Perception and Strategic Warning.
Abstract
In this note, strategic warning is regarded as a perception occurring in the minds of the persons in the nation's top leadership posts that an opponent may launch a nuclear attack upon the U.S. Because the only opponent now likely to take this action is the USSR, an examination is made of the reasons that might impel it to do so. A survey is made of the preparatory events in the USSR that would be related to the way in which war might begin. The chain between events observable by our intelligence apparatus and response by U.S. leadership is traced. The processes of evaluation of the evidence and leadership decisionmaking are examined in some detail and are illustrated with historical cases from World War I into the 1970s. Various factors influencing this process include the power of fixed ideas, informational failures, deception, value systems of the protagonists, and the dangers inherent in the dynamics of group decisionmaking. An example of successful perception of strategic warning and response (Cuba, 1962) is discussed. The conclusion is that strategic warning is of value in various ways and that it can possibly, though not certainly, be obtained. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Nov 01, 1979
- Accession Number
- ADA080448
Entities
People
- Edmund Brunner Jr
Organizations
- RAND Corporation