On Market Games,
Abstract
The 'market games' -games that derive from an exchange economy in which the traders have continuous concave monetary utility functions, are shown to be the same as the 'totally balanced games' -games which with all their subgames possess cores. (The core of a game is the set of outcomes that no coalition can profitably block.) The coincidence of these two classes of games is established with the aid of explicit transformations that generate a game from a market and vice versa. It is further shown that any game with a core has the same solutions, in the von Neumann Morgenstern sense, as some totally balanced game. Thus, a market may be found that reproduces the solution behavior of any game that has a core. In particular, using a recent result of Lucas (see RM-5518-PR, AD-661 544), a ten-trader ten-commodity market is described that has no solution.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 1968
- Accession Number
- ADA080462
Entities
People
- Lloyd Shapley
- Martin Shubik
Organizations
- RAND Corporation