The Inflexible Response. United States Army Mobilization Doctrine 1945 - 1951
Abstract
By examining the mobilization plans developed before the Korean War and the actual mobilization during the first year of that war, the author answers the question of why the Army mobilized in the manner it did for the war. After World War II the Army assumed unusual missions, the occupation of Europe and Japan and assistance to the fledgling Air Force, which hindered its readiness. While the Army developed traditional mobilization plans in 1946, the creation of the Department of Defense, uncertainty over the army's mission, and austere budgets prevented the development of a reserve force to support these plans. Only a partial mobilization was ordered for the Korean War but this put a strain on army readiness and created inequalities for those recalled. The burden fell on World War II veterans. The mobilization problems received political attention, and Congress passed the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 to protect reservists. Universal Military Training, the keystone of the mobilization plans, never passed Congress. The author concludes that the political, economic, military, and international enviroment of the period created an uncertain situation which insured that the Army could not have the large responsive reserve that it had desired. This environment forced the Army into the inefficient mobilization used during the Korean War.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 24, 1979
- Accession Number
- ADA079137
Entities
People
- John M. Kendall