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by

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McLean, Virginia 22101

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for the BEHAVIORAL and SOCIAL SCIENCES
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Study Title:	**An Analysis of the Training of Army Personnel at the Defense Race Relations Institute**
Author:	**Byron G. Fiman, Human Sciences Research, Inc.**
Principal Investigator:	**Peter G. Nordlie Human Sciences Research, Inc.**
Sponsor:	**U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences**
Contract Number:	**DAHC 19-76-C-0015**
Contracting Officer's Technical Representative:	**Dr. James A. Thomas**

The study reported here is one part of a larger, on-going study of Army race relations and equal opportunity training. This particular report provides an analysis of the training received by Army personnel at DRRI both in terms of its impact on the trainees and its relationship to the job that Army DRRI graduates perform in the field. Both Phase I and Phase II of DRRI training are examined.

The approach to the study involved a variety of different data sources and methods of data collection. Data were obtained by interviews and questionnaires from DRRI faculty, RR/EO personnel in the field, Unit Commanders, Unit Personnel, DRRI students, and Army DRRI graduates. All data were collected between April 1976 and December 1976, and thus, DRRI training operations at the time of report publication may be slightly different than at the time data were collected.

The implications of the findings of this study were viewed primarily from the perspective of the Army and secondarily from the perspective of DRRI, or more accurately, the Department of Defense. Both perspectives are obviously relevant to any changes which may be considered. The findings are summarized below, organized around a number of key issues. The final section is a set of courses of action which appear appropriate to consider based on the study findings.

The Impact of the DRRI Experience. Almost without exception, DRRI graduates report that the school experience had a powerful, important and personally meaningful impact on them. The overwhelming consensus on this point would appear to make the DRRI experience unique among military training experiences in general. Whatever other criticism graduates voiced, almost all emphasized a profound personal growth experience which they identified as important in their lives. It would appear unquestionable that DRRI graduates are far more aware of and sensitive to the nuances and insidious characteristics of discrimination at work in an organization than are those not exposed to DRRI training.

The strength and near universality of the impact, which comes principally from Phase I, must be acknowledged. Although criticism is made of the low relationship between the skills required by the job of the RR/EO in the Army and the DRRI Phase I training, it would be a misreading of the study findings to conclude that Phase I training therefore should be eliminated or entirely changed. To the contrary, there is evidence that Phase I training serves important functions and has a high value for the Army in that it is producing a group of individuals highly motivated and generally more qualified than personnel who have not received the training to deal with the problem of reducing discrimination in the activities of the Army. Also, DRRI has served as a symbol of the military's effort to achieve equal opportunity, especially for non-whites. The elimination of the Phase I experience would undoubtedly blunt the drive the Army has mounted to implement its equal opportunity responsibilities. This is not to suggest that Phase I training should not be changed at all, but rather that the impact it now has on trainees has high value both to them as individuals and to the Army to the extent that it can be assumed that the Army's expressed commitment to eliminate all forms of racial and sexual discrimination remains undiminished.

The Alignment of the Training Content with Job Characteristics. The content of the training in both Phases I and II is not aligned effectively with the job needs of Army RR/EO personnel in the field. This misalignment occurs because the basic mission of DRRI (Phase I) has not changed essentially since its inception whereas the Army's concept of the job of the DRRI graduate has undergone substantial and continuing change. The original mission of DRRI was to train instructors in race relations and, originally, the Army used DRRI graduates primarily as instructors. However, the Army no longer uses DRRI graduates

in this way. Compared with RR/EO duties during the era of the original 18-hour RAP I curricula, instructing is now a minor and infrequently performed task of Army RR/EO personnel in the field. Gradually, the job of Army RR/EO personnel has shifted from instructor-facilitator to an advisor role which emphasizes performing staff functions for a commander. This shift was recognized by the establishment of the Phase II training which emphasized preparations for some of these latter functions, but since Phase I is still the source of the primary impact of DRRI, graduates still believe they are being trained as instructors.

Even though there now exists a listing of the tasks which constitute the job of RR/EO staff NCO (MOS OOU), there is only a tenuous connection between a few of these tasks and the training provided in Phase I and only a slightly less tenuous one for Phase II. The listing of tasks did not result from an actual task analysis and, indeed, such an analysis is virtually impossible to do in the face of DA policy revisions which have prevented the RR/EO job from becoming stable. Until tasks and responsibilities of RR/EO personnel are clearly and explicitly defined and that definition is understood by all personnel and agencies involved, there is no way that any training program can be adequately aligned with the needs of the job.

At present, Department of Defense specification of DRRI's mission and Department of the Army's specification of its utilization of DRRI graduates conflict. Department of the Army and Department of Defense need to develop RR/EO policy which is mutually reinforcing rather than contradictory. Once overall policies are clear, it should be possible to define the RR/EO job, identify the skills required, and modify the training to provide those skills.

Selection to Attend DRRI. There appears to be no particular relationship between existing selection criteria and performance at DRRI or performance on the job. A number of questions are raised about the suitability of existing selection criteria and procedures. Appropriate specific changes would, of course, depend in part on policy changes discussed above, but it appears clear that present selection standards do not seem well suited to producing graduates with capabilities required to satisfactorily perform the tasks of an RR/EO staff officer or NCO. A major rethinking and overhaul of the selection concept, procedures employed, and specific

standards appear in order. Once again, job performance data is lacking, but it appears that existing standards do not produce a population of graduates which one would expect to excel in the functions now emphasized in the RR/EO job; although, of course, many exceptions exist. A clearcut specification of the RR/EO's job is a prerequisite to rethinking selection criteria and procedures. Selection, training, and job performance are three components which constitute a dynamic system in which the success of policies in one component are dependent on the policies of another component.

Testing and Quality Control. The relatively low level of quality control exercised by DRRI over its students, in the end, may be counterproductive because it conveys the message that DRRI graduates do not have to meet high standards or, even worse, any standards at all.

It appears that the relatively low level of quality control stems from at least two sources: first, a reluctance to tighten entrance criteria and performance standards at the possible cost of having disproportionate adverse effects on minority students; and second, the lack of minimally adequate tests which could be used to exercise quality control. If effective quality control over students is to be implemented, the standards of acceptable student performance must be made explicit and the whole testing program overhauled. Tests now employed should be replaced with tests having acceptable psychometric properties including the ability to distinguish different levels of performance, and predictive validity in relation to on-the-job performance.

Mechanisms for Continuing Contact with Graduates. Until the recent advent of a newsletter and other educational and statistical materials sent to DRRI graduates, there was no mechanism for meeting the frequently strongly expressed need of graduates for maintaining contact with developments in the RR/EO field, becoming aware of what other graduates were doing, and generally to be in touch with an information clearinghouse function. Consideration should be given to upgrading the existing newsletter to make it an even more effective mechanism for meeting this valid and heretofore largely unmet need.

Other Missions of DRRI. DRRI was originally charged with five missions:

1. to conduct training for DOD personnel designated as instructors in race relations;

2. develop doctrine and curricula in education for race relations;

3. conduct research;

4. perform evaluation of program effectiveness; and

5. disseminate educational guidelines and materials for utilization throughout the Armed Forces.

It appears that the first of these five has been emphasized to the virtual exclusion of the remaining four. In particular, the general failure for reasons both of resource limitation and policy restrictions, to have consistently performed the research and evaluation functions adequately has resulted in the loss of the opportunity to have learned from the first six years of operation and to have accumulated objective information on which to base policy and procedural changes in the training program. As a result, the program in 1977 is still based largely on what it was in 1971 – the best guesses and personal opinions of whomever happens to be responsible.

Either the four largely unperformed missions should be removed from DRRI's charter and accomplished elsewhere, or DRRI should be appropriately structured and provided with adequate and appropriate resources to perform these other missions. It appears that these missions have been stated because they make logical sense, but in terms of realistic resources provided, and policy limitations, they have in essence been programmed to fail.

Miscellaneous Issues Deserving Consideration.

- Phase I is still criticized as too black oriented despite extensive curriculum changes which have substantially reduced the black orientation relative to other minorities.

- DRRI faculty, for the most part, are teaching the specifics of a job in which they themselves have had little or no experience in the field.

- There continues to be concern about the adverse affect of a RR/EO assignment on one's Army career.

- The transition between Phase I and Phase II has been an awkward experience for students and is perceived by them as having counterproductive value.

Interagency Communication and Coordination. The agencies within the Army and Department of Defense which make policy affecting the RR/EO job and DRRI training need to upgrade their communications and coordination in order to eliminate the sources of confusion which emanate from the policy level. Furthermore, effective training and effective utilization of DRRI graduates will continue to be less than optimum until a higher level of consistency than now exists is achieved between Department of Defense and Department of the Army policy makers.

Action Implications. The purpose of studying DRRI training ultimately is to learn how to increase the effectiveness of that training and how to increase its usefulness to the Army. The findings of this study suggest that serious consideration should be given to the following courses of action.

- Policies should be modified to make the mission of DRRI and the Army utilization of DRRI graduates consistent.

- DRRI Phase I and Phase II training objectives should be reformulated in explicit and measurable terms.

- The tasks of the RR/EO position should be more clearly and explicitly defined so that required skills and knowledge can be specified.

- Both Phase I and Phase II training should be made more consistent with the needs of the RR/EO job.

- Selection criteria and procedures should be overhauled in order to produce trainees whose capabilities better match the job requirements.

- Performance measures for the RR/EO job should be developed.

- Quality control over DRRI students should be substantially upgraded by specifying appropriate standards of performance and developing adequate tests of student performance.

- The existing newsletter produced at DRRI should be substantially upgraded to provide an effective mechanism for continuing contact with graduates to provide resource materials, updated references, and up-to-date communications about RR/EO related events.

- Adequate resources should be made available to enable DRRI to perform its non-training missions which are currently not being adequately performed.

- The Phase I curriculum should be further modified to address the perceived excessive black orientation.

- DRRI faculty should be required to have prior relevant instructional and job experience.

- Measures should be taken to eliminate the negative impact of the transition between Phase I and Phase II.

- DRRI should be supported by an experimental research program designed to develop and test optimal training methods and curricula the efficiency and effectiveness of which can be objectively documented.

- The agencies within the Army and Department of Defense that make policies affecting DRRI training and the RR/EO job should upgrade their communications and coordination to eliminate inconsistencies and sources of confusion which now exist and which degrade the achievement of optimum effectiveness of DRRI.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Background

The development and implementation of race relations and equal opportunity programs within the Army constitutes one of the most massive change efforts of its type ever undertaken. The creation of educational and training programs, the development of race relations/equal opportunity (RR/EO) staffs, the formulation of new policies, all required a large allocation of resources and a tremendous investment of time and effort. From the beginning, the Army's race relations training programs were initiated quickly to meet urgent needs; there was little precedent in civilian organizations and no experience with such training in the military. Methods and content were chosen on the basis of limited experience, trial and error, and the best judgments of relatively few people.

It was in the late Sixties and early Seventies when the manifestation of racial discrimination became sufficiently violent and overt that prior levels of organizational unawareness and denial were no longer tenable (Borus, Stanton, Fiman, and Dowd, 1972). Awareness in the civilian sector, expressed through increasing publicity in the media, accompanied by expressions of dissatisfaction from military personnel themselves stimulated the military hierarchy to deal with the newly acknowledged problem (Borus, Fiman, Stanton, and Dowd, 1973). In this context of racial turmoil, the Defense Race Relations Institute (DRRI) was established in 1971 (DOD Directive 1322.11) as a result of a number of studies that recommended an educational program in all of the Armed Forces to reduce and attenuate the intensity of racial conflict within the Department of Defense. DRRI was given the major mission of training instructors to carry out the recommended educational program.

With little precedent for an educational program of such massive size, a training and educational model was developed. As is usually the case for programs conceived in a period of urgency and apprehension, most energy and resources were invested in the trial and

error sequence of best guesses on how to proceed and develop the most effective educational program. Only a small proportion of the Institute's resources were allocated to assessing its own performance and impact. While some evaluative efforts were undertaken, no integrated program evaluation system which would continuously feed back data to DRRI was developed. Self-assessment programs tended to focus more on changes that occurred during training, rather than on an assessment of how well DRRI training met the job needs of graduates of DRRI once they returned to the field. Also, it seems that most of the energies of DRRI focused on its training mission, with proportionately much less attention given to the execution and evaluation of its non-training missions.

While DRRI has continued since its inception to study and improve its ability to produce race relations instructors, the policies and regulations of the Army, the nature and manifestation of discrimination, and the roles and tasks of DRRI graduates have changed considerably. For example, the original Army-wide race relations and equal opportunity training program (RAP I) was a mandatory 18-hour block of instruction which was generally taught by graduates of the Defense Race Relations Institute at the installation or community level. By early 1974, that program was modified by a revised AR 600-42 to create RAP II which placed the primary responsibility for conducting RR/EO training on the chain of command and required seminars to be conducted within units in platoon-sized groups on a monthly basis. Currently, in early 1977, revisions of the basic RR/EO policy documents are under consideration and further modifications in the unit training program are likely.

It is in this context of change that the present study has been designed to provide the Army and DRRI with feedback about its own processes. It should be noted that DRRI has collaborated in this study effort and has always remained committed to a process of self-examination and self-growth. The exigencies of operating a multi-Service Institute that deals with controversial and emotionally volatile content material create a situation which can be difficult, at best. Throughout its existence, DRRI has stood in the center of a raging dispute of legitimate disagreement about how to eliminate discrimination. Its existence has been a symbol of change and an example of the military's commitment to equal opportunity and the elimination of

racism, but DRRI has also been perceived by some as an attack on the values of tradition and as a breeding ground for activists and racial militants. Its current level of vigorous output continues to represent its commitment to the ultimate elimination of discrimination in the military.

Objectives

The overall objective of this study is to provide a program analysis of the Defense Race Relations Institute training of Army personnel, only. In specific terms, the study has four main objectives:

- To describe and analyze the training provided by DRRI for Army personnel;
- To describe and analyze the job, tasks, and utilization of Army DRRI graduates;
- To describe and analyze the impact of DRRI in terms of the relationships between training and job performance; and
- To provide a set of recommendations for future DRRI training of Army personnel.

Approach

The overall approach to accomplish the study objectives was to collect and synthesize information from a number of relevant sources across a wide variety of criteria to lead to a current analytic and evaluative set of statements about DRRI. The approach to the study of DRRI is Army-specific and is based on a multi-source and multi-method data collection paradigm to provide a broad and comprehensive view of DRRI training.

It is of importance to note that data are generally not available to permit more traditional evaluation designs. For example, one traditional approach to evaluation would compare the performance ratings of those Army personnel who received DRRI training to

those personnel in the same job who have not received DRRI training. Unfortunately, no valid performance criteria exist for RR/EO personnel other than the overall Army efficiency reports which are unsuitable for a variety of reasons. Another variation of a more classical evaluation design would have been to translate the RR/EO job into a matrix of specific tasks, develop a measure of performance for each task that constitutes the RR/EO job, and compare task performance measures before and after DRRI training. However, no valid taxonomy of tasks existed for the RR/EO job,[1] and the specific tasks of each RR/EO job tend to vary across installations, by rank, and in relation to various organizational parameters, such as type of position and organizational level. As a result, the most useful evaluative and analytical approach to accomplish the objectives for this study was to solicit perceptions about DRRI from a variety of important information sources and to execute a before-after training design on Army students at DRRI, using variables which are logically related to job performance; e.g., racial attitudes, behaviors, perceptions, and knowledge.

Data Collection Model

In Table 1, each of the different data sources used in the study is listed, along with the data collection method and objectives for which such information has been designed to provide information. Data from all sources were synthesized and used to meet Objective No. 4, "Recommendations for Future DRRI Operation."

Each of the populations of personnel with some relevant perceptions of DRRI was included as a data source. DRRI faculty/staff were queried about different aspects of the DRRI training program. Army graduates in the field were asked to describe the specific tasks that make up their jobs and to evaluate how well their training at DRRI meets their current job needs. Unit commanders at the brigade, battalion, and company levels were requested to provide their views on the performance of DRRI graduates in their units and on DRRI itself. A questionnaire was sent to all prior Army graduates of DRRI to solicit their task/role descriptions and their perspective on the adequacy of DRRI training. Finally, a major effort focused

[1] One exists now, but it is not one derived from task analysis data and its existence appears to be not widely known.

Table 1

Data Collection Model

Data Source	Data Collection Method		Objective		
	Interview	Questionnaire	1. DRRI Training Analysis	2. Job Analysis	3. Impact of Training
DRRI Faculty/Staff	X	X	X		X
RR/EO Personnel in the Field	X	X	X	X	X
Unit Commanders	X	X		X	X
Unit Personnel		X	X		X
DRRI Student Cohort					
- Pre-Training	X	X	X		
- Post-Phase I	X	X	X		X
- Post-Phase II	X	X	X		X
Army DRRI Graduates	X	X	X	X	X

on the members of the 1976-3 DRRI class, the trainees themselves. A sample of students or student cohort was identified and contacted three separate times: prior to their training experience; at the end of Phase I; and at the end of Phase II. In this way, statements of the relative impact of each of the phases of DRRI training could be made.

Figure 1 describes the evaluation model utilized in conceptualizing the impact of DRRI training on students. Training impact was seen as the combination of both pre-training experience/set factors and individual difference factors. A great deal of literature dealing with the evaluation of training (e.g., Steele, Zand, and Zalkind, 1970; Fiman and Conner, 1974), points to the importance of training expectations and the types of trainee in determining the impact of the training itself. Training factors are assessed to provide indications of type and level of training impact. Post-training factors partially determine the efficacy of training in terms of the utilization of trainees and the tasks that they perform. No matter how well the training program may meet its own objectives, it cannot be effective unless those objectives relate closely to the future on-the-job needs of its trainees.

Figure 1

DRRI Student Evaluation Model

Pre-Training Experience/Set Factors

1. Pressure to attend from superiors, peers, subordinates.
2. Freedom of choice/participation in decision to attend.
3. Satisfaction with advance information.
4. Expectations about change.
5. Information from others.
6. Attitude toward training.
7. Post-training role expectations.
8. Reason for attending DRRI.

Individual Difference Factors

1. Demographic background.
2. Interracial experiences.
3. Military experience (prior RR/EO duty).
4. Race/sex attitudes, knowledge, and behavior.

Training Factors

1. Peer rating.
2. Small group membership.
3. Academic tests.
4. Self-rating.
5. DRRI evaluation:
   - Phase, instructor, module;
   - Good/bad; too much/too little; value/utility
6. Race/sex attitudes/knowledge

Post-Training Factors

1. Race/sex attitudes.
2. Environmental factors:
   - Utilization;
   - Tasks performed;
   - Post.
3. Evaluation of performance:
   - Self, peer, commander, supervisor.
4. DRRI evaluation:
   - Phase, instructor, module.

Data Collection Instruments

Major reliance was placed upon the use of written, paper-and-pencil instruments as a data collection technique. Individual and group interviews were also used to gain more dynamic and subtle understanding of training and job performance circumstances and effects. A critical-incident instrument was used to assess positive and negative critical incidents on the part of trainees during each phase of DRRI. The administration and analysis of all instruments were consistent with current privacy and confidentiality regulations and legislation.

Student Survey Instruments

A similar survey instrument was administered to all Army members of the 1976-3 class at three different times. This instrument assessed demographic background; pre-training expectations; interracial and military experiences; and racial/sexual attitudes, perceptions, knowledge, and behavior. Also, evaluations of various components of the training program were requested from the students, in addition to their recommendations for future DRRI training classes. Instruments with prior psychometric validation on military populations were used, and some new instruments were developed.

A number of scales were created to assess various important variables. Scale scores generally represent the results of a combination of a number of individual questionnaire items and are psychometrically superior to individual items. The following scales were used to measure important variables:

Racial Attitudes and Perceptions

- **Perceived Discrimination against Blacks (PDB)**: Higher scores indicate more perceived discrimination; lower scores indicate less perceived discrimination.

- **Attitude toward Racial Interaction (ATI)**: Higher scores are more favorable toward racial interaction; lower scores are less favorable toward racial interaction.

- **Feelings of Reverse Racism (FRR)**: Higher scores indicate whites feel threatened or fearful of blacks and perceive favorable treatment of blacks; lower scores indicate whites do not feel threatened or fearful of blacks and do not perceive favorable treatment of blacks.

- **Racial Climate (RC)**: Higher scores indicate perceptions of a high quality of race relations in the Army and high level of commitment of the Army to racial harmony; lower scores indicate perceptions of a low quality of race relations in the Army and low level of commitment of the Army to racial harmony.

These four scales are part of the Racial Attitudes and Perceptions Survey (RAPS) that has been specifically developed on and for a military population.[2] Six items from each scale, usually those with the highest original factor loading, were selected from a longer list of items and were used in the student survey. The term "non-white" replaced "black" in these items, in order to generate the factors to include more than "black only" concepts. Thus, PDB and FRR refer in this study to non-whites, not just to blacks.

Students were also asked to indicate whether the events portrayed in a fictitious scenario showed racial prejudice and the type of action that should be taken by the main character in the scenario. Theoretically, racial assertiveness would be indicated by extremely high ratings of prejudice for the scenario and endorsements of more forceful and strong behavioral or action alternatives. Three scales were generated to deal with racial assertiveness:

- **Judgments of Racial Prejudice (JRP)**: High scores represent view that racial prejudice does exist in the scenarios; low scores indicate that racial prejudice does not exist.

- **In-Channel Actions (ICA)**: High scores represent strong endorsement for in-channel behaviors to resolve racial issues (e.g., file an EO complaint); low scores suggest weak endorsement of in-channel actions.

- **Out-Channel Actions (OCA)**: High scores represent strong endorsement for out-channel behaviors to resolve racial issues (e.g., use force or violence); low scores suggest weak endorsement of out-channel actions.

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[2] For more information on the development and technical characteristics of the RAPS and its scales, see Hiett, *et al., Measuring the Impact of Race Relations Programs in the Military* (McLean, Va.: Human Sciences Research, Inc., March 1974).

In-channel actions (ICA) refer to anti-racist behaviors that utilize the chain of command and appropriate organizational components to resolve racial issues in a way consistent with established regulations. Out-channel responses (OCA) refer to behaviors that utilize threat, violence, or power in ways that are not consistent with regulations. Hypothetically, as a result of DRRI training, we would expect endorsement of out-channel responses to decrease and in-channel responses to stay the same or increase.

Interracial Behaviors

- **Interracial Behavior (IB)**: Higher scores represent more frequent contact with people of other races; lower scores represent less frequent contact with people of other races.

- **Behavioral Intentions (BI)**: Higher scores indicate more probability and intention to engage in a series of positive interracial behaviors; lower scores indicate less probability and intention to engage in a series of positive interracial behaviors.

Racial Knowledge

Items designed to assess knowledge of racial issues were generated, and scales or sets of individual items were developed. One set of items dealing with minimal knowledge of Army regulations was so well known by students upon entry to DRRI that it was not able to discriminate among students. Virtually all students correctly knew those knowledge items related to basic information concerning Army regulations about race relations prior to DRRI training. A cross section of Army personnel surveyed in another study had dramatically less knowledge of the Army RR/EO regulations (Hiett and Nordlie, 1976). A knowledge scale was created that assessed general knowledge of racial history, contemporary racial issues, behavioral sciences and racial terminology and concepts. Higher scores indicate more knowledge, and lower scores represent less knowledge.

Other Measures of Racial Variables

In addition to the aforementioned variables and instrumentation, the results from those instruments routinely used by DRRI in its research program in Phase I were also used in the analyses in this study. The instruments that were used include:

- Opinion Inventory
- Penick Inventory
- Integration/Segregation Index
- Internal-External Control
- Nominal Index
- Role of Women

Further data on these instruments are available in Evaluation Research Reports: Report II (DRRI, 1975). Further data on the psychometric properties of all instruments used in this study are presented in the Appendix to this report.

Training Performance/Experience Variables

Data to assess a student's experience and performance at DRRI were also collected. Generally, performance during Phase I is assessed through a series of academic tests and peer ratings made by members of each small group. In addition, self-ratings of performance were collected from trainees. Performance during Phase II is assessed through a series of examinations in specific content areas. Personnel may take each examination a number of times and indication is noted whether successful completion on these exams occurred on the pre-test, normal examination administration, or on re-test.[3]

Information about students' military performance was available for a sample of the 1976-3 class. These data included the general test (GT) and clerical (CL) subscale scores from the Army General Classification Test (AGCT), the weighted average of Enlisted Efficiency Reports (EERWA), most recent score on the Primary Military Occupational Specialty Examination (PMOSE), and mental category based on scores from the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT).

Student Interviews

In addition to the comprehensive survey instruments that were used to gather data from the students, instruments for individual interviews were also developed and used with a small sample of the 1976-3 class. These instruments were used in one-hour, individual

[3]This procedure had been modified by the time this report was published.

interviews and were designed to yield more dynamic and subtle information about training effects. A critical-incident technique was also used, where each student who was interviewed was also asked to complete an instrument which requested one positive and one negative critical incident in each phase of DRRI training. This technique has often been used as a way of identifying central issues related to change and training effect.

Control Group

In order to be confident that the training program itself is responsible for those changes detected in trainees over the period of training, an experimental design with a control group is required. Comparisons of changes over time between those who received DRRI training and those members of a control group who have not received training is necessary for valid conclusions about training effects. Students already selected for the future 1976-5 DRRI class were used as a control group for the 1976-3 class.

DRRI Faculty Survey

A survey, quite similar to the student survey, was also given to a sample of faculty and staff members of DRRI. An initial interview with faculty members had previously identified important issues. Also, many of the same attitudinal, perceptual knowledge, and behavioral variables were assessed in order to compare them with student data. Each faculty and staff member was also asked for his evaluation of different training components.

DRRI Graduate Followup Survey

DRRI had the primary responsibility to conduct a survey to describe how graduates are utilized in the field, the organizational levels at which they are located, and the tasks and roles they perform. HSR provided some technical input into the survey design and data analysis. DRRI had slightly different goals and, more importantly, had to operate under a significantly more complicated mesh of rigid regulations; therefore, the survey itself was not always the most appropriate to meet all of the objectives of this particular study. It did, however, provide important information about the functioning of DRRI graduates in the field.

Generally, the survey is divided into four parts. Part 1 deals with demographic and behavioral information, while Part 2 focuses on the tasks and functions performed by the graduate. The third part provides a description of the installation racial climate and race relations instruction program, and the last part yields evaluative data about DRRI.

Field Surveys

Research scientists from our staff visited 16 separate Army installations. Nine of these were within the United States, one was in the Far East, and six were in Europe. At each installation, a wide variety of personnel was surveyed and interviewed about various aspects of the installation race relations and equal opportunity program. Included in nearly each instrument were some items concerning DRRI or DRRI graduates. Generally, at each installation, a sample of brigade commanders, battalion commanders, and company commanders were asked about the roles and performance of DRRI graduates and their perceptions of DRRI. All unit personnel surveyed were asked whether they knew about DRRI. Each group of personnel who occupied RR/EO positions was asked various questions related to DRRI on both a written survey and during a group interview. A survey of DRRI graduates dealt with their duties and tasks performed, a description of the installation training program, perceptions of the Army race relations program, and an assessment of the DRRI training experience.

Summary of Data Collection

The overall approach of this study was to collect information from a number of sources on a wide variety of issues. Table 2 presents a summary of the data sources, instrumentation, and samples used in this study. From all of this information, a rich set of data sources is generated which can lead to a comprehensive view of the DRRI training program.

Table 2

Summary of Data Collection

Data Source	Type of Instrument	Time Period	Number
Army Students: 76-3 Class	Survey	Pre-Phase I: April 1976	83
" "	Interview	Pre-Phase I: April 1976	10
" "	Survey	Pre-Phase II: May 1976	76
" "	Interview	Pre-Phase II: May 1976	10
" "	Survey	Post-Phase II: June 1976	69
" "	Interview	Post-Phase II: June 1976	10
Army Students: 76-5 Class	Survey	July 1976	30
" "	Survey	September 1976	16
DRRI Faculty/Staff	Survey	September 1976	20
DRRI Graduate Followup	Survey	Fall 1976	519
DRRI Graduates:			
Non-Europe	Survey	Spring 1976	98
Non-Europe	Group Interview	Spring 1976	98
Europe	Survey	Winter 1976	48
Europe	Group Interview	Winter 1976	48
Senior Commanders	Interview	Spring 1976	58
Company Commanders	Interview	Spring 1976	90
Unit Personnel	Survey	Spring 1976	3,973
Discussion Leaders Course Graduates	Interview	Spring 1976	83
Discussion Leaders Course Graduates	Survey	Spring 1976	83
RR/EO Staff (Non-DRRI)	Interview	Spring 1976	48
RR/EO Staff (Non-DRRI)	Survey	Spring 1976	48

A Brief Review of Prior Reports

A number of prior evaluation research reports have been generated by DRRI. Three evaluation reports and two DRRI graduate/commander field survey reports have been published (see References). A chronology of major events at DRRI is included in the evaluation reports, and therefore, little description of such changes will be documented in this report. Also, data are presented about student changes during training, student perceptions of training, and commander and DRRI graduate feedback about training. Although there are some methodological limitations in the way data were collected and analyzed, the conclusions and recommendations are consistent throughout the reports and are, in general, consistent with findings of this report. It is our impression from our visits to DRRI and field installations that these reports have not had a wide audience. This seems especially unfortunate, as the more critical issues confronting DRRI have been raised as early as December 1972, with the publication of Report 1.

The major conclusions and recommendations from this series of reports can be summarized.

- Feedback from students tends to be overwhelmingly positive about nearly all aspects of DRRI training. Both subjective perceptions of the quality of training components and pre-post assessments of trainee attitudes and perceptions consistently document the positive impact and change on DRRI trainees. Also, followup surveys to DRRI graduates and field commanders confirm the positive perceptions about the value of DRRI training.

- Suggestions for curriculum changes have consistently focused on two suggestions, more non-black minority content and more reality-based skills training. DRRI has been responsive to the call for more material on non-black minorities and has increased content on other minority populations, including blocks of instruction concerning anti-semitism, the white working class, and sexism. The addition of the Phase II training component was designed to provide training in educational techniques and other Service-unique areas. However, as the role of the Army DRRI graduate has expanded beyond the instructor role, the demand for more skills training, rather than awareness or cognitive content, has increased and is likely to continue to do so.

- In line with the request for more practical, skills training, earlier reports suggested that graduates be given more concrete indications of support after graduation in the form of refresher courses and frequent, regular feedback. Current data from graduates in the field demonstrates that this need for followup activities still exists. Very few graduates reported having any contact with DRRI subsequent to graduation, and a common request during group interviews with graduates was for refresher courses to bring them up to date on new programs and materials. Many reported they had a need to share difficulties with other professional colleagues, a process which would enhance problem-solving activities and help reduce feelings of isolation and "burnout." The quarterly newsletter recently published by DRRI should be useful in facilitating communication among graduates.

- The quality of instructors employed at DRRI as lecturers and small group leaders has been perceived consistently high and has been seen as one of the most positive aspects of DRRI. However, there has been some concern about the lack of on-the-job experience of faculty. An early report recommended at a minimum that all faculty be DRRI graduates. A recent faculty survey found that only 37 percent of those faculty members responding had attended both phases of DRRI. Further, 37 percent had never worked in the field as a race relations instructor, and 53 percent had never worked in the field in the role of an equal opportunity staff member. For 32 percent, DRRI was their first experience teaching courses in the RR/EO area.

- The quality of students has consistently been a controversial issue in the chronology of DRRI. The first evaluation report recommended greater quality control in the selection of students. This study has found that the processes that determine who is selected to attend DRRI and who is allowed to complete training based on graduation criteria are more stringent; however, these actions were taken in the absence of performance criteria. Thus, higher qualification scores might be unrelated or negatively related to RR/EO job performance.

These recommendations from prior reports are important, for they foreshadow the important findings of the current study. It is hoped that the recommendations of this report receive more attention than those of past reports. Perhaps the most important recommendation is to develop a mechanism to ensure the dissemination of findings and that some needed actions are finally taken.

Organization of This Report

Following this chapter which presented the background and objectives of the study and a description of the study methodology, the findings of the study will be presented. In Chapter II is a description of the jobs of DRRI graduates. In Chapter III is a description and analysis of the training of Army personnel during both phases of DRRI training, with particular emphasis on how well the training meets the on-the-job requirements of graduates. Conclusions and implications of these findings are presented and discussed in Chapter IV.

This report is addressed to policy makers at DRRI and in the Army. Data analyses which are too detailed or technical in nature have been placed in the appendix.

CHAPTER II

THE JOB OF THE ARMY DRRI GRADUATE

The primary mission of DRRI since its inception has been "to conduct training for Armed Forces personnel designated as instructors in race relations. . . " (DRRI, 1976). In 1974, the mission was expanded to include ". . . to conduct training for Army and Navy personnel designated as *equal opportunity/human resources management specialists*" (DRRI, 1976). The primary objectives of the Phase I/Phase II program emphasize knowledge, understanding, teaching techniques, and group skills—all of which focus on the assumed future role of the DRRI graduate; i.e., to be a race relations instructor. Certainly students at DRRI think they are being trained to be instructors. Twenty-five percent of the 1976-3 class, at the end of their Phase II training, expected to spend almost all of their time in their future RR/EO job as an instructor. Fifty-five percent of the class felt that they would spend at least one-half of their time providing instruction. The faculty at DRRI are generally in agreement with this prediction of future job role, for 44 percent did expect students to spend at least one-half of their time as instructors.

Students depart from DRRI under the impression that they will return to their installations with new skills as instructors in race relations. The value of their training at DRRI is in a large part dependent on the opportunity of graduates to use these new skills as a race relations instructor and to serve in an instructor role. No matter how well DRRI may train personnel to become instructors, the training is only effective if it meets the graduates' job needs; i.e., if graduates perform the tasks they were trained to do at DRRI.

Procedure

The description of the job of the Army DRRI graduate is based on two types of data collection efforts. In the first, samples of DRRI graduates in RR/EO positions at each of ten Army installations were interviewed in small groups, and each graduate also completed a written survey. The second major data collection effort was a followup survey sent by mail to Army graduates of DRRI.

Samples of Graduates

Field Visits

Sex:	93 percent male; 7 percent female.
Race:	57 percent black; 32 percent white; 11 percent "other."
Age:	4 percent, age 23 or less; 45 percent, age 24-29; and 43 percent, age 30-39.
Pay Grade:	54 percent, E6 or below; 23 percent, E7-E9; and 22 percent, O1-O3.
Years of Service:	12 percent, 1-3 years; 37 percent, 4-9 years; 44 percent, 10-20 years; and 6 percent, 20 or more years.
Education:	16 percent, high school or less; 57 percent, some college; 13 percent, college degree; and 15 percent more than college degree.

Generally, DRRI graduates in the field-visit sample tended to be non-white, middle enlisted grade personnel. Small percentages were either inexperienced (12 percent had three years or less in the Army), or quite experienced (6 percent had more than 20 years in and were Grade E8-E9). This sample tends to be less white and includes fewer officers than the total population trained at DRRI, which probably reflects a trend for non-white and enlisted personnel to remain in the RR/EO career field subsequent to DRRI training, as compared to white and officer personnel.

Followup Survey

Sex:	96 percent male; 4 percent female.
Race:	48 percent black; 40 percent white; 12 percent "other."
Age:	2 percent, age 23 or less; 36 percent, age 24-29; and 50 percent, age 30-39.
Pay Grade:	34 percent, E6 or below; 29 percent, E7-E9; 30 percent, O1-O3; 6 percent, more than O3.

Years of Service: 13 percent, 0-4 years; 28 percent, 5-9 years; 24 percent, 10-14 years; 28 percent, 15-19 years; 8 percent, 20 or more years.

Education: 14 percent, high school or less; 47 percent, some college; 12 percent, college degree; 27 percent, more than college degree.

These descriptive statistics should be seen as describing this sample rather than the population of Army DRRI graduates. This sample, as would be expected, is slightly older and higher ranked than the DRRI class profiles. There are also proportionately fewer females and whites. Level of education is somewhat higher than class profiles and confirms the high value placed on education by graduates. Sixty-nine percent of the graduates have had other training courses dealing with RR/EO, other than at DRRI, and 79 percent have had other courses dealing with instructional/teaching techniques. Since leaving DRRI, 75 percent of the graduates have taken additional formal education.

Job Description of DRRI Graduates

In general, graduates described their job in terms of two types of roles: monitoring the race relations instruction program and advising the commander by reviewing installation racial statistics and complaints. At each installation, graduates were responsible for monitoring the RAP training conducted in their units. Usually this was accomplished by reviewing and compiling the seminar reports sent to them by all the units in their own command structure. Monitoring was also sometimes done in person, where graduates would make regularly-scheduled and/or unannounced visits to seminars in their units. Results from monitoring were then usually summarized and furnished to higher level commanders. Graduates at a few posts also provided some consultation to chain-of-command personnel who conducted the RAP training, usually in the form of sharing lesson plans and other educational materials or coordinating seminar schedules throughout the units in the command.

The definition of the advisor to the commander role tended to vary considerably as a function of installation and organizational level. The advisor role was composed of investigating complaints, counseling individuals, and collecting and maintaining statistics

relevant to the installation racial climate. These tasks tended to occur somewhat infrequently but were quite time consuming. Investigations of racial complaints often become complicated and may require extensive field work.

Task Analysis

In order to provide a more specific definition of the job of the graduate, a detailed task analysis was done. Each graduate in the followup survey was asked to indicate how often he/she performed each of 35 tasks. The responses were factor analyzed in order to identify clusters or groups of tasks that could be used to provide specific descriptions of graduate roles. The technical results of the factor analysis and the list of tasks that belong to each factor are presented in the appendix.

Four meaningful factors or clusters of tasks emerged from the factor analysis. Factor 1 represents the Equal Opportunity Staff (EOS) function associated with the RR/EO program. It includes counseling, investigation, and advocacy types of tasks. Tasks reportedly done most often are:

- counseling individuals or groups;
- exploring indicators of racial unrest; and
- recommending methods for correcting discriminatory practices.

Tasks in this factor done least frequently are:

- appearing at functions to generate support;
- maintaining liaison with civic action agencies; and
- seeking cooperation and participation from the surrounding civilian community.

Factor 2 is composed of Race Relations Instructor (RRI) tasks. It includes both preparation and conducting tasks. There are many fewer tasks in this factor than in the EOS factor, but tasks in this factor tend to be accomplished more frequently.

Most graduates did serve in some type of instructor role, although they were not usually directly involved in RAP training for unit personnel. Only two percent stated that they usually conducted RAP training. Instructional duties tend to be to train local

discussion leaders, to provide RAP I-type training to new arrivals at the installation, or to respond to special requests; e.g., give a talk at a community group or provide a seminar to a local correctional facility. Forty-three percent of the graduates spend one-fourth or less of their time providing any type of race relations instruction.

Army DRRI graduates in Europe tend to provide more race relations instruction than do graduates stationed at installations in the United States. However, almost all unit or RAP training is provided by company commanders or other chain-of-command personnel, not by DRRI graduates, who are more likely to provide community-level instruction for incoming personnel. About one-third of the Army DRRI graduates in Europe spend one-quarter or less of their job time providing race relations instruction.

The decrease in the amount of time spent as a race relations instructor is further dramatized by comparing current findings to the results of earlier DRRI graduate field surveys. Table 3 illustrates the percentage of graduates who spend various proportions of their time providing race relations instruction. Clearly, the utilization of graduates as instructors has been drastically modified. Whereas the vast majority of graduates used to spend most of their time as instructors, in 1976, only one out of ten graduates spends all or almost all of his time providing race relations instruction.

Table 3

Proportion of Graduates' Time Providing Race Relations Instruction

Proportion of Job Time Providing RR Instruction	First 6 Classes	Classes 73-3 Through 74-1	1976 Graduate Field Survey
Full-Time	71	68	10
Half-Time	14	13	27
One-Quarter Time	8	11	20
Less than One-Quarter Time	7	8	43

The third factor is composed of tasks which specify contact with commanders or senior officers and is called Command Consultation (CC). Items in this factor have a lower mean frequency, suggesting they are done less often than other types of tasks. However, other survey and field data have emphasized the critical importance of command support, so that while these types of CC tasks may be performed less frequently, they may also be the most important of all the job tasks.

Factor 4 is called Program Coordination (PC) and reflects coordinating and scheduling tasks. Field data discussed earlier pointed out that such scheduling tasks are also a part of the overall race relations instruction monitoring role of graduates. PC tasks tend to be done more often than other types of tasks.

These task factors are closely associated with each other, indicating an interaction among all types of tasks. Graduates who perform one set of tasks more, also tend to perform all tasks more often. However, correlations among task factors are lowest with the RRI factor, reinforcing our hypothesis of two major job roles: one consisting of monitoring, scheduling, and occasionally assisting in the installation race relations instruction program; and an advisory role defined by equal opportunity staff functions and consultation to the command structure. The PC task factor includes tasks in both roles.

Job Time Spent on Specific Tasks

In addition to identifying the types of tasks done by graduates, analyses were done to assess how graduates spend their job time. Each of the graduates on the followup survey was asked to indicate how much of their job time was spent in performing each of several specific tasks. The distribution of the percentage of graduates who devote time to each of these types of tasks is illustrated in Table 4. For example, 51.1 percent of the graduates spend 0-9 percent of their overall job time in the preparation of materials for race relations instruction. Only 3 percent of the graduates devote 70 percent or more of their job time to this task. Examining the distribution of how graduates spend their job time, it seems that relatively few graduates invest all or even most of their job time in any one type of task. Rather, graduates account for their job time through the performance of several different types of tasks. The two types of tasks that more graduates spend more of their time in are

administrative and supervisory duties and non-RR/EO military duties, which may be components of any military job regardless of its nature. An examination of the distribution of time spent by task generally indicates no apparent pattern or set of patterns, except to confirm the fact that few graduates spend even one-half of their time providing race relations instruction.

Table 4

Percentage of Job Time Spent by Graduates in Each Type of Task
(N = 519)

Type of Task	Percent of Graduates Spending Different Percent of Total Job Time				
	Percent of Total Job Time on Task				
	0-9%	10-19%	20-49%	50-69%	70% or More
Preparation of materials, lesson plans, etc., for race relations instruction.	51.1	27.9	14.6	3.5	3.0
Conducting race relations workshops/ instruction for unit personnel.	58.0	18.1	13.3	5.7	4.8
Assisting chain of command personnel in conducting race relations instruction for unit personnel.	60.5	23.5	10.6	2.7	2.7
Conducting training courses for personnel who work or will work in RR/EO roles.	72.4	16.2	7.3	1.4	2.7
Counseling individuals about RR/EO matters.	58.2	26.6	11.7	1.5	2.1
Investigating individual RR/EO complaints	61.5	23.5	12.1	1.7	1.2
Collecting and reporting information about the racial climate on the installation.	62.6	24.5	8.9	1.7	2.3
Administrative and supervisory duties.	43.9	17.5	21.2	8.1	9.2
Drug/alcohol abuse programs.	92.1	4.8	1.6	.8	.8
Non-RR/EO military duties.	59.5	14.3	9.8	2.3	14.1

Task Importance

Graduates were also asked to rate each of these same tasks in terms of how important each is to the successful completion of their overall job. The importance ratings are generally high for all types of tasks, although the ratings tend to be slightly higher for the equal opportunity type tasks, those found on the EOS task factor, than for those tasks involved with providing race relations instruction, the RRI task factor. The two most important tasks are counseling individuals about RR/EO matters and investigating or making inquiries about individual RR/EO complaints. The two least important tasks are non-RR/EO duties and administrative and supervisory duties. Graduates tend to spend less time accomplishing those tasks, EOS tasks, that they also perceive as most important; or at least, they do not allocate their time to tasks according to their ratings of task importance.

Allocation and Utilization of Graduates

The overall deployment and utilization of graduates seems to be an important consideration. In the organizational change literature, much has been written about the most appropriate type of position, organizational level, and hierarchical location for personnel who serve as consultants, evaluators, or facilitators. In the main, few universal guidelines are available to use in allocating those types of personnel, but at a minimum it seems useful to describe how they are allocated. Table 5 describes the allocation pattern of graduates with respect to position, organizational level, and reporting level; i.e., to whom the graduate directly reports.

Examining the distribution of graduates by position, graduates are found at all of those positions, in spite of the fact that the first six positions were designed by members of other military services to designate RR/EO titles only for non-Army DRRI graduates. Army graduates (29.5 percent) labeled themselves with position titles formally used by other military services. Furthermore, almost 20 percent called themselves something other than any of the position options available. While some installations have changed their designations to reflect a more broad human relations approach rather than exclusively race relations, the lack of uniformity and consistency in position designations seems to reflect the confusion that characterizes the Army RR/EO program.

Table 5

Position, Organizational Level and Reporting Level of Army DRRI Graduates

Position	Percent of Graduates
EOSO–Staff Officer	2.3
EOPS–Program Specialist	.2
EO Assistant	.6
Human Relations Officer	6.2
Human Relations NCO	10.8
Human Relations Facilitator	9.4
Race Relations/Equal Opportunity Officer	13.9
Race Relations/Equal Opportunity Specialist	5.0
Race Relations/Equal Opportunity Sergeant	15.8
Race Relations/Equal Opportunity Senior Sergeant	16.2
Other	19.6
Organizational Level	
Major Command	9.4
Post/Installation/Community	34.9
Corps	1.9
Division	4.2
Brigade/Regiment	23.1
Separate Battalion/Group	8.1
Other	18.4
Reporting Level	
Commanding Officer	20.8
G1/DPCA	9.2
G3/S3 Training	1.2
Director of Human Resources	4.4
Social Actions Officer	.2
RR/EO Officer	32.0
Chief of Staff	2.1
Executive Officer	7.3
Other	22.8

With respect to organizational level, large groups of graduates are at the post/installation/community and brigade/regiment level. About eighteen percent reported that they were at an organizational level other than any listed. Graduates listed a variety of reporting levels, although a large group reported directly either to the commanding officer or to the RR/EO officer.

There also tends to be a relationship between the position of a graduate and to whom he or she reports. For example, graduates in RR/EO officer-type positions tend to report most often to one of the commander's staff officers, while graduates in other types of positions most often report to the command RR/EO officer. Examining organizational level, it seems that graduates at the major command level seldom report directly to the commanding officer and those at the installation level are more likely to report to the RR/EO officer. Graduates who work at levels below the installation command report about equally often to commanders, staff officers, and RR/EO officers. There also is a relationship between organizational level and position. There are more RR/EO NCO/specialists at each command level, and facilitators tend to be located at the installation level command.

Analysis was also done to compare *position and organizational level with race*. Only blacks and whites are included in this analysis on account of the small numbers of graduates of other races available. In an analogous manner, the number of females in the survey sample is too small to permit an analysis of sex by these utilization descriptors. The distribution of graduates across positions is quite different by race. Almost three-fourths of the blacks are in the RR/EO NCO/specialist position, and almost one-half of the whites are in the RR/EO officer position. Facilitators tend to be more often black, although the number is quite small. Race does not at all appear to be related to organizational level.

The various ways to describe the allocation and utilization of graduates seem to be related to each other and suggest that the role of the graduate is related to the type of position, the location of the position, and perhaps the role of the person reported *to*. Also, it would seem that the specific tasks of the graduate might vary as a function of these same utilization descriptors. Graduates at different levels or positions might be expected to do more or less of various types of tasks. An investigation of this hypothesis is shown in an

analysis in Table 6. For each type of position and organization level, the mean task factor scores are presented. The higher the score, the more often the task is performed.

Table 6

Task Factor Scores by Position and Organizational Level

		Task Factor—Scores			
Position	**N**	**EOS**	**RRI**	**CC**	**PC**
RR/EO Officer	102	41.9	15.9	12.1	11.6
RR/EO NCO or Specialist	234	44.8	16.5	11.2	11.1
Facilitator	40	37.4	16.7	8.8	9.2
Organization Level					
Major Command	40	40.6	16.4	10.4	10.3
Installation Level Command	189	45.7	17.0	11.0	11.1
Below Installation Level Command	147	40.9	15.5	11.6	11.1

In Table 6, the most apparent trend is for facilitators to perform most job tasks less often, with the exception of the RRI type of task. This is especially the case for consultation and coordination tasks. Officers most frequently are involved with CC and PC tasks. With respect to organizational level, graduates who work at the major command level have lower task scores for most tasks. Graduates who are located at the installation level command have higher EOS scores and slightly higher RRI scores, while those at lower organizational levels have slightly higher CC scores.

In addition, the tasks of graduates vary not only by position or location, but also by the interaction of position and location. For example, while NCO's say they perform some tasks more frequently than graduates in other positions, the officer position at the major command level has higher task scores than graduates in other positions. Task frequency for facilitators is low regardless of command level for all tasks except instructional tasks. Officers report that they perform consultation and coordination tasks more often, although not consistently across all command levels.

A similar analysis was done substituting importance of task for frequency of task, and task importance was found to vary as a function of position, organizational level, and their interaction. The implication is that graduates will probably have somewhat different job descriptions based on where they are used. For example, graduates in the RR/EO officer type of position tend to perform staff and instructional tasks most often if they work at a major command level. However, graduates in the same type of position perform consultation and coordination tasks most often if they are located at the below installation level command position. NCO's at the installation level command have high scores in all task scores, including a higher RRI score than those in facilitator positions at that command level. The very low CC scores for facilitators reinforce the low command priority afforded race relations instruction programs, for evidently those in facilitator positions have low frequency contact with the commander.

It is evident that all graduates do not perform the same way. The job description and frequency of job tasks varies by organizational parameters, so that it does not appear useful to conceptualize the DRRI graduate or RR/EO job as a unitary role, as only one job. There is probably not one set of tasks that defines *the* RR/EO job. It will be more effective to generate a task analysis model in which there is one set of core skills and tasks common to all RR/EO personnel and another set of job tasks which are defined by the position and organizational level of RR/EO personnel. In an analogous fashion, it may not be appropriate to conceptualize the training of personnel in a unitary fashion, for varying job roles and tasks call for different training needs. A more job-relevant training model would generate a core set of training modules for all trainees corresponding to those skills required by all RR/EO personnel. Additional sets of modules would be developed for trainees, based on their extent of prior RR/EO experience and the organizational level and RR/EO position of their future assignment.

Job Performance

In terms of performance of the graduates, little information of a systematic nature is available to assess the quality of graduate performance. Prior studies done by DRRI suggest that commanders tend to positively assess the performance of graduates of DRRI.

Graduates themselves were asked to rate their own performance on a scale of one to nine, with one being the worst performer, five being average, and nine being the best performer. Most graduates rated themselves as substantially above average as a race relations instructor, EO staff member, and overall RR/EO staff member. For each type of role, over 65 percent rated themselves as either an eight or a nine, with a mean rating of almost eight on each dimension.

Commanders at the battalion and brigade levels were asked to assess the performance of their graduates. Most of them did not feel that they had sufficient contact with any DRRI graduates in their command to assess their performance, although those commanders who could rate performance made a positive rating. Company commanders also could not provide much indication of DRRI graduate performance. The lack of command familiarity with the performance of DRRI graduates in their command reinforces other comments about the lack of command support and perhaps confirms other findings which point to the low priority of RR/EO programs in general (Hiett and Nordlie, 1976).

Other RR/EO personnel who were not trained at DRRI but work part- or full-time in an RR/EO capacity were asked to rate the performance level of DRRI graduates as compared to non-DRRI trained RR/EO personnel. Seventy-six percent of the non-DRRI trained, full-time RR/EO personnel felt that DRRI graduates were more effective in race relations instruction tasks, and 65 percent said they were more effective in RR/EO staff work. At one installation, the opinion was expressed that DRRI graduates lacked objectivity and flexibility, and have a "bad image," in terms of their competency to do their job. At a few installations, some RR/EO personnel felt that DRRI graduates did not receive enough practical experience training and were not able, for example, to set up a complaint processing program.

In addition to full-time, non-DRRI trained RR/EO personnel, graduates of installation Discussion Leaders Courses (DLC) were asked about DRRI graduate performance. Generally, graduates from DLC work part-time as race relations instructors for unit seminars. Often the DLC graduate is taught by DRRI graduates, and DRRI graduates have contact with th DLC graduates in their race relations instruction monitoring role. Most of those responding felt that DRRI graduates are more effective than non-DRRI trained personnel for RR/EO instruction and staff work. Eighty-seven percent believed that DRRI graduates were more

effective than non-graduates in instructional tasks, and 77 percent said that DRRI graduates were more effective in terms of EO staff work.

RR/EO personnel in Europe had somewhat less positive perceptions of DRRI graduate performance than RR/EO personnel in CONUS. Sixty percent of the full-time, non-DRRI trained RR/EO personnel believed that the DRRI graduate was a more effective race relations instructor, and 40 percent believed that the DRRI graduate was a more effective EO staff person. Only 47 percent of the graduates of the race relations instructor school in Europe thought the DRRI graduates were more effective race relations instructors than non-DRRI trained race relations instructors.

The performance ratings of all respondents of graduate performance are generally quite favorable in comparison to non-DRRI graduates. RR/EO personnel, who would be expected to be in a position to assess graduate performance, generally see those with DRRI training as more effective. The percentage endorsing DRRI graduates decreases when assessing performance as an EO staff member. This appears reasonable, since graduates received training primarily aimed at making them instructors.

In addition to assessing ratings of performance, analyses were done to identify the relationships between graduate performance and demographic and organizational variables. A correlation matrix was run to determine if there were associations between characteristics of graduates and characteristics of performance. With respect to association with frequency of tasks performed, correlations between task scales and other variables tend to be somewhat low, although a few associational patterns tend to emerge. EOS tasks are performed more often by personnel who tend to be:

- older;
- non-white;
- less educated; and
- lower ranked.

Relationships with other task factors are in the same direction, although quite low. Those who perform EOS tasks more frequently also seem to be:

- more satisfied with their job;
- perceive more positive effects from the installation race relations instruction program; and
- perceive less "burnout" among other race relations instructors.

Similar correctional patterns appear with the CC factor, which reinforces the recurrent theme throughout this report about the importance of command support to the DRRI graduate and the RR/EO program.

Job Satisfaction

In terms of job satisfaction, from the field survey, 47 percent stated that they were satisfied or very satisfied with their job, as opposed to 33 percent who were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied. On the followup survey, there was considerably more job satisfaction among graduates. Seventy-two percent were satisfied and 19 percent were dissatisfied with their job. The difference between the levels of job satisfaction in the two samples of graduates is probably associated with the low response rate and resultant response bias on the followup survey. In the field visits, all graduates at each installation were surveyed.

Generally, graduates who are more satisfied with their jobs tend to:

- have more positive career intentions;
- perform RR/EO tasks more frequently;
- perceive more command support;
- perceive a more effective race relations instruction program; and
- perceive less "burnout."

Since all graduates were trained to be race relations instructors and most expected to be in an instructor role, the dissatisfaction may reflect the unmet expectations to have opportunities to provide the services for which they were trained. It may also reflect the difficulties associated with working in a controversial area with little program support from either command or unit personnel. Data collected in another study also tended to be similar to the field survey data in identifying substantial job dissatisfaction among RR/EO personnel and in pointing out the high level of frustration related to job performance (Hiett and Nordlie, 1976).

Graduates were also asked to indicate their career intentions on the followup survey. Sixty-three percent stated that at the current time, they intended to stay in the Army for a total of at least 20 years. Graduates with career intentions tended to be older, non-white, less educated, and have more satisfaction with their job.

Burnout

The phenomenon of "burnout" is not uncommon in human service positions and generally refers to the negative effects of stress or performance inherent in jobs that required prolonged periods of high pressure and high intensity interpersonal contact. Graduates in the field remarked that "burnout" used to be associated with providing emotional, intense race relations instruction at a high frequency with little time between instruction sessions. As a result, instructors became "drained" and "burnt out," and quality of performance decreased. Since instructor responsibilities have decreased, "burnout" at the current time is perceived as the product of extreme frustration in attempts "to get something done." Some graduates pointed out the stress caused by being in a position where there is high visibility but little command support and sparse support from unit personnel. Thus, "burnout" seems to result from a combination of graduates' frustration at this lack of success in "changing the system," and their sense of isolation in working for a program that is not strongly supported by command or unit personnel.

Estimates of the existence of "burnout" vary for graduates. When asked to estimate the percentage of race relations instructors they had known who had experienced "burnout," about one-half of the graduates indicated that less than ten percent of instructors they had known had experienced it. However, another one-third of the graduates believed that 25 percent of the instructors they had known had felt "burnout." Seventy percent of the graduates thought that commanders were "seldom" or "almost never" aware of "burnout." Graduates who perceived more "burnout" tended to be:

- younger;
- white;
- higher ranked;
- higher educated;
- have less positive career intentions;
- perform tasks less frequently;
- be less satisfied with their job;
- have less command support; and
- perceive negative effects on their military career from their RR/EO involvement.

Perceptions of the Consequences of DRRI and RR/EO Involvement

One of the potential consequences of working in a controversial program is that perceptions of an individual's own performance may be affected, positively or negatively, by the perceptions of the performance of the overall program. Graduates were asked to indicate their perception of personal consequences as a result of their DRRI and RR/EO experiences. Data from the followup survey is presented in Table 7.

Table 7
Graduate Perceptions of Consequences of DRRI and RR/EO Involvement
(N = 519)

	Very Positive or Positive	Neither Positive Nor Negative	Very Negative or Negative	Mean Value (1 = Very Positive) (5 = Very Negative)
DRRI experience and intention to stay in the military	29.1	63.8	7.2	2.65
DRRI attendance and effect on military career	59.6	22.5	17.9	2.28
DRRI attendance and attitude toward the military	47.3	39.3	13.4	2.49
RR/EO involvement and effect on military career	50.6	22.4	26.8	2.59
RR/EO involvement and attitude toward the military	48.4	38.4	13.0	2.47

The majority of graduates perceive positive and neutral consequences, and a small group of respondents have negative views on the effects of the DRRI and RR/EO experiences. The highest percentage of negative consequences occurs on the effects of RR/EO involvement on a graduate's military career, a consistent finding across groups of respondents in the study. DRRI is perceived by some as self-enhancing in a personal growth sense and in terms of leadership attributes. However, RR/EO experience is simply not perceived by some as career enhancing, a finding not surprising in light of the history of the RR/EO program in the Army. Data

from interviews at installations were similar to the data from the followup survey, although slightly higher percentages of graduates had both more positive and more negative beliefs about the results of being at DRRI and being in the RR/EO program.

The perceptions of consequences are correlated across types of consequences, and they are correlated with race, rank, and education. More negative effects tend to be perceived by graduates who are:

- white;
- higher educated;
- higher ranked;
- have more negative career intentions;
- have less command support; and
- perceive more "burnout."

As a *gestalt*, the set of analyses concerning job performance and job climate tends to point to a set of characteristics that defines the DRRI graduate who is more satisfied with his job. Generally, the graduate tends to be:

- younger;
- non-white;
- lower ranked;
- lower educated; and
- positive about career intentions.

The more satisfied graduate also tends to perform job tasks more frequently, particularly equal opportunity and command consultative tasks, and has more support from his commander.

Perception of RR/EO Problems

A more thorough understanding of the job of the graduate is provided by examining his/her perceptions of problems and strategies to eliminate discrimination. The mean ratings of how serious various types of problems are at the graduates' installations are presented in Table 8. Higher scores represent more serious problems with the installation race relations instruction program. From the table, the more serious problems are apparent and generally confirm our perceptions gained during the site visits. Each of the more serious

problems reflects one of the dimensions of command support that graduates had defined as what they needed from their command structure:

- presence and visibility;
- resources;
- availability and access; and
- enforcement of guidelines and regulations.

Table 8

Problems of Race Relations Instruction Programs and Strategies to Eliminate Discrimination

Problems	Mean Rating of Problem (1 = No Problem) (5 = Very Serious Problem)
Senior NCO's and officers are not participating.	3.15
Lack of command support	2.92
Getting new materials and resources.	2.88
Attendance requirements are not enforced.	2.81
Instruction periods are too short.	2.23
Instructors or discussion leaders are not well trained.	2.15
Instruction is held too infrequently.	2.01
Group participation is not encouraged.	1.93

Strategies	Mean Rating of Effectiveness (1 = Very Ineffective) (5 = Very Effective)
Increased command support.	4.72
Tougher EO compliance monitoring	4.39
Tighter EO regulations.	4.10
More race relations instruction.	3.82
More pressure from minority groups.	3.24

The most serious problems in race relations instruction perceived by graduates are the lack of participation by senior NCO's and officers, the lack of command support, the

failure to enforce attendance requirements, and the difficulties related to getting new materials and resources. The last-mentioned problem is one that has particular relevance to DRRI, for many graduates during the site visits complained about the failure of DRRI to supply them with new materials and resources. In some cases, lesson plans and other instructional materials were outdated and had become redundant to personnel who suffered through the same lesson plan many times before. As the mission of DRRI includes the development of educational curricula and the dissemination of materials throughout the military services, graduates' perceptions about the lack of educational materials assumes greater priority as a statement about the impact of DRRI.

The ratings of the effectiveness of the strategies to eliminate racism and discrimination are also presented in Table 8 and continue to reinforce the vital importance of the relationship with the commander. Increased command support is perceived as *the* most effective strategy, followed by tougher EO compliance monitoring, which is also a strategy that requires the support and cooperation of the commander. Other approaches which do not require command involvement are seen as less effective. Thirty percent of the graduates did not see more race relations instruction as either a "very effective" or "effective" strategy, which seems quite substantial for a group of personnel whose main role and set of competencies in the past had been as a race relations instructor.

It is important, then, that given the clearly emerging importance of the commander in the performance of the DRRI graduate that, when asked to indicate how important various indicators were in determining the quality of race relations at an installation, the commander's opinion was seen as the least important in the following set of indicators.

Indicator	Mean Rating of Importance (1 = Very Unimportant) (5 = Very Important)
1. Number of racial incidents.	4.42
2. Opinions as expressed in race relations seminars.	4.35
3. Proportions of promotions and disciplinary actions given to minorities.	4.35
4. Existence of racial polarization.	4.10
5. Commander's opinion.	3.80

While the opinion of the commander is perceived as important, it is seen as the least important indicator compared to the others that are listed. Certainly many commanders do not have the awareness of the manifestations of racism and have not been trained to identify the more subtle forms of discrimination. Thus, their opinion may not necessarily accurately reflect the racial climate. However, strategies to eliminate racism which do not fully involve the opinion of *the person* who allocates the resources; the person whose support, it has been seen, is absolutely essential in accomplishing a successful program, seems programmed to fail. The fact that "the number of racial incidents" is perceived as the most important indicator of the racial climate virtually guarantees a program of limited success.

Higher and Lower Quality Race Relations Programs

A final analysis done with the survey data from graduates in the field was to compare the responses of graduates who are both involved in programs that they perceive as effective and who are at installations with more favorably perceived racial climates to graduates who see their race relations programs and installation racial climate as less positive. In order to identify graduates with more positive perceptions, the responses to five separate questions were utilized.

- In your opinion, how do the effects of current race relations education efforts compare with those of previous years in terms of motivating personnel to desirable behavior in racial and ethnic situations?
- How do you feel race relations instruction has affected racial and ethnic relations at your installation?
- In your opinion, how does your installation commander view the effectiveness of race relations workshop/instruction at your installation?
- In your opinion, what is the general attitude of installation personnel toward race relations instruction/workshops or seminars?
- In your experience, how do *most* participants rate the seminar or workshop?

The responses to these questions were substantially correlated, suggesting that all of these items were assessing a similar dimension of race relations instruction program quality. Responses by each graduate to these questions were totaled, and two groups of graduates were identified. One group tended to answer each of the questions in a positive or favorable way and represented higher quality race relations instruction programs. The other group responded in a neutral or negative fashion to these questions to assess their program quality and represented lower quality programs and installations. The criteria for the high quality group was made somewhat stringent, so that the size of the higher quality group is substantially smaller than the lower quality group. The responses of each group on a variety of other questions were compared in order to develop a profile of those characteristics that distinguish perceived higher from lower quality programs.

It is important to note that the designations of quality are based on subjective perceptions of graduates rather than objective criteria. Also, more than one graduate may be responding for any one installation, and installations may vary considerably by size, type, etc. Nevertheless, this analysis is useful in pointing out the characteristics of race relations instruction that consistently distinguish the quality of the program. Table 9 displays those characteristics that are significantly different between the two groups of graduates.

The characteristics that distinguish quality of race relations instruction are quite supportive of prior analyses and add credence to the importance of command involvement. Graduates were asked if they provided training to a series of groups, and those that provided training to chain-of-command personnel and to a lesser extent to unit commanders in particular, also tended to have higher quality programs. Also, graduates were asked to indicate what percent of all race relations instruction was done by different potential instructor personnel. As can be seen, in higher quality installations, more instruction is provided by DRRI-trained personnel. Ratings of the seriousness of several problems distinguished groups, but again command support appears to be the most important problem as related to program quality. When specifically asked how well the installation commander supports the race relations program, higher quality programs reported more command support.

In addition to reinforcing the conclusions concerning the commander, this analysis also points out that the way sexism is integrated into the race relations instruction program

Table 9

Characteristics of Higher and Lower Quality Installation Race Relations Programs

Characteristic	Higher Quality Mean (N = 157)	Lower Quality Mean (N = 325)	Difference	t-Value*
DRRI Graduates provide training for:				
- Command Team Training Personnel (Yes = 1, No = 2)	1.57	1.75	-.18	-3.45
- Unit Commanders	1.45	1.55	-.10	-1.84
Percentage of All RR Instruction Provided by DRRI-Trained Personnel	5.55	4.73	.82	2.47
Percentage of Military Personnel with Less than 6 Hours of RR Instruction (Higher numbers mean higher percentages).	3.74	3.37	.37	2.44
Severity of Problems:				
- Lack of Command Support	2.38	3.19	-.81	-6.12
- Senior NCO's and Officers Are Not Participating	2.79	3.33	-.54	-4.44
- Instruction Periods Are Too Short	2.03	2.34	-.31	-2.53
- Instruction is Held Too Infrequently	1.67	2.18	-.51	-4.14
- Attendance Requirements Are Not Enforced	2.39	3.03	-.64	-4.47
- Group Participation Is Not Encouraged	1.57	2.11	-.54	-5.03
- Instructors or Discussion Leaders Are Not Well Trained	1.66	2.40	-.74	-5.95
Commanders' Support (Higher numbers indicate more support).	4.40	3.79	.61	5.89
Sexism a Formal Part of RR/EO Program (Yes = 1, No = 2)	1.05	1.15	-.10	-3.05
Frequency Sexism Brought into Discussion (Higher numbers indicate higher frequency).	4.08	3.76	.32	3.02

*All t-Values are statistically significant at the .05 level, except "unit commanders."

seems important. Higher quality programs tend to include sexism as a formal part of race relations instruction and also find sexism more frequently brought into discussions during the instruction. This finding is not surprising given the increased attention to the minority status of women, the increasing numbers of women in the Army, and the awareness that discrimination is a phenomenon associated with minority status by race or by sex.

Although it is not presented in Table 9, this type of analysis also tended to suggest a slight association between position, organizational level, and program quality. Higher quality programs tended to have more graduates who labeled themselves to be in the facilitator position and less in the RR/EO officer position, and tended to have more graduates at the installation level command and less below the installation level.

Summary

Information collected from Army DRRI graduates in the field installations indicated that the job of the graduate consists of two major roles:

- Race Relations Instructor Role
- Command Advisor Role.

Examination of the specific tasks done by graduates revealed four specific roles or groups of tasks:

- Equal Opportunity Staff Tasks
- Race Relations Instruction Tasks
- Command Consultation Tasks
- Program Coordination Tasks.

Where graduates still have race relations instruction tasks, the amount of job time devoted to these tasks has dramatically decreased over the past few years, and graduates monitor, assist, or coordinate instruction, but spend little of their job time in the actual conduct of race relations instruction for unit personnel. While graduates spend more of their job time in administrative and instruction-related tasks, they rate EOS tasks as more important.

Army DRRI graduates are found in a variety of RR/EO program positions, at various organizational levels, reporting to different types of commanding officers. The specific job of a graduate varies as a function of his/her position, organizational level, and reporting level.

Ratings of DRRI graduate performance are quite positive. Ratings as a race relations instructor tend to be higher than ratings as an EO staff person.

Assessment of job satisfaction and related variables shows that while most graduates seem relatively satisfied, a substantial percentage are dissatisfied with their job, see "burnout" experienced among their colleagues, and perceive negative consequences from their DRRI and RR/EO involvement. The graduate with a more positive view about his overall job tended to be:

- younger;
- non-white;
- lower ranked;
- lower educated.

Perceptions of the effectiveness of RR/EO programs are mixed, but the perceptions about the importance of command support are highly consistent. Lack of command support is seen as the most serious problem at installations; increased command support is noted as the most effective strategy to eliminate discrimination; and the amount of command support given to a program is the strongest predictor of the quality of a race relations program.

CHAPTER III

DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF DRRI TRAINING FOR ARMY PERSONNEL

Overview of Training

The DRRI is a field activity of the Department of Defense and is under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. Operations of the DRRI are subject to policy guidance by the Race Relations Education Board of the Department of Defense.

The mission of the DRRI is (DRRI, 1976):

- to conduct training for DOD personnel designated as instructors in race relations;
- develop doctrine and curricula in education for race relations;
- conduct research;
- perform evaluation of program effectiveness; and
- disseminate educational guidelines and materials for utilization throughout the Armed Forces.
- to conduct training for Army and Navy personnel designated as equal opportunity/human resources management specialists.

The emphasis in our study is on examining DRRI's performance of its mission to conduct training of race relations instructors, just as DRRI has emphasized this specific mission as its most important one.

The curriculum of DRRI-Phase I emphasizes the use of the small-group discussion or seminar method as a means of exposing personnel to the differing racial and ethnic life styles and concerns, opening communication channels among themselves, identifying intergroup problems and sources of stress, and providing an arena where constructive recommendations

can be made to appropriate local commanders. As an expansion of the DRRI curriculum, a follow-on phase (Phase II) commenced in September 1974. This second phase operates as part of the DRRI, but the instruction is provided by personnel assigned by the individual Services. The instruction in Phase II provides training in educational techniques and other Service-unique areas of instruction. Students receive instruction in small group discussion leadership, specific Service policies and procedures, and special preparation required for carrying out the unique race relations and equal opportunity programs of the individual Service.

The Phase I program is five weeks with instruction in minority studies and behavioral sciences. The Phase II program length varies and immediately follows the Phase I program. At the current time, the Phase II program in the Army is five weeks in duration, although higher ranking personnel may complete the course in less time.

The Phase I/Phase II program is designed to accomplish its mission by achieving six primary objectives. The objectives are to provide all students attending the Institute with (DRRI, 1976):

1. A knowledge of minority group history and the contributions of minority groups to the development of our nation and the Armed Forces.

2. A knowledge of selected psychological, social and cultural factors relating to race relations to increase their understanding of the social and behavioral dynamics related to intergroup tensions and conflicts.

3. Racial and ethnic group experiences in various communities to increase their understanding of minority group culture and life styles.

4. The opportunity to develop teaching techniques and group skills which will prepare them to lead discussion groups.

5. The opportunity to become aware of current DOD, Service and command equal opportunity and treatment policies and directives, and their relationship to the need for maintaining good order and discipline.

6. The capability and judgment to work with their commanding officers in determining the specific needs for a race relations group discussion program, and how best to employ the Defense Race Relations Institute resources within that command.

This description of DRRI training is a brief overview. More detailed descriptions of specific course modules can be found in the Program of Instruction, and other information relevant to a student's experience is available in the Student Information Booklet published by DRRI. Also, data about the organization of DRRI are found in the Organization and Function Chart Book which is also published and available at DRRI. No useful purpose can be served by reproducing such information in this report, since it is easily available elsewhere and subject to periodic and administrative change. Detailed narrative descriptions of the historical development of DRRI are also available in DRRI Evaluation Reports.

In this chapter, the perceptions of DRRI training of students, graduates, faculty members, and Army personnel in the field are presented and synthesized in a descriptive analysis of DRRI training. Detailed analyses were executed on the training experiences of the 1976-3 Army class in terms of their self-perceptions of change and their changes in relevant racial attitudes, knowledge, perceptions, and behavior. Also, data from DRRI faculty members and graduates in the field is presented to provide a comprehensive view of DRRI training with particular emphasis on the relationship of training to the job of the graduate.

Student Perceptions of DRRI Training

Phase I

Assessment of Training

Prior studies of student assessment of Phase I training have consistently found quite positive perceptions of training. Data from the 1976-3 class tend to confirm this positive level of perceptions, for 89 percent rated Phase I as "satisfactory" or "very satisfactory" in preparing them for their future RR/EO jobs. Ratings for various training components are presented in Table 10. As is evident, ratings for each component are very high with all of the separate components of DRRI training perceived quite favorably. The most favorably rated components are the inner-city experience in Miami and the knowledge and presentation of instructors. The least highly rated components are the audio-visual aids, which were seen as too old and not reflecting contemporary issues. This data is consistent with information

Table 10

Phase I: Student Ratings of Training Components
(N = 76)

Rating					Training Component
Excellent	Above Average	Average	Below Average	Unsatisfactory	
54%	37%	7%	1%	1%	Presentation of instructors.
62%	30%	7%	1%	--	Knowledge of instructors.
54%	26%	17%	3%	--	Handouts and other printed instructional materials.
47%	32%	19%	1%	1%	Audiovisual aids.
51%	34%	13%	1%	--	Lectures (in general).
57%	21%	15%	5%	1%	Small Group Discussion (in general).
55%	26%	17%	1%	--	Minority studies.
53%	32%	11%	4%	1%	Individual and group behavior.
53%	30%	15%	3%	--	Racism and ways to combat it.
76%	11%	7%	5%	1%	Inner-city experience.

gathered during the interviews at the end of Phase I. The inner city experience in particular was seen as a very critical personal experience. For many, it was a shock, engendering strong reactions of guilt and sudden awareness of the reality of discrimination, more real and personal than was ever communicated in the abstract rhetoric of the classroom. Most felt that the experience forced them to look more seriously at themselves and their responsibilities, and consequently they felt more involved in the rest of their Phase I training. A few interviewees felt that such "shocking" experiences were unnecessary.

Instructors were seen as very knowledgeable about their content areas and perhaps more importantly for the students, they were seen as caring and devoted to the elimination of discrimination. Some students complained that lectures were sometimes too long or that a small group leader didn't handle a specific situation very well. However, in general, the instructors were seen as one of the most positive aspects of DRRI training.

Negative perceptions of Phase I included: long lectures; tight schedules; and lack of time available to pursue some areas further. The criteria of performance at Phase I received the most negative criticism, particularly the academic tests which were seen as ambiguous, too hard, or too easy. Some thought that tests were too academic and did not reflect one's skills and abiliities to work in RR/EO. Tests were seen by some as letting those who didn't "care" or who were really racist get through the training. Others saw tests as too easy, that some students were "spoon-fed" so that no one would flunk, and that low quality academic standards allowed low quality students to get through DRRI.

An independent evaluation of DRRI's academic tests was done in 1975, and its conclusions support students' perceptions (Temp, 1975). DRRI tests were judged to be too easy, but at the same time had some items which were too difficult. Very easy items were seen as "free points" to students and led to a view of tests as trivial. Other items related to unimportant portions of the curriculum and were answered correctly by only a small proportion of students. Together, these characteristics may result in the reported student dissatisfaction.

Table 11 reports the recommendations for changes in content areas for future classes. As in the past, students want more of everything, although they particularly want

Table 11

Phase I: Student Recommendations for Training Changes
(N = 76)

Recommendations for Amount of Time					Training Area
Much More	More	About the Same	Less	Much Less	
40%	33%	26%	1%	--	Individual and group behavior.
32%	38%	29%	1%	--	Racism and ways to combat it.
11%	20%	55%	12%	3%	Black studies.
15%	34%	47%	4%	--	Latino studies.
28%	42%	30%	--	--	American Indian studies.
25%	38%	37%	--	--	Asian American studies.
33%	40%	28%	--	--	White working class.
46%	20%	33%	--	1%	Inner-city experience

more content concerning non-black minority groups. Students want more training on practical aspects of instruction or dealing with commanders. While they assumed more of such training would be provided in Phase II, they still hoped for more during Phase I.

Perceptions of Change

One method of assessing training impact is simply to ask students how much they think they've changed in a variety of ways. The results of this assessment are presented in Table 12. As is apparent, the large majority of students report at least "some" change in each of the areas that were originally hypothesized. The largest amount of change occurred in students' attitudes toward themselves and attitudes about sexism. Less change was reported in students' attitudes toward the Army, although almost one-half the class believed that there had been at least "much" change in their attitudes toward the Army.

Table 12

Phase I: Student Assessments of Change

(N = 76)

Amount of Change					Areas of Change
Very Much	Much	Some	Little	None	
59%	17%	12%	9%	3%	Attitude toward myself.
50%	22%	18%	8%	1%	Attitude toward people of other races.
47%	23%	13%	11%	7%	Attitude about racism.
59%	16%	11%	8%	6%	Attitude about sexism.
28%	21%	26%	16%	9%	Attitude toward the Army.

Information gained from the interviews strongly supports these subjective assessments of change. However, the enthusiasm, fervor, and strength of conviction reported by students are not adequately conveyed by the percentages of students who changed in various ways. Most students reported a major shift in their feelings and values about people from other minority groups. They talked about an increase in tolerance and acceptance of other

kinds of people and a new sense of being able to value the ways that other people behave and think, although it may be quite different from their own. But overshadowing this type of change was a report of major changes in their feelings about themselves, a new sense of self. As some students expressed it:

- "I can feel more";
- "It helped me express my feelings better";
- "I found I had greater capability to respond to needs than I thought";
- "DRRI has given me a high degree of confidence";
- "I feel like a new person."

Such self-proclaimed change is more typical of the results of long-term psychotherapy or highly intense encounter groups or sensitivity training. For a few students, DRRI Phase I training was and will be a critical incident in their life, representing a major change in the way he/she feels about himself. While such accounts may seem sensational or hyperbolic, they are not inconsistent with reports from other DRRI graduates. The small group discussion, the high value placed on openness and honesty of expression, the intense peer pressure, and the focus on a controversial and emotionally volatile subject area are characteristics common to change strategies used to accomplish personal growth. They appear to combine in ways that are powerful in their impact on the way a person feels about himself.

Although fewer students saw much change in their attitudes toward the Army, for some, especially non-white students, the DRRI experience had considerable meaning for their military feelings:

- "In DRRI I saw the commitment of the military to eliminate racism."
- "I feel more patriotic."

Student descriptions of changes associated with Phase I training also deal with their attitudes about sexism. Some students spoke of developing a new awareness of their

own sexist attitudes. Particularly for those who arrived at DRRI with a comfortable sense of their own level of racial awareness, new information and experiences dealing with sexism were especially impactful. Examples of student comments include:

- "I learned I liked being a sexist and I have to deal with that."
- "I felt ashamed of myself—discovered I was guilty."
- "I reconfirmed my own sexism—my oppression of my wife."
- "I need to check myself out—didn't realize it."

Pre- and Post-Training Assessment of Change

DRRI has been administering a battery of instruments at the beginning and end of Phase I since the earliest DRRI classes, and the results have been published in a series of evaluation research reports. The scores from these instruments were furnished to us and the results of pre-post Phase I differences on these instruments are furnished in the appendix. A similar pre- and post-training assessment was done utilizing a different set of instruments which had been used previously on military populations by HSR, and results are reported in the appendix. Since prior research with these instruments and with racial attitudes and perceptions generally has shown strong associations with race and rank (Hiett, *et al.*, 1974), separate analyses were done comparing differences between white and non-white students and officers and enlisted personnel. The small number of non-black minority and female students in the sample made analyses using these groups unfeasible, although hypotheses about different dynamics of change might be made for these groups.

Figure 2 provides a summary of the types of changes in students viewed as a total class and by race and rank. It seems that Phase I training is associated with a number of changes in student racial attitudes, perceptions, knowledge and behaviors, and that the types of changes are to some extent a function of the race of the student. All students left Phase I training with more awareness of racial discrimination, more knowledge of race-related content, and less sexist attitudes. White students expressed less racial prejudice, increased their frequency of contact with people of other races, and learned more about racial issues. There was little change in their basic philosophical values of racial interaction.

Figure 2

Summary of Phase I Pre-Post Training Assessments
(1976-3 Class)

Variable*	Total Class	White Students	Non-White Students	Officers	Enlisted Personnel
Prejudice (Opinion Inventory)	No Change	Less	More	Less	No Change
Information about Blacks (Penick Inventory)	No Change	No Change	No Change	No Change	No Change
Pro-Integration	Less Favorable	No Change	Less Favorable	No Change	No Change
Pro-Separation	More Favorable	No Change	More Favorable	No Change	No Change
Internal Ideological Control	Less	Less	Less	Less	Less
Personal System Control	No Change	No Change	No Change	Lower	No Change
Activity Orientation	More	No Change	No Change	More	No Change
Nominal Index	No Change	Lower	No Change	No Change	No Change
Pro-Feminist Attitude	More	More	More	More	More
Perceptions of Dsicrimination	More	More	More	More	More
Attitude toward Racial Interaction	Less Favorable	No Change	Less Favorable	No Change	Less Favorable
Feelings of Reverse Racism	No Change	No Change	No Change	No Change	No Change
Racial Climate	No Change	No Change	No Change	No Change	Less Favorable
Judgments of Racial Prejudice	More	No Change	More	No Change	No Change
In-Channel Actions	No Change	No Change	No Change	No Change	No Change
Out-Channel Actions	No Change	No Change	No Change	No Change	No Change
Knowledge	More	More	More	More	More
Interracial Behavior	More Frequent	More Frequent	No Change	More Frequent	No Change
Behavioral Intentions	No Change	No Change	No Change	More Intentions	No Change

*See Chapter I and DRRI Evaluation Research Reports for variable definitions.

However, non-whites increased their expression of racial prejudice and their belief in racial separation and decreased their belief in racial integration, a viewpoint inconsistent with Army policy. There was no change in the frequency of interracial behavior and their attitude toward racial interaction decreased. It is important to note that non-whites' frequency of interracial behavior was higher than whites before and after training.

In addition to looking at attitudinal differences, an analysis was done which compared changes in ratings of task importance and the effectiveness of various strategies to eliminate discrimination. In spite of the fact that many students leave Phase I with expectations that they will spend substantial proportions of their job time as race relations instructors, the rating of instructional types of tasks tends to decrease in importance. Ratings of EO-type tasks remain the same, but were highly important before and after Phase I. Ratings for each strategy tend to increase in their perceived effectiveness, and increased command support is rated as most effective both prior to and after Phase I.

Phase II

Assessment of Training

During our field trips and even our first trip to DRRI, a common view communicated by most personnel reflected a negative view of Army Phase II. Apparently, Phase II training had been subject to personnel turnover in its leadership, and changes in Army and RR/EO policy. The version experienced by the 1976-3 class is an interim one and will be modified, so somewhat less emphasis will be placed on an analysis of Phase II. However, it is important to note that most students at the beginning of Phase II were looking forward to Phase II and had bought into the proposition that Phase II would give them the practical tools to use in operationalizing their newly-gained awareness of discrimination. Eighty-two percent stated that they needed Phase II and 88 percent expected it to be at least "satisfactory." Only 16 percent expected Phase II to be less valuable than Phase I.

The ratings of satisfaction with Phase II are also quite high. Eighty-eight percent were satisfied or very satisfied with Phase II. Table 13 illustrates the ratings of training components and recommendations for future courses. Again, most ratings are quite positive.

Table 13

Phase II: Student Ratings of Training Components and Recommendations for Training Changes

(N = 69)

Rating					Training Component
Excellent	Above Average	Average	Below Average	Unsatisfactory	
40%	28%	29%	1%	1%	Presentation of instructors.
46%	33%	16%	3%	1%	Knowledge of instructors.
35%	44%	16%	4%	--	Handouts and other printed instructional materials.
38%	31%	24%	7%	--	Audio visual aids.
36%	42%	19%	1%	1%	Lectures (in general).
41%	28%	29%	1%	--	Small Group Discussion (in general).
33%	28%	32%	3%	4%	Management.
36%	35%	23%	4%	1%	Educational Development.
56%	28%	12%	1%	3%	Race Relations Exercise.

Recommendation for Amount of Time					Area
Much More	More	About the Same	Less	Much Less	
38%	39%	22%	1%	--	Management.
22%	33%	42%	3%	--	Educational Development.
35%	16%	33%	15%	1%	Race Relations Exercise.

although less than Phase I, and students want more time in all areas. The quality of instructors, again, is seen as one of the most positive aspects of training. One comment about these ratings is that these responses and those from our interviews are based primarily on data from lower-ranking enlisted personnel. Officer and higher-ranking enlisted personnel finished Phase II earlier which caused the inadvertent loss of input from these data sources.

Data from interviews suggest that while instructors were seen positively, considerable criticism emerged about their lack of field experience in RR/EO jobs, primarily from students with significant prior on-the-job experiences. As one student put it, "Many instructors seem to be locked into some intellectual ivory tower where prejudice is just some theory to be discussed." Students expressed a need for more practical, less theoretical, content.

Other issues reported included the difficulty in maintaining the high emotional level achieved in Phase I, and the resultant letdown, and resentment about dividing the class by rank. A more common criticism dealt with the mixed quality of students in terms of prior RR/EO experience and intellectual skills. One student said that there are "different needs for people who've never been in the field. We who have been, don't need as much time." Another said that the "wide range of intellectual skills of students makes the level of the class boring and frustrating for some of us." While Phase I reactions were almost universally high, a small but substantial group in Phase II felt that they already knew too much of Phase II. This was particularly the case for those with extensive prior RR/EO experience, an amount of practical experience that exceeded the experience of some of the instructors.

Perceptions of Change

During Phase II most students reported substantially less change in any of the attitudinal or perceptual characteristics that were modified during Phase I. Approximately 20 percent reported no change at all on each of the types of racial or sexual attitudes. Such changes might not be expected to occur from Phase II type training, since it is designed to facilitate the acquisition of skills, not to change "understanding" or "awareness."

Student feedback about Phase II experience was somewhat mixed in their descriptions. For some, it was a positive opportunity to learn practical ways of utilizing their newly acquired personal and racial awareness from skilled instructors, while for some others it was more like an endurance contest in which they felt forced to listen to instructors with less on-the-job experience condescendingly lecture to them about what they have already experienced. Some students left Phase II satisfied with their new armamentarium of techniques and strategies and eager to try them out on their job. Another group departed from Phase II

feeling resentful that the training had been directed toward the lowest common denominator of experience and intellectual capacity of students so that little new learning for them had occurred. It seems that the heterogeneous nature of the students was perhaps most disruptive during Phase II. The intensity of Phase I and its focus on self probably minimized the effects of the differences in students. In fact, such differences were probably well utilized in the discussions of cultures and values in a pluralistic society. However, these differences in skills and prior experience seemed to make classes too easy or too hard for some proportion of students during Phase II. Accelerated training schedules for Phase II and the use of module-specific examinations recognize this potential difficulty; however, rank may not be the variable which clearly identifies the amount of prior RR/EO experience and skill level of the student.

Some students spoke of the letdown in intensity and group cohesiveness during Phase II—"coming back to reality" seemed to be particularly catalyzed by the separation of Phase II students by rank. One way this decrease in personal involvement was expressed was,

> "There was a lack of concern toward the student. He/she is not a computer. They have feelings and need to be given some kind of consideration as to what is asked of them."

Pre- and Post-Training Assessment of Change

A set of attitudinal, perceptual, and knowledge instruments was administered to students at the end of Phase II. There is relatively little difference in any of the attitudinal, knowledge, or perceptual areas, which is consistent with student subjective reports of a smaller amount of change. Since Phase II emphasizes skills change and not attitude change, such results would be expected. What small changes do occur tend to be in the opposite direction as compared to Phase I. Students tend to decrease their perceptions of discrimination against non-whites and decrease their frequency of interracial contact, although they increase their behavioral intentions. Knowledge instruments focused on areas more likely dealt with in Phase I, so that the lack of significant increases in knowledge is not surprising.

With respect to differences in task importance and strategy effectiveness ratings associated with Phase II, ratings of race relations instructional tasks tend to increase in importance, where EO-type tasks are still seen as slightly more important. Administrative and

supervisory duties become seen as more important, which is consistent with Phase II intent. Increased command support is perceived before and after Phase II as the most effective strategy to eliminate discrimination. Differences in self-performance ratings are in the desired directions so that students rate themselves as more effective after Phase II training.

Control Group Analyses

The attribution of causality for any changes associated with DRRI training requires a comparison with a similar group of students who did not undergo a training experience. Without such an analysis, the statement that training *causes* the results that have been presented cannot be made. The differences might be accounted for by some other set of dynamics. A group of 16 personnel who were initially like the group of arriving 1976-3 students and had no DRRI training were surveyed over a three-month interval. While the small size of this control group limits our confidence, the data more strongly support the changes associated with DRRI training.

Generally, the personnel in the control group, who would be students of the 1976-5 DRRI class, had attitudinal and perceptual characteristics quite similar to the 1976-3 class students when they arrived at DRRI. On the post-test, data from the control group revealed few statistically significant changes in attitude, perceptions, knowledge, or behavior. Therefore, the changes in students that have been described are more likely the result of DRRI training.

DRRI Training Objectives

The student ratings of DRRI's effectiveness in accomplishing its objectives are presented in Table 14, assessed after Phase I and after Phase II. Generally, ratings are quite high at both times. Comparisons are not useful, since ratings at the end of Phase II do not include higher ranking personnel. However, it is clear that those objectives that deal with knowledge of minority group history, behavioral science concepts, and minority group experience are to a greater extent accomplished than those objectives dealing with skills and practical application of such knowledge. Also, there may be a "halo effect" in the positive ratings of Phase I for skill-related objectives, since skill-related training content is covered primarily in Phase II. In a sense, it is common for those who complete any type of

Table 14
Student Ratings of DRRI Training Objectives

Ratings – End of Phase I (N=76)					Ratings – End of Phase II (N=69)					
Very Effective	Effective	Neither Effective Nor Ineffective	Ineffective	Very Ineffective	Very Effective	Effective	Neither Effective Nor Ineffective	Ineffective	Very Ineffective	Training Objective
54%	36%	9%	1%	--	59%	34%	5%	1%	--	A knowledge of minority group history and the contributions of minority groups to the development of our nation and the Armed Forces.
60%	33%	4%	3%	--	58%	38%	3%	1%	--	A knowledge of selected psychological, social and cultural factors relating to race relations to increase their understanding of the social and behavioral dynamics related to intergroup tensions and conflicts.
64%	28%	8%	--	--	57%	41%	1%	1%	--	Racial and ethnic group experiences in various communities to increase their understanding of minority group culture and life styles.
37%	38%	18%	4%	3%	31%	39%	21%	8%	1%	The opportunity to develop teaching techniques and group skills which will prepare them to lead discussion groups.
50%	34%	13%	1%	1%	27%	35%	25%	9%	4%	The opportunity to become aware of current DOD, Service, and command equal opportunity and treatment policies and directives, and their relationship to the need for maintaining good order and discipline.
44%	37%	13%	4%	1%	35%	41%	12%	7%	5%	The capability and judgment to work with their commanding officers in determining the specific needs for a race relations group discussion program, and how best to employ the Defense Race Relations Institute resources within that command.

educationally oriented training to be less than secure about their ability to *do* what they were trained for. However, the call for more skills training with practical application potential has been a part of each prior evaluation of DRRI and has been mentioned by virtually every data source in our study. As the job of the graduate changes, these types of skills can only increase in importance.

Perceptions of Consequences of DRRI Training and RR/EO Involvement

The student perceptions of the military consequences of their DRRI training and RR/EO involvement were assessed at the beginning of Phase I, the beginning of Phase II, and the end of Phase II. The results of these assessments are reported in Table 15. Most students

Table 15

Perceptions of Consequences of DRRI Experience and RR/EO Involvement

	Pre-Phase I				Post-Phase I				Post Phase II			
	Positive	Neither Positive Nor Negative	Negative	Mean* Value	Positive	Neither Positive Nor Negative	Negative	Mean* Value	Positive	Neither Positive Nor Negative	Negative	Mean* Value
DRRI Experience and Career Intention	30%	69%	1%	2.52	25%	59%	16%	2.83	28%	68%	4%	2.65
DRRI Attendance and Effect on Military Career	76%	16%	8%	1.88	64%	20%	16%	2.27	50%	26%	23%	2.43
DRRI Attendance and Effect on Attitude toward the Military	51%	43%	6%	2.41	44%	45%	12%	2.55	48%	37%	15%	2.51
RR/EO Involvement and Effect on Military Career	68%	16%	16%	2.15	58%	23%	20%	2.39	46%	28%	26%	2.60

*1 = Very Positive, 5 = Very Negative

begin DRRI with a positive set of expectations about the perceived consequences of DRRI and RR/EO experiences. The perceptions of consequences across the four types of potential effects are positively correlated, indicating that students who perceive negative consequences for their career also tend to perceive negative consequences on their career intention and military attitude. Race, rank, and level of education are related to these perceptions so that whites, higher ranking personnel, and those with more education tend to have more negative perceptions of consequences. At the end of Phase I, perceptions of consequences tend to become more negative, particularly for the perceived effects of DRRI on career intention and on their military career. Ratings at the end of Phase II do not consistently increase or decrease from the end of Phase I, although Phase II ratings do not include the input of higher ranking personnel, who have more negative perceptions.

Data from DRRI faculty who responded to the survey about job satisfaction and other job attitudes do seem relevant, for it confirms student perceptions of the reality-based difficulties associated with RR/EO work:

- 22 percent report being dissatisfied with their jobs;
- 47 percent report their non-DRRI colleagues feel negative about their duty at DRRI;
- 21 percent responded that their wife/husband feels negative about their job;
- 29 percent state that their DRRI duty has *decreased* their intention to stay in the military;
- 53 percent believe that DRRI or RR/EO involvement will have a bad effect on their career.

The perceptions of the effects of DRRI and RR/EO career involvement on one's military career require direct attention. The data from all respondents suggest that rumors of negative consequences are much more negative than a systematic assessment of graduates' perceptions suggests. The majority of graduates perceive positive or neutral effects of their DRRI and RR/EO experiences. However, there is a small but substantial minority of

graduates who do perceive a negative effect. As one might expect, they tend to be disproportionately made up by white officers. One student in the 1976-3 class, when asked to describe his job expectations remarked, "It will be challenging for me, but it will probably hurt the career of a white officer." Rather than denying or avoiding this issue, it seems much wiser to directly and clearly acknowledge this finding and begin to investigate its determinants.

Faculty/Staff Perceptions of Training

Seventy-eight percent of the Phase I faculty survey respondents rated Phase I as satisfactory or very satisfactory. Faculty also saw students making significant changes in various areas, although they saw less change in attitude about sexism than students perceived themselves. Training components were all highly rated, and like students, the inner city experience and the quality of instructors were the most positive training components. Similar to students, Phase I faculty wanted more time spent in all content areas, particularly non-black minority groups and practical skills application.

Army Phase II faculty survey respondents were slightly less satisfied with Phase II, analogous to student results. Sixty-seven percent rated Phase II as satisfactory or very satisfactory. Training components were seen positively, although less so than Phase I. Again, instructor quality was most highly rated and audiovisual aids were least highly rated. Recommendations for future courses in terms of content areas were less insistent for more of everything. Phase II staff strongly recommended more training in management but were mixed about "educational development." There were more faculty members who requested a decrease in time devoted to "race relations exercise" than were suggesting an increase.

Faculty members were asked to indicate the most positive and negative aspects of training at DRRI and the results were similar to student responses. Positive aspects were changes related to self and changes in student awareness of racism. Negative comments focused on the selection and testing procedures used at DRRI. A few faculty were skeptical of the intensity of peer pressure in Phase I which, in their view, ultimately led to "white students feeling guilty." In this vein, it's interesting to note that the 1976-3 students were asked to

indicate their frequency of interracial contact before entering the Army. Their assessment of pre-Army interracial contact increased substantially during Phase I, particularly for white students, suggesting the pressure to deny prior lack of interracial contact. Also, whites increased interracial behavior during Phase I and non-whites did not, although non-whites had more frequent interracial contact before and after training. Faculty members also suggested that more emphasis be placed on studying "the racist and racist society" rather than studying minorities and females. A few commented on the overemphasis on racism as being exclusively black-white, and recommended more attention be given to program evaluation and research.

Most faculty members surveyed rated DRRI as effectively accomplishing its objectives, although as with students, objectives not dealing with knowledge or understanding were less highly rated. Faculty were also asked to rate the effectiveness of DRRI in the performance of its mission. While DRRI's ability to train race relations instructors was perceived as highly effective, mission performance in other areas was seen quite differently. More faculty members rated DRRI as ineffective than effective for these missions:

- Conduct research;
- Perform evaluation of program effectiveness;
- Disseminate educational guidelines and materials for utilization throughout the Armed Forces.

Army DRRI Graduate Perceptions of DRRI Training

In Table 16, the percent of graduates from the followup survey who are satisfied with DRRI training in reference to their perceived ability to accomplish specific types of tasks are presented. The results are quite consistent with feedback from students. Graduates report very high levels of satisfaction from their DRRI training in preparing them to accomplish race relations instructional tasks, but seem less satisfied with their training to accomplish EO tasks and administrative and supervisory tasks. Table 16a presents graduate estimates of satisfaction with training for each phase of training. Ratings of Phase I are substantially higher than Phase II, and overall ratings of DRRI are dramatically high.

Table 16

Satisfaction with DRRI Training by Type of Task

Type of Task	Very Satisfactory or Satisfactory	Neither Satisfactory Nor Unsatisfactory	Very Unsatisfactory or Unsatisfactory	Mean Value (1 = Very Dissatisfied) (5 = Very Satisfied)
Preparation of materials, lesson plans, etc., for race relations instruction.	91%	6%	3%	4.42
Conducting race relations instruction for unit personnel (e.g., RAP)	87%	10%	3%	4.37
Assisting chain of command personnel in conducting race relations instruction for unit personnel	79%	14%	7%	4.13
Conducting training courses for personnel who work or will work in RR/EO matters (e.g., DLC)	76%	17%	7%	4.12
Counseling individuals about RR/EO matters	76%	12%	12%	4.05
Investigating individual RR/EO complaints.	67%	16%	17%	3.83
Collecting and reporting information about the racial climate on the installation.	69%	19%	11%	3.93
Administrative and supervisory duties.	58%	25%	16%	3.65

Table 16a

Satisfaction with DRRI Training

Phase of Training	Very Satisfactory or Satisfactory	Neither Satisfactory Nor Unsatisfactory	Very Unsatisfactory or Unsatisfactory	Mean Value (1 = Very Dissatisfied) (5 = Very Satisfied)
Phase I	93%	5%	2%	4.61
Phase II	73%	14%	13%	3.80
Overall	94%	4%	2%	4.54

Data from the interviews of graduates in the field was somewhat similar, although it was less positive. Most graduates at all posts felt that DRRI training was necessary for them to be in the RR/EO field. Eighty-nine percent felt that a DRRI-trained instructor would be more effective than a non-DRRI trained person as an instructor. However, for RR/EO staff work, only 59 percent felt that a DRRI graduate would be more effective. With respect to the phases at DRRI, 99 percent felt that Phase I had been satisfactory or very satisfactory in preparing them for their job. They felt the experience in Miami, the emphasis on learning about one's self, and the quality of the instructors were the highlights of Phase I. On the other hand, Phase II was seen as satisfactory by only 64 percent of the graduates. The REX and other management/administrative exercises were perceived as the best aspects of Phase II. However, most comments focused on the poor quality of instructors and general disorganization as the major characteristics of Phase II.

Most graduates felt they were being trained at DRRI to be an instructor or educator, and some saw their role more broadly as a change agent, to get people together. Most also felt that the training made them better military leaders and rejected the "activism" theory as either pertaining to the past or an expression of resistance from a slow moving Army. More training was suggested by many in terms of refresher courses and more at DRRI about management/administration, and dealing with frustration on the job. Both areas were seen as areas where they were not prepared as well and needed some "how to get things done" training.

In the group interviews with DRRI graduates held at each of the installations, a general discussion of their experience at DRRI brought out many of the same issues that were raised by students.

- The standards for graduation were seen by some as too easy so that incompetent graduates were allowed to go to the field and lower the reputation of DRRI and RR/EO. On the other hand, others felt that academic criteria were largely irrelevant and that more effort should be devoted to training personnel who truly "*care*."

- The request for more practical training was consistent and strong. It tended to focus on the need for more skills in dealing with command and on the need for more contact with DRRI and others who work in the field. In addition to expressing the need for

more contemporary lesson plans and other educational materials, graduates seemed to desire some contact with others who understand their problems in order to counteract their feelings of isolation and frustration.

- Some graduates commented on the "black" focus at DRRI and requested more training and materials about non-black minority groups.

Command Personnel Perceptions of DRRI Training

At each installation, commanders at the battalion and brigade levels were personally interviewed about a number of issues concerning DRRI. Generally, reactions to DRRI were quite general and non-specific, and little evidence for a militant or activist perception of DRRI was found. The overwhelming majority had heard mainly positive things about DRRI training. Only two of the commanders had heard negative things about DRRI. The comments of commanders who had positive things to say about the school generally centered around their positive assessment of the ability of DRRI graduates.

The commanders were about evenly divided as to whether DRRI is particularly important to the maintenance of a combat-ready Army. Those who felt that DRRI was very important did so generally because they felt DRRI "helps certain internal problems." Several commanders expressed the opinion that DRRI may have been important several years ago when there were racial problems in the Army, but not now since there are no longer "racial incidents." Only two of the commanders interviewed, both at the same installation, expressed the opinion that DRRI graduates are less able to perform in a military organization, and might have "subversive effects on the chain of command." The remaining commanders were about evenly divided between those who felt DRRI did a good job in training its graduates, and those who had no opinion on the issue.

Company commanders were also interviewed about the RR/EO program and DRRI, but little information about DRRI could be obtained. Seventeen percent had never heard of DRRI, 54 percent had heard positive things about DRRI, and 27 percent had heard neutral things about DRRI. Only two percent had a negative view of DRRI, an opinion usually

associated with an unfavorable encounter with a graduate. The few company commanders who commented on the performance of graduates were positive in their assessments. Only a few had heard any information about any "radical" reputation of DRRI. Suggestions for qualities of DRRI graduates or selection standards for DRRI were general and ambiguous, encompassing the gamut of "good military attributes."

General Army Perceptions of DRRI Training

An indirect indicator of the value of DRRI training is simply the number of Army personnel who are aware of DRRI's existence and their overall image about DRRI. In a written survey administered to about 4,000 Army personnel of all ranks, as another part of the study of the RR/EO program in the Army, respondents were asked to indicate what they knew about DRRI.

> The Defense Race Relations Institute (DRRI) at Patrick Air Force Base (Florida) is an MOS-granting school for RR/EO instructors and staff personnel. What, if anything, have you heard about DRRI?
>
> 72% Never heard of it before.
>
> 18% Have heard mostly good things about it.
>
> 2% Have heard mostly bad things about it.
>
> 7% Have heard as many bad things as good things.

Almost three-fourths of the personnel had never heard of DRRI. In 1974, a similar question appeared on a survey of Army personnel. At that time, 27 percent of white personnel and 29 percent of black personnel knew about DRRI, a figure nearly the same as the results of 1976 (Brown and Nordlie, 1975). Of those who knew about DRRI, many more had heard good things as opposed to bad or neutral things about DRRI. A higher proportion of blacks had heard of DRRI than whites or non-black minorities, and more blacks had heard favorable things about DRRI. Rank tended to be positively associated with awareness and quality of DRRI. Higher ranking NCO's and officers were much more likely to have heard of DRRI and to have heard positive things.

Non-DRRI Trained RR/EO Personnel Perceptions of DRRI Training

All of the full-time non-DRRI trained RR/EO staff interviewed, except two or three from one installation, expressed positive perceptions of the value of the DRRI training experience. A frequent response was that it should be mandatory for everyone working in RR/EO. Reasons given included that graduates are better qualified and can deal "psychologically" with people better.

The opinions of DLC graduates on the desirability and/or necessity of DRRI training were generally divided both across and within posts. A bit more than one-half felt that DRRI training was appropriate for people in their positions. DLC graduates noted that a DRRI-trained person tended to have more background information, more experience, and could handle problems better. A commonly expressed theme among DLC graduates was that if they went to DRRI, then they could "psychologize those racists better." Most of those interviewed said that they would like to attend DRRI if they were given the chance. The most important reason given was generally that it would give them more knowledge and experience and enable them to do a better job. Those who did not want to go to DRRI said that they liked their present job, or were planning to get out of the race relations field.

Student Selection

The student selection process at DRRI has been a controversial one from a variety of perspectives. The high priority on student motivation as *the* selection criterion has a recurrent theme in our field work and has received comment in other studies. For example, a recent report by the General Accounting Office concludes that "trainers seem to be selected solely on the basis of interest in the issue" (Comptroller General, 1976). Another recent study indicates that commanders might select minority soldiers for DRRI, assuming that they have a "built-in" concern, or that the commanders might choose someone more expendable, someone he can afford to lose, since RR/EO is not that important (MacDowell, 1976). An extreme version of that theme occurs when a commander selects personnel whom he perceives are misfits, whom he wishes he could lose.

Students in the 1976-3 class were aware of the selection issue and many commented on the mixed caliber of personnel in the class and the failure to develop any quality control mechanism to weed out less competent personnel. Interviews with personnel in other Army agencies often included a reference to the "low failure rate" at DRRI implying that graduation criteria are not sufficiently stringent. Some faculty and staff at DRRI echoed this criticism in our preliminary set of interviews at the start of this study. Responses to a later survey were consonant in that 68 percent *disagreed* that "Generally students sent to DRRI are of high quality," and 63 percent agreed that "Standards for graduation at DRRI are too easy." However, the process for changing selection criteria by upgrading intelligence criteria, for example, is not one where there is agreement. About 42 percent of the faculty agreed and about 42 percent disagreed that "Intelligence and/or aptitude-based selection criteria should be raised for DRRI students, even if that means fewer minority students."

Selection Criteria

Each group of respondents in this study was asked about their view of the type of personnel who should be selected to attend DRRI. Suggestions for selection standards were usually somewhat vague and non-specific. Most respondents thought that DRRI students should be "good soldiers" and be "highly motivated."

DRRI Graduates

Graduate suggestions for selection standards for DRRI were generally that prospective DRRI students should be: volunteers; sincere/committed/motivated; and have an ability to communicate/be articulate. Some felt academic qualifications, e.g., some college, were important, whereas others saw such qualities as irrelevant. Most did *not* see a relationship between performance at DRRI which they felt emphasizes academic aspects, and performance in the field. Graduates believe that "knowers are not always doers."

RR/EO Personnel

Across installations, a number of characteristics were mentioned by non-DRRI trained, RR/EO personnel as selection criteria for DRRI attendance. Most frequently

mentioned was that the individual should volunteer to attend. He should be someone who really wants to work in the race relations program, and wants to work with people. He should also be sensitive and a self-starter, and should have a background of experience with different types of people. At least three years of college and a previous enlistment were also noted as desirable. The qualities most frequently used to describe the ideal DRRI student included such general characteristics as open-minded, willing to learn, dedicated, somebody who likes to deal with people, talkative, ready to listen, objective, honest, and "somebody who can get along with anyone."

Army Commanders

There was little valuable input by commanders as to what skills DRRI graduates should have. Most frequently mentioned was that they should have an understanding of different racial and ethnic backgrounds, and that a graduate should be a good counselor, a good listener, and a skilled instructor. Less frequently mentioned characteristics included common sense, general leadership skills, being a good mediator, and being articulate.

A wide variety of qualities were mentioned by the commanders as desirable for people they would send to DRRI. Those qualities which were mentioned most frequently included that the individual should be a volunteer, i.e., want to go; should be mature; have substantial Army experience; be able to communicate with people; and have some background in the social sciences. Some less frequently mentioned qualities were that he should be a good listener and be interested in people; have a military attitude; and be an E5 or E6 or above. Two commanders felt that he should not be from a minority group, while one felt that he should. Good appearance, intelligence, a self-starter, not a radical or "into" drugs, and having had a successful command were also mentioned. The lack of specific suggestions beyond normal qualities for a good soldier tends to support the overall low level of command attention for RR/EO programs.

The ultimate decision about selection criteria requires information about job performance, data that can document the characteristics of personnel who are effective in their job. Until such data are available, analyses of the kinds of students who attend DRRI seem useful.

Characteristics of Army 1976-3 DRRI Training Class

Demographic Background

An analysis of the characteristics of Army students who were selected to attend DRRI has implications on the overall selection process. Table 17 presents the demographic data for Army personnel of the 1976-3 class. Generally, the 1976-3 class tends to be somewhat younger and lower ranked than prior classes, and educational and racial breakdowns tend to be quite similar to previous classes. While there are some differences between the 1976-3 class and other DRRI classes, they do not suggest that the 1976-3 class is sufficiently deviant to be unrepresentative of DRRI classes in general.

Table 17

Demographic Characteristics of the Army 1976-3 Class

Variable		1976-3 Army Only (Percent)
Age	23 or less	8
	24 - 29	38
	30 - 39	42
	40 or more	12
Rank	E6 or below	53
	E7 - E9	21
	O1 - O3	19
	O4 and higher	7
Education	High School or less	41
	Some College	26
	B.A.	28
	Graduate degree	5
Race	White	41
	Black	41
	Latino	8
	Others	10

There are some characteristics of the students which do seem important in terms of selection processes, *especially with respect to the utilization of graduates in the field.* In examining the background of students there is a small, yet substantial, group of young, inexperienced students:

- 7 percent are age 23 or less;
- 10 percent are E3 or E4;
- 4 percent are O1;
- 18 percent have three years or less of active duty service.

It appears that these are a group of personnel with somewhat meager experience in dealing with the military system. As long as the role of graduates was to instruct, the lack of system experience may not have been a limitation. However, as consultant and advisory roles tend to characterize the utilization of graduates, experience with the system becomes more and more critical. Low levels of experience do not seem to be compatible with consultant roles which emphasize "working within the system" types of skills.

The Army is concerned about selection criteria for Army personnel at DRRI and has instituted new selection standards. In order to attend DRRI at the present time, enlisted personnel must be at E5 and be serving on a second or subsequent enlistment. Officers must at least be at the O2 grade, have had a minimum of 12 months of leadership experience, and have one year of service remaining after completion of DRRI (Department of the Army, DAPE-MRO, 1976). However, it is still not clear that these are the most appropriate standards, because standards must be based upon job performance.

Motivation

All groups of respondents throughout this study, including students themselves, have insisted that personnel must be sincerely motivated and committed to eliminating discrimination as a criterion for attendance at DRRI. In this context, the racial history of students becomes relevant in terms of assessing the level of commitment prior to DRRI and describing the types of personnel who choose to attend DRRI. About one-half the class came from segregated neighborhoods in which people were "all" or "almost all of your own race." Forty-five percent had "little" or "almost none" levels of interest and effort in improving race relations prior to entering the Army, and 82 percent had never been a member

of an organization concerned with race relations or equal opportunity. It seems that for many students, interest and motivation in the RR/EO area is a relatively recent phenomenon. Also for some, motivation and interest may not be as high as expected. Eleven percent of the students stated that they did not volunteer to attend DRRI, and 15 percent said that they felt "much" or "very much" pressure from their commander or supervisor to attend DRRI.

Students were asked to rate the importance of a number of specific reasons for attending DRRI. The elimination of racism, and to some extent sexism, was seen by most students as the major reason for coming to DRRI. Forty-one percent rated "to get into RR/EO duty" as a "very important" reason and seven percent felt similarly about "to get out of your last duty or MOS." Since in the Army, attendance at DRRI is a prerequisite for an RR/EO MOS, many of those who currently work in RR/EO capacities come to DRRI to legitimize their status, as well as to enhance their skills; however, an unintended paradox may occur. Personnel, who had installation Discussion Leaders Course training, usually provided by DRRI graduates, and provided unit race relations instruction, look to DRRI to increase their awareness and skill as an instructor. Ironically, after DRRI training to become instructors, these same personnel may return to their installations to positions where there is *less* opportunity to serve in an instructor role than in the positions they previously held!

There does appear to be a very small group who choose an RR/EO career and DRRI to avoid more physically demanding career specialties. One student in our sample suggested that RR/EO seemed like a more quiet place to finish his career now that his physical prowess has diminished and his 20 years are almost over. The location of DRRI and especially the granting of college credit for DRRI training may also serve as incentives to attend DRRI; the latter incentive being endorsed as "important" or "very important" by 49 percent of the students. Thus, there appear to be a heterogeneous set of motivations to attend DRRI.

RR/EO Experience

The heterogeneous nature of the students who attend DRRI is also reflected in the prior experiences of students with RR/EO tasks and activities. Sixty-three percent had been full-time RR/EO staff members just prior to DRRI, as compared to 27 percent who had no RR/EO duties just before DRRI. Thirty-one percent had never had any other training courses dealing with RR/EO, and 24 percent had no prior training as an instructor. Fifty-one percent had been through a Discussion Leaders Course, and 60 percent had previously served as an instructor in a course dealing with minority group issues or RR/EO. Thus, students enter DRRI with a widely divergent set of prior relevant experiences. Some enter DRRI already serving in an instructor role with the expectation that DRRI will provide them new and additional instructional skills. Others arrive at DRRI with no prior experience in either instruction or RR/EO. The probability is quite low that one unitary training program can meet the sets of training needs represented by students with very different levels of job experience. This is particularly the case in the Army for those personnel who return to DRRI for Phase II, after having completed Phase I sometime in the past and having accumulated substantial periods of on-the-job experience. While Phase II is designed to be flexible to different learning needs, acceleration of the training is based primarily on rank, rather than on prior RR/EO experience. The importance of different sets of training needs and different sets of prior experience is further enhanced by the fact that many of the students have substantially more field experience than some of the faculty. Forty-two percent of these faculty responding to our Faculty/Staff Survey had no prior experience in the field with RR/EO duties.

Expectations about DRRI

The training program literature has pointed out that the expectations of trainees are often critical in determining the quality of a trainee's experience. Trainees who are provided with adequate prior information, expect some change, and expect to be satisfied with the training are more likely to be satisfied and positively impacted by the training. Students coming to DRRI did expect to be satisfied with training, for 99 percent expected

Phase I and 92 percent expected Phase II to be "satisfactory" or "very satisfactory." With respect to expectations for change, the level of expected change is high with most students expecting at least "some" change in their attitudes about racism, sexism, self, and people of other races. There is less expectation for change in "attitude toward the Army," although still only 14 percent expected no change in this area. When asked about their expectations about the effect of DRRI on career intention or their career itself, most students reported having a positive set of expectations. Only 1 percent felt that DRRI would decrease their career intention, and only 8 percent felt DRRI would have a bad effect on their career. However, 16 percent felt that RR/EO work would have a bad effect on their career, a figure consistent with the stigma that has been noted in prior work. Such perceptions, regardless of their actual validity, serve to discourage entry into the RR/EO field.

Respondents in our smaller sample of personnel who were interviewed at the beginning of Phase I reinforced these perceptions of the stigma associated with RR/EO involvement. One person was specifically advised by his commander not to attend DRRI because "RR/EO would hurt your military career." Four interviewees had experienced some pressure from their friends and colleagues *not* to attend DRRI because it would not be good for their career. Some students felt that RR/EO personnel were often viewed as "legal militants," "hot-heads," or "troublemakers" and so just working in that field might hurt them.

In the main, students arrive with very positive feelings and expectations about DRRI, although other data suggest ways to further enhance expectations. When asked how satisfied students were with advance information about DRRI, 63 percent of the students felt "satisfied" or "very satisfied," and 13 percent were "dissatisfied" or "very dissatisfied." About 35 percent said they received no information from DRRI, and 6 percent said they learned nothing about DRRI from their commanding officer. Most students learned about DRRI from other DRRI graduates, and for most (93 percent) this information was positive. Therefore, it would seem useful to look more closely at how prospective students learn about DRRI. The lack of interagency coordination that prevents DRRI from knowing

exactly who will be attending DRRI hampers its ability to provide all students with satisfactory advance information. The apparent lack of information about DRRI among commanders also deserves attention, for the lack of command support for RR/EO programs is perhaps the fundamental problem for DRRI students when they return to their jobs. Army regulations state that all applicants for DRRI will have been interviewed by a field grade officer in the applicant's chain of command. About 18 percent stated that they did *not* have any interview at all at their installation, and 4 percent stated that their interview was with lower ranking personnel. Fourteen percent stated that they felt "much" or "very much" pressure to attend, usually from their commander.

Racial Attitudes, Perceptions, and Knowledge

As compared to large Army cross-sectional samples, students arriving at DRRI prior to training had:

- much greater awareness of and more perceptions of discrimination against non-whites;
- much more favorable attitudes toward racial interaction;
- lower levels of feelings and perceptions that whites are threatened by non-whites and that non-whites are treated more favorably than whites;

Students had vastly more knowledge about a variety of race-related issues, particularly about Army RR/EO regulations and policies. On questions dealing with behavioral science and discrimination concepts and terminology, 93 percent of the students correctly identified a "stereotype" as compared to 50 to 60 percent of the general Army population. Similarly, only about 15 percent of the general Army sample knew what institutional discrimination meant, as opposed to about 50 percent of the arriving DRRI Army students. Thus, DRRI students are quite different from the Army at large, in terms of their racial perceptions, attitudes, and knowledge.

Student Characteristics and DRRI Performance

An analysis was done to assess the relationship between performance while a student at DRRI, assessed in different ways, and variables that describe various characteristics of students as they entered DRRI (see the appendix). It was found that variables that predict one of the DRRI performance criteria do not necessarily predict another, and performance criteria themselves are not closely related. Performance criteria were:

- Graduation;
- Peer Rating;
- Total Academic Test Score;
- Self-Rating

Correlations among performance criteria indicate that graduation is positively related to peer rating and total test score. As would be expected, those students who graduated had higher peer ratings and test scores and are more closely associated with self-rating. Self-rating is unrelated to test scores. Thus, a student's own rating of his performance is associated with the rating of his peers. But neither of these ways of assessing quality seems to be related to academic performance, which is the most important criterion related to graduation. Ultimately, the question of which performance criterion is most important rests with its relationship with job performance.

The demographic variable most closely related to DRRI performance is level of education. Those students with higher levels of education tend to do better at DRRI, particularly in terms of academic performance. Other measures of intelligence, such as GT and CL subscales from the AGCT instrument, and mental category from the AFQT, also predict academic performance. Education also predicts self-ratings, but is not related to peer ratings at a statistically significant level. Rank is related to performance, but is also highly related to education. EERWA and PMOSE, both indications of military performance, are basically unrelated to performance. Males are rated higher by themselves and their peers, and non-whites rate themselves higher but do less well on academic tests than whites. Non-whites also tend to have less education.

Prior RR/EO experience has a modest relationship with performance. Those who had previously been race relations instructors rated themselves better and tended to be seen more favorably by their peers. Those with interest in civil rights issues prior to the Army did better academically. Motivation for attendance at DRRI predicted academic performance, particularly in terms of the importance of getting into RR/EO duty. Those who did *not* volunteer tended to do better academically, and had more education.

In terms of expectations about DRRI, the level of expected change in various areas tended to predict performance, except self-ratings. However, the direction of this relationship is opposite from the hypothesis. Those students who expected less change tended to do better! One interpretation of this finding might be that students who already felt that they had satisfactory levels of knowledge, awareness, and ability in these areas also expected little change as a result of DRRI training. Generally, those who had less expectations for change also tended to have higher levels of education and more prior knowledge about race-related issues, both of which predict higher performance. Also those with *less* positive expectations about the effect of DRRI experience on their career intention, their career itself, and their attitude toward the military also tend to do better at DRRI. Again, these students tend to be better educated, higher ranked, and had more prior race relations knowledge. Thus, it would seem that the most important factor in these associations is level of education.

Looking at measures of racial attitudes, perceptions, knowledge and behavior, few patterns emerge. The Nominal Index, which had predicted peer ratings in prior classes, is unrelated to performance at DRRI. Students with more pro-feminist attitudes and students with more prior knowledge about race relations content did better at DRRI. As before, these students also tended to have higher levels of education.

A more sophisticated statistical analysis was done to see the type of student who did better at DRRI. The variables with the strongest associations with each of the performance criteria were entered into a stepwise multiple regression procedure to identify those student characteristics that are related to performance at DRRI. The various sets of predictor variables for each criterion are shown in the appendix.

The results show that different sets of variables predict each of the different DRRI performance criteria. There are, however, a few variables which appear to be able to predict more than one performance variable;

- Students who felt "to get into RR/EO duty" was a less important reason for coming to DRRI tended to do better on all performance standards.

- Level of education predicts each performance criterion, except peer rating.

- Sex is negatively associated with peer- and self-rating, indicating that the performance of females is perceived less highly.

- Race is only related to self-ratings. Non-whites rate themselves more highly.

- Expectations for change of some type predicts each performance criterion. Students with *less* expectation for change tend to do better at DRRI.

- In terms of racial attitudinal/perceptual scores, those students with more pro-feminist attitudes and higher perceptions of the racial climate and Army commitment to RR/EO are more highly regarded by their peers. Students who, to a *lesser* extent, endorse integration do better on academic tests, whereas students who are *more* in favor of integration and *less* in favor of separation are *more* likely to graduate.

It seems clear, then, that there are a few student characteristics that tend to be associated with a number of ways to assess DRRI performance, but that each performance criterion has a somewhat different set of predictors. It is important to point out that the motivation to eliminate racism was not the most important variable in predicting DRRI performance, in spite of the feedback from most every set of respondents in this study that such motivation and commitment was *the* most important characteristic for student selection. In fact, those who did *not* volunteer to come to DRRI tended to perform better. Also, although in prior classes the Nominal Index had been able to predict peer ratings, in the 1976-3 class there was not a significant relationship between DRRI performance and the Nominal Index.

A similar stepwise multiple regression analysis was run between student characteristics and student performance for non-whites and whites separately. The results demonstrated that not only are different sets of student characteristics related to each separate indicator of performance, but that different sets of characteristics also tend to predict performance for non-whites as compared to whites.

- Pro-feminist attitude is the most strongly associated predictor of performance for non-whites, but is not related to performance for whites.

- Level of education is more strongly related to performance for whites, whereas knowledge of race-related content is more strongly predictive of performance for non-whites.

- Attitudes about integration/separation are more highly related to performance for whites than for non-whites.

These regression analyses, to indicate the type of student who does better at DRRI, should be done on larger samples of students. Regression equations are quite susceptible to shrinkage and modification when cross-validated on different populations. Our analyses are based on only one class, but do confirm, the confusion expressed by faculty and students about how to validly assess DRRI performance. We recommend regression analyses between student characteristics and performance be performed for a number of classes and that evidence reflecting *performance on the job* be added.

In this study, one data collection component yielded information on graduate performance in the field. Peer ratings and the ratings of the highest ranking RR/EO officer at each installation were collected on 97 graduates at nine locations, and furnished to DRRI. We were given a draft of a report done by DRRI which found *no relationship* between field performance and performance at DRRI, Phase I. Students who did well at DRRI did not necessarily do well on the job. Thus, not only are different performance criteria at DRRI unrelated, but they may also be unrelated to performance in the field.

Summary

DRRI training was assessed positively by all groups of respondents in this study. Phase I training was highly regarded as a powerful experience leading to changes in a graduate's awareness of discrimination and feelings about self. The inner-city experience and the quality of instructors were seen as the most positive training components of Phase I. While Phase II training was seen as satisfactory, training assessment tended to be less positive, especially from graduates who had substantial on-the-job experience. DRRI was consistently seen as effective in training areas related to race relations instruction and awareness and understanding, but was perceived as less effective in training related to the accomplishment of other RR/EO tasks and in providing more practical, "how to do it" skills. Despite decreasing instructional responsibilities for Army DRRI graduates in the field, students and faculty still expect trainees to spend much of their job time providing race relations instruction.

Perceptions of potential training problem areas were consistent among groups of respondents and consistent with the results of prior analytical studies. Potential issues included:

- the level of selection and graduation standards;
- disagreement about how to assess performance at DRRI;
- academic tests are too easy/too hard;
- more non-black minority group training content;
- more practical skills training and less theoretical content;
- more contact with DRRI and other colleagues, e.g., refresher courses;
- more educational material/curricula for graduates;
- perceived negative consequences from DRRI and RR/EO involvement;
- need for data on field/job performance.

A close examination of the selection process at DRRI revealed that different student characteristics were related to each separate indicator of performance at DRRI. While most groups of respondents believed that motivation and commitment were the most important factors for selection to DRRI, analyses showed that level of education was the best predictor of DRRI performance. Students who attend DRRI represent a heterogeneous set of personnel in terms of motivation and prior RR/EO interest, experience, and knowledge. The variety of student experiences suggests different sets of training needs and individualized training models.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

In this chapter the important findings of the study are reviewed and some of the implications of these conclusions are discussed. The emphasis of the discussion is focused on DRRI training effectiveness in relation to the current job needs of DRRI graduates. Some issues are raised which have specific relevance for DRRI itself. However, the most important issues deal with the relationship between DRRI and other military agencies. The overall implication appears to be that specific communication linkages between DRRI and Army agencies responsible for RR/EO program policy and implementation need to be improved to insure effective DRRI training of competent RR/EO personnel for the job they perform in the field.

Conclusions

Perceptions of DRRI training are clear and consistent from students, faculty, DRRI graduates and Army personnel. Phase I training is dramatically endorsed as a highly satisfactory training experience. It is seen by most personnel as a very important life experience leading to changes in racial and sexual awareness and profound changes in feelings about one's self. Particularly in contrast to the other training programs attended by Army personnel, Phase I training is a highly unique and personally meaningful experience. Comments from students and graduates attest to the power of self-examination found in Phase I training.

The criticisms of Phase I training found in this study are quite similar to those found in the earliest training assessments done by DRRI. Feedback from students emphasizes the need for more non-black minority group content and more practical, job-relevant, skills training. Dissatisfaction focuses on the quality of student selection and graduation standards and on the quality of academic tests. Graduates have continued to ask for more contact from DRRI in terms of new educational materials and periodic refresher courses.

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DRRI staff has repeatedly urged that data about what the graduate does when he returns to the field be collected to assess the effectiveness of DRRI training *in relation to job performance.*

Phase II training at DRRI has been continually modified since its original development in 1974. Graduate assessments of Phase II training while generally positive, have been somewhat mixed and have been indicative of the confusion and lack of coordination associated with prior training versions. The higher Phase II ratings of the 1976-3 class, as compared to previous classes, is encouraging and suggests that the Phase II training structure has begun to stabilize. Since Phase II training emphasizes skills development, it is particularly vulnerable to criticism about the lack of instructor job experience. The large variation in trainee RR/EO job experience and intellectual aptitude has resulted in some difficulties for Phase II in developing an optimal training program for all trainees. Separate training models based on rank have not been sensitive to the more important dimensions of trainee experience and aptitude. Also, the Phase I-Phase II integration of the overall DRRI training experience has not been entirely successful in taking advantage of the changes in awareness and self, associated with Phase I.

Information collected from DRRI graduates at Army installations has indicated that the job of the graduate has dramatically shifted from that of providing race relations instruction to unit personnel. Current job descriptions of graduates consist of a variety of roles with major emphasis on command consultation and equal opportunity administration and management roles. The specific tasks performed by Army graduates tend to vary depending on type of position and organizational level, although most graduates spend only a very small proportion of their time in the actual conduct of race relations instruction. Performance ratings of graduates tend to be satisfactory, and they are higher for instructional tasks than for other types of performance. Job satisfaction and perceptions of "burnout" vary considerably among graduates with the more satisfied graduates tending to be younger, non-white, lower ranked, and lower educated. The alleged stigma of RR/EO involvement is more highly perceived by graduates who are white, higher ranked, and higher educated. Graduate perceptions reinforce the critical importance of command support in the success of RR/EO programs.

It appears that the job of the Army DRRI graduate has become more diverse and emphasizes non-race relations instructional duties, although DRRI training objectives continue to focus on race relations instruction-related knowledge and skills. DRRI has been aware of the major criticisms of its training program and has been consistent in its request for job performance data on graduates since its first evaluation report in 1972. However, the job needs of Army graduates have still changed without concomitant modifications of training objectives and content. While DRRI has made some training modification, it seems that the exchange of information between DRRI and those Army agencies responsible for the utilization of graduates has not been adequate to result in a process where training objectives mirror job needs. Students arrive and depart from DRRI expecting to be race relations instructors, only [illegible]rn to a job in which race relations instructor opportunities are minimal.

The pattern of interagency relationships and responsibilities does not appear to be clear to many personnel and such relationships have not been consistently operationalized. For example, the organization tasked with the responsibility for policy guidance for DRRI, the Race Relations Educational Board of the Department of Defense, has not met consistently throughout the history of DRRI. In fact, the Board did not meet between May 1974 and September 1976. Also important positions in DOD and DA have not been consistently filled or have turned over so rapidly as to result in a gap between training and job policy. In an analogous fashion, important positions at DRRI have not been consistently filled. For example, the permanent Chief of Research and Evaluation position at DRRI has been vacant since 1974 and as of March 1976, the assigned strength at DRRI was less than authorized.

During the course of this study, a number of changes have occurred to enhance the interagency coordination between DRRI and other relevant agencies, and it seems like such changes will be productive. Ultimately, it is this linkage that is the most critical determiner of training effectiveness, because training models, regardless of their sophistication and good intent, must be generated from clear statements of RR/EO program policy in order to develop competent RR/EO personnel and an effective Army RR/EO program.

Implications: Discussion of Specific Training Issues

Throughout this report, a number of specific training issues have been consistently raised by faculty, students, and graduates, and/or been pointed out in prior evaluation reports. The implications of these issues will be discussed. Final decisions regarding these issues are dependent on policy statements and job needs of graduates.

The Mission(s) of DRRI

DRRI has been tasked with a variety of specific missions, although most of its resources have been allocated to conducting training of personnel. In the early development of DRRI and RR/EO programs, there was a legitimate urgency to train needed personnel to operate the planned RR/EO program in the field. However, it seems that the allocation of resources has not been modified to accomplish the other DRRI missions. Graduate feedback indicated that educational materials at installations were often out of date, and that they were seldom or never furnished with new materials from DRRI. Most graduates were unaware of the development of new educational materials, indicators of institutional discrimination, or new strategies and tools to assess racial climate. Evaluations of program effectiveness at most installations were subjective and best guesses with no consultation or assistance available from DRRI. Research done by DRRI tended to be process-oriented, dealing with internal changes among students at DRRI and affording little utility for the graduate in the field. New curricula and doctrine were generated at DRRI for DRRI training and were not made available for field use. Research efforts at DRRI, regardless of their psychometric sophistication, were hampered by their inability to relate training and student characteristics to field performance, and thus, were not perceived even by DRRI faculty as very useful.

It is unfortunate that training demands have overwhelmed the accomplishment of other DRRI missions. RR/EO personnel operate installation programs in relative isolation from the mainstream of social science and training technology. An ongoing research/evaluation mechanism from the beginning of DRRI and RR/EO programs would have been able to take advantage of the successes and failures of the last few years to enhance the effectiveness of the current programs. Apparently on account of resource limitations, DRRI

has not been able to use its resources out in the field, away from DRRI. Also, policies of individual military services have had the effect of prohibiting, or at least limiting, DRRI involvement in field curriculum development and program evaluation, since each service has exclusively assumed responsibility for such tasks. Precise clarifications of DRRI missions is imperative. It is not feasible for DRRI to be able to accomplish successfully its non-training missions without adequate internal research resources, the removal of policy limitations, and support from other agencies to develop ongoing mechanisms with graduates and RR/EO programs in the field.

DRRI Training Objectives

The type of training objective endorsed by DRRI raises another issue, for the objectives emphasize knowledge and understanding, rather than skills, behaviors, and performance. The objectives basically are educational or achievement oriented. They are concerned with the transmission of information, and implicitly assume that students who have more knowledge, understanding, racial group experiences, opportunities for awareness and capability will in some vague way be better race relations instructors. While it is possible that instructors with these attributes may perform more effectively, the performance as an instructor, and certainly performance in the other non-instructor roles accomplished by graduates currently, is determined by a far more complex set of variables, many of which are behavioral or skill-related rather than simply cognitive or informational. DRRI's mission is to conduct training, to produce personnel who can perform effectively on the job. Its objectives, as stated, stress knowledge and intellectual characteristics, not performance.

Also, the objectives are process-based rather than goal- or outcome-based, and they are vague and deny measurement. They reflect intermediate stages of a hypothetical process that might lead to a goal. Personnel with more knowledge should be better instructors, but the training objective is to produce effective instructors and competent RR/EO personnel. For example, the DRRI objective:

> The opportunity to become aware of current DoD, Service, and Command equal opportunity and treatment policies, and directives and their relationship to the need for maintaining good order and discipline.

All personnel have the "opportunity to become aware" of RR/EO regulations and do not require a separate training program to apprise them of the availability of RR/EO regulations. It does seem appropriate to hypothesize that competent RR/EO personnel would have specific levels of knowledge of RR/EO regulations and specific levels of skills in their utilization. Therefore, a more useful training objective would specify the desired level of knowledge of regulations and preferably the desired level of skill in their utilization. Training content and curricula would be designed to accomplish the behaviors and skills specified by the training objective, and the training objectives would reflect characteristics that distinguish effective RR/EO personnel and that reflect job performance.

Persistent demands by students for more practical skills training is reflected by objectives which are not skill- and performance-based, and thus are more difficult to transfer to the job environment. The focus on objectives that are cognitive rather than behavioral creates an interesting double message for these future race relations instructors who are also told, "We are interested in behavior change. We don't care what they think, just what they do!"

These criticisms of objectives are found elsewhere as well and warrant immediate examination (Comptroller General, 1976). Certainly, DRRI's mission to "develop doctrine and curricula in education for race relations," cannot be productively served by its own quality of training objectives.

Selection of Students

The selection of students to attend DRRI is an important issue. Although the Army has recently upgraded selection criteria for students, most respondents in this study believed that motivation was the most important selection criterion. Analyses indicated that level of education was the most important indicator of performance at DRRI and that motivation seemed less related to performance. In fact, those who reported that they did *not* volunteer tended to perform better at DRRI, as they had higher levels of education. Job performance data of graduates needs to be collected and related to student characteristics, because valid selection of students (and instructors) can only be based on job criteria.

The belief that DRRI students, at least upon entrance, should constitute a cadre of personnel *totally dedicated* to the elimination of racism may not serve DRRI well. Field interviews suggest reliance on motivation and sincerity as selection criteria may reinforce the image of DRRI and DRRI graduates as militant and radical. When DRRI began, group cohesiveness and identity were perhaps more important in generating a small group of devoted trainees faced with the problem of how to help change a huge bureaucratic system. However, as the role of the graduate has changed to emphasize analytical rather than verbal skills and the RR/EO program has been institutionalized, the value of motivation as a criterion can be questioned.

The self-selection of students into DRRI and the RR/EO career field by motivation and volunteer status seems confirmed by comparisons of racial attitudes and knowledge with the general Army population. The advantages of this self-selection scheme are not all apparent, for while a cadre of racially aware and knowledgeable personnel are identified, the composition of DRRI graduates is increasingly differentiated from the Army as a whole. The quality of facilitation as a race relations instructor or consulting as the commander's advisor might not be enhanced if the perceptions of the graduate and his client are so disparate. Also, the recruitment of personnel who all have the same values and perceptions stands the risk of generating a group of RR/EO personnel whose strategies and understanding of the problem become more and more insulated from the skepticism of those who have different opinions. If students already have relatively favorable and desirable levels of awareness and attitudes about discrimination, the priority for using much of Phase I training time to increase awareness levels might be examined, particularly at a time when graduates are asking for more "how to do it" skills and are having more demands for consultative and analytical skills.

One of the most negative consequences of the current selection process was aptly expressed by one faculty member at DRRI.

> "Exert quality control, not management by race or sex, in selecting personnel for the school. Make commanders take the program seriously by requiring *qualified students only* for the course. Sending a minority (or majority) member to the school who is a functional illiterate does no one a favor, everyone a disservice. We end up putting the real victims of discrimination up against the system knowing full well how poorly armed they are."

Greater Individualized Training

Analyses of characteristics of students at DRRI demonstrate a wide range of variation in student RR/EO experience and intellectual aptitude. Also, job descriptive data indicate that the specific tasks performed by graduates vary by their utilization. It appears that training effectiveness might be enhanced by conceptualizing training as a matrix of experiences based on a student's personal experience and aptitude and future job description, rather than as one unitary training intervention, or two types of training based on rank alone. Training at DRRI could be provided to groups of personnel based on where they have been and where they are going. While all trainees would undergo a common, core training experience, specific sets of training modules would be provided to trainees, based on their prior RR/EO experiences and intellectual aptitude and on their future RR/EO assignment following training.

DRRI, in its last evaluation report, also has realized that instruction may be more effective if it is modified to flexibly deal with individual differences.

> ". . . perhaps groups with greater previous exposure to race relations themes have higher expectations of the training received at DRRI. This explanation suggests the need for additional research on the question of student perceptions, but more importantly, raises the issue of whether DRRI should consider "customized" instruction based on the level of awareness individual students possess upon entering DRRI." (DRRI, 1976.)

Experience of DRRI Instructors

The quality of instructors was seen by students as one of DRRI's major assets. One of the few criticisms dealt with the lack of field experience of instructors. An examination of the responses of instructors surveyed indicates that experience in the field, as an instructor, or in RR/EO content areas is quite low for some instructors. The following percentages indicate some of the characteristics of DRRI Phase I and Phase II instructors.

DRRI Instructors	Phase I (N = 11)	Phase II (N = 8)
• Had never worked in the field as a race relations instructor.	55%	13%
• Had never worked in the field as an EO staff member.	64%	38%
• Had no training other than DRRI dealing with RR/EO.	36%	13%
• Had never taught a course, other than at DRRI, dealing with RR/EO.	55%	0%
• Had little or no interest in improving RR/EO prior to their military experience.	43%	63%
• Was a member of any organization that dealt with RR/EO prior to their military experience.	9%	0%
• Did not attend DRRI as a student.	27%	0%
• Attended Phase I only.	27%	63%

From these data, it seems that many of the faculty have little prior job experience and little experience as an instructor. For most faculty, interest in RR/EO is relatively newly acquired, since their military experience. In spite of a recommendation made in 1972 in the first evaluation research report that all instructors be DRRI graduates, some instructors never or only partially attended DRRI.

The selection of instructors should receive as close an examination as the selection of students. Instructor characteristics related to effective performance should be developed and utilized in their selection. At a minimum, instructors require adequate field/job experience as a basis for training competent RR/EO personnel. Student requests for more practical, "how to do it" training seem quite reasonable in view of the low levels of practical experience of their instructors. The increase in non-instruction tasks in the job of the DRRI graduate will probably further highlight the vital importance of organizational and practical skills. Instructors need job experiences in order to train students to deal with the problems of "out there."

Black-White Training Emphasis

Since the first DRRI classes, some graduates have criticized the black-white emphasis that characterizes DRRI training and requested more non-black minority group training content. It is important to note that DRRI has responded by increasing training in non-black minority group areas, but the criticism has persisted. The optimal balance of training content ultimately depends upon the job needs of graduates. However, the reality of black visibility in the Army and in the RR/EO program may explain the persistence of the criticism.

An analysis of RR/EO personnel in the Army as contrasted to the Army as a whole, based on a quantitative model of institutional discrimination, showed that blacks found to be dramatically overrepresented in RR/EO positions in the Army (Department of the Army-HRR, 1976). At the end of Fiscal Year 1975, blacks constituted about 23 percent of the total Army population; however, 63 percent of all Army enlisted RR/EO positions were occupied by black enlisted personnel. While blacks accounted for about 5 percent of the Army officer population, about 25 percent of all officer RR/EO positions were held by blacks. Also, the overwhelming majority of all minority group personnel in the Army are black, so that it is likely that discussions and studies of discrimination by race would emphasize blacks.

Neither the composition of the Army nor the composition of the Army RR/EO program are the responsibility of DRRI. However, an explicit acknowledgment of the racial composition of military and program personnel and its effect on the selection of training content might meet the needs of those who perceive an overemphasis of black training content in spite of curriculum changes to reduce black content. Another training approach might be to shift more of the focus of training away from the study of minority groups and women to a study of racism and the mechanisms of racial discrimination. In the end, the allocation of training content must be dependent on the job needs of graduates.

Miscellaneous Training Issues

- The relationship between Phase I and Phase II, while somewhat conceptually logical, seems strained by different approaches and styles, a multi-Service set of disparate strategies, and

different faculty members. Only 45 percent of the Phase I faculty respondents and 75 percent of Phase II faculty respondents agreed that they were complementary. There was fairly high consensus—Phase I, 64 percent; Phase II, 88 percent—on the feeling that much more attention should be given to the Phase I-Phase II transition. Students commented on the difficulty in maintaining their level of intensity of feeling in Phase II, and that for some Phase II was "naturally a letdown."

- The increase in importance given to sexism as a major type of discrimination might be perceived as diluting the efforts to eliminate racism. This potential conflict seems worth examining, for 47 percent agreed and 37 percent of the faculty disagreed with the statement: "While sexism may be important, racism should still be the main focus for DRRI training." Sexism has, from students, been getting more attention at DRRI and was highlighted during many student interviews. Some faculty and students have expressed frustration at the low level of sexism awareness in DRRI training content and that non-sexist means more than not calling females "girls."

- Performance standards at DRRI require further examination and explicit linkages with job performance. Various performance criteria currently used are not highly related to each other and academic tests are still a source of student dissatisfaction.

Perceived Consequences of DRRI and RR/EO Involvement

The effects of DRRI and RR/EO career involvement on one's military career require direct attention. The data from both this survey and other data suggest that the rumors about how such experiences negatively affect the attitudes and military are much more negative than a systematic assessment of graduates' perceptions suggests. The majority of graduates perceive positive or neutral effects of their DRRI and RR/EO experiences. However, there are a small but substantial minority of graduates who do perceive a negative effect.

The frustration expressed by graduates seemed most severe when graduates were in situations that were greatly insulated from the commander and where he/she was not permitted to be every active; i.e., where task frequency was low, particularly command consultative-type tasks. The higher ranking, white graduate appears to be the least satisfied

with his role, a finding consistently reported in site visits. Non-white personnel are assumed to be motivated to participate and lead RR/EO programs, for many Army personnel see the RR/EO program as being *for* non-whites. The white graduate not only must demonstrate and rationalize his concern for suspecting white unit personnel, but must pass a test of motivation to convince suspicious non-white personnel and especially non-white graduate colleagues. Further, he becomes identified as a part of a program that is unpopular with higher ranking command personnel, a position that is unlikely to enhance his efficiency rating which is an intolerable situation for anyone with career aspirations. As a seasoned officer in another study simply put it, "You're not likely to find your water-walkers here" (McDowell, 1976). Rather than denying or avoiding this issue, it seems much wiser to directly and clearly acknowledge this finding and begin to investigate its determinants. Such an examination of perceived consequences accompanied by more contact with graduates in the field may decrease "burnout" and remove perceptions that serve as barriers for higher quality personnel to choose RR/EO careers. In fact, it appears to be in DRRI's interest to publicize this data, since about 29 percent of graduates felt that DRRI *increased* their intention to stay in the military. This figure compares favorably with any of a myriad of programs and incentives that are specifically designed to to keep personnel in the military.

The Image of DRRI

Very little evidence was found in this study to corroborate a negative, activist image of DRRI. Interviews with Army command personnel revealed generally positive feelings about DRRI, with existing negative perceptions more sharply focused at specific elements of the RR/EO program. Army unit personnel were generally unaware of DRRI and its alleged activist reputation. While the lack of data for perjorative labels on DRRI is encouraging, the large percentage of Army personnel who had never heard of DRRI warrants attention.

The intense personal feelings that many students leave Phase I with are in most ways a testimony to the substantial impact of DRRI training. However, in more subtle ways, there may be some counterproductiveness in the almost evangelistic fervor of graduates. It is possible that this sense of dedication has been confused with activism by

commanders in the field; or graduates, armed with new awareness and new feelings about self, may be overeager to share their discoveries and become impatient with those who are not able to enhance their own awareness of the subtle aspects of discrimination.

Phase I had differential training effects on non-whites, some of whom departed less in favor of racial integration and more in favor of racial separation than when they arrived. While the merits of these philosophies are debatable, the clear Army policy endorsing racial harmony leaves little room for any belief other than an endorsement of racial integration.

The changes in self-perceptions voiced by some students were by and large seen positively. However, the validity of these changes are mediated by their implications for success on the job. For example, one student after Phase I commented:

> "I changed my attitude toward people in authority. I used to have blind obedience before–just followed orders. Now I will question seniors more than before."

Such changes might be universally applauded in personal growth contexts, but these changes might not necessarily be productive in an Army environment.

The potential anxiety associated with the expression of a new conceptual framework that gives permission to communicate *feelings* in the context of a strongly hierarchical organizational environment which stresses cognitive forms of expression can be stressful. As one student put it, "It's a challenging job–you lose friends and may lose your family."

The important point is that the value of changes associated with training is exclusively determined by the relationship of the changes to job performance. If more self-awareness is a characteristic of competent RR/EO performance, then such changes are desirable. However, it seems that such changes in self may not be desirable in all circumstances. It would be useful for DRRI to allocate specific training resources to deal with changes in self and their relation to job performance. Most human relations training programs routinely include a segment on transfer of training to the "back home environment." DRRI presently devotes some training to transfer issues, but more is clearly indicated.

One final point about the image of DRRI relates to the characteristics of Army RR/EO personnel. Blacks are dramatically overrepresented in RR/EO positions, so that it is likely that RR/EO, and DRRI indirectly, will be perceived as a program for blacks regardless of protestations to the contrary. Also, data are available relevant to the perceptions of the quality of RR/EO personnel and indirectly to the quality of DRRI graduates.[4] Comparisons of Enlisted Efficiency Report Weighted Average Scores between RR/EO personnel and Army personnel in general, show small differences across E5 to E9 ranks. However, comparisons by mental categories, derived from AFQT scores, between RR/EO enlisted personnel and personnel in an analogous personnel actions MOS, show that RR/EO personnel have less than one-half as many personnel in percentage terms in the higher mental categories (I and II), and almost three times as many in the lowest mental category (IV). Since intelligence or intellectual aptitude is formally a higher valued characteristic in the Army, the image communicated by a program staffed by personnel who have disproportionately lower levels of intellectual aptitude must suffer.

Command Support

It is evident from this study that today the job of the DRRI graduate is more diverse and the roles and tasks more heterogeneous than in the past. The original conception of DRRI, based on a pyramid training of trainers model, seemed most appropriate as the military services began to confront racism. However, in the last few years the overall strategy of each of the Services has changed with an increase in the development of the command/consultant role of its professional RR/EO personnel and a concomitant decrease in the reliance on race relations instruction as *the* anti-racism strategy. More race relations instruction is no longer seen as the most effective strategy to eliminate racism. While some graduates still serve in the instructor role, this is not their exclusive role, and time is spent in other roles, expecially the equal opportunity staff role.

[4]Data furnished by Office of Equal Opportunity Programs, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army.

The vital importance of the commander in the effectiveness of the installation RR/EO program has been emphasized in a recent analysis of the Army unit race relations training program (Hiett and Nordlie, 1976). The perceptions of DRRI graduates in this study further reinforced the critical role of command. The amount of command support most strongly distinguished higher and lower quality RR/EO programs, and it also correlated strongly with the overall job satisfaction of the graduate. Graduates consistently requested more training on how to deal with their command.

The notion of command responsibility is nearly sacred in the military. Earlier anti-discrimination strategies that seemed to be implicitly modeled on a "get the racist commander" motif, which may have been appropriate at an earlier point in the overall development of strategy, do not seem to work now. The commander *is* the commander, and the data suggest that his support is necessary for an effective race relations program. Adversary, confrontative approaches with the command structure do not appear to be likely to be successful. The fact that the non-participation of NCO's and officers in race relations instruction is perceived as the most serious problem of race relations instruction suggests that command will simply opt out when presented with programs that do not appear to meet their needs, with a resultant decrease in the effectiveness of the program. Based on this rationale, the fact that graduates see the "commander's opinion" as the *least* important indicator of the racial climate at an installation seems unfortunate and serves to guarantee the less-than-desired quality of success in race relations programs in the military. Albeit, many commanders may not be aware of the racial climate in their command. However, the failure to deal explicitly with the commander, the allocator of resources, would seem to limit the success of any endeavor. The acknowledged importance of increased command support is even further confirmed by its endorsement by graduates as the most effective strategy to eliminate discrimination.

DRRI graduates rate the number of racial incidents on an installation as the most important indicator of racial climate. It would seem that racial tension would be fairly well developed to lead to racial conflict. Further, racial conflict in 1977 is simply not

manifested in physical, confrontative manners as it was in 1965 to 1970. Waiting for racial incidents to occur eliminates hope for progress in eliminating institutional discrimination and reinforces commanders to lower or maintain current levels of awareness and resources to eliminate racism. As many commanders expressed it, "I don't have a race problem in my unit because there haven't been any racial incidents." Since commanders are aware that racial incidents in their command will reflect badly on their own performance, there will be very few reported, regardless of the quality of race relations and the extent of discrimination. At a time when most organizations are coming to realize that the more subtle and insidious forms of discrimination are institutional in nature, both DRRI graduates and commanders continue to buy into racial incidents as the best measure of racial tensions. This belief instigates a set of dynamics which lead to a paradox that, as one graduate put it, states "the only way for us to eliminate racism here is to go out and start a racial incident and then maybe we'll be able to get something done." The RR/EO program-command relationship must receive greater training emphasis for the RR/EO program to be effective.

Interorganizational Relationships

Organizational relationships between DRRI, each phase of training, DOD, and individual military services seem less than clear. In the course of this study, many respondents appeared somewhat confused about which military agency was responsible for DRRI policy and operations. For example, fifty-eight percent of the faculty agreed with the following statement:

> Policy for Phase I-DRRI is set by the DOD Race Relations Education Board.

Information published by DRRI about operations and policy states:

> Operations of the DRRI are subject to policy guidance by the Race Relations Education Board of the Department of Defense.

If "set by" is the same as "subject to . . . guidance by," then at least one-half the faculty correctly understands the DOD-DRRI relationship. Regardless of which answer is the

correct answer, about one-half the faculty do not correctly understand the organizational relationship.

Army Phase II, according to a recent Memorandum for the Record (Lewis, 1976), is to be developed and implemented by the U.S. Army Administration Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, and Phase II training is reviewed and approved by TRADOC at Fort Monroe, Virginia. Many of our respondents believed that Phase II was operated by the Department of the Army, Director of Equal Opportunity Programs in Washington, D.C. The aforementioned MFR also points out that Army policy is developed by the Department of the Army. Thus, it seems that the agency responsible for development and implementation of Phase II is located over a thousand miles away from the training itself; and that another agency located in a different place has *approval* for the implementation of the training; and that a different agency at a different location develops the policy that determines what those trainees do on the job; and that the training itself follows a highly intense and unusual different training experience (Phase I) that was developed, implemented, and approved by another set of different agencies. While this matrix of relationships is theoretically possible, one wonders about its effectiveness in terms of developing a training program designed to produce effective on-the-job performance. At a minimum, relevant RR/EO personnel should know who does what to whom and why!

The generally low level of interorganizational coordination is also felt in the student selection process. DRRI does not know exactly which Army students and how many Army students will attend training until the first day of training. Without precise knowledge of who will attend training, DRRI cannot furnish students with satisfactory advance information about the training, nor can DRRI plan to develop training strategies that can take advantage of the different types of students and the different types of training needs. Further, the general lack of coordination with other Army agencies limits the ability of the agency to know who actually attended training and to be aware of the validity of their selection standards.

The most profound consequences of poor interagency coordination has been the creation of a gap between decision-making/policy operations about DRRI training and decision-making/policy operations about the job of the DRRI graduate. DRRI is subject to

policy guidance from one set of agencies and has developed curricula based on this guidance. Each group of respondents in this study assumed that the goal of DRRI training was to train race relations instructors. Fifty-five percent of the Army students in the class studied expected to spend one-half of their job time or more providing race relations instruction when they returned to their installation. One out of five students expected to spend almost all of their time as a race relations instructor. Phase I faculty respondents also expected Army students to return to the field to provide race relations instruction. Sixty-four percent of the Phase I faculty respondents, compared with only 13 percent of the Phase II faculty respondents, expected students to spend one-half of their time or more providing race relations instruction. In spite of the expansion of the mission of DRRI in 1974 to train equal opportunity/human resources management specialists and Army Phase II doctrine, most students believed that DRRI training was designed to produce race relations instructors. Perhaps the expectations created by local installation commanders and RR/EO officers remain regardless of guidance to the contrary.

In the last few years the Army has made substantial changes in the RR/EO program policy and operation. Data from the First Annual Assessment of the Army's Equal Opportunity Program make it clear that the Army has changed both its emphasis of the importance and type of race relations instruction and its use of DRRI graduates.

> "The racial strife, turmoil and divisiveness of the late 60's and early 70's dictated a training and education program oriented to racial harmony. Apparent calm and lack of racial confrontation exist in the Army today. Positive efforts are required to deepen this condition, in view of White feelings that the Army has gone too far with this program and minority suspicions of promises of equal opportunity for upward mobility. It is now believed that the RR&EO training and education program's thrust should be toward management practices and functions that provide equal opportunity for all soldiers." (Department of the Army–HRR, 1976.)

Thus, the job of RR/EO personnel and DRRI graduates has dramatically shifted away from providing race relations instruction to emphasizing equal opportunity management practices. In the Army, chain-of-command personnel conduct race relations instruction, not DRRI graduates, who may monitor, coordinate and assist race relations education.

Also, the goals and strategies of race relations instruction in the Army have changed. DRRI provides students a model of race relations instruction in which the small group discussion method is seen

> ". . . as a means of exposing personnel to differing racial and ethnic life styles and concerns, opening communication channels among themselves, identifying intergroup problems and sources of stress. . . . " (DRRI, 1976.)

In contrast, Army revisions of its race relations instruction program are designed to:

- Deemphasize racial/ethnic differences in educational material and exploit commonalities and the cultural pluralism that exists in our society.

- Assist in identifying and combating various forms of institutional discrimination and sexism.

(Department of the Army–HRR, 1976.)

It is imperative that interagency coordination between DRRI and relevant Army agencies improve before DRRI training can meet the job needs of its students. Clear and precise statements of policy about the goals and implementation procedures of RR/EO programs need to be shared among DRRI and Army agencies in order for DRRI to develop training programs designed to produce quality RR/EO personnel in the Army.

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TECHNICAL APPENDIX

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PSYCHOMETRIC PROPERTIES OF INSTRUMENTS

Nearly all of the measures of racially-oriented variables utilized in this study are totally or in part the result of prior developmental work on military populations. Therefore, the psychometric properties of these instruments have been previously documented. However, it is still important to document these properties for their current utilization to insure that they maintain satisfactory levels of reliability and validity.

Reliability

The reliability of each of the instruments or scales used in this study are presented in Table 18. In this table, the number of items on each scale and an estimate of the internal consistency reliability are presented. Internal consistency was estimated by calculating the coefficient alpha, which is based on the average correlation among items and the number of items on a scale. It represents the expected correlation of one scale with alternative forms containing the same number of items, and provides a satisfactory estimate of reliability since the major source of measurement error is usually content sampling (Nunnally, 1967). Most of the scale reliabilities are adequate, although a few, with small numbers of items, are sufficiently low to warrant limited confidence when interpreting results. Our attempt to assess a wide range of variables without using an enormously long instrument resulted in some scales with only a few items and low levels of reliability. Future assessments will be able to use fewer scales of higher reliability.

Validity

An analysis of the relationship among scales was executed in order to demonstrate that the scales measure what they purport to; i.e., that they have construct validity. Interscale correlations should be in directions that would be hypothesized based on the meaning of the underlying constructs of each scale; and they should be sufficiently modest

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Table 18

Psychometric Characteristics of Scales: Reliability
(N = 83)

Instrument/Scale	Numbers of Items	Internal Consistency Reliability
Perceived Discrimination against Blacks (PDB)	6	.83
Attitude toward Racial Interaction (ATI)	6	.76
Feelings of Reverse Racism (FRR)	6	.67
Racial Climate (RC)	6	.63
Interracial Behavior (IB)	5	.88
Behavioral Intentions (BI)	10	.84
Judgments of Racial Prejudice (JRP)	5	.52
In-Channel Actions (ICA)	8	.64
Out-Channel Actions (OCA)	11	.79
$Knowledge_1$	8	.64
$Knowledge_3$	7	.59
$Knowledge_4$	9	.78
$Knowledge_T$	24	.85

to imply that scales are measuring related, yet different constructs. The correlations among scales are presented in Table 19.

Generally, the pattern of correlations is similar to prior work with these variables and in the expected, hypothesized directions. Personnel who perceive higher levels of discrimination against non-whites (PDB) tend to:

Table 19

Correlations among Attitudinal, Perceptual, Behavioral and Knowledge Variables
(N = 83)

Attitude/Perceptions	Attitude/Perceptions						Knowledge	Behavior	
	ATI	FRR	RC	JRP	ICA	OCA		IB	BI
Perceived Discrimination against Blacks (PDB)	+.27*	- .03	- .04	+.35*	+.42*	- .07	+.22*	+.47*	+.30*
Attitude toward Racial Interaction (ATI)		- .37*	- .15	+.14	+.14	- .27*	+.36*	+.33*	+.29*
Feelings of Reverse Racism (FRR)			+.11	- .07	- .10	+.05	- .36*	- .23*	- .30*
Racial Climate (RC)				- .23*	- .17	- .01	- .42*	- .01	- .01
Judgments of Racial Prejudice (JRP)					- .59*	- .08*	+.18*	+.09	+.15
In-Channel Actions (ICA)						- .03	+.11	+.26*	+.21*
Out-Channel Actions (OCA)							+.03	- .01	+.07
Knowledge								+.26*	+.17
Interracial Behavior (IB)									+.60*
Behavioral Intentions (BI)									

*Statistically significant at the .05 level.

- have *more* positive attitudes toward racial interaction (ATI);
- perceive *more* prejudice in the scenarios (JRP)
- have *more* racial knowledge;

- have *more* frequent interracial behavior (IB);
- be *more* likely to engage in interracial behavior (BI).

Personnel who perceive that whites feel threatened by non-whites and that non-whites receive more favorable treatment (FRR) tend to:

- have *less* positive attitudes toward racial interaction (ATI);
- have *less* racial knowledge;
- have *less* frequent interracial behavior (IB);
- be *less* likely to engage in interracial behavior (BI).

A separate analysis calculated the relationships between those instruments used by DRRI and those instruments specifically developed and utilized for this study. Whereas our instruments were developed on military populations, those instruments used by DRRI were apparently developed in civilian settings. Little information about their psychometric characteristics is available in any DRRI report. For example, The Opinion Inventory was developed only for whites to assess their attitudes about blacks (Woodmansee and Cook, 1967), but is apparently used for personnel of all races. The Nominal Index was developed at DRRI as a composite predictor from the other instruments. However, little data about its reliability or validity are available.

The correlations between our instruments (HSR) and DRRI instruments are presented in Table 20. Generally, associations seem to be in the hypothesized directions. The Integration/Separation indices are not significantly related to ATI, suggesting that their concepts of integration are somewhat different. The role of women scale is highly related to the racial variables, suggesting some association with racial and sexual attitudes.

The scores of DRRI students on our instruments tended to be somewhat different from the general Army population that was used to develop the instruments. DRRI students are self-selected in large part and have a different set of racial attitudes compared to the general Army population. For example, the mean ATI score for the 1976-3 class was about

Table 20

Correlations among DRRI and HSR Instruments
(N = 83)

HSR Instruments	Opinion Inv.	Penick Inv.	Pro-Int.	Pro-Sep.	IEC Int.	PER.	ACT	Role of Women	Nominal Index
Perceived Discrimination against Blacks (PDB)	-.39*	+.24*	+.27*	+.04	-.30*	-.27*	+.16	-.39*	-.38*
Attitude toward Racial Interaction (ATI)	-.43*	+.24*	+.11	+.11	-.05	-.05	+.18*	-.35*	-.35*
Feelings of Reverse Racism (FRR)	+.35*	-.10	+.04	+.28*	+.18*	-.02	-.32*	+.44*	+.28*
Racial Climate (RC)	+.13	+.07	+.23*	+.04	+.22*	+.06	-.23*	+.26*	+.12
Judgments of Racial Prejudice (JRP)	-.34*	+.05	+.02	-.16	-.03	+.09	-.01	-.20*	-.30*
In-Channel Actions (ICA)	-.33*	+.11	+.03	-.16	-.18*	-.17	+.11	-.29*	-.28*
Out-Channel Actions (OCA)	+.05	-.11	-.05	-.08	+.01	+.11	-.08	+.13	+.05
Knowledge	-.39*	+.11	-.20*	-.14	-.25*	-.03	+.44*	-.43*	-.40*
Interracial Behavior (IB)	-.48*	+.35*	+.26*	+.01	-.18*	-.14	+.21*	-.43*	-.48*
Behavioral Intentions (BI)	-.47*	+.33*	+.27*	-.01	-.14	-.04	+.13	-.29*	-.47*

*Statistically significant at the .05 level.

27 out of a possible 30. Therefore, it would be difficult to detect change from training with such a restricted range of possible scores. Communication with DRRI research staff, the lengthy versions of DRRI instrumentation, and the lack of psychometric data on their instruments suggest that little effort has been made to develop more precise, reliable subsets of

data from DRRI results. Therefore, we would hypothesize that DRRI instruments are perhaps more susceptible to error sources like range restrictions and recommend that psychometric analyses be conducted on DRRI instruments.

FACTOR ANALYSIS OF DRRI GRADUATE TASKS

A principal components factor analysis with a varimax rotation was run on the 35 items that described task frequency for DRRI graduates. Item means were substituted for missing data. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 21.

Four meaningful factors emerged from this analysis. The last two factors do not include a sufficient number of items to be psychometrically reliable, but will be included for their descriptive value. Factors were determined by selecting items that loaded .40 or higher on each scale. The scores on each item were summed to equal a factor score. The higher the factor score, the more frequent the graduate performs those types of tasks. The specific items in each factor are presented in Table 21, along with the factor loading and mean frequency value for the item. Each of the responses was based on the following frequency continuum.

1 = Never.
2 = Less than once a month.
3 = Once a month.
4 = Two times a month.
5 = One time a week.
6 = Two or more times a week.

Most item means fall between 2 and 4, or "less than once a month" to "two times a month." Factor loadings indicate the strength of association between the item and the overall factor. Items with highest factor loadings tend to define the meaning of the factor, by representing its center.

An analysis was also done to assess the relationship between task factor scores and time spent on various tasks. Correlation coefficients were calculated between each task score and each general type of task to provide some evidence of validity for factors. Correlations with non-RR/EO military duties are high with all factors suggesting that graduates tend to perform less frequently any type of task as they spend more time in non-RR/EO duties. Generally, the correlations on each task score are higher with the appropriate, most relevant tasks. For example, EOS task score is most associated with time spent on counseling,

investigating, and collecting information tasks, which are part of the equal opportunity staff role; whereas, the RRI task score is most highly related to the preparation of materials, conducting race relations instruction, and conducting training courses tasks. The correlations with the CC task score are less clear, but are highest with the assisting chain of command tasks and the EOS tasks. Correlations with the PC score tend to be significant across many tasks, indicating that coordination tasks involve all content areas of the graduates' jobs.

Table 21

Factor Analysis of Task Items
(N = 519)

Factor 1. Equal Opportunity Staff (EOS)	Factor Loading	Task Mean Frequency
Maintaining liaison with civic action agencies for assistance available in matters of discrimination affecting military personnel.	.78	2.29
Seeking cooperation and participation from surrounding civilian community.	.77	2.42
Making inquiries relative to race/sex discrimination complaints.	.68	3.40
Maintaining cooperative working relations with Public Information or Public Affairs Office.	.65	2.55
Writing or reviewing reports on race/sex discrimination incidents.	.64	3.02
Exploring possible indicators of racial unrest and techniques to avoid/resolve serious incidents.	.60	3.62
Recommending methods for correcting discriminatory practices.	.60	3.48
Representing the interest of racial minorities when they appear to be threatened on the installation.	.59	2.47
Appearing at civic or installation functions to generate support for the Human Goals Program.	.56	2.26
Meeting with minority groups or organizations.	.56	2.55
Supporting cultural programs to increase the appreciation of the contributions and achievements of racially different Americans.	.52	2.74
Counseling individuals or groups who see themselves as victims of race/sex discrimination.	.51	3.88

Table 21 (Continued)

Factor 1 (Continued)	Factor Loading	Task Mean Frequency
Assisting in the establishment of compliance monitoring procedures.	.47	3.17
Conducting research (surveys) to determine the racial climate on the installation.	.47	2.43
Factor 1 Mean Score:	40.23	2.87
Factor 2. Race Relations Instruction (RRI)		
Giving formal ("stand up") lectures.	.85	2.73
Preparing lectures.	.84	2.62
Preparing lesson plans and other educational materials.	.65	3.15
Preparing educational materials.	.58	3.45
Providing race relations instruction in small group seminars.	.46	3.72
Factor 2 Mean Score:	15.61	3.12
Factor 3. Command Consultation (CC)		
Conducting feedback sessions and decision meetings with commanding officers.	.74	2.36
Briefing senior or general officers on local racial conditions.	.51	2.11
Meeting with commanders to review objectives and progress of RR/EO programs.	.50	2.92
Assisting the commander in improving command environments and strengthening the chain of command.	.49	3.11
Factor 3 Mean Score:	10.48	2.62

Table 21 (Continued)

Factor 4. Program Coordination (PC)	Factor Loading	Item Mean Frequency
Making or revising schedules for RR/EO instruction.	.54	3.67
Coordinating arrangements for RR/EO programs.	.53	3.10
Assisting in the development of RR/EO programs.	.52	3.46
Factor 4 Mean Score:	10.09	3.36

PRE-POST DIFFERENCES ON SCALES

Table 22

Phase I: Pre-Post Differences on Racial Attitudes, Perceptions, Knowledge, and Behavior

Instrument	N	Pre-	Post-	Difference	t-Value	Statistical Significance
Perceived Discrimination against Blacks (PDB)	53	19.26	21.40	+2.13	+4.40	.00
Attitude toward Racial Interaction (ATI)	54	27.54	26.44	- 1.09	- 2.54	.01
Feelings of Reverse Racism (FRR)	55	14.55	15.40	+ .85	+1.95	.06
Racial Climate (RC)	53	20.32	19.60	- .72	- 1.69	.10
Judgments of Racial Prejudice (JRP)	48	19.69	21.42	+ .73	+2.21	.03
In-Channel Actions (ICA)	41	32.56	32.39	- .17	- .28	.78
Out-Channel Actions (OCA)	42	14.53	14.60	+ .05	+ .07	.95
$Knowledge_1$	41	6.05	6.95	+ .90	+4.38	.00
$Knowledge_3$	41	5.37	6.17	+ .80	+4.68	.00
$Knowledge_4$	44	5.73	7.09	+1.36	+5.12	.00
$Knowledge_T$	39	17.21	20.21	+3.00	+6.76	.00
Interracial Behavior (IB)	76	18.29	19.30	+1.01	+2.02	.05
Behavioral Intentions (BI)	74	45.30	45.93	+ .64	+1.56	.12
Contact	76	1.63	1.17	- .46	- 4.19	.00

Table 23

Phase I: Pre-Post Difference on DRRI Instruments

Instrument	N	Pre-	Post-	Difference	t-Value	Significance Level of Difference
Opinion Inventory	62	14.45	.11	- .34	- .28	.78
Penick Inventory	58	24.41	24.69	+ .28	+ .25	.81
Pro-Integration	62	17.08	6.21	- 10.87	- 2.20	.03
Pro-Separation	60	- 45.37	- 34.97	+10.40	+2.13	.04
Internal-External Control						
Internality	63	10.63	8.29	- 2.35	- 4.18	.00
Personal System Control	58	3.93	3.83	- .10	- .59	.56
Activity Orientation	62	3.58	4.06	+ .48	+2.10	.04
Nominal Index	67	19.51	19.16	- .35	- .24	.81
Role of Women	61	32.38	24.54	- 7.84	- 6.34	.00

PREDICTORS OF DRRI PERFORMANCE

Table 24

Variables That Predict DRRI Performance
(N = 83)

Variables	Graduation (1=no; 2 = yes)	Peer Rating	Total Academic Test Scores	Self-Rating
Demographic				
Sex (1 = male; 2 = female)	+.14	-.26*	+.13	-.19*
Race (1 = non-white; 2 = white)	-.11)	+.08	-.32*	+.28*
Rank	+.17	+.15	+.38*	+.26*
Education	+.24*	+.16	+.45*	+.33*
AGCT: GT	+.13	-.13	+.41*	+.07
CL	+.07	-.11	+.31*	+.06
AFQT: Mental Category (I = high; III = low)	+.23	-.05	+.11	+.19
EERWA	+.19	+.07	+.16	-.13
PMOSE	-.02	+.08	-.55*	+.10
Prior RR/EO Experience				
Prior RR/EO Duty (1 = yes; 2 = no)	+.08	-.13	-.07	-.16
Number of Courses Taught Previously	+.13	+.17	-.02	+.26*
Prior Civil Rights Interest	+.18*	-.04	+.24*	-.02
Motivation to Attend DRRI (Higher scores indicate reasons is more important.)				
To Eliminate Racism	+.16	+.09	+.27*	+.05
To Get into RR/EO Duty	+.31*	+.15	+.33*	+.19*
To Get College Credit	+.11	+.11	+.26*	+.02

*Statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 24 (Continued)

Variables	Graduation (1-no; 2 = yes)	Peer Rating	Total Academic Test Scores	Self-Rating
Volunteer (1=yes; 2=no)	+.14	+.06	+.25*	+.04
Attitude toward Training	+.08	+.17	+.01	+.18*
Expectations about DRRI (Higher scores indicate more expected change.)				
Attitude toward myself	-.27*	-.19*	-.18*	+.02
Attitude toward people of other Races	-.30*	-.31*	-.27*	-.07
Attitude about Racism	-.32*	-.26*	-.20*	.00
Attitude about Sexism	-.27*	-.21*	-.19*	+.09
Attitude toward the Army	-.19*	-.04	-.27*	+.12
Phase I Expectations (5=very satisfactory; 1 = very unsatisfactory)	-.11	+.06	-.14	+.03
Effect on Career Intention (5=very positive; 1=very negative)	-.21*	-.04	-.17	-.10
Effect on Career (5 = very positive; 1 = very negative)	-.13	-.07	-.19*	-.20*
Effect on Attitude toward military (5 = very positive; 1 = very negative.)	-.20*	-.11	-.31*	-.06
Racial Attitudes, Perceptions, Knowledge, and Behavior				
DRRI Instruments				
Opinion Inventory	+.10	+.05	.00	-.06
Penick Inventory	+.18*	+.05	-.05	+.15
Pro-Integration	+.09	-.01	-.27*	-.13
Pro-Separation	-.31*	-.03	-.04	-.02

*Statistically significant at the .05 level.

Table 24 (Continued)

Variables	Graduation (1=no; 2 = yes)	Peer Rating	Total Academic Test Scores	Self-Rating
Internal-External Control	.00	-.08	-.05	-.07
Personal Systems Control	-.02	+.18*	+.09	-.10
Activity Orientation	-.06	+.05	+.12	+.02
Nominal Index	.00	.00	-.08	-.09
Role of Women	-.27*	-.27*	-.12	-.12
HSR Instruments				
Perceived Discrimination against Blacks (PDB)	-.09	+.09	-.11	+.12
Attitude toward Racial Interaction (ATI)	+.01	+.17	+.06	+.41*
Feelings of Reverse Racism (FRR)	-.22*	-.13	-.14	-.10
Racial Climate (RC)	-.11	+.09	-.21*	+.13
Judgments of Racial Prejudice (JRP)	+.12	+.04	-.03	+.19*
In-Channel Actions (ICA)	+.05	+.03	+.09	-.01
Out-Channel Actions (OCA)	-.08	-.15	+.09	+.20*
Knowledge	+.19*	+.19*	+.23*	+.12
Interracial Behavior (IB)	-.04	+.18*	-.14	+.16
Behavioral Intentions (BI)	-.16	+.03	-.14	+.04

*Statistically significant at the .05 level.

PREDICTING DRRI PERFORMANCE

Table 25

Multiple Regression to Predict DRRI Performance
(N = 83)

Criterion: Peer Rating

Variable	Multiple R
Expected change: Attitude toward people of other races	.31
Sex	.40
Pro-feminist attitude	.49
Importance of reason: To get into RR/EO duty	.53
Racial climate attitude	.54

Academic Test Score

Variable	Multiple R
Education	.45
Prior interest in civil rights	.50
Pro-integration attitude	.53
Importance of reason: To get into RR/EO duty	.55
Expected change: Attitude toward people of other races	.57

Graduation

Variable	Multiple R
Expected change: Attitude about racism	.32
Pro-separation attitude	.47
Importance of reason: To get into RR/EO duty	.54
Pro-integration attitude	.57
Education	.59

Self-Rating

Variable	Multiple R
Education	.33
Race	.53
Sex	.56
Importance of reason: To get into RR/EO duty	.58
Expected change: Attitude toward the Army	.59