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ARMY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM STUDY (PMS2). VOLUME I. MAIN R--ETC(U)  
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
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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) The study purpose was to develop an Optimal Organizational Structure and functional Configuration for the HQDA Level Personnel Management System. Three organizational alternatives were developed reflecting: (a) functional restructuring; (b) organizational restructuring; and (c) formation of an Army Personnel Command (APC). These alternatives were reviewed and evaluated by a Senior Officer Action Planning Conference, 27-28 Aug 79. Consensus of conferees regarding each alternative follows: (a) functional restructuring -		

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easiest to implement, a modest change, <sup>but</sup> organizational problems would remain, <sup>and</sup> alternative would not be perceived as a meaningful change; (b) organizational restructuring - an appropriate course of action, creation of new ODCSPER Directorate for Plans and System heavily supported, transfer of USAFAC to ODCSPER was not necessary; and (c) formation of APC - feasible, <sup>but</sup> no demonstrated desirability, some functions would be facilitated, costs need further study, and mobilization capabilities should be emphasized. PMS<sub>2</sub> is basis for current reorganization planning within ODCSPER.

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Army Personnel Management System Study

Final Report

Volume I

for

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This final report of the Personnel Management System Study (PMS<sub>2</sub>) covers the following major topics:

- . Scope of the PMS<sub>2</sub> and its relationship to overall Army management
- . Summary of recent related events leading to the PMS<sub>2</sub>, documenting a longstanding Army interest in an Army Personnel Command:
  - Four previous studies have recommended a Personnel Command
  - These studies led to the creation of the Office of Personnel Operations (OPO) and the Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN)
- . Organizational and functional structure of the current Army personnel management system (PMS)
- . Objectives of an optimal PMS, including the reasons for setting objectives and the source of PMS objectives
- . Analysis of perceptions survey interviews and questionnaires
- . Findings and conclusions concerning the PMS from three sources:
  - Interviews and studies
  - Functional analysis
  - Perceptions survey
- . Criteria for developing and evaluating PMS organizational alternatives developed from four sources:
  - Findings and conclusions from functional analysis

- Other PMS<sub>2</sub> findings and conclusions
- PMS objectives
- Management theory
- . Alternative PMS organizations, developed following three strategies:
  - Functional restructuring without significant organizational change
  - Functional and organizational restructuring
  - Establishing a Personnel Command
- . Summary of the evaluation of alternative PMS organizations by the Senior Officer Level Action Planning Conference.

1. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE CURRENT ARMY PMS

Chapter VII presents the following findings and conclusions:

(1) Findings and Conclusions From Interviews and Studies

Over 150 Army personnel from all components of the Total Force were interviewed in-depth. Those interviewed, listed in Appendix J, included:

- . Members of Army Secretariat
- . More than 55 general officers
- . Principal civilian personnel managers at DA, MACOM and lower levels
- . PMS staff members
- . USAR generals and other officers
- . Command Sergeants Major and other NCOs.

Interviews were conducted in person in the Washington, D.C. area, elsewhere in CONUS, and Germany;

six telephone interviews were conducted when a visit was otherwise impossible.

Some 23 past studies also were reviewed, with emphasis on the most recent PMS-related efforts.

A synopsis of the most significant findings and conclusions follows, arranged by subject area:

. Adequacy of PMS organization

- PMS organization at DA level is viewed as a loose confederation of semi-autonomous elements.
- Fragmentation exists in PMS management.
- Functions are duplicated across several organizations.

Conclusions: DA level organizations concerned with personnel management form a loose confederation with overlapping functions, layered authority, and diffused responsibility.

. Execution of policy responsibilities

- PMS policy is broadly believed to be inadequately developed.
- Many interviewees believe that the ODCSPER neglects its policy functions.
- MILPERCEN/TAGCEN make policy because of ODCSPER default.

Conclusions: Formulation of personnel management policy at the DA level is inadequate and is one of the most critical problem areas; ODCSPER is using scarce staff resources for operations that should be at MILPERCEN or TAGCEN.

. Personnel planning and doctrine development

- More interviewees commented on inadequate PMS planning than on any other subject.

- Mobilization planning is deficient.
- ODCSPER does not have overall personnel management objectives.
- Responsibility for doctrine is not clearly established.
- Human resources research is generally considered to be inadequate.

Conclusions: Many aspects of DA PMS planning are deficient; responsibility for personnel doctrine should be clearly defined; human resource research should be improved.

. Management of information and systems

- Significant PMS problems result from separate, mutually incompatible data bases maintained by various organizations.
- ACSAC's role is intentionally limited to budgeting issues; technical guidance also has not been available from the Computer Systems Command.
- MILPERCEN has initiated efforts to provide coherent, integrated personnel systems for the short term, but longer range solutions are not being studied.

Conclusion: Personnel information systems are not standardized or coordinated, making Total Force management almost impossible; redundant data bases compound organizational fragmentation problems.

. Staffing of PMS organizations

- Interviewees cite lack of professional personnel managers as a significant problem.
- Personnel-related assignments are not viewed as career enhancing.

- Civilian personnel management is viewed as benefiting from better trained managers.

Conclusions: The Army does not have adequate trained, professional, senior, military personnel managers and the PMS has suffered as a result; such managers exist in the civilian component of the PMS.

. Operations of the PMS

- The PMS does not respond adequately to external pressures.
- There are significant differences in understanding and/or confidence in military PMS operations.
- Civilian personnel operations enjoy an appreciable degree of confidence and support from DA civilians.

Conclusions: Military PMS operations are believed to be unresponsive in an all-volunteer environment; confidence in, and understanding about, the PMS varies widely by rank and detracts from its effectiveness; most military personnel know nothing of civilian personnel management; most operational complaints are caused by policies and procedures, and not amenable to improvement solely by reorganizing the PMS.

. Attitudes about an Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM)

- Attitudes for/against a PERSCOM were evenly divided among OSA personnel and general officers who expressed an opinion.
- PMS officials assigned to HQDA did not significantly support a PERSCOM.
- Personnel assigned to PMS FOA strongly support a PERSCOM.

- Strong attitudes against establishing a PERSCOM were expressed by Civilian Personnel Directors.

Conclusion: There are significant differences of opinion regarding a PERSCOM that vary depending on the grade, position, or organization of the individual; differences also exist between military and civilian personnel.

(2) Findings and Conclusions from Functional Analysis

A synopsis of the most significant findings follows, arranged by subject area:

. Redundant functions

- Responsibility for policy development of all kinds is shared by ODCSPER with PMS operators.
- Responsibility for mobilization planning is poorly defined.
- Responsibility for screening and accessing personnel is widely distributed.
- Responsibility for developing job knowledge and skill requirements is widely distributed.
- Personnel records are maintained by numerous organizations.
- Evaluation of policy, programs and feedback from the field is broadly diffused.

. Inadequately performed functions

- All planning functions suffer from lack of resources and attention. In particular, personnel doctrine is not developed and a master personnel plan does not exist.

- Evaluation functions are not only organizationally diffused but receive very little attention.
- Human resources research is under-emphasized.

• Misplaced functions

- Many policy-making functions are performed by operators
- Mobilization planning is being handled by ODCSPER, with an ad hoc planning group, while MILPERCEN has a full-time office staffed out of its own resources.
- Many operations functions are performed by ODCSPER.

• External pressures on the PMS

- External pressures impose a disproportionate workload on the PMS, especially on ODCSPER.

• Automated systems support for the PMS

- Automated support is deficient for policy-making, planning, and evaluation functions.
- USA, USAR, NG, and Army civilian personnel records are mutually incompatible.
- Personnel recordkeeping systems are different and incompatible for the Army in the field and HQDA.

- U.S. Army Safety Center performs neither personnel planning nor personnel life-cycle functions.

Conclusions from functional analysis are:

- Inadequate personnel doctrine and the lack of a master personnel plan have contributed to shortfalls in policy-making functions.

- . Much personnel policy is diffused across the PMS and made in a reactive manner by system operators, instead of a proactive manner by ODCSPER. Thus, policy has not been consistent, coordinated, or comprehensive.
- . The PMS would be more effective if planning were institutionalized in a manner that would protect those functions from routine external pressures.
- . Improved personnel doctrine and implementing a master personnel plan would help provide direction and unity of purpose to the PMS, and compensate for the lack of institutional memory, by providing day-to-day guidance to PMS operators.
- . Policies and programs are instituted without adequate evaluation of their total effect or results.
- . Mobilization, personnel, and manpower planning have been underemphasized, suffer from lack of a focused responsibility, and are sometimes organizationally misplaced. As planning functions, they belong in ODCSPER.
- . The lack of an integrated Total Force data base and ADP system detracts from mobilization readiness, efficiency of operations, and has contributed to the perceived need for redundant personnel records.

(3) Findings and Conclusions From the Perceptions Survey

The survey of perceptions is completed for FORSCOM, WESTCOM, TRADOC, and Washington area staffs; USAREUR and Reserve components results will be reported at

a later date. Based on these partial returns, the following findings about perceptions have been identified:

- . About two out of three people surveyed felt that the PMS is currently working at least "somewhat well."
- . Most elements of the PMS covered in the survey were rated as at least "somewhat fair" by the majority in the sample.
- . Outcomes of the PMS rated as being at least "somewhat good" were:
  - The respondent's morale
  - Satisfaction with current job
  - On the job training
  - Housing

Items receiving the lowest ratings were:

- Health care provided to dependents
- Family satisfaction with the Army
- Satisfaction with pay and entitlements
- Health care provided to the respondent
- Morale in the respondent's unit
- Fringe benefits such as PX, commissary, recreational facilities

. Only about one in four respondent's reported that they understood the overall PMS "very well." The best understood elements of the PMS are:

- Pay and allowances to which you are entitled
- Leave regulations and policies

Fewer than half understand "very well":

- How their career development is managed
- Military justice/courts martial
- How they are assigned by MILPERCEN
- Promotion regulations and policies

The least well understood elements of the PMS are:

- Reenlistment regulations
  - Travel regulations and policies
  - Separation benefits and entitlements
- . All ranks use a variety of sources for information or advice about regulations and policies
  - . There is widespread agreement that the Personnel Administration Centers (PACs) have failed to realize their objective of increasing contact between Company Commanders and 1st Sergeants and their troops
  - . Of those with an opinion, most agree that problems in personnel management stem more from the people that work in the system than from the system itself, and that too few people working in the PMS are well-qualified to do their jobs
  - . There was general agreement that:
    - MILPERCEN is responsive to requests from the field
    - Personnel assignments should be handled through a centralized agency such as MILPERCEN
    - Consolidation of all personnel agencies under a single commander would result in an improved PMS
    - Commanders should be given more authority in making assignments to key positions such as Battalion Commander, Command Sergeant Major, etc.
  - . Barely half of the sample agreed that their units had sufficient qualified personnel to accomplish their missions
  - . There was strong agreement that "too often, just when an individual learns to do the job well, that person is transferred."

- . Field personnel tended to agree that turnover was hurting morale and hurting the ability of their units to accomplish their missions. Staff personnel tended to disagree that their units were experiencing these problems as a result of turnover
- . Most respondents tended to agree that individuals are usually assigned to the job they are trained for, and that in their unit nearly everybody is working in his or her proper MOS. However, of ranks E1-E6 and E7-E9, only 37% in the field, and 16% on staff, agreed that their current assignment is giving them the training they need to pass their SQTs
- . While officers tend to feel that they were given an accurate picture of Army life at the time they joined, the preponderance of ranks E7-E9, and a large majority of ranks E1-E6, disagree that they were. Of ranks E1-E6, 40% strongly disagree
- . More disagreed than agreed that the Army provides good career counseling and guidance.

In conclusion, the findings of the quantitative phase of the study support those of the earlier qualitative phase. If anything, the quantitative phase is providing a more positive view of perceptions of the PMS than did the preceding phase. That is, while the problems that emerged in the depth interviews undeniably do exist and were confirmed by the quantitative survey, most of them are by no means universal. The majority of our sample appear to be relatively positive toward most aspects of the current PMS and very positive toward some particular aspects. However, it is clear that some matters are strongly perceived to be problems, and there are

some pockets of dissatisfaction. Moreover, there are indications that certain changes would be well received by the majority of personnel at all levels.

These findings and conclusions appear in full in Chapter VII.

2. CRITERIA FOR DEVELOPING AND EVALUATING ALTERNATIVE PMS ORGANIZATIONS

Each of the information sources analyzed by the PMS<sub>2</sub>—past studies, interviews, surveys, and functional analysis—provide different perspectives about the two central PMS problems facing the Army: what are the functional and organizational inefficiencies in the PMS, and what are the optimal functional and organizational structures for the PMS? To answer these questions, Chapter VIII consolidates those perspectives and translates them into a single set of organizational criteria. These criteria include all of the findings and conclusions of the PMS<sub>2</sub>, plus HQDA level objectives and current management and organizational theory. (See Appendix H for PMS objectives) The criteria are used to develop reasonable alternative PMS organizations. These PMS criteria include most revisions made during the PMS Study Advisory Group (SAG) conference on 16-17 August, 1979:

1. In consonance with the overall Army plan, organizations must develop objectives, assign responsibility for their accomplishment, and evaluate programs implemented to achieve them. Thus a PMS organization should:
  - a. Provide for the development and accomplishment of organizational objectives.
  - b. Assign responsibility to top management supervisors to provide an effective chain of authority to accomplish objectives.
  - c. Provide for progress reports and evaluation of objectives.

2. Certain "key" functions, listed in Exhibit 1 on page 16, have great leverage on the overall performance of the PMS, support top-management objectives, and demand priority attention from senior PMS managers. Thus the PMS should be organized so that key functions are:
  - a. Positioned at a sufficiently high organizational level to ensure direct top-management supervision.
  - b. Afforded priority of resources and management effort.
  - c. Kept distinct from day-to-day operations so that divergence of effort is minimized.
3. The PMS should consolidate certain functions currently diffused across multiple organizations. These functions, listed in Exhibit 2 on page 17, should be assigned to PMS organizations so that they are combined into single, or at least fewer, organizations to improve coordination, consistency, and efficiency. Functions that are currently either not performed or inadequately performed also should be assigned; these functions are listed in Exhibit 3, on page 18.
4. Findings and conclusions have identified problems with the current PMS relating to Total Force integration, responsiveness to external demands, efficiency of operations, and adequacy of staffing. The PMS should be organized to mitigate those problems:
  - a. In the absence of compelling reasons, key functions should be performed uniformly across the Total Force, which requires an organizational mechanism for DCSPER to ensure coordination and consistency. This requires key functions to be consolidated for the Total Force and enhanced by data systems which interface and employ an essentially common data base.
  - b. External pressures on the PMS and public affairs liaison work require that a primary focal point be designated for coordination of requests for information and other

requirements on the PMS from external sources. (Staff resources must be provided to handle those demands that are distinct from staff who support key functions.)

Inefficiency of operations and inadequacy of staffing must be recognized as problems that are only indirectly related to organizational structure and must be resolved primarily by other means. These problems are related more directly to:

- . Inadequate numbers of professional military personnel managers
  - . The lack of an integrated Total Force data base and ADP system
  - . Deficiencies in planning and policy-making functions.
5. The PMS should be organized to best satisfy the principles of management theory, which include: flexibility; functional definition of authority and responsibility; chain of command; division of work; parity of authority and responsibility; balance; leadership; efficiency; unity of command; span of management; information management.
  6. The PMS should be structured to provide for the separation of policy formulation and its execution.
  7. The PMS must be responsive to wartime operations and requirements.
  8. The PMS must include all functions that are essential to accomplish the mission of the organization.
  9. The PMS must serve the Total Force.

EXHIBIT 1  
Key PMS Functions

- \*. Project manpower availability, technology, and personnel trends (1.1)
  - \*. Project unconstrained manpower and personnel requirements (1.2)
  - \*. Develop personnel doctrine (1.3)
  - \*. Prepare a Master Personnel Plan (1.4)
  - \*. Assess manpower and personnel implications of all Program Objectives Memorandum submissions (2.3)
  - \*. Determine policies and standards for enlistment/reenlistment/matriculation/hiring/induction (5.1.1.1)
  - \*. Evaluate personnel procurement policies, procedures, and activities (5.1.1.5)
    - . Evaluate effectiveness of recruiting/advertising programs (5.1.2.3)
    - . Evaluate training/education programs (5.2.1.7)
  - \*. Develop military personnel distribution policies and procedures (5.3.1)
  - \*. Develop personnel policies and plans for mobilization (5.3.3)
    - . Develop personnel reclassification policies and procedures (5.4.1.3)
    - . Develop labor and employee relations policies (5.4.1.9)
    - . Develop job analysis and evaluation policies (5.4.1.10)
  - \*. Develop promotion policies and procedures (5.4.1.15)
    - . Evaluate personnel performance (5.4.2.2)
    - . Provide financial services (5.4.3.1)
    - . Maintain personnel records (5.4.3.2)
    - . Conduct human resources research (5.4.4.1)
    - . Develop and administer labor and employee relations programs (5.4.4.6)
    - . Develop and administer job analysis and evaluation programs (5.4.4.7)
    - . Develop and administer career development programs (5.4.4.12)
  - \*. Establish personnel separation policies and procedures (5.5.1)
- 
- \* Functions which require the DCSPER's personal attention.

EXHIBIT 2  
Redundant Functions or Functions with  
Diffused Organizational Responsibility

<u>Function Number</u>	<u>Function</u>
5.1.1.1*	Determine policies and standards for enlistment/reenlistment/matriculation/hiring/induction
5.1.1.2	Design procedures and recordkeeping systems for personnel procurement
5.1.1.5	Evaluate personnel procurement policies, procedures, and activities
5.1.2.1	Develop enlistment/reenlistment programs
5.1.3.3	Access personnel using applicable procedures
5.2.1.1	Develop job knowledge and skill requirements
5.2.1.3	Develop skill attainment evaluation criteria
5.3.1*	Develop military personnel distribution policies and procedures
5.3.3*	Develop personnel policies and plans for mobilization
5.4.1*	Develop sustainment policies and procedures
5.4.3.2*	Maintain personnel records
5.4.3.3	Provide personnel information to authorized parties
5.4.3.4	Evaluate personnel reclassification requests
5.4.3.7	Administer travel and PCS matters
5.4.4.12*	Develop and administer career development policies
5.5.1.1*	Develop military retirement policies and procedures
5.5.1.2*	Develop military separation policies and procedures
5.5.2.1	Evaluate retirement and separation requests
5.5.2.2	Evaluate involuntary separations and discharged

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\*"Key" functions (see Chapter VIII, p. VIII-3)

EXHIBIT 3  
Functions With No or Inadequate  
Organizational Support

<u>Function Number</u>	<u>Function</u>
1.1*	Project manpower availability, technology, and personnel trends
1.2*	Project unconstrained manpower and personnel requirements
1.3*	Develop personnel doctrine
1.4.1*	Establish PMS objectives
1.4.2*	Design and administer PMS objectives reporting system
1.4.3*	Evaluate overall PMS performance
1.4.4*	Prepare/revise Master Personnel Plan
5.1.1.5*	Evaluate personnel procurement policies, procedures, and activities
5.1.2.3*	Evaluate effectiveness of recruiting/advertising programs
5.2.1.7*	Evaluate training/education programs
5.3.1.4*	Evaluate distribution policies and procedures
5.3.2.4	Evaluate civilian personnel assignment policies and procedures
5.4.1.10*	Develop job analysis and evaluation policies
5.4.4.1*	Conduct human resource research
5.5.1.4*	Evaluate separation policies and procedures
5.5.3.5	Evaluate post-separation/retirement programs

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\* Key functions (see Chapter VIII, p. VIII-3)

### 3. PMS ORGANIZATIONAL ALTERNATIVES

The PMS<sub>2</sub> was tasked to examine personnel management at DA General and Special Staff levels above MACOM and to address how the Army should be organized to manage people. This report addresses that basic question. It proposes alternative PMS organizational structures and describes the concept of each alternative.

Within the framework of criteria for PMS organizational alternatives, Booz, Allen has identified three basic PMS organizational strategies:

- . Restructure responsibility for some functions, but leave the current organizational structure unchanged
- . Reassign responsibility for functions and organizationally restructure the PMS
- . Establish a Personnel Command.

Two decisions are necessary: first, select a basic organizational strategy; and second, develop a specific organization consistent with that strategy.

There are certain priority actions, however, that may be undertaken without significant change from the present PMS organization:

- . Develop formal PMS objectives and a Master Personnel Plan on a continuing basis
- . Develop a long-range, integrated personnel management information systems plan, and implement it.

The relative merits of these three strategies are complex, and the issues to be considered include:


- . Ability to respond to PMS problems by reallocating functions and/or reorganization
- . ODCSPER manpower authorization ceilings
- . Separation of policy and planning from routine operations
- . Potential creation of a personnel command
- . Reduction of traditional branch affiliations and responsibilities of the heads of special staff agencies.

Many of these issues also impact on the design of organizational alternatives. Each of the three alternative PMS organizations is summarized in the following pages.

(1) Strategy One: Functional Restructuring Without Reorganizing the Current PMS

The PMS<sub>2</sub> criteria for organizational alternatives require that, at a minimum, certain functional realignments take place in the current PMS organization. Essentially, problems of redundant, unsupported, and misplaced functions are resolved as well as possible within constraints of the current organizational structure.

Alternative PMS Organization One shown in Exhibits 4 and 5, pages 21 and 22, is a realignment of functions without reorganizing the current PMS. Policy and




**NOTES:**

1. COA INTERFACES WITH THE ODCSPER AT THE STAFF LEVEL IN THE AREAS OF BUDGET AND PERSONNEL ENTITLEMENTS.
2. ACSAC INTERFACES WITH THE ODCSPER AT STAFF LEVEL IN THE AREAS OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS REVIEW AND APPROVAL.
3. TAG IS DUAL-HATTED AS THE COR TAGCEN, AND SERVES AS A DA SPECIAL STAFF OFFICER FOR ARMY-WIDE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS AND CERTAIN OTHER SUPPORT FUNCTIONS.
4. TJAG, CHAPLAIN AND SURGEON INTERFACE WITH THE ODCSPER AT THE STAFF LEVEL ON PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT POLICY AND COMPENSATION MATTERS.
5. CHIEF, NGB AND CHIEF ARMY RESERVE INTERFACES WITH THE ODCSPER AT THE STAFF LEVEL ON PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT POLICY, MOBILIZATION AND MANPOWER MATTERS TO INCLUDE CERTAIN PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING ACTIVITIES.
6. TAG FUNCTIONS AS A ODCSPER DIRECTOR WITHIN DESIGNATED FUNCTIONAL AREAS WITH BOTH TAGCEN AND RCPAC BEING THE OPERATING ARM FOR THESE SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS; THEREFORE, BOTH TAGCEN AND RCPAC ARE SHOWN EQUIVALENT TO OTHER ODCSPER FOA'S FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS DEPICTION.
7. COR, MILPERCEN AND USAPDA HAVE DIRECTOR EQUIVALENT STATUS. BOTH ORGANIZATIONS ARE ODCSPER FOA'S.
8. ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATIONS ARE THOSE WHICH PROVIDE SUPPORT TO OR INTERFACE WITH ODCSPER OPERATIONS BUT ARE NOT UNDER THE COMMAND OR SUPERVISION OF THE ODCSPER.
9. ADMINCEN PROVIDES COMBAT AND TRAINING DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT FOR ALL ASPECTS OF ODCSPER AND OTAG FUNCTIONAL AREAS. DHRD MAY TASK ADMINCEN ON A DIRECT BASIS TO ACCOMPLISH PROJECTS IN SUPPORT OF HR FUNCTIONS. ALL OTHER TASKING ORGANIZATIONS IN ODCSPER AND OTAG ARE ROUTED THROUGH HQ TRADOC AND ODCSOPS IF TASKING IS UP AR 5-5 (THE ARMY STUDY PROGRAM). THE ADMINCEN IS ALSO SUBJECT TO TASKING BY COA AND ACSAC, AND OTHER HQDA STAFF ELEMENTS REQUIRING COMBAT AND TRAINING DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT WITHIN THE PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION AREA.
10. COR USAREC IS ALSO CDR MEPCOM.
11. FOUR ADDITIONAL FOA'S OF TAGCEN INCLUDE TWO PUBLICATION CENTERS AND TWO MILITARY MAIL TERMINALS EACH OF WHICH ARE ON SEPARATE TDA SIMILAR TO THE U.S. ARMY COURIER SERVICE.

EXHIBIT 4  
Current PMS Organization

TO JOG, COURAGE, AND EXECUTIVE  
POWER NOT SHOWN



LEGEND:  
 [Dashed Box] DIRECTOR EQUIVALENT STATUS  
 [Dotted Line] TECHNICAL SUPERVISION/OPERATIONAL CONTROL  
 [Dotted Line] SUPERVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS  
 [Dashed Line] POA OF OTHER THAN DOD/DCR

2

FUNCTIONS		ORGANIZATIONS													TAG				
		ODCSPER DIRECTORATES						ODCSPER FIELD OPERATING AGENCIES											
		Manpower, Plans and Budget	Military Personnel Management	Human Resources Development	Civilian Personnel	The Adjutant General	Cdr. MILPERCEN	Cdr. Physical Disability Agency	Army Research Institute	Civilian Appellate Review Agency	MEPCOM	MILPERCEN	Physical Disability Agency	Safety Center	USAREC	OTAG	TAGCEN	ROPAC	TRADOC
1.0	<b>PLANNING</b>																		
1.1	Project manpower availability, technology, and personnel trends	●	x	●		x	●		x	x								x	
1.2	Project unconstrained manpower and personnel requirements	●		●	x				x									●	
1.3	Develop personnel doctrine	●	●	●			●			x					x	x		x	●
1.4	<b>PREPARE MASTER PERSONNEL PLAN</b>																		
1.4.1	Establish PMS objectives	●	●	●	●	●	●												
1.4.2	Design and administer PMS objectives reporting system	●																	
1.4.3	Evaluate overall PMS performance	●	●	●	●														
1.4.4	Prepares/revise master personnel plan	●	●	●	●														
5.1	<b>PROCURE PERSONNEL</b>																		
5.1.1	Develop personnel procurement policies and procedures	●	x	●		x			x	x					●				●
5.1.2	Develop personnel recruiting/advertising programs	●		●											●				
5.1.3	Access personnel	●								●	●				●			●	●
5.1.4	Maintain a professional recruiting force	●		●					●	●					●				●
5.2	<b>TRAIN/EDUCATE PERSONNEL</b>																		
5.2.1	Develop training/education programs	●		●	x				●	●					●	●		●	●
5.2.2	Schedule training/education programs								●	●								●	●
5.2.3	Schedule personnel to training/education programs								●	●	●				●			●	●
5.2.4	Conduct training/education																		●
5.3	<b>DISTRIBUTE PERSONNEL</b>																		
5.3.1	Develop military personnel distribution policies and procedures	x	●	●		●					x							x	
5.3.2	Develop civilian personnel assignment policies and procedures	●	●	●					●						●	●			
5.3.3	Develop personnel policies and plans for mobilization	x	●		●	x	●			x	x							●	
5.3.4	Assign personnel										●							●	
5.4	<b>SUSTAIN PERSONNEL</b>																		
5.4.1	Develop sustainment policies and procedures	●	●	●	●	●	x	●		x	x				x	x	x	x	x
5.4.2	Promote personnel		●		●				●	●	●								
5.4.3	Provide administrative services	●	●		●	●	●			●	●				●	●	●		
5.4.4	Provide human resource development programs		●	●	●	●	●	●		●	●				●	●		x	●
5.4.5	Provide community-related programs	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		●					●	●			
5.5	<b>SEPARATE/RETIRE PERSONNEL</b>																		
5.5.1	Develop personnel separation policies and procedures	●		●						●	x				x	x		●	
5.5.2	Administer separations/retirements				x					●	●						●	●	
5.5.3	Develop post-separation/retirement programs	●		●											●	●	●		



planning are concentrated in ODCSPER in "exchange" for the reassignment of military personnel operational functions from DHRD to TAGCEN and from DMPM to MILPERCEN.

Also:

- . DCSPER (Dir. Plans) is assigned responsibility for development of a Master Personnel Plan
- . DCSPER (Dir. Plans) is assigned responsibility for development of a set of top-management personnel objectives and administration of an objectives reporting and evaluation system
- . CCH, TJAG and TSG Personnel Management functions (less training) are transferred to MILPERCEN.


If the Army follows this strategy, a problem is encountered in accommodating the required manpower spaces for personnel planning and policy formulation within the current authorization of ODCSPER. Restrictions on the size of the DA Staff militate against any increase in the size of ODCSPER even though the total size of the PMS might be unaffected.

(2) Strategy Two: Organizational Restructuring


The PMS<sub>2</sub> criteria for organizational alternatives indicate that the efficiency and effectiveness of the PMS could be improved significantly by reorganizing and reassigning functions. Alternative PMS Organization Two shown in Exhibits 6 and 7, pages 24 and 25, is an organizational restructuring to:



EXHIBIT 6  
 Strategy Two:  
 Organizational Restructuring and  
 Functional Realignment



- 8. REORGANIZED FROM RESOURCES PREVIOUSLY IN DIRECTORATE OF MANPOWER, PLANS AND BUDGET.
- 9. COMMANDER MILITARY PERSONNEL CENTER IS DUAL-HATTED AS DIRECTOR MILITARY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AND ASSIGNED ADDITIONAL FOA: USAREC, MEPCOM, USMA (FOR SUPERVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS), AND USMA PREP SCHOOL. USA PHYSICAL DISABILITY AGENCY FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTION (LESS INDIVIDUAL TRAINING) OF TJAG, CCH AND TSG ARE REASSIGNED TO MILPERCEN.
- 10. DIRECTOR OF PLANS AND SYSTEMS ESTABLISHED AS NEW DIRECTORATE. ARI RECEIVES TASKING FOR HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH FROM DHRD.
- 11. USA SAFETY CENTER REASSIGNED FROM DCSPER TO TIG.
- 12. RELATIONSHIP AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR DOCTRINE CLARIFIED.
- 13. ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATIONS ARE THOSE WHICH PROVIDE SUPPORT TO AND INTERFACE WITH DCSPER OPERATIONS BUT ARE NOT UNDER THE COMMAND OR SUPERVISION OF THE DCSPER.
- 14. CDR, USAREC IS DUAL HATTED AS CDR, MEPCOM.
- 15. FOUR ADDITIONAL FOA'S OF TAGCEN INCLUDE TWO PUBLICATION CENTERS AND TWO MILITARY MAIL TERMINALS EACH OF WHICH ARE ON SEPARATE TOA SIMILAR TO THE U.S. ARMY COURIER SERVICE.



FUNCTIONS	ORGANIZATIONS	DDCSPER										TRADOC	ACS AC								
		DIRECTORATES					FOA OF														
		Human Resources Development/ TAG	Manpower Programs and Budget	Military Personnel Management/ CDR MILPERCEN	Civilian Personnel	Plans and Systems	Human Resources Dev/ TAG	MILPERCEN	Civilian Personnel	Plans and Systems	TRADOC	ADMINCEN	USACSC	CCH	JAG	TSC	NSB	OCAR	DCR		
1.0	<b>PLANNING</b>																				
1.1	Project manpower availability, technology, and personnel trends			●					●												●
1.2	Project unconstrained manpower and personnel requirements			●																	●
1.3	Develop personnel doctrine			●					●		●										
1.4	<b>PREPARE MASTER PERSONNEL PLAN</b>																				
1.4.1	Establish PMS objectives	●	●	●	●	●															●
1.4.2	Design and administer PMS objectives reporting system				●																
1.4.3	Evaluate overall PMS performance				●																
1.4.4	Prepare/revise master personnel plan				●																
5.1	<b>PROCURE PERSONNEL</b>																				
5.1.1	Develop personnel procurement policies and procedures			●	●																
5.1.2	Develop personnel recruiting/advertising programs							●													
5.1.3	Access personnel							●													
5.1.4	Maintain a professional recruiting force							●													
5.2	<b>TRAIN/EDUCATE PERSONNEL</b>																				
5.2.1	Develop training/education programs	●		●						●						●					●
5.2.2	Schedule training/education programs								●		●										
5.2.3	Schedule personnel to training/education programs								●		●										
5.2.4	Conduct training/education									●											
5.3	<b>DISTRIBUTE PERSONNEL</b>																				
5.3.1	Develop military personnel distribution policies and procedures			●																	
5.3.2	Develop civilian personnel assignment policies and procedures				●																
5.3.3	Develop personnel policies and plans for mobilization			●	●																●
5.3.4	Assign personnel							●	●												
5.4	<b>SUSTAIN PERSONNEL</b>																				
5.4.1	Develop sustainment policies and procedures	●		●	●																
5.4.2	Promote personnel							●	●	●											
5.4.3	Provide administrative services							●	●	●											
5.4.4	Provide human resource development programs	●						●													
5.4.5	Provide community related programs							●													
5.5	<b>SEPARATE/RETIRE PERSONNEL</b>																				
5.5.1	Develop personnel separation policies and procedures	●		●	●																
5.5.2	Administer separations/retirements							●	●	●											
5.5.3	Develop post-separation/retirement programs	●		●																	

LEGEND  
● Tasked with performing function  
⊙ Provides input for performing function

EXHIBIT 7  
 Strategy Two:  
 Organizational Assignment of Functions

ORGANIZATIONS	ODCSPER																		
	DIRECTORATES						FOA OF			TRADOC		ACS							
	Human Resources Development TAG	Management Programs and Budget CDR MILPERCEN	Military Personnel Management CDR MILPERCEN	Civilian Personnel	Plans and Systems	Human Resources Dev (TAG)	MILPERCEN	Civilian Personnel	Plans and Systems	TRADOC	ADMINCEN	USACAC	ECH	JAG	TSG	MOB	OCAR	DCSOPS	ASA (MS/RA)
Ability, technology, and personnel trends																			
manpower and personnel requirements																			
ine																			
<b>PERSONNEL PLAN</b>																			
MS objectives reporting system																			
formance																			
ersonnel plan																			
ement policies and procedures																			
ing/advertising programs																			
recruiting force																			
<b>PERSONNEL</b>																			
on programs																			
on programs																			
ining/education programs																			
on																			
<b>REL</b>																			
of distribution policies and procedures																			
Assignment policies and procedures																			
and plans for mobilization																			
ies and procedures																			
ice																			
velopment programs																			
ograms																			
<b>PERSONNEL</b>																			
on policies and procedures																			
vements																			
irement programs																			

LEGEND  
 ● Tasked with performing function  
 ○ Provides input for performing function

2

- . Accomplish functional realignments as in PMS Organization One
- . Assign all PMS FOA to a directorate of ODCSPER
- . Reassign operational functions of the Army Council of Review Boards from ASA(M&RA) to DHRD/TAG. OASA(M&RA) retains appellate review authority
- . Reassign USAFAC from COA to DHRD/TAG. COA retains General Staff responsibility for financial management matters
- . Reassign NGB Support Agency functions from the NGB to RCPAC
- . Reassign USA Physical Disability Agency functions to MILPERCEN
- . Reassign Safety Center from ODCSPER to TIG.

This assignment of functions frees the ODCSPER staff from operational involvements under most circumstances.

Two operational heads of agencies (TAG and Cdr., MILPERCEN) are dual hatted and provided a planning staff element to formulate policy and coordinate on the general Staff level within their areas of staff cognizance.


Other features of this alternative are that:

- . Military personnel operations (less Human Resources Development and support activities) are concentrated in MILPERCEN
- . Cdr., MILPERCEN also discharges GS responsibilities through his planning staff element in his capacity of Director of Military Personnel Management
- . TAG PMS functions are consolidated with those of DHRD; TAG is given General Staff responsibility for these functions, and a planning staff element to accomplish them. He is dual hatted as DHRD/TAG.

(3) Strategy Three: Establish an Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM)

The proposed PERSCOM, developed from PMS<sub>2</sub> criteria for organizational alternatives, is shown in Exhibits 8 and 9, on pages 28-30. The alternative incorporates these points:

- . All operational functions assigned under Alternative PMS Organization Two to FOA of directorates of ODCSPER are assigned to the Personnel Command and its subordinate organizations
- . TAG retains Special Staff responsibility for HQ Administrative Services
- . Life-cycle policy formulation functions for Total Force military personnel are accomplished in the Directorate of Plans and Systems
- . Centralized management planning of PMS systems is accomplished in the Directorate of Plans and Systems
- . The functions of programming and budgeting are separated from planning and manpower in different Directorates
- . The Director of Civilian Personnel performs policy formulation functions for civilian personnel in coordination with the Director of Plans and Systems.
- . The Safety Center is reassigned to TIG.
- . Functions of CIVPERCEN are reassigned to the Civilian Personnel Management Directorate.




**NOTES:**

1. ARMY COUNCIL OF REVIEW BOARDS OPERATING FUNCTIONS REASSIGNED TO USA PERSCOM. OASA (M&RA) RETAINS APPELLATE REVIEW AUTHORITY.
2. DCSOPS INTERFACES WITH DCSPER THROUGH GENERAL STAFF COORDINATION AND COMMITTEE STRUCTURE IN MATTERS PERTAINING TO INDIVIDUAL TRAINING.
3. USAFAC REASSIGNED FROM COA TO USA PERSCOM.
4. TAG PMS FUNCTIONS AND ITS FOA TRANSFERRED TO USA PERSCOM. TAG CONTINUES AS SPECIAL STAFF OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR HQDA ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS.
5. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS (LESS INDIVIDUAL TRAINING) REASSIGNED FROM TJAG, CCH AND TSG TO USA PERSCOM.
6. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS REASSIGNED FROM NGB SUPPORT AGENCY TO RCPAC, UNDER USA PERSCOM.
7. DIRECTOR PLANS AND SYSTEMS ASSIGNED POLICY DEVELOPMENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL LIFE CYCLE FUNCTIONS. RESEARCH IN ALL AREAS CONDUCTED BY ARI, TASKING TO ADMINCEN AND OTHER ARMY AGENCIES, CONTRACT, ETC.
8. DIRECTOR CIVILIAN PERSONNEL ASSIGNED POLICY DEVELOPMENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL CIVILIAN PERSONNEL LIFE CYCLE FUNCTIONS.
9. USA SAFETY CENTER REASSIGNED FROM DCSPER TO TIG.
10. RELATIONSHIP AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR DOCTRINE CLARIFIED.
11. ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATIONS ARE THOSE WHICH PROVIDE SUPPORT TO OR INTERFACE WITH DCSPER OPERATIONS BUT ARE NOT UNDER THE COMMAND OR SUPERVISION OF THE DCSPER.


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EXHIBIT 8 (1)  
 Strategy Three:  
 Army Personnel Command



2

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
**NOTES:**

1. DIRECTORATES AND SUBORDINATE ORGANIZATIONS INDICATED BY CODE (O) REPORT TO DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR OPERATIONS.
2. STAFF GROUP, DIRECTORATES AND SUBORDINATE ORGANIZATIONS INDICATED BY CODE (S) REPORT TO DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR SYSTEMS AND SUPPORT.
3. FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY LINE DIRECTORATES ARE OPERATIONAL LIFE CYCLE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS PREVIOUSLY IN ODCSPER, MILPERCEN, OTAG, TAGCEN AND THE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS (LESS INDIVIDUAL TRAINING) FROM TJAG, CCH AND TSG.
4. FOA REASSIGNED FROM MILPERCEN AND ODCSPER.
5. MEPCOM AND USAREC REASSIGNED FROM ODCSPER.
6. USAFAC REASSIGNED FROM COA.
7. RCPAC REASSIGNED FROM TAG.
8. CDR, USAREC IS DUAL HATTED AS CDR, MEPCOM.

DEPUTY  
COMMANDER FOR  
SYSTEMS & SUPPORT  
STAFF

(NOTE 2)

STAFF GROUP



2

**LEGEND**

- DUAL-HATTED POSITION
- (D) - REPORTS TO DEP CDR OPNS
- (S) - REPORTS TO DEP CDR SYS & SPT
- ..... - SUPERVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS

FUNCTIONS	ORGANIZATIONS	ODCSPER		US ARMY PERSCOM										TRADOC	ACS AC					
		DIRECTORATES	FOA	DIRECTORATES	SUBORDINATE ORG		TRADOC		ACS AC											
		Plans and Systems Programs and Budget	Civilian Personnel Manpower	Army Research Institute	Distribution and Operations	Enlisted Operations	Officer Operations	Civilian Personnel Management and Support	Community Migration and Special Programs	MEPCOM	USA/REC	USAFAC	RCPAC	TRADOC	ADMINCEN	USACSCC	CCH	JAG	TSG	RGA
<b>1.0 PLANNING</b>																				
1.1	Project manpower availability, technology, and personnel trends	●		●																
1.2	Project unconstrained manpower and personnel requirements	●																		
1.3	Develop personnel doctrine	●		●										●						
<b>1.4 PREPARE MASTER PERSONNEL PLAN</b>																				
1.4.1	Establish PMS objectives	●	●																	
1.4.2	Design and administer PMS objectives reporting system	●																		
1.4.3	Evaluate overall PMS performance	●																		
1.4.4	Prepare/revise master personnel plan	●																		
<b>5.1 PROCURE PERSONNEL</b>																				
5.1.1	Develop personnel procurement policies and procedures	●	●								●									
5.1.2	Develop personnel recruiting/advertising programs										●									
5.1.3	Access personnel						●			●		●								
5.1.4	Maintain a professional recruiting force										●									
<b>5.2 TRAIN/EDUCATE PERSONNEL</b>																				
5.2.1	Develop training/education programs	●	●											●						●
5.2.2	Schedule training/education programs							●						●						
5.2.3	Schedule personnel to training/education programs							●						●						
5.2.4	Conduct training/education													●						
<b>5.3 DISTRIBUTE PERSONNEL</b>																				
5.3.1	Develop military personnel distribution policies and procedures	●																		
5.3.2	Develop civilian personnel assignment policies and procedures		●																	
5.3.3	Develop personnel policies and plans for mobilization	●																		
5.3.4	Assign personnel					●	●	●	●				●							
<b>5.4 SUSTAIN PERSONNEL</b>																				
5.4.1	Develop sustainment policies and procedures	●	●																	
5.4.2	Promote personnel						●	●	●				●							
5.4.3	Provide administrative services					●			●	●		●								
5.4.4	Provide human resource development programs										●									
5.4.5	Provide community-related programs										●									
<b>5.5 SEPARATE/RETIRE PERSONNEL</b>																				
5.5.1	Develop personnel separation policies and procedures	●	●																	
5.5.2	Administer separations/retirements						●	●	●											
5.5.3	Develop post-separation/retirement programs	●																		

LEGEND  
 ● Tasked with performance  
 ● Provides input for performance



I. INTRODUCTION

## I. INTRODUCTION

Beginning in October 1961 (Hoelscher Committee Report), studies have addressed the requirement for organizational and functional realignments within DA's personnel management community. On July 6, 1978, the Army Personnel Command (APC) Ad Hoc Study Group under the auspices of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) was chartered to "develop the concepts which depict the most advantageous and efficient command relationships and organizational structure for performing the Army's personnel management and administrative function," with a second objective of determining "the need and feasibility of establishing an Army Personnel Command ...."

The Chief of Staff, Army (CSA), on July 13, 1978, approved a series of initiatives aimed at improving the Army's ability to perform its PMS mission. Thus, on October 12, 1978 the Personnel Management Action Committee (PMAC), an ad hoc committee under the DCSPER, was established to accomplish and coordinate far-reaching personnel actions. The APC charter and PMAC mission were closely related, and the APC study effort was merged into, and continued by, PMAC in December 1978.

To assist PMAC, a joint Army-Booz, Allen & Hamilton effort, the Personnel Management System Study (PMS<sub>2</sub>) was conducted from 19 April 1979 to 5 September 1979.

1. SUMMARY OF PMS<sub>2</sub> TASKS

Working closely with PMAC, Booz, Allen was charged with performing the following tasks:

- . Develop baseline description of the current PMS, its structure, and functional distribution/organizational relationships
- . Conduct an analysis of the functional distribution and organizational relationships existing within the current PMS to identify weaknesses and strengths
- . Develop and conduct interviews of selected operators and users of the PMS to obtain perceptions regarding the organization and operational efficiency and effectiveness of the PMS
- . Design and develop a questionnaire to survey the perceptions of key PMS operators and system users regarding PMS organizational and operational effectiveness
- . Develop the objectives of an optimal PMS
- . Develop alternative organizational configurations— at least three alternatives, one of which will be an Army Personnel Command
- . Develop evaluation techniques and assist the Army in determining preferred PMS organizational alternatives
- . Brief the Senior Officer Level Action Planning Conference, which will evaluate alternative PMS organizations
- . Prepare Study Draft Report
- . Prepare Final Study Report.

2. SCOPE OF THE ARMY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM STUDY

In accomplishing these tasks, Booz, Allen has conducted in-depth interviews, perception surveys and organizational and functional analysis. This effort has been made in accordance with the following Army guidance for the PMS study:

- . Examine the functional and organizational structure and relationships which are currently established to perform the Army-wide personnel management mission for the active Army, Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and Department of the Army civilians.
- . Limit the PMS<sub>2</sub> study to analysis of personnel management systems operating above Major Command level.
- . Take into consideration the suggestion of the Under Secretary of the Army that an Army Personnel Command may provide the organizational structure which best accomplishes the Army's personnel management mission.

Booz, Allen has observed these guidelines, while recognizing that the PMS extends downwards through the Major Commands and upwards through the Secretariat and into DOD. Those portions of the PMS not included in this study are the subject of other ODCSPER and TRADOC initiatives. The PMS<sub>2</sub>, by its nature, highlighted the active Army. Notwithstanding, senior officials in all Total Force components--active Army, Army Reserve, National Guard, and DA civilian--were interviewed, and a perceptions survey specifically targeted at the Reserves was administered.

There is, however, a limit to the scope of the PMS<sub>2</sub> other than the organizational limit of "above Major Command

level." This is the issue of Army overall management, as opposed to Army personnel management. Overall management of the Army is not within the scope of this study. Personnel management exists as a subset of manpower and personnel management, which in turn is a subset of overall Army management, and it is important to discuss briefly this broader context.

The PMS<sub>2</sub> has been focused on the five personnel life cycle functions:

- . Procure
- . Train/educate
- . Distribute
- . Sustain
- . Separate/retire.

These life cycle functions are couched in the broader context of manpower and personnel management:

- . Plan
- . Program
- . Budget
- . Plan Execution
- . Execute.

Of these five broad functions, only Planning has figured directly in the PMS<sub>2</sub> analysis of life-cycle functions; however, all of these manpower and personnel functions affect the PMS. For example, for procurement there must be a plan, a program, a budget, and all must be executed. The same is true for the other life-cycle functions.

Manpower and personnel management functions also must be managed; however, this level of operation constitutes overall management. One way of displaying this concept is

shown in Exhibit I-1, following this page. The exhibit shows the classic functions of overall management:


- . Plan
- . Organize
- . Coordinate
- . Control
- . Evaluate.

The PMS<sub>2</sub> represents a part of the Army's overall "planning" to get "organized" to "execute" the "personnel life cycle functions." PMS<sub>2</sub> will contribute to the first step in this process, but it is only a portion of the total context of overall Army management.

## 2. STRUCTURE OF PMS<sub>2</sub> STUDY REPORT

This PMS<sub>2</sub> Final Study Report has ten chapters plus appendices. Chapter II contains a brief review of related events which have preceded the PMS<sub>2</sub>. Other personnel management studies and significant associated developments completed by the Army in the past 15-20 years are included in this background summary to place this report in perspective.

Chapters III and IV contain organizational and functional structures required by Task One. These chapters are followed by the objectives of an optimal PMS and an analysis of survey interviews in Chapters V and VI as stipulated by Task Three, Four, and Five. Findings and conclusions developed from in-depth interviews and functional analysis, required by Task Two, are discussed in Chapter VII.



Chapters VIII and IX address Task Six: "Develop at least three alternative organizational configurations, one of which will be an Army Personnel Command." Chapter VIII contains the criteria to evaluate an optimal PMS organization. These criteria also are designed to assist in developing the alternative PMS organization structures which are contained in Chapter IX.

Chapter X contains the Evaluation of Alternative Organizations by the Department of the Army Senior Officer Level Action Planning Conference on 27-28 August 1979. Tasks VII and VIII were completed during this conference.

\* \* \* \* \*

This chapter has reviewed the events leading up to the PMS<sub>2</sub> Study, summarized the PMS<sub>2</sub>, discussed the scope of the PMS<sub>2</sub>, and outlined the structure of this report.

The next chapter provides a summary of significant historical events and more recent developments which have affected the evolution of the current PMS.

II. BACKGROUND

## II. BACKGROUND

### A SUMMARY OF SELECTED HISTORICAL EVENTS WHICH HAVE AFFECTED THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CURRENT ARMY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

A brief summary of selected historical events and more recent related developments which have influenced the development of the current PMS are presented in this chapter. Other personnel management studies and significant, associated developments by the Army in the recent past also are included to assist in placing this report in perspective.

In 1903 the Secretary of War, Elihu Root, directed reforms that brought about the most sweeping changes in Army organization in the two centuries of the Republic. After studying the lessons of the War with Spain, Secretary Root concluded that most of the Army's major mistakes during that war were caused by faulty organization. Among the most important changes he made to improve Army organization was the creation of a General Staff. The General Staff was headed by a Chief of Staff who acted as chief advisor and executive agent of the President on military policy. The newly formed General Staff was composed of selected officers who planned,

investigated and coordinated military activities under the supervision of the Chief of Staff.

Secretary Root's innovations were relatively untouched by the National Defense Act of 1920. Likewise, the massive changes under Chiefs of Staff Douglas MacArthur and Malin Craig in the 1930s left the internal functioning elements of the War Department staff unaffected. Today the staff organization of field elements of the U.S. Army reflects directly the internal organization of the Department of the Army Staff. For example, on a smaller scale, Major Command (MACOM) headquarters mirror the structural organization of Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) General and Special Staffs.

Several studies and partial reorganizations during the past twenty years represent the first major departures from the staff organization established by Secretary Root. These developments, in gross terms, represent change toward an industrial or corporate model organization. This change resulted in developing functional lines of communication outside the traditional chain of command; e.g., comptroller to comptroller, personnel managers to their counterparts, etc.

These changes also have resulted in a high degree of centralization and separation of specialist elements from the traditional and special staff roles of the past.

Primary examples of these changes are the establishment of the Communications Command, Criminal Investigation Command, Intelligence Command, and Health Services Command. Thus, many communications and other specialists no longer are in the chain of command of the local commander but report through functional channels to separate headquarters.

The first of several recent studies to impact on the personnel management function was the Office of the Secretary of Defense Project 80 (Hoelscher Commission) of 1961. The commission was charged with "functionalization of the technical services"; however, there was, of necessity, some consideration of the personnel arena. This commission recommended the establishment of the Office of Personnel Operations (OPO), which was implemented later. It also considered the establishment of an Army Personnel Command (APC) but concluded that such a move was infeasible at that time.

The Comptroller of the Army Report (Traub Report), 1962, contained the results of a study of the feasibility of establishing an OPO. The OPO concept was supported, except that OPO was placed under DCSPER rather than function in a special staff status. The Traub Report further identified functions for transfer from The Adjutant

General's Office (TAGO) to OPO and generated a series of memos of understanding between those two agencies.

Two years later, in 1964, Project BEST MAN was established to plan the move of selected personnel functions, including OPO and portions of TAGO, from the Washington area to Fort Benjamin Harrison and to St. Louis. A comprehensive plan was developed with time-phasing for the move, but the only significant result was the establishment and movement of the Reserve Components Personnel Administration Center (RCPAC) to St. Louis. (To comply with Presidential directives, moves to the Hoffman building and colocation with U.S. Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) recently have been completed by U.S. Army Civilian Personnel Center (CIVPERCEN) and currently are underway by TAGCEN.)

In 1969, the Staff Management Division of the Office of the Chief of Staff conducted a Functional Manpower Survey of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER), Office of Personnel Operations and the Adjutant General's Office. The survey identified an overlap of functions among TAGO, OPO, and ODCSPER, and it concluded that the various memos of agreement were not being followed because of unclear lines of responsibility. The survey recommended establishing a separate Army

Personnel Command (APC). The other organizational alternatives this survey developed differed only in the detail of the functions to be assumed by the proposed APC. In every alternative configuration, the APC was recommended. These recommendations were not adopted. For a more complete history of the APC concept, see Appendix A, History and Organization Data for an APC.

Two years later, in 1971, the Special Review Panel on Department of the Army Reorganization, Office of the Chief of Staff (Parker Panel) reached similar conclusions and recommendations regarding ODCSPER, TAGO, and OPO. The Parker Panel's recommendation that an APC be established was disapproved with the guidance to "re-evaluate when colocation (of agencies) is feasible."

In 1971 the Staff Management Division of the Office of the Chief of Staff updated its survey of 1969 and came to essentially the same conclusion as before: establish an APC. This time it recommended that OPO become the core of an APC. No action was taken on this recommendation.

Subsequently, the Comptroller of the Army Study-Analysis of Class II Activities of the Army Staff was conducted in 1972. The primary goal of this study was to consolidate similar functions and commands, and its charter went well beyond the personnel function. Again,

the same personnel agencies were identified for consolidation. The study had two major personnel management recommendations: (1) establish a Personnel Center (which was accomplished with the establishment of the United States Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) in 1973); and (2) consider colocation of all similar agencies.

The 1972 Comptroller Study was followed by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel's Report of the Army Personnel Center (TAPCEN) Study Group (1972). This report specified the functions to be merged in MILPERCEN the next year. Specifically excluded were many functions of TAGCEN and of the Recruiting Command.

Contemporaneously with many of these efforts, the STEADFAST Plan was being developed by the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, DA staff elements and Continental Army Command. The STEADFAST Plan established the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) while disestablishing the Continental Army Command and the Combat Developments Command in 1973.

Later iterations of the Plan (1973-1974) provided for three centers within TRADOC to coordinate doctrine development for their specified interests in the Army. Change Two to the plan addressed the responsibilities of the U.S. Army Administration Center (ADMINCEN). A series

of meetings through 1974 and 1975 established a consensus that the ADMINCEN would assume proponency from DA agencies for personnel and pay systems on an extended time schedule. DA proponent agencies would provide the personnel spaces to accompany functional responsibility as they were transferred. ADMINCEN thereby was established as another agency to develop personnel doctrine, co-equal in some respects with TAGCEN and MILPERCEN but removed by a major command headquarters, TRADOC.

Under the STEADFAST Plan proponency and system design for combat operations went to TRADOC's Combined Arms Center and proponency for logistics combat development to the Logistics Center, which works closely with DARCOM. No similar change has taken place for personnel functions. Consequently, personnel doctrine continues to be established by ODCSPER, TAGCEN, MILPERCEN and U.S. Army Finance and Accounting Center (USAFAC) through regulations and daily operations. However, ADMINCEN is tacitly tasked with responsibility for developing these personnel management systems; e.g., the Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS), the Joint Uniform Military Pay System (JUMPS), efficiency reporting, and Company Administration at Battalion Level (CABL) as they impact on the battlefield or "transcend the theater of operations."

In 1973 the DCSPER introduced The Army Personnel Plan (TAPP), which was intended to serve many of the functions of a master personnel plan for the Army. However, TAPP never was fully implemented, and it was never used as an overall management tool for the PMS at HQDA level. Some of the TAPP's reporting functions were initiated and continued for a few years on a decreasing basis. The plan was last updated in 1974 for the 1975-1979 period.

This review has summarized the evolution of the current PMS. It also has focused on those agencies that have proponency for the major functions that impact on soldiers' lives while in the Army: training, distribution and sustainment. Other agencies are responsible for accessions and separations. Specifically, the U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) is responsible for all enlisted accessions, and TRADOC (ROTC and OCS) and DCSPER (USMA) divide the responsibility for non-specialist officer accessions. The various officer specialties are handled by the Surgeon General (TSG), Judge Advocate General (JAG) and Chief of Chaplains (CCH). Separations involve the Reserve Component Personnel Administration Center (RCPAC) with, in the cases of death and retirement, both TAGCEN and USAFAC.

Considering that there has been direct coordination and tasking authority from DCSPER to ADMINCEN, the major

agencies in a soldier's life-cycle are: ADMINCEN, MILPERCEN, RCPAC, TAGCEN, TRADOC, USAFAC, and USAREC. Other agencies include The Surgeon General (TSG), Judge Advocate General (JAG), Chief of Chaplains (CCH) and; to some extent, The Inspector General (TIG), Chief of Engineers (COE) (living quarters), Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) (commissaries) and the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES).

Additionally, in the mid- to late 1970s, there have been several integrative studies which were much less comprehensive than those already discussed. These studies have included attempts to consolidate pay and personnel functions (Project COPPER); to plan current and projected personnel support system and services for the Army (PS<sub>3</sub>); and recommendations by field operating agencies (e.g., ADMINCEN and TRADOC) that some functions be re-aligned among existing agencies.

\* \* \* \* \*

Included in the above discussion are two major classes of studies and reports: (1) specific personnel community initiatives; and (2) generic staff restructuring studies. Among both classes of studies, a trend has been established over the past 18 years. There have

been repeated recommendations to establish a separate Personnel Command, and some recommendations toward that goal have been partially implemented.

Care must be taken when partially implementing a recommended systemic change. It has been observed in organizational development literature that a partial organizational change can be worse than no change at all when the recommendations for systemic change are mutually supportive and interrelated. More specifically, when changes are recommended to be implemented over a period of months or years, one dependent upon another, implementation of one or only a few changes is frequently disintegrative of the system rather than integrative.

The next chapter discusses the organizational structure of the current Army PMS.

III. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE  
CURRENT ARMY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

III.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE  
CURRENT ARMY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Personnel management is described in AR310-25, the Army dictionary, as follows:

Military Personnel Management: The process of planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling the procurement, training/education, utilization, separation/retirement, development, and motivation of military personnel to assist in the successful accomplishment of the organizational mission. It includes all procedures related to: military job analysis and evaluation; position classification; personnel classification, assignment and utilization; maintenance of an adequate system of records and reports required for successful operation of the Army personnel system; human resources development activities to include development of individual potential; and development of an organizational climate that enhances the attitude, motivation, commitment, and sense of well-being of soldiers and their families.

Civilian Personnel Management: The development and maintenance of a skilled and civilian work force. It includes recruitment and placement; job evaluation and pay administration; incentives; communication; employee relations and morale; performance appraisal; training; and career development.

This chapter describes the major elements of the Army that have significant Army-wide personnel management responsibilities although only their formal missions and relationships are described.

The Army PMS functions under the guidance of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

(ASA(M&RA)). As directed by the Secretary of the Army, the ASA(M&RA) acts in consonance with the provisions of laws enacted by the Congress and with policy guidance promulgated by the Executive Department and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The members of the Army General Staff render professional advice and assistance to the Office of the Secretary of the Army (OSA), the Under Secretary of the Army (USA) and the ASA(M&RA) in developing broad basic policies, plans, and programs. Heads of Army General Staff agencies who exercise significant personnel management responsibilities include:

- . Chief of Staff (CSA)
- . Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER)
  - Director, Manpower, Plans, and Budget (DMPB)
  - Director of Military Personnel Management (DMPM)
  - Director of Civilian Personnel (DCP)
  - Director of Human Resources Development (DHRD)
- . Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS)
- . Comptroller of the Army (COA).

Additionally, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Automation and Communication (ACSAC) has primary general staff responsibility for Automation and Communication policy formulation and dissemination, planning, standards, resource management, and validation of requirements for automation and communication systems to include Personnel Management Systems. The Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) is a functional proponent agency and the Administration Center (ADMINCEN) is a system designer.

Heads of Special Staff agencies provide assistance to the OSA, the CSA, members of the Army Staff, and other elements of the Department of the Army on specialized matters that fall within their area of responsibility. They prepare plans, review technical doctrine and coordinate technical, administrative, and operational plans and activities related to the PMS with other agencies of the Army staff. Heads of Army Special Staff agencies who exercise significant personnel management responsibilities include:

- . The Adjutant General (TAG)
- . The Surgeon General (TSG)
- . Chief of Chaplains (CCH)
- . The Judge Advocate General (TJAG)
- . Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB)
- . Chief, Army Reserve (CAR).

The heads of Special Staff agencies may have dual staff and command roles which are distinct in that each involves different responsibilities and duties. For example, in the personnel management area, TAG is both a special staff head and Commanding General (CG) of The Adjutant General Center (TAGCEN).

MACOMs are directly subordinate to, established by authority of, and specifically designated by HQDA. They may be assigned missions for personnel management tasks to be accomplished by their headquarters or subordinate elements. All MACOMs, including the Army component commands of

unified and specified commands, are customers of the Army PMS. Their subordinate commands operate the PMS in the field. One MACOM, the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), has significant mission responsibilities for individual training, accessions of officers from ROTC and OCS, and doctrine for operation of the Army PMS at MACOM level and below, plus functional PMS training at all levels.

Field Operating Agencies (FOA) are under the supervision of HQDA, and by definition are designed to execute policy. However, CG, MILPERCEN in certain cases and CG, TAGCEN in all cases exercise total policy responsibility, which equates to General Staff status. They do not have major command status.

The FOA are:

- . U.S. Army Military Review Boards Agency (MRBA)
- . U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC)
- . U.S. Military Enlistment Processing Command (MEPCOM)
- . U.S. Army Civilian Personnel Center (CIVPERCEN)
- . U.S. Army Civilian Appellate Review Agency (CARA)
- . U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral Sciences (ARI)
- . U.S. Army Physical Disability Agency (USAPDA)
- . U.S. Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN)
- . The Adjutant General Center (TAGCEN)
- . U.S. Army Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center (RCPAC)

- . U.S. Army Computer Systems Command (USACSC)
- . U.S. Army Finance and Accounting Center (USAFAC).


Figure III-1 on page III-6, depicts the organizational alignment of the elements comprising the PMS.

Additional information pertaining to organizational responsibilities of PMS elements is in Appendix C.

#### COMMAND AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS OF THE MAJOR PMS ELEMENTS

The levels of authority in the Department of the Army form a hierarchy of responsibility within the PMS. One channel of authority through the hierarchy is, in descending order, from the Secretary of the Army to the Assistant Secretaries of the Army and Chief of Staff, Army General Staff, Army Special Staff, Major Army Commands and Field Operating Agencies.

Alternate channels of communication and authority exist through the heads of designated Army staff agencies who have been delegated the authority to communicate directly with the Army Secretariat about subjects within their areas of cognizance. In addition, acting as an ODCSPER directorate chief, the CG MILPERCEN and certain other FOA may communicate directly with the Army Secretariat on matters other than policy formulation of concern to the Chief of Staff or to intermediate superior staff echelon heads.




**NOTES:**

1. COA INTERFACES WITH THE ODCSPER AT THE STAFF LEVEL IN THE AREAS OF BUDGET AND PERSONNEL ENTITLEMENTS.
2. ACSAC INTERFACES WITH THE ODCSPER AT STAFF LEVEL IN THE AREAS OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS REVIEW AND APPROVAL.
3. TAG IS DUAL-HATTED AS THE COR TAGCEN, AND SERVES AS A DA SPECIAL STAFF OFFICER FOR ARMY-WIDE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS AND CERTAIN OTHER SUPPORT FUNCTIONS.
4. TJAG, CHAPLAIN AND SURGEON INTERFACE WITH THE ODCSPER AT THE STAFF LEVEL ON PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT POLICY AND COMPENSATION MATTERS.
5. CHIEF, NGB AND CHIEF ARMY RESERVE INTERFACES WITH THE ODCSPER AT THE STAFF LEVEL ON PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT POLICY, MOBILIZATION AND MANPOWER MATTERS TO INCLUDE CERTAIN PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING ACTIVITIES.
6. TAG FUNCTIONS AS A DDCSPER DIRECTOR WITHIN DESIGNATED FUNCTIONAL AREAS WITH BOTH TAGCEN AND RCPAC BEING THE OPERATING ARM FOR THESE SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS; THEREFORE, BOTH TAGCEN AND RCPAC ARE SHOWN EQUIVALENT TO OTHER ODCSPER FOA'S FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS DEPICTION.
7. CDR, MILPERCEN AND USAPDA HAVE DIRECTOR EQUIVALENT STATUS. BOTH ORGANIZATIONS ARE ODCSPER FOA'S.
8. ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATIONS ARE THOSE WHICH PROVIDE SUPPORT TO OR INTERFACE WITH ODCSPER OPERATIONS BUT ARE NOT UNDER THE COMMAND OR SUPERVISION OF THE DDCSPER.
9. ADMINCEN PROVIDES COMBAT AND TRAINING DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT FOR ALL ASPECTS OF ODCSPER AND OTAG FUNCTIONAL AREAS. DHRD MAY TASK ADMINCEN ON A DIRECT BASIS TO ACCOMPLISH PROJECTS IN SUPPORT OF HR FUNCTIONS. ALL OTHER TASKING ORGANIZATIONS IN ODCSPER AND OTAG ARE ROUTED THROUGH HQ TRADOC AND ODCSOPS IF TASKING IS UP AR 5-5 (THE ARMY STUDY PROGRAM). THE ADMINCEN IS ALSO SUBJECT TO TASKING BY COA AND ACSAC, AND OTHER HQDA STAFF ELEMENTS REQUIRING COMBAT AND TRAINING DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT WITHIN THE PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION AREA.
10. CDR USAREC IS ALSO COR MEPCOM.
- 11: FOUR ADDITIONAL FOA'S OF TAGCEN INCLUDE TWO PUBLICATION CENTERS AND TWO MILITARY MAIL TERMINALS EACH OF WHICH ARE ON SEPARATE TDA SIMILAR TO THE U.S. ARMY COURIER SERVICE.

EXHIBIT III-1  
Organizational Structure of  
Major Army PMS Elements

INTERFACES TO OMB, CONGRESS, AND EXECUTIVE  
BRANCH AGENCIES NOT SHOWN



LEGEND:  
 [Dashed Box] DIRECTOR EQUIVALENT STATUS  
 [Dotted Line] TECHNICAL SUPERVISION/OPERATIONAL CONTROL  
 [Dotted Line] SUPERVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS  
 [Solid Line] FOU OF OTHER THAN DOD/DA

2

Principal officials within the PMS also function as members of formally organized and ad hoc committees, boards, and other groups. These informational and planning groups supplement established command and staff channels and, in effect, form an informal organizational structure that influences the PMS. These groups serve as channels through which planning guidance and information are passed, as forums for the generation of staff requirements, and as coordinators for proposed recommendations. Additionally, such groups as the Army Policy Council, the Army General Staff Council and the Select Committee make decisions affecting personnel management.

Appendix D contains a list of committees on which principal officials of the PMS serve. The number of committees in this appendix indicates the importance of these bodies to the current PMS.

### 3. RESPONSIBILITIES OF MAJOR PMS ELEMENTS

Most of the major PMS staff actions regarding policy formulation and operations are accomplished in ODCSPER, TAGO and MILPERCEN. TAG and CG MILPERCEN also serve as Directors in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. Together with the Director of Civilian Personnel, NGB, and OCAR, these offices manage most of the HQDA military and civilian personnel operations of the active Army and Reserve components.

The ODCSPER staff is designated as a planning staff. It is organized to operate predominately in that mode, responding to general policy direction and specific tasks assigned principally by ASA(M&RA) and CSA. The annual planning, programming and budgeting process (PPB) requires continuous and sizable staff resources to develop and promulgate the resulting personnel management programs and guidance. This is especially true in ODCSPER, and the PPB process is also a major task in MILPERCEN and TAGO.

Another major ODCSPER workload is manpower management. This responsibility, recently transferred from DCSOPS to DCSPER, is closely related to budget actions and requires interface among Army staff, OCSA agencies and Army Secretariat officials for all significant force development issues.

The DCSPER devotes considerable attention to recruiting, mobilization planning, manpower management, human resource development, and ROTC matters. Formulation of policy and development of staff papers results in requests for information which are passed to the operational level in MILPERCEN, TAGO and the FOA. When desired, committees or other groups are formed to facilitate communications and to

coordinate the development of staff papers. An ODCSPER action officer usually chairs the special study groups.

The Adjutant General maintains close coordination with other directorates of ODCSPER in the development of community life support programs and reserve personnel administration matters. Decisions on routine policy matters in these areas are made within the agency organization. Major policy and doctrinal documents are forwarded through DCSPER, CSA, and ASA(M&RA).

MILPERCEN interfaces on a continuing basis with DCSPER-MP and DCSPER-PB. MILPERCEN officers actively participate in the development of policy which is formally staffed by DCSPER at the coordinating staff level. The mission-oriented organization of MILPERCEN directorates matches the management and distribution functions for officer and enlisted personnel and the development and management of personnel information systems.

Other actions accomplished by the primary elements of the PMS are individual personnel actions, human resource matters, and civilian personnel policy actions:

- . Most individual personnel actions are accomplished within ODCSPER, MILPERCEN, and their operating FOAs. However, actions pertaining to General

Officers are matters of personal concern to the DCSPER and CSA. On an exceptional basis, and as required to respond to individual inquiries such as requests from members of Congress and the White House, actions of an individual nature may be forwarded to or through CSA and ASA(M&RA).

Development of human resources policy is accomplished principally in the Human Resources Development Directorate, DCSPER, and in TAGCEN. The interest of ASA(M&RA) in this area is reflected by a number of staff actions which are forwarded to that level.

Most civilian personnel policy actions are completed within the Civilian Personnel Directorate, DCSPER, and CIVPERCEN, in coordination with the functional chiefs on the DA staff where appropriate. The basic role of CIVPERCEN, however, is to implement, interpret, and recommend policy. Civilian personnel policy regulations are approved by ASA(M&RA). Many individual civilian personnel appointment requests, which prior to enactment of the Civil Service Reform Act required referral outside Department of Defense (DOD), may now be approved at lower echelons.

Although the preponderance of personnel policy formulation and execution is found in ODCSPER, TAGO, RCPAC and MILPERCEN, similar responsibilities are also discharged in other staff agencies and FOA:

The Surgeon General, Chief of Chaplains, and the Judge Advocate General provide career management services for officers in their respective groups which is similar to that provided by MILPERCEN for other DA officers and all enlisted personnel

- . COA has general staff responsibility for pay and related matters
- . DCSOPS exercise DA staff responsibility for training of military personnel, except precommission training which continues as a DCSPER responsibility
- . Recruiting is accomplished by the U.S. Army Recruiting Command, an FOA of DCSPER, and by the NGB
- . Systems development activities of MILPERCEN are subject to the guidance and approval of ACSAC and its FOA, the Computer Systems Command
- . The NGB exercises policy formulation responsibility and supervises execution by the States of personnel management matters for members of the Army National Guard
- . The CAR acts in an advisory role in developing personnel management policy for the Army Reserve
- . TRADOC manages the operations of the ROTC program, OCS (except state National Guard OCS programs) and the training base, and commands ADMINCEN which has doctrinal responsibilities in the PMS.

Taken together, these organizations form the PMS at DA level. The interfaces outside the scope of this study—upward to OSD, the Congress, and other governmental agencies, and downward to field agencies and commands below MACOM level—complete the context of the PMS at DA level.

The traditional personnel life cycle functions are procurement, education and training, distribution, sustainment, separation and retirement. A comparison of how these functions are applied to the total force components by the major PMS elements was made by the Military Personnel Management Study Group. These comparisons, contained in Appendix E, highlight the differences in how active military, National Guard, Army Reserve,

and DA civilian personnel are managed, in the context of the personnel life cycle functions.

\* \* \* \* \*

This chapter has briefly described the major organizations which address personnel issues at HQDA level and their formal responsibilities. Both the large number of organizations and their complex interrelationships have been sketched.

The next chapter discusses the functional structure of the Army PMS.

IV. FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE CURRENT ARMY  
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

#### IV. FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE CURRENT ARMY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Organization and mission effectiveness studies have traditionally begun with mission statements and moved quickly to the specification of organizational structures and processes. The first two sections of this chapter describe a more systematic approach for studying the Army PMS — functional analysis — and present a functional description of the current system. The last section discusses organizational implications of functional analysis.

##### 1. METHODOLOGY OF FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS

The purpose of this study is to understand the Army PMS as it currently operates at HQDA level and to define it as it should operate. Because of the complex organizational interactions, a carefully structured analysis and documentation technique are required to achieve a useful and thorough understanding of the problem. As Peter Drucker has written:

Organizational structure will not just "evolve". . . organizational design and structure requires thinking, analysis, and a systematic approach.

The first step is to identify and organize the building blocks of organizations.

Structure follows strategy. . . Structure is a means for attaining the objectives and goals of an institution.\*

\* Drucker, Peter F., Management Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices, 1973, p. 523.

Functional analysis describes what must be done as opposed to who does it.


This study's functional analysis of the PMS begins by identifying the small group of top-level functions that must be performed by the Army to carry out its personnel management missions. These functions overlap with those used to manage manpower, which is outside the scope of this study, but this only occurs at the top level. Next, component work steps that make up personnel-related functions are identified with their associated information inputs and outputs. These work steps, or subfunctions, can in turn be decomposed into inputs, work steps, and outputs. This functional decomposition, illustrated in Exhibit IV-1 on page IV-3, can be continued until any desired level of detail is achieved. The resulting structure is a hierarchy with generic functions at the top and many detailed subfunctions below. This functional decomposition is recorded on Hierarchy-Input-Process-Output (HIPO) worksheets. For clerical convenience, the functions are numbered, but the numbering scheme is arbitrary and does not imply relative importance or sequence.

## 2. CURRENT ARMY PMS FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE

As displayed in Exhibit IV-2 on page IV-4, five top-level functions are identified as supporting the Army's manpower and personnel mission:

Planning

VISUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS (VTOC)



HIPO WORKSHEET

FUNCTION ID: 2.0

INPUT	WORK STEPS
1. <i>~~~~~</i>	1. <i>~~~~~</i>
2. <i>~~~~~</i>	2. <i>~~~~~</i>
3. <i>~~~~~</i>	3. <i>~~~~~</i>
	4. <i>~~~~~</i>

HIPO WORKSHEET

FUNCTION ID: 2.0      SUBFUNCTION ID: 2.3.2


INPUT	WORK STEPS	OUTPUT
1. <i>~~~~~</i>	1. <i>~~~~~</i>	1. <i>~~~~~</i>
2. <i>~~~~~</i>	2. <i>~~~~~</i>	<i>~~~~~</i>
3. <i>~~~~~</i>	3. <i>~~~~~</i>	<i>~~~~~</i>
	4. <i>~~~~~</i>	

EXHIBIT IV-1  
Illustration of HIPOs and  
Functional Decomposition

ENTS (VTOC)


HIPO WORKSHEET

FUNCTION ID: 2.0		SUBFUNCTION ID: 2.3	
INPUT	WORK STEPS	OUTPUT	
1. <i>wavy</i>	1. <i>wavy</i>	1. <i>wavy</i>	
2. <i>wavy</i>	2. <i>wavy</i>	2. <i>wavy</i>	
3. <i>wavy</i>	3. <i>wavy</i>	3. <i>wavy</i>	
	4. <i>wavy</i>		



2

EXHIBIT IV-2  
Top-Level Functions Supporting the  
Army's Personnel Mission



90

- . Programming
- . Budgeting
- . Execution planning
- . Execution.


The scope of this study is limited to personnel management, or "Execution," which is composed of the following subfunctions:

- . Procurement
- . Training/Education
- . Distribution
- . Sustainment
- . Separation/Retirement.

These five subfunctions are the classic life cycle functions of personnel management. They have been broken down into their component subfunctions to the degree necessary to support future analysis. The first two levels of the "Execution" group of functions are displayed in Exhibit IV-3, on page IV-6. Two points concerning the HIPOs should be noted:

- . Not all of the functions contained in the HIPOs are performed at DA level, e.g., "Conduct Training/Education" (function 5.2.4). When deemed necessary, however, these have been included to provide a complete mosaic of functions for future analysis.
- . Some functions are not related to personnel management as such, but were included if it was felt they had a significant impact on personnel sustainment. Examples are "Administer Army Postal System" (function 5.4.3.6), and "Develop and Administer Charity and Relief Programs" (function 5.4.5.6).

EXHIBIT IV-3  
 First Two Levels of Personnel  
 Management Functions



The HIPOs should be carefully reviewed for completeness and accuracy, as they form the foundation for all subsequent functional analysis.

Once the functional structure was developed, it was possible to identify organizations which perform the various functions. Current organizational responsibilities for the execution functions are indicated in Exhibit IV-4, on page IV-8.

\* \* \* \* \*

This chapter has discussed the methodology of functional analysis and presented a functional overview of the Army PMS at HQDA level.

The next chapter presents the objectives for an optimal Army Personnel Management System.

EXHIBIT IV-4  
Organizational Responsibility for  
Personnel Management Functions

EXECUTION FUNCTIONS	ORGANIZATIONS																					
	DCSPER	ARI	MILPERCEN	MEPCOM	USAREC	CIVPERCEN	PDC	DTAG	TAGCEN	RCZAC	DCDA	FINGEN	TRADOC	ADMINCEN	ACCAC	CCH	JAG	MGB	DCAR	TSG	DCSO/PS	
<b>5.1 PROCURE PERSONNEL</b>																						
5.1.1 DEVELOP PERSONNEL PROCUREMENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES	●		○		○	○			○								●	●	●	●	●	
5.1.2 DEVELOP PERSONNEL MARKETING PROGRAMS	●				●								●				●	●	●		●	
5.1.3 ACCESS PERSONNEL			●	●	●				○				●				●	●	○		●	
5.1.4 MAINTAIN A PROFESSIONAL RECRUITING FORCE					●												●	●	●		●	
<b>5.2 TRAIN/EDUCATE PERSONNEL</b>																						
5.2.1 DEVELOP TRAINING/EDUCATION PROGRAMS	●					●							●	○			●	●	●	●	●	●
5.2.2 SCHEDULE TRAINING/EDUCATION PROGRAMS									○				○				●	●	●		●	●
5.2.3 SCHEDULE PERSONNEL TO TRAINING/EDUCATION PROGRAMS			●						●								●	●	●		●	
5.2.4 CONDUCT TRAINING/EDUCATION													●	●			●	●	●		●	
<b>5.3 DISTRIBUTE PERSONNEL</b>																						
5.3.1 DEVELOP MILITARY PERSONNEL DISTRIBUTION POLICIES AND PROCEDURES	●		○						○								●	●	●	○	●	
5.3.2 DEVELOP CIVILIAN PERSONNEL DISTRIBUTION POLICIES AND PROCEDURES	●					○												●				
5.3.3 DEVELOP PERSONNEL POLICIES AND PLANS FOR MOBILIZATION	●		●						●								●	●	●	●	●	
5.3.4 ASSIGN PERSONNEL			●						●								●	●	●		●	
<b>5.4 SUSTAIN PERSONNEL</b>																						
5.4.1 DEVELOP SUSTAINMENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES	●	○	○			○	○	●	●	○	●	○					●	●	●	●	●	●
5.4.2 PROMOTE PERSONNEL			●						●										○			
5.4.3 PROVIDE ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES			●					●	●	●	●	●					○	○	○		○	
5.4.4 PROVIDE HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS	●	●	○			●	●	●	●			○	○				●		○			
5.4.5 PROVIDE COMMUNITY-RELATED PROGRAMS	●							●	●								●	○			●	
<b>5.5 SEPARATE/RETIRE PERSONNEL</b>																						
5.5.1 DEVELOP PERSONNEL SEPARATION/RETIREMENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES	●		○					●	○	○							●	●	○		●	
5.5.2 ADMINISTER SEPARATIONS/RETIREMENTS			●					○	●										●			
5.5.3 DEVELOP POST-SEPARATION/RETIREMENT PROGRAMS	●							●	○		●	●							○			

○ PERFORMS PART OR ALL OF FUNCTION  
● FORMALLY TASKED WITH PERFORMING PART OR ALL OF FUNCTION

V. OBJECTIVES OF AN OPTIMAL PMS

## V. OBJECTIVES OF AN OPTIMAL PMS

To manage personnel in the Army and to do it well requires that both the goal of personnel management and the objectives of personnel management be articulated. Without a goal and objectives that are operationally useful, managers of the Army PMS can, at best, only hope to "get by."

The goal — or mission — of the Army PMS is to provide the Army with highly effective and morally responsible military and civilian men and women capable of fulfilling their wartime responsibilities and to sustain quality of life support for soldiers and their families, while requiring from them a reciprocal dedication to service. At the same time, the Army PMS must prepare the total Army for rapid transition to combat, fully capable of performing its wartime mission (Total Army Goals, Department of the Army, 21 September 1977). What is needed today is a coherent set of objectives that will provide direction based on this goal, to personnel managers throughout all levels of the Army. Such a document does not currently exist--the Army has neither a personnel plan nor stated personnel objectives. It needs both, developed in detail, and this chapter addresses that requirement.

There are two reasons for articulating objectives in the context of this study. First, objectives in this chapter can serve as the basis for developing more detailed objectives in the future. Because the study is targeted at the DA level and is intended to support reorganization decisions at this level, only the top-level objectives are considered in this report. But objectives will be eventually needed for all PMS organizations, divisions, branches, and individuals.

Second, the objectives serve as criteria for determining the adequacy of an optimal PMS functional structure. Stated differently, if the baseline PMS functional structure does not support the objectives, then it must be modified. Applying this criteria resulted in an optimal PMS functional structure that supports all the objectives. Documented on Hierarchy-Input-Process-Output (HIPO) worksheets, this optimal functional structure, which appears in Appendix G, is very similar to the baseline functional structure.

#### 1. DEFINITION OF OBJECTIVES

At the outset, agreement on definitions is needed. Paraphrasing Peter Drucker in Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices, objectives will be defined broadly as the action commitments through which the mission is accomplished. They

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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART  
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are the result of translating an organization's mission into several focused statements which provide operational guidance for performing that entire mission. Each of the resulting objectives can in turn be broken into component objectives which are even more focused, and so on. The result is a pyramidal hierarchy of objectives. The top-level objectives are few, broad, and encompassing; the bottom-level objectives are many and specific.

Objectives must specify a time frame for achievement, the results to be achieved, the measures of achievement, and possibly the methods to be used for achievement. Although stating the desired results is necessary, top-level objectives might be either continuing in time, difficult to measure, or both. This does not reduce their value for top-management guidance, but one might prefer to call this type of objectives "goals"; we choose to call them objectives, because there is little conceptual difference.

## 2. SOURCE OF OBJECTIVES

To complete this study, it was necessary to document the top-level objectives of an optimal PMS. The Army does

not currently have a single-source statement of objectives relating to personnel management. The last such document was the Army Personnel Plan FY 1974-79 (TAPP), most recently published in 1975. Notwithstanding this fact, most of TAPP has been verified by the study team to be currently viable. Current documents containing relevant personnel management objectives include:

- . Army Program Objectives Memorandum, FY 81-85
- . Statements before U.S. Senate and House Committees
  - Secretary of the Army
  - Army Chief of Staff
  - Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
- . Army Regulations and Circulars.

A compilation was made of objectives drawn from all these sources. After eliminating redundancies and editing, a master list of personnel management objectives that are currently active was prepared. This list, containing over 150 objectives, appears in Appendix G.

The original intent of the study team was to deduce the small set of current Army top-level objectives by consolidating and refining this lengthy list. However, most of the objectives in Appendix G are written for action officers, not MA-level managers, and this was not possible.

### 3. TOP-LEVEL PMS OBJECTIVES

Because of the inability to deduce top-level objectives for an optimal PMS "bottoms-up" from currently-stated Army objectives, the study team synthesized a set of top-level objectives, by following these criteria:

- . The objectives should support the Army personnel goal cited at the beginning of this chapter.
- . The objectives should address the major problem areas identified by the study.
- . The objectives should be targeted at DA-level managers.
- . The objectives should facilitate functional management.

The resulting objectives are prepared for, and concentrate on, DA-level personnel managers. They are intentionally broad and represent responsibilities that would be assigned to entire organizations. Some of the objectives are short-term and easily measured, while others are long-range and more difficult to measure. But whether short- or long-term, they are all action commitments for Army personnel top-management.

#### (1) Planning Objectives

To accurately forecast long-range personnel requirements, personnel resources, and their availability

to the Army, considering political, economic, strategic, technological, and societal trends and demands.

To develop and maintain a continuing strategy for allocating scarce personnel resources to total force components.

To develop and maintain a research and analysis capability which is integrated with and supports all aspects of the personnel planning, programming, and budget process.

To develop and maintain an integrated, Total Force data base and ADP system for handling personnel/pay information.

To develop and maintain an integrated set of objectives for Army personnel managers at all levels which will serve as a management tool and have minimal reporting requirements.

(2) Programming/Budgeting Objectives

To develop programs to increase workforce productivity which will offset growing personnel costs.

(3) Procurement Objectives

To acquire personnel which fulfill Army force requirements in terms of numbers, qualitative characteristics, and total force mix.

To develop and test mobilization plans for the activation of Army Reserve and Army National Guard components and the procurement of new personnel for all Total Force components.

To secure congressional acceptance of an increase in enlistment/reenlistment incentives for both active Army and Army Reserve components, which will strengthen the Army's readiness posture and eliminate manpower shortfalls.

To support peacetime selective service registration which will facilitate mobilization manpower planning.

(4) Training/Education Objectives

To establish and maintain undergraduate, graduate, and professional military training, education and development programs which produce individual skills and unit performances that meet the requirements of the Total Force.

(5) Distribution Objectives

To establish and maintain distribution policies which provide for the assignment of personnel in accordance with operational priorities, with due consideration for individual preferences.

To fully integrate women into the Total Force at all levels and in all units, consistent with the legal and policy constraints on assignment of women to certain skill categories and units.

To fully integrate and utilize minorities in the Total Force at all levels and in all units.

To develop and test mobilization plans for the assignment of all Total Force elements and individuals in the event of a national emergency.

(6) Sustainment

To further develop personnel career fields emphasizing opportunities for advancement comparable to operational line and command positions.

To design personnel evaluation systems for the Total Force components which can describe current

performance, individual potential, and can be used to select personnel for schools, promotion, and assignments.

To provide quality of life programs which best serve the health, welfare, and morale of soldiers and their dependents.

To establish and maintain a means to correctly and completely inform the total Army about the objectives of the personnel management system and how it functions, and to gather and evaluate feedback concerning this effort.

(7) Retirement/Separation Objectives

To separate and retire personnel in a manner which fulfills the Army's requirements for quality control and quantitative management and considers individual desires.

\* \* \* \* \*

This chapter has presented top management objectives for an optimal PMS. The next chapter discusses the analysis of perceptions survey interviews.

VI. ANALYSIS OF PERCEPTIONS SURVEY INTERVIEWS

## VI. ANALYSIS OF PERCEPTIONS SURVEY INTERVIEWS

A qualitative, preliminary study of perceptions of the U.S. Army Personnel Management System was completed in July 1979. A total of 28 group depth interviews and individual depth interviews were conducted, involving 104 personnel representing staff in the Washington area, FORSCOM and TRADOC posts, and Reserve components. The objectives of this qualitative study were to:

- . Gain an in-depth perspective of perceptions, knowledge, and attitudes concerning personnel management in the Army
- . Establish a basis for developing the questionnaire and designing the sample for the contractor's follow-on quantitative perception survey which will be conducted on July and August 1979.

Results of the subsequent quantitative study of perceptions appear in Chapter VII, "Findings and Conclusions About the Current Army Personnel Management System (PMS)."

These perceptions, which appear unabridged in the first half of Appendix F, have been condensed and classified into four categories:

- . Operation of the Personnel Management System
- . Personnel Management Functions
- . Special Personnel
- . Other Perceptions.

A discussion of these categories form the first four sections of this chapter.

A comparison of the preliminary results and results based on the complete returns is in Section 5 of this chapter. Results of the survey of USAREUR personnel are summarized in Section 6.

A quantitative survey also was conducted of commanders and personnel managers in the Army Reserve. Results of the survey of Army Reserve personnel are contained in Volume III of this report.

1. OPERATION OF THE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Few respondents have a perspective on the Personnel Management System as a whole. Generally, each person views it from his current job or jobs that were held in the recent past.

There was some feeling that the importance of personnel management in the Army is underrated. The overall system was seen as being unresponsive to human needs because of the rigidity of the system and its regulations, and the complexity of the system. Several specific problems with the overall system were suggested:

- . Multiple systems
- . System overload
- . System lag
- . Inadequate information systems
- . Overly-frequent changes in the system.

A number of specific elements in the Personnel Management System emerged as areas of controversy or concern:

- . While the Personnel Administration Centers (PAC) were regarded as providing more efficient and higher quality service than the company clerk system, many felt that these advantages were outweighed by the loss in responsiveness and contact between company commanders, NCOs, and the men. Other disadvantages cited were overspecialization, non-applicability to wartime, and the presence of "shadow clerks" in the companies.
- . MILPERCEN was viewed with some skepticism by people in the field, and some resentment by field personnel managers emerged.
- . SIDPERS was felt by some to be too sophisticated for the personnel available to operate it.
- . JUMPS was generally regarded as working well, although its applicability to wartime was questioned.
- . The split between personnel management policy and its implementation at the Division level was noted.

Personnel problems in the Personnel Management System itself primarily come down to a perceived shortage of qualified people, particularly at the enlisted, NCO, and Washington Staff levels.

There is a general feeling that the PMS would function more effectively if it were better understood by personnel in the field. Inadequate understanding results from:

- . Constant change in the system
- . Blockage of the information flow
- . Cynicism.

## 2. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS

Perceptions in this section have been arranged by life-cycle function.

### (1) Procurement

Awareness of the difficulties in recruiting sufficient numbers of capable personnel at the enlisted level was universal. Many were aware of "shady" recruiting practices. Most attributed recruiting difficulties to the available manpower pool, the attractiveness of the civilian sector, and the lack of a draft.

Reenlistment was not a universal problem and some units exceed their quotas. However, concern was expressed at the numbers of "good soldiers," particularly NCOs, who were leaving the service. It was noted that units no longer have authorized "reenlistment NCOs."

The "New Soldier" generally was felt to be different from the enlistee of the past. Differences include:

- . Less motivation, pride, and professionalism
- . Lower mental capacity, on the average
- . More likely to have dependents
- . Higher percentage of females.

(2) Training and Education

Initial Entry Training, a combination of the former Basic Combat Training and Advanced Individual Training, was rarely mentioned in the course of the interviews. Advanced Individual Training for technical and personnel management MOSs was felt to be inadequate.

Recent changes in manuals and training materials were generally viewed as being improvements.

The need for remedial education and civilian schooling was generally acknowledged. Great frustration was expressed by enlisted personnel who knew they needed remedial education to advance their careers but were prevented from attending the classes by the demands of their jobs. This problem also was noted by action officers on Washington area Staffs.

Problems with career progression and professional development were noted by both enlisted personnel and officers:

- . At the enlisted level, the philosophy of EPMS is generally accepted, but in practice:
  - Disconnects between the realities of several MOSSs and their SQTs were noted
  - EERs were viewed as increasingly less valuable because of inflated ratings
  - The "up or out" philosophy was felt to be driving away too many good soldiers.
  
- . Among officers, "ticket punching" was acknowledged, but not all viewed it as a problem. It was agreed OERs had become inflated to the point of being worthless; however, difficulties were foreseen with basing judgments on narrative evaluations.
  
- . Troops arrive at new assignments from training with their pay records in disorder, and they can get into trouble because they have nobody to call in the event of inadvertent late arrival.

(3) Sustainment

Morale was felt to be low among NCOs and enlisted men. A number of reasons for this were suggested, including diminished authority at the company level.

Enlisted personnel felt that on occasion, military justice was arbitrary, overly harsh, and unfair. Some

felt that black soldiers received harsher treatment than white soldiers.

Generally, people felt that the minority situation in the Army was showing improvement.

Housing was felt to be a serious problem at some posts and on overseas assignments, particularly for enlisted personnel with dependents.

Drug and alcohol abuse programs were felt to be inadequate. Little mention was made of family counseling and other types of welfare services.

There was a perception that certain fringe benefits connected with serving in the Army had declined; for example, health care, the clubs, the PX, and the commissary.

#### (4) Separation

The major aspect of separation that emerged is a perception that the Army is losing too many people that it cannot afford to lose. These losses were seen to arise from:

- . Uncertainties in the Personnel Management System (e.g., benefits, career progression)
- . Overseas tours
- . Weight control policy
- . Separating soldiers rather than addressing problems.

Separation services, at least for officers, were felt to be effective.

Some viewed the volume of separations as necessary for the vitality of the Army, rather than as a problem. This outlook was found at the Washington area Staff level more frequently than in the field.

### 3. SPECIAL PERSONNEL

Perceptions in this section have been arranged by type of personnel.

#### (1) Army Medical Professionals

The Army is experiencing great difficulty in attracting and retaining sufficient numbers of medical professionals. The reasons cited for this are:

- . Low pay
- . Turbulence
- . Low prestige of medical service in the Army
- . Lack of trained assistants and sophisticated equipment
- . Lack of flexibility in promotions and assignments
- . Housing.

Several advantages enjoyed by TSG in dealing with the situation were cited, including an independent recruiting system and responsiveness to the needs of individual professionals.

(2) Army Lawyers

At present, TJAG reports no problems in recruiting sufficient numbers of lawyers. However, difficulties in retention increase with length of service, particularly at the level of Major and above. Reasons cited for these separations were:

- . Increasing disparity between military and civilian pay as careers progress
- . Dissatisfaction with jobs
- . Orders to move.

A problem is seen in the inability to predict or allow for these shortfalls at the senior levels.

(3) Chaplains

Only one problem relevant to personnel management was cited by action officers from CCH:

- . The effort they must expend in what they perceive to be a constant need to defend their independence.

(4) Civilians

From the military point of view, problems in dealing with civilian personnel include:

- . Inflexibility of civilian rules and regulations
- . Competition between military and civilian personnel for desirable jobs
- . Loss of esprit and of quality of service in the PX, clubs and commissary, stemming from the assumption of these duties by civilians.

(5) Army Reserve

Personnel shortages in the Army Reserves are perceived to be severe, in terms of numbers, capabilities, and commitment.

- . Many units are far from combat-ready, and some fear that many Army Reservists would refuse to go, if called in wartime.
- . The day-to-day administrative workload far outstrips the capacities of Army Reservists and is being increasingly handled by civilians.
- . The Army Reserves are hampered by an inability to geographically shift personnel to meet needs.

All levels of personnel agree that there are few incentives for people to enlist in the reserves, especially in metropolitan areas. Few from the active Army join. The quality of enlistees is perceived to be, on the average, lower than that of active Army recruits.

In non-urban areas, many personnel join the Army Reserves as a community activity. In metropolitan areas, many officers and most enlisted personnel stay only as long as the economic benefits outweigh the inconvenience. A number leave because they see reserve activities as meaningless and a waste of time.

There was general agreement that centralized promotions would be desirable. At present it is perceived that there is too much favoritism in the system. Also, the current practice of promoting officers as vacancies

in their units occur was viewed as closing too many career paths.

Problems cited in Army Reserve training were:

- . Resources were perceived as inadequate for meaningful and effective training.
- . MOS tests and SQTs were perceived as pertaining to the active Army, but not to the Army Reserves.

Discipline was seen as lax and as detrimental to morale and effectiveness. Two particular problems were noted:

- . Because of current regulations, coupled with the manpower shortage, disciplinary actions often were "more trouble than they were worth."
- . Discipline could be difficult in the Army Reserves because of overlaps between community and reservist roles.

. SYSTEM WIDE CONFLICTS

The overall thrust of training often conflicts with individual missions at the commander and supervisor levels. These conflicts are generally resolved in favor of the

individual mission. This may penalize individuals involved by preventing them from obtaining the training or education necessary to advance their careers.

While some forms of centralization such as the PACs and the battalion mess, rather than the company mess, may have resulted in more efficient management, there is widespread feeling that they have dangerously eroded leadership by diminishing meaningful contact between officers and their men.

While differences between the needs of the Army in peacetime versus its needs in wartime were generally acknowledged, some felt that certain systems, for example, PACs, prevent experience that will be necessary if war breaks out. An example of this would be promotion boards. The viability of JUMPS in time of war was questioned. The increase in workload for field personnel managers during peacetime was pointed out.

While the advantages of centralization of personnel management were recognized, many felt that responsiveness and interpersonal relations would be improved if more authority were decentralized and returned to the field.

5. COMPARISON OF PRELIMINARY RESULTS AND RESULTS BASED ON COMPLETE RETURNS

A preliminary report of the findings of the quantitative phase of the perception survey was released in August, 1979. The preliminary report presented results based on 1581 completed questionnaires from FORSCOM, WESTCOM and TRADOC posts, and from DA Staff and Field Operating Agencies, received as of August 9, 1979.

Subsequent to August 9, additional CONUS questionnaires were received, to a total by September 5 of 2,489 returned and usable questionnaires. This is a sufficiently large increment that the statistical tables were rerun, to ensure that the preliminary results, based as they were on a smaller number of cases, had not been biased by virtue of the fact that they were early returns.

Table 1, in Appendix F, Part Three, shows the final completion rates for the quantitative phase of the perception survey, both for CONUS and for USAREUR. At the time of the preliminary survey, a completion rate of about 50% had been attained. By September 5, the completion rate for FORSCOM/WESTCOM and TRADOC was approximately two out of three, and better than four out of five for DA Staff/FOAs. Including USAREUR, the overall completion rate was a respectable 68%.

Table 2 shows the sample analyzed in the preliminary report and the final sample, broken out by MACOM and by rank. The major sources of the later returns were FORSCOM and WESTCOM junior officers and enlisted personnel. The TRADOC and the DA Staff/FOA samples were increased by proportionally smaller amounts in all ranks.

Because of the nature of the personnel who accounted for most of the increase in sample size, it would be expected that, on an overall basis, results would have shifted on items where junior officers and enlisted personnel on FORSCOM and WESTCOM posts had perceptions or views that differed from other categories of respondents. However, as was pointed out in the preliminary report, this sample was never designed to provide a representative view of the entire Active Army, but instead was disproportionately weighted in favor of senior officers, commanders and personnel managers.

Therefore, overall shifts in the findings are not particularly significant. Rather, the only question of importance is: Were there any noteworthy shifts in the perceptions or attitudes of specific categories of personnel that resulted from the addition of subsequent returns to the preliminary sample?

In general, there were very few changes in the findings of the survey larger than one or two percentage points, which is

well within the statistical confidence limits of any particular cell of the analytic design. There were virtually no noteworthy changes in ratings of effectiveness, fairness, satisfaction, or understanding of the Personnel Management System. Among the items measuring attitudes concerning various aspects of the Personnel Management System, some changes in results for specific categories of personnel occurred as a consequence of the additional cases added to the sample. Tables 3 through 10 show the largest shifts. None of the changes that appeared was large enough to affect the interpretation or conclusions presented in the preliminary report. Rather, the value of these tables is to illustrate the relatively small differences that resulted from the additional survey returns.

Changes were noted for the following items:

- . "In my unit just about everybody is working in his or her proper MOS." (Table 3)
  - Enlisted personnel were slightly less inclined to agree that this was the case, a drop of four percent.
  
- . "Turnover is hurting the morale of my unit." (Table 4)
  - All ranks were more strongly inclined to agree with this statement, with increases in the range of four percent to seven percent.

- . "Turnover is hurting the ability of my unit to accomplish its mission." (Table 5)
  - All ranks were inclined more to agree with this statement, with the exception of E1-E6. Gains were in the range of three percent to seven percent.
  
- . "My current assignment is giving me the training I need to pass my SQT." (enlisted only) (Table 6)
  - Enlisted personnel in all MACOMs represented were slightly more inclined to agree that this is the case, with increases of about five percent.
  
- . "My unit has sufficient qualified personnel to perform its mission." (Table 7)
  - Most ranks were less inclined to agree with this statement, by as much as five percent.
  
- . "MILPERCEN is generally responsive to requests from the field." (Table 8)
  - All ranks were less inclined to agree with this statement. This was particularly true of E1-E6, whose agreement dropped from 39% to 30%.
  
- . "Personnel assignments should be handled through a centralized agency such as MILPERCEN." (Table 9)
  - Agreement with this item dropped by 13% among ranks E1-E6.
  
- . "The Army provides good career counseling and guidance." (Table 10)
  - Agreement with this item rose by seven percent among ranks E1-E6.

6. SURVEY OF USAREUR PERSONNEL

As part of the quantitative phase of the perception survey, a sample of USAREUR personnel was selected for distribution of the same questionnaire that was used in the survey of the Active Army. Table 11 shows the units included in the USAREUR sample. The questionnaires were distributed to the following personnel:

- All general officers
- All brigade commanders
- All battalion commanders
- 25% of company commanders/warrant officers
- All G-1/DPCA
- All adjutants General
- All S-1
- 3% of NCOs (E7 to E9), randomly sampled
- 0.3% of enlisted personnel (E1 to E6), randomly sampled

Because of the greater length of time required for transmitting and distributing the questionnaires to personnel in Germany, as well as the longer time necessary for mail to arrive from overseas, insufficient returns from the USAREUR had been received at the time of the preliminary report of August, 1979.

Of the 1,738 questionnaires distributed to the USAREUR sample, 953 were completed and returned to National Analysts by the September 5 cutoff date, a return rate of 55%. Table 12 shows a breakout of the sample by rank, assignment, length of service and various demographic categories.

(1) Perceptions of the Effectiveness of the Personnel Management System

In their ratings of the effectiveness of the PMS, USAREUR personnel were generally very similar to personnel in FORSCOM/WESTCOM/TRADOC (Table 13). The item with the greatest discrepancy was the effectiveness of SIDPERS, with 19% fewer USAREUR personnel rating it as working very well or somewhat well. Commanders, particularly, differed widely in their assessment of SIDPERS. While 76% of CONUS commanders rated SIDPERS as working at least somewhat well, only 55% of USAREUR commanders gave it that high a rating.

There were notable differences between USAREUR and CONUS enlisted personnel in their ratings of the effectiveness of EPMS and of the overall Personnel Management System. Table 14 shows that on these items, USAREUR enlisted personnel gave these items somewhat higher ratings.

Table 15 compares the major commands and agencies included in this survey on their attitudes concerning the consolidation of all personnel agencies such as MILPERCEN, TAGCEN, etc., under a single commander. The views of USAREUR personnel are quite similar to those of personnel in FORSCOM, WESTCOM and TRADOC, who, if they do have an opinion, tend to be more favorable toward this idea than do personnel on the DA staff or in Field Operating Agencies.

(2) Understanding of, and Information Concerning, the Personnel Management System

USAREUR personnel closely resemble FORSCOM/WESTCOM/TRADOC personnel in their ratings of their own understanding of the PMS and its various elements (Table 16). Where there are discrepancies between USAREUR and the other MACOMs, these generally are the result of the much larger proportion of enlisted personnel in the USAREUR sample, rather than any intrinsic differences between stateside and overseas assignments. Understanding of promotion regulations and policies is rated as somewhat better understood by company grade officers and NCOs in USAREUR than by their CONUS counterparts.

NCOs are rated a more important source of information about personnel regulations or policies in USAREUR than they are in CONUS (Table 17). Even allowing for the higher proportion of E7-E9 and E1-E6, who more frequently than other ranks report that NCOs are their single best source, still a relatively high percentage of USAREUR personnel tend to rely on NCOs. Conversely, the AG is less frequently mentioned as the one best source among USAREUR personnel. In all MACOMs, the most frequently mentioned "best source" is Army Regulations.

Table 18 compares the MACOMs as to their satisfaction with the information they are getting regarding personnel policies and regulations. The USAREUR sample is virtually identical to the FORSCOM/WESTCOM/TRADOC sample, both of which express marginally less satisfaction than the DA Staff/FOA sample.

(3) Fairness of the Personnel Management System

As with other perceptions, in general USAREUR personnel are very close to FORSCOM/WESTCOM/TRADOC personnel in their ratings of the fairness of various aspects of the PMS. Overall, their ratings of reclassifications and housing assignments are somewhat lower and their ratings of awards policies are somewhat higher. (Table 19)

For several of the PMS elements, the overall differences between MACOMs are deceptive. For example, Table 20 shows comparisons of ratings of different ranks on the fairness of military justice. Even though the percentage rating military justice as "very fair" is higher for USAREUR than for CONUS at every rank, overall, USAREUR appears to rate the fairness of military justice lower because of the higher proportion of enlisted personnel in that sample.

Although overall ratings of the fairness of the assignment/reassignment system appear to be almost identical between CONUS and USAREUR, Table 21 illustrates that, among senior officers, USAREUR ratings of "very fair" are sharply lower than those of CONUS.

Similarly, even though overall differences in the ratings of the fairness of housing assignments between CONUS and USAREUR are small, at the levels of colonel and LTC/Major USAREUR

ratings are much lower than those of CONUS (Table 22). And for the ranks of general officer and E1-E6, USAREUR personnel are more inclined to rate housing assignments as "very fair" than are CONUS personnel.

As shown in Table 23, except for colonel and E7-E9, every rank in USAREUR rates awards policies as being more fair than do their counterparts in CONUS.

(4) Satisfaction with Personnel Management

In their ratings of satisfaction with various outcomes of the Personnel Management System, USAREUR personnel are sharply lower than the other MACOMs regarding their housing situation and conditions where they currently work (Table 24). They are slightly lower in their ratings of opportunities for military and civilian education, and they rate the morale in their units slightly lower even though their own morale is, on the average, virtually the same. USAREUR ratings are higher regarding their satisfaction with pay and entitlements, and with health care provided to their dependents.

Table 25 shows comparisons of satisfaction with health care provided to dependents between CONUS and USAREUR, broken out by rank. USAREUR personnel, on the average, rate their satisfaction as higher than do CONUS personnel. For both sample, satisfaction at the enlisted level is actually higher than for officers at the level of colonel and below.

While senior officers in USAREUR appear to be reasonably well satisfied with their current housing situations, satisfaction declines steadily with lower ranks (Table 26). Below the rank of colonel, USAREUR personnel indicate considerably less satisfaction with housing than do the corresponding ranks in CONUS.

At ranks E1-E6, 51% in USAREUR rated their current housing situation as "not too good" or "not good at all," compared to 44% of CONUS E1-E6.

Different ranks in CONUS and USAREUR are compared on their satisfaction with pay and entitlements, and fringe benefits, in Tables 27 and 28, respectively. For neither of these items is the percentage rating them "very good" outstandingly high. USAREUR personnel are more satisfied with pay at all ranks except company grade, but less satisfied at all ranks with fringe benefits. The ranks of general officer, colonel and E1-E6 show the greatest differences between USAREUR and CONUS in their satisfaction ratings of fringe benefits, with about 20% fewer in USAREUR rating fringe benefits as "very good."

(5) Attitudes Regarding Personnel Management in the Army

1. Implementation of the Current PMS

Generally, attitudes of USAREUR personnel regarding implementation of the PMS are similar to those of FORSCOM/WESTCOM/TRADOC (Table 29). The biggest discrepancies are in attitudes concerning the amount of contact between commanders, 1st Sergeants and troops that has resulted from the Personnel Administration Centers (PACs). In general, the samples do not agree that increased contact has resulted. USAREUR personnel are less inclined to agree that more contact with company commanders has resulted, and this reflects less agreement at every rank. However, they are more inclined to agree that the PACs have increased the involvement of 1st Sergeants with the troops, and here the overall difference stems from the greater proportion of enlisted personnel in the USAREUR sample, who are more inclined than other ranks to agree that this contact has increased.

2. Centralization

In their views on the role of MILPERCEN, USAREUR personnel are not widely divergent from FORSCOM/WESTCOM/TRADOC personnel (Table 30). The preponderance agrees that MILPERCEN is responsive to requests from the field and that personnel assignments should be handled through a centralized agency such as MILPERCEN.

USAREUR personnel do tend to agree a little less strongly that commanders should be given more authority in making assignments to key positions such as Battalion Commander, Command Sergeants Major, etc. The difference between USAREUR and FORSCOM/WESTCOM/TRADOC is primarily in the ranks of Company grade/Warrant officer and below: these ranks in USAREUR are less inclined to agree with the idea of increased authority for commanders than are the same ranks in FORSCOM/WESTCOM/TRADOC.

### 3. Utilization of Personnel

Generally, differences in attitudes concerning utilization of personnel reflect the differences in authorizations between USAREUR and CONUS (Table 31). USAREUR personnel are much more inclined to agree that their units have sufficient qualified personnel to perform their missions, and much less inclined to agree that turnover is either hurting their units' morale or the ability of their units to accomplish their missions. Reflecting the longer assignments in Europe, USAREUR personnel are less inclined also that individuals are too often transferred just when they learn to do the job.

Enlisted personnel in USAREUR are somewhat less inclined than FORSCOM/WESTCOM/TRADOC enlisted personnel to agree that their current assignments are giving

them the training they need to pass the SQTs, but even so are much more inclined to agree than are DA Staff/FOA enlisted personnel. In all MACOMs, the majority of enlisted personnel disagree with this statement.

#### 4. Responsiveness

Table 32 shows that the three MACOMs are similar in their views on career counseling and guidance provided by the Army: only about one in three agree that it is good.

The lower amount of agreement among USAREUR that they were given an accurate picture of the Army life at the time they joined is a result of the higher proportion of enlisted personnel in the USAREUR sample. Comparing USAREUR and FORSCOM/WESTCOM/TRADOC rank by rank, attitudes on this question are about the same.

7. SUMMARY

The perceptions and attitudes of USAREUR personnel are more similar to those of FORSCOM/WESTCOM/TRADOC personnel than they are different, when compared rank for rank. Since these two samples represent essentially the same pool of personnel, the only difference being whether they currently are assigned to CONUS or USAREUR posts, this is not surprising.

The differences found between these two samples reflect the differences between CONUS and USAREUR assignments, not the people per se. Thus,

- . USAREUR personnel are more inclined to express dissatisfaction with their current housing situations and working conditions. They also are more inclined to report that morale in their units is low.
- . Personnel in FORSCOM/WESTCOM/TRADOC are more inclined to feel that their units do not have sufficient qualified personnel to accomplish their missions, and that turnover is hurting their units' morale and ability to accomplish their missions.


Otherwise, the results for USAREUR are very similar to the results for FORSCOM/WESTCOM/TRADOC, with both having occasionally divergent views from those of personnel with the DA Staff or Field Operating Agencies, as reported earlier, in the preliminary report.

\* \* \* \* \*

This chapter has presented summarized perceptions of attitudes of Active Army personnel about the PMS and other related issues. The next chapter discusses Booz·Allen and conclusions about the current PMS organizations.

VII. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ABOUT  
THE CURRENT ARMY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (PMS)

VII. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE CURRENT ARMY  
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM




Findings and conclusions with regard to the PMS were derived from four sources:

- . The perceptions survey
- . Previous studies and surveys
- . Individual interviews by Booz, Allen and Hamilton
- . Functional analysis.

The findings and conclusions developed from these sources are discussed in the following sections of this report.\*

1. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS FROM THE PERCEPTIONS SURVEY



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\*Three words used in this chapter and elsewhere in this report -- command, doctrine, and policy -- are sufficiently important to warrant including their definitions in Appendix L, "Glossary and Definitions."

The second phase of the survey of perceptions of the U.S. Army Personnel Management System (PMS) is currently underway. Based on the Phase I qualitative exploration of perceptions reported in Chapter VI, a quantitative questionnaire was developed and sent to a sample of Army personnel representing:

- . FORSCOM, WESTCOM and TRADOC officers and enlisted personnel
- . USAREUR officers and enlisted personnel
- . Washington HQ staff with personnel management duty assignments
- . Army Reserve commanders and personnel managers.

The questionnaire and the unabridged findings and conclusions of the perceptions survey appear in the second part of Appendix F. Because of the nature of the study, the sample was designed to disproportionately represent senior officers and personnel managers. Sufficient personnel at all ranks were surveyed to permit meaningful statistical comparisons.

As of August 9, 1979, 1,581 questionnaires had been received from the FORSCOM, WESTCOM, TRADOC and Washington HQ samples, a return rate of more than 50%. Findings of the surveys of USAREUR and Reserve personnel will be reported at a later date. Findings based on the returns to date appear in the following subsections.

(1) Findings About the Effectiveness of the Personnel Management System

About two out of three people surveyed felt that overall, the current PMS is working at least "somewhat well." However,

- . Only about 5% felt that it is working "very well"
- . About one in three rated it as working "not very well" or "not well at all".

With few exceptions, the following were rated as being relatively effective:

- . Pay System (JUMPS)
- . Procedures for correcting errors in pay
- . Assignments to duty stations
- . Promotion system (except for ranks E1 - E6)
- . SIDPERS
- . Selection for schooling (except for ranks E1 - E6).

The following were rated as being relatively less effective:

- . Recruiting system (47% rated it as working "not well at all")
- . Reenlistment incentives
- . MOS reclassifications.

Generally, the higher the rank, the higher the ratings of effectiveness. Washington staff rated the effectiveness of most items more highly than did field personnel. One exception to this was SIDPERS, which received higher ratings from the field.

(2) Findings About the Fairness of the Personnel Management System

Most of the elements of the PMS covered in the survey were rated as at least "somewhat fair" by the majority of the sample. Almost without exception, the higher the rank, the more fair the PMS was perceived to be.

Particularly high fairness ratings were given to:

- . Military justice system
- . Selection for schooling
- . Promotion system.

The only item not rated as at least "somewhat fair" by the majority was awards policies. About one in four rated this as "not fair at all."

(3) Findings About the Satisfaction With Personnel Management

Of the outcomes of the Personnel Management System included in this survey, none was rated by the majority of the total sample as being "very good." However, every item was rated by large majorities as being at least "somewhat good", with the exception of health care provided to dependents.

The highest rated items were:

- . The respondent's morale
- . Satisfaction with current job
- . On the job training
- . Housing

The items receiving the lowest ratings were:

- . Health care provided to dependents
- . Family satisfaction with the Army
- . Satisfaction with pay and entitlements
- . Health care provided to the respondent
- . Morale in the respondent's unit
- . Fringe benefits such as PX, commissary, recreational facilities

Female personnel tended to be lower in their ratings of personal morale, job satisfaction, training, working

conditions, opportunities for military education and health care for dependents.

Blacks tended to give higher ratings than whites on morale, training, fringe benefits, health care and family satisfaction with the Army. Other minorities generally tended to give lower ratings.

Personnel who reported having no likelihood of being with the Army three years from now had particularly negative ratings on:

- . Family satisfaction with the Army
- . Health care provided to self and dependents
- . Pay and entitlements
- . Housing
- . Job satisfaction and morale.

(4) Findings About the Understanding of the Personnel Management System

Only about one in four reported that they understood the overall Personnel Management System "very well." However, a number of specific elements of the PMS are apparently understood reasonably well by most Army personnel.

The best understood elements of the PMS are:

- . Pay and allowances to which you are entitled
- . Leave regulations and policies

Fewer than half understand "very well":

- . How their career development is managed
- . Military justice/courts martial
- . How they are assigned by MILPERCEN
- . Promotion regulations and policies.

The least well understood elements of the PMS are:

- . Reenlistment regulations
- . Travel regulations and policies
- . Separation benefits and entitlements.

Generally, the level of understanding increased with years of experience in the Army, rather than strictly by rank. That is, the lowest ratings came from Company Grade/Warrant Officers and ranks E1-E6. Ratings of understanding of the overall PMS were highest among senior officers, personnel managers and HQ staff.

(5) Findings About Sources of Information Concerning The Personnel Management System

All ranks use a variety of sources of information or advice concerning regulations and policies. For every rank except General Officer, the preferred source was Army Regulations. The preponderance of General Officers reported that the AG at their post was their preferred source, and a relatively high percentage

of Col/LTC/Major also cited the AG. Ranks E1-E6 had a strong preference for NCOs in their units. Sources that are used but were not preferred by noteworthy percentages included: officers, Army Times, PACs, MILPOs, enlisted men and Soldiers Magazine.

The majority of all ranks are at least "somewhat satisfied" with the information they are getting regarding personnel policies and regulations. Degree of satisfaction is clearly a function of rank: General Officers and Colonels report the highest level of satisfaction, while at ranks E1-E6, 37% indicated that they are "not very satisfied" or "not at all satisfied" with the information they are getting.

(6) Findings About Attitudes Concerning the Personnel Management System

. Implementation of the current PMS

- There is widespread agreement that the Personnel Administration Centers (PACs) have failed to realize their objective of increasing contact between Company Commanders and 1st Sergeants and their troops.
- Of those with an opinion, most agree that problems in personnel management stem more from the people that work in

the system than from the system itself, and that too few people working in the PMS are well-qualified to do their jobs.

. Centralization. There was general agreement that:

- MILPERCEN is responsive to requests from the field
- Personnel assignments should be handled through a centralized agency such as MILPERCEN
- Consolidation of all personnel agencies under a single commander would result in an improved PMS
- Commanders should be given more authority in making assignments to key positions such as Battalion Commander, Command Sergeant Major, etc.

. Utilization of Personnel

- Barely half of the sample agreed that their units had sufficient qualified personnel to accomplish their missions. Agreement was much stronger from staff personnel than from field personnel.
- There was strong agreement that "too often, just when an individual learns to do the job well, that person is transferred."
- Field personnel tended to agree that turnover was hurting morale and hurting the ability of their units to accomplish their missions. Staff personnel tended to disagree that their units were experiencing these problems as a result of turnover.
- Most respondents tended to agree that individuals are usually assigned to the job they are trained for, and that in their unit nearly everybody is working in his or her proper MOS. However, of

ranks E1-E6 and E7-E9, only 37% in the field, and 16% on staff, agreed that their current assignment is giving them the training they need to pass their SQTs. Fifteen percent reported currently being assigned out of their proper MOSSs.

- Opinion is split as to whether or not it is too easy to quit the Army these days. General Officers and ranks E1-E6 tend to disagree that it is, but other ranks tend to agree.

Responsiveness

- While officers tend to feel that they were given an accurate picture of Army life at the time they joined, the preponderance of ranks E7-E9, and a large majority of ranks E1-E6, disagree that they were. Of ranks E1-E6, 40% strongly disagree.
- More disagreed than agreed that the Army provides good career counseling and guidance.

(7) Conclusions

The findings of the quantitative phase of the study thus far support those of the earlier qualitative phase reported in Chapter VI. If anything, the quantitative phase is providing a more positive view of perceptions of the PMS than did the preceding phase. That is, while the problems that emerged in the depth interviews undeniably do exist and were confirmed by the quantitative survey, most of them are by no means universal. The majority of our sample appear to be relatively positive toward most aspects of the current PMS and very positive toward some particular aspects. However,

it is clear that some matters are strongly perceived to be problems, and there are some pockets of dissatisfaction. Moreover, there are indications that certain changes would be well received by the majority of personnel at all levels.

## 2. INTRODUCTION TO SELECTED IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS AND STUDIES

During the study of personnel management organizations and practices in the Army, Booz, Allen conducted interviews, attended briefings and consulted with over 260 Army personnel. Interviews were of three distinct types:

- . Qualitative perception interviews which were conducted to:
  - Gain an in-depth understanding of the perceptions about the Army's PMS from a variety of personnel of different ranks and assignments
  - Provide the basis for designing the sample and developing a questionnaire for the quantitative survey about the PMS by Army personnel
- . Fact-finding and verification interviews to obtain other information for the study
- . In-depth interviews with a significant cross section of knowledgeable people in management positions both within and outside of the PMS. These individuals were encouraged to:
  - Express opinions about the strengths and weaknesses of the current Army PMS
  - Discuss their preference for more or less centralization or decentralization of personnel management

- Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of establishing an Army Personnel Command (APC).

In-depth interviews were conducted from May into August and provided significant, current information for evaluating the PMS. Findings and conclusions from these interviews are discussed below.

(1) Interviewees

Booz, Allen worked closely with ODCSPER Human Resources Development (HRD) to develop a comprehensive list of Army personnel to be interviewed. The interview results are significant. A total of more than 150 in-depth interviews were conducted with the individuals whose names are listed in Appendix J.

Those interviewed included:

- . Members of the Office of the Secretary of the Army
- . More than 55 general officers
- . Principal civilian personnel management officials at Department of the Army, Major Command and lower levels
- . Other officers working in, or directly affected by, the PMS
- . Reserve component management officials
- . Command Sergeants Major, other NCOs and enlisted personnel.

It should be noted that a large majority of the personnel interviewed were senior to most of those included in the qualitative perception survey interviews discussed in Chapter VI and Appendix F.

(2) Positions

As stated above, some of the interviewees were officials serving in the Office of the Secretary and the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army. Others included:

- . Commanders
- . Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Personnel or G-1s
- . Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Personnel and Community Affairs or Deputy Community Commanders
- . Adjutants General
- . Civilian personnel directors
- . Command Sergeants Major.

(3) Organization

The people interviewed were affiliated with the following organizations:

- . Department of the Army PMS
- . DA PMS field operating agencies (FOA)

- . Other DA staff
- . Major commands and field organizations
- . Other organizations.

Exhibit VII-1 on page VII-15 shows the percentage of officials interviewed in each of these categories.


As was the case with the qualitative perceptions survey, the findings of these in-depth interviews were treated as tentative because of the sample size and non-random selection process. However, many similar opinions exist both in the qualitative interviews and the in-depth interviews. Most opinions reported in our discussion of perception survey interviews were shared by one or more of those who participated in the in-depth interviews.

The findings of the in-depth interviews provide one basis for evaluation the efficacy of the current PMS. Results of those interviews also may be used in evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of an APC.

EXHIBIT VII-1  
In-Depth Interviews with Selected Officials

BY GRADE:	<u>% OF TOTAL</u>
ARMY SECRETARIAT & GENERAL OFFICERS	48
FIELD GRADE OFFICERS	33
COMMAND SERGEANTS MAJOR AND OTHER NCOs	10
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY CIVILIANS	9
	<hr style="width: 10%; margin-left: auto; margin-right: 0;"/> 100
<b>BY POSITION:</b>	
COMMANDERS	19
DEPUTY CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL OR G-1s	15
DEPUTY CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL AND COMMUNITY AFFAIRS OR DEPUTY COMMUNITY COMMANDERS	7
ADJUTANTS GENERAL	12
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL DIRECTORS	7
OTHER STAFF (INCLUDING COMMAND SERGEANTS MAJOR)	40
	<hr style="width: 10%; margin-left: auto; margin-right: 0;"/> 100
<b>BY LOCATION:</b>	
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM	9
FIELD OPERATING AGENCIES OF HEADQUARTERS DA, PMS	9
OTHER DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY STAFF	19
FIELD ORGANIZATIONS	63
	<hr style="width: 10%; margin-left: auto; margin-right: 0;"/> 100

### 3. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS FROM INTERVIEWS AND STUDIES



Our first report, 6 June 1979, listed six issues for future analysis. These issues were raised in our interviewing and considered while reviewing previous studies, and this procedure assisted in verifying the following problem areas:

- Adequacy of the current PMS organization
- Execution of policy responsibilities
- Personnel planning and doctrine development
- Management of information and systems
- Staffing of the PMS organization
- PMS operations.

Problem areas are displayed by level of interviewees and source in Exhibit VII-2, page VII-17.

Each problem area is discussed in the following subsections of this chapter. In each subsection, selected illustrative comments of interviewees are listed, followed by our findings and conclusions regarding that specific problem. A seventh subsection includes representative comments from interviewees concerning the establishment of an APC and our findings and conclusions regarding those comments.

EXHIBIT VII-2  
 Problem Areas of Interest to Army Agencies

PROBLEM CATEGORY	SOURCE OF IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS							TOTAL OF ALL SOURCES (%)
	INTERVIEWS:							
	ARMY SECRETARIAT (%)	GENERAL STAFF (LESS ODCSER) (%)	SPECIAL STAFF (%)	ODCSER (%)	PMS FOAS (%)	MAJOR COMMANDS (%)	STUDY REPORTS (%)	
ORGANIZATION	26	33	34	26	26	27	48	31
POLICY	0	13	11	8	10	4	2	6
PLANNING AND DOCTRINE	39	28	22	40	31	19	21	26
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT	0	14	11	2	12	8	10	9
STAFFING	13	12	11	14	11	13	14	13
OPERATIONS	22	0	11	10	10	29	5	15
TOTALS	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

(1) Adequacy of the Current PMS Organization

A majority of all personnel interviewed expressed an opinion on this subject. Comments by interviewees included:

- . The Army cannot return to a system for decentralized recordkeeping.
- . Reduced resources force more centralization.
- . Centralized personnel management denies the Army full use of a very valuable resource-- the MACOM Headquarters.
- . MILPERCEN manages people, but is insensitive to their personal needs.
- . Promotions should rest with DA. The centralized system works best.
- . The proposed establishment of a Civilian Personnel Office in OASA(M&RA) would pile another redundancy upon existing redundancies and imposes overriding operational decisions on the DA staff.
- . There is overcentralization and overcontrol at the highest levels.
- . A centralized system will help commanders do their jobs.
- . The PMS is too big to manage. It is trying to do too much.
- . Chiefs of the professional branches are required by U.S. Code Title 10, to be involved in the assignments of officers of these branches.

1. Findings Regarding the Adequacy of the PMS Organization

The majority of those interviewed who expressed an opinion indicated that the current PMS organization should be changed. These opinions are reflected in Figure 1.

FIGURE 1  
Attitude Toward Adequacy of Current PMS Organization  
(total of all interviews)

<u>Excellent</u>	<u>Good</u>	<u>Needs Some Change</u>	<u>Needs Major Change</u>	<u>Uncertain or Expressed No Opinion</u>
1%	10%	28%	15%	46%

Figure 1 indicates that:

- . A significant minority, 43 percent, believed the PMS should be changed. Reason for this opinion include the myriad shortfalls of the current organization.
- . Many express the hope that reorganization would produce better results.
- . Many field commanders and staff officers (although a minority of the total interviewees) think that delegation of more personnel management authority is needed.

Figure 2 reflects the attitudes of interviewees toward PMS decentralization.

FIGURE 2  
 Attitude Toward More PMS Decentralization  
 (by organization of interviewees)

<u>Officials</u>	<u>Support</u>	Inclined to <u>Support</u>	Inclined <u>Against</u>	<u>Against</u>	Uncertain or Expressed <u>No Opinion</u>
DA PMS	0	27%	9%	9%	55%
FOA PMS	9%	0	0	36%	55%
Other DA	9%	18%	5%	36%	32%
Field	5%	14%	0	15%	66%

The following additional findings are based on opinions of interviewees, and they were also reported in studies included in our research:

- . The PMS organization at DA level is represented as a loose confederation of semi-autonomous elements each with strongly expressed preferences for current organizational relationships, including some claims (ANG, CCH, TJAG, and TSG) of constitutional or statutory basis for current structure.
- . Organization is one of the major problem areas cited most frequently in interviews and studies:
  - Fragmentation exists in the separate PMS procedures of the ANG, CCH, CPD MILPERCEN, TJAG, TSG, and USAR.
  - Many functions are duplicated across organizations.

- Areas of research and other activities overlap between MILPERCEN/Military Personnel Management Directorate, TRADOC/ADMINCEN and TAGCEN/Human Resources Directorate/ASA(M&RA)

. Planning and doctrine is another major problem area cited frequently.

. Many personnel management problems are not caused by PMS organization, and even the best of organizations is not likely to solve some of the problems.

## 2. Conclusions

DA level organizations concerned with personnel management form a loose confederation with overlapping functions, a layering of authority and a diffusion of responsibility.

An underlying difficulty is the perception that although the DCSPER is technically in charge of the personnel functions in elements of the PMS, he does not have the authority required to effectively plan, organize, coordinate, control, or evaluate the PMS.

### (2) Execution of Policy Responsibilities

The Army staff organization places responsibility for policy formulation at various echelons. DCSPER has Army General Staff responsibility for

plans, policies, and programs for manpower authorizations; management of military personnel in active and reserve components; and DA civilian personnel administration. Policy formulation has been delegated to TAG and Commander, MILPERCEN in some areas. These comments about policy formulation were made by interviewees:

- . Policy people in ODCSPER are too busy putting out brush fires; they tend to neglect policy development.
- . Policy should be made at the DCSPER level. Lower levels should get out of the policy business.
- . ODCSPER has lost its sense of purpose in terms of policy making.
- . Top PMS managers should be thinking about policy matters.
- . One bad result of decentralizing the PMS is that relatively junior officers wind up making policy on some very important matters.
- . The last reduction of the Army staff stripped DCSPER of any real capability to make policy.

1. Findings Related to Policy Formulation Responsibility

A significant number of interviewees believe that ODCSPER neglects aspects of its policy function. This view was expressed by

46 percent of those interviewed who were assigned to the DA PMS, FOA PMS, and other DA staff agencies. A smaller number, 20 percent, of those assigned to field headquarters and units held similar views. Other findings include the following:

- . ODCSPER is believed to be not only underinvolved in policy formulation, but also overinvolved in operations. Both the Military Personnel Management Directorate and the Civilian Personnel Directorate, ODCSPER, do expend substantial effort handling individual personnel actions.
- . MILPERCEN or TAGCEN, in the interest of timeliness, will create and implement personnel policies at the operator level which are then forwarded to DCSPER for concurrence; this procedure is especially true for enlisted personnel policies.

## 2. Conclusions

Formulation of personnel management policy at the DA level is inadequate, and this creates one of the most critical PMS problems. Because at times ODCSPER permits FOA to make policy without coordination or guidance, it is not fully in control of this function. Meanwhile, ODCSPER is using scarce staff resources for operations that could be handled at MILPERCEN or TAGCEN.

(3) Personnel Planning and Doctrine Development

Comments made by PMS officials, commanders and other staff personnel concerning the planning function revealed concern both about the adequacy and the scope of personnel planning. The absence of a DA master personnel plan, or a system for top management to evaluate accomplishment of planned objectives was noted. Additionally, interviewees noted the lack of clear assignment of responsibilities and resources for research studies and analyses concerning personnel management.

These specific comments were made:

- . The Army has never had an effective, overall, integrated personnel plan
- . Research, doctrine and conceptual development are being done by MILPERCEN and TAG. This is all wrong.
- . DCSPER needs a more effective relationship with Ft. Ben Harrison. We have trouble determining who has doctrine responsibilities.
- . Personnel doctrine development should be freed from the operator.
- . We develop doctrine at DA because we can't get it done at ADMINCEN. Our tasking is lost among TRADOC priorities and allocation of resources.
- . Perhaps Army PM doctrine could be brought under management by the DCSPER in a manner similar to that used by the Air Force.

- . The human side of the Army has low planning priority.
- . There is no master planning in PMS; the PMS just reacts.
- . The personnel-oriented analytic community is fragmented.

1. Findings Regarding Personnel Planning and Doctrine Development

More individuals commented about inadequate personnel planning and an absence of definitive personnel doctrine than about any other single subject. Figures 3 and 4 summarize these comments.

FIGURE 3  
Personnel Plans and Doctrine Deficiencies  
(by seniority of interviewee)

	<u>% Commenting</u> (Note 1)
Army Secretariat & General Officers	46
Field Grade Officers	46
Others	13

FIGURE 4  
Personnel Plans and Doctrine Deficiencies  
(by position of interviewee)

	<u>% Commenting</u> (Note 1)
Commanders	50
DCSPER/G-1	28
AG	38
CPD	11
Other Staff	43

Note 1: Column will not total 100%, because figures reflect percent of each group who expressed this criticism. The remaining members of each group did not express an opinion on this subject.

Other findings included the following:

- The primary deficiency in PMS planning is believed to be the absence of a personnel master plan.
- Mobilization planning deficiencies revealed in MOBEX 78 are mentioned as one indication of the seriousness of the lack of planning.
- ODCSPER does not have overall personnel management objectives, and there is no adequate system to measure program effectiveness.
- Doctrinal responsibilities are not now clearly established.
- MILPERCEN has an active mobilization planning office, staffed with MILPERCEN assets, while ODCSPER has created an ad hoc mobilization planning group.
- The Army's human resources research is broadly considered to be inadequate and possibly misdirected.

## 2. Conclusions

Many aspects of DA level long-range personnel management planning have been neglected or are deficient. In particular, a master personnel plan with objectives needs to be developed and implemented, and accomplishment measured on a continuing basis. Furthermore, responsibility for development of personnel management doctrine needs to be clearly delineated. Actions to significantly improve human resources and personnel management research and analysis need to be implemented.

### (4) Management of Information and Systems

A recurring theme in interviews was that the PMS has neither an effective automated information system nor a long-range system master plan. This problem was mentioned frequently, both in terms of fragmentation of systems and systems' deficiencies. The Master Automation Plan for Military Personnel Systems (MAPS) is an attempt to cope with the immediate problem, and the Personnel Community Project (PERCOP) may potentially deal with the long term solution.

These interviewees' comments address this problem:

- . We need a common data base information system to manage the total force, including active, reserve, guard and civilians.
- . (MILPERCEN) recently signed a memo of understanding with the financial community (USAFAC) saying both are working towards a common data base. In five years we could have a common personnel/pay data base.
- . Many personnel people have to fight for computer time. Over half the Army's money is spent on people, yet invariably personnel programs have the lowest priority for computer scheduling.
- . MOBPERS is geared to the present system. It might creak along in mobilization, but that's all.
- . Our current systems are peace-time systems. We can't go to war with them. We'll probably continue to need separate systems for war and peace.
- . There is a lot of activity in the mobilization plans area, but an adequate system to support mobilization planning is not even in the POM. We'll need over five years to get a system after making the decision.
- . PERCOP is vitally needed, but it will die like most needed personnel projects -- for lack of resources.

1. Findings Related to Management of Information and Systems

Improved collection, processing, and distribution of personnel information is believed to be necessary to rectify operating deficiencies.

From interviews it was determined that:

- . There is wide agreement that significant PMS problems are caused by the separate data bases maintained by various PMS elements: active officer and enlisted, ANG, civilian personnel, finance, USAR, etc.
- . Active officer and enlisted, civilian, National Guard, and Reserve personnel all are managed by separate personnel systems and data bases which are mutually incompatible. All these systems are separate from financial/pay systems.
- . There is little standardization throughout information systems, from data elements through overall guidance and policy.
- . MILPERCEN has initiated efforts to provide coherent, integrated personnel system design guidance for the short term; however, an adequate study to develop longer range solutions has not started.
- . Assistant Chief of Staff for Automation and Communications (ACSAC) influence on the development of automated personnel systems has been intentionally limited to budgeting issues; technical coordination and guidance has not come from either ACSAC or the Computer Systems Command.

## 2. Conclusions

Personnel information systems are fragmented, uncoordinated, and not standardized, making effective and efficient Total Force management all but impossible.

Lack of a common PMS data base not only denies ODCSPER managers overall planning and management information, but it seriously compounds the DA-level organizational fragmentation problem cited previously.

(5) Staffing of PMS Organizations

A recurring sentiment cited both in the field and HQDA is a need to increase the professional qualifications of senior personnel managers. Many senior DA PMS officers were mentioned for their lack of prior personnel management experience. Interviewees mentioned some significant individual exceptions to this generalization, naming a few professional PMS managers whose careers are marked by repeated and important PMS assignments.

Some typical comments about staffing of the DA PMS organization follow:

- . The Army claims that people are important, so why not give substance to the statement by properly training personnel managers?
- . There are few senior professionals in ODCSPER.
- . Most generals don't stay in the personnel business long enough to become fully effective.
- . The specialist mix in ODCSPER is bad.

- . I was never assigned to a personnel job before I was promoted to general officer (and assigned to a PMS position). My subordinates make the system work.
- . Good managers can be other than personnel trained. They have to grow with the job. Some do very well.

1. Findings Related to Staffing of the PMS

Figure 5 indicates the percentage of interviewees who commented on a need for more professionalism among PMS managers at DA level. No comments were made during interviews which reflected a different opinion.

FIGURE 5  
PMS Professionalism Deficiency

	<u>% Commenting</u> (Note 1, pg.III-15)
Army Secretariat and General Officers	27
Field Grade Officers	39
Others	13

The GAO Report of February 16, 1979, "Military and Civilian Managers of Defense Manpower," cited studies and surveys which

supported their finding of lack of professionalism among manpower and personnel managers in the Army. These findings included:

- . Service assignment and rotation policies do not contribute to professionalism. Officers are rotated at much too frequent intervals.
- . PMS managers lack formal training.
- . There is inadequate reward for personnel management professionalism.

Interviewees generally agreed with the GAO assessment:

- . Most personnel-related assignments are not viewed as career-enhancing.
- . Many military personnel assigned in personnel management positions have little prior professional experience. Many feel their effectiveness has been limited by this lack of prior experience.
- . Turbulence among PMS managers is believed to be excessive.
- . There are very few senior civilians involved in DA-level military personnel management.
- . Overall, civilian personnel management officials were considered to be better trained than their military counterparts. However, some military officers did not agree; see Figure 6 on page VII-35.

## 2. Conclusions

The Army does not have adequate trained, senior, professional, military personnel managers, and DA personnel management has suffered from this long term lack of depth and breadth of expertise. Conversely, there are a large number of well trained, professional, senior personnel managers in civilian personnel management.

### (6) Operations of the PMS

Significant criticisms were levied at some operational practices within the PMS. MILPERCEN was felt to be "too rigid" by some generals, field grade officers, and NCOs. However, civilian personnel operations were believed to be effective by managers of civilians in the PMS.

Among the comments pertaining to personnel management operations were these:

- . The personnel management system is patently out of control.
- . MILPERCEN is not managing people, it is managing choices.
- . MILPERCEN is doing an outstanding job of selecting battalion commanders. The enlisted management side of PMS has made remarkable progress. However, PMS is still too much draft-oriented.
- . Active Army OPMS is getting better; however, there is too much bad mouthing of OPMS by people for selfish reasons.
- . The Army is not managing its Total Force.

- . The pervasive problem is that acquisition and retention of people in today's PMS is not meeting the requirements of the Army.
- . The current civilian personnel system is not responsive to the Army, and it is not understood by "Green Suiters," especially O-5s and up who must manage it as commanders.
- . Too much DA staff effort is devoted to operations.
- . Reserve component PMS has considerable visibility with OSD and Congress.
- . The enlisted system is too complex. Commanders and most other officers don't understand it.
- . The administrative mission of RCPAC is unique and diverse.
- . Reserve OPMS is not good. Records management at RCPAC is poor. Management of USAR officers reflects a lack of professionalism.
- . At present, almost all reserve records need updating.
- . We need a system to reclassify people immediately if they are not physically capable of performing in their MOS.
- . Operations of MILPERCEN, NGB and RCPAC need to be closely integrated.

1. Findings Related to PMS Operations

Interviews and previous studies indicate that:

- . The current PMS does not respond adequately to requirements of OSA, OSD and the Congress.

- . Operations are not always keyed to an all-volunteer Army.
- . There is a lack of confidence in military PMS operations.
- . Civilian personnel operations in the PMS enjoy a marked degree of confidence and support from many civilians.
- . A small percentage (5-9%) of military officers believe that major changes are required in the Civilian Personnel System.
- . Attitudes toward the civilian personnel management system as expressed in interviews are shown in Figure 6.

FIGURE 6  
Attitude Toward Civilian Personnel Management

	<u>EXCELLENT (%)</u>	<u>GOOD (%)</u>	<u>NEEDS SOME CHANGE (%)</u>	<u>MAJOR CHANGE NEEDED (%)</u>	<u>UNCERTAIN/NO OPINION EXPRESSED (%)</u>
COMMANDER	0	0	5	5	90
DCSPER/G-1	0	0	0	6	94
DPCA/DCC	0	0	0	0	100
AG	0	7	0	7	86
CIVPERS DIRECTOR	0	56	33	0	11
OTHER STAFF	0	2	9	9	80

## 2. Conclusions

Military PMS operations are believed to be unresponsive in the all-volunteer Army environment. However, most operational complaints are

policy and procedurally oriented, not amenable to improvement solely by structural reconfiguration.

There is a significant lack of understanding about the PMS and also a lack of confidence in it, both of which detract from the effectiveness of the system. The very large percentage of military personnel who were either uncertain or expressed no opinion about the adequacy of civilian personnel management reflects in part the fact that civilian management is not well understood by most military personnel.

(7) Attitudes About An Army Personnel Command (APC)

A principal theme of in-depth interviews centered on the advantages and/or disadvantages of an APC. Sentiment was divided on the issue at most levels, and extreme positions were supported by strong arguments.

Comments concerning an APC are included below:

- . I am strongly in favor of an APC. Development of a centralized PMS would actually help field commanders do their jobs.

- . A totally new PMS needs to be built and supported with a sensible organization. Benefits that would be realized from such a system include: (1) eliminate redundancy, (2) develop a pool of managers who would understand the system, (3) do away with turf protectors, (4) the DCSPER heir apparent should come from such an organization.
- . The PMS needs a senior officer and a senior organization to get the job done. DCSPER could do this if he could get all the resources he needs, but he can't.
- . An APC type organization is the way to go. It should cover the Total Force. It must be a MACOM. It can't work for DCSPER any more than DARCOM works for DCSRDA. The Army is functionally oriented, and a personnel command is the logical organization.
- . I'm strongly for an APC that links USAREC and MILPERCEN, which are both people processors, e.g., in and out of TRADOC training centers and to the field. This APC should not be a part of TRADOC but should be closely linked to TRADOC.
- . There are three large chunks of the personnel family in Washington: ODCSPER, TAGO and MILPERCEN. Someone needs to pull it all together. ODCSPER is not staffed to take on this responsibility now.
- . An APC located outside Washington would require the return of certain policy functions and associated resources to the DA staff.
- . An APC has some advantages to offer, e.g., more generals would be required to manage the system and maybe this would give the PMS more clout.

- . The real problem is a system problem rather than organization. But organizational changes can breakdown institutional baracades like civilian personnel, and this might make sense.
- . An APC, headed by a four star general, may be necessary to give the PMS the necessary clout demanded by the importance of personnel requirements. However, change will create turbulence and should not be made unless the advantages are worth the price.
- . I have mixed feelings about the APC. I'm not sure what an APC would accomplish.
- . There have been recommendations to put ADMINCEN in an APC. Who is to say whether it would be good or bad?
- . Personnel management is the biggest problem in the Army. You'll have a hell of a time starting with structure. We need overall goals and objectives.
- . The PMS is already overcentralized.
- . The perception that an APC would improve the coordination and efficiency of personnel and administrative management functions is both naive and unproven.
- . APC? I'm uneasy about the concept; still not sure DARCOM was the right thing to do.
- . APC? I fear it would grow into a monster like DARCOM. It might reduce the clout of the DCSPER.
- . APC ... What would be its mission? It is difficult to draw a parallel to other operating commands. An APC would be managing people of other commands, which is a built-in push and pull situation.
- . Commanders are not in the personnel business, and that's what's wrong with the system now.

- . Regarding APC--not sure there is a clear concept of what ought to be the APC's mission. Other commands have defined job as "processors" like DARCOM and TRADOC.
- . An APC probably wouldn't look much different than the current MILPERCEN.
- . An APC four star commander presents problems. The entire PMS is DCSPER.
- . The professional services are different; civilian personnel is unique; and the National Guard belongs to the States. None of these belong in an APC.

1. Findings Related to an APC

A majority of all personnel interviewed expressed an opinion concerning establishing an Army Personnel Command. Figure 7 shows these attitudes.

FIGURE 7  
Attitude Toward Establishing An APC

<u>Support</u>	<u>Inclined to Support</u>	<u>Inclined Against</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Uncertain or Expressed No Opinion</u>
9%	20%	11%	14%	46%

Attitudes about establishing an APC also are shown by grade, position and organization of interviewee in Exhibit VII-3 on page VII-40.

EXHIBIT VII-3  
Attitude Toward Establishing an APC

<u>BY GRADE:</u>	<u>SUPPORT (%)</u>	<u>INCLINED TO SUPPORT (%)</u>	<u>INCLINED AGAINST (%)</u>	<u>AGAINST (%)</u>	<u>UNCERTAIN/NO OPINION EXPRESSED (%)</u>
ARMY SECRETARIAT AND GENERAL OFFICERS	14	20	18	18	32
FIELD GRADE OFFICER	8	15	5	3	69
CSM & OTH NCO	0	25	8	0	67
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY CIVILIAN	0	27	9	55	9
<u>BY POSITION:</u>					
COMMANDER	18	14	14	14	40
DCSPER/G-1	17	11	11	6	55
DPCA/DCC	0	38	13	0	49
AG	7	7	7	7	72
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL DIRECTOR	0	22	11	67	0
OTHER STAFF	6	26	11	13	44
<u>BY LOCATION:</u>					
DA PMS	9	9	18	27	37
FOA PMS	18	36	9	18	19
OTHER DA STAFF	9	23	18	23	27
FIELD	8	18	8	10	56


The in-depth interviews indicate:

- . Attitudes are fairly evenly divided across all categories of opinion by those Army Secretariat officials and Generals who expressed a point of view.
- . Strong support for an APC was evident among personnel who were assigned to PMS FOA.
- . Attitudes were almost uniformly spread across all categories of opinion by those commanders expressing a point of view.
- . Lack of significant support for an APC was apparent among PMS officers assigned to HQDA.
- . Strong opposition to an APC was expressed by Civilian Personnel Directors.

2. Conclusion

There are significant differences of opinion regarding establishing an APC, depending on the grade, position or organization of personnel; other major differences exist between various categories of military personnel and most DA civilians.

#### 4. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS FROM FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS



As discussed in Chapter IV, functional analysis provides a methodical, structured means of examining what is done--or should be done--by an organization. This method divorces the question of "what" is done from "who" does it, and highlights functions which are diffused across several organizations, or performed by inappropriate organization, or performed by no organizations.

All previous working papers have documented PMS functional structures, using Hierarchical-Input-Process-Output (HIPO) worksheets. These are included as Appendix G of this report. The first working papers examined the current PMS functional structure and documented the "baseline" set of functions. The second working papers, dated 20 July 1979, examined that baseline to see what functions would need to be added, restructured, or deleted to upgrade the baseline into an "optimal" functional structure. The conclusion reached in the second report was that there were only a few planning and evaluation

functions that needed to be added to the baseline structure to make it optimal, and thus capable of fully supporting Army objectives for personnel management.

This section starts with that optimal functional structure and uses it to identify shortfalls in the functioning of the current PMS. Exhibit VII-4, on pages VII-44 to VII-49, is a matrix of all the DA-level organizations involved in personnel management, plotted against the functions of the optimal functional structure.

Examination of this exhibit reveals these different issues:

- . Functions performed by different organizations for different components of the Total Force.
- . Functions performed by different organizations for the same component of the Total Force.
- . Functions nominally performed, but which in fact are only partially, superficially, or poorly performed.
- . Functions not performed at all.
- . Functions performed by organizations not tasked with that function.

The rest of this section deals with findings about these issues; the last subsection contains conclusions.

(1) Findings Concerning Redundant Functions

Almost all the functions of the PMS are performed by more than one organization, and some





FUNCTIONS		ORGANIZATIONS		ODCSPER DIRECTORATES								ODCSPER FIELD OPERATING AGENCIES					
				Manpower, Plans and Budget	Military Personnel Management	Human Resources Development	Civilian Personnel	The Adjutant General	Cdr. MILPERCEN	Cdr. Physical Disability Agency	Army Research Institute	Civilian Appellate Review Agency	MEPCOM	MILPERCEN	Physical Disability Agency	Safety Center	USAF
5.1.4	Maintain a professional recruiting force																
5.1.4.1	Develop qualifications for recruiters		○										○				●
5.1.4.2	Select recruiters												○				●
5.1.4.3	Train recruiters												○				●
5.1.4.4	Develop qualifications for staffing specialists				●							○					
5.1.4.5	Select staffing specialists											●					
5.1.4.6	Train staffing specialists											●					
5.1.4.7	Evaluate performance of recruiters and staffing specialists											●	○				●
5.2	TRAIN/EDUCATE PERSONNEL																
5.2.1	Develop training/education programs																
5.2.1.1	Develop job knowledge and skill requirements		●		●	○						○	○				
5.2.1.2	Select teaching methods																
5.2.1.3	Develop skill attainment evaluation criteria		●		●	●						○	○				
5.2.1.4	Develop or revise training courses											●					
5.2.1.5	Develop or revise educational curricula											●					
5.2.1.6	Develop policies and programs for education courses outside of Army				●							○	○				
5.2.1.7	Evaluate training/education programs		○														
5.2.2	Schedule training/education courses																
5.2.2.1	Determine required output of trained/educated personnel												○	○			
5.2.2.2	Determine availability of students												●	●			
5.2.2.3	Develop course schedule and detailed training plan																
5.2.3	Schedule personnel to training/education programs																
5.2.3.1	Determine availability of qualified personnel												●	○	●		○
5.2.3.2	Select personnel for education programs												●	●			
5.2.3.3	Select personnel for training courses												●	●			
5.2.3.4	Schedule accessions to IET												○	●			●







FUNCTIONS	ORGANIZATIONS	ODCSPER DIRECTORATES										ODCSPER FIELD OPERATING AGENCIES				
		Manpower, Plans and Budget	Military Personnel Management	Human Resources Development	Civilian Personnel	The Adjutant General	Cdr. MILPERCEN	Cdr. Physical Disability Agency	Army Research Institute	Civilian Appellate Review Agency	CIVPERCEN	MEPCOM	MILPERCEN	Physical Disability Agency	Safety Center	USABER
<b>5.4</b>	<b>SUSTAIN PERSONNEL</b>															
<b>5.4.1</b>	<b>Development sustainment policies and procedures</b>															
5.4.1.1	Develop pay and compensation policies and procedures	•	•	•	•											
5.4.1.2	Develop administrative policies and procedures				•	•						○				
5.4.1.3	Develop personnel reclassification policies and procedures		•		•		•				○		○			
5.4.1.4	Develop equal employment opportunity (EEO) policies		○	•	•						○		○			
5.4.1.5	Develop clubs system policy					•										
5.4.1.6	Develop policy for nonappropriate funds (NAF) programs	•			•	•					○					
5.4.1.7	Develop rehabilitation programs policies			•												
5.4.1.8	Develop physical disability evaluation policies							•					○			
5.4.1.9	Develop labor and employee relations policies				•						○					
5.4.1.10	Develop job analysis and evaluation policies	•	•		•						○		○			
5.4.1.11	Develop morale support programs policies					•										
5.4.1.12	Develop medical programs policies															
5.4.1.13	Develop community programs policies															
5.4.1.14	Develop personal award policies and procedures		○		•						○		•			
5.4.1.15	Develop promotion policies and procedures		•		•		○				○		○			
5.4.1.16	Develop law enforcement policies			•												
5.4.1.17	Develop personnel management legislation		•	•	•		○				○		○			
<b>5.4.2</b>	<b>Promote personnel</b>															
5.4.2.1	Administer DA centralized selection boards												•			
5.4.2.2	Evaluate personnel performance				•						○		•			
5.4.2.3	Issue promotions												•			
5.4.2.4	Adjudicate efficiency report appeals		•							•	○		•			
5.4.2.5	Adjudicate promotion appeals		•		•					•	○		•			











subfunctions are performed by over 15 organizations. In many cases some redundancy is not unreasonable. For example, CIVPERCEN and MILPERCEN perform many of the same functions, but for civilians and active military respectively.

However, there are a significant number of functions where the duplication of effort detracts from the performance of the function. These are listed in Exhibit VII-5, on page VII-51. Some of these instances of duplication are clear cut, such as the maintenance of personnel records (function 5.4.3.2). More frequently, though, a function is not so much redundant as it is diffused across organizations. Not surprisingly many of these organizationally diffused functions also are those functions that are partially, superficially, or poorly performed. Almost all the policy-making and evaluation functions listed in Exhibit VII-5 suffer from this dissipation of attention and effort.

Specific findings, which elaborate on highlights of Exhibit VII-5, include:

- . Responsibility for policy development of all kinds is shared by the OCDSPER with system operators, who formally and informally make policy in their respective areas. This fragmentation is particularly true in the areas of policymaking for:

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
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
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EXHIBIT VII-5  
Redundant Functions or Functions with  
Diffused Organizational Responsibility

<u>Function Number</u>	<u>Function</u>
5.1.1.1*	Determine policies and standards for enlistment/reenlistment/matriculation/hiring/induction
5.1.1.2	Design procedures and recordkeeping systems for personnel procurement
5.1.1.5	Evaluate personnel procurement policies, procedures, and activities
5.1.2.1	Develop enlistment/reenlistment programs
5.1.3.3	Access personnel using applicable procedures
5.2.1.1	Develop job knowledge and skill requirements
5.2.1.3	Develop skill attainment evaluation criteria
5.3.1*	Develop military personnel distribution policies and procedures
5.3.3*	Develop personnel policies and plans for mobilization
5.4.1*	Develop sustainment policies and procedures
5.4.3.2*	Maintain personnel records
5.4.3.3	Provide personnel information to authorized parties
5.4.3.4	Evaluate personnel reclassification requests
5.4.3.7	Administer travel and PCS matters
5.4.4.12*	Develop and administer career development policies
5.5.1.1*	Develop military retirement policies and procedures
5.5.1.2*	Develop military separation policies and procedures
5.5.2.1	Evaluate retirement and separation requests
5.5.2.2	Evaluate involuntary separations and discharged

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\* Key functions (see Chapter IV, p. IV-4)

- Enlistment/reenlistment/matriculation/hiring/induction (function 5.1.1)
  - Outside education (function 5.2.1.6)
  - Military personnel distribution (function 5.3.1)
  - Sustainment (function 5.4.1)
  - Career development (function 5.4.4.12).
- . Responsibility for mobilization planning (function 5.3.3) is poorly defined; currently an ad hoc DCSPER group and the MILPERCEN Mobilization Planning Office are most directly involved with this function.
  - . Responsibility for screening and accessing personnel (function 5.1.3.1, 5.1.3.3) is widely distributed.
  - . Responsibilities for developing job knowledge and skill requirements (function 5.2.1.1) and skill attainment evaluation criteria (function 5.2.1.3) are widely distributed.
  - . Personnel records are maintained by numerous organizations (function 5.4.3.2), and made available to authorized parties (function 5.4.3.3) from numerous sources.
  - . Evaluation of policy, programs, and feedback from the field is broadly diffused (functions 5.1.1.5, 5.1.2.3, 5.3.1.4, 5.5.1.4, 5.5.3.5).

(2) Findings Concerning Unperformed Functions

Just as "redundant" functions are not so much duplicated across organizations as they are diffused, so "unperformed" functions are more commonly neglected

than truly unperformed. Thus, there are only five functions in Exhibit VII-4 that are completely unassigned to organizations (functions 1.4.1 through 1.4.4, which establish, monitor, and evaluate PMS objectives, and develop the Master Personnel Plan). However, there are numerous functions which are either essentially unperformed or inadequately supported. These are listed in Exhibit VII-6, on page VII-54. Specific findings, which elaborate on findings of Exhibit VII-6, include:

- . All planning functions (1.0) suffer from lack of resources and inattention. In particular, personnel doctrine (function 1.3) is not developed and the various other components of a master personnel plan (function 1.4) do not exist, e.g., PMS objectives, etc.
- . Evaluation functions, besides being broadly diffused, receive very little attention (functions 5.1.1.5, 5.1.2.3, 5.2.1.7, 5.3.1.4, 5.3.2.4, 5.5.1.4, 5.5.3.5).
- . Human resources research is underemphasized and underperformed (function 5.4.4.1).

(3) Findings Concerning Misplaced Functions

Many redundant functions are also misplaced functions. In general, this shortfall results from an organization responsible for policy and planning being involved in operations, or the reverse.

Specific findings are:

EXHIBIT VII-6  
Functions With No or Inadequate  
Organizational Support

<u>Function Number</u>	<u>Function</u>
1.1*	Project manpower availability, technology, and personnel trends
1.2*	Project unconstrained manpower and personnel requirements
1.3*	Develop personnel doctrine
1.4.1*	Establish PMS objectives
1.4.2*	Design and administer PMS objectives reporting system
1.4.3*	Evaluate overall PMS performance
1.4.4*	Prepare/revise Master Personnel Plan
5.1.1.5*	Evaluate personnel procurement policies, procedures, and activities
5.1.2.3*	Evaluate effectiveness of recruiting/advertising programs
5.2.1.7*	Evaluate training/education programs
5.3.1.4*	Evaluate distribution policies and procedures
5.3.2.4	Evaluate civilian personnel assignment policies and procedures
5.4.1.10*	Develop job analysis and evaluation policies
5.4.4.1*	Conduct human resource research
5.5.1.4*	Evaluate separation policies and procedures
5.5.3.5	Evaluate post-separation/retirement programs

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\* Key functions (see Chapter IV, p. IV-4)

- . All policy functions are participated in by operators who, for lack of better alternatives, must make interpretive decisions which over time become de facto policy. This is particularly noticeable between the Military Personnel Management Directorate of ODCSPER and MILPERCEN, where 11 of 15 policy subfunctions are performed by both organizations.
- . Mobilization planning is handled by ODCSPER, the planning organization, with an ad hoc planning group while MILPERCEN, the operator, has a full time office staffed out of its own resources.
- . PMS operations are performed in ODCSPER:
  - Administration of EEO and EO programs (functions 5.1.1.3, 5.4.4.2)
  - Administration of civilianization programs (function 5.3.2.3)
  - Administration of travel and PCS matters (function 5.4.3.7)
  - Administration of leadership development programs (function 5.4.4.9)
  - Administration of counseling programs (function 5.4.4.11).

(4) Findings Concerning External Demands on the PMS

Enumerating functions and assigning responsibilities as in Exhibit VII-4 does not by itself indicate how the functional workload is distributed. In the case of the Army, function 5.4.5.8, "Provide Public Affairs Liaison," represents a significant workload to the PMS, particularly to the ODCSPER

directorates. Queries from Congress and the Executive branch, and their agencies, can be complex, require extensive data collection and analysis, and normally are time sensitive. The inevitable result is that ODCSPER is forced to be an operator. Similarly, politically/socially sensitive issues, such as equal opportunity, tend to be handled directly by ODCSPER, again as an operator. Both types of demands are realities that must be acknowledged in any discussion about redundancies and misplacement of PMS functions.

(5) Findings Concerning Automated Systems Support For the PMS

The impact of automation, both actual and potential, on the PMS is extensive. To illustrate this, Exhibit VII-7, on page VII-57, lists those functions which either require or are substantially enhanced by automated systems support. Many of these functions already are accomplished with ADP support, others are not. But the support that exists is not integrated across the Total Force nor even within the Active Army. Specific findings concerning automated systems support for the PMS include:

EXHIBIT VII-7  
Functions Requiring/Enhanced by  
Automated Systems Support

<u>Function Number</u>	<u>Function</u>
1.1	Project manpower availability, technology, and personnel trends
1.2	Project unconstrained manpower and personnel requirements
1.4.2	Design and administer PMS objectives reporting system
1.4.3	Evaluate overall PMS performance
5.1.1	Develop personnel procurement policies and procedures
5.1.2	Develop personnel recruiting/advertising programs
5.1.3	Access personnel
5.2.2	Schedule training/education courses
5.2.3	Schedule personnel to training/education programs
5.3.1	Develop military personnel distribution policies and procedures
5.3.2	Develop civilian personnel assignment policies and procedures
5.3.3	Develop personnel plans for mobilization
5.3.4	Assign personnel
5.4.1.1	Develop pay and compensation policies and procedures
5.4.1.2	Develop administrative policies and procedures
5.4.1.3	Develop personnel reclassification policies and procedures
5.4.1.15	Develop promotion policies and procedures
5.4.2	Promote personnel
5.4.3	Provide administrative services
5.4.4	Provide human resource development programs
5.4.5	Provide community-related programs
5.5.1	Establish personnel separation policies and procedures
5.5.2	Administer separations/retirements
5.5.3	Establish post-separation/retirement programs

- . Policy-making, planning, and evaluation functions all depend on historical data, projections, current operating results, and the ability to answer "what-if?" questions. Across the functional structure, automated support is deficient for these functions.
- . Mobilization requires that about 400,000 National Guard and about 260,000 U.S. Army Reserve personnel be rapidly integrated into the Active Army, yet their personnel records and systems are mutually incompatible. Additionally, automated support for an extended mobilization that would require civilian accessions to the active Army is not fully developed. Finally, the ability to track some Reserve personnel's availability and fitness for duty is questioned.
- . Personnel recordskeeping (function 5.4.3.2) systems are different and incompatible for the Army in the field and HQDA.

(6) Findings Concerning the U.S. Army Safety Center

The U.S. Army Safety Center performs neither personnel planning nor personnel life-cycle functions. It is the only organization that is a nominal member of the PMS, as an ODCSPER FOA, while having no identified PMS responsibilities, as demonstrated in Exhibit VII-4.

The nature of the Safety Center is very similar to that of The Inspector General. Both affect personnel, but neither manage nor sustain them, except indirectly.

(7) Conclusions from Functional Analysis

Functional analysis leads to these conclusions:

- . The lack of personnel doctrine and a Master Personnel Plan has contributed to shortfalls in policymaking functions.
- . Personnel doctrine and a master personnel plan would help provide direction and unity of purpose to the PMS, and compensate for the lack of institutional memory, by providing day-to-day guidance to PMS operators.
- . Personnel policy is diffused across the PMS and made in a reactive manner by system operators, instead of a proactive manner by ODCSPER. Thus, policy has not been consistent, coordinated, or comprehensive.
- . Policies and programs are instituted without adequate evaluation of their total effect or results.
- . Mobilization, personnel, and manpower planning have been underemphasized, suffer from lack of focused responsibility, and are sometimes organizationally misplaced. As a planning function, they belong in ODCSPER.
- . The lack of an integrated Total Force data base and ADP system detracts from mobilization readiness, efficiency of operations, and has contributed to the perceived need for redundant personnel records.
- . The PMS would be more effective if planning were institutionalized in a manner that would tend to insulate those functions from short suspense requirements, congressionals, and high-visibility operational functions.


An optimal PMS organizational structure should account for, and compensate for, these functional shortfalls in the current PMS.

\* \* \* \* \*

This chapter has presented findings and conclusions about the PMS resulting from the perceptions survey, interviews and review of past studies, and functional analysis. The next chapter presents criteria for creating and evaluating PMS organizational alternatives.

VIII. CRITERIA FOR DEVELOPING AND EVALUATING  
ALTERNATIVE PMS ORGANIZATIONS

VIII. CRITERIA FOR DEVELOPING AND EVALUATING  
ALTERNATIVE PMS ORGANIZATIONS



Each information source discussed in Chapter VII -- interviews, studies, surveys, and functional analysis -- provides different perspectives about the two central problems of the current PMS<sub>2</sub>: What are the functional and organizational inefficiencies in the PMS, and what are the optimal functional and organizational structures?

The purpose of this chapter is to integrate those perspectives in order to develop organizational evaluation criteria. These criteria should reflect the findings and conclusions of Chapter VII, the PMS top-management objectives of the second working papers, and management and organizational theory from the first working papers. Then these criteria can be used both to develop reasonable alternative PMS organizations and to assist in evaluating those alternatives.

Thus, the organizational evaluation criteria in this chapter provide a bridge from the findings and conclusions

in Chapter VII to the alternative PMS organizations in Chapter IX. Furthermore, the criteria will provide the yardsticks by which alternative PMS organizations can be measured, both against the current PMS and against each other.

1. A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN

An effective method for developing an organizational design is to relate the ability of an organization to achieve its primary objectives to the structure of that organization. This methodology is enhanced by the use of functional analysis, problem solving evaluations, and adhering to management theory principles. Thus, the criteria which are to be used to design and evaluate organizational structures for the PMS should be developed from:

- . Functional analysis of the PMS organization
- . Evaluation of PMS problems
- . Evaluation of PMS objectives
- . Application of management theory principles.

Earlier in the report, we identified the functions which are performed by PMS organizations. An analysis of organizational responsibility for these functions provides important criteria for organizational evaluation. Likewise, the evaluation of organizational designs to achieve

top management objectives, and to preclude or solve problems existing in the current PMS, provides criteria. These criteria, used to develop and evaluate PMS organizational structures, are discussed individually in the following sections.

## 2. CRITERIA DEVELOPED FROM PMS FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS

Criteria developed from functional analysis of the PMS are the most important of the four categories, and they will be covered first.

### (1) Performance of Key Functions

All functions of the PMS are important, but some are more important than others. There are some functions which, even when performed to near perfection, cannot significantly improve overall PMS performance; function 5.4.3.10, "Administer Armed Forces Professional Entertainment Program," is such a function.

Conversely, there are some functions where the quality of performance has a great impact on the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the PMS. These "key" functions support top-management objectives, and must receive priority attention from senior PMS managers as well as the highest priority for management resources. These key PMS functions

are listed in Exhibit VIII-1 on page VIII-5. The functions which require continuing personal attention of the DCSPER are indicated by an asterisk.

Often, the more crucial a key function, the more difficult it is to perform well. As established in Chapter VII, many key PMS functions are not performed well today, or they are performed at a low level organizationally, or they are not performed at all. Additionally, many of these key functions are easily overtaken and buried by day-to-day operations. This condition is particularly true for planning and policy functions.

Therefore, the criteria for performance of key functions are that they be:

- . Positioned at a sufficiently high organizational level to ensure direct top-management supervision.
- . Afforded priority of resources and management effort.
- . Kept distinct from day-to-day operations so that divergence of effort is minimized.

(2) Consolidation of Responsibility for Functions

Just as certain key functions should be organizationally positioned at a high enough level to be effective, certain functions should be consolidated

EXHIBIT VIII-1  
Key PMS Functions

- \*. Project manpower availability, technology, and personnel trends (1.1)
  - \*. Project unconstrained manpower and personnel requirements (1.2)
  - \*. Develop personnel doctrine (1.3)
  - \*. Prepare a Master Personnel Plan (1.4)
  - \*. Assess manpower and personnel implications of all Program Objectives Memorandum submissions (2.3)
  - \*. Determine policies and standards for enlistment/reenlistment/matriculation/hiring/induction (5.1.1.1)
  - \*. Evaluate personnel procurement policies, procedures, and activities (5.1.1.5)
    - . Evaluate effectiveness of recruiting/advertising programs (5.1.2.3)
    - . Evaluate training/education programs (5.2.1.7)
  - \*. Develop military personnel distribution policies and procedures (5.3.1)
  - \*. Develop personnel policies and plans for mobilization (5.3.3)
    - . Develop personnel reclassification policies and procedures (5.4.1.3)
    - . Develop labor and employee relations policies (5.4.1.9)
    - . Develop job analysis and evaluation policies (5.4.1.10)
  - \*. Develop promotion policies and procedures (5.4.1.15)
    - . Evaluate personnel performance (5.4.2.2)
    - . Provide financial services (5.4.3.1)
    - . Maintain personnel records (5.4.3.2)
    - . Conduct human resources research (5.4.4.1)
    - . Develop and administer labor and employee relations programs (5.4.4.6)
    - . Develop and administer job analysis and evaluation programs (5.4.4.7)
    - . Develop and administer career development programs (5.4.4.12)
  - \*. Establish personnel separation policies and procedures (5.5.1)
- 
- \* Functions which require the DCSPER's personal attention.

within a single organization to be effective. Problems caused by overlapping and redundant functional responsibility usually are caused by one or both of the following situations. First, a truism: if everyone is responsible for a function, then no one is responsible, and the function is neglected. Second, good intentions and committees normally cannot provide sufficient effective coordination of complex functions performed in different organizations. (Appendix D, "Committees on Which PMS Officials Serve", owes some of its extraordinary length to this lack of PMS functional consolidation).

There are clear opportunities for beneficially consolidating functions. In particular, many key functions in Exhibit VIII-1 are also functions identified in Chapter VII as being organizationally diffused, especially policy development functions. This situation exists in part from the lack of a codified body of personnel management objectives, policy and doctrine. Consequently, operators are inclined to make numerous, independent, and interpretive decisions which over time become inconsistent policy.

These key functions have suffered doubly, from lack of attention and from fragmentation, and their performance would be significantly improved by consolidating them.

Additionally, because of the nature of many of these key functions, they tend to be diffused downward and out of an organization, driven from top levels by daily operations. Organizations must be structured, tasked, and continually monitored to avoid this tendency.

The criteria for consolidation of diffused functions are that they be:

- . Consolidated into single, or at least fewer, organizations, to improve coordination, consistency, and efficiency.
- . Fenced off organizationally and monitored, if they are also key functions identified in Exhibit VIII-1.

### 3. CRITERIA DEVELOPED FROM PMS PROBLEMS

Chapter VII discusses problems which have been identified in the PMS from four sources:

- . Perceptions survey
- . Previous studies and surveys
- . In-depth interviews by Booz, Allen & Hamilton
- . Functional analysis.

An acceptable alternative organization should preclude the future development of those problems which are related

to structure. Organization criteria are needed to address the following problems identified in Chapter VII:

- . Total Force integration
- . Responsiveness to external pressures
- . Efficiency of operations
- . Adequacy of staffing.

(1) Integration of Total Force Management

The Army PMS consists of separate personnel management systems for active military personnel, Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and civilian personnel. This condition is accounted for in part by recognized differences in statutory and regulatory authority. Notwithstanding these differences, the DCSPER must ensure that personnel in all components of the Total Force are managed in a coordinated, consistent, effective, and efficient manner.

To achieve this required level of management requires that the key functions listed in Exhibit VIII-1 be performed in a uniform manner for all Total Force components. It is especially important that the key functions of special interest to the DCSPER are performed under central direction. Furthermore, separate systems must interface effectively and use a common data base where possible.

Therefore, the criteria for the integration of Total Force management are that key functions be:

- . Performed uniformly across the Total Force, which requires an organizational mechanism to ensure coordination and consistency.
- . Consolidated to permit direct coordination for the Total Force.
- . Enhanced by data systems which interface and employ an essentially common data base.

(2) Responsiveness to External Pressure

PMS organizations today are under pressures from Congress, the Secretary of the Army, OSD, and the President, as well as the major commands, the several states, and society at large, to meet the personnel needs of a modern army. The ability of the PMS to operate efficiently and effectively in this managerial, political, economic, and societal environment is important and should be built into the PMS both functionally and organizationally.

To respond to these requirements, the Army must meet two requirements:

- . The Army must identify and effectively articulate both:
  - Its personnel needs
  - The personal needs of its people
- . The Army must understand and effectively articulate how it intends to meet those needs.

The first point is functionally addressed by planning and human research, the second by developing personnel doctrine, objectives, and plans, e.g., a Master Personnel Plan. These are key functions identified earlier in this chapter as being of personal interest to the DCSPER. Therefore the DCSPER should deal directly and continuously with these functions.

However, if the people responsible for performing key planning and research functions, or any other key functions for that matter, must respond continuously to external pressures, they will not be sufficiently removed from day-to-day operations and their primary responsibilities will be neglected. Therefore, the criteria for responsiveness to external pressures are that:

- . A primary focal point be designated for coordination of requests for information and other requirements on the PMS from external sources.
- . Staff resources be provided to handle those demands that are distinct from people supporting key functions.

(3) Efficiency of Operations and Adequacy of Staffing

Efficiency of operations and adequacy of staffing are current PMS problems, but they are not directly

amenable to correction by organizational reconfiguration. A PMS organization may be inadequately staffed either qualitatively and/or quantitatively, or its operational efficiency may be degraded for reasons other than the assignment of functional responsibilities. In such cases, organizational adjustments will not correct these deficiencies. In general, it can be acknowledged that an organization should provide for an efficient and direct flow of work, should foster professionalism, etc.

4. CRITERIA DEVELOPED FROM PMS OBJECTIVES

The need for top-management PMS objectives was presented in Chapter V. The urgency of establishing objectives is further emphasized by the passage of the Civil Service Reform Act, which requires the Army to undertake specific objectives for its Senior Executive Service, which should be consistent with objectives for senior military managers.

In Chapter V, it was stated that to be effective an organization must:

- . Develop objectives
- . Assign responsibilities to accomplish objectives
- . Evaluate programs implemented to achieve objectives
- . Revise objectives based on such evaluations.

Organizational criteria that result from these objectives are that the PMS must:

- . Provide for the development and accomplishment of organizational objectives
- . Assign responsibility to top-management supervisors to provide an effective chain of authority to accomplish objectives
- . Provide for progress reports and evaluation of objectives

5. CRITERIA DEVELOPED FROM PRINCIPLES OF MANAGEMENT THEORY

Accepted principles of management theory should be considered for any alternative personnel management organizational design. These principles have been previously outlined in Exhibit H-8 of the first working papers, and they are restated here. All these principles are important. They are, however, listed in a rough priority order.

The criteria for adherence to principles of management theory are:

- . Flexibility
  - The PMS organization should be flexible enough to enable it to cope with special situations and a changing environment.
  - The PMS organization should be able to adequately respond to wartime requirements.

- . Functional definition of authority and responsibility
  - Concepts of managers' roles should be clearly articulated
  - Activities for which a unit is responsible should be precisely defined.
- . Leadership
  - Personal leadership qualities of unit managers should be facilitated
  - Development of professional personnel managers should be facilitated
- . Chain of command
  - Hierarchy of authority should be definite
  - Channels of communications should be clear
  - Command/organization layering should be avoided
- . Division of work
  - A unit should be responsible for a homogeneous block of work
  - To the extent that the work is heterogeneous, implications for unit effectiveness should be assessed
- . Parity of authority and responsibility
  - Sufficient authority should be delegated to a unit to enable it to discharge its responsibilities
- . Balance
  - Relative advantages and disadvantages of centralized authority, decentralized authority, or combinations of the two should be considered

- . Efficiency
  - Proposed PMS alternatives should involve the least amount of undesirable consequences considering the PMS generally, and its component organizations specifically
  - Proposed PMS alternatives should cause the PMS staff to react positively from the viewpoints of:
    - .. Ease of daily administration
    - .. Being in consonance with their own career plans and aspirations
- . Unity of command
  - Each individual and unit should have only one superior
- . Span of management
  - The number of individuals a manager is responsible for and the number of subordinate units a parent organization is responsible for should be reasonable and facilitate successful operations.
- . Information Management

6. CRITERIA DEVELOPED BY THE THIRD SAG

The third SAG developed these four criteria for PMS alternative organizations:

- . The PMS should be structured to provide for the separation of policy formulation and its execution
- . The PMS must be responsive to wartime operations and requirements
- . The PMS must include all functions that are essential to accomplish the mission of the organization
- . The PMS must serve the Total Force.

\* \* \* \* \*

An alternative Army PMS organizationa should be developed using these criteria. Initial use of all of these criteria may not be considered feasible in the short term, however. Reasons for temporarily not applying a particular criterion could include one or more of the following factors:


- . Full implementation of necessary organizational changes could be accomplished more effectively after one or more key individuals have been reassigned.
- . Budgetary or other relatively short term factors could delay some aspects of complete reorganization.
- . There may be a perceived need to obtain the best balance between overlapping, or conflicting, criteria.

Even if there should be sound reasons for postponing the use of all these criteria in reorganizing the PMS, the most important criteria should be applied from the beginning. In this way, the efficiency and effectiveness of the Army's PMS organization can be improved at the earliest possible date. However, the caution at the end of Chapter II about partial implementation of an integrated set of recommendations should be remembered.

The next chapter presents the alternative organizations developed by using these criteria.

IX. PMS ORGANIZATIONAL ALTERNATIVES

## IX. PMS ORGANIZATIONAL ALTERNATIVES



The genesis of the PMS<sub>2</sub> was the conviction that a broad examination of personnel management in the Army was necessary. Many efforts have resulted from this conviction, covering a wide range of issues. One of these efforts, the PMS<sub>2</sub>, was chartered to examine personnel management at Headquarters, Department of the Army level and to respond to the basic question of how the Army should be organized to manage people.

This chapter addresses that basic question. It proposes three alternative PMS organizational structures and describes the concept of each alternative. PMS<sub>2</sub> does not recommend a specific alternative; the Army retains that prerogative.

within the framework of criteria for PMS organizational alternatives, established in Chapter VIII, Booz, Allen has identified three basic PMS organizational strategies:

- . One: functionally restructure the PMS by reassigning functions, but leave the current organizational structure essentially unchanged
- . Two: Organizationally restructure the PMS, to include reassigning responsibility for functions
- . Three: Establish an Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM).


For each of these strategies, which are discussed in the next three sections of this chapter, an alternative organization is proposed and discussed.

1. STRATEGY ONE: FUNCTIONAL RESTRUCTURING

The criteria for organizational alternatives set down in Chapter VIII require that, at a minimum, certain functional realignments take place among existing PMS organizations. This section presents an alternative organization that reflects this minimal functional restructuring.

The current PMS organization, illustrated in Exhibit IX-1 on page IX-3, is retained. The necessary functional changes have already been suggested by three exhibits:

- . Exhibit VII-5, "Redundant Functions or Functions with Diffused Organizational Responsibility," page VII-51
- . Exhibit VII-6, "Functions With No or Inadequate Organizational Support," page VII-54
- . Exhibit VIII-1, "Key PMS Functions," page VIII-5.





**NOTES:**

1. COA INTERFACES WITH THE ODCSPER AT THE STAFF LEVEL IN THE AREAS OF BUDGET AND PERSONNEL ENTITLEMENTS.
2. ACSAC INTERFACES WITH THE ODCSPER AT STAFF LEVEL IN THE AREAS OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS REVIEW AND APPROVAL.
3. TAG IS DUAL-HATTED AS THE COR TAGCEN, AND SERVES AS A DA SPECIAL STAFF OFFICER FOR ARMY-WIDE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS AND CERTAIN OTHER SUPPORT FUNCTIONS.
4. TJAG, CHAPLAIN AND SURGEON INTERFACE WITH THE ODCSPER AT THE STAFF LEVEL ON PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT POLICY AND COMPENSATION MATTERS.
5. CHIEF, NGB AND CHIEF ARMY RESERVE INTERFACES WITH THE ODCSPER AT THE STAFF LEVEL ON PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT POLICY, MOBILIZATION AND MANPOWER MATTERS TO INCLUDE CERTAIN PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING ACTIVITIES.
6. TAG FUNCTIONS AS A DCSPER DIRECTOR WITHIN DESIGNATED FUNCTIONAL AREAS WITH BOTH TAGCEN AND RCPAC BEING THE OPERATING ARM FOR THESE SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS; THEREFORE, BOTH TAGCEN AND RCPAC ARE SHOWN EQUIVALENT TO OTHER ODCSPER FOA'S FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS DEPICTION.
7. COR, MILPERCEN AND USAPDA HAVE DIRECTOR EQUIVALENT STATUS. BOTH ORGANIZATIONS ARE ODCSPER FOA'S.
8. ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATIONS ARE THOSE WHICH PROVIDE SUPPORT TO OR INTERFACE WITH ODCSPER OPERATIONS BUT ARE NOT UNDER THE COMMAND OR SUPERVISION OF THE DCSPER.
9. ADMINCEN PROVIDES COMBAT AND TRAINING DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT FOR ALL ASPECTS OF ODCSPER AND OTAG FUNCTIONAL AREAS. DHRD MAY TASK ADMINCEN ON A DIRECT BASIS TO ACCOMPLISH PROJECTS IN SUPPORT OF HR FUNCTIONS. ALL OTHER TASKING ORGANIZATIONS IN ODCSPER AND OTAG ARE ROUTED THROUGH HQ TRADOC AND ODCSOPS IF TASKING IS UP AR 5-5 (THE ARMY STUDY PROGRAM). THE ADMINCEN IS ALSO SUBJECT TO TASKING BY COA AND ACSAC, AND OTHER HQDA STAFF ELEMENTS REQUIRING COMBAT AND TRAINING DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT WITHIN THE PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION AREA.
10. COR USAREC IS ALSO COR NEPCOM.
11. FOUR ADDITIONAL FOA'S OF TAGCEN INCLUDE TWO PUBLICATION CENTERS AND TWO MILITARY MAIL TERMINALS EACH OF WHICH ARE ON SEPARATE TDA SIMILAR TO THE U.S. ARMY COURIER SERVICE.

EXHIBIT IX-1  
Current PMS Organization

INTERFACES TO DOD, CONGRESS, AND EXECUTIVE  
BRANCH AGENCIES NOT SHOWN



2

346

FUNCTIONS WITH CURRENTLY DIFFUSED ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY	ORGANIZATIONS											ODCSPER DIRECTORATES					ODCSPE FIELD OPERATI		
	Manpower, Plans and Budget	Military Personnel Management	Human Resources Development	Civilian Personnel	The Adjutant General	Cdr. MILPERCEN	Cdr. Physical Disability Agency	Army Research Institute	Civilian Appellate Review Agency	CIVPERCEN	MEPCOM	MILPERCEN	Physical Disability Agency	Safety Center					
5.1.1.1* Determine policies and standards for enlistment/reenlistment/matriculation/hiring/induction		•	•																
5.1.1.2 Design procedures and record keeping systems for personnel procurement		•	•																
5.1.2.1 Develop enlistment/reenlistment programs		•																	
5.1.3.3 Access personnel using applicable procedures						•					•								
5.2.1.1 Develop job knowledge and skill requirements											•		•						
5.2.1.3 Develop skill attainment evaluation criteria											•		•						
5.3.1* Develop military personnel distribution policies and procedures		•	•			•													
5.3.3* Develop personnel policies and plans for mobilization		•		•		•													
5.4.1* Develop sustainment policies and procedures	•	•	•	•	•		•												
5.4.3.2* Maintain personnel records													•		•				
5.4.3.3 Provide personnel information to authorized parties													•		•				
5.4.3.4 Evaluate personnel reclassification requests													•		•				
5.4.3.7 Administer travel and PCS matters													•		•				
5.4.4.12* Develop and administer career development policies		•		•															
5.5.1.1* Develop military retirement policies and procedures		•																	
5.5.1.2* Develop military separation policies and procedures		•																	
5.5.2.1 Evaluate retirement and separation requests													•		•				
5.5.2.2 Evaluate involuntary separations and discharged													•		•				







FUNCTIONS	ORGANIZATIONS	ODCSPER DIRECTORATES							ODCSPER FIELD OPERATING AGENCIES							TAG		TRAM				
		Manpower, Plans and Budget	Military Personnel Management	Human Resources Development	Civilian Personnel	The Adjutant General	Cdr. MILPERCEN	Cdr. Physical Disability Agency	Army Research Institute	CIVPERCEN	MEPCOM	MILPERCEN	Physical Disability Agency	Safety Center	USAREC	DTAG	TAGCEN	RCPAC	TRADOC	ADMINCEN	DCDA	USAFAM
<b>1.0 PLANNING</b>																						
1.1	Project manpower availability, technology, and personnel trends	●	x	●		x	●		x	x							x					
1.2	Project unconstrained manpower and personnel requirements	●		●	x				x									●				
1.3	Develop personnel doctrine	●	●	●	●		●			x				x	x		x	●				
<b>1.4 PREPARE MASTER PERSONNEL PLAN</b>																						
1.4.1	Establish PMS objectives	●	●	●	●	●	●															
1.4.2	Design and administer PMS objectives reporting system	●																				
1.4.3	Evaluate overall PMS performance	●	●	●	●																	
1.4.4	Prepare/revise master personnel plan	●	●	●	●																	
<b>5.1 PROCURE PERSONNEL</b>																						
5.1.1	Develop personnel procurement policies and procedures		●	x	●		x			x	x		●					●				
5.1.2	Develop personnel recruiting/advertising programs		●		●								●									
5.1.3	Access personnel		●							●	●		●				●	●				
5.1.4	Maintain a professional recruiting force		●		●				●	●		●					●					
<b>5.2 TRAIN/EDUCATE PERSONNEL</b>																						
5.2.1	Develop training/education programs		●		●	x				●	●		●	●		●	●	●	●	●	●	●
5.2.2	Schedule training/education programs									●	●						●	●				
5.2.3	Schedule personnel to training/education programs									●	●		●				●	●				
5.2.4	Conduct training/education																	●	●			
<b>5.3 DISTRIBUTE PERSONNEL</b>																						
5.3.1	Develop military personnel distribution policies and procedures	x	●	●			●				x						x					
5.3.2	Develop civilian personnel assignment policies and procedures	●	●		●					●				●	●							
5.3.3	Develop personnel policies and plans for mobilization	x	●		●	x	●			x	x						●				x	x
5.3.4	Assign personnel										●						●					
<b>5.4 SUSTAIN PERSONNEL</b>																						
5.4.1	Develop sustainment policies and procedures	●	●	●	●	●	x	●		x	x			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
5.4.2	Promote personnel		●		●				●	●	●											x
5.4.3	Provide administrative services	●	●		●	●	●			●	●			●	●	●					●	●
5.4.4	Provide human resource development programs		●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			●	●		x	●				
5.4.5	Provide community-related programs	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		●				●	●							
<b>5.5 SEPARATE/RETIRE PERSONNEL</b>																						
5.5.1	Develop personnel separation policies and procedures		●		●					●	x			x	x	●						
5.5.2	Administer separations/retirements				x					●	●					●	●					
5.5.3	Develop post-separation/retirement programs	●	●		●									●	●	●					●	●

**LEGEND**  
 ● Tasked with per  
 ● Provides input  
 x No longer perfor  
 ✓ New tasking

EXHIBIT IX-4  
 Strategy One:  
 Organizational Assignment of Functions

ODCSER DIRECTORATES				ODCSER FIELD OPERATING AGENCIES										TAG		TRADOC	COA		ACSAC											
Strategy and Budget	Human Resources Management	Civilian Personnel Development	The Adjutant General	Cdr. MILPERCEN	Cdr. Physical Disability Agency	Army Research Institute	Civilian Appeals Review Agency	CIVPERCEN	MEPCOM	MILPERCEN	Physical Disability Agency	Safety Center	USAREC	DTAG	TAGCEN	RCPAC	TRADOC	ADMINCEN	OICDA	USAFAC	DACCAC	USACSC	CCM	JAG	TSC	NGR	OLAR	DCSDPS	AS2 WAF4	
●			x	●						x					x							x	x	x	x	x	●	x		
●	x				x											●						x	x	x	x	x	●	x		
●	●			●					x				x	x	x	●						●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
●	●	●	●																			●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
●	●																					●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
x	●		x		x				x			●				●						●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
●					●							●										●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
●	x				●							●	●		●	●					●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
●					●																	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
●	x	●		x					x							●				x	x	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
●					●																	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
●	●	●	x	●		x			x					x	x	x	x			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	●	●	
●					●	●																							●	
●	●	●			●																	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
●	●	●	●	●		●										x	●					●			x			●	●	
●	●	●	●	●	●																	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	
●					●				x			x	x	●								x	x	x	x	x	x	●	●	
x					●											●	●					x	x	x	x			●	●	
●																								●					●	●

LEGEND  
 ● Tasked with performing part or all of function  
 ⊙ Provides input for performing function  
 x No longer performs function  
 ✓ New tasking

2

Each of these exhibits highlights functions which, for one reason or another, should be organizationally handled in a different way than at present. The proposed reassignment/assignment of these functions is summarized in Exhibits IX-2 and IX-3, pages IX-4 and IX-5. These changes are then summarized in Exhibit IX-4, on page IX-6, which shows the overall resulting assignment of functions for the PMS.

Actions required to implement Strategy One include:

- . Reassign policy and evaluation functions to ODCSPER, to the extent possible
- . Transfer personnel between ODCSPER and its FOA to match the changing workloads, to the extent possible.

Strategy One is in many respects only a holding action, as most of the organizational criteria are only partially satisfied. It could provide time for the development of improved automated personnel systems and of a Master Personnel Plan, however, before a more comprehensive reorganization of the PMS can be accomplished.

## 2. STRATEGY TWO: ORGANIZATIONAL RESTRUCTURING

The criteria for organizational alternatives in Chapter VIII indicate that the efficiency and effectiveness of the PMS could be improved significantly by reorganizing the current PMS and reassigning functions. This section presents a course of action and an alternative organization to meet that objective.

(1) Organizational Assignment of Functions


Strategy Two reorganizes elements to improve the efficiency of operations and correct other problems discussed in Chapter VII. The organizational diagram and assignment of functions are shown in Exhibits IX-5 and IX-6, on pages IX-9 and IX-10.

All PMS FOA are assigned to directorates of DCSPER. Total Force management is achieved by integrating into ODCSPER the personnel management functions (less training) performed by special staff elements and their FOA.

TAG is continued as a Director in ODCSPER as well as a Special Staff Agency responsible for headquarters administrative support functions, and assumes the human resources development functions that are now performed by the Director, Human Resources Development, ODCSPER.

Commander MILPERCEN is assigned additional FOA and assumes the major functions now performed by Director Military Personnel Management, ODCSPER.


A new ODCSPER Director of Plans and Systems Office is established.




**NOTES:**

1. ARMY COUNCIL OF REVIEW BOARDS OPERATING FUNCTIONS REASSIGNED TO HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORATE AND ITS FOA. OASA (M&RA) RETAINS APPELLATE REVIEW AUTHORITY.
2. DCSOPS INTERFACES WITH DCSPER THROUGH GENERAL STAFF COORDINATION AND COMMITTEE STRUCTURE IN MATTERS PERTAINING TO INDIVIDUAL TRAINING.
3. U.S. ARMY FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING CENTER REASSIGNED FROM COMPTROLLER OF THE ARMY TO DIRECTOR HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT. COA RETAINS GENERAL STAFF RESPONSIBILITY FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS.
4. TAG IS DUAL-HATTED AS DIRECTOR HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT. TAG PERFORMS HEADQUARTERS ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS.
5. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS (LESS INDIVIDUAL TRAINING) REASSIGNED FROM TJAG, CCH AND TSG TO MILPERCEN.
6. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS REASSIGNED FROM NGB SUPPORT AGENCY TO RCPAC.
7. TAG IS DUAL-HATTED AS DIRECTOR HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT WITH RCPAC, TAGCEN AND USAFAC AS FOA. OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS OF ARMY COUNCIL OF REVIEW BOARDS ARE REASSIGNED TO TAGCEN AND RCPAC. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS OF NGB SUPPORT AGENCY ARE REASSIGNED TO RCPAC.
8. REORGANIZED FROM RESOURCES PREVIOUSLY UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF PERSONNEL.
9. COMMANDER MILITARY PERSONNEL CENTER IS DUAL-HATTED AS COMMANDER MILITARY PERSONNEL CENTER AND AS COMMANDER MILITARY PERSONNEL CENTER. ADDITIONAL FOA: USAREC, MEPCOM, USMA (FOR PHYSICAL DISABILITY AGENCY FUNCTIONS AND CCH AND TSG ARE REASSIGNED TO MILPERCEN).
10. DIRECTOR OF PLANS AND SYSTEMS ESTABLISHMENT RESEARCH FROM DHRD.
11. USA SAFETY CENTER REASSIGNED FROM DCSPER TO MILPERCEN.
12. RELATIONSHIP AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR DCSPER AND MILPERCEN ARE THOSE WHOSE UNDER THE COMMAND OR SUPERVISION OF THE CDR, USAREC IS DUAL-HATTED AS CDR, MEPCOM.
14. FOUR ADDITIONAL FOA'S OF TAGCEN INCLUDE: USAREC, MEPCOM, USMA, AND USAC. THESE ARE ON SEPARATE TDA SIMILAR TO THE U.S. ARMY.
- 15.

EXHIBIT IX-5  
 Strategy Two:  
 Organizational Restructuring



FROM RESOURCES PREVIOUSLY IN DIRECTORATE OF MANPOWER, PLANS AND BUDGET.  
 MILITARY PERSONNEL CENTER IS DUAL-HATTED AS DIRECTOR MILITARY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AND ASSIGNED  
 A: USAREC, MEPCOM, USMA (FOR SUPERVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS), AND USMA PREP SCHOOL. USA  
 MILITARY AGENCY FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTION (LESS INDIVIDUAL TRAINING) OF TJAG,  
 BE REASSIGNED TO MILPERCEN.  
 PLANS AND SYSTEMS ESTABLISHED AS NEW DIRECTORATE. ARI RECEIVES TASKING FOR HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOP  
 FROM DHRD.  
 AFTER REASSIGNED FROM DCOSPER TO TIG.  
 AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR DOCTRINE CLARIFIED.  
 ORGANIZATIONS ARE THOSE WHICH PROVIDE SUPPORT TO AND INTERFACE WITH ODOSPER OPERATIONS BUT ARE NOT  
 UNDER OR SUPERVISION OF THE DCOSPER.  
 DUAL-HATTED AS CDR, MEPCOM.  
 ALL FOA'S OF TAGCEN INCLUDE TWO PUBLICATION CENTERS AND TWO MILITARY MAIL TERMINALS EACH OF WHICH  
 ARE SIMILAR TO THE U.S. ARMY COURIER SERVICE.



2

FUNCTIONS	ORGANIZATIONS	ODCSPER										TRADOC	ACS AC						
		DIRECTORATES					FOA OF:												
		Human Resource Development TAG	Manpower, Programs, and Budget	Military Personnel Management/CDR MILPERCEN	Civilian Personnel	Plans and Systems	Human Resource Dev. TAG	MILPERCEN	Civilian Personnel	Plans and Systems	TRADOC	ADMINCEN	USACDC	CCH	JAG	TSC	MGB	OCAR	OC
<b>1.0 PLANNING</b>																			
1.1 Project manpower availability, technology, and personnel trends					●				●										●
1.2 Project unconstrained manpower and personnel requirements					●														●
1.3 Develop personnel doctrine					●				●		●								
<b>1.4 PREPARE MASTER PERSONNEL PLAN</b>																			
1.4.1 Establish PMS objectives		●	●	●	●	●													●
1.4.2 Design and administer PMS objectives reporting system					●														
1.4.3 Evaluate overall PMS performance					●														
1.4.4 Prepare/revise master personnel plan					●														
<b>5.1 PROCURE PERSONNEL</b>																			
5.1.1 Develop personnel procurement policies and procedures				●	●														
5.1.2 Develop personnel recruiting/advertising programs								●											
5.1.3 Access personnel								●											
5.1.4 Maintain a professional recruiting force								●											
<b>5.2 TRAIN/EDUCATE PERSONNEL</b>																			
5.2.1 Develop training/education programs		●		●						●					●				●
5.2.2 Schedule training/education programs									●		●								
5.2.3 Schedule personnel to training/education programs									●		●								
5.2.4 Conduct training/education											●								
<b>5.3 DISTRIBUTE PERSONNEL</b>																			
5.3.1 Develop military personnel distribution policies and procedures				●															
5.3.2 Develop civilian personnel assignment policies and procedures					●														
5.3.3 Develop personnel policies and plans for mobilization				●	●														●
5.3.4 Assign personnel								●	●										
<b>5.4 SUSTAIN PERSONNEL</b>																			
5.4.1 Develop sustainment policies and procedures		●		●	●														
5.4.2 Promote personnel								●	●	●									
5.4.3 Provide administrative services								●	●	●									
5.4.4 Provide human resource development programs		●						●											
5.4.5 Provide community-related programs								●											
<b>5.5 SEPARATE/RETIRE PERSONNEL</b>																			
5.5.1 Develop personnel separation policies and procedures		●		●	●														
5.5.2 Administer separations/retirements								●	●	●									
5.5.3 Develop post-separation/retirement programs		●		●															

LEGEND  
● Tasked with performing function  
⊙ Provides input for performing function




(2) Required Implementing Actions

The following actions are required to implement the Strategy Two organization alternative:

- . Reorganize ODCSPER and assign FOA to staff directorates as indicated in Exhibit IX-5.
- . Transfer the Army Council of Review Boards' functions from ASA (M&RA) to TAG. Further reassignment of significant parts of these functions to RCPAC is envisioned. OASA (M&RA) retains appellate review authority.
- . Reassign USAFAC from Comptroller of the Army to TAG.
- . Reassign personnel management functions (less training) from TJAG, CCH and TSG to MILPERCEN.
- . Reassign National Guard Support Agency functions from NGB to RCPAC.
- . Reassign USA Physical Disability Agency functions to MILPERCEN.
- . Reassign the Safety Center from ODCSPER to TIG.

3. STRATEGY THREE: ESTABLISH AN ARMY PERSONEL COMMAND

The Strategy Three organizational alternative establishes a Personnel Command, organized as shown in Exhibit IX-7, and with functions assigned as shown in Exhibit IX-8, on pages IX-12 through IX-14.




**NOTES:**


1. ARMY COUNCIL OF REVIEW BOARDS OPERATING FUNCTIONS REASSIGNED TO USA PERSCOM. OASA (M&RA) RETAINS APPELLATE REVIEW AUTHORITY.
2. DCSOPS INTERFACES WITH DCSPER THROUGH GENERAL STAFF COORDINATION AND COMMITTEE STRUCTURE IN MATTERS PERTAINING TO INDIVIDUAL TRAINING.
3. USAFAC REASSIGNED FROM COA TO USA PERSCOM.
4. TAG PMS FUNCTIONS AND ITS FOA TRANSFERRED TO USA PERSCOM. TAG CONTINUES AS SPECIAL STAFF OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR HQDA ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS.
5. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS (LESS INDIVIDUAL TRAINING) REASSIGNED FROM TJAG, CCH AND TSG TO USA PERSCOM.
6. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS REASSIGNED FROM NGB SUPPORT AGENCY TO RCPAC, UNDER USA PERSCOM.
7. DIRECTOR PLANS AND SYSTEMS ASSIGNED POLICY DEVELOPMENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL LIFE CYCLE FUNCTIONS. RESEARCH IN ALL AREAS CONDUCTED BY ARI, TASKING TO ADMINCEN AND OTHER ARMY AGENCIES, CONTRACT, ETC.
8. DIRECTOR CIVILIAN PERSONNEL ASSIGNED POLICY DEVELOPMENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL CIVILIAN PERSONNEL LIFE CYCLE FUNCTIONS.
9. USA SAFETY CENTER REASSIGNED FROM DCSPER TO TIG.
10. RELATIONSHIP AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR DOCTRINE CLARIFIED.
11. ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATIONS ARE THOSE WHICH PROVIDE SUPPORT TO OR INTERFACE WITH ODCSPER OPERATIONS BUT ARE NOT UNDER THE COMMAND OR SUPERVISION OF THE DCSPER.

U.S. ARMY  
CENT  
(NOT)

EXHIBIT IX-7 (1)  
 Strategy Three:  
 Army Personnel Command




2



**NOTES:**

1. DIRECTORATES AND SUBORDINATE ORGANIZATIONS INDICATED BY CODE (O) REPORT TO DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR OPERATIONS.
2. STAFF GROUP, DIRECTORATES AND SUBORDINATE ORGANIZATIONS INDICATED BY CODE (S) REPORT TO DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR SYSTEMS AND SUPPORT.
3. FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY LINE DIRECTORATES ARE OPERATIONAL LIFE CYCLE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS PREVIOUSLY IN ODCSPER, MILPERCEN, OTAG, TAGCEN AND THE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS (LESS INDIVIDUAL TRAINING) FROM TJAG, CCH AND TSG.
4. FOA REASSIGNED FROM MILPERCEN AND ODCSPER.
5. MEPCOM AND USAREC REASSIGNED FROM ODCSPER.
6. USAFAC REASSIGNED FROM COA.
7. RCPAC REASSIGNED FROM TAG.
8. CDR, USAREC IS DUAL-HATTED AS CDR, MEPCOM.

DEPUTY  
COMMANDER FOR  
OPERATIONS & SUPPORT  
  
STAFF



2

**LEGEND**

- DUAL-HATTED POSITION
- (O) - REPORTS TO DEP CDR OPNS
- (S) - REPORTS TO DEP CDR SYS & SPT
- ..... - SUPERVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS

FUNCTIONS	ORGANIZATIONS	ODCSPER		US ARMY PERSON							TRADOC	ACS AC								
		DIRECTORATES	FOA	DIRECTORATES	SUBORDINATE ORG															
		Plans and Systems Programs and Budget	Civilian Personnel Manpower	Army Research Institute	Distribution and Operations	Enlisted Operations	Officer Operations	Civilian Personnel Management and Support	Personnel Systems Management	Community, Morale, and Special Personnel Programs	MEPCOM	USAREC	USAFAC	RPAC	TRADOC	ADMINCEN	USACSC	CCH	JAG	TSG
1.0	<b>PLANNING</b>																			
1.1	Project manpower availability, technology, and personnel trends	●		●																
1.2	Project unconstrained manpower and personnel requirements	●																		
1.3	Develop personnel doctrine	●		●											●					
1.4	<b>PREPARE MASTER PERSONNEL PLAN</b>																			
1.4.1	Establish PMS objectives	●	●																	
1.4.2	Design and administer PMS objectives reporting system	●																		
1.4.3	Evaluate overall PMS performance	●																		
1.4.4	Prepare/revise master personnel plan	●																		
5.1	<b>PROCURE PERSONNEL</b>																			
5.1.1	Develop personnel procurement policies and procedures	●	●								●									
5.1.2	Develop personnel recruiting/advertising programs										●									
5.1.3	Access personnel					●			●			●								
5.1.4	Maintain a professional recruiting force										●									
5.2	<b>TRAIN/EDUCATE PERSONNEL</b>																			
5.2.1	Develop training/education programs	●	●												●					●
5.2.2	Schedule training/education programs						●								●					
5.2.3	Schedule personnel to training/education programs						●								●					
5.2.4	Conduct training/education														●					
5.3	<b>DISTRIBUTE PERSONNEL</b>																			
5.3.1	Develop military personnel distribution policies and procedures	●																		
5.3.2	Develop civilian personnel assignment policies and procedures		●																	
5.3.3	Develop personnel policies and plans for mobilization	●																		
5.3.4	Assign personnel				●	●	●	●					●							
5.4	<b>SUSTAIN PERSONNEL</b>																			
5.4.1	Develop sustainment policies and procedures	●	●																	
5.4.2	Promote personnel					●	●	●					●							
5.4.3	Provide administrative services				●			●	●			●								
5.4.4	Provide human resource development programs								●											
5.4.5	Provide community-related programs								●											
5.5	<b>SEPARATE/RETIRE PERSONNEL</b>																			
5.5.1	Develop personnel separation policies and procedures	●	●																	
5.5.2	Administer separations/retirements					●	●	●												
5.5.3	Develop post-separation/retirement programs	●																		

**LEGEND**  
 ● Tasked with pe  
 ● Provides input



(1) Organizational Assignment of Functions

This structure provides an organization designed to perform personnel life-cycle functions for individuals. This functional/organizational configuration combines activities which manage personnel on an individual basis, have lateral interface requirements, and rely on the HQDA personnel information system and data base for both individual personnel data, demographic analysis, personnel force modeling, and projections.

(2) Required Implementing Actions

The following actions are required to implement the Strategy Three organizational alternative:

- . Reorganize ODCSPER as a policy and planning staff office with four directorates as indicated in Exhibit IX-7.
- . Establish a Personnel Command, reassigning functions and discontinuing units as necessary to permit the Personnel Command to assume the PMS functions (less training) now performed under CDR MILPERCEN, CCH, TAG, TJAG, TSG, and the currently assigned FOA of ODCSPER, less ARI and Safety Center.
- . Continue OTAG as a special staff agency for HQDA administrative services functions.

(Information concerning another organizational structure developed by the Army Personnel Command Study Group is in Appendix B.)

4. VARIATIONS TO STRATEGY ONE, TWO AND THREE ALTERNATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES

During the third SAG, 16-17 August 1979, certain changes in the organizational structures discussed above were suggested. These variations centered around the following functions and agencies:

- . PMS functions of CCH, TJAG, and TSG
- . USA Finance and Accounting Center
- . USA Safety Center
- . PMS functions of NGB and NG Support agency
- . Operational functions of the Army Council of Review Boards

(1) PMS Functions of CCH, TJAG, and TSG

Reasons were presented during the third SAG for retaining personnel life-cycle functions in the professional branches. These reasons included:

- . Reassigning procurement, distribution, career sustainment, and separation/retirement functions from the special branches fragments the overall branch functions
- . Legal and regulatory branch responsibilities militate against transfer of personnel functions from CCH, TJAG, and TSG
- . Consolidation is not necessary since the functions currently are being executed in an efficient and effective manner.

COMMENT:

Reasons for considering consolidation of these functions in all three organizational alternatives include:

- . Consolidation of functions reduces fragmentation of the overall PMS
- . Clear and distinct management authority for all life cycle functions should provide efficiencies and economies in operations
- . Problems inherent in managing the operations of life cycle functions across multiple agencies would be appreciably reduced.

If the Army opts to perform these functions as currently assigned, Alternative One would delete these functions from the realignment and the Alternative Two and Three organizations could be modified as indicated in Exhibits IX-9 and IX-10, pages IX-22 through IX-24.

(2) USA Finance and Accounting Center (USAFAC)

A proposal was made during the third SAG to exclude USAFAC from realignment under Strategy Two and Three since:

- . Major functions of USAFAC are more related to financial management than to the PMS
- . Proposed alignment precludes Cdr., USAFAC from exercising his responsibilities as a director of COA.

COMMENT:

Strategy Two and Three organizations placed this agency directly within the PMS in order to give DCSPER

greater control over this function, and to enhance the environment and relationships necessary to develop a common personnel data base. The importance of pay as a sustainment function of the PMS is emphasized under the realignment.

Modified alternative Two and Three organizations which do not realign USAFAC are shown in Exhibits IX-9 and IX-10.

(3) USA Safety Center

The opinion was expressed by some members of the third SAG that functions of the USA Safety Center were in fact personnel sustainment functions and should not be reassigned to TIG.

COMMENT:

The mission of the Safety Center is broader than sustainment of personnel, although we recognize the significance to personnel management of the safety function.

• Exhibits IX-9 and IX-10 show modified strategy Two and Three organizations which provide for retention of the USA Safety Center within the PMS.

(4) PMS Functions of NGB and NG Support Agency

The statutory and regulatory role and responsibilities of the Chief, NGB were cited during the third SAG as reasons the personnel functions of NGB and the NGSA should not be realigned.

COMMENT:

These functions were realigned under Strategy Two and Three in order to reduce fragmentation, enhance mobilization planning, facilitate establishment of a more effective, integrated common systems data base and provide for greater and more effective control over PMS planning and operations.

Modified organizations which do not realign these functions are depicted in Exhibits IX-9 and IX-10.

(5) Operational Functions of the Army Council of Review Boards

Concern was expressed during the third SAG over the lack of rationale in the study to support moving the operational functions of the ACRB from OSA(M&RA) to other PMS elements.

COMMENT:

The appellate responsibilities of ASA(M&RA) are recognized. Most appeals, however, are now resolved

within OSA(M&RA) at operational levels and many others could be resolved by administrative review and actions before being referred to OSA. The conduct of boards which might provide a basis for higher echelon discussions in appropriate cases is properly an operational function and should be delegated to the operational level of the PMS.

Modified organizational alternatives which do not realign this function are shown in Exhibits IX-9 and IX-10.

(6) Individual Training Function

The absence of a recommended realignment of the individual training functions under Strategy Two or Three was considered by some members of the third SAG to be a shortfall. These SAG members pointed out that this is a major life cycle function of the PMS and should be under the DCSPER.


COMMENT:

This functions was not realigned in Strategy Two or Three because of the potentially disruptive nature of actions which would reverse the recent decision assigning training responsibilities to TRADOC and

DCSOPS. Since the full impact of this recent realignment cannot be evaluated until more time has elapsed, such a change would be inappropriate at this time.

In the event the Army wishes to realign the individual training functions to place it under PMS control, a Director of Individual Training could be added to the DCSPER staff under Strategy Two or Three. An additional strategy also could be developed to reorganize TRADOC by reassigning doctrine and combat development functions to a separate MACOM and combining the current training functions with other PMS functions in the PERSCOM organization depicted in Strategy Three. The resulting functional command would accomplish all operation life cycle functions of the PMS.


Strategy Two and Three organizations which transfer the individual training functions from ODCSOPS to ODCSPER are shown in Exhibits IX-9 and IX-10.



**NOTES:**

1. ARMY COUNCIL OF REVIEW BOARDS OPERATING FUNCTIONS REASSIGNED TO HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORATE AND TO FOR OGA (MILPER) RETAINS APPELLATE REVIEW AUTHORITY.
2. DCSPER INTERFACES WITH DCSPER THROUGH GENERAL STAFF COORDINATION AND COMMITTEE STRUCTURE IN MATTERS PERTAINING TO INDIVIDUAL TRAINING.
3. U.S. ARMY FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING CENTER REASSIGNED FROM COMPTROLLER OF THE ARMY TO DIRECTOR HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT. OGA RETAINS GENERAL STAFF RESPONSIBILITY FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS.
4. TAG IS DUAL-HATTED AS DIRECTOR HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT. TAG PERFORMS HEADQUARTERS ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS.
5. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS (LESS INDIVIDUAL TRAINING) REASSIGNED FROM TAG, OGA AND TAG TO MILPERCEN.
6. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS REASSIGNED FROM HCS SUPPORT AGENCY TO RCPAC.
7. TAG IS DUAL-HATTED AS DIRECTOR HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT WITH RCPAC, TAGCEN AND A TAGCEN FOR OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS OF ARMY COUNCIL OF REVIEW BOARDS ARE REASSIGNED TO TAGCEN AND RCPAC. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS OF HCS SUPPORT AGENCY ARE REASSIGNED TO RCPAC.
8. REORGANIZED FROM RESOURCES PREVIOUSLY IN DIRECTOR HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT.
9. COMMANDER MILITARY PERSONNEL CENTER IS DUAL-HATTED. ADDITIONAL FOA: USAREC, MEPCOM, USMA (FOR SUPERVISORY PHYSICAL DISABILITY AGENCY FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS).
10. DIRECTOR OF PLANS AND SYSTEMS ESTABLISHED AS NEW ELEMENT RESEARCH FROM DHRD.
11. USA SAFETY CENTER REASSIGNED FROM DCSPER TO TAG.
12. RELATIONSHIP AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR DOCTRINE CLARIFICATION AND COORDINATION ARE THOSE WHICH PROVIDE UNDER THE COMMAND OR SUPERVISION OF THE DCSPER.
13. ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATIONS ARE THOSE WHICH PROVIDE UNDER THE COMMAND OR SUPERVISION OF THE DCSPER.
14. CDR, USAREC IS DUAL-HATTED AS CDR, MEPCOM.
15. INDIVIDUAL TRAINING FUNCTION REASSIGNED FROM DCSPER TO TAG.

EXHIBIT IX-9  
 Strategy Two:  
 Organizational Restructuring  
 Showing All Changes Suggested by  
 Members of the Third SAC




- 1. REORGANIZED FROM POSITIONS PREVIOUSLY IN DIRECTORATE OF PLANNING, PLANS AND BUDGET
- 2. COMMANDERS MILITARY PERSONNEL CENTER IS DUAL HATTED AS DIRECTOR MILITARY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AND ASSIGNED ADDITIONAL DUTY USAREC, NAFROM, USMA FOR SUPERVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS AND USMA PREP SCHOOLS, USA PHYSICAL DISABILITY AGENCY FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS LESS INDIVIDUAL TRAINING, OBT TAG, COMMANDERS ARE REASSIGNED TO MANPERCOM
- 3. DIRECTOR OF PLANS AND SYSTEMS ESTABLISHED AS NEW DIRECTORATE, ARE RECEIVES TASKING FOR HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, RESEARCH FROM INTRA
- 4. USAREC IS DUAL HATTED AS COM, NAFROM
- 5. RELATIONSHIP AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR DUTY ARE CLARIFIED
- 6. ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATIONS ARE THOSE WHICH PROVIDE SUPPORT TO AND INTERFACE WITH DCSPER OPERATIONS BUT ARE NOT USAREC OR COMMAND OR SUPERVISION OF THE DISPER
- 7. COM, USAREC IS DUAL HATTED AS COM, NAFROM
- 8. INDIVIDUAL TRAINING POSITION REASSIGNED FROM DISPER TO DCSPER

LEGEND:

- DUAL HATTED POSITION.
- DUTY OF OTHER THAN DCSPER.
- SUPERVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS.
- OPTIONAL DELETION.
- OPTIONAL ADDITION.


2




**NOTES:**

1. ARMY COUNCIL OF REVIEW BOARD OPERATING FUNCTIONS REASSIGNED BY USA PERSCOM. OASB (MERAL) RETAINS APPELLATE REVIEW AUTHORITY.
2. OCSO INTERFACES WITH OCSPER THROUGH GENERAL STAFF COORDINATION AND COMMITTEE STRUCTURE IN MATTERS PERTAINING TO INDIVIDUAL TRAINING.
3. CONTRACT REASSIGNED FROM OSA TO USA PERSCOM.
4. TAG PMS FUNCTIONS AND ITS FOA TRANSFERRED TO USA PERSCOM. TAG CONTINUES AS SPECIAL STAFF OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR HQDA ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS.
5. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS (LESS INDIVIDUAL TRAINING) REASSIGNED FROM TAG, OCH AND TOS TO USA PERSCOM.
6. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS REASSIGNED FROM HQS SUPPORT AGENCY TO ROPAS, UNDER USA PERSCOM.
7. DIRECTOR PLANS AND SYSTEMS ASSIGNED POLICY DEVELOPMENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL LIFE CYCLE FUNCTIONS. RESEARCH IN ALL AREAS CONDUCTED BY ARI, TASKING TO ADMINCEN AND OTHER ARMY AGENCIES, CONTRACT, ETC.
8. DIRECTOR CIVILIAN PERSONNEL ASSIGNED POLICY DEVELOPMENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL CIVILIAN PERSONNEL LIFE CYCLE FUNCTIONS.
9. USA SAFETY CENTER REASSIGNED FROM OCSPER TO TAG.
10. RELATIONSHIP AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR DOCTRINE CLARIFIED.
11. ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATIONS ARE THOSE WHICH PROVIDE SUPPORT TO OR INTERFACE WITH OCSPER OPERATIONS BUT ARE NOT UNDER THE COMMAND OR SUPERVISION OF THE DCSPER.

EXHIBIT IX-10 (1)  
 Strategy Three:  
 Army Personnel Command  
 Showing All Changes Suggested by  
 Members of the Third SAC



2




**NOTES:**

1. DIRECTORATES AND SUBORDINATE ORGANIZATIONS INDICATED BY CODE (0) REPORT TO DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR OPERATIONS.
2. STAFF GROUP, DIRECTORATES AND SUBORDINATE ORGANIZATIONS INDICATED BY CODE (S) REPORT TO DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR SYSTEMS AND SUPPORT.
3. FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY LINE DIRECTORATES ARE OPERATIONAL LIFE CYCLE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS PREVIOUSLY IN ODCSPER, MILPERCEN, OTAG, TAGCEN AND THE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS (LESS INDIVIDUAL TRAINING) FROM TJAG, CCM AND TSG.
4. FOA REASSIGNED FROM MILPERCEN AND ODCSPER.
5. NEPCOM AND USAREC REASSIGNED FROM ODCSPER.
6. USAPAC REASSIGNED FROM ODA.
7. RCPAC REASSIGNED FROM TAG.
8. CDR. USAREC IS DUAL-MATTED AS CDR, NEPCOM.




DEPUTY  
CHIEF OF STAFF  
FOR  
OPERATIONS & SUPPORT

(NOTE 2)

STAFF GROUP



**LEGEND**

-  - DUAL-HATTED POSITION
- (D) - REPORTS TO DEP CDR OPNS
- (S) - REPORTS TO DEP CDR SYS & SPT
- ..... - SUPERVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS
-  - OPTIONAL DELETION
-  - OPTIONAL ADDITION

2

\* \* \* \* \*

This chapter has presented three strategies for restructuring the PMS. Three alternative PMS organizations also are included.

It should be again stressed that all the Army's problems with the PMS are not caused by organizational structure alone, nor are they all within the scope of the PMS<sub>2</sub>. Restructuring the PMS at HQDA level, while extremely significant, can only be one part of the total Army effort to improve the management of its most valuable asset: its people. Other parts of the total Army effort must include:

- . Integration of personnel data bases and ADP systems across the total force
- . Emphasis on long-range personnel planning, personnel doctrine, and policymaking across the total force
- . Development of adequate numbers of professional personnel managers
- . Coordination of personnel management with manpower management.

The next chapter summarizes the results of the Senior Officer Action Planning Conference.

X. EVALUATION OF THE PMS,  
DURING SENIOR OFFICER ACTION  
PLANNING CONFERENCE

X. EVALUATION OF THE PMS<sub>2</sub>  
DURING SENIOR OFFICER ACTION  
PLANNING CONFERENCE

On 27-28 August, 1979, some 30 general and field grade officers met in the Pentagon for a Senior Officer Action Planning Conference; attendees are listed in Appendix M. The purpose of the conference was to evaluate the alternative PMS organizations described in Chapter IX, to evaluate the changes suggested by the third SAG of 16-17 August 1979, and to propose possible additional changes. The conference was intended not to decide on a course of action, but rather to discuss the proposed alternatives and to begin the Army's decision process.

The conference operated by splitting into three workgroups which discussed all three organizational alternatives in succession. After each alternative was discussed in the workgroups, all attendees assembled, workgroups reported out their opinions, and there was a general discussion. The following subsections primarily report the results of these general sessions. It should be noted that consensus was reached on very few issues, so all comments are not consistent.

1. ALTERNATIVE ONE: FUNCTIONAL RESTRUCTURING

A general concensus was reached that Alternative One, while easiest to implement, is such a moderate change that

the organizational problems of the Army PMS would not be solved, nor would the rest of the Army perceive any significant improvement. Comments made about Alternative One include the following:

- . Functions and responsibilities are still fragmented; there is not enough change to be meaningful
- . Policy-making and planning are insufficiently "insulated" from daily operations; external pressures would still affect ODCSPER directors and action officers
- . Wartime operations are insufficiently considered
- . Deficiencies in personnel information systems, especially as they relate to mobilization, policy-making, and program evaluation, are insufficiently addressed
- . The Directorate of Manpower, Plans and Budget would be overloaded
- . The relationship between manpower and personnel management is not considered
- . Management of the Total Force continues to be fragmented
- . Adoption of this Alternative would signal "business as usual" to the rest of the Army

2. ALTERNATIVE TWO: ORGANIZATIONAL RESTRUCTURING

While many participants agreed that organizational changes to the PMS on the order of those suggested by Alternative Two were appropriate, there was little consensus on particulars. Issues that received significant support included these:

- . Creation of a Directorate of Plans and Systems in ODCSPER had significant support
- . Transfer of functions from USAFAC to ODCSPER's FOA was not felt to be necessary.

Other comments concerning Alternative Two include the following:

- . PMS functions of the professional services should not be reassigned
- . Integration of the professional services is not inappropriate
- . ODCSPER directors should not be dual-hatted
- . Dual-hatting appears appropriate, although the directors might be too heavily loaded; this would, however, reduce the DCSPER's span of control, which is desirable
- . The Safety Center should be assigned to TAG
- . PMS functions of the Reserve Components and the ACRB require further study
- . Mobilization capabilities are enhanced
- . Mobilization capabilities are not truly improved
- . Incorporating portions of RCPAC as an FOA of the DMPM might facilitate IRR operations
- . Managers of personnel information systems need to report directly to the ADCSPER or the DCSPER
- . Alternative Two might be an appropriate first step towards a PERSCOM.
- . During the conference the Judge Advocate General (TJAG) presented and explained the position of Professional Branches regarding potential reorganization. Copies of vugraph charts used by TJAG during this presentation are at Appendix N.

One workgroup believed that Alternative Two was not sufficiently structured along functional lines, and outlined

a detailed proposal for further study. This proposal, as outlined to the Conference and elaborated in subsequent discussion, structures ODCSPER into seven conceptual components:

- . Directorate for Accessions. This directorate would manage recruiting policies, standards, and operations. Its FOA, over time and phased incrementally, would include:
  - USAREC, responsible for active Army, Army Reserve, and National Guard
  - MEPCOM
  - Enlisted Eligibility Activity
  - Parts of RCPAC
  - FOA for Officer Procurement, to manage accessions from OCS, ROTC, USMA, Professional Services, Warrant Officers accessions and also USMA Preparatory School.

This directorate would provide the means to interface with a draft mechanism in the case of mobilization.

- . Directorate for Sustainment. This directorate would manage career development, force distribution, promotions, and reenlistments. Its FOA would include:
  - Parts of MILPERCEN
  - TAGCEN
  - Parts of RCPAC

Other responsibilities would include personnel pay, Quality of Life programs, and the PMS functions of the Professional Services. This directorate provides the link to the Army in the field and forces deployed overseas.

- . Directorate for PPBS. This division would manage the Army's manpower programming and budgeting, and policy and doctrine development

- Directorate for Mobilization and Planning. This division would manage the development of long-range personnel planning, and perform ODCSPER mobilization planning. Its FOA would include the Army Research Institute.
- System Integration. This element, responsible directly to the DCSPER/ADCSPER, would manage the conceptualization, coordination, design, and implementation of standardized, integrated personnel ADP systems.
- Directorate for Civilian Personnel. This directorate provides ODCSPER management of the civilian component of the Total Force.
- The Adjutant General. This division, possibly dual-hatted, would provide administrative and support services.

Additionally, this work group stated that their suggested reorganization of ODCSPER would be an intermediate development pending the possible establishment of an Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM). However, the PERSCOM concept should be immediately and thoroughly studied for feasibility and desirability. Specifically, a cost-benefit analysis should be completed at an early date, and other factors, such as command structure and rank of the PERSCOM commander, geographic location, and colocation of various components should be examined.

3. ALTERNATIVE THREE: ARMY PERSONNEL COMMAND

As with Alternative Two, the attendees generally agreed that a PERSCOM was feasible, but opinions as to its desirability or detailed design varied widely. A general consensus was reached on these points:

- . Some PMS functions would be facilitated
- . The costs of implementing a PERSCOM needs to be studied
- . Mobilization capabilities should be emphasized.

Comments concerning Alternative Three include the following:

- . ODCSPER would be focused on policy and planning
- . Doctrinal relationship of PERSCOM and TRADOC needs further study
- . Mobilization capabilities would be enhanced
- . Total Force management would be improved
- . DCSPER/PERSCOM should possibly not include:
  - NGB
  - PMS functions of Professional Services
  - USAFAC (pay)
  - RCPAC (parts)
- . DCSPER/PERSCOM should possibly include:
  - Safety Center
  - ROTC functions
  - RCPAC (parts)
  - USAFAC (pay)
- . PERSCOM could provide a command structure for overseas replacement stations and for IET during mobilization
- . PERSCOM should be part of TRADOC

- . Power of a major command could better inject personnel considerations into Army decisions and, in general, be an advocate for personnel-related issues
- . The DCSPER might be dual-hatted as Cdr., PERSCOM.

4. OVERALL COMMENTS

Some points were widely accepted by the Conference as applying to any organizational alternative. These were as follows:

- . Mobilization capabilities of the PMS should be an overriding concern
- . Establishing ODCSPER Directorate of Plans and/or Research has significant support
- . Coordination and development of a standardized and integrated personnel management information system(s) deserves priority attention
- . Potential for decentralizing certain PMS functions should be seriously examined
- . Extensive further study of the desirability and cost of a PERSCOM is necessary
- . Alternatives must be assessed in terms of base realignment and resource implications before final judgments can be made
- . More ODCSPER emphasis on planning and policy-making is appropriate
- . The question of PMS functions of the Professional Services should be held in abeyance for the immediate present.

\* \* \* \* \*

This chapter of Volume I of the PMS<sub>2</sub> report has summarized the comments and opinions of the members of the Senior Officer Level Action Planning Conference held in the Pentagon on 27-28 August 1979.