Bureaucratic Decisionmaking in the Military Assistance Program: Some Empirical Findings,
Abstract
This memorandum explores three topics: alternative generation, bargaining relatioships between different parts of bureaucracy, and organizational learning. A small survey of twenty-five officials in six agencies dealing with the Military Assistance Program (MAP) was conducted. Alternatives are rarely conceptualized as mutually exclusive packages. There are stereotyped policy positions for the various agencies involved in MAP; these positions are independent of personality and specific issues and are simplifiable into two dimensions. Officials report that although the war between India and Pakistan in 1965 was a very unfortunate event for MAP there were lessons from this crisis, and these lessons were applicable to other parts of the program; but they also said that almost no modifications were made in these other parts of the program. Some of the implications of these and other findings are discussed, using such concepts as multiple determination and location of agencies in a policy space. Finally, a new set of research questions is presented, taking into account the empirical findings. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Oct 01, 1968
- Accession Number
- ADA080461
Entities
People
- Robert Axelrod
Organizations
- RAND Corporation