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INSTITUTIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL VALUES IN THE U.S. MILITARY[1]

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INTRODUCTION

The United States armed forces have undergone three major interrelated changes during the past four decades. First, along with other industrial nations of the western world, they have abandoned the "mass force" model of rapid mobilization in times of war and demobilization in post-war periods in favor of a large standing force-in-being.[2] Second, they have replaced a manpower system based upon military conscription with an all-volunteer force, again reflecting general patterns in the industrial nations of Europe and the Anglo-American world.[3] Third, the primary function of the military, particularly in the industrialized nations with multi-party parliamentary governments, has been redefined, so that its mission is not to wage war, but to contribute to stability in the international system through deterrence or through constabulary operations.[4]

Four themes have achieved prominance in sociological analyses aimed at describing and explaining the structural changes in military organization engendered by these changing definitions of the military institution: (a) the decline of the citizen-soldier; (b) convergence between civilian and military institutions; (c) the industrialization of military organization; (d) structural pluralism within the military. In our analysis, we attempt to specify the linkages among these theoretical constructs, and to relate them to survey data on the attitudes of American military personnel in the 1970s.

CONCEPTUAL BASIS

The four dominant themes of contemporary military sociology are interrelated, and portend major changes in the motivational basis of

military service. The first of these themes is the decline of the citizen-soldier. In the nations of the West, the growth of conscription-based mass armies in the nineteenth century contributed to the development of parliamentary democracy, and linked the role of citizen to that of soldier, thus integrating the military institution with its host civilian society. This structural relationship continued into the twentieth century. In the United States, for example, young males, members of racial minority groups, and women, have all been granted expanded rights of citizenship concomitant with their service in the armed forces.[5] As military technologies have changed and the role of the military in international relations has been redefined, the decline of the mass armed force has been accompanied by the progressive segmentation of the role of citizen and that of soldier, as the all-volunteer force has become progressively more professional and career-oriented.[6]

The bifurcation of the roles of citizen and of soldier is rooted in part in the second theme that we have identified: that of the structural convergence of civilian and military institutions. Prior to the conversion to an all-volunteer force, in the 1950s and early 1960s, military sociologists were suggesting that the military institution was becoming increasingly similar to civilian institutions, particularly with regard to required skills and organizational strategies.[7] Janowitz, for example, has argued that "to analyze the contemporary military establishment as a social system, it is...necessary to assume that for some time it has tended to display more and more of the characteristics typical of any large-scale nonmilitary bureaucracy."[8] There was at the same

time, however, a recognition that because of the unique mission of military organization - the legitimate management of large scale organized violence - military organizations could never become identical with civilian organizations.[9] Where the convergence hypothesis provided a structural basis for the fusion of citizen and soldier roles in isomorphic organizations, the recognition that there were limits to convergence, or indeed that convergence might be succeeded by divergence, placed limits on this role fusion.

The third theme that we wish to address, the industrialization of the armed forces, reflects the major empirical problem in the study of civil- military convergence: the inability of our theories to predict, a priori, the areas in which convergence was likely to take place, the degree to which it was likely to take place, and the processes that would bring it about. One element of convergence was in fact imposed on the armed forces by civilian policy-makers as a consequence of the conversion to an all-volunteer force. Prior to the all-volunteer force era, and its attendant attempts to equalize civilian and military compensation, there were clear economic disadvantages to military service that were in part offset by fringe benefits that came to be viewed as part of the compensation package of an implied contract. Among the latent functions of this pattern of compensation were: support of military service as a calling rather than simply an occupation, maintenance of the military installation as a community, enhancement of the fraternal nature of military organization, legitimation of the military as a social institution, and symbolic incentives for the citizen to serve in the military and thus fulfill a right and responsibility of citizenship.

With the move toward equalization of military and civilian pay levels, there have been changes in the structure of benefits from what had been regarded as the terms of the implied contract. In sum, the conditions of "working for" the armed forces as uniformed members of the service have increasingly come to resemble the employment conditions of civilian occupations. Whether by design, intuition, or accident, the makers of military personnel policy have sought to compete with commerce and industry for "workers" by making military employment increasingly similar to civilian employment.

Models to describe the structural implications of this shift have been proposed by Segal and by Moskos.[10] Segal describes the change as moving from fraternal organization, characterized by the communal nature of the installation and high solidarity of military units, to corporate organization, characterized by the cash nexus. Moskos characterizes the same change as the transformation of military service from a calling, legitimized in terms of institutional values, to an occupation, legitimized in terms of the market place. These conceptualizations are not directly comparable, since Segal focuses on the nature of the institution while Moskos focuses on the individual service person. Nonetheless, there is clearly a high degree of compatibility between Segal's corporate model and Moskos' occupational model. That is, the occupationally motivated individual fits naturally into a corporate setting. The fit between Segal's fraternal model and Moskos' "calling" is not as good, and some conceptual refinement regarding how to characterize the pre-all-volunteer military force is necessary. More importantly, it is necessary to relate such concepts as "fraternal organization,"

"calling," "occupational model," and "corporate model," to the structural and motivational realities of modern military organization.

The fourth theme upon which we seek to build, that of structural pluralism, suggests the potential coexistence of occupational and institutional orientations within the modern American military establishment. The notion of a transformation of military service from a calling to an occupation did not originate with Moskos. Rather, it was anticipated by Janowitz, who in his analysis of the officer role, noted that "Those who see the military profession as a calling or a unique profession are outnumbered by a greater concentration for whom the military is just another job."[11] It did, however, influence Moskos' notion of a plural military force. Building upon the convergence theme, and upon the counter-argument that he developed in 1970, suggesting that the military was becoming increasingly divergent from civilian institutions, Moskos suggested at the time that the all-volunteer force was established that some aspects of the military will be divergent and traditional (particularly the ground combat forces), while others will be convergent and civilianized (particularly clerical, technical and administrative areas).[12] The former model might be characterized by fraternalism, institutionalism, and the maintenance of a calling, and the latter by corporatism and the transformation to an occupation.

The theme of differentiation of the force, and its elaboration into a two-force structure, was further developed by other analysts. Hauser, for example, envisages the American Army of the future as

consisting of a combat force, divergent from civilian society and maintaining traditional military values, and a support force, convergent with civilian society and corporate in organization. Bradford and Brown present a similar conceptualization of the Army. Moskos has modified his own formulation somewhat, and now advocates a two-tier personnel system based upon the differentiation of "citizen-soldiers" from "career soldiers, rather than combat from noncombat personnel."[13]

CONCOMITANCE OF INSTITUTIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL ORIENTATIONS

As already suggested, these four dominant themes are interrelated. One *major common* concern in the literature dealing with these themes has been their impact on the motivational basis for military service. This paper focuses on the notions of institutional and occupational orientations as vehicles for exploring further this common concern. A number of analyses of the all-volunteer force have now used the occupational and institutional perspectives, at least implicitly, in trying to understand the motivational conditions of military service and the organizational climate of the armed forces. But even while showing some initial agreement in both conceptualization and findings, these perspectives have begun to reveal important differences both in conceptualization and findings that lead to still more important differences in interpretation, assessment, and policy recommendations having to do with all four themes previously discussed, and particularly with the future prospects of an all-volunteer force. Since these analyses draw upon two rather distinct traditions of scholarship, it is not surprising

that initial attempts to synthesize them by simultaneously treating both institutional and occupational orientations need to be refined.

The occupational orientation is found in analyses of the military rooted in the perspectives of industrial psychology. In particular, problems of human resource management such as racial tension, drug and alcohol abuse, and concern with morale and esprit de corps during the latter years of the Vietnam War, led the U.S. armed forces to borrow personnel management technologies from the civilian sector. Initially, the techniques adopted were problem-specific: race relations training programs, drug education programs, etc. Increasingly, however, an awareness developed that human resource management problems were interrelated. This awareness led to the adoption of broad-based organizational development strategies (referred to as organizational effectiveness in the U.S. Army) developed in civilian industry.[14] It was hoped that techniques such as survey feedback, management development, team building, and the like, would improve the organizational climate of the services, and reduce human resource problems.

The adoption of organizational development strategies developed by industrial psychologists in the civilian sector represents an important change of direction in technology transfer between the civilian and military spheres. Since the World War I period, personnel management technologies have been pioneered in the military context, and subsequently adapted for use in civilian organizations.[15] This has been true in fields as diverse as the development of selection and classification tests, training technologies, and human factors research. Reversing the direction of

technology transfer, and adopting organizational development techniques from civilian industry, involved an acceptance on the part of the military of an assumption of structural and processual similarity between military and civilian organizations, and of similarities between the soldier and his civilian labor force counterpart. In short, it assumed some degree of convergence.

The institutional orientation, on the other hand, is embedded in the traditions of military history and military sociology. Here, the focus has been on those aspects of the military that differentiate it from civilian organizations: engagement in combat operations in wartime, willingness among peacetime soldiers to go to war should the need arise, and attitudes regarding obedience to authority, the role of force in international relations, and the appropriate role of the military in domestic politics.[16] This perspective assumes that the soldier is different from a civilian employee.

Research conducted from the occupational and institutional perspectives has developed with little if any contact between the two traditions. Research currently underway in the United States Air Force represents the first large scale attempt to empirically identify the degree to which the occupational and institutional models coexist in military organization, with the balance between these orientations changing over time.

The Air Force research based upon these conceptualizations has moved to focus on the institutional and occupational orientations of specific military groups. While noting that a respondent "could" score high on both institutional and occupational dimensions or low on both, Stahl, Manley, and McNichols stress a conceptualization and

findings that emphasize the incompatibility between the two orientations.[17] They find that the two orientations are negatively related to each other overall, that the higher ranked and more integrated groups such as senior sergeants, senior officers, and regular commissioned officers are high on institution and low on occupation, while the lower ranked and less integrated groups such as junior enlisted personnel, junior officers, and commissioned reservists are low on institution and high on occupation, and that such variables as career intent, seniority, and job satisfaction are all related positively to institutional orientation. Though Stahl, Manley and McNichols only minimally discuss the implications of their operationalization and findings they do explicitly suggest that they be used to monitor changes in the military forces for policy purposes. Their article reflects concerns that the growth of an occupational orientation in the military is antithetical to the integration and commitment required to maintain minimal levels of motivation to perform effectively.

Formulating policy on the basis of this research would seem to us premature. At a minimum, at least three reasons for caution should be noted. First of all, their research seems to be constrained by their interpretation of Moskos' ideas in terms of a continuum on which individuals espousing a high level of institutional orientation will generally maintain a low level of occupational orientation and vice versa. That the underpinnings of the continuum perspective have noticeably affected both the interpretation and operationalization of their institutional and occupational indexes is suggested by the overall negative correlation

between them (r=-.25), by the fairly direct utilization of the questions used by Gouldner to measure cosmopolitanism vs. localism,[18] and by the logic with which they select and utilize groups with presumed extreme differences in integration and commitment for purposes of their construct and concurrent validation procedures. A second reason for caution, indirectly related to the first, is that a number of items in their occupational index could be more appropriately conceptualized as items for a "dissatisfaction" index. A low score on their occupational index need not necessarily indicate a lack of occupational orientation but rather a lack of satisfaction with the Air Force as an occupation. A third reason for caution lies in the fact that although Stahl, Manley and McNichols call for "longitudinally assessing changes along the institutional-occupational dimensions," there are no data which allow a comparison over time. An assumption that the draft era army would have shown high institutional and low occupational levels seems to be rather easy for some people to make. Yet this is questionable once one takes into account the different subgroups and the highly coercive basis for participation of many participants in such an army.[19]

In another effort, Bowers, whose work is among the most influential in the occupational tradition, included in an analysis of Navy reenlistment a set of attitudes reflecting institutional rather than occupational orientations (e.g., opportunity to serve the country; opportunity to make the world a better place). Most of the potential predictors of reenlistment included in his analysis were derived from the Survey of Organizations, an organizational

development diagnostic tool developed in the context of civilian industrial settings. Although the opportunity to serve the country was significantly related to reenlistment intentions, it was far overshadowed by the organizational climate measures. More generally, while the most powerful items dealing with military issues were about as powerful as the best organizational measures in predicting reenlistment intention, Bowers found little value in adding these issues to his organizational measures. The perspective that he brought to his data dictated a preference for the latter rather than the former measure.[20]

In contrast to work done in the organizational psychology tradition, research conducted at the University of Maryland and the University of Michigan has developed along somewhat different lines with somewhat different results that could lead to considerably different policy implications. The major difference is that this work has developed a view of Moskos' institutional and occupational orientations not as alternative orientations on opposite ends of the same continuum but rather as two independent but potentially co-varying orientations. They not only see that co-variation is possible but also that such co co-variation could be an indicator of very positive development and stability in the new military. Thus, Segal and Blair reported positive correlations (r=.27 and r =.36) between one institutional measure and two occupational indexes. And Blair, who had included multiple indexes of institutional and occupational orientations in his study on value integration of youth in the military, concluded that institutional and occupational orientations are not opposing forces, and furthermore suggested that

at the organizational level the army has characteristics fostering both the institutional and occupational models.[21] This research also takes into account major differences in these orientations according to rank and career intention, but does so in a way which avoids the equation of institutional orientation with commitment and of occupational orientation with noncommitment. For instance, noncareer officers are found to show only institutional orientations, while career officers indicate both institutional and occupational orientations.

This present analysis further builds upon this latter type of work on institutional and occupational orientations. It seeks to extend it and link it more directly to the convergence, industrialization, and structural pluralism themes, particularly by comparing the levels of occupational and institutional orientations among those in combat units with those in noncombat units, reflecting Moskos' initial formulation of the pluralist model, and by comparing orientations between career and noncareer personnel, reflecting Moskos' recent reformulation. If structural pluralism is occuring within the military and if noncombat units exemplify the greatest and combat units the least degree of convergence toward civilian organization, then a comparison of institutional and occupational orientation levels for these units should provide us with information useful both for understanding the nature and extent of such structural pluralism and convergence and for assessing the meaning and implications of these orientations. For instance <u>if</u> structural pluralism has developed, with noncombat units showing greatest convergence toward civilian organization while combat units

remain divergent in retaining traditional military institutional arrangements, and if occupational orientation is a characteristic accompanying convergence while being incompatible with an institutional orientation, then we would clearly expect that individuals in combat forces would report a high institutional orientation and a low occupational orientation, while just the opposite would be true among noncombat personnel. Should the data not support those expectations but show career minded soldiers with both high institutional and occupational orientations regardless of membership in combat or noncombat units, then at least one and possibly both assumptions (structurally pluralistic convergence and incompatibility of institutional and occupational orientations) need to be questioned. Alternative interpretations more in keeping with those tentatively advanced by Segal and Blair would then be in order. These alternatives, in fact, are consistent with emergent concerns in the literature on civilian occupations. The parallel between these concerns, in turn, supports the convergence hypothesis at least insofar as it points out that the changes taking place with regard to military service are not unique to the armed forces, but apply to other work environments as well.

DATA SOURCES AND ANALYSIS STRATEGIES

Data to examine these issues are taken from survey questionnaires administered to a sample of 2286 army personnel in late 1974 and early 1975 (approximately two years after the end of the draft), stratified to represent major army entities. The data were collected by the Institute for Social Research (ISR) of the

University of Michigan. For these analyses only the sample of enlisted personnel (N=968) and officers (N=56) with four or less years of service will be analyzed, since they represent the newcomers in the army under all-volunteer conditions. Only men are included because the number of women is very small and the sample, in any case, represents primarily only male soldiers. The sample is described in greater detail in a recent volume which reports a wide variety of findings based on the data set, as well as in a detailed technical report.[22]

We used multiple indexes indicative of institutional and occupational orientations in an attempt to uncover differences in orientations between those in combat units and those in noncombat units. In the following analyses, we will first look at four groups: enlisted men in combat units, enlisted men in noncombat units, officers in combat units, and officers in noncombat units. We have treated as combat units those units whose members have primarily combat military occupational specialities (MOSs) and as support units those units whose personnel have primarily support MOSs, although a small proportion of men with combat MOSs are found in these units. Ambiguous units were eliminated from the sample. Based on Moskos' reformulation of the pluralistic model, we will separate the combat and noncombat categories into those who are career oriented and those who are not. In this paper we have treated as career-oriented those who planned to reenlist and make the military a career, plus those who planned to reenlist but were undecided about a military career. We have treated as noncareer-oriented those who planned not to reenlist, plus those who expected to reenlist but did not intend to

make the military a career. In dealing with career intention we will focus only on enlisted men because there are too few officers to analyze in this manner. Wherever possible, however, because motivation to participate often differs by organizational position due to differences in the reward and career opportunity structure, we shall also examine the effect of rank (officers vs. enlisted) on institutional and occupational orientations.

Our initial measures of the degree to which military service was viewed as a calling or as an occupation by our respondents were based upon questions dealing with their reasons for entering military service, and the characterististics that they sought in military organization. The view of military service as a calling, at the individual level, is complementary to the institutional model of military organization, while the occupational orientation complements the corporate model. The questions used in our attempt to construct measures of "calling" or "occupation," and the distributions of responses to them, are presented in Table 1.

The items in Table 1 were selected from larger series of questions dealing with desired occupational characteristics and influences on the enlistment decision. The items selected were those which in our view came closest to measuring the difference between a calling and a job. It was felt that items 1, 2, 6, and 7 reflected a "calling" orientation, while items 3, 4, 5, 8, and 9 reflected a "job" orientation. As the distributions in Table 1 show, job characteristics (steady work, fringe benefits, good pay) were in the aggregate more important to our respondents in defining their ideal employment than were "calling" characteristics (serve the country,

Table 1. Attitudes used in the Measurement of Calling and Occupational Orientations (N=943)

In thinking about the kind of job you would like to have, how important are each of the following.

	Very Unimportant	Fairly Unimportant	Fairly Important	Very Important	Total
1. A job that gives me a chance to serve my country well.	12.3	18.9	37.1	31.7	100%
2. A job that gives me a chance to make the world a better place.	6.7	13.2	38.2	41.9	100%
3. A job that is steady; no chance of being laid off.	5.7	7.2	23.9	63.1	99.9%
4. A job where the pay is good.	2.7	2.8	22.0	72.5	100%
5. A job where the fringe benefits (medical care, retirement plan etc.) are good.	2.7	6.1	28.7	62.6	100.1%

Indicate how important items 6 through 9 were in your decision to enlist or accept a commission in the Army.

	Extremely Important	Important	Somewhat Important	Not very Important	Of no Importance	Total
6. Wanted to serve my country.	14.7	23.9	27.9	15.2	18.3	100%
7. To continue a family tradition of military service.	6.3	8.7	14.2	17.4	53.3	99.9%
8. Job opportunities looked better than in civilian life.	12.6	23.7	25.7	17.2	20.9	100.1%
9. For a secure job with promotions and favorable retirement benefits.	13.9	20.0	26.9	16.3	22.9	100%

make the world a better place). The preferences were not as clear however, among the enlistment motivations. The differences were not great among items 5, 7, and 8, and indeed, a desire to serve the country was somewhat more important than were the two job orientation items (job opportunity, job security). While family tradition was considerably less important than all other items, it is of course more constrained by the occupational choices of generations past than by the preferences of our respondents. It is in fact notable that a familial military tradition was of at least some importance to almost 30 percent of our respondents.

Factor analysis of the data, with an oblique solution, suggested the presence of three rather than two factors. The first factor was defined by items 8 and 9, and reflects job-related reasons for enlisting in the army. The second factor was defined by items 3, 4, and 5, and reflected a general job orientation toward the ideal occupation. Note that these two factors separate views of the ideal occupation from reasons for joining the army. The third factor was defined by items 1, 2, and 6, and reflected a sense of mission, or calling, both in views of the ideal occupation, and influences on the enlistment decision. Item 7 did not load sufficiently highly on any of the factors to warrant inclusion in further analysis.

On the basis of the factor analysis, we constructed three cumulative indexes to measure job motivation, job orientation, and sense of calling, respectively. However, because of the highly skewed distributions of the variables loading on the second factor, variance was minimal. Hence, this factor was excluded from many of our subsequent analyses.

The difference between job characteristics as part of the definition of the ideal occupation and as an enlistment influence is reflected in the positive but relatively low correlation between our indexes of job orientation and job motivation (r=.104). Our index of sense of calling, on the other hand, is more strongly related to both job orientation (r=.272) and job motivations for enlistment (r=.362). It would appear that the analytic distinction between military service as a calling and as a job is not empirically reflected in terms of the crystallization and polarization of attitude constellations that measure these constructs. To the extent that they are measurable, they seem not to be alternative orientations, but rather to co-vary.

Moskos uses the term, "calling" and "institutional orientation" interchangeably. It is our view that the service orientation reflected in our measure of calling is true to Moskos' concept, but is also applicable to a wider range of service-oriented occupations. We have therefore added to our analysis a set of measures that refer specifically to the military institution.

An expanded set of indexes is presented in Table 2. This set adds to the sense of calling index, which focuses on serving the country and the world, a group of indicators which focus on more specifically military issues. Preference for U.S. military supremacy measures the extent to which respondents feel that the U.S. should have greater military strength than any other nation. The next index, support for U.S. action in Vietnam, taps the level at which soldiers felt the U.S. involvement in Vietnam was important in stopping the spread of communism and maintaining a good global

American image. Nonsupport for amnesty shows one's level of desire to see draft-evaders who went to Canada punished. The next indicator, preference for higher military spending, was a single item: "Do you think the U.S. spends too much or too little on the armed services?" with five response categories from "far too much" to "far too little." The last institutional measure, preferred military influence, measures soldiers' desire to see more military rather than civilian control over military policy, e.g., whether to be involved in war and the tactics and weapons to be used during war.

Three indexes were included as measures of an occupational orientation dimension among the soldiers. Job motivation, based on our factor analysis, reflected the degree to which occupational considerations were important in one's decision to enlist (i.e., job opportunities, job security, promotion possibilities, and benefits). Perceived military job opportunities reflected the extent to which soldiers felt that the army provides a chance for soldiers to get ahead, to get more education, to get their ideas heard and to advance to a more responsible and fulfilling position. The final index, perceived fair treatment in the service, contrasted the personal treatment perceived as obtainable in civilian life with that received in the army, as well as the degree to which individuals can counteract any unjust treatment received in the military. It is notable that each of these indexes is positively correlated to each of the others, reflecting the co-variation in institutional and occupational orientations.

RESULTS

Tables 3 and 4 present the scale scores on our indexes for the analysis groups with which we are concerned. In order to scale the distances away from the neutral point in a way that provides some comparability across the various measures, we express each departure from the scale midpoint as a fraction of the standard deviation (SD) for the measure in question. In order to facilitate comparisons among groups, all groups use the standard deviation for the total subsample of newcomers as the basis for computing departures from the neutral point. The top panels in these tables present the mean scores, midpoints and standard deviations. The bottom panels present the scale scores for each group, and the percentage of variance explained for each indicator. We note, first of all, that comparisons of the scores reflecting institutional orientations reveal no discernible cleavage between soldiers in combat and those in noncombat units. The same lack of cleavage is the case in the comparison of scores reflecting occupational orientations. However, there are substantial differences on each indicator of institutional orientation by rank. For four out of the six indexes, officers appeared more institutionally oriented than enlisted men, in both combat and noncombat units. However, enlisted men reported a greater desire for U.S. military supremacy in the international arena and for military (rather than civilian) influence in military policy. On the indicators of occupational orientation, rank again shows an impact, particularly on two of the three dimensions. Neither the enlisted men nor the officers reported occupational considerations as especially important or unimportant in their rationale for joining the army. It is apparent along the last two dimensions, however,

that officers view occupational facets of the army more positively than do the enlisted men. The rating by enlisted men of civilian life as being more fair is especially noticeable.

The comparison of soldiers in combat and noncombat units provides no basis for distinguishing between these groups of soldiers in terms of their orientations. However, as anticipated, career intentions provided a clear delineation. As Table 5 shows, those intending to make the army a career, irrespective of unit membership, were consistently more institutionally oriented than those who were not career oriented. Yet despite their relatively lower scores, it is interesting to note that, for the most part, the noncareerists were institutionally oriented in an absolute sense.

Again, among the dimensions of occupational orientation, we found no difference between the attitudes of soldiers in combat and noncombat units. Career intentions, on the other hand, showed clear differences in occupational orientation. In line with the perspective that institutional and occupational orientations co-vary, we found that careerists, who were institutionally oriented, were also occupationally oriented. The noncareerists, on the other hand, who were largely institutionally oriented, were not occupationally oriented. It seems, therefore, that the institutional and occupational orientations are independent; and, they co-vary relative to career intention. The type of unit a soldier is in makes no difference.

DISCUSSION

Several conclusions seem to clearly emerge from the above data.

First of all, institutional and occupational orientations are found to be quite compatible with each other in that they in fact do co-vary for certain, though not all, groups in the U.S. Army. Therefore they should not be viewed as opposite ends of a single continuum but rather as two separate dimensions. Moreover, they were found capable of co-varying at both the positive and negative ends of their respective dimensions, with some groups being high on both and some groups being low on both. Furthermore high-high combinations of these orientations were more common than low-low combinations. This is not only a possible occurence but a positive occurence. The Army's strength as an institution is evidenced by the fact that such high-high combinations are most common precisely among those groups which can usually be presumed to be the most committed and critical groups, namely those at higher ranks and those intending to continue their career in the Army. An additional important finding is that combat and noncombat units seem not to differ significantly in their institutional and occupational orientations, so that we can conclude that structural pluralism in the sense of combat units maintaining traditional institutional orientations and noncombat units developing a preponderance of occupational orientations seem not to be occurring in the U.S. Army.

The personal ideologies of career soldiers are to some extent congruent with the missions and characteristics of the military organization. These soldiers not only see themselves participating in an organization with a role in society and the world which they support but also they perceive occupational rewards which meet their expectations. It is interesting that noncareer-oriented soldiers

displayed positive levels of institutional orientations (although lower than career soldiers) but negative levels of occupational orientation. This group seems to be relatively unmotivated in an occupational direction and, moreover, quite negative about what the military has to offer them along an occupational dimension. This finding strikes a resonant chord with Moskos' notion that different personnel systems might be required for career and noncareer personnel.

The identification of both service and military components of the institutional orientation has implications for military personnel policies beyond the simple distinction between career and noncareer personnel. In particular, we feel that these components of a military calling have potential impacts on the recruitment and utilization of women in the armed forces. In terms of traditional sex-role definitions, women have been excluded from combat roles in the western nations, and indeed their early socialization has not in the past prepared them for such roles. By contrast, women have been both socialized for and accepted in a wide range of service-oriented occupations, such as nursing, teaching, and librarianship. Women have also disproportionately filled the unpaid voluntary service niches in society, such as the Red Cross and the March of Dimes. In short, the service orientation is there, and appeals based on neither occupational concerns, nor more specifically military components of the institutional orientation, but rather on traditional notions of service, may yield substantial pay-offs in terms of increasing the pool of personnel available for military service.

The identification of noncombat oriented institutional factors

in the military has implications for projections regarding convergence and industrialization of the Army. The blending of institutional and occupational orientations in the Army reflects very similar kinds of blendings, in other organizational sectors of society, of orientations and principles which in the initial stages of change are widely perceived as antagonistic, with the ascendent orientation assumed to be a threat to the integrity and purpose of the relevant institutional or occupational group. The eventual results have been however that the organization has often undergone considerable change, with its members experiencing tension as they strive for the appropriate balance in the competing orientations, but has emerged with essential acknowledgment that its capacity to fulfill its focal purpose is considerably stronger than before such change. Thus the sociological literature of the 1950s and 1960s dealt often with the theme of the incompatibility between professional and bureaucratic orientations with the implication of threat to professional service and autonomy because of increasing bureaucratization and the implication of threat to organizational efficiency and coordination because of increasing professionalization. These were the early days of the trends toward professionals carrying out more of their work in large organizational contexts and organizations seeking more professionally trained staff. Coexistence brought tensions and jockeying for influence in a merger where the old rules were changing at a fast rate precisely because both sides benefited from the merger being advanced still further. Gradually adjustment occurred: young turk professionals became professional-bureaucrats who once in organizational positions were

able to use bureaucratic authority and methods to assure professional work while also being equally ready to manipulate professional symbols and commitments to get bureaucratically required compliance and co-operation. The literature which formerly addressed itself to professionals versus bureaucracy first began to decrease in frequency, then began to examine which set of professional characteristics might conflict with which set of bureaucratic characteristics in which types of occupational settings. Later this literature began to acknowledge the compatibility of professional and bureaucratic principles, not only in the sense of being positively associated but also in the sense of their blending being positively associated with career success, position level, and productivity. Most recently, we begin to see literature which associates professionals and bureaucrats as the elite technocrats under attack by ideologies and forces which define them as the common enemy.

Almost all major professional groups and most major institutional and industrial groups have experienced in some fashion these tensions over the trend to combine professional and bureaucratic principles. In similar fashion, these groups have also experienced the related tension between innovative initiative and coordinated routines, between personal sensitivity with concern for the client and impersonal rigor with concern for the overall result, between participation motivated by moral dedication to service goals and participation motivated by utilitarian interest in a broad range of intrinsic and extrinsic rewards which could be received from the organization in exchange for performance of services. And here again increasing rationalization, in the handling of increased complexity,

size, and technology have resulted first in negative concern that bureaucratic experience produced trained incapacity, sterility and rigidity, and later in positive reinterpretation of the bureaucratic experience as contributing to cognitive complexity and creativity. The military profession is a unique exception because unlike physicians, lawyers, and clergymen, military professionals have always performed their tasks in complex organizational settings. In any event, apart from its impact on individual cognitive complexity and creativity, it is even more clear that it is in the large bureaucratic organization where the most important and exciting action goes on, where the most intelligent and ambitious people go for challenge, and where the most significant influences and products in our society are generated. Similarly the best medical service is no longer provided by the individual general practitioner, even when the old virtues of personalized concern for individual patients can still be detected.

In other words, rationalization has led to a situation where the old virtues, including ones like professional commitment, personalized loyalty, moral commitment, and belief in an overriding system of meaning and values are not enough by themselves. In fact modern rationalized control systems with their emphasis on overall coordination, efficiency, and predictable outcomes generally find that control over members with such old virtues alone is much more unreliable than control over members seeking utilitarian rewards in exchange for their participation. However it should also be noted that modern organizations do not utilize the same blends of motivators at all levels. Where judgment, initiative and loyalty are

still of major importance in proper performance, intrinsic reward factors are included as well as extrinsic. Where simple or machine controlled routines constitute the entire task, however, very little attention is paid to providing intrinsic rewards. This dichotomy can be seen most directly in mechanized production organizations with a clear division between management and unionized labor. In service organizations, particularly those offering the most critical services of health, religion, or education, such a dichotomy is not as stark. Normative motivation has not entirely disappeared and utilitarian motivation contains intrinsic as well as extrinsic reward factors (though in decreasing ratios) at lower as well as at higher position levels. In the military, instead of simply talking about institutional and occupational orientations we perhaps need to talk about different balances of these two orientations as appropriate for different levels of and perhaps for different types of service unit. Also we may need to include some further breakdown of these notions to include the fact that the institutional orientation that dominated in the older military contained elements of both normative motivation (sense of calling, etc.) and coercive motivation (authoritarian discipline, forced membership, etc.) and that the occupational orientation coexisting in the new military contains elements of both extrinsic rewards, (pay, benefits, security) and intrinsic rewards (job satisfaction, self-actualization, career enhancement).

What our analysis seems to suggest is that the Army may not have to choose between institutional and corporate models. Rather, it may be able to make good use of both. Personnel accession, retention, and management policies and incentives that have been shown to work

in the civilian sector, we suspect, can be adapted for use in the military setting regardless of the degree to which this process makes the conditions of military service increasingly similar to civilian employment. There may be no harm in making service in the Army a job, as long as it is not just a job. The difference is in the sense of calling, or mission, that can also be nurtured, and indeed is essential if the uniformed federal employee is to perform effectively in combat situations.

FOOTNOTES

1. Paper prepared for the 1979 Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Boston, Mass., August 27-31. This research was supported in part by the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral Social Sciences under Grant DAHC-19-77-G-0011. Computer support was provided by the Computer Science Center of the University of Maryland. The views expressed herein are the authors' own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of the Army.

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institutional measures.

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Table 2. Correlation Matrix of Institutional and Occupational Indexes

		INSTITUTIONAL				OCCUPATIONAL		
	Preference for U.S. military supremacy	Support for U.S. Action in Vietnam	Nonsupport for Amnesty	Preference for higher military spending	Preferred military (vs. civilian) influence	Job motivation	Perceived military job opportunities	Perceived fair treatment in service
INSTITUTIONAL								
A sense of calling	.28	.31	.20	.17	.32	.38	.41	.30
*Preference for U.S. military supremacy		.32	.20	.27	.34	.13	.16	.13
*Support for U.S. action in Vietnam			.30	.25	.29	.23	.25	.26
*Nonsupport for Amnesty				.18	.27	.10	.11	.17
*Preference for higher military spending					.31	.12	.19	.15
*Preferred military (vs. civilian) influence						.24	.33	.25
OCCUPATIONAL								
Job motivation							.30	.36
*Perceived Military job opportunities								.54
+Perceived fair treatment in service								

*These indexes are described in Bachman, Blair & Segal, The All-Volunteer Force. The Nonsupport for Amnesty index is the reverse of its original form.

+This index paraliels the "occupational orientation" index of Stahl, Manley, & McNichols.

Table 3. Mean Scores, Scale Midpoints, Standard Deviations, and Scale Scores for Enlisted Men and Officers of Combat and Noncombat Units

PANEL A

	Enlisted		Officer			SD
	Combat	Noncombat	Combat	Noncombat	MP	All Groups
Institutional Orientation Indicators (N)	(326)	(576)	(23)	(33)		
A sense of calling	2.78	2.89	3.17	3.14	2.5	.74
Preference for U.S. military supremacy	2.89	2.88	2.75	2.83	2.5	.85
Support for U.S. action in Vietnam	2.47	2.38	2.68	2.56	2.5	.63
Nonsupport for Amnesty	2.48	2.53	3.38	3.50	2.5	1.10
Preference for higher military spending	3.44	3.23	3.71	3.70	3.0	1.17
Preferred military (vs. civilian) influence	3.65	3.60	3.39	3.63	3.0	.84
Occupational Orientation Indicators						
Job motivation	2.92	2.89	2.92	3.23	3.0	1.19
Perceived military job opportunities	3.11	3.15	3.94	3.85	3.0	.99
Perceived fair treatment in service	2.30	2.27	3.27	3.10	3.0	.98

PANEL B

	Enlisted		Officer		Percent of Variance
	Combat	Noncombat	Combat	Noncombat	Explained
Institutional Orientation Indicators					
A sense of calling	+.38	+.53	+.91	+.86	1.3
Preference for U.S. military supremacy	+.46	+.45	+.29	+.39	0.1
Support for U.S. action in Vietnam	-.05	-.35	+.29	+.10	1.1
Nonsupport for Amnesty	-.02	+.03	+.80	+.90	3.9
Preference for higher military spending	+.38	+.20	+.61	+.61	1.3
Preferred military (vs. civilian) influence	+.77	+.71	+.46	+.75	0.2
Occupational Orientation Indicators					
Job motivation	-.08	-.09	-.07	+.19	0.3
Perceived military job opportunities	+.11	+.15	+.94	+.85	3.1
Perceived fair treatment in service	-.71	-.74	+.28	+.10	4.6

Table 4. Mean Scores, Scale Midpoints, Standard Deviations, and Scale Scores for Enlisted Men's Career, Institutional and Occupational Orientations

PANEL A

	Career		Noncareer			SD
	Combat	Noncombat	Combat	Noncombat	MP	All Groups
Institutional Orientation Indicators (N)	(90)	(166)	(235)	(423)		
A sense of calling	3.01	3.17	2.68	2.78	2.5	.71
Preference for U.S. military supremacy	3.09	3.06	2.81	2.80	2.5	.85
Support for U.S. action in Vietnam	2.66	2.60	2.40	2.28	2.5	.62
Nonsupport for Amnesty	2.96	2.78	2.31	2.43	2.5	1.09
Preference for higher military spending	3.78	3.63	3.33	3.07	3.0	1.19
Preferred military (vs. civilian) influence	4.07	3.87	3.48	3.50	3.0	.85
Occupational Orientation Indicators						
Job motivation	3.41	3.58	2.73	2.61	3.0	1.20
Perceived military job opportunities	3.52	3.68	2.95	2.95	3.0	.99
Perceived fair treatment in service	2.90	2.91	2.11	2.04	3.0	.96

PANEL B

	Career		Noncareer		Percent of Variance
	Combat	Noncombat	Combat	Noncombat	Explained
Institutional Orientation Indicators					
A sense of calling	+.72	+.94	+.25	+.39	5.5
Preference for U.S. military supremacy	+.69	+.66	+.36	+.35	1.8
Support for U.S. action in Vietnam	+.26	+.16	-.16	-.35	5.4
Nonsupport for Amnesty	+.42	+.26	-.17	-.06	4.0
Preference for higher military spending	+.66	+.53	+.28	+.06	4.8
Preferred military (vs. civilian) influence	+1.26	+1.02	+.56	+.59	6.1
Occupational Orientation Indicators					
Job motivation	+.34	+.48	-.23	-.33	10.7
Perceived military job opportunities	+.52	+.68	-.05	-.05	9.5
Perceived fair treatment in service	-.10	-.09	-.93	-1.00	14.8