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
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
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ACTORS AND PROCESSES.

by

10 Freeland Henry/Carde, III

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Thesis Advisor: Claude A. Buss

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THE MAKING OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY:
ACTORS AND PROCESSES

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on the decision-making processes in Chinese foreign policymaking. Roles of institutions and individuals in these processes are explicated in different types of decisions. The information "windows" through which China views the world are identified. Career backgrounds on foreign ministry officials and the diplomatic corps are presented, China's behavior in negotiations and crisis management are analyzed, and a case study of decisions leading to the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese war offered in example.

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I. FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING: VIEW AT THE TOP

I. FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING: VIEW AT THE TOP

A. THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS--A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Our understanding of the decision-making processes in Chinese foreign policy is still very incomplete. This is an anomaly, as Lucian Pye (1978) has pointed out, because the Chinese frequently use the mass media to discuss sensitive bureaucratic policy matters which in other societies would be left to confidential channels of communication.¹ We are left with a remarkably clear picture of the issues under discussion, but with very little insight into the bureaucratic politics of the decision-resolution process itself. It is the reverse of our access to and understanding of most other polities.

There are at least two reasons for this lack of insight. First, the political processes themselves have been unstable and subject to frequent change. Second, our understanding is hampered by our self-imposed lack of contact with Chinese decision-makers (on all levels) and on the reluctance of Chinese officials to speak or write about their domestic processes, which impact directly on personal political fortunes.

A variety of approaches has been used to try to explicate the domestic politics underpinning China's foreign policies, with only limited success.

Professor John K. Fairbank and other historians have stressed the Confucian tradition and its "Middle Kingdom" world view as the sociological perspective structuring Chinese thinking about its world neighbors. The distrust of the rapacious, uncultured West; China's inexperience in dealing with other nations as equals rather than through hierarchical relations, and an inflexible, chauvinistic bureaucracy are characteristics of the dynastic system, among others, which this school emphasizes as determinants

in Chinese behavior.² While this approach has enriched our understanding of historical attitudes and geographical continuities as domestic determinants, it tends to understate the social changes brought on by the Chinese revolution and the communist reconstruction of society and social values. The Confucian classics no longer have a literary lock on the bureaucratic mindset; today's bureaucrats are politicians, technocrats, and ideologues who speak, if anything, from anti-classical perspectives. Decision-making, while colored by traditions from Old China, has to be explained in terms of the paradigm of a modern state, which China, though still in a mixed state of development, certainly is.

The largest school of analysis in Chinese foreign policy falls into what Graham Allison calls a Model I paradigm (unitary rational actor).³ This school essentially treats the nation-state as an individual interacting with other individuals (states) on the basis of rational choices. The approach typically analyzes one or more historical events in terms of the interaction among the players, explaining the sequence of actions as resolution of national interests. Harold C. Hinton,⁴ Zbigniew Brzezinski,⁵ and Robert C. North⁶ are leading proponents of this methodology. It is, by and large, a very useful approach that has enhanced our understanding of the "diplomatic game" from the perspective of the "Chinese player." It falls short of a full understanding, however, in that Chinese foreign policy behavior is no more "rational" to the external observer than other nation states behavior because decision-makers are weighing domestic political considerations that affect their priorities, freedom-of-action, and attention-span on external problems.

Attempts to analyze the domestic determinants of foreign policy decision-making have so far been limited to what Allison calls Model II (institutional politics) analysis. This is a specialized elite theory that attempts to

identify political groups (institutional, special interest, and personal factions) and explain how they interact in defense of parochial interests to reach a final bureaucratic balance--i.e., a decision.⁷

Several techniques have been tried on this level of analysis.

William W. Whitson made a thorough study⁸ of the military backgrounds of Chinese party and government leaders and came to the conclusion that the most powerful factions in the country, including the civilian sector, were personal alliances built by men who had served in the same Field Armies. Because the Red Field Armies (like those of the earlier warlords) were regionally based for support, these factions remained regionally oriented. This retarded the transition of political power to the party/government "Center" in Peking. Whitson's analysis provide valuable insights but suffered from the obvious limitation of focusing on only one factor. Presumably, Whitson would hedge some of his conclusions today, in view of the decline in PLA political power in 1972-74, after his study was completed.

Melvin Gurtov used a modified Model II approach to correlate factional fighting and its impact on foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution, a time when the decision-making process was particularly affected by domestic politics.⁹ It provides valuable insights but is time-relevant only to an aberrant period.

Several scholars have broken important ground in the study of elites within the domestic system. Robert Scalapino is coordinating research in elite formation, recruitment, and power interplay in China¹⁰ and Japan,¹¹ but the sophistication and relevance of the analyses of elite roles in Chinese foreign policy-making lag far behind the work done on Japan.

Parris H. Chang¹² made the first comprehensive effort to trace power shifts among contending factions over a broad period of time and across multiple issues. Although the focus is not primarily on foreign policy

issues, they are interwoven as secondary factors among the other issues. Chang's analysis of the movement of the power center among contending groups is important for any correlations others will draw about trends in decision-making.

Chang's approach is carried over into contemporary Peking politics by the Hong Kong leftist press, which generally follows the analysis developed by Ting Wang, managing editor of Cheng Ming. Wang sees a power struggle between the old Chou En-lai moderate faction, now headed by Teng Hsiao-ping, and the more orthodox (but not radical) Maoists, led by Hua Kuo-feng and Wang Tung-hsin.¹³ The series of rehabilitations of individuals (exceeding 100,000 by 1978) and institutions (for example, the CCP Propaganda department and judiciary organs), however, make current analysis of power centers difficult. Power is not stabilized in institutions and individuals, with the result that policies tend to be provisional and sensitive to every kind of feedback. Wang's analyses of other than cadre rehabilitation patterns are largely based on leaks and rumors of party meetings, not always reliable data sources. Without definitions of the power structure and formal and informal processes to confirm his assessments, there is no clear point of reference. Lively debate among China watchers exists over the most central question: whether Hua and Teng are in a power struggle.

A variety of analytical methods have been employed to attempt to develop Model II analyses. The most frequently used is polemical (or textual) analysis.

Using polemical analysis, Donald Zagoria developed a factional politics model (radicals, moderates, bureaucracy) in the early 1960's, which was further refined into various forms by RAND analysts. The works of Michael Pillsburg, Thomas Gottlieb, Roger Glenn Brown,¹⁴ among others, seek to identify power cliques and struggles through changes and contradictions

within official and semi-official Chinese rhetoric. These attempts have provided interesting hypotheses, but little more. As Pittsbury pointed out, institutional interests and power group composition are in constant flux; attempts to identify groups with issues is an abstract shorthand with only limited utility.¹⁵

Andrew Nathan, who developed his own factionalism model to explain policy shifts in China,¹⁶ also recognized that the tendency to view Chinese politics as a tug-of-war between two major factions ("militant fundamentalists" and "eclectic modernizers," quoting Michel Oksenberg's terms¹⁷) with a resultant "oscillation" or "cyclical" policy pattern ignores too many shades of variation and overlap among decision-makers' views.¹⁸

Social psychologists have also tried to explicate decision-making processes, but their efforts have focused mainly on the more accessible local elites, and their decision-making efforts to implement central party directives under local conditions.¹⁹ While some local characteristics may also apply on the national level, to use these studies as models for foreign policy decision-making would be analogous to using studies of New England town meetings to explain the nuances of State Department processes.

The limitations of an Allison Model II ("institutional politics") approach towards Chinese decision-making are not confined to foreign policy. Even the PLA is an institution of competing blocs, whose composition depends on given issues: modernization, strategic doctrinal changes, demagogification, center-regional power distribution, etc. Each issue tends to generate ad hoc policy interests. These are subject to polarization among personal factions, shifting power groups, and intra-bureaucratic constituency interests,²⁰ as well as the personal opinions of each actor.

Attempts to generate Model III analyses (Allison's "bureaucratic politics" model) have been few and unsuccessful. Most have centered on

crises, when the "spillage" of confidential intra-Party papers and politics enabled outsiders to acquire tantalizing details of "push-pull" politicking in decision-making councils. Dittmer's, Gurtov's, and Ahn's analyses of Cultural Revolution politics, and Lieberthal's description of the infighting between Teng Hsiao-ping and the radicals in 1975, came close to Model III in approach, if not in format and completeness.²¹

B. DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURE--THE POLITBURO

Final decision-making authority on all issues, domestic and external, rests in the Politburo.²² Only recently, however, has information clarified how the Politburo manages its deliberations, builds support for its decisions, and achieves implementation. These general processes have direct bearing on foreign policy making.

The Politburo is divided into two tiers: The Standing Committee members who act as generalists, and the rest of the Politburo, whose members assume responsibility for one or more functional areas under the "division of responsibility system."²³ There are several Politburo members with active foreign policy roles. Hua Kuo-feng, although nominally head of the party and government, seems to have a limited role--either by his own predilection or because of constraints imposed by Teng. Hua receives important foreign guests and has begun to travel abroad, but so far has not been involved in substantive negotiations on new foreign policy initiatives. He has been abroad only twice; to Korea, and to the Balkans and Iran.

Marshal Yeh Chien-Ying, as chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Peoples' Congress, is head of state, but due to his age (81), performs most diplomatic functions such as receiving ambassadors' credentials by proxy, through his 21 Standing Committee vice chairmen. Yeh was instrumental in swinging the PLA behind Hua in the showdown with the radicals in

1976. He still seems to wield enormous influence, despite dwindling energies, but his foreign policy stands are generally unknown. His choice of Chi Peng-fei, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, as secretary-general of the NPC Standing Committee, suggests that he is generally content to leave matters of diplomacy in trained hands.

Teng Hsiao-ping, though a generalist, has strong views on foreign affairs, derived from a considerable background of foreign contacts. He spent six years in France and Russia in the 1920's, gaining certain cosmopolitan tastes and attitudes found in Chou-Enlai and others who shared such experiences, but lacking in those without such exposure to the West. Teng was a senior delegate to the Moscow conferences in 1957 and 1960, and in 1963 headed the CCP delegation that faced a similar CPSU team headed by Suslov in the last attempt by both sides to settle ideological differences. He is outspokenly anti-Soviet.²⁴ Teng traveled to France in 1975 and, since his last rehabilitation in 1977, travels frequently. He has pushed to get other Chinese leaders abroad to see first-hand China's relative backwardness and the need for closer outside contacts to spur modernization.

Teng seems to be responsible for creating the Academy of Social Sciences out of the older Academy of Sciences in July 1977. A trusted Teng staff aide, Hu Chiao-mu, was named president of the new Academy in March 1978. Since then the Academy has served as a "think tank" for Teng on a wide number of issues, including foreign affairs. Its World Economy Institute, World Religion Institute, Trade and Commerce Institute, Foreign Literature Institute, and World History Institute, among other research branches, have helped surface foreign issues for discussion at high levels of government. One institute within the Academy was responsible for drafting the November 1977 article "Chairman Mao's Theory of the

Differentiation of the Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism,"²⁵ the pivotal foreign policy paper of the post-Mao era.²⁶

Huan Hsian, a former Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs (1964-1968) and Ambassador to Great Britain (1954-1962), is a vice president of the Academy and presumably coordinates such studies for Hu Chiao-mu and Teng. At any rate, Teng has his own foreign policy think-tank to develop foreign policy studies, which gives him additional expertise and clout in Politburo sessions.

Li Hsien-nien, the fourth-ranking Politburo member, has had extensive foreign affairs experience. Since his appointment in 1954 as Finance Minister (succeeding Teng in the job), Li has increasingly shouldered responsibility for China's economy, a position which has put him in the middle of lively foreign policy debates over trade expansion and ideological leadership in the world. Although the reemergence of Ch'en Yun as finance and trade czar in early 1979 has transferred some of this responsibility, Li's prestige and longevity in the Politburo have made him a key voice in foreign affairs. He and Teng are the only leaders who speak freely on foreign policy with foreigners. It was Li who made the important trip to southern Africa in January 1979 to discuss Soviet expansion in the region and hold talks with national liberation movement figures such as Robert Mugabe. When Teng is unable to meet an important visitor in Peking, it is usually Li who fills in and makes whatever agreements or commitments are required. Visitor talks with Hua tend to be shorter and more pro forma, after business is conducted.

Ch'en Yun's role in foreign affairs is as yet unclear. Since his admission to the Politburo and its Standing Committee in December 1978, he has been immersed in retrenching the economy. As that job sorts itself out, he may take on more external responsibilities. Until his fall-out with

Mao over the Great Leap Forward, Ch'en had routinely filled in for Chou as acting premier as the need arose.²⁷ Whether he will again seek such general responsibilities of state is not known.

Wang Tung-hsin, leader of the opposition group confronting Teng over the de-Maoification program, joined the Politburo in 1977 and has been abroad since then only once, to Cambodia, in November 1978. There has been speculation that Wang may be opposing Teng's efforts to end economic autarky²⁸--a key Maoist credo--but there is no direct evidence of this.

The remainder of the Politburo is grouped in three clusters: (1) Teng's key backers (Wei Kuo-ching, Hsu Shih-yu, Teng Ying-chao), (2) technocrats and bureaucrats (Fang I, Keng Piao, Nieh Jung-chen, Yu Chiu-li, and Ch'en Mu-hua), and (3) residual Maoists (Wu Te, Saifudin, Ch'en Hsi-lien and Ni Chih-fu). A coalition of the first two groups under Teng has largely neutralized the third. One is encouraged to speculate that the second group's backing of Teng's principal programs in support of various aspects of modernization includes his foreign policy line, since this group has been active in establishing overseas contacts. Fang I, Ch'en Mu-hua, and Keng Piao are among the most widely traveled of China's top leaders.²⁸

Apart from the conflict areas of modernization and trade, there are no clear divisions over foreign policy issues. The leadership appears to have been united in the decision to attack Vietnam, and there is no evidence of dissension over normalizing ties with the U.S., or rejecting detente offers from Moscow.

While all members of the Politburo share responsibility for final policy decisions, there is a fairly clear-cut division of responsibility in the preparation of position papers and in the execution of policies (usually in the form of "central documents" issued serially by year) resulting from discussion of those papers. Of 35 full and alternate Politburo members,

the 16 who hold vice premierships also hold government positions which require frequent contact with foreigners, and so have titles with visible governmental seniority.

Each of these 16 double-hatted Politburo members can legitimately bring before the Politburo foreign policy issues which fall within his bureaucratic purview. For example, Ch'en Mu-hua, minister of external economic relations (i.e., foreign aid), would be responsible for staffing a Tanzanian request for major repairs to Chinese equipment on the Tan-Zam railroad through the minister of railways and the minister of finance, before she would present a recommendation for action. More importantly--from the standpoint of Politburo politics--no one can properly submit agenda items outside his own "division of responsibility." Chiang Ching in 1975 attempted to "capture" part of the foreign trade area by criticizing export of art objects and handicrafts--her bureaucratic realm being culture--but was rebuffed.²⁹

Kenneth Lieberthal, in analyzing Politburo decision-making processes, describes the policy paper preparation process as follows:

Each leading Politburo member evidently has a staff of personal advisors, and one or more of these may play a role in the drafting of a document in which the Politburo member is involved. Once the person on the Politburo with responsibility for a specific functional area takes over the drafting process, moreover, he typically contacts people in the appropriate executive organs and assigns them the task of pulling together the data necessary for drafting the CD. This in turn initiates a process of consultation, research and investigation that might well stretch down to the basic levels, if this is felt necessary. The consultation involves sounding out people in the appropriate functional hierarchy at lower levels of the bureaucracy to solicit their views on the current situation and how best to handle the problem on the agenda. Frequently meetings are convened at various levels to discuss the issue. Research includes checking appropriate documentation on previous policy, technical documentary material relevant to finding the best solution to the problem concerned,....Often investigations are commissioned as a part of this process, either to generate

better data on real conditions in the problem are concerned or to trial test some of the proposed solutions so as to provide the leadership with data on the likely results of the proposals. These investigations may well produce models for later use. Some available data strongly suggest that particular Politburo members cultivate individual locales where they return repeatedly to test out proposed policies--evidently because they know the local situation relatively well and have faith in the local leaders' integrity, wisdom, and loyalty. Through this process of consultation, investigation, and research, an initial draft is produced.³⁰

Lieberthal analyzes in some detail how the division of responsibility system was used by Teng in 1975 to keep the radicals from prematurely learning of, and countering, his three major programs (what were later reviled as "the three poisonous weeds"). This bureaucratic ability to "capture" an issue area and control the data and conditions for its presentation to the Politburo can become critical during periods of factional strife:

The input of the various actors is structured by the assignment of specific functional areas of responsibility within the Politburo and the organization of the Party and state bureaucracies into functional "systems" on a national basis. This arrangement can be seen as a rational and efficient way to link up the Politburo with the various bureaucracies that govern China. The rules governing the flow of documents, and thus of information, are contoured to this functional division of responsibility. Nothing in this modus operandi need preclude widespread sharing of information and full cooperation among various members of the Politburo. As documented in the text above, however, to the degree that the Politburo itself becomes divided and ridden with factionalism, this system of channeling information can provide a vehicle by which each side can try to deny necessary technical and political data to its opponents. Indeed, the rules of this system allow for a situation whereby, until policy papers concerning a given issue area are virtually complete, only perhaps one or two Politburo leaders and the Politburo member responsible for that "system" of work need have access to the drafting process and the information that it generates. This is a system that can be used, then, to work against those who would like to block a policy in a functional area over which they have not been given control, for they cannot legitimately undertake independent investigations of the issue or begin to work seriously on the problem until it has been formally tabled for discussion by the entire Politburo.³¹

Given the current composition of the Politburo, one can see that the coalition of moderates and technocrats has preempted virtually the whole foreign policy field.

Once the position paper is before the Politburo, a process of consensus and compromise is invoked. If the issue is too thorny for compromise and protracted debate begins, it is customarily shelved rather than forced through on a majority vote.³² Consensus-building is then transferred into a wider public debate through the media (the radicals used the press frequently to defame policies they abhorred but couldn't contest on the basis of bureaucratic expertise).³³ An enlarged Politburo meeting or central party work conference may be employed to "stack" such an overwhelming majority for a given position that opposition is drowned out. The additional members are usually specially invited provincial and military region leaders sympathetic to the majority view. Mao developed the tactic³⁴ and Teng has favored it.

Teng has held two key central work conferences that appear related to foreign policy shifts. His late November 1978 conference was followed by a slight relaxation of Peking's position on Taiwan--opening the way to normalization of ties with the U.S. the following month--and a hardening of Peking's position on Vietnam--leading to preparations for war in February 1979.

A second working conference in late April 1979 reorganized China's foreign trade into a codified legal system that was adopted by the second session of the 5th National Peoples' Congress a few weeks later in June. Both working conferences also included major and highly controversial domestic reform packages, which were probably the real reasons the Politburo was bypassed. Whether they came in "piggybacked" on the domestic issues

or not, it is clear that Teng seeks to avoid open splits in the Politburo over foreign policies.

Throughout his career Teng has promoted the idea of collective leadership and fought bulldozing tactics in the Politburo. As Secretary-General of the CCP in the 1950's and the early 1960's, Teng worked hard for "unity and stability" and showed he could live with the majority's ruling even when he disliked it, as he proved when he implemented the rectification program against intellectuals after the 1957 "Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom" campaign. Even then Teng was willing to step outside the Politburo when Mao tried to block its majority will, as happened over agricultural policy in 1960-62. That Teng has not purged his Politburo opposition (such men as Wang Tung-hsin, General Chen Hsi-lien, Saifudin, and Wu Te) suggests that he still values an outlet for opposition within the Politburo.

The result is that, instead of an increasingly autocratic one-man rule, one sees a reenforcement of the whole "collective leadership" approach towards decision-making. The emphasis is on an open, consultative, consensual style of decision-making with a bias towards compromise. Teng is restructuring the political process in such a way that hardline, cross-issue factionalism should play a decreasing role. Decisions are likely to be more incremental and flow from consensus adjustments rather than the old pattern of sharp policy oscillations erupting from "two-line" ideological battles.

This same conservative approach towards the fullest possible consensus is mirrored in Teng's use of Central Committee plenums and National People's Congress sessions to endorse shifts in the party line, including foreign policy changes. During the faction-riddled Maoist era, convening a CC plenum or an NPC session to approve policies was extremely difficult in the absence of consensus. New NPC's and Central Committees were convened

sporadically, and typically after repeated delays. The fact that Teng uses the NPC and Central Committee frequently for prompt endorsements of new policies shows that he is equally concerned about achieving a national consensus, above and beyond that among the central leadership. The additional step is critical for effecting whole-hearted local implementation of new domestic policies, but is also relevant to the "selling" of foreign policies which might otherwise be misunderstood or unpopular. The composition of the Central Committee, and to a lesser degree the NPC, ensures that regional and local party "opinion-makers" have a chance to discuss and absorb policies which they might otherwise oppose had they not been consulted.

The overall effect of Teng's orchestration of the Politburo and legislative organs is that decision-making in all aspects of national policy--including foreign policy--has become one of consensus and relative stability.

We now consider the government bureaucracy headed by the State Council, focusing on the increasing role of institutional power in collecting, staffing, and processing information going to the Politburo for foreign policy decisions, and implementing those decisions after they are made.

C. DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING FOREIGN POLICIES--THE STATE COUNCIL

Even though the Politburo meets frequently--Lieberthal estimates about once every 9-10 days³⁵--its members are too busy with the highest matters of state and party to attend to day-to-day matters. More importantly, the party structure is not staffed to handle the flood of government details.

The daily routine of government is supervised by the State Council, headed by Premier Hua Kuo-feng and first Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping. The Council has 15 other vice premiers, all of whom are double-hatted as heads of various ministries, except Keng Piao and Li Hsien-nien. There are 16 other ministers without vice premier status, for a total of 29 ministries. (See Chart I-1.)


The Ministry of Foreign Affairs serves as a clearing house for overseas business of other ministries. It appears to have considerably less political clout than its counterparts in Washington, Moscow, and London. The current minister is Huang Hua, who entered the job in December 1976, replacing Ch'iao Kuan-hua, who had been discredited by ties with the Gang of Four. Huang Hua has spent the bulk of his diplomatic career overseas in Africa, the Mideast, Europe, and the U.S. His lack of a power base in Peking is reflected by his modest party credentials; he does not sit in the Politburo and is only one of 201 full members of the Central Committee.³⁶ The post seems to be intentionally downgraded in the power structure; one has to look back to Marshal Ch'en Yi (Foreign Minister 1958-1972) to find a foreign minister who sat in the Politburo and could be considered a political boss in his own right.

There are two possible explanations for this low-key political status. First, all three foreign ministers since Ch'en Yi have been career diplomats, too frequently out of the country to build up political alliances and not directly engaged in domestic operations, where power bases are built. Second, China's top leaders have conducted a very personalized handling of foreign affairs, preferring to conduct key bargaining with foreign leaders in Peking. Chinese foreign ministers have been used as spokesmen and go-betweens, but the charter to go abroad to treat with foreign powers is only rarely given. Foreign ministers have been more like chiefs of staff for foreign affairs, using their ministry to collect and collate information for the top leadership to make decisions. This role is described on the level of negotiations in Chapter V.

Both of Huang Hua's predecessors, Chi Peng-fei and Ch'iao Kuan-hua, lasted 2-3 years in the job. Should Huang's tenure extend significantly beyond this normal rotation, he may eventually establish enough of a base

Chart I-3

ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE COUNCIL



to win an alternate seat in the Politburo, as did his Soviet counterpart Gromyko. If Huang is replaced in the near future, his most likely successor is Huang Chen, currently minister of culture, who has had a long and distinguished diplomatic career, including being head of the PRC mission to Washington, as well as a brilliant military career during the Civil War.

The other key personalities in the Foreign Ministry are discussed in Chapter II.

D. INTER-MINISTERIAL COOPERATION IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

There is no data on the periodicity of full State Council meetings. During certain times of the year, such as year's end when the next year's budget is being decided, the meetings for coordination are probably frequent.

Most of the State Council's business, however, appears to be done in work groups on the sub-ministerial level.

Within the Foreign Ministry, there are two levels of coordination to work with other ministries: the vice ministerial level and the departmental. Twelve departments, covering geographical and functional areas, serve to collect information, staff position papers, and perform other related staff functions, such as setting up visits by important foreign officials to Peking, and visits abroad by senior Chinese leaders. The departments are in some cases subdivided into smaller bureaus, roughly comparable to "country desks" in the U.S. State Department.

The departments and bureaus in the Foreign Ministry have counterpart offices and bureaus in most of the other ministries (See Table A) and State agencies (See Table B).

A few ministries, such as the Ministry of Foreign Trade, have a structure of departments with geographical responsibilities nearly as complex as the Foreign Ministry itself. The departments and bureau

TABLE A

MINISTRIES WITH FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUREAUS

Ministry of Coal
Ministry of Commerce
Ministry of Communications¹
Ministry of Culture
Ministry of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries
Ministry of Education
Ministry of Foreign Trade
Ministry of Light Industry
First Ministry of Machine Building²
Fourth Ministry of Machine Building
Ministry of National Defense
Ministry of Petroleum Industry
Ministry of Public Health
Ministry of Water Conservancy and Power

This leaves 13 other ministries without known internal sections for foreign affairs.

¹ called "Foreign Aid Office"

² called "Machinery and Equipment Export Corporation"

(Source: CIA, Directory of Officials of the PRC, November 1978.)

TABLE B

STATE AGENCIES WITH FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUREAUS

Bank of China
Central Meteorological Bureau
China Travel and Tourism Bureau
Civil Aviation General Administration
Foreign Experts Bureau
Foreign Language Publications and Distribution Bureau
New China News Agency
State Museums and Archeological Data Bureau
State Oceanography Bureau
State Standardization and Metrology Bureau

(Source: CIA, Directory of Officials of the PRC, November 1978.)

probably deal directly on most matters, with the Foreign Ministry regional departments providing the linkage between embassies overseas and Peking bureaus needing information and coordination for such things as market surveys, trade and scientific protocol negotiations, and trips. When one considers, for example, that the Ministry of Commerce has commercial counselors in only 11 embassies, and the Defense Ministry has military attaches in fewer than two thirds of China's embassies, the Foreign Ministry's geographic departments clearly must be busy handling the flow of requests and information from other ministries to the embassy personnel under their cognizance.

A second, higher level of inter-ministerial cooperation exists at the vice minister level. The Foreign Ministry's 10 vice ministers and four assistant ministers share general protocol functions but each is responsible for specific geographical and/or policy areas. (See Table II-1, Chapter II.)

On military matters, coordination seems to be handled by Vice Foreign Minister Ma Wen-po (who came to the Foreign Ministry from the PLA during the Cultural Revolution) and Deputy PLA Chief of Staff Wu Hsiu-chuan (a career diplomat--ambassador to Yugoslavia, 1955-1958 and Assistant MFA 1950-1955--until he shifted to the PLA General Staff in 1975). There appears to be a hazy distribution of geographical responsibilities among the PLA's deputy chiefs of staff (See Table C).

On matters of military aid and guerrilla training to the Mideast, Deputy Chiefs of Staff Wang Shang-jung and Hsiang Chung-hua appear to have handled matters in concert with Vice Foreign Minister Ho Ying, the senior Mideast expert.³⁶

Further similar correlations can be drawn on vice-ministerial tie-ins among ministries through appearances at diplomatic functions in Peking for visiting foreign dignitaries and experts. The same "crowd" tends to show up for certain types of visitors.

TABLE C


REGION-ASSOCIATED APPEARANCES DEPUTY CHIEFS OF PLA STAFF
1977-1978

Figure	USSR	Africa	Asia	SE Asia	Latin America	West Europe	East Europe	North America	Trips
Chang Ai-ping	1					12			Switzerland, Italy, Sweden (78)
Chang Ts'ai-chien		3	5	1		2	3		Mexico (78) Japan (78)
Ch'ih Hao-t'ien		1		1		1	1		Congo (78)
Ho Cheng-wen		12	7	1		1	4	1	Sri Lanka (77) Sudan, Somalia (78)
Li Ta		6	10	3			6	1	
Wang Shang-jung		8	4	7		6	1		Tunisia (77)
Wu Hsiu-chuan	2	5	16	2	3	19	6	6	Yugoslavia, Greece, Romania (77) Philippines, Burma (78)
Yang Yung		2	8	1		5	7		North Korea (77), Yugoslavia, Romania (78)

(Source: CIA, Appearances and Activities of Leading Chinese Officials, 1977 and 1978)

CHART I-2

INTER-MINISTERIAL COORDINATION CHANNELS



In cases where a foreign delegation arrives in Peking seeking aid, for example, the delegation leader is met by either a MFA department head or vice minister, unless he is very senior, in which case the Minister himself acts as host. The department head or vice minister will hold extended preliminary talks, probing the delegation leader's position. The delegation is then taken in to see either Huang Hua or Li Hsien-nien for wrap-up talks, at which time senior officials from other ministries (PLA, Trade, etc.) may be present. A handshake-and-tea photo session with either Li, Hua, or Teng seals the business. It is at the vice ministerial level, though, that other ministries appear in the talks and the Chinese position is apparently coordinated.³⁷

The general process is delineated in Chart I-2.

NOTES

1. Lucian W. Pye, "Communications and Chinese Political Culture," Asian Survey, March 1978, p. 222.
2. See John K. Fairbank, et al., East Asia: Tradition and Transformation, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1978); John K. Fairbank, "China's Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective," Foreign Affairs, April 1969, pp. 449-463 (especially p. 449: "To deal with a major power without regard for its history, and especially its tradition in foreign policy, is truly to be flying blind."); and Edwin O. Reischauer, "The Sincic World in Perspective," Foreign Affairs, January 1974, pp. 341-348.
3. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co., 1971).
4. Harold C. Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1972). Rev. Edition.
5. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974).
6. Robert C. North, The Foreign Relations of China, (North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press, 1978), 3rd Edition.
7. In methodological terms, Chinese studies lag far behind Soviet studies in this effort. For excellent Model II-type analyses of Soviet foreign policymaking, see Jiri Valenta's forthcoming book, Czechoslovakia 1968: The Soviet Decision to Intervene, and V. V. Aspaturian, Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971).
8. William W. Whitson and Huang Chien-hsia, The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-1971, (New York: Praeger, 1973).
9. Melvin Gurtov, "The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs During the Cultural Revolution," The China Quarterly, No. 39, 1969, pp. 41-54.
10. Robert A. Scalapino, ed., Elites in the People's Republic of China, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972).
11. Robert A. Scalapino, ed., The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977) and the earlier volume in the same series, Ezra F. Vogel, Modern Japanese Organization and Decision-Making, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).
12. Parris H. Chang, Power and Policy in China, (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978). See also by same author, "Research Notes on the Changing Loci of Decision in the CCP," The China Quarterly, pp. 169-194.
13. Ting Wang, "Leadership Realignments," Problems in Communism, July-August 1977, pp. 1-17. See also David Bonavia, "The Future of Hua Kuo-feng," Pacific Community, January 1978, pp. 156-181.

14. Roger Glenn Brown, "Chinese Politics and American Policy: A New Look at the Triangle," Foreign Policy, Summer 1976, pp. 3-23; Thomas M. Gottlieb, "Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism and the Origins of the Strategic Triangle," RAND, R-1902-NA, November 1977; and Michael Pillsbury, "Personal Ties and Factionalism in Peking," RAND, P-5373, February 1975.
15. Lecture presented at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Summer 1979.
16. Andrew J. Nathan, "A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics," The China Quarterly, January-March 1973, pp. 34-67.
17. Michel Oksenberg and Steven Goldstein, "The Chinese Political Spectrum," Problems in Communism, March-April 1974, pp. 1-13.
18. Andrew J. Nathan, "Policy Oscillations in the People's Republic of China: A Critique," The China Quarterly, December 1976, pp. 720-733.
19. For example, see Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1968); Richard H. Solomon, Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, 2nd Edition, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968); and Martin K. Whyte, Small Groups and Political Rituals in China, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).
20. For a sophisticated treatment of different kinds of power bases and alignments in China, see Lowell Dittmer, "Bases of Power in Chinese Politics: A Theory and an Analysis of the Fall of the Gang of Four," World Politics, October 1978, pp. 26-60.
21. Lowell Dittmer, Liu Shao-ch'i and the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Politics of Mass Criticism, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); Gurtov, op. cit.; and Kenneth Lieberthal, et al., Central Documents and Politburo Politics in China, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1978).
22. Author's conversation with John S. Service, retired U.S. foreign service officer and a leading "China-watcher" for 50 years.
23. See Lieberthal, op. cit., pp. 26-111.
24. Teng has on several occasions regaled foreign correspondents with such statements as "Suslov thinks I am the worst Chinese," (U.S. Representative Doug Barnard, "Teng Clearly Concerned About Soviets' Aggressiveness," Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 28 January 1979, p. 10C); and "Brezhnev told the Japanese that I, myself, as the worst Chinese," interview in Time, 5 January 1979.
25. Reprinted from Renmin Ribao by Peking Review, 4 November 1977.
26. I am indebted to Harry Harding of Stanford University for this information, gleaned during a trip to Peking in 1978.
27. Donald W. Klein and Anne B. Clark, Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1925-1965, Vol. I (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 153.

28. Sources for this speculation can be found in the leftist Hong Kong press and dissident wallposters.
29. CIA, Appearances and Activities of Leading Chinese Officials During 1978, CR-79-12264, May 1979.
30. Lieberthal, op. cit., pp. 28, 77.
31. Ibid., p. 29.
32. Ibid., p. 76.
33. For discussion of the consensus/compromise aspects, see Nathan, "A Factionalism Model," p. 54. The Soviets also appear to emphasize compromise and consensus, particularly in foreign policy decisions by the collective leadership in the Politburo.
34. For an early appraisal of this "stacked meeting" ploy, see Parris Chang, "Research Notes." Kenneth Lieberthal has expanded this analysis in a very insightful introduction to A Research Guide to Central Party and Government Meetings in China 1949-1975, (White Plains, NY: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1976), pp. 3-45.
35. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the diplomatic corps altogether can boast only two more members of the CCP Central Committee: Vice Minister Liu Chen-hua, and a female deputy director of the American and Oceanic Affairs department, T'ang Wen-sheng. Not a very impressive suggestion of influence in party affairs.
36. Based on appearances of all three with PLA and Mideast visitors in FBIS-PRC between 1976 and 1978.
37. This pattern is compiled from numerous FBIS reports of visiting delegations. See the Agence Press-France report in FBIS-PRC on the special PLO delegation to Peking on 2 November 1977 for a particularly good example.

II. THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: DIRECTING TRAFFIC

II. THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: DIRECTING TRAFFIC

A. COORDINATION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In addition to the overseas activities of other ministries in the State Council, there are a large number of quasi-governmental bodies which perform roles in the foreign affairs process. These include the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC), the parent organization to a bevy of smaller state-to-state friendship associations; the Chinese People's Institute for Foreign Affairs (CPIFA), an advisory but also participatory body semi-connected to the Foreign Ministry; the International Department of the CCP Central Committee, which is responsible for relations with fraternal socialist parties; the United Front Work Department, which handles political mass campaigns within and without China's borders; various professional, scientific, health, and sports associations, which actively send delegations around the world; the Hsinhua central news service, which operates offices and bureaus worldwide; the China International Tourist Service, which is involved in a mushrooming operation that "exposes" China and the official Chinese viewpoint to hundreds of thousands of foreigners every year; and the foreign affairs offices set up to handle official guests at provincial and municipal levels.

The few scholars who have raised the issue of "Who coordinates the various levels of Chinese diplomacy?" are not in agreement. From 1958, when Chou turned over the Foreign Ministry to Chen Yi, until 1966, there was a Foreign Affairs Office, whose function seems to have been such coordination, set up within the State Council. Although George Jan in 1977 argued that it still exists and performs this function, Donald Klein in 1974 insisted it was never resurrected after 1966. He is supported by the Central

Intelligence Agency, which does not list a Foreign Affairs Office among the various offices within the State Council in its 1978 PRC Directory. The author has not seen any references to such an office in any official Chinese media over the past few years.

If one accepts a differentiation between decision-making and coordination in foreign policy, then it is possible and useful to view the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a hub connecting various spokes that make up a "wheel" of foreign policy. The wheel helps move the wagon of government along, but it doesn't "drive" the wagon. The role of coordinating policy-related inputs up to the State Council, then coordinating the execution of policies down may seem rather modest to foreigners accustomed to the overdriving roles of the U.S. State Department and Whitehall in their government decision-making processes, but the Chinese Foreign Ministry seems to be content with such a limited role. It has tried to seal itself off from the internecine battles of the political factions by staying out of the decision-making process at the top.

The rather unique cohesiveness of the Foreign Ministry, based on the loyalty by its members to their institution and its role, has been demonstrated in various ways. During the Cultural Revolution, when Foreign Minister Chen Yi was under severe attack, 91 senior members of the ministry issued a manifesto defending him, a remarkable act of political courage at the time.³ Roger Dial has done a fascinating case study of the Foreign Ministry's defense strategy against radical disruptions over the same period, as seen through the actions of the Chinese ambassador in Nepal.⁴ While publicly mouthing the Red Guard slogans, the diplomats overseas continued to maintain normal diplomatic ties with host countries, which would have been anathema to the Red Guards, had they suspected.

The Foreign Ministry has been successful in insulating itself from the arena of final decision-making in part because the top leaders have preferred such a relationship. As seen in Chapter IV on China's negotiating style, Chinese leaders have traditionally been careful to separate diplomatic functions from the decision-making process, so that foreigners cannot directly "reach" the decision-makers. The buffer group coordinated by the Foreign Ministry is distinctly separate from the decision-making group.

Does this "separation" mean that the Foreign Ministry is without influence in the decision-making process? On the contrary. The level of expertise of the Foreign Ministry and the areas over which it exercises coordination have been steadily growing. Position papers from the Foreign Ministry going to the State Council and Politburo may well be the most professional and detailed within the government. This inference is based on the stability and experience levels of the diplomatic corps, to which we now turn.

B. STRUCTURE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

Chart II-1 shows the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the end of 1978. The Minister, Huang Hua, is directly supported by 10 vice ministers and four assistant ministers. There are 12 separate departments, six geographic and six functional. Each department has a director and from one to 8 deputy directors. The departments are further broken down into sections, for specific countries and policy problems, but the structure of these sections is not known in any detail.

The structure of the Foreign Ministry has changed from time to time for a variety of reasons. From 1949 until the Cultural Revolution, it grew steadily until it had 6 geographic departments and 9 functional departments, supervised by 11 vice ministers. The Cultural Revolution saw the purge of

5 vice ministers, 6 department directors, and 20 deputy directors, and a reduction in the number of departments. By the end of the Cultural Revolution, between purges and transfers, there were only 4 vice ministers, and the number of departments had been reduced from 15 to 9. Since then, it has been rebuilding slowly in response to workload pressures. The number of vice ministers has increased to 10, and the number of assistant ministers from one to 4. The number of departments is back to 12.⁵



In addition to structural changes, the ministry has also experienced several major personnel shakeups. Besides the extended one during the Cultural Revolution, it experienced a major shifting of personnel in the summer of 1972 and in 1977-1978. The 1972 changes represented in part that Chen Yi's 14-year tenure was finally broken by a new man, and in part due to the shift in political winds created by Chou's power resurgence. The 1977-78 changes occurred after the ouster of Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua, who had supported the Gang of Four, but appear to be less a purge than an overall promotion for seasoned diplomats into the higher posts.

The current configuration occurred as a result of a major reorganization in 1977-78 that saw, besides a new Foreign Minister, the addition of five new vice ministers and the transfer of one vice minister, Fu Hao, to the ambassadorial post in Tokyo. Two of the new vice ministers, Wang Hai-jung⁶ and Chang Wen-Chin, served previously as assistant foreign ministers, and had had extensive diplomatic experience. Chang Wen-chin had served as ambassador to Pakistan and Canada, as a director and deputy director of MFA departments, and had participated in international negotiations going back to the 1954 Geneva talks and the 1969 Sino-Soviet border talks. Wang Hai-jung, Mao's niece, was a 1966 graduate of the Peking

Chart II-1

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Minister
Huang Hua



Language Institute and had been a deputy representative at the 26th UN General Assembly as well as director of the General Department and Deputy Director of the Protocol Department in the MFA. She had been actively involved in interviews with visiting heads of state and, despite heavy involvement with the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution, still appears to be active despite the recent purges of other GPCR activists.

The other three new vice ministers were also career diplomats. Liu Chen-hua joined the Foreign Ministry in the early 1970's after being the political commissar of an army as late as 1969. He spent over five years as ambassador to Albania (1971-1976), one of Peking's most important and difficult overseas posts.

Chang Hai-feng held ambassadorial posts in three Eastern European countries (Yugoslavia 1973-78; Rumania 1969-73; and East Germany 1964-Cultural Revolution). His promotion directly from postings in the Balkans to the upper level of the Foreign Ministry provides the leadership with first-hand expertise on the two "maverick" communist states, Romania and Yugoslavia, which so far constitute China's only contact with mainstream European communist parties. Hua Kuo-feng's August 1978 trip to Romania and Yugoslavia was probably organized by Chang. His appointment underscores the high interest of current foreign policy initiatives in the Balkans.

Wang Shu's background is more obscure. He first appeared as the delegate with full powers to negotiate establishment of diplomatic relations with West Germany after serving as an NCNA European correspondent. He became the Chinese embassy's charge d'affaires in November 1972, counselor in March 1973, and ambassador in September 1974. His performance in Bonn must have been outstanding, because it is extremely rare for the

Chinese to promote a counselor or charge directly to ambassador within the same country. From the limited information available, it appears that Wang is a specialist in West German/NATO/West European affairs, and directs Chinese efforts to expand contacts that would facilitate high technology transfers, which are Peking's primary interest in this area. Wang was editor-in-chief of Red Flag, the party ideological journal, from February 1977 to mid-1978, when he returned to the Foreign Ministry as a vice minister.

Of the other five vice ministers, all but one are career diplomats with at least twenty years of experience.

Han Nien-lung, who served under Chen Yi during the civil war, has been a vice minister since 1964, and is accordingly the senior vice minister. After leaving the army in 1951, he entered the diplomatic service as ambassador to Pakistan. Several tours later he became an assistant foreign minister in 1958 and a vice minister in 1964. He was one of the few vice ministers to survive the Cultural Revolution, during which he performed his usual functions. This may have been due to a political savvy reflected in the fact that his wife, Wang Chen, is one of the deputy directors of the Information (Intelligence) Department, where she is in an excellent position to guard her husband's political flanks. Han Nien-lung supervised the pre- and postwar negotiations with Vietnam, acting as the ministry's top spokesman in Peking. He is the senior "Asia hand" in the ministry.

Chung Tsi-tung's career parallels Han Nien-lung's, although he did not become vice minister until the 1972 reorganization. Chung left the PLA as a major general in 1961 to become ambassador to Czechoslovakia, a post he held for 5½ years. After the GPCR he served as ambassador to Tanzania for three years (1969-72). An interesting incident in his personal history, and one that boosted his military career, occurred in 1945,

when he organized a local resistance group to block successfully an attempted landing by the U.S. Navy's Yellow Sea Squadron.

Ho Ying, perhaps the busiest of the vice ministers, was also promoted to the job in the 1972 reshuffle. He left the PLA after independence in 1949, having been political commissar of a division, to enter the consular service in 1951. He served in a number of posts in the ministry and abroad, but reached preeminence as China's first ambassador to Tanganyika in 1962. Within the next two years, in a flurry of personal diplomacy, he succeeded in outpacing the Taiwanese diplomats and established diplomatic relations for Peking with Uganda (1962), Zanzibar (1963), Burundi (1963), and Zambia (1964). He is on excellent personal terms with President Nyerere and the African revolutionary exiles in Tanzania. While in Tanganyika, he achieved a reputation for flamboyance for having the second biggest limousine in the country, after the U.S. ambassador's. He directs Foreign Ministry activities with Africa and the Mideast, including the PLO.

Yu Chan became a vice foreign minister in 1972 after extensive experience in Soviet and East European affairs going back to 1955. He heads the Chinese side of the intermittent Sino-Soviet border talks and is considered the strategist behind Peking's tentative openings to the Soviet bloc in Europe.

Ma Wen-po, also a 1972 appointee, is the dark horse of the Foreign Ministry. He became active in diplomatic activities in Peking in 1968. Ma had been Vice Chairman of the Military Control Commission of the Foreign Ministry towards the end of the Cultural Revolution, which led to speculation that he performs liaison, if not institutional surveillance duties for the PLA General Staff. The heavy involvement of the Defense Ministry in diplomatic activities would justify the need for such a figure. He has no known overseas experience.

As a general rule, the vice foreign ministers are each responsible for a geographical or functional area, as indicated in Table II-1. This level of the ministry, decimated during the GPCR to four vice ministers, is almost back to its pre-GPCR level of eleven vice ministers. The 1977-78 reorganization added three billets to the seven listed in 1972.

The four current assistant foreign ministers were all appointed in 1978. Three of the four are seasoned diplomats and the fourth's background is unknown.

Assistant Foreign Minister Sung Chih-kuang entered the foreign service in 1950 and has held numerous posts, mostly in Western Europe. He was ambassador to Great Britain prior to his current posting. He appears to have been appointed to this billet, created to advise the Foreign Minister on expanding contacts with the high-technology states of Western Europe. He assisted Chi Peng-fei in Peking talks with Common Market President Colombo in January 1979.

Lin Chung entered the foreign service around 1958. His background mirrors Sung's, only with an emphasis on Eastern Europe.

Kung Ta-pei's most recent posting was as ambassador to Zaire, a country of special interest to Peking in countering Soviet encroachments in southern Africa. When Angolan troops with Cuban and, possibly, Soviet advisors behind them, tried to invade Shaba province in 1977, the panic in Peking was reflected in Huang Hua's return flight from the U.N. disarmament talks in New York, being suddenly diverted to Zaire. A high-level PLA military aid delegation to Zaire followed within two weeks. It would appear that Kung's recent expertise is being added to Huang Hua's and Ho Ying's own considerable experience in this key region.

TABLE II-1

Vice Foreign Ministers: Areas of Responsibility

Han Nien-lung	First vice foreign minister handling general functions, but with special expertise on Asia
Chung Hsi-tung	Northeast and Southeast Asia; headed 1978 Sino-Vietnamese border talks
Wang Hai-jung	Protocol and administration; usually on-hand for VIP visits, although no longer acts as the official interpreter; seems to be developing expertise in North America and Australia
Ma Wen-po	Liaison with PLA; general protocol responsibilities
Ho Ying	Africa and Mideast, including PLO
Yu Chan	Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
Liu Chen-hua	Seems to be MFA's liaison with the International Department of the CCP Central Committee
Chang Wen-chin	Seems to be shifting duties from Asia to Western Europe; is an expert on border negotiations and treaty law
Chang Hai-feng	Balkans
Wang Shu	Western Europe and NATO; public relations and propaganda

TABLE II-2

Assistant Foreign Ministers: Areas of Responsibility

Sung Chih-kuang	Western Europe
Lin Chung	Eastern Europe
Kung Ta-pei	Southern Africa
Tsao Chun-keng	Administration/personnel

(Source: author's analysis of public appearances 1977-1978)

Tsao Chun-keng, the fourth assistant minister, served concurrently as director of the General Department, which oversees the administrative staff functions for the Ministry. Apart from a four-year tour as ambassador to Norway (1972-1976), nothing is known of his background. Tsao's promotion to the inner circle of assistant and vice ministers probably reflected the need for a general secretary to prepare for and implement results of their meetings, as the size and work volume of the Foreign Ministry "executive council" have increased.⁷

The career backgrounds of the incumbent assistant ministers of foreign affairs are listed in Table II-3.

C. DEPARTMENT DIRECTORS IN THE MFA

The 12 department directorships within the Foreign Ministry seem to serve as mid-career launch points. Successful foreign service officers in line to get their first ambassadorship are usually shunted into one of these directorships, where they come under close surveillance of the MFA executive group, the assistant and vice ministers. The posts turn over fairly rapidly. If the foreign service officer passes the inspection of his seniors, apparently a matter of trust in his judgement, the man goes directly to his own embassy from the department directorship. He can expect to rotate from one ambassadorship to another, with a slight chance of becoming an assistant or vice minister later. In some cases, he may be sent back to Peking to another department director job, either to expand his expertise into a different region, or because his talents are needed in Peking. The career patterns of the incumbent department heads are listed in Table II-4.

TABLE II-3
CAREER PATTERNS OF ASSISTANT FOREIGN MINISTERS

NAME	JOB	HISTORY	Entered F.S.
Sung Chih-Kuang b. 1916	Asst MFA Jan 78	Amb Britain Jun 72- Dec 77 Amb GDR Sep 70- Apr 72 Counselor Feb 64- Jul 70 Mbr Jun 57 Dep Dir 58-61 W. European Aff Dept Secretary GDR Embassy 50-54	1950
Tsao Chun-Keng	Asst MFA Mar 78	Amb Norway 72-76	
Lin Chung	Asst MFA May 78	Amb Algeria Aug 71 Counselor Albania Jul 69- Bulgaria May 65- Hungary Dir Personnel Jun 58- Counselor Oct 64 Charge Nov 62	1958
Kung Ta-fei	Asst MFA Aug 78	Amb Zaire Jan 73 Amb Iraq Dec 70 Actg Dir W.Asia & Africa Feb 70 Actg Dir African Aff Mar 65 Dep Dir W. Asia & Africa Aug 60-63 Oct 63-64 Jul 59-60 1st Sec Burma Aug 53 Ch-Iraq Fr 58 Ch-Syr Fr 57	

TABLE II-4

CAREER PATTERNS OF MFA DEPARTMENT HEADS

DEPARTMENT	NAME	HISTORY	Entered F.S.
General Affairs Department	Dir Tsao Chun-keng Concurr MFA Sep 77	Amb Norway Sep 72-Dec 76	
Asian Affairs	Dir Shen Ping Sep 75	Amb Iran Feb 71-Jun 74 Amb Italy Apr 71 Counselor Britain Dec 62-66 Delgn to Indonesia Asian Aff Mar 61 Dep Dir 1st Aug 59 Consul-gen Geneva Jul 57 Counselor Switzerland May 58	1956
W. Asian No. African Affairs	Chou Chueh Dec 74	Dep Dir W. Asia & Africa Dec 71 Dir of Section of W. Asia & Africa Nov 70	
African Affairs	Ho Kung-Kai Aug 72	Dep Dir W. Asia & Africa Dec 70 Counselor UAR Jan 66-67	
Soviet Union & E. European Affairs Dept.	Yu Hung Liang Jul 78	Dep Dir SU & EE Aff. Date (?) Immed. preceding jobs in Hellungkiang prov.	
W. European Affairs	Vacant	Former Dir Wang Tung now Amb Canada	

TABLE II-4 (cont'd)

DEPARTMENT	NAME	HISTORY	Entered F.S.
American & Oceanic Affairs	Lin Ping Jul 73	Amb Chile Jun 71- Feb 73 Ldr Tr msn Chile Jan 65 Dep Dir America & Australia Sep 64 Adv Ch-Lam Ch-Cuban Fr Ass 60-62 Dep Dir America & Aus- tralia Oct 59 Transl. Asst to Amb Poland 1955	1955
Protocol Department	Chu Chuan- Hsien Nov 74	Dep Dir Protocol Nov 71	
Information Department	Chien Chi- Chen Dec 76	Amb Guinea Aug 74-Oct 76	
Informational Organizations and Conferences and Treaty and Law Department	Vacant		
Consular Affairs Department	Kao Shih- Kun Apr 78	Dir Consular Aff Sep 61	
Political Department	Vacant		

The assistant directors to the various departments are junior foreign service officers, who are working towards counselor, charge, and first secretary slots overseas, in much the same pattern as the directors work towards ambassadorships.

D. THE DIPLOMATS ABROAD - GROWTH IN NUMBERS AND EXPERTISE

Several analysts of Chinese foreign policy have contended that the rapid growth of the PRC's overseas ties has meant that the expertise of its diplomats is rather low.⁸ As Chart II-2 shows, the decade 1969-1977 saw the number of overseas missions almost triple, as more countries became willing to establish relations in response to China's more moderate foreign policies and the end of U.S. containment efforts. George Jan, in a study analyzing experience backgrounds of Chinese ambassadors in 1975, came to the conclusion that

a substantial number of Chinese ambassadors had little or no experience in diplomatic service prior to their ambassadorial appointments. They were transferred from other government services, such as the military, the party, or the central and provincial civil administrations to the diplomatic service without any apparent pattern.⁹

Jan's conclusions from his 1977 study were based on information, frequently sketchy, on 83 ambassadors of 100 on station (correcting for concurrent postings to more than one country, and posts filled only by chargés or consuls-general).

The picture today is considerably different, in part because more information is available about diplomats' backgrounds. As of the end of 1978, there were 103 ambassadors (correcting again for double-postings, chargés, a consul-general, and posts not yet filled in recently recognized countries). Of these, 66 were known to have previously been ambassadors and another 17 had been chargés, giving a total of 83, or 81 percent, who had experience as mission chiefs prior to heading their current embassies.

Chart II-2

GROWTH OF PRC'S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS




TABLE II-5

TABLE 4: Cumulative Growth of Diplomatic Recognitions

<u>Year</u> (notes)	<u>Changes</u>	<u>Total in Effect</u>
1949	13	13
1950 (1)	12	25
1955	1	26
1956	3	29
1958	5	34
1959	1	35
1960	4	39
1961 (2)	1 (-1)*	39
1962	2	41
1963	2	43
1964	6	49
1965 (3)	1 (-1)	49
1966 (4) (5) (6)	0 (-3)	46
1967 (7) (8)	0 (-2)	44
1968	2	46
1970	5	51
1971 (3) (7)	16 (+2)	69
1972 (6) (2) (4)	14 (+3)	86
1973	2	88
1974	8	96
1975	9	105
1976 (5)	5 (+1)	111
1977	3	114
1978	2	116
1979	2	118

* = denotes corrections for suspended and resumed relations

Notes

- (1) Israel recognized the PRC Jan 1, 1950 but the PRC has not recognized Israel.
- (2) Zaire suspended relations Sep 18, 1961; resumed relations Nov 24, 1972.
- (3) Burundi suspended relations Jan 29, 1965; resumed relations Oct 13, 1971.
- (4) Benin suspended relations Jan 3, 1966; resumed relations Dec 29, 1972.
- (5) Central African Republic suspended relations Feb 1966; resumed relations Aug 20, 1976.
- (6) Ghana suspended relations Oct 20, 1966; resumed relations Feb 29, 1972.
- (7) Tunisia suspended relations Sep 15, 1967; resumed relations Oct 8, 1971.
- (8) Indonesia suspended relations Oct 27, 1967; relations not yet resumed.
- (9) The PRC recognizes but has not yet established relations with Panama and Grenada.

Adding another eight who had been counselors (equivalent of deputy chiefs of mission), gives a total of 91, or 88 percent, with senior embassy experience before becoming a current ambassador. Using the data consolidated to draw up the career histories of the current (end of 1978) diplomatic list in Table II-6, one finds that the average ambassador has been a head of mission 2.5 times, including his current post. He has spent 9.5 years overseas, of which 6.3 were as an ambassador. By any standard, these figures reflect a seasoned diplomatic corps.

Chart II-11 shows that the number of overseas personnel has grown proportionately with the increase in numbers of missions. This is borne out by Table II-7 which shows, albeit with a dip during the Cultural Revolution, that the average manning level per mission has remained at about 11 over the past 25 years. This overall growth rate conceals two balancing trends. The size of China's largest missions has been steadily increasing (see Table II-8), while at the same time China has been extending most of its recent recognitions to newly independent mini-states, such as Fiji, where one or two-man missions suffice.

The growth of the overseas establishment has roughly kept pace with the growth of staff in Peking. Taking the data in Table II-9 for 1953-1973, as compiled by Klein, and using Terrill's figure from the Chinese that the total 1971 manning of the ministry's personnel in Peking and overseas was about 1,000 people, one comes up with an estimate of 566 for 1971 in the Peking headquarters. Using the same ratio of overseas to capital personnel gives an estimate of 1600 for the Peking ministry figure for 1978, which seems about right, given the commensurate growth in workload to supervise the expanded overseas establishment.

TABLE 11-6

CAREER PATTERNS OF PRC AMBASSADORS IN 1978

Ambassadors	Country	Preceding Jobs	Entered FS
Fu Hao	Japan Aug 77 -	Amb N. Vietnam Sep 74-Apr 77 MFA Nov 77 Mbr UN Delegation Nov 71 Gen Off Div MFA Nov 70 Charge India Jul 58-Mar 60	1954
Meng Ying	Mongolia Aug 78 -	Amb Cent Af Rep Dec 64-Jan 66 Dep Dir W.Asian & African Aff. Mar 61	1956
Lu Chih-Hsien	N. Korea Sep 76 -	Amb Congo (B) Apr 73-May 76 Amb Hungary Aug 70-Jan 73 Amb Maritania Sep 65-Oct 67 Hangchow U. Pres Jan 64	1965
Chen Hsin-Jen	Philippines Sep 78 -	Amb Netherlands Jan 75-Jul 78 Amb to Iran Mar 72-Oct 74 VP CPIFA Nov 61 Amb Finland Sep 54-Jan 59	1954
Chen Chih-Fang	Vietnam Sep 77 -	Amb Switzerland Dec 70-Aug 75 Amb Uganda Apr 64-67 VP CPIFA Jun 62 Amb Iraq Aug 58-Aug 60 Amb Syria Oct 56-Feb 58	1956
Hsu Huang	Laos Dec 77 -	Dep Dir FM Sep 64 Counselor GDR Mar 60-Jul 61 Dep Dir Info Dept MFA Aug 55	1955
Sun Hao	Kampuchea Aug 74 -	Counselor Cambodia Sep 72-74	1972
Yeh Cheng-Chang	Malaysia Dec 77 -	Amb Burma Aug 73 Dep Dir Asian Aff. Mar 1971 Counselor India Oct 62-64	

TABLE II-6 (cont'd)

Ambassadors	Country	Preceding Jobs	Entered FS
Chang Wei-Lieh	Thailand Jul 78 -	Amb Mongolia Feb 78-Jul 74 Oct 74-Apr 78 China-Cub Fr Jul 70 Assn Jul 70 Amb Iraq Sep 68-Jan 66 Counselor USSR Oct 56-Aug 60	1956
Mo Yen-Chung	Burma Nov 77 -		
Chen Chao-Yuan	India Sep 76 -	Amb Spain Oct 73-Jul 76 Charge India Apr 63-Oct 70 Amb Burma Jan 71-May 73 Int'l Aff Dep Dir MFA Oct 59 Counselor Sweden full dir Oct 60 - Jun 58	unk (prior 58)
Lu Wei Chao	Pakistan Sep 74 -	Dir As Aff Sep 70 Counselor Vietnam Jul 64-70 Charge Vietnam Jul 63-Jul 64	
Chuang Yen	Bangia Desh Apr 76 -	Dep Rep UN Jul 72 Counselor Britain Apr 62 Int'l Liaison Dep Dir Nat TU Fed Apr 53-May 54	
Sun Sheng-Wei	Sri Lanka Sep 77 -	Amb Kuwait Aug 71 Counselor Apr 60 Burma Charge Oct 70	
Huang Ming-Ta	Afghanistan Sep 77 -	Amb Sri Lanka Mar 73-77 Amb Maldives Mar 73-77 concurr.	1965 Charge India Oct 70 Counselor Burma Apr 65
Peng Kuang-Wei	Nepal Jan 78 -	Amb GDR Jun 72	
Wu Fan-Wu	Australia Aug 77 -	Dep Dir Amer & Ocean Aff Aug 72 -	

TABLE II-6 (cont'd)

Ambassadors	Country	Preceding Jobs	Entered FS
Pei Chien-Chang	New Zealand May 73 -	Charge U.S. May 71	
MI Kuo-Chun	Fiji Apr 77 -	Counselor Japan Apr 73 Rep Ch Cncl Promotn Tr in Australia Oct 67-68	1973 Tech Advisor Nat'l Machy Impt Exp Corp
Mei Yong-Ching	Turkey May 76 -	Cncl mbr CPIFA Sep 71 Charge Mauritania Sep 65-Feb 69	
Tsao Chih	Cyprus Mar 78 -	Amb Nepal Sep 72 No app. C.R.	1966 Amb Iraq Jan 66-70
Chiao Jo-Yu	Iran May 77 -	Amb Peru Jan 72-Jan 77 Amb Korea Nov 65-Jul 67	1965 Polit C'sar Shonyang Militia
Yao Kuang	Egypt Jul 77 -	Amb Mexico Sep 73 Mar 72-Aug 73 Amb Canada Aug 70-Dec 71	Charge Poland Apr 59-Oct 63 Dir 2nd Asian Aff Aug 64-Oct 69 Acting Dir Apr 64
Tsao Ke-Chiang	Syria Aug 74 -	Party Govt Deln Vietnam Mar 71 Dir Aug 72	Amb Korea Dec 57 2nd Asian Aff Feb 61
Hsu Ming	Lebanon Mar 72 -	Cncl mbr Ch-Ja Fr Ass Oct 70 Rep Italy Cncl Promote Tr Feb 65	1955 Counselor GDR Jan 55- Aug 60 Dep Dir Sut EE Aff MFA Sep 60

TABLE II-6 (cont'd)

Ambassadors	Country	Preceding Jobs	Entered FS
Ku Hsiao-Po	Jordan Dec 77 -	Amb Dahomey Jan 73 Amb Sudan Apr 62-Nov 65	
Hou Yeh-Feng	Iraq Sep 77 -	Amb Tunisia Feb 72 Dep Dir Africa Aff Aug 66 Cncl Ch-Ja Fr Assn Oct 63	1963
Ting Hao	Kuwait Sep 77 -	Cnclr Chile Aug 71-77 Charge Chile Jan 71 - Counselor Denmark Nov 65 Dep Dir W. Eur Aff Apr-Nov 65	
Chao Chin	N. Yemen Sep 75 -	Amb Bulgaria Mar 71-Jul 75 Counselor Mongolia Aug 60	1960
Huang Shih- Hsieh	S. Yemen Nov 77 -	Amb Rwanda Jan 72 Counselor Ghana Apr 65-Oct 66 (when diplomatic relations broken)	1965
Chang Yueh	Sudan Sep 74 -	Amb Somalia Mar 61-Sep 64 Counselor Yemen Dec 58-Apr 61 Counselor Egypt Jan 56 Dep Commerc Rep Egypt Apr 56 Dep Dir W. Europe & Africa Aff MFA Apr 55	1955
Tsui Chien	Tunisia Aug 77 -	Amb So. Yemen Aug 72 Dep Dir W. Asian & Africa Aff May 72 -	
Sung Han-Yi	Morocco Jul 74 -		

TABLE II-6 (cont'd)

Ambassadors	Country	Preceding Jobs	Entered FS
Chao Yuan	Mauritania May 78 -	Counselor Mozambique Jun 75 Dep Dir Africa Aff MFA Apr 73 VMFA Sep 69 Dep Dir W. Asian & No. Africa May 67 Charge Guinea Dec 59	1959
Chang Shih-Chieh	Somalia Mar 75 -	Amb Nepal Jul 60 Dep Dir 1st Asian Aff Jul 60 Dep Dir Personnel Off MFA Apr 57- Feb 60 Counselor Hungary Jun 57 Counselor Afghan Aug 55	1955
Wang Chin-Chuan	Ethiopia Nov 77 -	1st Amb Senegal Jun 72 Charge UN Nov 71 Cnclr Albania Jan 66-Jan 67 Cncl mbr CPI FA Oct 60 Head, Extern Aff Dept Kwantung Mar 60 Officer Protocol Dep MFA May 55	1955
Wang Yueh-Yi	Kenya Sep 74 -	Amb Austria Sep 71	1971
Tai Lu	Uganda Mar 78 -	Amb Cyprus Aug 72 - Charge Apr 71 Korea Counselor Sep 71 Tr & Cult Sec Jan 62 Laos Charge Apr 63-65 Official in 2nd Asian Aff Sep 61 1st Sec Vietnam Jan 59 - Jan 60	1959
Liu Chun	Tanzania May 76 -	Amb Turkey May 72-Mar 76 Dep Dir Asian Aff Sep 70 Amb Laos Sep 62-Jan 67 Charge Laos Jul 62 Dep Ldr Cult & group in Laos Oct 61	1961
Fan Tso-Kai	Mali Sep 75 -	Amb Somalia Sep 70-Mar 75 Wuhan V. Mayor May 60	1970

TABLE II-6 (cont'd)

Ambassadors	Country	Preceding Jobs	Entered FS
Hsieh Ke-Hsi	Niger Mar 75 -		
Miao Chiu-Jul	Chad Sep 77 -	Consul-Gen Karachi 72 - 77	1971
Peng Hua	Guinea Jan 77 -	Dir Info Dept MFA Aug 72	1961
Hsieh Pang-Chih	Upper Volta Oct 73 -	Amb Afghanistan Jul 69 - Jan 73	1960
Yueh Hsin	Togo Jul 74 -	Amb Finland Aug 65 - CR	1965
Chang Chun-Hua	Benin Jan 78 -	Counselor Tanzania Dec 71	1971
Nei Pao-Shan	Cameroon Sep 74 -	Charge Algeria Aug 71	
Li Lien-Pi	Congo Aug 76 -	Head PRC Mission EEC Sep 75 - Feb 76	1962
		Amb Belgium Apr 72-Feb 76	Charge Jul 64 Dep Dir
		Amb Luxembourg Dec 73-Feb 76	Counslr Oct 62 2nd Asian Aff May 62
			Con Curr. Poland
Hu Ching-Jul	Equat. Guinea Aug 74 -	Charge May 72 Counselor Mauritius Sep 72	1971
		Consul Dacca, E. Pakistan 71 - Dec 71	

TABLE II-6 (cont'd)

Ambassadors	Country	Preceding Jobs	Entered FS
Liu Ying-hsien	Cabon Aug 74 -	Congo (B) 1st Secretary Aug 64 Counselor Jul 71 Charge May 72	1964
Li Shih	Central Africa Rep Nov 76 -	Charge Kenya Oct 73	1953
Feng Yu-Chiu	Nigeria Nov 73 -	Amb Mauritania Jul 69 - 73	1965
Yang Ke-Ming	Ghana Sep 74 -	Amb Norway Jan 65	
Tsung Ke-Wen	Sierra Leone Jul 75 -	Charge May 71 Czech Amb Oct 71	
Wang Jen-San	Liberia Jul 77 -	Charge Jul 64 Hungary Counselor Oct 64-67	
Lei Yang	Gambia May 75 -	Amb Chaci Apr 73 -	1956
Chia Hwai-Chi	Guinea- Bisseau Feb 76 -	Counselor USSR Aug 72 Charge Poland Aug 69 MFA Education Dept Dir Oct 64	1956 Charge Burma Oct 60

TABLE II-6 (cont'd)

Ambassadors	Country	Preceding Jobs	Entered FS
Yang Shou-Cheng	Mozambique Oct 77 -	Amb Ethiopia Dec 74 Amb Sudan Apr 70 Amb Somalia Sep 64 - CR	
Chou Po-Ping	Zaire Aug 78 -	Amb Algeria Aug 75 - May 78 Amb Greece Mar 73 - Jun 75 Tanzania Jun 75 Charge Oct 67 Counselor Jun 69 Charge Jul 70	1967
Yueh Liang	Rwanda Sep 77 -	Amb Denmark Feb 71 Dept MFT May 70 Dep Dir Gen Dept MFA Jun 58	
Shih Tzu-Ming	Burundi Mar 78 -	Amb Finland Apr 70 Wuhan Factory Dir 58	
Ke Pu-Hai	Zambia Mar 78 -	Amb Uganda Apr 72 - Nov 77 Protocol Dept Dep Dir Nov 60 Actg Dir Dec 64	1955
Chao Cheng-Yi	Botswana Aug 75 -	Amb Sierra Leone Mar 72-Mar 75 Charge Jul 70 Pakistan Counselor Feb 71 CPIFA Indonesia Romania Jun 53 Jul 63	1953
Tien Chih-Tung	Malagasy Jun 74 -	Charge France Nov 71 Counselor France May 71 Counselor Mali Dec 63-66 Charge Jan-Oct 61 1st Sec Oct 63	1961
Wang Jo-Chieh	Mauritius Sep 77 -	Amb Rev Govt So. Vietnam May 73 Amb Yemen Feb 64-Jan 67 M Gen & Pol C'Sar	
Chai Tse-Min	United States Aug 78 -	Amb Thailand Jan 76-May 78 CPAFFC Sep 74-Aug 75 Amb UAR Jun 70-Aug 74 Amb Guinea Aug 64-Jul 67 CPAFFC May 61 May 54 Inst 55	1954

TABLE II-6 (cont'd)

Ambassadors	Country	Preceding Jobs	Entered FS
Wang Tung	Canada Jul 77 -	Dir W Europe Aff Oct 72 Dep Dir W Eur, Amev & Australia Mar 72 Amb Sweden Jun 69- Jan 72 Counselor Rumania Oct 64 Eur Dep Dir Min Cult Aug 60 1st Sec Albania Dec 54- May 56	1954
Liu Pu	Mexico Aug 77 -	Amb Malta Jun 72-Jul 77 GDR Dep Cncir Charge Apr 65 Aug 68	1965
Li Shan-Yi	Cuba Jun 75 -	Mexico Charge Counselor May 72 Aug 72 Charge Cuba Oct 67 Counselor Nov 70	1967
Wang Chung-Li	Jamaica Mar 77 -	Alt Rep Perm Mission to U.N. Geneva Office Jul 72 - Dir Dept MGA Oct 64-Sep 70 Charge Syria Oct 61 Consul-General Damascus Apr 60	1960
Wang Chan-Yuan	Trinidad & Tobago Apr 72 - Guyana Mar 73	Counselor Romania Jun 70 2nd Sec Bulgaria May 59	1959
Hsu Chung-Fu	Argentina Jan 78 -	Amb Chile Mar 73 Charge Canada Jan 71 Cncir Jul 71 Cult Counselor UAR Jun 64-67 Counselor Sweden Oct 56 Counselor Pakistan Sep 58	1955
Chang Teh-Chun	Brazil Apr 75 -	Amb Cuba Nov 70-Feb 75 Counselor USSR Aug 60	1960

TABLE II-6 (cont'd)

Ambassadors	Country	Preceding Jobs	Entered FS
Hu Cheng-Fang	Chile Mar 78 -	Amb Iraq Feb 73-Jul 74 Czech Charge Mar 63- Jan 67 Counselor Dec 62 1st Asian Aff 1961 Dep Dir 1st Asian Aff 1961	1961
Cheng Wei-Chih	Venezuela May 78 -	Amb Argentina Sep 72-Oct 77 Dir American & Australian Aff Jan 65 Amb Denmark May 56-May 61 Pakistan Counselor Jun 52 Charge Jan 55	1952
Wang Tse	Peru May 77 -	Amb Nepal Jul 69 Consul-General Dacca Oct 66-67 Consul-General Mandalay Jan - Jul 61	1961
Li Chao	Surinam Jul 77	Amb Jamaica Jul 73-Nov 76 Counselor Iraq Jul 65 Dep Dir Protocol MFA Sep 64-Apr 65 V Chm Hupeh Oct Aff Feb 57 Chm 61	1957
Ko Hua	Great Britain Sep 78 -	Amb Philippines Dec 75 - Apr 78 Dep Dir Asian Aff Apr-Aug 75 Amb Ghana Sep 72- Sep 74 Dir Africa Aff MFA Sep 64-67 (crit & purgd) Amb Guinea Mar 60 Dir Atn & Asian Aff Sep 56 Dir Protocol Mar 55	1955
Han Ke-Hua	France Aug 77 -	Amb Italy Sep 74-Jun 77 Amb Guinea Jun 69-Aug 74 Amb Hungary Aug 64-Sep 67	1964
Chang Tung	W.Germany Aug 77 -	Amb Egypt Sep 74-May 77 Amb Pakistan May 61-Aug 74 Dep Dir 1st Asian Aff Sep 62 Dir Sep 64 Charge Congo Jul 61 Mil Attache India Sep 56	1956

TABLE II-6 (cont'd)

Ambassadors	Country	Preceding Jobs	Entered FS
Chen Tung	E. Germany Mar 78 -	Amb Iceland Aug 72-Oct 77 Charge Poland Oct 67 Consul-General Gdanski Pol Aug 65	1963
Wang Kuo- Chuan	Italy Aug 78 -	Amb Australia May 73 - ? Pres CPAFFC Jun 72 VP CAPFFC Oct 70 Amb Poland Jul 64 - Oct 67	1957
Li Yun-Chuan	Switzerland Aug 76 -	Amb Korea Mar 70-Jun 76 Amb Netherlands Feb 65-Jan 66 Cncl CPIFA Ocy 64 Int'l Lsn Dir Nat Tu Cncl Jul 63	1964
Ma Mu-Ming	Spain Sep 76 -	Charge India Jun 74	1974
Kang Mao-Chao	Belgium May 78 - Luxembourg EEC Mission	Amb Mauritania Jan 75-Feb 78 Amb Kampuchea May 69-Aug 74 Charge Yugo Feb 62 MFA Feb 60 Dep Dir Info Dep Counselor Afgh Jul 56 Counselor Nepal Aug 55 Cult. Counselor India 53-55	1953
Wang Yung- Chien	Netherlands Oct 76 -		
Yu Pei-Men	Austria Sep 74 -	Amb Ethiopia May 71 Amb Sudan Jan 66-67 Geneva Del May 61 Dir Protocol Apr 58 Cncl mbr CIPFA Jul 55	1954
Ho Yang	Greece Aug 75		

TABLE II-6 (cont'd)

Ambassadors	Country	Preceding Jobs	Entered FS
Chin Chia-Lin	Denmark Aug 77 -	Dir Infor Dept MFA Aug 74-Dec 76 Dir Syria Jun 69-May 74 Dep Dir Info Dept MFA Dir Mar 65-67 Charge Brittain Jun 57- Oct 62	1957
Chang Tsan-Ming	Finland Sep 75 -		
Chin Li-Chen	Sweden Jul 74 -	Dir Consul Aff Jan 74 Amb Zambia Feb 65-Jun 72 Amb Norway Feb 62 Overseas Ch Comm Sep 59 Dep Dir Counselor Aff Oct 55- Feb 62	1950
Liu Shu-Ching	Norway May 77 -	Amb Poland Apr 72 -	
Chen Feng	Iceland Mar 78 -	Amb Burundi Apr 72-Nov 77 Amb Afghanistan Jun 65-May 67	1967
Wang Chuan-Pin	San Marino Apr 73 -		
Cheng Chih-Ping	Malta Jul 77 -	Ldg Mbr Head Off China Int'l Travel Suc Sep 72 Off Ldg Mbr Cht Suc Sep 72 Dep Dir Ist Asian Aff Oct 61 Counselor Burma Sep 55 Dep Dir Info Dept MFA May 54	1954
Wang Yu-Ping	USSR Aug 77 -	1st Amb Malaysia Jan 75 Amb Vietnam Jun 69-Aug 74 Amb Cuba Jan 64-67 Amb Cambodia Sep 58 - Feb 62 Amb Norway Dec 54 - Aug 52 Amb Romania Jul 50 - Nov 54	
Chou Chiu-Yeh	Yugoslavia Jul 78 -	Amb Australia Aug 76-May 78 VP CIPFA Jun 73 Ldg Mbr CPIFA May 71 Sec-Gen Apr 71 - Mar 67 Amb Congo Dir Asian Apr 62 Counselor Yugo Apr 55	1955

TABLE II-6 (cont'd)

Ambassadors	Country	Preceding Jobs	Entered FS
Li Tse-Wang	Poland Apr 77 -	Amb Hungary Mar 73 - Dec 76 Tanzania Charge Nov 71 Counselor Apr 72	1972
Li En-Chiu	Czech- oslovakia Jun 75 -	Up Ch-Rum Ldg Mbr Fr Assn CPAFFC Jul 63 - Jul 66 Aug 74 Jan 71 Up Aug 73 Dep Dir Treaty Charge & Law Dept MFA Romania Jun 61 Feb 55 Apr 52	1952
Liu Tieh-Sheng	Hungary May 77 -	Poland Counselor Apr 72 Charge Mar 73	1972
Li Teng-Chuan	Romania Aug 73	Respon person 71 Dep Dir 1972 Actg Dir Nov 72 Ldg mbr Dec 70 Soviet Union & E Europe Aff Dept Charge Albania Feb 67 Cnclr Albania May 69 - Dec 70	1967
Meng Yueh	Bulgaria Sep 75	Amb Mali Apr 70-Jul 75	
Liu Hsin-Chuan	Albania Sep 76	Amb USSR Nov 70-Jan 76 VMFA Asst MFA 64-May 70 Apr 64 (crit R. Guards Aug 66) May 61-Jul 63	1961

Sources: Radio Press, Inc., China Directory 1979, Tokyo, 1979, also 1977.
 Union Research Institute, Who's Who in Communist China, H.K. 1966.
 Institute of Int'l Relations, Rep. of China, Chinese Communist Who's Who, Taipei 1970, Vols. 1&II.
 Union Research Service, Biographical Service (70-73).
 CIA, Appearances & Activities of Leading Personalities of the PRC During 1977, (CR78-10279; Mar 78).
 Wolfgang Bartlet, Der Diplomatische Dienst der Volksrepublik China Nach der Kulturrevolution, Mit Heilungen
 Des Instituts Fur Asienkunde Nr.46: Hamburg, 72.
 Union Research Institute, Hierarchies of the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, 1975.

TABLE II-7

Personnel in PRC Missions Abroad

	<u>1953</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1978</u>
Number of Missions (1)	17	33	42	48	51	72	89	116
Average per Mission	9	11	10	12	9	8	11	11 (2)

Notes

1. List includes U.N. mission.
2. See Chart II-3 for source data and derivation of 2.2 multiplier used to compensate for staff personnel not listed in CIA Directory 1978.

TABLE II-8

Peking's Largest Missions


	<u>1973</u>	<u>1978</u>
Japan	29	50
U.N.	44	48
U.K.	20	36
U.S.	19	32
Canada	21	23
U.S.S.R.	34	22
Australia	n.a.	14

Notes

1. Sources: 1973 figures are from D.W. Klein, "The Chinese Foreign Ministry," p. 51, compiled from "U.S. government directories." 1978 figures are from CIA, Directory of the Officials of the PRC, November 1978.
2. Both sets of figures were compiled on the same basis, listing accredited diplomats down to the level of attache. For the U.S., this excluded 6 "officers" and 11 "staff members" in 1973, and 16 "officers" and 45 "staff members" in 1978.

Chart II-3

GROWTH OF MISSIONS AND MANNING ABROAD



Sources: For number of personnel abroad, D.W. Klein, "The Chinese Foreign Ministry," p. 50, for 1953-1973 data; for 1978 data, CIA Directory of Officials of the PRC, Nov. 1978.

Note 1: Although Klein cites "U.S. government directories" as his data source, it is not clear down to what "level" he is counting. The CIA lists 566 "accredited officials, plus specific staff totals for the UN and US. I have used these specific totals to derive a 2.2 multiplier for total 1978 overseas staffing.

TABLE II-9

Personnel in MFA and Abroad (1)

	<u>1953</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1978</u>
MFA Personnel in Peking (2)	32	54	76	75	25	56	72	77
Personnel in Missions Abroad	154	351	411	582	434	583	879	1245 (3)
Totals	186	405	487	657	459	639	951	1322

Notes

1. Sources: For 1953-1973, D. W. Klein, "The Chinese Foreign Ministry," p. 46. For 1978, CIA, Directory of Officials of the PRC, Nov 1978.
2. These figures constitute only the tip of the bureaucratic "iceberg," consisting of the minister, vice ministers, assistant ministers, special advisors to the MFA, and directors and deputy directors of various departments. Figures are not available for staff personnel at lower bureaus and divisions. In 1971 Ross Terrill was told the MFA had about a thousand people altogether including overseas personnel (800,000,000: The Real China, p. 230). Assuming the same supervisor-to-staff ratio in Peking was maintained during expansion, one can estimate an MFA total in Peking of about 1600 people in 1978 - a reasonable figure in light of the expansion of PRC's diplomatic activities.
3. For derivation of this 1978 estimate, see note 1 in chart II-3.

The impression held by North and others that the Foreign Ministry was heavily infiltrated by other government and party groups does not seem to be borne out by available data. Table II-10 reflects the known backgrounds of the current diplomatic list (based on data available on 94 of the 103 ambassadors). The number of lateral transfers from other bureaucracies is small, particularly when one considers that this survey spans careers, in some cases, ranging back 40 years. Most transfers occurred in the 1950's, when the Foreign Ministry was gearing up. Most ambassadors have come up from within the diplomatic service as career officers.

The turnover of ambassadors is partially reflected in Chart II-4, which shows the number of ambassadorial appointments by year. The surge in 1970-73 reflects in part the increase in number of missions to be filled, as well as the general reorganization in 1972. A similar surge in 1977 reflects the reorganization of that year. An interesting follow-on study would be to identify how many "retirements" during these reorganizations were associated with political purges.

E. DIPLOMATIC TRAINING

The training a diplomat has received depends largely upon when he entered the diplomatic service.

The top diplomats (Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiao-ping, Wang Ping-nan, etc.) received their basic training prior to the revolution, and in many cases overseas. Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-ping studied in Paris in the 1920's. Wang Ping-nan studied in Japan 1929-30. Chou P'ei-yuan, now vice president of the Chinese People's Institute for Foreign Affairs, went from Tsinghua University (1924-physics) to the University of Chicago (BS-1926; MS-1927) and California Institute of Technology (PhD-1928). Ch'iao Kuan-hua,

TABLE II-10

Experience Backgrounds of PRC Ambassadors


	<u>'75</u>	<u>'78</u>
VFM	5	3
Asst FM	2	1
Advisor FM	1	2
Ambassador	42	66
Charge	32	38
Counselor	37	49
Director MFA Dept	19	14
Dep Dir MFA Dept	25	31
Consular Official	6	6
UN Rep or Staff	1	3
Other FM Posns.	7	2
CPAFFC or Fr Assns (bilat.)	n.a.	7
CPIFA	n.a.	8
Military Affiliation:		
Line Officer	6	1
Political Officer	15	3
Party Official:		
CC CCP	2	?
Alt. CC CCP	1	?
Central Party Admin.	3	?
Prov. or Local Admin.	18	17
Youth League	3	2
Other gov't bur/ministry	n.a.	5
Intelligence/Newspaper/Propaganda work	7	7
Trade Unions	n.a.	4
Int'l Trade Promotion	n.a.	4
Military Attache	n.a.	1
Travel Service	n.a.	1
Academic	4	4
Data Base (individuals)	83	94

Sources: For 1975 data, Jan, "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Since the Cultural Revolution," Asian Survey, June 1977.

For 1978, see sources Table II-6.

Chart II-4

NUMBER OF AMBASSADORIAL APPOINTMENTS
BY YEAR



Sources: For 1949-1973, D. W. Klein, "The Chinese Foreign Ministry," p. 95.
For 1976-1978, CIA, Directory of Officials of the PRC, Nov. 1978.

Foreign Minister (1974-77) did graduate study in Germany. The number of foreign-educated diplomats, however, has been declining through retirements; there were no inputs after the Long March in the 1930's.

With the notable exception of Li Hsien-nien, who started as a carpenter's apprentice, a large percentage of the current top foreign policy experts have had some higher education within China, either before or after the revolution.

Huang Hua is a 1935 graduate of Yenching University; Huang Chen (now Minister of Culture, previously Peking's first envoy in Washington) is a graduate of Shanghai's Fine Arts Academy; Chi Peng-fei, (former Minister of Foreign Affairs (1972-74) and now the new director of the CCP International Liaison Department) is a graduate of a military medical college. Vice President Keng Piao (former head of the Liaison Department and a career diplomat) graduated from the Whamboa military academy.

As this "second generation" of in-country trained diplomats reaches the higher levels of the diplomatic service, one might expect a less cosmopolitan attitude emerging. This expectation has not proved true. The extended overseas tours of most of these diplomats has exposed them to foreign cultures and made many of them fairly fluent in Western languages. Both Huang Hua and Huang Chen are striking examples of highly cultured, forceful, and fluent diplomats. The success in training this generation who left China for the first time in the middle third of their careers must be laid to Chou En-lai, who energetically pushed to get his young new diplomats overseas at every opportunity in the 1950's and 1960's. Foreign diplomats at the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina and the 1961-62 Geneva Conference on Laos were surprised at the size of the Chinese delegations. In the latter, the Chinese brought 50 people,

almost ten times the average size of the other delegations. At the time it was suspected that the Chinese were attempting to make up for expertise in numbers, that they didn't trust each other in small groups, etc.¹⁰ In retrospect, it is clear that the junior delegates were receiving a valuable education in high-level diplomacy.

The third generation of diplomats received more formal training after the communists came to power in 1949. Almost as soon as the Foreign Ministry was formed, the Peking Institute of Foreign Languages was started. By the early 1950's it was graduating several dozen students a year, in a five-year program that offered English, German, Spanish, French, and (for the majority) Russian. By 1965, before being closed by the Cultural Revolution, it was enrolling yearly several thousand students. By the mid-1950's at least six other higher schools, including the Shanghai Foreign Language Institute, were offering a broad range of languages, including Polish and Czech. By the 1960's the Shanghai school had about 1,500 students, and English had become the most popular language, followed in order by French, Spanish, and Arabic.¹¹ The language institutes began recovering from the Cultural Revolution about 1971, and have been expanding ever since.

In addition to the language institutes, largely administered and taught by diplomatic and educational officials who included large doses of political indoctrination, several ancillary institutes and academies sprang up to support foreign ministry needs. Little is known about the non-language aspects of these schools' curricula.

In the mid-1950's the Chinese People's Institute for Foreign Affairs (CPIFA) came into being. Membership in the Institute seems to be the mark of acceptance for rising junior foreign service officers. The

leadership of the Institute has become filled with elderly, successful but semi-retired diplomats. On the surface, the Institute provides low-key diplomatic social functions in Peking, such as banquets for important but non-governmental (at least not in office) foreign visitors. It serves a useful function particularly in hosting out-of-office foreign politicians.¹² The high-caliber of its leadership would suggest that the Institute also serves as a think-tank for the Foreign Minister in areas of policy research, in the pattern that the Council of Foreign Relations in the U.S. provides jobs for retired American diplomats who continue to study diplomatic problems while maintaining an advisory role to the State Department. Chinese foreign service officers in mid-career are occasionally seconded to the Institute between other assignments.

In 1956 the Academy of Sciences established an International Relations Research Institute. Very little is known about this body, which has not survived. With the formation of the Academy of Social Sciences in July 1977, a body associated with Teng Hsiao-p'ing's push for the re-assertion of the intellectuals' role in Chinese society, several subordinate institutes have sprung up, clearly oriented towards re-establishing professionalism in areas allied with diplomacy. Three history (ancient, modern, world) institutes, an institute for foreign literature, a trade and commerce institute, a world economy institute, and a world religion institute have appeared so far. All these institutes will require close contacts with the outside world, and should provide the government, and particularly the foreign ministry, with specialists of a kind not hitherto available.

A new, unidentified institute within the Academy of Social Sciences was also formed, which Teng Hsiao-ping is using to draft key policy documents, according to Professor Harry Harding of Stanford, who talked with

foreign ministry officials in Peking about it. The most complete statement on China's foreign policy, "Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism Leninism," of November 1977 (in an unusual 30-page feature in Peking Review), was reportedly drafted by this group. The new body sounds very much like the old U.S. State Department Policy Research Committee, reflecting in China's case a move towards greater bureaucratic sophistication. In Mao's time, foreign policy speeches that he delivered were usually written by Huang Chen and Ch'iao Kuan-hua.¹³ Chou En-lai apparently wrote his own. This new body, under the Academy of Social Sciences headed by Hu Chiao-mu, one of Teng's closest political supporters, appears to be a political animal designed to get around the "unliberated" thinking in the foreign ministry. In time, however, it will probably meld into the foreign ministry as it taps the brighter middle-level foreign service officers for joint projects.

A fourth generation of foreign service officers is about to appear as China embarks on a massive overseas education program. Although the first wave of these students are largely oriented towards the technical sciences in support of the modernization program, it can be expected that the social sciences will share as they did in China's internal educational reform movement. The value of overseas study for language training and cultural orientation of fledgling diplomats is not likely to be lost. Presently, the foreign language institutes are falling far behind the requirements for graduates. Besides the foreign ministry, virtually every other ministry and bureau is clamoring for language specialists to help translate the flood of foreign journals and technology pouring into China. It appears that even the China Travel and Tourism Bureau has a higher priority than the foreign ministry; the foreign ministry gets the third "draft" of language school graduates.

F. THE DISTAFF DIPLOMATS - A HIDDEN EQUATION

Certainly one of the least investigated but a potentially highly significant area of Chinese politics is the role played by wives. Few loom as high on the political horizon as Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, once did, but they are to be found from top to bottom of the bureaucracy, usually in key staff sections, quietly looking out for their husband's political flanks.

Teng's wife, Cho Lin, has become active diplomatically since 1978, appearing at public receptions with her husband and accompanying him abroad. She also holds a sensitive post in the CCP's Military Advisory Commission, where she reportedly keeps watch on security matters for her husband.¹⁴ Hua's wife, Han Chih-chun, still seems to be adjusting to the change from being a provincial official's spouse to being the premier's wife. She almost never appears in public, and holds a relatively obscure job as chief of the political section of the state-run Light Industrial Products Import and Export Corporation.¹⁵

Within the Foreign Ministry wives have traditionally shared the overseas duties, a necessity given the policy of near self-sufficiency of Chinese embassies. Wives appear on diplomatic rosters as counselors and secretaries although none have so far been able to parlay that experience into an ambassadorship; no woman has yet been named an ambassador. Chou En-lai's widow, Teng Ying-chao, has been elevated to a vice premiership and given mainly diplomatic duties, but her position exists outside the Foreign Ministry structure.

Little is known about Huang Hua's wife. She has become active in the general trend (since 1978) of wives participating in diplomatic social functions and travelling with their husbands. Two long-time stalwarts of

the Foreign Ministry, former Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua and former Vice Foreign Minister Chan Han-fu were married to sisters, which may have facilitated their rise together. First Vice Foreign Minister Han Nien-lung's wife, Wang Chen, is a deputy director of the Information Department, believed to be the processing center for intelligence within the Foreign Ministry (see Chapter III).

With wives becoming more accessible on the diplomatic circuit, it should be possible to identify more husband-wife bureaucratic linkages, and to analyze their roles. In any foreign service, the "wives' grapevines" have a significant impact on their husband's career. In a bureaucracy where the wives are also able to occupy key positions, their influence must be even greater.


G. SUMMARY

The PRC Foreign Ministry has proven to be one of the more durable government institutions. The Ministry has grown rapidly over the years, but still has managed to maintain institutional integrity through a strong esprit de corps and by promotions within its own ranks to top jobs. The willingness of its diplomats in many cases to spend virtually their whole careers overseas in chain-postings has meant that the heads of mission have remained a seasoned group despite the proliferation of missions.

The Foreign Ministry has limited itself to a coordination rather than a decision-making role (see Chart II-5), which has meant that the Politburo and State Council have had to share a relatively large role in the foreign affairs decision-making process. The relationship has given the decision-making elite a buffer against foreign probing, and has also enabled the Foreign Ministry to keep clear of the frequently cutthroat politicking of the high-level decision-making arena.

Chart II-5

FOREIGN MINISTRY FLOW CHART



(Source: Author's compilation from numerous sources and observed behavior)

With the rapid expansion of contacts with the West over the past two years, it seems likely that the State Council's Office of Foreign Affairs may be resurrected to focus the higher volume of decision-making required. If this were to happen, the Director of the Office would most likely be either Li Hsien-nien, Keng Piao, or Chi Peng-fei.

NOTES

1. George P. Jan, "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Since the Cultural Revolution," Asian Survey, June 1977, p. 514.
2. Donald W. Klein, "The Chinese Foreign Ministry," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1974.
3. Ross Terrill, 800,000,000: The Real China, (New York: Dell Publishing, 1971), p. 228.
4. Roger L. Dial, "Defense of Diplomatic Functions and Ideals During the Cultural Revolution: The Nepal Case," in Chün-tu Hsüeh, ed., Dimensions of China's Foreign Relations, (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 256-276.
5. Jan, op. cit., pp. 516-517.
6. Wang was actually promoted in late 1976, just prior to the shifts in 1977.
7. Ts'ao died on 5 December 1978 at the age of 61. His replacement had not been announced at the time this study was being prepared.
8. See Robert C. North, The Foreign Relations of China, 3rd edition, (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1978), p. 27; and Jan, op. cit., p. 524.
9. Jan, op. cit., p. 524.
10. Arthur Lall, How Communist China Negotiates, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 1-8.
11. Diana Lary, "Teaching English in China," The China Quarterly, October-December 1968, pp. 1-10, as quoted in Klein, op. cit., p. 150.
12. Chinese diplomacy has been very careful to maintain ties with "old" and "new" friends. The hospitality shown to Nixon, Schlesinger, and Kissinger on visits after their retirements from government service, as well as Teng's going out of his way on overseas trips to meet with former Prime Minister Tanaka and ex-President Nixon, reflect interest in keeping up ties with "old friends," who might, after all, return to power. Teng's own experiences in coming back from political disgrace probably explain this behavior. The Chinese also court rising new politicians not yet in power, but with good changes of being so in the future, as repeated invitations to Senators Kennedy and Jackson, and Margaret Thatcher before her election, attest.
13. Lucian W. Pye, Mao Tsetung: The Man in the Leader, (New York: Basic Books, 1976), p. 248.
14. Time, 12 February 1979, p. 14.
15. Washington Post, 4 October 1978, p. A19.

III. CHINA'S WINDOWS ON THE WORLD

III. CHINA'S WINDOWS ON THE WORLD

A. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

How do China's foreign policymakers look out on the world? How is information that forms their world view collected, assimilated, and disseminated? Peking has several "windows" through which it peers to collect its information requirements. These can be summarized as follow:

- (1) news on the world situation (opportunities and policy feedback)
- (2) military intelligence requirements
- (3) foreign technology requirements for modernization

B. WORLD SITUATION

The bulk of information on the outside world that comes to Chinese leaders is coordinated by Hsinhua, the New China News Agency (NCNA), in three kinds of publications: Reference News ("Ts'an-k'ao Hsiao-hsi"); a similar but highly classified version called Reference Materials ("Ts'an Kao Tsu Liao"), which is restricted to the top leadership; and the Bulletin of Activities of the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army. NCNA monitors over 40 stations of 30 news services around the world (including AP, UPI, Reuters, AFP, TASS, etc.), totalling about 300,000 words and 281 hours daily in radioteletype.¹ Those portions of the translations harmonious with official policies get included in the domestic press, such as People's Daily. Policymakers with access to Reference News or its secret counterpart, Reference Materials; however, get a much broader coverage, including sensitive information such as the Watergate scandal, details of the Allende coup in Chile, etc., which were not reported in the mass press.² Henry Schwarz, who did a detailed analysis of the few Reference News copies available in the West, found that

83 percent of the information in Reference News came from non-communist sources, whereas 97 percent of information in the open press came from communist sources.³ Sixty percent of the wire service news in Reference News came from four world services -- Reuters, AP, UPI, Agence France Press (AFP) -- although local and regional services (such as Kyodo in Japan and Indian services) were also cited.⁴ Schwarz estimates that Reference News began publication around November 1956; one wonders whether Chou's enthusiasm over the success of his new Bandung policies had a part in its inception. Its circulation has increased enormously over the years, from a few thousand in 1957 to 9 million or more today. Apparently Mao had pushed to declassify the paper, but wasn't able to get his way until the Cultural Revolution, when he was said to have resolved "that such 'elitism in information' was contrary to Communist practice."⁵ Recent visitors to China have reported seeing shopkeepers, elevator operators, and people in parks reading it openly. It is available in the offices of production brigades, though not permitted out of the room.⁶ It is not directly available to foreigners. With its declassification and broader dissemination within China, however, it has lost some of its earlier breadth of reporting and commentary.

The other version, Reference Materials remains classified. Indirect references to it suggest that it has remained highly objective, with little if any ideological filtering. It is this publication that Politburo members, Foreign Ministry officials, and foreign affairs institutes (including diplomats in training) depend upon.

The secret PLA Bulletin of Activities became known when the U.S. government released several copies in the mid-1960's. At a time when Western military strength was publicly underplayed, the Bulletin was

frank and detailed about Western power, and relatively free of heavy-handed ideological jargon. Its circulation at the time was limited to commanders and political commissars at the regimental level and above. Other bureaucracies also appear to have counterparts to Reference Materials.⁷ These classified news summaries have not been available in the West, but it is clear that all of China's top officials are well versed in current affairs, including details within their own specialties.

The New China News Agency itself is an interesting cog in China's foreign affairs structure. Besides monitoring foreign broadcasts and news services, it fields a network of over 57 foreign bureaus and offices,⁸ in addition to a vast internal media system, which reaches down to village newspapers. A typical overseas NCNA office, such as the one that opened in Lisbon in March 1978, has an office head and 6-10 staff journalists.⁹ In some cases the offices and bureaus operate within PRC embassies, in other cases separately.

The agency's main office in Peking is virtually a self-contained community. Besides gathering and processing domestic and foreign news, it houses a foreign languages school, a childcare center, a kindergarten, and an infirmary for its 2,000 or so employees.¹⁰ This self-sufficiency is not unusual in Chinese enterprises, yet it does enhance the security of its operations.

There has been a long history of personnel interchanges between China's foreign policy bureaucracy and NCNA. Two foreign ministers, Ch'iao Kuan-hua (1974-76) and Huang Hua (1976-present), entered the Foreign Ministry after NCNA tours in Hong Kong and Chungking, respectively, just prior to independence. Ch'iao continued his journalistic career after becoming a diplomat, by writing world affairs articles for

Red Flag, the Party ideological monthly, under the pseudonym Yu Chao-li.¹¹

A current vice minister of foreign affairs, Wang Shu, came from the editorship of the same journal, serving from February 1977 until mid-1978. As a NCNA bureau chief in the early 1970's in Bonn, Wang was instrumental in negotiating the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and West Germany, later becoming Peking's ambassador. As another instance of overlap, four of the six directors and deputy directors and deputy directors of NCNA before the Cultural Revolution held concurrent positions on major "friendship associations" with foreign countries.¹²

C. CHINA'S INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

There is no satisfactory analysis of China's intelligence apparatus, although speculation based on scanty information abounds.¹³ It is not even clear what individual, or institution, coordinates national-level intelligence. From the 1930's until his death in December 1975, K'ang Sheng appeared to be more or less the director of central intelligence operations, which were mainly oriented towards liaison activities -- support for revolutionary parties -- and internal security. The intelligence structure prior to the Cultural Revolution was similar to that in the Soviet Union, where K'ang had studied security practices from 1933 to 1936.¹⁴

Under K'ang the system appeared to have four parts: 1) the Social Affairs Department of the CCP Central Committee (roughly analogous to the KGB); 2) the PLA security groups (the GRU-like military secret police, the Political Department of the General Staff, and the Foreign Affairs Division, which supervised the military attaches); 3) the Ministry of Public Security; and 4) the Foreign Intelligence Department of the Foreign Ministry, whose agents reportedly operated, like those of most other nations, through

embassies, legations, the NCNA, overseas Chinese, etc. The Social Affairs Department, with an estimated 25,000 employees, was thought to dominate the other services until it "disappeared" during the Cultural Revolution. Apparently its functions were divided into two current bodies under the Central Committee, the International Liaison Department, nominally in charge of relations with other communist parties, including insurgent groups, and the General Office, which combines the functions of the CCP CC Secretariat (which also "disappeared" during the Cultural Revolution) with those of political intelligence.

The Liaison Department was recently taken over the Chi Peng-fei, who had previously been general secretary of the Standing Committee of the NPC, and before that, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1972-1974). Chi has a long career of overseas postings. From 1971 through early 1979 the department was headed by Keng Piao, another long-time diplomat, who is now a vice premier and Politburo member. As China's foreign policy goals shifted from inciting Marxist revolutions in the 1960's -- a policy that backfired in Africa -- towards enhancing state-to-state relations in the Third World in the 1970's, the Liaison Department's functions have expanded into the diplomatic levels of united front activities, as differentiated from the mass organization, non-government-oriented activities of the Central Committee's United Front Department, under another Politburo member, Ulanfu.

Keng Piao travelled extensively in his last year in the Liaison Department job, more than any other senior Chinese official, covering four continents, visiting North Korea, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Trinidad, Tobago, Jamaica, Guyana, Malta, Algeria, Mali, Ghana, Rwanda, Nigeria, and Somalia. His Peking appearances in 1978 included the usual visits by

pro-Peking Marxist-Leninist splinter parties around the world, but he also hosted important visitors from key non-communist countries, such as Zaire, Mauritania, Mozambique, Singapore, Japan, Chad, Thailand, Burma, and the U.S. His replacement, Chi Peng-fei, started out with a multi-stop tour through West Africa prior to assuming the job.¹⁵ It would appear that the Liaison Department is expanding its role into non-communist area intelligence, at the probable cost of the General Office.

The General Office of the CCP Central Committee is located inside the leadership enclave, known as Chungnanhai, which forms the western section of the Forbidden City. The General Office appears to have been put together during the Cultural Revolution by Mao and his one-time (pre-1949) bodyguard Wang Tung-hsing. The functions of the CC Secretariat (run for a decade prior to the Cultural Revolution by Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who was purged with many of his secretariat staff members for opposing Mao during the Cultural Revolution), and the Social Affairs Department (the CIA equivalent up to that time)¹⁶ were merged into the General Office under Wang, who was then charged in December 1965 by Mao: "Tight control of confidential matters and security work are most important. Make sure the party's secrets are well protected against exploitation..."¹⁷ Wang apparently supervised both foreign and domestic intelligence.¹⁸ Bypassing the Ministry of Public Security (which reported to the State Council under Premier Chou En-lai, who tended to be a brake on Mao's Cultural Revolution goals), Mao had Wang organize his old security command, PLA Unit 8341 (the so-called "Peking Palace Guard" responsible for CC members' security) so that it contained at least one reliable member from each province. Mao would then send these men out from time to time to quietly get him first-hand information on such things as the actual execution of Mao's agricultural

policies.¹⁹ Since Mao's death, this close association with Mao has hurt Wang despite his key role in arresting the Gang of Four in October 1976, thereby ensuring victory of the moderate faction under Hua.²⁰ Since November 1978 Wang appears to have been eased out of effective control over his intelligence and security posts, including the General Office, which reportedly has been taken over by Yao I-lin, due to Wang's opposition to Teng's de-Maoification programs. It is too early to be certain, but it appears that Teng may be again separating the secretariat and security functions to break up Wang's power base and get the system back to the way he ran it as secretary general of the party from 1956-1966. Internal party discipline has been assigned to a new CCP Discipline Commission, headed by Vice Chairman Ch'en Yung, a cohort of Teng's, who suffered the same purges by the radicals in the past. Keng Piao may be moving into a cross-institutional role as foreign intelligence coordinator, overseeing the separate activities of intelligence groups in the Liaison Department, Foreign Ministry, and the PLA. His seniority, broad international experience, and Politburo status would fit him for such a role, for which there is a clear need. It would also mirror the trend toward consolidation of institutional functions, exemplified by Ch'en Yun's new Finance and Trade Commission, which has made him economic czar over half a dozen ministries.

D. FIELD INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

With most countries, it is possible to reconstruct the central intelligence structure from analysis of its field activities. The sparse data available on Chinese clandestine activities offers little help in this regard, although a general pattern is emerging.

Since 1970, there have been only three publicized cases of Chinese agents being caught at clandestine activities. This incredibly low profile -- compared with the CIA and KGB -- is in part because the Chinese have been able to meet most of their needs, nearly saturating their translation capabilities, through open sources. Overt collection will be dealt with in later sections.

The most recent "hand-in-the-cookie-jar" case occurred in Japan in June 1978, when Tokyo police arrested a spy ring that had been funneling "thousands" of "sensitive documents" from the Defense Agency, the Nippon (national) Telephone and Telecommunications Company, and the transport and trade ministries to China through two overseas Chinese bookstores in Tokyo. The documents were restructured in dissemination to senior officials, and some dealt with missile research and troop movements. The case broke into the open when the court sentences (two years) were announced just prior to the signing of the Peace and Friendship Treaty in July, which may explain Japanese attempts to downplay the incident by describing such documents as unclassified. The spy ring had been operating about ten years.²¹

The second case surfaced in 1975 when Canada expelled Kuo Ching-an, a press attache in the Chinese embassy in Ottawa, for activities "incompatible" with his diplomatic work. The government-owned Canadian Broadcasting Company later revealed that Kuo had been making weekly trips between Ottawa and Washington, to pick up military and defense secrets for transmission to Peking. The Chinese apparently were reluctant to use their Legation Office in Washington, for fear of souring chances for normalizing relations. Equally reluctant to cause direct embarrassment, the F.B.I., who had been watching Kuo's regular trips, elected to pass the information on to their Canadian counterparts for action.²²

The third case occurred in 1974, when the Soviets expelled a low-level Chinese attache (type not revealed), in retaliation for an earlier arrest and expulsion of three Soviet diplomats and two of their wives. The Soviets charged that the attache, Kuan Heng-kuang, had been caught with espionage material while making contact with a Chinese-born Soviet agent in Irkutsk. Kuan was arrested on his way home to China after a six-year tour in Moscow. The Soviets provided no particulars of his alleged activities, although the Chinese published lurid accounts of the Soviet diplomats' liaisons.²³

The record is a lot fuller in the 1960's, when China actively sought to incite revolutions. NCNA correspondents were frequently expelled for active contacts with such movements. The following illustrative cases are drawn from Alan Liu's study of the NCNA in 1972.²⁴

Kao Ling, one of NCNA's more colorful correspondents, was recruited in 1957 and sent out as a correspondent to New Delhi in 1960. The Indian government expelled him the same year for gross interference in its internal affairs, and closed down the NCNA bureau in New Delhi shortly after his departure. Kao showed up the following year in Dar es Salaam, where he built up contacts with refugees and revolutionaries from South Africa, Nyasaland, and Rhodesia, as well as exiled African nationalist leaders in Tanzania. He travelled extensively in East Africa. Colin Legum in 1964 described Kao as the "key figure... who carried out the exploratory probes for Ho Ying" (then ambassador to Dar es Salaam; now a vice foreign minister) and "acted as a go-between for the diplomats and their African contacts."²⁵ Later he was reported to have taught at a school in Djove, Congo-Brazzaville, where he instructed members of the Youth Section of the National Revolutionary Movement in military techniques. He went on to a

tour in the U.N., where he continued to make use of his contacts with SWAPO and other liberation groups. He is now a counselor in the Chinese embassy in Lagos, Nigeria.

In 1964 two NCNA journalists in Brazil, Wang Wei-chen, a journalist of some 20 years experience, and his young interpreter-assistant, Chu Ching-tung, were arrested by the military junta on charges of scheming with Brazilian leftists to stage a communist revolution. Both had been in Rio since 1961.

In 1968 the Ethiopian government expelled NCNA correspondent Li Yeh-tseng and his wife, who had worked in the Mideast area since 1958. In the same year the Senegal government expelled NCNA correspondent Wang Yu-chang on charges of meddling in student demonstration.

NCNA reporters in Latin America are reported to have passed money to groups having pro-Chinese orientation, particularly newspaper and magazines that were financially weak.

Liu notes that NCNA correspondents abroad seldom mingle with reporters from other countries, being known as "remote and cloistered." They are seldom given a byline. A NCNA teletype operator who defected in Cairo has stated that the CCP usually plants a loyal cadre, sometimes under the title of "photographer," who is charged with surveillance over other members of the bureau or office.

The same defector also recounted an interesting incident between the Chinese ambassador in Cairo and the NCNA bureau chief there in 1959. NCNA's head office in Peking wanted its Cairo bureau to run a piece which could only worsen the ambassador's already strained relations with Nasser. At first the ambassador snapped, "I am the ambassador to Cairo, not your proofreader. Whether NCNA can survive in Cairo is none of my

business."²⁶ He later killed the piece. The quote suggests that the NCNA's activities were not fully answerable to the Foreign Ministry as, for example, the U.S. Information Agency is to U.S. ambassadors. The point is not certain, however. Several scholars believe the NCNA's intelligence functions are directed by the Foreign Ministry through its Information Department. George Jan, in his 1977 study of the Foreign Ministry, believes that the ministry's Department of Intelligence had its name changed to Department of Information in 1954 to euphemize its title.²⁷ According to a diplomat recently serving in Peking, the Information Department today does fulfill routine public affairs functions. But apart from the Ottawa press attache expelled in 1975, there is nothing substantive to connect the Foreign Ministry's Information Department with covert intelligence activities in the past few years. Yet one looks in vain on the Foreign Ministry's organization chart for any other department that could serve the necessary in-house function of coordinating the ministry's foreign intelligence requirements. When one considers Peking's diplomatic intelligence needs, it is probably fair to say that the majority of them can be met through normal news channels. NCNA interviews with key government or opposition figures enable the Peking leadership to probe attitudes and interests as they affect China. In that sense, as Liu points out, NCNA correspondents can be considered "Peking's intelligence officers."²⁸

F. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

The foreign affairs bureaucracy has a limited overlap of interests with the Ministry of Defense bureaucracy. Apart from the purchase of British Rolls Royce fighter engines and some French helicopters in early

1970's, the PLA did not begin to send high-level delegations to the West for modern weapons on a regular basis until late 1977. Since then it has held frequent talks with NATO countries over prospective arms purchases, trying to soak up as much modern military technology as possible in the bargaining sessions. PLA observers even accepted an invitation to observe NATO maneuvers. The prospect of China's obtaining sophisticated modern weaponry has sparked warnings from Soviet President Brezhnev of the "heavy consequences" of proceeding with the deals.²⁹ Only West Germany has failed to rebut the veiled threats, however. An Italian electronics executive has complained, on the other hand, of Chinese arm-twisting:

"The Chinese have made clear to us that nations that sell arms to them will get preference in commercial deals. Privately, they put it more bluntly - no arms, no business."³⁰

Since Washington refuses to sell China arms, Peking must operate gingerly in a diplomatic environment where COCOM restrictions could close off direct access to military technology. Even some "civilian" sales, such as computers, infra-red devices, avionics, etc., could have enormous military spin-offs. A Japanese sale of co-production facilities for large integrated-circuit (LCI) televisions has caused some concern, as has a proposed sale of a French reactor similar in design to reactors used in U.S. nuclear submarines.³¹ Huang Hua, Fang I, Ku Mu, Li Chaing, and other senior officials have toured European capitals at critical stages of arms talks.³² Chinese diplomats are also using Third World contacts to absorb technology indirectly, such as Soviet MiG-23's from Egypt and Libya.³³

F. MILITARY ATTACHE SYSTEM

The Foreign Ministry has also opened the way for the PLA's General Staff's Foreign Affairs Division to send increasing numbers of military attaches overseas in Chinese embassies (see chart III-1). At end 1978, China had 60

military attaches and 25 assistant military attaches posted in 49 countries and with the U.N. Military Affairs Committee, out of a total of 116 countries with which diplomatic relations had been established. These attaches were distributed as follows:


<u>Area</u>	<u>Military Attaches</u>	<u>Assistant Military Attaches</u>
Africa	6	1
Asia	22	7
Western Europe	13	7
Eastern Europe	11	7
North America	3	1
Latin America	2	1
U.N.	3	1
TOTALS	60	25

(Source: CIA, Directory of Officials of the People's Republic of China, November 1978)

Although several countries had several full military attaches (the USSR has four), only in the U.N. are naval and air attaches (one each) identified as such. Donald Klein found in 1974 that the trend was for most attaches to serve only a single tour, a practice common to most countries. Those few who had repeat tours tended to serve in the same geographic area, a pattern a typical for the diplomatic community as a whole. Only rarely did a military attache switch careers to the foreign service.³⁴

Practically nothing is known about the training and activities of these attaches. They host receptions on PLA's anniversary, participate in the routine attache social functions in their respective capitals, and presumably run low-key collection programs in the common international practice. Until recently they have been relatively junior officers;

Chart III-1
MILITARY ATTACHES ABROAD



(Sources: Klein, "The Chinese Foreign Ministry," pp. 144-
CIA, PRC Directory of Officials of PRC, Nov 78)

Note: Data not acquired 1974-77

prior to the abolition of ranks in the PLA they ranged from majors to colonels, except in the Soviet Union, where general officers were sent. The incumbent senior attache in Rome, however, has been identified as a major general. Whether seniority is creeping into the attache system may become clearer if the PLA reintroduces an overt rank structure, which they reportedly are considering. The rapid increase in assistant military attaches suggests that the PLA is taking advantage of the opportunity to get bright junior officers abroad, where they can be exposed to advanced military technology, gain language experience, and acquire a broader understanding of the world. Given the implicit certification of loyalty that comes with selection for overseas duty, these young officers are likely to rise quickly through the higher ranks and have a marked impression on PLA doctrine and development.

G. HIGH-LEVEL VISITORS

The Chinese foreign affairs establishment also makes good use of a steady flow of high-level foreign visitors, official and unofficial, to glean strategic information. Stanley Karnow has reported that U.S. Presidential advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski shared sections of a top secret strategic assessment of the Soviet Union (Presidential Review Memorandum - 10) with Vice Premier Teng during their talks on the world situation in May 1978.³⁵ British Chief of Staff Neil Cameron reportedly had equally frank talks about the Soviet military. Retired Japanese generals and admirals have visited China several times, and Tokyo has kept Peking informed about Soviet fleet movements out of the Sea of Japan at critical times, such as prior to the February 1979 Sino-Vietnamese war. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin warned Secretary of State Vance in January 1979 that the release of satellite imagery of Soviet defenses in Asia to China

could gravely imperil relations in general and SALT II in particular, after it became known that LANDSAT-3 photos of the Soviet Union had been sold earlier to an outlet in Hong Kong representing the PRC.³⁶ Bonn was also embarrassed in late 1978 when it became public knowledge that its intelligence agency had sold uranium to China.³⁷ The multi-dimensional relationships between Chinese and foreign bureaucracies that open up after visits by senior officials are perhaps the best indicator of the Foreign Ministry's symbiotic role with military intelligence.

H. ACQUISITION OF FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY

From dynastic times, Chinese leaders have been distrustful of foreign influences on their society. In communist China, this distrust has been a political tool of radical factions seeking to suture off foreign entanglements and dependencies, relying instead upon revolutionary fervor to keep China safe and progressive. The autarky of the Cultural Revolution, when outside economic and diplomatic contacts bottomed out, left a legacy that any leader who sought to open China to baser outside influences must, by definition, be a revisionist. Since being a revisionist was, in Mao's words, tantamount to being a "monster and a demon," -- therefore a plague to be stamped out -- most Chinese leaders seeking moderate reforms avoided this particular minefield. It was only after Lin Piao died and his followers had been purged at the 10th Party Congress that Chou En-lau had enough political clout to raise the issue of again "making foreign things serve China." He managed to expand trade in the early 1970s with the West, including the purchase of Rolls Royce Spey fighter engines, Trident jets, and French helicopters for the PLA, as well as 8 major chemical fertilizer factories from the U.S. for China's hard-pressed farms. Chou's declining health and newly rehabilitated Teng Hsiao-p'ing's increasing

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
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
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NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART

problems with the Gang of Four caused a backing away from foreign contacts in 1975. It was not until Mao's death and Teng's third rehabilitation in July 1977 that the issue was again raised, this time with growing momentum, that foreign technology was vital if China were to achieve the Four Modernizations by the end of the century. In 1978, over 90 top Chinese leaders and over 30 provincial leaders left China to visit foreign countries.³⁸ For many of them, including Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, it was their first trip outside China. This record hejira was almost certainly promoted by Teng who, according to diplomatic sources in Peking,³⁹ was pushing political elites overseas to see first-hand how far behind the rest of the world China had lapsed.

The campaign to acquire foreign technology was organized by Vice Premier Fang I, minister-in-charge of the State Scientific and Technical Commission of the State Council. He had the Academy of Sciences methodically research China's needs, establish priorities, and draw up a shopping list. They picked 27 subjects from basic science, production, and other fields, and chose 108 items out of those areas. They then selected eight critical items out of the larger list. These top items were agricultural, raw materials, energy resources, computer, lasers, space science, high-energy physics, and genetic engineering.⁴⁰

With this list approved, Fang I and the State Council began to explore ways of meeting the requirements. At this point, in 1978, procedures were considerably less methodical. Goals were announced, such as sending 10,000 students overseas, and expectations raised, such that local factories began to negotiate directly for advanced-technology whole-plant imports, which were far beyond China's resources. It was not until late 1978 - early 1979 that something approaching rational centralized coordination

began to emerge. Throughout the earlier chaos, the Foreign Ministry stood by like an overloaded switchboard, trying to sort out the confusion between eager Chinese bureaucrats and the equally eager foreigners. The nadir came in March 1979 when the Foreign Ministry was trying to soothe strained relations with Japan over China's attack on Vietnam. The State Planning Commission, apparently on orders from new finance czar Ch'en Yun, froze negotiations worth \$2.5 billion that Japan thought were already signed and committed.⁴¹ After a late March working conference sorted out the chaos, Vice Premier Teng Ying-chao (Chou En-lai's popular widow and an increasingly important Politburo figure in foreign relations) was sent to Japan in April to pick up the pieces and reassure the Japanese that commitments would be met, albeit on a differently prioritized production schedule.⁴²

I. STUDENT OVERSEAS STUDY

The plan to send 10,000 students overseas to study quickly fell apart when attempts were made to implement it. In late 1978 the Ministry of Education and the Foreign Ministry were frantically making whatever arrangements were possible, which ended up being about 3,000 students for 1979, a high percentage of them starting study overseas with the host country's language. The expected enrollments for 1979 by country were as follow:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Number Students</u>
USA	500-700
Canada	200-500
France	460
Japan	425
U.K.	250
West Germany	50
Austria	50-100

Australia	83
Italy	80
Switzerland	50-100
Norway	50
Netherlands	50
Sweden	40
Denmark	20
Yugoslavia	20
Romania	(still under negotiations)

(Source: Japan Times, 26 December 1978)

These students' areas of study were as indicated in Table III-1.

The Chinese were unprepared for the complexities of paperwork required by foreign universities and governments. They were also apparently appalled at some of the costs, particularly in France.⁴³ The paperwork had to be done in foreign languages, and the Ministry of Education had to examine candidates' linguistic proficiencies (a major problem, given the geographic spread of applicants in China) to provide the Foreign Ministry with its overseas language training requirements. The crucial importance of getting a new generation of scholars competent by world standards, after losing a whole generation from 1966-1978, was clear to all, if China were to absorb and use the expensive technology hardware being purchased. The Foreign Ministry acted as the conduit for these increasing exchanges.

J. SCHOLARLY EXCHANGES

As the barriers to the West were dropped in 1972, with the U.S., Japan, and several NATO countries giving up their PRC-isolation policies, Peking found that the advanced countries of the West were curious about what had

TABLE III-1

Initial Chinese Students to U.S.:
Fields of Interest 1978-79

Mathematics	30
Physics	58
Chemistry	30
Mechanics	10
Material Sciences & Technology	15
Astronomy & Astro-Physics	6
Meteorology	7
Life Science	25
Medical Sciences	29
Radioelectronics	50
Computer Science & Engineering	45
Control Engineering	15
Aeronautical Engineering	15
Space Technology	15
Nuclear Engineering	10
Construction Technology	10
Mechanical Engineering	8
Metallurgical Engineering	10
Chemical Engineering	10
Agricultural Sciences	11
Other Subjects	<u>24</u>
	433

Source: Committee on Scholarly Exchange with the People's Republic of China

been happening in the arts, sciences, and humanities in China over the preceding 25 years. First from Japan, and then increasingly from the U.S., scholars in every field from seismology to infant-care flocked to China. Almost as quickly, exchange visits were arranged, principally by the Committee for Scholarly Exchange with China, and the National Arts, Sciences, and Humanities Foundations. Chinese scientists began to tour and talk with American specialists at leading universities and such places as the Houston Space Center, major electronics laboratories, and huge agribusiness centers. The flood of American specialists to China was coordinated by the China Tourist Service through the overseas embassies and the appropriate host agencies in China. The foreign scholars not only paid their own expenses, in most cases, to visit China but also facilitated upon their return the subsidization of reciprocal visits to the U.S. by Chinese scholars through American professional organizations. By mid-1979, according to the State Department, about 30 Chinese groups a month were visiting the U.S., more than four times the rate in 1978. The pace of exchanges occasionally got ahead of monitoring by high-level officials on both sides. When Vice Premier K'ang Shin-en, who also heads the State Economic Commission, visited Treasury Secretary Blumenthal in Washington, they enthusiastically hit upon the idea of American assistance in recovering additional oil from China's existing oilfields, only to find that a special Chinese delegation was already in the U.S. on that mission.⁴⁴

Even tourists provide China with a significant flow of valuable expertise, even though its influx is relatively unguided. In many cases, foreign tourists are given opportunities to meet with Chinese from their own occupations during the prescribed tours. Whether farmer-to-farmer, mechanic-to-mechanic, or whatever, useful information is passed along.

The China Travel and Tourism Bureau reported that in 1978 more than 100,000 foreigners and 400,000 overseas Chinese "compatriots" visited the PRC.⁴⁵

The Chinese have not overlooked the opportunity to siphon off advanced and intermediate technology from less advanced countries. By 1977 China had signed economic and technical exchange agreements with over 60 countries, including many in the Third World. A Chinese broadcast to Southeast Asia in February 1978 pointed out, "China's activities in promoting the exchange of scientific and technical knowledge with all friendly nations in the world have become more vigorous than ever. China has signed agreements for scientific and technical cooperation or has established such relations with many countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe. The events of the past few years prove that although various countries have their strong points in the field of science and technology, they must learn from each other. Based on the requirements for developing out national economy and in line with the principle of maintaining independence, keeping the initiative in our own hands, relying on our own efforts and following the policy of making foreign things serve China, various visiting groups were sent out from China in 1977 to observe advanced techniques in foreign countries in the fields of petroleum, chemical engineering, coal mining, metallurgy, architecture, railway transport, electronics, aeronautics, and shipbuilding. These groups gained experiences which can be used in the development of industrial and agricultural production in China."⁴⁶

K. MAIL ORDER TECHNOLOGY

In addition to coordinating scholarly exchanges, the overseas Chinese embassies have also collected and sent back to China an enormous volume of technical literature in the public domain. The program to buy large

numbers of unclassified technical journals and books in the U.S. began with a low profile, with sympathetic Chinese-Americans sending them to Guozi Shudian (International Bookstores) and Waiwen Shudian (Foreign Language Bookstores), which in turn sent them back to Peking.⁴⁷

In 1971 Stanley Greenfield of the Ziff Davis Publishing Company, which acts as a book purchasing agent for libraries and governments, thought he saw an opportunity to cash in on opening contacts with China. After getting clearance from the State Department, which advised him to write the Chinese embassy in Ottawa, he offered to act as purchasing agent for publicly available documents in the U.S. The Ottawa embassy, which was either already running, or preparing to run, a covert agent to Washington, ignored his letter. Fourteen months later Greenfield resubmitted the proposal to the PRC trade mission in New York. He received a response 10 months later and, after some extended bargaining, had a going business with the China National Publications Import Corporation in Peking by January 1975.

His first order was for all microprint versions of the previous year's documents of the State Department, Defense Department, NASA, National Science Foundation, Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Standards, and Joint Publications Research Service, Army Navy, and Marines, a grand total of 548,000 pages, for which Greenfield charged \$10,000.

Greenfield got about 500 orders a year, each time for specific documents, reflecting the thorough bibliographic knowledge in Peking. Greenfield became aware that the Chinese were carefully perusing the incoming flood when he received a complaint a month after he had sent his largest shipment (all of NASA's 1963 and 1964 documents, a total of 560,000 pages), requesting a few missing microfilm strips. While China was conducting above-ground nuclear tests, Peking asked Greenfield for a Ph.D. dissertation on air currents over the Northwestern U.S.⁴⁸

The Chinese government has also begun to use the services of the Declassified Documents Reference System of Carrollton Press, which is run by an ex-CIA officer named W.W. Buchanan. The company specializes in using the Freedom of Information Act to get copies of previously classified government documents.⁴⁹

L. EMBASSY REPORTING

It is hard to generalize about the quality of embassy reporting, much less its role in policymaking in Peking.

Through Reference News the Chinese stayed very well informed about the U.S., even without the benefit of diplomatic relations. Ross Terrill, one of the few foreigners to have talked extensively with Foreign Ministry officials in Peking, reported in 1971 that "the Chinese seem to be as well-informed as the foreign ministries of medium-ranked nations," but gave their "political shrewdness" in using that information much higher marks.⁵⁰

The opinions of foreign diplomats in Peking are contradictory. Terrill quotes a Scandinavian ambassador who spent four and a half years in Peking as saying:

Going to the Foreign Ministry here has been just the same as going to the Quai d'Orsay. The level of knowledge is similar. You have the same kind of free, rank exchange about world affairs. Of course, it's not as close as when we talk to Washington or London -- for with these two my country has a special tie. But it's about like talking with the French.⁵¹

A Christian Science Monitor correspondent who surveyed the Chinese diplomatic service, quoted an Asian diplomat who had recently served in Peking in 1966: "Many (Chinese) envoys cable home only what Peking wants to hear."⁵² This perception may have been colored by the milieu of the Cultural Revolution, or it may reflect a tendency common among lesser diplomats of all nations to report what superiors are interested in and

want to hear. Donald Klein's discussions with foreigners and his own impressions were that, except for a handful of top-notch ambassadors, he was "struck forcefully by a seeming lack of curiosity."⁵³

The lifestyle of overseas Chinese diplomats tends to be frugal and withdrawn as well. As a rule Chinese embassies are self-contained -- all staff, including domestic housekeeping personnel, drivers, etc., are Chinese. Local people are not employed within the diplomatic compounds. This is true world-wide.⁵⁴ In the large Moscow embassy, there is even an attempt to grow their own food in plots within the compound, with the ambassador helping with the gardening. This tendency towards insularity does not foster rapid, close contacts with the local people; there is nothing like "living on the economy" to strengthen language skills and assimilate local customs that pave the way towards greater understanding and trust with a host country's inhabitants.

Samuel Kim, who did a study covering the first six years of the PRC's diplomatic interactions at the U.N., found that most U.N. diplomats described the Chinese delegates as quiet, good listeners, and generally reticent, even to the point of not appearing to lobby actively off the Assembly floor. Descriptions of how the Chinese participate in the consultative process included such comments as these: "in a very passive way"; "like a diligent student listening, observing, and learning"; and "yes, but they never assume the posture of leadership."⁵⁵

The Chinese U.N. delegation, then under Huang Hua (1977), asked a lot of questions but avoided answering questions directed at themselves. When there was a need for mutual consultation -- almost always bilateral rather than in any form of caucus -- the Chinese would seek out the other delegation, never the other way around. In short, the Chinese maintained a

generally passive, listening stance at the U.N., only occasionally actively seeking out information, and scrupulously avoiding being put in a position where the Chinese delegates would have to give a personal opinion before the official stance was worked out in Peking. The U.N. delegation routinely passed up rotating chairmanships of various committees.

A last indicator that embassies appear to have a secondary role in information exchange with other governments is the locus of negotiations China conducts with other nations. Douglas M. Johnson and Hungdah Chiu compiled a list of approximately 2,300 agreements signed between 1949 and 1967.⁵⁷ Of these, 80 percent were signed in Peking, a proportion fairly consistent over time and for both developed and less developed countries. This proportion probably reflects, as Klein points out, both China's limited communications capabilities and the concentration of experts (economic, military, and scientific) in Peking available to decision makers.⁵⁸ The key negotiations for normalization of relations with the U.S. and the Peace and Friendship Treaty with Japan in 1978 also occurred in Peking with foreign envoys, rather than through China's diplomats in Tokyo and Washington.

This preference to talk through foreign envoys in Peking rather than querying China's own envoys in the field may be a habit carried over from days when Chinese envoys were a fairly green group. This is no longer the case. As China's communications with her embassies become more sophisticated, it is reasonable to expect this practice to reverse itself, as Peking begins to use these experienced ambassadors more actively in the host countries' ruling elites to help influence policy.

M. SUMMARY

The Chinese leadership uses the full range of opportunities available to it to collect information on the outside world. Its leaders have access to world events through a wide range of international news services. Through its embassies, NCNA bureaus and offices, and through VIP and other exchanges, it is able to collect a high volume of valuable intelligence on World affairs. By carefully maintaining a positive international image, China has received enthusiastic help from the non-communist world in filling its needs for technology. Although China has from time to time been caught at covert collection activities, it appears to have found over the past few years that it can satisfy its immediate and near-term needs in the West through overt activities. The present situation is likely to continue until either (1) China has absorbed the 30 years of technology it lost and begins seeking state-of-the-art military and proprietary secrets, or (2) China's relations with the West sour, for whatever reason. The current arrangement balances the West's desires to see China reinforce its normative state-to-state behavior by a better understanding of, and interdependence with, the existing international order, with China's own modernization and security needs.

NOTES

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2. Alan P. Liu, Communications and National Integration in Communist China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1975), p. 11.
3. Schwarz, op. cit., p. 78.
4. Ibid., pp. 60, 78.
5. Liu, op. cit., p. 1.
6. Ibid., p. 11.
7. Schwarz, op. cit., pp. 55-56.
8. This 1970 figure (from Liu, "Ideology and Information: Correspondents of the New China News Agency and Chinese Foreign Policy Making," Journal of International Affairs, Vol 26, No 2, 1972; p. 137) is low; many more offices and bureaus have been opened since, but this writer has yet to find a current complete compilation.
9. FBIS-PRC, 6 Mar 1978
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12. Ibid., p. 134.
13. The only book-length account is Richard Deacon, The Chinese Secret Service (New York: Taplinger, 1970), and it is thin on data.
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31. Christian Science Monitor, 5 December 1978; New York Times, 29 October 1978; Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 October 1978.
32. Christian Science Monitor, 13 September 1978.
33. San Francisco Chronicle, 9 October 1978; San Jose Mercury (AP), 25 December 1978.
34. Donald W. Klein, "The Chinese Foreign Ministry," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1974), pp. 147-148.
35. Stanley Karnow, "East Asia in 1978: The Great Transformation," Foreign Affairs, (no date; special "America and the World 1978" issue), p. 599.
36. Defense/Space Daily, 12 January 1979, p. 50.
37. Christian Science Monitor, 20 December 1978.
38. CIA, Appearances, pp. xxxvii-xlvi.
39. I am grateful to Professor Claude A. Buss for this information from his 1978 PRC trip report.
40. KYODO interview with Chou Pei-yuan, vice president of the PRC Academy of Sciences, 21 September 1978; cited in FBIS-Asia, 26 September 1978, p. 2 (Annex).

41. Los Angeles Times, 18 March 1979.
42. Los Angeles Times, 12 April 1979.
43. Japan Times, 26 December 1978.
44. Washington Post, 9 June 1979.
45. FBIS-PRC, 12 January 1979, p. E19.
46. FBIS-PRC, 21 February 1978, p. A1. Note: In the case of overseas Chinese returning for visits, the emotional bonds and desire to see China become strong are very great. Those with special expertise are given red carpet treatment and invited to prolong their stays and in some cases, teach. Even before relations thawed, some Americans of Chinese descent returned to China, the most notable being Ch'ien Hsueh-sen, the Berkeley-trained rocket expert who is believed to have headed China's atomic research program.
47. Deacon, op. cit., p. 347.
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IV. CHINA'S NEGOTIATING STYLE: PREPARED, PATIENT, FIRM

IV. CHINA'S NEGOTIATING STYLE: PREPARED, PATIENT, FIRM¹

The process of negotiations between two nations is essentially the reactional behavior pattern of one country to another. As such, in cybernetic terms, it can be characterized as the changing output of each country's foreign relations system to a specific external environment, under specific conditions. Wars, economic boycotts, formal conferences, media exchanges, etc., can be, and should be, considered forms of negotiations, the interreactive output of foreign policy processes. This broad view of the negotiating process is particularly important when one attempts to dissect decision-making in the Chinese case, because the Chinese definitely weigh factors beyond the bargaining table in their negotiating behavior.

This chapter will examine past and current Chinese negotiating styles. The identification of national interests, the probing of the other side's position, the signalling methods, the bargaining techniques, the use of external power as pressure, and the resolution "end-game" tactics employed by the Chinese will all be examined. Because of the difficulty in recreating the nuances and evolving issues of past negotiations, this analysis will draw primarily from first-hand accounts, such as Admiral Turner Joy's experiences at the Panmunjom talks, Kenneth Young's at the Sino-U.S. Warsaw talks, Arthur Lall's at the 1961 Geneva talks on Laos, and Gilbert Verhif's at the PRC-Tanzanian 1962 treaty talks. Current patterns are derived mainly from appraisals of the 1972-78 Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship (PFT) treaty talks, the 1978 Sino-American normalization of relations talks, and recent contract bargaining sessions between U.S. business firms and Chinese trade officials.

A. NEGOTIATION - NOT ALWAYS TO REACH AGREEMENT

It is generally considered "bad faith" in Western societies to enter into negotiations without some commitment to reach a compromise settlement, or at least the intention to seek a full and frank exchange of views that might clear misperceptions blocking agreement. As the Committee for the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate once put it:

To an American, negotiation is the least troublesome method of settling disputes. Negotiation may be exploratory and serve to formulate viewpoints and delineate areas of agreement or contention. Or it may aim at working out practical arrangements. The success of negotiation depends on whether (a) the issue is negotiable (that is, you can sell your car but not your child); (b) the negotiations interested not only in taking but also in giving are able to exchange value for value, and are willing to compromise; or (c) negotiating parties trust each other to some extent--if they didn't, a plethora of safety provisions would render the "agreement" unworkable.²

An experienced American negotiator explains, "In a successful negotiation everyone wins; each party should have a stake and gain in the outcome."³

Such notions of fair play and good faith reflect Western behavioral norms. As Michael Blaker discovered in his in-depth analysis of 18 major negotiations conducted by Japan, non-Western countries may have very different sets of behavioral norms and expectations for negotiations. He found the Japanese not infrequently entered negotiations without expectations of any agreement, simply to avoid loss of face by appearing unreasonable. Appearances of sincerity and harmony were frequently more relevant than progress towards compromise. Bargaining success or failure, according to such reasoning, becomes ascribable to impersonal forces, fortune, or caprice.⁴

The Chinese negotiating style superficially resembles the Japanese in its inflexibility and seemingly endless patience in probing out an adversary's weak points. Both nations will enter negotiations, if necessary, without expectations of progress towards an agreement. However, the Chinese attitude towards negotiations, and techniques, tend to be vastly different.

The Chinese view negotiations as a tool in adjusting a favorable "correlation of forces" towards their objectives, not as an end in themselves.

From 1949 to 1971, when Sino-U.S. relations were virtually non-existent, it was an achievement for the Chinese to get the U.S. to a conference table on anything approaching equal terms. The U.S.-P.R.C. ambassador-level Warsaw talks from 1955 through the 1960's achieved very little but served Chinese national interests in getting the U.S. to make some limited concessions to their existence. The energetic Chinese efforts to negotiate cultural and trade agreements around the world helped win China's acceptance as a legitimate member of the world community. The negotiations for these agreements seldom dealt with anything more substantial than increasing contacts and establishing mutual respect.

As an American legal adviser to the Tanzanian foreign ministry observed during the negotiations for the first Sino-Tanzanian cultural exchange agreement,

Because they involve no significant commitment by either party, cultural exchange agreements are easy to negotiate. The expeditious and friendly manner in which the negotiations proceed serves to create an image in each other's eyes of reasonable, well-meaning people with whom one can do business. In the early stages of relations between two states the establishment of such an image may be far more important than the subject of the agreement itself.⁵

The Chinese negotiating position at the Korean Armistice talks at Kaesong and Panmunjom from 1951 to 1953--a pattern later used by the North Vietnamese at the Paris peace talks--is another case where Chinese interest in progress towards a settlement was questionable. Both the Chinese and Vietnamese used a protracted, inflexible stance at peace talks to influence what they perceived as waning U.S. domestic support for war. The negotiators kept the talks open as a forum for propaganda and as a convenient basket for U.S. concessions, as pressures built for a resolution of the conflict.

Negotiations provide the Chinese the opportunity to disabuse Western leaders of any ideas that battlefield losses have attrited their resolve. They provide

a milieu to marshal world opinion on their behalf, to make their opponent feel he is isolated by his unreasonableness. And they provide a window to study changes in their opponent's behavior, to exploit tactically in the talks or elsewhere.

It is not hard to get the Chinese to the negotiating table, but their presence there may not denote that they are ready to seek a compromise.

Anyone preparing to sit down with the Chinese to negotiate--whether it be a cease-fire armistice or the financing of a Marriott hotel in Shanghai--must first take a broad look at Peking's national interests. Is there a middle ground of common interests? Can China gain by dragging out the talks, or will it cost to do so? What other key Chinese interests are affected by the topics under negotiation? The record is clear that China will negotiate, if need be, just to gain information; that Peking's negotiators will prevaricate and not budge if this shows promise of concessions from the other side, and that China will reach a compromise agreement only when it is convinced no further concessions are forthcoming, and further delay is at China's cost.

In cases where the Chinese have entered negotiations with some intention (though not always an immediate one) of reaching a settlement, their tactics have followed a fairly set pattern. Borrowing from traditional negotiations theory (based in turn on game theory), one can identify three distinct stages; formulation and presentation of the initial position, maneuvering and probing for the adversary's minimum position, and the end-game.

These three phases are examined in detail below.

B. INITIAL PHASE--SEIZING THE HIGH GROUND

The initial tactical moves by Chinese negotiators are designed to throw their adversary off balance and put him in a defensive stance through the

rest of the negotiations. For Westerners accustomed to beginning talks by setting a positive tone, establishing personal rapport, and probing gently the hardness of the other side's positions, these Chinese tactics are frequently rather unsettling and disorienting.

Chinese behavior during the initial phase has five elements.

1. Extensive Homework. Before the Chinese agree to even begin talks they have thoroughly researched the issue at hand, historical precedents, the backgrounds of the opposing team members, and the peripheral politics. In every case studied over the past 28 years, the negotiators facing the Chinese have been unexpectedly surprised at the thoroughness of the Chinese preparations for the talks. As Arthur Lall has noted,

The meticulous attention to concrete details has been adopted by the Chinese in the conduct of international negotiations. Writing in 1944, Mao said, "Treat all problems analytically instead of negating everything." And again in the following year he said, "He who makes no investigation and study has no right to speak." These injunctions impose exacting disciplines on Chinese negotiators. They work hard to conform to Mao's dictum, and this generally helps them to gain an impressive mastery of the issues and situations that are under negotiation.⁶

At the Korean talks the Chinese and North Korean negotiators made extensive use of historical details about border arrangements, previous U.N. and U.S. statements that conflicted with later statements, precedents in international law and the U.N. charter, etc., to buttress their arguments and put the U.N. negotiators on the defensive. Similarly, at the 1961 Laos talks they made frequent references to details of the 1954 Geneva Indochina talks. In current talks with American private companies over contract terms, they have exhibited detailed knowledge about specifications and processes that came as a surprise to their Western counterparts, one notable example being their detailed specifications for communications satellite equipment.⁷ The extensive collection efforts and windows China uses to collect such background data for talks are discussed in Chapter II.

2. Get China's Agenda Adopted. At the Korean armistice talks, U.N. negotiators found the Chinese and North Korean delegations had prepared a detailed "loaded" agenda which, in the words of the senior U.N. delegate Admiral Turner Joy, was "composed of conclusions favorable to their basic objectives,"⁸ such as items setting the course of the demilitarized zone and the removal of "foreign troops." The importance of insisting upon a neutral as against a prejudicial agenda is not readily apparent to the general public, as Ambassador Young points out: "American negotiators are frequently criticized because they will not concede what seems to be a trivial or technical point of sequence or semantics in the agenda. But the whole outcome of the negotiation may be at stake and the entire issue won or lost in the initial process of battling over a "neutral agenda." Chinese Communist negotiators are tough, adroit, and persistent at that stage."⁹ Another U.S. ambassador, Arthur Dean emphasized the importance of agenda-setting in similar terms:

The battle for the agenda is fundamental to Communist negotiators, because they believe they can humiliate the other side and win or lose a conference in this first battle... Quite often, they are correct.¹⁰

Ambassador Averell Harriman brought the 1961 Geneva talks to a standstill for several weeks over the agenda sequence, refusing to discuss a statement on Laos' independence and neutrality until firm safeguards were established for the effective operation of the supervisory International Commission.

Besides the obvious advantage of getting an agenda which will treat issues in a sequence favorable to the development of your own position, without making premature concessions to the opponent's key positions, the U.S. negotiators hint, but don't say outright, that a favorable agenda is important to the U.S. because, as talks drag out, the U.S. position inevitably weakens, in the face of political pressures for "progress." Since the U.S. position

is usually strongest at the earlier stages of talks, a favorable agenda enhances favorable momentum while a hard-nosed position is still possible.¹¹

The Vietnamese negotiators, similar practitioners of the loaded agenda, encountered the same Chinese tactic when they started to negotiate an end to the 1979 Sino-Viet war. The Vietnamese refused initially to proceed to other topics until the Chinese vacated remaining footholds in Vietnamese territory, while the Chinese refused to proceed to implement a ceasefire until the Vietnamese met a list of eight demands. Apart from a prisoner exchange, no agenda was ever worked out that enabled the talks to progress.

A similar standoff exists in the ongoing Sino-Soviet border talks. The Chinese refuse to go on to other issues until the Soviets demilitarize their common border, including Outer Mongolia, a demand the Soviets are not prepared to discuss at the early stages of talks, if ever. The Chinese will not negotiate under the overt Soviet threat.

In short, the "agenda battle" constitutes China's preliminary sparring, the testing of the opponent's firmness.

3. Seize the Initiative From the Start. The Chinese have used a variety of means to "set the stage" as talks begin, ranging from crude attempts at humiliation, such as sawing short the chair legs on the U.N. side of the table, to subtle ploys with visiting U.S. businessmen, such as was done to a senior Fluor Corporation executive who, having been invited to Peking to discuss developing a Chinese copper property, was blithely met with "Welcome to China. Why are you here?", making the Fluor delegation respond defensively for five days before the talks got off the ground.¹² The Chinese moves are intended to put the adversary on the defensive from the very beginning.

When the Geneva talks on Laos opened on 16 May 1961, Ch'en Yi, China's foreign minister and senior representative, insisted on making an opening

statement, despite the fact that only the conference chairman, Prince Sihanouk, was scheduled to speak the first day. Ch'en Yi then made a strong opening statement, labeling the U.S. the culprit in the Laotian situation, playing up China's good deeds and high motives, and demanding proof of goodwill from all the other participants:

Provided all the countries participating in this conference have the sincerity to truly settle the question, there is no reason why our conference cannot achieve positive results. ¹³

When the talks are bilateral and major Chinese interests are involved, the Chinese are not above staging incidents to frame the other party. A few days after talks started at Kaesong in Korea, a Chinese patrol was "ambushed" and a few days later the meeting place was bombed, both incidents being blamed on the U.S., despite Kaesong being well within the North Korean side of the battleline. The Vietnamese have charged similar incidents since the start of the 1979 Sino-Viet border talks, as well as during the earlier, abortive talks in July-September 1978. Such incidents may be clear fabrications to the Chinese opponent, but they serve effectively to put international suspicion on the good faith of that opponent.

4. Submission of an Initial Proposal. Can one expect the Chinese to always table their own initial proposal? Not always. The decision to submit an initial proposal seems to depend on the Chinese need to preempt the situation.

At the 1953 Korean armistice talks, the 1961 Geneva talks, and the 1979 Sino-Viet talks, the Chinese elected to submit an initial position. In each case, it is safe to assume, they realized that there was little likelihood that the talks would proceed favorably for them in the immediate future. By adapting a hardline stance that put their opponents in a defensive position, they reduced the chances that the talks would proceed smoothly from their opponent's positions. At Kaesong and Geneva they needed to maneuver international

opinion behind their position that foreign troops must be withdrawn from Korea and Laos. Given the strategic geography, the U.S. was not likely to concede this point at the initial stages of talks. In Vietnam's case, the Chinese were unwilling to concede a ceasefire until the Vietnamese substantially altered their relationship with the Soviet Union, a demand that was unlikely to be met under the initial conditions of the talks.

In other cases, the Chinese have elected not to submit an initial position at negotiations. During the Sino-American talks in Warsaw from 1955 on, the Chinese rarely submitted proposals. In the current contract negotiations with American, Japanese, and European firms, the Chinese elect to use the initial phase to continue probing the firms' proposals rather than to seek an early resolution.

In cases where negotiations are non-adversary, such as talks to reach cultural, sports, and scientific/technological exchanges, an initial position is irrelevant; common practice dictates the terms of such agreements.

5. Responses to Others' Proposals. In the event the Chinese initial proposal is countered by a proposal from the other side, the Chinese negotiators immediately make it clear that there is no common ground, that their opponents' arguments are intrinsically wrong, evidence bad faith, and are beneath consideration. Their attacks leave little doubt in anyone's mind that the Chinese refuse to proceed with any kind of further discussion of these proposals.

Nam Il, rejecting the U.N. proposals for a ceasefire line, gave a typical example of this total-rejection tactic:

It has been proved that your proposal is untenable and that our proposal is based on reason....I can tell you frankly that as long as you do not abandon your untenable proposal, it will not be possible for our conference to make any progress. As for our proposal, its reasons are irrefutable; therefore it is unshakeable.¹⁴

Ch'en Yi, ten years later, used the same tactic, emphasizing the "wrongness" of the U.S. proposal and the immorality therefore in striking a balance:

The Franco-American draft protocol cannot be the basis for our discussion, nor can it be compared and reconciled with the Soviet proposals. How can we lump together right and wrong and then strike a mean between them?¹⁵

C. MIDDLE PHASE--MANEUVER AND PROBE

By the completion of the initial phase, most Western negotiators feel the "preliminaries are out of the way" and serious give-and-take can begin. This is usually a false assumption. Chinese negotiating behavior from this point forward resembles nothing so much as besieging a medieval town, or the 10-year assault on Troy. The Chinese employ a wide variety of stratagems with seemingly infinite patience to probe for weak spots and wear down their adversary. They are not yet in a position to force the issue, but they believe time is on their side.

The conduct of the protracted talks in the middle phase varies significantly from the initial and final phases. Routine exchanges are taken over by deputies and liaison officers, with the senior delegates appearing from time to time to punctuate key points and, occasionally, new positions. The Chinese have an interest in keeping the talks going, but are not above tactical suspensions of the talks to try to shake up the other side. Such suspensions are usually of short duration, and will be ended on the Chinese side if their opponents do not first seek to reenstate the talks.

1. Probing for Soft Spots in Opponents' Positions. Despite their initial stance that the opposing side's initial proposals were totally unacceptable, the Chinese negotiators soon begin to work on them. Using a slash-and-thrust technique of vilifying a particular point, then proposing more acceptable variations, the Chinese seek to find out which proposals are fixed in cement and which are susceptible to change.

Arthur Lall, the senior Indian delegate at the 1961 Geneva talks, tried to break a Chinese-American impasse with his own draft changes. After a brief huddle among themselves, the senior Chinese negotiator at that session, Chang Han-fu, came back elliptically with further probing:

We've not said we don't accept (your draft proposals). We've told you that many improvements could be made. Why should we accept them in their present form when, as you can see now, they can be improved? Don't you think our suggestions are good? Then, do you think the Americans will accept them? We don't think they will. Here is fresh tea. Please let us have some.¹⁶

The Chinese have not in fact submitted a counterproposal, but rather have put their opponents in a position of being forced to respond in such a manner as to show whether they will "move" on given points.

2. Divide-and-Conquer Through World Opinion. The Chinese are aware that the persuasiveness of their arguments on their opposing counterparts is frequently not as important as its effect on the world outside. Even wildly unsubstantiable points known to be fabrications by members of the conference may receive significant acceptance in the world at large, or even among key segments of their oppositions' home populations. When talks stall, the general public becomes impatient and wants to know why; the Chinese propaganda mill is ready to supply a plethora of examples of bad faith and unreasonableness on the part of their adversaries.

The use of a fabricated "ambush" of a Chinese patrol and the bombing of the Kaesong meeting site are examples of media manipulation. The Chinese stance that the U.S. was unreasonable is not agreeing to a general statement on Laos' independence and neutrality before proceeding to specific proposals to increase the effectiveness of the supervisory International Commission won sufficient sympathy to get the British delegation to accept the point, despite U.S. intransigence. As the impasse dragged on, the U.S. delegation became increasingly isolated from general world opinion. Even the allegations

of U.S. use of germ warfare in Korea, while generally discredited, served to create a tainted aura around the U.S. position. Most recently in talks with the Vietnamese, the Chinese media have played up themes of Vietnamese brutality and aggressiveness, which have received responsive reverberations in non-Communist Southeast Asia public opinion, at a real cost in Vietnamese diplomatic aspirations.

A similar, though less aggressive, approach is used in business negotiations. After getting the most comprehensive specifications possible on a Western firm's products and services, the Chinese will ask the firm to quote a price, then bargain hard for a discount, usually implying strongly that a competitor will provide one. In the highly competitive international rush for Chinese business, this is a credible threat. Stanley Lubman, a San Francisco-based attorney who has made 19 business trips to China, representing among others Bethlehem Steel's bid for a \$100 million iron ore project, states, "Chinese officials are quick to label a company's offer not competitive. Often the Chinese side may not even make a counter offer, but only continue to whittle prices down."¹⁷ The effect is the same; the Chinese are playing on their opponent's insecurities about external conditions the Chinese can manipulate bilaterally and secretly.

3. Selective Ambiguity. The Chinese love for ambiguity and circumlocution is well ingrained in their literature and language, and provides a hidden flexibility that is difficult for Westerners to penetrate.¹⁸ Mao created a whole policy science out of selective manipulation of contradictions.¹⁹ As Arthur Lall points out, "We must not expect to find fixed and verifiable meanings even in seemingly rigid statements," which adds to the negotiator's dilemma in "reading" the Chinese's real position:

This faculty that Peking has developed, of using the same words to cover a long spectrum of meanings, adds considerably to the difficulty of negotiation with China. One fundamental factor in negotiation is the need to discover the minimal requirements of each party to the negotiation. In the case of Peking it is especially difficult to make this discovery. It is a closely guarded secret.²⁰

The ability to move behind a smokescreen of vagueness not only helps obscure China's interim positions, but is useful at later points when China finally elects to reach an agreement. Vague statements about postponing resolution of territorial claims with Burma in the 1960 border treaty, similar statements over the contested Senkaku Islands in the final phase of the 1978 Sino-Japanese PFT talks, and the "agree to disagree" explanation of differing U.S. and Chinese stands on arms sales to Taiwan after normalization in 1978, all served to make it possible for China to reach negotiated settlements without giving up their claims. In the negotiating process itself, however, such hard-nosed obscurantism acts as a brick wall until the final Chinese decision to reach a settlement.

4. The Anvil of Time. Perhaps the most common observation made by those who have treated with the Chinese is that they are "endlessly patient." The ability of Chinese negotiators to hammer away hour after hour, week after week, with the same questions is maddening to their Western counterparts, and the Chinese know it.

Even in negotiations with Western businessmen, when the desire on the Chinese side to reach an agreement is clear, talks can drag on for weeks and months, becoming a test of patience.

During these deadening sessions, the Chinese are probing continuously for signs of weakening. David Janet, an executive of the Houston-based Pullman Kellogg Company that got into the China market early with a \$200 million deal for eight huge chemical fertilizer plants in the early 1970's, points out,

"To the Chinese an indication of anger is a demonstration of a loss of self-confidence."²¹

Admiral Turner Joy came to the conclusion that the Chinese used delaying tactics simply to play upon the known intolerance of the Western public toward lack of progress:

As a general matter, Communists believe that once negotiations have been initiated, to delay progress towards consummation of agreements tends to weaken the position of their opponents. They hope to exploit the characteristic impatience of Western peoples.²²

Ambassador Arthur Dean, the first civilian negotiator at Panmunjom, echoed Admiral Turner Joy's sentiments upon his departure in 1953:

Communists are in no hurry. They have no timetable. They think time is on their side and that Americans, being optimistic, friendly, truthful, constructive and inclined to believe and hope for the best, will become discouraged.

They believe that at a long-drawn-out conference the American negotiators will be forced by American public opinion to give in, in order to have a successful conference. Impatience mounts as no progress is reported. People ask: "What progress did you make today?" The Communists know this and burn bonfires under the American negotiators and utter rude, insulting, arrogant demands that the American negotiators stop their unconstructive stalling tactics.²³

In 1963 Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, one of the State Department's senior Asia hands, joined the others with this observation:

During the almost four years that I was negotiating with the Chinese Communists at Geneva, between 1954 and 1958, what I found most annoying and frustrating was their supreme self-confidence that they need make no concessions of any kind and that if they just waited long enough we would be forced to make all the concessions to them.²⁴

Ambassador Young sees in this Chinese patience a completely different time perspective:

Being Chinese and Marxist-Leninist simultaneously, the Chinese Communist negotiator implicitly believes that time and victory are on his side. While the historical process may be nudged along, it does not need to be hurried, should that be disadvantageous. Success in bargaining, whether for a piece of goods or the enemy's defeat, will come more easily if no sense of haste or concern is shown. Viewing negotiations in extended periods of time, Chinese Communist negotiators give the impression that they can wait forever, if necessary....²⁵

In this view, the Chinese are willing to forgo short-term gains for long-term successes.

Although they may have different rationales for the Chinese propensity for drawing out negotiations, all experienced negotiators agree with Rudyard Kipling that the White Man who "tries to hustle the East" has chosen a disastrous course. As long as the Chinese perceive a chance of gain by outwaiting their opponent's patience, they will not likely make concessions themselves.

5. Milking Concessions. During the protracted middle phase of negotiations, the Chinese tend to view unilateral concessions by the other side as a general weakening to be exploited. Admiral Turner Joy said:

Whenever Western negotiators make a concession to Communist views for the purpose of making progress, Communists consider this action is evidence of a deteriorating Western position. Therefore, they press even more strongly for further concessions, and become more confident that time plays on their side.²⁶

Never concede anything to the Communists for nothing, merely to make progress....Never imagine any point is unimportant. To concede a minor point without a like concession from them is but to convince them that in more substantive issues you will ultimately submit to their viewpoint.²⁷

Ambassador Young agreed with this fixed conclusion:

Making a concession or adjustment is the trickiest technique of all in adversary negotiating. If a move toward compromise is made too emphatically or too soon, the Chinese Communist negotiators will look upon it as a sign of weakness and defeat. They will be even less inclined to show any interest in any such American proposal, nor will they advance a version of their own.

How and when to move from what is bargainable to what is not negotiable, to the bedrock of minimum demand, is never easy. Americans tend to put too much material between what can be conceded away and what cannot be given up under any circumstances than do the Communists.

The essential technique for the Americans is to submit only clear, specific, and self-enforcing compromises which are reciprocal.²⁸

Admiral Turner Joy is more sanguine about the chances of reciprocal concessions. He advises expounding a firm position, declaring it final, then maintaining general silence, refraining from extended defense or justification of your position. Silence and finality rattle the Chinese and will eventually bring them to you.²⁹

6. Social Contacts. The Chinese make use of social functions (the exception being the Korean talks) to get to know their counterparts better. As a rule, business is never discussed at these functions. The Chinese have a habit of extended toasting, calling upon guests to respond to toasts with a "gam bay" ("bottoms up") exhortation. The unwary Westerner may not notice at first that the Chinese rotate this duty among themselves. The general rule seems to be that four toasts is an acceptable maximum, but the Chinese will go for up to ten if you don't demur.³⁰ The origin of the custom, which happens to be common throughout the Far East, is not clear, nor is it clear whether this form of socializing is done among the Chinese themselves when Westerners are not present. The Chinese use it to break the ice, but don't make a practice of it; there is no indication that the Chinese use alcohol on a recurring basis to wear out the opposition.

D. FINAL PHASE--SUDDEN DENOUEMENT

It is virtually impossible to predict at what point a breakthrough is likely to occur in negotiations. There are so many invisible inputs into the decision-making process, not the least of which are domestic political concerns, that the negotiator is left, like the ancient Roman seers, to look

for signs in the wind. There is probably no less exact science, or less coherent art, than the avocation of China-watching. Unidentified Washington officials have put it:

Signals remain terribly important in dealing with the Chinese, at least when active negotiations are possible or in progress....The Chinese rarely respond to points directly in face-to-face talks. They will not acknowledge that they have absorbed your point and agree with it. They will adjust their policy, but not acknowledge that any adjustment has taken place. They don't betray their eagerness for anything.³¹

The Chinese broke the deadlock in the 1961 Geneva talks without acknowledging any shift in position. After denying in June that any compromise between "right" (China's position) and "wrong" (the U.S. position) was possible, Ch'en Yi blithely called for "a conciliatory spirit for reaching agreement on a reasonable basis" in July, after four weeks of deadlocked talks. When asked how this was to be done, Ch'en Yi said that the way was shown by a Chinese saying, which he quoted, "Seek common ground and reserve divergencies."³² No acknowledgement was made that the Chinese position had shifted.

1. The Chinese Negotiating Team and Peking. Even in a slow-moving negotiation, as occurs with the Chinese, a negotiator must have some sense of two vital questions if he is to pace his proposals properly: (1) How much latitude does my counterpart have to make concessions, and (2) How long does it take my proposals to get to decision-makers and back to my counterpart?

It is clear that the Chinese negotiating teams are intentionally split from the decision-making group, whatever the type of negotiation. Ambassador Young has speculated that this division derives from the formation in 1861 of the Tsungli Yamen, the embryonic foreign ministry under the Dowager Empress. Certainly even from the earliest trading contacts with Europeans, the Chinese have sought to maintain intermediaries between the Imperial court and "foreign devils." Whether or not the practice reflects vestiges of an ethnocentric

"Middle Kingdom" perspective is moot, and to a degree, irrelevant. The arrangement allows the Chinese to concentrate experts on foreign affairs into the probing and communicating process, without any danger of precipitate commitment.

Peking charges its negotiating teams with initial positions and instructions, based on exhaustive research of the issues, then sends them out on that limited charter. In Young's words, "Peking keeps its negotiator accurately informed and precisely instructed."³³ The insistence on keeping control of negotiations in Peking underscores the larger strategy of Chinese negotiations. What goes on at the negotiating table is only part of a much larger campaign involving all aspects of the foreign policy apparatus--media, international forums, diplomatic contacts, and in some cases military operations. Peking acts as a concert master, in Ross Terrill's view: "The Chinese foreign policy machine is like an orchestra of diverse instruments. Now a drum is used; now a violin for a mellow effect; now a flute to achieve a delicate and modest melody line; now a trumpet such as Radio Peking...."³⁴

International businessmen recognize the efficiency of negotiating in Peking, and most bilateral state negotiations are conducted there. A study of over 2,000 agreements reached between 1949 and 1967 revealed that about 80 percent were signed in Peking.³⁵

The second question--What is the turn-around time for decision on a tabled proposal--is harder to answer.

When the senior Chinese delegate at the Korean armistice talks, General Hsieh Fang, was asked how long it would take his superiors to provide him with guidance on a certain question, Hsieh retorted, "I have no talent for prophesy."³⁶

A limited survey of out-of-Peking negotiations suggests that four to six weeks usually elapses between submission of a proposal and discernible

changes in the Chinese stance. The local negotiating team may continue to probe the proposal, but will not usually respond to it within that time-frame, unless a serious external event occurs, as occasionally happened on the Korean battlefield.

One can speculate that it takes from several days to a week for the local negotiating team to transmit the proposal and its recommendations, including follow-up probing results, to Peking. Another week is probably consumed in staffing the report through the relevant department of the Foreign Ministry through the appropriate Vice Minister, who in turn coordinates with other ministries, including in times of conflict the PLA General Staff. The Foreign Minister would probably be ready to submit the fully staffed position paper to the State Council and Politburo between the third and fourth week. Kenneth Lieberthal, on a sketchy analysis of Politburo member appearances, has estimated that the Politburo met about every nine days in the 1950's and about every ten days in the 1970's.³⁷ The final decision would probably be transmitted almost immediately through the Foreign Ministry to the Chinese negotiating team directly after the decision was reached. The fact that the negotiators shift position gears without any preliminary footwork suggests that they put forward the response position almost immediately, without concern for the embarrassment it might cause for arguments presented the day before.

Compression of the staffing cycle could occur if an overriding crisis developed, which caused the Politburo to monitor events daily. Again, this unusual situation appears limited in the past to wartime environments.

In contract talks with foreigners, a similar cycle appears to exist, with split negotiating-decisionmaking halves. Decision-making on contracts in the past was probably made below the Politburo level, once the general economic plan was approved. The level is hard to determine, although

Li Hsien-nien, the top financial expert in the Politburo, probably oversaw the bigger contract decisions. After the shakeup of the system in the spring of 1979 and the formation of an overarching Economic and Finance Commission headed by Ch'en Yun, it is likely that these decisions fell to Ch'en.

The precipitate agreements reached on contracts after foreign firms had given up on negotiations and were about to depart have entered the repertoire of international businessmen's favorite tales. A few examples will demonstrate the pattern.

Marshall Goldberg, director of administration for Brooklyn's Monarch Wine Company, which now holds the license for importing Chinese beer and vodka, got into a futile dispute with the Chinese over how much advertising would be necessary to sell the brews in the U.S. After three weeks of heated talks, Marshall says, "we walked away, saying, 'Let's part in friendship.' The Chinese then took us to the Peking opera that evening and the next morning put us on a train to Ts'ing-tao to see the brewery there. Through the train window, they said, 'We'll see you in Peking to resume negotiations.' They had wanted to see if we might say something different, the night before, when we were together socially. We didn't, so they knew we meant business." A deal quickly followed.³⁸

A West German steel company which had similarly come to a deadend in negotiations had packed up and turned in intending to leave China the following day, when a note signed by Vice Premier Fang Yi was slipped under their hotel door at midnight, agreeing to terms for a \$14 billion steel mill package.

E. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS

While the techniques of Chinese diplomacy have remained fairly constant, there have been other changes that have affected the decision-making process itself.

The Chinese have been shifting away from ideological priorities towards national interest priorities. As far back as 1956 India's ambassador Panikkar, who had extensive dealings with the Chinese leadership, observed a basic contradiction between the two interests:

The sense of universalism inherent in a great revolution is basically contradictory to national interests and therefore is incompatible with international usages. From this fact flow the anomalies and contradictions of revolutionary foreign policy.³⁹

James Chieh Hsiung has drawn a parallel between China and the Soviet Union in going through this adjustment phase:

Not unlike the Soviet Union in the early years, the CPR is caught in a very uncomfortable position between a militant ideology and a physical milieu compelling practical sobriety. The result is a strange combination of verbal militancy and prudence in real action. The degree of verbal militancy may increase in direct proportion to the degree of compulsion which dictates prudence.⁴⁰

A few characteristics, on the other hand, have remained constant. China generally has an excellent record in adhering to its international commitments.⁴¹ Chinese leaders have put great emphasis on establishing their credibility--"We mean what we say" is probably the most oft-repeated refrain in the Chinese diplomatic lexicon. This holds true of business dealings as well. The Chinese have scrupulously carried out their obligations once the hard-fought negotiations were completed. Where later disagreements emerged, all were resolved through mutual negotiation, without pursuing lengthy arbitral procedures.⁴²

Another characteristic that has remained constant is Chinese sensitivity towards being treated as an equal. The Chinese carefully arrange their relations with other smaller states on equal terms; this is one of the foundations to their claim for leadership of the Third World. They are not an hegemonic super power because they do not exploit smaller states. The Chinese are extremely sensitive that other major powers treat them as equals, however. The intransigent Chinese stand against rapprochement with the Soviet Union is

in no small part due to the Chinese perception that Moscow refuses to treat them as an equal. The Chinese have insisted on the demilitarization of their common border, including Outer Mongolia, before they will sit down to negotiate differences.

F. SUMMARY--DO'S AND DON'TS IN NEGOTIATING WITH THE CHINESE

It is hard to improve upon Ambassador Young's recommended procedures in negotiating with China:

1. Stand firm on the agenda and keep the initiative.
2. Stick to details and avoid principles and generalities, which the Chinese may consider tricks.
3. Avoid "agreements in principle" at the start; proceed with concrete propositions one at a time.
4. Avoid the Western style of explaining the same point from different angles; this leads to confusion and inefficiency.
5. Only submit concessions tied to a similar concession expected from the Chinese. Unilateral concessions tend to be viewed as signs of weakening and lead to a hardening of the Chinese position, nor are they likely to submit a counter proposal.
6. During periods of impasse, when the Chinese use invective and threaten to suspend negotiations, the American technique should be to remain silent and wait.⁴³

While the climate of relations with China may affect to some degree the tone of negotiations, it does not change the basic style of negotiations. The Chinese negotiators will probe positions with frontal challenges, reconnaissances of flanks, and tests of resolve and patience. They are seeking the best deal they can get for Chinese interests, and will not sacrifice those interests to short-term goodwill. Attempts to win their

"friendship" in negotiations are not as effective as convincing them that you are bargaining with them as equals in good faith. They are unlikely to compromise until they are satisfied that they have gotten you down to your minimum position, that your defenses cannot be breached further. If they feel those terms are in China's best interests, and there is no point in seeking deals elsewhere or delaying further, they will accept those final terms and the concessions required on their part. To the extent that the Chinese are convinced that your position is final and that you intend to close the talks after a reasonable period, you may be able to accelerate an agreement. Judging that point is tricky, however, and one is advised to err on the side of patience.

NOTES

1. I am indebted to LCDR Joseph Mazzafro, USN, for the apt phrase "prepared, patient, firm" to describe China's negotiating style. His observations derive from his excellent master's thesis, Japanses National Interests and the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty (Monterey, CA: U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, March, 1979).
2. Gerald I. Nierenberg, Fundamentals of Negotiating (New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1973), p. 5.
3. Ibid., p. 29.
4. Michael Blaker, Japanese International Negotiating Style (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 3-24. See also, Michael Blaker, "Push, Probe, Panic: The Japanese Tactical Style in International Negotiations," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977).
5. Gilbert V. Verbit, "Negotiating with China: A Minor Episode," in Jerome A. Cohen, ed., China's Practice of International Law: Some Case Studies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 163. See also Herbert Passin, China's Cultural Diplomacy (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 14-16, for role of negotiating bilateral agreements in this process.
6. Arthur Lall, How Communist China Negotiates (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 36. Ambassador Lall was India's representative at the 1961 Geneva talks on Laos.
7. Chinese Delegation of Space Technology, "Tentative Operational Requirements of Domestic Communications Satellites," November 1978, pp. 13-15.
8. C. Turner Joy, Admiral, USN, How Communists Negotiate (Santa Monica, CA: Fidelis Publishers, Inc., 1970), p. 18. On the question of to what degree the Kaesong/Panmunjom talks reflected North Korean or Chinese negotiating style, Admiral Turner Joy had little doubt. The senior North Korean delegate Nam Il was "merely a figurehead. The actual power rested in the Chinese Gen. Hsieh Fang." (p. 12). Nam Il always spoke from prepared texts; Hsieh Fang's remarks were always "extemporaneous and fluent." (p. 13). "It is worth repeating that ultimate authority in the mixed Communist delegation appeared to be in the hands of the Red Chinese." (p. 17).
9. Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967 (New York: McGraw-Hill/Council on Foreign Relations, 1968), p. 379.
10. Arthur H. Dean, "What It's Like to Negotiate with the Chinese," The New York Times Magazine, 30 October 1966, as quoted in Young, op. cit., p. 379.
11. This tendency for the U.S. position to crumble over time during protracted hostilities has been noted by numerous negotiators, from Admiral Turner Joy to Secretary of State Kissinger. See Bernard and Marvin Kalb, Kissinger (Boston, Little, Brown, 1974), pp. 430-435.

12. Louis Kraar, "China's Narrow Door to the West," Fortune, 26 March 1979, p. 64.
13. Quoted in Lall, op. cit., pp. 51-52.
14. Turner Joy, op. cit., p. 48.
15. Lall, op. cit., p. 85.
16. Ibid., p. 4.
17. Kraar, op. cit., p. 64.
18. For examples of these practices, see Kenneth Lieberthal, "The Foreign Policy Debate in Peking as Seen Through Allegorical Articles," RAND Report P-5768, Santa Monica, CA, May 1977; and Lucien Pye.
19. See Mao's essay "On Contradictions," (Aug 1937) in Mao Tse-tung, Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1971), pp. 85-133.
20. Lall, op. cit., pp. 27-28.
21. Time, 19 February 1979, p. 53.
22. Turner Joy, op. cit., p. 39.
23. Quoted in Young, op. cit., p. 352.
24. Ibid, p. 352.
25. Ibid, p. 351.
26. Turner Joy, op. cit., p. 14.
27. Ibid, pp. 170-171.
28. Young, op. cit., p. 389.
29. Turner Joy, op. cit., p. 172.
30. Time, 19 February 1979, p. 53.
31. Jay Mathews, "Peking's Foreign Policy Lacks Mao's Old Flamboyance," Washington Post, 2 April 1978.
32. Lall, op. cit., p. 92.
33. Young, op. cit., pp. 342-343.
34. Ross Terrill, 800,000,000: The Real China (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1972), pp. 235-236.
35. Douglas M. Johnson and Hungdah Chiu, eds., Agreements of the People's Republic of China, 1949-1967: A Calendar (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968).

36. Turner Joy, op. cit., p. 10.
37. Kenneth Lieberthal, et al., Central Documents and Politburo Politics in China (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan, 1978), p. 93.
38. Time, 19 February 1979, p. 53.
39. K. M. Panikkar, The Principles and Practice of Diplomacy (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1956), p. 99, as cited in Young, op. cit., p. 350.
40. James C. Hsiung, Law and Policy in China's Foreign Relations: A Study of Attitudes and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 319-320.
41. Verbit, op. cit., p. 165. See also Douglas M. Johnson, "Treaty Analysis and Communist China: Preliminary Observations," ASIL Proceedings (1967), pp. 126, 132. The few possible exceptions to this pattern probably derive from different understandings of what the agreements actually meant.
42. Hsiung, op. cit., p. 313.
43. Young, op. cit., pp. 388-390.

V. CHINA'S CRISIS MANAGEMENT: THE PATTERN

V. CHINA'S CRISIS MANAGEMENT: THE PATTERN

EARLY STUDIES--PATTERN CONSISTENCY

We have no equivalent of Graham Allison's Cuban missile crisis study for Chinese crisis management. The arguments and counter-arguments of the leadership elites in crisis periods are not available.

Until the memoirs of Chinese leaders become available, or some of them are willing to discuss what went on in Politburo and Military Affairs Committee meetings, we must rely on what the Chinese media said during crises--a wealth of information in itself, and probably reasonably accurate in terms of the final consensus--and actual Chinese behavior. Chinese crisis behavior has been fairly consistent, which enables outsiders to assess the criticality of current Chinese actions and warnings, even without access to deliberations of the inner councils, by comparing current actions with past behavior patterns.

The first study of note was Allen Whiting's China Crosses the Yalu (1960)¹ which combined analysis of China's statements about the Korean War and its actions prior to entering that war to show that China's decision to intervene was not premeditated long in advance, but that China had indeed had to rush troops up to the Korean border after U.S./U.N. troops posed a threat to China itself.

The development of data analysis techniques and field theory in the 1960's has yielded a series of studies which provide interesting insights but hardly firm conclusions about China's crisis behavior patterns.

A typical study by the Institute of Political Studies at Stanford University in 1970, "Trend Analysis Study of China in Its Relations With The Major Powers and Selected Medium Powers from 1922 Until 1968," used a series of equations (See Table 5-1) and a data base derived from the New York Times

Table 5-1

COMPUTATIONAL EQUATIONS AND EMPIRICAL MODEL
OF CHINA'S ATTRIBUTES & CAPABILITIES

(Source: Stanford Institute of Political Studies, "Trend Analysis Study of China in Its Relations With the Major Powers and Selected Medium Powers from 1922 Until 1968, p. 8)

$$\begin{aligned}
 X_2 &= b_{21}X_1 + u \\
 X_3 &= b_{32}X_2 + b_{31}X_1 + u \\
 X_4 &= b_{43}X_3 + b_{42}X_2 + b_{41}X_1 + u \\
 X_5 &= b_{51}X_1 + b_{53}X_3 + u \\
 X_6 &= b_{65}X_5 + b_{64}X_4 + b_{63}X_3 + u
 \end{aligned}$$

where^a

X_1 = Population

X_2 = GNP

X_3 = Trade

X_4 = Defense budget

X_5 = Men under arms


X_6 = Average level of conflict behavior or violence

u = Disturbance term

b = Beta coefficient (equivalent to p -- path coefficient for standardized variables).

^a It should be noted that our model does not draw upon all the indices of economic capability we have collected. This is yet to be done.

Our analysis yielded the following empirically derived model of China's attributes and capabilities:



to come up with the conclusion:

In terms of absolute levels our results indicate that China's conflict peaks are most responsive to the actions of Taiwan, the USSR, Japan, and the United Nations toward China--in that order.

* * * *

In this analysis United States' behavior toward China does not feature as a significant determinant of Chinese behavior.²

Another study two years later by Sang Woo Rhee at the University of Hawaii, entitled "China's Cooperation, Conflict and Interaction Behavior: Viewed from Rummel's Status-Field Theoretic Perspective," looked at two of Rummel's 13 theorems explaining status dependent cooperation and conflict between nations, in this case China and the major powers. Rhee found that China's antagonism towards more powerful states increased the greater the relative power gap, and but that the greater the economic distance between China and another power, the less antagonism was likely to develop. Accordingly Rhee predicted ever decreasing tension between Japan and China, since it appeared Japan would not rearm, while China closed the power gap, and Japan would at least maintain the economic gap, the "conflict-dampening factor." Rhee felt the USSR's relations with China would become worse, since the USSR's power edge over China would increase as it continued its expansion of strategic weapons systems, while not maintaining as wide an economic lead over China as the U.S. China's relations with the U.S. were likely to improve, since the U.S. had frozen its power ceiling (defined by Rhee as ICBMs and SLBMs) while expanding its economic lead. Rhee did not explicate in great detail why a power gap was an intensifying factor in conflict, and his explanation of the conflict-dampening effect of an economic gap was essentially that of a dependency relationship.³

In 1974 Andres Onate published an interesting study testing the hypothesis that domestic conflict within China led to conflict in its external relations, using data for the study from the New York Times Index. Onate found such a

"moderate" correlation between domestic conflict and external conflict that he declined to posit a clear causal relationship. What he had not expected, but came out of his data, however, was a much stronger correlation between external conflict and ensuing domestic conflict. He correlated this finding with the propensity for high-ranking party figures associated with foreign policies to be purged (P'eng Te-huai, Lo Jui-ch'ing, Liu Shao-ch'i, etc.).⁴

In 1975 Allen Whiting came out with another book, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, analyzing China's conflict management of its Indian and Indo-chinese (1960's) crises. From this analysis he extracted "a modest codification" of deterrence principles that reflect the patterns of perception and behavior manifest in the crises he examined:

Threats and Their Deterrence as Seen from Peking

1. The worse our domestic situation, the more likely our external situation will worsen.
 - a. A superior power in proximity will seek to take advantage of our domestic vulnerability.
 - b. Two or more powers will combine against us if they can temporarily overcome their own conflicts of interest.
 - c. We must prepare for the worst and try for the best.
2. The best deterrence is belligerence.
 - a. To be credible, move military force; words do not suffice.
 - b. To be diplomatic, leave the enemy "face" and a way out.
 - c. To be prudent, leave yourself an "option."
 - d. If at first you don't succeed, try again but more so.
3. Correct timing is essential.
 - a. Warning must be given early when a threat is perceived but not yet imminent.
 - b. The rhythm of signals must permit the enemy to respond and us to confirm the situation.
 - c. We must control our moves and not respond according to the enemy's choice.⁵

The most promising and interesting work in pattern analysis has come in the mid-1970's from three authors, Steve Chan, John Krieger, and Davis Bobrow, from the University of Maryland and Texas A&M University, working under a contract for ARPA.

In one study, the three have conducted a fairly exhaustive analysis of Chinese writings, extracting a cognitive map of how Chinese decision-makers view policy options. A part of this study, specifications for Chinese decision structure in second-order crises, follows:

- Rule 1: Identify China's main enemy.
- Rule 2: Assess the involvement of China's main enemy in the crisis.
- Rule 3: (a) To the extent that China's main enemy is heavily involved in the particular second-order crisis in question, Chinese policies should be designed to maximize his loss or vulnerability, and to minimize his gains.

(b) To the extent that China's main enemy is not heavily involved in the particular second-order crisis in question, Chinese policies should have a higher threshold for direct involvement. These policies should be designed to maximize the gains of the "progressive" forces and minimize the loss of these forces, as determined by Rule 10.
- Rule 4: Identify the intermediate actors (including China's secondary enemies) in the crisis.
- Rule 5: Assess the level of opposition of these intermediate groups to the policies of China's main enemy, or the potential of mobilizing their opposition to the policies of the latter.
- Rule 6: (a) To the extent that these intermediate actors are strongly opposed to the policies of China's main enemy, Chinese policies should have a higher threshold for direct involvement. These policies should emphasize "divide and rule" or "balance of power."

(b) To the extent that these intermediate actors are weakly opposed to the policies of China's main enemy, and to the extent that Rule 13(b) is satisfied, Chinese policies should encourage "united front" struggle with China playing a prominent role.

(c) To the extent that these intermediate actors are badly divided among themselves or are supportive of the policies of China's main enemy, or to the extent that Rule 13(b) is not satisfied, China should generally abstain from involvement in the crisis.

Rule 7: Assess the efficacy of Chinese policies based on 6(a) or 6(b).

Rule 8: (a) To the extent that these Chinese policies are successful for impeding the objectives of China's main enemy, or to the extent that they are considered to be adequate for that purpose, they should be continued or implemented.

(b) To the extent that these Chinese policies are unsuccessful for impeding the objectives of China's main enemy, or to the extent that they are deemed as inadequate for that purpose, more direct forms of Chinese involvement should be considered.

Rule 9: Identify the direct conflict participants in the second-order crisis.

Rule 10: Assess the relations of the direct conflict participants with China's main enemy.

Rule 11: (a) To the extent that the direct conflict participants are friendly with China's main enemy, China should raise its threshold for direct involvement. Chinese policies should emphasize the exploitation of the effects of their conflict on their relations with China's main enemy.

(b) To the extent that one of the direct conflict participants is hostile to China's main enemy, China should lower its threshold for direct support for it in the conflict.


Rule 12: Assess the domestic or internal characteristics of the conflict parties.

Rule 13: (a) To the extent that the party friendly to China's main enemy is strong, stable, and united, or to the extent that the party hostile to China's main enemy is weak, unstable, disunited, and of questionable class background, China should raise its threshold for direct involvement in the crisis.

(b) To the extent that the party friendly to China's main enemy is weak, unstable, disunited, and

"reactionary", or to the extent that the party hostile to China's main enemy is strong, stable, united, and "revolutionary," China should lower its threshold for direct involvement in the conflict.

The above specification of Chinese decision calculation in second-order crises can be operationalized into a computer model. The flow-chart of such a model can be delineated as below:



In a second study, the three have taken the above decision structure and compared actual Chinese behavior in 36 actual crises, using Peking's level of involvement as the dependent variable. Involvement was partitioned into four broad categories: (1) apparent inactivity, (2) verbal agitation, (3) limited, nonverbal posturing, and (4) massive, direct intervention.


Chart 5-1, taken from the study, shows three decision levels: Does the crisis involve China's main enemy? Is the crisis likely to have a qualitative effect on international power relationships? And is the crisis likely to affect the "polar character" (i.e., progressive/reactionary forces) of the world?

Table 5-2, also from the study, provides a summary breakdown of what Chinese responses historically have been for each decision path in Chart 5-1.

The third study was in the form of an article in 1978 by Steve Chan, wherein Chan took five military conflicts in which China participated (the Korean War, 1950; the Sino-American confrontation over Quemoy, 1958; the Sino-Indian border conflict, 1962; the escalation of the Vietnam War, 1964-1965; and the Sino-Soviet border clashes, 1969), and identified five "rather distinct sequences" of actions which China followed as the crises escalated: (1) probing, (2) warning, (3) demonstration, (4) attack, and (5) detente. The study is particularly interesting for two reasons. First, as in Whiting's works, it emphasizes the value of listening to China's signalling efforts, which are usually quite credible. Second, Chan's model for Chinese conflict calculus turned out to be one hundred percent predictive of the Sino-Vietnamese war of February 1979, a few months after the article was published.

The next chapter takes a closer look at that Sino-Vietnamese war, in terms of Chan's milestones and the wider interplay of domestic and external politics.

CHART 5-1
DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLED C.A.C.I. EVENTS



*Positive answers to the three basic questions have been assigned odd numbers and negative answers, even numbers. The even numbers are also assigned alphabetic suffixes corresponding to the alternate possibilities of a negative assessment which are listed in Table 2. At the terminal of each interpretive chain are the predicted Chinese responses; these alpha-numeric codes correspond to those presented in Table 1.

TABLE 5-2

DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES BY REASONING

Reasoning	Apparent Inactivity		Responses				Verbal Agitation	Nonverbal, Limited Posturing	Direct, Massive Intervention	N
	high sensitivity	low importance	indecision	routine comment	token support	strategic warning				
Path 1-3-7						1		1	2	
Path 1-3-8									0	
Path 1-4-9	2	1			20	1	11		35	
Path 1-4-10					1				1	
Path 2-5-11					1				1	
Path 2-5-12									0	
Path 2-6-13		4			5	12		1	22	
Path 2-6-14		1			5				6	
N	2	6	0	10	34	2	12	1	67	

NOTES

1. Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the War (Stanford, CT: Stanford University Press, 1960).
2. Institute of Political Studies, Stanford University, "Trend Analysis Study of China In Its Relations With the Major Powers and Selected Medium Powers From 1922 Until 1968," (Washington, DC: Office of Naval Research, 1970, Project Nr 177254), p. 11.
3. Sang-Woo Rhee, "China's Cooperation, Conflict and Interaction Behavior: Viewed From Rummel's Status-Field Theoretic Perspective," (Advanced Research Projects Agency Report No. 61, April 1972), pp. 46-51.
4. Andres D. Onate, "The Conflict Interactions of the People's Republic of China, 1950-1970," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, December 1974, pp. 578-594.
5. Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deference (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1975), pp. 202-203.

VI. CHINA'S CRISIS MANAGEMENT: THE 1979 SINO-VIET WAR--A CASE STUDY

I - INTRODUCTION

On February 17, 1979, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) attacked Vietnam across the entire 450-mile Sino-Vietnamese border. Twenty-seven days later, on March 15, after penetrating between 10 and 30 miles into Vietnamese territory and fighting several large-scale battles, which resulted in thousands of casualties on both sides, Beijing (Peking) unilaterally withdrew its forces from all but a handful of "contested" points along the border.

This study analyzes the factors which account for the nature and timing of the Chinese action. Its research reveals a complex interrelationship of actions and events, which indicates that far more than the historical relationship between "imperial" China and a "tributary" state was involved. What, then, were the key components of the Chinese decision?

The Cambodia-Vietnam conflict, along with Hanoi's propensity for closer ties with Moscow, created a situation which became intolerable to Chinese interests and which required positive action. Vietnam refused to become a party to Beijing's "anti-hegemony" united front directed against the Soviet Union following the United States military withdrawal from Indochina in April 1975. In Cambodia, a radical, ultra-nationalist communist state under Pol Pot struck out against its own people and its Vietnamese neighbor, which it had long feared and distrusted. Cambodia's hostility toward Hanoi threatened Vietnam's socialist reconstruction and forced Hanoi to take action. Supported by the Soviet Union, Vietnam's actions in Indochina would come to be perceived in Beijing as an unacceptable threat to its national interests. Indeed, there are many parallels between the way Vietnam reacted to Cambodia and the way China reacted to Vietnam.

As the Cambodia-Vietnam conflict escalated, Beijing would eventually decide that only the use of military force would suffice to remedy the situation. In

1975 Beijing had adopted a carrot-and-stick policy toward Vietnam, holding out the promise of aid and assistance while taking a strong "anti-hegemonist" position. Beijing's domestic turmoil and instability in 1976 and early 1977, however, complicated its ability to measure the direction and implications of the escalating conflict in Indochina. From Zhou Enlai's (Chou Enlai) death in January 1976 through the purge of Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-ping), the death of Mao, the rise and fall of the "Gang of Four," and the coming to power of the moderates under Hua Guofeng (Hua Kuo-feng) in October, Chinese decision-making was fragmented. Even after Deng's rehabilitation in July 1977, his primary concern was to broaden his political base and introduce the bold new economic and administrative reforms (the four modernizations) intended to make China a modern nation. Between mid-1977 and mid-1978, Beijing continued its carrot-and-stick policy toward Vietnam, even after Hanoi had committed itself to a hardline anti-China position. The Vietnamese crackdown on overseas Chinese in Vietnam in March 1978, Vietnam's entry into the Soviet-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in June, severe Vietnamese military pressure on Cambodia in June and July, and conflict on the Sino-Vietnamese border precipitated a crisis in Sino-Vietnamese relations. At the same time, the growing spectre of Soviet involvement in the crisis motivated Beijing to change its policy toward Vietnam.

The decision to respond to Soviet-Vietnamese "hegemonism" with a limited use of military force was motivated by Beijing's desire to avoid forcing the Soviet Union into becoming directly involved militarily in the Sino-Vietnamese conflict and by a desire to avoid those actions which might undermine China's long-range goals of detente with Japan, the United States, and the Third World. During the latter half of 1978 Deng continued to consolidate his political power base in China while moving by diplomatic means to improve China's

international position in order to support his programs to strengthen and modernize China. Vietnam's hostility and "collusion" with the Soviet Union was perceived in Beijing as a serious and immediate threat to China's national security and Deng's modernization efforts. Finally, the Soviet-Vietnamese peace and friendship treaty in November 1978, Vietnam's formation of a Kampuchean united front and its attack on Cambodia in December, and the overthrow of the Pol Pot regime in January 1979 set the stage for the implementation of China's decision to attack. Following the normalization of relations between China and the United States in January, and Deng's visit to the U.S. in early February, the Chinese crossed the border.

The invasion, which lasted less than a month, was essentially a demonstration of China's determination to oppose Vietnamese and Soviet expansionism and hegemonism in Southeast Asia. Beijing wanted to make it clear to Moscow, Hanoi and the world that it would not stand by and permit Moscow to "place too many pawns on the World's chessboard." In the minds of Chinese leaders, China's credibility as a world power and its legitimacy as the leader of the Third World were at stake. In an attempt to reinforce its credibility and in the hope of modifying Vietnamese behavior, China engaged in a manner of force diplomacy such as it has employed on several occasions in the past, going back to the Korean War.

The significance of this study in endeavoring to estimate the immediate and long range effects of the China-Vietnam conflict in terms of China's international development and national security is clear. Chinese domestic and foreign policies are intimately related. When the power center is fragmented, foreign policy is far less effective. Nevertheless, China acted as any other nation might have acted to preserve its national security interests. The risks in attacking Vietnam were measured against the possible gains and carefully weighed in terms of its implications on China's overall domestic and foreign policy.

II - THE ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT

The Traditional Perspective

Those who have studied Chinese and Vietnamese history are always quick to point out that there is a long history of conflict between these two countries. At times of internal weakness in China, Vietnam has traditionally tossed off the bonds of a tributary state and expanded its own empire within the region known as Indochina. After consolidating its affairs under a new dynasty, China would respond by sending out expeditionary armies to reassert its suzerainty over its independent-minded southern neighbor. This historical process has led many analysts to adopt a shorthand to explain the dynamics of this relationship. Vietnam is seen as an inherently virile, expansionist military state. China is labeled a Confucian "father state" seeking ever to reestablish moral harmony between tributary buffer states and the "Middle Kingdom."

The temptation to reduce contemporary Sino-Vietnamese relations to this kind of shorthand is strong, but doing so obscures the many complex variables that are actually at work. The historical traditions no doubt color the perceptions of Chinese and Vietnamese leaders but they are not completely deterministic. In the case of the 1979 invasion of Vietnam by China, the variables which influenced Chinese and Vietnamese decision makers appear to be more closely related to contemporary international political realities than to traditional trends. Indeed, it can be argued that China and Vietnam have acted in much the same manner that any nation in similar circumstances might have acted.

Vietnam and China's "Anti-Hegemony" Foreign Policy

In many respects, the year 1975 is the benchmark for most of the decisions that led to the Sino-Vietnamese war.

In 1975 Zhou Enlai, the architect of China's foreign policy for decades, lay on his deathbed slowly succumbing to cancer. He appeared briefly in January at the Fourth National People's Congress (NPC), to oversee the election of his chosen successor, Deng Xiaoping, to the post of First Deputy Premier of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Chief of Staff of the PLA. Throughout 1975 Deng would attempt to carry forward the policies which Zhou had formulated in the post-Cultural Revolution period. The previous year Deng had expounded the most important of these at the United Nations. The "Three Worlds" thesis, proclaiming that China no longer acknowledged the existence of the "socialist camp," was a declaration that China would take upon itself the leadership of the Third (developing) World in its struggle against the hegemony of the imperialists (the United States) and the social imperialists (the Soviet Union.)¹ This policy was another manifestation of Beijing's efforts to marshal the widest possible united front against its "main enemy" - Moscow.²

For Deng and Zhou in 1975, the successful implementation of this counter-encirclement strategy heavily depended on creating a nucleus of Asian socialist states to build upon.³ Other states in Latin America and Africa could not be won to the Chinese side without a credible bandwagon effect. Zhou's earlier efforts to tilt the non-aligned nations movement and the Afro-Asian solidarity conferences had been generally unsuccessful for the lack of such momentum.

In the spring of 1975 the sudden collapse of the Lon Nol and Thieu regimes in Cambodia and South Vietnam caught China somewhat unprepared. Beijing had been urging Hanoi to proceed more gradually with its major offensives since 1972, citing the need for greater development of the Maoist "people's war" movement in South Vietnam. Furthermore, the Chinese, now on much better terms with the United States, were in no hurry to see North and South Vietnam reunited. Since the early 1970's China had grown increasingly apprehensive about the role

that an independent, unified, and resurgent Vietnam would play in a Southeast Asia where American influence was dwindling.

During the summer of 1975 Deng visited France, the Philippines, and Thailand and had been successful in persuading both Ferdinand Marcos and Khukrit to include the now familiar "anti-hegemony" clause (a Chinese codeword for anti-Sovietism) in the communiqués establishing diplomatic relations. In August Prince Sihanouk signed a similar anti-hegemony statement on behalf of Cambodia. In an attempt to maintain this momentum, Chinese Vice-Premier Chen Xilian (Chen Hsi-lien) was sent to Hanoi the following month to lay the groundwork for a joint Sino-Vietnamese anti-hegemony communiqué.

Le Duan, Secretary General of the Vietnamese Workers Party, arrived in Beijing on September 22. He had come to claim the promises Zhou had made in 1973 to extend aid to Hanoi for another five years. Beijing greeted him warmly, but Le Duan apparently refused to sign an anti-hegemony statement in exchange for such aid. Le Duan departed Beijing without hosting a reciprocal banquet and without the usual joint communiqué. A month later he showed up in Moscow, where he received promises of reconstruction aid, and supported Moscow's foreign policy line in a joint communiqué.

By the end of 1975, Sino-Vietnamese relations were cool but not antagonistic. The state bureaucracy under Zhou and Deng appeared to have decided on a carrot-and-stick policy, intended to maintain a strong stance against closer Hanoi-Moscow relations while holding out the promise of assistance, which Hanoi needed to rebuild its war-torn economy. The events of the following year, however, made it extremely difficult for Beijing to implement this policy successfully. In 1976 China entered a period of great internal turbulence. Zhou died in January. Deng was formally purged from his posts in April. After a brief ascendancy of the radicals under the Gang of Four, Mao died in September and

a coup led by the moderate faction under Acting Premier Hua Guofeng and aging Marshal Ye Jianying (Yeh Chien-ying) took control in October. Although not as disrupted as it had been during the Cultural Revolution, Chinese foreign policy in 1976 was concerned only with the most pressing and immediate issues. Southeast Asia was not yet in this category.

Continuing Conflict in Indochina

The expectation that the reunification of North and South Vietnam and the overthrow of the Lon Nol government in Phnom Penh in April 1975 would mean an end to more than 30 years of war in Indochina was quickly shattered. Hanoi soon became involved in a series of escalating crises with its socialist neighbor, the Democratic Republic of Kampuchea (Cambodia).

Within weeks of these communist victories, Vietnam and Cambodia were on the verge of violent confrontation. In June their troops clashed over contested islands in the Gulf of Thailand. It was no coincidence that these islands had been on the verge of development by Western oil companies. Socialist solidarity notwithstanding, national interests made control of the seabed vital. Neither state had any short-term hopes of developing other significant export industries in their ravaged economies.

In an attempt to sort out their new relationship, Pol Pot visited Hanoi in June and Le Duan made a visit to Phnom Penh in August. Vietnam sought a "special relationship" because, as one Vietnamese official later explained, "there is not another example in history of such a relationship where the two people have shared each grain of rice, every bullet, suffering and victory."⁴ The new Pol Pot regime rejected this idea because it resembled too much the old Indochinese Communist Party relationship, through which the Vietnamese had dominated the Cambodian and Laotian communist parties in the 1930's and 1940's. Cambodia demanded a "normal" relationship between equals, which

Vietnam rejected as inadequate. The belief in Phnom Penh that Hanoi was seeking to establish an "Indochinese federation," although consistently denied by Vietnam, took root and grew rapidly following Hanoi's call for a special relationship. This distrust would lead to the breakdown, in May 1976, of the last peacetime talks between Hanoi and Phnom Penh over their border disputes.

Inside Cambodia, Pol Pot's government had initiated radical domestic reforms that resulted, among other things, in the mass evacuation of its cities and the brutal purge of a major portion of its population. These draconian measures were apparently prompted by a severe paranoia in the leadership that pro-Western and pro-Vietnamese "spies and criminals" were seeking to overthrow their government before it could establish itself. The new leaders, of peasant origin, were also convinced that the forced establishment of communes was the only way the new socialist Kampuchea could feed itself. This warped world view, however, would scarcely have been sufficient to lead to a confrontation with Vietnam had not the upheavals that followed in its wake poured out across its borders. The Cambodian government was not able to stem the mass exodus of its people in spite of setting up "free-fire" zones several kilometers deep along its ill-defined borders with Thailand and Vietnam. By 1978 over 150,000 refugees had swarmed into southern Vietnam, creating massive squatter camps in and around Ho Chi Minh City.⁵ Besides being an enormous economic burden, these refugees complicated Hanoi's own efforts to set up "new economic zones" in the border areas. Hanoi was unable to divorce its economic reconstruction program in the south from the explosive situation along its border with Cambodia.

By early 1977 Vietnam found itself enmeshed in a growing crisis with its intractable neighbor to the west. From March to May Cambodian forces staged several serious border incidents, shelling border towns and accelerating the flood of refugees. In June Hanoi proposed high-level talks to de-escalate the

tensions. When Phnom Penh turned the proposal down, Hanoi sent its defense minister, General Giap, to Beijing in an attempt to seek Chinese assistance to resolve the difficulties. In Beijing Giap emphasized Sino-Vietnamese friendship:

We will never forget the lofty and fine deeds of the Chinese people who, in the spirit of proletarian internationalism, supported the Vietnamese people in their resistance against the French colonialists and U.S. imperialists.⁶

Giap's overtures, lacking any commitment to an anti-Soviet stance, did not win any promises from the Chinese, who were neither inclined nor able to exert leverage on Hanoi's behalf. On his return from Beijing, Giap personally inspected Vietnamese defenses along the Cambodian front.

In May Hanoi reasserted its independence by promulgating a 200-mile territorial zone in the South China Sea that encompassed the Paracels and the Spratlys, laying claim to their oil-rich seabeds, which until 1975 Hanoi had acknowledged to be Chinese.⁷ Along the Sino-Vietnamese border, Vietnamese and Chinese troops were engaged in frequent rock-throwing incidents, harassment of border guards, and the movement of the 300-odd border markers back and forth 50 to 100 meters during the night. It is unclear, at this point, to what extent the deteriorating situation between Cambodia and Vietnam contributed to the deterioration of relations between China and Vietnam, but in the summer of 1977 Hanoi found itself increasingly at odds with both Beijing and Phnom Penh.

Chinese leaders were particularly disturbed with Hanoi in July when Hanoi signed a long-term peace and friendship treaty with Laos, which sanctioned a 40,000 man Vietnamese occupation army on Laotian territory. These forces served as a blocking force which could prevent any direct Chinese troop movements down the road the Chinese were building in Laos toward Cambodia or Thailand. They were also putting pressure on the easily malleable communist

government in Vientiane to adopt a pro-Vietnamese position vis-a-vis Chinese interests. This diplomatic maneuver along with the growing tensions along the Sino-Vietnamese border, was particularly unsettling for the Chinese, who were at the time deeply involved in their own domestic political problems.

III - PERCEPTIONS AND POLICIES

The development and implementation of a nation's foreign policy is a complex process which involves taking into account the interrelationship of a broad spectrum of independent and dependent variables relating to the problems at hand. When a nation is responding to the circumstances and events leading up to a potential crisis, it is imperative that a nation's decision-making body have a clear picture of the advantages and risks involved in each of several policy options. In the case of China's response to Vietnam's growing hostility and increasing partnership with the Soviet Union, the ability of Beijing's decision-makers to select a policy that would result in the modification of Hanoi's behavior was complicated by several factors. Domestically, the Chinese leadership was involved in what was perhaps the most serious succession struggle in its history. The Maoist and moderate factions were engaged in a bitter battle over who would determine the direction of Chinese domestic and foreign policy for decades to come. In mid and late 1977 it was not at all clear how serious the Vietnam-Cambodia border conflict would become. Although relations between Beijing and Hanoi had deteriorated considerably, Beijing still apparently believed that its carrot-and-stick policy would bring Hanoi around. Finally, the involvement of the Soviet Union in Vietnam had yet to become the serious problem for the Chinese that it would become when Hanoi and Moscow signed a treaty of peace and friendship in November 1978.

Throughout the last half of 1977 and the first few months of 1978, then, the major factors that Beijing had to take into consideration did not appear to be approaching a crisis stage. Meanwhile, domestic political considerations were more pressing.

The Rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping and the Four Modernizations

With Zhou's death and Deng's purge in early 1976, the decision-making structure in Beijing fragmented. Even with the death of Mao in September and the purge of the Gang of Four in October, the new leadership under Hua Guofeng had failed to establish an effective political base. By early 1977 the economy was in chaos, food was scarce in parts of the country, the railroad system had all but come to a stop, and the campaign to purge supporters of the Gang of Four had become bloody without approaching a conclusion. As a result, very little national-level attention was being paid to any but the most critical external problems.⁸

The decision to rehabilitate Deng at the Third Plenum of the 10th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (July 16-22, 1977), came as a result of two factors: (1) strong lobbying on his behalf by Wei Guoqing (Wei Kuo-ching) and Xu Shiyou (Hsu Shih-yu), leaders in southern China, and (2) recognition in the Politburo that only Deng had a strong enough political base throughout the country to restore order, having coalesced the old opponents of Lin Biao. His rehabilitation had been bitterly argued all spring because many members of the Politburo and the Central Committee, including Chairman Hua, had participated in Mao's "deepen the criticism of Deng" campaign in 1976. Deng's reemergence marked the beginning of a slow but steady centralization of authority and decision-making.

For the month after his reemergence, Deng would have little time for much else than domestic politicking. It was critically important, if Deng were to

carry out his bold new programs, that his own supporters get elected to the 11th Party Congress to be held in August. His success in these efforts resulted in 55 percent of the entire 10th Central Committee members being dropped and a majority of the new members being rehabilitated cadres who shared Deng's pragmatic approach to party policies.⁹

First on Deng's list of priorities was to reintroduce the "four modernizations" policy that Zhou Enlai had first introduced at the Fourth National People's Congress (NPC) in 1975. The primary objective of the four modernizations (agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology) was to make China a modern industrial nation by the turn of the century. This policy was an outgrowth of an earlier confrontation between the radicals and the moderates following the Cultural Revolution. The magnitude of the task was enormous. Not only would China have to make up for long years of isolation, during which its general level of technology had fallen 20 years behind the West, but China would have to heal the deep scars left over from the bitter years of the Cultural Revolution and the maneuverings of the Gang of Four. Virtually no sector of the economy or the society had been untouched. The memories of these years were still fresh in the minds of every Chinese. Deng had to overcome psychological as well as visible obstacles. Furthermore, radicals and supporters of the "gang" were still a force to be dealt with.

As 1977 came to a close, Deng made significant strides in consolidating his power. With his close political ally, Wei Guoqing, installed as head of the Political Department of the PLA in October, a new Central Committee behind him, and another round of purges and executions in progress through the provinces to eliminate non-supportive officials and radicals, he had the power centers sufficiently in hand to look outside China's borders. In September he sent a high-level military delegation to France, the highest ever to leave

China for the West since 1949, to shop for modern weapons. The same month he announced to the world that China had successfully tested missiles with nuclear warheads. For the first time since Mao's death, China began to move forward under an effective leader.

At the same time, however, the border conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam was escalating and tensions were mounting on the Sino-Vietnamese border. The Chinese leadership at first had been slow to react to the oncoming crisis, but as Deng consolidated his position and initiated economic and administrative reforms to support the new modernization program, he viewed the hostility of the Vietnamese and the spectre of Soviet involvement in Southeast Asia increasingly as serious threats to his fourfold modernization drive.¹⁰

The growing problem with Vietnam threatened China's modernization campaign in two ways. China needed time to develop its economic base upon which its industrial and military establishments could grow. A strong, independent Vietnam with Cambodia and Laos firmly in its camp and linked to Moscow in a "military alliance" directed against China, would confront Beijing with a new and more serious military threat. China would be forced early-on to devote ever increasing resources into the military sphere in order to cope with this threat. This in turn would deprive other spheres (agriculture, industry, science and technology) of resources needed for development and would in the long-run slow the entire modernization program. In addition to the external threat, domestically Deng was faced with the challenge of broadening his base of political support and dealing with those who opposed his bold new policies. As the Sino-Vietnamese relations approached a crisis, Deng would come under increasing pressure at home to deal with the problem in a manner which would be accepted by critics and supporters alike. If Deng's policies toward Vietnam and Moscow failed to secure China's interests, Deng risked losing

his base of support. Because the four modernizations program was primarily a "Deng show," with Deng gone the modernization program most probably would not survive.

Escalation of the Cambodia-Vietnam Border Conflict

On September 24, 1977, four Cambodian divisions attacked along the border of Tay Ninh Province, killing over 1,000 Vietnamese civilians, by Hanoi's count, between the end of September and early November. As the Cambodian forces dug in on the Vietnamese side of the border, another flood of Cambodian and Vietnamese refugees streamed into Ho Chi Minh City and the surrounding countryside. Four days after the assault had begun, Pol Pot arrived in Beijing to participate in National Day festivities, giving Hanoi the impression that China supported the invasion. Chinese weapons and ammunition had made the assault possible, and Pol Pot received no public rebuke for the attack while in Beijing.

The Vietnamese withheld their counterattack, which seems to have been planned since at least early summer, until Pol Pot returned to Phnom Penh on October 4. The counterattack, 13 divisions strong, mauled the invading Cambodian forces. As the Vietnamese pushed the Cambodians back across the border, Hanoi sent its top negotiator, Phan Hien, to Beijing for two weeks of talks. The following month, November, Le Duan himself, the top Vietnamese party leader, headed a delegation to Beijing. The visit received "cordial" and "friendly" greetings, the last time the veneer of friendship was to be applied for Vietnamese leaders.¹¹

On December 31, Phnom Penh and Hanoi broke diplomatic relations. On the following day Vietnamese forces began a major offensive into Cambodia, driving 30 to 40 kilometers before stopping, reportedly because of a warning from Beijing that further advance risked a direct confrontation with China. At this point Hanoi still seemed to shy away from such a confrontation. Beijing

responded to the Vietnamese drive into Cambodia by airlifting critical ammunition to Phnom Penh and by stepping up deliveries of heavy armaments (artillery and aircraft), to two shiploads a week.¹²

Beijing continued its carrot-and-stick policy toward Hanoi through 1977. Over 60 aid projects continued in progress, although Beijing refused to step up aid needed for Vietnam's postwar reconstruction until Hanoi fell in line. Hanoi's economy was in severe straits, with rice rations dropping toward the subsistence level as floods and other dislocations dropped production below pre-liberation levels.¹³ It no doubt occurred to Beijing that the cost of countering Cambodian belligerence might be the straw to break the back of Vietnamese intransigence. In fact, it only pushed Vietnam closer to Moscow, as Beijing would soon realize.

Beijing and Hanoi Commit to Forward Strategies

Until 1978, the actions of both Vietnam and China were severely limited. Vietnam had attempted to avoid full-scale hostilities with Cambodia and China was circumspect in dealing with Vietnam. As the year began both China and Vietnam shifted to more active policies, leading to increasing friction. A fatal interplay of forward policies began.

In January a National Conference on overseas Chinese in Beijing issued a proclamation:

We (Chinese) adopt a policy of uniting with those overseas Chinese who belong to the bourgeoisie. As to those who still harbor misgivings about the motherland and are even hostile to us, we should likewise work energetically among them....¹⁴

This proclamation aroused deep suspicion in Hanoi. After putting off the socialization of southern Vietnam's economy for almost three years, the Vietnamese leadership was about to close down the thriving private market system, still dominated by "overseas Chinese bourgeoisie." The proclamation from

Beijing expressing solidarity with these "capitalists" made Hanoi aware that confrontation with Beijing, whether over Pol Pot's regime, their border disputes, the overseas Chinese, or any combination of the above, was becoming increasingly difficult to avoid.

Also in January Deng took time to make a six-day visit to Burma and a three-day visit to Nepal, apparently to take political soundings in these two neutral states on China's periphery. Zhou Enlai's widow, Deng Yingchao (Teng Ying-Chao), was sent with a Foreign Ministry delegation to Cambodia. The new Beijing leadership found that respect for Chinese influence had slipped and that its neighbors were impressed by Soviet gains in Africa and elsewhere. The need for a more active stance became obvious.

On February 16, China and Japan signed a non-governmental agreement for an eight-year trade agreement for \$20 billion. On February 23, the Central Committee of the CCP announced an ambitious 10-year plan to implement China's modernization goals and make China a modern industrial nation by the year 2000. And on February 25, the Fifth NPC opened with a speech by Premier Hua which committed China to an active opposition to the Soviet Union:

But so far as the overall situation is concerned, there is a strategic task common to the people the world over, and that is to consolidate and expand the international united front against hegemonism.¹⁵

Hua went on to accuse the West of accelerating the approach of world war by appeasing the Soviet "social-imperialists," and of having "the fond hope of saving themselves at the expense of others." If the West could not stop the Soviet hegemonists, China and those who resisted Russia would. "Our attitude toward a new world war is: 'First, we are against it; second, we are not afraid of it.'"¹⁶ In short, Beijing had come to the conclusion that Western impotence over Soviet encroachments in Africa and elsewhere, along with its policy of detente and disarmament in Europe, would enable Soviet armed forces

to shift to the eastern frontier, gravely threatening China's security. China was going on record as being committed to checking Soviet global expansion, and was inviting others to join in an international united front to stop the Kremlin, Siad Barre, president of Somalia, then fighting Soviet advisors and Cuban forces in Africa, was entertained in Beijing a month after the conference. A series of high-level Chinese delegations were scheduled to cover Africa for the rest of the year.

At the same time Vietnam was also embarking on a more active policy course. In February Hanoi offered Phnom Penh a three-point peace proposal calling for: (1) an immediate ceasefire with international supervision; (2) a 10-kilometer demilitarized zone, each side pulling back five kilometers; and (3) a border agreement and a peace and friendship treaty. The Pol Pot regime rejected this proposal, insisting talks could not begin until Vietnam proved its good intentions by "not firing a shot" for seven months. Hanoi termed the response "ridiculous" and convened a secret Central Committee meeting in Hanoi.¹⁷

According to Far Eastern Economic Review correspondent Nayan Chanda, it was at this Central Committee meeting that Hanoi decided to go ahead with the training of a Cambodian refugee "army" to overthrow the Pol Pot government.¹⁸ Other major decisions apparently made at this meeting involved the economic integration and socialization of the reunited south and a crackdown on "bourgeois trade" and "capitalist elements" primarily in the Chinese Cholon section of Ho Chi Minh City. The Central Committee seems to have also approved closer contracts with Moscow and the buildup of forces along the Chinese border. After the meeting, it was rumored that General Giap flew to Vientiane to talk with visiting Soviet Deputy Defense Minister Pavlovsky. Le Duc Tho toured the Cambodian border commands, briefing them on Politburo decisions, as he had done before major offensives in 1968, 1972, and 1975.

The Sino-Vietnamese Dispute Becomes a Crisis

Relations between China and Vietnam deteriorated rapidly during the first months of 1978. In February Chinese and Vietnamese forces had clashed at Don Van and Mong Cai, with 30 Vietnamese reported killed at Mong Cai. The propaganda war heated up quickly, with both sides charging the other with border violations, which occurred with increasing frequency. Then on March 24, Hanoi implemented a program, decided on at the Central Committee meeting in February, cracking down on the "bourgeois trade" and "capitalist elements" in Cholon and Hanoi. The primary targets of this campaign were the ethnic (overseas) Chinese traders and merchants in Cholon, who controlled the wholesale rice trade and had continued to trade in gold and foreign currency after the fall of Saigon in 1975. This included Chinese engaged in both legitimate and illegitimate banking and commercial interests. Hanoi also cracked down on the traders and shopkeepers, mostly Chinese, who dominated that city's small private sector.

Within days a mass exodus of the Chinese living in Vietnam had begun and within weeks serious fighting was reported on the China-Vietnam border. On April 30 Liao Chengzhi, long-time head of China's Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau, expressed concern over the increasing numbers of overseas Chinese trying to return to their homeland from Vietnam and promised them protection. On May 4, Xuan Thuy charged that Chinese subversive groups were spreading horror stories in Vietnamese cities to aggravate tensions, and that the rumor-mongers were causing the exodus. By the end of May Beijing's propaganda machine dropped any semblance of restraint and began accusing Vietnam of atrocities against the overseas Chinese. The pro-communist press in Hong Kong initiated charges that Vietnam was carrying out such "Moscow's designs," and becoming a "second Cuba," by giving the Soviets a base at Cam Ranh Bay (themes which the Beijing press soon picked up on). On May 27 Hanoi's

foreign minister called for an end to polemics and proposed early talks. On June 9, the Chinese Foreign Ministry rejected the call for talks and announced a major cutback on aid to Vietnam, claiming that money had to be diverted to settle the mass of Chinese refugees that had been robbed and brutalized by Vietnam.

As May came to a close, Beijing dispatched two ships from Guangzhou (Canton) to pick up Chinese "victims" of Vietnamese "persecution" at Haiphong and Ho Chi Minh City. Hanoi flatly refused to permit the ships to land, standing on its right to control emigration. After two months, the ships finally returned to Guangzhou without having picked up any refugees. On June 16, China announced it was closing the Vietnamese consulates in Kunming, Nanning, and Guangzhou, ostensibly in retaliation for Hanoi's footdragging in responding to Beijing's requests for Chinese consulates in Ho Chi Minh City, Haiphong, and Da Nang. Although China professed concern about its rights to look after the sizeable Chinese populations in these areas, each capital was probably trying to prevent the other from observing significant military preparations along their common border.

Claiming that the Chinese were reinforcing their border, the Vietnamese strengthened their own border forces, reorganized the military command in the border area with more senior cadres, and purged pro-Chinese generals. In mid-June the newly reorganized Vietnamese army began a major military thrust into eastern Cambodia, seemingly aimed less at taking territory than at chewing up Cambodia's modest army. Heavy air strikes and artillery barrages were to continue all summer and fall. Despite solid resistance by the Cambodian forces, Vietnamese cannon-fodder tactics inexorable ate up Cambodian reserves. As the Cambodian army became hard pressed, a wave of an estimated 53,000 Cambodian refugees slipped through the cordon into Vietnam, trying to avoid

the mayhem of war and Pol Pot's excesses. The emigre army in Vietnam grew steadily larger under the command of So Phim, who had been a Pol Pot army leader until he mutinied in May 1978 after an alleged coup attempt.

Vietnam, hard-pressed by the costs of its war with Cambodia and experiencing a catastrophic flooding of its ricelands, needed ever-increasing amounts of assistance. On June 28 Hanoi announced it was joining the Soviet-controlled Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA), the Soviet bloc equivalent of Western Europe's Common Market. The move reflected Moscow's efforts to share the increasing financial burden of support to Vietnam with other CEMA members. The price of greater help by the Soviet Union was the abandonment of Hanoi's pretense of neutrality between its two communist benefactors. On July 2, Beijing responded to this action by terminating the last of its 60-odd economic aid programs to Vietnam. The CEMA countries picked up less than a dozen of these. Hanoi's efforts to seek U.S. assistance and investments to bolster its economy were shied away from by the United States, which refused to normalize relations with Hanoi, even after Hanoi dropped its insistence on war reparations in July.¹⁹ Cut off from Chinese aid because of the ever deteriorating relations between Hanoi and Beijing, and refused U.S. assistance, Vietnam had turned again to Moscow. Unlike previous years, Hanoi would find it much more difficult to resist Moscow's pressure for "base rights" and similar concessions by playing Moscow and Beijing off against each other.

June and July were months of serious stock-taking in Beijing. Vietnam's offensive in Cambodia had undermined Beijing's earlier confidence that they could "bleed" Vietnam by a drawn-out struggle on foreign soil against a hostile population. It was becoming clear that the Cambodian army could not long survive the heightened level of conflict.

Domestically, Deng was encountering problems overcoming inertia. Despite the rehabilitation of about 110,000 persons who had been detained for periods of as far back as the 1950's, local and regional officials were dragging their feet over full rehabilitation. They were concerned about old scores being settled, about competition for jobs, and about the viability of Deng's new policies. The rapid zig-zags of Beijing politics made many wary of going as far as Deng was pushing them.

In July Deng issued, over his own signature, the "July 4 Important Instruction." Its exact contents were not revealed publicly, but it started a new purge of Gang of Four sympathizers, particularly in Beijing, Tianjin (Tientsin), and Guangzhou. Top Deng supporters such as Wei Guoqing and Xu Shiyou went back to their home regions to supervise the execution of this instruction. By the end of the summer Deng's rehabilitation program, his "seek truth from facts" campaign, and his control over regional and local bureaucracies were well established.²⁰ Deng's political bandwagon was moving throughout the country, giving him the clout he needed for the final showdown with his politburo opponents in the fall.

His political debts to Wei and Xu were also increasing, however. By late summer the economic burdens of settling and providing for 160,000 refugees, with more expected, were putting a heavy strain on Wei's and Xu's political base in the drought-stricken southern provinces. Deng was forced to pay greater attention to the growing crisis in the south. Vietnam had become a major domestic issue as well as a foreign policy problem.

China and the Soviet Union

Until China assumed its active anti-Soviet stance in March, Soviet leaders appear to have been hopeful that a rapprochement could be reached with Mao's successors. The lull in active diplomacy in 1976 and 1977, coupled with clear

signs of factional differences, led the Soviets to believe that there might be elements in Beijing willing to seek better relations, despite the antagonistic official rhetoric. This hope was probably whetted by a brief warming on the Chinese side in November 1977, when Foreign Minister Huang Hua showed up at the Soviet Embassy reception celebrating its National Day, the first time a high Chinese official had done so in 10 years. Following up on this opening, the Supreme Soviet sent a let-by-gones-be-by-gones letter to its Chinese counterpart, the Fifth NPC, in February 1978. Hua, however, delivered an anti-Soviet diatribe at the Congress and in March the NPC sent an official note to the U.S.S.R. condemning the Soviets for failing to keep alleged past promises (such as demilitarizing Mongolia) and called for "real deeds, not hollow words."²¹ At the same time the Chinese extended the period of military conscription for each of the services by one year. In apparent reaction to these signs of renewed hostility, Soviet President Brezhnev and his defense minister made a highly publicized tour of Soviet military commands along the Chinese border from March 28 to April 9.

Chinese hostility increased Soviet interest in Vietnam. When Sino-Vietnamese relations plummeted over the overseas Chinese issue in May, the Kremlin obligingly dispatched a naval task force (two Kresta II's, one Krivak, and one Kashin destroyer) to exercise in the Philippine Sea, a short steam from the contested Paracel and Spratly archipelagoes. On May 11 a serious shooting incident erupted on the Sino-Soviet border, recalling similar incidents in March 1969. Belated, vague Soviet excuses about "chasing a prisoner" did not dispel the impression that heavy pressure had been brought to bear on China at a time when China was beginning to bear down on Vietnam.

Two other events occurred in May which no doubt heightened Soviet concerns and further tinged Sino-Soviet relations.

On May 5, Premier Hua Goufeng started his first trip ever outside China by visiting Pyongyang. North Korea's Kim Il-sung, who had committed a sizeable Korean aid program to Pol Pot, for the first time adopted a public position that fell only slightly short of espousing Beijing's "anti-hegemonist" line. Addressing a rally welcoming Hua with words about "dominationalists," Kim said:

Imperialism and other dominationalist forces are engaged in a furious scramble to draw the third-world countries into the sphere of their domination by estranging them from each other and dividing them, and resort to crafty schemings to disorganize the non-aligned movement and the world revolutionary forces . . . The non-aligned countries . . . must not allow the imperialist, colonialist, and dominationalist forces to set foot in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.²²

The Vietnam-Cambodia war promised to provide Beijing a major dividend by putting Pyongyang on China's side against the Soviet Union on this issue.

Also in May, President Carter's national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski visited Beijing. His hardline anti-Soviet ("polar bear" threat) statements won him a much warmer reception than moderate Secretary of State Vance had received the previous year. Brzezinski and Deng held extended discussions about the world situation, after which they publicly stated that they were in agreement. Speculation that Brzezinski may have given all or part of a Top Secret strategic assessment (Presidential Review Memorandum 10) to Deng led Moscow to warn the U.S. against sharing intelligence information, such as satellite data on Soviet force deployments on the Chinese border.²³

IV - CHINA COMMITS TO ACTION

Beijing Clarifies Its Options

By mid-July 1978 Beijing was moving to clarify its options in Indochina. It was becoming evident to the Chinese leadership that its policies toward

Vietnam were failing to curb Moscow's and Hanoi's "hegemonistic" actions in Southeast Asia. Vietnam's entry into CEMA foretold ever increasing cooperation between Vietnam and the Soviet Union; Beijing may have even anticipated the eventual signing of the peace and friendship treaty between Moscow and Hanoi. An invitation was sent to Hanoi to set up talks on the deputy foreign minister level, in Hanoi if desired, to try and resolve differences. After having withdrawn its ambassador in the heat of the refugee crisis, Beijing was now ready to reestablish communications with Hanoi on a high level. The deputy foreign ministers met in Hanoi on August 8, and China's Deputy Foreign Minister Zhong Xidong, presented a proposal on overseas Chinese on August 19. Hanoi rejected the proposal. The talks dragged on with intensifying rhetoric paralleled by increasing violence along the border until the talks were terminated on September 26.

Pursuing a second option in July, Beijing sent a senior PLA officer to escort Cambodia's Deputy Premier for Defense, Son Sen, to China. During talks held from July 29 to August 6, amidst festivities for China's Army Day, Deng told Son Sen that China's aid would be to no avail if the Pol Pot regime did not win the support of its people. He encouraged the Cambodian leadership to liberalize the harsh domestic programs, to bring Prince Sihanouk out of house arrest and into a broad unified front, and to prepare for a "people's war" in the countryside in the event their army weakened any further.²⁴ The Pol Pot government, however, failed to follow Beijing's advice to link more closely the Cambodian government and the Cambodian people.

By early autumn Beijing came to realize that its policies had been based on two faulty assumptions. Since late 1977 it had assumed that the Cambodian army, with Chinese supplies and advisors, could tie down Vietnam in an inconclusive but costly border war. Vietnam's previous offensives in October and

January had not exceeded two weeks before tapering off. There had been major skirmishes since then, but Pol Pot's forces had managed to handle them. However, after four weeks of high-intensity operations starting in mid-June, Beijing was forced to admit that Hanoi was capable of sustaining the conflict at a level of intensity that would soon destroy the Cambodian army. The other assumption, that its pressure on a war-ravaged Vietnam would in the end force Hanoi to soften its position toward Beijing, had in fact pushed Hanoi steadily closer to Moscow. Recognition of its miscalculations played a large part in the reassessment of its military position and the readjustment of its international geo-political position.

In an attempt to maneuver into the most advantageous position from which to counter Soviet-Vietnamese "hegemony" in Asia, Beijing shifted a major portion of its efforts towards improving its relations with Japan, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the United States. Beijing sought to create a more favorable climate of international public opinion and to strengthen its international position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Vietnam. As Beijing was beginning to decide that only a bold military response would suffice to blunt Vietnam's "aggression" in Cambodia and demonstrate its opposition to Soviet-Vietnamese "collusion," it became essential to bolster its strategic position by seeking understanding from Japan, ASEAN, and the United States.

It is important to keep in mind, however, that the conclusion of a peace and friendship treaty with Japan and the normalization of relations with the United States--and steps to improve its general international position, especially with the key ASEAN states of peninsular Southeast Asia--were key components of Deng's strategy to modernize China. If China were successfully to meet the goal of the four modernizations, to make China a modern industrial

power by the year 2000, massive inputs of Western and Japanese capital and technology would be required. Between Deng's rehabilitation in July 1977 and August 1978, however, little progress had been made on these issues. Indeed, the normalization of relations with the United States and the peace and friendship with Japan had been "in the mill" since China's diplomatic detente with the West in 1972. Thus, the advancement of Sino-Japanese, Sino-American, and Sino-ASEAN relations would serve a double purpose. It would contribute to the four modernizations and it would improve China's ability to deal with the Soviet-Vietnamese problem in Indochina.

Diplomatic Activity Further Strengthens China's Geo-Political Position

In May China agreed to reopen talks with Japan on a peace and friendship treaty. The talks, which had begun in 1972, had been stalled by Japan's reluctance to antagonize the Soviet Union by accepting an "anti-hegemony" clause in the treaty stating: "neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region of the world and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish hegemony." Both sides were now anxious to resolve this issue; Japan because its premier was coming up for re-election and needed a foreign policy "success" and because of heightened Japanese concern over the Soviet military presence in Asia, and China because closer ties with Tokyo were part of its overall strategy for modernization and because of the increasing hostility with the Soviet Union and Vietnam. China and Japan worked out their differences on the anti-hegemony clause and concluded an agreement on August 12, 1978.

One of the motivating factors for Beijing to enter into the peace and friendship treaty at this time was to make it difficult for Tokyo to feint neutrality toward Beijing's and Moscow's escalating competition for influence in Southeast Asia. Not only would more cordial and friendly relations between

China and Japan enable China to obtain the technology and capital needed for the four modernizations, but the peace and friendship treaty might serve as a deterrent to increased Japanese-Vietnamese and Japanese-Soviet economic cooperation by forcing Japan eventually to choose between foregoing the benefits accruing from better relations with China or supporting Beijing's anti-hegemonist policies.

In an editorial in Peking Review on August 18, 1978 Beijing left no doubt as to the significance of the anti-hegemony clause. "At present, hegemony is on the rampage in the world, carrying on aggression, interference, expansion, and subversion everywhere . . . Therefore, opposition to hegemonism is a major task in the work of defending peace and an important part of the treaty."

(Emphasis added.) The anti-hegemony clause, included in Article II of the treaty, strengthened the Chinese anti-Soviet, anti-Vietnamese stance, but later proved to be embarrassing for Japan when China attacked Vietnam.

In August, just after the signing of the Sino-Japanese treaty, Premier Hua Guofeng made his much publicized trip to the Balkans and Iran. According to diplomatic sources in Beijing, the trip was encouraged by Deng, who wanted Hua exposed to the modern world outside China, the better to appreciate the huge technological gap that had to be closed. Hua's willingness to leave the country stilled foreign speculation that he and Deng were vying for the top position in the party, except in Moscow, which continued to insist that a severe factional struggle between the two was in progress. Nevertheless, Hua's sojourn into this area of primary Soviet interest was an attempt to improve Chinese relations with these countries and to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that China intended to oppose "hegemonism," and not just in Asia.

In September and October, Premier Pham Van Dong toured the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, promising along the way not to support

communist insurgencies in these countries. His attempts to forge closer ties with ASEAN were politely rebuffed.

In October Beijing also shifted its position on India. Having castigated India for twenty years as a "bully to its neighbors" and having conducted two limited territorial wars against India, the Beijing press now began to praise the Desai administration in New Delhi, which had been steadily moving away from the close ties with Moscow established by the Nehru government. India's Foreign Minister Vajpayee, scheduled to visit Beijing on October 27, postponed the trip due to "illness." The trip would be made later in February 1979.

On October 26, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued its first clear threat to Vietnam: "The Vietnamese authorities must shoulder all responsibility for the consequences arising from their encroachments upon Chinese territorial integrity and sovereignty." In a Xinhua commentary on the following day, headline, "How Much Further Will Hanoi Go?" Beijing signalled that it felt it was being pushed toward war:

Since mid-September the situation has gone from bad to worse. . . the Vietnamese authorities created an atmosphere of military tension by stepping up their war preparations in the border areas. . . With lies and fabrications, they have tried to confound right and wrong. . . For more than a month, Moscow openly incited Hanoi "to hit back" at China and declared that Vietnam "may today as it did yesterday count on the support of the Soviet Union." Moreover the Kremlin has vastly increased its sea and air shipments of arms and military equipment to Vietnam . . . On September 7, Hoang Son, member of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party, even intimated the threat of war saying: "We must admit to the existing danger of war (with China) and prepare to fight" . . . It is still China's hope that they will become a little sober. Should they obdurately persist in their border provocations, their threats of war, they will certainly become victims of their own evil deeds. Let's see how much further the Vietnamese authorities have decided to go.²⁵

November-December 1978

In the months of November and December 1978, a series of precedent-shattering events occurred which rapidly moved China and Vietnam and their respective allies to the brink of war.

On November 3, Le Duan and Brezhnev signed a 25-year peace and friendship treaty, stating in Article 6, "in the event that one of the parties is the object of an attack or threat of attack, the high contracting parties will immediately begin mutual consultations with a view to eliminating that threat and by taking appropriate and effective measures to ensure peace and security for their countries."²⁶ At the signing ceremony Le Duan made no evasions that the treaty was aimed at Beijing.

In an effort to prevent this development of events, imperialism and the forces of reaction are doing everything they can to stem the onward march of history. It is indicative that the reactionary grouping in Peking's ruling circles is knocking together forces wherever it can and creating a new alliance with imperialism and fascist toadies. . . .²⁷

From November 5 to 14, Deng toured the ASEAN border states (Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore), and made a brief stopover in Burma. Although the talks were "secret," the word quickly got out that Deng was probing ASEAN leaders on their position should the Pol Pot government fall to Vietnamese aggression. Talking to a group of Thai journalists, Deng openly mentioned the possibility of the fall of Phnom Penh and said, "If my expectation is correct Cambodia will then be completely overrun, and it will prove to the world what kind of regime the Vietnamese have. Then will be the time for ASEAN to play an important role in solving the problem."²⁸ From later events it appears that Deng also reached some kind of unpublicized and unacknowledged understanding with Thailand's Prime Minister Kriangsak over the movement of supplies for Pol Pot forces should a guerrilla war become necessary in Cambodia.

Deng went out of his way to seek favorable publicity, even to the point of attending a religious ceremony and meeting with the foreign press. When asked about Chinese support for insurgencies, Deng got a generally favorable response from the press for his frank reply in Bangkok: "I will not copy Pham Van Dong in lying (about supplying insurgents). Sincerity is the prerequisite for good relations among states."²⁹

As Deng moved through Southeast Asia, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firubin also toured the area. In his case, however, every effort was made to avoid publicity. At the same time a separate Chinese delegation met in Phnom Penh with Cambodian leaders. Headed by Wang Dongxing (Wang Tung-hsing), a specialist in security matters and including Hu Yaobang (Hu Yao-pang) (Deng's close friend and supporter), the delegation reportedly urged Pol Pot to prepare to evacuate Phnom Penh and start guerrilla fighting in the countryside.

Deng barely had gotten off the plane after returning to Beijing when he convened an extraordinary session of the enlarged Politburo. Borrowing a trick from Mao, he stacked the Politburo with supporters from the provinces and military regions and called the session an "enlarged working conference."³⁰ Deng adroitly manipulated the Beijing media, rallies, and wallposters, and his own backers in the Politburo to force self-criticism from Hua, Wang Dongxing, Wu De (Wu Teh) and others who had opposed his pragmatic policies for modernizing China. The incredible events of that fortnight (November 15-30) resulted in Deng's complete control of the party center and its policies. From this point on, Deng spoke without hesitation in formulating policies. Hua and his backers receded into secondary roles. A full plenum (the Third) of the 11th Central Committee was rapidly assembled in December to ratify Deng's policies and a mass campaign was conducted throughout China to indoctrinate the population on these policies, issued as a 19-point document under the heading "Deng and

Li's talks with foreign friends." From now on Deng could move quickly in high-risk areas without having to compromise with critics. Events would show that Deng was indeed ready to take high risks to make up for lost time.

In the midst of these events the war between Vietnam and Cambodia approached its climax. On December 3, Hanoi announced the formation of the Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS), taking the final steps to implement its decision to overthrow the Pol Pot regime made at the February Central Committee meeting. On 25 December, 100,000 Vietnamese regular army forces and nearly 20,000 KNUFNS forces invaded Cambodia and drove for Phnom Penh, entering the defenseless capital 15 days later. The remnants of the Pol Pot government and its Chinese advisors fled into the countryside or over the border into Thailand. China lodged protests with the Vietnamese Embassy in Beijing and with the United Nations, but before a more direct response could be undertaken there remained unfinished business in China's foreign relations.

China and the United States

On December 4 Deputy Foreign Minister Han Nianlong (Han Nien-lung) (substituting for Huang Hua, who was ill), called on U.S. Liaison Office chief Leonard Woodcock and indicated China was willing to make certain concessions on the terms for normalization of relations with the United States. Following a flurry of messages between Woodcock and Washington, a final agreement was reached by December 15 and announced with a joint communique, which included the familiar "anti-hegemony" statement. Premier Hua, in his press conference following the announcement of normalization, made clear Beijing's understanding of the new relationship: "The content of opposing hegemony is included in our joint communique. And this, I believe will contribute to the struggle in Asia and the world against both big and small hegemony. We oppose both global and regional hegemony. . ."³¹

Responding to the invitation issued by President Carter in early December, when the U.S. and China agreed to normalize relations, Deng departed on January 28, 1979, for a nine-day visit to the U.S. During his visit Deng had little to say publicly about Vietnam or its attack on Cambodia. He focused primarily on the "hegemonists" in Moscow. Cautious at first, Deng increasingly used his appearances as a forum for attacks on the Soviet Union. Deng did refer specifically to Vietnam when he told members of Congress that to safeguard China's borders and security "we need to act appropriately, we cannot allow Vietnam to run wild everywhere. In the interests of world peace and stability, and in the interests of our own country, we may be forced to do what we do not like to do."³² Deng concluded his trip on February 5, calling the visit "smooth" and "successful" and trailing an informal invitation for the United States to forsake detente with the Soviet Union and to join in an informal alliance with China against the Soviets.

On his way home, Deng visited Tokyo, again making statements that indicated Beijing's intent to invade Vietnam. During a visit with former Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda he said "the United States is allowing the Soviet Union to place a lot of pawns on the World's chessboard" and "things cannot be allowed to go on this way." Vietnam must be "punished" and China would have to apply "sanctions."

As in the case of the peace and friendship treaty with Japan, the normalization of relations with the United States was a key element in Deng's strategy for China's modernization, but pressing security matters dictated that Beijing adjust its timetable for accomplishment of this major foreign policy objective. There are several reasons why it was to China's advantage to complete normalization prior to its attack on Vietnam.

It is reasonable to conclude that Deng, a seasoned politician, wanted a face-to-face meeting with President Carter to judge the U.S. response to the

idea of an attack by China to "punish" Vietnam. Assistant Secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Richard Holbrooke, has stated that Deng, although he did not state it explicitly, left no doubt in President Carter's mind that China intended to attack Vietnam.³³ Since improved relations with the United States was a key element in Deng's modernization strategy, he wanted to be sure that China's attack would not severely impede the rapid progress that was being made in improving relations with the U.S. In fact, during Deng's trip his repeated references to the "big and small hegemonists" and statements indicating that China would have to "punish" Vietnam drew only mild responses from U.S. government officials and Congressmen. At no time did President Carter or any other member of the administration indicate that an attack by China on Vietnam would result in a slowdown in improving relations between the U.S. and China or that the U.S. might take some punitive action, economic or otherwise.

If China waited until after its attack on Vietnam, opponents of Beijing's conditions for normalization in the United States could point to Chinese "aggression" in Vietnam as a sign that China could not be trusted to rely on peaceful means to resolve the Taiwan problem. In addition, even if this domestic political opposition could be overcome in the wake of a Chinese attack, a delay until the spring or summer of 1979 might have found the Carter administration in a less receptive mood and, as the time for the U.S. presidential elections drew near, less willing to attempt to deal with this issue.

Finally, although Beijing probably placed little value on the ability of the United States to deter the Soviet Union from retaliating against China for an attack on Vietnam, normalization of relations between the U.S. and China and Washington's moderating counsel to Moscow apparently did serve as a counter-influence on the Soviet Union. Richard Holbrooke stated that during the weeks immediately preceding the attack, "we were in constant

communication with both Beijing and Moscow."³⁴ Communicating through Washington, Beijing could make its limited objectives known to Moscow along with Washington's concern that any Soviet action in response to China's attack would be of "great concern" to the United States. The relaxation of COCOM restrictions on the sale of arms by NATO countries in November 1977, the spectre of increasing technology transfers to China from the United States, and the normalization of relations between the U.S. and China, intended or not, gave Moscow the impression that the United States was "behind" China.

China Attacks

On February 11, just six days before the attack, Beijing rejected overtures by the Vietnamese calling for a cease-fire along the border and a United Nations supervised demilitarized zone on both sides of the border.

Finally, on February 17, Chinese forces, over 100,000 strong, attacked Vietnam along the entire border area. The same day, Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong, who had arrived in Phnom Penh just hours before the invasion began, went ahead with the planned signing of a 25-year peace and friendship treaty with the new Vietnam-supported Cambodian government. Included in the treaty were commitments for mutual defense against "international reactionary forces," legitimizing Vietnam's military presence in Cambodia.

Following China's initial thrust into Vietnam, the attack slowed on February 20 and there was a general battlefield lull lasting about two days. While many Western news agencies were suggesting that this lull was an indication that Chinese forces might soon withdraw from Vietnamese territory, this pause enabled Beijing to measure Hanoi's and the Soviet Union's responses to the attack and gave Hanoi an opportunity to "reassess" its position. Peking also later admitted to terrain intelligence problems during this initial phase.

In the initial attack, Chinese forces apparently met with much stiffer resistance than they had anticipated and Hanoi failed to respond in the desired manner. Thus, battlefield activity intensified once again on February 22. In the heaviest fighting of the six-day-old war, Chinese forces launched fresh attacks on Highway 1 north of the Vietnamese provincial capital of Lang Son against Vietnamese units guarding the approaches to Hanoi. Chinese government officials announced that China's "punishment" of Vietnam was not yet finished. On February 23 the PLA clashed for the first time with well-equipped regiments of the Vietnamese regular army that had been deployed in the Lang Son area over the preceding few days.

The inability of China's forces to win a clear-cut victory over the Vietnamese in the initial phase of the attack required further escalation of the conflict in Beijing's "punishment" were to be effective. Although the Soviet Union did not intervene directly in the conflict, they had sent a high-level military delegation to Hanoi, rushed military supplies to Vietnam, and by February 23 had a naval task force of 13 warships off northern Vietnam. These actions, intended to intimidate the Chinese, and the intense Vietnamese propaganda claiming the Chinese invaders were suffering severe losses, placed Beijing in an awkward position. If China withdrew at this point it would appear that it had been defeated by the smaller Vietnam force or had backed down in the face of Soviet threats.

On February 26, during a lull in the fighting, Vice Premier Deng told reporters from Japan's Kyodo News Agency that China's invasion of Vietnam would end in about 10 days, or perhaps a little longer "because Vietnam is stronger than India."³⁵

The attack was escalated to a new phase when on February 28, Chinese forces began a large scale attack on Lang Son with the intention of inflicting

heavy damage on the Vietnamese regular forces defending the city. By March 3, after an intense battle, Chinese forces drove back the Vietnamese and captured Lang Son. China immediately called for a cease-fire and announced that it was ready to withdraw from Vietnam. Although the attack was not an overwhelming victory for China, the PLA had inflicted sufficient damage on Vietnamese regular forces to strengthen their position vis-a-vis Hanoi and again demonstrate to the world that the PRC would take military action when it perceived its national security interests were threatened. Beijing was now ready to explore detente with Hanoi.

The day after the attack on Lang Son, on March 1, China initiated detente measures intended to prevent the conflict from escalating further. The Chinese government sent a note to the Vietnamese Embassy in Beijing proposing talks "as soon as possible" to end the two-week-old border war. Beijing proposed devising "any constructive measures that ensure peace and tranquility" along the border and then proceed to settle their border disputes "concerning the boundary and territory."

On March 5, Xinhua announced that China had begun withdrawing its troops from Vietnam, stating that the invasion force had been pulled out "after achieving the goals assigned them." On March 15, Beijing announced that all Chinese PLA units had been withdrawn from Vietnamese territory.

V - COMPONENTS OF THE DECISION

The foregoing discussion has traced the development and interrelation of the many complex variables that led to China's decision to use military force in Vietnam and those actions taken by China to deal with the developing crisis. Based on an analysis of these variables and events and Chinese statements made after the attack, it appears that China's decision to invade Vietnam can be broken down into three components.

The first decision component was that positive action was necessary to change a situation which had become intolerable to Chinese interests. With Vietnam's entry into CEMA in June 1978, the signing of a peace and friendship treaty with Moscow in November, and the formation of the KNUFNS and attack on Cambodia in December, it became progressively clear to Chinese decision-makers that previous policies and actions toward Hanoi had failed to prevent a serious escalation of the conflict or to modify Vietnamese behavior. In addition Beijing considered this problem in the broader context of Sino-Soviet relations. Beijing believed that it was necessary to demonstrate to both Hanoi and Moscow that it could not permit this threat to its security and modernization efforts to go unchecked. A strong Vietnam with control over Cambodia and Laos would effectively cut China off from a powerful and influential role in Southeast Asia.

Vietnam's intensification of the armed conflict reflected the will of both Hanoi and Moscow. If this will prevails unchecked, China's southern borders areas will never be stable, her territory and sovereignty will be trampled on, and her socialist modernization programs will suffer from increasing interference; Vietnam will become more unbridled in its drive for expansion and, like Cuba, it will act wildly without being punished, and in that case, the peoples of Laos and Kampuchea will directly suffer from the bitter fruit of aggression and the peace and security of the Southeast Asian countries will also face growing pressure and threat.³⁶

The second decision component--that force was essential to remedy the situation--was based on the experiential belief that anything short of force would not suffice to change Vietnamese behavior.

Facts have proved that in dealing with the Vietnamese authorities, restraint and forbearance were regarded as an invitation to more bullying and all appeals, advice and warnings have fallen on deaf ears. Their bullying has gone beyond the limit of our forbearance.³⁷

As far as Beijing was concerned they were confronted by "Vietnamese authorities (who) are nationalist expansionists," who were conspiring with Soviet aid and protection in the encirclement of China.

Hanoi wishfully hoped that so long as China refrained from making any counterattack against its armed provocations in the Sino-Vietnamese border areas, it would be able not only to have an advantage over China in the north, but also to use this as a kind of show of force to intimidate the Southeast Asian nations so that it could ride roughshod over Southeast Asia and expand there.³⁸

A public display of China's willingness to employ force to protect its interests was important not only for its impression on Hanoi and Moscow, but on the rest of Southeast Asia and the World. If a small country like Vietnam could ride roughshod over an ally of China, humiliate overseas Chinese, and act provocatively on China's very border, anything less than a resolute display of force would be interpreted as pusillanimous. The credibility of China's legitimacy as the leader of the Third World against the superpowers was at stake. In declaring a victory after the invasion, the Chinese asserted "The situation has not developed as Hanoi and Moscow hoped. No hegemonism, whether global or regional, can frighten people except those who are weak willed."³⁹ (Emphasis added.) Deng's repeated promises before the attack that "China means what it says" revealed the importance in Chinese thinking of establishing such credibility. In the specific case of Vietnam, China also felt it was important to "explode the myth of Vietnamese invincibility." The cautious stance adopted by ASEAN countries after the blitzkrieg on Phnom Pneh in December-January clearly had eroded Chinese influence in the region. China's "punishment" of Vietnam got a generally favorable press reaction later, and helped to reverse this slippage.

The third decision component--how much force should be used, and in what manner--was essentially a question of risk exposure. Extreme use of force, to

overrun major Vietnamese population centers, or to occupy a large amount of Vietnamese territory, posed unacceptable hazards. Moscow might have had no choice but to respond massively to roll back Chinese forces, or lose face. Strategically, this response would logically have had to come as an invasion along the Sino-Soviet border or in the form of a punitive nuclear strike. Beijing was not prepared to provoke a such a response from Russia. The alternative was a limited war, a form of force diplomacy with which Beijing had had considerable experience in the past. The gradual escalation of military pressure through a series of phases (probing, warning, demonstration, attack, and detente) has been a pattern of Chinese conflict management behavior in confrontations going back to the Korean War.⁴⁰ China's use of this kind of limited warfare makes a maximum use of signalling devices as increasing pressure is brought to bear. The element of surprise is minimal.

Beijing's election of this option reduced its risks but also reduced its chances of obtaining a clear-cut success in its war aims. By choosing to "punish" Vietnam with a limited strike into Vietnamese territory, it forewent the greatest psychological advantage in warfare: convincing the enemy you will keep escalating pressure until he is no longer willing to endure the punishment and capitulates to your demand. Beijing could hope that Hanoi would transfer its forces in occupation of Cambodia to the new front, it could hope that Vietnam would move enough regular army units to the war zone to permit the Chinese army to win a major battle, it could hope that the hardpressed Vietnamese people would despair of the unceasing military adventures of their leaders under this new pressure, but it could not guarantee these results with the constraints it imposed on itself.

VI - AFTERMATH: THE UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

The Sino-Vietnamese war of 1979 was clearly a watershed, but the full significance of the event remains to be seen. Three questions are particularly pertinent: Will China "punish" Vietnam again? How has the war affected Chinese domestic politics? And what was the role of the United States in the development of the China-Vietnam situation and what light does the U.S. role shed on the development of the strategic triangle (China, the Soviet Union, and the U.S.)?

Will China "punish" Vietnam again? Although the war improved Beijing's image among the non-communist Southeast Asian states and enabled China to dispell the "myth of Vietnamese invincibility,"⁴¹ China's action failed to relieve the primary concerns in Beijing: (1) Soviet military penetration of Southeast Asia; (2) the threat of Soviet-Vietnamese military collusion to the four modernizations (and Deng's domestic political position); (3) Vietnamese control over Cambodia; and (4) Vietnam's attitude toward the overseas Chinese in Vietnam.

The strains of war has actually opened the way for greater Soviet military access in Vietnam. Arguing the need to support Vietnam most effectively during the war, the Soviets for the first time have been able to forward-stage TU-95 reconnaissance (BEAR) bombers in Vietnam and obtain permission for Soviet warships to use Vietnamese port facilities. It also appears the Soviets have been allowed to set up an electronic intelligence-gathering facility in Vietnam.

In Cambodia, even after the Chinese attack, the Vietnamese went on to conduct a major offensive. Although some forces may have moved north in the postwar mobilization as Chinese troops withdrew, an estimated 100,000 Vietnamese occupation troops remained in Cambodia, securing the country for Hanoi's puppet regime. To oppose these Vietnamese moves, China, on the military

front, has continued to support the Khmer Rouge resistance movement; diplomatically, it has taken active measures to undermine the legitimacy of the new Cambodian government, such as attempting to block seating of the Heng Samrin delegation at the Colombo talks.

Both Vietnam and China still have formidable forces facing each other across their common border. Since February, the Vietnamese were reported to have more than doubled the number of their troops in the north, to over 140,000. Despite a charge in May by Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister Dinh Nho Liem that China has massed "up to 10 divisions" on its border, Western military analysts have suggested that China has considerably reduced its strength in the border provinces of Guangxi and Yunnan, leaving some 250,000 to 300,000 troops, and pulling back equipment and planes for maintenance.⁴² Beijing would probably not attempt to launch a new attack until Pol Pot's forces had been regrouped and resupplied, so that they could rise up in coordination with China's new invasion, prepared to exploit any resulting weakness in Vietnam's position in Cambodia. If and when the Chinese do strike, the attack may once again take place along the Sino-Vietnamese border or it might occur in Laos, where the Vietnamese are even more vulnerable.

Certainly the negotiations to end the war showed no desire to improve relations on either side. China rejected Vietnam's three-point proposal for a cease-fire, return of territory, and a demilitarized zone and the Vietnamese rejected China's eight-point proposal, which insisted on a change of alignment in Vietnam's foreign affairs, the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, and, significantly, the return of overseas Chinese forced out of Vietnam. A May 5 Xinhua report claimed that 20,000 more refugees had been driven into China since April 1. Each side has claimed continuous, serious border violations by the other side after hostilities ceased.

On May 2, Deng Xiaoping told UN Secretary General Waltheim that it might be necessary to "teach Vietnam another lesson."⁴³ The statement came at the end of a two-week enlarged party working conference in late April, similar to the one in November 1978 that cleared the way for final preparations for the February attack.

How has the war affected Chinese domestic politics? Quarrels over foreign policy in China usually exacerbate already existing struggles for authority, status, and influence among leaders in the Politburo.⁴⁴ Sources in the leftist Hong Kong press give the impression that Deng's dominant party is opposed by the remaining Maoists, led by Wang Dongxin, but give no evidence to show that the Maoists opposed the decision to invade Vietnam. Apart from two short-lived wall-posters (which may have been put up by a human rights group, or even by someone in connivance with the Soviets), there is every indication that the war won wide-spread national support. Deng's press was slow to announce that the war had begun (it was several days until the Chinese people heard about it from their own media), but this reticence was probably due to Deng's caution in waiting for the gamble to show some positive results that could be dressed up before he committed himself publicly. Wang's faction may have taken issue with peripheral decisions made in preparation for the war, such as accelerating ties with Japan and the U.S., and Chinese concessions on the Taiwan issue, but there is no public record of such footdragging. One sole intriguing hint, which may not be directly connected with the war except in time, came with a front-page editorial in People's Daily on March 10 as Chinese troops were withdrawing from Vietnam. Headlined "Settle Grudges and Tighten Solidarity," it warned that "There are grudges among many comrades of the party that, in the worst case, led to the formation of a major breach." Further elaboration on what provoked such an editorial at this critical time

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
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will be required before it can be related to the war. The fact that Deng personally investigated the situation in Southeast Asia immediately before the November party meeting, and travelled in the U.S. just prior to a final leadership meeting on the eve of the war, also supports the speculation he was garnering evidence to quell opposing arguments in the Politburo.

The only faction in China strong enough to curb Deng is the PLA. Despite heavy losses in the war, admitted by Deputy Chief of Staff Wu Xiuquan to be 20,000 killed and wounded,⁴⁵ the PLA appears to be in Deng's camp. Furthermore, the PLA stands to benefit substantially from Deng's modernization program. In the 1979-80 budget, the military sector received a major increase.

What was the role of the U.S. in the development of the China-Vietnam situation and what light does the U.S. role shed on the development of the strategic triangle? For months prior to China's attack, U.S. officials were preoccupied with the effects of possible hostilities on U.S. national interests. In a New York Times story on Hodding Carter's press conference on the day of the attack, it was admitted that the U.S. had been urging China, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union to avoid an armed conflict since September 1978,⁴⁶ and that these efforts included meetings with Vietnamese diplomats and messages from Vance to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and to Chinese officials.⁴⁷ Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke reportedly summoned the PRC ambassador twice in the week prior to Deng's U.S. visit, to warn him that an attack during the visit would deeply embarrass the U.S.⁴⁸ And just prior to the attack, U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Malcolm Toon conveyed hope to Gromyko that the Soviets would show restraint if an attack came.⁴⁹ The U.S. was in the unusual position, as a White House official "who asked not to be named" (probably Brzezinski) pointed out, of being the only global power in a position to talk effectively with both Moscow

and Beijing.⁵⁰ This role appears to have played a critical function before, during, and after the unfolding crisis.

While these diplomatic activities were taking place a constant stream of intelligence appeared in the Washington, Tokyo, Bangkok, and Hong Kong press to the effect that the size of the Chinese forces near the border was limited, most of the Chinese forces in the south were in defensive positions, and Soviet forces neither reinforced their units on the Russian-Chinese border nor ordered mobilization until after the attack had begun.⁵¹ This information tended to ensure that none of the active participants (China and Vietnam), or a possible participant (the Soviet Union) overestimated and overreacted to changes in the situation.

The conduct of the belligerents and the Soviet Union in this war was strange, judged by any standards. All concerned knew well in advance a war was imminent. Yet Vietnam, a country of 50 million people, chose not to move its mainline army units out of Cambodia, where they were mopping up the remnants of Pol Pot's shattered army, even to protect itself from attack by a country of over 950 million. Although a movement would have been time-consuming, Vietnam had adequate warning to shift the units, had it so desired. Once attacked, it could have been too late. Hanoi elected not to shift the forces, seemingly risking its survival. Vietnam's treaty with the Soviet Union was not much to count on, given Moscow's record of limited support in wars for North Korea and India, previous treaty allies. Nevertheless, Hanoi seemed to have confidence that Beijing's attack would be limited and brief. Was this confidence based on foreknowledge, and if so what was its source?

The actions of the Soviet Union appear equally strange. Once the Chinese attacked Vietnam, Moscow did not take the basic precautions of reinforcing its border units and deploying its Pacific fleet. Having just signed a

defense treaty with the overt purpose of deterring such an attack, and being by nature a suspicious and conservative military power, Russia could have been expected to prepare for the worst as Vietnam and China started over the brink into the unknown. Or was it unknown? Was Moscow the source of knowledge which account for Hanoi's apparent confidence?

The pattern of Soviet and Vietnamese activity bespeaks a clear understanding of future Chinese activities. Beijing did not announce that it was launching a limited war until the day of the attack; the specific limitations of its actions (depth and duration of penetration, not entering Red River valley, etc.) were not announced for days later. Yet Hanoi and Moscow acted even before the attack as though they possessed this key information and were confident in its accuracy. It is highly unlikely that Beijing could have approached Moscow to probe the threshold of its reaction to possible Chinese attack scenarios, and even if it had, there is no reason to believe that Moscow would have had any confidence in Beijing's assurances. Both wanted to talk about the expected hostilities in Indochina, but needed a reliable intermediary.

U.S. national interests would have supported taking this role, and there are good reasons to believe Washington in fact did. Both Washington and Beijing wanted to avoid an Indochina war spreading into a major Sino-Soviet war, and both found it in their national interests to avoid a situation in Indochina that could lead to Soviet intervention and possibly permanent presence in the area. The interests of the U.S. and the Soviet Union also overlapped: neither wanted a wider war. Moscow seems to have taken the unprecedented step signalling Beijing through Washington what specific limits of Chinese action could be accepted without Moscow feeling forced to intervene to back up its treaty commitments.

For the first time a new communications grid was apparently established within the strategic triangle, with Washington at its center. In this specific case it appears the United States put its own prestige on the line by supporting the bona fides of the Chinese to the Soviet Union, and vice versa. The ploy was successful because of the enormous stakes involved. But more importantly, its very success may leave these tested channels open for use in future crises.

NOTES

This case study was researched and written jointly with Major Edward Ross, USA, at the Naval Postgraduate School.

¹For a text of Deng's Three Worlds speech to the United Nations, see Peking Review, No. 16, April 19, 1974. Mao had first enunciated the concept to "a foreign leader" in February 1974. For the fullest exposition of the thesis, see the reprint of a Renmin Ribao editorial, "Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism," in Peking Review, No. 45, November 4, 1977.

²For an excellent summary of Beijing's use of the anti-hegemony statement in treaty-making, see Joachim Glaubitz, "Anti-Hegemony Formulas in Chinese Foreign Policy," Asian Survey, March 1976, pp. 205-215.

³Chinese perceptions of encirclement and counterencirclement are elucidated in Francis Romance's, "Peking's Counter-Encirclement Strategy: The Maritime Element," Orbis, Summer 1976, pp. 437-459.

⁴Nayan Chanda, "The Bloody Border: Vietnam Prepares for a Long War," Far Eastern Economic Review, April 21, 1978, p. 17.

⁵Michael Richardson, "A Helping Hand for Vietnam," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 23, 1978, p. 20.

⁶Peking Review, No. 24, June 10, 1977, p. 7.

⁷This at least has been Beijing's consistent contention. For particulars, see extensive arguments presented in Shih Ti-tsu, "South China Sea Islands, Chinese Territory Since Ancient Times," Peking Review, No. 50, December 12, 1975; Xinhua Correspondent, "Xisha and Nansha Islands Belong to China," Beijing Review, No. 21, May 25, 1979.

⁸The best analyses of shifting power bases during this period are probably: Lowell Dittmer, "Bases of Power in Chinese Politics: A Theory and an Analysis of the Fall of the Gang of Four," World Politics, October 1978, pp. 26-60; Jergen Domes, "China in 1976, Tremors of Transition," Asian Survey, January 1977, pp. 1-17; and Ting Wang, "Leadership Realignment," Problems in Communism, July-August 1977, pp. 1-17.

⁹Hong Yang Lee, "The Entanglement of Ideology and Cadre Politics After the Cultural Revolution," a paper presented to the Association of Asian Studies Conference, March 1979, in Los Angeles, California, pp. 25-26.

¹⁰The relationship between the growing external threat from the south to China's modernization drive has been frequently mentioned without explication; see for example, Peking Review, No. 11, March 16, 1976, p. 16. ("... If we had let such acts of aggression pass, we would have been encouraging the aggressors. Our socialist modernization programme could hardly proceed smoothly..")

¹¹Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Trends in Communist Media, November 23, 1977.

¹²Nayan Chanda, "Peking Escalates the War of Nerves," Far Eastern Economic Review, March 17, 1978, p. 10.

¹³Vietnam's rice harvests were devastated by monsoon flooding in both 1977 and 1978. One Ho Chi Minh City official estimated 83 per cent of the 1978 winter crop was lost. See Far Eastern Economic Review, October 20, 1978; Wall Street Journal, October 4, 1978; New York Times, March 4, 1979.

¹⁴Renmin Ribao, January 4, 1978.

¹⁵Peking Review, No. 10, March 10, 1978, p. 36.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Nayan Chanda, "The Timetable for a Takeover," Far Eastern Economic Review, February 23, 1978, p. 33.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹According to Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, in a speech at the 1979 World Affairs Council of Northern California Conference at Asilomar, California, although there were no longer any bilateral impediments to the normalization of relations between the United States and Vietnam once Hanoi dropped its demands for war reparations in late Summer 1978, the State Department opposed normalization because of the Vietnam refugee situation and Hanoi's belligerence toward Cambodia.

²⁰The "seek truth from facts" campaign, launched during the All-Army Political Work Conference in April-June 1978, became the driving wedge for Deng's moderates in their efforts to overcome footdraggers like Hua, who were reluctant to espouse an inherently anti-Maoist program. The de-Maoification forces emerged victorious in August, when the final conference instruction took Deng's position rather than the "politics in command" positions taken in earlier speeches by Hua and Marshal Ye Jianying.

²¹Peking Review, No. 13, March 31, 1978.

²²Peking Review, No. 19, May 12, 1978.

²³The allegation that PRM-10 was shared with the Chinese was made in Stanley Karnow's "East Asia in 1978: The Great Transformation," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 57, No. 3, (no date; special "America and the World" issue, 1979), p. 599. The Soviet warning on satellite intelligence-sharing is from "Soviets Warn U.S. on Release of Reconnaissance Photos," Defense/Space Daily, January 12, 1979, p. 50.

²⁴Far Eastern Economic Review, August 11, September 8, 1978.

²⁵Peking Review, No. 44, November 3, 1978, pp. 25-26.

²⁶ Pravda, November 4, 1978 (from Current Digest of the Soviet Press, No. 44, p. 10.).

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Nayan Chanda, "Cambodia: Waiting for the Inevitable," Far Eastern Economic Review, November 24, 1978, p. 10.

²⁹ David Bonavia, "The Marxist and the Monarchy," Far Eastern Economic Review, November 17, 1978, p. 11.

³⁰ This political technique has been analyzed by Parris Chang, "Research Notes on the Changing Loci of Decision in the CCP," China Quarterly, October-December 1970, pp. 169-194; and Kenneth Lieberthal, A Research Guide to Central Party and Government Meetings in China 1949-1975, (White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press, Inc., 1976), pp. 3-31.

³¹ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, People's Republic of China Daily Report, December 18, 1978, p. A6.

³² U.S. News & World Report, February 12, 1979, p. 22.

³³ See f.n. 19. The imminence of the Chinese attack at the time of Deng's visit was clear to U.S. policy makers from intelligence data, which the U.S. apparently made available to the press as reports on major troop movements to the border. According to Newsweek, February 5, 1979, p. 32, Holbrooke twice summoned the Chinese ambassador the week prior to Deng's visit to warn him that an attack on Vietnam during the visit would deeply embarrass the U.S. Holbrooke admitted after the attack began in mid-February that President Carter was aware of Chinese intentions, but "had not given any 'green light'."

³⁴ See f.n. 19.

³⁵ San Francisco Chronicle, February 27, 1979.

³⁶ Beijing Review, No. 12, March 23, 1979.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Beijing Review, No. 12, March 23, 1979.

³⁹ Beijing Review, No. 8, February 23, 1979, citing a February 18, 1979 Renmin Ribao editorial.

⁴⁰ For an excellent analysis of Chinese conflict management behavior, see Steve Chan, "Chinese Conflict Calculus and Behavior: Assessment from a Perspective of Conflict Management," World Politics, April 1978, pp. 391-410.

⁴¹ H. Kamm, "Asians Appear to Side with Peking against Hanoi," New York Times, March 14, 1979.

⁴² Far Eastern Economic Review, May 18, 1979, p. 12.

⁴³ This threat was repeated later in stronger terms by Vice Premier Li Xiannian:

The Vietnamese are still firing at us along the Sino-Vietnamese border and I would not like to exclude the possibility of another strike back against the Vietnamese in self-defense on the part of China. We tell our friends that this is not the thing we want to do. But if the Soviets and the Vietnamese should compel China to do this, then there is no way out -- we have to do it....We now know that our counterattack against the Vietnamese last February did not give the Vietnamese enough of a lesson, because we declared in advance that the attack was limited both in scope and duration. (emphasis added) (Newsweek, Jul 6, 1979).

⁴⁴ See Roger Glenn Brown, "Chinese Politics & American Policy," Foreign Policy, Summer 1976; Lowell Dittmer, "Bases of Power in Chinese Politics," World Politics, October 1978.

⁴⁵ New York Times, May 3, 1979.

⁴⁶ Washington Post, February 18, 1979. Note: The Washington Post identified Hodding Carter as the "senior official" mentioned holding the press conference by the New York Times article.

⁴⁷ New York Times, February 18, 1979.

⁴⁸ Newsweek, February 5, 1979.

⁴⁹ Christian Science Monitor, February 26, 1979.

⁵⁰ Monterey Peninsula Herald (AP despatch), February 19, 1979.

⁵¹ Among numerous examples of information clearly from intelligence channels which tended to focus on the limited nature of force redeployments, see Nayan Chanda, "Mustering for a Border War," Far Eastern Economic Review, February 16, 1979, p. 10; E.Q. White, "Press Coverage of the Indochina Conflict Proves Difficult," Monterey Peninsula Herald (AP despatch) February 27, 1979; K. Beech, "Chinese Troops Move Toward Vietnam Border," San Jose Mercury (AP despatch), January 26, 1979.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

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A consistent pattern of foreign policy decision-making is emerging in the post-Mao era. This pattern can be expected to survive Teng Hsiau-ping's leadership tenure, unless the purged radicals and hardline Maoists regain power, which seems unlikely.

Foreign policy objectives and programs are approved in the Politburo, where a coalition of older party bureaucrats and younger technocrats are committed to expanding foreign ties to speed modernization. Considerable diplomatic experience exists at this level and is increasing, as Politburo members start to travel abroad.

Routine foreign policy decisions are coordinated and made in the State Council. The proliferation of these incremental day-to-day decisions in the past two years is the result of China's rapidly expanding trade and diplomatic interests. As Chinese national interests have shifted from ideological to economic priorities, the State Council has become the natural forum in which competing bureaucratic interests resolve conflicts. Decision-making increasingly can be tied to the budget cycle and trade balances. The shift of responsibilities from party to government organs is promoted by functional as well as political considerations. Teng's power base is in the government bureaucracy.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs acts as a center of coordination and policy development, but not as a decision-making point. Its top bureaucrats do not occupy key party positions. The Ministry has established a tradition of avoiding involvement in the political arena of decision-making, with all the turbulence traditionally found there. Instead, it has gradually built up a corps of seasoned diplomats who are expert observers and reporters, and a managerial echelon of vicr and assistant ministers who are highly

experienced in specialized fields. The Ministry exercises influence through its recommendations and position papers, for State Council and Politburo approval. The decision-making bodies are well served by this arrangement, in which the Foreign Ministry serves as a buffer between them and outside pressures.

Foreign policy decision-makers have continual access to unedited world press reporting on current affairs, through internal translation services. Their leaders frequently consult with visiting heads of state and influential politicians. Their embassies and the NCNA provide additional well-focused reporting. In general one must give the Chinese leadership high marks for being well informed and sensitive to changing situations, even under crisis conditions.

Decision-making during negotiations is retained in Peking, no matter where the talks may be situated. Chinese negotiators are well-briefed, patient, and careful probers of their adversaries' positions. Only when every direct and peripheral pressure has been brought to bear, and the opponent's rock-bottom position ascertained, will Peking signal its negotiators to reach an agreement. The "response cycle" time (between submission of a proposal to Chinese negotiators in the field and their receipt of instructions from Peking in response) is typically 4-6 weeks.

China's crisis management behavior has been highly consistent over the past 30 years. It is most likely to involve force when its interests are threatened in countries along its borders. It concentrates its hostilities towards a current "main enemy" and tends to analyze situations in terms of resolving "the main contradiction" to Chinese interests posed by that enemy's behavior. Peking will follow a set escalation ladder (probing, warning, demonstration, attack, and finally detente) in its use of force to protect its threatened interests.

As our contacts with Chinese decision-makers increase, we need to extract in discussions with them more details about the bureaucratic politics that angered these highly consistent patterns of diplomatic behavior. Only then can we put the patterns in their natural environment and draw conclusions about their future viability.

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