Some Types and Distributions of Intelligence Errors.
Abstract
The analysis presented in this memorandum illustrates some of the manifold errors in military intelligence. The data are drawn from the actions of V US Corps in Normandy, France, between 6 and 13 June and on 30 June 1944. Reliable statistical inferences cannot be drawn because of the paucity of material collected in the allotted time. The investigation consisted of an historical reconstruction of the actual German situation in Normandy, collection of available data from V Corps G2 records concerning the enemy, and statistical analysis of the matched data. The statistical analysis indicates that there is a significant difference between the frequency of error from one day to the next. The implications of the data seem to reinforce common sense and military experience; that is, if a retreating enemy breaks contact, it is difficult to know what action he is taking. The data of this study indicate that the frequency with which elements of units are identified as entire units and the frequency with which units are thought to be other units rises sharply when contact is broken or relaxed.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 30, 1958
- Accession Number
- ADA076316
Entities
People
- James Hodgson