Japan Communist Party, who was then in Yenan, gave us great help in this work.

The essence of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of army building is that in building a people's army prominence must be given to politics, that is, the army must first and foremost be built on a political basis. Politics is the commander, politics is the soul of everything. Political work is the lifeline of our army. True, a people's army must pay attention to the constant improvement of its weapons and equipment and its military technique; but in its fighting it does not rely purely on weapons, and technique, it relies mainly on politics, on the proletarian revolutionary consciousness and courage of the commanders and fighters, on the support and backing of the masses.

Extracted from an article by Lin Piao, Defense Minister of Communist China, entitled, "LONG LIVE THE VICTORY OF THE PEOPLE'S WAR," Daily Report Supplement, FAR EAST, No. 171(45), Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Dated 3 September 1965.

Due to the application of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's line on army building, there has prevailed in our army at all times a high level of proletarian political consciousness, an atmosphere of keenness to study the thought of Mao Tse-tung, excellent morale, solid unity, and a deep hatred for the enemy, and thus a gigantic moral force has been brought into being. In battle it has feared neither hardships nor death; it has been able to charge or hold its ground as the conditions require. One man can play the role of several, dozens or even hundreds, and miracles can be performed.

All this makes the people's army led by the CCP fundamentally different from any bourgeois army, and from all the armies of the old type which served the exploiting classes and were driven and utilized by a handful of people. The experience of the people's war in China shows that a people's army created in accordance with Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of army building is incomparably strong and invincible.

CARRY OUT THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE PEOPLE'S WAR

Engels said, "The emancipation of the proletariat, in its turn, will have its specific expression in military affairs and create its specific new military method." Engel's profound prediction has been fulfilled in the revolutionary wars waged by the Chinese people under the leadership of the CCP. In the course of protracted armed struggle, we have created a whole range of strategy and tactics of people's war by which we have been able to utilize our strong points to attack the enemy at his weak points.

During the war of resistance against Japan, on the basis of his comprehensive analysis of the enemy and ourselves, Comrade Mao Tse-tung laid down the following strategic principle for the communist-led Eighth Route and New Fourth armies: "Guerrilla warfare is basic, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favorable conditions." He raised guerrilla warfare to the level of strategy because, if they are to defeat a formidable enemy, revolutionary armed forces should not fight with reckless disregard for the consequences when there is a great disparity between their own strength and the enemy's. If they do, they will suffer serious losses and bring heavy setbacks to the revolution. Guerrilla warfare is the only way to mobilize and apply the whole strength of the people against the enemy, the only way to expand our forces in the course of the war, deplete and weaken the enemy, gradually change the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves, switch from guerrilla to mobile warfare, and finally defeat the enemy.

In the initial period of the second revolutionary civil war, Comrade Mao Tse-tung enumerated the basic tactics of guerrilla warfare as follows: "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue." Guerrilla war tactics were further developed during the war of resistance against Japan. In the base areas behind the enemy lines, everybody joined in the fighting--the troops and the civilian population, men and women, old and young; every single village fought. Various ingenious methods of fighting were devised, including "sparrow warfare," landmine warfare, tunnel warfare, sabotage warfare, and guerrilla warfare on lakes and rivers.

In the later period of the war of resistance against Japan and during the third revolutionary civil war, we switched our strategy from that of guerrilla warfare as the primary form of fighting to that of mobile warfare in the light of the changes in the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves. By the middle, and especially the later period of the third revolutionary civil war, our operations had developed into large-scale mobile warfare, including the storming of big cities.

War of annihilation is the fundamental guiding principle of our military operations. This guiding principle should be put into effect regardless of whether mobile or guerrilla warfare is

the primary form of fighting. It is true that in guerrilla warfare much should be done to disrupt and harass the enemy, but it is still necessary to actively advocate and fight battles of annihilation whenever conditions are favorable. In mobile warfare superior forces must be concentrated in every battle so that the enemy forces can be wiped out one by one. Comrade Mao Tse-tung has pointed out:

A battle in which the enemy is routed is not basically decisive in a contest with a foe of great strength. A battle of annihilation, on the other hand, produces a great and immediate impact on any enemy. Injuring all of a man's 10 fingers is not as effective as annihilating one of them.

Battles of annihilation are the most effective way of hitting the enemy; each time one of his brigades or regiments is wiped out, he will have one brigade or one regiment less, and the enemy forces will be demoralized and will disintegrate. By fighting battles of annihilation, our army is able to take prisoners of war or capture weapons from the enemy in every battle, and the morale of our army rises, our army units get bigger, our weapons become better, and our combat effectiveness continually increases.

In his celebrated 10 cardinal military principles, Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out:

In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force (two, three, four and sometimes even five or six times the enemy's strength), encircle the enemy forces completely, (few words indistinct) (in terms of numbers), we, are absolutely superior in every part and every specific campaign and this ensures victory in the campaign. As time goes on, we shall become superior as a whole and eventually wipe out all the enemy.

At the same time, he said that we should first attack dispersed or isolated enemy forces and only attack concentrated and strong enemy forces later; that we should strive to wipe out the enemy through mobile warfare; that we should fight no battle unprepared and fight no battle we are not sure of winning; and that in any battle we fight we should develop our army's strong points and its excellent style of fighting. These are the major principles of fighting a war of annihilation.

To annihilate the enemy, we must adopt the policy of luring him in deep and abandon some cities and districts of our own accord in a planned way to let him in. It is only after letting the enemy in that the people can take part in the war in various ways (words indistinct) power of a people's war can be fully exerted. It is only after letting the enemy in that he can be compelled to divide up his forces, take on heavy burdens, and commit mistakes. In other words, we must let the enemy become elated, stretch out all his 10 fingers, and become hopelessly bogged down. Thus, we can concentrate superior forces to destroy the enemy forces one by one, to eat them up mouthful by mouthful. Only by wiping out the enemy's effective strength can cities and localities be finally held or seized. We are finally against dividing up our forces to defend all positions and putting up resistance at every place for fear that our territory might be lost and our pots and pans smashed, since this can neither wipe out the enemy forces nor hold cities or localities.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung has provided a masterly summary of the strategy and tactics of people's war. You fight in your way and we fight in ours; we fight when we can win and move away when we can't.

In other words, you rely on modern weapons and we rely on highly conscious revolutionary people; you give full play to your superiority and we give full play to ours; you have your way of fighting and we have ours. When you want to fight us, we don't let you and you can't even find us. But when we want to fight you, we make sure that you can't get away and we hit you

squarely on the chin and wipe you out. It is opportunism if one won't fight when one can't win. It is adventurism if one insists on fighting when one can't win. Fighting is the pivot of all our strategy and tactics. It is because of the necessity of fighting that we admit the necessity of moving away. The sole purpose of moving away is to fight and bring about the final and complete destruction of the enemy. This strategy and these tactics can be applied only when one relies on the broad masses of the people, and such application brings the superiority of people's war into full play. However superior he may be in technical equipment and whatever tricks he may resort to, the enemy will find himself in the passive position of having to receive blows, and initiative will always be in our hands.

We grew from a small and weak to a large and strong force and finally defeated formidable enemies at home and abroad because we carried out the strategy and tactics of people's war. During the eight years of war of resistance against Japan, the people's army led by the CCP fought more than 125,000 engagements with the enemy and put out of action more than 1.7 million Japanese and puppet troops. In the three years of the war of liberation, we put 8 million of the Kuomintang's reactionary troops out of action and won the great victory of the people's revolution.

ADHERE TO THE POLICY OF SELF-RELIANCE

The Chinese people's war of resistance against Japan was an important part of the anti-fascist world war. The victory of the antifascist war as a whole was the result of the common struggle of the people of the world. By its participation in the war against Japan at the final stage, the Soviet Army under the leadership of the CPSU headed by Stalin played a significant part in bringing about the defeat of Japanese imperialism. Great contributions were made by the peoples of Korea, Vietnam, Mongolia, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, Burma, India, Pakistan, Malaya, the Philippines, Thailand, and certain other Asian countries. The people of the Americas, Oceania, Europe, and Africa also made their contribution.

Under extremely difficult circumstances, the Communist Party of Japan and the revolutionary forces of the Japanese people kept up their valiant and stanch struggle, and played their part in the defeat of Japanese fascism.

The common victory was won by all the peoples, who gave one another support and encouragement. Yet each country was, above all, liberated as a result of its own people's efforts.

The Chinese people enjoyed the support of other peoples in winning both the war of resistance against Japan and the people's liberation war, and yet victory was mainly the result of the Chinese people's own effort. Certain people assert that China's victory in the war of resistance was due entirely to foreign assistance. This absurd assertion is in tune with that of the Japanese militarists.

The liberation of the masses is accomplished by the masses themselves--this is a basic principle of Marxism-Leninism. Revolution or people's war in any country is the business of the masses in that country and should be carried out primarily by their own efforts; there is no other way.

During the war of resistance against Japan, our party maintained that China should rely mainly on its own strength while at the same time trying to get as much foreign assistance as possible. We firmly opposed the Kuomintang ruling clique's policy of exclusive reliance on foreign aid. In the eyes of the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek, China's industry and agriculture were no good, its weapons and equipment were no good, nothing in China was any good, so that if it wanted to defeat Japan, it has to depend on other countries, and particularly on the

U.S. - British imperialists. This was completely slavish thinking. Our policy was diametrically opposed to that of the Kuomintang. Our party held that it was possible to exploit the contradictions between U.S. - British imperialism and Japanese imperialism, but that no reliance could be placed on the former. In fact, the U.S. - British imperialists repeatedly plotted to bring about a "Far Eastern Munich" to arrive at a compromise with Japanese imperialism at China's expense, and for a considerable period of time they provided the Japanese aggressors with war material. In helping China during that period, the U.S. imperialists harbored the sinister design of turning China into a colony of their own.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung said: "China has to rely mainly on its own effort in the war of resistance." He added; "we hope for foreign aid but cannot be dependent on it; we depend on our own efforts, on the creative power of the whole army and the people."

Self-reliance was especially important for the people's armed forces and the liberated areas led by our party.

The Kuomintang government gave the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies some small allowances in the initial stage of the anti-Japanese war, but gave them not a single penny later. The liberated areas faced great difficulties as a result of the Japanese imperialists' savage attacks and brutal "mopping-up" campaigns, of the Kuomintang's military encirclement and economic blockade, and of natural calamities. The difficulties were particularly great in 1941 and 1942 when we were very short of food and clothing.

What were we to do? Comrade Mao Tse-tung asked: How has mankind managed to keep alive from time immemorial? Has it not been by men using their hands to provide for themselves? Why should we, their latter-day descendants, be devoid of this tiny bit of wisdom? Why can't we use our own hands?

The Central Committee of the party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung put forward the policies of "ample food and clothing through self-reliance" and "develop the economy and insure supplies," and the army and the people of the liberated areas accordingly launched an extensive production campaign, with the main emphasis on agriculture.

Difficulties are not invincible monsters. If everyone cooperates and fights them, they will be overcome. The Kuomintang reactionaries thought that it could starve us to death by cutting off allowances and imposing an economic blockade, but in fact it helped us by stimulating us to rely on our own efforts to surmount our difficulties. While launching the great campaign for production, we applied the policy of "better troops and simpler administration" and economized in the use of manpower and material resources; thus we not only surmounted the severe material difficulties and successfully met the crisis, but lightened the people's burden, improved their livelihood, and laid the material foundations for victory in the anti-Japanese war.

The problem of military equipment was solved mainly by relying on the capture of arms from the enemy, though we did turn out some weapons, too. Chiang Kai-shek, the Japanese imperialists, and the U.S. imperialists all have been our "chiefs of transportation corps." The arsenals of the imperialists always provide the oppressed peoples and nations with arms.

The people's armed forces led by our party independently waged people's war on a large scale and won great victories without any material aid from outside, both during the more than eight years of the anti-Japanese war and during the more than three years of the people's war of liberation.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung has said that our fundamental policy should rest on the foundation of our own strength. Only by relying on our own efforts can we in all circumstances remain invincible.

The peoples of the world invariably support each other in their struggles against imperialism and its lackeys. Those countries which have won victory are duty bound to support and aid the peoples who have not yet done so. Nevertheless, foreign aid can only play a supplementary role.

To make a revolution and to fight a people's war and be victorious, it is imperative to adhere to the policy of self-reliance, rely on the strength of the masses in one's own country, and prepare to carry on the fight independently even when all material aid from outside is cut off. If one does not operate by one's own efforts, does not independently ponder and solve the problems of the revolution in one's own country, and does not rely on the strength of the masses but leans wholly on foreign aid--even though this be aid from socialist countries which persist in revolution--no victory can be won, or be consolidated even if it is won.

THE INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF COMRADE MAO TSE-TUNG'S THEORY OF PEOPLE'S WAR

The Chinese revolution is a continuation of the Great October Revolution. The road of the October Revolution is the common road for all people's revolutions. The Chinese revolution and the October Revolution have in common the following basic characteristics: 1) both were led by the working class with a Marxist-Leninist party as its nucleus; 2) both were based on the worker-peasant alliance; 3) in both cases state power was seized through violent revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat was established; 4) in both cases the socialist system was built after victory in the revolution; and 5) both are component parts of the proletarian world revolution.

Naturally, the Chinese revolution had its own peculiar characteristics. The October Revolution took place in imperialist Russia, but the Chinese revolution broke out in a semi-colonial and semifuedal country. The former was a proletarian socialist revolution, while the latter developed into a socialist revolution after the complete victory of the new democratic revolution. The October Revolution began with armed uprisings in the cities and then spread to the countryside, while the Chinese revolution won nationwide victory through the encirclement of the cities from the rural areas and the final capture of the cities.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung's great merit lies in the fact that he has succeeded in integrating the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution and has enriched and developed Marxism-Leninism by his masterly generalization and summation of the experience gained during the Chinese people's protracted revolutionary struggle.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of people's war has been proved by the long practice of the Chinese revolution to be in accord with the objective laws of such wars and be invincible. It has not only been valid for China, it is a great contribution to the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and peoples throughout the world.

The people's war led by the CCP, comprising the war of resistance and the revolutionary civil wars, lasted 22 years. It constitutes the most drawn-out and most complex people's war led by the proletariat in modern history, and it has been the richest in experience.

In the last analysis, the Marxist-Leninist theory of proletarian revolution is the theory of the seizure of state power by revolutionary violence, the theory of countering war against the people by people's war. As Marx so aptly put it, "force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one."

It was on the basis of the lessons derived from the people's wars in China that Comrade Mao Tse-tung, using the simplest and the most vivid language, advanced the famous thesis that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

He clearly pointed out: The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good universally, for China and for all other countries.

War is the product of imperialism and the system of exploitation of man by man. Lenin said that "war is always and everywhere begun by the exploiters themselves, by the ruling and oppressing classes." So long as imperialism and the system of exploitation of man by man exist, the imperialists and reactionaries will invariably rely on armed force to maintain their reactionary rule and impose war on the oppressed nations and peoples. This is an objective law independent of man's will.

In the world today, all the imperialists headed by the United States and their lackeys, without exception, are strengthening their state machinery, and especially their armed forces. U.S. imperialism, in particular, is carrying out armed aggression and suppression everywhere.

What should the oppressed nations and the oppressed people do in the face of wars of aggression and armed suppression by the imperialists and their lackeys? Should they submit and remain slaves in perpetuity? Or should they rise in resistance and fight for their liberation?

Comrade Mao Tse-tung answered this question in vivid terms. He said that after long investigation and study the Chinese people discovered that all the imperialists and their lackeys "have swords in their hands and are out to kill. The people have come to understand this and so act after the same fashion." This is called doing unto them what they do unto us.

In the last analysis, whether one dares to wage a tit-for-tat struggle against armed aggression and suppression by the imperialists and their lackeys, whether one dares to embark on revolution. This is the most effective touchstone for distinguishing genuine from fake revolutionaries and Marxist-Leninists.

In view of the fact that some people were afflicted with the fear of the imperialists and reactionaries, Comrade Mao Tse-tung put forward his famous thesis that "the imperialists and all reactionaries are paper tigers."

He said: All reactionaries are paper tigers. In appearance the reactionaries are terrifying, but in reality they are not so powerful. From a long term point of view, it is not the reactionaries but the people who are really powerful.

The history of people's war in China and other countries provides conclusive evidence that the growth of the people's revolutionary forces from weak and small beginning into strong and large forces is a universal law of development of class struggle, a universal law of development of people's war. A people's war inevitably meets with many difficulties, with ups and downs and setbacks in the course of its development, but no force can alter its general trend towards inevitable triumph.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung points out that we must despise the enemy strategically and take full account of him tactically. To despise the enemy strategically is an elementary requirement for a revolutionary. Without the courage to despise the enemy and without daring to win, it will be simply impossible to make revolution and wage a people's war, let alone to achieve victory.

It is also very important for revolutionaries to take full account of the enemy tactically. It is likewise impossible to win victory in a people's war without taking full account of the enemy tactically, and without examining the concrete conditions, without being prudent and giving

great attention to the study of the art of struggle, and without adopting appropriate forms of struggle in the concrete practice of the revolution in each country and with regard to each concrete problem of struggle.

Dialectical and historical materialism teaches us that what is important primarily is not that which at the given moment seems to be durable and yet is already beginning to die away, but that which is arising and developing, even though at the given moment it may not appear to be durable, for only that which is arising and developing is invincible.

Why can the apparently weak newborn forces always triumph over the decadent forces which appear so powerful? The reason is that truth is on their side and that the masses are on their side, while the reactionary classes are always divorced from the masses and set themselves against the masses.

This has been borne out by the victory of the Chinese revolution, by the history of all revolutions, the whole history of class struggle, and the entire history of mankind.

The imperialists are extremely afraid of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's thesis that "imperialism and all reactionaries are paper tigers," and the revisionists are extremely hostile to it. They all oppose and attack this thesis and the Philistines follow suit by ridiculing it. But all this cannot in the least diminish its importance. The light of truth cannot be dimmed by anybody.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of people's war solves not only the problem of daring to fight a people's war, but also that of how to wage it.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung is a great statesman and military scientist, proficient at directing war in accordance with its laws. By the line and policies, the strategy and tactics he formulated for the people's war, he led the Chinese people in steering the ship of the people's war past all hidden reefs to the shores of victory in most complicated and difficult conditions.

It must be emphasized that Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of the establishment of rural revolutionary base areas and the encirclement of the cities from the countryside is of outstanding and universal practical importance for the present revolutionary struggle of all the oppressed nations and peoples, and particularly for the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America against imperialism and its lackeys.

Many countries and peoples in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are now being subjected to aggression and enslavement on a serious scale by the imperialists headed by the United States and their lackeys. The basic political and economic conditions in many of these countries have many similarities to those that prevailed in old China. As in China, the peasant question is extremely important in these regions. The peasants constitute the main force of the national-democratic revolution against the imperialists and their lackeys. In committing aggression against these countries, the imperialists usually begin by seizing the big cities and the main lines of communication, but they are unable to bring the vast countryside completely under their control. The countryside, and the countryside alone can provide the broad areas in which the revolutionaries can maneuver freely. The countryside, and the countryside alone, can provide the revolutionary bases from which the revolutionaries can go forward to final victory. Precisely for this reason, Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of establishing revolutionary base areas in the rural districts and encircling the cities from the countryside is attracting more and more attention among the people in these regions.

Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called "the cities of the world," then Asia, Africa, and Latin America constitute "the rural areas of the world."

Since World War II, the proletarian revolutionary movement has for various reasons been temporarily held back in the North American and West European capitalist countries, while the people's revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America has been growing vigorously. In a sense, the contemporary world revolution also presents a picture of the encirclement of cities by the rural areas. In the final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of the Asian, African, and Latin American peoples who make up the overwhelming majority of the world's population. The socialist countries should regard it as their internationalist duty to support the people's revolutionary struggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The October Revolution opened up a new era in the revolution of the oppressed nations. The victory of the October Revolution built a bridge between the socialist revolution of the proletariat of the west and the national-democratic revolution of the colonial and semicolonial countries of the east. The Chinese revolution has successfully solved the problem of how to link up the national-democratic with the socialist revolution in the colonial and semicolonial countries.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung has pointed out that, in the epoch since the October Revolution, anti-imperialist revolution in any colonial or semicolonial country is no longer part of the old bourgeois, or capitalist world revolution, but is part of the new world revolution, the proletarian-socialist world revolution.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung has formulated a complete theory of the new democratic revolution. He indicated that this revolution which is different from all others, can only be, nay must be, a revolution against imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucrat-capitalism waged by the broad masses of the people under the leadership of the proletariat.

This means that the revolution can only be, nay must be, led by the proletariat and the genuinely revolutionary party armed with Marxism-Leninism, and by no other class or party.

This means that the revolution embraces in its ranks not only the workers, peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie, but also the national bourgeoisie and other patriotic and anti-imperialist democrats.

This means, finally, that the revolution is directed against imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucrat-capitalism.

The new democratic revolution leads to socialism, and not to capitalism.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of the new democratic revolution is the Marxist-Leninist theory of uninterrupted revolution.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung made a correct distinction between the two revolutionary stages, that is, the national-democratic and the socialist revolutions; at the same time he correctly and closely linked the two. The national-democratic revolution is the necessary preparation for the socialist revolution, and the socialist revolution is the inevitable sequel to the national-democratic revolution. There is no great wall between the two revolutionary stages. But the socialist revolution is only possible after the completion of the national democratic revolution. The more thorough the national-democratic revolution, the better the conditions for the socialist revolution.

The experience of the Chinese revolution shows that the tasks of the national-democratic revolution can be fulfilled only through long and tortuous struggles. In this stage of revolution, imperialism and its lackeys are the principal enemy. In the struggle against imperialism and

its lackeys, it is necessary to rally all anti-imperialist patriotic forces, including the national bourgeoisie and all patriotic persons. All those patriotic persons from among the bourgeoisie and other exploiting classes who join the anti-imperialist struggle play a progressive historical role; they are not tolerated by imperialism but welcomed by the proletariat.

It is very harmful to confuse the two stages, that is, the national-democratic and the socialist revolutions. Comrade Mao Tse-tung criticized the wrong idea of "accomplishing both at one stroke," and pointed out that this utopian idea could only weaken the struggle against imperialism and its lackeys, the most urgent task at the time. The Kuomintang reactionaries and the Trotskyites they hired during the war of resistance deliberately confused these two stages of the Chinese revolution, proclaiming the "theory of a single revolution" and preaching so-called "socialism" without any Communist Party. With this preposterous theory they attempted to swallow up the Communist Party, wipe out any revolution and prevent the advance of the national-democratic revolution, and they used it as a pretext for their nonresistance and capitulation to imperialism. This reactionary theory was buried long ago by the history of the Chinese revolution.

The Khrushchev revisionists are now actively preaching that socialism can be built without the proletariat and without a genuinely revolutionary party armed with the advanced proletarian ideology, and they have cast the fundamental tenets of Marxism-Leninism to the four winds. The revisionists' purpose is solely to divert the oppressed nations from their struggle against imperialism and sabotage their national-democratic solution, all in the service of imperialism.

The Chinese revolution provides a successful lesson for making a thorough-going national-democratic revolution under the leadership of the proletariat; it likewise provides a successful lesson for the timely transition from the national-democratic revolution to the socialist revolution under the leadership of the proletariat.

Mao Tse-tung's thought has been the guide to the victory of the Chinese revolution. It has integrated the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution and creatively developed Marxism-Leninism, thus adding new weapons to the arsenal of Marxism-Leninism.

Ours is the epoch in which world capitalism and imperialism are heading for their doom and socialism and communism are marching to victory. Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of people's war is not only a product of the Chinese revolution, but has (?some) characteristics of our epoch. The new experience gained in the people's revolutionary struggles in various countries since World War II has provided continuous evidence that Mao Tse-tung's thought is a common asset of the revolutionary people of the whole world. This is the great international significance of the thought of Mao Tse-tung.

DEFEAT U.S. IMPERIALISM AND ITS LACKEYS BY PEOPLE'S WAR

Since World War II, U.S. imperialism has stepped into the shoes of German, Japanese, and Italian fascism and has been trying to build a great American empire by dominating and enslaving the whole world. It is actively fostering Japanese and West German militarism as its chief accomplices in unleashing a world war. Like a vicious wolf, it is bullying and enslaving various peoples, plundering their wealth, encroaching upon their countries' sovereignty, and interfering in their internal affairs. It is the most rabid aggressor in human history and the most ferocious common enemy of the people of the world. Every people or country in the world that wants revolution, independence, and peace cannot but (?launch the) spearhead of its struggle against U.S. imperialism.

Just as the Japanese imperialists' policy of subjecting China made it possible for the Chinese people to form the broadest possible united front against them, so the U.S. imperialists' policy of seeking world domination makes it possible for the people throughout the world to unite all the forces that can be united and form the broadest possible united front for a converging attack on U.S. imperialism.

At present, the main battlefield of the fierce struggle between the people of the world on the one side and U.S. imperialism and its lackeys on the other is the vast area of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In the world as a whole, this is the area where the people suffer most from imperialist oppression and where imperialist rule is most vulnerable. Since World War II, revolutionary storms have been rising in this area, and today they have become the most important force directly pounding U.S. imperialism. The contradiction between the revolutionary peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the imperialists headed by the United States is the principal contradiction in the contemporary world. The development of this contradiction is promoting the struggle of the people of the whole world against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys.

Since World War II, people's war has increasingly demonstrated its power in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The peoples of China, Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Cuba, Indonesia, Algeria, and other countries have waged people's wars against the imperialists and their lackeys and won great victories. The classes leading these people's wars may vary and so may the breadth and depth of mass mobilization and the extent of victory, but the victories in these people's wars have very much weakened and pinned down the forces of imperialism, upset the U.S. imperialist plan to launch a world war, and become might factors defending world peace.

Today, the conditions are more favorable than ever before for the waging of people's wars by the revolutionary peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys.

Since World War II and the succeeding years of revolutionary upsurge, there has been a great rise in the level of political consciousness and the degree of organization of the people in all countries, and the resources available to them for mutual support and aid have greatly increased. The whole capitalist-imperialist system has become drastically weaker and is in the process of increasing convulsion and disintegration. After World War I, the imperialists lacked the power to destroy the newborn socialist Soviet state, but they were still able to suppress the people's revolutionary movements in some countries in the parts of the world under their own and so maintain a short period of comparative stability. Since World War II, however, not only have they been unable to stop a number of countries from taking the socialist road, but they are no longer capable of holding back the surging tide of the people's revolutionary movements in the areas under their own rule.

U.S. imperialism is stronger, but also more vulnerable, than any imperialism of the past. It sets itself against the people of the whole world, including the people of the United States. Its human, military, material, and financial resources are far from sufficient for the realization of its ambition of dominating the whole world. U.S. imperialism has further weakened itself by occupying so many places in the world, overreaching itself, stretching its fingers out wide and dispersing its strength, with its rear so far away and its supply lines so long. As Comrade Mao Tse-tung has said, "Wherever it commits aggression, it puts a new noose around its neck. It is besieged ring upon ring by the people of the whole world."

When committing aggression in a foreign country, U.S. imperialism can only employ part of its forces, which are sent to fight an unjust war far from their native land and therefore have a low morale, and so U.S. imperialism is beset with great difficulties. The people subjected to its aggression are having a trial of strength with U.S. imperialism neither in Washington nor New York, neither in Honolulu nor Florida, but are fighting for independence and

freedom on their own soil. Once they are mobilized on a broad scale, they will have inexhaustible strength. Thus superiority will belong not to the United States but to the people subjected to its aggression. The latter, though apparently weak and small, are really more powerful than U.S. imperialism.

The struggles waged by the different peoples against U.S. imperialism reinforce each other and merge into a torrential world-wide tide of opposition to U.S. imperialism. The more successful the development of people's war in a given region, the larger the number of U.S. imperialist forces that can be pinned down and depleted there. When the U.S. aggressors are hard-pressed in one place, they have no alternative but to loosen their grip on others. Therefore, the conditions become more favorable for the people elsewhere to wage struggles against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys.

Everything is devisible, and so is this colossus of U.S. imperialism. It can be split up and defeated. The peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and other regions can destroy it piece by piece, some striking at its head and others at its feet. That is why the greatest fear of U.S. imperialism is that people's wars will be launched in different parts of the world, and particularly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and why it regards people's war as a mortal danger.

U.S. imperialism relies solely on its nuclear weapons to intimidate people. But these weapons cannot save U.S. imperialism from its doom. Nuclear weapons cannot be used lightly.

U.S. imperialism has been condemned by the people of the whole world for its towering crime of dropping two atom bombs on Japan. If it uses nuclear weapons again, it will become isolated in the extreme. Moreover, the U.S. monopoly of nuclear weapons has long been broken; U.S. imperialism has these weapons, but others have them too. If it threatens other countries with nuclear weapons, U.S. imperialism will expose its own country to the same threat. For this reason, it will meet with strong opposition not only from the people elsewhere but also inevitably from the people in its own country. Even if U.S. imperialism brazenly uses nuclear weapons, it cannot conquer the people, who are indomitable.

However fully developed modern weapons and technical equipment may be and however complicated the methods of modern warfare, in the final analysis the outcome of a war will be decided by the sustained fighting of the ground forces, by the fighting at close quarters on battlefields, by the political consciousness of the men, by their courage and spirit of sacrifice. Here the weak points of U.S. imperialism will be completely laid bare, while the superiority of the revolutionary people will be brought into full play. The reactionary troops of U.S. imperialism cannot possibly be endowed with the courage and the spirit of sacrifice possessed by the revolutionary people. The spiritual atom bomb which the revolutionary people possess is a far more powerful and useful weapon than the physical atom bomb.

Vietnam is the most convincing current example of a victim of aggression defeating U.S. imperialism by a people's war. The United States has made South Vietnam a testing ground for the suppression of people's war. It has carried on this experiment for many years, and everybody can now see that the U.S. aggressors are unable to find a way of coping with people's war. On the other hand, the Vietnamese people have brought the power of people's war into full play in their struggle against the U.S. aggressors. The U.S. aggressors are in danger of being swamped in the people's war in Vietnam. They are deeply worried that their defeat in Vietnam will lead to a chain reaction. They are expanding the war in an attempt to save themselves from defeat. But the more they expand the war, the greater will be the chain reaction. The more they escalate the war, the heavier will be their fall and the more disastrous their defeat. The people in other parts of the world will see still more clearly that U.S. imperialism can be defeated, and that what the Vietnamese people can do, they can do too.

History has proved and will go on proving that people's war is the most effective weapon against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys. All revolutionary people will learn to wage people's war against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys. They will take up arms, learn to fight battles and become skilled in waging people war, though they have not done so before. U.S. imperialism, like a mad bull dashing from place to place, will finally be burned to ashes in the blazing fires of the people's wars it has provoked by its own actions...

CHAPTER 5

HISTORICAL SURVEY

"In the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops, the former may be likened to water and the latter to fish who inhabit it. If the temperature of the water is right, the fish will multiply and flourish."

Mao Tse-Tung
1930's

TAB
HERE

Section	
I	GUERRILLA WARFARE
II	WHAT IS PAST IS PROLOGUE - THE US ARMY AND GUERRILLA WARFARE

CHAPTER 5

HISTORICAL SURVEY

Section I

GUERRILLA WARFARE

Although the word "guerrilla" was first used in the Napoleonic wars, guerrilla warfare is as old as war itself. The first guerrilla war had been fought in China in 360 B.C., when the Emperor Huang, by employing guerrillas finally defeated his enemy Tsi Yao. British history records evidence of the guerrilla activities of the Britons led by Caractacus, who harassed the Roman legions from his mountain stronghold in South Wales. Later Hereward the Wake caused King William trouble with his raids and ambushes. Throughout the Middle Ages and up to the mid-18th Century the Scots engaged in a series of guerrilla actions against their stronger English opponents, and were not completely subdued until 1745.

Subsequently, partisans made an appearance during the American and French Revolutions, and history credits the Russian armed peasants with considerable success during the French Grand Army's retreat from Moscow. However, it was during the American Revolution that the form of guerrilla warfare took a new turn. Until this time what had been the affair of the state, now became a national matter because the private citizen became involved. Armies began to find themselves opposed not only by armies but by a hostile people as well. Eighty years later a man named Karl Marx put this hitherto revolutionary theory of warfare in a nutshell by stating:

"A nation fighting for its liberty ought not to adhere rigidly to the accepted rules of warfare. Mass uprisings, revolutionary methods, guerrilla bands everywhere; such are the only means by which a small nation can hope to maintain itself against an adversary superior in numbers and equipment. By their use a weaker force can overcome its stronger and better organized opponents."

Further examples of this form of warfare was evidenced by the actions of its Free Corps leaders in the American Civil War. Such men as Stuart, Mosby, Forrest and Ashby by their ceaseless raids on isolated outposts, destruction of communications and attacks on supply areas created destruction out of all proportion to their strength. The Franc-Tireurs in 1871 by their activities caused the Prussians to deploy an additional 150,000 troops to protect 250 miles of railway, their main supply line to their armies outside Paris.

Throughout the 19th Century the British Army was fighting actions all over the world, most of which could be described as guerrilla wars. Yet when its largest outbreak of all occurred in South Africa in 1899, they had learned none of the lessons.

Examples of guerrilla campaigns in the 20th Century are many and varied. Space alone on this paper would not permit of even a brief outline of them all. However, the attention of Great Britain was focused on this aspect of warfare as a result of her bitter experiences with the Boer Commandos in the South African War, and valuable lessons were learned. A flagging interest in this subject was revived during the First World War by the classic example of irregular or guerrilla warfare carried out by Colonel Lawrence and his Arab Forces in the Hejaz, Palestine, and Syria against the Turks.

Reprinted from the October 1956 issue of the Australian Army Journal, by Major C. H. A. East, Australian Army.

The Irish rebels in 1922 practiced this form of warfare, and in the late 1920's we see the communist guerrillas of the great guerrilla strategist Mao Tse-Tung waging war against the Japanese invaders. In the 1930's the Spanish Civil War produced an outbreak of guerrilla fighting, and a few years later the Abyssinians practiced the art with great effect on the Italian Army in Abyssinia.

The Second World War advanced this branch of warfare further. It was conducted on a gigantic scale against the invading German armies in the U.S.S.R. There were also Chinese, Yugoslav, Greek, Polish, French, Abyssinian, and Filipino guerrillas, not forgetting our own Chindits in Burma. During the war our troops did not meet guerrillas, as enemies, on a large scale. Japanese, Italian, and German guerrilla forces were virtually nonexistent.

Since 1945, guerrilla warfare has not ceased to be waged in some corner of the world. In Greece in 1947-49, communist guerrilla forces threatened the existence of the Central Government. In Indo-China in 1945, guerrilla forces began to threaten the state and French rule. The communist inspired Hukbalahaps retarded the post-war development of the Philippines and tied up large government forces. Communist Chinese guerrillas in Malaya have interfered with the economic rehabilitation of the country and forced Great Britain to use large military and police forces to maintain order. At the end of 1949 China, the most populous nation in the world, had been seized from within by overgrown guerrilla warfare. In Palestine the activities of the Jewish Stern Gang and Irgun Ivai Leumi rendered the task of the British forces in maintaining law and order a difficult one.

The above paragraphs do not pretend to mention all the guerrilla activities since the turn of the century. However, it is proposed to select some of the more important to us, and draw from them the pattern of conduct of guerrilla operations for our future use.

South Africa 1900-1902

After the heavy British defeats at Colenso, Stormberg, and Magersfontein the Government dispatched Britain's premier soldier, Lord Roberts, to South Africa. Following on the relief of Ladysmith and Kimberley, Roberts gained a decisive victory at Paardeburg with the capture of a Boer force of 4,000 men under Cronje. The way to Bloemfontein and Pretoria was then open, and any hope of a Boer victory was gone.

However, hopeless though the prospect was, the enemy fought on under the leadership of such men as Botha, de Wet and Smuts for another two years. Those two long years of guerrilla warfare against such a past-master in the art as the Boer, taught the British soldier valuable lessons in the years to come. The Boers were extremely mobile, all possessing horses, while every man was a sharpshooter and an expert at taking cover. They did not wear a regular uniform, which permitted them to double the part at a moment's notice, of a first-class fighting man with that of a peaceful civilian. The Boers favored ambushes and booby traps, and they were apt to be a little careless in their use of the white flag. They taught the British soldier that he must be prepared to fight his opponent with his own weapons. Under the British training system of the time, the accepted method of attack was by short rushes in open order, the men lying down and firing at the end of each rush. Bayonets were fixed and a charge made 350 yards from the enemy. Such methods directed against an invisible opponent merely provided him with the best target for his methods. British mobile columns, inexperienced and hampered by too much transport, tramped up and down the veldt in pursuit of a will o' the wisp opponent seemingly possessed of no encumbrances of any kind, capable of vanishing into thin air at one moment and reappearing unexpectedly at another to cut off a party of stragglers or catch a convoy crossing a river.

The British soldier learned the hard way. The Boer taught him the importance of mobility, intelligent scouting, and skillful use of ground and cover. From him, too, he learned that it is

not always desirable to attack in drill book formation, but that troops must learn to fight in small detached groups, where each man will have to think for himself. Eventually the pupil learned his lessons to the discomfiture of his teacher. In South Africa the British Army first developed the spirit of commando or guerrilla warfare, with its unconventional methods, which it was to display with advantage in Burma and Malaya some forty years later.

The Middle East 1915-1918

The operations of Colonel Lawrence in the Middle East are described as a classic example of the employment of irregular or guerrilla troops. Lawrence's value to us is that he helped to destroy the Turkish force in the Middle East, and gave us new concepts of guerrilla strategy.

While the Arabs were more mobile, but less able to bear casualties than outside armies, the Turks were almost uninterested in losses of men, though not in losses of material, of which they were very short. Superb at sitting tight in a trench or firing at a directly oncoming target, they could not adapt themselves to, nor endure, the strain of fluid operations. Lawrence seized on that weakness by destroying railroad equipment thus paralyzing Turkish movement.

To understand the working of Lawrence's plan it is necessary to understand the real weakness of the Turks in the Middle East. This weakness was based upon two factors - the restlessness of the subject people, especially the Arabs, and the brittle and tenuous line of communication by which the Turkish Empire was controlled.

Lawrence and his Arabs leapfrogged north to Wejh and thence to Akaba, cutting the rail communications, raiding and harassing the Turks and keeping them immobilized. Allenby then made ready to strike for Damascus while Lawrence pinned down the Turks in the Hejaz. He then made his supreme contribution - a paralyzing raid out of the desert on to the rail complex at Dera, cutting off the Turks in the Hejaz and Jordan from all aid. While Allenby pursued the main Turkish armies the Arabs turned on the Turkish VIII Corps fighting its way north along the Hejaz railway, and decimated it.

It is considered that a major achievement of Lawrence was his most successful selection of Feisal as the leader of the Northern Arab Army. Feisal was admired and trusted by the Arabs, and through him Lawrence was able to mature his plans. However, the supreme lesson of Lawrence's triumph was that granted mobility, outside assistance, time and an idea which gained the sympathy of the civil population, victory rested with the guerrillas.

China 1924-1949

History does not reveal very much of the struggle which went on inside China from the early 1920's until 1949. The struggle began when the Communist Party broke away from the Kuomintang of Chiang Kai-Shek, and retired to the interior to avoid persecution. Civil war broke out, and from 1927 the Chinese Red Army became Chiang Kai-Shek's formidable enemy within. The struggle became three-sided when Japan, with its well-trained and equipped forces struck at China in the years before the Second World War. A United Chinese Front was formed in 1937 by the Kuomintang and Chinese Communists which gave Chiang the assistance of the Red Eight Route Army, the best fighting formation in China. It owed its high reputation and success to the adoption of guerrilla warfare based on the teachings and experience of the leader of the Chinese Communists, Moscow-trained Mao Tse-Tung. The Chinese forces gave up the cities to the Japanese, but were never dispossessed of the provinces throughout the entire war. The Japanese armies were strung out along the main communications, the railroads, and in garrisons in the larger forms principally on the coast. The Chinese obtained arms and ammunition from the US and from their enemies the Japanese, harassed the enemy's lengthy lines of communication, cut off and destroyed small garrisons. They developed their own mobile guerrilla industries in the interior, and they had the backing and support of the people.

Mao Tse-Tung foresaw three stages in the war against Japan. The first stage would be Japan's advance and China's defensive retreat. In this retreat great reliance would be placed on guerrilla tactics. Once this maneuvering was completed the second stage was to be one of watchful spanning - guerrilla units would harass the enemy twenty-four hours a day until the Japanese were forced to maintain troops all along their lines of communication and bases. Then the third stage would begin, when the mobile counterattack would be launched after the enemy became over-extended and exhausted. Again guerrillas would come into play, continuing their harassing tactics, cutting off the enemy's retreat. All this came about as Mao forecast.

After the Japanese War the communist returned to the task of defeating Chiang Kai-Shek, using the same methods. One important factor in this final margin of victory was provided by a powerful outside supporting power. Our Soviet ally transferred to the Chinese Communists large quantities of Japanese arms surrendered in Manchuria. By 1949, the communists by a combination of its use of guerrilla and regular forces had taken control of China.

Russia 1941-1945

Stalin put the teaching of Mao Tse-Tung to excellent use against the Germans, and Soviet practice developed that plan of campaign formulated by the Chinese leader in 1937. The German armies in Russia suffered more damage from guerrillas than from all the modern paraphernalia of warfare. They could match each Soviet weapon with similar or superior weapons of their own, but they were almost powerless against guerrillas.

When the German armies invaded the U.S.S.R. in 1941, they did not anticipate large-scale guerrilla activity and at first they did not in fact encounter it. However, soon the Germans found themselves fighting on two fronts - against the Soviet armies in the forward areas and against Soviet guerrillas deep behind their lines.

The Soviet guerrillas waged the most extensive and effective irregular campaign in history. In two years of this warfare in the rear of the invaders, the guerrillas killed more than 300,000 Germans. During this period 3,000 trains were derailed, thousands of road bridges were destroyed, while the number of tanks, armored cars, guns, airplanes, lorries, and camps which were destroyed by the guerrillas ran into many thousands. In the summer of 1942 it was established that 144 S.S. battalions and 14 field divisions were operating solely against the guerrillas. In the spring of 1943, the Germans launched large-scale attacks against the guerrillas in the Bialystok and Minsk regions, in which 70,000 troops were employed. Guerrilla attacks on enemy communications were an outstanding factor in the Russian success. The guerrilla link with the civil population provided them with a splendid source of information on German dispositions and troop movements. Their mobility, knowledge of the locality, use of surprise attack, the separate withdrawals of individual units from battle, were all factors in confusing and harassing the enemy.

This is the major lesson of the German-Russian campaign. Guerrilla warfare has come to stay. It has revolutionized the conception of war. A regular army with guerrillas as its auxiliaries not only has a hard-hitting fighting force, but also an outstanding intelligence service, which makes it practical for the opponent to conceal his troop movements and intentions. In the post-war years all Soviet satellite states without exception have formed their own guerrilla brigades.

Indo-China 1945-1954

In March 1945 the Japanese decided to eliminate the French forces in Indo-China, and set up a national Government of their own choice. When this took place, various Nationalist and Communist groups organized themselves and took over large parts of Annam and Tonkin. The Allies parachuted weapons, radios, and instructors into the guerrilla units, which soon gained

a degree of combat strength and efficiency. The Communist groups under their Moscow-trained leader Ho Chi-Minh not only had the strength but the leadership to exploit the situation. After the fall of the first atomic bomb on Japan, Ho Chi-Minh's guerrillas became the Vietnam Liberation Army, and the new Government installed by the Japanese was overthrown by an organized Communist onslaught.

Speedy action by the French in reoccupying Indo-China at the termination of hostilities forced the Vietminh to dissolve its divisions and regiments in the South and return to guerrilla warfare. In December 1946 the Vietminh attacked French installations throughout Indo-China, and the war between France and the Vietminh had begun.

Although the French initially had great difficulty in supplying isolated bases, General Leclerc with a judicious use of armor, parachutists, and air transport relieved the pressure. However, the French forces were too weak to follow the guerrillas and defeat them in the mountains.

This proved a welcome respite to the Vietminh. The guerrillas were reorganized on a battalion basis, officer training schools were established, and the eventual victory of Mao Tse-Tung over Chiang Kai-Shek brought about a welcome flow of ammunition, equipment and instructors. Soon the French were faced with 30 regular Vietminh battalions under General Giap in the north, while in the south guerrilla units cut off Saigon from the hinterland and occupied Indo-China's rice bowl.

The Vietminh then overreached themselves, Giap attacked with initial successes against the smaller French forts, but American aid, French reinforcements and the French command being assumed by General de Lattre de Tassigny, resulted in eventual defeat for the Vietminh forces. The reason for the Vietminh failure appeared to have been caused by an error in appreciating the stages of the three basic principles for Communist warfare in Asia, laid down by Mao Tse-Tung, which Giap was following. They were:

- a. Yield any town or terrain you cannot hold safely.
- b. Limit yourself to guerrilla warfare as long as the enemy has numerical superiority and better weapons.
- c. Organize regular units and pass over to the general counteroffensive only when you are sure of the final victory.

The Vietminh high command had mistakenly underestimated French capabilities and passed prematurely from Step 2 to Step 3 with disastrous results. This mistake was not repeated, and guerrilla warfare was continued until the end of 1953 before the guerrilla forces were ready to be converted to regular forces and launch the counteroffensive, with the results that are now history.

This campaign demonstrates the importance of getting outside assistance to guerrillas. Again, the people of Indo-China, although not all Communist, were not favorably inclined to the continuance of French rule, and desired their independence. These people, instead of aiding the French, remained neutral and aloof. Finally, the French military rigidity - the pill-box technique - in dealing with the Vietminh was inadequate. No war, and particularly no guerrilla war, can be won by remaining on the defensive. The French would have been better advised to adopt Mao Tse-Tung's advice and fight the enemy with his own weapons, i.e., the employment of antiguerrilla or Special Forces.

Malaya 1948-1955

*The Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) began as a British-trained guerrilla force just prior to the fall of Singapore. It was then known as the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) until it changed its name in 1948. After the surrender of Japan the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) disbanded the guerrilla army, then numbering 8,000 men, but retained the nucleus of the military organization and possession of dumps of weapons and ammunition concealed in the jungle. In June 1948 the MCP had provoked terrorism and murder through propaganda and industrial strife, and the Emergency was declared.

Malaya had a narrow escape. The country was unprepared for war. Its police force was untrained and ill-equipped to combat large-scale internal hostilities. The MRLA possessed every initial advantage an army could desire. Its total strength was unknown. It could launch attacks on any rubber estate, tin mine, police station, village, or town at any time with complete success. Unlike the defenders, it had plenty of arms and ammunition. Its leaders were experienced guerrillas, particularly Chen Ping, the Secretary-General of the MCP, who had a genius for Communist organization.

General Briggs and General Templar struck a crippling blow at the guerrilla's supply organization - The Min Yuen or Peoples' Movement. This was composed of civilian supporters of the MRLA, who provided food, money, and information and were living in "squatters" areas at the edge of the jungle. The administration had them moved and resettled in completely new villages, which were wired and the outskirts cleared. These villages were guarded by police or army units. The guerrillas were thus cut off from their regular sources of supply.

Recruiting of special police intelligence personnel, joint police/army operational control at all levels, and building up of the armed forces also provided emphasis in the defeat of the MRLA.

The granting of independence to Malaya on 31 August 1957 removed a further plank from the MRLA policy and deprived them of what little remaining support they had from the civilian population.

When the emergency ended most of its remaining MRLA's had been driven deep into the jungle or into the area of the Thai-Malayan border and under pressure from the Security Forces gradually shifted over the border into Thailand where they are now reduced to a total strength of 500 and are living in small groups in Southern Thailand.

The guerrilla activities of the MRLA failed. They failed because their forces lacked the equipment for special, modern guerrilla warfare, such as radio communications and transport. Then terrorism and murder alienated the people whose support would have won greater victories for the Communist.

*Reprinted from Special Warfare, US Army - An Army Speciality, Office, Chief of Information, Department of the Army by Lt Col Hugh H. Gardner.

Section II

WHAT IS PAST IS PROLOGUE - THE U.S. ARMY AND GUERRILLA WARFARE

Over the past year, as a result of increasing interest on the part of top levels of government, the subject of Special Warfare and its various applications has been much in the news. Frequently heard and read have been such terms as resistance movements, special forces, counterinsurgency, and guerrillas. Of these topics guerrillas and guerrilla warfare seem to have excited the greatest interest and inspired the largest amount of writing.

Unfortunately, not all the writing has been crystal clear and many people have got the impression that these aspects of Special Warfare are new ideas - that they are concepts invented and developed by the Soviet Union, and that the U.S. Army is blindly groping in a field in which it has no experience and little knowledge. Actually nothing could be further from the truth.

Although the Communists have developed some new wrinkles, the insurgent or guerrilla wars in Viet Nam, Laos, and Cuba have illustrated nothing that is basically new. Guerrilla warfare is as old as warfare itself, and the U.S. Army is intimately familiar with its conduct as well as with the antidote - counter guerrilla warfare.

The militia of the thirteen original colonies were frequently assembled - as counter guerrilla forces - to defend their lands and conduct punitive operations. In 1755, during the French and Indian War, General Braddock suffered a humiliating defeat when he attempted to employ the conventional tactics of the European battlefields against the guerrilla tactics of the French and Indian forest fighters. To combat the Indian guerrilla forces, the British formed ranger units capable of employing the same battle tactics as the Indians.



BRADDOCK'S DEFEAT, JULY 9, 1775

ROGERS' RANGERS

From this war, probably the most colorful character to emerge as a guerrilla and counter guerrilla leader was Robert Rogers, leader of the famed Rogers' Rangers. After service with the New Hampshire militia at Crown Point, Rogers was given command of nine similar units. The British Army's faith in the ranger companies was well founded as they proved extremely valuable in the performance of special Indian fighting missions and in protecting the flanks and encampments of the British troops. They probably would have been more useful had it not been for their almost complete independence of spirit.

Rogers' principal, perhaps only, talent appears to have been that of inspiring men to follow him - either as recruits to join his ranger companies or in battle. He lacked administrative ability and was no more amenable to discipline than were his men. However his dashing raids and successful, though often foolhardy, exploits made him famous in both England and America; and his shortcomings were generally overlooked. At the conclusion of the French and Indian War, Rogers and a picked group of rangers were sent west to receive the surrender of the French outposts in the Detroit region.

GUERRILLAS IN THE REVOLUTION

During the Revolutionary War, Rogers offered his services to both the British and the rebelling colonists. Washington distrusted him and had him imprisoned as a spy. Escaping from his guards, Rogers went back to the British and formed a ranger force to fight against the colonists. He was soundly defeated in one of his first engagements, and thereafter his only contribution to the British cause was in the field of recruiting. He died in near poverty in England.

Although the Minute Men of 1775 were not considered to be guerrillas, they were insurgents; and their methods of operation were definitely of a guerrilla type. Gathering for a swiftly executed attack, the Minute Men would disperse as soon as their objective had been gained or when confronted by superior British forces. Actually much of the colonists' war was fought by unconventional standards.

True guerrilla operations played a large part in the campaigns of the South. Generals Thomas Sumter and Andrew Pickens together with Lieutenant Colonel Francis Marion continually harassed British supply lines, disrupted communications, and prevented the strong loyalist elements in the area from organizing.

Francis Marion - nicknamed "The Swamp Fox" - became the best known of the southern guerrilla leaders. The South Carolina militia under his command varied greatly in strength. Comprising several hundred men at most, his force might melt away to a mere handful within a few weeks. Using patience, tact, and rare military skill he effectively employed his variable force in typical guerrilla fashion. If the odds were in his favor he fought valiantly; if the British held the advantage he withdrew rapidly and the British found themselves pursuing a will o' the wisp. Using the swamps as hideouts, he consistently outwitted General Tarleton, the British cavalry leader.

During the campaign against Cornwallis in 1780-81, General Green used guerrilla forces to good advantage, luring Cornwallis in pursuit of his withdrawing main force while his guerrilla units played havoc with the British flanks and rear. To a great extent, the operations of Sumter, Pickens, and Marion were responsible for turning the tide of the war in the South.

Following the achieving of independence, the small American army was almost continuously engaged in counter guerrilla warfare as it sought to protect the western borders from Indian depredations. The small forces stationed along the border areas were not always successful and suffered a number of serious defeats at the hands of Indian tribes which were aided and supplied by the British Indian Department in Canada. The Army, however, learned from bitter experience, and in August of 1794 General Anthony Wayne inflicted a crushing defeat on the Wabash and Maumee River tribes at the Battle of Fallen Timbers.

Ranger units composed of trained woodsmen were also used to good advantage in countering Indian attacks during the War of 1812 and in the intermittent warfare with the Seminole Indians of Florida between 1816 and 1842.

In 1848 U.S. Army forces under General Winfield Scott were involved in counter guerrilla operations in Mexico after the defeat of the Mexican Army and the occupation of Mexico City.

In combating the Mexican guerrillas, the Army took drastic action which proved most effective. As students of guerrilla warfare know, guerrilla bands cannot exist without the support of the local civilian population. General Scott moved to remove this support from the guerrillas by denying them civilian intelligence sources and supplies. The inhabitants of the towns and villages were held accountable for the depredations of the guerrillas. When robberies occurred, the Army insisted that the alcalde, or mayor, of the nearest community make good the loss and even establish set fees for deaths or injuries. There were few reprisals in kind for killings, although the counterguerrilla forces burned a number of towns and villages which habitually harbored guerrillas.

Employing counterguerrilla forces composed of Texas Rangers and other units familiar with the type of terrain in which the guerrillas operated, the Army pursued the bands relentlessly. The guerrillas were given no rest and were driven into the hills, dispersed, and prevented from reuniting. Hounded night and day, the guerrilla bands were no longer able to exist by preying on U.S. Army units and turned to robbing and requisitioning supplies from the Mexican civilians. Such actions, combined with the firm but just attitude of the Army toward the civilian communities, cost the guerrillas the moral and physical support of the populace. The guerrilla movement was soon broken up.

General Scott also utilized the services of a Mexican Spy Company, a group of disaffected Mexicans. The company, with a strength of about 100, assisted the Army during the war and was later to furnish guides and reconnaissance patrols for counterguerrilla expeditions.

MOSBY'S RANGERS



COLONEL JOHN SINGLETON MOSBY

The Civil War saw the development of a number of guerrilla organizations - although many of them were little more than groups of bandits who avoided military engagements and preyed on the civilians of both sides. Probably the best known of the guerrilla leaders whose operations were primarily military was John Singleton Mosby of the Confederate Army. In January 1863, after serving for over a year with J. E. B. Stuart's cavalry, Mosby commenced independ-

ent operations with a band of nine mounted men. His band never established permanent camps but kept on the move and occupied the most convenient quarters available whenever they needed food and rest. After each engagement, Mosby's Rangers scattered to meet at a prearranged rendezvous.

One of Mosby's earliest and most publicized exploits was his capture of General Stoughton and about 100 others at Fairfax Courthouse in northern Virginia. According to rumor, the Union general was routed out of bed in his nightshirt to receive a whack across his bare posterior with the flat of Mosby's sword when he refused to move with the speed the guerrilla leader felt necessary. After other successful raids, Mosby's force was officially recognized by the Confederacy and designated as Company A, 43rd Partisan Rangers. Subsequently Mosby raised and led other companies of rangers.

Mosby was relentlessly hunted by the Federal forces but his dispersal tactics generally enabled him and his men to avoid capture. As is customary in counter guerrilla campaigns, the Union promptly branded Mosby and his men as bandits and announced that, if captured, they would be hanged rather than treated as prisoners of war. Although Mosby's operations methods were most unconventional, he was not a bandit and did abide by the conventions of war - within reason. At one time he hanged seven prisoners - chosen by lot - in reprisal for the hanging of seven of his men by the Union forces. He advised General Sheridan of his action and expressed the hope that he would never again have to hang Union prisoners. That was the last time any of Mosby's men were hanged by the Union troops.

During the last year of the war, Mosby's command, which had grown to eight well-equipped companies, was the only Confederate military force in northern Virginia. Operating behind the Union lines as well as between the opposing armies, Mosby's Rangers were a continual thorn in the side of the Union; and a price was put on his head. After Lee's surrender in April 1865, Colonel Mosby held a last review of his eight companies and disbanded his force at Salem, Virginia. In June, having been assured amnesty for himself, he surrendered. Later, after turning Republican and serving in President Grant's administration, Mosby lost much of his popularity in the South.


THE ARMY AND THE INDIANS

After the Civil War the interests of America once more turned westward and a tremendous migration began. The Indians, many of whom had already been pushed from their eastern hunting grounds, bitterly resented and resisted this new encroachment. For the next twenty years there was almost continuous warfare between the Indians and the U.S. Cavalry.


Although the Indian was often described by maudlin sympathizers as "the simple, child-like red man," many tribal chieftans showed evidence of having a considerable grasp of international politics. Secure in the knowledge that the U.S. Army would not be able to pursue them into the lands of a friendly power, several Kickapoo, Lipan and Apache tribes dwelt quietly in Mexico - only going on the warpath after crossing the Rio Grande in Texas.

Exasperated by the Army's inability to retaliate for the periodic attacks across the border, Colonel Ronald MacKenzie, commander of the 4th Cavalry Regiment, sought permission to pursue the Indian raiders into Mexico. Although he well knew that his act might result in a court-martial, MacKenzie led his regiment on a punitive expedition against the hostile Indians south of the border. The 4th's first objective was a Kickapoo village which was taken by surprise. Lacking time to prepare a defense, all the warriors were killed or dispersed and a number of women and children were taken captive. Riding on, MacKenzie's forces burned several other Lipan and Kickapoo villages and returned to Texas after covering over 150 miles in about 32 hours. Diplomats eventually soothed the Mexican Government's outraged feelings, while Texans praised MacKenzie's action in putting an end to Indian raids from across the Rio Grande.

Chiefly responsible for eliminating the Indian menace in the West was General George Crook. As a lieutenant fresh from West Point he had served in the Northwest, assisting in the conduct of explorations and protecting settlers from periodic Indian raids. At the outbreak of



PERHAPS THE WORLDS GREATEST EXPONENT OF GUERRILLA WARFARE.



the Civil War he was ordered east where his distinguished and brilliant service brought him rapid promotion to the rank of Major General of volunteers. When hostilities between the North and South were concluded he returned to the west with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the regular army. His success in bringing an end to the Indian wars of southern Oregon, Idaho, and northern California won him an unusual jump in promotion to Brigadier General.

Subsequently he was sent to Arizona to pacify the Apaches - a mission he performed with outstanding success. Placed in command of the Department of the Platte, he took a prominent part in the Sioux War of 1878. In 1882, he was sent back to Arizona where Apache trouble had once again developed. His chief opponent in that campaign was the cruel and fearless Geronimo whose fanatical followers inflicted heavy losses on settlers and Army units before they were finally rounded up.

A number of factors were responsible for Crook's success as an Indian fighter. He was personally fearless, a trait which the Indians admired, and he was scrupulously honest in his dealings with the red men. He understood the Indians and sympathized with their problems - in this he was far ahead of his times. Crook advocated fair treatment and equal rights as well as citizenship for the original Americans.

ADOPT NEW TECHNIQUES

Completely familiar with the unconventional fighting methods of the Indians, General Crook never hesitated to employ innovations in his own tactics and operations. In the early days of Army operations against the Indians, one of the main difficulties experienced by the Army was the fact that military movements were extremely slow compared with the highly mobile Indians. Encumbered by wagons and other impedimenta, punitive expeditions were seldom able to overtake what have been described as "the finest horse soldiers the world has ever known."

Crook discarded the slow-moving wagon trains and utilized mules for carrying supplies and equipment. To fill his requisitions for mobile transport, large numbers of untrained and often unbroken mules were imported from Missouri. To distinguish the new and less reliable beasts from the old, well-trained Army mules, the tails and manes of the Missouri mules were closely clipped. The custom was probably responsible for the inclusion of the word "shavetail" in the Army vocabulary.



GENERAL GEORGE CROOK WITH HIS FAVORITE MULE "APACHE" AND TWO NATIVE SCOUTS DURING HIS CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE APACHES

Mindful of the old precept, "Set a thief to catch a thief," Crook employed large numbers of Indian scouts recruited from tribes which were friendly to the United States. These Indian scouts proved invaluable in gathering intelligence, performing reconnaissance missions, and in tracking down hostile bands.

Possibly Crook's most effective innovation was the inauguration of the winter campaign. Instead of following the time-honored custom of retiring into forts to spend the coldest months in virtual idleness, his troops were required to campaign in the bitter cold of the Western winters. Winter campaigns were successful in catching many Indian tribes immobilized by the deep snows and unprepared to fight.

Although the United States had been officially at peace since the conclusion of the Civil War, the soldiers of the West who had been fighting in the Indian Wars had little time for rest before they engaged in the Spanish-American War. As wars go, the dispute with Spain was not a particularly large or bloody conflict - more American casualties resulted from disease than from Spanish gunfire. However, peace with Spain did not end the fighting and much of the hardest combat came in the Philippines after the Spanish-American War had ended.

In 1898 the Filipinos declared their independence from Spain and established a provisional government with Emilio Aguinaldo as president. Although U.S. forces were first welcomed as deliverers, when the Filipinos found they were not to have immediate independence, they again rebelled. In February 1899 Aguinaldo declared war against the United States, and his forces attacked American troops in the Manila area. The Filipinos were completely defeated in this first battle and Aguinaldo and his government fled to northern Luzon. In November, he reorganized his forces and began guerrilla operations against the U.S. Army.

FIGHTING AGUINALDO



AGUINALDO

Although the large island of Luzon was the scene of most of the operations of Aguinaldo's insurrection, considerable guerrilla activity took place on other islands of the Philippine Archipelago. Between May 1900 and the end of June 1901, the U.S. Army fought over 1,000 counter guerrilla engagements - killing nearly 4,000, wounding some 1,200, and capturing over 6,000 Philippine guerrillas. American casualties totaled 245 killed, 490 wounded, 118 captured, and 20 missing.

One of the most resourceful counter guerrilla leaders to develop during the Philippine Insurrection was General Frederick Funston. As a soldier of fortune, Funston had early joined the Cuban rebels in fighting the Spaniards. Just prior to the outbreak of the Spanish-American War he returned to the United States bearing the rank of Lieutenant Colonel of the Cuban insurgent army. Because of his Cuban experience, Funston was given the same rank in the U.S. volunteer army and took command of the 20th Kansas Regiment. He and his Kansas troops arrived in the Philippines too late to see action against the Spanish but in time to become active in combatting Aguinaldo's guerrilla forces.

By the end of 1900, having distinguished himself in a number of engagements, Funston was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General of volunteers. In early 1901 he was denied a Regular Army commission and ordered home to be mustered out along with his regiment of volunteers.

A short time before his scheduled departure, Funston learned the location of Aguinaldo's headquarters and in typical headstrong fashion evolved a risky plan to effect the capture of the Philippine leader.

With six other Americans and a few Makabebe tribesmen who were loyal to the U.S. he infiltrated Aguinaldo's hidden camp and kidnapped the Filipino leader from the heart of his guerrilla stronghold in Central Luzon. Although some guerrilla forces continued to hold out for several months, the capture of Aguinaldo broke the back of the insurrection. Aguinaldo's action in taking an oath of allegiance to the United States and in urging others to terminate hostilities was responsible for effecting the surrender of some 23,000 guerrillas with over 15,000 rifles and 300,000 rounds of ammunition.



MAKABEBE TRIBESMEN, led by General Funston, infiltrated Aguinaldo's camp and kidnapped the Filipino leader, "breaking the back" of the insurrection.

Because of his successful feat, Frederick Funston was transferred to the Regular Army and permitted to retain his volunteer rank of Brigadier General. He later distinguished himself in maintaining law and order in San Francisco after the disastrous earthquake and fire of 1906.

CHASING PANTHO VILLA

The U.S. Army added to its store of counter guerrilla experience in the fighting along the Mexican border just prior to World War I. The recognized Mexican government was unable to control the insurgent forces of Pancho Villa who continually raided across the Rio Grande. To discourage Villa and his raiders, General John "Black Jack" Pershing led a counter guerrilla force some 400 miles into the interior of Mexico. This punitive expedition was successful in so dispersing and breaking up Villa's forces that the Mexican Government was able to cope with the remnants.



GENERAL JOHN J. PERSHING leading a counter-guerrilla force into the interior of Mexico.

Although T. E. Lawrence and his operations in Arabia constitute a classic of guerrilla warfare lore, his feat was unique in World War I, for the static trench warfare of France and Belgium was not conducive to the development of mobile tactics. As a consequence, Pershing's AEF was not involved in either guerrilla or counter guerrilla operations during that war. World War II, however, saw the employment of many phases of Special Warfare and the rise of guerrilla movements in many phases of Special Warfare and the rise of guerrilla movements in many areas of Europe and Asia. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), commanded by General William Donovan, was responsible for infiltrating U.S. agents and liaison personnel to work with the underground and guerrilla movements in Greece, Italy, France, and Burma.

GUERRILLAS IN THE PHILIPPINES

In the Philippines, an area in which the United States was vitally concerned, numerous guerrilla bands sprang into existence. Many of these were well-organized, well-disciplined military organizations composed of former Philippine Army men, mostly led by American officers and non-coms. Although widespread, the Philippines' guerrilla movement was not exploited to its fullest capacity - possibly because General MacArthur's headquarters feared to expose the Filipino people to cruel reprisals by the Japanese. Throughout the occupation of the Philippines, by MacArthur's direction the guerrillas did little more than organize and exist for the purpose of passing on intelligence to the U.S. forces. Even in the period just before the U.S. invasion, no widespread campaign of sabotage or harassment of the Japanese rear area was directed. In carrying out the intelligence mission, the guerrillas of the Philippines were eminently successful and for the planning of the U.S. invasion MacArthur had the advantage of a full knowledge of enemy dispositions, strengths, and capabilities.

At the inception of the fighting in the Philippines, the guerrilla forces were used primarily as scouts, guides, and in reconnaissance missions. Later however, in the face of stiff Japanese resistance and inadequate U.S. troop replacements, guerrilla units which distinguished themselves in combat operations on Luzon were: Volckmann's division strength USAFIP (Northern Luzon), Anderson's Battalion, Marking's Regiment, the Buena Vista Regiment of East

Central Luzon, and the Magsaysay Battalion. The Peralta force on Panay, Kangleon's Regiment on Leyte, Cushing's Regiment from Cebu, the Abcede Regiment of Negroes, and Colonel Wendell Fertig's forces on Mindanao fought side by side with the troops of MacArthur's Sixth and Eighth Armies.

A number of Ranger forces were developed for special missions during World War II. Although not actually guerrillas, most of the Ranger units were trained in guerrilla tactics and were prepared to operate behind enemy lines.

The First Special Service Force, jointly manned by 1,700 U.S. and Canadian Army volunteers, was given intensive training in skiing, mountain climbing, demolitions, and hand-to-hand combat in preparation for sabotage missions in Norway. Although the Norwegian operation was cancelled, the force did lead the assault on Kiska in August 1943, and was later, at General Eisenhower's specific request, transferred to the Mediterranean Theatre where the unit distinguished itself in Italy and southern France.

MERRILL'S MARAUDERS

The 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), a force of 3,000 under the command of Brigadier General Frank Merrill - and better known as Merrill's Marauders - was recruited to make a long-range penetration into Burma. Entering northern Burma from India, Merrill's force bypassed enemy lines and swung in on the flank and rear of the Japanese 18th Division. The Marauders engaged in five major and thirty minor combat operations and, in conjunction with the American trained Chinese 22d and 38th Divisions, cleared the Ledo Road and captured the airfield at Myitkyina.

Operating in the same general area as Merrill's Marauders, Detachment 101 conducted true guerrilla operations. Officers and non-coms trained by OSS, organized the native Kachin tribesman and directed them in operations against the Japanese. In addition to sabotaging enemy rear area installations, the Kachin Rangers were an invaluable source of intelligence information. During the drive to clear the Ledo Road they performed scouting and reconnaissance missions for General "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell's forces. They also spotted and pinpointed targets for the Eastern Air Command.

The Alamo Scouts, organized in ten teams of thirty men each, operated with General Walter Krueger's Sixth Army in the Southwest Pacific. The mission of the Alamo Scouts was the gathering of intelligence information and the conduct of reconnaissance rather than sabotage or combat. Infiltrated ahead of U.S. invasion forces, the Scouts were successful in reconnoitering New Britain, Noemfoor, and Sansapor, and the Philippines for information vital to the planning and execution of the invasions of those areas.

Soon after America's entry into World War II, a number of Ranger battalions were organized and trained to serve as commandos in the conduct of hit-and-run raids or long range penetrations behind enemy lines. The 1st Ranger Battalion led the assault landing at Arzew, Algeria, on 8 November 1942. Thereafter, two additional battalions were formed, bringing the total strength of the Ranger organization up to 2,000. The three Ranger battalions spearheaded the Sicily landings, and later at Anzio two of the three were lost in the initial assault. Two Ranger battalions, reconstituted, were in the forefront of the D-Day landings at Pointe du Hoc, France. In the invasion of the Philippines, the 6th Ranger Battalion cleared islands in Leyte Gulf and conducted advance operations ashore.

COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS

In 1947, the U.S. Army became involved in a somewhat different type of counter guerrilla operation - a type in which it is undoubtedly destined to participate many times in the future - aiding and advising a friendly or allied nation in combatting guerrilla or insurgent forces.

An appeal from the Greek Government resulted in a military mission being sent to coordinate distribution of supplies, train Greek Army units and advise troop commanders. Originally under the leadership of Major General William J. Livesay and later led by the dynamic Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet, the U.S. military mission successfully reequipped the Greek Army and assisted in a reorganization that enabled it to combat the Communist guerrillas effectively.

Teams of officers and non-coms worked with each Greek Army corps and division, training men in the use and maintenance of U.S. weapons and equipment. Signal personnel established communications schools and developed improved communications between Army units and also made them more responsive to headquarters direction.

In addition to strengthening the Greek regular army, the U.S. mission aided in the buildup of a constabulary known as the National Defense Corps which was used to maintain order and prevent the reentry of guerrilla forces into areas which the army had cleared.

After a year of reorganization and resupply activities, aggressive counter guerrilla campaigns were undertaken in which the Greek Army effected the almost complete disintegration of the rebel movement by the end of 1949.

THE KOREAN WAR

A well-organized Communist guerrilla movement had been in being in Korea since mid-1948, and in the six-month period from July to December 1949, Republic of Korea (ROK) Army units fought 542 separate guerrilla actions. When war broke out in June 1950, guerrilla forces accompanied the invading North Korean troops. After the U.N.'s Inchon landing, remnants of six North Korean divisions hid in the mountains of South Korea to fight as guerrillas, posing a large enough threat for Lieutenant General Walton A. Walker to commit his U.S. IX Corps against them.



...North Korean divisions hid in the mountains of South Korea to fight as guerrillas.

By the summer of 1951, U.N. Headquarters estimated that there were over 8,000 guerrillas operating in South Korea with the heaviest concentrations being in the Chiri-san mountains. In December 1951 two ROK divisions detached from the U.S. Eighth Army converged on the Chiri-san region as National Police, Youth Regiments and internal security forces assumed blocking positions. As these forces drew the net tight around the guerrilla bastion, they flushed groups of ten to five hundred guerrillas and killed or captured over 3,400 in a twelve-day operation. Similar tactics were used in follow-up operations during the winter of 1951-52, as the two ROK divisions and auxiliary units reported a total of over 9,000 guerrillas killed and an equal number captured. Despite heavy losses, small groups of guerrillas remained a thorn in the side of the U.N. Command and the ROK Government until the end of the war.

The U.N. Command also supported the formation of anti-Communist guerrilla bands behind the lines of the North Korean and Chinese "Volunteer" Forces. In addition, the islands off the shores of North Korea were occupied by U.N. supported guerrillas. Protected and supplied by U.S. naval vessels, the guerrillas of the island launched many profitable raids on the mainland.

Liaison groups, chiefly U.S. Army personnel, landed on the islands and the shores of North Korea, brought supplies, and advised the bands of U.N. requirements. In addition to arms and ammunition, the liaison officers usually provided large supplies of rice for distribution to those civilians who assisted and supported the guerrilla bands.

Many North Korean and Chinese units were kept from a place in the main battle line by the necessity of conducting counter guerrilla operations. The U.N. guerrillas were also of inestimable aid in rescuing downed flyers and escaped prisoners.

Although the operations in Korea were of a joint nature, with many nations participating, the principal strength and leadership came from the U.S. Eighth Army. In the support of the anti-Communist guerrillas and in operations against North Korean guerrillas, U.S. Army personnel played an important part.

NOTHING NEW

No, guerrilla warfare is not new to the U.S. or the American people. Throughout much of our history we have been fighting wars that were unconventional in nature, if not actually guerrilla conflicts.

The earliest colonists were forced to resort to counter guerrilla operations to gain a foothold and expand westward on the American continent. Always violently opposed by the Indians, the settler tilled his land with one eye to the furrow and the other fixed on the surrounding forests - on the alert for an attack by the guerrillas of that day.

We have fought guerrillas in our own country, Mexico, the Philippines, Burma, Greece, and Korea - always emerging victorious. Since the first settler in the New World dodged the first Indian arrow, we Americans have adopted and used guerrilla tactics to seek out, defeat, and destroy our enemies.

A long record of victory in guerrilla and counter guerrilla warfare is a bright part of the heritage of today's modern Army.

CHAPTER 6
CONSIDERATIONS

"Here is the thesis: Guerrilla war must have an unassailable base, something guarded not merely from attack, but from fear of it: such a base as the Arab revolt had in the desert... It must have a friendly population... sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy, and independence of arteries of supply. These factors are in the end decisive."

T. E. Lawrence

Section	
I	TO BEAT THE GUERRILLA AT HIS OWN GAME
II	BOTH SIDES OF THE GUERRILLA HILL

TAB HERE

CHAPTER 6

CONSIDERATIONS

Section I

TO BEAT THE GUERRILLA AT HIS OWN GAME.

Traditional military tactics employing conventional weapons and large numbers of men who spend most of their time in fixed positions is unsuited for counter guerrilla operations in a South Vietnam-type environment. An analysis of the results of nearly nine years of French fighting in Indochina, from 1945 to 1954, and of the operations of United States forces in South Vietnam during the past few years clearly points in this direction. Both from the military and the psychological viewpoint, small unit operations using tactics developed specifically for this type of warfare -- which includes the political and economic portions of the spectrum, as well as the military -- are imperative.

It is both frustrating and embarrassing when a government force of, perhaps, regimental size engages a much smaller Viet Cong unit and finds, when the smoke of battle has cleared, that fewer than a dozen of the enemy have been killed or captured. This is somewhat like using a cannon to shoot a mouse, and then missing. And the Viet Cong gains much in prestige as small groups of its men seemingly thwart the efforts of larger government forces.

Equally detrimental is the heavy destruction of civilian property -- often resulting from employment of large units -- causing resentment or even hatred of the government by the people.

I do not discount the legitimate need for conventional weapons, defensive positions, frontal tactics, and mass operations. I strongly contend, however, that the emphasis for operations within a South Vietnam-type environment ought to be on small mobile, semi-independent units which can seek out and destroy the enemy wherever he is operating. In other words, operations in this environment ought to be based on small units; conventional tactics should be used primarily in support.



... emphasis ... ought to be on small mobile, semi-independent units which can seek out and destroy the enemy wherever he is operating.

SHORTCOMINGS

Militarily, the basic reason for the failure of conventional military doctrine in South Vietnam is that it requires an enemy that can be seen and engaged within a reasonably limited and well-defined geographical area, using tactics which are governed somewhat by the rules of war and confined essentially to military action. These conditions do not prevail in this area. The enemy is clearly evident, yet he is almost invisible; he is everywhere yet nowhere. With rare exceptions, he can be contacted only at the time and place of his choosing.

The enemy's doctrine maintains that the area of combat is everywhere with no stationary front or rear areas. He teaches that the enemy's rear is his front. He advocates virtually unlimited retreat unless conditions for combat are overwhelmingly in his favor. He is a master at trading space for time.


Mao Tse-tung emphasized this in his doctrine of protracted conflict; the Vietminh used it during their struggle against the French.

The guerrilla's tactics are unconventional and defy any rules or regulations. His conflict is total.

MILITARY ADVANTAGES

More than a decade of fighting in Vietnam has demonstrated that small units employing unconventional tactics can operate effectively within an area that is occupied by large numbers of

enemy troops — if the enemy uses conventional tactics. It is probable, though, that the success of the guerrilla forces would drop off sharply if the occupation troops adopted predominately small unit and unconventional tactics themselves. And it would appear to be worthwhile to test the validity of the axiom, "it takes a thief to catch a thief," and substitute guerrilla for thief.



... friendly small units ought to expand into the enemy zone of strength.

Friendly small unit operations should not, of course, be confined to the area that is essentially under friendly control. They ought to expand vigorously into the enemy zone of strength. A unit of 50 men — properly motivated, trained, and led — operating clandestinely over an extended period of time inside an enemy area of strength, could possibly be more effective than several raids by airborne units of regimental size, particularly if the airborne soldiers returned to their barracks immediately after the raid.

The friendly force must be capable of living indefinitely away from its home base. It must be a hunter-killer outfit capable of beating the guerrillas at their own game.

Enough of these friendly units should be roaming the countryside so that the enemy will lose his mobility and his capability of assembling into company, battalion, or regimental strength without being detected.

SUBSIDIARY MISSION

These units must avoid locations, practices, and patterns that would compromise them, leaving roads and well-traveled paths in favor of the jungle, swamps, and rice paddies. Although the hunter-killers would fight the enemy whenever warranted, they would have as a subsidiary mission the requirement to furnish information about their area of operations on a daily basis. Only this kind of group can find, fight, and destroy the guerrilla enemy.

In addition, small units should be stationed permanently in villages in the areas of enemy strength. These village-based units should have patrols out around the clock, operating in a random manner.

The objective for both type units is to make the area unsafe for enemy guerrillas. If this could be achieved, it would seriously damage the enemy's confidence and morale, and, perhaps, of even greater importance, it would substantially improve the morale and confidence of the friendly forces and the civilians who do not sympathize with the enemy. This program would also destroy the contact between the enemy and the villagers.

When enough small friendly units are roaming the countryside, it will be both difficult and dangerous for the enemy guerrillas to mobilize their forces into battalion and regimental strength for raids and ambushes. They will no longer have the ability to move within a rather large geographical area for a considerable period of time without being detected and intercepted. In fact, if properly conducted, this program should give the friendly forces considerable ambush capability against the enemy.



... the military force must develop a sympathetic identification with the people before it can carry out its mission successfully.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ADVANTAGES

There are a number of psychological advantages associated with small unit operations.

FOR THE PEOPLE

The military force must develop a sympathetic identification with the people before it can carry out its mission successfully. It must avoid actions that would result in negative handling of civilians, looting, and stealing — particularly during operations in enemy strongholds.

Avoiding actions that would result in negative public opinion is not enough. The military force must also have a well-defined and properly managed positive program to win public approval.

It is highly desirable for the troops stationed within a village or hamlet to participate and, where appropriate, to take the initiative in village activities. The troops might form or participate in youth groups, demonstrate advanced agricultural practices, dispense medical care, or offer some schooling to the villagers.



...the troops might form or participate in youth groups.

To do this would require servicemen trained in these skills. This type of close, personal identification between the troops and the villagers is possible only on a small unit basis, and is essential if the people are to accept the military as a constructive rather than a parasitic force.

Another facet of the village program is to use troops who are from the area and have local family and friends. Care should be exercised to prevent the soldier from being intimidated through or because of his family. Gaining the support of the people is all important; the enemy cannot be defeated without it.

FOR THE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER

From the viewpoint of the individual soldier, small units have a distinct advantage because they form a group that lends itself more to a close identification with its members than do large groups.

Undoubtedly, a major part of the reason for the excellent record of the Viet Cong in Vietnam — expressed in terms of a low defection rate, a high fighting spirit, and dedication to cause — is a result of the very close identification that the individual feels with his small guerrilla unit.

Antiguerrilla forces must have an esprit de corps equal, if not superior, to that of the guerrillas. This requires something that can best be accomplished on a small unit basis — a feeling of belonging, responsibility, and need. Experience in Vietnam demonstrates this to be true, and the conclusions reached by US investigators, as a result of a thorough study into the morale and loyalty of US troops during the Korean War, testify to the validity of the concept.

If friendly forces are to conduct an aggressive and effective campaign, they must consist of highly motivated troops who are dedicated to a cause. Unfortunately, loyalty to a government is often inadequate as a motivating factor; other loyalties must be found with which the individual can form a personal association. There must be something in which he has great pride and in which he will not fail — for example, a close-knit, proud team.

It is the proud, highly motivated soldier who must form the backbone of the antiguerrilla forces. He must be physically and mentally capable of living for several weeks at a time in the jungle without returning to a permanent base. He must be able to destroy the guerrillas and, at the same time, make friends with the local populace — a large order, indeed. The troops who belong to the small antiguerrilla units will symbolize the government, and they must create the best and most useful symbol possible.



...he must be physically and mentally capable of living for several weeks at a time in the jungle...

The problem of creating the ideal soldier for the hunter-killer units is the most difficult part of this proposal. His motivation must be so high that he will be aggressive, courageous, and loyal under even the most dangerous, difficult, and trying conditions.

In most regions of successful guerrilla operations, the government cannot initially command the type and degree of loyalty required for successful antiguerrilla operations from either the general populace or the average soldier. If the population were sufficiently loyal to the government, there probably would not be a guerrilla problem in the first place.

To instill the proper motivation into the troops will require all of the psychological techniques that can be mustered. Perhaps the most important of them will be to develop an esprit de corps to the point where the soldier would rather die than let his buddies or his unit down. It can be done only on the basis of small units.

ARMED PROPAGANDA

This is the tactic of intimidating, kidnapping, or assassinating carefully selected members of the opposition in a manner that will reap the maximum psychological benefit. It is an activity which, if used at the wrong time and the wrong place for the wrong purpose, will probably have serious negative results.

Extreme caution must be taken not to create fear or hatred of the government among the general populace through these operations. Both the assignments and the tactics of the armed propaganda teams will depend on the operational environment, and their possible consequences must be thoroughly evaluated and weighed prior to any action.

CONCLUSIONS

The type of conflict that prevails in South Vietnam — total, protracted, and unconventional — cannot be adequately combated by traditional or conventional means. This was clearly demonstrated in Indochina between 1945 and 1954.

Success requires small units that can find, engage, and destroy the enemy, and at the same time conduct themselves in a way that will persuade the populace to support the cause of the government.

Section II

BOTH SIDES OF THE GUERRILLA HILL

*My 25 years of overseas service have allowed me to take part in a good deal of campaigning, and although I am reluctant to admit it, frankly I wouldn't have exchanged my lot for a series of most comfortable billets in England. I use the old-fashioned "campaigning" rather than "fighting" because several of the small shows I have been in, such for example as chasing terrorists in the jungles of Malaya or rounding up tribesmen in Tanganyika, can hardly be dignified by the term "fighting."

Nevertheless, whether it has been standing vigil in a sangar (a small breastwork or rifle pit to hold a few men) on the bleak hills of the Northwest Frontier of India, or helping the Greek Army rout out Communist gangs in Thessaly, I have had plenty of time and opportunity to reflect on the techniques of guerrilla fighters, to assess the sort of things which lead to their success and to observe their limitations and their weaknesses.

It is encouraging that training for guerrilla warfare now is becoming more fashionable in the forces of the West, for I think its potential has frequently been overlooked. On the other hand, the know-how for combating guerrillas, so painfully acquired after many years of experience, often is frustratingly allowed to fade at the end of a campaign; or worse, to be remembered only in the form of aphorisms and clichés seldom applicable to the new circumstances.

A study of the past counter guerrilla operations in many parts of the world startlingly confirms the view that usually it takes many months and sometimes years for the forces of law and order to re-learn lessons that should by now be well known. For the guerrillas — terrorist, bandit, or whatever they may be called — this obviously has great advantages. For the government of the country concerned (and its supporters) it spells unnecessary casualties, large reinforcements, heavy expense, and in some instances ultimate failure to restore the situation.

With these somewhat ponderous reflections I turned my thought first of all to considering the romantic improbability of finding myself organizing a rebellion in, say, one of the less developed countries of Asia or Africa.

ORGANIZING A REBELLION

What would I need, and how would I set about it? In the first place, I must of course have a Cause with a capital C. It must be the sort of cause with a vital popular appeal and be both clear and simple. Like, without being irreverent, the one facing Pontius Pilate two thousand years ago. Religious causes these days, however, are few and far between, and mine is more likely to be of the nationalist type: Throw out the Imperialists! if I am organizing my rebellion in one of the remaining colonies; or, more plainly, Fight the Oppressor! if the country is under foreign domination or an unpopular regime. If I were a Communist, my task would probably be easier, since the more rudimentary tenets of the Communist's faith often have a subtle and pervasive appeal among the have-nots. Moreover, as a Communist I would exploit to my own ends genuine feelings of nationalism or discontent. However that may be, it is quite certain that no rebellion can succeed without a virile cause.

If my cause must be clear, so must my aims, and it is here, I remind myself, where political direction of a revolution often fails. True, the ultimate aim is to seize power, but this may first entail a protracted campaign of attrition, of gradually wearing down the government. If the methods of timing are at fault, the revolution may defeat its own ends.

*Reprinted from the March 1962 issue of Army, Association of the United States Army, by Brigadier R. C. H. Miers, British Army.

As happened, for example, in Malaya in 1948 when the Communist early successes practically brought the great rubber industry of that country to a standstill. But in so doing the Communists alienated the sympathy of much of the civilian populace. Owners of plantations were forced to curtail their activities and pay off some of their workers, unemployment followed, food became scarce. Resentment grew against the Communists who, recognizing that they had overplayed their hands, were forced to reduce the pressure. They had struck too soon and too hard, bearing in mind that they could never hope to muster sufficient military strength to defeat the British forces in open battle.

That is one mistake to be avoided in this country where I am planning a revolution. Again the aim of the native revolutionaries may be very different from that of the foreign government supporting them. Take the case of the Yugoslav rebels in World War II. In 1943, the Allied commanders in chief, who had supplied Tito with a substantial quantity of arms, wanted him to launch an offensive against the Germans and prevent their withdrawing divisions to other fronts. Tito had different ideas. He realized he would need his forces to secure his own political position at the end of the war, and with postwar reconstruction in mind he was most averse to blowing up bridges and towns to harass an enemy who was getting out anyway. So he did very little, proving the point that the aim of the native rebels may be more parochial than that of their supporters.

MILITARY SIDE OF THE BUSINESS

Anyway, having got my cause and aims clear, I now turn to the more military side of the business: that of organizing and equipping my guerrilla fighters. For this purpose I define the much overworked term "guerrilla" as someone who actively assists the revolution by taking up arms. The aim of guerrilla fighters is basically to tie down superior enemy forces and wear them out by continual harassing tactics. At the same time guerrilla fighters will be keeping the seeds of revolution alive in the minds of the populace.



...I define the overworked term "guerrilla" as someone who actively assists the revolution by taking up arms.

In organizing my force I will be guided by three axioms. First, guerrilla operations must be coordinated with the general plan of the campaign. Undirected free-lance activity against the enemy by anyone who possesses a weapon will frequently defeat its own ends.

Secondly, my force must never be committed to pitched battles. History is littered with instances of guerrillas, after initial success, becoming over-confident and suffering sharp defeat by engaging their enemy in a positional battle. Guerrillas must never lose their mobility or their capacity for rapid dispersal after an action.

Finally, I must carefully control the number of new recruits to my guerrilla force. All too often, I have observed, in the first flush of enthusiasm the guerrilla signs on too many volunteers. It is seldom possible to reduce numbers later, because once you have joined the guerrilla force you are a marked man, unable to return home for the fear of arrest, torture, death, or whatever punishment the government has prescribed for you.

MAINTAINING DISCIPLINE

Then there is the question of leadership. In selecting leaders I would look for men with a burning enthusiasm in the cause and possessed of a ruthlessness which most civilized people would find abhorrent. It is no use bilking the matter: a successful guerrilla leader must maintain discipline in his force by unorthodox methods; on occasion he may be forced to kill his enemy rather than be burdened with prisoners; and he must be prepared to deal harshly with traitors. It is a fact of life that most good guerrilla leaders are killers at heart. Now even if you, the reader, have that qualification as well as other more obvious ones, you would not be fit to lead the guerrilla force of a foreign country — simply because a successful leader must be a national of that country. The best you could hope for would be the job of liaison officer or advisor — the man with the bag of gold and all the time being as careful as was Lawrence of Arabia in not usurping the authority of your particular King Feisal.




... in selecting leaders I would look for men with a burning enthusiasm in the cause and possessed of a ruthlessness which most civilized people would find abhorrent.

Before I even consider the formation of a guerrilla force I would have to decide if the country was suitable for this type of activity. Ideally I want a region with few roads, poor communications generally, and plenty of room for maneuver. Rocky, forested mountains or better still, jungle and swamps which give cover both from the ground and from the air would suit my purpose well; the sort of terrain to be found in many parts of Southeast Asia; in Viet Nam, Malaya, or Laos. It would also be an enormous advantage if there was a neighboring friendly country whose frontier we could hop over if badly pressed.

How are we going to equip and supply our guerrilla force? Perhaps a friendly country will help us by airdrops or other means. If not, we will have to live on the country, obtaining our arms and ammunition by raids on the enemy. Clothing in a hot country should not bother us too much. But the procurement of food and medical supplies might be the very devil of a problem. We will have to get them either by payment or extortion, and in either event run the risk of losing the sympathy of the civilian populace. In some countries where a large surplus of food is grown it will not be so difficult, but where food is scarce or has to be imported we may find great difficulty — another reason for keeping our force small.



IF EXTERNAL SUPPORT IS NOT SUFFICIENT AND INTERNAL SUPPLY DOES NOT FULFILL THE NEEDS, THE GUERRILLA IS CAPABLE OF SETTING UP HIS OWN SMALL ARMORIES FOR PRODUCTION OF WEAPONS.



Those, then, are some of the more fundamental principles which I must consider before trying to start a revolution: a worthwhile cause, clear aims, suitable terrain, ruthless leaders, and a method of supplying the guerrillas. Given all these conditions, I reckon I could have a lot of fun and games.

CONTAINING A REBELLION

Now, rather reluctantly, I take off my revolutionary hat and looking over the other side of the hill, replace it by the one worn by the head of a state which is simmering with revolution and discontent. It would soon dawn on me, as it has on the heads of many newly emergent countries, that law-and-order is as important a concomitant of national prosperity as are natural resources, technical skill or economic viability. I can, of course, impose order by adopting ruthless measures such as those exercised by the Russians in Hungary. If I consistently and vigorously pursue such methods, they will probably succeed for a great many years. What I must avoid, though, are brief forays into the field of ruthlessness, such as those which certain French units are accused of in Algeria, which in the long run serve only to strengthen the determination of the rebels. Half-measures are no good; I must be either utterly ruthless or obey the canons of civilized behavior. Let us say that I decide to adopt the latter course, and see where we go from there.

Good and reliable political intelligence is a cardinal requirement for dealing with rebellion, and I can bet my bottom dollar that at the outset of a revolution my political intelligence will be in poor shape. The pattern is well known to those who have been involved in suppressing rebellions in British possessions since the war: after a long period of peace and quiet, the special or intelligence branch of the police, who are responsible for collecting political information, has become ineffective through being progressively starved of money. So when trouble threatens, being ill-informed, it gives false reassurances to the government. Only where full-blooded rebellion breaks out does the government become aware of its deplorable lack of information and desperately tries to remedy the situation. But it takes a very long time indeed to build up a police special branch, organize agents and informers, and evaluate the intelligence. Lesson One is, therefore, to keep strings on your political intelligence system, whether you lead a police state or a democracy.

Now suppose that much to my surprise and that of my police widespread rebellion suddenly breaks out. Let us examine some of the steps we should take to suppress it. As head of the state I may be tempted to impose martial law; that is to say, to suspend the civilian administration for the duration of the emergency and let the army run the country. At first sight this seems to have attractive possibilities: control through army channels would be quick and effective; the forces of law and order could operate without hindrance; and captured rebels could be swiftly brought to justice. But while thumbing through historical records of instances where martial law has been imposed in democratic states, I would be struck by the fact that it has never proved satisfactory except for very short periods. In the minds of the populace their dislike of the army will soon prove infinitely greater than their dislike of the rebels. Besides, I remind myself, armies which are allowed to become too powerful all too frequently start rebellions themselves and depose the head of the state.

COOPERATION AMONG OFFICIAL AGENCIES

Having, then, discarded martial law as a solution, I will realize that the suppression of the rebellion will require the very closest cooperation by the civilian administration, the army, and the police. This cooperation must work at all levels throughout the whole governmental structure of the state, starting with a defense council at the top which includes myself, my army commander, and the head of my police force. It stretches down to the smallest administrative district where, again, a standing committee of administration, soldier, and policeman will be formed. That in simple form will be my structure for running the business.



... the suppression of the rebellion will require the very closest cooperation by the civilian administration, the army, and the police. This cooperation must work at all levels. ... it stretches down to the smallest administrative district.

Now to practical policies. Right at the start of the rebellion there will be an outcry from loyal citizens for physical protection against the rebels, and here we will be faced with an immediate and difficult problem. If we try to protect every village with outlying farms, our force of police and army will soon be whittled away in small packets all over the country. On the other hand, we cannot afford to ignore appeals for help from innocent victims of the rebels, or things will only get worse.

Faced with this dilemma, the authorities both in Malaya and during the Mau Mau troubles in Kenya undertook gigantic (and costly) resettlement schemes whereby in troubled areas the people were all gathered into new homes in fortified villages. This not only eased the problem of protection, but made it more difficult for the rebels to contact sympathizers among the civilian populace. However that may be, the dominant desire of the military commander will be quickly to get on the offensive.

If the military commander is lucky, the guerrillas, flushed by initial success, may be inclined to stay and fight; in which case the campaign becomes a series of orthodox battles. But if the guerrillas know their business, they will soon resort to hit-and-run raids. This is the real crux of the matter: how to deal with frequent and widespread raids by small gangs who, like will-o'-the-wisps, scatter after a raid and disappear into a jungle, a swamp, or a mountain vastness of dimensions far too great for us to have any hope of surrounding them.

INFORMATION AND MOBILITY ARE BASIC

Information and mobility are, I suggest, the two basic principles on which our whole plan must be founded. If through spies, agents and bribes we can get information about the enemy's



...the people were all gathered in new homes in fortified villages.




intentions, we can take steps to surprise him. But there is much more in it than that. By information I include among other things the acquisition by our forces of a most detailed knowledge of the ground and of the enemy's habits, so that our plans are based on intelligent anticipation and are not just blind swipes at an enemy whose object is to avoid contacting our forces. Under mobility comes such considerations as equipping our forces with high-class signal communications and all modern means of transportation, including a large number of helicopters. Mobility also means — and this is frequently forgotten — that our troops must be as fit and as well hardened as the enemy, so that they can follow enemy gangs anywhere, hounding and harassing them and never having to give up because the pace is too fast or rations are too low.

This is the blueprint for my counterguerrilla campaign. Now we can turn to see it applied by a small unit, say a district to which one battalion has been allotted.

As we have seen, to run the show there will be a triumvirate of administrator, soldier and policeman, and these three will meet every day to review the situation and plan for the future.

The civilian administrator will be largely concerned with ensuring that the activities of the police and army do not bear too heavily on the civilian populace. He will also, by all modern means of propaganda, keep the people informed of the progress of operations and try to anticipate and thwart enemy propagands.

The policeman, for his part, will be concerned mainly with enforcing the law, but he will have the additional and highly important task of obtaining through his intelligence staff information on which operations can be mounted.



... The military commander, if he is wise, will realize that he can only beat these guerrilla gangs by a system of continuous, unrelenting patrolling and ambushing.



MODERN MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION PROVIDES THE COUNTER-
GUERRILLA FORCE WITH THE MOBILITY AND FLEXIBILITY RE-
QUIRED FOR COMBATTING THE GUERRILLA.



The military commander, if he is wise, will realize that he can only beat these guerrilla gangs by a system of continuous, unrelenting patrolling and ambushing. If the gangs are large and comparatively well armed, then his patrols will have to be of comparable size, perhaps as much as company strength. If the enemy has split into small, highly mobile gangs, then our patrols can be much smaller, perhaps only eight or nine men, but the principle is the same: the commander must aim to cover every yard of his area by frequent patrols.

In fact, patrols serve many purposes besides that of contacting the enemy. By their ubiquity, alertness, and attitude they impress the civilian populace with a sense of security. In covering the ground they get to know their own bit of real estate as well as they know their own home towns, so that when the enemy appears they know all the short cuts, hiding places and tracks which he may use. It has been said that patrolling is the bedrock of infantry work. This is never more true than in counter guerrilla operations; but because results often take a long time to become apparent, military commanders often are slow to appreciate that a most carefully planned system of patrolling is of first importance.

THE CONTROL OF FOOD

We have seen that under certain conditions procurement of food may be the guerrilla's greatest difficulty. On our side, therefore, we must do all we can to prevent the civilian populace from supplying the guerrilla. The mounting of a full-scale food control system cannot be lightly undertaken, for it needs a great deal of thought and planning, and again, the closest co-operation between the civilian authorities and the military.

A system of rationing of foodstuffs will have to be set up; the growing of surplus food must be restricted; stocks in shops and markets must be checked for leakage; and many other restrictions, all unfortunately bringing some measure of hardship to the people, must be imposed. Indeed, to be really successful, food control may eventually have to include the establishment of central kitchens in each community where all food is cooked and the people come to eat it on the spot. In certain of the worst localities in Malaya, where despite all other controls the people still managed to supply the Communist, this drastic step of central feeding was undertaken — at great cost and, it should be noted, at the expense of incurring bitterness against the government.



SOUTHEAST ASIAN GUERRILLAS WITH IMPROVISED COOKING EQUIPMENT "SHOVEL" COOKED RICE FROM OIL DRUM TO SERVING CONTAINER.

From the military point of view food control makes exorbitant demands on manpower. Men are required for enforcing the regulations; for searching houses and villages for surplus food and hidden dumps; for intercepting smugglers by searching persons and vehicles; and, once more, for patrolling to prevent the guerrillas from coming into town and villages to obtain supplies.

A food-control system can be successful only if enough men are available to enforce it. But if supplies to the guerrilla can be effectively interrupted, we are halfway toward winning the battle: as food becomes scarce the guerrilla must take more risks to get it; more risks mean more chances by our forces of gaining contact with the gangs. The wheel of success has begun to turn.

These, in very simplified form, are some of the first measures I would institute in my counter guerrilla campaign. But above everything I would impress upon all my subordinates that we will get nowhere without careful and specialized training of our troops. Junior leaders must be trained to use guile rather than orthodox methods: brains before sweat. They must be trained to remember that ruses as old as those in the Bible will work if not repeated too often, and that the guerrilla has many weak points which must be exploited.

Having given that piece of advice I, as the head of the state, would then resolve to see that I and my fellow politicians interfered as little as possible with the day-to-day running of the campaign.

Other things being equal, which hat would I prefer to wear: that of a guerrilla or one of a government official? Personally I would go for the guerrilla's every time. Life is much more fun when you hold the initiative.

CHAPTER 7
PRE-WORLD WAR I AND
WORLD WAR I PERIOD
"Uproar in the East, strike in the West."

Sun Tzu
5th Century BC

Section	
I	GUERRILLA
II	COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS: A CASE STUDY.
III	TO GAIN THE REAR

TAB
HERE

CHAPTER 7

PRE-WORLD WAR I AND WORLD WAR I PERIOD

Section I

GUERRILLA

Spain between the years 1808 and 1813 was the scene of nation wide guerrilla operations which in point of intensity and effectiveness have not been equalled in history. Dozens of talented guerrilla leaders were developed, and to their skill and daring Wellington owed a great measure of his success in the Peninsular War. The guerrillas themselves could not have driven the French from Spain, but neither could Wellington have done this without their aid and the Great Duke never depreciated the contribution of the guerrilleros to his success.

Here we see for the first time strategic and tactical coordination between conventional formations of both the Army and the Navy and organized guerrillas; we may trace the development of poorly equipped bands into well trained, highly mobile, hard striking combat groups, elusive and pervasive as mist. In their independent operations, the Spanish guerrilleros established the general pattern of partisan war with which we are familiar.

Frequently week after week passed with no communication between the Emperor in Paris, the higher headquarters of the French Army in Spain, and their columns operating in the field. Hundreds of carriers carrying official dispatches were captured, foraging parties were ambushed and annihilated, and isolated garrisons were overwhelmed in surprise attacks. Supplies for the armies were intercepted, great sums of money were stolen from paymasters, traitors on whom the French relied for information were searched out and summarily executed. These activities produced in the French feelings of complete frustration, which in turn caused them to take primitive measures that were ill-considered and served only to intensify resistances. Heavy detachments were required to guard the vulnerable lines of communications, to hold the principle cities and to protect convoys with the result that forces available for the field were reduced in strength. Thus were a few able to immobilize many, to retain its initiative, to create consternation, and to produce results out of all proportion to their numerical strength.

The first popular reactions to Napoleon's iniquitous coup d'etat in Spain took place on 24 May 1808 in the Province of Asturias. The Asturians proposed no halfway measures of resistance; They declared war on France. Other provinces followed, and by July the French had on their hands a full scale revolution, in which the guerrilla bands played an important part.

A certain Francisco Fernandez who advocated "the avoiding of battles, the harassing of the enemy's flanks and communications, and the employment of numerous flying bands," was regarded as visionary, and in 1809 few Spanish patriots paid him much attention. They were unable to see that Fernandez was attempting to introduce a new dimension to warfare.

The first of the great Spanish guerrilleros was Juan Martin Diaz, nicknamed "El Empeinado," "The Obstinate One," who in the fall of 1809 raised large bands during the absence of the normal garrisons and swept the countryside capturing convoys and cutting the lines of

Extracted from an article by Colonel Samuel B. Griffith II, entitled, "Guerrilla." Reprinted by permission of the copyright holder, the Marine Corps Association, publishers of the Marine Corps Gazette, professional journal for Marine Officers. Copyright July 1950 by Marine Corps Association.

communication. The French governors on every side kept reporting their perilous position when they could get a message through to Madrid. A mild foretaste of what the future held in store for the French governors!

The Emperor bombarded his commanders with advice as to how to repress the guerrillas. His order resulted "in much marching and countermarching of the newly arrived troops" but too little practical effort in the way of repression for skilled leaders like Miva, the Emp-ecinado and Julian Srchez nearly always slipped between the fingers of their pursuers.

In the fall of 1810 Miva the leader with his guerrilla bands was extremely active in Navarre. Although he never mustered over 4,000 men he kept six French generals busy: "...his services were invaluable during the campaign of Portugal since he was wearing out a French force of five times his own strength, in fruitless marches, under winter rains, and over roads that had become all but impossible, the archives of the French war office showed lists of officers with the legend killed or wounded 'dons une reconnaissance en Navarre ...' during the latter months of 1810..." Wellington owed him no small gratitude.

It was estimated that in 1810-1811, there were never more than 20,000 guerrillas under arms between the Guadoiroma Mountains (north of Madrid) and the Bay of Biscay. "Yet these lightly moving guerrilla bands unhampered by a base to defend or a train to weight them down and well served as to intelligence by the residents of the countryside paralyzed the action of an infinitely larger number of regular troops."



...It was estimated that in 1810-1811, there were never more than 20,000 guerrillas under arms between the Guadoiroma mountains and the Bay of Biscay.

By January 1811, Napoleon (who had lost patience with the generals unable to suppress the guerrillas in the north of Spain) summoned Marshal Bessieres to command the "Army of the North" and gave his army another mission, that of putting an end to the partisans. This

proved to be a task well beyond the means at the Marshal's disposal, and he reports to the Emperor that the guerrilla bands were daily increasing and that if he concentrated as much as a third of his 60,000 effective to subdue them, all communications would be lost. He concluded this dispatch by pointing out that victory in Spain did not depend upon the outcome of a battle with the English, but rather upon the pacification of the country.

During the spring and early summer the guerrilleros in the north were receiving arms and equipment from British cruisers operating in the Bay of Biscay and were steadily becoming stronger. The expedients the French adopted to control them were fruitless. Destruction of towns, taking of hostages, devastation of the countryside, execution of prisoners, construction of blockhouses -- all were in vain.

In June and July of 1811 northwestern Spain was "hotter" than it had ever been. Two famous guerrilleros, Longa and Porlier, in command of well organized and well equipped formations were operating in the Asturias and Leon with the result that the reports of Bessieres were more pessimistic than usual.

"Countless expeditions against them had led to no final result. Like the holy men of old, when persecuted in one region they merely fled to another. If the flying columns and petty garrisons were withdrawn for a moment they would be at the gate of Burgos or Santander in two days and the . . . main arteries with France would be cut."

At the end of July Bessieres was relieved by Dorsenne.

The change in French commanders in northern Spain produced no change in the general situation, which steadily deteriorated.

Dorsenne did not last long, and the French commander Abbe signalized the opening of the year 1812 by the issuance of a proclamation which prohibited "quarter" for guerrilleros, made their families and villages responsible for them and authorized the execution of hostages. Miva promptly announced that he would shoot four Frenchmen for every Spaniard, a threat that he carried out with punctuality and exactitude. Abbe withdrew his proclamation and there was a truce to terror while the French concentrated 30,000 troops to destroy the partisan chief and his band of 3,000. As the invaders busied themselves trying to track him down, Miva fell upon an immense convoy escorted by a force of 2,000 troops and completely destroyed it. The entire Army of the North spent the remainder of April and the month of May in futile pursuit of this phantom.

In June Adm. Sir Harve Popham had at Wellington's direction concentrated with Mendozabal, a well known guerrillero of the Biscay coast, a series of Joint Operations designed to prevent the Army of the North from aiding Mocmont, who was opposing the English general. This joint campaign, brilliantly executed, culminated in the seizure of Santarbo, the most important port on the Biscay coast of Spain.

Until the close of the campaign on the Peninsula the contribution of the guerrilleros to Wellington's success continued to be of the utmost importance, but strangely enough, even after Napoleon's return from Moscow, they never seem to have made an impression on the Emperor's mind. If we follow him to Russia we will find him still dreaming of magnificent strategic and tactical combinations; still oblivious to the potential of well organized guerrilla war, conducted by capable leaders.

Section II

COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS: A CASE STUDY

They were unequalled in endurance and fighting ability. So cunning were the Apaches that a mere handful could keep a community in terror or an army in disorder. What type operations would be required to subdue the Apaches who have been described as the most hardy, warlike people known to history?

What were the qualifications of the Army officer who was to guide this counter guerrilla operation and to subdue Apaches such as "Old Nana" who at the age of 81 led 30 of his Apache warriors on a raid into New Mexico and in a period of less than 60 days traversed over a thousand miles of U. S. territory, fought and won eight separate battles, and successfully evaded a pursuing force of 1,000 soldiers and 400 civilians?

It was General George Crook -- a brilliant military strategist, tactician, and leader -- who was to subdue and effectively rule the Apache Indians. A description of the officer by one of his contemporaries of the 1870's would read something like this.

Crook arrived in Tucson, Arizona, in the summer of 1871 unheralded and unknown, but already an experienced Indian fighter. He immediately interviewed everyone who could contribute in any part to building up this information concerning the area of operation, the Apaches, and the overall situation in the Southwestern United States. He talked and listened to a multitude of people representing all walks of life -- privates and colonels, mule skinnners and bankers, as well as the Governor.



... He immediately interviewed everyone who could contribute in any part to building up this information concerning the area of operation...

NEED FOR INTELLIGENCE

Before making any plans concerning the conduct of the campaign he was to wage, Crook made absolutely sure that he had explored all sources to gain information concerning the situation -- his intelligence estimate was thorough and complete.

"The General was every inch a soldier -- always in top physical condition and ready for battle. He was a large man, erect, spare, and muscular. When considering a plan he listened much and talked little. No soldier or Indian was too low or too poor to gain access to him. He was quiet and unpretentious, but even to a stranger there was the power, the force of a man who DOES."

Crook's mission was to tame the Apache Indians and establish them on a reservation. It is apparent immediately that he was to wear two hats -- that of tactical military commander and that of diplomatic negotiator. He was faced with the job of defeating on their own ground the most outstanding fighting men on the continent of North America, and at the same time he was to negotiate a peace with these nomadic people who had for centuries lived by fighting and plundering.

Guerrilla type forces, employing tactics characterized by surprise, rapid movement, deception, secrecy, and stealth, have realized considerable success throughout history. Since World War II, guerrilla warfare and counter guerrilla operations (Greece, Algeria, Malaya, and Indochina) have become the most common forms of overt warfare.

The scope and nature of a commander's counter guerrilla mission may include political and administrative aspects seldom encountered in normal operations. The methods and techniques of combat in which commanders have been trained may have to be modified or even disregarded. To conduct counter guerrilla operations without sound intelligence and counter-intelligence, wastes time, material, and troop effort. However, the intangible aspects of guerrilla warfare create intelligence obstacles that can be overcome only by patient determination and the utmost resourcefulness.

Plans for counter guerrilla operations are based primarily on a detailed analysis of the country concerned and its population. The political, administrative, economic, sociological, and military aspects of the plans are correlated closely with the overall military plan.

Crook knew that the type of warfare in which he was about to engage would be anything but normal and that his training and orientation program would have to insure that his organization, as well as the mental and physical conditioning of his men, would permit him to cope with such a foe as the Apache. Demands of significant proportions would have to be placed on the officers and men of Crook's command. Crook knew that in order for the men to "pay the price" willingly, his leadership must be strong, and the men of his command must know him, trust him, and have faith in him.

OBSERVE AND LISTEN

Drawing on his knowledge gained from studies of the highly organized transportation systems of Spain, Peru, Mexico, and the mining systems of the southwest, he developed and maintained a pack train system that was equal to the task of wearing down the Apaches. Crook spent most of his time in close observation of the pack trains and gained even more knowledge of the trains and the mule skinnners by talking frequently to the men around the campfires and observing the trains in operation.

Constant pressure must be maintained against the guerrillas by continuous operations and vigorous combat patrolling until they are brought to decisive battle. This keeps the guerrillas on the move, disrupts their security and organization, separates them from their bases of supply, weakens them physically, destroys their morale, and denies them the opportunity to conduct operations. Once contact is made, it must be maintained until the guerrillas are brought to battle and destroyed.



...a superior mobility differential is essential
in counter guerrilla operations

A superior mobility differential is essential in counter guerrilla operations. Consideration is given to the type and size of units employed; the selection, training and equipping of individuals and units; communications and administration. These variable factors are then considered in relation to the hostile guerrilla forces, the mission of the various command echelons, and the topography, weather, and climatic conditions. A commander develops the desired mobility through initiative, improvisation, and aggressiveness, as well as by choice of transportation.

The most effective means of destroying the hostile guerrilla force is to conduct a continuous, aggressive offense.

Crook realized that no American soldier would be able to compete with the Apache warriors on a man-to-man basis in the field of endurance. The Apaches had been trained since childhood to go for days with little or no food or water and to march 50 to 75 miles a day on foot.


By mid-July Crook was on the march at the head of his command. His general objective was not to do battle, but to shake down his command and, more specifically to conduct a study of the terrain, to condition his men, and to create esprit de corps. The route that he selected for the march was through enemy territory and included some of the most rugged terrain in

the southwestern United States. When Crook had completed his 700-mile training-march he knew his command well and the command had come to know and respect its new leader.

An intimate knowledge of the terrain is necessary. Only when the counter guerrilla force's knowledge of the terrain begins to approach that of the guerrillas can they meet the guerrillas on anything like equal terms. Commanders and troops need time to become acquainted with the detailed topography of the area, the civilian population, and the organization and operations of the hostile guerrilla forces. Time is required to impart this knowledge to new commanders, staffs, and troops.

Morale of forces engaged in counter guerrilla warfare presents problems quite different from those encountered in normal combat. Operating against an elusive, violent, destructive force that seldom offers a target, that disintegrates before opposition, and then reforms and strikes again is quite different from operating against the more tangible forces encountered in normal combat.

Crook recognized that the key to the effective conquest of the Apaches would be his ability to maintain a strong and continuous pursuit of the hostiles. To do this he would need men capable of combatting the Apache in his own element, and a transportation system far better than any that existed at the time. He organized a transportation system that was unequalled in his day. He became known as the daddy of the American mule; his men were fond of saying that he was "packmule wise."



...and a transportation system far better than any that existed


USE THE NATIVES

Recognizing the problem, Crook recruited scouts on a scale never before employed in order that he would have fighting troops with the necessary individual endurance and "know how" to fight the Indians on their own terms. Navahos, Pimas, and friendly Apaches were hired on such a scale that Crook was able to put numerous forces in the field each of which had sufficient Indian Scouts to maintain direct pressure on the evermoving hostile Apaches.

Whenever possible, Allied troops native to the area should be employed against hostile resistance elements. Their familiarity with the country, people, language, and customs makes them invaluable.

When feasible, special counter guerrilla units are organized, equipped and trained to combat guerrilla forces by using guerrilla methods. They are an effective means of carrying on offensive action with relatively small forces. Under many conditions, they are more effective than larger conventional troop units. The chief value of these units is not their numerical strength, but the abilities of the commander and the individuals to develop special skills and teamwork. The effectiveness of a special counter guerrilla unit increases as it becomes thoroughly familiar with the terrain and the habits of the hostile guerrillas and the supporting populace.

EXPLAIN AND PERSUADE



... explain and persuade. (CONFERENCE BETWEEN
GENERAL CROOK AND GERONIMO)

While engaged in his preparations for the military campaign Crook did not forget to don his diplomatic cap. He talked personally to every Apache Indian who would meet with him. He explained to them exactly what was expected of them and told them what their life on an Indian reservation would be like. He explained the advantages that would accrue to them if they accepted the reservation life. He also told them the alternative if they would not move peacefully to a reservation -- that he would hunt them down and kill them.

Crook made no false promises and his words were so sincere and impressive that there is little doubt that every soldier and Apache in the area knew exactly what the situation was.

This policy of keeping everyone concerned informed and of speaking nothing but the bare, cold facts was to have decided bearing on Crook's military campaign against the Apaches.

Campaign objectives, together with the measures governing political, economic, and social functions, should be publicized clearly. Information and propaganda should stress that the people's cooperation and acceptance of the announced policies will determine the amount of assistance and freedom of action given them. If offered, amnesty terms should be widely publicized and scrupulously observed.

By the fall of 1872 it was evident that many of the Apaches were not going to accept reservation life peacefully. Raiding, plundering and killing were continuing on a large scale. By this time Crook was ready to accomplish his mission; his forces were trained and organized -- they knew what had to be done and how to do it.

In November 1872 Crook's well-prepared forces took to the field to chase down the renegade Indians. Crook's orders to his separate commands were simple but complete. Each of his commands was to find and fight the renegades wherever possible until the Indians either submitted or were destroyed. The renegades were to be kept on the move constantly, and Crook told his commands that if their horses died, they were to pursue the Indians on foot. They were to maintain relentless, never-ending pressure. The mule pack train system, coupled with the friendly Indian scouts, gave Crook a means to maintain this pressure, and he demanded that it be maintained at all times. By the end of the winter the relentless and effective pursuit had accomplished its purpose and most of the renegades were willing to submit.

THE PRINCIPLES STILL APPLY

The campaign was a success. Crook's policies had paid off. He had "tamed" the Apaches who represented one of the most destructive guerrilla forces the world had ever known. Remember how General Crook did it: modify tactics to fit current material, and results should be equally effective.

Section III

TO GAIN THE REAR

*That guerrilla warfare goes much deeper than an annoying series of seemingly disconnected acts of violence and sabotage can best be seen if we go back in time to Lawrence of Arabia, who Liddell Hart credits with winning the first of the modern guerrilla wars. Lawrence's campaign, fought against the Turks between 1916 and 1918, was based on self-formulated principles of guerrilla warfare. The validity of Lawrence's principles rested in their applicability to the time, terrain, and temperament of the combatants. The conventional forms employed slavishly by the Turks were valid if, and only if, their opponents chose to play by the same rules; this was Lawrence's purpose -- to play by rules his enemies could not follow.

Lawrence analyzed, among others, the war philosophies of Clausewitz, Napoleon, and Foch, only to find them strangely inapplicable to the war problems facing the Hejaz Arabs then in revolt against Turkey. He went on to formulate his own theories of strategic guerrilla warfare, which makes his book -- *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* -- a still usable manual of principles and techniques for nonconventional forms.



T. E. LAWRENCE

Liddell Hart, writing in 1936, cited Lawrence as a genius because he had created an entirely new form of warfare out of the elements of the old. Hart suggested that Lawrence's war was but the handwriting on the wall; that guerrilla wars would eliminate most of the senseless violence and brute force usually engendered in the conventional; and that they would be fought with greater economy.

How did Lawrence wage his unconventional war against the Turks?

*Reprinted from the November 1963 issue of the *Military Review*, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, by William Paul Haiber.

Gain the Rear

Simply stated, Lawrence felt that the aim of all military activity is to gain the rear behind one's enemies, since it represents all that is tender, vulnerable, and open to both exploitation and domination at minimum cost to the aggressor. Guerrilla warfare begins and ends in an already occupied rear area. This activity is characterized by a subtle multiplication of force, by being, as Lawrence theorized, "an influence, a thing invisible, intangible, without front or back, drifting about like a gas." Guerrilla warfare does away with the concept of fronts entirely.

The conditions Lawrence considered necessary for a guerrilla campaign in the Middle East were:

The Turks would operate on long, easily accessible lines of communication.

The Turks would be bound by the rules of conventional warfare.

The Turks would remain ignorant of the predictability of their own defeat.

Shortly before the beginning of World War I, the Turks threw in their lot with the Germans. The British, realizing the threat to their Suez lifeline, tried to take them out by their ill-fated Gallipoli Campaign. The failure at Gallipoli permitted the Turks to strengthen their hold and confirm their leadership over the Ottoman Empire, then in a state of collapse, administratively, but still the stronghold of Islam and all that implied.

Religious Strife

The great boil on the back of the Ankara Moslems embodied itself in the austere orthodox Hejaz Arabs who never ceased to sing the song of successorship to the Prophet and to proclaim spiritual leadership over Islam. The Ankara Government could not hold its loyalty by either persuasion or by force. And so it came about that, after the Turks hanged several sheriffs and imprisoned others, the Arabs went into open revolt, rallying around the green banners of King Husein. The time was June 1916.

With little effort the Arabs captured the twin holy cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina.

The Turks, true believers in the value of properly applied force, responded promptly by sending an army corps down the rails to Medina, which the Arabs relinquished almost as easily as they had acquired it. The second phase of Turkish operations was to push a corps out of Medina to capture Mecca which lay 250 miles beyond their reach, across a railless desert.

Taking that city was another story, and in it lies the story of Lawrence, the first of the modern guerrilla campaigns, and the birth of communications warfare.

The English were not idle. They had high hopes of exploiting the Arab revolt, and they eventually chose Lawrence as their agent to bring this about.

Lawrence was at that time a rather unconventional young staff officer at general headquarters in Cairo, with a well-known background of travel among the Arabs and a deep understanding of their language and customs.

In 1916 Lawrence chose to spend his leave visiting Arabia, where his contacts quickly gained him access to Prince Faisal, who led the Arab Army. Much impressed with Faisal, he returned to Cairo to advise that the revolt could succeed without the aid of British troops, who could ill be spared.

The general staff, delighted with this economy, dispatched Lawrence as liaison officer to Faisal in order to put his ideas into practice. Within two years, Lawrence generated the legend and the facts that after 45 years are still subject to both controversy and admiration.

Situation


The situation Lawrence confronted had no pleasing orientations. The Turks were spread out along the Hejaz Railroad, 800 miles in length which ran parallel to the Red Sea, across the high tableland of Arabia, connecting Damascus in the north with Medina in the south. The Hejaz line was a single track affair, having been built by German engineers from monies collected throughout Islam. Its construction was religious, in that it was built to make the pilgrimage to Mecca possible for much of the Islamic population. The line had been completed in 1908 as far as Medina; its construction to Mecca had been halted by the advent of the war.

In the north, in what is called the Fertile Crescent, a British army faced a Turk-German force determined to fight for every yard of ground. Both sides used the "effusion of blood" principle developed by Foch: this led to a stalemate.

The Germans realized that the Turks were dissipating their forces along the length of the Hejaz line, forces that might well swing the balance of attrition their way. Medina had absolutely no military value, but the Turks insisted on holding the town for religious considerations, completely ignoring that a military victory in the north would give them Medina forever.

The defeat of German and Turkish arms lay in the rails between Damascus and Medina; Lawrence saw it there, and he made it happen.

Conventional thinking on the part of the Arabs was vague and nebulous, calling for some unspecified movement against the Medina Turks. The Turks, however took the initiative and pushed a whole army corps out of that city on a broad front moving toward Mecca. One wing reached for Rabigh on the Red Sea, at which seaport the Arab regular army was in training.



... Lawrence realized that the Arab irregular could neither hold a line nor defend one. Their strength... lay in depth rather than in front.

Lawrence realized that the Arab irregulars could neither hold a line nor defend one. Their strength, he thought, lay in depth rather than in front, and that it had been the threat of an attack by Faisal's men against the northern Turkish flank that had actually inhibited for so many precious weeks the latter's attempt against Mecca. Developing the flank threat, Lawrence and Faisal quit Rabigh, moved north to Wejeh, another Red Sea port, occupied it in January 1917, and set up a new base.

Turning Point

The Arab movement northward threw the Turks into confusion. They canceled their drive against Mecca, returned to Medina, and sprinkled half their strength along the railroad, reinforcing station-garrisons. Although it was not apparent at the time, the movement to Wejeh was the actual turning point in the war. It forced the Turks to create a front almost 800 miles in length. To the Turkish leaders the front gave the appearance of one solid black line, impenetrable and strong; but to the Arabs the front was composed of black dots representing rail garrisons, with the interstices more apparent and meaningful than the dots.

As Lawrence saw it:

For the rest of the war the Turks stood on the defensive and the Arab tribesmen won advantage after advantage till, when peace came, they had taken 35,000 prisoners, killed and wounded and wore out as many, and occupied more than 100 thousand square miles of enemy ground, at little loss to themselves.

By not fighting the Turks, the Hejaz Arabs had been able to gain the initiative and prevent movement against Mecca; the Turks, having little forage for their transport animals, were forced to eat them. Without animals, a foot movement to Mecca was impossible.

Lawrence had seen the essence of Arabian aims as geographical, to occupy all Arabic-speaking lands. Killing Turks was not one of the aims. If the Turks would go quietly, the war would be over; if they refused, they would be driven out, but at the cheapest possible price.

Initially, Arab thinking had been along conventional lines -- begin some sort of movement against the rails, preferably behind Medina, there to bring on a battle that would merely demonstrate the capacity of blood to flow without coming to any real decision. Lawrence was against it, and as persuasively as he could he presented his analysis of war and how that analysis meshed with Arab aims.

Three Elements

Lawrence saw all warfare as a three-element affair: one algebraical; one biological; and one psychological.

Algebraic

The algebraic element dealt with known variables like time, space, geography, climate, transportation, and men in type-masses. In this element Lawrence saw 140,000 square miles of Turkish-occupied ground. He estimated that it would require a minimum of 20 soldiers to hold four square miles, or a total of 600,000 men. As Lawrence conceived it, this conspired to give the Arabs dominance.

Biological


The biological element dealt with wear and tear, with the one element of unpredictable variability -- men and the commanders of men. Lawrence observed that the greatest commander was:

one whose intuitions most nearly happened. Nine-tenths of tactics are certain, and taught in books; but the irrational tenth is like a kingfisher flashing across the pool and that is the test of generals.

Lawrence extended his wear and tear theory to include materials. He knew that the Turks were not strong in them, so that the "death" of a Turkish rail, train, depot, gun or cannon was more important than the death of a Turk. Depriving an enemy of his weapons and sustenance rendered him as useless as if he were, indeed, dead. The Arabs, who could not endure losses in men, were always able to arrange for material superiority in all of their attacks.

Lawrence's theory called for the negation of contact with the enemy. The Arabs were to fight a war of detachment, to contain the enemy by:

the silent threat of a vast unknown, not disclosing ourselves until the moment of the attack. This attack need only be nominal, directed not against his men but against his materials: as it should not seek for his main strength or his weakness, but his most accessible material.



... the silent threat of a vast unknown.

As a working tactic the enemy was to be denied his targets, and thousands of Turkish soldiers in the desert never fired a shot as a result. To avoid being targets, the Arabs developed and maintained a very effective intelligence net. They were always aware of what the enemy was planning and, consequently, were always able to disperse, to evaporate before the Turks arrived. Nonproductive marches and countermarches always subtracted from enemy morale.

Psychological

The psychological elements dealt with the adjustment of the minds of the troops; of the minds of one's enemies; and, wherever possible, of the minds of neutrals and noncombatant populations. Lawrence wrote:

The printing press is the greatest weapon in the armoury of the modern commander . . . a province was won when the civilians in it had been taught to die for the ideal of freedom: the presence of the enemy was of secondary importance.

According to Plan

And so it came about, quite intentionally and according to plan, that the Turks were allowed to maintain themselves in great numbers in every harmless place, including Medina. They felt disposed to concentrate in areas they could effectively dominate. Their confidence was restored by a reduction in Arab guerrilla operations.

As it developed, the Arab strategy was not to destroy the Hejaz Railroad, but to keep it operating at a minimum, with maximum discomfort to the enemy. In short, the Arab attacks on the line were designed to fix the maximum number of Turkish soldiers all along the rails, making it possible for the Arabs to provide an overwhelming force at any single point on the line.

Arab strategy called for a distribution of attacks along the entire Turkish line to lend the appearance of Arab superiority and to force the Turks to build up their rail garrisons beyond a minimum number of men.

As Lawrence stated:

The ratio between area and number determined the character of the war. By having five times the mobility of the Turks, the Arabs could be on terms with them, with one fifth their number.

To Lawrence, battles were impositions on the side which considered itself to be the weaker.

The Arabs were to defend nothing, shoot nothing. Their cards were speed and time, not hitting power, and these gave them strategic rather than tactical strength. Range is more to strategy than force: the invention of bully beef did more to modify land warfare than the invention of gunpowder.

By putting these theories to work, Lawrence's guerrilla forces captured Aqaba, Ta'ila, Azraq, Dera, and finally Damascus. By using the widest distribution of force with the maximum number of raids going at once, the Arabs achieved maximum disorder; it was this that supplied equilibrium to their campaign.

The accomplishments of Lawrence and his guerrilla forces were masked by General Edmund Allenby's conventional breakthrough in the north. Yet for all of Allenby's closeness to the final objective -- Damascus -- it was Lawrence and his men who met him at the gates of the city, having come a much greater distance and overcoming great obstacles. As Allenby's mobile right wing, it was Lawrence who had made the conventional victory in the north possible by tying down thousands of Turks to the Hejaz rails.

The Thesis


Out of this protracted and grueling warfare, Lawrence developed his thesis by which a successful guerrilla war could be waged.

Rebellion must have an unassailable base, something guarded not merely from attack, but from fear of it: such a base as the Arabs had in the Red Sea ports, the deserts, or in the minds of men converted to its creeds. It must have a sophisticated alien enemy, in the form of a disciplined army of occupation too few to fulfill the doctrine of acreage: too few to adjust number to space, in order to dominate the whole effectively from friendly posts. It must have a friendly population, not actively friendly, but sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy. Rebellions can be made by 2% active in a striking force, and 98% positively sympathetic. The few active rebels must have the qualities of speed and endurance, ubiquity and independence of arteries of supply. They must have

the technical equipment to destroy or paralyze the enemies' organized communications, for irregular warfare is fairly Willisen's definition of strategy, "the study of communication" in its extreme degree of attack where the enemy is not.

In fifty words: granted mobility, security (in the form of denying the enemy targets), time and doctrine (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victory will rest with the insurgents, for the algebraical factors are in the end decisive, and against them perfection of means and spirit struggle quite in vain.

For a brief inspection of the tactical and strategic theories and practices used in all of the guerrilla campaigns fought since 1916 shows them to be duplicates of those developed by Lawrence. Where most of the guerrilla wars have failed, namely in the Philippines, Malaya, Greece, and Kenya, the basic conditions for success, if initially present, were absent in the end as the result of aggressive countermeasures, some luck, and bad practice of misapplication.



CHAPTER 8

WORLD WAR II PERIOD

"During a two year period (1943-44) Russian Partisans annihilated some 300,000 Axis troops to include 30 General officers, 6400 other officers and 1500 Airmen."

Department of the
Army Pamphlet
20-230, 1950

Section	
I	RUSSIAN PARTISAN METHODS
II	EAST CENTRAL LUZON GUERRILLA

TAB
HERE

CHAPTER 8
WORLD WAR II PERIOD
Section I

Russian Partisan Methods

The following, taken from Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-230, November 1950, are examples of Russian partisan methods. Generally speaking, Russian partisan groups on the Eastern Front were formed early in 1942. At first they were mainly isolated bands of little strength, frequently dropped from aircraft, operating in rear areas well behind the German front. During the summer of 1942, however, these bands were gradually combined into more closely knit groups, put under a unified command, and continuously reinforced. Accordingly, their operations grew in scope and impact.

Partisan group activities seldom covered areas near the front except when extensive, pathless forests favored their approach. In general, the partisan groups would maneuver in the rear areas of the German armies, in woods and swamps next to highways and railroads. They avoided open territory and regions occupied by German troops, but kept the latter under surveillance.

From the outset the German troops had difficulty defending themselves against this type of warfare. Its effectiveness had been underestimated. Apart from the fact that, considering the vast areas, the German forces were not numerous enough to combat the steadily expanding partisan groups, the frontline troops, which had been trained for orthodox warfare, all lacked experience in antipartisan warfare.

During large-scale enemy break-throughs, or German withdrawals, strong partisan groups frequently managed to coordinate their operations with those of Soviet cavalry, ski units, infiltrated infantry, or paratroops. Substantial German forces (usually several infantry and panzer divisions) had to be mustered in order to combat the joint enemy efforts. Prior to large-scale Russian offensives, strong bands would often migrate to the areas that the Red Army soon hoped to take. Such movements, therefore, gave some indication of Russian intentions. Prior to the beginning of the large-scale Red Army offensive in East Galicia in July 1944, for example, numerous bands worked their way into the Carpathian Mountains south-west of Lwow, which were among the objectives of the Soviet operations.

On the other hand, during each Russian withdrawal, as well as subsequent to battles of encirclement, innumerable soldiers cut off from their own forces, and sometimes entire combat units, made their way to the partisans and fought with them. In such instances, too, partisan activities developed into a serious threat.

During the winter, strong bands, well organized from a military standpoint and commanded by specially trained leaders, developed intense activity in the extensive woodlands of the Eastern Front.

Extracted from Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-230, November 1950



Russian Partisans in the Ukraine during World War II

The bands were generally organized into groupments of from 3,000 to 5,000 men each. As long as the front remained static, these groupments would remain in a fixed location; they were quartered in winter-proofed camps, excellently constructed and heavily guarded. Smaller groups varying greatly in strength, comprised at least 100 men. Attached to each groupment was a number of these smaller partisan groups. They branched out through the entire rear area and frequently were only in loose liaison with the groupment. They constantly changed their position and therefore were difficult to locate in the vast area, which was only sparsely occupied by German troops. They had contact men in all the larger villages of importance to them. Dispersed and cut-off Russian units gave them even tactical striking power. In 1941, for instance, in the area of Army Group Center, 10,000 men under General Kulik operated very skillfully and could not be cornered. Another example was the remnants of the 32d Kazak Division, whose destruction required the commitment of German frontline troops on 6 and 7 August 1941. In 1944, activities of partisans, reinforced by infiltrated troops, had reached such proportions west of the extremely swampy Narva River that the left wing of the northern front (III SS Panzer Corps) had to be pulled back in order to form a shorter and more easily guarded line.

Every camp of the larger partisan groups was secured on all sides -- in some sections to a depth of several hundred yards -- by thick underbrush, brier obstacles, or abatis and wire entanglements. All roads leading to the camp were blocked or camouflaged, or detours were built which led in another direction. Traffic to the camp was conducted on paths known only to the initiated. Sometimes these paths were protected by bodies of water, with crossings built 8 to 12 inches below water level, or by large stretches of swamp which could be crossed only on swamp skis. All movements of strangers were carefully controlled by sentries stationed far from camp and disguised as peasants. Strangers were also kept under close surveillance by a network of spies active in all villages in the vicinity.

The camps were well supplied with weapons, ammunition, explosives, and rations. Only very reliable partisans were put in charge of these supplies.

The camps procured their food supplies by forced requisitions in nearby villages. Villages refusing food contributions were ruthlessly put to the torch by the partisans; the men were dragged into the woods, and the women and children dispersed. Supplies were also

received by aircraft, which dropped the rations in the immediate vicinity of the camp when prearranged light or fire signals were displayed. Looting vehicles during partisan raids likewise provided ammunition and small arms for the bands.

Excellent camouflage prevented any aerial observation of the camps. The shelters were allowed to be heated only at night, so that no smoke would disclose the existence of the camp during the day. The partisans succeeded in maintaining the secrecy of the camps for a long time by having small bands appear in remote villages and by disseminating false rumors concerning partisan movements. The mere suspicion of betrayal was sufficient cause for execution of the suspect. The same fate threatened the family of the condemned. These measures explain why all partisan operations were kept secret. Whoever joined a partisan group, voluntarily or involuntarily, could leave it only at the risk of his life.

The Partisans also had signal communications at their disposal. The larger partisan units received their directives by short-wave radio, so that they had up-to-date information about current military developments in their respective sectors. Air couriers were also used. There was a carefully camouflaged landing place for liaison airplanes in the immediate vicinity of almost every major camp.

Practically without exception partisan operations were carried out at night. Daytime raids seldom took place, and then only in areas in which no German troops were stationed for miles around. Raids of that type were usually confined to individual motor vehicles.

A major partisan operation, with the demolition of a railroad bridge as its objective, would proceed as follows: A long column of women and children would move along the right of way in the direction of the bridge. Presuming them to be refugees, the German sentry would take no action. When the head of the column had reached the bridge, heavy surprise fire was directed against the bridgehead from the end of the column. Machine guns, set up on the roadbed in the direction of the bridge, pinned down the German guards. Under this fire cover, and by utilizing women and children in violation of international law, the partisans succeeded in installing prepared demolition charges and in destroying the bridge.

Partisan operations generally included mining main highways, demolition of railroad tracks, mining railroad beds and arming the mines with push and pull igniters, surprise fire attacks on trains, looting derailed railroad cars, raids on trucks and convoys, and burning ration, ammunition, and fuel depots. Less frequent were raids on command posts of higher German headquarters.

The partisans followed the practice of avoiding open combat as much as possible. This practice was indeed the guiding rule upon which their method of warfare was based. Unusual developments at the front would immediately result in extremely lively partisan activity, essentially aimed at the disruption and destruction of railroad lines. During a major German attack, for instance, the main line of a railroad that had to handle the supplies for three German armies was blasted at two thousand points in a single night and so effectively disrupted that all traffic was stalled for several days. Such large-scale operations, carried out by small partisan teams and numerous individuals, at times seriously hampered the supply of the German troops.

Section II

EAST CENTRAL LUZON GUERRILLA

Organization

Long before the final fall of Bataan, scattered elements of the USAFFE (United States Army Forces in the Far East) cut off from their units in Northern Luzon banded together and started guerrilla warfare with the support of patriotic civilians. In January 1942 Lieutenant Colonel Nakar and several other Filipino officers were already operating north of Pangasinan along with various other scattered groups led either by an American or a Filipino. In February 1942, General Mac Arthur sent Lieutenant Colonel Thorpe, 26th Cavalry, PS (Philippine Scouts), from Bataan through enemy lines, charged with the mission of coordinating, integrating, organizing, and intensifying guerrilla activities. Traveling through the mountains, Colonel Thorpe's small party arrived in the area of Mt. Pinatubo (behind the enemy's main line) in the latter part of March 1942. Early in April 1942, a second party reached Colonel Thorpe's camp, sent out of Bataan by boat to establish radio communications with Colonel Thorpe and to engage in an intelligence mission. Upon the fall of Bataan, several other American and Filipino officers who escaped capture by the Japanese joined Colonel Thorpe who then drew up the general plans and policies for organizing the USAFFE Luzon Guerrilla Army Forces. Armed with the authority granted him by General Mac Arthur, Colonel Thorpe appointed and inducted additional guerrillas, issued General and Special Orders which subdivided Luzon into four areas, and initially assigned commanders as follows:

1. North Luzon Guerrilla Area, comprising all the provinces north of Nueva Ecija, Tayabas, and Pangasinan, under Major Ralph Praeger, 26th Cavalry, PS (he was captured by the enemy in September 1943 and Major Volckman, 11th Division, inherited the command, including the units organized separately by Lieutenant Colonels Moses and Noble who were also captured by the enemy).
2. West Central Luzon Guerrilla Area, comprising the province of Zambales under Captain Maguire, Corps of Engineers.
3. Southern Luzon Guerrilla Area, comprising the provinces south of Manila under Captain Jack Spies, 26th Cavalry, PS, who was killed while en route to his assignment.
4. East Central Luzon Guerrilla Area (ECLGA), comprising the provinces of Pangasinan, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, Pampanga, Bulacan, Bataan, and all of Manila and suburbs. Captain Joseph Barker II, 26th Cavalry, PS (executive officer of Colonel Thorpe), was ordered to organize and command the East Central Luzon Guerrilla Area including Manila.

The staff of ECLGA then consisted of:

Captain J. Barker II, 26th Cavalry, Commanding Officer.
First Lieutenant E. P. Ramsey, 26th Cavalry, Adjutant.
First Lieutenant R. B. Lapham, Inspector General of Pangasinan and Nueva Ecija.
Captain B. L. Anderson (who reported later in June 1942), Commander of Bulacan.

Shortly after assuming command of ECLGA, Captain Barker unsuccessfully attempted to contact Colonel Straughn, USA, retired, who was leading an independent unit in Laguna, south of Manila. Captain Barker, disguised as a priest, would go in and out of Manila while conferring with Filipino supporters and guerrilla leaders. He was finally captured by the

Reprint from the March 1946 issue of the Military Review, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, by Colonel A. N. Bautista, Philippine Army.

Japanese on 11 January 1943 and was forthwith succeeded by his Adjutant, then 1st Lieutenant E. P. Ramsey, who proceeded to carry on the work of organizing and consolidating guerrilla units in the area and appointed officers to replace those captured with Captain Barker. On or about March 1943, Lieutenant Ramsey was informed of his promotion to Major via the Northern Luzon Area radio set, then operated by Major Praeger.

In accordance with the plan laid out by Colonel Thorpe, the Luzon guerrillas were recruited in the following manner:

1. Each province in the four main areas into which Luzon was subdivided was organized as a military district with a commander duly selected and appointed by Colonel Thorpe and/or the area commander. The district commander selected and appointed his staff (organized along divisional staff sections) and the regimental commanders; the latter similarly organized his regimental staff and appointed battalion commanders; and thus the selection and induction of officers was made down to platoon leaders who in turn picked their own platoon sergeants and squad leaders. The squad leader was the man who really recruited the privates of the squad. Consequently, members of the squad did not know one another and knew only the squad leader; the latter only knew the platoon sergeant and his lieutenant; the platoon leader knew only the captain, and so on to higher command.
2. Except those actively on duty with district G2 and regimental and battalion S2 sections, all guerrillas remained in their homes and kept their normal occupations, but received secret instructions and circulars from higher headquarters.
3. Unit commanders, down to squad leaders, devised ways and means to check on the loyalty, determination, and courage of the prospective guerrilla members.
4. All guerrilla members worked gratuitously and were not allowed to bring their families with them on active duty with their unit.
5. Appointments and promotions of officers and men were subject to confirmation by the area commander.
6. District court-martials, patterned after the USA court-martial, tried and sentenced military offenders.
7. Pseudonyms were assumed by every guerrilla for further security. Directed and guided by a staff of experienced USA and USAFFE officers, the ECLGA had a total strength of 28,400, of which 21,000 were recognized, paid, and equipped by USAFFE (now AFPAC) (Armed Forces of the Pacific), and attached for combat operations as follows.

Sixth Army: I Corps - 8,000
 XIV Corps - 6,000
 XI Corps - 5,000
 Signal Base Depot - 2,500

Operations

Before the liberation of Luzon, the main mission was intelligence. Organization of combat units was conducted secretly and the regiments were inactive. A training school for officers was conducted in each district headquarters for highly selected guerrilla officers who had no military background and had demonstrated leadership and loyalty to the cause. The Manila District school was located at not more than fifteen miles from the heart of the city of Manila and within a few miles from a Jap garrison in the hills of Novaliches, Rizal.

Most of the instructors were graduates of the Philippine Military Academy, and consequently guerrilla student officers underwent a hazing and toughening process continuously while absorbing training in minor tactics and techniques of infantry, sabotage, intelligence, and counter-intelligence. Equipment, supplies, and funds for operations previous to the landing of American Forces of Liberation were obtained mainly through voluntary subscriptions by the people. This was supplemented by raiding Jap depots, warehouses, truck convoys, and trains -- the usual source of firearms and ammunition for Luzon guerrillas. It was operationally impossible to receive arms and equipment from Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) until after the liberation of Pangasinan.

Intelligence Activities. -- The Intelligence Unit of ECLGA was centrally controlled and coordinated. District G2 and regimental and battalion S2 sections operated in their territories. Agencies operating under ECLGA G2 provided means for counterchecking, sifting, collating, and evaluating information of immediate operational importance, such as enemy identifications and land, air, and sea movements; furnished data essential to long-range planning; and counter-intelligence. The Intelligence network, spread out in Manila, Pangasinan, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija, Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Rizal, and Cavite, supplied vital information on the enemy's installations, concentrations, strength, and dispositions, locations of airfields, dispersal area, depots, factories, axis of communication, identifications of units, movement on land, air, and sea, tactics, and order of battle. Coverage was for twenty-four hours, operatives working in pairs. Information was transmitted to area headquarters within twenty-four hours by couriers and/or radio. Area G2 collated and evaluated all the information and decided which was to be transmitted to General Headquarters, SWPA, over the radio. Periodic reports, together with captured enemy documents, maps, and sketches, were dispatched by couriers who hitch-hiked to Batangas or Tayabas Bay to catch sailboats for Mindinao and Panay, where copies of the reports were delivered to Colonels Fertig and Peralta, respectively, for transmission to SWPA. Close liaison was maintained with other guerrilla units in Luzon and Visayas. However, since October 1944, when area G2 established contact with Lieutenant Commander George Rowe, USNR, Commanding the SWPA Advance Department that landed by submarine in Mindinao in July 1944, all periodic reports and enemy documents and materiel, as well as USA pilots who were shot down and recovered in ECLGA, were sent to Mindinao.

The main radio station and General Headquarters, ECLGA, were installed on Mt. Balagbag, overlooking Manila Bay, San Mateo, Novaliches, Montalban, and Ipo (towns surrounding Manila). Aircraft warnings and naval sighting stations were maintained and operated here with the aid of a telescope. Movements of vessels in Manila Bay, and pinpoint observations on effects of Allied bombings were instantly radioed to SWPA. Less powerful radio sets operated at mobile advance observation posts in Novaliches and San Mateo and in district headquarters tied in with General Headquarters, ECLGA, at Mt. Balagbag. The Mountain Corps Regiment furnished security around the base of Mt. Balagbag and handled the logistical requirements of General Headquarters, ECLGA. Gasoline for the battery chargers was sneaked out weekly from a sealed warehouse guarded by a Jap sentry in Montalban in five-gallon tins. One guerrilla squirmed through an opening in the rear and the Japanese never noticed that the drums of gasoline were being emptied by rubber hose siphon into five-gallon tins.


It is interesting to point out at this juncture that Montalban, San Mateo, Novaliches, Marikina (towns below and around Mt. Balagbag) were strongly garrisoned by the enemy. It was quite a feat to smuggle not only gasoline but much needed Class I supplies past the thick cordon of sentries and rowing patrols up to General Headquarters, ECLGA. Night and day vigilance was kept at strategic points by the guerrillas, but the Japs finally determined the location of the station in December 1944 only upon the breakdown of several civilians and guerrillas arrested in various raids on our advance command posts in San Mateo, Novaliches, and Manila.

Attempts by the enemy to assault the General Headquarters, ECLGA, from December 1944 to January 1945, employing 500 infantry, military police, and blood-hounds, were repulsed. Two reconditioned caliber .50 machineguns salvaged from the Gruman Fighter of Ensign Woods (who was shot down in that vicinity in October 1944) were mounted on top of a commanding hill covering the avenues of approach. Time and again the Japs suffered casualties in attempting to raid General Headquarters. Even after they had placed a strong cordon around us, arrested and tortured civilians found in the area, burned houses, and abused women suspected of guerrilla activities, we were able to dismantle and transfer the station, including all records down to the Leprosarium in Novaliches in the later part of January 1945. The Leprosarium, which was avoided by the Japs, was a haven to guerrillas. The lepers were really not there any more, having escaped and moved to other houses in the vicinity. Guerrillas wounded in skirmishes with the Japs were treated at the Leprosarium where one concrete building was reserved for guerrillas. In fact, the employees were guerrillas too.

Particular attention is drawn to intelligence operations in Manila and suburbs right under the vigilant watch of the Kempei-Tai and in a territory infested with enemy troops and spies. The largest counterintelligence net of the ECLGA also operated inside Manila. Operatives worked as laborers and employees in airfields, railroad terminals, shipping yards, Port Area, government offices, factories, and Japanese Military Administration offices, including Fort Santiago; rendering daily reports on their missions; took census of salient details of installations, seizing or duplicating secret maps and sketches; determining the enemy's intentions; traced his communication lines; studied his tactics and methods; evaluated his equipment; and at opportune times, sabotaged his installations and liquidated his counterintelligence agents. During the Leyte campaign, this net successfully identified enemy units, including high-ranking commanders, dispatched to Leyte as reinforcements. Daring intelligence agents rubbed elbows with the Japanese military police, and in this role they helped in the rescue of apprehended guerrillas and gave timely warning of possible raids on guerrilla headquarters by the enemy. Prior to the battle of Manila when Japanese counterespionage activities reached threatening proportions, operatives laboring under extremely precarious and hazardous circumstances stuck to their assignments at the risk, and in many cases, the cost, of their lives, and turned in detailed and highly reliable information on the enemy's defense plans in Manila, supplemented by maps and sketches of pillboxes and foxholes; street barricades; mined streets, bridges, and buildings; gun emplacements; troop strength, dispositions, and movements; and other tactical information. From September, 1944, when the first Allied air raid struck at Manila, the Manila Intelligence Unit played an enviable role in spotting enemy air defenses and maneuvers, plane disposition area, naval activities, troop billets, and potential military installations, contributing largely to the accurate bombing and the subsequent destruction of military objectives in and around the city. Casualties among the operatives were heavy and many were tortured to death by the Kempei-Tai, all in line of duty - also unhonored, unsung, and unpaid.

Sabotage Activities. --Directives issued by ECLGA Headquarters coordinated sporadic raids and sabotage activities, although seriously handicapped by lack of arms and materials. Sabotage machines were improvised and made in Mt. Balagbag from chemicals and local materials smuggled from Manila and slipped through the strict vigilance of the enemy. Intrepid saboteurs swam to enemy vessels anchored at Manila Bay on 16 June 1944 and managed to set afire a tanker loaded with gasoline. The fire spread out to a transport and cruiser anchored nearby. In Pangasinan, Pampanga, Bataan, Bulacan, Rizal, and Tarlac, enemy communication lines were tampered with, small patrols were ambushed, supply dumps were raided, bridges were burned, and rice stock and alcohol of the "BIBA" (the rice procurement agency of the Laurel puppet government) were diverted to guerrilla with the aid of USAFFE officers holding key positions in the "BIBA", as directed by ECLGA G2, who held a ranking position there and directed operations from inside Manila with utmost secrecy until the Japs were informed of his real identity with ECLGA in July 1944. Arms were obtained by raiding enemy dumps or small garrisons and waylaying army trucks. On 25 July 1944 a steamship anchored

at Pasig River; loaded with rice, crude oil, and other supplies, was set afire. On 15 July 1944 parts of Piers 5 and 7 were burned, as well as some bodegas of the National Development Company and the Philippine Refining Company.



Filipino Guerrillas Using Captured Japanese Weapons Wait to Ambush the Enemy

Propaganda Activities. --These consisted of dissemination of news broadcasts from San Francisco and the "Voice of Freedom," posting wrappers from American-made chocolate bars with the words "I SHALL RETURN - MAC ARTHUR" and typewritten thereon "COMPLIMENTS OF THE VOICE OF THE MISGUIDED ELEMENTS" on billboards, inside toilets of first-class theaters, and on street cars, busses, and other places on 20 June 1944. On or about 15 June 1944, a large sign was written in charcoal on a bulletin board inside Fort Santiago, reading "WARNING - THE AMERICANS ARE COMING."

Combat Activities. --Immediately upon the return of area G2 from a Mindinao rendezvous with Lieutenant Commander Rowe in October 1944, warning orders were issued to all inactive units of ECLGA outlining detailed operations on D-day, to be synchronized with SWPA landing operations in Luzon. Thus ECLGA combat elements entered the picture on the day Sixth Army landed in Pangasinan. ECLGA units in Pangasinan, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija, Bataan, and Pampanga readily reported to beachheads and assisted actively in combat operations of Sixth Army. We were engaged with the enemy in Meycauayan, Bulacan (where General Headquarters, ECLGA, was established) three days before the 37th Division advance guard reached that town. Bypassed enemy pockets of resistance, especially in Bulacan, Rizal, and Manila, were mopped up by ECLGA troops. Generals Krueger and Kenney selected trained "Ranger" units of ECLGA for their bodyguard troops.

CHAPTER 9
COLD WAR PERIOD

"Treachery...surprise - these are essential...hit and run, lie in ambush, again hit and run...without giving any rest to the enemy."

Che Guevara
1960

Section	
I	GUERRILLA WAR IN GREECE, 1946-49: A CASE STUDY
II	INDOCHINA - THE LAST YEAR OF THE WAR - THE NAVARRE PLAN
III	ROYAL MARINES - ACTION IN MALAYA
IV	BULLETS ALONE WON'T WIN

TAB
HERE

CHAPTER 9

COLD WAR PERIOD

Section I

GUERRILLA WAR IN GREECE, 1946-49: A CASE STUDY

Ten years ago the Soviet Union, through the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), turned to military pressure in an attempt to extend its influence and control to the Mediterranean. Had the effort been successful, a satellite Greece would have appeared in the Soviet orbit and a centuries old dream of Russian rulers — outflanking the Turkish Straits — would have been realized. In addition, Crete, the largest of the Greek Islands, occupying a strategic position in the eastern Mediterranean 200 miles off the North Africa Coast, would have provided an excellent base for continued unconventional warfare operations against the Middle East complex.

Other than its geographical position, Greece possesses none of the elements which a foreign power could consider as valuable war potential. Natural resources are largely underdeveloped and limited in variety, while Greek industrial capacity is small and, by western standards, technologically backward. The land area, about 50,000 square miles, is only one-fourth arable and is insufficient to support the population of under eight million.



Reprinted from the June 1957 issue of the Military Review, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, by Lt Col Edward R. Wainhouse.

THE RUGGED ARENA

Terrain, which is an influencing factor in any type of military operation, is of critical importance in the conduct of guerrilla warfare. Craggy, mountainous terrain with crude roads and poor communications is ideally suited for guerrilla operations. Forests, swamps, jungles, marshes, and similar geographical features which reduce the mobility of and hamper control by conventional forces provide the required protection and strongholds for guerrilla units. In areas of this type heavy weapons, artillery, and air support are considerably reduced in effectiveness.

The mountains of Greece cover more than two-thirds of the mainland and in normal times are the homes of about 40 percent of the population. The remainder of the population is concentrated in cities with about one-seventh of the entire population living in the Athens-Piraeus area. There are no large towns in the mountain areas, but the land supports small groups in widely separated villages. Few areas are uninhabitable but there is usually grazing for sheep and goats, and from these animals and the poor soil the mountain dwellers eke out a bare existence.

Of the major mountain masses in Greece, the Pindus range, extending from the Albanian frontier southeastward to the Gulf of Corinth, forms the central core and largest area of sparse population.

The second important massif, the Kaimakchalan-Vermion-Olympos, runs in a semicircular arc along the western coast of the Gulf of Thermai (Salonika). The third is the southern end of the Rhodope range, which lies between the Strimon and Nestos Rivers in Macedonia, and drops sharply to the plain bordering the Aegean Sea south of Bulgaria.

The interior road net in Greece is a primitive one. Consequently, the towns guarding the mountain passes are of special importance in the planning and execution of operations. Examples are Metsovon, which guards the pass on the road from Ioannina to Kalabaka, and Karpenision, astride the road from Lamia to Agrinion.

Topographically then, the country provides almost optimum conditions for waging guerrilla warfare.



...Topographically then, the country provides almost optimum conditions for waging guerrilla warfare.

STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS

Three basic strategic requirements must be met in the conduct of successful guerrilla warfare. The first basic requirement is to ensure the support — material, moral, ideological, and psychological — of a large part of the population, guerrilla troops are faced with almost insurmountable difficulties in recruiting, intelligence and information collection, and supply. Without a doubt there is a decided advantage to the guerrilla force if this support by the population is voluntary and enthusiastic. However, this support can, if necessary, be induced by widespread measures of terror and repression.

Although the extent to which the Greek population supported the Communist guerrilla movement during 1946-49 cannot be validated, there was, at least initially, a great degree of sympathy for the Communist Party of Greece. This sympathy had been generated by the activities of the KKE's World War II military arm, ELAS (National People's Liberation Army), during the German occupation.



...the interior road net in Greece is a primitive one.

By the end of 1943 the ELAS forces had about 20,000 guerrillas and a highly organized underground which had been trained and in operation even during its period of suppression prior to World War II. The prewar organizations of the KKE were abundant and included not only hardcore Communists but sympathizers representing almost the entire spectrum of national life and culture. The Communist Party thus afforded the Greek people a multiplicity of organizations in which membership was possible for people in almost all age, sex, occupational, and social categories. The list of Party controlled organizations listed below shows the Communist facility for achieving unity among population elements of diverse personal interests.

PARTY CONTROLLED ORGANIZATIONS

AKE — Communist Agricultural Party
DAS — Democratic People's Army (post-World War II guerrilla organization)
EAM — National Liberation Front (during German occupation)
ELAS — National People's Liberation Army (military arm of EAM)
EPON — Communist Youth Organization
ERGAS — Communist Labor Organization
ETA — Supply Organization of the DAS
KEN — Seamen's Partisan Committee
KKE — Communist Party of Greece
KOEN — Communist Organization of Aegean Macedonia
KOSSA — Communist Organization of the Army and Security Corps
(secret cells inside the Greek National Army)
NOF — Slav-Macedonian Organization (promoting Macedonian independence)
OENO — Maritime Organization
OPLA — Protective Organization of the People's Fight
PDEG — Democratic Women's Organization of Greece

MUST HAVE LOGISTIC SUPPORT

The second basic requirement for the successful employment of guerrilla forces is continuous logistical support from outside the area of operations. Since guerrilla forces do not maintain or operate the extensive industrial facilities required for the manufacture of arms, ammunition, technical equipment, and critical expendables such as demolitions and explosives, their ability to conduct offensive operations is dependent upon an uninterrupted supply of war materiel from allied sources.

This second strategic requirement initially was solved by the Greek guerrilla forces through the logistical support given them by the Communists and allowed to flow into Greece from her Communist neighbors — Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. This logistical support included not only clothing, rations, arms, and ammunition, but training camps, transit areas, replacement centers, field hospitals, and supply depots, all easily accessible in safe areas across the northern borders.

The third basic requirement necessary in order to realize the objective of guerrilla warfare (to assist in the attainment of ultimate victory) is the close coordination of operations between guerrilla forces and conventional forces. The closer and more efficient this operational coordination, the greater will be the military advantages accruing to both forces. The Greek guerrilla forces fought as an independent military organization which could not consolidate its military gains because of the nature of the type of warfare in which it was engaged. Having failed to meet the third basic requirement, the guerrilla forces were forced to rely on attaining ultimate victory through political strategy. The objective was to demonstrate the Greek Government's inability to maintain law and order and to emphasize the deteriorating economic conditions stemming from the conflict, thereby forcing the government to sue for a cessation of hostilities on terms dictated by the guerrilla high command.

PRELUDE TO VIOLENCE

Following the surrender of Italy in September 1943 many Italian occupation units in Greece, at the urging of British agents in contact with them, moved into the mountain areas supposedly to cooperate as Allies of the Greek resistance forces. Instead, they were disarmed by ELAS forces. In this way the Communist guerrillas were able to build up sizable stocks of arms, ammunition, and equipment.

In October 1944 German forces withdrew from Greece and the Greek Government-in-Exile, composed of representatives from the major political parties, including KKE, returned from Cairo to Athens. General Sir Ronald MacKenzie Scobie, Commander of Allied Forces in Greece, which consisted mainly of British and a few Greek units, ordered the disbandment of all resistance groups. The ELAS forces refused to comply with this order and their political representatives resigned from the government on 2 December. The surface political unity was broken and on the following day an armed revolt by ELAS forces broke out in Athens. For two months civil war raged but the KKE was defeated in its attempt to seize control of the government. On 12 February 1945 the Communists and the newly formed government reached an agreement which ended the short but bloody uprising.

KKE leaders and commanders of the ELAS forces left Greece and took refuge in Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. Other groups of ELASites took to the mountains and formed small bands which conducted sporadic harassing activities in the countryside. The reestablishment of the monarchy in 1946 was followed by an acceleration in Communist guerrilla activity aimed at disrupting the internal security and economic rehabilitation of Greece.

FOLLOWED FAMILIAR PATTERN

As in other European countries where the aftermath of World War II found the population destitute and ideologically confused, conditions in Greece offered a fertile area for the spread of communism. The three and one-half years of the German occupation of Greece were a record of despair — collaboration, inflation, hunger, oppression — and the political-economic, and social disintegration of a population subjected to the total impact of the "Urbarmensch" philosophy.

From its inception in 1942 the Communist guerrilla movement, organized and directed by hard-core Party members, attracted a motley collection of blind idealists, political opportunists, regenerate criminals, and misled individuals who honestly thought the KKE could alleviate the occupation and, later, the postwar misery of Greece.

During 1947 the guerrilla forces conducted small-scale operations, concentrating their efforts on an intensive recruiting campaign in the rural areas. The campaign was aimed at acquiring volunteers but also carried out a considerable number of forced abductions. By the end of the year Communist-led guerrilla forces in Greece totaled approximately 23,000 armed troops, of whom 20 percent were women, with about 8,000 armed replacements in training centers in the neighboring Soviet satellites. "General" Markos Vafiades, who had been political commissar of the ELAS forces, was made commander in chief of the postwar guerrilla forces.

GOVERNMENT MEASURES WEAK

During the early stages of the guerrilla rebellion, the countermeasures undertaken by the Greek Government and Greek National Army (GNA) failed to have any significant effect on reducing the offensive activities of the guerrilla forces. Basically, the reason for this failure was attributable to political interference in the deployment of the GNA. Influential politicians in Athens insisted on "adequate protection" for the areas which they represented. Under this pressure the GNA had dissipated its tactical capabilities by piecemeal deployment of most of its available units to the static defense of towns and villages throughout the country. In addition, when military commanders found it necessary to redeploy any of their units they had to seek authority through channels with final approval retained by the Greek General Staff.

In a politico-military situation of this type it was practically impossible for field commanders to adhere to the basic principles of war. The principles specifically violated were

those of unity of command, mass, economy of force, maneuver, and, above all, the offensive. It was under these conditions which destroyed the GNA's initiative that the guerrilla forces, capably and fanatically led, were able to carry out their program of systematic devastation.

By the end of 1947 the guerrilla reign of terror had forced approximately 700,000 people of the farm population to flee to the larger cities for protection, further seriously complicating an already deteriorating political and military situation. The problem of providing shelter and food for these refugees was a tremendous economic burden on a nation which was already extremely short of dwellings and food supplies.

THE ARMED CONFLICT

During 1946 and 1947 the guerrilla bands scattered throughout Greece, each numbering 50-100 in strength, periodically descended from their mountain hideouts and carried out harassing raids against unprotected villages in order to collect food and clothing, recruit personnel, extort funds, sabotage lines of communication, and produce a general disruption of movement throughout the country. At this stage of the guerrilla campaign the Communist units were lightly equipped and seldom concentrated in large formations. They adhered largely to the three principles of successful guerrilla operations — surprise, shock action, and mobility.

Although the GNA had carried out a number of small-scale clearing operations during 1947, these only succeeded in pushing the guerrilla from one area to another, and in the north the guerrillas would simply escape into Communist satellite territory, subsequently reappearing in another part of Greece.

As in the case with any type of combat force, the guerrillas were faced with the problem of replacing losses in personnel, equipment, and supplies. Personnel losses were replaced through three principal sources:

1. The KKE supplied volunteers from among its members and sympathizers throughout Greece, especially from the larger cities where the underground's ability to operate is greatly enhanced.
2. Slav-Macedonian elements along the northern border areas, motivated by the hope of an autonomous Macedonia, supplied the recruits and formed a few small combat units of ethnic homogeneity.
3. Forced recruiting and abduction of villagers. Guerrilla raiders obtained the "cooperation" of the abductee by threat of death for him and his family should he attempt to escape or show lack of enthusiasm in combat.

Originally, the guerrillas obtained arms and ammunition from two sources: First, from Allied air drops made to the ELAS forces operating in the mountains of Greece during the German occupation, and second, from the disarmed Italian units following Italian surrender during World War II, and from German army supplies which the guerrillas were given in exchange for permitting an unhampered withdrawal of German forces from Greece in October 1944. The replacement of arms and ammunition during the postwar period of guerrilla operations was accomplished through logistical support by way of Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria.

SOUND INTELLIGENCE NET

In the field of intelligence the guerrilla combat forces were aided by "self-defense" or informer personnel in most of the populated centers of Greece. These "self-defense" personnel operated clandestinely through local "YIAFKA's" or cells, into an excellent intelligence

net which kept the guerrilla forces informed of all GNA movements. In addition to their information function, YIAFKA members collected funds, carried out supply and recruiting activities, and were used to effect reprisals against individuals suspected of aiding the Greek Government forces in any way. At the end of 1947 "self-defense" personnel throughout Greece were estimated at about 50,000 with some 750,000 more sympathizers, some in high political positions, aiding the Communist cause in varying degrees.

Supply operations for support of guerrilla forces in the interior of Greece were difficult and hazardous because of terrain, distance, and possible interception by the GNA. The guerrillas solved the problem adequately by using pack animal trains moving mainly at night. Interior supply operations also were organized around guerrilla area units with an average strength of 56 to 60 men. The area units had the missions of collecting and forwarding information, concentrating and guarding food and ammunition caches, providing clothing, and arranging for the care of sick or wounded guerrillas. These area units were prohibited from leaving their area of responsibility and, consequently, during clearing operations by the GNA the units would split up into small groups and remain hidden in their areas until the situation permitted the resumption of activities.

At the beginning of 1948 there were 182,000 government troops in the field, supported by two Spitfire squadrons of the Greek Air Force, against 23,000 guerrillas without air support. Terrain obstacles and the impossibility of sealing the northern borders of Greece were the principal reasons an armed force of this size had to be organized to conduct an antiguerrilla campaign.

To provide coordinated operational and logistical advice to the Greek Armed Forces, a Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) under the United States Army Group was established in December 1947.

GUERRILLA TACTICS SOUND

As a result of the combined efforts of the Greek General Staff and JUSMAPG, by the spring of 1948 the GNA was able to begin a series of planned major operations against guerrilla strongholds. In spite of well-conducted offensive which had cleaned out a number of guerrilla infested areas and reportedly cost the guerrillas 32,000 casualties in killed, captured, and surrendered, the total number of guerrillas in Greece at the end of the year remained about 23,000. Intensive forced recruiting inside Greece netted approximately 24,000 civilians. By virtue of this and the influx of reserves and recovered wounded from the border countries, the guerrilla high command managed to replace its losses during 1948.

The guerrillas had fought tenaciously and efficiently. Their tactics, ideally suited to the terrain, generally were of two types — the defense, for a limited time only, of an important area; and the hit-and-run raids of roving units.

In the limited time defense of an area, an outer ring (or outpost line of resistance) and an inner ring (or main line of resistance) were organized. These lines consisted of machinegun pillboxes dug into the ground and covered with 3 to 10 layers of logs with dirt filler in between. These pillboxes were mutually supporting, particularly at places where there were few, narrow avenues of approach to the defended position. In coordination with this area of defense, guerrilla saboteur squads operated in the rear of GNA lines mining roads and rail nets, destroying bridges and telephone communications, and ambushing supply columns. Guerrilla leaders placed great stress on the use of saboteurs and snipers for operations in areas under GNA control.

RAIDS CAREFULLY PLANNED

In the hit-and-run raid the roving guerrilla forces of the interior assembled two or more units at some distance from the objective. The number of units depended on the scope of the operation to be carried out. By a forced march of up to 10 hours, and carefully avoiding observation, these units reached their objective and attacked, usually at night. Good intelligence had supplied the attackers with a plan of the town defenses, locations of the home of Nationalist sympathizers, important government and public service installations, military headquarters, factories, well-stocked shops, and a list of recruitable persons. The bulk of the guerrilla force would attack and enter the town while supporting detachments isolated the town by mining approach roads and trails, blowing up bridges and rail lines in the vicinity, and occupying commanding heights outside the town in order to prevent the arrival of any GNA reinforcements. When the attacking force withdrew it left behind burned and gutted houses, government installations, utilities, factories, and shops. Lying murdered where the guerrillas left them were the Nationalist sympathizers and their families.

Despite the fact that the guerrillas at the end of 1948 still were 23,000 strong, the initiative had passed to the GNA and a confident, more experienced and better trained national army was ready to launch its offensive in the spring of 1949.

GUERRILLA STRATEGY CHANGED

Toward the end of 1948 the KKE realized that its initial objective of destroying the Greek economy was doomed to failure so long as US aid to Greece continued. Therefore, to attain its final goal of seizing power, its immediate objective became the delivery of a decisive blow against the major obstacle — the Greek National Army. Consequently, in November 1948 the guerrilla high command reorganized its units along conventional lines with unit designations to include brigades, divisions, and corps. The brigade totaled 600 to 800 men, with a division consisting of two or three brigades, and a corps of two or three divisions.

Shortly after this reorganization General Markos was relieved as supreme commander of the guerrilla forces. Based on what is known of the internal political struggle in the KKE at the time, it is probable that Markos' relief from command was due to his differences with Nikos Zachariades, secretary general of the KKE, who succeeded him as supreme commander. These differences concerned the strategy of resistance, with Markos favoring the retention of small unit operations, while Zachariades insisted on meeting the GNA forces in large-scale attack.

The key to the success of the guerrilla until 1949 was due largely to the excellent operation of their intelligence net which provided them the information necessary to determine when and where to engage GNA forces. However, in each of the series of successful operations executed by the GNA in 1949, army and police security forces took steps to destroy or render inoperable the guerrilla intelligence net in an area prior to the start of any operation. This involved the arrest and temporary internment of known Communist sympathizers or suspected informers. As a result the armed guerrillas, operating without their "eyes and ears," could no longer avoid surprise attacks by GNA units. Guerrilla leaders and their forces were killed or captured in a number of quickly executed GNA operations beginning in the Peloponnese and working north toward the satellite borders.

Two noteworthy operations, carried out in August 1949, involved the destruction of the major guerrilla strongholds in the Vitsi area and Grammos mountain area of northwestern Greece. The guerrilla high command had made the strategic error of deciding to hold and defend these areas along conventional lines. The result was destruction of the bulk of guerrilla forces in Vitsi and Grammos. Those guerrilla remnants which escaped into Albania could no

longer be reconstituted as an effective fighting force. By the end of 1949 a few small, starving, and desperate guerrilla bands were left in the mountains, their entire effort directed toward survival. They were militarily incapable of any significant activity. The KKE had failed in its objective to bring a satellite Greece into the Soviet orbit. As an anticlimax the "Free Greek Government" announced that it had ceased to continue further operations in order to save Greece from destruction. This hypocritical explanation was motivated entirely by the desire to sugar-coat the very bitter pill of defeat.


CONCLUSION

International communism, operating in the Greek arena, used all of the typical stratagems of unconventional warfare in its drive for power — misleading Party names and alliances, "united front" association with worthy causes, organization of clandestine cells of hardcore members, infiltration and attempted subversion of the armed forces and government ministries, industrial violence and sabotage, espionage for foreign powers, and the stratagem of desperation: armed insurrection.

The failure of the KKE in its postwar bid for control of Greece was the cumulative effect of a number of factors, not the least of which were the Communists' fallacious evaluation of the psychological factors inherent in this type of warfare and their organizational and operational blunders such as reorganization into conventional, identifiable units which reduced mobility and tended to dictate conventional warfare. Other important factors, generally beyond the control of the KKE, were: Yugoslav denial (beginning in the spring of 1949) of supply routes into northern Greece; improved capabilities of the Greek Army as a result of US training and logistic support; and the gradual replacement of old and incompetent Greek division commanders by more capable officers.

The war in Greece was a civil war, for the most part conducted on the KKE side through guerrilla operations designed to harass, delay, and disrupt the military operations of the Greek Army. If such a people's war is to be successful, it must appeal to the fundamental political, moral, and ethical values of the people among whom it is waged. An intensive psychological warfare campaign must precede, and be conducted concurrently with, guerrilla warfare operations if the necessary support of a significant segment of the population is to be obtained. To maintain this support the tendency toward blind excesses of terror and destruction must be avoided at all costs, as this will finally lead to complete alienation of the populace.

Who can say what the course and duration of the war would have been had the Communists earned the voluntary support of a significant segment of the Greek people in the areas of their guerrilla operations? Instead, the KKE and its guerrilla forces resorted to indiscriminate repine, extortions, assassinations, reprisals, abductions, arson, and terrorism which contributed a great deal toward sealing the military doom of the Communist guerrilla campaign in Greece.



Section II

INDOCHINA — THE LAST YEAR OF THE WAR — THE NAVARRE PLAN


While a previous article (MILITARY REVIEW, October 1955) dealt with the organization and tactics of the Communists in Indochina, this article will attempt to describe briefly the operations of the French Union Forces during the fateful 1953-54 period which led to the disaster of Dien Bien Phu and the cease-fire at Geneva in July 1954.

In brief, the problem that faced every French field commander in Indochina since the outbreak of hostilities in 1946 was to compel the main battle force of the enemy to make a fight-or-die stand; and to loosen the Communist's stranglehold upon the majority of the population. The first of those objectives was strictly military; the second was fraught with political implications, and thus not within the sphere of control of the military commander (except when he, as in the case of Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny and General Paul Ely, simultaneously held the civilian post of French High Commissioner in Indochina).

Until 1953 the French logistical and manpower base was too narrow to permit a full-scale counteroffensive of nearly one-half million men over a terrain four times the size of Korea. However, by 1953, thanks to increasing American aid and French reinforcements, the time now was considered ripe to strike this decisive blow. The man chosen to lead the French Union Forces in this final operation of the war was a newcomer to Indochina, Lieutenant General Henri-Eugene Navarre.

When General Navarre took over command of the French Union Forces in the Far East on 28 May 1953, he found a situation that was at best stagnant. Surely, the first Vietnam People's Army (VPA) offensive into northern Laos had been stopped short of Luang Prabang, the royal residence of Laos, but at the price of building up another airhead at the Plaine des Jarres, thus again diverting precious troops from the Red River Delta. Navarre brought with him to Indochina the promise of increased American aid and that of additional fresh French troops: seven infantry battalions, the French reinforced United Nations battalion from Korea (where hostilities had ended in July 1953), an additional artillery group, and two battalions of combat engineers.

Furthermore, the Vietnamese National Army — which already had more than 100,000 men in the field — fighting as an ally of France was to raise within the year a first group of 19 "light" (that is, 600 men) commando battalions for the purpose of fighting the Communists on their own terrain, to be followed by 35 additional commando battalions within the next fiscal year. Several subsectors had been transferred to Vietnamese command in the meantime, in order to create a mobile reserve with the French troops thus withdrawn from duty in the fixed positions in thousands of bunkers of the De Lattre Line.



A FRENCH FORTIFIED OUTPOST

There had never been an official published program known as the "Navarre Plan." However, according to various public statements made at the time of its inception, the practical meaning and purpose of the plan becomes clear. According to Navarre's own chief of cabinet, Colonel Revol, the Navarre Plan was to endow the French battle corps "with a mobility and an aggressivity which it lacks." According to another authoritative source, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the Navarre Plan was designed to break "the organized body of Communist aggression by the end of the 1955 fighting season," leaving the task of mopping up the smaller guerrilla groups to the national armies of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.

Whatever the ultimate effect of the Navarre Plan, it cannot be denied that the French Union Forces showed the same offensive ability which they had displayed under the late Marshal De Lattre. In fact, it can even be said that too much activity was displayed too often at too many different places thus leaving troops and leaders but little time to prepare for the large-scale operations envisaged for the latter phase of the Navarre Plan. (The French still operated with Groupe Mobiles (units the size of a regimental combat team) as their largest tactical unit, while the VPA operated with Chinese type, 10,000-man divisions.)


On 17 July 1953 two airborne battalions were parachuted 150 miles behind Communist lines at Lang Son, destroying important enemy depots of Red Chinese and Russian material. The troops withdrew successfully to the coast where they were awaited by a French naval task force. This was followed on 28 July by Operation Camargue — an attempt by the French to liquidate a string of enemy fortified villages along the central Vietnamese coast which, in view of the losses they had caused to passing convoys, had become known as the "Street without Joy." Two airborne battalions, followed by 10 infantry battalions, three amphibious squadrons, two French Navy commando units, and adequate air support, sought for nearly two weeks to corner VPA Infantry Regiment Number 95. When the latter was finally cornered, one of its companies fought to the death while the rest of the regiment quietly "melted" into the countryside.

On 8 August began the successful air evacuation of the 12,000 men uselessly bottled up in the Na-San airhead, thus relieving the sorely overburdened French transport air force of one

of its heavier charges and giving the Red River Delta, for the first time in years, an operational reserve for guerrilla mopup operations. The evacuation was completed without enemy interference on 11 August.

Antiguerrilla operations began now on a large scale within the delta. On 16 August began Operation Tarentaise in the Bui-Chue area, followed on 28 August by Operation Claude — the latter directed against regular VPA Battalion Number 120 which operated on an island outside of the main port of Haiphong — and by Operation Brochet (Pike) on 22 September. Pike was the largest antiguerrilla operation ever undertaken within the delta: no less than 17 infantry battalions, six artillery battalions, one combat engineer battalion, and two Dinassaut (naval assault boat groups) were engaged in order to wipe out VPA Infantry Regiment Number 42, infiltrated in Hung Yen province, in the center of the delta. After several severe fights, Pike came to a halt on 10 October; Regiment 42 had melted into the countryside, its arms hidden in underground caches.

In an effort to accentuate pressure upon the enemy's rear communications lines through methods similar to those of the Communists themselves, several Groupes Commandos Mixtes Autochtones (GCMA), or Mixed Native Commando Groups made up of French-trained Thai tribesmen and French cadres, began to operate behind enemy lines. They were, however, too weak to influence the outcome of any particular operation but proved useful for long-range reconnaissance. The most significant operation of such a commando group was the parachuting of 40 Meo tribesmen near Lao Kay on 4 October 1953, in an attempt to destroy VPA communications lines at this vital point of entry into Red China. The operation failed, but as late as October 1955 the Communist authorities in North Vietnam complained over their radio about guerrilla tribesmen who refused to surrender.



A PORTION OF THE RED RIVER DELTA

However, it became clear to the French High Command that the offensive of the Navarre Plan had thus far failed in their two main objectives: destruction of the enemy's organized battle force, and liquidation of the guerrilla threat behind French lines. Under the personal supervision of General Navarre, Operation Mouette (Seagull) was launched on 14 October into enemy territory south of the delta in direction of the important enemy supply center of Phu Nho Quan. More than six Groupes Mobiles, reinforced by tank and amphibious battalions, two

French Navy marine units, broke through the Ninh Binh limestone hills in a pincer movement seeking to encircle the VPA's 320th Infantry Division. VPA Regiments 48 and 64 resisted and even counterattacked the vastly superior French forces until all vital supplies and materiel had been removed from Phu Nho Quan.

Contrary to the hopes of the French, Communist General Giap did not let himself be goaded to commit the mass of his elite forces for the sake of saving one division. When Phu Nho Quan had become useless, the VPA forces around it merely melted again into the rice paddies and hills, and the French entered a deserted city. On 7 November they returned to delta perimeter. The 320th, although severely mauled, was still a fighting unit. The last attempt to force Giap to a decision on a terrain not of his own choosing had failed.

It but remained for General Navarre to seek out the enemy in his own lair, the mountain uplands. Two alternate solutions were open to him: either attack the enemy's main bases in the Thai-Nguyen Tuyen-Quang "redoubt" (with the chance of perhaps capturing a good part of the enemy's central government and supplies), or place his troops astride the traditional invasion routes into Laos. In spite of the entreaties of General Rene Cogny, the able commander of the Red River Delta, and in all likelihood due to nonmilitary considerations, Navarre chose to defend Laos. At the same time he hoped to make this upland stronghold into a sufficiently attractive bait for Giap to commit his elite divisions against it in the hope of taking it.

The bait chosen turned out to be an oblong valley, about 10 miles long and six miles wide, in which the Japanese had built a fairly solid airfield. In pre-French times the little city in the center of the valley had been near the Chinese border and was, therefore, named "Seat of the Border Prefecture," or in Chinese: Dien Bien Phu.

THE TRAP

Contrary to what has been asserted elsewhere, Dien Bien Phu was never conceived as a "large-scale raid." Its entire mission from the outset was to become a "meat-grinder" for the bulk of the Communist battle force far from the vital Red River Delta, while the French Command would concentrate the remainder of its forces upon mopping up the delta without interference by regular enemy troops. In addition, bomber units stationed in Dien Bien Phu could successfully hamper — if not strangle altogether — the ever-increasing flow of Red Chinese supplies reaching the VPA, and the fortress could become a solid anchor for French raider units operating behind lines, in addition to covering northern Laos.

Operation Castor — the code name for the Dien Bien Phu attack — began on 20 November 1953 by the dropping of three parachute battalions over the valley. While the operation itself was a tactical surprise, a Communist mortar unit and several rifle companies training in the drop zone at the moment of the landing inflicted losses to the parachute force before withdrawing for the nearby ring of hills.

Thus the first objective of destroying enemy forces in the immediate vicinity of Dien Bien Phu was never achieved. Considering the number of troops available for the operation (seven paratroop battalions, three North African battalions, one Vietnamese and two tribal Thai battalions, one combat engineer battalion, one truck company, ten light tanks, two 75 and 105mm artillery groups, and four 155mm medium howitzers), the size of the valley prevented the occupation of the high grounds surrounding the fortress and their inclusion in the defense perimeter. Therefore, all French preparations had to be made in presumably full view of Communist reconnaissance parties.

However, the major miscalculation of the Dien Bien Phu operation seems to have been made by French intelligence estimates which initially credited the enemy with an artillery

composed of 40 to 60 medium howitzers capable of firing 25,000 rounds. However, they apparently gauged Giap in terms of his attack two years earlier on the Na-San airhead and gave the VPA and its Red Chinese backers, now freed from the drain of the Korean conflict, no credit for improvement. As it turned out, Giap's artillery used an estimated 240 to 350 guns, including Soviet heavy rocket launchers, and fired nearly 350,000 rounds, while the fortress (initially provided with 13 days of supplies and less than 10 days of ammunition and fuel) had to use its ammunition sparingly in the face of ever-increasing losses of air-dropped tonnage to the enemy as the defense perimeter shrunk to less than a few hundred yards in diameter.



THE SIEGE OF DIEN BIEN PHU, TRAGIC ENDING TO AN EIGHT YEAR WAR.

An investigation by a commission of French generals as to the causes of the Dien Bien Phu disaster was held recently. Its results are still classified but as early as 9 June 1954 General Pierra Koenig, then French Minister of Defense, admitted that:

"In fact, from the outset, the enemy artillery dominated ours . . . It was the same with the (VPA) antiaircraft artillery which immediately proved very effective. Under such conditions the drama began with the beginning of the battle . . ."

However, the drama of Dien Bien Phu was only a relatively more spectacular part of a drama that now played throughout Indochina on a far grander scale: General Vo Nguyen Giap's long-promised general counteroffensive.

COMMUNIST GENERAL COUNTEROFFENSIVE

Ever since his first attack upon northern Laos in the spring of 1953, Giap had retained a corps of about four divisions in the Thai highlands and the northern part of central Vietnam, at almost equal distance between the Red River Delta and Luang Prabang. Throughout the rainy season of 1953 (May to October), Giap successfully avoided engaging his main force while Navarre vainly sought to disrupt the Communist timetable or order of battle. In December Giap was ready. Regiment 101 of the 325th and Regiment 66 of the 304th Infantry Divisions, VPA, drove across the Annamite mountain chain, sweeping ahead of themselves French Groupe Mobile (G. M.) Number 2 which had been hurriedly sent out to Hue to meet the new threat and whose battered remains now fell back upon the Laotian side of the mountains to the unfortified airfield of Seno.

Once more Navarre had to disperse his already thinly stretched reserves. Along the tried pattern of Na-San, the Plaine des Jarres and Dien Bien Phu, another fortified airhead was hurriedly created around Seno, and a separate Middle Laos Operational Groupment (BOML) activated on Christmas Day 1953: three parachute battalions from the general reserve — including two Vietnamese battalions which gave an excellent account of themselves — parts of G.M. Number 2, all of G.M. Number 1 and, a few days later, G.M. Number 51, plus assorted air and supply components, were concentrated 400 miles away from the major battlefronts of the Red River Delta and Dien Bien Phu.

On 25 December 1953 the Communists reached the Thai border at Thakhek on the Mekong — the overland lifeline to northern Laos was severed and Indochina cut in two. In the meantime, Regiment 66 of the VPA directly cut across the mountains and one by one crushed the smaller French posts strung out along the road from Vietnam to Seno. G.M. 51, sent to the rescue, fell into a severe ambush of the jungle variety and its lead battalion was practically annihilated on 24 January 1954, losing all its vehicles.

Two of the paratroop battalions of the Seno airhead, by valiant stand at Hine Sit, saved Seno from a direct attack, but Gia's major southern Laos forces bypassed the now well-fortified position and melted into the jungle only to reappear 20 days later nearly 200 miles farther south, in hitherto quiet northern Cambodia, while another pincer from the Annamese coast suddenly attacked the lightly defended posts of the Moi Plateau.



... but Giap's major southern Laos forces bypassed the now well fortified position and melted away into the jungle only to reappear 20 days later nearly 200 miles farther south.

In northern Laos the situation had also taken a turn for the worse. The entire 316th VPA Division, after having taken the airhead at Lai Chau 55 miles north of Dien Bien Phu, now again marched upon Luang Prabang in four separate columns, liquidating the small garrisons of Miong Nguoi and Muong Khoua, where the year before a small Laotian garrison under a French captain had fought to the death to delay the Communist rush upon Luang Prabang. This time the 2d Laotian Battalion and the 2d Battalion, 3d Regiment, French Foreign Legion, covered the retreat of the small garrisons toward the new defense perimeter around Luang

Prabang, being nearly wiped out in the process. On 13 February 1954 Navarre airlifted another five battalions, including a parachute battalion, into Luang Prabang, thus further dispersing his forces and adding another crushing burden to the already heavily taxed air infrastructure. Five additional battalions were diverted to Muong Sai, covering the northern approaches to the city.

Giap thus had fully succeeded in making Navarre progressively throw his painfully gathered mobile reserve into the four corners of Indochina in pursuit of a "single-battle decision" that was definitely not part of the pattern of the war fought in Indochina. Yet, in his New Year's message to his troops, Navarre stated:

"Having lost all hopes of winning a decisive battle in the Red River Delta, the Vietminh disperses its forces . . . However, in that type of warfare, we have the advantage of being able to concentrate our forces rapidly at any essential point . . . A campaign begun under such conditions can but turn in our favor."

What happened next cannot be readily explained in terms of military strategy and must await careful examination by future students of military history: with Dien Bien Phu threatened, central Laos invaded, northern Laos under attack, and the Red River Delta more infiltrated than ever, Navarre, on 20 January 1954, launched a combined land and amphibian attack against Tuy-Hoa, a stretch of Communist-held coast in southern Central Vietnam that had been in Communist hands since 1945 and was of no military usefulness to anyone. Operation Atlanta — as it was called — diverted another 15,000 troops and, after initial successes in the landing area, soon bogged down in the jungle-covered hills of the roadless hinterland. The time now was ripe for Giap's last round.

Within a week after the beginning of Operation Atlanta, Giap called off the attack of the 316th Division upon northern Laos and concentrated the bulk of the 304th, 308th and 312th Infantry Divisions, and all of the 351st "Heavy" Division around Dien Bien Phu. Giap's attack began at 1730 on 13 March 1954 by a heavy artillery barrage upon the two major outlying hill positions covering the central redoubt which were overrun 48 hours later after several "human sea" attacks.

According to a conservative French weekly, Paris-Match, of 12 May 1956, the report of the French military investigation commission states that General de Castries had committed "a grave error" in not attempting to hold the two hill positions at all costs.

Attempts were made to constitute a link-up force in northern Laos in order to save the doomed fortress. Under the code name of Jura and Condor, about 5,000 men were assembled under Colonels de Grevecoeur and Goddard, but the attempt was finally abandoned for the good reason that there were simply not enough reserves left to give the column the necessary strength for at least an even chance of survival against the 40,000 Communist troops concentrated around Dien Bien Phu.

Furthermore, the logistical problem of supplying by air a mobile 12,000-man force over several weeks in addition to supplying Dien Bien Phu with the daily 200 tons it needed was simply insuperable under the then prevailing conditions, the more so as the monsoon weather considerably curtailed air activities throughout the area.


THE END

The ensuing disaster, although it deprived the French only of about four percent of their total military manpower in Indochina, proved a crippling blow. Navarre's order of the day of 9 May 1954, that Dien Bien Phu's "sacrifice had not been in vain, for . . . it saved Upper Laos

from invasion and preserved the (Red River) Delta, " is not too convincing, for the Red River Delta, already thoroughly undermined by Communist guerrillas and infiltrated VPA régulars, already had begun to crack even before the arrival of the victorious VPA divisions from Dien Bien Phu. General Paul Ely, the new French Commander who had replaced Navarre, now had to face in the delta area nearly 100,000 Communist regulars and an equal number of guerrillas with less than 80,000 troops of his own. And among the French Union Forces certain Vietnamese units, seeing the signs of the tide, began to disintegrate.

On 30 June 1954 began Operation Auvergne, the last of the Indochina war: two armored and two motorized G.M. covered the retreat of all French forces in the southern part of the delta toward a shortened line south of the Hanoi-Haiphong road, where the maintenance of communications had become a daily battle between French armored forces and hordes of Communist infantry now armed with modern recoilless weapons.

Hostilities ended on 21 July 1954 after a cease-fire had been negotiated at Geneva which gave the Democratic Republic of Vietnam control of all of Vietnam north of the 17th parallel. The eight years of war had cost the French about 10 billion dollars (in addition to 1.1 billion dollars United States aid delivered before the cease-fire), and 106,000 dead or missing, including three generals and 2,000 officers.




LEGEND

NAVARRE PLAN

- 1 "HIRONDELIE"
17-20 Jul 1953
- 2 "CAMARGUE"
28 Jul-10 Aug 1953
- 3 EVACUATION OF NA-SAN
8-11 Aug 1953
- 4 "TARENTEISE"
16-21 Aug 1953
- 5 "CLAUDE"
28 Aug-16 Sep 1953
- 6 "BROCHET"
22 Sep-10 Oct 1953
- 7 RAID ON LAO KAY
4-7 Oct 1953
- 8 "MOUETTE"
14 Oct-11 Nov 1953
- 9 "CASTOR"
20 Nov 53-7 May 1954
- 10 "ARDECHE"
Dec 1953
- 11 MIDDLE LAOS
27 Dec 1953
- 12 "ATLANTE"- "AXELLE"
20 Jan 1954
- 13 "JURA"- "CONDOR"
Mar-Apr 1954
- 14 "AUVERGNE"
30 Jun-3 Jul 1954

VPA OFFENSIVE

- A FIRST THAI OFFENSIVE
Sep-Nov 1952
- B FIRST LAOS OFFENSIVE
Jan-May 1953
- C BATTLE OF BUI-CHU
Sep 1953
- D LAI CHAU OPERATION
30 Nov-12 Dec 1953
- E CENTRAL LAOS OFFENSIVE
(THAKHEK) 21 Dec 1953
- F CENTRAL LAOS OFFENSIVE
(SENO)-27 Dec 1953
- G SECOND NORTHERN LAOS OFFENSIVE
27 Jan-20 Feb 1954
- H MOI PLATEAU OFFENSIVE
2 Feb-Apr 1954
- I DIEN BIEN PHU
13 Mar-7 May 1954
- J COMMANDO ATTACKS ON
FRENCH AIRFORCE BASES
Mar-Apr 1954
- K GENERAL COUNTEROFFENSIVE
ON RED RIVER DELTA
May-Jul 1954



Section III

ROYAL MARINES ACTION IN MALAYA

During the Japanese occupation of Malaya in W. W. II, the only serious, organized resistance to the enemy was provided by the "Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army." The hard core of this guerrilla force was provided by members of the Malayan Communist Party, the majority and most influential members of which were Chinese.

When peace came the Communists possessed a battle-tested organization and an enhanced reputation amongst the civilian population. In the main, they refused to surrender the arms and ammunition supplied to them by the British, and under the threat of proscription, went underground. They proclaimed the birth of the Malayan Races Liberation Army (the MRLA) and announced a program which included the overthrow of the government with such of its instruments as the police, the expulsion of Europeans and the redistribution of wealth.

In much of this there was a popular appeal to the "have-nots" and to those infected by the rising tide of nationalism, which crept over Asia in the wake of the departing Japanese.

The Japanese had treated Malaya badly, had exploited and bullied its population, drained and pilfered its resources and allowed the tin mines and rubber estates to go to ruin. While the British Military Administration governed and maintained order, the country gradually began to recover. Europeans — officials, business men, planters and miners — returned to their offices, estates and mines and started to rebuild. The police force, which had more or less disintegrated during the occupation, was slowly reorganized, although many new officers and men had to be recruited.


It was at this stage in the recovery of Malaya that the MRLA launched the first phase of its intensive campaign. The brunt fell on the police force. It grappled manfully with the task, but it was only too evident that it was not yet sufficiently large or well-trained to cope with a state of affairs which was rapidly deteriorating.

With the declaration of a state of emergency and the introduction of more troops, the struggle between the communist organization on the one hand, and the security forces on the other, started in earnest.

In the early stages the MRLA met with some success. Its tactics were based on fear — intimidation, terrorization, murder, arson, abduction, threats and blackmail. It aimed to win over the Asian population, especially the Chinese, who formed almost half the population of the Federation.


The Communist organization was split into three more or less independent bodies, which were yet closely interrelated; the armed and uniformed bandits, who were formed in military units and were the MRLA proper; the "Min Yuen", who were its plain clothes workers, living in the towns and villages; and the "Lie Ton Ten", or Killer Squads. These corresponded very much to the strong-arm thugs of gangsterdom who were charged with the "rubbing-out" of elements undesirable to the Communists and with minor operations such as the slashing of rubber trees, cutting of telephone wires and so on.

"Royal Marines Action in Malaya," by Major Anthony Crockett, British Royal Marines. Reprinted by permission of the copyright holder, the Marine Corps Association, publishers of the Marine Corps Gazette, professional journal for Marine Officers. Copyright January 1955 by Marine Corps Association.



To keep their organization going and, in fact, to exist at all, the Communists needed money, food, arms and ammunition. The last two they already had in fair amounts since the end of the war and they had added to them since by raids on police posts and from what they had been able to salvage from the dead bodies of armed men they had killed. For money and food they had worked out to a fine art. The Chinese have a saying, in which they liken themselves to the bamboo. When the storm comes, they say, the straight, tall tree stands proudly in his resistance to it and when he can resist no longer, he breaks. But the humble bamboo bends his head, bows before the storm — and survives.

The Communists made every small community responsible for supplying a quota of money from its weekly pay packets and each and every family was bound to provide food under arrangements laid down for them. This system of supply was greatly facilitated by the presence of a vast population of "squatters," nearly all of whom were Chinese. The Chinese, or their forebearers, had entered Malaya, most of them illegally, and had settled down quite arbitrarily on a patch of ground where they had built a shack and then proceeded to cultivate the ground around it. Some of these people lived on the very fringes of the jungle, where their isolated homes formed ideal staging posts for money and food destined for the bandits living in it. Others in squatter villages, which had grown in the course of time and which were far enough away from the main populated areas to make them only too accessible to the bandits.



SQUATTER VILLAGES

In order to strangle this almost inexhaustible pipeline, a vast system of resettlement was undertaken by the civil authorities. All isolated squatters were concentrated into villages defended by barbed wire, protected by police posts and provided with such facilities as medical and welfare centers and schools. These measures not only protected the squatters from the easy depredations of the bandits, but afforded them such an extent of security that they began to lose some of their initial fear and passed information to the police.

It is necessary to know some of these facts about the origins of the present situation in Malaya, to understand the difference between the struggle taking place there and the more conventional forms of warfare. In May of last year, shortly before he retired as High Commissioner, General Sir Gerald Templar stated that there were some 4,000 active terrorists operating in the Federation. To combat their activities and those of a far larger body of ancillary supporters, it has been necessary to keep something in the nature of 35,000 troops active in Malaya for several years. This is surely an outstanding example of the efficacy of guerrilla warfare.

Another point to bear in mind when studying the Malayan situation is: it is not (in legal terms) war but a "state of emergency." The "military" are in support of the Government and the police. While there are a number of emergency laws, and capital offenses now include such crimes as consorting with terrorists or possessing arms, civil and not martial law is administered in the court by civil magistrates and judges.

In a country two-thirds of which is jungle, the speedy deployment of large bodies of troops is impossible. In general, a battalion is responsible for an area, which is subdivided into smaller company areas. The 3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines was deployed in the State of Perak, in northern Malaya. My unit, 42 Commando, had its Headquarters in the town of Ipoh. (There are 5 Rifle Troops and 1 Support Troop in each Commando. Each Rifle Troop in Malaya, with attached drivers, signallers, cooks, medical personnel, etc., numbered about 70.) My Troop camp was some five miles away. It was based on a four-roomed bungalow, around which were grouped tents, wash-houses and latrines.

While remaining under the command of the CO, we were at the same time a self-contained outfit. My area comprised a long strip of flat country two miles deep, containing tin mines, swamps, some small rubber estates and a large number of Chinese small-holdings. Beyond this it embraced a chain of high limestone outcrops and, on the far side of these, the jungle — stretching away through the mountains to the borders of Pahang.

The terrorists' military organization was much akin to ours, with a chain of responsibility for certain areas. Their bases were deep in the jungle. For food, clothing and medical supplies they relied upon the "Min Yuen," whom they would meet inside or near the jungle edge. Occasionally, large camps to accommodate as many as 60 men would be found. Generally they lived in groups of from 10 to 30, shifting their camps frequently. They were expert at living and operating in the jungle. Tough and hardy, they could move swiftly and silently over long distances, even when wounded, and were skillful in concealing their tracks. With a basic diet of rice and dried fish, and a way of living which needed only the bare necessities of life, their logistic problem was infinitesimal compared to that of British troops.

The uniformed MRLA carried out many forms of operation; ambushes on roads, raids on isolated police posts, the destruction of mine-machinery and smoke-houses, the murder of Europeans and/or of Asians who had failed to "cooperate" with or were suspected of informing on the bandits. These are but a few examples. They were all governed by the same principles — surprise, swift action, good planning, excellent intelligence and the avoidance of a direct clash with military forces.

The fundamental requirement for us — pitted against an enemy with a net, difficult to find and always on the move — was accurate and rapid information. With a civil population not actively hostile to the security forces but cowed into silence by fear, this was not easy to obtain. In this respect, we maintained the closest link with the police who, alone, were in a position to get this information. In Ipoh, a Joint Operations Room was set up in the police station, manned by our Intelligence Officer and a Police Operations Officer. Here was built up a picture of bandit movements and strength. Camps found and incidents reported often made it possible to gauge the tenor of terrorist activity and to anticipate their actions.

As I had said, sometimes those joint Headquarters were on a Commando/Battalion level. At other times, as for instance when my troop was operating more or less independently in Selangor State, in central Malaya, they were on troop level. This close cooperation between the military forces and the police was the secret of all successful operations. Furthermore, it was cooperation at all stages, from the sifting and integration of intelligence, through the planning, to the eventual execution. Like most forms of cooperation, it depended also on the personal relationships between ourselves and the police.

To understand how the system worked, let us follow a hypothetical case from its inception. The scene opens with the troop commander being called to the telephone.

"Captain Walker, Sir? IO here. The CO says you will come down to police headquarters as quickly as you can."

Tim Walker grabs his carbine, calls for his driver, and in his armored scout-car makes tracks for the Joint Operations Room. There he finds his commanding officer, the Officer Superintending the Police Circle (OSPC), the IO and the Police Operations Officer. They are poring over maps and a large air-photograph mosaic pinned on the wall.

"Tim," says the CO, "we've just had an interesting bit of news about your area. The pumping engine at the Liu Chin mine was destroyed last night and the engine house burned down. The watchman reports about 20 armed bandits. He thinks they were all Chinese — some of them wearing red-starred caps."

The OSPC chips in, "luckily he recognized one of them, a lad who used to live in this village, called Ah-Kee. Now we know Ah Kee is in 6 Platoon of the 3d Company and that that platoon has been working for some time from up the Sungei (River) Tembo. We also know that this is the third attack on tin mines in that district in the last fortnight. We've been hearing rumors of late that some of the owners are getting fed-up with paying their 'contributions.' It looks as if the bandits are putting on the pressure."

"The police think there may be more of these attacks planned," the CO continues. "An informer has got hold of some yarn that the Li Han Chow is next on the list — they say old Li is a pretty stubborn character — and that the raid is going to take place in a couple of nights' time. Our plan is roughly this. Soon after dark, two police squads will move into the rubber between the main road and the mine and will watch likely routes. I want you to deal with any of the possible ways down to the mine from the jungle."

"As you know, Sir," says Tim, "half my troop is out at the moment and they won't be back for 4 or 5 days. They're right up in the jungle on the other side of my area. Even if I recalled them, I doubt if they'd be back in time. However, I've got enough men in camp to deal with this. I know that part of the country well. If the bandits are lying up in the upper stretches of the Sungei Tembo, they'll probably use one of two tracks down from there towards the mine. I'll ambush both of them with small parties. They'll have to move out today."

Tim and the OSPC then coordinate the details of their plans, making quite sure that each knows where the other's men are going to be. This is vitally important in operations where it is often difficult to distinguish friend from foe and where the enemy, if encountered, is only visible for a few, fleeting seconds.

Back in his own camp, Tim briefs the ambush parties. A subaltern will command one and he will take the other. They will leave camp at 1500 hours and travel by truck, one to the west and the other to the east of the area, taking 48 hours' rations with them. They will de-bus in the rubber (the rubber tappers will have left for the day by then) and strike through it to the jungle, where they will have to reach the ambush positions by a circuitous route, camping for the night on the way.

At 1430 hours the ambush parties fall in for inspection. Each is about 12 strong, including a sergeant, a signaller, with his set on his back and an SBA (Sick Berth Attendant — a naval rating). They look a motley crew, in stained, shapeless shirts and slacks of olive green, their battered jungle hats worn with a rakish individuality. They carry the minimum of equipment — a small haversack containing their rations, washing and shaving gear, a change of clothing, sweater and an old pair of rubber sneakers — the last three for sleeping in. Below the haversack is strapped a green poncho. On the front of the belt are two pouches for ammunition. On one hip is a waterbottle, on the other a machete. They are armed with light machine guns, carbines, rifles, HE and smoke grenades. A bandolier of ammunition is slung round the waist or a slatted satchel, filled with carbine or Sten magazines, is suspended from the belt.

The transport for the ambush parties is drawn up facing the camp gate. There is a 3-ton truck for each party, each escorted by an armored scout car. The men em-bus and the vehicles drive out, one pair turning to the right and the other to the left. We will follow the fortunes of Tim Walker, who with his party, is sitting in the 3-tonner which turned to the left.

The scout car and the truck speed along the main, tarmac road. The men sit facing out-board, their weapons at the ready and the tailboard down. There is always the possibility of an ambush to be borne in mind. Presently they reach a long stretch of road, lined on each side by rubber estates. It is away from all signs of habitation and there is no one in sight. Tim orders the driver to slow down, the men jump out, run quickly off the road and in amongst the trees. The truck and the scout car drive on.

They walk through the trees in extended line, their rubber-soled jungle boots making no noise. No one speaks — they have learned to move silently. Tim consults his compass from time to time. He has worked out beforehand the exact spot where the rubber ends — there he wants to enter the jungle. Presently the patrol senses they are reaching the limit of the rubber. Through the evenly spaced trees, they can see the tangled undergrowth which is the preliminary to the jungle proper. They have not met a soul since they left the road.

The bearing on which they have been advancing leads them to a narrow opening in the undergrowth. Shortly before they reach it, Tim halts the patrol and they form into single file, which is the only possible formation in which a body of men can move in the restricted space of the jungle. First goes the leading scout, armed with a machine carbine. A few yards behind is another scout, similarly armed. Then comes Tim, with the Bren group immediately in rear and the remainder of the patrol strung out behind him.



... in the rubber, they had been able to see in all directions for two or three hundred yards.

In the rubber, they had been able to see in all directions for two or three hundred yards, but now the visibility is reduced to a yard or two. The light filters gloomily through the trees, almost as if they were under water, and throws deep patches of shadow about them. It is much cooler, but there is an aura of damp and decay and a sense of airlessness. The ground at their feet is seeping with moisture, spongy with the leaf mold of centuries, packed with twisting roots. The trees soar upwards, branchless for a hundred feet or more, reaching for the sun. It is deathly quiet.

The track they are following leads up a spur and along the spine of a ridge. These tracks, made by game and the aborigines who live in the jungle, have existed perhaps for hundreds of years and provide the only means of making reasonable progress. They nearly always follow similar formations of ground.

The aids for jungle map-reading are few. Available maps are of a small scale and can show little more than the configuration of the land, the rivers and the larger streams. With these, a compass and the accumulated knowledge of the country obtained by his troop, a patrol leader has to be satisfied. It is seldom, if ever, possible to reach a point where he can fix his position in relation to another, owing to the confined visibility. In any case, landmarks hardly exist where dense jungle covers every feature.

The ground begins to rise sharply. It has rained during the afternoon, as it nearly always does, and the track, winding this way and that, is treacherous and slippery. Soon every man is soaked with sweat and is beginning to feel the weight of his equipment. They toil on until the track reaches the top of the spur and levels out along the ridge. There Tim Walker halts the patrol. They move off into the undergrowth and unfasten their equipment, while two of their number act as sentries, watching the track in either direction.

Tim takes out his map and fixes his position as well as he can. From now on, he plans to move across the "grain" of the land in order to reach the ambush position unseen. This will entail moving where no tracks exist, up and down steep slopes and across rocky stream beds. It will undoubtedly entail cutting a way through thick undergrowth for a part of the trip. It will be gruelling work and progress will be very slow.

He looks at his watch. In two hours it will be getting dark and he must find somewhere to camp for the night, preferably near a stream, and in sufficient time for the patrol to build shelters and have a meal. They press on again, slithering down the flank of the ridge supporting themselves as best they can by gripping saplings and creepers as they pass. A vast brake of bamboo bars their way. Cutting a way through it would make far too much noise and they have to work their way around it. Half an hour later Tim halts the patrol. They are almost in the bottom of the valley and, although he cannot see it, he knows water of some sort will be flowing nearby.


Camp is soon made. While the men construct 3-man bivouacs from branches and their ponchos, the signaller rigs an aerial ready for Tim to report back to base. Ration packs are opened. Tea is being brewed and tins of food are heated over Tommy cookers. Any minute now darkness will descend with tropical suddenness. The patrol stands to until it is quite dark and then turn in. A pair of sentries are posted who squat, silently back-to-back. Should anyone approach their camp, which at night is unlikely, they want to be able to look upwards, if they are to have any chance of spotting a moving shape against the dark background of the jungle.

In spite of the fact that the sun has gone down, it is still very hot and, deep in amongst the trees, also very close. The outline of the sentries gradually merges into the pockets of blackness in the background as the night creeps down upon them. Soon the whole world is becalmed in silence.

Suddenly, about 20 yards away, there is still whistle sounds from the other side of the camp and it is picked up by yet another from somewhere else. The sentries remain motionless.

This is a signal for the whole jungle to go crazy. As suddenly as the whistle starts, a thousand others burst in together. Every imaginable whistle, scream, rattle and wail is let loose on the night air, until the whole place sounds like a baseball game attended by a crowd of lunatics. For half an hour this tuneless din continues and then, as surprisingly as it started, it stops and the patrol is shrouded in deep, leaden silence.

As soon as it is light, they breakfast, dismantle the camp and hide all traces of occupation. The men have changed back into sweat-soaked clothes of the day before, preserving their dry outfit for another possible night in the open. They cover the hundred yards to the stream at the foot of the valley. Here, looking up at the gap in the trees over the water, they get a clear view of the sky for the first time since they left their truck.



...a body of men crossing a jungle stream is always vulnerable... this is just the spot they are likely to run into an ambush.

A body of men crossing a jungle stream is always very vulnerable. Should they by ill luck have been located by bandits, this is just the spot where they would be likely to run into an ambush. Many of these streams are fast-flowing with hidden pools, their beds littered with boulders. The Bren gunner takes up a position where he can cover the crossing point and the men, one by one, wade slowly to the other bank. The Bren gunner crosses last, covered by one of the patrol who has already reached the far side.

All day they push on, sometimes cutting their way, pace by pace, gaining only a few yards in an hour, slithering down the steep slopes of valleys and toiling up the other side of them. About three o'clock Tim halts the patrol. He reckons they are near the summit of the ridge, along which runs the track he is going to ambush. Taking one Marine with him he goes forward, slowly and silently, lest he should be nearer to the track than he had estimated. When he finds it he stops and begins to search for a suitable ambush position. This takes some time, as he dare not move on to the track in case he should leave signs of his presence imprinted on the soft mud. He sends back the Marine who is with him, with instructions that the patrol is to move another hundred yards down the hill and have a meal. He will join them as soon as his reconnaissance is finished.

They take up their positions some two hours before darkness. Tim has no idea how long they may have to maintain the ambush — perhaps 2 hours, 12 hours, 24 or 36 hours. Obviously, therefore, he cannot man it fully throughout this time. He divides the patrol into two watches, those off watch resting some 30 yards away, connected to the main position by a simple, string operated signal.

The ambush lines one side of the track about 12 yards. Here the path is straight but, just above it, in the direction from which the bandits might be expected it vanishes round a corner. Half an hour ago the sergeant crossed it lower down, where it narrows, and laid a line of booby traps in the undergrowth a few yards in from the track and opposite the ambush position. Should the enemy walk into the trap and try to escape from the ambush party's fire, an unexpected reception will await them.

The men have concealed themselves in their individual positions and made certain that their fields of fire, restricted though they may be, are clear. There is nothing now for them to do save wait — and hope.

At this critical moment in the affairs of the ambush party, we will leave Captain Walker and his small group of Marines. It might well have been that they were successful and that a silent-footed line of bandits, unaware of their danger, walked into the trap set for them. On the other hand — and far more akin to actual experience — they may well have waited, restless, uncomfortable and tensed, for another 24 or 36 hours and then, rations exhausted, have had to withdraw.


Such frustration, following on severe and prolonged physical effort, and at a sustained nervous tension, was typical of our work in Malaya. Constant patrolling of one's area, whether in the jungle or through the rubber estates and no-man's land between them, was essential. It kept the bandits guessing and on the move and, on isolated occasions, might lead to a surprise encounter or the discovery of a camp. Operations culminating in action, however, with enemy killed, wounded or captured, were not everyday events. For the most part, it was slog, slog with very few concrete results to show for it.

The work was hard and the men got little rest. Any slackening in effort in an area, or part of an area, was immediately reflected in increased terrorist activity. It called for a high degree of physical fitness and stamina. In this respect it is interesting to note that the older men were inclined to stand up to the rigors of a prolonged patrol better than the younger lads.

High morale was essential. I have referred to the continual, nervous strain, which spared not even the most unimaginative and bore most heavily on the junior officers and NCOs. On operations, nerves were keyed to a constant intensity. In close country particularly, every yard of track, every overhanging bank or stream-crossing held a potential ambush. Round the next bend the leading scout might find himself face to face with a khaki-clad figure in a red-starred cap — the first to fire might well be the only one to survive. Patrols might return to camp after a week or several days away, looking forward to a day or two of rest and civilized comfort, only to be shot off again to cope with a sudden incident. Hours or days of waiting in mosquito-ridden ambush positions or on gruelling patrols would end in nothing, with an expected enemy who never came or one who fled only a short time beforehand. These situations aggravated by repetition, were met with patience, good-humor and, generally, by a considerable amount of colorful invective. The response to a sudden emergency or to a test of endurance was a keenness which never flagged.

I think this state of morale can be attributed to four main factors. Good leadership on the part of junior officers and NCOs; the intense interest taken by all ranks in the day-to-day struggle against the terrorists; an existence which gave no one the time or excuse to be bored; and, pleasant camps, with decent living conditions for the troops when they had the opportunity to enjoy such facilities.

As a training and testing ground for leaders, particularly junior leaders, Malaya could not have been bettered. Subalterns, sergeants and corporals had to take small bodies of men, sometimes for days on end, into country where they would be quite alone and cut off from all assistance. Contact with base was maintained by wireless, but with the thick jungle, the mountainous and hilly nature of the terrain, the severe weather conditions of heavy rain and tropical storms, wireless was often a doubtful aid.



A high standard of skill and personal leadership was required of a patrol leader; skill in not losing his way, in adapting the jungle to his own ends, in his instant reactions to a sudden emergency; personal leadership in his own example of stamina, cheerfulness, courage and self-confidence. Some of this could be taught in the Jungle Training Center. The ability to live in the jungle, to master its difficulties and discomforts so that a man became confident in himself could be learnt, to a certain extent, by careful training. There was, however, all too little opportunity for sparing sufficient officers and NCOs for such training and most had to learn the hard way — by experience.

It was the same with the troops. By the time they reached their units, they had been a month at sea. While they gradually became acclimatized during this period, they had hardly advanced their physical fitness. Their first two weeks were spent on short patrols or simple operations, which did not involve the covering of long distances or lengthy periods away from camp. They were also given as much instruction as possible on the "jungle" range. Most troops were able to construct one of these. A small area of broken, overgrown country would be selected. In it, hidden here and there, would be figure targets which would appear for a few seconds as the firer approached them. This called for a quick eye and instant reactions, both vital attributes in a warfare where contact with the enemy was, more often than not, unexpected and always fragmentary.

The care of his personal weapons, that basic lesson drummed into Marines on both sides of the Atlantic, was never more important than in Malaya. Rain, streams and sweat, any or all three, brought rust in their wake only too quickly. Mud, earth, broken twigs and leaves fouled barrels and moving parts. Men learned to watch the state of their weapons constantly, to overhaul them thoroughly each night and to check them on patrol at every halt. A sudden meeting round a bend in the track — a bandit as surprised as you are — bringing his weapon forward to fire — and your carbine jams! It was a salutary thought, forgotten only by the foolish.

Jungle lore, the art of tracking, the ability to "read" the terrain and to "get the feel of it" are not learnt in a day. We had splendid trackers in our Ibans (Dyaks from North Borneo) who were skilled and courageous and accompanied us everywhere. By the time we left Malaya there were some men who could almost match them in these skills, and there were few who actively disliked the jungle.

The jungle, however, was not the only scene of our operations. It was the type of country, however, in which we spent most of our time and from which we probably won the least obvious results, although the time and energy spent there were of paramount importance. Many Commando Troops met with their greatest successes in the outskirts of squatter areas or in rubber estates. One of the more fortunate ventures of my own troops occurred among some overgrown vegetable gardens a quarter of a mile away from the Ipoh Golf Course!

A fact which distinguishes operations in Malaya from more conventional forms of warfare, is their logistics. Once a patrol is committed to the jungle, it is, except for its wireless communications, cut off from the outside world. Each officer and man has to carry with him all that he and the patrol will need in the way of weapons, ammunition, food, clothing, wireless batteries and so on. Depending on the country to be traversed (and it is seldom anything but difficult), this load is limited to three or, at the most, four days. Subsequent supplies, therefore, come by air.

At least 24 hours before the air drop takes place, the patrol leader signals his requirements back to base. His list is generally lengthy, a considerable portion of it being devoted to clothing. This takes a beating in jungle. Canvas, calf-length, rubber-soled, jungle boots wear quickly; sweat-soaked shirts and trousers tear easily on thorns and undergrowth; socks

shrink to pygmy sizes. A drop zone has somehow to be found, enlarged or constructed. Sometimes a natural clearing can be used, or a patch of abandoned, aboriginal holes in miles and miles of tree-tops. Yet, somehow, the pilots never failed to make their drop, with little to help them save a map reference (which is probably at least a mile off), a thin column of smoke spiraling upwards through the trees and a call-sign on the radio.

Of the helicopter I can say but little. When 3 Commando Brigade was in Malaya, there were no troop-carrying machines as there are today and only three S51s, which were used for casualty evacuation — one of the worst problems of all in the jungle. The advent of the S55 must obviously have done much to redress the balance of jungle warfare and at least our troops can hope to achieve both speed and surprise in terrain where formerly they seldom had either.



...the jungle has to be mastered...

In conclusion, it should be stated quite clearly — as it was to all of us who went out to join the 3 Commando Brigade — that there is no black magic about operations in Malaya. Some of the problems of conventional warfare are minimized — i. e., the enemy possesses no aircraft, tanks or artillery. Some of the problems are aggravated — the jungle has to be mastered and a guerrilla enemy found and brought to battle. Underlying everything, however, are the same principles, the same factors of morale and discipline and, most important of all, the spirit, tenacity, courage and sound training of the individual Marine.

Section IV

BULLETS ALONE WON'T WIN

When most United States Army officers and NCOs arrive at their duty stations in "up country" South Vietnam, they are usually informed, "Your most important advisory effort is to assist your Vietnamese counterpart in actions concerning the controlling and protection of the population."

This unglamorous and difficult-to-define task encompasses the entire spectrum of counterinsurgency - military, social, political, economic, and psychological actions. The great majority of United States military personnel are astounded and, in many cases, overwhelmed with the magnitude of knowledge, drive, initiative, frustrations and just plain hard work required to master this over-all "key to victory" in any counterinsurgency operation.

Our service schools, especially the Infantry, Special Forces, Intelligence and Civil Affairs, plus the Military Assistance Institute, are responding to the instructional challenge of training the "cream of the crop" to cope with the 24-hour-per day "soldier-statesman" problems the United States is now confronted with in most parts of the world. However, there's no teacher or "POI" equal to actual experience. Considering this fundamental fact, this article may assist professional personnel in preparing for the inevitable counterinsurgency assignment.

GUIDING PHILOSOPHY

Col Nguyen Bao Tri, one of the most outstanding and fearless troop leaders in South Vietnam, stated many times to his commanders and staff, and their U.S. advisers, that his planning and execution priorities for most operations were:

Psychological warfare-civic action-propaganda

Intelligence

Communications

Population and resources control

Tactics

To our S/G3-oriented officers, this appears to be sacrilegious. However, only a few weeks with a combat division on duty in a "sector" (province) quickly proves to even the most dedicated tactician that "fire and maneuver," important as it is, must be preceded by detailed and constant planning, coordination, internal security and execution of the "tools of counterinsurgency" - psychological warfare, civic action, propaganda, intelligence, communications and population and resources control.

Most Vietnamese officials and U.S. advisers contend that the Southeast Asia counterinsurgency conflict will be won not by military operations alone but by "gaining the hearts and minds of the population." The primary mission of each GVN (Government of Vietnam) official must be the "control and protection of the population." When the Republic of South Vietnam controls the population, the Viet Cong will be denied three of their most important necessities, intelligence, food, and people to be indoctrinated into the psychology of communism and to act as slaves (recruits) for the Viet Cong.

Reprinted from the July-August 1965 issue of Infantry, the United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia by Col G. Harry Huppert.

Considering the border situation, Viet Cong KIA's and WIA's are almost immaterial and irrelevant. If GVN units kill so many Viet Cong today, twice that number can infiltrate during the next 12-24 hour period. However, if GVN forces make friends out of a certain number of Viet Cong-controlled or uncommitted people each day, the Viet Cong have lost domination and a source of intelligence and food from these "converted" individuals and families.



... the average South Vietnamese inhabitant, outside the larger towns and cities, has no real interest in politics. So long as he and his family have enough to eat, a place to sleep, can rule themselves in simple fashion and are protected, ... he is happy.

The average South Vietnamese inhabitant, outside the larger towns and cities, has no real interest in politics. So long as he and his family have enough to eat, a place to sleep, can rule themselves in a simple fashion, and are protected from any outside altercations, he is happy. He does not care who or what the central government is, or about its high level policies. This ossification of the mind must be countered.

It is known fact that the Viet Cong promise these people much but actually produce or give little. The GVN psychological-civic action program must reach every person, not just once but on a constant and continuing basis. Only a few promises must be made, things that will improve the individual's standard of living. These promises must be fulfilled. After GVN has accomplished this, then a few more promises must be made and quickly fulfilled. In this way the government will "gain control of the heart and soul of the people!"

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE — CIVIC ACTION-PROGAPANDA IN AN ACTUAL COUNTERINSURGENCY CONFLICT

A few actual examples of successful psychological-civic actions are presented below. These actions were executed in one area of the country, and the propaganda themes were aimed directly at the population which required converting. The same basic principles can be applied to other areas.

To attain specific goals, the division used, in conjunction with tactical engagements, a combination of psychological operations, civic action, and the strategic hamlet program. Civic action secured the receptive audience, and the strategic hamlet program offered visible proof of a better, more secure life.



... Most Vietnamese officials and US advisors contend that the Southeast Asia counterinsurgency conflict will be won not by military operations alone but by "gaining the hearts and minds of the population."

During the summer the availability of effective airborne loudspeakers greatly increased. Utilizing the L-28 and the HU-1B helicopter, the division completed more than 80 airborne loudspeaker missions. Broadcasts were directed at Viet Cong soldiers, Viet Cong controlled populations, and villagers relocated in strategic hamlets.

The various dialects and the illiteracy rate in South Vietnam limited the effect of propaganda leaflets. However, combined with airborne loudspeaker broadcasts, leaflets were effective. In three months more than 700,000 leaflets, both written and graphic, were disseminated throughout the division area. In addition, 100,000 formal safe conduct passes signed by the division commander were distributed, resulting in numerous Viet Cong defections.

The division combined psychological-civic action functions with tactical operations. The success of this combination was demonstrated during numerous enemy encounters.

In one operation nearly 2,000 persons located in two areas were affected. As a result of an integrated, coordinated and comprehensive psychological-civic action program, climaxed by loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflet drops, more than 800 refugees migrated to a safe area. The province chief (similar to a state governor) was on hand to welcome them. He distributed food and blankets and explained how the Republic of Vietnam would assist them. The joint U.S.-ARVN (Army of Vietnam) medical civic action team was present to treat the sick. As word of their initial treatment spread, approximately 1,200 more people returned to government control.



... However, if GVN forces make friends out of a certain number of Viet Cong - controlled or uncommitted people each day, the Viet Cong have lost domination and a source of intelligence and food from those "converted" individuals and families.

In mid-summer, reports indicated that 2,000 persons in another area desired to accept GVN control, but were hesitant. The division locally produced 30,000 leaflets and airdropped them in the area in conjunction with airborne loudspeaker instructions. Within one month, more than 1,200 people from the target area returned to the control of the Republic of Vietnam.

In early fall, an estimated Viet Cong battalion attacked two strategic hamlets. The next morning, 2,500 villagers were missing. Airborne loudspeaker broadcasts by the two village chiefs were utilized to contact the dislocated natives. This resulted in the return of approximately 2,300 villagers to their hamlet. Refugee interviews indicated that the majority returned due to the direct appeal of their village chiefs. In addition, wounded villagers were air-evacuated by helicopter. Other injured individuals, attempting to walk back to their villages, were spotted during loudspeaker missions. The psywar helicopter landed in the target area and evacuated them to the hamlet where the civic action medical team was located. On several occasions, the psywar helicopter landed in the target area to allow the village chief to talk to groups of frightened people, thus employing face-to-face persuasion.

Another aid to psychological operations was the audio-visual Jeepster. Many times this vehicle was employed to display motion pictures as a means of propaganda. A total of more than 12,500 villagers from 47 strategic hamlets attended performances. Coordination between division and province information services resulted in excellent audience participation. Five-minute commercial type propaganda talks, which were presented between film strips, were found to be the best format for maintaining attention to and interest in the government sponsored message.

CIVIC ACTION

During the four summer months U.S.-ARVN province medical teams treated over 18,000 people. In conjunction with psychological operations, CA teams continually distributed food, blankets, clothes and tool kits to the needy people.

The division built schools, churches and pagodas for strategic hamlets. Charity drives were conducted for victims of fire and Viet Cong actions. The division engineers, in coordination with public works, initiated construction on an extensive secondary road network which when completed would link remote areas and villages to important routes of communication, thus paving the way for improved economic conditions.

Another vitally important civic action program was the USOM (U.S. Overseas Mission) sponsored self-help program. Projects were:

A fish hatchery that would provide free distribution of fish to strategic hamlets plus stockage for future fish ponds planned for each district (county). These ponds were to be stocked with the Tilapia fish, a member of the Carp family, which is full grown in three to four months, reproduces constantly, and requires little care. One pair of Tilapia produce approximately 10,000 young in one year.

An animal husbandry and agriculture training center was established to train the people how to cultivate their land and raise their livestock to support themselves.


Public works initiated well-digging projects. Fifty-four wells were approved for two districts. The remaining five districts were submitting plans.



FORTIFIED OR STRATEGIC HAMLETS WILL HELP PROTECT THE POPULATION FROM THE GUERRILLA AND WILL CUT OFF MUCH OF THE GUERRILLAS SOURCE OF SUPPLY.

THE VOICE FROM THE SKY

The Viet Cong have increased their insurgent activities in attacking and harassing the hamlets, attempting to demoralize the people and to destroy the strategic hamlet program. To permit ARVN forces to penetrate the Viet Cong safe bases, the hamlet militia (home guard) must defend their hamlets.



...the hamlet militia (home guard) must defend their hamlets.

With this in mind, the division used the HU-1B airborne loudspeaker to broadcast instructions and encouragement to villagers. In general, they were told to concentrate on information gathering, to improve their defense, including alert plans, fences, communications, and spike traps; to be alert constantly for Viet Cong attacks and report them immediately; what to do if a Viet Cong attack penetrated the defense; and what to expect from the Viet Cong if the defense was not successful. The effectiveness of this message, although only of 'three minutes' duration, was demonstrated when hamlet chiefs contacted the district chief and stated that they had understood the instructions and would comply.

"The voice from the sky at night" had a terrific psychological impact on all people. Night missions permit a greater audio range and reduce danger of ground fire. (If the VC can't see you, he can't hit you.) Also, more villagers were reached as they were in the hamlet at night. The selection of "family" and "religious" propaganda themes proved most successful. The VC divide families and do not believe in religion. By informing the people of these facts, GVN actions helped convince the people that the Central government was the side to be on.

TROOP INFORMATION AS A WEAPON

A U.S. division senior adviser, Col V. M. Anido, informed his counterpart as follows:

We suggest that your troop information and education program be directed toward informing your small unit commanders and your soldiers concerning the aims and benefits of the civic action program. Each soldier must be imbued with a desire to enhance the image of ARVN and the government of Vietnam. Each soldier must realize that his personal contact with the civilian populace is as important to the over-all effort as killing Viet Cong.

To obtain efficient and willing cooperation from your soldiers, you must see that their families are fed, clothed, housed, and their children educated. It will be difficult to convince a soldier to participate actively in civic action programs if his own family is not being cared for.

"Active participation by your medical personnel and the province staff in the civic action program is essential to gain the support of the population. Your medical personnel must constantly strive to give medical assistance to the civilian population as well as to care for the soldiers of your command."



... active participation by your medical personnel and the province staff is essential to gain the support of the population.

"Propaganda leaflet and broadcast programs can solidify the friendly populace, destroy the fighting will of the Viet Cong, and win Viet Cong supporters to the government's cause. I suggest that you saturate the DTA (Division Tactical Area) with appropriate leaflets and broadcast mission."

INDISCRIMATE BOMBING

It was the opinion of many ARVN commanders and their U.S. advisers that indiscriminate, saturation type aerial or artillery bombardments were detrimental to the winning of the counterinsurgency war. One does not influence people to "join the cause" when his family, home and friends are subjected to bombs in the front yard. It was better to use "friendly persuasion" and secure a citizen, than to drive people into the Viet Cong camp. When in doubt of whether a group (village) is "friendly" or "enemy" use "psywar."


RESULTS

The division that conducted the above activities concluded that the combination of psychological operations and civic action were the most effective means of convincing the people to return to government control. Psychological operations provided the spoken word, civic action the deed. The use of psychological warfare and planned, coordinated civic action could not be overlooked as major factors in developing favorable public opinion and fostering active opposition to the Viet Cong. Full use had to be made of the tools available: the individual soldier, the audio-visual Jeepster, the Lambretta scooter, the loudspeaker helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft, leaflets, movies and lectures.

In any counterinsurgency campaign, psychological warfare-civic action-propaganda are greater "tools to ensure victory" than guns, tanks, bullets, and fighter aircraft.

A CONCEPT FOR POPULATION AND RESOURCES CONTROL

It has become increasingly apparent to the author in recent months that more stringent action must be taken to separate the population from the guerrillas. Control of the population will never materialize until a positive and dynamic program is instituted. To improve our posture in South Vietnam a "population and resources control" plan can and must be established. The following concept may be a partial solution:



... to foster and improve the social conditions... it is necessary to use the roads...

To foster and improve the social and economic conditions of South Vietnam, it is necessary for the citizens, businessmen and the military to utilize the roads, railways, canals and rivers. In the future when the majority of U.S. personnel depart, Vietnam cannot afford the luxury of helicopters and C123's. As the railroad system provides transportation only to certain areas, the roads, canals and rivers become all important. When GVN officials properly plan, organize and execute land and river convoys, losses to the Viet Cong will be minimum. The Viet Cong wish to deny South Vietnam the use of their natural means of cheap and simple communication. By not utilizing the roads, canals and rivers, the government is aiding and abetting the Viet Cong.

However, during this counterinsurgency conflict, freedom of movement must be controlled. When people move, the local authorities must know "why," "when," "where," "how," and "with what." It is impossible to distinguish a Viet Cong from a loyal citizen, but Viet Cong movement must be stopped. Because they do not have aircraft and have only a limited number of vehicles (boats), it will be relatively easy to exercise "population and resources control."

This population control system can be executed at province-district level. The local governmental authorities, assisted by U.S. advisers, must devise a system of positive identification of the inhabitants of each town and hamlet. The GVN local officials must be able to identify loyal citizens. The hamlet, subdistrict and district chiefs are the key authorities in such an identification program. Because a paper identification system, utilizing photos, fingerprints, infrared, etc., is the simplest and most economical, the people must be made to realize its value and importance. In my opinion more check points manned by reliable personnel must be established along every road, canal, river, railroad and trail. The location of these "round the clock" check points must be changed daily. The proper planning, establishment and operation of these check points are most important, so CG (Civil Guard), local police, and/or SDC (Self Defense Corps) personnel can be used. A "positive action" curfew must be established and strictly enforced, including in the cities.



When people leave the city, town, hamlet or village (including Saigon), they must be made to produce their identification. They must state where they are going, why they are going and how long they will be gone. When they arrive at the next city, town or village, they must be made to produce the same identification. Check points must notify (utilizing the TR-20 and other available radios) other check points of the arrival and departure of individuals, families, ox carts, trains, trucks, boats, etc. People utilizing bus and rail transportation must be included in this system. Local authorities must know where the people are going, because some of the people moving on trails, roads, trains, canals and rivers are Viet Cong. Officials must separate the loyal citizens from the guerrillas. Without proper identification no one should be allowed to enter a city, town (hamlet), use the roads, trains, canals or rivers, purchase from stores, and/or receive USOM rice, etc. When large sales of rice or other foodstuffs are made, the local authorities must approve such sales and ensure that delivery is made to people loyal to the government. If they cannot produce proper identification, they must be detained by the local authority until their true status can be determined. Such a system will capture more Viet Cong at check points than on an extended tactical field exercise.

In a counterinsurgency operation, intelligence is most difficult to obtain. By questioning the travelers, "Where did you come from?", "Where are you going?", "What did you see?", "Where are the Viet Cong?", "What are the Viet Cong doing?", etc., the check point becomes an excellent information gathering post. The sector intelligence officer, assisted by the U.S. sector intelligence adviser, can establish a "check point intelligence net" which will gain more information than most divisions and provinces are now securing.



INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THE CIVIL POPULATION WILL
BE ONE OF THE MAIN SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE.

Most traveling people carry something. What is in these baskets, bundles, etc.? Without disturbing the people's freedom, every rice package, basket, bundle of bamboo, every bundle on top of a bus, in a train or boat must be inspected. More weapons, ammunition, explosives and Viet Cong propaganda material will be discovered in the first few weeks of such spot inspections than will be recovered on an extended tactical operation. As soon as the Viet Cong realize what is happening to their "secure" routes of communication, they will be forced to revise their "carrying parties." This system will make it most difficult for the Viet Cong to operate.

COUNTERINSURGENCY TRAINING

The thermometer of world temperature indicates that the present geo-political turbulence will continue unabated throughout the next decade. Our advisory officers, in the majority, are well versed in the necessary military tactics of counterinsurgency, professional knowledge of small unit (squad and platoon) tactics, night operations, ambushes, patrolling, first aid, communications, fire support, coordination with tactical air, employment of troop carrier helicopters, self-survival, and weapons training, especially with carbines, shot guns, grenades and anti-personnel mines.

However, experience directs that more positive training emphasis on the major tools of counterinsurgency — intelligence, psychological warfare, civic action, propaganda, population control — must be accomplished.

**UNITED STATES ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL
Brigade and Battalion Operations Department
Fort Benning, Georgia**

**SELECTED READINGS
IN
GUERRILLA AND COUNTERGUERRILLA
OPERATIONS**

PART TWO

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

"We must realize that counterinsurgency is not solely a task for our Special Forces or any other single group. It is an Army task, and it is the responsibility of every agency, unit, and soldier."

Major General W. R. Peers
Asst. Dep. Chief of Staff for
Special Operations
1964

PRECEDING PAGE BLANK

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

AGENT - In intelligence usage, one who is authorized or instructed to obtain or to assist in obtaining information for intelligence or counterintelligence purposes.

ANTIGUERRILLA/COUNTERGUERRILLA WARFARE - Operations and activities conducted by armed forces, paramilitary forces, or nonmilitary agencies of a government against guerrillas.

AREA COORDINATION CENTER - A composite area headquarters at various political/military levels in which internal defense and development operations are planned, coordinated, and directed. Its members include the local chiefs of military, paramilitary, and other governmental agencies and their US counterparts.

AREA ORIENTED - A term applied to personnel or units whose organization, mission, training, and equipping are based upon operational deployment to a specific geographical area.

ASSET (INTELLIGENCE) - Includes any resource - person, group, relationship, instrument, installation, or supply - at the disposition of an intelligence organization for use in an operational or support role.

BASE - A locality from which operations are projected or supported. An area or locality containing installations which provide logistical or other support.

CIVIC ACTION - The participation by an agency, organization or group in economic and sociological projects which are useful to the local population at all levels, but for which the sponsor does not have primary governmental responsibility. Projects may be in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others which contribute to the general welfare and serve to improve the standing of the sponsor with the population.

CIVIL AFFAIRS - Those phases of the activities of a commander which embrace the relationship between the military forces and civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area, or occupied country or area when military forces are present. Civil affairs include, inter alia: a. matters concerning the relationship between military forces located in a country or area and the civil authorities and people of that area usually involving performance by the military forces of certain functions or the exercise of certain authority normally the responsibility of the local government. This relationship may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to military action in time of hostilities or other emergency and is normally covered by a treaty or other agreement, express or implied; and b. military government: the form of administration by which an occupying power exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority over occupied territory.

CIVIL DISTURBANCES - Group acts of violence or disorder prejudicial to public law and order.

CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS - Activities to accomplish intelligence, counterintelligence and other similar activities sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies, in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment.

COLD WAR - A state of international tension, wherein political, economical, technological, sociological, psychological, paramilitary, and military measures, short of overt armed conflict involving regular military forces, are employed to achieve national objectives.

CONSOLIDATION PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS - Psychological operations conducted toward populations in friendly areas of operations or in territory occupied by friendly military forces with the objective of facilitating operations and promoting maximum cooperation among the civil population.

COUNTERESPIONAGE - A category of counterintelligence, the objective of which is the detection and neutralization of foreign espionage.

COUNTERINSURGENCY - Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency.

COUNTERSABOTAGE - Action designed to destroy the effectiveness of foreign sabotage activities through the process of identifying, penetrating, and manipulating, neutralizing, or repressing individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such activities.

COUNTERSUBVERSION - That part of counterintelligence which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical subversion activities through the detection, identification, exploitation, penetration, manipulation, deception, and repression of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such activities.

COVERT OPERATIONS - Operations which are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. They differ from clandestine operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation.

DENIAL OPERATIONS - An operation designed to hinder or deny the enemy the use of space, personnel, or facilities. It may include destruction, removal, contamination, or erection of obstructions.

ECONOMIC ACTION - The planned use of economic measures designed to influence the policies or actions of another state, e.g., to impair the war-making potential of a hostile power, or to generate economic stability within a friendly power.

ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION - The process of preparing for and carrying out such changes in the organizations and functioning of the national economy as are necessary to provide for the most effective use of resources in a national emergency.

ECONOMIC WARFARE - Intensified government direction of economic means to affect foreign economies.

ESCAPE - Any person who has been physically captured by the enemy and succeeds in freeing himself.

ESPIONAGE - The clandestine or covert use of agent personnel and/or equipment in order to obtain information.

EVADER - Any person who is isolated in hostile areas and succeeds in eluding capture. Not to be confused with escapee or liberated personnel.

EVASION AND ESCAPE (E&E) - The procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from an enemy held or hostile area to areas under friendly control.

EXFILTRATION - The removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception, surprise, or clandestine means.

GUERRILLA WARFARE - See unconventional warfare.

HOST COUNTRY - A nation in which representatives or organizations of another state are present because of government invitation or international agreement. Particularly refers to nation receiving assistance relevant to its national security. (See also RECEIVING STATE.)

INFILTRATION - The movement through or into an area or territory occupied by either friendly or enemy troops or organizations. The movement is made by small groups or individuals at extended or irregular intervals. When used in connection with the enemy, it implies that contact is avoided.

INSURGENCY - A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. In the current context, subversive insurgency is primarily communist inspired, supported or exploited.

INSURGENCY MOVEMENT - The broad category of opposition to an existing government to include political, social, economic, and military actions. Within this broad category of opposition, the terms revolution, rebellion, and insurrection can be used interchangeably.

INSURGENT WAR - A struggle between a constituted government and organized insurgents frequently supported from without, but acting violently from within, against the political, social, economic, military and civil vulnerabilities of the regime to bring about its internal destruction or overthrow. Such wars are distinguished from lesser wars by the gravity of the threat to government and the insurgent object of eventual regional or national control.

INTELLIGENCE - The product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of all available information concerning one or more aspects of foreign countries or areas, which is immediately or potentially significant to the development and execution of plans, policies, and operations.

INTERNAL ATTACK - The full range of measures taken by organized insurgents to bring about the internal destruction and overthrow of a constituted government.

INTERNAL DEFENSE - The full range of measures taken by a government and its allies to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

INTERNAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE OPERATION - Any operation undertaken by the military, paramilitary, police, or other security agencies of an outside power to strengthen the host government politically, economically, psycho-socially, or militarily.

INTERNAL DEFENSE OPERATION - Any operation conducted by host country or its allies -- security establishment, military, paramilitary, or security organization -- directly against armed insurgents, their underground organization, support system, external sanctuary, or outside supporting power.

INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT - The strengthening of the roots, functions, and capabilities of government and the viability of the national life of a country toward the end of internal independence and freedom from conditions fostering insurgency.

INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE OPERATION - Any organized action taken by government or non-government agencies of an outside power to support host government internal development efforts.

INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT OPERATION - Any direct operation undertaken by host government or its allies to strengthen the local government politically, economically, socially, or militarily, or make more viable its national life.

INTERNAL SECURITY - The state of law and order within a nation as determined by the government's capability to cope with violence, subversion and lawlessness and the prevailing public confidence in that capability.

IRREGULAR FORCES - Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police or other internal security forces.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP (MAAG) - A joint service group normally under the military command of a commander of a unified command and representing the Secretary of Defense which primarily administers the US military assistance planning and programming in the host country.

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION - Civic action performed or supported by military or paramilitary forces using their military skills, equipment, and resources in cooperation with civil authorities, agencies, or groups.

NATIONAL INTERNAL DEFENSE COORDINATION CENTER - The national level civil/military composite headquarters in which internal defense and internal development programs are planned, coordinated, and directed. See also Area Coordination Center.

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE - Intelligence required for planning and executing all types of operations.

PARAMILITARY FORCES - Forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training or mission.

PARTISANS - Individual or organized groups of civilians who are devoted adherents to the enemy course. They may engage in guerrilla warfare. (No longer used in JCS Publ.)

PENETRATION OPERATION (INTELLIGENCE) - The use of agents or technical monitoring devices in a target organization or installation for the purpose of gaining access to the secrets or of influencing and controlling its activities.

PHYSICAL SECURITY - That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel, to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, facilities, materiel and documents, and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft.

POLITICAL WARFARE - Intensified use of political means to achieve national objectives.

POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL - Actions undertaken by a government to control the populace and its material resources or to deny access to those resources which would further hostile aims and objectives against that government.

PROPAGANDA - Any form of communication designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group, in order to benefit the sponsor either directly or indirectly. No change to subordinate terms "black", "grey", and "white".

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS - The planned use of propaganda and other measures to influence the opinions, emotions, attitude, and behavior of hostile, neutral, or friendly groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE THEME - A subject or topic used as a means of accomplishing a psychological warfare task.

RAID - An operation, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or to destroy his installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission.

RECEIVING STATE - A nation, party to an international agreement, which pursuant thereto accepts within its territory the presence of military personnel of another nation party to the agreement.

RESISTANCE MOVEMENT - An organized effort by some portion of a country's population to resist the legally established government or occupying force.

SECTOR - A defense area designated by boundaries within which a unit operates, and for which it is responsible.

SPECIAL WARFARE - All military and paramilitary measures and activities related to unconventional warfare, psychological operations and counterinsurgency operations.

STABILITY OPERATION - That full range of internal defense and development operations and assistance which we can employ to maintain, restore, or establish a climate of order within which Government under law can function effectively, and without which progress in the modernization process cannot be achieved. (Not Pub in JCS Pub 1)

SUBVERSION - Action, principally clandestine or covert, designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, morale, or political strength.

SUBVERSIVE POLITICAL ACTION - A planned series of activities designed to accomplish political objectives by influencing, dominating, or displacing individuals or groups who are so placed as to affect the decisions and actions of another government.

SURVEILLANCE - The systematic observation of air, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means for intelligence purposes.

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE - Includes the three related fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion, conducted within hostile areas by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source.

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE FORCES - United States forces having an existing unconventional warfare capability consisting of Army Special Forces and such Navy, Air Force, and Marine units as are assigned for these operations.

UNITED STATES COUNTRY TEAM - The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the Chief of the United States diplomatic mission, usually an ambassador, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency.

WARS OF LIBERATION - Is the propaganda term used by the communists to dignify their efforts toward covert aggression.

WARS OF SUBVERSION OR COVERT AGGRESSION - Are terms used to define the communist inspired actions designed to subvert free governments through development of indigenous resistance movements, including the eventual organization of guerrilla forces, and the support of these movements from external sources.

UNITED STATES ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL
Brigade and Battalion Operations Department
Fort Benning, Georgia

SELECTED READINGS
IN
GUERRILLA AND COUNTERGUERRILLA
OPERATIONS

PART THREE

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND READING LIST

"I fear the man of only one book."

Pliny the Younger

PRECEDING PAGE BLANK

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND READING LIST

USAIS Library Call Nrs

Selection (Title)

D772.35
.A 41bU

Achin, M. K. - First Guerrillas in Europe. N.Y., Vantage Press, 1963. 181 p.

U 167.51
.A 22 bU

American University, SORO - Case Book on Insurgency & Revolutionary Warfare. Wash., D.C., GPO, 1963. 607 p.

F 1788
.A 22 bU

American University, SORO - Case Studies in Counterinsurgency & Revolutionary War: Cuba, 1953-1959. Wash., GPO, 1963. 173 p.

D 772.21
.A 6 bU

American University, SORO - Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II. Wash., D. C., American Univ., 1961. 338 p.

DT 295
.A 3 bU

American University, SORO - Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary War: Algeria, 1954-1962. Wash., D. C., American Univ., 1963. 151 p.

DS 557
.A 5 22 bU

American University, SORO - Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary War: Vietnam, 1941-1954. Wash., D. C., American Univ., 1964. 159 p.

F 1466.5
.A 2bU

American University, SORO - Case Studies in Insurgency & Revolutionary Warfare: Guatemala, 1944-54. Wash., D. C., American Univ., 1964. 116 p.

D 773
.A 12 bU

American University, SORO - Guerrilla-Counterguerrilla Operations in Russia During World War II. Wash., D. C., American Univ., 1963. 167 p.

U 167.51
.A 23 bU

American University, SORO - Underground in Insurgent, Revolutionary and Resistance Warfare. Wash., D. C., American Univ., 1963. 349 p.

U 240
.A 2 #550-104 bU

American University, SORO - Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies. Wash., D. C., GPO, 1965.

DS-671
.B 12 bU

Baclagan, U. S. - Lessons from the Huk Campaign in the Phillippines. Manila (Author) 1956. 272 p.

DT 434
.K 4 B-2 bU

Baldwin, W. W. - Mau Mau Manhunt. N. Y., Dutton, 1957 252 p.

DA 962
.B 27 bU

Barry, Tom - Guerrilla Days in Ireland. N. Y., Devin-Adair, 1956. 303 p.

D 732.815
.B 32 bU

Battaglia, Roberto - Story of the Italian Resistance. London, Oldham Press, 1957. 287 p.

D 787
.B 37 bU

Beamish, John - Burma Drop. London, Elek Books, 1958. 222 p.

USAIS Library
Call Nrs

Selection (Title)

DA 962 .B 42	Bennett, Richard - <u>Black and Tans</u> , Boston, Haughton and Mifflin, 1960.
D 750.25 .B 53 bU	Bird, M. J. - <u>Secret Battalion</u> , N. Y., Holt, 1964.
U 240 .B 56 bU	Blacker, I. R. - <u>Irregulars, Partisans, Guerrillas</u> , N. Y., Simon & Schuster, 1954.
DS 596 .B 74 bU	Bredin, A. E. C. - <u>Happy Warriors</u> . Gillingham, (England), Blackmore Pr., 1961.
DS557 .A6B8bU	Browne, M. W. - <u>The New Face of War</u> . N. Y., Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1965.
E 470.45	Brownlee, R. S. - <u>Gray Ghosts of the Confederacy; Guerrilla War in the West, 1861-65</u> , Baton Rouge, La., Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1958.
DS 557 .A 7 B8 bU	Burchett, Wilfred G. - <u>Vietnam: Inside Story of the Guerilla War</u> . N. Y., International Publishers, 1965. (A communist viewpoint)
D 787.2 .C 132 bU	Calvert, Michael - <u>Fighting Mad</u> , London, Jarrolds Publishers Ltd., 1964.
DT 294 .C 54 bU & pU	Clark, M. K. - <u>Algeria in Turmoil</u> . N. Y., Praeger, 1957.
DS 596 .C 59 bU	Clutterbuck, Richard L. Brig. - <u>The Long Long War</u> . N. Y., Praeger, 1966.
D 732.71 .F 3.C 8 bU	Cowburn, Benjamin - <u>No Cloak, No Dagger</u> . London, Jarrolds, 1960.
DS 596 .C 87 bU	Crockett, Anthony - <u>Green Beret, Red Star</u> . London, Spottiswoode, 1954.
U 240 .C 88 bU	Cross, James - <u>Conflict in the Shadows; the Nature and Politics of Guerrilla Warfare</u> . N. Y., Doubleday, 1963.
D 732.83 .M 2 C 8 bU	Cross, John - <u>Red Jungle</u> . London, R. Hale, 1957.
D 843 .C 88 bU	Crozier, B. - <u>The Rebels: A Study of Postwar Insurrections</u> . Boston, Beacon Press 1960.
U 240 .D 2 bU	Dach, H. - <u>Total Resistance</u> . Boulder, Colo., Panther Publishers, 1965.
D 759.71 .D 64 bU	Dixon, C. A. & Heilbrunn, Otto - <u>Communist Guerrilla Warfare</u> . N. Y., Prager, 1955.

USAIS Library
Call Nrs

DS557

.A6D71bU

Selection (Title)

Donlon, R. H. C. - Outpost of Freedom. N. Y., Toronto, London.
McGraw - Hill Book Company, 1965.

DS 518.1

.D 74 bU

Douglas, W. H. - North from Malaya: Adventures on Five Fronts.
N. Y., Doubleday, 1953.

DS 535

.F 19 bU

Fall, B. B. - Street without Joy: Indochina at War. Harris-
burg, Stackpole.

DS 550

.F 19 bU

Fall, Bernard B. - Hell in a Very Small Place; The Siege of Dien
Bien Phu. N. Y., Lippincott, 1966.

DS 557

.A 5 F 21 bU

Fall, Bernard B. - Vietnam Witness, 1953 - 1966. N. Y.,
Praeger, 1966.

D 748.243

.F 24 bU

Farran, Roy - Operation Tombola. London, Collins, 1960.

U 167.51

.S 3 A 2 pF

Final Report on Unconventional Warfare Operations. Jt Exercise
Swift Strike II.

U 240

.F 81 dF

France, Army - Counter guerrilla Training in the Scope of Mainte-
nance of Order in AFN (translation).

U 240

.F 8 (1958) dF

France, Army - Special Training in Counter guerrilla Warfare,
Vol 3 (translation).

U 240

.F 82 dU

France, Ministere de la Defense Nationale - Provisional
Instruction for Combat Operations of Armed Forces, Title II -
Guerrilla and Counter guerrilla Warfare (translation).

U 240

.G 15 bU

Galula, David - Counterinsurgency Warfare. N. Y., Praeger,
1964.

DS 38

.G 52 bU

Glubb, G. B. - Britain and the Arabs. London, Hodder &
Stoughton, 1959.

DS 154.52

.G 5 A 3 bU

Glubb, G. B. - Soldier with the Arabs. N. Y., Harper, 1957.

HX 743

.G 87 bU

Griffith, Samuel Brig. Gen. USMC ret. - Peking and Peoples War.
N. Y., Praeger, 1966.

DS 58.4

.G 88 bU

Grivas - Gen. Grivas on Guerrilla Warfare. New York, F. A.
Praeger, c1965.

U 240

.G 938 bU

Guevara, Che - Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare. N. Y.,
Praeger, 1961.

D 793.3

.H 22 bU

Harkins, P. - Blackburn's Headhunters. N. Y., Norton, 1954.

U 240

.H 38 bU

Heilbrunn, Otto - Partisan Warfare. N. Y., Praeger, 1962.

USAIS Library
Call Nrs.

Selection-(Title)

U 167.5
.R 4 H 3 bU

Heilbrunn, Otto - Warfare in the Enemy's Rear. N. Y.,
Praeger, 1963.

DB 957
.H 36 bU

Heller, Andor - No More Comrades. Chicago, Henry Regnery,
1957.

DS 596
.H 39 bU

Henniker, M. C. A. - Red Shadow over Malaya. London, Black-
wood, 1955.

D 812.32
.H 43 bU

Hernandez, Al - Bahala Na. . . Come What May. Berkeley,
Calif., Howell-North Co., 1963.

DS 557
.A 7 H 5 bU

Hoang-Van-Chi - From Colonialism to Communism. N. Y.,
Praeger, 1964.

DA 962
.H 74 bU

Holt, Edgar - Protest in Arms; Irish Troubles 1916-1923. N. Y.,
Coward-McCann, 1960.

D 764.2
.H 83 bU

Howarth, David - Across to Norway. N. Y., Wm. Sloane
Assns., 1951.

D 759.7
.H 83 bU

Howarth, Patrick - Special Operations. London, Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1955.

D 787.25
.H 91 bU

Hunter, C. N. - Galahad. San Antonio, Naylor Co., 1963.

D 772.35
.H 9 bU

Huot, L. - Guns for Tito. N. Y., L. B. Fischer, 1945.

D 772.35
.I 51 bU

Inks, James - Eight Bailed Out. N.Y., Norton, 1954. 222 p.

E 470.2
.J 72 bU

Jones, V. C. - Gray Ghosts and Rebel Raiders. N. Y., McGraw-
Hill, 1956.

DT295
.A3bU

Jureidin, P. A. - Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary
Warfare: Algeria 1954-1962. Wash., Government Printing
Office, 1963.

D 793.3
.K 22 bU

Keats, John - They Fought Alone. Philadelphia, Lippincott.
Co., 1963.

DT 434
.K 4 K 6 bU

Kitson, Frank - Gangs and Counter-Gangs. London, Barrie
& Rockliff, 1960.

D 732.71
.N 6 K 5 bU

Klefoe, Brede - They Came in the Night. Greenlawn, N. Y.,
Harian Pubs., 1959.

D 568.4
.L 4 bU

Lawrence, T. E. - Seven Pillars of Wisdom. Garden City.
N. Y., Doubleday. 1935.

USAIS Library
Call Nrs

Selection (Title)

D 576
.G3 L 57 bU

Lettow-Vorbeck - East African Campaigns. N. Y., Robt
Speller & Sons, 1957.

D568.4
.L 45 L 5 bU

Liddell Hart - Colonel Lawrence. N. Y., Dodd, Mead & Co., 1934.

U 240
.M 32 bU

Mao, Tse-Tung - Basic Tactics. N. Y., Praeger, 1966.

U 240
.M 33 bU

Mao, Tse-Tung - On Guerrilla Warfare. N. Y., Praeger, 1961.

U 240
.M 35 bU & pU

Marine Corps - Guerrilla -- and How to Fight Him. N. Y.,
Praeger, 1962.

U 240
.M 13 bU

McCuen, John - The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War. Harrisburg,
Penn., Stackpole Books, 1966.

DB 957
.M 53 bU

Meray, T. - Thirteen Days That Shook the Kremlin. N. Y.,
Praeger, 1959.

DB 957
.M 58 bU

Michener, James - Bridge at Andau. N. Y., Random House,
1957.

DS 596
.M 58 bU

Miers, Richard - Shoot to Kill. London, Faber & Faber,
1959.

DS 596
.M 61 bU

Miller, Harry - Menace in Malaya. London, George Harrap &
Co., 1954.

D 731.89
.M 63 bU

Milroy, Vivian - Alpine Partisan. London, Hammond & Co.,
1957.

DS557
.A6M7bU

Moore, Robin - The Green Berets. N. Y., Crown Publishers.
1965.

DS 595.6
.M 6 A 2 bU

Moran, J. W. G. - Spearhead in Malaya. London, Peter Davies,
1959.

DS644
.N18bU

Nasution - Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare. N. Y., Praeger,
1965.

U 240
.N 49 bU

Ney, Virgil - Notes on Guerrilla Warfare. Wash., Command
Pubs., 1961.

D 787
.O 8 bU

Oatts, Balfour - Jungle in Arms. London, Wm. Kimber,

DF 850
.O 1

O'Ballance, Edgar - Greek Civil War: 1944 - 1949. N. Y.,
Praeger, 1966.

DS550
.022bU

O'Ballance, Edgar - The Indo-China War (1945-1954). London,
Faber and Faber, 1964.

USAIS Library
Call Nrs

Selection (Title)

DS 596 .0 2 bU	O'Ballance, Edgar - <u>Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, 1948 - 1960.</u> Hamden, Conn., Archon Books, 1966.
D 787.25 .0 4 bU	Ogburn, Charlton - <u>Marauders.</u> N. Y., Harper, 1959.
DS 596 .0 45 bU	Oldfield, J. B. - <u>Green Howards in Malaya, 1949-1952; the Story of a Post-War Tour of Duty by a Battalion of the Line.</u> London, Gale & Polden, 1953.
UB 271 .R 905 bU	Orlov, Alexander - <u>Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare.</u> Ann Arbor, Mich. Press, 1963.
U 240 .0 5 bU	Osanka, F. M. - <u>Modern Guerrilla Warfare; Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941-61.</u> N. Y., Free Press, 1962.
U 167.51 .P 21 bU	Paret, Peter - <u>French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria.</u> N. Y., Praeger, 1964.
U 240 .P 21 bU	Paret, Peter - <u>Guerrillas in the 1960's.</u> N. Y., Praeger, 1962.
D 787.2 .P 31 bU	Peers, W. R. - <u>Behind the Burma Road.</u> Boston, Little Brown, 1963.
DS 556.34 .P 63 bU	Pike, Douglas - <u>Viet Cong.</u> Cambridge, Mass., M. I. T. Press, 1966.
D 772.22 .P 95 bU	Psychoundakis, George - <u>Cretan Runner.</u> London, John Murray, 1955.
U 167.51 .P 97	Pustay, U. S. - <u>Counterinsurgency Warfare.</u> N. Y., Free Press, 1965.
DS 556.76 .R 44 bU	Rigg, Robert B. - <u>How to Stay Alive in Vietnam.</u> Harrisburg, Penn., Telegraph Press, 1966.
DS 686.5 .R 66 bU	Romulo, Carlos - <u>Crusade in Asia; Philippine Victory.</u> N. Y., John Day Co., 1955.
DS 550 .R 81 bU	Roy, Jules - <u>The Battle of Dien Bien Phu.</u> N. Y., Harper & Row Publishers, 1965.
D 759.7 .S 2 bU	Sanderson, J. D. - <u>Behind Enemy Lines.</u> Princeton, N. J., Van Nostrand. 1959.
D 731.71 .N 3 S 2 bU	Schreurs, J. - <u>My Country in Trouble.</u> N. Y., Carlton Press, 1962.
D 772.35 .S 31 bU	Seitz, A. B. - <u>Mihailovic - Hoax or Hero.</u> Columbus, O., 1953.

USAIS Library
Call Nrs

Selection (Title)

DR 45 .S 35 b	Seton-Watson - <u>East European Revolution</u> . N.Y., Praeger, 1956.
DS556.3 .S55bU	Sivaram, M - <u>The Viet Nam War: Why?</u> Tokyo, Japan, Charles E. Tuttle, Co., 1966.
DS 778 .S 77-bU	Stuart, Gilbert - <u>Kind-Hearted Tiger</u> . Boston, Little, Brown, 1964.
DS 550 .T 12 bU	Tanham, G. K. - <u>Communist Revolutionary Warfare the Vietminh in Indochina</u> . N.Y., Praeger, 1961.
F 1788 .T 15 bU	Tanner, Hans - <u>Counter-Revolutionary Agent</u> . London, G. T. Eoullis, 1962.
D 829 .L 5 T 2 bU	Tauras, K. V. - <u>Guerrilla Warfare on the Amber Coast</u> . N.Y., Voyages Co., 1962.
U 240 .T 33 bU	Thayer, C. W. - <u>Guerrilla</u> . N.Y., Harper - Row, 1963.
U 240 .T 37 bU	Thompson, Sir Robert - <u>Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam</u> . N.Y., Praeger, 1966.
U 240 .T 73 bU	Trinquier, Roger - <u>Modern Warfare; A French View of Counter-insurgency</u> . N.Y., Praeger, 1961.
DS 557 .A 7 T 7-bU	Truong Chinh - <u>Primer for Revolt</u> . N.Y., Praeger, 1963.
UA 649 .T 81 bU	Tugwell, Maurice - <u>Unquiet Peace; Stories from the Post-War Army (British)</u> . London, Allan Wingate, 1957.
D 750.62 .U 81 bU	<u>Unseen and Silent; Adventures from the Underground Movement</u> . N.Y., Shead & Ward, 1954.
U 133 .U 21 #20-243 dU	U S Dept of the Army - <u>German Anti-Guerrilla Operations in the Balkans, 1941-44</u> . (DA Pam #20-243).
U 133 .U 21 #20-240-dU	US Dept of the Army - <u>Rear Area Security in Russia</u> (DA Pam 20-240).
U 167.61 .A 21 bU & pU	US Dept of the Army - <u>Special Warfare, U S Army</u> . Wash., GPO, 1962.
U 133 .U 21 #20-244 dU	U S Dept of the Army - <u>Soviet Partisan Movement</u> (DA Pam #20-244).
DF 850 .7 65 pU	USA Special Warfare School - <u>Guerrilla Warfare in Greece</u> . (Instructional material). 1962.

USAIS Library
Call Nrs

Selection (Title)

U 167.51
.I 4 pU

U S Industrial College of Armed Forces - Insurgency & Counter-insurgency; an Anthology. Oct. 62.

U 240
.U 56 pU

U S Naval Inst. - Studies in Guerrilla Warfare. Annapolis, The Institute, 1963.

DS 686.5
.V 23 bU

Valeriano, N. D. - Counter guerrilla Operations; the Philippine Experience. N. Y., Praeger, 1962.

D 793.3
.V 88 bU

Volckmann, R. W. - We Remained. N. Y., Norton, 1954.

DS 550
.V 65 pU

Vo-Nguyen Giap - Inside the Viet Minh. Quantico, Marine Corps Assn., 1962.

DS 557
.A 7 V 6 bU

Vo-Nguyen Giap - People's War, People's Army. N. Y., Praeger, 1962.

**UNITED STATES ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL
Brigade and Battalion Operations Department
Fort Benning, Georgia**

**SELECTED READINGS
IN
GUERRILLA AND COUNTERGUERRILLA
OPERATIONS**

**PART FOUR
PROBLEMS**

"Considering the less than startling results of conventional western methods in nearly all areas of the world where they have come face to face with revolutionary warfare, capitalized upon by the communist, all branches of the Armed Forces of the United States and her allies should begin to study and teach the theory and practice of such warfare. The ultimate survival of freedom in much of the world may well depend upon it."

Dr. Bernard B. Fall
1962

CHAPTERS	
10	BFC04 INTRODUCTION TO INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT
11	BFC08 FUNDAMENTALS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIC ACTION
12	BFC12 FUNDAMENTALS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE AND VIET CONG TACTICS
13	BFC18 FUNDAMENTALS OF COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS
14	BFC22 INFANTRY BRIGADE IN COUNTER- GUERRILLA OPERATIONS
15	BFC24 INFANTRY BATTALION IN COUNTER- GUERRILLA OPERATIONS
16	BFC26 ROLE OF THE MAAG ADVISOR IN INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS
17	BFC28 BRITISH POSTWAR INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCES
18	BFC29 FRENCH POSTWAR INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCES

"This country has no more important job right now than to get the very best men in every field for more effective service to our embattled friends in South Vietnam. I want no U.S. officer to be in doubt of the value of service in South Vietnam and of the importance I personally attach to it."

President Lyndon B. Johnson
1964

TAB
HERE

CHAPTER 10
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNAL DEFENSE AND
DEVELOPMENT

BFC04

"We must prove that Communist aggression cannot succeed through subversion, but will fail as surely as it failed in direct confrontation."

Secretary of Defense McNamara
1962

TAB
HERE

CHAPTER 11
FUNDAMENTALS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
OPERATIONS AND CIVIC ACTION

BFC08

"The printing press is the greatest weapon in the armoury of the modern commander."

T. E. Lawrence

"... military civic action makes the soldier a brother of the people as well as their protector."

Major General Rosson, USA
Asst. Dep. Chief of Staff
for Special Operations
1962

SUCCESSING PAGE BLANK

TAB
HERE

CHAPTER 12

FUNDAMENTALS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE AND VIET CONG TACTICS

BFC12

"Select the tactics of seeming to come from the East and attacking from the West; Avoid the solid, attack the hollow; Attack, withdraw; Deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; Harass him when he stops; Strike him when he is weary. . . they must move with the fluidity of water and the ease of the blowing wind."

Mao Tse-Tung
1930's

TAB
HERE

CHAPTER 13

FUNDAMENTALS OF COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

BFC18

"Military forces alone cannot eliminate the roots of insurgency, which are deep in the whole political, social, and economic structure of a target country."

Major General W. R. Peers; USA
Asst. Dep. Chief of Staff for
Special Operations
1964

TAB
HERE

CHAPTER 14

INFANTRY BRIGADE IN COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

BFC22

"All conceptions born of impatience and aimed at obtaining speedy victory are gross errors. Only a long term war enables us to utilize to the maximum our political trump cards, to overcome our material handicap, and to transform our weakness into strength."

Vo Nguyen Giap
1949

CHAPTER 15

INFANTRY BATTALION IN COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

BFC24

"We need a greater ability to deal with guerrilla forces, insurrection and subversion. Much of our effort to create guerrilla and antiguerrilla capabilities has, in the past, been aimed at general war. We must be ready now to deal with any size force, including small externally supported bands of men."

President John F. Kennedy
1960

TAB
HERE

CHAPTER 16

ROLE OF THE MAAG ADVISOR IN INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS

BFC26

"The MAAGs and Missions have remained in the forefront of the Army's
Counterinsurgency effort."

Major General W. R. Peers, USA
Asst. Dep Chief of Staff for
Special Operations
1964

TAB
HERE

PRECEDING PAGE BLANK

CHAPTER 17

BRITISH POSTWAR INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCES

BFC28

"The war will be between an elephant and a tiger. If the tiger stands still the elephant will crush him, but the tiger will not stand still. He will lurk in the jungle and by night will pounce on the elephant's back, tearing huge chunks of flesh from the elephant and eventually the elephant will bleed to death."

Ho Chi Minh
1946

PRECEDING PAGE BLANK

CHAPTER 18

FRENCH POSTWAR INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCES

BFC29

"Winning and victory are but incremental gains and milestones of achievement, and never the ultimate. "Winning" means success for the moment, hope for the future, and acknowledgment that more struggle lies ahead."

COL Robert B. Rigg
March 1966

PRECEDING PAGE BLANK

CHAPTER 18

FRENCH POSTWAR INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCES

BFC29

"Winning and victory are but incremental gains and milestones of achievement, and never the ultimate. "Winning" means success for the moment, hope for the future, and acknowledgment that more struggle lies ahead."

COL Robert B. Rigg
March 1966

TAB
HERE