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US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
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AN ARMORED CONVERTIBLE?: SHUFFLING SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS IN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

SPECIAL REPORT

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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

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
FOREWORD

This special report explores, along rather controversial lines, the relationships between military and civilian members of the military establishment. The author asserts that the major defense concern is for adequate manning of the whole establishment in the future. According to the author, this concern is emphasized in view of critical developments such as the approaching dearth of adolescents, the mixed acceptability of various alternatives, the impact of powerful changes, and what he considers the built-in procedures in the establishment that discriminate against many civilians. The author concludes that one feasible alternative for dealing with the manning problem is the greater use of civilians; however, he holds that this approach cannot be expected to become effective until those features that tend to relegate civilians to the status of second-class citizens are eliminated.

This special report was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the Strategic Studies Institute, the Army War College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

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SUMMARY

The military establishment is being buffeted by great winds of change; but some portions are affected quickly while other portions, though closely connected, appear to remain unaffected, or affected only slightly, for long periods.

One major effect of advancing technology is the declining proportion of military forces that serve as fighters; the supporters increase in proportion until, today, about 65%-70% of uniformed soldiers are in the support elements. The prospects for the next decade are that fewer adolescents will be available for the military establishment--or any other national purposes.

One response to this and other pressures has been civilianization of about 150,000 positions in the military forces--a practice that under current procedures carries several disadvantages. Among other aspects, it will be necessary to make more accurate and profound comparisons between the two statuses before arbitrarily ordering additional conversions that may prove debilitating.

This study devotes some effort to grasping the nature of the "X Factor," the Military Factor, the cluster of special conditions that characterize service in uniform. The study also investigates a number of characteristics of civilian government service, especially in a military department.

A number of critical developments affecting civil-military relationships are cited, such as the general decline in the roles of military force, the arsenals of nuclear weapons, the transcendent role of civilian strategists, the indispensable roles of civilian scientists in weapons development, and the numerous instances of turning to civilian arrangements (e.g., insistence on a unit of civilian monitors of the peace agreement in the Sinai). Civilians are already performing support duties on combat ships at sea, and at field installations of the Army and Air Force.

Various differences exist, however, in the professional personnel systems of military and civilian members of the military establishment--in benefits to survivors, in retirement systems, in training, in access to higher grades, in duty hours, in frequency of moves, and other aspects. One of the most pervasive and distinctive differences is the complex of written and unwritten procedures by which the civilian professional must accept status subordinate or inferior to that of comparable military professionals.

There are various alternatives to future manning problems--contracting out, using more women, establishing national, lateral entry, and others. Probably appreciable numbers of civilians will have to be used, in several different ways. Two large systems, entailing substantial modification of both military and civilian roles, are suggested.

It is also suggested, however, that no future system intending to use many more civilians will be successful unless attitudes and practices tending to impose second-class citizenship on civilians in the military establishment are eliminated.

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AN ARMORED CONVERTIBLE?: SHUFFLING SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS IN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

Anthony L. Wermuth

The views, opinions, and/or findings contained in this report are those of the author and should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy or decision, unless so designated by other official documentation.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Scope and Purpose.

1. General.

The principal purpose of the Department of Defense (DoD) is perfectly plain: to produce armed forces of maximum effectiveness in modern times, and, if armed conflict involves the United States, to direct American armed forces so as to prevail on the battlefield.

Directing America's course during a war, including the course of the armed forces, is more clearly seen in modern times to be part of the continuing prerogative of civilian control, of political leadership. Within these parameters, the mission of achieving battlefield success remains clearly linked to men in uniform. The other mission, however--the advance production of forces of maximum effectiveness--is less and less conceded to be a monopoly of uniformed persons and is more and more seen to be a complex task for which civilians in the defense establishment, as well as military men, share substantial responsibilities, and in which, as a matter of fact, numerous civilians outside the military establishment also perform substantial roles.

The overall purpose of this exercise is to contribute to improvement of the Army. A more immediate purpose of this study is to identify and analyze indicators of change that apparently further those trends which move DoD

civilians further toward the center of the military establishment, especially in the nonfighting elements. At the same time, these trends create some degree of loss in traditional military separateness and uniqueness, especially beyond the fighting units. Changes in the various roles of civilians within the military establishment, especially outside the fighting elements, will compel compensating adjustments in military roles.

In the military establishment, in comparison with military persons, how are civilian employees regarded--as principals? fifth wheels? horseholders for military principals? second-class citizens? the real brains? behind-the-scenes agents of continuity? Some of these, all of these, and more? Any generalizations are bound to be partially inaccurate.

This paper, additionally, analyzes many roles of military and civilian employees of the military establishment, often in relation to each other. In a sense, this whole paper constitutes an extended comparison.

For many reasons having to do with modern changes in war, organizational dynamics, personnel administration, and American values, the proportion of uniformed persons who do the actual war-fighting is declining within military establishments of any given size, while the proportion of those uniformed persons who perform supporting activities is rising; at the same time, more and more civilians also become engaged in support. The Defense Manpower Commission calculated in 1976 that while civilians in the military establishment are well known to work in support systems, 65 percent of the active military also work in support, not in fighting systems.[1] The burgeoning of both military and civilian participation in military support activities has brought with it displacement of numerous soldiers by civilians.

Such substitutions, if effected in substantial numbers, force significant adjustments in the roles and statuses of both soldiers and civilians, including job, career, and administrative adaptations, affecting recruitment, classification, education, career development, promotion, and many other vulnerable aspects.

Whatever changes occur, a substantial portion of the military establishment will continue to constitute the "cutting edge," the fighting forces, the combat units, in which cultivation of the military ethos will continue indefinitely to be required, so that the whole military establishment can perform successfully the basic mission for which the establishment exists. No part of the following discussion should be taken to support any other overall premise than that, no matter what evolution occurs in military and civilian roles, the supreme ethos and defining spirit of the entire military establishment must continue to be the interests of the fighting forces.

While there is inevitably a certain amount of commonality (and also some critical differences) in interests and procedures among all the civilians employed by the Federal Government, this study concentrates as exclusively as possible upon those who can be identified as "civilians within the military establishment"--viz., employees of the Department of Defense, including the Military Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force. Collectively, these almost one million civilians constitute the largest departmental proportion of the total 2.8 million civilian employees of the Federal Government.

2. Tentative Hypotheses.

Initially, and tentatively, three related propositions are put forth, for study and judgment, in this project:

Proposition 1: The most difficult problem facing the military in the future is neither technical nor technological, but demographic.

Proposition 2: The role of the civilian in modern military establishments is on the verge of great change.

Proposition 3: The traditional Army climate in which some civilian employees are regarded as, in some degree, "second-class citizens," will have to be substantially reoriented, if maximum readiness is to be attained by the Army out of available resources.

3. Qualifications.

Varied experience has provided credentials and underpinnings for my entry into study of this subject. For 32 years, I served in the Regular Army, from enlisted man and cadet to colonel of infantry. After retirement from the military, I served over seven years as research director, professional scholar, and manager in a private industry think tank--during the final years, as director of social science studies. Then I moved to Civil Service. I was forced to the conclusion that, in my uniformed days, I had greatly overrated my knowledge of Army civilians.

4. Definitions.

Despite efforts to reduce repetition, I shall use the term "civilians" constantly, meaning, in this text, civilian employees of the military establishment, and especially those employed by the Army. Frequently, moreover, by "civilian employee" I shall be referring primarily to professionals (GS-11 and up).

In somewhat the same manner, the term "soldier" is often used to refer only to Army uniformed persons; but much of the time, the reference is valid also for sailors, airmen, and marines. In most cases, "soldiers" refers primarily to officers, but sometimes to officers and NCO's and sometimes to everyone in uniform.

In differentiating between "civilian" and "military," it is the term "civilian" that is in most instances the larger, nonlimiting term. "Military" is the special term, and the related term "nonmilitary" simply applies again to all civilians. While soldiers are growing up, they, too, are all civilians. When they are discharged from military service, they again become "veterans," or civilians. When they retire, the armed forces say that retirees are subject to recall to active duty in emergencies and that monetary amounts received during retirement are not "pensions" but "retired pay." During the long stretches of peacetime, however, few or no retirees are ever recalled. They live essentially as civilians in civilian communities, wholly under civil law. Thus, the two groups are composed of essentially the same people, with the same general values and interests, and with the exception of limited group and individual conflicts. They are not natural manipulable adversaries, except for limited periods on specific issues; accordingly, civilians and soldiers are not fixed and exclusive opposites. Hence, in many contexts, attempts to present one term as the reverse of the other are not effective.

The two groups are subject to differentiation for purposes of social efficiency--not on any moral, political, economic, or philosophical principle of distinction. In certain contexts, the military sometimes develops a self-image of differentness, of concreteness, of definitive identity--sometimes of aloofness to "vague and formless" civilian society. But such a contrast will exist whenever <u>any specialist group</u> in any society appraises itself in contrast to the great <u>mass</u> of civilian society.

This study is limited to the four uniformed combat services--Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. No kind of reflection is intended here; the description is offered to place the Coast Guard's role in perspective as not

being a force primarily intended for combat and war, any more than police forces and fire departments, dangerous and violent as their work often is. In this study's context, they are all civilians.

Because of repetition to a potentially annoying degree, we frequently substitute "DoD" for "the Department of Defense," and "DA" for the Department of the Army. Because of its central importance to this study, we refer frequently to the Defense Manpower Commission and its report as "DMC" and "DMC Report," respectively.

A very good rundown[2] on the literature of recent decades is available, by George A. Kourvetaris and Betty A Dobratz, on issues which have been subjects of enlightening contributions by a gradually increasing number of notable civilian scholars such as Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz, Charles Moskos, John Lovell, Kurt Lang, Amos Perlmutter, Bernard Brodie, Bengt Abrahamsson, Stanislav Andreski, Albert Biderman, and Jacques Van Doorn--not to omit reference to notable contributions by military professionals to this literature.

5. Caveats.

Much material of variable significance to military affairs is not included in this discussion. For example, as is the case throughout the American military establishment, civilian control is taken for granted here and remains unquestioned, largely beyond discussion. Change in the nature of war and requirements for a modern military establishment, however, are quite relevant, and in some sections we discuss them sparingly.

Officials of government, endeavoring to construct viable military manpower programs, must cope with every relevant facet of this problem. This study addresses a number of them, but not all. Omitted from this study, although

peripherally addressed here and there, are detailed analyses of these important subjects:

- strategic equations
- force structures
- national military policies, including those which emerge with baffling intensity during low-level, guerrilla war, such as those experienced within the American government over policies to be supported in connection with Vietnam.
- Reserve and National Guard programs
- mobilization policies
- political appointees (i.e., "in and outers," to be distinguished from careerists)
- extensive analysis of military and civilian compensation systems

Another area of special relevance to the subject discussed here is that of statuses and tensions between, on the one hand, both military and civilian careerists, and on the other hand, civilian executives appointed by political administrations (sometimes called "in and outers").

This study discusses primarily General Schedule employees, especially those civilian employees in professional, specialist, and supervisory positions.

This discussion, it is intended, will not engage in polemics or, though it may argue vigorously, argue one-sidedly. It is hoped that only meritorious arguments will be presented; but certain points cannot be made without raising some possibility of tension, even controversy; however, while employing as much delicacy as seems appropriate, we shall try to avoid controversy but shall not yield the debating grounds because of it. I leave room for the possibility that I am wrong, that such major trends as I cite here are not occurring or will not continue, that I have misjudged scope or intensity, or that these are only temporary phenomena that may even reverse themselves.

B. The Current Dilemma Leading to the Future.

We are in this monograph most concerned about the future. The Army is necessarily alarmed by the promised demographic shortfalls of the 1980's and

beyond. But even some current conditions in Army service are hardly reassuring, and brief description of them contributes to understanding of the future problem of manning the Army. Professor Charles C. Moskos, Northwestern University sociologist and astute longtime analyst of Army manpower problems, testified to Congress with invaluable illumination of background in February 1979 on shortcomings among the current ranks of soldiers (I apologize for unusually lengthy, though succinct, quotation):

> Since January 1973, the United States has sought to accomplish what it has never attempted before: to maintain two million persons on active duty on a completely voluntary basis. . . .
>
> The problems of the all-volunteer force are found . . . /in/ a redefinition of military service in terms of the economic marketplace and the cash-work nexus. . . .
>
> * * * * * * *
>
> It is revealing to look at actual numbers as well. In 1964 over 40,000 persons who had at least some college entered the Army's enlisted ranks; in 1978 the figure was less than 5,000.
>
> * * * * * * *
>
> . . . Since the end of the draft, the proportion of black high school graduates entering the Army has exceeded that of whites, and by quite a substantial margin. What is happening in the all-volunteer Army is that whereas the black soldier is fairly representative of the black community, white entrants of recent years are coming from the least educated sectors of the white population.
>
> * * * * * * *
>
> . . . the issue is more than morality; it is also one of military effectiveness. There is a clear relationship between socioeducational background and soldierly performance. High school graduates, compared with high school dropouts, are twice as likely to complete their enlistments. Other measures such as combat effectiveness, enlisted productivity and low indiscipline rates show the same positive connection with socioeducational background. The evidence is also clear, contrary to conventional wisdom, that better educated soldiers do better across the board--in "low skill" as well as "high skill" jobs.
>
> * * * * * * *

> In all-volunteer recruitment, a consistent theme--out of necessity, to be sure--has been on the self-serving aspects of military life, notably, on what the service can do for the recruit in the way of training in skills transferable to civilian jobs.
>
> The irreconcilable dilemma is that many military assignments--mostly, but not exclusively, in the ground combat arms and aboard warships--do not and cannot have transferability to civilian occupations. And it is precisely in such military assignments that attrition and destruction are most likely to occur.
>
> Large raises in military pay for lower enlisted personnel /has/ . . . turned out to be a double-edged sword. Youth surveys show that pay motivates less-qualified youth (for example, high school dropouts, those with poor grades) to join the armed services while having a negligible effect on college-bound youth.[3]

* * * * * * *

One relationship that has remained fairly constant over a century, yet without explanation in relation to this problem of current concern, is the rather constant proportion of the Defense Establishment included in both military and civilian sectors, as shown here:[4]

Year	Combined Civ. and Mi. Def. Establ.	% Civilian	% Military
1881	54,142	30.1	69.9
1901	156,846	28.4	71.6
1931	360,585	30.	70.
1957	4,091,296	30.2	68.3
1968	4,802,260	27.4	72.6

C. The Principal Problem Addressed.

The basic problem addressed here is the necessity to keep the armed forces manned by persons of sufficient qualifications and in sufficient numbers. One important obstacle to achievement of this national goal is the general increase

in sophistication of American society and the American economy, generating more intensive competition in the future for talented youth.

Probably the obstacle of greatest significance in manning American armed forces in the future, however, is the certain decline in the population's youth sector. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) forecasts that the number of Americans reaching the age of 18, the prime age for entry into military service, will be 2.1 million in 1979, but only 1.7 million by 1987 (a drop of 20 percent). Currently, the armed forces must recruit 1 out of every 5.6 18-year olds, but by 1987 will have to recruit 1 out of every 4.6.

This current and projected shortage applies not only to regular forces, those on active duty and presumably ready to go anywhere promptly, but also to America's Reserve and National Guard. For example, the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), however, supposed to hold a pool of reserve fighters for assignment as early replacements for early casualties, is said by the Army to require 729,000 individuals; its recent strength, however, was 182,000. The Defense Manpower Commission estimated that by FY 1980, total IRR strength may drop to 77,000.[5] Observed Robert Goldich, the CRS analyst: "There is a general consensus that given present military manpower procurement and utilization policies, the Services will not be able to maintain current military manpower strengths in the 1980's.[6]

This is a grave conclusion, and much of this study is concerned with ways of coping with its implications.

CHAPTER II

SOME BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM IN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

A. Principal General Distinctions Between the Bases for Military and Civilian Personnel Systems.

1. Making General Distinctions Between Combatants and Noncombatants.

This chapter explores, mainly, the institutional contexts of military-civilian relationship in the military establishment.

The terms "civilian," "soldier," "military," and "armed forces," especially as they involve status comparisons, also require, for clarity, discussion of the terms "combatants" and "noncombatants." Such discussion is particularly relevant, as we shall see in this and later sections, to such activities as "civilianization," or "convertibility," or "substitution" of civilians in positions previously designated as military.

Distinctions between civilian and military incumbency of a position depends upon a number of factors; but the basic distinction rests upon the relationship of the position's incumbent to battle, to combat against an enemy.

A well-known British commentator on international law, Georg Schwarzenberger, pointed to distinctions

> . . . between combatants and noncombatants, between members of armed forces and civilians, and between lawful and unlawful combatants. While the three distinctions overlap, they are not identical. Civilians may be combatants and members of the armed forces noncombatants, and either one may be lawful or unlawful combatants.[1]

Exclusion of civilians from being members of armed forces is implicit throughout US public law. Stackhouse asserts that civilians employed by the armed services are not members of the armed forces from a legal standpoint

and may not legally be considered to be combatants. Civilians should be excluded from all combatant positions and from noncombatant positions of jeopardy near fields of battle.[2]

Morris Greenspan, a widely accredited jurist and writer, states in The Modern Law of Land Warfare:

> The distinction between combatants-noncombatants within the armed forces must be taken to correspond to the distinction between fighting troops and troops in service units. The fighting troops of an Army carry out the actual military operations. Whereas the service troops minister to the needs of the former and supply their various requirements. . . . Combatants would include infantry, cavalry, armored troops and the like whose function it is to engage with the enemy; as well as artillery, engineers, signals, and others, whose duty it is to support such action. . . . The functions of noncombatant elements within the armed forces do not ordinarily bring them into actual conflict with the enemy, but except for medical personnel and chaplains, no objection can be raised to their employment as combat troops if need should arise.[3] /italics added/

Another important area for prudent investigation ahead of time involves Title 5 of the United States Code, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, certain traditional perspectives, and various directives of the Department of Defense and regulations of the Department of the Army--all relating to supervision, in mixed activities, i.e., such questions as whether civilians may or may not supervise soldiers. We shall not attempt here to penetrate very far into the legal thicket that looms ahead on this path.

In response to the 1955 recommendations of the Hoover Commission, the Department of Defense directed that an inventory be taken of management positions in support activities. One of the criteria issued for the inventory was this one: "The line of authority and supervision in support-type activities need not be military. Any level of supervisory authority may be exercised in support-type activities by either civilian or military personnel."[4]

An appendix to that study included this relevant passage:

> Supervisory Authority. At the discretion of the responsible commander, any level of supervisory authority within his unit or units may be delegated to civilian personnel. The exercise of supervisory authority by civilian personnel or military personnel will be as specified in each case by the responsible commander. Civilian supervision of the work of military personnel does not preclude the military superior of such personnel from exercising military discipline or performing other duties in administration of military personnel. . . . At the discretion of the responsible commander, military or civilian personnel may be utilized on a temporary basis to fill any position of a TD unit when the best utilization of available personnel dictates. . .[5]

2. The Military Factor.

a. Definition. "In warfare, the force of armies is the product of the mass multiplied by something else, an unknown X." Thus spoke Tolstoy in War and Peace:

> Military science, seeing in history an immense number of examples in which the mass of an army does not correspond with its force, and in which small numbers conquer large ones, vaguely recognizes the existence of this unknown factor . . . X is the spirit of the army, the greater or less desire to fight and to face dangers on the part of all the men composing the army, which is quite apart from the question whether they are fighting under leaders of genius or not, with cudgels or with guns that fire thirty times a minute.[6]

At the risk of compounding confusion, I quote the foregoing famous passages from Tolstoy in order to distinguish the well-known X factor he describes--a perfectly valid and important description--from the X factor centrally involved in this project. Tolstoy's X factor is spirit, elan, morale; but the X factor in this project is the cluster of characteristics that are unique to military service, that distinguish the military environment from the other social environments. The most obvious such cluster is the environment of combat, but combat is not the whole of it. There are many common factors in various kinds of civilian and military work, including danger.

In analyzing differences and samenesses in the prototype environments of military and civilian positions in the armed forces, possibly the most objective analysis in print is still the great 4-volume landmark sociological study from World War II: The American Soldier.[7] In analyses of combat, the emphasis in The American Soldier was primarily on ground combat:

> Combat is the end toward which all the manifold activities of the Army are oriented, however indirectly. Organized combat is also the activity by which an armed force is most differentiated from other social organizations. . . . In a war in which the trend was toward the development of intricate weapons requiring highly specialized skills for their management, ground, sea, or air warfare still required the maximum of physical and emotional endurance. In ground combat in particular the stresses and countermotives involved in warfare can be seen in their simplest terms. Yet, taken in their details, combat situations are almost infinitely varied. There are literally thousands of perceptible combinations of factors among the important variables.[8]

Yet, this colossal task force of great talents, working for four or more years, was not able to produce a satisfactory definition of "combat." For that matter, for certain contexts, the Department of War was unable to produce one.

> 'Combat' turns out to be extraordinarily difficult to define, so much so that the Army was obliged to use the admittedly inadequate criterion of award of campaign stars as a substitute for counting days in combat in determining demobilization credit /for priority in returning home at the end of World War II/.[9]

The Stouffer teams attempted to identify important variables that almost always affect combat situations (which in turn may be relevant to the propriety of designating a position as "military," "civilian," or either): terrain; climate and weather; adequacy of resupply; adequacy of personnel replacement system; competence of leadership; adequacy of pretraining; adequacy of medical services; type, intensity, and quality of enemy opposition;

adequacy of supporting and cooperating forces; adequacy of internal and external communications; preceding and follow-on actions; duration without rest; extent of casualties incurred; and anticipated duration of current situation and of the war.[10]

The American Soldier has this to say about the most notable quality of combat:

> The one all-pervading quality of combat which most obviously marks it off as the object of special interest is that it was a situation of stress. It combined in one not-too-neat package a large number of major factors which men everywhere tend to regard as things to be avoided. Adjustment to combat means not only adjustment to killing, but also adjustment to danger, to frustration, to uncertainty, to noise and confusion and particularly to the wavering faith in the efficiency or success of one's comrades and command.[11]

Helpfully, the main types of stress that occur in combat have been identified by the Third Annual Quadrennial Review:[12]

1. Threats to life, to limbs, to health.
2. Physical discomfort--heat, cold, wetness, dryness, exposure, insects, disease, filth, injuries or wounds, fatigue, lack of sleep.
3. Deprivation of sexual and related social satisfactions.
4. Isolation from accustomed sources of affection.
5. Loss of comrades; sight and sound of wounded and dying comrades.
6. Restrictions on personal movement.
7. Extended uncertainty.
8. Repeated conflicts among one's values:
   a. Between duty and one's safety and comfort.
   b. Between duty and obligation to family.
   c. Between loyalty to comrades and requirements of the military situation.

d. Between familiar moral codes and combat imperatives.

9. The impersonality of combat; use of the person as a weapon of war.

10. Lack of privacy; pressures of close living.

11. Alternative periods of boredom and anxiety.

12. The "endlessness of combat"; lack of terminal individual goals.

As we all recognize, the foregoing diversified stresses are not unique to military fighters, not even danger of terrible injury or death. Most of these stresses, however, are unique when occurring on a large scale or in clusters, or when sustained overlong. Still, there are more than a few civilian occupations in which the danger of violent death is ever present, such as coal-mining, the digging of tunnels through Alps and under rivers, riveting on high steel, deep-sea diving, and the activities of steeplejacks, stunt men, racing drivers, wild animal trainers, bomb defusers, police and firemen.

While readily acknowledging that danger in some of these civilian activities may be comparable to the hazards of combat, there are often certain factors present in civilian contexts that serve to lessen the intensity of the stress experienced:

- participants are volunteers, and can quit when they want;

- participants are highly paid, usually enjoying premium bonuses;

- usually, only a relatively few persons are involved out of a whole community;

- periods of maximum tension are limited (e.g., most all such positions operate for the individual for "8 hours per day"; substantial efforts are made for the individual's rest and recreation during the hours

per day and weekends when he is off the job; even in the rare circumstances in which a civilian worker remains in dangerous circumstances around the clock, various arrangements are usually provided for his relief every 10 days or every month or similar periods).

The Third (Dec 1976) quoted the First (Nov 1967) Quadrennial Review on Military Compensation:

> There are marked differences between military service and civilian employment, and the differences are so substantial and so varied that some effect on pay provisions must be expected. It is important, accordingly, to seek to identify the significant differences and to determine what effect, if any, they should have on pay.[13]

It is possibly of significance that the most penetrating study of the military environment should take place for the purpose of analyzing military pay. The First Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (1967) concentrated on elements of regular military compensation and retirement. The Second Review (1971) restricted its investigations to selected special pays: submarine pay, flight pay, reenlistment bonuses, pay for physicians, and hostile fire pay. The Third Review, 1976, directed by and mostly composed of military persons, undertook more ambitious and comprehensive analysis of military compensation than any previously attempted.

The Third Review announced that it addressed: ". . . all conditions of military service, both positive and negative, that are an inherent part of the acceptance of military service, and which may or may not have a bearing on compensation."[14] This compilation, said the Review, constitutes "the military factor," that is, the factors which justify payment of an added increment as "The X Factor" or "the Military Factor.[15]

The Third Review identified 57 general conditions of military service, listed in Note 19, 27 of which were considered positive (that is, relatively

advantageous to persons in military service) and 30 judged to be negative (i.e., disadvantageous) conditions or factors. The Review also designated two broad factor-categories of conditions of military service:

- The X Factor, the general factor is intended to answer such a question as, "What percentage of military pay should be calculated as an amount added to compensate the military member for being subject to the additional general difficulties of military life, over and above the general conditions of civilian life?"

- The Individual military factor, meaning conditions of unusual hazard or stress within the military which are normally experienced by individual members selectively and which, for similar kinds of civilian employment, there is usually recognition via premium pays on an individual basis.

There are a number of things that need to be said promptly about these factor-categories:

1. The same advantages and disadvantages, such as the hazards of combat, are not borne equally by all persons in uniform.

2. Quantification can be, and was, attempted, with mixed results. Some factors can be measured only very roughly, and others cannot be "measured" at all.

3. Some factors are listed as "positive" and some as "negative" conditions of service. A few of such categorizations may be considered controversial, entailing some subjective element. Some soldiers, for example, rather than complain about being in the field for long periods, prefer such periods.

4. Some categorizations appear to contradict conventional evaluations. Where many civilians would adjudge a certain condition of military life

"negative," some military might evaluate the condition as positive, such as conditions which enhance group cohesion, even combat effectiveness--such as wearing of the uniform, living in military communities, parades, awards, even shared dangers.

> . . . to disregard personal safety for goals higher in the hierarchy of human needs, in intense danger and confusion of warfare, results from feelings of group power, need for group approval, and acceptance of group goals and ethics. . . .[16]

5. On balance, the cited conditions apply equally to officers and enlisted men.

6. The <u>most significant negative factor</u> affecting the individual in military service is said to be the unique loss of personal control of one's destiny. Even the risks of combat are subsumed under this factor.[17]

7. The next two most damaging factors are considered to be frequent moves and family separation, which cause uncertainty and anxiety, cost money, hamper the development of roots in a community, require repeated efforts to "start over" in new communities, bring grief to some, and are at least partly responsible for families growing apart. It should be recognized that separation effects are felt by single members as well as by "marrieds."[18]

The "unique" features, positive and negative, identify the military environment wherein it is most difficult and separate from civilian life. These features support an expectation that it takes a substantial degree of personal adjustment to transfer effectively, even temporarily, from civilian to military status. Adjustment cannot be expected overnight, or by the stroke of a pen, or merely by changing the labels on personnel spaces.

b. A Career Model. The Third Review found the average military career to extend over 22 years and to experience 9 relocations. The model[20] seems to say that the total of repeated combat exposures over a typical career would tend, on the average, to fall into the proportions shown below:

Military Situation	Percent of Career Military Experience
Combat Zone	9 %
Category I	(3.9%)
Category III	(5.1%)
Family Separation, Unaccompanied Tours (Excludes combat, sea duty, and field duty)	2.8%
Overseas (with family, excluding field duty)	14.0%
Field (or Sea) Duty	10.4%
Other, Overwhelmingly in CONUS	63.8%
	100 %

Thus, the model establishes the allocation of various principal conditions that occur in the average of all current military careers, and so underwrites the validity of perceptions that there is indeed some increment of compensable disadvantage suffered by the average soldier (and sailor and airman) in comparison with the average citizen in civilian life, including civilians who work in the military establishment.

c. Internal Imbalance in the X Factor. A number of positive conditions equal and balance out certain negative conditions, but negative conditions are not balanced out. According to the Third Review, the following 11 general liabilities in military service cannot be adequately balanced out by citing positive benefits: combat exposure, frequently directed moves,

directed family separations, sea duty, field duty, unlimited and irregular workweek, exposure to disease and low sanitary conditions, isolated posts, loss of earned leave (officers only), no right to quit, and liability to command at sea and in field equivalents. (One or two of these factors seem possibly ambivalent. The last one above, for example, is considered in some military contexts to be a positive opportunity, rather than a negative condition. In the context above, however, it is apparently meant to highlight the great responsibilities that weigh on a commander at sea or in the field, such as command of a nuclear aircraft carrier costing $2 billion and carrying 3,000 men, but for which no additional compensation is provided to the incumbent of the top job.)

d. Attempts to Quantify the X Factor for Pay Purposes. As noted, the United States has never formally provided compensation to its troops for the explicit purpose of offsetting the X Factor. The Defense Manpower Commission, after its exhaustive analysis of numerous aspects of the American military establishment, recommended[21] in 1976 that no explicit payment should be made to all or most service members for the X Factor.

Only the five factors listed below[22] are subject to some kind of quantification, however partial: combat exposure (number of days?); frequently directed moves, including overseas; directed family separation; unlimited and irregular overtime without pay; and field training (and equivalent training at sea).

In 1970, a British Panel, admittedly acting partly subjectively toward much data relevant to the differential between military and civilian conditions of service, estimated their X Factor at 19 percent. Evidently, the Australians and Canadians also provide an X Factor.[23]

Specifically, the United States has never paid compensation to its military members for participation in combat, but has provided amounts, invariably modest, for being liable to exposure to combat. Thus, every soldier in the US forces in all of Vietnam, regardless of rank or assignment, from E-1 to 0-10, whether in a combat unit or an administrative unit, received "hostile fire pay" of $65 a month--a token amount that perhaps overcompensated those serving at negligible risk and undercompensated those serving in front-line combat units (all US military persons in Vietnam with dependents left at home also received a separation allowance of $30 per month, and exemption of $500 of income from Federal income tax, for each month being served in Vietnam).

In any event, the Third Review came to this conclusion:[24] general military liability should be addressed in a General Military Factor applicable throughout a military career and (at least, initially and cautiously) set at these figures: between 4.4 percent and 10.1 percent of Military Equivalent Salary for E-7 and above; between 9.4 percent and 15.1 percent for E-6 and below.

3. The Great Web: Control, Convergence, and Divergence.

The great web of American civilian-military relationships is fraught with pressures and counterpressures, with contrary forces at different levels (and some at the same levels). Some principles, such as the sacrosanct principle of Civilian Control, are universally praised. But what, exactly does the term mean in various situations?

The principle of civilian control has been both widely understood and widely misunderstood in American history. Aside from long-standing views about such subjects as standing armies, quartering of troops, and regimentation,

the fundamental basis for the principle is that the custodianship of the nation's great weapons arsenal is turned over to the military. The military has the guns and, except for police, the legitimized monopoly of means of violence.

Occasional verbal forays by civilians of limited powers of comprehension, however, lead to allegations that the real basis for civilian control is that military persons are sure to possess lesser capabilities in brains, competence, imagination, and integrity. Among such antimilitary citizens, it is viewed as inevitable that civilians run national programs because civilians are believed to possess superior abilities. Such is the stuff of prejudice.

Basically, we are interested in whether or not, and to what extent, the military establishment reflects the society from which it springs and which it is charged to protect. Is military society "converging" toward civilian society or "diverging"--that is, becoming more unlike American society in general? Professor Charles Moskos has discerned both trends in the military, and concludes[25] that the eventual result will not be pervasive homogeneity one way or the other, but a pluralistic military in which divergence would be most marked in combat units, selected other units, and higher operational-command headquarters, where the traditional military ethos would be cultivated. On the other hand, convergence would be characteristic of military units and enterprises concerned with administrative, educational, medical, logistical, technical, and other areas not uniquely military--areas which would be allowed to become, and which are becoming, more civilianized.

Arthur Larson has emphasized that these two sectors must not become separate, and any tendency toward antagonism to each other must be headed off

decisively; they must remain closely responsive to each other--especially must the "civilianized" sector be responsive to the combat sector.[26]

4. Comparison of Costs.

In any program to substitute civilians for soldiers, or vice versa, one of the primary considerations for an economy-minded legislature is cost. But costing out this factor of substitution is more elusive than at first it appears to be. In general, in direct cost comparison, man for man, in salary and benefits, the civilian employee appears to average slightly more costly than the military employee. In some direct substitutions of appreciable numbers, however, it has required fewer civilians to replace a given number of military persons. The basic reason is said to be that man-hour availability is greater for the civilian employee in comparable positions, since military incumbents of "office jobs," for example, must perform a number of collateral military duties not performed by the civilian, e.g., drill, ceremonies, range-firing, police of barracks, police of the base, guard duty, and similar chores.

In any event, it is occasionally concluded that military and civilian costs and capabilities are so intertwined that it is almost impossible to determine whether one or the other costs more.

In several incisive analyses, R.V.L. Cooper has investigated the relative factors in allocation of military or civilian manpower and other resources.[27] He points out that various combinations of weapons, units, and other elements can be developed to perform the same action, some relatively labor-intensive, some relatively capital-intensive; thus, the capital-labor ratio varies, and no one combination is always cheaper.

> Manpower requirements are in general a function of four basic factors: the force structure, operations and maintenance policies, the types of equipment in the force structure, and the types of personnel used.[28]

Variations in any or all of these factors will affect the number of persons needed and the costs of performing the contemplated action.

Cooper's analysis leads to a conclusion that probably no more than 50 percent of the spaces in the military establishment actually need to be military, and that the remaining 50 percent could be manned by either military or civilian persons--except for several constraints, described elsewhere, such as rotation base, career opportunities, and a few others. He noted that, whatever people believe about civilians and combat, in Vietnam civilian contractors performed support activities that at times placed them in close proximity to combat.[29]

It is not clear what concrete measures are available to transform the armed forces from being labor intensive to being capital intensive, especially in the uniquely-military combat units. In the support sectors, many civilian-military substitutions have taken place, and many of the lower-skilled, civilian and military, have already been eliminated.

5. Mobilization and Wartime Differentials.

We approach here an issue to which reactions vary widely; for some people, this issue, pro or con, is quite sensitive. Among illuminating possibilities is one that compares and contrasts differences in pay in wartime. Compensation reflects a number of considerations, not merely "the ultimate appraisal," in relation to wartime participation in war-related activities. Differences in relative remuneration certainly contribute evidence to support perceptions of differences in "deservingness."

As a generalization, it would appear that the fairest way to "allocate risk and sacrifice" in wartime is for a nation to mobilize everybody, men and women; but apparently, no nation has settled the complex problem of equity in

mobilization. Meanwhile, some nations content themselves by allocating several ex post facto advantages to the fighters by granting insurance to families of those killed, by providing postwar medical care for the wounded, and by granting certain benefits--education, housing loans, and similar benefits.

Thus, the military warfighters' pay (except for the recent annual cost-of living-raise period) tends to stability over years, and changes only for all Servicemen at the same time. Except for a wartime raise in pay--and, of course, except for whatever postwar benefits are made available by Congress for veterans of that particular war--all Servicemen are paid on the same scale, a scale different from civilian scales (again, differences in wartime hazards, as such, among Servicemen are ignored in pay scales).

Throughout the civilian sector, wages and salaries rise. Genuine profiteers emerge. Substantial differentials in pay are granted to civilian persons who are deferred from military work, but who become subject to war-danger for limited periods--e.g., merchant marine.

Here are some examples (no doubt variations occurred), all cited by the Third Review, from recent national experience in Vietnam, illustrating that civilians are able to engage in some forms of combat, and that during wars, when maximum members of men in uniform are reached, the men in uniform are usually paid the least, even in comparison to civilians who are doing the same things that are being done by combat troops.

- All American military persons of any rank, serving anywhere and doing anything from battle to beach, in Vietnam, were paid (in addition to regular pay and allowances) $65 per month as "hostile fire" pay (that's $780

per 12 months); family separation allowance of $30 per month, and exemption from federal income tax at the rate of $500 per month;

- The United States paid Laotians, Cambodians, and Vietnamese in military service at a rate five times what a person of the same capabilities was paid in the civilian economy of those countries;

- US civilians piloting helicopters on resupply and leaflet dropping missions in a combat environment (the same missions as were being carried out by US Army warrant officers and other troops) were paid a base salary three or four times the pay of warrant officers performing exactly the same jobs at the same time and in the same place;

- The civilian pilots received bonuses and additional differentials (not paid to military) for flying in excess of 125 hours per month; for flying over hostile areas; for rescue operations; and for their helicopter's receipt of combat damage;

- A member of the merchant marine, during the Vietnam War (like comparable emoluments paid in previous wars) received a 100 percent salary differential for each pay period, or part of a pay period, during which his ship was in "combat waters." If his ship was attacked in any way on the high seas, all members received a $300 bonus; and if the ship was attacked while in port, each member (whether he was on board the ship or not at the time of attack) received a $200 bonus.[30]

- US civilian employees (Civil Service) working in Vietnam--naturally, in circumstances remote from all but the most exceptional war peril (such as did occur, however, in Saigon and many other towns in Vietnam, at the time of Tet 1968)--received a 25 percent salary differential for service "in a combat zone," although they had, of course, no combat role.[31]

In addition, opportunities were profuse for civilians to earn overtime pay (at 150 percent of the regular rate and 200 percent for Sundays and Holidays). Normally, in the United States, it is quite difficult for Civil Service employees at grades of GS-11 and higher to be paid for "overtime," usually, compensatory time only is allowed. In Vietnam, employees could pile up overtime; those of GS-11 and higher grades could receive no higher hourly rate, however, than the highest rate payable in the grade of GS-10, with a total top limit set at the statutory limit of pay to any and all Civil Service employees (set in 1978, for example, at $47,500).[32]

- In addition, overseas civilian employees are accorded a housing allowance, Post Exchange and commissary privileges, and medical care in military facilities. None of these are provided to Civil Service employees in CONUS.

- Another factor is separate from pay and concerns that factor of civilian status that reverses the universal requirement for the soldier to stay with his unit. The civilian employee does not have to stay overseas if danger approaches. The civilian employee is included with dependents in "noncombatants."

The basic status is covered in Army Civilian Personnel Regulations:

> . . . Commanders will make plans for the rapid reassignment or safe evacuation of Army civilian employees under their jurisdiction should civil disturbance, disaster or enemy action require such measures. However, key civilian employees whose services are needed during this period may remain overseas on a purely voluntary basis.[33]

All US Army commands overseas have for years been asking civilian employees whether they would be willing to continue in current jobs if war were to break out. A number of civilians say yes, but the resulting commitment will not be binding in wartime.[34]

Thus, we have established here that some civilians have served, and do serve, in "combat zones" (however loosely defined) in wartime. Some are Civil Service employees of the Military Departments, and some are civilians in the vast domestic scene outside the Department of Defense. Civilian employees involved, both public and private, are invariably given higher money differentials of varying scope, compared to the pay levels provided for the warfighters in uniform.

To some extent, this condition is relevant to an overall comparison of soldiers and civilians within the military establishment. Enjoying the status of noncombatants, civilians are normally shielded from combat in all but negligible respects; if they voluntarily enter combat zones, they are provided high emolument--appreciably higher than amounts provided to uniformed Servicemen, most of whom, in wartime, have no opportunity to volunteer one way or the other.

6. Rank Equivalency Comparisons.

One of the most difficult aspects of the civilian-military relationship to pin down, and directly related to intentions to substitute one for the other, is the relationship of rank or status. The ladders of military rank are perfectly clear, as are the ladders of Civil Service rank. Some steps appear to be directly comparable, but others appear to correlate imperfectly, as a particular step on one ladder may overlap more than one step, up or down, on the other ladder.

The resulting confusion and uncertainty is sometimes exploited by one side or the other, whenever advantages can be discerned from exploitation. Meanwhile, in American government service, this entire question remains

partially in limbo. Attempts to resolve it definitively have been sponsored by various offices in government; but the status of continued irresolution is preferred by other offices or groups in government; and so, irresolution lingers.

A basic equivalency list was established in the Geneva Conventions, to indicate levels of status and facilities to which prisoners of war, military and civilian, are to be entitled. Apparently, no more definitive basis for comparison of military and civilian rank is officially acknowledged by any agency in the American bureaucracy. Nevertheless, numerous such lists do exist (see Appendix).

It will be noted throughout all the lists developed by the military establishment that, even when a military and a civilian grade are "equated" for any purpose, such as the invariable equation of GS-15 and colonel (06), the military grade is always listed ahead of the civilian grade. It may be that some device (such as the simple intra-military device of using date of appointment to category or level) will be conceived that will solve the precedence question in a way satisfactory to both military and civilian employees of government.

B. The Federal Work Force.

Somewhat different tensions exist between those who serve in uniform, and those who do not; between those who are drafted and those who volunteer; between those who serve part-time (Reserves) and the full-timers (Regulars); among those who risk life in battle and those others, who may be in uniform and hard-working but who prefer to perform the kinds of services that take place in relative safety; and especially between those who go out to fight the war and those who remain on the "home front" during a war. What is equity in these relationships?

The early US Government was naturally influenced by the Founding Fathers--a semi-aristocracy, well-educated, relatively well-born, prosperous--in other words, the upper classes. It is said that "the first precedents of office-holding were honorable ones." In its early days, compared to other national civil services, the American version was one of the most competent and most democratic in the world.[35]

It was not long before struggle developed between adherents of different central guiding principles: the spoils and patronage principle, on the one hand, and on the other, the merit principle. Jackson's concept, victorious in 1829, was a rather mild application of the premise that to the victor belongs the spoils--a premise that reached new heights under Lincoln, who replaced 1457 out of a possible 1639 presidential officers.[36]

It may be surprising to a few readers to realize how long delayed was the acceptance of the concept of efficiency in modern personnel administration.

It may be distinctly American that for decades many attempts to reform government services were undertaken as moral crusades, as attempts, not to install efficiency, but to overcome evil. In any event, a scholar of administration, Felix A. Nigro, tells us[37] that as late as the late 1930's, personnel administration in many agencies of government was conducted by clerks. It was not until 1938 that the President (Franklin D. Roosevelt) issued an executive order requiring all major government departments and agencies to establish bona fide, professionally staffed personnel offices.[38]

Meanwhile, over many decades, the military personnel systems were being constantly refined and improved. The administration of civilian personnel started (in modern terms) very late and has never caught up--even as one of

two systems administered by the same military department. The dichotomy between them has been recognized for a long time.

Professor Paul Van Riper, historian of the civil service, coming to the conclusion of his study, was greatly troubled by the "competitive relationships" between what he saw as "two great executive bureaucratic establishments." Writing in 1958, he suggested that "the largely unexplored area of civil military relations within our great executive branch must not remain much longer untouched and uncharted."[39] /Italics added/

A representative summary of "Civilian Personnel Management" follows, as perceived within the military establishment:

> Civilian Personnel Management: General. . . . both the military services and the civil service are required or expected to be: representative of the people and servants of the people; relatively free of internal political influences; subject to scrutiny by the press and the public; based on merit principles with demonstrated affirmative action to provide equal opportunity for minorities and women; and accountable to elected officials of the Federal Government.
>
> To the President, the Congress, and the American people, the Public Service includes all federal civil service and the military services; and this combined bureaucracy is looked upon and utilized interchangeably, as instruments of national policy and power, both in domestic affairs and foreign relations. So it should come as no surprise to find civil service personnel deeply involved in national security and military matters. Nor should military personnel become so entrenched in their commitment to the accomplishment of their assigned mission that they overlook their responsibilities as federal managers, to actively support domestic policies and programs. /Note absence of mention of civilians as "federal managers."/
>
> The Civil Service System. The Federal Civil Service System can trace its inception to the great reform movements of the late nineteenth century and the passage of the Civil Service Reform Act in 1883 . . . This was the beginning of the merit system. . . .

> . . . Generally, all positions in the Executive Branch are in the competitive service. All positions in the legislative or judicial branches are outside of the competitive service.[40]

Every person entering civilian government service must swear to and sign these affidavits:

> AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. I am not participating in ANY STRIKE against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, and I will not so participate while an employee of the Government of the United States or any agency thereof.
>
> AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE. I have not, nor has anyone acting in my behalf, given, transferred, promised or paid any consideration for or in expectation or hope of receiving assistance in securing this appointment.[41]

Congress has established two major classification systems intended to help provide equal pay for equal work in the Federal Government:

> The General Schedule Classification System, which covers more than one million white-collar workers . . . has 18 grades. . . .
>
> The Federal Wage System which covers more than 600,000 blue-collar workers . . . has 15 nonsupervisory grades and separate grading structures for supervisors and others.[44]
>
> Up to late 1978, the Civil Service Commission functioned as the central personnel agency for the Federal Government, . . . It had some ten regional offices. Under the Regional Offices were 65 Area Offices, at least one in each state located at major population centers. In addition, the Commission operated over 100 Federal Job Information Centers.[42]

In late 1978, legislation was passed to disband the Civil Service Commission, and to divide its functions between two agencies created for the purpose: the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the Merit Systems Protection Board. One strong thrust of the reorganization efforts was said to be decentralization--"giving federal agencies greater autonomy in dealing with their employees."[43]

This decentralization movement is particularly interesting in view of the 1977 analysis by Allen R. Janger, of the private civilian Conference Board of New York, that the reverse process is underway in private sectors.[44] Thus, it is particularly interesting that the federal civil service is being decentralized further at the same time that industry ceases to decentralize and swings back to centralization.

Another indicator of enormous forces of change is the status of the hierarchy of the military establishment at the height of World War II; with over 10 million men in the armed forces at one time, there were some 7-10 civilians in the Pentagon of Assistant Secretary rank or higher. By January 1957, however, with a military establishment about one-third the size of the wartime establishment, there were some 40-50 civilians of comparable rank in the Department of Defense.

The following "diversity" table shows the breadth of the classification, utilization, and personnel management problem confronted by the Department of Defense, compared to the scope of the same problem faced by other major Federal departments. It is clear that in most cases, the problem faced by each military service alone is equal to or larger than those facing other whole Cabinet departments.[45]

	White Collar (Total Possible 428)		Blue Collar (Total Possible 1353)		Total (1781 in Occup Series)	
Agency	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
DOD	(351)	(82%)	(1201)	(89%)	(1552)	(87%)
Army	332	78%	657	49%	989	55%
Navy	295	69	631	47	926	52
Air Force	269	63	615	45	884	50
Vets Admin	212	50	112	8	324	18
HEW	269	63	164	12	433	24
Treasury	182	43	120	9	302	17
Agric	237	55	118	9	355	20
Transp	223	52	256	19	479	27
Justice	184	43	113	8	297	17
GSA	158	37	186	14	344	19

Perhaps needless to say, the majority of the high-graded civilian jobs in government are located in the Washington area.[46]

It should be noted that many factors combine, as the work week declines (in number of hours actually worked), as various work benefits and conditions are given more "permissive" controls, it takes more persons to complete certain tasks than it used to.

Sheer numbers aside, note the trends of grade-escalating change in the proportion of "white-collar" and "blue-collar" sectors of the Federal work force (as for the American work force in general):[47]

	FY 1964	FY 1968
White-collar empl of Fed Govt	1,275,000	1,398,000
Blue-collar empl of Fed Govt	641,000	565,000

Between 1968 and 1974, the number of jobs in the lowest 5 GS grades decreased by 82,000 (-5%), while the number of jobs in the highest 5 GS grades increased by 55,000 (+14%). Obviously, requirements for increased skills are mounting as we look to the future of the military establishment, as well as the rest of government.

It is relevant to consider grade levels among civilian employees of government. It is particularly informative to note grade access at high levels in Washington, contrasted with "decentralized" agencies. In 1949, the three supergrades (GS-16, GS-17, and GS-18) were added to the federal grade structure. Of the 400 authorized, no more than 25 were to be in grade GS-18, and no more than 75 in grade GS-17. By April 1972, the 400 had increased by almost 600 percent to the total of 2745. Meanwhile, in 1962, Congress also authorized certain supergrade quotas to be controlled outside Congress, primarily for Research and Development in the physical sciences, medicine, and engineering; by 1972, there were 1950 of these posts.

By 1972, there were eight top levels established: three were in the so-called supergrades, and five were in five Executive Levels above them. Executive Level 1, for instance, covered members of the Cabinet. There were 11,000 incumbents in these eight levels, 7,000 in the Executive Branch of the government.[48]

Of relevance to the status of department members stationed in Washington and those located at numerous far-flung bases and communities, it is to be expected that more holders of high grades will be located in Washington than elsewhere. A majority of the highest ranking generals and admirals will be found in Washington; the same thing happens among civilians. Out of the 3,410 GS-16s in the whole federal system, 2444 are in Washington, 901 out of the 1,091 GS-17s, and 367 out of the 403 GS-18s.

There are a number of ways of categorizing subelements of the DOD and the Services according to occupational groups of the civilian work force. Civilians work in a wide spectrum of DOD functional areas. While half of all civilians are employed by the materiel commands, half of them in turn are in white-collar jobs.

An important relevant point: anyone who intends to press for greater substitution of civilians in military positions will have to cope with the current situation, in which it is apparent that a very great many positions of almost all kinds <u>throughout DOD</u> are <u>already</u> occupied by civilians.

While DOD must cope with the largest dual personnel system in government, certain Federal departments other than Defense also contain uniformed elements (in other words, those departments must also cope with various elements of dual personnel systems): for example, US Coast Guard (Dept

of Transportation, in peacetime), Forest Service (Dept of Agriculture), Customs and Immigration Service (Dept of Interior), Public Health Service (Dept of HEW), and others. Excepting the Coast Guard, and despite being uniformed, all the personnel in such departments are essentially civilians.

In addition, certain non-uniformed entities are subjects of special national legislation applying only to their distinctive personnel systems, within but not identical to those of their departments (e.g., FBI, in the Attorney-General's department; and the Foreign Service, in the Department of State). Thus, there are other federal departments in existence which must cope with dual personnel systems, or mixed manning. This study makes no attempt to investigate such departments for purposes of comparison, contrast, or enlightenment. It is believed that no other department confronts the same problem, either in kind or in scale, as the Department of Defense confronts in simultaneously administering civilian and military personnel systems. No other department confronts entities such as the armed forces, skilled in activities that are very old, long in history, tradition, and commitment.

Nor is it known whether any of the federal departments do better or worse at personnel administration (especially with <u>both</u> branches of dual systems) than the Department of Defense.

At this point, prior to investigating tensions and other differences in the personnel situation in the military establishment directly, we put forth here a three-part tentative proposition that we expect to repeat at the end of this study:

a. The career of the soldier is just as important to the soldier as is the civilian's career to the civilian in any other federal department.

b. The career of the civilian employee in the Department of Defense is just as important to him as is the civilian's career to the civilian in any other federal department.

c. The career of the civilian employee of the Department of Defense is just as important to that civilian as the soldier's career in the Department of Defense is to that soldier.

C. Department of Defense.

1. General.

Since the American Revolution, the armed forces of the United States have been controlled until 1947 by two Cabinet-level departments. In 1947, however, the Departments of Army and Navy were downgraded to the status of military departments, ending their status as Cabinet-level departments. Simultaneously, there was imposed above them a substantial layer of civilians in a form called the Department of Defense. It will be recalled that the National Security Act of 1947 created the position of Secretary of Defense, but instructed him specifically not to form a military staff. It being essential, in the nature of things, that the Secretary of Defense have a staff, he formed one in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and it was necessarily a civilian staff.

Eventually, a military staff was also formed within the Department of Defense--the Joint Staff, part of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--but it has always been at some remove, with "one foot planted outside the principal channels of power in the Pentagon." The fortunes of the Joint Staff have waxed and waned, depending upon the predilections or the occupants of the chairs in the Oval Office and the Secretary of Defense's office. And while the law says that the JCS, not the Secretary of Defense,

are the principal military advisers to the President, the Joint Staff, overall, is no equal rival of OSD.

2. The Military Ethos.

The soldier (and his fighting counterparts on the sea and in the air) has a long history. Sociologist Robert Nisbet, studying the nature and evolution of the concept of community, concluded that the military developed the second oldest form of community--second only to kinship. From the most ancient of recorded times, the deeds of fighting men have been told in every form of literature and song. History (in many ways, unfortunately) is given over largely to recitals of expeditions, battles, generals, and wars. Most of the resources of nations have been devoted to arms and equipment.

While the military institution shares with other American social institutions the preponderance of its values, methods, perspectives, and orientations, the division of labor among all social institutions allocates functions to the military which result in certain more or less unique environmental characteristics.

There is no need to labor the uniqueness of the primary military function to fight the nation's wars and to win them. For that purpose, constrained by a number of safeguards, the military is entrusted with the monopoly of the domestic instruments of international violence.

Various domestic police forces are entrusted with a near-monopoly of lower-level instruments of force and bear the primary responsibility, under duly constituted civil authorities, for maintaining domestic order by force. The armed forces are also called upon to back up domestic police forces, but infrequently; and the function is secondary for the armed forces and is not unique to them.

A military function ancillary to this primary function is taken for granted so much that it is sometimes overlooked: the maintenance and modernization of military skills and weapons, and the preservation of appropriate military ethos, during peacetime. Regardless of any current state of public support of the military, from low to high, from indifference or hostility to enthusiasm, the military much perform this function continuously.

Certain characteristics are not unique to the military establishment, but they are more important to the military than to most other institutions.

For example, while the military is one of the largest institutions in society (in wartime, far and away the largest), with an open-ended basis for full professional careers demanding various levels of intelligence, and with a full structure from the unskilled recruit to leader-executives at high levels of society, the nature of its primary function requires that the military emphasize youth and physical vigor. The differences with other social institutions in this regard are relative, but a basic difference applies at every level.

While war-fighting (and readiness for war-fighting) exploits the physical vigor already inherent in large numbers of youth, the military function also requires physical vigor in incumbents at all its higher NCO and officer field grade levels, and on into one-star and some two-star positions; in the higher levels, and hence in the middle and later years of professional military life, there is less requirement for physical vigor and as in most other social institutions, more requirement for intellectual vigor.

Since the military educates and trains and applies intensive selectivity to its emerging military executives throughout their professional careers,

emphasis on military executives who are younger than their civilian counterparts results in accumulation of substantial numbers of military leader-executives at higher rank levels, for whom there are fewer and fewer places in the grade structure and who are forced to terminate their professional careers at ages earlier than is common in civilian institutions.

This situation is further complicated by other factors more or less peculiar to the military. One is the rank-in-the-man concept long basic to the military, in which pay and numerous aspects of status are tied firmly to the personal rank possessed by the individual. This contrasts with the rank-in-the-job concept prevalent in nonmilitary institutions.

Another factor is the unique nature of military combat expertise, which can be refined and enhanced only within the military establishment. There are no counterparts to management of large-scale organized violence within any society. The almost-inflexible route to becoming a major general in command of a division is through channels of service in command of companies, battalions, and brigades.

Still another factor, but one exerting pressure in the reverse direction, is that the uniqueness of military expertise applies with full force only to the mainstream of combat units within the military establishment, and only in varying degrees to the numerous other activities, specialties, career patterns, support units, and administrative contexts within the military establishment. Since many of these activities and organizational elements are reasonably compatible counterparts of similar civilian activities, it may appear practicable, as we discuss later, to contemplate a certain amount of lateral entry in selected specialties into the officer field grades and higher NCO levels.

It seems timely and appropriate to cite the following conditions of modern life as the 1970's come to a close:

1. The single unique responsibility and skill of the military is in the management of violence, combat, and battle in war--that is, in training for, conducting, and directly supporting combat operations.

2. There is no other skill that distinguishes the military person as such, not management; leadership; administration of men, agencies, activities, or communities; planning; scientific, intellectual, or manual prowess; logistic competence; or other specialist qualification. An individual soldier may be outstandingly skilled in one or more of such functions, but not necessarily because he learned or practiced them in a military environment. In general, outstandingly skilled civilians, pursuing their own specialties and professions, are likely to match or exceed the military person's skills in fields such as those cited above (always leaving room for virtuosi on either side).

This point can also be extended to the functions performed by the Army. The military's fighting missions are, of course, largely unique, particularly as they involve combat actions--operating killing machines on land, on and under the sea, and in the air--and, in extremis, engaging in warrior-to-warrior combat. In relation to these fighting men and units, numerous ancillary support actions, however, are universal--driving, cooking, feeding, delivering, paying, resupplying, ministering, doctoring, refueling, administering, transporting, and so on. Near "the cutting edge," these actions become more dangerous than the same actions performed almost anywhere else; but even in relation to fighting units, many of these functions are performed only briefly and intermittently in the most dangerous areas near to the fighters.

An inevitable conclusion, put very simply at this stage, is that fewer fighting men, proportionately speaking, are <u>essential</u> to manning a full modern military establishment. A greater share of manning modern military establishments <u>can be</u> (not necessarily ought to be) undertaken by civilians.

Thus, one may be moved to ask about the civilian in the military establishment: Is the federal civilian employee in the military establishment equal in status to his civilian counterparts of equal grade, responsibility, and experience in other government departments? Is he the professional equal, or the subordinate (given equal attributes of skill and status) to the military members of the Department of Defense? If he is "subordinate," are then all the civilian employees in other government departments also "subordinate" to the military members of the Department of Defense? These questions arise in explicit form, but mostly in subtle form, from time to time, but have never been really resolved, as a number of qualified observers have perceived over many years.

The Second Hoover Commission of the early 1950's found that: ". . . the unique personnel problem of the Department of Defense is that military and civilian personnel are working together without clear delineation of the role appropriate to each."[50]

> Civilian and military relationships, the delineation of the military and civilian roles, and the effective utilization of the two groups together are problems which are peculiar to the Department of Defense and exist nowhere else in the Government or in business and industry. This general problem will always confront the Department of Defense because the Nation will never permit the Department to be completely military-run, and military science makes complete civilian staffing impossible. The only solution is to spell out the respective spheres of the two groups and to provide opportunity and incentive for both.

Twenty years later, in 1976, a military analyst wrote: "It is unfortunate that the productivity, responsiveness, and compensation of one million civilians that work for the Department of Defense have received much less attention than the military services."[51]

The DMC observed in 1976 that a pyramid is an accurate symbol for the progression of military personnel, but not for civilians: "There is no centrally managed system for the civilian personnel force that provides for a close relationship betwen age, grade, and years of service."[52]

As a major issue summary statement, the DMC said this: "Management practices of the Department of Defense are not completely adequate in assuring that the civilian workforce is effectively integrated into the total workforce structure."[53]

In relation to the lack of viable career programs and management systems, the Commission pointed out that one of the most obstructive stumbling blocks is the fragmentation of civilian management in all Services: one manager authorizes all personnel spaces, but another manager completely manages civilian personnel.[54]

The same DMC elucidated on the issue statement above and came up with a strong recommendation:

> The Department of Defense presents a singular problem in management. Its workforce is composed of two separate and distinct groups of employees--the uniformed military and the civilian; each governed by a separate set of rules and regulations; each operating under a different concept of organization, use, and manager/worker relationship; each contributing in a unique fashion to the overall efficiency of the Department. A central theme of this report is that there are military functional managers who are uninformed on civilian personnel management directives, policy and practices.[55] /Italics added/

One can be certain that no military personnel manager is uninformed on military personnel practices. On this important latter point, an Army major attending the Armed Forces Staff College, previously quoted, spoke of the many hours devoted to education of military managers on the management and administration of military personnel:

> The absence of such instruction concerning civilian personnel management and administration implies that civilians are not as valuable, or that they are always operating at their optimum of efficiency or effectiveness. Certainly, either view is clearly erroneous. However, a survey of various military schools affiliated with career progression reveals very little, if any, curriculum devoted to providing military managers with even an overview or orientation of the Civil Service System. . . From a personal standpoint, I cannot recall a single minute of formal instruction presented in a military school on the subject of civilian personnel management or the Civil Service system. . . Conversations with Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps students at the Armed Forces Staff College revealed similar experiences in those services.[56]

The DMC, while supporting the concept of one integrated personnel system for the DOD, felt that a dual system, as now used, can work well enough and ought to work better than it does. While the primary mission of the armed forces is unquestionably unique, the specific jobs that civilians do throughout the military establishment are hardly unique; after all, the DOD utilizes civilian employees in 87 percent of all the occupation series identified by the federal civil service.[57]

Major Wright felt that there was room for still more civilian participation: "certain functional areas such as administration, supply, transportation, communications, maintenance, intelligence, medicine, automatic data processing, and research and development will lend themselves to more civilian managerial control.[58]

Overall, DOD manages what is by far the largest work force in the Civil Service, with about 30 percent of the entire federal civilian work force (600,000, or 28 percent of the federal white-collar force, and 400,000 or 78 percent of the federal blue-collar force). Of Wage Grade (blue collar) employees, the DOD employs almost four times as many as all other Federal agencies combined.[59] Surely, the challenge of civilian administration is formidable; is there any cogent reason, however, for DOD civilian affairs to be less effectively managed than military personnel affairs? Or less than those of civilians in other government departments?

The two systems are not incompatible, said the Commission; some improvement would come from establishing certain features of the military system (e.g., broad career systems each covering several related occupations; geographical mobility; tightly controlled duty assignments) within the civilian personnel system. If the civilian component of DOD were to be excepted from civil service, perhaps the DOD would manage it more like its management of the military system. In any event,

> short of converting the Defense Department into an all military or an all civilian force, neither of which would be considered reasonable, practical, or acceptable to the nation, it seems reasonable to accept the premise that the dual system of personnel management within the Department of Defense is proper and necessary.[60]

Yet, the DMC pointed out that, while the totals involved elsewhere exist on a much smaller scale than in DOD, there are other federal departments that manage a work force with dual characteristics, and that DOD could manage its dual work force more effectively

> if both are viewed as equal partners in the enterprise, rather than as separate and distinct vying entities. . . . There have been some splendid achievements on both sides of the house, sometimes because of good management and excellent military/civilian cooperation, sometimes in spite of the lack of both.[61]

The Commission cited a recent report that when the criterion for measuring the combat sector is counting the persons assigned to combat jobs, the combat-to-support ratio for US forces is 30/70, that is, 30 percent of the individuals in the armed forces are in positions classified as "combat" positions, while 70 percent are in "support" positions. Applying these percentages to DOD strength for FY 1975, we find the US support portion of the US military establishment to comprise approximately 2.4 million persons (1.5 military and .9 million civilian). As the Commission put it: "In the final analysis, all noncombat positions, military and civilian, are 'support' to the combat forces." Military and civilian employees are intermixed at almost all levels of support effort. Thus, there is no practicable perspective in which the enormous civilian effort in the military establishment can be looked upon as a work force apart, let alone as a vaccum, or as some mere "adjunct" to the military.[62]

In order, the four largest employers of civilians in government are these: (1) Department of Defense; (2) Department of the Army; (3) Department of the Navy; and (4) Department of the Air Force.[63] In view of these sizes and numbers, it may surprise some readers to realize that grade levels do not keep pace. The average civilian grade in DOD is lower than the average federal civilian grade.[64]

Of course, in DOD, civilians in high ranks provide only part of the incumbents of positions at those ranks; military officers also occupy a share of posts at those levels. Nevertheless, the DOD military-civilian hierarchy

is leaner than the hierarchies in the rest of government.[65] To be sure, the percentage of organizations in hierarchies depends partly on each organization's mission; nevertheless, numbers are not negligible. Here it is difficult to conceive of DOD as being composed mainly of low-order jobs, while all other departments are composed mainly of high-order jobs. For example, when the Department of HEW managed a work force of 106,000, HEW contained 600 positions, or .57 percent of its total strength, in grades GS-16 through GS-18. If the same percentage (.57 percent) were applied to the total DOD civilian work force alone (972,475), there would be 5,543 civilians in Grades GS-16 through GS-18 in the Department of Defense. If one added in all general and flag officers, and GS-16's through GS-18's, and applied the same percentage (.57 percent) of the total military and civilian work force of DOD (2,823,576), DOD would be entitled to 12,825 officials at that level. Actually, the combined total in DOD is less than 2,700, with some 1,470 civilians in grades GS-16 through GS-18, and 1,200 general and flag officers, in the entire Department of Defense. Thus, DOD has less than 1/4 of the numbers of high officials than HEW has, despite DOD's having about 28 times HEW's strength.

We conclude this section's references by citing the four personnel problem areas which the DMC considered most important and recommended for particular remedial attention: 1. Coordination of Personnel Management Under a Dual System; 2. Force Structure Planning; 3. Civilian Career Programming; and 4. Civilian Training. We shall consider each further, though briefly.

Coordination of Personnel Management Under a Dual System. Except for military persons in combat units, both civilians and soldiers are intermixed throughout the DOD work force; the overall mix is military 68 percent, civilian 32 percent. At some critical interfaces, the civilian work force is often considered to be a mere adjunct to the military. For example, the initial

determination as to whether a space or position is to be filled by a military or a civilian person is currently made by military personnel and military manpower managers with no participation by civilian personnel managers. The line manager at a base "in the field" gets instructions from six different sources at higher echelons. There are various forms and procedures for interaction of varying effectiveness, sometimes adequate, sometimes not. The Commission suggests placing all three functions under one well integrated head.

Force Structure Planning. The commission cited the long standing policy of the Department of Defense, stated in DOD Directive 1400.5:

> Civilians shall be utilized in all positions which do not require military incumbents for reasons of law, training, security, discipline, rotation, or combat readiness, or which do not require a military background for successful performance of the duties.

This directive involves whether a particular space should be filled by a military or a civilian person, and the effectiveness of alternative mixes of soldiers and civilians, which is heavily dependent upon centralized planning for the whole establishment--active military, active civilians, combat units, support units, Reserve, National Guard, and contracted services. Naturally, emphasis clusters on critical aspects--cost, effectiveness of incumbent, compatibility with system, amenability to management, as well as on military necessity, relationship to mobilization, relationship to rotation bases, and even (if significant) the special nature of individual jobs.[66]

Contributing to ineffectiveness were broad generalizations, which are frequently inaccurate because of the differing levels of precision in classification of military and civilian jobs (analysis of civilian jobs is far more detailed and precise), and because of the differing concepts of rank and job linkage.[67]

In the past, military personnel seemed less expensive, for only each person's direct costs were cited. Currently, direct costs are about equal. More and more, very careful analysis of each job is required.[68]

Civilian Career Force Planning. The need for such planning has been known for years; DOD issued early instructions to develop such programs in 1955, and again in 1966. Complete career programing for civilians is still a utopian objective, not realized in real life anywhere. It requires some of the most difficult coordination in the whole area of personnel management.

A formidable problem in the military services and the Department of Defense, as now constituted, is that operational line managers want to fill their civilian vacancies with specialists, not broadly trained career generalists.

This is another point at which this study touches a sensitive nerve in the corpus of this entire complex problem. The military deliberately and unrelentingly select and train military officers toward the end of preparing them for broader responsibilities in senior positions. Few civilians experience similar development. But the system will eventually have to accept that, outside of combat-unit requirements, both military and civilian can be trained and used for both or either specialist expertise or broad managership.

Civilian Training. "Training" in this context includes almost all kinds of training and education--vocational training, training in management, etc. Among all Federal agencies, concerning the number of civilians receiving any training, the Army ranks 1st, the Navy 2d, and the Air Force 4th. However, concerning proportion of civilians trained compared to total strength, the Department of Defense (including the military Services) trains a lower

percentage than other Federal agencies. For example, in a list of 17 federal agencies showing proportion of civilian employees given any training, the Army placed 12th.

An interesting table[70] shows significant differences in the kind and quality of training for military and civilian members of DOD during FY 1973:

	Total Expenditures for Individual Training	Per Capita Expenditures	Percent Participating	Avg Length of Training (in weeks)
Military	$247.6 Million	$11,400	41%	21.0
Civilian	$ 6.7 Million	$ 200	60%	1.3

The Defense Manpower Commission called this "an appalling record of failure to provide essential training." One reason is that all military training is centrally funded; but civilian training, if any, is funded only at the local level.

D. The Department of the Army.

It is obvious to anyone, as the Defense Manpower Commission pointed out in 1976, that the military officer personnel system is a far better system than the civilian employee personnel system administered by the same executive department. This condition applies specifically to professionals in and out of uniform. An interesting report came from a RAND study in late 1978, which did not consider civilians or enlisted persons; the report found that the system of administering military officers is at least as good as personnel management of executives in major firms, and superior to the management of executives in small and middle-size companies. Education and training opportunities are far better for military officers; retention rates are

about the same in industry and in the military (though higher for military academy graduates) and it turns out to be a myth that industry is more ruthless than the government in getting rid of deadwood ("there is an almost pathological reluctance of one manager to fire another").[71]

The Army War College manual cited earlier has this to say:

> The Army's civilian personnel management program is based upon the principle that personnel management is a function of line supervision and that authority fully adequate to perform this function should be delegated to the lowest operating echelon which is consistent with efficient administration and effective control. . . . Ordinarily, therefore, authority to take final action on any matter pertaining to a civilian employee's assignment, pay, separation, etc., is delegated to the commanding officer[77] of each independent field installation. . . .

Examining this text carefully, one is moved to wonder, if there actually exists a "principle that personnel management is a function of line supervision and that authority fully adequate to perform this function should be delegated to the lowest operating echelon," why this principle of personnel management is not applied equally to the system for management of military personnel? The analyst of both systems will discern that major aspects of one are centralized while the same aspects of the other are decentralized. Whatever its positive attributes may be, decentralization carries a number of disadvantages, principally the result that all the people in the system are not treated equally in important functions. Since they have authority to do so, local commanders will apply their differing philosophies and priorities. Consider the single aspect of providing awards for especially meritorious performances by civilians: one local commander may believe that, since civilians do not operate on battlefields, their performances are not of high value; another local commander may make special efforts to note meritorious performances, and to see to it that all performances are recognized and rewarded;

still another local commander may conclude that endorsing several awards will put too much constraint on his budget, and so few civilian performances may be recognized under his administration.

Thus, with emphasis on institutional contexts, we have provided a considerable number of details pertinent to any intent to interchange civilians for soldiers in the military establishment. We shall now turn to more overt, more direct, more individual and personal comparisons between soldiers and civilians. In sum, the differences between their statuses appear formidable, though not impossible, to overcome.

CHAPTER III

CONTEXTS FOR GROUP AND INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS AND CHANGES

A. Dynamic Environmental Changes Affecting War, the Military Establishment, and Civilian-Military Relationships.

1. General Change.

In this chapter, we pay less attention to formal institutional environments and more to dynamic changes affecting military establishments, and in turn to effects on the interrelationships among soldiers and civilians in the military establishment. We shall pursue understanding of such interrelationships to the level of each group's perception of the other group.

On August 16, 1978, Undersecretary of the Navy R. James Woolsey, delivered a provocative address at the Naval War College, including this:

> . . . it will come as no great surprise to you that much of civilian society and a number of those in the civilian government hierarchy with whom you must work do not share many of your values and characteristics. . . .
>
> * * * * * * *
>
> I don't need to tell you that the last war, the war for which we did not mobilize, was the most unpopular in our history. . . . Increasingly, in future years . . . you will be dealing with many men and women who came into adulthood looking upon you and many of your values as part of the problem, not as part of the solution.[1]

While the primary military mission, war-fighting, remains the responsibility of the military, many important changes have revised the way in which we prepare for and fight wars--for example, it seems no longer necessary that all members of a military establishment be in uniform. The military has no viable choice but adjustment to the most significant changes in the environment.

It is clear that the percentage of soldiers who actually engage in combat continues to decline. Only a minority of soldiers fight in modern war. The

rest, the majority--65 percent overall, in fact--are engaged in supporting the fighters and themselves. The question at the moment is: must everyone serve in uniform in order to support our forces?

Proliferating technology may change the nature of similar work in all social organizations engaged in that kind of work. For example, the success of nuclear deterrence may impel shift of resources toward increased capability to cope with labor-intensive kinds of war.

Social developments may also generate changing relationships within organizations. For example, widespread education raises both competence and expectations in a larger proportion of the available work force. Pervasive rises in standard of living may generate demands for shorter work periods and greater leisure, requiring more workers to accomplish the same work output.

It is our intention to examine a number of forces and trends at work in the current world, and to speculate about their possible impacts on the civilian-military relationship within the American military establishment.

2. Definitive Mid-20th Century Refinements of the Military Role in the United States.

Rather than past limited-scale clashes of fighting specialists over limited areas with weapons of limited range and effect, war in modern times has extended over almost unlimited areas, with masses of uniformed persons fighting battles but causing battle effects in various circumstances upon great numbers of civilians, with weapons of almost unlimited range and power--all capable of reaching unprecedented cumulative peaks of effects within short periods of time. Compression of time is one of the most important effects. In earlier centuries, one could have achieved comparable tools of destruction, but only in relatively "small" increments and only if sustained for years

and years; today, destruction can, within hours, exceed the most extreme levels ever achieved before.

Such colossal developments could not fail to affect the ways in which wars are prepared for, how wars are approached, how wars are fought, and especially in the participants' control processes affecting the preparations for, and the conduct of, war.

No longer, as in the past, is war upon arrival to be "turned over to the military." Civilian officials are certainly present in military affairs, in layers thickened above and below previous thin levels, and in numbers far beyond any numbers of roles played by civilians in wars of the past.

And it can be expected that, whatever capabilities are developed for direct participation of future high civilian officials in war, those capabilities will be exploited, stimulating substantial presence of civilians in the soldier's environment for approaching and conducting wars.

Similarly, in the imagining, conceiving, and developing of modern weapons systems, civilians are not only valuable but invaluable. Advanced weapons and supporting systems are devised principally by civilian scientists. Kurt Lang asserts: "The more technology a weapon contains, as Zuckerman points out, the more likely it is to have been the result of civilian rather than military thinking. . . ."[2]

> Civilian expertise is also highly useful, if not indispensable, in assessing the probable effects of the new weapons and of their most effective deployment to achieve certain goals. Thus, the military has been forced not only to pay its tribute to the scientist and engineer working on weapons development but also to cede some ground to the civilian-military specialists in the area of strategy, its proper professional domain. . . . They /the military/ have been dispossessed from their monopolistic position as the only qualified technical advisors to government on all matters pertaining to the use of force in foreign affairs.[3]

The role played by the transplanted German rocket expert, Wernher von Braun (and dozens of other civilian scientists) was extraordinary. General Leslie Groves administered the great wartime project called The Manhattan District; but the fission and fusion bombs were created by civilians--Einstein, Fermi, Teller, Bohr, Oppenheimer, and others. The development of computers, without which no astronaut, no matter how competent or brave, could travel in space (certainly not to the moon and back) reached advanced stages principally through the work of civilians. The military are now heavily dependent upon scientific and technological developments in the R&D community outside the military; and much, in fact, is outside the government.

Twentieth century developments and debates have resulted in defining more closely and clearly the military role in the United States, especially the following developments:

a. Any major conflict activity with the potential of reaching near-global or extra-global dimensions will no longer be turned over to the military. During World War II, efforts were frequently made by the military to exercise control over even the nation's economy. Civil Service historian Van Riper wrote: "The military leaders never relinquished their conviction that they could do it better." Their overtures were denied and rejected repeatedly during World War II by both the President and the Congress.[4]

b. One recalls the powerful conflict within the government after World War II, over who would exercise overall control affecting the nuclear activities of the United States--military or civilian. It was a "bloody" fight; but the decision that emerged was that basic control over these weapons systems would be vested, in response to a joint Congressional overseer

committee, in the civilian agency created for the purpose, the Atomic Energy Commission (with a subordinating linkage to a Military Applications element).

c. The same outcome resulted several years later when a similar contest erupted over who was going to run America's activities in space. Again, a heated conflict ensued. Again, it was decided that a civilian activity, the National Aeronautics and Space Agency, would conduct America's program (and again, military elements, particularly the Air Force, were linked in subordinate roles).

d. Essentially, up to World War II, the United States maintained only military attaches in foreign countries to gather military intelligence, but all other kinds of intelligence gathering were left to ambassadors and allies. However, tutored by the British, the United States learned that it must establish a national intelligence service. Another central government contest ensued over potential control; while the Service intelligence roles were not much affected, control of the new national service, the Central Intelligence Agency, was vested in civilians, not the military.

e. The military won only one of these skirmishes and that a relatively minor one, during the latter stages of World War II and immediately thereafter, a number of debates broke out about an exceptional premise that one or more top scientists should sit as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dr. Vannevar Bush, the nation's top scientist at the time, had this to say: "Eventually, the military won. No provision for a civilian of any kind on the JCS was made."[5]

f. In 1947, a great superstructure, intended to effect civilian control more directly, was placed over at the top and inside the military establishment. The military departments lost stature to the Department of

Defense; over the years, that trend has been confirmed and sustained, as the authority and status of the top layers of the military departments have been eroded (and in many aspects, captured) by the largely-civilian layer of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. (This layer, incidentally, has developed procedures for the civilians who inhabit it, that provide certain advantages over the military personnel system.)

g. Also at the top and over the military establishment have been interjected additional civilian layers of the Executive branch--not only such agencies as the National Security Council and various missions of the Office of Management and Budget and several "interagency" committees, but also an enormously expanded White House and its enclave of the Executive Office of the President. In addition, the Congress (sometimes accused of too great deference to the White House and "Presidential Government") has expanded its own staffs and agencies enormously (including the General Accounting Office, the Office of Technology Assessment, and the Congressional Budget Office), so that the Congress in a number of ways has reversed the process of "aggrandizing the Presidency" by aggrandizing itself into the direct administration and execution of legislation by Executive agencies, including the once nearly-autonomous military.

3. Miscellaneous Developments in the Environment of Modern Military Establishments.

Many changes are occurring, some beyond any capability of the military to terminate or to delay. Some represent deliberate choices; some represent irresistible forces; some are superificial but damaging meat-ax swings motivated by politics; some represent mixed, uncertain dynamics. In a number of ways, civilians are already performing many of what used to be military roles in support of the armed forces, sometimes in activities performed close

to combat functions. Various illustrative situations and perceptions are cited throughout the rest of this Chapter as "Items." They do not pretend to comprehensiveness--which would require a mosaic of thousands of expository "Items." Some of these items are expository, some are descriptive, some are factual, some cover not the facts but what many people involved perceived to be "facts." A few "Items" are included primarily to give tone and immediacy to the presence of conflicting views on one point or another.

a. Item: Declining Military Ethos: It has been observed a number of times that the traditional military ethos has been declining in the cultures of all advanced societies. As Professor Klans Knorr expressed it: "A . . . condition of restricting the military of interstate force results from the normative devaluation of war. War is no longer the legitimate activity it once was."[6]

b. Item: Nuclear Weapons: After three decades of nuclear presence, it is recognized widely that nuclear weapons are not military instruments but national instruments.

c. Item: The Laws of War: The Geneva Conventions and other vehicles expressing the laws of war have been affected by consensual decisions among nations that further restrict the acts of military forces, in relation to civilians.

d. Item: Dependency and Readiness: The military has always faced the problem of making themselves self-sufficient in the field. Since they cannot be certain ahead of time whether they will have to fight in an arctic, a temperate, or a tropical environment, in cities or mountains or swamps--or even simultaneously in the deltas, mountains, or jungles of Vietnam--they resist being limited only to the lesser capabilities they require in garrison.

They cannot, they have said often enough, permit themselves to become dependent upon civilians, upon the private economy, or upon persons who do not have to accompany the armed forces into the boondocks.

Yet, one reflects that, in the United States, military forces and installations are already overwhelmingly dependent upon the civilian community structure for numerous resources, goods, and services: electric power, gas power, telephone systems, water, sewage, trash collection, food distribution, and other services manned wholly by civilians. Nor are there enough support units in the force structure anymore to make adequate support completely available in the field.

Overseas, American bases are equally or more dependent upon foreign resources, and even on foreign manpower, for certain important goods and services.

e. Item: Civilian Surveillance Between Forces: After the Yom Kippur War, in an unprecedented move, it was requested by both sides that the truce territory between Egypt and Israel be monitored in the United Nations buffer zone by an intervening nonpartisan force; the unprecedented aspect was that the force should be a civilian force, not military units.[7]

f. Item: Civilian Command: Though perhaps of distant relevance to large questions of civilian "encroachment" into military affairs, it was a remarkable development in July 1969 when, with two field-grade military members also assigned aboard the Apollo flight, the civilian Neil A. Armstrong was designated as the commander of the flight, during which Armstrong became the first human to place his foot on the moon.

g. Item: Tooth-to-Tail Ratios: This section described a most important development affecting the civilian-military relationship: the

proportion of any military force that is made up of fighters is declining, while the proportion that supports the entire force but does not normally fight is increasing. Most observers know that the civilian part of the military establishment supports the fighting part; few are yet aware that 65 percent of the active uniformed military are also engaged in support of the fighting part. Meanwhile, combat positions remain unique to the military, there being no civilian counterpart to killing in battle.

Now, ratios of combat to support distribution can vary greatly, depending upon how the numerators and denominators are defined. DOD's Military Manpower Requirements Report for FY 1973[8] described seven different ways to calculate combat-to-support (or tooth-to-tail ratios). We select here the most extreme in order to dramatize this trend.

h. Item: Changing Skill Requirements: Kurt Lang has analyzed the changes in skill requirements resulting from technological changes in warfare, and points out that the traditional career structure is being modified because it is inadequate to today's variety of roles required of officers. He points out that Janowitz (in The Professional Soldier, 1977) and Little (in Sociology and the Military Establishment, 1965) have contributed a number of probing insights, which are primarily related to the enlisted occupational structure.[9]

Lang notes that Army and Marine Corps emphasis reflects their continued reliance on manpower to do the fighting, with substantial requirements for troop leadership. At the same time, technological complexity, states Lang, requires more expertise of operators; greater destructive potential requires that responsibility and control be exercised at higher levels. Except in the Air Force, enlisted men predominate among fighters; in the Air Force, most of the fighting is done by officers. Thus, the Air Force has the highest

proportion of officers in relation to total strength. Lang also cites the Navy practice of separating ship command and operation from operation of the ship's guns; unlike aircraft crews, ship gun crews usually function as combat treams only when under direct enemy fire.[10]

One might look on the varying Service statistics, says Lang, as being similar to the economists' classification of the three basic areas of occupations as primary (agriculture, mining, fishing); secondary (production); and tertiary (service and management). The primary military area could be said to involve tactical operations; the secondary could include the production and maintenance of military equipment; and by the tertiary could be meant intelligence, operational planning, services, and resources management.

Lang suggested the following table of percentage distribution of officer occupations in 1970:

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
General Mil Mgmt	1%	4%	4%	1%
Primary: Opns	57%	30%	69%	45%
Secondary: Sci of Engrg	16%	33%	14%	28%
Tertiary: Admin, Logist, Intelligence	26%	33%	14%	26%

Note that it is now possible for some specialists to meet with better opportunities and to be promoted faster than some officers in the primary occupational category.[11] Note that the Navy and Air Force have more officers in Science and Engineering than the Army and Marine Corps have. The Air Force is the only Service with more officers in the "secondary" occupations than in "tertiary." As more machines replace more men, the Primary and Secondary sectors become inversely related--"More of the higher ranking officers are required for the technical management positions and fewer for tactical operations."[12]

The forces of change require some major adjustments in orientation during the course of a career. Obviously, as one contemplates Air Force operational units, for example, one sees great numbers of pilots, navigators, and bombardiers. The great majority are young. Near the top of the rank ladder, few persons are still pilots, navigators, etc., in operational units (although they keep up with flying proficiency in order to keep their wings); few in operational jobs are higher than majors. One asks, particularly in peacetime, where did all those young men go as they climbed the rank ladder? Well, of course, many left military life and the Air Force on various bases of sickness, injury, selection "out," or change of interest. Most of those who remain in the Air Force (as in the other Services) are occupying jobs in the relative plenitude of modern staffs, many in planning staffs, many in one of numerous staff specialities in management.[13]

To sum up Professor Lang's findings, it can be said that they tend to substantiate greater diversification occurring within military officer occupations. Firepower, for example, now depends more on technical instrumentation than on masses of men, as in former times. As military technology has advanced, the proportion of officers and enlisted men needed to participate in tactical operations has declined, while the proportion needed to support military operations has increased. The increasing shortages in military manpower tend to occur (not exclusively; first-class fighters are always at a premium, too) among specialties involving technical skills analogous to specialists in the civilian work force.[14]

i. Item: Democratization: Much influence has emerged from class, ethnic, and social turmoil, continuing to exert various pressures toward greater democratization. Unfortunately, we have opportunity here only to

skim the surface on this point. Social preferment based on class is declining, and with it many elite pretensions associated with various professions and other social categories. A few centuries ago, some nations used only certain ethnic minorities to man their armed forces and do their fighting. In other instances, it was common practice to employ mercenaries for the purpose. Meanwhile, almost everywhere, officers constituted elites; whereas the mass of troops were illiterate peasants, or serfs, or peons.

One can conclude that today the social dynamics of military service and military establishments have altered drastically, under the joint impacts of "democratization" and technology. For example, the professional requirements for military officers of a century ago have been exceeded, in general, by the modern requirements for professional capabilities of NCO's. Over recent decades, considerable slippage of officer duties has occurred, especially at company grades, to NCO's.[15]

Meanwhile, numerous facets of enlisted personnel systems have been upgraded and sophisticated in ways that were unthinkable a generation ago.

Many officers are not effective combat leaders, but are indispensable specialists. So are many NCO's. So are many civilians. Much "leveling" has occurred, and this trend will probably continue--not only among officers, and among officers and NCO's, but also among military and civilian members of the military establishment.

j. Item: Civilian Strategists: It would be totally inadequate to say that civilian strategists contributed to the development of national strategy and military strategy since World War II, for the civilian strategists have made the most important contributions in this field. I should not leave unsaid that, though military men do not write books about American strategic

policies and plans while they are on active duty (and very few do so after they retire), their contributions are enormous, if seldom credited. Strategic considerations are part of the stuff of their jobs; they analyze and debate the issues endlessly. Their overwhelming context, however, is classified for talk and writing, and so most of their contributions to national policy are unknown to the public. Some academicians and others, being Reserve officers or consultants, serve their assigned periods on key Pentagon staffs or committees and become privy to some highly illuminating discussions. Some brilliant "outside" groups analyze difficult concepts alone. Eventually, analyses and insights are published by civilian analysts and scholars; a number of soldiers may have contributed heavily to the discussions before publication, but no one can say so or identify them.

Outside of that caveat, anyone concerned with strategic equations must be aware of the tremendous contributions of civilian scholars such as Bernard Brodie, William W. Kaufmann, George F. Kennan, Henry Kissinger, Herman Kahn, Albert J. Wohlstetter, Arnold Wolfers, Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Thompson, and a host of others. A few military persons (e.g., Matthew Ridgway, James Gavin, Maxwell Taylor, et al.) wrote insightful books after they retired from active duty; they and many other (anonymous) military men contributed brilliantly to the debate. But there can hardly be question that the "civilian strategists" provided the bulk of the debate. As early as 1937, Liddell Hart had deplored that "the day that decisions are reached on questions of strategy, tactics, organization, etc., is lamentably unscientific. . . ."[16]

John M. Collins holds that the official establishment, despite talent in crisis management, "has been badly outclassed in the field of grand strategy.

Why? Because its environment is inimical to creative thinking." The official establishment, he says, is distinguished by frenetic activity, turbulent career patterns, and autocratic restrictions; whereas prerequisities for creativity include an unregimented regime, unfettered research, unconventional approaches, prolific contacts, and professional career patterns ("only careerists can excel at this complicated endeavor").[17]

Wrote Bernard Brodie in early 1978:

> Virtually all the basic ideas and philosophies about nuclear weapons and their use have been generated by civilians working quite independently of the military, even though some resided in institutions like RAND which were largely supported by one or another of the Services. In these matters the military have been, with no significant exceptions, strictly consumers. . . .[18]

The vast majority of citizens have withdrawn from exclusive commitments to anybody where the security of themselves and their families is concerned.

Bernard Brodie wrote:

> As Captain B.H. Liddell Hart put it in 1935, in a world far simpler strategically than the one we know today, 'It is not that generals and admirals are incompetent, but that the task has passed beyond their competence. Their limitations are not due to a congenital stupidity--as a disillusioned public is so apt to assume--but to the growth of science, which has upset the foundations of their technique. . .a scientific habit of thought is the last thing that military education and training have fostered. Perhaps that is an unalterable condition, for the services might hardly survive if they parted company with sentiment.' This was a marvelously perceptive as well as foresighted statement, because sentiment is the very stuff of leadership and dedication, which are what most military histories are about.[19]

Brodie also had this important insight to convey:

> . . . above all, scientific analysis is applicable to important problems, but usually not the most important. The profound issues of strategy and certainly those of politics, those likely to affect most deeply the fates of nations and even of mankind, are precisely those which do not lend themselves to scientific analysis, usually because they are so laden with value judgments.

Therefore they tend altogether to escape any kind of searching thought.[20]

Professor Brodie later put these developments into a deeper perspective:

> Today . . . we can say without hesitation and without animus that the military problem is, even in its stark outlines, not only beyond the competence of any one person or group of persons but beyond the competence of any one profession.[21]

k. Item: Civilians Already in the Military Establishment: Erwin Hackel, in a 1970 Adelphi paper, wrote from a European viewpoint:

> . . . the growing trend toward specialization and technological sophistication in all modern armed forces steadily reduces the proportion of military personnel earmarked for actual combat duty. For example, in the United States Army, one soldier out of four is assigned to ground combat duty; the appropriate ratio was one out of three during the Korean War and is expected to drop to one out of five in the post-Vietnam era. The discrepancy between the size of the fighting "head" and the supporting "tail" is even larger in those Service branches that rely on very complex weapons as every modern Air Force does. A single jet fighter pilot, for example, is dependent upon a supporting crew of at least ten men on the ground, such as electronics specialists, engineers, technicians, mechanics, craftsmen, administrative and clerical personnel, and other auxiliary hands.[22]

Hackel linked his observations closely to the scope and purpose of this study:

> The significant aspect of this phenomenon, as far as manpower policy is concerned, is the growing similarity of the military's skill requirements to those of the civilian sector. This implies, on the one hand, that more and more military tasks can in fact be entrusted to civil servants and civilian employees with appropriate skills, and on the other hand that the military recruitment machinery is in increasing competition with the civilian sector for young men with technical education and specialized skills. The armed forces in more and more countries may come to realize that they can attract the services of these young men in sufficient numbers only in a civilian and not in a military capacity.[23] /Italics added/

4. Changes in Progress in Contexts of U.S. Armed Forces.

a. Item: Miscellaneous Environmental Changes: There have occurred great changes, not only in the weaponry and war-fighting technology and tactics of the Army, but also in the Army's peacetime living arrangements (partly dictated by war-fighting style). Prior to World War II, most of the Army was stationed in "regimental" posts--isolated, self-contained. Few Civil Service employees worked on posts, as the Army performed most of its own housekeeping. Few enlisted soldiers were married. One feature facilitated this system--the large number of "basic" soldiers in the Army. Most of the men in a rifle squad were "basics"--that is, it was a labor-intensive Army.

However, during waves of civilianization since World War II, pressed by Congress and others, most of the "basics" were eliminated from the Army on the grounds that they constituted on posts a general labor pool "which was no longer needed." Despite the current practice of stationing much of the Army on division-size or larger posts, there are not many "basic" soldiers left in the Army. This situation forms one of many factors relevant to the facts that considerable civilianization has already been accomplished, and that any additional future attempt to replace soldiers, in order to accomplish more than a generalized strength reduction that may result in gutting of the Army, will have to confront effectively the question: Which specific soldier positions should be converted and what will be the effect of conversion in these instances?

b. Item: Requirement for a Youthful Establishment: In reference to the possibility of replacing some career soldiers with some career civilians, the objection is sometimes voiced that "soldiers are fighters, and they stay

for full careers, while civilians are constantly departing." Fighters are soldiers, to be sure; but, by quite a ways, not all soldiers are fighters. We have just shown by analyzing tooth-to-tail ratios that individuals who occupy the fighting positions in modern times constitute a proportion of the entire uniformed military force varying from 5 percent to 30 percent.

Of all the enlisted members of the American armed forces who retired during the single year 1975, for example, averaging 21 years of service, 81 percent had spent their entire careers in noncombat assignments. Of all officer retirees during 1975, averaging 24 years of service, 30 percent had spent their entire careers in noncombat assignments. The General Accounting Office has argued that the Services do not need "youth and vigor" in the noncombat part of the armed forces.[24]

c. Item: Opening Support Functions to High Rank: At the end of World War II, the expectations of many citizens, military and civilian, were that things would inevitably and rapidly revert to the status quo ante. Others were perhaps more sensitive, more perceptive. Since the 1940's and 1950's, many military specialists have demanded recognition and status never before accorded them. Many opportunities opened up for officers of the support branches, simultaneously reducing the opportunities for high rank available to officers of the combat arms. In 1978, the President appointed as Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General David Jones, an officer who had never served in combat (previously, combat experienced officers had a monopoly on all "Chief of Staff" positions).

d. Item: Civilians Already Performing Duties in Army Units: For almost two decades, the city-protecting sites of NIKE-AJAX, and later NIKE-HERCULES, antimissile missile-firing units, came gradually to be manned by civilians formed into units of the National Guard and Reserve. The sites were permanent, so that the unit locations became merely work-sites for local residents. Since that time, the whole National Guard and Reserve structures have been informed by the presence of civilian employees--not part-time presence of citizen-soldiers serving in military (National Guard and Reserve) units for a few hours each week, but full-time civilian employees of the Department of Defense who remain full-time civilians while conducting unbroken administration (in GS-rated jobs) and vehicle maintenance (in WB jobs); they have also recently moved into the field of training. To convey the scale of this development, it was reported in February 1979 that there were 53,000 federal civilian employees already in the National Guard (of whom about 12,000 are also "reservists" in the Reserve military units).[25] In brief, military units of the National Guard and Reserve are already partially manned by full-time civilian employees of the military establishment.

e. Item: Civilian Ships Supporting Naval Fleets at Sea: One of the most impressive examples of support functions performed in working environments by civilians is demonstrated by the Navy's Military Sealift Command (MSC) in direct support of fleet operations at sea. The MSC operates 106 ships worldwide: 33 dry cargo vessels, 3 bulk carriers, 29 oil tankers, and various special project ships (e.g., cable layers). Operating ships averaging more than 30 years in age, civilians operate many of these ships; these are Civil Service employees, a number of whom are retired Navymen. Most are skilled old hands.

Resisted initially in the Navy, these civilian supporters at sea have demonstrated that experienced civilians can operate underway replenishment ships with considerably smaller crews than their Navy counterparts. Wage scales, pay increases, and living conditions are on a par with commercial industry; however, these Civil Service employees may not strike (there has never been such a strike). It is said that this fleet support is "here to stay," because now the fleet wants it. One boatswain's mate is quoted as observing: "They sure ain't pretty, but damn how they do work."[26]

f. Item: "Tech Reps" with Combat Units Overseas: Relevant to the possible permanent presence of civilians among American fighting forces overseas, it is widely known that civilians (technical representatives, or Tech Reps, of US aircraft companies under contract, as well as US Civil Service specialists), have lived full-time at US bases abroad, among deployed forces. To a lesser extent, the same situation has existed in the Navy; Captain James Elliott writes, in a passage in which the reader may discern several implications:

> The complexity of modern weaponry is such that, in order to ensure the presence of adequate technical expertise, the Navy has for years used contract civilian engineers on board deployed ships to fill the middle and upper enlisted pay grade deficit in various ratings. These contract engineers are many times more expensive than the career technicians they replace, but the trained and experienced enlisted members simply aren't available..[27]

g. Item: Air Force Civilians Manning Distant Warning Sites: In April 1977, the Air Force announced that 1,150 jobs previously held by military members would be nearly eliminated by the planned change to civilian manning of 13 Aircraft and Control Warning Sites within the Alaskan Air Command. At the same time, the Air Force said it might use either Air Force civilians or private contract employees. However, the commander of each site would continue to be military, in order to exercise "command and control authority."[28]

h. Item: Civilians Take Over Operation of Military Clubs: The Services have long held out for operation of their clubs by military personnel (officers, warrant officers, and NCO's) as knowing what the military members want, and how to give it to them. Nevertheless, the Air Force announced that, beginning on 1 September 1978 and extending over 3 years, the Air Force would turn over complete operation of its officers' clubs to civilian employees. The designation "club officer" would be eliminated from among military officer occupational specialties.[29]

i. Item: Some Negative Evaluations of the Current Military Manpower Market: Undeniably, a fact of real life in modern military establishments is the need for concern over not only the quantity of military manpower, but also over the quality, in the primary sense that it may take two persons of limited capability to perform a task that could be accomplished by one person possessing a higher level of capability. In general, military tasks become steadily more complex and more challenging.

Still, evaluations differ. Without implying that these judgments express the last word, I cite here two recent evaluations of soldiers and Army units; their degree of reliability is unknown, but both have been published by reputable journals.

Representative Robin Beard (R-Tenn) released in April 1978 a report called the "Beard Report," which stated that many current troops have trouble learning how to read instructions and how to operate increasingly complicated weapons in the US arsenal, and they fail to retain what they have learned. Major General John K. Singlaub, evidently referring to the Beard Report, asserted that many soldiers are nearly illiterate. "Many

training manuals," he said, "are being reduced to the fifth-grade level; the eithth-grade level is too high for them."[30] There was some evidence that Army officials considered the report controversial.

The second evaluation to be cited here was written by a journalist, Arthur T. Hadley, with an admirable record as a combat officer in World War II, and with prizes won in the early 1970's for his uniquely accurate descriptions of combat in Vietnam:

> The tank now costs three times as much in constant dollars as the World War II fighter plane; it has more complex weapons systems and is harder to maintain. Yet the fighter was commanded by a lieutenant with two years of college or the equivalent; today's tank is commanded by a sergeant who may well not be a high school graduate.
>
> Or, to look at the problem another way, a tank and a helicopter cost about the same and are equally complex. Yet the helicopter is flown by two warrant officers and maintained by a crew headed by a senior sergeant. But the tank is still commanded by a sergeant and maintained by privates.[31]
>
> * * * * * * *
>
> . . . In a recent NATO tank crew competition, the best American crews finished last in gunnery behind such minor powers as the Dutch and the Belgians. The Germans point out, and honest American commanders admit, that the level of tank-driving skill in the US Army is so low that the tanks don't know how to maneuver individually. . .

Arthur Hadley links his evaluation to "tooth-to-tail" ratios described earlier:

> The final area of air control in which NATO falls apart is called IFF (for Identification: Friend or Foe). . . Until now, shooting at your own people didn't matter so much because most shots missed. But modern weapons hit the target. Identification is now the ball game.
>
> * * * * * * *

> The Yom Kippur war proved that in the electronic precision-guided munitions age the losses are horrendous, approaching those of nuclear warfare. NATO war plans call for each American division to fire 5000 tons of ammunition on the first day and 3000 tons a day thereafter. At these rates of fire, artillery gun tubes will last less than a week. But there are not enough trucks or drivers to bring such masses of supplies forward. Nor does NATO have the mechanics to make the repairs. . . .
>
> The fault lies in Washington. No one in the Defense Department will ask Congress for funds for trucks, fork lifts, or mechanics. Why? Because those are noncombat troops or 'tail.' And Congress and President Carter want the military to cut the noncombat 'tail' in favor of combat 'teeth.' But as the teeth get more deadly, you must increase the tail, as both the Israelis and West Germans have done since 1973.[32]

Thus, in the light of the foregoing, it appears reasonable to consider (not necessarily accept) the possibility of substituting even more civilians for soldiers in the military support establishment, in ways that could enhance the utilization of fewer but more capable soldiers in the military establishment.

j. Item: *Civilian Security Guards*: *Speaking of housekeeping, it* appears relevant to note that even the security guards at the Pentagon--and at other American military headquarters, bases, posts, and facilities of the Army, Navy and Air Force worldwide--are now civilians. Moreover, at the Pentagon they are not even employees of the Department of Defense, but of the General Services Administration.

5. Direct Internal Comparisons.

Having discussed compelling environmental changes, as well as changes in civilian participation within the military establishment, we proceed to consideration of several items of direct comparison in the internal administration of military members and civilian members. As before, comprehensiveness is neither claimed nor attempted; these are selected comparisons and representative "Items."

a. Item: Why Not a Common System? In answer to a question as to why not have one common personnel system for soldiers and civilians, the DMC noted that several critical differences exist between the two systems, stemming from differences in organic laws, customs, traditions, roles, and underlying concepts; the Commission listed six principal differences as follows:[33]

Army Civilian Personnel System	Army Military Personnel System
1. Open career system with entry possible at any level.	1. Closed career system with entry only at bottom levels.
2. Rank vested in the job.	2. Rank vested in the person.
3. Promotion competition from within or outside the Service.	3. Promotion competition exclusively from within.
4. "Contractual" relationship between worker and employer.	4. Command relationship between worker and employer.
5. Pay package similar to worker in the private sector--generally limited to base pay and occasional overtime.	5. Pay package more comprehensive--including housing, subsistence, medical care, Commissary, and PX privileges.
6. Force heavily unionized.	6. Minimum union impact.

I would take issue with a couple of these points; but I shall merely suggest some qualifications, and then pass on. In Item 4, above, different contexts may engender difficulty with the term "employer." Who is the civilian's "employer"--the Federal Civil Service? And who is the soldier's "employer"--his unit commander? There is a large sense in which the relationship evolving between both military and civilian employees and their "employers" is closer to a "contractual" nature than to "command" dynamics.

Item 5, above, on "pay package" is also undergoing evolution, expanding its coverage in portions of the private sector to include medical and dental

coverage, support for dependents, pension contributions, holidays and annual leave, working conditions, cost of living supplements, access to company stores, and other benefits. (See the 57 elements of "The Military Factor" compared in Chapter II.) There is reason for expectation that this item will be in a state of contentious flux for a number of years ahead.

Item 6, above, on unions, also needs amplification. The Federal civilian workforce is indeed over 70 percent unionized, thus "heavily unionized" in numbers. However, in this instance, the heavy hand of conventional union control is restrained by certain terms of federal employment--especially by the advance declaration by every civilian employee that he will not strike, and by the Hatch Act, which bars partisan political activity. In general, government employee union activity confines itself to conditions of status and the work place, not with substantive activities of agencies of government.

In any event, the six contrasts listed certainly distinguish the two forms of federal employment from each other. As noted, none of them is impervious to change. However, there are also many other differences important enough to be brought to the attention of anyone contemplating the substitution of civilians for soldiers. Some have been imposed by Congress on the military despite strenuous military objection (such as admission of women to the Service academies); others <u>appear</u> to be imposed by coercion from time to time, but have actually been applied just about as the Services requested. The "Items" cited below are not exhaustive, but they do cover a number of representative relationships.

b. <u>Item: Benefits to Survivors</u>: The Survivor Benefit Plan available to civilians is different from the one available to soldiers, by being made

available to civilians after only 18 months of service (of course, that means that those who choose it begin paying for it at 18 months of service). But the soldier's Survivor Benefit Plan is not available to soldiers until their retirement, i.e., after they have completed at least 20 years of military service. No one knows why this difference exists. (Lest anyone misunderstand--if soldiers are killed on active duty, no matter how many or few years they have served, their survivors receive certain benefits from their Service, and later from the Veterans Administration.)[34]

c. Item: Civilian and Military Retirement Systems: These two systems vary, each with advantages and disadvantages, though a member of one group complaining about the other frequently omits the full comparison. As a portion of active-duty pay to be received in retirement, the military accrues 2½ percent after each year of active service, whereas the civilian accrues only 1½ percent for each of the first 5 years, 1 3/4 percent for each of the next 5 years, and 2 percent for the 11th and subsequent years. At 20 years of service, the military has acquired a multiplier of 50 percent, while the civilian has acquired only 36¼ percent.

The multiplier is applied to whatever the Serviceman's pay is at the time he retires; the civilian's is applied against the average of the three highest annual pays. If the military permits the soldier to stay for 30 years, the soldier can reach the maximum retired pay of 75 percent of his active duty pay after those 30 years; the civilian attains a multiplier of only 56¼ percent after 30 years, but he can work up to a maximum multiplier of 80 percent by working 41 years and 10 months. Civilian pay to which the multiplier is applied is the 3-year average of full active pay; the military multiplier is applied against active-duty pay only, which does not include the active-duty supplement of housing and subsistence.

The military contribute nothing to retirement (as is the dominant practice in the private sector), but they are assessed FICA taxes from which they draw Social Security at ages 62 or 65. Unless he becomes disabled, a military person cannot retire before 20 years of service, but he can retire at that point on his own request. The civilian can retire with as little as 5 years of service, but not until age 62; he can retire earlier, at age 55, but only after 30 years of service. Civilians contribute 7 percent of their pay towards their retirement and 0.9 percent for life insurance, but they contribute nothing to Social Security and they draw no benefits from Social Security. (The Civil Service retirement system was established a decade before Social Security.) There are several other more or less minor differences.[35] It is not possible to say which group benefits more than the other from the existing retirement laws.

d. Item: Duty Hours: Among soldier complaints about the alleged advantages of civilians, two stand out: (1) civilians don't have to move, and (2) civilians get paid for overtime. The civilian personnel system sets 8 hours of work a day, and 40 hours per week, as the standard. Any time worked beyond that amount calls for overtime pay. This entitlement to overtime pay runs up through the 10th step of Grade GS-10; and even though higher-graded professionals occasionally work for overtime pay, they are reimbursed for it, not matter what their grade, at the pay rate of the 10th step of grade GS-10. In practice, it is infrequent that most Civil Service civilian professionals receive actual overtime pay, for few agencies are willing to pay it; they are heavily encouraged to use the device of compensating time off--preferably arranged in advance. Despite disparagement by soldiers, some civilians, especially professionals, also work overtime

without pay; at the higher levels of government service, no extra money is paid to civilians for working exorbitantly long hours. Of course, at lower and middle layers of the military establishment, most employees work only standard hours, just as the employees of all government offices (and as many military employees) do.

For the military, this point of difference sticks deeper than almost any other. The military repeatedly point out these days that they keep their oath of obedience by either working or "being on call" for 24 hours every day, 7 days per week, year round. From many soldiers, such a declaration should be taken with a generous sprinkling of salt; for in many Army agencies, even in the Pentagon, the soldiers, too, go home at the formal closing time. But as a soldier reaches field grade, especially the grade of lieutenant colonel, he is confronted by very long-lived and very strong traditional dynamics that one must work late often--or even all the time. Personal ambition is also relevant. The efforts of "chiefs" to break the practice have had only mixed results, for the chiefs themselves are frequently the worst offenders.

e. Item: Frequent Moves: Being moved every 2-3 years or oftener is one of the major complaints against the conditions of military life, although several positive effects (e.g., sophistication) of mobility are also cited from time to time. Few civilians employees are required to move; those who do so have usually requested moving (with more or less the same government assumption of moving expenses, as for military persons and families). This factor is related to the characteristic often cited by the Army as an advantage contributed by most civilians: stability. This situation is changing moderately for more civilians than in the past (certain jobs have required mobility for a number of years).[36]

f. Item: Mobility and Family Separation: As noted, most military persons are required to move with their families every 2-3-4 years; moving expenses are paid by the Army. Transportation and facilities are not provided for the lowest grades. Some Servicemen choose to leave their families behind. Civilian employees are increasingly subject to movement, but the totals involved are still small compared to the military. For Navymen, with frequent periods at sea, the scale of separation well exceeds the Army's. Some military persons claim that the movement and family separation involved is unique in either private or government service. This is an exaggerated claim. For years, the constant travel of American civilian officials, especially for the Department of State, exceeded anything to which all but a handful of military were subject. Of course, a number of activities and callings in private civil life are also subject to considerable moving and family separation, such as scientists on expeditions, traveling salesmen, construction specialists building the Alaska pipeline, inhabitants of offshore oil platforms, the civilian technicians monitoring the Middle East truce, merchant mariners, ambitious young academicians and industry executives, employees of airlines and other forms of transportation, and others.

g. Item: Leave or Vacation: This is another area in which the advantages of provisions available to the other side are often exaggerated or misunderstood.

Federal civilians are entitled to 13 days off per year during their first 3 years of service, to 20 days after 3 and up to 15 years of service, and 26 days after 15 years' service. These are working weekdays only; weekends and holidays do not count against leave--thus, 26 days of annual leave means

5 full weeks plus one day off. The maximum that can be accumulated is 60 days; accumulated leave up to that total is paid for in cash on one occasion during one's career: retirement. Accumulations over 30 days not used by year's end are forfeited. There is no such thing as a "pass" for civilians.

Civilians also accumulate sick leave at the rate of 4 hours every two weeks (13 days per year). Unlimited sick leave can be accumulated, for which service credit is given to calculate retirement; but no cash is paid for sick leave, even at retirement, no matter how much is accumulated.

Military employees, from their first day of service, are entitled to 30 days of leave per year. If a leave period runs through Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, those days must be charged as leave days. No more than 60 days can be accumulated, but at retirement, payment is given for up to 60 days--whatever has been accumulated. If sick absence is authorized for a soldier by a medical officer, there is no limit to the number of days off sick, and there is no reason to accumulate any.

The military also enjoys the "pass" or "VOCO" (Verbal Order of the Commanding Officer), a system of allowing up to 96 hours off duty and in absence, without charge to one's leave account. Which side is better off in respect to leave and vacation, I cannot tell.

h. Item: Access to Higher Grades: This may be one aspect in which only a limited number of middle and upper-level civilian professionals are interested, but it is also an aspect of greatest disparity between the personnel administration of soldiers and civilians. As noted here in several places, the military personnel systems are highly sophisticated. There are a number of persons "worrying" about every aspect of every soldier's status and progress, at several levels of his unit, on his base, and in the Pentagon

or in one or more of the Pentagon's satellites. In contrast, the only persons "worrying" about the vast majority of civilians are in the local Civilian Personnel Office on the base where he works.

The military officer, for example, no matter where in the world he is stationed at any time, can be fully confident that he is being considered for every activity and opportunity relevant to his often-evaluated skills and potential, regardless of where the activities and opportunities are located. In a real sense, he is constantly being measured against the requirements for higher status, all the way to the position of Chief of Staff.

The civilian receives no such treatment. Part, but not all, of many civilian employee's lack of access to higher grades rests on the average civilian's reluctance to move, often coupled with reluctance to find out about job opportunities for which he may be eligible elsewhere. The Civilian Personnel system maintains that it "advertises worldwide" lists of upcoming opportunities (especially if the civilian is in one of the existing career fields); but such advertising is quite limited simply because many agencies, especially those in Washington, do not advertise upcoming vacancies in higher grades--instead, they fill the vacancies from "in house," i.e., from among eligibles already inside their offices.

Not long ago, the then head of the Civil Service Commission, Chairman Alan K. Campbell (now head of the new Office of Personnel Management), said:

> The fact is now that, above Grade 13 most civil servants spend their lives in one agency, and that at least is one piece of empirical evidence that the people within that agency are taking care of their own. That is why we must have more lateral transfers between agencies as well as recruiting more outstanding people from outside government.[37]

This effect is one important result of decentralizing the civilian personnel system while centralizing the military system.

Somehow, the civilian personnel system ought to place all professionals in monitored career fields, and ought to be sophisticated in ways that support confidence on the part of every interested civilian employee that the path will be open to him (and he will be informed of appropriate opportunities) all the way, limited only by his own skills, personality, competence, and performance, just as career paths open for every person in the military system.

i. Item: Higher Education: The DMC declared: "The Commission believes that, with the exception of the scientific areas, a bachelor's degree is sufficient formal education to prepare an officer to achieve four-star rank."[38] It may be that the Commission went out on a limb on that point, as illustrated by some data on the 1978-1979 class at the Army War College, keeping in mind that it is practically impossible in the Army to become a general officer without first doing well at one of the 5 War Colleges, and that neither the Army nor the officer would support the acquisition of graduate degrees unless professional benefits were derived.

1977-1979 Army War College Classes[39]

	1977	1978	1979
All Students	237	246	218
Active Army, All Sources	186	192	160
Combat Army (Mil Only)	105	120	100
Doctorate	3	5	9
Law Degrees	5	4	4
Masters Degrees	134	138	132
Years Active Service (Mil Only)	18 yrs/10 mos	19/00	19/04

This is something of an anomaly. The majority of each class are combat-arms officers (not "the scientific areas"). Obviously, the Army does not agree with the DMC--that a bachelor's degree is sufficient; for, by war college attendance time, after about 19 years of service, the Army has already sent out to acquire graduate degrees a majority of those officers from whom the Army will eventually select its achievers of one star and up.

j. Item: Training of Civilians: For many decades, any need for training for civilian employees was simply beyond the perception of everyone, even beyond civilian employees themselves. If the government needed certain skills, it expected to hire them from the civilian work force, in the market place. Only gradually were a few attempts suggested to improve the skills of civilian employees of the military departments. The DMC of 1974-76 identified inadequate training as one of the chief ills of the civilian personnel system.

Modern government has been said to be "the most complicated activity man engages in."[40] Nevertheless, the federal government has been accused of being dominated by technical professionals who do not respond clearly enough to needs for learning more about management.[41] It is said that large private companies invest 6 to 8 times as much as the average federal agency does in the development of their executives. More directly relevant to the issue at hand is the charge, made in 1974, that "the military services spend about 8 times the amount in improving the managerial effectiveness of the officer corps as is spent on civilian managers."[42]

Since the DMC made its report (1976), there has been a modest flurry of training activities organized or improved for civilians throughout the Army. Nevertheless, at least one vital aspect of training lags: the training of military supervisors of civilians (let alone training of civilian supervisors).

6. The Exceptional Situation in the Office of the Secretary of Defense: In the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), there served in February 1979 some 1,190 civilians and 400 military. There are also 6,459 (who also work in OSD, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and "Other Defense Activities," but who remain accounted for on the rolls of their home Service) and 77,048 civilians who work in "Other Defense Activities"--separate both from OSD and from the Services. Among the "Other Defense Activities," all with the word "Defense" as the first word of their titles, are the Audit Service, the Contract Audit Agency, Communications Agency, Intelligence Agency, Mapping Agency, Logistics Agency (by far the largest, with 48,000 civilians and 1,000 military) Supply Agency, and a number of others.

Especially in OSD, where there are so many high-graded civilians, the administration of civilian personnel is sophisticated indeed. The civilians there know about every opportunity and nuance of advantage made available in the Civil Service regulations and in allowable exceptions to the regulations. They are likely to be far more knowledgeable about the Washington bureaucracy than any soldier is likely to be. Many start at high grades and quickly move to higher grades.

Generally speaking, the civilians in the OSD are a somewhat different "breed of cat" than those out in the working commands of the armed forces and Civil Service. Normally, many military officers reach the Pentagon in the course of their occupational escalation, and encounter more and more civilians. The civilians they encounter, members of the layer of the Office of the Secretary of their Service, are generally the first large body of civilians they meet officially of whom many occupy directive positions,

supervising military officers, as well as other civilians. The next higher staff layer, that of OSD, is even more pervasively occupied by civilians.

Civilians in the staff layers of the Secretariat of their Services and of OSD wield considerable power. There are few "second class citizens" among the civilians serving in OSD. They are at the same location as the centers of power in personnel systems; they do not suffer from the unevenness of decentralized delegation of personnel administration, such as is cited later in describing the administration of Army civilians. In some respects, civilians at these two high levels have access to certain advantages, such as ready access to high rank via local promotion ladders, frequently unavailable to and unknown to talented employees "in the boondocks."

There is an enormous amount of work to be done to lessen the sporadic "second-class" status of the civilian throughout the military establishment. However, in the offices of the Secretary of Defense, where civilians are stationed in relatively small numbers but in positions of large "clout," the discrepancies frequently occur in reverse. In any equalizing effort, very special pains will have to be taken in relation to OSD to see that conditions of appointment, authority, promotion, career opportunities, etc., place military and civilian personnel in conditions of equal (not relatively equal, but genuinely equal) system relationships.

B. Exchanging Perspectives and Perceptions: Military and Civilian.

1. General.

Perhaps the weight of perjorative assessments and messages may have emanated from one side or the other; but the traffic on this highway runs both ways. Overall, enormous differences used to exist (and many still do) in practices, procedures, motivators, recognitions, and awards in the respective systems with which the Services administer their military and civilian members.

As we shall discuss later in more detail, separation between these two categories is less clear cut than in the past. Much interchange and interaction and overlap exist today. Despite some divergence in relation to civilian society, most of the armed forces are far less isolated--geographically, physically, organizationally, intellectually--than in the past. Various individuals, however, especially among both military and civilian hierarchies, remain committed to the past--or at least to the present system, in which they have done so well. Complicating every task is the explosion in knowledge, in meaningful activity, that bridges previous gaps among knowledge and creates new gaps suddenly, without warning, without even awareness on the part of some experts that their expertise has been invaded or eroded.

For various reasons explained from time to time in the military literature, the military is usually more inclined to preserve familiar understandings. Dr. Vannevar Bush (the US chief scientist during World War II), for example, related in his memoirs his encounter with Admiral King, the crusty wartime Chief of Naval Operations, over the use of the newly-invented proximity fuse:

> Characteristically, our discussion opened as follows: King scowled and said, 'I have agreed to meet with you, but this

> is a military question, and it must be decided on a military basis, to which you can hardly contribute.' So I told him, 'It is a combined military and technical question, and on the latter you are a babe in arms and not entitled to an opinion.'

Dr. Bush added, "It was a good start, and the discussion went on from there--and went well." Unfortunately, such mutual if delayed understanding was not necessarily characteristic of many other civilian-military exchanges.[43]

As another example of confidence in familiar terms, it is related that when Harry Truman suddenly found himself President, being given a tidal wave of information that was new to him, Secretary of War Stimson informed him about the Manhattan project for the creation of an atomic bomb. Some advisers supported the project; others derided the whole idea. Three months before the first device was detonated, Admiral Leahy (wartime chief of staff to the chief executive) assured Mr. Truman: "This is the biggest fool thing we have done. The bomb will never go off, and I speak as an expert in explosives."[44]

These incidents might be regarded as examples of the failure of the military and the civilian (scientist) to be interested enough to keep track of what each other was doing and the dangers of maintaining the great traditional enclave that the military preferred to be. Something of that insistence on separation and distinctiveness has been preserved in the two personnel systems within the military establishment. Some military leaders do not want to know or learn a mountain of details about the civilian personnel system; nevertheless, they want the system run in accord with their wishes.

Even in comparison with the entire Federal Government Civil Service, civilians in the Department of Defense (DOD), do not fare notably well. As noted in the previous chapter, the DMC in 1976 pointed out that the <u>average</u> civilian grade in the Department of Defense is consistently lower than the

average grade in the federal service as a whole, and that the DOD civilian force has a leaner senior managerial structure than the rest of the Civil Service. The DMC mentioned encountering ignorant beliefs that it is easier to manage either a civilian or a soldier; but both systems are complex and difficult to manage. The principal difference is that the military establishment devotes extensive resources to managing soldiers, but lesser and fewer resources to managing civilians.

One of the most comprehensive evaluations of personnel systems in DOD was the one accomplished over two years by the DMC, to which we have already referred many times. Reporting to the President and the Congress in 1976, the DMC said: "Management practices of the Department of Defense are not completely adequate to assuring that the civilian is effectively integrated into the total workforce structure." The Commission also said: "There is no centrally managed system for the civilian personnel force that provides for a close relationship between age, grade, and years of service.[45]

Nevertheless, in reference to the need for a professional development system for civilians, the DMC said: "There is no viable career program nor a management system to insure its operation."[46]

> This problem has been recognized within the Department of Defense since 1955, but the Services have shown little interest in solving it. The Army has shown the greatest initiative by developing programs which cover approximately 80 percent of its white-collar force. . . . The other Services are waiting for automated data systems which are currently under development and have not established programs for the various careers. All Services are in need of a 'capstone' career program which would provide development across functional and organizational lines for those men and women careerists who seek senior management positions that involve two or more functions or mission elements.[47]

To be sure, neither the military departments nor the Department of Defense took lying down all the criticism leveled by the Defense Manpower Commission, nor is it implied here that every allegation in the DMC Report is to be swallowed whole. The Army, for example, issued a document of 109 pages,[48] responding to 149 elements of criticism in the DMC Report. Not all of the DMC comments could have been unwarranted or widely wild of the mark, however; for the Army responded as follows:

Concurred with 69 comments.

Concurred partly, with 12.

Concurred, but with comments, with 12.

Inconclusive response: 21

Nonconcurred: 26.

Incidentally, in its response, the Army disagreed that it "exercised little control over the management of the civilian work force," and stressed the Army's mixture of centralization and decentralization, especially as the latter permitted "control by the commander responsible for getting the job done." It was not explained why the same criterion was not also applied to the military system, where commanders were also "responsible for getting the job done." Said the Army: "More effective control over civilian management could be achieved--at the expense of the flexibility given commanders--through 'fencing in' the account for civilian pay. . . ."[49]

2. Military Criticisms of Civilians.

a. Item: There are a number of perceptions of civilian employees by soldiers, and of soldiers by civilians, which either subject of scrutiny would hardly recognize or admit. Some are not accurate. Some are questionable. Some are one-sided. On the other hand, some are accurate enough, if painful,

Some stem from different provisions of law or regulations; some stem from the manner, tone, or implications of differential treatment.

We shall point out here several perceptions, principally perceptions held by civilian employees, and influencing them occasionally to a conclusion that they are, in some respects, "second-class citizens" in the military establishment. Some are not particularly heart-warming observations, yet they describe conditions as they exist. Not all such perceptions are necessarily accurate or fair or important, but they exist and exert influence. Not many will be cited here--perhaps enough to confirm the existence of tensions. Here we set out a few such perceptions, a number labeled simply "Item," and follow them with descriptions of certain changes occurring in the environment of the military which may indicate that the days of "things as they always were" are numbered in the military establishment, as they are numbered in numerous other long-lived institutions. This conclusion can be fortified by observing the sudden flurry in each military service over the past couple of years in activities aimed at improvement in civilian employee status and procedures.

Mostly, the perceptions to be cited surface in innocent guises. I daresay that they often do not rise into the consciousness of the holder, and even less often, into some overt kind of behavior. Nevertheless, they exist in considerable strength and, over time, must affect behavior in ways mostly subtle, though occasionally more obtrusive. A professor of political science, Ronald J. Stupak, at the Federal Executive Institute in Charlottesville, has furnished this observation, one that should not be dismissed out of hand by anyone interested in the subject:

> . . . /Based on/ numerous 'civil-military seminars' conducted at the Federal Executive Institute. A tremendous amount of anxiety-producing anger, conflict, and tension was uncovered between the military officers and the civilian careerists in the defense policy-making environment. It therefore becomes extremely important /to/ highlight some of the major tension areas that have led to ineffectiveness in the defense community because of jealousy, misperceptions, and ignorance on the part of the civilian executives and the military officers concerning each other's styles, concerns, and cultures.[50]

b. Item: Despite many similarities, some basic military-civilian differences exist, some often exaggerated, some true enough without exaggeration. The DMC Report of 1976 stated unequivocally:

> Employment as a civilian is not comparable to service as a soldier, sailor, marine, or airman. Upon his entry into service as a military member of the armed forces, the individual is subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. He is no longer a civilian. He is no longer at liberty to disobey a lawful order of any kind /Are civilians at liberty to disobey lawful orders?/. . . .[51]

Another professional observer comments:

> There is a divergence of views between civilian perceptions of the military and officer perceptions of the host society and civil-military relations. Almost immediately after the end of US participation in the Vietnam War, the military began a dramatic climb in public opinion polls. Literally dozens of polls have identified military leaders as honest and efficient and the military a trusted institution as highly regarded as churches, colleges, etc. As an institution, the military is much more respected in public opinion polls than Congress, labor unions, or the federal bureaucracy.[52]

Individuals on both sides perceive the other side with various distortions; a certain amount of folklore lingers on both sides. Overall, the heavier weight of misperception and adverse appraisal seems to be accompanied by the asperity reflected in the following fairly representative passage:

> Not until civilian employees of all government agencies voluntarily relinquish certain Constitutional guarantees and agree to accept the discipline and rigors of military life will there be any true comparison between military and civil service careers. Until the day arrives, the uniqueness of the military career must continue to be recognized through special incentives.[53]

How close to validity are the perspectives on which this passage of asperity is based? Or consider the following opinion by Lt. Gen. Leo Benade after a December 1977 meeting of the President's Commission on Military Compensation:

> I think there is also a resentment. If there is one thing that seems to make people in uniform climb the wall, it is to be compared to civilians. In fact, the reaction is almost emotional in my judgment. You have to recognize it and allow for it. And they bitterly resent any attempts to compare and to talk comparability in pay. If I could give you one recommendation to the Department of Defense, it would be to drop from their lexicon this word 'comparability.' It makes far more enemies than friends.[54]

How wide and how deep do these sentiments run?

3. Civilian Views of the Military.

As in earlier compilations of "Items," the following selected "Items" are not intended to be comprehensive, only representative:

a. Item: The Fordyce Comments of 1953. As the author quoted below puts it, much has been said and continues to be said about military organizations, and much also about civilian organizations; but relatively little is said about mixed civilian-military organizations, which exist in increasing numbers.

As an early (and rare) example of a serious approach to this problem, the observations of J. K. Fordyce, a civilian employee of the Navy with an MPA degree, published 25 years ago under the title: "Officer-Civilian Relationships in Semi-Military Technical Organizations," are here presented in condensed form.[55] At the time of writing, Mr. Fordyce was Deputy Director, Civilian Personnel Division, Bureau of Ships, Department of the Navy. He mentioned that he was limited to experience on the civilian side.

Times have changed over 25 years, and the status of the civilian employee has been somewhat improved; perhaps the reader will develop conclusions as to whether or not enough changes have occurred. The basic article is drastically condensed here; yet this digest is itself somewhat lengthy. I apologize for this citation at length; yet it seems to me especially relevant and valuable.

> The military-civilian technical organization brings together the diverse viewpoints of the generalist, the operator, and the technical specialist for the solution of complicated technical problems. The members come together from two principal groups, 'groups which for all they have in common, have generally had some lack of mutual confidence and esteem.'
>
> This article looks closest at the type of DOD agency staffed by both military and civilian engineers and scientists, primarily concerned with research, design, testing, and maintenance related to military equipment. . . . In the great majority of cases, officers are given management responsibility at all levels, high and low, in that organization. The primary function of the civilian group is to provide engineering and scientific experience. To some extent, capability to perform either function may be found in either group.
>
> An important differentiation is that between the frequent rotation of officers and the stability of civilians. Another important difference is that officers and civilians come from two different career systems--one from the old authoritarian form of social organization, the other from the loose area of diversity, less rigid in status allocation. Neither system is inherently superior to the other. . . . However, managerial positions are almost invariably reserved for military members;

inevitably, there arise frustration and loss of dignity among civilians, and between the two groups, there arises competition for power and prestige. Some agencies appear to try to influence civilians to accept "inferiority."

The positions of most civilians are dependent for progress on military officers; hence, signs of subordination and deference inevitably emerge--for example, the listing first of all officers in order of rank, before any civilians are listed. . . . In addition to removing stimuli to growth, the near-monopoly of authority by officers overloads the manager group and is a constant irritant to authority-less civilian scientists and engineers. The need for immediate products results in paralysis of civilian careers, while officers receive constant elaborate attention and broadening in training, personal development, and career opportunities. No one has responsibility for even moderate career development of management talents of civilians. Two practices have serious effects: rotating managers, and the long-standing custom that civilians will not be assigned to supervise officers.

* * * * * * *

. . . In some agencies, distinctions are practically eliminated; in others, civilians are more or less 'second-class citizens.' An impressive illustration appears as a statement in a training manual for civilians: 'In a sense, an officer of the lowest rank has authority over the highest rated civilian.'

Some changes are occurring. . . . Military skills are no longer adequate to make a good officer; broadening an officer now means becoming more civilianized and acquiring civilian skills.

Convictions that only an officer is qualified to command any group or to manage affairs . . . are slow to change, such as beliefs about civilians and what their primary motivations are. . . .

Any kind of valuable organizational experience tells one to place in each position not even the most senior person, but the available person best qualified for the job. Too much importance is currently attached to the uniform, which is basically an artificial factor. Different jobs require different mixes of operating experience, scientific knowledge, managerial talent, and other qualities. /Recruitment and retention of civilians of high competence are difficult./ Civilians, to be sure, must be more ready than they have been to move to fit the military department's requirements.

> . . . A highly-placed scientist-officer recently commented that 'we have provided amply for the dignity of the officers; we must do the same for the civilians. This is good business, as well as good human value.' The usefulness of mixed organizations will not be maximized until status and opportunity are equalized for officer and civilian.

(End of Fordyce Digest)

The foregoing passages provide a digest of a remarkable document which, in many respects, anticipated this entire study. Many significant points are made; and, while some of them have been overtaken by events or revised at last, many remain to this day characteristic of the relative statuses of soldiers and civilians in the military establishment.

If I had to single out one sentence for extra emphasis, it would be the quotation from Functions of the Naval Administrator[56]: "In a sense, an officer of the lowest rank has authority over the highest rated civilian." I do not know whether that sentence still exists in one or more Navy documents; but, even if the sentence has been eliminated, the spirit lives on in many civilian personnel contexts and practices in the Department of Defense.

b. Item: Career Civilians at War Colleges: In the matter of providing higher education at war colleges for its people (not confined to study of battlefields, by any means), the Department of the Army sends about 250 military officers to war colleges each year; and the Navy and Air Force send comparable numbers. Up to 1964 the number of Army civilian employees sent by the Army to war colleges was zero. In 1964, one DA civilian was sent to the Army War College, then one each year through 1971, 3 in 1972, 2 in 1973, 3 in 1974 and 1975, 2 in 1976, and 1 in 1977. Total military executives sent to war colleges by the Army between 1950 and 1977: about 6750. Total civilians sent, same period: 22.

c. Item: Civilians Not Welcome As Club Members: At military posts everywhere, up until a few years ago, civilian professionals working on military bases were not permitted to become members of the Officers' Club, even after the military practice arose of inviting "prominent civilians" from nearby communities to become members in a special category. Later, at least at one well-known club where dues were maintained on a sliding scale (captain less than major, major less than LTC, etc.), post civilians from GS-11 up were at last admitted to membership; but all civilians regardless of grade were charged the same highest-level dues as colonels. Now, post civilians may join both NCO and officer clubs, at graduated scales of dues.

d. Item: Civilians Not Included in "Faculty" Listing: One Army educational institution published a directory annually, listing graduates and faculty members of previous years, and members of the current Faculty. A co-located Army agency employing both senior military and civilian scholar-specialists intermittently loaned to the Faculty various officers and civilian scholars to participate full-time for months at a time in teaching duties in the curriculum. All the military officers were always listed in the annual director as "members of the Faculty," including that majority of agency officers who had had nothing to do with the curriculum that year. On the other hand, despite the fact that a number of civilian scholars did cross over and participate at length in the curriculum that year, no civilian from the agency was ever listed among the Faculty that year, or any other year.

e. Item: Evaluation of Civilian Performance: Officers and enlisted men are carefully rated at least once each year on extensive forms and in elaborate systems of evaluation of performance, personality, traits, and other factors. They may be rated extensively several times in one year.

Many persons and machines at several levels enter into the process, and the data gathered in any one year on any one military person swells the files continuously maintained. On the rating form for the civilian employee, however, are three words: "outstanding," "satisfactory," and "unsatisfactory." If the rater checks either "outstanding" or "unsatisfactory," the rater must write out additional prose justifying either rating. If he checks "satisfactory," however, he does not have to add or explain anything. Thus, an entire year's performance by a civilian employee, possibly a performance of a high order in a complex, critical position, can be totally evaluated in the Army's system by a mere check mark on a single sheet of paper. (It appears that a civilian performance appraisal system is being formulated, but it is not in effect at this writing.)

f. Item: Quality of Support While Visiting on Official Business: Congress ordered in July 1978 that DOD civilians while on Temporary Duty (TDY) on a military base should stay in "military quarters" rather than in commercial hotels or motels. The "military quarters" referred to were the same ones used by military persons on TDY. Rep. Mark Hannaford issued an unfortunate public statement: "Defense Department employees are not second-class citizens. They did not forswear to sleep on a bed of nails when they accepted their employment." Immediately, soldiers set up a hue and cry. The implication was then clear, it was said, that the military were to be regarded as "second-class citizens"--evidently it was considered perfectly acceptable for the military to sleep on "beds of nails," that is, to put up with mediocre temporary quarters, but not civilian employees. Many angry letters influenced Rep. Hannaford to back off. He later said:

> The last thing I meant to do was imply a measure of second-class citizenship to those in the Service. The 'bed of nails' refers to the great sacrifices made by Servicemen. Military people should not be considered second class but rather a class apart because of the sacrifices they make.
>
> But DOD civilians did not make that choice of sacrifice when they accepted employment. They expected to stay at a Ramada Inn and eat in the hotel dining room.
>
> The military does a good job serving its people but that level of service is not up to that in commercial hotels and restaurants. . . .[57]

It is questionable that military persons, serving without demur under terrible field conditions in maneuvers, crises, and wars, ever "made a choice" to prefer mediocre or inferior quarters in circumstances involving temporary duty at military posts on Army business. In any event, this problem was settled by compromise.

g. Item: Navy Discrimination: Symbolic of lack of integration of civilian professors and instructors at the Naval Academy were such practices as the appointment of military officers to head all departments, including heads with no specialized training at all in the respective disciplines of their departments. The civilians also resented the almost total domination of policy discussion by the military participants--until 1949, when civilian professors were included. Also symptomatic was the exclusion, until the 1950's, of civilian faculty members from the Academy's commencement exercises. (These are citations of Navy practices, of course, but symptomatic of practices prevalent throughout the military establishment.)[58]

h. Item: Officer-Enlisted Discrimination: The Soldiers' and Airmen's Home in Washington has stood for 126 years to house aging enlisted soldiers (and airmen) only. The highest positions of administering the Home have always been barred to NCO's and have always been filled by officers. A

controversy arose in 1978, during which it was found that the bar against enlisted men serving as administrators of the Home was not and never had been legal.[59]

i. Item: Department of Defense Discrimination: The 1976 Defense Manpower Commission (note that it was not designated only as the "Military Manpower Commission" but charged to consider all DOD manpower) was given the mission of investigating the condition of all manpower systems in the Department of Defense. The Commission rendered its one-volume Report in April 1976, accompanied by 5 volumes of studies in 47 sections, and 1,000 pages. Despite its clear appraisal of the inferiority of existing civilian personnel systems to meet the requirements of DOD civilians, the DMC devoted the overwhelming proportion of its 513-page Report to the military, as well as four volumes of the studies and most of the fifth volume, 45 sections, and 850 pages, to numerous problems of military manpower, but only 2 sections and 150 pages to civilian manpower. In the 160-page Section R, "Career Force of the Future," there was specific mention of civilians employees amounting to almost one page.

j. Item: Omission of Civilian "Strategists": About 1975, the Department of the Army adopted a new program by which selected military officers were to be given an extra designation as "strategists." No civilians were proposed to be designated nor have any civilians since that time been so designated. It remains something of a paradox that a number of civilian specialists who are well-known analysts of strategic problems--such as Stephen Canby, Herman Kahn, Albert Wohlstetter, Thomas Schelling, Henry Kissinger (recognized well before he joined the White House), Colin Gray--have been given considerable respect by the military Services and are sought

out for their views. Evidently, if one is a civilian in the military establishment, however, one cannot be accorded recognition as a strategist.

We have already pointed out, relatively early in this study, a number of developments in the modern world, in political, economic, social, military, and technological affairs, that tend to increase or otherwise change the civilian's role from the periphery to central positions in national defense. Inevitably, within the modern military establishment, many changes in the civilian's role require corresponding changes in the soldier's role. Some of these changes are modest, and some are profound. It remains to describe certain additional perceptions.

k. Item: Discrimination Via Decentralization: A factual situation will illustrate the kinds of discrepancies possible to arise under comprehensive decentralization--that is, authority delegated to local commanders to interpret differently the personnel regulations of the Civil Service System and of the military departments. In one military agency staffed with both military and civilians, the work was accomplished by mixed temporary teams. This agency was structured locally to include numerous positions for 0-6's (Colonels) but included only one civilian position at GS-14 and the rest at GS-13 and below. Practically all other comparable agencies doing similar work included civilian grades up to GS-16 and GS-17. Since the equivalency tables discussed earlier equate colonels and GS-15's, all civilians in this agency were considered subordinates; despite the existence in the agency of civilian scholars of unequaled competence on certain issues, all mixed work teams over several years were headed by colonels.

Moreover, the earlier military chief had established as prevailing his personal misinterpretations of standing regulations. He declared (erroneously)

that the Civil Service mixed two functions--evaluation and reward--into one. Specifically, he enforced his rule that, if a supervisor evaluated a civilian member's performance as "outstanding," he was by that act giving a reward; what the broader regulations really said that in case of such evaluation, the civilian should be given one of a range of possible awards, from a certificate or cash to a one-step increase within his grade. One result of this decentralized interpretation in this agency over a period of years was that "outstanding" performance ratings were few and far between.

4. Questionable Perceptions: Summary: This particular section is not easy to write without offending someone--which I have no desire to do. Yet, it seems prudent to discuss certain sensitive issues of cross-perception that may be partly true, half-true, or untrue, or held by some, or many, or nearly all on one side, but need correction before certain basic institutional relationships can be expected to change for the better.

First, consider certain civilian perceptions of the military. Some are deeply rooted in American folklore and values--for example, the myth that it was the Minute Man, the unskilled amateur leaping to arms, who won our wars. America was founded at a time when certain military practices impacted heavily and adversely on communities (such as forced quartering of troops in private homes), and were rejected by this fledgling democratic republic. The ambivalent "Tommy Atkins" cycle, decried by Kipling ("Oh, it's Tommy this and Tommy that, and 'throw 'im out, the brute'; but it's 'thank you, Mr. Atkins,' when the guns begin to shoot") has recurred again and again in American history. As soon as its wars have ceased, America has raced itself to gut the military establishment and place itself at some disadvantage in those international interactions that take account of military power in existence.

The principle of civilian control is deeply honored in the military establishment, but some civilians have distorted rationales in accounting for the principle. Civilian control is important because the nation's arsenals are entrusted to the military, because the control of such irresistible physical power may tempt some military custodian to undertake the role of "the man on horseback" and attempt to ride over the interests of the American citizenry at large. Therefore, it is stressed that ultimate control is vested in the highest elected officials of the nation, civilians all, and in the lesser officials appointed by the elected officials. Hence, the line of accountability to all the citizens is direct.

A number of civilians, from time to time, however, choose to believe that civilian control is exalted as a principle because civilians are innately superior to soldiers in important characteristics--intelligence, competence, humanism, morality, reliability, even patriotism. To believe so may be satisfying to one's prejudices, but it is actually myopic on several counts. In the first place, of course, it simply isn't so; a cross-section of the officers, say, of any military service, and a cross-section of a civilian hierarchy, are both overwhelmingly similar counterparts to a cross-section of the nation, with a few minor differences attributable to extra trained emphasis within either group on a few special characteristics.

Another source of (distorted) civilian interest in military affairs is a residue of military glory, as experienced in the past but still revivable in crisis: a conviction among a few civilians that the conduct of military operations is relatively simple and within their ready capabilities. Even though many of these bemused civilians will concede that they cannot pilot a great bomber or run an overpowering aircraft carrier, some still harbor a delusion that they are equal to command of troops in the land battle.

Also, a biased civilian view is exaggeratedly apprehensive about the chances that a "man on horseback" will be a uniformed totalitarian; this view appears to be perversely ignorant of the fact that in modern advanced countries, the unprincipled dictators have been civilians, not soldiers--Mussolini, Hitler, Lenin, Stalin, Ho Chi Minh. Even in America, two who were suspected of totalitarian proclivities--Huey Long and Joseph McCarthy--were unquestionably civilians. There may be some question about the French army's potential for a coup at the time of the Algerian crisis; but the French army did not rise in opposition. Of course, there have been military dictators in our time--Franco, Stroesser, Amin, Somoza--but only in undeveloped countries, not in advanced countries.

Reverse perceptions are equally mixed and equally faulty. As noted by Fordyce, claims are regularly made that officers are more competent to be in charge. This may become relatively true in later career stages of some persons, though certainly not in all of them.

For many decades it was the practice when listing both officers and civilians engaged in a common enterprise (such as, say, membership in a committee) to list first all military members in order or rank, then all civilians, sometimes ignoring their ranks--as though civilian status were ignorable.

Over time, in some jurisdictions, when both military and civilian instances compete for attention and resolution, the civilian instances, in dozens of ways, are accorded lesser priority and are addressed after the cases of military persons.

Some officers believe that civilians are competent only in low-level jobs. Line officers, coming up through combat branches, on relatively remote bases, come into contact with few high-ranking civilians; their contacts are mostly with civilian clerks and typists, with van loaders and trash-collectors from the post engineer's office. Only later when (and if) they reach the higher echelons of the Pentagon, some officers come into sustained contact for the first time with numerous decisionmaking civilians in the military establishment.

Some military think civilians cannot command anything. Some of this peels off into constant military emphasis on a claim that all the synonyms--management, direction, supervision, executive leadership--are weak counterparts to command, that such terms are suitable for civilians, but that command is exercised only by the military. Accordingly, the military tends to emphasize command and authoritarian leadership, even in various modern contexts of supervision in which such styles are moribund.

Similarly, despite mountains of contrary evidence, many military persons take it for granted that if a post or base or location is to be directed, only a military person can run any such entity or enterprise. To believe that, one must ignore the host of bases and enclaves under US Government civilian departments (e.g., Department of State, FBI, General Services Administration, NASA, etc.) not to mention the vast number sponsored by private industry, in the United States and overseas, and run by civilians--evidently with competence equal in every way (police, fire, supply, budget, housing, discipline, etc.) to those in which military bases are directed.

Moreover, another unwarranted assumption of lesser influence often accompanies the one above to the effect that supervision of people cannot be effectively accomplished by civilians, that only military supervisors are effective. This prejudice ignores the great departments of government outside DOD, some enormous and highly complex, containing not one soldier, but operated with firmness, decisiveness, discipline, foresight, responsiveness to the national interest, and competence equal to that of men in uniform. It ignores the vast number of civilian enterprises in private life with not one soldier aboard but worthy of envy in the efficiency and effectiveness of their operation. It ignores the great systems of transportation worldwide, on land, on sea, and in the air, operating with precision despite the absence of military persons.

Contemplating these activities, one sees that there is a convincing rationale for experienced military direction of military enterprises related to combat, but no devastating rationale for undeviating military direction of every single nonmilitary activity, even though it takes place within the military establishment. Noncombat units, even in the military departments, can be effectively directed by civilians, as they can be directed effectively by military persons.

In any event, a number of soldiers perceive the only important career being administered by the military establishment to be the military career. Some see the civilian's career as being of lesser importance. Since other government departments, just like DOD, attach premier importance to administering the careers of their employees (all civilians), one may be moved to ask: "Why are these civilian employees of the government considered to be of lesser importance, simply because they work for the Department of Defense?"

There is a three-cornered equation here that may mislead one unless one thinks it all the way through, as follows:

Given three government employees, all of equal rank--one military and one civilian from the Department of Defense and one, necessarily civilian, from another department of government:

Is there any basis for the civilian from another department to feel that his status is inferior in any respect to that of the military employee of the Department of Defense?

Assuming the answer is no, is there any basis for the DOD civilian employee to feel that his status is inferior in any respect to a civilian employee of another department?

Again, assuming the answer to be no, we logically conclude that, despite the fact that it is the Department of Defense, there ought to be no basis for a DOD civilian to feel that his status is inferior in any respect to that of a military employee of DOD.

CHAPTER IV

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO SEEKING ADEQUATE MILITARY MANPOWER

A. General.

There are available, of course, a number of alternative ways of seeking to obtain adequate numbers of skilled military manpower--alternatives, that is, to current approaches and methods. It is not difficult to jot down almost a dozen suggested alternatives. However, even cursory appraisal will find few of them likely to be very effective in producing adequate numbers and capabilities. Ten alternatives are suggested below, but only the final three appear to harbor the potential, under current rules and statutes, of making improvement possible in appreciable numbers. The ten alternatives suggested here include enhancement of the status quo (by "sweetening the pot" still further); reduction of current manpower requirements; reinstatement of Selective Service; adoption of a system of national service, with allocation of suitable persons to the armed forces; adoption of a system of lateral entry of specialists into noncombat areas and units at medium and higher levels; use of military retirees; use of other groups as substitutes or supplements; adoption of a system of contracting out for services of various kinds and various levels on military bases; use of women as substitutes for men; and substitution or civilianization, i.e., the replacement of individual military persons with individual civilians.

We shall take a brief look at each of these alternatives, of which three, as noted above, seem to enjoy some hope of substantial contribution: contracting out, replacement of men by women, and civilianization. The latter receives the bulk of analysis in this chapter.

1. Enhance the Status Quo.

By this wording and by terms like "sweeten the current pot" is meant that if current offers, pay scales, benefits, and other inducements are not effective enough in attracting sufficient numbers of qualified males, the economic inducements can be raised--for example, raise starting pay, increase benefits, offer larger bonuses, etc. Would it work? No one knows. Practically all authorities who have explored this question agree that money is important but not supreme as an inducement. In any event, a large increase in starting military pay is not likely to be supported by Congress or the general public.

2. Reduce Current Requirements.

The future of this armed and dangerous world is still far too uncertain for any major power to undertake unilateral disarmament. The alternative of reducing the current strength of American armed forces so as to maintain fewer troops would probably not be popular with any element of the American citizenry.

3. Reinstate the Draft.

The entire "machinery" of Selective Service has been placed in standby status; and it would require many months to rebuild the system until it performed effectively. Whether or not, if the draft were reinstated, women would be subject to the draft, is a highly controversial subject. The most critical question has never been answered: Who should serve when not all serve?

4. Establish National Service.

Various forms of this option have been suggested. One recurrent form involves the "drafting" of all young people for two years of national service,

of which one option would be military service. All the options but military service would be low paid, and subsequent benefits (such as free college education) would be higher for military service than for any other option.

Many Americans oppose National Service on the grounds that it is an outrageous intrusion in the lives of free American citizens--that this intrusion does not even have the justification of coping with some national crisis. Opponents argue that if involuntary military service is sought as a national program, it should be supported in standard political forums and channels on its own merits, and not as a "hidden" program in an all-inclusive national program.

Other opponents would concede all the probable benefits but still oppose the program on the grounds that it should be available only by choice, not coercion.

5. Lateral Entry.

In this alternative, persons would be admitted to the support elements of the armed forces at various levels, depending upon the need for their skills and upon their experience and expertise. A Canadian author has defined lateral entry as "the recruitment of persons /who have/ civilian training similar to their eventual military occupations and who enter the military on a contractual basis at an advanced level."[1] The only route to higher levels of combat forces is military experience, and it can also be argued that the physical demands on combat forces in peace and war can be satisfied only by a system emphasizing youth and vigor. Hence, "lateral transfer" would not normally be a channel for entrants into combat forces (although a limited number of exceptions is conceivable).

For all the support forces and all the noncombat specialties involved, it seems reasonable to argue that today, when civilian society and the military establishment are converging in many respects, the exercise of technical and professional skills in many civilian environments can be effectively adapted to military environments. In numerous respects, the military administrative bureaucracy resembles the civilian administrative bureaucracy. A host of specialties can be "retreaded" into approximate positions in the noncombat part of the military establishment: economists, engineers, physicians, military policemen, explosives managers, transportation directors, supply managers, personnel specialists, counselors, contract negotiators, construction supervisors, translators, and many others.

Some difficulties can be foreseen; for example, there must be maintained enough spaces fillable by men in uniform under the practice of rotation--that is, when soldiers return from overseas, the military establishment at home must include positions in which the skills of the returning soldier can be used.

The Defense Manpower Commission recommended that DOD take the initiative with the Departments of Labor and HEW in the establishment of standards for common occupations that would enhance lateral movement between civilian and military occupational contexts.[2]

6. Contracting Out.

The practice of contracting out is simply a practice of hiring somebody else to perform services you could do yourself if you had the people and the time. If an employee is no longer needed as a permanent employee to perform a particular essential service regularly, while the essential service is performed by a contract agency, one can eliminate the permanent employee and

all the costs of benefits that many permanent employees become entitled to.

The rationale often given is that the military forces (or the military establishment in general) must not perform services in competition with "the civilian economy." But Government itself, and many of the acts performed as part of it, are frequently "in competition with" all the similar or identical acts performed in the civilian or private economy.

A perennial argument considers that one of the constant objectives of military forces is to be self-reliant, capable of moving out of any sedentary circumstances and out into any kind of field situation as a self-contained body carrying within itself all the essential capabilities it will need for combat. When such forces are deprived of various services because they are "in competition with" the civilian economy, they lose the internal capability to perform that service for themselves. Then, as invariably happens some day in time of peril or disaster, they are ordered into the field. But those contract agents of the private economy who are performing services drop out at that point, and do not go to the field. There are no commercial agencies for hire in the deserts, jungles, and other battlefields of the world. On battlefields, of course, private enterprise establishments drop any claim that military support activities are "in competition" with them. Of course, services are not available in the field, and if the soldier no longer has the capability to perform them himself in his unit, the military units may have to do without.

Nevertheless, this practice of contracting out is spreading. The Department of Defense was instructed in the course of 1959 hearings by Congress to eliminate from Service activities those which "competed" with

the civilian economy.[3] The basic policy was stated back to the Congress in a letter from DOD to the House Armed Services Committee:

> . . . The DOD should not carry on commercial-industrial-type activities in competition with private industry if a satisfactory product or service can be obtained at a reasonable price from commercial sources, unless Government operation is required in the interest of the national defense.[4]

The letter cited above reported a detailed breakdown of actions taken in this program in early 1954 through 1957, and those taken during 1958. The total of activities surveyed amounted to 1679 (including 405 automotive repair shops, 309 telephone systems, 199 office equipment repair shops, 136 laundries and drycleaning plants, 58 bakeries, 36 power plants, 87 printing plants, 12 shipyards, 56 cobbler shops, and 18 cement-mixing plants).[5]

In 1976, the Defense Manpower Commission recommended substantial increase in contracting out by the armed forces, as a cost-effective substitute for manpower.

In April 1978, the Army announced that in 1979 some support operations would be conducted at 22 Army posts under commercial contract, eliminating from federal service some 859 civilian and 49 military jobs, covering various services (e.g., clothing alterations, fire protection, telephone services, ADP services, bus operations, and furniture repair).

In November 1978, a relevant case that had been in Federal courts for 11 years was settled. The case had involved the right of the National Aeronautical and Space Administration, a government agency, to contract with commercial agencies for work in telephone communications, building custodianship, and private police. The opposed unions were unions of federal employees, seeking to overturn lower court decisions upholding NASA contracts, and seeking to restrict the right of government agencies to contract freely for agency work to be done by the private sector.[6]

Contracting out involves highly complex trade-offs. If a military unit is serviced at bases able to get services performed cheaply by nearby communities, both money and manpower can be saved in military budgets. But carried too far--that is, to the point of practically eliminating a ready capability from the armed forces--this device may well do more harm than good.

In addition, as mentioned elsewhere, the military structure at home must contain a large number of positions in various specialties to which military personnel may be "rotated" from overseas.

7. Retirees.

This alternative approach to supplement manning of the armed forces contemplates the recall to active duty of retired military persons in the event of general mobilization. In theory, it sounds attractive. For five years after retirement, skilled retirees would be vulnerable to being recalled to active duty to perform a number of military administative positions in the United States, thus freeing younger soldiers to go on to battlefields overseas.

Here are ready persons trained in a great miscellany of skills. Why not use them? There are some 1.2 million retirees on the rolls now, and about 38,000 military persons of all ranks retire every year. At first glance, this source looks like a huge pool of trained replacements. But there are flaws. A retiree of age 38 after 20 years of service is one thing; a retiree of age 55 after 30 years of soldiering is another (and, of course, a retiree of 83 is still another).[7] The great need will be for young men--competent young men in large numbers to operate the machines of war and prevail in the terrible battles--not for old men.

One should not expect too much from such a device. The real world intervenes, looking not as seductive as it looked at first. Skills that are not used atrophy; so that after a few years of disuse, the expertise of many retirees may well be in variable states of disrepair. Many retirees, after their career of full-time soldiering, would resent being recalled except for a genuine crisis, feeling that they had contributed a lifetime's share of service to the uniform and the society. And physical ability inevitably runs downhill; the great majority of retirees at any one time are beyond any sensible age limit for practical soldiering.

8. Women.

For many years, women have been utilized in the armed forces. Most people alive at the time remember the WAC's, WAVES, and WAF's of World War II, not to mention earlier presence of nurses. Until the early 1970's, women constituted about 2 percent of total enlisted strength of the armed forces (about 40,000).[8]

The forthcoming world is predicted to be more complex, technological, and sophisticated, demanding more talent from populations than may even be present. Brains will be at an ever-increasing premium. Meanwhile, the largest unexploited pool of brains in every society exists in its women. Many activist women are demanding unlimited opportunities for women, both in numbers and in higher-status jobs. Nevertheless, there is reason to conjecture that, with or without vocal activists, the real trigger revising relationships between the sexes is the coming need for greater brains throughout the mechanisms of society.[9]

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As part of this dynamic social development, the military, realizing that it will probably not be able to keep up a constant influx of talented males in the future, has turned to one of the most promising alternatives, or "supplemental devices," to fill out its forces: women.

The New York Times quoted a Pentagon official in March 1978:

* * * * * * *

> The volunteer military simply needs more women because we're coming to the end of the baby boom. . . . There will be a 15 percent drop in the supply of 18-year-old males by the mid-80's, and 25 percent drop in the 1990's. We shouldn't be depriving women of these jobs that they're qualified to do and want to do.[10]

Reports multiply concerning female incursions into male bastions. "By all accounts," said the Times, "the Army has used women far more extensively than have the other Services."[11]

The numbers and proportions anticipated are difficult to establish, for the Services keep changing the figures--upward. A recent report says plans will increase the proportion from 7.5 percent today (132,100) to almost 12 percent (208,000) in 1984.[12]

A Brookings study[13] by Martin Binkin and Shirley Bach estimated that the numbers of women that could be taken in by the Services without change in current laws are as follows:

Army	175,000
Navy	42,500
Air Force	363,000
Marine Corps	15,000
	595,000

Some estimates go even higher. Professor George H. Quester wrote in 1977: "Estimates have been developed that as much as 60 percent of the Air Force could be female without any alternation /sic; probably meant "alteration"/ of the bans on women in combat." No basis is given for this "estimate."[14]

Other than numbers, important issues involve the kinds of statuses and jobs opened up to women. An early DOD summary[15] gave this account of Army enlisted career fields open to women:

	Mid-1971	End-1973
Army	39%	90%
Navy	24%	100%
Air Force	51%	98%
Marine Corps	57%	72%

The Army opened 434 of 482 job specialties to women; the skills excluded were only combat, combat related, or those otherwise considered "too hazardous or arduous." The Navy asked Congress in 1977 to amend the law as to allow women on noncombat support ships, such as submarine tenders, salvage and cargo vessels, seagoing tubs--and on combat ships on a temporary basis.[16]

Professor George Quester appraised the United States as "close to emerging as the world leader in female participation in its armed forces." He finds such a status persuasive in wartime propaganda terms: "A nation forced to send its women into combat must be the underdog, the nation that has been threatened, the nation that cares the very most about the justice of its cause."[17]

I consider such an appraisal unrealistic, highly fanciful. Does caring about justice validate the justice of one's cause? Does sending women into combat have anything to do with justice? Or does sending women into combat represent an advanced stage of callousness? In further discussion, Dr. Quester expressed confidence that American use of women in these roles will arouse in Scandinavian countries admiration for American "social progress" and envy in the Balkans when they learn that "there are hundreds of thousands of women in the American armed forces, and virtually none in the Soviet forces."[18]

Coping with military manpower shortages by substituting women may represent "social progress," or even enlightened or reluctant expediency; but I strongly doubt that use of women in combat will be hailed as "progressive" by very many nations of the world. The allocation of roles by gender, including the allocation of work, has evolved over many millenia.

We cannot succumb to the assertions of extremist advocates, who seek various profits and satisfactions (political, professional, power-sharing, psychic) from advocacy of "unlimited" change in the status of women. The whole subject of physiological and psychological differences between men and women is highly complex and not one to be resolved instantly in relation to women soldiers. Many tensions have arisen in recent years in male-female contexts, including military units. It is clear that, in general, male fighters do not want women in combat units.[19]

No matter how many agreeable forecasts are issued by men or women or both, the subject and the movement are still controversial and will remain so for some time. In 1977, the senior woman in the Army, Brigadier General Mary E. Clarke, cited the fact that enthusiasts for putting women into combat were not themselves going to be the persons actually risking their lives in combat. Speaking of women soldiers already in the Army, she said: "I find very few women with whom I've talked desire to be combat soldiers. I find that much of the pressure to put women into combat comes from outside the Army, not within."[20]

A study by the Army Administration Center concluded that both men and women prefer male leaders.[21] Interviewed in early 1978, Major General Jeanne Holm, senior woman in the Air Force, opposed any restrictions on women in combat "as members of air crews. I see no reason why they should

not serve aboard combat ships. The bottom line is obviously infantry. There I have a little difficulty. . . ."[22] In the same interview, a former senior Army woman, Brigadier General Elizabeth Hoisington, said: "I think we should continue to have a legal bar against women in combat units--not because they are women but because the average woman is simply not physically, mentally and emotionally qualified to perform well in a combat situation for extended periods."[23]

What are the implications for mobilization of a military establishment that is 12 percent women? What would the implications be if the proportion were 25 percent? 40 percent? 50 percent? We simply do not know, and cannot envision, the answers to such questions. The practicable limit may have already been reached; whatever the optimum proportion of women eventually turns out to be, I expect the armed forces, on the whole, to probe the unknown future very reluctantly, very slowly, and very very cautiously.

As noted, expectations that more and more women will flock to the armed forces in great numbers are probably doomed to disappointment. Early in 1979, the Army announced[24] that, for the first time, such recruitment goals as the Army had set were not being met.

In his February 1979 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Professor Charles Moskos also touched on these interactions:

* * * * * * *

> . . . Certainly, enlisted women are not clamoring for a major expansion of their numbers into combat roles. It is almost a surety that the recruiting successes in attracting women would be reversed if combat assignments were given to females.
>
> Considering the difficulties in getting men to volunteer for combat roles, it is simpleminded in the extreme to believe women would be any more willing. Indeed, the services already are finding it increasingly difficult to attract high-quality enlisted women. . . .[25]

Supplementary measures, other expedients, will have to be found.

9. Other Potential Substitutions.

Other sources suggest themselves to one's mind, from which to seek substitution of skilled manpower for the US armed forces. Some possible target populations are internal: for example, ethnic minorities. One asks: which ethnic minorities are likely to accept being singled out to provide disproportionate numbers of soldiers, even though various impressive inducements were to be offered? My own response to such a question is, "Probably none." Since their ways of assimilating themselves will probably greatly resemble those of their immigrant predecessors (whatever their ethnic origin), it is probably unreasonable to expect more than a modest fraction to employ the device of serving in the armed forces.

A more generalized, balkanized source might be aliens at large, especially illegal aliens, who might respond to an offer, resembling the post-WWII offer to foreign groups, of American citizenship in return for five years of military service. Such a contingency rests on conjecture; one wonders why many would respond if their fellow-ethnics who are also illegal aliens remained unresponsive, expecting the passing of time to provide citizenship opportunities without military service.

Similarly, "foreign legions" are not popular these days, neither as multinationality conglomerates or mercenaries, nor as single tribes or subelements of some national citizenry.

10. Civilianization.

Civilianization, or substitution of civilians for soldiers, is the last general alternative we shall consider in this study. There are a number of ways available to effect civilianization. It is in its own right a highly

complex sugject, with a substantial history already accumulated; for a considerable amount of civilianization of the armed forces has already been accomplished. It is emphasized that the history of civilianization so far is an account of substituting individual civilians for individual soldiers.

It is the premise of this study that, while it may indeed be possible--even quite desirable, from the viewpoint of national interest--to civilianize even more of the current military spaces in the Department of Defense, there are numerous substantial obstacles firmly fixed in the path of such an effort. As this discussion will show, further conversion would be an enormously complex thing to do. It may also be a harmful thing to do. Whether or not the proposal would result in any appreciable saving of public funds, while purporting to provide a more effectively-manned defense establishment, is not reasonably clear.

Essentially, pressure for continued civilianization is based on a belief that civilian employees in the Defense Department cost less than military employees (soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines) and that, therefore, on a basis roughly though not precisely one for one, as many civilians as can be used effectively should be substituted for uniformed members of the armed forces. We have already seen that deep probing cost comparisons are inconclusive; no one really knows which is always less expensive than the other.

Encouraging to further civilianization are a number of recent trends and forecasts: e.g., the changing nature of war.

Discouraging to further substitution of civilians for soldiers are a number of other kinds of events: for example, uncertainty about alleged savings resulting from cost differences; discrepancies between military

and civilian grade structures in the Defense establishment; and, perhaps the condition most difficult of all to resolve: certain long-standing and deeply-rooted tensions between military and civilian members of the military departments.

Back in 1973, the Senate Armed Services Committee had expressed itself clearly enough on the desirability of substituting civilians for military persons in Army positions: "As the cost of military manpower has increased and the difficulties of achieving an all-volunteer force become apparent, civilianization programs need to be reassessed."[26]

At the same time, the House Appropriations Committee addressed the same problem:

> The Committee wants and expects to see military personnel out from behind desks and back in aircraft, ships and troop units. The Committee hopes to encourage the Department of Defense, at all levels, to move in this direction by setting aside $25,000,000 of the transfer authority exclusively for this purpose. It should be noted that the amount set aside does not constitute a limitation and such additional amounts of the transfer authority as may be needed may be used for this purpose.[27]

The Department of Defense, in 1970, had issued a classic statement: "Civilian employees shall, therefore, be utilized in all positions which do not require military incumbents for reasons of law, training, security, discipline, rotation or combat readiness. . . ."[28] (These factors cited above number six; in practice, a seventh is added: orderly career progression opportunities.)

George B. Stackhouse, who has done extensive research into this problem area, identified three factors in America's national security environment which promote recurrent efforts to civilianize military positions:

1. The primary factor is cost. Efforts to civilianize have almost invariably been based on a belief that, whatever other effects it may have, civilianization saves money.

2. General American dedication to the free-enterprise system, encouraging wherever feasible the performance of public functions by private contractors, thus reducing the number of permanent military and civilian employees of the government.

3. In certain activities, it is the perception by Congress of the "stability and general maturity" of the government civilian workforce that encourages the promotion of civilianization.

Nevertheless, there are limits, obviously, to the extent to which civilians can be substituted for military incumbents. As Mr. Elliott Richardson expressed it to Congress in 1973, while he was Secretary of Defense: "We must be careful not to over-civilianize because this would weaken the ability of the Services to carry out their missions."[29]

The primary difficulty lies in the complexity and uncertainty of deciding whether each of a host of specific positions is more appropriately filled by a military person or by a civilian, or retained in a third category as "interchangeable." Recurrent exhaustive study has gone into such analyses by military departments; yet, results have been mixed, at best. The issue is far from being clear-cut. An important legal factor is the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

In any event, the Gates Commission suggested that the billets of 23,000 military officers and 84,000 enlisted men could be civilianized. Later, in 1973, in response to a request that they estimate how many military positions could be civilianized without loss of force effectiveness, the Services

themselves estimated 103,000 enlisted positions (more than the 84,000 recommended by the Gates Commission).[30]

The Senate Armed Services Committee made a tentative forecast in February 1973:

> The greatest potential for civilian substitution appears to exist in the Air Force since a large number of base operations positions are located in the United States. The Gates Commission had indicated that of about 100,000 billets that were found to be appropriate for civilian substitution, about three-fourths were Air Force positions. The committee therefore desires that the Department of Defense conduct a thorough analysis of civilian substitution potential and include the results in next year's Military Manpower Requirements Report.[31]

In any event, two substantial "civilianizations" were undertaken in the 1960's and 1970's. Between 1964 and 1969, 114,215 authorized military positions in the armed forces were converted to 94,979 authorized civilian positions (only 90,000 were actually manned). In 1973, another program was initiated, converting 47,878 military positions to 40,020 civilian positions.[32]

The ability to replace a certain number of military persons by a lesser number of civilians is attributed to the fact that in a "total institution" such as the Army, soldiers, no matter what their major work-designation, must also perform various extra duties and actions that civilians do not perform--for example, participation in parades and ceremonies, guard duty, qualification with weapons, selected special training, inspections, physical training, regular health checkups, and others. Since these activities take up some military but no civilian working time, it is sometimes believed that even if the civilian were more expensive to hire on a one-for-one basis, one needs fewer civilians to do the main job for which both military and civilian individuals may be qualified (the loss of attributes in military capability by converting a military specialist to a civilian specialist often is disregarded, or declared to be negligible).

Analysis of positions according to all the relevant factors has never been comprehensive enough to satisfy all parties concerned. In one action of December 1972, for example, 31,000 conversions were allocated by the Department of Defense, not on a carefully analyzed basis of each Service's needs and opportunities, but on an arbitary basis of 10,000 each to the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and 1,000 to the Marine Corps.

Let us consider one hypothetical sequence of events:

Step 1: Congress announces a hard-nosed search for "austerity"; Congress demands that the armed forces "trim the fat" and get more combat potential, and less support, out of any given number of troops.

Step 2: In response, the armed forces eliminate whole units (usually logistic support units) from the formal Troop Lists and report these cuts to Congress proudly. Congress is given the assurance that it desires to hear--that, for example, "we have cut logistic support for our forces in Europe by 20 percent, but we have not hurt combat efficiency." (This familiar declaration is utter nonsense. It can be taken as a generalization, but as a near-absolute generalization, that when we cut logistic support by 20 percent, we simultaneously cut combat efficiency by at least 20 percent. There is no means short of magic by which the result can be otherwise.)

It should be noted that the enlisted positions converted to civilian incumbency during 1973/1974 were largely in fixed support units in fixed installations. They were not in combat or combat support units.

The Army said that, in addition to some budget savings:

> . . . field commands were assessed a reduction in their allocation of full-time permanent civilian positions without a restoration of the military spaces already withdrawn in the civilianization program. While these were separate actions, the effect was the same on the commands, a reduction in both military and civilian end strength without a compensating reduction in workload.[34] /Italics added/

In October 1978, the Navy said it could convert 12,000 more spaces over the following three years. The Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, however, expressed strong reservations about any further civilianization programs, citing detrimental effects on readiness.[35] Janowitz has noted that the process of what is here called "civilianization" had been going on for a long time; but "during the period 1960-1970" he wrote, "the limits of this trend were reached."[36]

Thus, civilianization has already converted many military spaces to civilian within the military establishment; and later, when civilian strength was also reduced, the effect was to reduce both military and civilian work forces. As mentioned earlier, "basic" soldiers have largely disappeared from military units, as Congress objected to the existence of even a small labor pool that enabled many military units to be self-sustaining on base. From time to time, some critics, largely attracted by peacetime "opportunities," continue to insist on further civilianization. It is questionable, however, whether this option is viable any longer in the form of one-for-one substitution.

There is another form of civilianization, however, involving collective classification, that might or might not work effectively in exploiting more effective civilian participation in the modern military establishment. We shall briefly explore that alternative in the next section.

In any event, cutting through a mass of important and unimportant details, one reasonably familiar with the demands of war can unhesitatingly offer this caution: it may well be feasible that civilians can be substituted for soldiers effectively in the support activities of the military establishment. On the other hand, civilianization should not be attempted, even at modest

levels, in the combat and combat support units--the fighting units, of the armed forces. No organizational or personnel device, however attractive in peacetime, should be permitted to dilute the preparation of combat units toward the unique and unrelenting exigencies of combat.

B. Two Suggestions for Structural Alternatives.

1. General.

In Chapter II (Section A3) we discussed briefly the relationship between the military establishment and society in terms of convergence and divergence; I tend to agree with Professors Moskos and Larson that some degree of divergence (or non-convergence) is necessary among the combat forces of the military establishment, but that convergence is inevitably occurring among the support forces, as they tend in many respects to become more "civilianized." (The reader will recall that, nevertheless, we were warned not to condone separation and antagonism between these two great sectors of the military establishment.)

Meanwhile, we have explored many nuances of the relationships between military and civilian persons in the military establishment. Many readers may have come to the conclusion that substitution of individual civilians for individual soldiers is not a simple exchange, to be set in motion casually, and that further substitution on an individual basis will become increasingly difficult (and possibly counterproductive).

It is the role of this Section, relying on earlier discussion, to suggest two alternative approaches, both collective and structural, dealing with the approaching decline in the numbers of young Americans reaching military age.

2. The Canadian Experiment.

Our first suggestion is to examine and compare the Canadian approach, not with a view to swallowing it whole, but with the hope and intention of finding aspects which might be profitably adapted for American use. To be sure, there are many important differences in scale of military affairs between a nation of 25 million people and a superpower of 220 million people,

and not a few differences in values; but there are also numerous value-commonalities between the United States and the ingenious, enlightened, democratic people of Canada. Much social change affects both nations simultaneously and similarly.

Everyone interested in military affairs will be aware that in the 1960's, the Canadians combined their Army, Navy, and Air Force into a single service--a bold move watched with great interest by the rest of the world. In 1977, the Canadian armed forces of about 78,000 were counted functionally as follows:

Functional Distribution, Canada's Forces, 1977[37]

Category	No. of Officers	Percentage	No. of EM	Percentages
Combat Forces	1,875	13.8	11,634	17.8
Air Operations	3,957	29.1	1,565	2.4
Sea Operations	962	7.0	1,595	2.5
Support: engineering/electronics (for EM "technical")	3,032	22.5	27,868	42.6
Support: Administrative	3,746	27.6	22,669	34.7
	13,572	100.0	65,331	100.0

Like all other armed forces, Canadian combat forces include armor, artillery, infantry, combat engineers, and combat signals.

Canadian specialists discern trends toward three distinctive functional sectors--Combat Arms, Sea Forces, and Administrative-Technical Support--and identify critical requirement problems associated with each area:

Combat Arms - "based on the regimental system and traditional values, recruiting its personnel without regard to civilian skills, and cognizant of the fact that in a liberal democracy, few individuals can be expected to accept a career in /this/ field." This seems to me a critical evaluation, to be pondered seriously by Americans, whether they agree or not.

Sea Operations - "with unique institutions of socialization and internal culture, recruiting unskilled civilians and trained technicians under a lateral entry scheme."

Administrative-Technical Support Element - "where the value of technical expertise holds sway, recruiting /both/ individuals with combat arms' experience, and untrained and skilled civilians."[38]

The two areas, "combat arms" and "sea operations" are perceived as the occupational areas within the military most dissimilar to the civilian work environment, yet with relatively unchanging environmental work requirements. The occupational area of administrative and technical support (which is said to include virtually all the military occupations associated with the air element), on the other hand, is appraised as convergent with civil society and, hence, not presenting much of a problem in recruitment and adaptation.[39]

Canadian experience is reflected in this chart of retention of "other ranks" (enlisted):

Retention by Percentage[40]

Percent Remaining After Time	Sea Operations	Combat Arms	Tech-Admin Support
1 year	65%	52%	76%
2 years	53%	41%	65%
3 years	41%	31%	55%
4 years	32%	27%	51%
5 years	23%	22%	44%

Obviously, twice the proportion remain in the techn-admin areas as in either of the other two. With officers, similar differences hold, although with a higher retention rate that does not go above 50 percent after 5 years, even for graduate of the military college system. Persons

> who have no difficulty coping are less willing to tolerate military life and remain for a career. . . . The following generalization appears to hold: the greater the dissimilarity between a particular sector of the military and civil society under conditions of voluntaristic participation, the greater the marginality of recruitment. . . . Well-educated young Canadians, who experience little difficulty in coping with military training, are reluctant to remain in the sea operations and combat arms for a career of twenty years. Generally, surveys of recruit characteristics indicate that the military is recruiting from the qualitative margins of the market . . . the young, the unemployed, those from depressed economic areas, and the less educated without specialized vocational training. . . .[41]

Cutting their uniforms to fit their cloth, the Canadians foresee considerable recruitment via lateral entry for the sea operations and the technical-administrative sectors. For combat arms, however, they have resurrected the regimental system (said to be the "only way of bridging the gulf between the individuality of liberal democracies and the collective ethos required on the battlefield"); and a good share of advanced infantry training has been taken out of centers and placed under the control of the regiments.[42]

An additional measure is regarded as significant. Recruits are invited into the combat arms for three years; they are guaranteed that after three years they can enter one of the administrative-technical support occupations for a career. Not everyone chooses to do so; some do remain in the combat arms cadre, to be promoted rapidly and receive civilian education and training after completion of a combat-arms career. Among the benefits foreseen from this system is constant leavening of the convergence-tending sector with people experienced in the land combat environment.

This approach recognizes that "the norms of the combat environment are radically dissimilar to those of civil society and that it is illogical to expect that all, or even a majority, of recruits will develop a strong career commitment in this field."[43]

It seems to me that a number of these Canadian perceptions (including the use of a regimental system) are well worth weighing very carefully by American military planners and demographers, especially in the face of a declining supply of qualified recruits.

3. The Two-Level Force Concept.

From our earlier discussions, we should have become clearly aware by this time that the great majority of men in modern military uniform do not fight. The contributions of some of them to military prowess may be no less important on that account; but we are not assessing relative importance here. To put an essential point into a nutshell, we need to recall that in the American Civil War, the forces were 93.2 percent in combat MOS and 6.8 percent in support MOS, whereas in Vietnam the figures were 22.7 in combat MOS and 77.3 percent in support.

One suggestion, for a two-level military establishment, has emerged--undeniably a radical concept. That it is radical should not necessarily deter us, for many concede that radical solutions may become indispensable for coping with a radically changed world. This proposal would involve structural, extensive revision of current legal, administrative, and other statutes, regulations, and procedures. Like any complex revision, a number of dilemmas arise to which no solutions are readily apparent. Some of the principal provisions designed to cope with the looming shortage of military-age

males may, upon actual implementation, bring in their wake complications that are worse than the ones they replace. However, at this stage, the concept, if not yet exactly desirable, appears likely to prove feasible.

In any event, this concept has developed partly out of cognizance of many of the difficulties cited throughout this paper, especially the declining tooth-to-tail ratio, the decline in the proportion of fighters in the military establishment, and the burgeoning role of the civilian in military affairs.[44]

To cope with this concept, one should be familiar with the Army's overall categorization of field units as combat, combat support, and combat service support. Combat units are infantry and armor battalions. Combat support units are artillery, air defense, and engineer battalions, and aviation, signal, and military police (and sometimes chemical and intelligence) units. The combat service support category includes ammunition distribution; maintenance, transportation, and medical units; and miscellaneous service units.[45]

Combat units, particularly infantry, are at and remain at the forefront, the cutting edge of our armed forces when the armed forces close with enemy forces. Artillery units, as combat support forces, remain constantly within a few miles or furlongs of the most forward units, and are sometimes overrun by enemy penetrations. The other combat support units move around constantly within the area of a combat division; major enemy penetrations put them at peril occasionally, and their periodic forays into forward areas to do their work put them at peril more frequently, but normally for limited periods.

Combat service support units remain in the theater of combat, within supporting distance of our forward combat elements (with "supporting distance" connoting variable lengths of space), but still some distance from high-danger areas. At variable intervals, depending on the nature of their work, some of their members visit the rear portions of combat areas. A number of their members may come under indirect enemy fire occasionally--for all but a handful, not often and not long.

Behind them is usually a vast logistical and administrative complex, essential to the support of modern forces overseas, but relatively much less vulnerable in modern terms, from enemy fire and enemy attack.

The essence of the two-level force concept can be stated very simply, but one should have no illusions that implementation would not be enormously difficult. The essence is this:

> Constitute all combat and combat support units (the fighting forces) as military units and the personnel therein as military persons; constitute all other persons within the military establishment as civilians, or as members of some still-to-be-created semi-military or quasi-military category of units.

In other words, divide the national security establishment into two parts: (1) the fighting forces, which perform the same role that armed forces have always performed, but which, due to various developments in modern times, are becoming a smaller and smaller proportion of the national security establishment; and (2) the support forces, performing all support functions from the area behind direct combat support forces through all the logistical and administrative support areas, through all the communications zones, back to the continental United States and all the fixed facilities and support activities performed there. The support forces, while

having a good deal to do with maintaining the effectiveness of the fighting forces via logistical support, would not normally affect the battle directly.

By the simple suggestion to include combat and combat support units in a category of "fighting forces," and exclude all others, I do not mean to suggest that such categories should necessarily conform to current categories and current listings. I have no doubt that, even if the Services were to agree that this concept is worth exploring further, they would appreciably revise the definition, organization, missions, and categories of selected units, and of the categories to which the units would be assigned.

Perhaps another aspect needs to be described a bit more clearly here. However the fighting forces and support forces eventually come to be distinguished, it is not intended to define fighting forces as those units which are always in combat, or support forces as those units never in combat. A basic criterion is that a "support unit" would be one that does not stay in the combat area.

As soon as one contemplates such a radical transformation of the nation's military establishment, a host of implications suggest themselves. We cannot hope to list them all here, but we ought to cite a few of the more important ones:

- This concept would reduce the number of soldiers (or fighting men of land, sea, and air) necessarily sought by the armed forces, and hence would help to solve the problem of reconciling dwindling age-groups with needs for skill and competence in a period of rising technological sophistication.

- In Geneva Conventions and the international laws of war, the concepts of "combatant" and "non-combatant" would have to be rethought along several lines, including the familiar issue that individuals must wear a clearly distinguishable uniform on battlefields in order to be accorded, if captured, the status of prisoner of war.

- The ethos and the requirements of the fighting man and the fighting units, not of the supporters, should dominate the entire establishment.

- The support professionals currently in uniform seem to me to be closer in the nature of their work to support professionals not in uniform than to fighters in uniform.

- A number of observers and participants would argue that such an arrangement would erode the commitment of the "transferred" uniformed person down to the level of relative disinterest believed in some quarters to be characteristic of the civilian professional. I tend to discount this expectation. I believe it to be within the limits of probability that many civilian professionals can be motivated, and their sense of commitment to the interests of the fighting troops raised considerably, if military authorities undertake to cultivate such motivation. The "morale" and commitment to battle forces of civilian employees have been given little attention in the past, as involving what we have here loosely termed "second-class citizenship"; hence, "commitment" never averaged out very high. The problem will be to raise the level of the civilian supporter's commitment to the level traditionally maintained by uniformed supporters.

- The issue of headquarters power will be sensitive and extraordinarily complex. In order to ensure that the ethos of the fighting forces dominates the establishment, I would argue that the channel to top

command of the entire establishment should, normally without exception, pass up through the fighting forces. Many of the positions near the top can be allocated to outstanding officers and civilians from both fighting and support forces.

- Many classic, historically-based perspectives toward armed forces would have to change--in the world in general, in governments, in recruiting sources, in parliaments, in legal and judicial circles, in general publics, in educational institutions, and in the armed forces themselves.

- There should be interchange possibilities maintained for members of both fighting and support forces. A quota of positions throughout the support forces should be maintained for rotation purposes (explained earlier) of military persons who seek relief for several years from the demands of maintaining constant combat readiness among fighting forces, while retaining military career status. Similarly, a special status category might be devised for members of the support forces who desire (and can qualify) to serve a "hitch" (of whatever duration) in the fighting forces.

- Essentially, those serving in the support forces would be treated as civilians, with legal and disciplinary systems appropriate to civilians, even if quasi-military civilians.

- In the support forces, many different aspects of status and procedures would be developed. As noted, the members would be essentially civilians, though with some added commitment. A loose duty "uniform" might be devised. A different, more suitable Universal Code of Military Justice would no doubt have to be devised. Civilians who take up membership would probably have to conform to some special provisions. Discipline? The

current level of discipline maintained in government civilian agencies and enterprises may be suitable. Whatever their career status, they would probably have to agree to serve for specific periods in support forces overseas and to continue to serve even if war were to break out. The accptability of unions, especially of union influence in substantive military matters, would be questionable, and probably subject to control by statute.

- It may be argued against this proposal that such a radical revision would render military units unable to sustain themselves in the field with complete autonomy any longer. The fact is that combat and combat support units of great variety and power have not been able to sustain themselves in the field with complete independence for many decades. The figure was cited a few paragraphs above that in Vietnam the fighting forces constituted only 22.7 percent of the total forces. Ten years ago, each infantry battalion required 32 percent extra outside strength to support itself; a self-propelled artillery battalion required 77 percent of its strength to be added so as to support iself; and a helicopter gunship company required for full support an extra 145 percent of its own strength.[46]

- In the foregoing text, I have several times used a new term, "the national security establishment" in lieu of the familiar "military establishment." One hopes that the military ethos would dominate the eventual establishment; however, the proportion of persons in military uniform will be a minority and cannot be expected to dominate such an establishment totally, although everyone in such an establishment should be devoted to the overriding interests of those who constitute the cutting edge.

This proposal does not envision that one could expect to fight modern wars with fewer persons in the overall establishment. What it does is simply recognize reality in clearly identifying the smaller percentage that does the fighting (and for whom priority conscription should be provided). Fewer specially talented young persons will be required for the fighting forces, and for voluntary or mandatory manpower acquisition systems to provide to the fighting forces. However, in crisis, there will probably not diminish (and there may well increase) the numbers of persons required for the total security establishment, especially for the support forces.

CHAPTER V

SEEKING A BALANCED CLUSTER OF SOLUTIONS: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Background.

In the preceding four chapters, we have drawn together relevant strands; so far, without attempting to trace every relationship in exhaustive detail, we have woven them into what we hope is a coherent picture of the theme we undertook to address. In this chapter we recapitulate those strands, and clusters of strands, which seem most critical to full understanding.

The Continuing Primary Military Role.

One of two major national missions remains unique to the military: the direction of armed forces on the battlefield. Heroic leadership and military ethos will continue to be critically needed in the military establishment.

However, out of any given number of uniformed members of an armed force, the proportion required to do the fighting is now a decided minority; the proportion has steadily declined to about 35 percent and continues to dwindle.

The Relationship of Civilians to Combat.

In rare crises, civilians have fought in battle directly, and have served in other ways close to or in battlefield forces. Nevertheless, great pains are taken in modern military contexts to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants, and to protect noncombatants from direct consequences of battle. From time to time, this distinction becomes unclear or ambivalent.

Regardless of legal distinctions, in or near scenes of combat, a number of civilians, not members of the fighting forces, usually volunteer to perform various needed services, sometimes mixed together with uniformed personnel. Almost invariably these civilians, whether on land or sea or in the air, are

paid several times the emolument paid to regular soldiers, sailors, and airmen doing the same or more difficult things.

The Support of Fighting Forces.

Support elements of all kinds now constitute a large and clear majority of the military establishment. Some 65 percent of the military persons, and practically 100 percent of the civilian employees in the military establishment perform functions in support of modern fighting forces, from the edge of the battlefield all the way back to the Pentagon and other installations in the United States.

The Second Major Mission: Preparation of Forces.

The other major mission of the defense establishment--the preparation of American armed forces for war--is still heavily, but no longer exclusively, within military responsibility. Civilians both inside and outside the Department of Defense, also share this responsibility, including increasing involvement in technological battlefield sophistication, research and development, strategic analysis, and exploitation of the social and behavioral sciences.

Simultaneously, developments in the nature of war, in the allocation of work-roles in the preparation and operation of national security establishments, and other important developments have forced this result: Military generalists and specialists must share their expertise with civilian generalists and specialists, who have moved closer to the center of military establishments.

Military Manpower: The Core Problem.

The United States faces an ominous decline in the number of males of military age expected to become available in the 1980's. It is therefore likely that the most important problem facing the military establishment in the decade ahead will be demographic.

It appears probable that, due to forecasted increasing sophistication required in the nation's future work force, the armed forces are likely to compete at a disadvantage for enough qualified youths in the 1980's.

Meanwhile, Cooper of RAND says that only 50 percent of the spaces in the military establishment need to be filled by military persons; the remainder can be filled by either military or civilian persons.

The most prominent general principle for coping with this situation, one that immediately attracts the attention of all interested parties, and one that has been applied for several years on a large and increasing scale, is the substitution, within the military establishment, of civilian employees for soldiers. The individual substitution process, since 1964, has reached a total of at least 150,000.

There are at least a dozen alternative ways (over the current status quo) to increase the availability of adequate numbers of qualified soldiers, such as taking in more women, contracting out, and more civilianization. The probabilities of successfully performing more individual civilianization, however, may be limited. Structural or collective forms of civilianization may be more effective, such as adaptations of the Canadian system or adaptation of some form of a two-sector military establishment.

The Military Establishment and the Rest of the Federal Government.

It is evidently a fact that the DOD and the military departments are disproportionately lean in the grade structures of both their military and civilian hierarchies, compared to other government departments, and disproportionately low in their overall average grade compared to the entire government's average. The ramifications of this situation are not readily apparent; however, it would be fatuous to assume that this situation has nothing to do with grade structures, recruitment, and incentives among both civilian and military employees of the military establishment.

Within the Military Establishment, Elements of Comparison Between Military and Civilian Status.

There are substantial differences in quality in the military establishments between the system for administering military and civilian personnel systems. Possibly the greatest offending aspect of structure is the decentralization of major aspects of civilian personnel administration, resulting in diversity of treatment for many civilians; whereas a major structural feature of military personnel administration is centralization of the same major aspects, and hence, of equal treatment of every soldier. Decades pass, while responsible analysts such as the Hoover Commission and the Defense Manpower Commission repeat criticisms of certain deficiencies of military department administration of civilian employees.

a. Conditions for Substitution of Civilians for Soldiers.

In reference to civilian substitution, seven features have been declared relevant to each military space: legal requirements, training, discipline, rotation, combat readiness, military background, and tradition. In addition, equitable linkages in rank have been sought between the 23

military and 18 civilian grades; but such linkages are still partially skewed and inconclusive in theory, though variably so in practice.

b. The Military Side: The X Factor.

One recent study, following many other attempts to identify the X Factor (the net sum of distinguishing features of the military context), identified 57 special features, of which 27 were positive and 30 were negative, with a number balancing off features on the other side. A related career model shows that the average retiring soldier has spent 9 percent of his military career in combat environments, 10.4 percent in the field or at sea, and an additional 2.8 percent separated from his family.

Although the United States has never officially calculated and added an X factor to military pay, the British (19 percent), the Canadians, and the Australians do add such an increment. The Defense Manpower Commission recommended against US payment of an increment for the X Factor, but the Third Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation calculated and recommended a specific proportion.

c. Comparison of Costs for Civilian and Military Employees.

On direct comparison of costs, an individual civilian appears to cost slightly more than a military individual, but it takes fewer civilians to substitute for a given number of soldiers. Various combinations of weapons, units, and skills can be utilized--some capital-intensive, and some labor-intensive; but no one combination is always cheaper. Simple comparative calculations are no longer possible.

d. Mutual Perception: An Important Element in Comparison.

Perceptions by military and civilian employees of each other are not invariably mutually supporting. Organizational structures and procedures include various measures apparently intended to keep civilian employees subordinate to military members throughout the military establishment. It is natural for both military and civilian employees to support conditions of Service and environment which are favorable to their long-term interests, and to seek to change unfavorable conditions.

B. Conclusions.

The greatest and most distubing social changes are not willed; they do not usually emerge from plots among ambitious seekers. All the formerly self-contained, autonomous institutions of society are being buffeted by egalitarianism, by increasing knowledge, by secularization and democratization, and by the inexorable advance of technology--reallocating work, combining and splitting responsibilities, revising priorities among values, and shifting internal political objectives. The military, the most authoritarian of all massive institutions, cannot hope to escape impact from these dynamics.

It is asserted and repeated that no words or ideas expressed herein have been intended to reflect adversely upon the fighting soldier or sailor, or airman, or upon the warrior spirit, or to diminish the affection and esteem with which the soldier is regarded by the citizenry of America.

Nor, for that matter, is any discourtesy intended toward the soldier or civilian who does not confront the enemy, but who performs essential support. In this role, both share responsibility, no more and no less.

The prevailing ethos of the military establishment should be that of the most demanding element and the most difficult to inculcate: that of the fighting forces. In all other activities, performed by both civilians and the majority of soldiers, each element has equally valuable contributions to make and should be administered by personnel systems that are not necessarily identical but that are equal in quality. Each sector will have certain more or less distinctive perspectives and styles. Each sector will doubtless generate provisions and procedures peculiar to itself; nevertheless, an integrated establishment will also generate a corpus of rules and procedures held in common and applicable to all. Doubtless, this cannot be done perfectly; but it can be done better than it is done now.

There are pressing needs related to the procurement of adequate numbers of qualified soldiers for the armed forces of the United States in the coming years. These needs include:

a. Careful analysis and vigorous pursuit of the most promising and equitable methods of obtaining desirable manpower.

b. It appears reasonable to seek to exploit the largest existing manpower pool--viz., civilians, in several concurrent approaches, some of which may turn out to be more profitable and suitable than the practice of recent years of substituting individual civilian employees for individual soldiers--a practice whose potential may now have become no longer viable.

It appears that the time has come to develop an overall personnel system that in important selected aspects administers military and civilian employees (at least, professionals) at generally the same pace and with the same opportunities in recruitment, education, training, promotion, evaluation, career planning, executive appointment, and other elements of professional

development. One critical variable used in the calibration of systems should be age (so that, for example, outstanding 25-year old civilians in OSD do not rapidly outpace outstanding 35-year old soldiers elswhere in DOD).

Unsatisfactory perceptions held by military and civilian employees towards each other are not likely to revise themselves quickly. However, the process can be accelerated by revising organizational procedures that have supported perceptions of civilian employees as usually subordinates and "second-class citizens." The principle of supervision in the "mixed" areas should develop executive training, opportunities, etc., for civilians to the degree equal to that of the military. Throughout the mixed portion, supervision of military by civilians, where appropriate, should be as well-accepted and as common as military supervision of civilians.

To weld the civilian members of this work force into this team (that is, not merely into the periphery of the team, where they are now, but into the pulsating center of this team) it will not be enough to improve the civilian personnel system until it matches in sophistication (at least for professionals) the military personnel system. It will probably be necessary to undertake enlightened measures of motivation to attract deeper commitments from civilian employees who gradually gain confidence that their own identities, their own services, their own careers are regarded by the military departments as important in their own right and not merely important as background for the military members of the military establishment. Levels of commitment and dedication to the national security interests of the nation should be comparably high among all the members of such an establishment.

To weave all these strands together in effecting beneficial transition for the role of the civilian in the national security establishment will involve giving greater recognition to this premise: the status and career of the civilian employee of the Department of Defense is just as important to him and his department as the status and career of the military person is to him.

Restatement of Theme.

What this study has said is this: In order to secure sufficient numbers of qualified manpower in the difficult future, the military establishment will probably have to undertake several lines of enlightened recruitment and acquisition. Possibly still, a promising line would be continuation of the substitution of more civilians for soldiers--not individually, as in the past, but collectively and structurally. There is, of course, a practicable limit to the reduction of the proportion of fighters in the military establishment. In any event, any attempt to further civilianize the military establishment will probably find it mandatory to end the "second-class citizen" status of civilians to the extent that it still exists in the military establishment.

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19. In the listing of 57 conditions below, three columns are used, with headings that are subject to some debate. "Unique" means found only in military service or emphasized to a uniquely high degree. "Different" means found in the civilian work force but not as pervasively or frequently as in military service. "Similar" means that over 50 percent of reporting civilian corporations and other agencies said the same conditions are likely to be found in civilian sectors.

57 CONDITIONS OF MILITARY SERVICE

Positive (Advantageous) Conditions	Unique	Different	Similar
(1) Membership in Distinctive Group with Mutual Dependency	X		
(2) Job Training, Educational Opportunities and Rewards		X	
(3) Medical Care for Self and Dependents		X	
(4) Noncontributory Retirement after 20 Years Service		X	
(5) Perceived Job Security		X	
(6) Pay and Allowances	X		
(7) Survivors' Benefits		X	
(8) Nontaxed Allowances	X		
(9) Income Tax Credit for Combat	X		
(10) Post-retirement Benefits		X	
(11) Extensive Government-Furnished Housing	X		
(12) Membership in Low-Cost Food and Merchandise Support		X	
(13) Veterans Assistance	X		
(14) Official Recognition for Achievements: Awards and Decorations	X		
(15) Duty Travel Opportunities		X	

Positive (Advantageous) Conditions	Unique	Different	Similar
(16) General Leave Policies for New Members		X	
(17) Nonduty "Space Available" Air Travel Opportunities		X	
(18) Funerals and Burial Grounds	X		
(19) Exclusive On-Post Recreation, Health, and Community Services		X	
(20) Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act	X		
(21) Dependents' Educational Svcs		X	
(22) Military Community Welfare Svcs		X	
(23) Limited Legal Assistance		X	
(24) Uniform Issue and Upkeep		X	
(25) Convenient Pay Systems			X
(26) Special Pays for Special Duties		X	
(27) Free Parking			X
Negative Conditions (of the Military Factor)			
(28) Exposure to Combat	X		
(29) Frequent Directed Moves	X		
(30) Directed Family Separation	X		
(31) Low Job Security (Reenlistment Can Be Denied)		X	
(32) Sea Duty	X		
(33) Field Duty	X		
(34) Unlimited Work Week Without Paid Overtime or Required Compensatory Time	X		
(35) No Contract: Employer's Right to Terminate Job Without Cause	X		

Positive (Advantageous) Conditions	Unique	Different	Similar
(36) No Right to Quit (Over Extended Periods)	X		
(37) Pay Change Without a Standard	X		
(38) Statutory Loss of Certain Civil Rights, Including Right to Criticize the Government, and to be Candidate for Public Office		X	
(39) Exposure to Disease and Comparatively Low Sanitary Standards (in the Field)		X	
(40) Exposure to Dangerous Material: Explosives, Toxic Chemicals, Tracked Vehicles, Damaging Noises, etc.		X	

Negative Conditions (of the Military Factor)	Unique	Different	Similar
(41) Annual Written Exam or Exam for Enlisted Promotion	X		
(42) Efficiency Reports which Affect Promotion and Assignment		X	
(43) Formalized Competition Promotion		X	
(44) Up or Out Career Continuation Policy	X		
(45) Military Law Liability, in Addition to Liability to Civil Law	X		
(46) Directed Appearance and Dress Standards Linked to Continued Employment		X	
(47) Directed Social Conduct Standard Linked to Continued Employment		X	
(48) Security Clearance for all Members		X	

Negative Conditions (of the Military Factor)	Unique	Different	Similar
(49) No Termination Pay for Enlisted Personnel		X	
(50) Isolated Posts	X		
(51) Interruptions in Personal Educational Progress	X		
(52) Employer Control of Moonlighting	X		
(53) Loss of Earned Leave (Until Recently, Not Applicable to EM, Who Were Paid for Unused Leave at End of Each Enlistment)		X	
(54) Required Physical Standards		X	
(55) Compulsory School Completion and Educational Standards		X	
(56) Frequent Inspections and Tests		X	
(57) Mandatory Retirement (for some) Between 20 and 30 Years	X		

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FEDERAL PRECEDENCE LISTING

FEDERAL PRECEDENCE LIST NUMBER	DOD	USA-USMC-USAF	USN-USCG	DEPT OF STATE	US INFO AGENCY	CIVIL SERVICE
16	Secy of Def					
23	Dep Secy of Def					
25		Secy of Ar				
26			Secy Navy			
27		Secy of AF				
33	CJCS					
34,35,36		Chief of Svc Relative to Appointment				
37		Comdt USMC				
51				Ambassador		
56				Ministers		
57		Under Secy of Military Department				
58		General	Admiral			
59		Asst Secy of Military Department				
64	Assts to Secy of Def					
65		LTG	VADM			
68						GS-18
73	Dep Asst Secy of Def					
74		Deputy Under Secy of Military Department				
76		MG	RADM (upper half)	FSO-1 FSR-1	FSCR-1 FSLR-1	
77		Dep Asst Secy of AR				
81						GS-17
85		BG	RADM (lower half)	FSO-2 FSR-2	FSCR-2 FSLR-2	
88						GS-16
91		COL	CAPT	FSO-3 FSR-3 FSS-1	FSCR-3 FSLR-3	GS-15
92						GS-14
93		LTC	CDR	FSO-4 FSR-4 FSS-2	FSCR-4 FSLR-4	GS-13

FEDERAL PRECEDENCE LISTING (Continued)

FEDERAL PRECEDENCE LIST NUMBER	DOD	USA-USMC-USAF	USN-USCG	DEPT OF STATE	US INFO AGENCY	CIVIL SERVICE
94	-					GS-12
96		MAJ	CDR	FSO-5 FSR-5 FSS-3	FSCR-5 FSLR-5	
97						GS-11
99		CPT	LT	FSO-6 FSR-6 FSS-4	FSCR-6 FSLR-6	
100						GS-10
101		1LT	LTJG	FSO-7 FSR-7 FSS-5	FSCR-7 FSLR-7	GS-09
102				FSS-6		GS-08
103		2LT	Ensign	FSO-8 FSR-8 FSS-7	FSCR-8 FSLR-8	GS-07

FSO	Foreign Service Officer
FSR	Foreign Service Reserve Officer
FSS	Foreign Service Staff
FSCR	Foreign Service Career Reserve
FSLR	Foreign Service Limited Reserve

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Civilianization; personnel substitution; civil and military service; civilian and military personnel systems; personnel discrimination; manning the military establishment; tooth-to-tail ratios; combat-to-support ratios; maintaining the quality of military support; civil-military relations; second-class citizens in the military establishment.

20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

This study explores, along certain lines, the relationships between military and civilian members of the military establishment. The major concern is for adequate manning of the whole establishment in the future, in view of critical developments such as the approaching dearth of adolescents, the mixed acceptability of various alternatives, the impact of powerful changes, and the built-in procedures in the establishment that discriminate against many civilians. As fewer soldiers do the actual fighting, the majority of military forces —next page

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become supporters. One feasible alternative is the greater use of civilians; but such an approach cannot be expected to become effective until those features are eliminated that tend to relegate civilians to the status of second-class citizens.