

9 Research Note 79-28

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6 MODELS OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

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11 December 1979

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MODELS OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS*

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The major issues raised in modern theories of civil-military relations are rooted in Harold D. Lasswell's developmental construct of 'the garrison-state.'¹ In a world in which modern military technology would make civilians as vulnerable to armed attack as military personnel would be, Lasswell projected that 'specialists in violence,' i.e., military elites, would add management to their repertoire of skills and would become a major force in ruling elites. Among their skills, they would count the manipulation of symbols, in the interest of mobilizing the entire population for defense efforts. Income would be somewhat equalized, in order to reduce opposition to the regime by the underprivileged. Economic production would be regularized and geared primarily toward military rather than consumption goods. Democratic elections would be replaced by plebiscite. What was new in Lasswell's thinking was not that military forces would play a major role in the governance of a state. Indeed, there is a large literature on the role of the military in politics.² This literature, however, focusses on pre-industrial nations. What was new in Lasswell's construct was that, as part of the normal course of development, military elites might gain ascendancy in modern industrial states.

Before elaborating on the impact of the garrison-state

construct, three points need to be emphasized. First, Lasswell did not suggest that the garrison-state in fact existed anywhere in the post-World War II world. He was postulating a projection that he regarded as probable, but not inevitable.

Second, Lasswell did not regard this evolutionary scheme as most applicable to the United States among world powers. Indeed, his first published presentation of the construct was in an Oriental context, the Sino-Japanese conflict,³ and in his more general theoretical formulation, in speculating where the garrison-state might evolve, Japan, which has subsequently eschewed military might and production to become a major world economic power, headed the list.

Third, while some elements of the construct have come to pass in the United States, such as the increasing mastery of management techniques by military elites,⁴ the major configurations of the model have not appeared here, or indeed anywhere among industrial-parliamentary states. In the United States, the military has not come to dominate the government. The population has not shown itself to be easily manipulable in the long run. In fact, the reverse has been true. In the case of the Vietnam War, for example, over time the mobilization of opinions and symbols led to political decisions to effect a military disengagement, in precisely the way the democratic process was supposed to accomplish this task.⁵ Unemployment has not been abolished nor income equalized in the interest of mobilizing popular support.⁶ Resistance to both large military budgets and to military conscription belies the image of a society mobilized for a defense effort.⁷

Samuel Huntington, in the formulation of his own theory of civil-military relations in the post-World War II industrial world, recognizes the importance of the garrison-state hypothesis. However, he rejects it as an accurate picture of the modern world on the basis of assumptions inherent in the model which have proven false.⁸

The model assumes the subordination of all other societal purposes and activities to war or the preparation for war. The allocation of resources in the development of modern welfare states belies this assumption. The model assumes the existence of a bellicose "military mind," showing a marked preference for warfare as a means of conducting the business of international affairs. Research on military belief systems, however, gainsays the difference, at least for the period prior to the advent of the all-volunteer force.⁹

The model also assumes that the only alternative to total war and destruction is total peace through the evolution of a world community. Extended periods of cold war are excluded. Yet the post-war period has been characterized primarily by continual sabre-rattling, with the armed forces of major industrial powers actually crossing swords only rarely and in a surrogate capacity.

Lasswell himself recognized the limitations of his model, but was less willing to reject it. A quarter of a century after developing the model, he pointed out that the expectation of violence continued in the world, that the garrison-state model was already approximated among the Warsaw Pact nations, and that specialists in violence were already located at strategic points in modern industrial societies. He saw hope, however, that the advent of the garrison-state could be forestalled by "civilianism," as opposed to

militarism. By civilianism he meant the absorption of the military by civil society and the deglamorization of violence.¹⁰

It is my contention that the major trends observable in American civil-military relations are in the direction of civilianism. This is not to deny that some of the characteristics that Lasswell associated with the garrison-state have in fact appeared. These empirical verities are not, however, the reason for taking Lasswell's garrison-state model as our starting point. What is crucial is that the model established the conceptual agenda and provided us with the vocabulary we use today in the analysis of civil-military relations. In particular, three themes derived from the garrison-state model have driven contemporary discourse on civil-military affairs in the United States: the issue of civil control of the military (which obviously has constitutional roots as well); the issue of structural similarity between military organization and civilian institutions; the issue of interpenetration, at all levels, of the civilian and military sectors of modern industrial societies. Each of these issues will be dealt with in turn below.

THE ISSUE OF CIVILIAN CONTROL

The principle of control of the military by civilian governmental leaders was in theory established by the framers of the Constitution of the American Republic by specifying, in Article I, that the President was to be Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and that only the Congress could declare war and appropriate funds for the armed forces (but never for more than a two-year period). It is widely assumed that these controls were based upon a distrust of

the armed forces on the part of the framers.¹¹ This interpretation, in turn, assumes that the framers believed that a civilian, elected as President of the United States and thereby as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces would not, by virtue of that role, become a militarist, but than an army general officer, be he a Washington, a Grant, or an Eisenhower, would by virtue of election set aside his fearsome military characteristics, and command as a civilian. It also assumes that war is a voluntaristic act of legislative will rather than an event that may occur independent of the will of a legislature. Richard Henry Dana pointed out the weakness of this assumption before the Supreme Court in 1863, and a century later, the Congress was learning the lesson again in Vietnam.

In our recent military history there has in fact been a differential in the behavior of our civilian decision-makers and our military personnel, but it has been in the opposite direction from what would have been predicted on the basis of mistrust of the military. The American military adventure in Vietnam in general was a product of civilian policy and against the advice of senior military advisors, who after their advice was rejected, acquiesced to civilian control as they were supposed to do.¹² And in the specific instances of irregular behavior in that war, it was more often than not the senior civilians who appeared as militarists, while the system was readjusted on the basis of acts of conscience on the part of individual military personnel. When General John Lavelle conducted aerial warfare over North Vietnam in violation of the rules of engagement then in force, for example, his actions were apparently less acceptable to the Air Force sergeant who brought the activities

to light than to the Secretary of Defense, who was responsible for the rules of engagement that had been violated, but who indicated that he was satisfied with the then-existing system of control and responsibility.

In my own opinion, the framers of the Constitution, with the experiences of the Revolution fresh in their minds, were probably far more concerned with fiscal than with political excesses on the part of the military. In any case, Article I set the framework within which relationships between the executive and legislative branches, the armed forces, and society, were to evolve.

Huntington, in rejecting the fusion of the civil and the military implied by Lasswell's garrison-state model, depends upon these constitutional issues to guarantee civilian control over the military. In Huntington's "objective" model of civilian control, it is assumed that one aspect of military professionalism is political neutrality. The apolitical professional military is assumed to be responsive to a formal chain of command that, in the American case, is controlled by civilian decision-makers, both elected, such as the President in his role of commander-in-chief, and appointed, such as the secretaries of defense and of the military departments. Potential excesses on the part of these civilians, in turn, are controlled through checks and balances built into the system: the powers of the Congress to declare war, and to amend and approve the defense budget. In Huntington's preferred system, as long as the federal administration is responsible to the electorate, the chain of command functions effectively in communicating information and instructions in both directions, and the checks and balances between

executive and legislative branches operate smoothly, control of the military by the citizenry can be maintained.

Social scientists are forever seeking formal models of social organization that describe how the social world operates, and forever learning, and then forgetting, that it is informal social processes that allow the formal models to operate. Sociologists of the early University of Chicago school bemoaned the social disorganization of modern American cities, as reflected for example in the absence of extensive religious and grange-type organizations.¹³ William Foote Whyte's Street Corner Society then carried the burden of showing that in the absence of formal membership based bureaucratic organizations, social organization and social control were still possible.¹⁴ In the study of bureaucratic organizations themselves, generations of scholars influenced by the work of Max Weber focused on the rational aspects of formal organization charts to understand how organizations functioned, until Blau reminded us that it was informal processes that allowed bureaucracies to function despite, rather than because of, their rationalized structures.¹⁵ In like manner, Janowitz, in analyzing the structure of civil-military relations, recognized that the constitutional definitions of responsibility of the federal government vis-a-vis the armed forces established both the principle of civilian control, and the broad parameters of a formal structure to maintain that control, but that these in and of themselves were not sufficient to attain the democratic goal of responsiveness of the military to the civilian polity.

To attain this control, Janowitz suggested that the formal

objective model of civil-military relations put forward by Huntington be supplemented, not replaced, by a system of subjective controls established through the integration of the military institution into its host civilian society.¹⁶ Where Huntington saw the military as largely isolated and insulated from civilian institutions, Janowitz saw them interacting intensively at an institutional interface through which Lasswell's goal of civilianization might be achieved.

Janowitz' model questions Huntington's assumption that military professionalism will guarantee the political neutrality of the armed forces. This assumption is rooted in a functionalist view of the professions generally, in which their occupational autonomy is justified by their service ethic. Alternative theories about the nature of professionalism have recognized that regardless of the degree to which they subscribe to a service ethic, members of a profession have common interests which, at times, are different from those of their client groups. At such times, their professional organizations, in the interest of organizational maintenance, may become politicized. At least two of the traditional professions, medicine and law, are clearly active forces in modern politics. With regard to the military specifically, Abrahamsson has in fact argued that the process of professionalization will inevitably transform the military into a corporate interest group which, rather than subjecting itself to civilian control, will seek to increase its political autonomy and expand its political role.¹⁷ From this point of view, internalization of norms restricting the political role of the military, which is a necessary component of Huntington's objective model, is unlikely to take place in the process of

professionalization.

In the absence of a guarantee of political neutrality on the part of the military, the subjective model of civilian control substitutes an assumption of political sensitivity for that of political neutrality, and therefore seeks ways to integrate the military into the larger society rather than isolate it from civilian influences outside the formal chain of command. Rather than assuming that the president will be responsive to the will of the people, that the system of checks and balances will operate smoothly, and that the chain of command will function effectively, Janowitz prefers that there also be informal processes which will ensure that civilian sensibilities are incorporated within the military. These informal processes of social control can operate through social networks that span the boundary between the military and civilian sectors of society. Thus, where the objective model seeks to minimize interaction between military and civilian sectors in the interest of maximizing civilian control, the subjective model seeks an optimal level of interaction to achieve the same goal. In so doing, it poses the basic dilemma of the garrison-state model: will such interaction lead to the militarization of society or to civilianization of the military?

THE ISSUE OF STRUCTURAL SIMILARITY

Prior to World War II and the formulation of Lasswell's garrison-state model, there were important differences between the nature of civilian and military organizations, between the military and civilian work forces, and between the nature of military service

and civilian employment. These differences mitigated against the fusion of military and civilian spheres. There were crucial technological differences between the two spheres, rooted in the fact that military personnel spent their time doing different things than did civilians. Warfare was a land-based event, with the infantry and, increasingly, armor (which had only recently replaced the mounted cavalry) being the core of the army. The military world was overwhelmingly male, predominantly young, and predominantly unmarried. The military work-force was elastic, expanding rapidly in times of war, and demobilizing rapidly thereafter, with most personnel returning to civilian life. For those who were mobilized, military service was seen as a short-term obligation to the state, rather than as part of a career.

With the increased use of air power between the two world wars, and the advent of nuclear technology in World War II, warfare became more capital-intensive in the middle part of the twentieth century, and military organization began to increasingly require personnel with skills that were needed in the civilian economy as well. By the 1950s and 1960s, military sociology was stressing the increased similarity of military and civilian sectors of American society. Janowitz, for example, argued that "to analyze the contemporary military establishment as a social system, it is...necessary to assume that for some time it has tended to display more and more of the characteristics typical of any large-scale nonmilitary bureaucracy."¹⁸ Thus, the convergence, or fusion, of military and civilian organizations was anticipated.

Scholars quickly recognized, however, that common technologies,

leading to common organizational forms, could not lead to total elimination of the fundamental difference between that which is military and that which is civilian. By the early 1970s, some scholars were defining the convergence function as an asymptotic one, with military and civilian structures becoming increasingly similar, but failing to reach a point of intersection.¹⁹ Janowitz, in 1971, pointed out that "the narrowing distinction between military and nonmilitary bureaucracies can never result in the elimination of fundamental differences."²⁰ Moskos took an extreme position, that he has since rejected, that in fact the trend had been reversed. "The over-two-decade long institutional convergence of the armed forces and American society is beginning to reverse itself...the military in the post-Vietnam period will increasingly diverge along a variety of dimensions from the mainstream of developments in the general society."²¹

The position that Moskos moved to subsequently became the basis for a more refined model of civil-military convergence. Rather than regarding convergence in gross organizational terms, Moskos argued that some elements of the armed forces would be divergent and traditionally military, particularly the ground combat forces, while others would be convergent and civilianized, particularly clerical, technical, and administrative areas.²² This theme of differentiation of the force, and its elaboration into a two-force structure, one convergent and civilianized and the other divergent and military, was further developed by other analysts. Hauser, for example, envisages the American Army of the future as consisting of a combat force, divergent from civilian society and maintaining

traditional military values, and a support force, convergent with civilian society and serving as a buffer between civilian society and the combat formations.²³ Such isolation of the combat force is, of course, consistent with Huntington's objective model of civilian control. Moskos more recently has modified his own formulation somewhat, and now advocates a two-tier personnel system based upon the differentiation of "citizen-soldiers" from "career-soldiers," rather than combat from noncombat personnel.²⁴

In addition to the growing agreement among analysts that at least some parts of the American military establishment are coming to resemble civilian corporate bureaucracies, there is an emerging body of theory that argues that, at the level of the individual soldier, sailor, or airman, military service is increasingly growing to resemble civilian employment.

Prior to the conversion to an all-volunteer force, the nature of military compensation, the conditions of service, and the system of traditional symbolic rewards in the armed forces, imposed upon military service a definition as something other than a civilian job. Although not well paid by civilian standards, military personnel were involved in an activity that was as much a community as it was a workplace, they shared a fraternal spirit with brothers-in-arms, and they received societal respect for their fulfillment of a responsibility of citizenship.

The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force rejected this definition, and assumed that if the all-volunteer force were to succeed in competing with civilian employers for quality personnel, it would have to adopt the most desirable attributes of

those civilian employers.²⁵ Among the recommendations of the commission were that military compensation be based on a salary system, similar to that of civilian industry, that lateral hiring of trained personnel from the civilian labor force be increased, and that, in general the all-volunteer services compete with industry for quality personnel as similar (although not identical) entities.

During the transition to an all-volunteer force, efforts were in fact made to make the military competitive with civilian employment in terms of pay. Between 1967 and 1975, Regular Military Compensation (RMC) - the sum of base pay, quarters and subsistence allowance, and tax advantages - increased 87 percent, while General Schedule civil service salaries increased 55 percent. Pay for military personnel (RMC) is now roughly equivalent to that of civil service personnel at similar grade levels, and increases in military compensations are tied to increases in General Schedule civil service salaries. A 1974 survey of conditions of military service in the Western nations reported that while all of these nations had their pay structured "in relationship to civilian employment," only the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom indicated that their service pay scales were comparable to civilian employment.²⁶ All three of these nations have volunteer armed forces.

With the move toward equalizing military pay levels with civilian pay-levels, and the attendant increases in direct personnel costs in the armed forces, there have been changes in the structure of benefits that have traditionally been associated with military service. Benefits that have traditionally enhanced the image of the military as a fraternal community that looks after its members, its

past members, and its dependent, have begun to decline. There have been decreases in the availability of medical care to military dependents and retirees, and cutbacks in allowances for travel and shipment of household goods. Post-graduate education benefits for active military personnel have been cut back, as have educational benefits for veterans. Appropriated fund support for military commissaries has been under attack. Junior officers, with good service records, who desired military careers, have been discharged from the service through reductions in force before they could become eligible for retirement benefits. Indeed, the entire traditional military retirement system is being revised to make it more similar to the retirement plans of civilian organizations.

In sum, the conditions of working for the armed forces as a uniformed member of the service have increasingly come to resemble the employment conditions of a civilian occupation. Whether by design, intuition, or accident, the makers of military personnel policy have sought to compete with commerce and industry for workers, by making military employment increasingly similar to civilian employment.

These organizational changes have, in turn, changed the nature of military service at the level of the individual service person. Moskos describes this change as the transformation of military service from a calling, legitimized by institutional values, to an occupation, legitimized by the labor market.²⁷ In terms of this conceptualization, a member of the armed services comes to see his service in much the same terms as does an employee in a civilian organization. Instead of being motivated by a desire to serve his

country and make the world a better place, he is concerned with pay, benefits, and quality of working life. Personnel in the all-volunteer force have been shown to seek the same things in their work environments as do employed civilians.²⁸ The nature of the individual's relationship with the organization is transformed, with the traditional implied contract of mutual obligations between the service person and the service being replaced by an explicit contract in which work and time are exchanged for economic remuneration. The installation, base, or post is seen less as a community, and more as a workplace, where the uniformed employee spends only his working hours. If the nature of the employment does not meet the expectations of the individual, he does not feel bound to serve his obligated enlistment period, but feels almost as free to seek a way out of the organization as does his counterpart in the civilian sector. In recent years, more than one-third of our enlisted volunteers have left the service prior to completion of their obligated tours.

This transition of military service to an occupation has already been manifested in the recruitment strategies used by the all-volunteer services. Recruitment advertising has stressed the benefits of service that make the armed forces look good relative to civilian employers: pay, skill training, higher education benefits, travel in Europe. They have downplayed the very factors that make the military different from civilian employers: assignment away from one's family, military training and maintenance activities that are dirty, distasteful, or boring, and the likelihood of physical danger in the event of hostilities.

If Moskos is correct, there are other correlates of the occupational model that must be attended to. If military personnel see themselves simply as an other category of workers in the broader labor force, they might be expected to seek some control over the nature of their work lives using the same techniques as other workers, including unionization. The Defense Department has been sufficiently concerned about this prospect to issue a regulation prohibiting it, and the Congress has manifested its concern by passing legislation against military unionization. There does not yet seem to have been a great deal of support for unionization among American military personnel, but if military service does come to approximate civilian employment, the prospect of unionization cannot be discounted in the long run.

Probably more crucial is the issue of whether, and under what conditions, armed forces personnel who see their service as a job will go into combat. One of the distinctive characteristics of military service as a sacred calling, as compared, for example, with working on the assembly line in an automobile plant, is in the nature of the sacrifice that the individual could be called upon to make within the expectations of his job. Under a traditional model of military service, it was expected that a soldier might be called upon to risk his life in the defense of his country. One could equally expect that if an automobile manufacturer asked its labor force to take up arms and go into battle, it would meet with widespread refusals. If indeed the American soldier is coming to resemble the assembly-line worker more closely than he resembles his conscription-era counterpart in his attitudes toward his job, than his willingness to go into combat becomes an empirical question. We

need look only as far back as the Vietnam engagement to realize that the issue of whether American military personnel will go into combat when ordered to is a real one.

The question is not whether anyone will be willing to fight. In a peacetime environment, in the civilian world there are individuals who are willing to enter high risk occupations in return for remuneration. Indeed, there are individuals who undertake great risks in their leisure time activities, for no remuneration, and frequently at great financial cost. We might find the same motivations among some people in combat jobs in the armed forces. These motivations, however, are different from those that have traditionally led large numbers of Americans to be willing to go into battle in defense of national security. If the armed services were to be dependent primarily upon people who were willing to take risks either for remuneration or for thrills, it is unlikely that we would be able to field a viable combat force.

Empirical research on Moskos' model shows that indeed, there is an occupational orientation reflected in the attitudes of personnel in the all-volunteer force. This orientation seems not to have replaced a sense of calling, however, but seems to coexist with it.²⁹ The issue of whether military service is a calling or a job seems not to be a dichotomous choice, but rather seems to have evolved to the degree to which these two orientations are balanced among our military personnel. While our armed forces personnel may want the same things from their jobs as do their civilian counterparts, and while many of their motivations may be the same, there also seems to be the recognition that the military is

inherently different from a civilian work environment, and that the difference is essential for the continued viability of the armed services. This recognition reflects a basic reality of military organization. The time frame during which the recognition will persist, however, seems to be an empirical question. It currently seems to be rooted in strata of military personnel who served in the armed forces prior to the all-volunteer force, and indeed prior to the Vietnam engagement. Will it persist when they have left the scene?

THE ISSUE OF INTERPENETRATION OF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SECTORS

The most interesting issue raised by the garrison-state model is the fusion of military and civilian institutions. It is interesting theoretically because it is the main characteristic of the militarized society that Lasswell feared. It is the key element of Lasswell's formulation with which Huntington disagrees, and it is the process that Janowitz seeks to institutionalize in order to guarantee civilian control over the military. Obviously, Janowitz and Huntington disagree regarding the dilemma that Lasswell raised: will a fused structure represent civilianization of the military, or militarization of civilian society?

The issue is also interesting empirically because of the range of indicators available to measure various aspects of interpenetration or fusion.³⁰ Indeed, the major difference between the theoretical positions of Janowitz and Huntington may be rooted in the indicators that the theorists have in mind when they think about interpenetration.

In terms of elite strata of society, the American public received warnings from two quarters about an allegedly unhealthy and perhaps conspiratorial fusion of industrial and military elites in the middle of the twentieth century. From the university, C. Wright Mills published The Power Elite, in which he argued that the United States was operating on the basis of a permanent war economy, with power vested in the hands of "the political directorate, the corporate rich, and the high military." He saw this elite as a unified one in terms of social and psychological similarities, frequent social interaction, and coordinated activities among its three components.³¹ Within five years, a similar warning, issued in part as a response to Mills, came from the White House itself. In his farewell address, President Dwight D. Eisenhower said, "In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influences, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex."

Certain basic dimensions of military industrial relations are uncontested in the debate on whether American politics are dominated by a power elite, and four of these are primary. First, following World War II, the United States did not decrease the size of its military force as drastically as it had in previous postwar periods. Indeed, since that period, we have moved progressively further away from a mobilization model of military manpower, and toward a force-in-being: a large force maintained under arms in peacetime. Although the size of the active duty force has contracted since the advent of the all-volunteer force from what it was in Vietnam, the dollar cost of the military establishment has continued to be a major

factor in the national budget, driven largely by personnel costs.

Second, as mentioned earlier, the emphasis in warfare has shifted in the post World War II period from manpower to technologically sophisticated firepower. The military has thus become a major consumer of research and development services, as well as of material production by civilian industry. It might be said that the Department of Defense has become American industry's best customer, causing some critics to go so far as to suggest that the large modern corporations are becoming part of the governmental administrative complex.³² Some civilian corporations have become totally dependent on the patronage of the military establishment, and others, while less than totally dependent, count heavily on doing business with the government. Certainly, one of the factors that had to be taken into account when the government considered guaranteeing loans to a failing Chrysler Corporation in 1979 was that, regardless of the quality of products and services provided by Chrysler to the American consumer, Chrysler made fine tanks for the American Army.

Third, there is a demonstrable circulation of personnel between the Department of Defense and civilian corporations holding government contracts. Despite the movement of industry personnel into the Secretariats of the Defense Department and the military departments, this flow of people is primarily the other way: from the armed forces into the civilian economy. The largest two hundred military contractors in the civilian sector employ among them well over 1,000 former military officers with the rank of major or above, as well as hundreds of former Department of Defense civilian employees. The greatest flow of personnel is out of the highest

technology service: the Air Force. In complementary fashion, the industrial sector that employs the largest number of retired officers is the aerospace industry.

Fourth, there have clearly been instances in which members of the Congress and the Senate have attempted to intervene in the defense contract review procedure to get contracts assigned to corporations within their constituencies. Such intervention, of course, takes place with regard to other federal agencies as well. Congressmen have also been fast to protest the closing of military bases in their constituencies because of the economic loss associated with the departure of military activities. Here, however, the negative territorial correlation between industrial concentration and the location of military installations would seem to belie hypotheses regarding the impact of industrial influence on military decision-making.

These four parameters do not in and of themselves demonstrate the existence of a fused civil-military power elite. They do suggest that there is a military-industrial complex, if this phrase is taken to describe a set of interorganizational relationships rather than a conspiracy. In fact three different perspectives have been suggested for viewing the linkages between the military and industry. These perspectives are not, on the whole, mutually exclusive, but they do contain contradictory elements.

The first position reflected in the literature is the elitist or conspiratorial view, following in the tradition of Mills. Its major thesis is that a relatively small group of people located at the top of the congressional, military, and industrial hierarchies determine

national policy in such areas as foreign affairs and military spending, keeping the American economy in a state of "military capitalism." A major cleavage is presumed to exist between this elite and the rest of society. The elite is presumed to be an integrated network of individuals acting in concert.

Recent work in this tradition has gone beyond Mills, who had noted historic shifts in the relative importance of the military, corporate, and governmental realms. In the post World War II period, he saw the military ascendancy as the dominant influence in shaping the power elite. Yet he also recognized that, in terms of education and social origin, the military were not really similar to the rest of the elite, and that the process of promotion through the military hierarchy produced officers who had given up some of their civilian sensibilities. This difference between civilian and military members of the power elite may be seen as an obstacle to the cohesiveness of that elite.³³ Mills in fact suggested that the elite were frequently in some tension and came together only on certain coinciding points.

Other scholars, have gone further than Mills in asserting the similarity of social backgrounds and the social cohesiveness of the power elite.³⁴ The bulk of the data, however, suggest that they are not all that similar. American business leaders tend to be the sons of business leaders, and in general are recruited from the higher strata of society. They tend to come from the Middle Atlantic, New England, and Pacific Coast states, and are likely to have been born in large urban areas. Most are college educated.³⁵ Military leaders also tend to come from high status

backgrounds, with over half their fathers having been in business and the professions.³⁶ Military leaders, however, are more likely to come from rural areas, and to overrepresent the Southern states.³⁷ In addition, of course, military leaders and corporation executives receive their higher educations at different institutions, the former being predominantly military academy graduates. Thus, civilian and military elites are not held together by old school ties, and they differ in the urbanity and region of their social origins.

There are important differences between the two groups of civilian elites as well. While both U.S. Senators and corporation presidents have been shown to be roughly representative geographically, senators tend to come from rural areas, while corporation presidents are usually from urban centers. Similarly, although both groups tend to be college educated, the corporation executives are more likely to have gone to Ivy League schools, while senators are more likely to have attended state universities. It has been argued that these background differences lead to disparate images of society and a lack of communication between these groups.³⁸

In addition to social background differences, the interchangeability of personnel among the three groups making up the power elite has been challenged. Mills suggested that military leaders are like corporation managers, and that elite personnel are interchangeable among organizational contexts. This assertion was quickly challenged.³⁹ It assumes structural similarity of military and civilian organizations, and as we have noted above, the

convergence hypothesis has been rejected in favor of more complex models of modern military organization.

Of course, it may be argued that the military operates in the same socioeconomic climates as does industry, and that, especially if we take seriously the argument that under military capitalism the defense industries operate as quasi-agencies of the government, common constraints should lead to similar management structures in the military and in industry. The data suggest, however, that the top levels of military command are not made up of specialists in organization, but rather, and not surprisingly, of specialists in warfare.

The U.S. Air Force, as the newest of the American armed services, and the one with the most complex technology, might be expected to be the most adaptive branch and the most likely to adopt new organizational principles. However, promotion to general officer grades in the Air Force comes primarily through performance of mission-oriented activities, i.e., flying aircraft, rather than through attainment of managerial skills.⁴⁰ Similarly, the U.S. Navy, which, as the ranking service in terms of the social background of its officers, is the most likely to contribute personnel to a power elite, promotes personnel to flag (admiral) rank on the basis of combat rather than management training.⁴¹ Given different management structures and skills in the military and in industry, Mills' notion of the interchangeability of leadership personnel does not stand up. This is not to deny that a considerable number of retired military officers do find employment with corporations that hold large contracts with the Department of Defense. Indeed, such

personnel interchange is to be expected, given that most professional officers finish their military careers in early middle age and then undertake a second career, and that these retired officers have some expertise in the needs of the clients of defense contractors.⁴²

What is crucial is that only in rare cases do these retired officers find themselves at the topmost levels of the hierarchies of large corporations. Retired generals and admirals do not automatically become corporation presidents or chairmen of boards of directors. Thus, while interpenetration does take place between military officer corps and the managerial strata of industry, it does not take place in general at high enough organizational levels to sustain the proposition that industry is being militarized by this process. At the same time, it is notable that the process is largely one-way. With the exception of industrial managers accepting political appointments in the secretariats within the defense establishment, there is no offsetting flow of personnel from the civilian sector into the top reaches of military management. Thus, the processes of interpenetration cannot be presumed to lead to the civilianization of the military. Despite this fact, additional criticisms of Mills' model have been based on the dominant position he assigned to military leaders in the power elite. More recent attempts to demonstrate the existence of a power elite in the United States have come to view the military as a junior partner in the elite structure, frequently participating through cooptation rather than cooperation, and serving, rather than shaping, the interests of an assumed upper class.⁴³

The second major perspective on the relationship between the

military and the industry is the pluralist position. In this view, the military is seen as an interest group attempting to influence political decisions. Similarly, industries producing goods for the military are viewed as an economic interest group. This approach concedes that when the interests of the military and industry converge, the two might form a coalition. It also concedes that the Congress may be responsive to the demands of these groups. It asserts, however, that the military and military-related industries are not powerful enough to consistently dominate the national political scene. Rather, it views them as two elements in a large and diverse set of interests, some manifested as organized groups and others as a more diffuse public opinion, that from time to time exert or try to exert leverage on the policy-making processes.⁴⁴ It further asserts that the Congress is no more responsive to military interests than to other interests in the long run. Rather than assuming the concentration of power in the hands of a relatively small elite, this approach assumes the incremental building of pluralities in support of policy. This difference has implications for the policy process itself. Rather than making sweeping policy changes, as a unified power elite might do, the decision-makers in a pluralistic system evolve policy through a series of small steps in what they perceive to be the desired direction, pausing at each point to evaluate the effects of what they have done.⁴⁵

The third perspective is that of compensating strategies. This viewpoint shares with the pluralists the assumptions of the absence of a power elite, and the existence of a multitude of interest groups. However, where pluralism tends to see decisions made on the

basis of popular preferences among alternatives, the compensating strategies approach recognizes that policy need not reflect plurality interests. It assumes that different policies have different degrees of salience for different interests. Thus, one segment of the business community can involve itself greatly in policy debates regarding military expenditures, while other existing interests disregard the debate because they derive their benefits in other policy domains. Each interest group seeks to maximize its own net gain, and if it can increase its gains at low cost by entering an alliance with another interest, it will do so. Consequently, political decisions in an area such as military expenditures may well reflect "the intense concern of a minority of interests coupled with the support obtained from other segments whose major interests are found elsewhere."⁴⁶ As long as interests other than the military or defense industries can increase their gains by influencing legislation involving factors such as taxes or labor law, they will not involve themselves deeply in matters of military spending, but may well ally themselves with military and defense-industry interests by providing moral support, in turn for which they expect similar support when their own interests are at stake. However, should it come to pass that they cannot make gains in other areas because of the magnitude of defense spending, these interests are likely to enter the defense spending debates in support of alternative allocations of budgetary resources: if they are in the dairy business, they will try to persuade the Congress to buy butter instead of guns.

The compensating strategies perspective is better supported by

empirical evidence than are the other approaches, and it is fair to conclude that there is an empirical basis for refuting conspiratorial models of a power elite or a military industrial complex based upon a fusion of civilian and military sectors that produces a militarization of the civilian world. At the same time, the nature of civil-military interpenetration at the elite, or management levels, reflects at least minimal input of military personnel in civilian organizations, while at the same time, the absence of lateral entry to the highest ranks of the military structure, and the criteria used in the military's own promotion system,⁴⁷ precludes the civilianization of that structure.

Historically, the officer corps has always been a relatively closed system in this regard. The interpenetration of civilian and military sectors then, must involve a broader view. Under a conscription system, the permeability of the civil-military boundary was guaranteed by the flow of draftees through the military. These citizen-soldiers came into the armed forces without shedding their primary self-definitions as civilians, thereby bringing civilian views into the military system. At the end of their military obligations, they returned to the civilian world, bringing with them personal military experiences that got included, as "war stories," in the flow of information about the military.

When conscription ended, it was assumed by many that the voluntary army would be a professional army as well, made up of military careerists at the enlisted as well as officer grades.⁴⁸ The rate of personnel turnover would be reduced by increases in average length of service, thus reducing boundary permeability. The

point was also made that conscription had "democratized" military service, and that under an all-volunteer system, some strata of society would be systematically unrepresented in the armed forces. The burden of defending the country would be borne by the poor and the black, and the middle-class would have no personal ties to the military.⁴⁹ The latter consequence might impact directly - and negatively - on middle class support for the military institution.

The experience of the volunteer army has been that, like the conscription army, personnel turnover has been high at the enlisted grades. My sense, is however, that there has been a qualitative change in the nature of that turnover. Under conscription, the turnover was due to draftees being discharged at the end of their obligated tours of duty and returning to the civilian community with a generally positive image of the military. Today, the turnover is due largely to people who, for a variety of reasons, fail to adapt to the military environment, and leave the service before the completion of their obligated tours, with the military having provided them with a failure experience. On the other hand, among the people brought into the enlisted grades, there is a higher rate of expectation of pursuing a military career than was the case under conscription, and opinions differ on the amount of career retention that would be desirable at these grades. There is also an unresolved issue of whether the overrepresentation of racial and ethnic minorities has undesirable consequences that outweigh the benefits of having a large organization serve as a mobility channel for these groups.⁵⁰

The issue of socio-demographic representativeness of the force aside, the question of the social isolation of the armed forces still

remains. Janowitz has extended his views of civil-military integration down through the enlisted ranks of the military and the mass public in the civilian sector, and pointed out that the quality of integration of the military and civilian society is dependent upon the presence of boundary-spanning social networks dependent upon "personal initiative and membership in voluntary religious and community associations."⁵¹ His emphasis is on the civil participation of the military to counteract strains toward social isolation.

Relatively little is known empirically about the linkages that tie members of the mass public to the military institution, although it is recognized that these linkages probably have an effect on the degree of support the military receives from its host society, as manifested by such indicators as the availability of recruits, and the willingness of taxpayers to support large military budgets. Even less is known empirically about the linkages that tie members of the military back to the civilian community, despite the crucial role that these linkages play in civil-military relations.

My colleagues and I have looked at the structural relationships between a sample of civilian Detroit residents and the military establishment.⁵² Forty percent of the males in our sample were veterans, and had their own military experience to draw upon in developing their evaluations of the military. Eighty-six percent of the veterans, however, served prior to the Vietnam War, and the modal group were World War II veterans. Demographically, the veteran population is aging more rapidly than the male population generally.

When our respondents were asked to name their closest friends,

44 percent did not include in that group anyone who had ever served in the military. The 25 percent of all of the friends thus named who had ever served are approximately the figure that one would expect given that slightly over 20 percent of the adult population have served, but the figure also reflects the fact that large numbers of civilians do not have close friendship networks that span the civil-military interface.

Neither do other potential linkages tie the Detroit population to the military establishment. Even among veterans, only about a quarter of our respondents reported using specific veterans' benefits such as G.I. Bill education benefits, mortgage loans, or insurance benefits. Although most of our veteran respondents reported using one veterans' benefit or another, very few used more than one.

Almost 15 percent of our respondents indicated that they had ever had a civilian job that brought them into contact with military personnel. This finding was probably influenced by the colocation of the U.S. Army's Tank Automotive Command with the center of the automobile industry, but this arena for potential economic exchange does not suggest a more permeable boundary at the rank and file level than seems to exist at the elite level.

Blair has looked at these linkages from the military side of the equation.⁵³ In the aggregate, his data suggest some openness of the system. In response to a question similar to the one asked of Detroit civilians, 71 percent of the noncareer enlisted soldiers he surveyed indicated that two or three of their three best friends were civilians. The figure was significantly less (43%) among career-oriented enlisted men, reflecting the greater isolation of

this stratum. Moreover, this isolation increases by grade. Among career-oriented enlisted personnel, 23 percent of the most junior personnel reported having no civilians among their three best friends. This figure increased to 36 percent among junior noncommissioned officers, and 50 percent among senior noncommissioned officers. Interestingly, among both junior enlisted men and junior officers, career-oriented personnel were more likely to report living off-post, in the civilian community, than were noncareer personnel. The lower rate of reported civilian friendships, among career personnel, then, was despite ecological relationships that made them more spatially proximate to civilians.

In the aggregate, these data seem to suggest not a fusion of the civilian and military sectors, but at least some permeability in the system boundaries of the military. At the elite levels, the flow of potential influence would seem to be relatively little, and predominantly from the military to the civilian sectors. At the rank and file level, however, there seems to be more openness in the other direction, manifested both by the flow of noncareer personnel through the military, and the maintenance of interpersonal ties with civilians among military personnel.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 1980s

As the above discussion suggests, the two major linkages between the civilian and military sectors of American society are the flow of fiscal and capital resources, and the flow of people. These flows, in turn, are consequential for the nature of civil-military relations. The nature of these linkages will be conditioned in the

1980s by the peaking of the "birth dearth" cohorts.

America converted to an all-volunteer force at precisely the right point in time demographically. While the massive increase in the birth rate experienced immediately after World War II subsided rapidly, the number of families of child-bearing age was sufficiently large that even moderate birth rates produced large numbers of children. It was these children who were of military age eligibility when we converted to an all-volunteer force, and with the American economy in disarray, the military was an attractive employer.

The cohorts to come of military age in the early 1980s are post-baby boom. Going into the decade of the 1980s, all of the American armed services experienced at least moderate personnel shortfalls, and one of the major bridges between the military and civilian sectors, the citizen soldier of the reserve components, was an endangered species.

Let us consider the alternative responses to continued personnel shortfalls. One response is the economic substitution of capital for labor. We could continue the trend toward less labor-intensive, more capital-intensive warfare by replacing people with the technology of the automated battlefield, and shoring up our claim to being a world military power by increasing our nuclear capability rather than maintaining a large force-in-being. In addition to curtailing our ability to respond with conventional forces to a non-nuclear threat (about which I worry, but which is not the topic of this essay) such a policy would severely curtail the people-to-people nature of the traditional relationship between American society and its military institution. Our military force would become estranged from its host

society, and might well have to face distrust and resentment. Equally important, the economic linkage between the defense establishment and the industrial sector would expand markedly, producing higher levels of warfare capitalism. Consumer production might well have to take second place to military production, the military might well be given priority in the allocation of scarce resources such as fossil fuels, and we might move one or more steps closer to the garrison-state model.

A second alternative, not mutually exclusive with the first, is to define our military personnel and strengths not in terms of an abstract calculus of how many troops we need to fight one and a fraction wars on a modern battlefield, but in terms of a pragmatic calculus of how many people we can recruit, train, and retain on an all-volunteer basis, substituting a "lean, mean force" for a larger, but perhaps meeker force in being. This in fact is the strategy that the U.S. Marine Corps has been explicitly following for several years. Given that the costs of recruiting in relatively small birth cohorts, and competing for quality people against other institutions that are also hurt by the birth dearth generation, such as colleges, will be high, and that the cost of training personnel for a higher technology military organization will also be high, the emphasis will be on career-oriented personnel, rather than short-term citizen-soldiers. These are the personnel who previous research have shown to maintain the fewest ties to the civilian community, and are most interested in seeing the military play a more active role in the formulation of policy. A force made up of career soldiers, untempered by the short-term enlistee or the citizen-soldier

reservist, seems to me to pose a range of problems with regard to the maintenance of civilian control. That range includes increasing tension between the civilian executive branch and the uniformed departments, as senior military commanders increasingly speak out publicly in opposition to executive policies, some degree of uncertainty about the conditions under which military personnel will be willing to go to war, and negotiation with a unionized armed force. I am not asserting that senior officers should not speak out against policy, that military personnel should not refuse to fight wars they feel are illegal or immoral, or that the military should not be unionized. I regard each of these as an open question. I merely note that each involves a change in the way we do the business of civil-military relations.

A third alternative is to maintain over 2.1 million people in uniform by returning to a system of military conscription. This has the advantages of not forcing us to substitute capital for labor and thus become more dependent on military capitalism, of reinstituting a flow of people from all sectors of civilian society into the military and out again in a relatively short period of time, thus establishing interpersonal ties between the manifold communities that make up our nation and the institution charged with its protection, and the possibility of reestablishing the viability of the reserve components. It has the moral problem that plagued the conscription system of the 1960s: how does one choose who will serve when not all serve? Additionally, it may have the additional political problem of being unacceptable to the national constituency, and therefore unavailable to the executive and legislative branches of the federal

government as a policy alternative.

The problem of allocating deprivations can be dissipated by a more universal form of service that embeds military service in a more general matrix of recognition that citizenship involves responsibilities as well as rights, and that one's responsibilities to the nation can be manifested in a range of ways. It is this alternative that I personally find most appealing. It defines norms of citizenship and of service in the public interest. It establishes military service as the moral equivalent of helping the domestic poor or aiding less developed nations. It reintegrates the military with those institutions that must shape these norms: families, schools, churches. It reestablishes the role of the citizen-soldier, both in the active forces and the reserves. In short, it weaves the military back into the fabric of the society it defends.

FOOTNOTES

- * I am grateful for support from the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences during the period that this paper was being written under Grant No. DAHC-1977-G-0011. The views expressed herein are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of the Army.
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