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
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⑨ Master's **THESIS**

⑥ MOSLEM FUNDAMENTALIST MOVEMENTS AND  
THEIR IMPACT ON MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS

⑩ by  
Stephen C. Jayjock

⑪ September 1979

⑫ 276

Thesis Advisor: J. W. Amos

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Moslem Fundamentalist Movements and Their Impact on Middle Eastern Politics		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Master's Thesis;
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) Stephen C. Jayjock		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School ✓ Monterey, California 93940		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		12. REPORT DATE September 1979
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 275
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)  Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Middle Eastern Politics Iranian Islamic Revolution Islamic Fundamentalist Movements Moslem Brotherhood		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)  Most observers of the Arab world point out that Islam has and is currently playing a significant role in the region's political life. In particular, the more fanatical, religiously based political movements have and are determining the internal stability of the Middle East and consequently affect the United State's political and economic position in the world.		

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#20 - ABSTRACT - CONTINUED

The success of the Iranian Islamic Revolution has dramatically underscored the United States' ignorance of the political impact of Islam. Not only has the revolution embarrassed the United States but it has also threatened the stability of those regimes which America currently depends upon economically and politically; specifically, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

Given the political influence of Islam and the importance of Saudi Arabia to the United States, the question must be asked concerning Saudi Arabia's ability to withstand the current wave of Islamic revolutionary activity.

Through an analysis of two previous politically influential Islamic Fundamentalist Movements in the Middle East; the Moslem Brotherhood of Egypt and the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Movement, as well as an in depth analysis of Saudi Arabian society and politics, this thesis will prove that Saudi Arabia cannot withstand the strains presented by Islamic fundamentalist activity. Specifically, it will confirm that certain, identifiable socio-political phenomena exist in Saudi Arabia today that were common to both Egypt and Iran and ultimately will lead to a change in relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia, if not a dramatic upheaval in Saudi Arabian society and internal politics.

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Moslem Fundamentalist Movements and  
Their Impact on Middle Eastern Politics

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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## ABSTRACT

↓  
Most observers of the Arab world point out that Islam has and is currently playing a significant role in the region's political life. In particular, the more fanatical, religiously based political movements have and are determining the internal stability of the Middle East and consequently affect the United States' political and economic position in the world.

The success of the Iranian Islamic Revolution has dramatically underscored the United States' ignorance of the political impact of Islam. Not only has the revolution embarrassed the United States but it has also threatened the stability of those regimes which America currently depends upon economically and politically; specifically, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Given the political impact of Islam in the affairs of Middle Eastern states, it is appropriate to reconsider the ways in which Islam may affect the political values and policy choices of the ruling elites in the Middle East. Further, little effort has been made to account for the political strengths and weaknesses of the fundamentalist movements in the region and thus a research into their origins, beliefs and directions are also appropriate.

The spectacular success of the Iranian Islamic Revolution has most dramatically underscored the United State's ignorance of the political impact of Islam. Not only has the revolution embarrassed the United States but it also threatens America as well as those regimes which the United States' currently depends upon economically and politically; specifically, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

Fortunately, there are currently several well documented cases of politically influential Islamic Fundamentalist movements in the Middle East. Two movements in particular, the Moslem Brotherhood of Egypt and the recent Iranian Islamic Revolutionary movement provide the analyst with a clear picture of the power, beliefs and politics of Islam in the twentieth century. One movement, the Moslem Brotherhood, has been relatively neutralized by the ruling elite in Egypt yet remains influential even today despite decades of persecution. The

other movement found in Iran has decidedly destroyed the ruling elite and placed another religiously inspired government under its control in power. Both movements, then, dramatically represent the past and present success of militant Islam and provide an indication of what Western analysts can expect to see in the future politics of the Middle East.

Of particular importance to the United States will be the effect that the recent Iranian Revolution will have on the political and societal stability of Saudi Arabia. Representing Islamic fundamentalism at its extreme and greatest power, the Iranian Revolution has sent shock waves felt throughout the Middle East and most assuredly will affect the future political and societal direction of Saudi Arabia. The question must be raised then, concerning the Saudi ruling elite's ability to withstand the current wave of Islamic fundamentalism. It is the thesis of this work that though there are some notable differences between Saudi Arabia and Egypt and Iran, there are enough political and social similarities to warrant the belief that Saudi Arabia faces a crisis which will undoubtedly force a shift in its political and economic alignment with the Western world, and produce a dramatic upheaval in its internal politics and society. In any case, the United States has much to lose politically and economically if it continues to ignore Islam as a political force and faces as well a crisis of its own in the near future if Saudi Arabia bends to its pressures.

The following hypothesis is offered to support this thesis;

1. That Moslem fundamentalism is a response to:
  - a. the political impact of the West either through colonialism and/or the Israeli occupation of Palestine,
  - b. the dramatic changes in the social structure of selected countries brought about by the influence of Western technology and culture,
  - c. the rising secularism of Arab governments and societies,
  - d. the alienation of Moslem intellectuals and class groups who can be sociologically identified,
  - e. the discontent of poor, rural, highly traditional populace,
2. That all fundamentalist movements have in common
  - a. a traditional Islamic education and upbringing,
  - b. an alienation brought on by the social-political changes which appear to denigrate or destroy Islamic values,
  - c. simplistic, religiously inspired solutions to complex social and political problems,
3. That Saudi Arabian politics and society;
  - a. show social problems identical to Egypt and Iran as a result of its modernization efforts,
  - b. faces a severe leadership problem in the near future,

- c. is threatened by radical regimes outside of its borders,
- d. has unique internal problems of its own requiring immediate solutions,
- e. and finally, has a well established and unique fundamentalist movement and tradition with its own borders.

In order to best appreciate the problems of Saudi Arabia today and for the near future, this work will analyze first the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt and then the Iranian Islamic Revolution in Iran. In both studies, an effort will be made to not only reveal the social and political problems responsible for ensuring the rise and success of the fundamentalist movements but their ideological and organizational structures as well. In so doing, certain socio-political phenomena will be identified and will act as a measuring device so that an in depth analysis and comparison can be made in regards to Saudi Arabia.

It will be proven that the past and present cases of Islamic fundamentalism are directly applicable to the future of Saudi Arabia. As such, Saudi Arabia, long touted as a bastion of stability, will face a crisis not unlike that faced by Egypt and Iran and as a result American foreign policy in the Middle East will be faced with yet another crisis in the near future. Because of the severe repercussions of such an event, it is hoped that this paper may prove valuable for whatever insight it may reveal into the dynamics of Islam and the fundamentalist movements; their past, present and future.

## II. THE MOSLEM BROTHERHOOD

### A. INTRODUCTION

In 1928 a diminutive school teacher in Ismailia named Hassan al-Banna founded an association called al-Ikwan al Muslimum (The Society of Moslem Brotherhood). Little did the Egyptian government nor the world realize that this little inauspicious club would soon rise to the most influential political/religious movement in Egypt's modern history and a power to be reckoned with throughout the Middle East region. Its emergence as a religiously inspired political movement is not without precedence in Egypt or the Arab World as several similar militant Islamic fundamentalist movements had risen to similar heights of power and influence, as the Wahhabiyya, Mahdist and Sannusi movements amply demonstrate. Its political organization and ideology are, however, unique in the Islamic world as is its political impact on the political/religious environment in the Middle East today. Consequently, no study on the impact of Islamic Fundamentalist movements upon Middle Eastern politics is complete without a thorough understanding of the Moslem Brotherhood. Indeed, it remains a premise of this work that the birth and success of the movement clearly illustrate certain sociological phenomena which can be identified, defined and utilized in the study of other Islamic fundamentalist movements. Through an analysis of the Moslem Brotherhood, those factors which contributed to its strength and weakness may provide the historical and

sociological data necessary to completely understand present similar movements and quite possibly, predict the emergence or revival of future ones.

With this in mind, the political, religious, economic background of Egypt prior and during the movement's growth will be reviewed, as well as the political/religious organization, ideology and activities of the movement from 1928 to present.

#### B. BROTHERHOOD HISTORY

Upon reviewing the history of modern Egypt and for that matter the Moslem World, the establishment of the Moslem Brotherhood (or Brethren) was the natural result of sociological and religious problems encountered by Islamic peoples in the 19th and 20th centuries.

The Brotherhood was an Islamic nationalist organization and movement that derived its special strength from the acute tensions built upon Egyptian society during the modern era. In its Islamic manifestation, it was an outgrowth of ultraconservative Muslim reaction against the Western Christian penetration of Egypt from the middle of the 19th Century. In its nationalism, it was a product of the Egyptian nationalist movement from 1879 to 1936.<sup>1</sup>

Consequently, the world Hassan al-Banna was born into and which consequently molded the ideology of his movement was not unlike that faced by most Third World countries thrust into the 20th century. Egypt at the time of his birth remained under the control and occupation of a Western foreign power, Great Britain. As a result of this foreign domination and British colonial policies, the nation gradually became

westernized and modernized. Because of this foreign occupation and modernization, Egypt faced not only national humiliation but a severe intellectual crisis brought on by the conflicting forces of conservatism and modernism a crisis which challenged ancient societal values and religious beliefs.

As a nation emerging from a medieval society, Egypt found itself at a crossroads which seemingly placed before it the choice of either accepting or totally rejecting the Western way of life forced upon it. The Moslem Brotherhood under Hassan al-Banna arose to challenge the Westernization, the modernization, the occupation and the consequential secularization. It attempted, as the bastion of conservatism, to create a uniquely Islamic alternative and solution for the problems facing young Egyptians.

Raised in an ultraconservative village environment, taught by religious schools and inspired by a Sufi brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna reacted violently even at an early age to the changes developing in his country.<sup>2</sup> World War I had left Egypt with a legacy of strikes, shortages and political/nationalistic unrest. The occupation of British armed forces exacerbated nationalistic feelings of the population. It was during this period of civil strife that al-Banna's views on nationalism crystallized.

More importantly, events during this period were creating a society not unlike that of Westernized states. Al-Banna viewed these changes as a departure from the fundamentals of Islam, from the perfect community (umma) of the believers.

As a youth, Hassan al-Banna was greatly influenced by both his deeply religious father and by the one of the many Sufi's Brotherhoods in Egypt, the Hasafiyya Brotherhood. Inspired by the two and moved by the works of Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali, al-Afghani, and by Rashid Rida, al-Banna became stricken with what was perceived as the moral decay of the society.<sup>3</sup>

No one but God knows how many nights we spent reviewing the state of the nation ... analysing the sickness, and thinking of the possible remedies. So disturbed were we that we reached the point of tears.<sup>4</sup>

His proclivity for joining and organizing societies was marked not only by religious and Sufi intentions but also by nationalistic motives. Patriotic duty was considered unavoidable and obligatory. Consequently al-Banna took part in the nationalist strikes and protests during the violent years leading to Egypt's independence in 1919.

After assignment as a teacher in Ismailia in September 1927, he continued his religious activities by preaching in the mosques and cafés. In March 1928, he founded the Society of Moslem Brotherhood (fam. 'iyyat al-ikhwan al-muslimin) with a meager following of six loyal followers. By judiciously avoiding controversial subjects, he was able to gain the approval of the ulema, shaikhs, clubs and important people as well as expand his membership. Concerning this he said,

I tried to make this a broad, general movement based on science, education and a spirit of militancy, which are the pillars of the Islamic mission.<sup>5</sup>

Evidently, his call for the return to the faith and of the rewards of the simple religious life struck responsive chords among the poor and illiterate working class who could only compare their lives with those of the wealthy Europeans living amidst them. Interestingly, though working among the British occupation forces and foreigners, no political activity had emerged as yet.

Al-Banna continued spreading his movement by means of travel, speeches, pamphlets, letters & newspapers. Soon over fifty chapters were organized and through the merger with the Society of Islamic Culture in 1933 he was able to exploit not only their administrative and organizational capability but also their numbers. Accordingly, this early period of growth can be characterized as a period of preparation, organization and diversification of membership. Actual political activity was confined to calls for the dissolution of political parties and letters to King Farouk and princes urging them to follow the path of Islam, its rules, laws and civilization. The Brotherhood had not yet taken to violence, nor did it shrink from cooperation with government institutions. By 1938, the movement had solidified and assumed its final shape laying down as its principles upon which it was to be based upon. Al-Banna said:

It is a Salafite movement, an orthodox way, a Sufi reality, a political body, an athletic group, a scientific and cultural society, an economic company and a social idea.<sup>6</sup>

Almost contradictorily, he also said;

My brothers: you are not a benevolent society, nor a political party, nor a local organization having limited purposes. Rather you are a new soul in the heart of this nation to give it life by means of the Qur'an; you are a new light which shines to destroy the darkness of materialism through knowing God: and you are the strong voice which rises to recall the message of the Prophet...

In the years 1939 to 1945, the movement entered a new phase, a phase characterized by more growth, success in its social programs and by recognition and persecution by governmental forces.

It's broad program of social action continued to expand and bear fruit through the large influx of members, good organization and plentiful funds. Commensurate with its religious activism, the Brethen had through its formative years created charitable foundations, textile and rug factories, built mosques, ran dispensaries and built schools. The society had been so successful that it had become a juggernaut of such size and success that no political party much less the Egyptian government could ignore it.

The government during the war years had gone through several regimes under the leadership of Ali Makir, Hasan Sabai, Husayn Sirri, al-Nakhas, Ahmad Makir, al-Nuqrashi, Isma 'il Sidqi, and then al-Nuqrashi again. During the first two ministries, the Brotherhood maintained their social activism and even cooperated with Ali Makir's decision of neutrality during World War II. However, due to British pressure the government under Husayn Sirri began what was to become the

consistent fate of the Brethren, political persecution. Their presses were shut down, meetings closed and later its leaders arrested, including Hasan al-Banna himself. This oppression, however, brought them ever more attention of the masses and garnered them more support and followers.<sup>8</sup> The al-Nakhas regime which followed, moderated this policy, allowing the Brotherhood to become active but only under certain restrictions. With Akmad Makir in power, the pendulum again moved back to persecution. His reign was shortlived however, as he was assassinated by his political opponents of another party.

When al-Nuqrashi took power, arrests of the Brethren were made, followed by the heaviest restrictions of their activities. As the war ended, the movement had undergone a metamorphosis, i.e., from a purely religious, social oriented organization with some ties to politics<sup>9</sup> to a more militant, politically active organization which had shed its peaceful approach for those of violent action. This new era for violent change was inauspiciously inaugurated at the general assembly held on Sept. 8, 1949 with al-Banna in his introductory speech saying:

In the time when you will have - Oh ye Moslem Brethren - three hundred phalanxes, each one of them equipped spiritually with faith and principle, mentally with science and culture, and physically with training and exercise; at that time ask me to plunge with you into the depths of the seas, to send the skies with you and to attack with you every stubborn tyrant; then God willing, I will do it.<sup>10</sup>

The inference to be made from his speech and was made by his followers was that force would be used and when done so,

it would be "honorable and forthright, they would warn first, and then they would come forth with dignity and resolution and bear the consequences of their stand in all confidence and satisfaction."<sup>11</sup>

Several other important developments resulted from the war years which had led to this militant stance. Foremost among these was the establishment of a secret wing of the brotherhood. Driven underground by the various leaders of the government, the Brotherhood's organization naturally developed into a more secretive society and created a secret militant wing organized into families (usar) and a revitalized rover system (jarwala). This secret apparatus was rationalized as an instrument for the defense of Islam and the society and, accordingly, began military training and storing weapons, much to the surprise and delight of Anwar al-Sadat and the nascent Free Officers Movement.<sup>12</sup> This development led to another, possibly a more important one, that is, the Moslem Brotherhood association with the military, specifically, the revolutionary minded officers. As one of the most powerful political forces in the country as well as the acknowledged leader in religious/ social reform, the Brethren support was actively sought by them. Thus many meetings and efforts to coordinate the two independent groups were made through al-Banna, and Anwar al-Sadat.<sup>13</sup> These early contacts were to prove fruitful at a later date when the Free Officers' Movement seized power in 1952. Commensurate with these efforts were the relatively successful efforts of the Brethren to recruit members from

the armed forces other than the revolutionary officers. This recruitment was so successful that at a later date, the new revolutionary government could not ignore the movement. Indeed, it had to placate them seemingly at every turn due to the fact that so many members of the armed forces and of the revolutionary government itself were members of the Brethren or had strong ties to it.

The next most significant development of this period came from outside of the country; the British, American and Zionist efforts in Palestine. Though active in the political ferment of the area since 1936,<sup>14</sup> the Brethren became increasingly alarmed with developments of the post war partition plans. Running diametrically opposed to the basic principle of Pan Islamism (Pan-Arabian) and anti-imperialism, the establishment of a Zionist state, provided an opportunity to expand its legitimacy and membership in other Arab states, an impetus for massive rearmament and training and later on, actual combat experience under the banner of a truly Islamic jihad.

The last development contributing to the growing strength and militancy of the Brethren, arose from the impact of the war upon Egyptian society. Inflation had gone rampant, the gap between the wealthy upper class and the poor expanded, unskilled rural and urban laborers were suffering severe privations and the middle class resilient before, now became hard pressed. A significant feature of the transformed society was the massive and catastrophic urbanization of the major

cities. The rapid growth in industry caused by the war collapsed with its end, and the thousands of peasants attracted to the urban areas became jobless and homeless. This position of the population swelled the membership of the Brethren and added fuel to the political fire engulfing post war Egyptian society and government.<sup>15</sup>

In essence then, as the country approached the eventual showdown between the Brotherhood and government in 1948, the Brethren had become more entrenched and powerful in the society. Through the succeeding war years, it had set up more economic companies, strengthened their position among the working and middle classes, established a daily newspaper, regenerated their pamphlet propaganda, created phalanxes (para-military units), a secret apparatus, organized more branches into tightly knit groups not only in Egypt but in other Arab countries as well, maintained the only real effective social welfare program, and solidified the leadership of the Director General (al-Banna). Their membership had reached a total of well over 500,000 with over 1,700 branches throughout Egypt.<sup>16</sup> They had become truly a force to be reckoned with and feared.

Realizing their strengths, Hasan al-Banna embarked upon, on what some have said was a blatant move for control of the country. Abandoning previous efforts of conciliation with the Sidqi and al-Nuqrashi regimes, al-Banna took the government to task for their vacillation in the negotiations with the British, incompetence for curing unemployment and showing

leniency and favoritism to foreign companies. Sidqi Pasha retaliated with arrests and confiscations of Brethren presses. When he resigned, al-Nuqrashi maintained the counterattack that only the Palestine War of 1948 interrupted. The Brethren participation in the war though initially welcome, became a two-edged sword for the government as the combat experience of the Brotherhood and rumors of their intent to overthrow the government became well known. Consequently, a military order, dated 8 December 1948 (No. 63) was promulgated disbanding the Brethren and its branches, closing all their centers, seizing all papers and assets of the organization. All funds and companies were taken and many arrests were again made. Al-Banna attempted to negotiate with the government but his efforts came to nought as al-Nuqrashi was assassinated on 28 December 1948. Following this execution blamed on the Brethren, al-Banna reversed his militant stand and publicly denounced the violent activities of this society. The effort again was to no avail and on 12 February 1949 al-Banna himself was assassinated by members attributed to the Sa - dist party. The government persecution prevailed with lengthy trials and the Brethren's strength was diminished but not eradicated. Despite their depleted resources and tarnished image, the association prevailed and by 1950, a new leader emerged, a former judge by the name of Hasan Ismail-al-Hudaybi. On 15 Dec. 1951, the new government under the Wafd Party and al-Nahas released some of the Brethren properties and lifted the

ban on press activities. By 18 December 1951, their legality became a fact with a court order. As a result of this and the law of 23 April 1951, the Brethren were able to resume their activities openly but with some restrictions. Characteristically, they managed to avoid the prohibitions and continued their secret activities and military preparations. Thus began a new phase of the association, one of gathering in the remnants, regrouping of ranks and filling of various posts in preparation for a new surge.<sup>17</sup> During this phase the Brethren regained their previous position when the Egyptian/British negotiation efforts & crises renewed. Hedaybi cautiously avoided the political arena and in some instances, cooperated with the regime. Further, the new leader attempted to quietly reorganize and strengthen the association foundations including a major restructuring of the top leadership. Besides the inauguration of this cautious approach to politics, the society underwent a major intellectual effort to crystallize and systematize their ideology. This effort resulted in a plethora of articles, books and speeches written on all subjects concerning Islam and government, and attempted to fill the void of the politically expedient generalizations of the al-Banna era.

Though the association had regained some of their power, it did not recapture its previous power due not only to the decimation caused by political persecution but by more devastating in-house fighting after al-Banna's death and the tarnished image of political violence and terrorism. The internal schism of the association proved the most debilitating

of all factors in the decline of power and influence. When Hudaybi was officially appointed Director General in 17 Oct 1951, the election was looked upon by some members as temporary and transitory.<sup>18</sup> Hudaybi, however, through a variety of means, notably through secrecy and packing of key positions in the organization, consolidated his hold and developed a program designed to further increase his power and standing within the society. These moves, especially his insistence on secrecy and undisputed authority, exacerbated existent rivalries within the demoralized association. Consequently, Hudaybi's personal background and style of leadership both completely different from the awesome personality of al-Banna only worsened the situation as did his close association and frequent visits to King Farouk.<sup>19</sup>

Later, the Egyptian government was able to capitalize on this disunity by playing its hand in the support of the Hudaybi opposition and publicizing the schism.

Despite the divisions within the ranks, the Brotherhood still maintained a powerful voice in the society. Hudaybi continued his policy of limited cooperation with the government and abhorrence to violence. When the great riot of 26 Jan 1952 broke out in Cairo, Hudaybi denied and denounced any part of it. Nevertheless, he was arrested and later released. At the same time, his tenuous hold on the secret apparatus became apparent as they partook in terrorist activity against the British in the Suez Canal Zone.

At this juncture in time, the Moslem Brotherhood entered a third phase of political activity, that is, active support

of and later persecution by, the Free Officer's Movement. By the time of the 23 July 1952 revolution, the Brethren were firmly established not only within the ranks of the army but within the revolutionary elite as well. As mentioned before, a liaison had already been established between the Brethren through the services of Anwar al-Sadat and later, Abdal-Munim Abd al-Rauf.<sup>20</sup> Their participation in the 1948 war had placed them in good standing with the army in particular Jamal Abdal-Nasir who directly benefited from their support in the siege of the al-Juflaq pocket.<sup>21</sup> Further, their activities against the British in the Canal Zone provided added legitimacy to the new revolutionary leader's eyes.

In any event, the Brotherhood were called upon to support the coup by providing protection to foreigners, sparking support in the streets in case it faltered, assisting in order and security and by assisting and protecting the revolution if the coup failed.

Once in power, however, the temporary alliance collapsed. At the onset, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) opened the doors for Brethren participation. Hedaybi without consulting the General Assembly<sup>22</sup> offered three men for Cabinet posts of which only Hasan al-Baquri was acceptable to the RCC. Hedaybi, evidently insulted and desiring greater voice in the affairs of the government, publicly refused to cooperate with the new government which in turn was seen by the RCC as duplicity and hostility towards the new government. Hedaybi

pressed for a role as the spiritual leader of the new regime nonetheless and campaigned for the establishment of an Islamic Constitution, religious government, and land reform. On 16 Jan 1953, despite the differences, the RCC allowed the Brethren to escape a new law prohibiting political parties. However, on 23 Jan 1953, the RCC announced the creation of the Liberation Party, built as the nucleus of a political organization to replace the abolished parties. The feud renewed itself again as the new organization was seen as a challenge to the Brethren role as "civil protector" and popular voice of the people.

Matters came again to a head when the government completed negotiations on the evacuation of the Canal Zone. Hudaybi rejected the treaty stating that a jihad or armed struggle was the only way to oust the British. This created a rift within the Brethren ranks and was astutely exploited by the RCC. Backing Hudaybi rivals within the society, they were able to demoralize and split the ranks further. On October 21, 1954 a coup was made within the Brotherhood which was quickly quelled by Hudaybi but not before serious harm had come to the association's unity.<sup>23</sup> Finally, after several violent clashes in the streets between RCC supporters (Liberation Movement) and an attempted assassination of Nasir on 26 October 1954, arrests were made of the Brethren's secret apparatus. Hudaybi himself was arrested and along with six others, convicted of the attempt to overthrow the government. All except Hudaybi who was given a stay of execution, died on

the gallows despite a wave of protests throughout the Arab world.<sup>24</sup> Along with the trial of the Brethren, the dissolution of the society was ordered again. This time, the disillusion was to remain in effect till the 1970's.<sup>25</sup>

For a variety of reasons, then, the Brethren again seemingly collapsed. In retrospect, Hudaybi had committed serious errors in his administration, leading his organization to its worst political defeat and dissolution. Analysts point out that the Brethren, again like 1948, had prematurely intervened into politics. The internal dissension and drive for reforms within the society had left the community weak and demoralized. Further, the Brethren had insisted on reestablishing principles, and practices that were now perceived by many as being no longer compatible with modern conditions. Finally, most of the programs which had made the Brethren popular had been coopted by the RCC who in turn were seen by the population as the legitimate government who had ousted a corrupt regime and deserved support.

It was practically completely ousted from the political arena not so much by repressive action taken against it as because of the progressive social and economic reforms effected in the country, the atmosphere of moral and political uplift and the awakening of the national and human dignity of millions of ordinary Egyptians. The socio-psychological ground was thus knocked from under the feet of the Brotherhood.<sup>26</sup>

Despite the repression and executions, the Moslem Brotherhood miraculously survived, a fact not lost on Abdal-Nasir or Anwar al-Sadat. Driven underground, the society existed

in secrecy composed mainly of members of the secret apparatus. While thousands including Hudaybi remained in prison the headquarters moved to Syria and the Brethren continued to maintain their organizational structure and ties with Egypt. Until 1965, the Brethren were thought to have been completely destroyed or neutralized. However, activity in Jordan<sup>27</sup> and in Syria indicated that it still remained a viable force, at least outside of Egypt. Then on 29 Aug 1965 it was reported that President Nasir had crushed a plot by the Brotherhood to overthrow the government.<sup>28</sup> Evidently led by Said Ramadan, an exiled Egyptian, the Brotherhood had survived the persecution. Having moved their headquarters to Geneva, and receiving funding from other Arab sources they were again politically active.<sup>29</sup>

Though the plot was known well in advance and despite wholesale arrests (4-6,000), the attempt to assassinate Egypt's top leaders and unleash a wave of terrorism almost succeeded.<sup>30</sup> The significance of the effort, not lost to Egyptian leaders was not the plot itself but that its perpetrators represented elements not only from the lower classes but from the professional middle class as well. Not only was this startling to the regime but the fact that they were young and direct products of Nasir's new society when one would suspect as being its heatiest supporters was even more alarming.<sup>31</sup> After lengthy trials and over thousands of arrests, seven death sentences were handed down. Notably Sayid Kotub the chief ideologist of the society was among the executed.<sup>32</sup> The

trials indicated again that many of the convicted were students, teachers, scientific workers and engineers.<sup>33</sup> Despite Arab world protests such as in Jordan, Sudan and Pakistan<sup>34</sup> they were hung and many others imprisoned.

It was not until 10 Nov 1967, after the disastrous 1967 Arab-Israeli War that the government released 1,000 prisoners arrested for the 1965 plot. Supposedly, it was a move made by Nasir to show he had no fear of the Brethren.<sup>35</sup> This and other releases was later followed ominously by Brethren inspired student rioting in November 1968.<sup>36</sup> Once again the Moslem Brotherhood were active in propaganda and demonstrations and were threatening the stability of the regime. Among the items protested by the society was the liaison and close ties with the Soviet Union. The protests and propaganda found receptive ears among a disenchanted military<sup>37</sup> who chafed under the growing Soviet influence and sympathized with the call for a jihad against their humiliators, Israel.

After Nasir's death (20 Sept 1975), and emergence of Anwar al-Sadat as leader of Egypt (15 Oct 1970), the Moslem Brotherhood again came to the forefront of Egyptian politics. After releasing more prisoners including Hasan Hudaybi, Sadat appeared to be on the road to reconciliation with the society. His moves however could not be construed as a manifestation of friendship or trust based on previous prerevolutionary experience. Sadat, evidently feeling the growing pressures of the leftist movement needed a counterbalance which the Brethren could and did give Sadat the much needed support in

the ouster of the Soviets and against Sadat's rivals, Vice President Ali Sabri and his group.<sup>38</sup>

The Brethren despite this show of cooperation were found implicated in another coup attempt on 21 April 1974. An armed attack on a military college with the aim of overthrowing the government was led by a group calling themselves the Islamic Liberation Organization.<sup>39</sup> Though quickly crushed, the plot showed that Moslem fanaticism was far from muted by the government. Indeed, a Parliamentary commission investigating clashes between Copts and Moslems ranging back to 1972 found "that there had been an upsurge of religious fervor and that some of this fervor had taken on the form of fanaticism."<sup>40</sup>

Possibly in view of this report and acknowledging the growing strength of the Brethren, Sadat released more Brethren prisoners.<sup>41</sup>

This period under Sadat then can be described as a rebirth for the society long suffering over 20 years of political repression. With the release of many of its members, the publishing of its official newspaper, Al Da'wa, emergence of demonstrations and activities in the Cairo University, and a gradually perceived revival of Islam throughout the Arab world, the Moslem Brotherhood appeared again to be on its way to a true political force not unlike that of its earlier years. Conservative elements exist today fueling their drive to power which the Sadat regime cannot ignore and indeed can be seen to

have been acknowledged by him.<sup>42</sup> The pressure of conservatism has yielded results as can be seen by the acceptance of the government of the principle that laws will not be adopted which contradict Islamic Sharia laws. Further, laws prohibiting alcohol were in the process of promulgation and a liberal bill concerning women's rights shelved.<sup>43</sup>

This conservative trend was seen not only as a manifestation of Sadat's conservatism but also as a result of encouragement from Saudi Arabia.

When riots broke out in the spring of 1977, the government hastened to condemn leftists and exempt the Brethren from fault. These riots, symptomatic of the deteriorating Egyptian economy and Sadat's actions were seen by analysts as cutting Sadat's freedom of political maneuver. As a result of the exemption, the society was now more than ever conscious of their power and privileged position and thus made increasing demands on the President.<sup>44</sup>

The Moslem Brotherhood have exploited the current events and have gained considerable strength from the Arab world, notably Saudi Arabia. However, it must be noted that though they enjoy "considerable and important support inside the regime and is working to establish itself as the defender of order in Egypt" it lacks the political clout of its early years.<sup>45</sup> It is less organized than its Nasserite and Communist counterparts. It does not have a program capable of providing solutions for the economic and social malaise found in Egypt today. It currently lacks support among,

ironically, the working class and poor peasantry and has inherited a historical distrust from many in the government.<sup>46</sup>

The fairly recent terrorist activities of the al-Takfir ol Higma (atonement and exodus) group has not alleviated the suspicions and fears of the government.

In fact, the current regime does not enjoy any support from the Brotherhood due to its peace efforts and treaty with Israel.<sup>48</sup> Groups of Moslem Brethren have demonstrated greater opposition to the negotiations and since political parties today exhibit the same characteristics of previous ones, there is the increased possibility that these activities will be exploited and thus project the Brethren as the only viable alternative to the Sadat government. The unofficial truce with Sadat appears to have collapsed and a new wave of repression seems likely.<sup>49</sup> In any event, the society has declared a jihad against the peace accords and they are willing to use violence and terrorism to disrupt them and the regime.<sup>50</sup>

### C. ANALYSIS OF THE BROTHERHOOD

#### 1. The Problem

In retrospect, what can account for the spectacular rise, fall and resurrection of the Moslem Brotherhood? Clearly certain historical and sociological events determined its rapid growth and strength and just as clearly, certain organizational elements contributed to its power as well. As far as historical/sociological events are concerned, they may be categorized as follows:

1. European military, commercial and cultural imperialism.
2. Rapid modernization and Westernization of the society.
3. Rapid secularization of the society.
4. Religious/intellectual crises concerning role of Islam.
5. Social disparities between classes both indigenous population and Europeans.
6. Rise of Arab nationalism/Rise of Pan-Arabism.
7. Political and Economic ineffectiveness of the Western party system and capitalism.
8. Creation of the state of Israel.

The basic problem confronting the 20th century Egyptians lay in the British interference and later full military occupation of the land.<sup>51</sup> For more than a century, Egypt forced by European incursions developed from a medieval society to a modern state. This development produced strains which threatened to rip the entire social fabric of the Islamic community. These strains, bad as they were for any developing nation were executed by European imperialism and exploitation and consequently all evils and ills were blamed on the foreigners presence and his institutions. Modernization and Westernization become not something to be looked forward to by the devout Moslem but something to abhor and prevent. As al-Banna said, "It is the culture and civilization of Islam which deserve to be adopted and not the nationalistic philosophy of Europe."<sup>52</sup> The exploitation of Egypt's resources was considered rape

and restructuring of the government along Western lines as cultural imperialism.

The evacuation of the British troops from Egypt in 1954 meant for the Brothers the end of the 'military-political-ethical-social invasion.' Here again, in the social order imperialism was seen as the fountain head of corruption. When the armies of Europe came to Egypt, they brought with them their laws, schools, languages, and sciences; but also their 'wine, women and sin.' The introduction of the traditions and values of the West has corrupted society, bred immorality, and destroyed the inherited and traditional values of Moslem society.<sup>53</sup>

Consequently, with Washington as a scapegoat for the inevitable social/economic dislocation occurring in Egypt, Islamic fundamentalism coupled with nationalistic activity found a receptive audience.

Besides the hateful presence of the Europeans, there were varying social/economic problems confronting the emergent Egypt. The image of Islam in the modern world created a religious and intellectual crisis which had gripped the Arab world.<sup>54</sup> How could Islam, created by God, have fallen to such low esteem and power to be dominated by the infidel West? For some, Islam needed to be reformed and restructured to meet the demands of modern society. For others, a return to the true Islamic state was called for, emphasizing Islamic law (Sharia), the traditions of the prophet and the pure state of the community of the believers (umma). The debate, however, was always waged on the intellectual level and it took Hasan al-Banna representing the conservative element to apply intellectual debate to lasting political action. To

al-Banna, the famed university of al-Azhar, its teachers, and the ulema in general had failed to vitalize Islamic faith. They had fallen under the direction of the government who used them for what was perceived as political expediency.<sup>55</sup> As a matter of fact, the educational system of Egypt had been reorganized along Western secular lines with religious leaders no longer in control or teaching. Various Christian missionary schools had been established and were enrolling ever increasing numbers of Egyptians. Divisional strife was rampant as the various religious sects vied for religious legitimacy and power and hundreds of Sufi brotherhoods dotted the country. In this atmosphere al-Banna urged a return to the past, unity of ranks, and a revitalization of Quranic precepts.

The government, stylized after a Western parliamentary structure proved ineffective in coping with the economic and social malaise growing within the country. Political parties were identified by the Brethren as the bastion of personal greed and interests, lacking social programs and goals, governed by men and not ideas, and ruling as kings not servants as specified by the Quran. The corruption and inefficiencies of both the parties and government provided him with the necessary facts to prove the moral deficiencies of Western constitutionalism and parliamentary systems.

The foreign economic exploitation in the form of the capitalistic system not only created a wealthy European class

in Egypt but also an ever widening gap between the rich and poor native population. The maldistribution of land and wealth started by Ismail and nurtured by the successive governments provided an impetus for social change which al-Banna felt could only be accomplished by his organization. Particularly irksome was the establishment of Western laws and codes which were created by man not God and worse, sometimes violated the principles of the Sharia. Finally, the creation of a Palestine mandate proved beyond a doubt that imperialism and Zionism were establishing a permanent state insulting and humiliating to all Islamic peoples.

These factors resulted in a spiritual crisis, a struggle between the old and new, religion and science, liberalism and tradition.<sup>56</sup>

## 2. The Solution

Faced with these problems, Hasan al-Banna offered a solution through his Society of Moslem Brotherhood. There was a need to go back to the Quran and reinterpret it in a literal sense while disregarding all the modern interpretations prevalent in intellectual circles. Accordingly, six principles were outlined by the Moslem Brotherhood for the betterment of the society.<sup>57</sup> The tenets of the Brethren began with the Quran and its interpretation. It would be scientific; the Quran would be precisely explained and interpreted, revealing it in the spirit of the age and defending it from falsehoods. It would and could be proven to be compatible with the spirit of the age and in complete harmony with modern science and knowledge. The second principle was the unity of the nation and all Islamic peoples around the Quranic tenets. All

divisions and sects with the umma could be reconciled and the pristine state of the community of Mohammad's time recreated.

The third principle was economic. The Brotherhood's goals were the growth of national wealth, protection and liberation of its resources, an increase in the standard of living, the realization of social justice, social security for all and the guarantee of equal opportunity for all. Fourthly, the Brethren emphasized social service in the struggle against ignorance, disease, poverty and vice by utilizing charitable organizations. Fifth, the Brethren promised to liberate the country, all Arab lands and Moslem communities from all foreigners while at the same time promising rights for all minorities. Lastly, the society would strive for universal peace and humanitarian civilization based on the principles of Islam.

In order to obtain fruition of these principles Ishak Musa Hussaini identified nine more principles and tactics.<sup>58</sup> They were: the avoidance of theological disputes and devotion to the bare essence of Islam. In this way, the society appealed to a broad base of the population. They attempted to avoid all political parties and organizations as this would maintain the purity of the movement. Commensurate with this the Brethren would avoid domination by government leaders and prominent men for the same reason. The Brotherhood stressed the idea of gradual development with stages for growth being propaganda, inculcation of ideas, application, action and production. They

would seek such help of the power of doctrine, faith, unity, solidarity and finally weapons, using force only when necessary.

So if the people refuse to listen to this call and resort to defiance, oppression and revolt, then, as a last measure, recourse should be had to the sword to disseminate the call.<sup>59</sup>

Because Islam makes government one of its cornerstones and is itself the embodiment of rule, execution, legislation and education, the Brethren sought the establishment of a religious government. As another principle, they believed in Arab unity and Islamic unity under the symbol of a Caliphate who would represent this unity and bind all lands together. Finally, the society believed all Western countries to be aggressive and imperialistic and as such the Brethren would work to throw off their yoke, "for death is better than a life of slavery and humiliation."

The Brotherhood saw education as the focus for the implementation of these goals and principles. Accordingly, they called on the government to provide a program of education that would: inculcate national spirit, emphasize Islamic history and civilization, establish religious instruction, reconsider the educational programs for girls, remove those who were corrupt in their faith from the teaching profession and finally, encourage the practical sciences so that the nation could be technologically strong.

Not content on waiting for implementation of these goals, the Brethren set up their own schools for the poor in order

to establish the system on such far-sighted principles as will ingrain religious tenets in the minds of students, preserve their health, inform them of religious injunctions, develop in them self respect and, along with it, broaden their vision about contemporary affairs.<sup>60</sup>

Further, they constructed mesques, established dispensaries provided health and life insurance for members, set up programs for the dispensation of alms and built up their own industries along Islamic socialist ideas.

To reach the ultimate goal of the establishment of a religious state, its members were trained for the jihad necessary for its accomplishment.

It is this very collective mission towards which Allah has beckoned the whole Moslem Millat so as to turn them into one solid phalanx, one power and one force. So that they should become an army of such selfless soldiers as would glorify the entire humanity by leading it to the path of truth. They should be devoted to prayer in the night and be horsemen during the day.<sup>61</sup>

The members were prepared by encouraging athletic sports, creating groups of rover scouts and phalanxes, stressing absolute obedience and finally instruction of Islamic tenets.

They were able to accomplish many of their goals, then, by their comprehensive programs which included all aspects of life, be it spiritual, social, scientific, economic, industrial, political or military. Their success can be attributed not only on the exploitation of the events and conditions around them but more importantly through their social organization and leadership.

### 3. Organization

The society has been compared to the workings of a fine watch and its success was directly attributed to its synchronization.<sup>62</sup> The organization was described as:

a precise and exact organization; secondly, it is a mixture of various other organizations; thirdly, the method of organization is the most outstanding of its characteristics, and indicative of its strength and success; and fourth, it bears a religious stamp which is the mark of the entire movement.<sup>63</sup>

Due to the talents of its founder and Director General, al-Banna, the organization developed into a large well oiled machine. At its top sat al-Banna and later Hudaybi as Director General (or General Guide). He was required to devote all his time to the society, provide its direction, settle all disputes and remain above internal politics. He was elected for a life term but could be required to resign if he abused his powers. Below him presiding over the operation of the society, supervising its administration and executing its policy lay the General Guidance Council (GCC), led by a Secretary General elected by the Consultative Assembly. The Consultative Assembly whose membership varied between 100-150, worked alongside the GCC and supervised the progress of the organization, the election of the GCC and supervised the progress of the organization. All three components of the central leadership met and performed their duties in the general headquarters in Cairo. From this center the Technical Operation and Field Apparatus were organized and controlled. The Technical Operation Branch maintained all the

special activities enumerated above. It is in the Field Apparatus that the heart and soul of the society can be formed, the brothers themselves.<sup>64</sup>

Membership was divided into grades. There were 'assistant,' 'related' and 'active' grades. Any Moslem had to declare his intention to join, agree to pay dues and sign a membership card. He became a 'related' member after he had understood the principles of the society, attended meetings and committed himself to obedience. Upon fulfillment of his physical training, achievement in Islamic study and total dedication to the movement and its activities, he became an 'active' member. A fourth degree, 'struggler' was reserved for a select few who made up what was later called the Secret Apparatus.<sup>65</sup> Women were encouraged to join the 'Moslem Sisters' but they were relegated inferior roles in the organization and attracted few educated or upper class women.

Active members were subsequently divided into spiritual units formed as families (aslah), usually consisting of five members. Families were incorporated first experimentally into battalions of 40 members but this was dropped in favor of 'class' of 20 members. Five classes joined together to form a 'group' and five groups formed a battalion (new system). In such a system, unwieldy numbers were brought under direct control and effective dissemination of orders and action promulgated.

Coincident with this structure the Brethren organized a para-military group called the "Rovers" (jariwalah).

Ostensibly oriented toward scouting its young members eventually turned out to be the para-military arm of the society. Perhaps the oldest of the institutions created by al-Banna, the idea of the rovers was based on religious roots and stressed inseparability of a healthy body and mind.<sup>66</sup> It had as its major activity, scouting, but its more important function was to preserve order within the society and defend it against enemies from outside. In 1948, just before its dissolution, the society claimed over 40,000 members in the group.<sup>67</sup> By the end of 1953 government measures and the society's lack of encouragement, had dissolved it.

The family and rover sections, then, were the two major institutions for membership organization and indoctrination.

They alone reached the membership as a whole and provided the cement in the fabric of the the Society's power.<sup>68</sup>

Arising from both groups and garnering much support from them, the secret apparatus evolved. Largely responsible for the terror and violence blamed on the Brotherhood, their numbers reached to a level between 1,000 and 3,000. Highly secretive, little is known about them other than they were responsible for the assassination attempts on leaders, notably President Nasir, and terrorist activities (as brought out in trials). It was said that they were directly controlled by al-Banna and Hudaybi.<sup>69</sup> They had become a two-edged sword for the Brethren as their activities brought more harm than good for the society. Hudaybi evidently was unable to effectively

control them or their activities, a fact not lost by Egyptian government who in the course of the trials concerning Nasir's attempted assassination, attacked the secret apparatus and not the organization itself.

In any event, the organization despite internal schisms and the independent secret apparatus, clearly withstood all the efforts brought to bear on their succeeding governments. After their dissolution in 1954, many felt that the society had been neutralized if not iradicated in Egypt.<sup>70</sup> Events in 1964 (attempted coup) and their current resurrection, however, prove that the Brethren are as viable as ever. Since 1954, the society turned into a secret underground organization still maintaining a semblance of its former structure.

Today, attesting to its enduring strength, the society has emerged again with its own newspaper Al-Da'wa, university pressure groups and an enlarged membership. There appears, however, to be lacking a 'guide' on a par with al-Banna and Hudaybi. At present, two leaders stand out, the managing editor of Al-Da'wa, Umar al-Talmasani and former member of the old Guidance Bureau and Shaikh Abd-al-Hamid Kishshik, who attacks the regime every Friday in the mosques.<sup>71</sup>

Though no central leadership has stood out, the Brotherhood, nevertheless, have re-emerged, reorganized and are presently at odds with the government again.<sup>72</sup>

#### D. CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, the Moslem Brotherhood was at its early stages a purely religious movement employing Islamic socialist

ideas.<sup>73</sup> As it matured and grew in size, it swayed from its spiritual roots and played an ever increasing role in politics, resorting in the end to self destructive terrorism and ending in bitter schism. Its uniqueness from other powerful religious movements, such as the Sanusai, Wahhab and Mahdist revolts lay in its all inclusiveness of Islam upon all the affairs of man not just in the spiritual realm. Further, its tightly knit organizational structure, its popular orientation and appeal, and its successful interaction with local events in Egypt, distinguish it from all previous religious movements. Probably more distinctive is the fact that the society was lay inspired and ulema led. The ulema of Egypt had recognized the value of the religious fervor and had acknowledged the importance of the movement but they remained skeptical as it was thought to be lacking intellectual discipline. This skepticism turned to jealousy over its popularity and fear over their lack of control over it.<sup>74</sup>

Nevertheless, the Moslem Brotherhood had coopted the Ulema and had become the authority for Egypt's Islamic revival.

The Brotherhood's rapid rise can be attributed to its successful combination of religion, socialism and nationalism. It reacted against imperialist rule with both a religious and nationalist fervor, claiming that it was the duty for all believers to throw off the shackles of imperialism not only in Egypt but throughout the Moslem world. The society exploited the sad state of domestic politics. Political parties, according to the tenets of Islam were sinful as their disputes

and divisiveness were not in conformity with brotherhood. Further, they lacked social welfare programs and were concerned only with ruling and not being servants of the people according to the dictates of the Quran. Finally, the Brotherhood offered what appeared to be a sound religious ideal and activism in a period of political transition, intellectual crisis and social upheaval. Facing the threat of the West, they offered an Eastern counterattack.

All these factors, then, imperialism, domestic politics and religious confusion, "resulted in a spiritual crisis, a struggle between the old and the new, religion and science, liberalism and traditionalism."<sup>75</sup> In this environment, the Brotherhood worked and promised to fill the void present in all of Egypt. With over 500,000 members in the society, it becomes obvious they found a receptive audience.<sup>76</sup>

They offered simple remedies to a country in desperate need of them. The society called for the return of the Quran and Hadith, for the gathering of religious sects. They successfully tied religion with world affairs. The religious/intellectual crisis, a result of various materialistic antecedents, could be solved through the reinstatement of an Islamic life, religious government, a Caliphate and Pan-Islamic ideals. It offered a comprehensive solution for societal problems. Finally, it emphasized the new Islamic Man who through their schools and teachings would be able to create a better society.

With such fertile ground to farm why did the Moslem Brotherhood collapse? The very programs responsible for its success also contributed to its fall. Its anti-westernism was indiscriminate, labelling all Western institutions and people as abhorrent and sinful. Thus the society became labelled as reactionary. It called for unity of all religious sects but failed to unite them. The society fell short of its own ideal of peace, humanitarianism, and pursuit of its aims by peaceful aims.

As the movement grew, it became more irresponsible as their preoccupation with politics and power led them farther away from its goals and closer to the very corruptions it originally set out to cure. Blinded by ambition and power it refused to compromise its principles and reforms which by the 1950's were seen by many as impractical and archaic. Increasingly, they paid only lip service to their extensive reform programs and let some of their organization's programs fall to the wayside (notably the Rovers). Their theological and intellectual arrogance alienated large segments of the middle and upper classes and especially the ulema upon whose support the Brethren required.<sup>77</sup> Finally, it exaggerated the cultural and other differences between Moslems, Christians and Jews, further alienating a large segment of the population.<sup>78</sup>

For these reasons, the Brotherhood slowly eclipsed from a popular religious socialist movement to just another violent, divided political party. The death stroke which capped the

fall of the Society and prevents it today from regaining the power it used to enjoy, came through the revolution of 1953. The revolutionary government not only removed from power the inefficient government and party system but more importantly, they coopted most of the social welfare programs of the Brotherhood. Thus they and succeeding governments have undercut the popular appeal of the Brethren by incorporating their more popular ideas and eradicating or at least appear to be solving many of the social problems confronting the Egyptians.<sup>79</sup>

They have provided free education stressing the new Egyptian and today the Islamic Man. Government projects continue in their attempts to provide housing, medicine and welfare for its citizens. Though their efforts have not borne sufficient results as yet, they are nonetheless existent and benefitting from government concern and efforts.<sup>80</sup>

Only one problem still remains cancerous and quite possibly may become an opening for Moslem Brotherhood exploitation. The issue of Israel and the recent peace treaties have already brought official condemnation and demonstrations by the Brethren.<sup>81</sup> This plus some of the still unsolved social/economic problems could provide the necessary fuel for a Brotherhood resurgence. However, the traditional fear and suspicion of the Brethren still remains not only within the government but in all elements of the society. Such a resurgence is most likely to be met with severe repression and thus drive the Society into prominence and ultimately underground, but if their past history is any indication, it will

never be destroyed. Instead it will remain a ghost continually harassing the Sadat government and those that follow it.

### III. THE IRANIAN ISLAMIC REVOLUTION

#### A. INTRODUCTION

In 1976 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi Shah held absolute power over his nation. Because of huge profits derived from the exploitation of oil, massive industrialization and military arms buildups, he felt his country was well on the road to becoming a superpower. By 1979, however, the Shah and his cohorts were fleeing Iran and seeking havens wherever they could find them. An Islamic Revolution had put an end to their dreams and boasts.

Apparently taking the world, especially the United States, by surprise, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had done what was felt to be the impossible. He had unified all Iranian opposition groups and overthrown the most pro-western and "stable" regime in the Middle East. In light of all the promising reports emanating from Iran, how was this possible? How could an old religious leader in Paris destroy the powerful regime in Teheran?

Many analysts answered these questions by pointing out the "very bad economic situation," the "stifling political atmosphere," the "social injustices" and the "failure of the ruling elite."<sup>1</sup> All of the above certainly contributed to the explosion but are found lacking in providing the overall reason, the motivational and organizational impetus for the revolt. They all overlook the driving force of Islam in

politics. In particular, they write only the seeds for the revolt and not the unifying factor which ensured its success.

Accordingly, this chapter analyzes the Iranian Islamic Revolution from the perspective of the impact of Islam on politics. As the Moslem Brotherhood of Egypt represents conclusively the past strengths of a conservative Islamic movement, so does the Iranian Islamic Revolution depict its present but still underestimated power.

To fully understand the reasons for its success, to realize "why the Shah fell," this chapter will analyze first, Shiite Islam, its origins, uniqueness and political impact. Afterwards, the "rebirth" of the fundamentalist movement as a political power will be reviewed along with the seeds of the revolt. Ayatollah Khomeini's leadership, beliefs, and organizational capability will be analyzed as well, thus providing the reader with a complete picture of the Islamic Revolution and the political impact of Islam today.

#### B. IRANIAN SHIITE ISLAM

The most distinctive feature of modern Iran lies in the almost total acceptance by its population of the Shiite branch of Islam.<sup>2</sup> Iran, in fact, remains the only country in the world that can claim to have always had a Shiite majority within its national boundaries. Moreover, most Iranians belong to the "Twelver" Shiite sect, thus imparting to Iranians a further unique distinction among its more numerous Moslem neighbors.

The special characteristics of Twelver Shiism and their role in Iranian history need to be fully explored in order to fully understand the political impact of the faith, and its leaders in modern Iran. Accordingly, the origins, the uniqueness, and political impact of the faith will be delved into in this section.

### 1. Origins

The Shiite branch of Islam was created from an early dispute and division of Islam in the seventh century (AD). The dispute, more political than doctrinal, arose over the issue of leadership succession in the Moslem community. Upon the death of the Prophet Mohammad, Ali, Mohammad's cousin and son-in-law, was coopted of the leadership role of Caliph by Abu Bakr, Umar and later, Uthman. This occurred despite Ali's pre-eminence long acknowledged by Mohammad himself.<sup>3</sup> For the sake of unity, Ali and his followers (the Shia) accepted these men as Caliphs, but upon the death of Uthman insisted that Ali be recognized as the leader of Islam. He thus became the fourth Caliph and reigned for only five years (656-661 AD). Politics intervened again and Mu'awiya, a governor in Damascus had Ali assassinated thus throwing the community into a confusion in regards to choosing the next Caliph. Believing that the Caliph should be based upon appointment by Allah and his prophet, and not man, Ali's sons, Hasan and Hossein were designated by the Shiites as their Imam (leader). Hasan declined (later poisoned) and Hossein was slain by the forces

of Mu'awiya, creating another martyr for the partisans of Ali.

Though all power went to the Caliphate in Damascus and later Baghdad, the Shiites refused to accept "the practical compromise of the Caliphate" and created secret societies and missionaries to convert the people.<sup>4</sup> As followers of Ali, a line of specially selected leaders followed Hassan and Hossein. Eventually, the Shiites split into sects based on some of the succeeding Imams, but not before the twelfth, and last Imam, Mohammad al-Muntazai (d. 878 AD) was selected.<sup>5</sup> The majority of the Shiites, follow this twelfth Imam who reportedly disappeared and will come again at a later date.<sup>6</sup> Iranians are considered to be "Twelvers" in that they believe in the entire line of Imams. They follow, however, the teachings of Jafar, the sixth Imam and are thus known as Ja'farite Shiites.

The Ja'fari Shiites differ from the other sects in their acknowledgement of the true line of succession in that they do not insist upon some "living exemplar of the true faith." Instead they believe that the last of the twelve Imams is now 'hidden' and will appear to bring justice to the earth at some unannounced time.<sup>7</sup> After Mohammad al-Muntazai died, four 'lieutenants' followed as leaders and interpreters of law. After the failure of the fourth 'lieutenant' to designate a successor, leadership fell not to a specific person but to many of the ulema. These special men, as a group, known for their piety and understanding of Islam, led the faithful through the years of persecution at the hands of the Sunnis.

Consequently, two major Shiite themes concerning the proper government of Islam were developed due to the succession problem. The first demands that the Imam must be a descendent of Ali and exhibit all the qualities of pious men and kings. He must rule through acceptance of all men and "unfailingly institute the kingdom of God on earth." Secondly, due to the absence of the hidden Imam, the faith created the need for pious and talented ulema (mujtahids) to advise and guide the ruler or Imam.<sup>8</sup>

Despite succession problems, the Shiite faith survived the ruthless persecution of the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs by going underground and adopting the principle of dissimulation (Taqiyah).<sup>9</sup>

A period of doctrinal or "ideological confusions" however, remained. It was not until the Saffavid Empire (1500-1722) was established in what is now present day Iran did their political theory fully develop.<sup>10</sup>

The highly politicized nature of the faith revealed itself with this emergence of the Saffavids, for they arose to power and influence through the clever usage of the faith. Transforming "a Sufi order of purely local importance into a religious movement" the Saffavids claimed a Shiite origin "to differentiate themselves from the Ottoman's (a rival Sunni power) and to enable them to enlist the sympathies of all heterodox elements."<sup>11</sup> They claimed descent from the seventh Imam, Musa al-Kazim, and thus legitimized their rule

and garnered many more followers, who were enthusiastic in following a man considered divine.<sup>12</sup>

The new state capitalized on and sustained itself not only through the uniqueness of this faith but upon also the Persian nationalism which did not want to be absorbed by the Turkish Ottomans. Thus Shiism became the religion of the Persians and the state theocracy. The kings called themselves Imams, appointed religious judges and regulated the religious lands (awqaf). They appointed leading members of the ulema to official positions and patronized those of any influence and standing in the community. Finally, they accepted the guidance and advice of the most learned ulema and thus set a precedence to that which would undermine their power at later dates.<sup>13</sup>

Having once attained this pre-eminence, the ulema fought to maintain it in succeeding years. They shifted through periods of strength and weakness depending upon who was on the throne. Under Nadir Shah (1736-1747) the Shiite clergy were cast aside and lost much of its material advantages.<sup>14</sup> Under the Qajars (1779-1925) the ulema "played an important role in public life, maintaining established privileges and paralyzing the progress of the country."<sup>15</sup> They obtained especially significant power in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, having successfully overturned the Tobacco Concession (1891-1892) and forcing through a Constitution in the revolt of 1905-1909.<sup>16</sup> With the rise of Reza Shah Pahlavi, the role of the ulema became considerably

reduced and attempts were made to keep them out of political affairs.

The Shiite faith in Iran, then, can be seen as having deep political roots. First, with Ali and the problem of succession and later with Ismail, the Saffavid king who adopted and utilized the faith to create an empire distinguishable from the Ottoman's through the succeeding years, the faith melded with the Persian culture and created a religious society with many unique features. The exalted and powerful position of the ulema as well as the monarchical tradition had been well established. But more importantly,

Not only during the 222 years of Safavid rule but even up to our day, Shiism, with its overtones and its aroma of opposition, of martyrdom and of revolt, is matched quite well with the Persian character - a character formed in the course of a long history which is very different from the history of other people's nearby.<sup>17</sup>

## 2. Uniqueness

In the course of time, the Shiite system of doctrine and law had diverged considerably from that of Sunni's. In many areas, they are similar in thought and attempts have been made to legitimize the faith as the fifth orthodox 'school' of religious jurisprudence but those attempts have so far failed.<sup>18</sup>

For the purposes of this paper, however, a detailed review of Shiite beliefs is unnecessary. There are, however, certain unique features of the faith that bear review.

Foremost among these is the unique stature of the ulema. The Shiites have a decided preference for a living

leader and strong monocratic tendencies in questions of legal interpretations. From these two drives, there emerged the notions that the faithful follow the most learned individuals in the ulema and recognize his authority in reinterpreting religious law.<sup>19</sup> In essence, then, the Shiites unlike the Sunni's, do not recognize the authority of the four schools of law previously noted. Instead, each individual must decide which living mujtahid to follow. Hence, a distinct feature emerges which has great impact on politics. Unlike the Sunnis, the Shiites have a closer knit religious hierarchy in direct contact with the population. At the level of the masses, there were the mullahs. Above them, the mujtahids (a restricted group of canonists) who held power at government levels. Finally, there are the Ayatollahs, the most learned and respected religious figures who wielded great power over the masses which followed them. The mujtahid's after special training gained power only through the following they attracted. This power is manifested by the numbers of people who pray behind him during the Friday prayer service and can at times wax and wane since allegiances are fluid and easily swayed. The Ayatollahs become the most respected and powerful through their choice as one by the mujtahids and the people. Their numbers vary but usually there are close to five at any one time in Iran who wield the most influence.

The political significance of this hierarchy of ulema lay in the fact that the voice of the Ayatollah could mobilize

the masses and command large, previously unruly and divided groups to do his bidding. Their voice as well as all the ulema in Iran derive even greater legitimacy through their historical role as protectors of the people especially against conquering foreigners and sometimes against the indigenous government. It was noted by one scholar;

... the religious classes enjoyed more respect than any others; and since some of their leaders at least acted as a shield for the people from the exactions of the government, it was to them the people looked for protection.<sup>21</sup>

The next unique feature of the Shiite faith with great political impact was the tendency of the religion to regard their rulers as 'usurpers.' Legitimate rule, pending the return of the twelfth Imam could only emanate from those leaders of the ulema who were competent to interpret his will.<sup>22</sup> Ayatollah Khomeini took this principle one step further by declaring that "monarchic rule is in conflict with the Islamic rule and with the Islamic political system ... only God is Sultan."<sup>23</sup> Because temporal rulers were usurpers the need for advice and guidance by mujtahids was paramount in order to legitimize and maintain their rule. This principle was firmly established in Saffavid times under Ismail and was used as a rationale for revolt in later centuries, including today.

Another feature of the faith is the glorification of martyrdom. The Shiites strongly identify with the martyrdom of Ali and his sons. Due to the many years of religious

persecution, the faith has incorporated martyrdom as the highest ideal to be attained by its followers. When combined with Persian culture, it produces a fanaticism unequalled throughout the Middle East. As one noted in reviewing the Persian Revolution of 1905-1909 and Persian culture, the Persians were capable of extreme stoicism and courage.

But it is not in the conscript soldiers of a despotic shah that we must look for the highest manifestations of Persian courage. It is when the Persian is inspired by that enthusiasm for a person, a doctrine or a cause of which he is so susceptible that his heroism becomes transcendental ... Persians when exalted by enthusiasm, can meet death and the most horrible tortures imaginable, not merely with stoicism but with ecstasy.<sup>24</sup>

When one notes this particular trait amongst the Shiite Persians, one can fully understand the power of an Ayatollah who can enthuse a crowd so much so that death and hence martyrdom is actively sought after. This power coupled with Persian fanaticism was evident not only in the Persian Revolution of 1905-1909 but in the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The streets of Teheran and Qom were full of religious fanatics who bared their chests and begged the shah's troops to kill them.<sup>25</sup>

This martyrdom complex remains powerful through another distinct feature of Shiism, that is, the religious holidays and passion plays (SHABI, TAZIYEH). The Iranian calendar is dotted with religious holidays commemorating the deaths of Ali, Hossein and others. The most important one being the month of Moharram in which towns and cities recreate the

events of Imam Hossein's martyrdom at Karbala (known as Ashura) the passion plays of which is the highlight of Moharram often become extremely frenetic, sometimes leading to riots against Sunnis or rival neighborhoods.<sup>26</sup> The emotionalism, aggression and grief displayed at such times can and has been utilized as demonstrations of opposition to the central government. It's highly political character has made it a time of concern for whomever is in power and demonstrates most aptly the true mobilizing and political power of the ulema.<sup>27</sup>

Finally, there is the distinct unification of Shiism and nationalism. As noted earlier, Shiism was accepted in the early periods of Iranian history due in large part for its distinctiveness from the Sunni and hence Ottoman empire. It was a major rallying point for the Persians to throw off the yoke of foreigners and their occupation forces. This acceptance of Shiism is also due to the fact that Hossein had married the daughter of Yazdgerd III, the last Sassanian (Persian) monarch and that subsequent Imams were descendents of that marriage. In this way, the line of Imams was Aryanized and hence, distinctly Persian.

This symbolic unity of Shiism with Persian particularism and nationalism was and continues to be reinforced by the ulema. It was they who most often led the revolts against colonialists as well as with the status quo. It was the mujtahids who fired the people's emotions with religious and nationalist fervor in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

It is they who the people look for in definitions and leadership of nationalist causes.<sup>28</sup>

When one combines all these distinct and unique features of Persian Shiism, the political impact of the ulema can be most clearly seen. From its earliest period, Shiism has been and continues to be highly political, passionate and revolutionary. No ruler can completely stamp out these traits but must instead learn to avoid their dire consequences. Some have learned to accept them and rule effectively (i.e., Ismail), others have misjudged their strengths and revolutionary character and have suffered greatly (i.e., Qajar kings and the present shah).

### 3. Political Impact

Having noted the origins and uniqueness of Persian Shiism, it can be seen that its political impact has been great, yet most times misunderstood by Shah's and Westerners alike. Through the Saffavids, a theocratic state was created. During the Qajar reign the ulema went through periods of strong and weak political influence. During the Paklavi dynasty, they have once again re-asserted their power and influence, once with Prime Minister Mossadeq and later with Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Throughout all these periods, the ulema have shown remarkable resilience to governmental control and have at various times shown remarkable political astuteness and compromise to achieve their goals.

The present situation in Iran reflects this past astuteness indicating that the presently successful revolution

is not unprecedented nor unique. In fact several features of the past role of the ulema are present today and help explain how Ayatollah Khomeini was able to unite so many diversified groups and lead the revolt.

Two revolts dramatically point out the political expertise and characteristics of the ulema; the Tobacco Protest and the Constitutional Revolt inferred earlier. These two revolts will be examined for specific actions undertaken by the ulema that help explain the present Iranian situation.

The Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892 shows the capability of the mujtahids to mobilize the masses against the Shah as well as the capability to form alliances with various power groups to ensure success of their goals. When the government gave the Tobacco Concession to the British entrepreneurs, the mollahs led the revolt against it.<sup>29</sup> Significantly it was led on primarily nationalist and economic grounds. The ulema and their production of tobacco grown on their waqf lands were obviously endangered by the monopoly. Particularly irksome and relevant today was the large numbers of foreigners which had to come to Iran and organize the concession. To the ulema, this represented a wedge for un-Islamic practices and beliefs to be introduced to Iranians.<sup>30</sup>

More significant than the opposition, however, was the method or practice of the opposition which bears direct relevance today. A leading mollah, Sayyid Ali Akbar, started the

violent revolt in Shiraz. The Shah ordered his arrest but due to Akbar's following and influence, the shah was forced to acquiesce as it would create a 'martyr' for the cause.<sup>31</sup> Martyr's, however, were created and used extensively to stir up more revolutionary activity.

Continuous telegraphic communication was another feature of the protest besides the use of religious leaders and martyrs. The leaders of the ulema maintained continuous contact throughout the protest making the movement "perhaps the first coordinated national movement of Iranians."<sup>32</sup> The use of mass communications and media then were played to their fullest potential with remarkable results.

Because the leaders of the ulema in each city could be the most effective spokesman, discontented merchants and growers turned to them for support. Leadership subsequently fell to the most respected religious leader in Teheran, Hajji Mirza Hasan Shirazi. A fatwa (religious decree/order) was issued by him forbidding the use of tobacco by all Shiites and resulted in the complete breakdown of the concession and the central government's authority.<sup>33</sup> The alliance between mollahs, merchants, and growers ensured success as it provided legitimate leadership in the mollahs and money and mob raising capabilities in the bazaaris and growers.

Another feature which finds an echo today was the firm intransigence of the leading mujtahids. They refused to cooperate with the Shah at all times and demanded successfully

the termination of the concession without bargains. There was no equivocation on their part and due to their rising power, the Shah himself had to deal individually with Hajji Shirazi to bring the country back to order.<sup>34</sup>

The Constitutional Revolt revealed much the same features except with a few new twists. Most who watched the revolution were struck by the rare phenomena of a popular movement in which the clergy played so prominent a part; a movement if successful would deprive them of a large part of their influence and power. Again the reasons for their participation has relevance today for the ulema, showing remarkable ease in compromising with democrats and intellectuals, sought to attain a higher goal, the delimitation of the power of the shah and an end what was perceived to be a corrupt and foreigner dominated government. Neither group could dispense with the power of the other and close cooperation was needed to ensure the success of their sometimes divergent priorities.<sup>35</sup> That cooperation was given, but not wholeheartedly by the ulema. Some mujtahids supported the shah in maintaining that representative government was incompatible with the spirit of Islam.<sup>36</sup>

The use of the media again became an important attribute of the modern mollahs. Letters, telegrams, and manifestos were used extensively as were the pulpit, newspapers and radio.<sup>37</sup>

The ulema again proved adroit, even more so in the Constitutional Revolt, in controlling and leading mobs. This

became evident due to the fact that the majority of opposition occurred in Teheran streets and not the whole country as in the Tobacco Protest.<sup>38</sup> The use of mobs, often paid or 'drafted' by the bazaar merchants, proved highly successful in bringing Teheran to the brink of chaos.<sup>39</sup> Led by the mollahs and organized by professionals, their role in the revolt and later during the Mossadeq Coup of 1951-53, foretold of their usage and impact in the fall of the shah in 1979.

In sum, the Iranian mujtahids have historically and successfully led revolts against the central government. In the process, they revealed several practices or characteristics of a well organized, revolutionary movement. They were capable of coalitions with merchants, growers, landowners and even intellectuals and democrats when it suited their purposes. The role of the mujtahid as leader and voice of the revolt became paramount if success of the revolts was to be ensured. The ulema's usage of modern communications supplemented and at times surpassed their powerful voice found at the pulpit. The use of mobs, of martyrs, of intransigence on issues, and compromise with diverse opposition groups, all made up the political personality and practices of the Iranian ulema.

This personality or capability survived through many years of repression. Even after the years of Reza Shah's repression and belittlement of the ulema's power and prestige, the ulema were again capable of resurrection and insurrection. Ayatollah Kashani proved this by leading the revolt alongside Mossadeq in 1951-53. It should come as no surprise then that

after 25 years of Mohammad Reza Shah's attempts to control the mollahs, that they would again lead a revolt and do almost exactly as they had done so many times before. The Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 then was not unique. What was unique was the failure of the Shah and political analysts to perceive and acknowledge these capabilities and inherent characteristics of Persian Shiism.

## C. THE IRANIAN ISLAMIC REVOLUTION

### 1. Introduction

When Mohammad Reza Pahlavi succeeded his father Reza in September 1941, Iran had undergone an almost complete transformation under the modernizing and stern rule of Reza Shah. Initially weak, Mohammad Reza soon overcame most opposition within his country and pursued with vigor his dream of rapidly bringing his country to the level of superpower status. As with his father, this effort entailed growing Westernization, secularization and modernization of the society's culture, people and socio-political systems.

This effort did not go unopposed. Under the banner of nationalism, Mohammad Mossadeq was able to seize power for a few short years. More importantly, the ulema though weakened by the social reforms of the two modern shahs, were able to mobilize many people to revolt in 1963 and later 1978 and 1979. Despite the efforts of the two Pahlavi's the ulema were always to be a force to be reckoned with. This force showed its true strength in 1963 and presaged the events of 1978-79.

Accordingly, the re-birth of the fundamentalist movement and the re-emergence of mujtahid power must begin with the 1963 revolt. It was here that Ayatollah Khomeini came into the limelight and ensured his pre-eminence in any future battle with the shah. The stalemate which lasted almost fifteen years will also be covered as well as seeds for revolt which were planted in this time frame. Finally Ayatollah Khomeini's views on government and his plan for the future of Iran will be analyzed.

Inevitably, one will recognize many similarities with past Iranian revolts. History indeed repeated itself in many aspects, except for one point. A shah would no longer rule Iran, instead a religious man, an Ayatollah would. Thus the inconceivable had become fact. The Islamic fundamentalist revival, often referred to in the past but most often ignored by the West, had succeeded in producing the first real theocratic state in the Middle East in the twentieth century. This fact cannot be overestimated. Iran today represents truly the present power and influence of Islamic fundamentalism. It is a power that cannot be overlooked again as its ramifications for the future security and stability of the Middle East remain high.

## 2. Rebirth of the Movement

By the early 1960's, the ulema's hold over the people of Iran had been greatly weakened. Reza Shah since 1925 had systematically closed many of the doors for the clerics rule. Reza Shah had taken the throne as a reformer which meant the

destruction of tradition, that is, the traditional monarchy, the privileges of the aristocracy and the perogatives of the ulema.<sup>40</sup> Both he and his son were committed to a separation of religion from politics and to undermine the influence of the religious classes. Reza Shah, then, systematically secularized education thus depriving the ulema of one of their closest ties and influence with the people. Besides the educational system, Reza Shah had secularized and Westernized the legal system. "Attacking them here (the sphere of law) deprived them of their chief social function and principal source of legitimate revenue."<sup>41</sup> Their function as interpreters of the law meant that they had to validate the most vital acts of the society; marriage, divorce, testimonies, transfer of property, and commercial contracts. This changed with the introduction of a New Civil Code in 1928.<sup>42</sup> The state with Western laws ruled the courts and not the ulema and the Sharia.

Control over religious endowments followed as well as pressures to reduce the number of seminarians studying to become mollahs.<sup>43</sup> He also attempted to outlaw a number of popular practices associated with the faith, most notably with restrictions on the passion plays during Moharram.<sup>44</sup> The traditional dress and veiling of women also were changed, with European headgear being made mandatory in 1935 and the veil outlawed. These reforms did not go unanswered by the ulema as a rebellion erupted in the shrine city of Meshed in which only troops and machine guns could quell.<sup>45</sup> However by 1936 Iran

was legally and socially "emancipated" from religion to a great degree.<sup>46</sup>

Mohammad Reza Shah did not abandon his fathers dreams of a modern state when he assumed power. The present shah, however, dealt less harshly with the ulema. In fact, he attempted to legitimize his rule on religious grounds. As one analyst points out, his sensitivity to the Shiite faith resulted in several unprecedented moves.

The Shah and his court never failed to pay homage to Shiism, the state religion. He took every opportunity to stress his belief in God, always maintained that his reforms were in conformity with the prescriptions of Islam, and went on pilgrimages to Meshed and other holy cities.<sup>47</sup>

Despite these acts, the mullahs still regarded the Shah as a secularizing modernizer and hence a threat to their power.

Nevertheless, the crises which would occur in the early 1960's had its roots not just on religious grounds but more so on political-sociological areas. After the 1951-53 scare due to Prime Minister Mossadeq's seizure of power, the shah returned to Iran determined to rule and not reign. Ever sensitive to his political survival, he rapidly rebuilt the army and created a new secret police, SAVAK. He effectively diminished the power of the Majli's (part of the Iranian Parliament) and attempted to control every aspect of government. Political freedoms were in effect curtailed and all facets of society put under close scrutiny. Added to this were chronic social

problems which included overcentralization of government in Teheran, concentration of land into the hands of the few, an enormous and inefficient bureaucracy and unequal tax laws and administration.<sup>48</sup>

Of great import prior to the revolt of the early 1960's was the "reign of terror" created by SAVAK in the fifties.<sup>49</sup> Starting first with the supporters of Mossadeq and the National Front, the military and SAVAK undertook mass arrests and executions.<sup>50</sup> The Communist movement in the form of the Tudeh Party was next. After finding that the army was heavily infiltrated with Tudeh members, a purge followed which affected all levels of society.<sup>51</sup> Strict censorship closed newspapers and print shops and the shah's troops attacked university students and professors as well as anyone else who expressed dissident views.<sup>52</sup>

While all this repressive activity continued, it did not escape the notion of many Iranians that the United States was intimately involved with it. Whether Americans were actively involved in the repression still lies open to dispute. The fact remains, however, that the United States was quick to supply foreign aid to the shah's regime, massively rearm his army, and build the hated SAVAK organization.<sup>53</sup>

The SAVAK organization (coined from the Iranian, Sazelman-e Ehala-at Va Amnujate Khasvari) established in 1957 through American aid and expertise was particularly disturbing to the Iranians.<sup>54</sup> Its activities would be forever linked, appropriately or not, with the United States.<sup>55</sup>

The 'reign of terror,' then, ultimately led to the widespread revolt in the 1960's. It created enough antagonism in the society to allow the ulema to once again be the spokesmen for reform and justice. Outside international pressures were nonexistent but acknowledgement of the repression was there and proved disturbing to many outside observers. As Peter Avery recounted,

Perhaps foreigners were unaware of the reign of terror going on in Iran at that time, but for those who wished to see the Shah become a beloved and effective sovereign, whatever allowance had to be made for the rumors being exaggerated or inspired by foreign communists, they were extremely disturbing rumors nevertheless. They were disturbing on the grounds of humanity alone; but also on political grounds their effect in implanting a gulf of bitterness between the Shah and the nation seemed ominous."<sup>56</sup>

During the years immediately under review the ulema were not a serious problem. By 1958 they had assumed a passive attitude, due in large part to the mujtahid highest in dignity and respect, Ayatollah Burujirdi. When the discontented looked to him at Qom, they found him and many others more concerned with scholarship than politics.<sup>57</sup> Two events would change this compliant attitude; the 1960 elections and the Shah's White Revolution.

The 1960 elections were "among the most flagrantly corrupt ever experienced," and the Shah was forced to order new elections.<sup>58</sup> The 1961 elections were even more 'pathetic' and considered to be a mockery by many people. The Shah dissolved the Majlis and the Senate and unrest resulted over the failure to announce new elections.<sup>59</sup> The Shah had in effect

suspended the 1906 Constitution and ruled not through the authority of Parliament, but by royal decree (Farman).<sup>60</sup>

Political ferment continued and the economic situation deteriorated. The decade of the sixties opened with student demonstrations and teacher's strikes which in turn was accompanied by disorder and repression.<sup>61</sup> The government attacks on the students on January 21, 1962 were particularly brutal as were the attacks on the teacher's strike in May 1961.<sup>62</sup>

Into this maelstrom the Shah through his Cabinet formed legislation for the execution of a program of land reform and distribution of large royal estates.<sup>63</sup> Limiting the size of land one could own, the effort was made to alleviate the gross hardships of the peasants and secure their support for the Shah. Originally weak in design, the law underwent several modifications and finally in January 1963, the Shah presented the new version with five other reforms. The six point program, known as the "White Revolution," included land reform, nationalization of forests, sale of state owned factories, profit sharing plan for industrial workers, electoral law reforms and the creation of the Literacy Corps. Six more points were subsequently added and all had a profound effect on social development in Iran. In promoting the program the Shah had bypassed the frustratingly inept Parliament and appealed directly to the people for support. In a referendum held in January 1963, the Shah purportedly received an overwhelming 99 percent of the vote and pushed forward with his programs.<sup>64</sup>

### 3. Black Reaction

Previously, it was noted that the ulema had been evasive and uncharacteristically neutral to the problems around them. The events outlined above, however, ended this acquiescence. The first voice heard came in August 1960 as Ayatollah Behbehani demanded that the elections of the time be cancelled and run again. Due to mounting criticism, the Shah was forced to do just that.<sup>65</sup> Increasingly the clergy took part with the resurrected National Front in demonstrations demanding a return to the Constitution. The repressive crackdown by the Shah's troops stifled the National Front but not the ulema who could and did use the Friday prayer to voice their dissent.

The ulema, however, were far more concerned with the Shah's land reform laws and especially his six point program, the "White Revolution." As early as 1960 the ulema through Mujtahid Burujirdi, had declared it contrary to the Sharia, the religious law and the Constitution.<sup>66</sup> But as one analyst points out,

... it is probably correct to attribute the religious classes' opposition to Land Reform to an instinctive fear of the extension of the Central Government's power in a manner resulting in government interference in the people's lives at all levels, and in conflict with traditional patterns of behavior."<sup>67</sup>

Of particular concern to the ulema was the disposition of their vaqf lands. Ayatollah Behbehani announced that the vaqf lands must be exempt from the Reform laws. Prime Minister Asadollam Alam, however, noted their notorious corruption and

exploitation of the peasants and refused the exemption.

Alam's reply, made public, was quickly regarded as an affront by the religious community.<sup>68</sup> Reaction was quick as was the emergence of a new leader, Ayatollah Khomeini.

Khomeini had long been a member of Ayatollah Burijirdi's circle and had constantly strove to impel Burijirdi to a more activist stance in political affairs.<sup>69</sup> After the death of Burijirdi in 1961, Khomeini gradually came to lead the political revolt for the ulema. After only two years he had revitalized the role of mujtahids in politics, remade the mosque as the center of social and political command and activity, "and embarked on the campaign for the abolition of the hated monarchy."<sup>70</sup>

On 22 January 1963, the ulema organized large and violent demonstration in the bazaar area of Teheran in an attempt to obstruct the Shah's forthcoming referendum. Besides the land reform, the ulema hoped to block and arouse public sentiment against the electoral emancipation of women.<sup>71</sup>

Khomeini helped lead the revolt for he

saw that the agrarian reform would further weaken the position of the clergy in the country; and as for the reforms concerning the status of women and the role of religious courts, these were 'abominations' whose acceptance would entail giving up positions which Islam had held for more than a thousand years.<sup>72</sup>

The Shah responded to these demonstrations by going to Qom and distributing former vaqf lands to the peasants before the most revered shrine in the city. Further insulting

the clerics, he said, "we are done with social and political parasites; I abhor the 'black reaction even more than the red destruction.'"<sup>73</sup>

Ayatollah Khomeini responded with a series of sermons delivered in Qom, denouncing the Shah, the close ties with the United States, the economic malaise in the country, and the extension of the repressive apparatus of the state into the countryside as well as so-called crimes of violating Islam and the Iranian Constitution.<sup>74</sup> Immediately afterward, the shah's troops attacked Qom's theological school on May 22, 1963 and arrested Khomeini.

Released shortly thereafter, Khomeini resumed undaunted in attacking the regime. In the summer, Khomeini, cleverly utilizing the commemorative day of the martyrdom of Hossein, led the riots in Teheran. Again the careful and very capable utilization of mobs was apparent as they looted, burned and destroyed whatever they could. Further, "the rioters made a particular effort to frighten women and to demonstrate their new rights exposed them to serious violence."<sup>75</sup> The violence, principally in Teheran and Shiraz lasted four days and was well supported by the common populace, as well as the wealthy landowners and bazaaris.<sup>76</sup> The government's severe and immediate punitive measures and Marshall Law ended the riots but only after many deaths and the arrest of Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Qomi.<sup>77</sup>

After being placed in house arrest, SAVAK issued a public statement that an "understanding" had been reached

according to which Khomeini and two other leading "eminences" would "cease to interfere in political matters."<sup>78</sup>

The government, through its demonstrated willingness to use harsh force, had momentarily neutralized the religious opposition. Recounting later, the Shah had this to say of Ayatollah Khomeini and the riots of 1963;

The latter were inspired by reactionary forces led by an individual who claimed to be religious, even though his origin was obscure. It was certain, however, that he had secret dealings with foreign agents. Later the radio stations run by emigré members of the Tudeh Party, who were atheists by principle, accorded him the high religious title of Ayatollah ("the sign of God") and praised him to the skies, although he was anything but divinely inspired.<sup>79</sup>

Fearful of the ulema's power, then, the shah set out to intimidate them and their allies. Prior to 1963 the government security forces had concentrated on the National Front, Tudeh Party and radical intellectuals. After the 1963 riots they broadened their activities to include the clergy and bazaaris.<sup>80</sup> Accordingly religious and bazaari leaders were among the many arrested in a mass roundup of the opposition. Included among the arrested was Ayatollah Taleqhani who was later ordered to be executed by the Shah. Though this execution order was stayed, Taleqhani was imprisoned for ten years.<sup>81</sup>

In less than a year, Khomeini again rose from his banishment in Qom to denounce the regime and the Majli's who had passed a bill granting diplomatic immunity to American military personnel and accepted a \$200 million loan from the

United States for the purchase of military equipment.<sup>82</sup> In a particularly biting sermon, Khomeini attacked the bill as a capitulation to a foreign power, a power which no less supports Israel as well as the Shah's modernizing policies.<sup>83</sup>

In extremely nationalistic terms, he said;

Do they (the Iranian people) know that the assembly on the suggestion of the state, has signed the bond of their enslavement, has approved the colonization of Iran and has given America a bill to treat the Moslem Iranian nation brutally?<sup>84</sup>

Further, his resentment toward America and Israel was equally evident in his attack.

It is America that defends Israel and the supporters of Israel (the Shah). It is America that is strengthening Israel to strike the Moslem Arabs. It is America that imposes deputies on the Iranian people. It is America that views Islam and the venerable Koran as a danger threatening it. It is America that sees in the clergymen and the ulema a thorn in the path of colonialism and sees that they must be jailed, insulted and tortured.<sup>85</sup>

For this speech, Ayatollah Khomeini was arrested by SAVAK and flown to Turkey where he lived under house arrest. After several months there he was able to proceed to Najaf in Iraq, a major center of Shia learning and pilgrimage. While teaching there, he resumed his attacks and proclamations against the Shah and government. His influence had waned but was not completely broken as the shah would see in the next decade.

In effect then, by 1965, political opposition activity had dwindled and become disorganized. In the following years, the government extended surveillance over the bazaaris and

clergy, periodically ordered "vicious police attacks" on seminary students and undermined the traditional independence of the trade and craft guilds.<sup>86</sup> Sporadic opposition continued for the next few years but the initiative had clearly gone to the government. The years to follow can then be considered a stalemate in the struggle between Conservative Islam and Khomeini and Modernization and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

If anything is to be deduced from the riots of 1963 and reemergence of militant mollahs, it is that despite years of repression, the ulema could and would lead a revolt against the regime. Again they proved the power of the mollahs was unbroken; the mosque was the only place where open criticism of the Shah could be voiced, the clergy could still get the mobs into the streets and that only the ulema through their Ayatollahs could effectively lead the opposition. For them to be a power however, the regime had to provide the right environment so that the masses would find reason to oppose the government, for this revolt was obviously more than a religious one. The economic and political malaise certainly aroused many to go into the streets but the regime also had to directly threaten the powers of the ulema and other conservative elements, notably the Bazaaris, in order to impel them to lead the opposition. The government as could be seen from above had created just such an environment and threat. The religious riots of 1963 opposed not only the land reform. They attacked the modernizing tendencies of the Shahs in

general, such as the introduction of civil laws and courts, secularized schools, and the enfranchisement of women. The build up of the military and SAVAK, close relations with the United States and the recognition of Israel; all were subject to condemnation.

By 1965, the Shah again appeared to be in control as he would for the next decade. Yet through the period of stalemate, he again created the conditions which would lead to another Islamic revolt.

#### 4. Stalemate

A disaffected calm prevailed over Iran for the next decade partly due to a rising and hopeful economic change. A pattern for the coming years also relegated opposition to a neutral role, that is: a docile, rubber stamp Parliament, the appointment of technocrat ministers and the increased use of SAVAK for political repression.<sup>87</sup> The only remaining protest was desultory opposition from within the universities and the mollahs. Despite SAVAK, both the students and mollahs persisted in sporadic protests but they were in reality low key and easily quelled by arrests.

Subsequently only two major opposition events may be recorded for the time frame; Ayatollah Khomeini's continued protest from Iraq and the development of an underground guerrilla movement.

From his base in Najaf, Iraq, Khomeini continued to comment on Iranian affairs. Through the use of smuggled papers and tape cassettes of his sermons, he was capable of

keeping his opposition image intact as well as voicing dissent to the Iranian populace. For the most part, his calls fell on deaf ears due to the economic boom Iran was to undergo in the late sixties and early seventies.<sup>88</sup>

The most significant exposure for him came in April 1967 through an open letter to Prime Minister Hoveyda. In it, he denounced the continued violation of the Iranian constitution and Islamic principles by the Shah's regime as well as its subordination to foreign powers, particularly the United States and Israel.<sup>89</sup> Other messages to the people continued expressing concern over the arrest of Muhandis Bazargan and Ayatollah Taleqhani as well as other members of the so-called Freedom Movement, the commemoration of martyrs, especially religious ones such as Ayatollah Sa'idi, denunciation of the "celebration of the Iranian monarchy" and condemnation of the Shah's one-party system. In the later years of the 1970's, his speeches evidently were placing pressure on the regime for the mere possession of a copy of one of his works meant imprisonment and torture.<sup>90</sup>

While in exile, Khomeini devoted much of his efforts to develop his theories on Islamic rule. Perhaps the most important of his writings are "The Rule of the Sharia" and "Islamic Government."<sup>91</sup> In both Khomeini says that rule in Islam is not absolute but constitutional but not constitutional in the Western sense. The rulers are bound by the Koran and its holy laws. Its legislator is God and not the people's elected representatives.

More was heard from Khomeini when the Shah adopted in the late 1960's the course of "Persianization." Trying to dilute religious feelings by reviving nationalist feelings, the Shah reminded Iranians of past glories of the ancient Persian state. This call confirmed to the religious establishment as well as Khomeini, the suspicion they held concerning the Shah and the throne.<sup>92</sup> In the latter years, Ayatollah Khomeini was to consistently attack this attempt to legitimize monarchial rule as un-Islamic.

The efforts of Khomeini during this period were more along the lines of scholarship and propaganda. From his post in Iraq, his protests were heard but lacked the impact of former years. The thrust of active opposition was left to underground guerrilla movements which emerged into the limelight in the sixties.

The underground guerrilla movements had their genesis in the 1950's but were not as prominent as they were in the late sixties and seventies.<sup>93</sup> By early 1970 however, a total of over eight major groups had been identified with either religious or leftist orientations or a mixture of the two.<sup>94</sup> The religiously motivated groups began in 1965 and were considered to be the Fedayeen Islam and the Islamic Nations Party. The leftist groups were the Tudeh Party, the Revolutionary Tudeh Organization, Tufan, the Saka, and the Siah Kal guerrillas while the third group, a syncretism of the previous two groups was the Iran Freedom Movement (or National Liberation Movement). Finally, there was the Confederation of Iranian

Students which was not active inside Iran but caused considerable international impact and has acted as a spawning ground for other guerrilla movements.<sup>95</sup>

Of primary concern for this paper however is the religious groups as they represent militant Islam in its extreme. The first group to surface in the 1960's was one known as Fedayeen Islam. The Fedayeen espoused the overthrow of the Shah and the establishment of an Islamic republic and employed assassinations as its primary tool. They were responsible for the deaths of several high ranking government officials in the late fifties and sixties.<sup>96</sup> They achieved national notoriety in their assassination of Prime Minister Mansur in 1965.<sup>97</sup> When he was shot, the government accused a religious study class (Maktab) of the deed, however, subsequent testimonies revealed the hand of the Fedayeen Islam. The swift arrests and executions after this event ended this groups' activity and little was heard of it again.

The Islamic Nation's Party arose as another religiously oriented opposition group in 1965. This group attained prominence when they were rounded up in the fall of 1965. Though little is known of the party, their stated goal appeared the same as the Fedayeen's, the overthrow of the Shah in order to restore religious principles to the government and work for Islamic unity.<sup>98</sup> Of significance however was that the leader of the group Mohammad Kazim Musave was the son of a mujtahid in Najaf, Iraq and was a follower of Ayatollah Khomeini.<sup>99</sup> The foreign connection claimed by SAVAK undoubtedly referred

to Khomeini. In any event, the group, noted for its modern yet conventional terrorist attacks, disappeared as quietly as the Fedayeen after the arrests and executions of its main members.

Another group, syncretic in ideology was the Iran Freedom Movement (IFM) founded in 1961 by Mohandis Mahdi Bazargan. Joining him for leadership was Ayatollah Sayyed Mahmud Taliqhani whose religious and political views earned him the title "the Red Mollah."<sup>100</sup>

The IFM advocated a highly activist role in politics and subsequently took on a more radical stance than the old National Front, from which most of its members came. The IFM attempted to

reconcile what appears to be genuine religious convictions with a modern socio-economic theory, Marxist Socialism, in hopes of producing a doctrine capable of social and economic modernization on one hand, while remaining uniquely Moslem on the other.<sup>101</sup>

By the mid sixties, the IMF was described as having a large following but lacking in organization and executive cadre strength.<sup>102</sup> In the late sixties the group moved to far safer countries and concentrated on recruitment of students.<sup>103</sup>

They came into the limelight again in 1970 when Ayatollah Saedi, the most prominent mujtahid in Iran led riots against an American Investors Conference. Ayatollah Saedi was arrested for his part in the demonstrations and reportedly died under torture, causing even more unrest in Teheran and Qom. Though banning all demonstrations, the

leaders of the IFM, Ayatollah Taleqhani and Dr. Abbas Shaybani, led another protest march and were promptly arrested.<sup>104</sup>

The group garnered greater public recognition in January 1972 when SAVAK announced that it was the best and largest armed group of three supposedly broken up in 1971. At the same press conference, they were said to be responsible for bank robberies, skyjackings and the attempted abduction of the Shah's nephew. During this time frame the name of the group changed to the Iran Liberation Movement (or National Liberation Movement) and under this new name were responsible for gun battles with the police, bombings and assassination of an Iranian General and an American colonel.<sup>105</sup> Their activities continued along this same vein up to the Iranian Islamic Revolution where its more militant members became known as the Mujahedin-e Khalq. They played a significant part in the revolution with an estimated 30,000 membership claimed and are presently Khomeini's de-facto police force.<sup>106</sup>

The stalemate period then can be characterized by more violent underground political and terrorist activity of guerrillas with religious and sometimes Marxist views. The Marxist organizations, though not covered here, became highly organized and potent during this period as did, to a smaller extent a few religious based groups. The ulema maintained its traditional role as spokesmen for the people through Ayatollah Khomeini, Taleqhani and Saedi. They as a group paid dearly as Khomeini remained in exile, Taleqhani imprisoned and Saedi killed. Nonetheless, as years went by their role gained in

prominence and activity. Massive social problems, economic dislocation, intensification of government repression and the increasing involvement of the United States in the daily lives of Iranians - all these factors aided in the maturing of discontent into revolution, in which the ulema would take a leading role.

#### 5. Seeds of Revolt

The seeds for revolution ironically were planted by the regime itself. Revolving around the production of oil, Iran undertook the calculated risk of rapidly transforming the Third World country into an industrial power comparable to Western states. In the process, a "centralized command structure" and not a democratic institution was deemed the only way to seize and utilize the oil revenue properly.<sup>107</sup> The prevailing notion in the early seventies was that such an opportunity would not avail itself again and that firm measures for modernization and oil exploitation were needed immediately. One measure of the scale of this 'gamble' was that while imports were running at over \$15 billion annually, non oil exports were under \$600 million.<sup>108</sup> The early years of the 1970's then previewed the most dramatic social economic upheaval any country, other than Saudi Arabia today, would or could experience. The transformation entailed in the gamble however, was to go uncontrolled and poorly led and ultimately contributed to the downfall of the Shah.

The seeds for revolt in Iran were many and some evolved over a great many years. They include a multitude

of political, social and economic problems that most modernizing underdeveloped countries experience. Iran was no exception to these problems. In most cases, when a state finds itself in a quagmire of such problems, revolution or a similar social upheaval erupts in an attempt to change the situation. For revolutions to be successful, however, it is not enough that a majority of the people suffer various deprivations. To be successful a revolution requires leadership, organization, and the participation of elite groups who are generally either leisured, better educated and better off people than the masses.<sup>109</sup> In Iran's case, leadership can also come from a privileged class; a group noted by tradition as protectors and leaders of the people, in essence, the ulema. Only when both the ulema and the privileged classes were pushed to revolt, was the final ingredient for a successful revolution introduced.

Thus while many Iranians suffered through the years of social transformation during the reign of the Shah, a great many others, in particular government workers, entrepreneurs, the military and a growing middle class benefitted from it. Only when these groups became effected by a variety of deprivations at one time did a revolution have any hope of being instigated much less accomplished. Meanwhile, the seeds for revolt lay dormant. They steadily built up however through the succeeding years of the 1970's. Their explosive growth and flowering then should serve all analysts as a classic case for the study of, and perhaps, prevention of, revolution.

Indeed, the implications of the Iranian Islamic Revolution should be noted not only by analysts but by leaders of nations undergoing similar programs and problems as did Iran, especially, in this case, Saudi Arabia.

What exactly constituted the reasons or seeds for the Iranian Islamic Revolt? As mentioned earlier, they may be summarized as: a bad economic situation, perceived social injustices, a stifling political atmosphere, and even a failure of the ruling elite to govern popularly and effectively.<sup>110</sup> Included in this categorization, one must add other unique features prevalent in Iranian society, that is, an unusual demographic change in the population's age and location and a perceived spiritual-cultural exploitation of the society by foreigners. Each problem will be dealt with below.

The "very bad economic situation" referred to by Walter Laqueur in Why the Shah Fell had its roots in the economic boom of the early seventies. In January 1974, the Plan and Budget Organization (PBO) began examining the effect of the new price of oil which had quadrupled revenues in the course of the year.<sup>111</sup> The Shah instructed them to prepare a blueprint of what to do with the windfall and in July 1974, and the PBO revised the five year plan started in 1973. The Shah and Prime Minister Hoveyda, ignoring the cautious views of economists embarked upon a program to accelerate their already ambitious programs. As one writer stated,

the new Plan unveiled after Ramsar was a breathless example of what was going to become of the new Iran ... It was an impatient attempt to concertina the time scale to economic takeoff. The real change was not one of substance but form; more money to be spent on bigger projects in a shorter time; better imported technology; more foreign experts and a host of marginal items that seemed a luxury in the old Plan - especially in the military field.<sup>112</sup>

This gamble then could be seen as an attempt by Iran to bypass the centuries required by the West to industrialize yet achieve the same sophistication in a matter of a few years. No country had ever attempted it before but its false hopeful start spurred the government to accelerate the pace even more.

Every sector of the economy, with the exception of agriculture showed dynamic growth with its implementation.<sup>113</sup> The "hyper-boom" however proved to be shortlived. By mid-1976 expenditures overtook revenues and accumulated bottlenecks curbed the hectic pace of development.<sup>114</sup> Worldwide inflation cut deeply into programs as the average cost of imports rose by 28% in 1974/1975.<sup>115</sup> By 1976 inflation in Iran ran rampant as food prices rose 30% per year and rents in Teheran rose by as much as 200% in 1976.<sup>116</sup>

The boom had other ill effects as well. An increasing proportion of the oil income had been spent on other expenditures which did not contribute to Iran's productive capabilities. Arms expenditures had taken up increasingly large percentages of available funds.<sup>117</sup> The service sector of the economy had expanded even more and by its nature of its product

catered only to the well off.<sup>118</sup> Import substitution became the main form of industrial expansion with the result that badly needed capital intensive industries suffered.<sup>119</sup> Disparities arose in income distribution, between the rural areas and urban ones, between the North and South of the country and finally, amongst the working class and upper class.<sup>120</sup> Finally, the shortage of trained manpower greatly increased and stalled the ill-fated programs.<sup>121</sup>

The net effect of these problems placed great strains on the Iranian economy, in particular, the lower classes, both urban and rural. The skyrocketing costs in housing benefitted only the privileged classes. Added to the high rents was the shortage of housing units available and being constructed.<sup>122</sup> In response to these pressures, the workers went on strikes throughout the decade in most of the industries. The heavy handed government response to them more often than not resulted in deaths, imprisonment or the drafting of the men into the army.<sup>123</sup> Prior to and concurrent with the boom, was the invasion of large numbers of rural people in search of better opportunities. Between 1960 and 1970 Teheran's population increased at roughly 6% a year to reach 3.2 million, over double the national average.<sup>124</sup> By 1976, shanty towns dotted Teheran while the population increased at the rate of 12% a year and if left unchecked would have made Teheran a city of 16 million in twelve years. The cities obviously were totally unprepared for such an assault and became vast slums teeming with discontented people.<sup>125</sup> Add to these figures the

fact that demographically, the median age of the population was between sixteen and seventeen years of age and one can foresee the future problems. The extreme youth of the population had great socio-political implications in terms of the burden placed on workers of children too young to be economically active and the need for the creation of new jobs.<sup>126</sup> Further, this large group of young people were easily susceptible to revolutionary causes and leaders.

Perceived and real social injustices exacerbated this dismal picture. The backwardness of the countryside was not alleviated by government programs which reflected a cynical attitude toward those rural areas and the poor.<sup>127</sup> The most telling sign of this backwardness was the literacy rate among the rural people. Despite the efforts of the Literacy Corps, enrollment in primary level schools in 1973 was only 39% for the rural areas whereas in urban areas it was 90%. Since 1973 the situation altered little with only 40% completing primary education.<sup>128</sup> When these rural people moved to the city, the differences between the two became apparent and divided the population there. Relegated to lower paying job opportunities and discrimination, they added to the tension in the cities.<sup>129</sup> The culture shock alone meant confusion and their only solace could be found not in bureaucratic welfare machinery of the government but through the mollahs.

Indeed the culture shock experienced by the rural migrants was felt by other groups.<sup>130</sup> One of the main complaints against the government was the gross importation of

anything Western. The alienation experienced by the Iranian in his own society was great and reflected to some the cultural-spiritual exploitation by the West. As one Iranian pointed out,

The image presented to Iranians for self-identification reflected, in importunate, superficial and selective colors, imported European-American features rather than their own. Not only does this physiognomy appear behind bluish glass panes on the back seats of big American sedans, not only does it smirk from toothpaste billboard ads, not only does it flick across the screen as sheriff or fashion model, or appear as a striptease star through the early morning hours in dim, feudal enclaves of the plutocracy; it lies over this land like a poisonous mist and enters like a deadly tumor into the consciousness of the astounded Iranian, who has lost track of his lineage in an abruptly changing reality and now seeks salvation in a precipitate flight forward, in identification with what is hopelessly heterogeneous.<sup>131</sup>

The effect on the traditional man, then, as well as the true Persian was enormous. "These substitutes literally tear him out of the soil in which he is rooted."<sup>132</sup>

The Bazaaris suffered this alienation and more. The restructuring of the economy had put the bazaar and its ideals under severe pressure, to the point that they did not wish their sons to be bazaaris.<sup>133</sup> The government since 1956 had undertaken several attempts to eliminate them as a power by splitting the guild system, establishing banks (thereby taking away their traditional source of revenue, money and lending), creating strict commercial laws, and creating import licensing, building price controls and waging corruption campaigns.<sup>134</sup> The traditional market system then, lost much of its prestige,

value and power. Thus those within it, always closely allied with the ulema, were more than willing to strike at the regime at the most opportune moment.<sup>135</sup>

Finally, the judiciary system developed to be a cancerous sore in the society. According to one author, the judiciary had been absorbed almost completely by the executive branch of government and reflected only the will of the ruling elite.<sup>136</sup> Increasingly, military tribunals acquired greater importance as all cases affecting national security were within its realm of justice. In this case, "national security" was loosely interpreted. Where the judiciary had not lost out to the military, its authority was further usurped by special courts serving the whim of the regime.<sup>137</sup>

Probably more disturbing to the traditional man was the imposition of a Western civil code of law and not the Sharia or traditional Bazaar methods of justice. Faced with secret trials, military and executive courts, Western laws, corrupt and inefficient judges, many Iranians felt deprived of the most basic rights and efficient justice while the ulema and bazaris felt deprived of an essential power and function.

The political environment of Iran at the same time had gone from bad to worse. The Parliament continued in its role as a rubber stamp of the ruling elite. SAVAK accelerated its activities of repression in all spheres of Iranian life. In effect, all legitimate avenues to formulate governmental decisions or voice dissent had been successfully closed to the majority of Iranians.

In theory the Shah observed the 1906 Constitution; which envisioned a constitutional monarchy with an independent legislature. However,

In practice, the Constitution had only served as a point of reference when convenient. The distinction between the executive authority of the Shah and the independence of the legislature ... has been blurred and all were merely part of the monarchs' executive arm.<sup>138</sup>

Throughout the period all important decisions were by a select few men and by royal decree (Farman) without any real intercourse between the Shah and Parliament. The only real exchange of ideas appeared between the Shah and those closely surrounding him. As one analyst pointed out, this personal rule by the Shah and a select few individuals was not unique, "the government of Iran historically has been and continues to be 'of, by and for the elite'."<sup>139</sup>

Recognizing the artificiality of the Parliament and Party system, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi finally dispensed with all pretenses of democratic rule. In 1975 he created a single party, the Rastakhiz-e Iran.<sup>140</sup> It was to serve as a mobilizing agency in the modernization process, a screening device for more political talent, and a channel to educate the masses in the principles and priorities of the White Revolution.<sup>141</sup> The Shah himself declared its true purpose as a vehicle for legitimizing his tenuous hold over the people and isolating dissenters by saying,

Every Iranian who has clarified his position, that is who believes in the Constitution, the Monarchy, and the Sixth Bakman Revolution (the White Revolution) must definitely joint this political organization.<sup>142</sup>

The party to many Iranians finally dismissed the masquerade of a Western-style political system in Iran. From 1975 onward even the prospect of voicing legitimate opposition was denied to them. Further, the Party represented a hated extension of the Shah's ruling elite. It was used, for example, in policing the anti-profiteering and price control campaigns in 1975; a campaign that brought the ire of the main targets, the bazaaris.

Denied even the rudiments of party politics, the Iranians had little else to turn to for voicing ideas much less dissent. The SAVAK organization intervened in all organizations capable of providing such a voice. In the field of labor, SAVAK ensured that labor groups did not become politicized. Interference in the arts was more noteworthy, for the banning of plays, films or the refusal of permission to publish works were an integral part of SAVAK's duty.<sup>143</sup> What remained of the press in Iran was controlled by two families closely linked to the Shah.<sup>144</sup>

SAVAK could even have a hand in granting industrial licenses, the right to import certain equipment and in the clearance of goods through customs. By far the most damaging influence of SAVAK was its methods in dealing with the opposition in exile, and at home. Student surveillance was all embracing, corrupting the educational system.<sup>144</sup> Dissidents everywhere, even abroad, faced the prospect of intimidation, interrogation, torture, and imprisonment without trials.<sup>145</sup> Professor Richard Cottam wrote to one Iranian of special

SAVAK hit squads' overseas, saying, "these men will appear as ordinary muggers and kill the Iranians one by one."<sup>146</sup>

Contrary to what Walter Laqueur has said, thousands of men and women were summarily executed during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah. "More than 300,000 people are estimated to have been in and out of prison during the last nineteen years of the existence of SAVAK, an average of 1,500 people are arrested every month."<sup>147</sup> As Martin Ennals of Amnesty International stated:

the Shah of Iran retains his benevolent image despite the highest rate of death penalties in the world, no valid system of civilian courts, and a history of torture which is beyond belief.<sup>148</sup>

In conclusion, the SAVAK organization had become synonymous with terror in Iran and abroad. Necessary to stifle dissent, it created more opposition and laid the final seeds for revolt against the Shah.

Thus economically, socially, and politically, the Shah had created a bedrock for revolutionary activity. A list for the causes of the revolution may be summarized as follows:

- the too rapid modernization of the economy resulting in inflation, housing, manpower and bottleneck problems,
- the costly militarization of the country at the expense of the economy,
- the collapse of agriculture due to government inefficiency and neglect,<sup>149</sup>
- Western cultural-spiritual exploitation,
- Repression of traditional sources of power and influence,

- overcontrol of a highly centralized government,
- the failure of the ruling elite - and of Constitutional government,
- SAVAK repression,
- the "Persianization" of Iran,
- the massive foreign presence in the country,
- the secularization of the society.

#### D. KHOMEINI'S SOLUTION: REVOLUTION


##### 1. Unity and Leadership

As could be seen from above, the seeds for revolt were well sown by the late 1970's. With the necessary ingredients there, the revolution needed only a leader and a spark, an "X-factor" for revolution.

The leadership in the form of Khomeini was ideal. Being a mujtahid and in exile for opposing the Shah gave great legitimacy to his role as leader. Being in Iraq and later Paris, allowed him relative freedom of movement as well as access to the media and publicity. Khomeini's views had the advantage of great simplicity as he concentrated on only a few essentials: the overthrow of the Shah and the creation of a still nebulous Islamic Republic. As he stated to one journalist,

Once Iran is independent it will also have freedom and social justice. Once the country is liberated from political and economic dependence on foreign powers, all the other causes of repression and exploitation will disappear and all citizens will be able to freely develop. 150





MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART  
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

This simplicity garnered for him diverse opposition groups which might not ordinarily follow a religious leader. As Walter Laqueur pointed out,

this prince of the church became the darling of the extreme left. For however reactionary his views in every other respect, on two main counts they were "progressive", he was against the Shah and he attacked the Americans.<sup>151</sup>

The disaffected middle class and intellectuals flocked to him because of his advocacy of the return to a Constitution. The Bazaaris knew of his previous support to them and were guaranteed "business as usual" if he returned as their leader.

Khomeini also took advantage of the resurgence of Islamic faith in Iran, especially among the young and university students thus capturing a highly emotional and volatile group.<sup>152</sup> Khomeini was guaranteed the support of the traditional and religious oriented men in Iran for obvious reasons. He built up this support even more by coloring his speeches with religious and nationalist imagery. "Thus the Shah became 'Yazid' - the Khalif detested more than any other by the Shiites," as well as a satanic figure while Khomeini pictured himself almost as a prophet.<sup>153</sup>

Finally, Ayatollah Khomeini had the distinct advantage of a lack of competition. Largely due to the Shah and SAVAK, all potential leaders were dead, imprisoned or totally intimidated. The only other source of leadership, the underground movements were disorganized, weak and lacking in legitimacy.

Ayatollah Khomeini did not take these advantages for granted. Showing astute political skill, he backed down from previous stands concerning land reform, women and leftists. On land reform, he stated that he opposed it only because it created new markets for foreign countries and now advocated it along Islamic lines.<sup>154</sup> His attitude toward women toned down from his previous 1963 position where Khomeini now said,

All women and men are at liberty to attend universities, to vote and be elected, however, 'As Moslems, we will not accept the Western view of women as toys.'<sup>155</sup>

With secularists and leftists the Ayatollah was less intransigent as cooperation with them was disavowed. He said however, "they are free to advocate their own views and convictions."<sup>156</sup> Further, though not accepting leftists, those that made up his semi-provisional government in Paris "were men whose loyalty is certainly not to Allah."<sup>157</sup>

Unexpectedly, the Shah provided the ideal environment in which all the societal discontent and the leadership of Khomeini could emerge. Because of student demonstrations overseas, Amnesty International investigations and President Carter's "Human Rights" criticism, the Shah eased his grip on Iranian society.<sup>158</sup>

In March 1977 the Shah granted amnesty to 256 political prisoners. In April, he permitted foreign lawyers to attend trials. In May, he met with Amnesty International officials and in June, he announced through the Rastakhiz Party that he would allow "free discussions" and "constructive

criticism."<sup>159</sup> Encouraged by these acts, the opposition groups emerged from hiding and various, previously illegal organizations were created. Both groups promptly campaigned for more freedoms and an end to repression and corruption. Among the most prominent were the "Writer's Association," "Group for Free Books and Thought," "Society of Merchants, Traders and Craftsmen," and the "Association of Iranian Jurists."<sup>160</sup>

It was in this atmosphere of new felt freedoms and demands that the government provided the "X-Factor" for revolt. By allowing in January 1978 the publication of an article in a Teheran newspaper criticizing and questioning the piety of Khomeini, the government created the spark to light off the revolution.<sup>161</sup>

The religious leaders in Qom reacted violently to the affront to Khomeini. They quickly organized a protest meeting in Qom where they announced twelve demands on the government. They were: the implementation of the Constitution, separation of powers, abolition of the bureau of censorship, freedom of speech, freedom for political prisoners, freedom to form religious associations, dissolution of the Rastakhiz-e Iran Party, the reopening of Teheran University (closed as a result of poetry meetings), an end of police violence against students, state assistance to farmers, the reopening of "Fuzieh," a seminary closed by the police in Qom and finally, the return of Ayatollah Khomeini.<sup>163</sup>

The formulation of the twelve points again reflected the ulema's political expertise as they not only mirrored the

aims of the masses and particular opposition groups, they avoided as well issues that could alienate other groups, such as the veil and land reform.

Immediately after the demands were posted, the leading religious figures led a demonstration of over 4,000 people and attempted to march throughout Qom. The government's response created a serious clash and provided "martyrs" which thus began the cycle of forty-day riots which were to plague Iran throughout the year.<sup>163</sup>

## 2. Revolution

After the customary forty day period of mourning for the Qom demonstrators, the city of Shiraz erupted with riots centered around the university there. In Tabriz, the mosques and other religious places became centers for demonstrations and bloody riots.<sup>164</sup> These riots were reported by the government as premeditated and carefully executed.<sup>165</sup> By March the government reported unrest throughout the country but that

the agents of black reaction will not be able to undermine the atmosphere of national understanding in our country; on the contrary, it will unit and consolidate the ranks of the Iranian people.<sup>166</sup>

Significantly "foreign agents" were blamed for the disturbances implying Ayatollah Khomeini and his supporters as well as Soviet activists.<sup>167</sup>

It was not until late April that the government admitted that it was going through a critical phase as more funerals fed the fire of revolt.<sup>168</sup> Typical of the banners carried throughout the country, one carried;

Glory and everlasting life for our martyr's blood in Qom, Yazd, Tabriz and Palestine. Victory to the Koran and death and shame on our enemies ... our Islamic scholars will go on existing and become immortal ... God will bestow victory on us. Down with Zionism and victory to Palestine.<sup>169</sup>

By August, Marshall Law was declared in Esfahan in wake of riots there but violence continued unabated.<sup>170</sup>

Increasingly theatres, restaurants and banks became targets of the religious and nationalist rioters. Anything American or perceived to be a part of the Shah's modernization program were subject to attack. In Abadan, 400 people died when a cinema was burned to the ground by saboteurs. A cinema in Shiraz burned down as well a few hours later.<sup>171</sup>

Ayatollah Khomeini and the religious leaders very cleverly utilized many of the age-old tactics for revolt described previously. Ties with the Bazaaris provided them money, organization and mob control.<sup>172</sup> The mosque played a significant role as the only place where criticism could be voiced and demonstrations planned. The highly volatile students, many being new adherents to a resurrected Islam, eagerly obeyed the mollahs commands. Finally, in a new twist, Ayatollah Khomeini couched his rhetoric in vivid religious and revolutionary terms stirring the martyrdom complex among the faithful and leftists, thus creating fearless mobs in the streets.<sup>173</sup>

Competition for leadership still remained nihil as Ayatollah Khomeini became the symbol of the revolution. However, over fifteen opposition parties emerged during the revolt

which would place serious strains on the revolutionary government when its revolt succeeded. Among them representing the extreme right were the Pan Iranist Party, Iran Nationalist Party, Society of Iranian Socialists. In the middle were the Iran Liberation Movement and on the left were the Mujahedin Khalk, Strugglers for Freedom, and the Fedayeen Khalk.<sup>174</sup>

Besides these groups many religious leaders represented differing views from that of Khomeini but they will be discussed later. In any event, Ayatollah Khomeini was still able to present himself as the leader of the revolt and all activity in Iran came as a response to his orders.

Realizing the seriousness of the situation, the Shah responded to it with a mixture of the 'carrot' and 'stick.' The 'stick' has already been mentioned as it included extensive use of SAVAK and the military to break up demonstrations, create counter demonstrations and establishing Marshall Law. The 'carrot' entailed a series of moves meant to placate the various opposition groups.

Previous to the more serious rioting, he had ordered the release of hundreds of political prisoners. Instead of stifling dissent, more demands for more releases were created and during 1978 many more were released.<sup>175</sup> Along the same lines, Premier Janshid Amuzegar made an effort to restore the country's economy by cutting inflation from 31% to 8%, cracking down on tax dodgers, reshuffling his Cabinet, and purging corrupt civil servants. His reforms however came too late and he was replaced by Jaafar Sharif-Emami, a former Premier known

for his piety.<sup>176</sup> Court Minister Hoveyda also was forced to resign in September 1978 in an apparent attempt to mollify the opposition groups.<sup>177</sup>

To placate the ulema, Sharif-Emami ordered the imperial calendar scrapped and replaced by the old Islamic one, as well as the closing of the country's eight big gambling casinos, including four owned by the Paklavi Foundation, the abolishment of the Minister of State for Women's Affairs post, the lifting of press censorship and the release of a half dozen religious leaders.<sup>178</sup>

The Shah's concessions, though many, were not enough to stem the tide of revolt, and only made the opposition demand for more. In early September, the Shah was forced to declare Marshall Law throughout the country thereby causing more riots in what is now called "Black Friday" in Teheran. At least 122 demonstrators were killed in Teheran's Jaleh Square alone.<sup>179</sup> In November when strikes in the oil fields threatened to paralyze the economy, the Shah played his last major card - the formation of a military government under General Gholam Reza Azhari.<sup>180</sup>

The strikes in the oil fields represented the turning point for the Shah. Previously, the regime had tried to prevent dissent from spreading into the working class, in particular, the oil workers. As the regime knew well, the middle class already in revolt could not carry through a successful revolution by itself, but with the two million industrial workers it could. By answering the call of Khomeini, all the

Shah's efforts were unravelled and as much as \$60 million a day of revenues and four-fifths of the annual output of oil was lost.

In December with the oil strike crippling the country, the ulema increased their attempt to depose the Shah. The month of Moharram and the day of mourning known as Ashura were again used more as political demonstrations than religious commemoration. The true power of Khomeini was revealed as millions of demonstrators shouting "Death to the Shah" and "Long Live Khomeini" engulfed Teheran, Qom and Isfahan. Again, though mostly peaceful, the Shah's forces provided for more martyrs in the cause.<sup>181</sup>

Finally realizing the hopelessness of the situation, the Shah formed a new government in January 1979 with a National Front leader at its head, Shahpur Bakhtiar.<sup>182</sup> In an attempt to win over the masses Bakhtiar promised more concessions; the halt of oil flow to Israel and South Africa, to support Palestinian "legitimate rights," strip SAVAK of power, phase out martial law and hold elections.<sup>183</sup>

Bakhtiar's promises of reform like the Shah's failed to sway the opposition. In a matter of days, Khomeini refused to recognize the new government, reiterated that the Shah must pay for his crimes and formed a rival government in Paris.<sup>184</sup>

More demonstrations continued till at the end of January, the Shah was forced to flee his country. Three days

later, in a response to a call from Khomeini Iranians took to the streets again, "this time in numbers that dwarfed even the most massive rallies during Iran's year of protests."<sup>185</sup> At least a quarter of Teheran's four million people marched through the streets demonstrating for support of Khomeini and celebrating the fall of the Shah. The giant rally had been meticulously orchestrated by the Ayatollah's political machine and demonstrated once again who held real power; Khomeini and not Bakhtiar.

Bakhtiar's efforts to negotiate with Khomeini revealed the same intransigence met by the Shah. Bakhtiar had to resign. His futile pleas for national unity and refusal to allow the Ayatollah to return, finally collapsed.

After his triumphant return to Iran in February 1979, Khomeini prepared for the final assault. He immediately attacked the United States and the Bakhtiar government. Declaring he would create an Islamic Republic by peaceful means, he also threatened a holy war if Bakhtiar put up resistance.<sup>186</sup> On February 5, 1979 Bazargan, a Moslem human rights activist was appointed to form a transitional government to turn Iran into an Islamic republic and on 8 February, the first signs of the army's disintegration appeared. By 10 February, the battle for Teheran erupted with Moslem forces loyal to Khomeini gaining victory and arresting Bakhtiar.<sup>187</sup> Finally, the crushing blow to the Shah and Bakhtiar came with the United States officially recognizing Khomeini's new government on 16 February 1979.<sup>188</sup> The bloody revolution had finally ended.

## E. KHOMEINI AND ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT

### 1. Introduction

The Iranian revolution could not have been successful without the personality and character of Ayatollah Khomeini. Nor could it have the impact without his views on Islamic government and the role of ulema in politics. Therefore this section will review Khomeini's life, his theory concerning Islamic government and the role of the mujtahids in the revolution and government.

### 2. Khomeini and Politics

What pushed Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to the forefront of politics? As could be seen in Iranian history, the ulema always had a central role in Iranian politics. Based on their mass following and tradition, they wielded considerable power. Khomeini gathered his following at a remarkably early age while still a student in Qom, where he advanced so swiftly that he was allowed to teach other seminarians.<sup>189</sup> Khomeini also became celebrated at this early point in life, for the eloquence and effectiveness of his speech, a quality which was deemed indispensable during the years of opposition.<sup>190</sup>

His entrance into politics followed the deposition of Reza Shah with the publication of a book entitled The Unveiling of Secrets. This book, a detailed criticism of Reza Shah and his modernizing policies, brought him more acknowledgment from the people and more importantly, the government police. Consequently, his classes were repeatedly raided and himself harrassed.<sup>191</sup>

The uniqueness of Khomeini, however, was that his political activism was virtually singular among the ulema of his time. Preferring to be concerned only with religious scholarship and neutralism vis-a-vis the government, the ulema followed the quiet Ayatollah Burujirdi. Only with his death in 1961, did Khomeini rise from Burujirdi's circle of friends and become an Ayatollah. It was Khomeini, then, after years of persecution, who transformed the quiescent ulema into political activists and the mosque a headquarters for socio-political command and activity.<sup>192</sup>

Khomeini's role in the 1963 revolt launched him into greater pre-eminence among the ulema and people. With Iranians left with little leadership due to the Shah's purges, he motivated other ulema into carrying the revolution onward: a group readily accepted by the disenchanted populace.

One of the more popular figures among the ulema and the masses for his opposition to the Shah, his prestige could only gain with more persecution from the Shah's forces. His exile, the mysterious death of his eldest son, Mustafa, and the continued modernization policies of the Shah only strengthened his noted intransigence with the Shah.<sup>193</sup> It was this intransigence and his repeated call for the overthrow of the Shah that made him distinctive from other opposition leaders and garnered him more supporters. Increasingly, as the economy turned sour and socio-political problems became more pronounced, the people saw only the uncompromising Shah as the source of the problems. It was important then, that Khomeini was the

earliest and most visible leader who would not compromise with the Shah.<sup>194</sup>

His leadership then cannot be solely attributed to his political theories but rather because of his symbolic role of opposition and intransigence with the Shah.

As was noted earlier, this intransigence did not carry through his sense of diplomacy concerning other opposition groups. Realizing that his strict conservatism would not be well received by many in the population, Khomeini reversed many of his demands concerning women, land reform and minorities. By far the most important reason for his acceptance by the masses, however, was the simplicity of his call - the overthrow of the Shah. By avoiding major issues, by being deliberately obscure on many issues, and by repeating this call, Ayatollah Khomeini insured his popularity and leadership role.

In sum, Ayatollah Khomeini was a marked leader for the opposition movement at an early age. Utilizing the role of Mujtahid to its fullest, having been renowned as a religious scholar and ardent foe of the Shah for decades, exercising restraint and intransigence at the appropriate times and most of all, keeping his goals simple and policies obscure, Ayatollah Khomeini ensured his role as leader and the successful completion of the revolution.

### 3. Khomeini and the Ulema

Though Ayatollah Khomeini at present enjoys undisputed leadership of the Islamic revolution, there are indications

that his leadership may be tenuous due to differences and jealousies on the part of other Ayatollahs, in particular Ayatollah's Taleghani and Shariatmaderi.

As noted previously, Ayatollah Khomeini was found at odds with other members of the ulema as far back as 1960. Only after the death of Ayatollah Burijurdi and great efforts on his part was Khomeini able to motivate the ulema to enter into political activism. Before Khomeini had achieved this however, many had opposed him, preferring "an adroitly non-committal attitude, adopted with considerable urbanity."<sup>195</sup>

During the years of opposition, Khomeini was not the only religious leader, for Ayatollah Taleghani had distinguished himself as a forceful opponent to the Shah during the late sixties and early seventies. Leadership of the rebellion however fell to Khomeini due in large part because he was not jailed for ten years like Taleghani and hence silenced. Taleghani also made the mistake of being identified with a leftist ideology thereby alienating a large segment of the mujtahids traditional source of power, the bazaaris.

Yet both Taleghani and Shariatmaderi played significant roles in the revolution. They were the immediate contact point for Khomeini and due to their presence in Iran, the revolutions most visible coordinators. Further, both were highly instrumental in creating alliances with the diverse groups of opposition in Iran. Taleghani through his secularist and leftist emphathies was able to attract the many leftist intellectual and middle class groups to his cause.<sup>196</sup>

Ayatollah Mohammad Kazim Shariatmaderi primarily added legitimacy to the revolution and garnered the religious segment to the cause because of his piety and scholarship.<sup>197</sup> Both men due to their activities and risks were greatly responsible for the revolutions success. One would assume that both would have a say in the direction of the Islamic republic afterwards as well but this is not the case. Recent events in Iran have proven that it is Khomeini alone and not anyone else who will provide the direction for the Islamic republic.<sup>198</sup>

Yet differences exist among the Ayatollahs nonetheless. Whereas all are committed to building the still nebulous Islamic Republic, Taleqhani and Shariatmaderi have voiced concern as to what kind it should be and who should lead it. While Khomeini seeks a strict, seventh century type of government, Taleqhani requested for a return to the 1906 Constitution with a veto power given to religious leaders over any laws passed.<sup>199</sup> Shariatmaderi on the other hand opposes the establishment of the secret revolutionary council as it interferes with the operations of the Bazargan government. On the question of leadership both Taleqhani and Shariatmaderi oppose the seemingly autocratic rule of Khomeini. Taleqhani, in an obvious reference to the high handed and absolute behavior of Khomeini said, "an Islamic government is not the monopoly of one person."<sup>200</sup>

It is significant to note also that both Ayatollahs, months before Khomeini's return to Iran were expressing ideas different from Khomeini. For example, Shariatmaderi has said,

"We don't want to turn Iran into another Saudi Arabia or another Libya. But we shall demand strict adherence to the Islamic precepts of our country's constitution." Perhaps even more significant, however, is the fact that Shariatmaderi has formed his own party based in Qom.

Despite the jealousies and differences, Khomeini rules the Islamic Revolution and dictates who will run the government, as well as how it will be run. Through his revolutionary council, created while in exile, Khomeini has been effective in limiting the role of other mujtahids, and establishing the new Bazargan government.

In sum, Ayatollah Khomeini holds almost dictatorial powers in Iran, and as such, remains the most dominant personality in Iran. It is a testimony to his leadership and political skill that he remains so today and as such his views on Islamic government should be reviewed.

#### 4. Islamic Government

Khomeini's exact views concerning the Islamic Republic remain open to interpretation. Most of his ideas and general principles can be discerned through his work written in 1969 titled Islamic Government.<sup>202</sup> In it Khomeini says that rule in Islam is not constitutional in the conventional Western sense. It is,

not similar to the well known systems of government. It is not a despotic government ... it is constitutional in the sense that those in charge of affairs observe a number of conditions and rules outlined in the Koran and in the Sunna and represented in the necessity of observing the system and applying the dictates and laws of Islam.<sup>203</sup>

Thus, the Islamic state relies on holy laws and its legislator is God, whereas the role of legislature in the Western sense is performed by the people's elected representatives. Since "Islam has thus dealt with every aspect of life and has given its judgement on it," the need for man's laws and legislation is not apparent.<sup>204</sup> The legislature then can be replaced by a "planning council" that works to run the affairs and work of the ministries so that they may offer their services in all sphere.<sup>205</sup>

Since legislative and judiciary branches of government are already covered by the holy laws and the ulema that interpret and implement them, there is need only for an executive branch. A monarchy is out of the question for as he has said, "Islam abolished monarchy and succession to the throne ... only God is sultan."<sup>206</sup> Yet an executive authority must exist but not as "the conveyor of laws and not a legislator" but only for implementation of laws.<sup>207</sup>

The presence of a person in charge of the Islamic laws and rules is essential because such a presence prevents injustice, violation and corruption.<sup>208</sup>

This executive must meet certain qualifications. He must have knowledge of the Islamic law and have a sense of justice. In essence, he must be a religious and pious ruler.<sup>209</sup>

The role of the ulema in this government is supreme and Khomeini devoted much of his work concerning it.

They are the nation's reference and leaders. God's authority is the man appointed by God in charge of the affairs of the Moslems.<sup>210</sup>

Since the ulema are the heirs to the Prophet and have a knowledge of Allah and His laws that no other men have, they should and must rule side by side with the executive.

Hence,

We must lead the people by virtue of our mission and position in ordering good deeds and proscribing evil deeds ... for fighting injustice and resisting the unjust.<sup>211</sup>

Further,

If the ulema are faithful to the permissible and the knowledge, then they can take charge of affairs, establish the strictures and set up the religious system, without misery, injustice or obstruction of the laws...<sup>212</sup>

Finally,

Since Islamic government is a government of law, the religious expert and no one else who should occupy himself with affairs of government. It is he who should function in all those areas in which the Prophet functioned - neither adding nor diminishing these in the slightest degree.<sup>213</sup>

Khomeini's view of religious and national minorities shows less tolerance and more xenophobic ideas. As he said,

Christian, Jewish and Bahai missionary centers are spread in Teheran to deceive people and to lead them away from the teachings and principles of religion. Isn't it a duty to destroy these centers?<sup>214</sup>

As for women, Khomeini does not oppose their freedoms but only wants to "restore her dignity." The veil has less importance than but their dress and social behavior should conform to Islamic laws. The same laws apply to all nationalities as well. They are welcome if they accept the laws but will be punished severely for its non-acceptance and any creation of disorder.<sup>216</sup>

Only in the area of foreign policy is Khomeini specific. He wants to restrict foreign influence in Iran and promote Islamic causes outside of it.<sup>217</sup> Of particular concern to him are Israel and the United States. On Israel, he stated;

Israel has usurped a Moslem people's land and committed immeasurable crimes ... I have always strongly urged Moslems throughout the world to unite and fight their enemies, including Israel.<sup>218</sup>

Islamic countries must unite and must exert all their efforts and employ all their resources to uproot the usurping aggressor. They must stop aiding Israel, those who proceed in its bandwagon and those who support it.<sup>219</sup>

Further, Khomeini holds the United States largely responsible for what has afflicted Iran and the Israeli state. As he stated,

Let the world know that all our problems emanate from America. All our problems emanate from Israel. Israel is also a part of America.<sup>220</sup>

Plainly, the United States does not stand in good favor, nor would it in the future, given its commitment to Israel and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty.

Today, after victory in the revolution, Khomeini has put into practice what had been advocated during the struggle. He severed relations with Israel, expelled Israeli and American military experts, declared a halt to oil shipments to Israel and South Africa. To reassure the Arab states, he declared an end to Iran's role as policeman of the Persian Gulf.

In the field of government operations, however, his general principles have failed to materialize into practical applications. In his words, all that remained for the new government to do was for it "to organize the ministries, their jurisdictions, their activities and their tasks."<sup>221</sup> Yet under Khomeini the new Iranian government's efforts to do just that have been undermined. Evidently, the only proper machinations of government can be found in Khomeini himself and his government within a government in Qom.<sup>222</sup>

For the present, the world has to wait and see if a truly Islamic government can be formed, much less run along the general principles proposed by Khomeini. Indeed, his ideas concerning the legislative and judiciary branches of government have to be modified. The Constitution of 1906 may well serve as the better model for government operations than Khomeini's idealistic notions as it has established a tradition that the vast majority of Iranians accept. Given Khomeini's ability to recognize the political wind shifts, then, one should expect the new Constitution about to be presented to the people, to reflect more the 1906 model than his ideas noted previously. In any event, until Ayatollah Khomeini can provide more specific guidelines concerning the Islamic Republic and give it his whole hearted support, such a state may never materialize.

#### F. CONCLUSIONS

With the successful overthrow of the Shah, the world witnessed what had only been discussed, argued and mostly

forgotten: the revival of Islam and the power it wields in politics. As could be seen in the historical survey of Iran, the event had many precedents, some of which nearly duplicated Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's fall. Equally evident in this fall was the power and tactics encompassed in the mujtahid's struggle which were remarkably similar to those of Iran's early history. The power of the mollahs was shown to be unbroken, the mosque remained the center of criticism and opposition, its leaders (the ulema) unquestioned in their roles, the clergy could still move the masses in the streets, and ultimately, could overthrow the most powerful and "stable" regime in the Middle East.

The uniqueness of the revolution, then, lay not in the successful overthrow by religious forces; this had been established many times before in Iran's history as well as in Saudi Arabia (to be discussed later) and to a limited extent in Egypt (the Moslem Brotherhood). The uniqueness of the revolt lay in the failure of the Shah, political analysts and the intelligence communities to acknowledge the resurgence of Islam, the political impact of Islam and the uniqueness of Iranian Shiite Islam. Even today, this negligence on the part of the Western world still remains as one journalist stated:

An astounding spectacle is happening right before the eyes of the West which still believes in progress and the Third World which is eager to advance. At the threshold of the 21st century, the 35 million strong Persian people, just liberated from the despotism of a reckless upstart, seem by way of a religious time machine to be

vaulting back 1,300 years to the original Moslem society, and religious doctrinaires clamor for the conquest of temporal power.<sup>223</sup>

This bewilderment of such a spectacle has dire consequences for the United States for as one Arab writer stated, "For the millionth time, the American computer confirmed its failure to observe the behavior of peoples."<sup>224</sup> Already shuddering from the effects of the Iranian oil cutbacks, can the United States afford to miscalculate again the political impact of Islam in other Moslem oil producing countries? The answer of course is no yet the United States can be found doing precisely the same things in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East as it had done in Iran.

As will be seen in the next chapter, Saudi Arabia like Iran, is in the process of vaulting from the medieval ages to the 21st century in as quick a time as possible with the United States intimately involved with this effort. Further, the United States continues its policy of support of the Moslem nemesis, Israel. Both policies it was seen helped create the Iranian Islamic Revolution, so the question remains whether the United States intelligence community, political analysts and leaders can learn from its mistakes and prevent such a catastrophic event from happening in Saudi Arabia or other Moslem oil producing countries. Judging from the response of American newspapers, magazines, analysts<sup>225</sup> and leaders, it would appear that those mistakes have not been learned and that the United States will face yet another powerful Islamic inspired upheaval if not revolution.

#### IV. SAUDI ARABIA AND ISLAM

##### A. INTRODUCTION

Given that Saudi Arabia remains a linchpin for the United State's security and foreign policy efforts in the Middle East, as well as of great importance to America's economic well being, it would behoove American policy makers to undertake a critical study of the Saudi Arabia's rulling elite's political future. If that future appears to be unstable and revolutionary, then efforts should be made to either 1) prevent the fall of the monarchy or 2) prepare the United States for its consequences.

It is the thesis of this paper that due to certain and unique developments within the Saudi society, a revolutionary or radical change in that country's government is forthcoming. Consequently, the religious and political background of Saudi Arabia will be reviewed and analyzed. The major ruling elements that can be found in the society will also be discussed as well as their political and religious impact on the society. Finally, the positive influences that give stability to the present regime and the negative aspects and influences found in the society that threaten to destroy it, will be identified and analyzed.

It will be found that due to a variety of social, economic and political factors, Saudi Arabia's present ruling elite lives on borrowed time. A radical social and political transformation is in the making and will occur in the near future.

## B. THE WAHHABI MOVEMENT

### 1. Introduction

The present religious state of Saudi Arabia came as a result of an eighteenth century reformist reaction to the conditions of Islam in the country. Since the time of Mohammad the Prophet in 632 to the fall of classical Islam to Mongol and Turkish invaders by 1250, the religion and its believers dominated most of the civilized world. As a result, they achieved brilliant secular and religious triumphs. With the invasions of non-Arabs, a new period began (1250-1800); a period witnessing many and varied interpretations of Islam, most often non-Arab and mystical (i.e., sufism).<sup>1</sup>

Opposition to the introduction and infusion of these new ideas, deemed distortions to the pure concept of Islam, appeared in peninsular Arabia. Under Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wakhab, a new militant sect arose to combat and cleanse the world of the Satanic inroads in Islam. Intolerant of all ideas other than the pristine world which Mohammad had originally created and animated with the driving force of the jihad (holy war), the new reformists called the muwahhidin (Unitarians) struck out from the Nejd in central Arabia. Their success, fall and resurrection had a profound impact on modern day Saudi Arabia, an impact which created it and some say may destroy it.

Accordingly, this section of the paper devotes itself to the movement's early history, its dormant period and its rise to power under King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud in the twentieth

century. It will outline the precepts of the Wakhabi faith and describe its impact on the society that today remains uniquely religious and powerful.

## 2. Birth of the Movement

In the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Turks nominally held the peninsula of Arabia. In-land, however, in the Nejd the Bedouin tribal chiefs remained largely independent and the land, largely untouched by foreign invaders.<sup>2</sup>

The lack of political unity, the absorption of the tribes in raiding, counter-raiding, personal disputes, the absence of leadership, all contributed toward keeping Arabia as a remote rimeland of the empire, easily visited, as forgotten as it was before Mohammad's time.<sup>3</sup>

Life in the territory, however, was far different from what the Prophet had created. Islam had lost its vitality and was corrupted with the superstitions, customs and rites not unlike that of pre-Islamic Arabia.<sup>4</sup> As Philby was to point out:

Laxity in the observance of the prescribed rites, in sexual relations, and in other ways was ignored rather than approved by folks of decent standing. Superstitious belief in the efficacy of chains, offerings, and sacrifices and in the powers of trees, rocks, and certain tombs to effect or hasten the gratification of normal human desires was but the measure of Samaritan ignorance in the masses.<sup>5</sup>

The country, in the eyes of the deeply religious, desperately needed reform. In the early eighteenth century, Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wakhab arose to do just that.

Born in 'Ayaina in 1703, al-Wakhab lived much like his namesake Mohammad the Prophet. Taught at an early age the puritannical precepts of Islam by both his father and

grandfather (a noted ecclesiastic) al-Wahhab distinguished himself at an early age with his knowledge and zeal. Indeed, his father

often had to curb the zeal of the young man, whose enthusiasm, to be up and doing in the cause of God was apt to outrun his discretion in a society which was not yet ripe for conversion from the easy-going ways of the time.<sup>6</sup>

Al-Wahhab continued his religious instruction under his grandfather, Sheikh Sulaiman and quickly accepted his Unitarian philosophy inspired by the works of ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328).<sup>7</sup> Once he completed this training, he travelled, much like the Prophet, and observed the deviations practiced in the land. In the cities of Mecca and Basra, he continued his studies under the renowned Sheikhs garnering for himself fame and honors for his zeal and learning. By 1740, "he had thrown caution to the winds and come out openly as an apostle of moral and spiritual regeneration."<sup>8</sup> Convinced that the people had abandoned Allah and his message, he preached a doctrine following the strict and purist teachings of the Hanbali school of Islamic law.<sup>9</sup> Again like the Prophet, he was forced to flee his first ministry and move back to 'Ayaina where the Sheikh, Uthman ibn Hamad ibn Mu'ammam proved to be "an apt and ready pupil for his teaching."<sup>10</sup> Striking a bargain with him, Uthman supported al-Wahhab in extolling virtue and fighting vice.

Al-Wahhab's reputation for courage and sincerity grew as he smashed sacred trees and tombs without harm from the

people or Allah. Catching the scornful eye of Uthman's sheikh and threatened with his life, al-Wahhab was again forced to leave. This time, in 1745, Mohammad ibn Saud of Dar'iyah accepted him and joined with him in an alliance that would shake the foundations of Arabia. Promising to wage war in God's cause ibn Saud opened his city to the teachings of the reformer.

The Sheikhs classes were open to prince, peasant and pauper without distinction: all of them equally in need of spiritual comfort in the slough of despond, into which the Arabs had sunk through years of ignorance and neglect. The greater and the lesser sins were rampant in high quarters and low alike: prayers were neglected or perfunctorily performed, and the giving of alms had long ceased to be an operative obligation.<sup>11</sup>

Spurred by persuasion, zeal and spoils of war, the new converts set out on their jihad. Striking typically at local rivals first, their efforts at first faltered then succeeded as village after village fell to the two leaders. While ibn Saud provided the military prowess, al-Wahhab supplied the religious experience and legitimacy.

When ibn Saud died in 1765, his exploits not only earned him a sizable kingdom but also recognition of his piety, humanity and military skill. His efforts were so great that Philby remarked, "It may be said with complete truth that but for him Wahhabism would never have had its day. It was he who provided the stage for a renaissance by Abdul Aziz."<sup>12</sup>

Succeeded by his son Abdul Aziz (not the great one of the 1900's), the conquered territory was expanded and consolidated. In 1788, al-Wahhab ensured his legitimacy by proclaiming Abdul Aziz as the Imam, the ultimate spiritual authority. Making all take an oath of allegiance and loyalty to Abdul Aziz, al-Wahhab died in 1792 knowing his work would be carried on after him. Again Philby remarked,

And it is amply attested that he not only presided with distinction over the ecclesiastical administration of the realm, but also took an active and vigorous part in the direction of its military and political activities in the cause of God.<sup>13</sup>

Under Abdul Aziz, the movement swept into Iraq in 1802 and in an orgy of slaughter and pillage, the venerated tomb of Hussain was demolished as the incarnation of Shiite infidelity. The Wahhabi movement had thus earned a reputation for violence and fanaticism. The general wave of revulsion for this and other acts landed as far as Constantinople. On the other hand, despite this reputation, their fervor was also acknowledged as having "a salutary and revitalizing effect, which spread little by little over the whole Moslem world."<sup>14</sup>

In 1801, the Wahhabi forces now under Saud ibn Saud captured Mecca and secured the Hijaj. The Wahhabi movement had reached its zenith. Saud demonstrated beyond a doubt that the Hijaj and the pilgrimage were his responsibility by stopping a pilgrimage originating from Syria. The "Commanders of Virtue and Forbiders of Vice," a kind of religious policemen, went on their rounds to see that the people did not

smoke or drink and enforce strict and punctual attendance in the mosques.<sup>15</sup>

The Ottoman Turks responded to this and the massacre at Karbala by sending an Egyptian expeditionary force under Mohammad Ali, the viceroy of Egypt.<sup>16</sup> Mohammad Ali's son, Ahmad Tusun led this first invasion but was defeated. After Mohammad Ali personally took command, Medina fell to him in 1812, followed closely by Mecca in 1813. The introduction of the cannon on the battlefield and the superior equipment and forces of the Egyptians quickly defeated the Wahhabi warriors and in 1818 Da'iyā the Wahhab capital fell. Mohammad Ali razed the city to the ground and sent Abdullah, the new ruler of the Wahhabs to Constantinople, for execution.

Wahhab power and influence had shattered due to the success of the viceroy of the Ottomans. The ecclesiastical hierarchy were executed and tortured with a reign of terror lasting nine months.<sup>17</sup> More importantly, however, the foreign occupation fostered a spirit of discontent due to the ruthless and incompetent rule of the Egyptians. As a result of their administration and their incomplete persecution of the Wahhabi ulema, Wahhabism stayed alive in the desert through the works of the mutawwas (missionaries) "who continued to spread reading and writing among the tribes so that they could study the Koran and the hadith of Mohammad."<sup>18</sup> The defeat had crushed the Wahhabi army, but it did not destroy the spirit of the movement which in its dormant state, kept alive the fervor

until resurrected by Abdul Aziz ibn Saud in the twentieth century.

The importance of the early Wahhabi movement in regards to the future of Saudi Arabia cannot be underestimated. The movement though not nationalist, created the first successful effort by the Arabians to throw out foreigners and ideas in the Nejd and Hejaj. As a strictly religious phenomena, it spread the doctrine of a unique reformist faith and brought back true Islam to the countryside. The religious doctrine of Wahhab further acted as a unifying force among the tribes and brought relative peace, long non-existent, to the land. It revitalized the idea of the jihad and the use of military force to spread the faith. Further, it established the Saudi family as the legitimate religious and political leader of Arabia, not only then but for generations to follow. Finally, it proved that using a religious creed, a strong leader could arise to unify the previously divisive society. Unfortunately, after the fall of Dariya, the movement lacked such a leader. Still, according to H.A.P. Gible,

the results of this first Wakhabi movement were, and still are, far reaching. In its original phase it shocked the conscience of the Moslem community by the violence and intolerance which it displayed not only toward saint-worship but also toward the accepted orthodox rites and schools.<sup>19</sup>

### 3. The Dormant Period

After the destruction of Dariya, the Wahhab movement entered a period of dormancy. One might ask, how could such a movement invigored with religious fervor and legitimacy fall

so quickly? Philby offers the view supported by the Saudi's who taught him that the rise and fall came about through the "relaxation of the disciplines which had rescued the Arabs from the barbarism of pre-Wahhabi times."<sup>20</sup> Old tribal and parochial jealousies and rivalries resumed their destructive influence over the society. The movement had lost its interest in the people's welfare and economy. Their own ruthlessness and fanaticism ran unabated and consequently alienated a great portion of the population especially in the Hijaj.

In any event, Arabia returned to the conditions that had prevailed before the movements birth. Travel became dangerous, raiding common, and the country leaderless under the harsh Ottoman rule.<sup>21</sup> A member of the Saud family, Turki, reestablished a deformed version of the Wahhabi state around Riyadh in 1820. Slowly retreating from the Nejd, the Ottomans played the tribes against each other providing subsidies and arms.<sup>22</sup> Through the succeeding years, the Saudi's fought among themselves over the succession of rule. It was not until Sheikh Abdul Rakman ibn Hassain, the grandson of al-Wahhab, that religion was restored as an effective element in the life of the Arabs. Yet under his rule, the Wahhabis never reached the height of their previous rule.<sup>23</sup> Yet both Turki's and Abdul Rahman's reign were of "utmost importance in restoring something of the shattered fortunes of the Wahhabi state and the prestige of the House of Saud."<sup>24</sup>

Prior to and during their reigns, however, inter-family feuds weakened their power. Their's and other family

members' initial successes alarmed the Ottomans and once again Mohammad Ali reentered Arabia in 1836 to reassert control. Using Khalid ibn Saud as a puppet, his success was followed by a resurgence of Saudi power under Faisal ibn Saud in 1843. The Saudi family, weakened by feuds, however, came into conflict with ibn Rashid, the powerful ruler of the Shammar tribes and were forced into exile into Kuwait. Although humiliated and an outcast Abd al-Rahman set out to restore Saudi power and extend the Wahhabi cause throughout Arabia. Thus, in exile, he instilled in one of his sons, Abd al Aziz ibn Abd al-Rakman al-Faisal al Saud (ibn Saud henceforth) the fervor and lessons needed to accomplish the goal.<sup>25</sup> The period of Wahhab weakness, of dormancy, had come to an end.

#### 4. Resurrection

Armed with religious conviction and determined to restore family honor, Ibn Saud with forty followers returned to Arabia. In a campaign much like a Greek epic tale, he succeeded in recapturing Riyadh and restored Saudi Wahhabi power in the peninsula.<sup>26</sup> Through a series of successful campaigns, all of the Nejd fell to him by 1906. By 1913 he had captured part of the Hijaz and defeated the Rashidis and their Turkish allies.<sup>27</sup> More importantly, he had conquered Al-Hasa thereby reaching the Persian Gulf and making contact with the British.

Ibn Saud soon found out, however, that conquering the infidel came quite easily in comparison to ruling his domain.

After the Ottoman Sultan had agreed to recognize ibn Saud as the lawful ruler of the Nejd, he turned his attention to the administration of the state. He had much working for him in securing his hold over the society. His political legitimacy was assured through his military exploits, his family pedigree and his sincere Wahhabi faith. He had the nucleus of a theocratic state in the ulema, many of whom directly descended from al-Wahhab, and through his father, Abdul Rahman who still held the title of Iman. The mutawas strengthened his position through their missionary work among the tribes. Despite all his accomplishments and all these supportive forces, he still could not effectively contain, much less rule, over the nomadic and unreliable bedouin.

The astute ibn Saud saw the basic weakness of the society which had brought about the Wahhabi movements' decline and prevented him from ruling effectively. It was the constitution of a desert society:

capable as it was of heroic effort under the impulse of a great cause or a great personality, but temperamentally unable to maintain indefinitely the discipline necessary to develop the fruits of victory for the common good.<sup>28</sup>

Local and parochial loyalties overrode all attempts to sustain the state and when harnessed, under the unifying banner of Unitarianism, lasted only briefly. Ibn Saud, using religion as his tool, struck upon the solution known today as the Ikhwan (Brotherhood). But before describing this unique solution, one must first become more familiar with the forces of instability which ibn Saud hoped to overcome.

## 5. The Forces of Instability

With defeat of the Rashidis, ibn Saud had gained a kingdom as large as France. His people, however, had no conception of an ordered society, where laws didn't change with each tribe or town passed. Totally illiterate, isolated from the world by the desert, a lack of resources and their unruly ways (referred to as al-Djakiliya), their lifestyle remained unchanged for centuries. Raiding and robbery, feuds between tribes and the Bedouin concept of honor and his elevated status among all men; all created an anarchial society defying unity and order.

Essentially six elements could be found in the society that encouraged this anarchy. Foremost among them, Bedouin were not accustomed to serving one master for an extended period of time. Many rulers before ibn Saud had created kingdoms; "but most of the kingdoms had broken up as soon as the rulers died, whether they died by violence or were cunning or lucky enough to die in their beds."<sup>29</sup> The Bedouin could be hired to the fight for the thrill, glory and booty it would bring. For after all, it merely extended the act of raiding beyond familiar borders. But when the struggle proved to be an extended one, the forces owing allegiance to only their sheikh and not the grand strategist, proved unreliable and tended to drift away, sometimes even joining the enemy's side.

The second element revolved around the basic conflict inherent to the society of the peninsula between the townsmen

and the nomadic Bedouin. The nomadic Bedouin as a class were those men whose main economic support derived directly from the sheep or camels which were constantly driven in search of water and pasture. The townsmen, on the other hand, earned their living and the disdain of the nomads directly from their agricultural and urban activities.<sup>30</sup> Especially after the introduction of the Wahhabi Movement, the noble Bedouin considered the town dweller "with his waterpipe and clean shaven face the very essence of sin and the town dweller considered the Bedouin convert as little more than a fanatical animal."<sup>31</sup> This level of animosity, first based on their relationship to the land, the treatment of women, and then later on religious grounds, showed itself in a variety of ways. Besides the normal violence and discrimination, town dwellers would not even allow intermarriage with the Bedouin or vice versa.<sup>32</sup>

Ibn Saud like his predecessors, utilized the armies of townsmen more often and more successfully as they were far more reliable on the battlefield and in times of peace. With the capture of the Hijaz, this conflict between the two classes became more evident with slaughter and conflict the usual end result of their meetings.<sup>33</sup>

The third element came from the townsmen themselves. Each ruling family pandered to its own petty ambitions and rivalries. The absence of a strong leader often led to factionalism and dissension not only among themselves but later against Ibn Saud. In 1908, Ibn Saud had to forcefully retake the town of al-Hariq which had grown independent and

adventurist.<sup>34</sup> Not only had they caused mayhem in their territory, they had even challenged ibn Saud, refusing him entrance to their town to mediate their own quarrelling and warring.

A fourth element could be easily identified with the first and third elements of independence and petty township rivalries. The two problems are related to a more pervasive phenomena in the peninsular society, that is, kinship or tribal ties. Kinship is easily identified in the nomadic Bedouins who wander in semi-autonomous bands of kinsmen. These bands in turn relate to members of a larger grouping or tribe on the basis of descent. Each group owes its allegiance to its skeikh who in turn submits to one of a larger or more powerful kin group who enjoys his status like those below him via his election from all skeikhs or elders and in particular family lineage. Villages in the same way are united to a particular tribe with the elders and a skeikh enjoying the position of leadership. Not all towns relate to kinship or tribal ties as totally as others though. In some cases such ties are important but the members remain united through their common residence and shared experience. Nevertheless, such villages exhibit the same loyalties as those characterized above.

In any event, the phenomena produced a political affinity of all its members toward a particular group or leader. Re-aligning and keeping their allegiance to another leader, in

particular, of another tribe did not come easy. Further, as there were distinct rivalries and differing social status among tribes, divergence of opinion on who should hold the leadership was common and divisive.

A fifth corrosive element could be found in the many racial and religious minorities found in the kingdom. A large group, the Shiites were never treated with any tolerance by the Ikhwan or more fanatical Sunni's. In fact, a fatwa issued by the ulema under ibn Saud called for their forced conversion denial of the right to worship and demolition of their mosques.<sup>35</sup> Ibn Saud overturned the order as he did not wish to risk more war. Indirectly then, the existence of a large religious minority in the Eastern Province contributed substantially to the problem of social and political consolidation.<sup>36</sup>

The sixth problem related to the difficulties of establishing law and order in the realm. Ibn Saud faced the problem of developing trust among tribesmen in the established legal and regulatory forms of government. Familiar with their own customs and law, they were hard put to accept the Sharia and the central authority of Riyadh which sought to standardize them.<sup>37</sup> Similarly, the townsmen remained aloof of other laws other than their own. In his attempts for law and order, ibn Saud constantly had to deal with both groups as they attempted to use that law which suited their needs at the time.<sup>38</sup> No one group readily accepted the new laws or gave up their familiar and ancient ones.

Thus ibn Saud faced many challenges against his attempts to unify the society, to build a solid citizenship and to preserve his kingdom beyond his death. Knowing that the fate of his kingdom's independence and growth into a modern state hinged on his ability to overcome these ancient conflicts he utilized the cohesive elements of Wahhabism and embarked upon a unique solution, the Ikhwan.

6. The Ikhwan

Starting in about 1912, ibn Saud encouraged the unruly Bedouins to build close to two hundred hijras, "new towns which were a combination of military cantonment, agricultural colony, and missionary center for the propagation of Wahhabism."<sup>39</sup> Drawn basically from the Harb and Mutair tribesmen, they came to be called the Ikhwan.<sup>40</sup> The first experimental colony established itself at Artawiya and were given arms, money, seed and agricultural equipment. Supplemented by the mutawwas, the Ikhwan rendered valuable service to ibn Saud as devotees of the jihad against unbelievers. This settlement Artawiya, expanded to house over 10,000 Ikhwan and was much feared by Moslems and foreigners alike. Philby reported in passing by it, that it was "dreaded throughout the length and breadth of Arabia" having become "a veritable metropolis of narrow fanaticism."<sup>41</sup>

Ibn Saud had thus canalized the warlike propensities of the Arabs in the service of God and his representative on earth, ibn Saud. Intra-tribal raids, highway robbery, tobacco,

and the luxuries of life were now taboo. All men regardless of tribe and social status became Ikhwan and helped build the mosques, schools and dwellings of the hijra.

Daily existence in these cantonments resembled a military camp. Conditions were austere with religious duties the most demanding. If one missed the call of the minaret and lacked an adequate excuse, he faced execution. All members worked for the development and expansion of the town and participated continuously in all religious activities and training.

The equality of the membership, though in theory unanimous, actually broke down into the development of three classes. Bedouins now farmers made up the warrior class and the majority. The leadership of this group, the skiekhs were sent to special ulema schools in Riyadh to ensure their faith and loyalty to the Wahhabi cause. They and specially trained ulema made up the second class and religious leadership in the community. This group, the mutawwas performed a dual function. They collected the zakat and spread the gospel in the economy and construction of the settlements.<sup>42</sup> Finally, merchants and craftsmen aided in the economy and construction of the settlements and thus comprised the third class in the hijra.

The hijra at its height had become the major feature of the resurrected Wahhabi movement. It remained a ready source of manpower and fanaticism for ibn Saud. At one time, they could field a force of twenty five thousand men in ninety six hours.<sup>43</sup>

They were an elite force, the only true Moslems.

It was a force of men who were always fresh and always changing, with a lust for battle and plunder, or reward in Paradise, which was always new and sharp. These were men far more ruthless and far more terrible than the men of the tribal levies of his earlier days - men who spread fear and respect for the justice of ibn Saud.<sup>44</sup>

The man ultimately responsible for their creation and success, for their organization and vitality was Sheikh Abd Allah ibn Mohammad ibn Abd al-Latif. A major actor in the resurrection of the movement, Abd Allah had originally undertook the task of re-educating the Nejd in 1902. He organized the armies of mutawwas, directed their activities and inspired their religious thought. His rules and regulations permeated the country and the religion and his treatises served as the basis for the philosophical and practical application of the faith.<sup>45</sup> He had inspired ibn Saud to combine religion and agricultural responsibilities with the obligation of jihad. Through him, the true significance of the Ikhwan as compared to other religious movements came into being. Nowhere else had such a force and organization been created for such an ideal. For the first time the Bedouin were involved in the social and economic mainstream of the towns. "A formerly unreliable social element was forged into a reliable and loyal fighting force; all this was accomplished through the medicines of religion as implemented and understood by the people of the towns."<sup>46</sup> A new class of citizen, a class between the merchants of the towns and the unruly Bedouin had been born.

This new class, by its very existence, tipped the balance from barbarity towards a kind of civilization. For the first time in the deserts' history, the proportion of men who were settled and more or less amenable to law was enough to form the foundation of a stable state: it was on that foundation that the state of Saudi Arabia began to grow.<sup>47</sup>

In such a way, ibn Saud overcame, at least temporarily, the divisive forces mentioned earlier. For close to twenty years, they ensured his rule, conquered more territory and spread the unifying faith of al-Wahhab.

#### 7. The Wahhabi Precepts

To understand fully this unifying element of the Wahhabi faith, one must first understand its precepts. For based on this faith, ibn Saud could boast to the British, "should I have but to give the word and a great host would flock to my banner ... and not one of them but lives to die for the great reward."<sup>48</sup>

At the onset it must be pointed out that ibn Saud could make such a boast first because he was a religious leader. Blessed by al-Wahhab, ibn Saud's forefathers had established themselves not only as the political leaders of the tribes but as the religious tutors of the faithful. Secondly, his great personality of epic proportions ensured the loyalty of the religious as well as the indifferent.

Besides this, puritanical Islam embodied in the Wahhabi movement struck responsive chords among the population long accustomed to austere living conditions and deprivations of desert life. Not only did the accretions of wealth

(Western lifestyle and inventions, gold, silk, liquor and tobacco) come under attack, but also their location, namely, the towns. As mentioned before, the animosity toward townsmen was great and what better way to vent this hatred than to war against them in the name of Allah and righteousness.

Using these primordial factors, Mohammad ibn Abdul al-Wahhab thrust his beliefs on the people of the Nejd. Though inspired by ibn Taymiyya, in some major aspects he departed from his teachings.<sup>49</sup> Thus unlike ibn Taymiyya, he rejected all forms of Sufism. There could be no mystical relationship with God by man. Therefore, walis, saints, and so-called 'friends of God', were deemed heretics. Mohammad the Prophet could only make such a claim and he was the last. No one, according to the Wahhabi's theory has influence or a special relationship with Allah. One can't reach Him nor comprehend Him. Thus the tradition of grave visitation and the cult surrounding special tombs became sinful. Wahhabi's strictly forbid the adornment of graves and destroyed those that were, as in the case of Hussain's tomb in Karbala.<sup>50</sup>

Wahhabi's also rejected, with much more vitulence, ibn Taymiyya, the intellectualism of Islam.<sup>51</sup> Taqlid, the various schools of Islamic thought, fettered men to false rules and ideas. Written by men, they carried with them foreign influences and errors. The only path to true Islam was fresh thinking formed "through a personal study" deriving "an understanding of his responsibilities to God."<sup>52</sup> Significantly, al-Wahhab insisted that all follow his interpretation which embodied Hanbali ideas.<sup>53</sup>

Through study one would soon discover the 'unity of God.' According to al-Wahhab, Allah was all pervasive, the only worthy object of adoration, with no other object worthy of devotion.<sup>54</sup> Hence, Mohammad's warning against polytheism was taken strictly. The pagan beliefs of the Bedouins concerning jinns, sacred trees and venerated rocks violated this tenet and had to be eradicated. Not even the celebration of the Prophet's birthday was tolerated.

As can be construed from above, one of the main tenets of the Wahhabi faith lay in the strict adherence of the Quranic precepts. Wine, narcotics, music, use of gold and silk, and other luxury items were to be forbidden and disdained. Further, all true Bedouins were to contest all men, Moslem and non-Moslem alike until they acknowledged that there is no God but Allah and followed the Quranic precepts strictly, especially the five pillars of faith.

Finally, the Wahhabi faith stressed the evils of innovation, the necessity for punishment of wrong dress, the importance of sinner and complete devotion to Allah and the requirement to follow and remain loyal to those leaders who accept and rule through the Sharia. They were taught that good works, especially death in a jihad would bring pardon from Allah and ensure an afterlife in paradise.<sup>55</sup>

With these principles ibn Saud and the Wahhabi ulema ruled the Bedouin. Legitemized by his position as Imam, he was able to:

- 1) create and establish a legal (Sharia based) form of taxation,
- 2) build a legal system corresponding to the Sharia as the Wahhabi's interpreted it,
- 3) provide the proper religious education for townsmen and Bedouin alike,
- 4) develop religious controls to ensure complete conversion of all to the true faith,
- 5) and legitimize the pre-eminence of the king (umara) over the ulema through directing the jihād, presiding over prayer, and being responsible for all religious obligations.

The Wahhabi movement with its precepts, resurrected as it was by ibn Saud, legitimized his rule, unified the society and provided the fervor necessary to complete the conquest and consolidate his gains in the peninsula. The Wahhabi faith and the development of the Ikhwan provided the perfect solution to the primordial challenges before him and his people.

#### 8. Revolt of the Ikhwan

By 1925, with the Ikhwan leading the way and Wahhabi inspired townsmen doing much of the fighting, ibn Saud had conquered al-Aksa, Asir and finally the Hijaj provinces. With the fall of Hijaj, then under the self-proclaimed caliph Husayn, ibn Saud felt that his fighting years were over.<sup>56</sup> The Ikhwan did not. The Brethren's desire to kill or convert the unfaithful was still unsatisfied. There were always more infidels to conquer. Once started, there was simply no way of stopping the Brethren. They were "certain to crash as a train or a car without brakes."<sup>57</sup> Yet they had to be stopped

for there was no one left to fight without encountering the wealth and mechanized arms of the British. All the small shiekhdoms on its periphery as well as Trans-Jordan and Iraq had British treaties, alliances and forces stationed to protect them.<sup>58</sup>

The Ikhwan, however, long chafing under the moderation and modernization of ibn Saud threw caution to the wind and attacked Iraq in 1927. Thus after a period of mistrust and resentment toward the king, the Ikhwan started their revolt.

The revolt had its roots well before their invasion of Iraq. The massacres at Taif and in Jordan in 1921 had shocked ibn Saud who was quick to reprimand them.<sup>59</sup> Further ibn Saud at this time had embarked on a cautious program of modernizing the state. Though giving due deference to Wahhabism, the Ikhwan viewed this modernization with its foreign inventions and contacts as evil and sinful.<sup>60</sup> The first automobile to enter the fanatical town of Hauta, for instance, was burned publicly with its driver almost sharing its fate.<sup>61</sup> The king's contacts with the British and acquiescence to the foreigners international laws were further irksome to the Ikhwan. All of these sources of discontent led ultimately to the Brethren under Faisal al-Duwaish of the Mutair tribe and Sultan ibn Bijad of the Ataiba to take matters into their own hands and start raiding Iraq and Kuwait.

Their complaints were well known through a previous conference of Ikhwan leaders in 1926. In that conference they promised to continue the jihad against infidels and censured ibn Saud on seven points.<sup>62</sup> They were:

- 1) for not having punished the Egyptians for murdering some Ikhwan who were preventing the Mahmal (a holy covering for the Kabal) and its military band from entering Mecca,<sup>63</sup>
- 2) sending his son, Faisal to London to curry favor with the British,
- 3) introducing the telegraph, telephone and automobile into the land of Islam,
- 4) levying custom taxes on the Moslems in Nejd,
- 5) granting grazing rights to Jordan and Iraq on Wahhabi land,
- 6) prohibiting commerce with Kuwait (if they weren't Moslems they should be killed or converted, if they were, then trade should be lawful),
- 7) tolerating the dissenters of al-Aksa and al-Qatif. He should force them to become Moslems or kill them.<sup>64</sup>

The ulema during this time frame were also perturbed by ibn Saud's actions but were more disturbed by the fanatical Ikhwan. In issuing a famous fatwa in 1927, they underscored their concerns by:

- 1) taking a neutral position on the question of the telegraph,
- 2) wanting to prevent the entrance of the Mahmal into the Hijaj,
- 3) wanting the Shiites converted or exiled,
- 4) wishing to prevent Shiites from grazing in Moslem territory,
- 5) requesting the Imam to return illegal taxes while also stating that this was not an issue of sufficient grounds to destroy Moslem unity, and
- 6) decreeing that it was the Imam's responsibility alone to declare a jihad not sheikhs.<sup>65</sup>

Ibn Saud called a conference in April 1927 in Riyadh to consult with the leaders. Many of his innovations were

passed in review; the religious and tribal leaders gave their support of all the main issues raised, especially his policy of peace and friendship with all their neighbors. Thus armed with this consultation and endorsement, he could face the Ikhwan.

After more raids into Iraq and into Kuwait and after diplomatic protests from the British, ibn Saud held another conference in 1928. Al-Duwaish and ibn Bijad refused to attend. Ibn Saud offered to resign his post but since his power and prestige could not be replaced, it was naturally refused. Receiving again their endorsement, the king, with a clear conscience, set out to purge the Brethren.

Organizing levies from the towns, the war was brought to its conclusion in two years. Once again the ethic of the towns and the ethic of the people of the desert became an issue.<sup>66</sup> For the Ikhwan this was more than a jihad for the Wahhabi faith, it was war against the hated lifestyle and politics that came to be associated with the town. Once again, the townsmen bore the brunt of the battle with the still basically unreliable tribal levies in the wings.<sup>67</sup> The final battle at Sibila was to mark an end of an epoch as well, for the battle was waged with motorcars and radios against camels and swords. Further:

Saudi Arabia had virtually assumed its final shape as the result of constant war upon the infidel; and henceforth the infidel would be a valued ally in the common cause of progress. Hitherto the killing of infidels in the way of God had been regarded as the supreme virtue; but Faisal al-Duwaish had been taught at Sibila

that that virtue must not be practiced without the permission of higher authority; and henceforth its practice would be strictly forbidden.<sup>68</sup>

The rebellion had showed that clan loyalties were still very strong for the men fought and died as their Shiekhs had ordered. Ibn Saud realizing the revolt for what it was, that is, the essence of ancient primordial politics, ended it quickly with characteristic military efficiency and humanitarianism, "It was to be the last time that the ethos of the desert would challenge the religious ethic of the towns."<sup>69</sup>

Once so prominent in the creation of the new regime, the Ikhwan were now shattered and sank into oblivion. Brilliantly conceived, useful in conquests, the Ikhwan had become a juggernaut out of control. The modernization and progress so desperately needed by the state was then at stake. So it was ironic that in the end, the very force used to unify the country, threatened it with disintegration. Philby said it better by writing:

Ibn Saud's creation of the Ikhwan movement in 1912 was a stroke of genius; only equalled by his courageous liquidation of the organization eighteen years later, when it could be nothing but an obstacle to the consolidation of a position which he had built up so patiently and laboriously. The Frankenstein of his own creation would surely have destroyed him, if he had not taken the initiative of destroying it himself.<sup>70</sup>

#### 9. Conclusions

With the defeat of the Ikhwan, serious internal resistance to the regime of ibn Saud ended. Other than the easily quelled rebellion of ibn Rafida, internal dissatisfaction

did not rise again till 1958 with the reign of Saud. Still, ibn Saud and his heirs had to reconcile Wahhabism with their plans for modernization and later the immense wealth derived from oil. It would not be an easy task.

Though modernization and the exploitation of oil would bring profound changes to Saudi Arabia, neither of them could compare to the impact of Wahhabism. Through al-Wahhab and his first convert king, Mohammad abn Saud, the peninsula had been brought out of the religious 'dark age' and politically revived. Based on purely religious motives, the two men had created a nation unique in the Arab world. However, due to internal and unique primordial conflicts, their dream came to an end only to be resurrected by Abdul Aziz ibn Saud in 1901.

The impact of ibn Saud on the formation of the modern state, was beyond great; he was the state. Deeply religious yet politically astute, he created and molded a state where none had existed or had lasted for so long.

Through his grand design, the society and state "had been established on the bedrock of consultation between classes," and in particular between the king and the ulema.<sup>71</sup> Many Bedouins had been permanently settled and brought into the community. Legal anarchy and the violent code of the people had been corralled. Finally and most importantly, Islam in its purist form had been reestablished throughout the land. For the first time, religious instruction and rule had been introduced to the towns and the nomadic people.

Having handled internal and external conflict without the loss of unity or power, the Wahhabi Movement had and would continue to mold the society and state well beyond the death of its greatest of leaders, ibn Saud.

## C. SAUDI ARABIA TODAY

### 1. Introduction

With the creation of the Wahhabi society and the creation of the new state in 1932, King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud faced the enormous problem of creating a modern nation state. With the crushing defeat of the Wahhabi rebels in 1929, ibn Saud shifted from the strictly religious direction of his politics to a more secular one. Recognizing that the nations future security depended on modernization and growth, he single-handedly thrust his nation into the twentieth century. How he and his successors were able to do so, despite the difficulties, will be discussed below. Accordingly, the various elements which make up Saudi Arabian society and government will be identified and their political religious power analyzed, as well as their means of political expression. Finally, the modern sources of conflict will be reviewed and then analyzed. With this information, the paper will conclude by forecasting Saudi Arabia's near future; a future which in the end does not look promising for the royal family.

### 2. The Political-Social Forces

#### a. The House of Saud

To understand the present and future of Saudi Arabia one must not only look to the king and royal family as the source for directions and power but to the ulema , the tribal

Bedouin, the rising middle class and the military as well. All define and shape the political, social and economic structure of the society. Each group provides a significant influence that cannot be ignored by either the analyst or the ruling elite, the House of Saud. Nevertheless, the authority and source of power in the nation lies with the king and his royal family. Ibn Saud had created through his dominant personality, religious and military acumen, and purposeful acts, a socio-political structure that remains vibrantly alive today.<sup>72</sup> Difference in method of rule exists today but for the most part they remain intact.

In the early period of the state, ibn Saud ruled his country as if it were his personal household.<sup>73</sup> His reign was absolute but because he modeled his conduct after that of the Prophet Mohammad, the Quran and the Traditions, he governed much like a constitutional monarch. In matters concerning religion he consulted the ulema, specifically from the Al-al-Shaikh clan. In other matters he held a daily 'majlis' where his family, tribal chiefs and notables had their sway.<sup>74</sup> Ibn Saud's rule was further cemented through the use of marital alliances which ensured not a huge royal family derived from over three hundred wives but the loyalty of tribal chiefs as well.<sup>75</sup> Thus ibn Saud placed a vested interest in all families for the regimes stability and created political legitimacy in the eyes of the people.<sup>76</sup>

The primary method of rule, at least in the formative years, embodied ibn Saud's personal decision making. Faced

with a poor country and lacking an adequate administration, he relied on the money garnered from the pilgrimages, the remaining Ottoman bureaucrats in the Hijaj and his own political maturity. These, however, were not enough as a modern state could not be ruled by Bedouin raised and Unitarian motivated king who saw the land as his personal estate.

Ironically, the one factor that ensured that Saudi Arabia was to remain one nation would be his drive for and acceptance of modernity. This drive allowed for the first oil and mineral exploration to be conducted between 1931 and 1933 by an American named Twitchell and its production in 1936-38 by Aramco ensured that the state would survive.<sup>77</sup>

Besides supplying the needed funds for the state, "the oil revenues of Saudi Arabia have in a sense liberated it from the necessity to choose between tradition and modernity."<sup>78</sup> The missing ingredient for the success of the regime - money - came flowing in the millions of dollars. Considering the country's fiscal problems, the money was welcome yet it bequeathed ibn Saud with still more problems<sup>79</sup> In the first year, the king received ten million dollars.<sup>80</sup> In later years, it would geometrically rise.

Ironically, the very item so necessary for construction of a modern state, corrupted it. Being ignorant and naive, the funds were unwisely spent resulting in spiralling inflation; "anarchy of money grabbing" and corruption.<sup>81</sup> Foolish extravagances and expensive vices became the norm and a source of bad publicity for the House of Saud.

Many of the princes entirely misunderstood the west, they saw and craved its luxury, but never saw its foundation of morality and taste. To some degree, the west misunderstood the princes; it saw a brood of playboys, but never saw the sternly moral world they came from.<sup>82</sup>

The political structure then was incapable and incompetent in the early years to handle the wealth and modernization process. Indeed, ibn Saud's government failed to provide for the needed medical programs, schools, sanitation services and infrastructure, so necessary for an emerging state.<sup>83</sup> At his death in 1953, ibn Saud had left a unified but incompletely prepared society as well as a legacy of corruption and government inefficiency. Prior to his death, however, he created what was to be a political tradition to ensure the regimes stability still further - the Saudi principle of succession. Since the principle of primogeniture was not universally accepted, he insisted on selecting his successor, his eldest surviving son, Saud, and forced all to oaths of loyalty to uphold his rule.<sup>84</sup> Thus by a simple act, he prevented the future disintegration of the Saudi dynasty which had plagued it previously. The principle of succession incorporated previous traditions besides this oath process. The ulema, tribal leaders and the royal family all influence the succession and can dethrone the king if need be (such as Saud in 1964). The succession also "would be determined not by seniority but by ability in leadership, suitability of character, and the indefinable characteristic of being lucky."<sup>85</sup>

Though his choice as successor proved to be a poor one, the system left behind him proved enduring and capable. The royal family armed with numbers, unity, prestige, political legitimacy and Quranic principles were able to depose Saud; albeit with difficulty, and replace him with a more competent ruler, Faisal ibn Abdul Aziz-al-Saud.<sup>86</sup> If any questions remained concerning the stability of the Saudi state they were quickly dispelled with the quick and efficient handling of Faisal's assassination.<sup>87</sup>

It was with Faisal's reign that the royal family's power and prestige expanded. Not only had they proved responsible in handling internal government problems, they had embarked upon a successful drive for modernization and efficient government. Cutting down waste and corruption, Faisal inaugurated the Ten Point Program to ensure the state would progress yet maintain its cultural values.<sup>88</sup>

Today, the royal family's strength has grown far beyond the expectations of ibn Saud. In fact, the kingly powers exercised previously have been considerably curtailed. For a variety of reasons, King Khalid exercises less power and influence than his predecessors and the trend will likely continue. The demise of the autocratic rule of the king came about gradually. Foremost among the reasons was the creation of ministries to handle the ever increasing complications of a modern state. Starting even with ibn Saud, the ministries were created to handle Foreign Affairs (1930),

Finance (1933), Defense and Aviation (1944), the Interior (1951), Agriculture, Communication and Education (1953), Commerce and Industry, Health (1954), Information, Labor and Social Affairs (1960's) and finally, Justice (1970).<sup>89</sup> By 1975, even more ministries were created. They were: Ministries of; Higher Education, Industry and Electricity, Commerce, Municipal and Racial Affairs, Planning, Posts, Telegraphs and Telecommunications, and Public Works and Housing.<sup>90</sup> The ministries, at first staffed by foreigners, were manned mostly by princes of the royal family and later some educated laymen.<sup>91</sup> This placed the princes in positions of significant influence and greatly curtailed the powers of the king. Tied to this, another element attributing to the rise of the royal family's power was education. Though not holding any degrees, they were better educated and politically experienced.<sup>92</sup> Consequently, they demanded a greater voice and active participation in the government. Further, their numbers and propensity to form coalitions provided added strength and necessitated that they not only be heard but heeded. Finally, due to their royal ties, they have amassed great wealth through business deals and royal annuities while the king, though wealthy too, cannot use the coffers of the state for personal use as in ibn Saud's time. Thus the king cannot buy loyalties as had been traditionally done before but rather must use argument and consultation more than ever. Finally, with the death of ibn Saud, no personality has risen that can match the power, prestige, legitimacy and epic

background of the great king. As a result each succeeding king must live under his shadow and prove his worth and capabilities and subsequently depend on certain power groupings and the support of all the five thousand or more princes. Consequently, the requirement of consultation remains not only bound by cultural tradition embodied in the majlis but political reality as well.

It would be erroneous to conclude that each prince holds equal and commensurate powers. In fact, only a favored few hold the reins of government and actively plot its future course. Foremost among them are what is commonly called the "Sudairi Seven", one of whom is Crown Prince Fahd. Because ibn Saud's mother was a Sudairi, all of his descendents have and will continue to have important connections with the family and government.<sup>93</sup> By 1976, four of the seven Sudairi sons were ministers or vice ministers, while the others held other important posts, with the last, Abdul Rahman, acting privately as the financial advisor of the family.<sup>94</sup>

Another influential group, the Al-al-Shaikh family, holds not only political power but great religious influence. As direct descendents of Wahhab and ibn Saud, they wield considerable prestige along with the ulema and act as the traditional guardians of the Islamic orthodoxy of political decisions, also along with the ulema. Under Faisal, however their influence declined.<sup>95</sup> Only under Khalid have they seemed to regain their power and influence. At present one member

heads the Ministry of Justice and another, the Ministry of Higher Education, both areas of traditional control.

Through these two prominent families as well as members from the Jiliwi and Thunayyan families, there is room for all to share in decision making and direct clashes among them restrained. Due to the nature of the decision making process, issues revolve more around personalities than parties or ideological ideas.<sup>96</sup> Family ties remain important but not so important if they threaten to destroy the overall unity and power of the House of Saud.

Together, they duly support the king under oath providing the basis for him to rule as head of state, sheikh of sheikhs, supreme religious leader and commander in chief of the armed forces.

b. The Ulema

As could be seen in the previous chapter concerning the Wahhabiyya Movement, Saudi Arabia owes its national identity to the fundamentalist version of Islam as espoused by Mohhamad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Traditional influence, well before al-Wahhab, also prevailed. In early Islam, "the problems on the affairs of the Moslem community were to be brought before God and Mohammad." Their judgement must be obeyed. "Herein lay the basis for the establishment of Moslem theocracy."<sup>97</sup> Hence the descendents of al-Wahhab and ibn Saud continue today to share religious and political hegemony, as the patrilineal descendents of the 'reformer' dominate the top religious and political posts. The pervasiveness of Unitarian Islam in

Saudi Arabia cannot be overestimated as the faith pervades all aspects of public and private life. The constitution of the state, though not written is said to be the Quran. The legal system relies on the Sharia and the educational system remains predominantly religious.<sup>98</sup> All acts of government and all social activities are under their close scrutiny and subject to their injunctions and fatwas. Thus the ulema, along with the royal family, hold a central and powerful role in the state's affairs.<sup>99</sup>

In recent years, their influence has been on the wane due in part to the ruling elites actions and powers as well as the eroding effects of wealth and modernization upon the society. Nevertheless the ulema perceive their role in society and government as being very active. As guardians of Islamic orthodoxy, they have a voice in all things, including the succession of kings.<sup>100</sup> These powers of legitimizing authority continue to be important as could be seen in the succession of Faisal.

Since the mosque remains one of the most important channels for communication, the ulema can generate support or trouble for the government policies. Their influence lies not only with internal domestic policies but in foreign affairs as well. The creation of Israel, the occupation of Moslem land, the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty has moved them to apply force on the ruling elite to oppose them. Further as the center of Islam, the keeper of the holy cities, it has an

international role through various conferences and councils, most of which are based out of Saudi Arabia.<sup>101</sup>

As mentioned before, the role of the ulema has somewhat diminished in Saudi society. It should be noted that even in ibn Saud's time, at the height of their power, some of their more fanatical activities were not tolerated. Ibn Saud, though always mindful to consult them on religious and some political problems, would not let them stand in the way of progress or the welfare of the state.<sup>102</sup> It was over their objections that he and his successors introduced the automobile, modern telecommunications and other Western technology.<sup>103</sup> Later, the ulema's hold over the educational system was diminished with the dispatch of Saudi students to Egypt in the 1940's to receive a secular education and culminated with the establishment of a more secular curriculum in the state's schools.<sup>104</sup> Thus more secular teachers and subjects started to infiltrate the country's schools. Through these developments and gradually eroding influence of modernization and Western educated elite, the ulema have slowly lost the great influence of the Wahhabi period.

Today, the ulema maintain a voice in government and society through their two most prominent groups, the Al-al-Shaikh in the upper class and the mollahs of the lower class. Their organization, dominated by the Al-al-Shaikh family in the highest positions maintains a hierarchial structure for centuries.

With the death of the Mufti in 1970, no other al-Shaikh has been designated one and consequently, the al-Shaikh lack a central and higher authority. Consequently, no great personality stands out and today, the ulema are ranked in importance only according to their geographical position. As George Lipsky states, "the ulema of ar-Riyadh occupy a position superior to that of the ulema in the provincial capitals and larger towns."<sup>105</sup> It is generally the lower class mollahs who are the most conservative and contentious of forces in Saudi Arabia while the upper class mollahs have been coerced or open to manipulation by the Saudi kings. Both groups carry great weight and they could constitute a conservative force which the government must always reckon with.

An implication of the pervasive force of the ulema exists in the fact that the government retains such offices as Collector of Zakat and Chief of the Committee for the Encouragement of Good and the Suppression of Evil. Though the infamous Committee does not break into homes as it had done previously, it remains active, in particular, during the month of Ramadam.<sup>106</sup>

c. The Bedouin

The next most traditional element in the Saudi society are the Bedouin. Saudi Arabians use the term 'al-badu' (Bedouins) to indicate the nomadic Arab tribes whose pastoral existence bases itself on the raising of camels, sheep and goats. Among the tribes, some count themselves of

noble descent and even when poor enjoy high prestige as members of the desert aristocracy.

Unlike Villagers, Bedouin live an erratic life - on the move, dreading where and when to move next, and concerned with daily care of animals and family needs. There is a continuous sense of insecurity in a physically hostile world. To meet the demands imposed on them, they must be tough, self-disciplined, and aggressive, characteristics reflected in traditions of independence, hostility to compromise and a strong system of values.<sup>107</sup>

Their lifestyle has become symbolic of basic Arab values.<sup>108</sup> Even while working in the oil fields they maintain their rigid codes of honor, revenge, hospitality and hostility, loyalty and resistance to change.<sup>109</sup> To many townsmen, as explained before, the term Bedouin has long been an expression of contempt yet at the same time, a badge of honor, one of which ibn Saud carried with great pride. "The bedouin of Saudi Arabia are the spring from which other groups in the population have revitalized themselves periodically through centuries."<sup>110</sup>

There are four main groupings of Bedouin; the Badia, Arabdar, Hukra and Hadbar.<sup>111</sup> The Badia remain at the top of the social scale with the Sharif tribes the most aristocratic and the Arabdar, the semi-nomads next in line. They are considered of lower caste because of their association with the towns, which is thought to be soft and decadent. The Hakra are shepherds who look after the sheep of the important tribes and city dwellers and are 'inferior' because of their restricted movements caused by the sheep. Finally,

the Hadbar lie at the bottom of the Bedouin world. They are the people who live in permanent dwellings and therefore are despised by the true Bedouin.

Leadership in Bedouin society lies in the hands of the Sheikh of each tribe and ultimately each of the one hundred or more tribes provides a voice in the government. They, like the ulema, must be heard and their loyalty sought by the king. At first resistant to the central authority of Riyadh, they have through succeeding years succumbed to it. Though the problems they traditionally cause for any ruler have been discussed previously, it is worth noting that they have been far from erased.

Under Saud, their loyalty had to be bought and consequently they helped drain the treasury. Their power and influence however were dramatically pointed out when efforts were made to curtail the despotism of Saud in 1958, 1962 and in 1964. Saud was able to maintain power by touring the country, buying off sheikhs and drumming up support for his rule. Only when Faisal stopped his funds and preempted his visits with his followers was Saud finally ousted.<sup>112</sup>

The importance of the Bedouin and tribal support cannot be overstated especially in the modern age. They have resisted the central rule of Riyadh even under ibn Saud.

Although the House of Saud undertook some major changes in the administrative framework for the governance of the tribes and its vast new possession, for instance, organization of the Kingdom or its territorial basis, and despite the fact that the acceptance of the spiritual authority of ibn Saud made the

majority of the population aware of vaguely belonging to some larger community, it remains wholly inappropriate to suggest that a modern political loyalty had emerged or developed despite the Western predilection for associating territorial bases of governances with "nationalism."<sup>113</sup>

Riyadh then does not fully control most of the society of Bedouins either in a territorial or qualitative sense. There are no territorial limitations upon the effectiveness of the central authority based upon the ability of tribal rulers to resist this authority and the qualitative limitations based upon the consultative rights of the leaders of major tribes and confederations.<sup>114</sup> This independence can be clearly seen in the majlis whereupon the tribal sheikhs are treated with deference and respect.

The role and influence of the Bedouin tribes then lay in its numbers (over 100 tribes), their familial lineage and ties, their traditional independence, and historical background of self-contained loyalties.

The tribe remains a basically autonomous political entity which demands loyalty from its members; indeed, it is widely recognized by both the government and tribe alike that governmental laws and regulations which are applicable in villages, towns and cities are not necessarily relevant nor applicable to the tribes.<sup>115</sup>

Nevertheless they are restrained by institutional checks of the society and government; i.e., the tribal council, the subordinate position of the sheikh to the higher shiekh of the main tribe and by custom. Further, the central government holds the reigns on money and the military, both of which offer

powerful deterrents to tribal turbulence. Still more, the Bedouin have a vested interest in the stability of the traditional ruling elite as more secular, modernizing forces stand as an alternative and opposition to it. Their vested interest and support is clearly illustrated by the development and pre-eminent position of the National Guard, which is made wholly from Bedouin recruits.

d. The Military

The present military system like all things in Saudi Arabia bears the indelible stamp of ibn Saud. As previously mentioned, his army was made chiefly from the more reliable levies of townsmen with the Bedouin nomads, supplementing the force. The Wahhabi Ikhwan forces, proving extremely successful in the early years, had by 1930 dissolved. In his wars, with the tribes, ibn Saud used modern motorized transport and communications equipment including high powered radio stations. He established, finally, a small regular army and air force and thus was able to easily quell any tribal rebellions such as the Harb tribe revolt near Mecca.<sup>116</sup> The military forces were further divided into two distinct arms: the regular army and the White Army (a national and royal guard unit). The regular army had been considered unreliable but necessary. The White Army, existing today as the National Guard, possessed greater political power as a unit and acted as an effective counter to any defections by tribes or the regular army. Both armies have grown considerably

in recent years with the National Guard seemingly receiving priority treatment.

Four mechanized infantry battalions and one artillery battalion of the Saudi National Guard, politically the most sensitive and the fastest growing branch of the Saudi forces, were trained by a private American company.<sup>117</sup>

Significantly, since its early organization, the armies have received very little attention of the government, except of course until recently. Whenever possible, police units and personal guards of tribal shiekhs were used to handle internal disorders, such as the Aramco strikes of 1953 and 1956.<sup>118</sup> Further, the military came under scrutiny and were much feared by some members of the ruling elite especially during the deposition crises of Saud in 1962-1964. At that time the National Guard had levelled its guns toward Riyadh in support of Saud and decided in his favor, several problems.<sup>119</sup> Not until they had been sent to the far corners of the country was Saud finally ousted.

It was with the civil war in Yemen, immediately after, that the army distinguished itself though it was not directly involved in the conflict. More important was the military aid given by the Soviet Union to the radical forces in Aden and Egypt. To counterbalance this, Faisal's first decisions as king was to modernize the military through the services of the United States and United Kingdom. He reorganized the entire military organization and named two of his brothers to leadership posts in the area of the Nation Guard and Internal

Security. Through the aid, the military was significantly upgraded in training and arms, so much so, that they were deployed in the 1967 and 1973 wars in Syria and Jordan. Since then, they maintained a sizeable presence in Lebanon as a security force<sup>120</sup> which was withdrawn in the spring of 1979.

With Prince Sultan as Defense Minister, Prince Nayif as Interior Minister, Prince Turki ( al-Faisal) as Director of Intelligence and another Prince Turki as Deputy Defense Minister, the Sudairi family holds a firm grip on the forces. The only exception to this is the National Guard under Prince Abdullah. This alone demonstrates the counterbalancing effect of the Guard not only as a threat to a military insurgency but a royal one as well.

From its inception, the mission of the armed force was a conventional one of safeguarding the integrity of the nation's boundaries and protecting it from invasion. In times of severe disorder they will assist public security forces for the restoration of stability. The National Guard likewise will assist the armed forces in times of national emergency, but their primary mission remains to maintain internal security. Today, the nation is witnessing a tremendous expansion of the armed forces facilities. Total outlays rose astronomically from S.R. 262 million in 1959 to S.R. 1,711 million in 1973-74 and it has gone far higher since then.<sup>121</sup> Though the Defense Ministry's share of outlays

has decreased, this has been made up by outlays to the Interior Ministry (which deals with the nation's administrative organs as well as internal security) which has increased thirteen fold.<sup>122</sup> Since 1976 spending has increased with \$6.7 billion earmarked for defense. Over eighty percent of the defense spending is, however, spent on infrastructure; building naval and air bases and military cities. Once military city at al-Kharj is expected to cost ten billion dollars alone and house 100,000 people.<sup>123</sup> Saudi expenditures today are more than Iran in the same time frame and if expenditures are compared to population, it is spending six times more per head than Iran.<sup>124</sup>

This influx of military equipment has stirred wide debate in the United States in light of what has happened to Iran and the Saudi's own capability to accept them.<sup>125</sup> At present the Saudi state suffers severe drawbacks to the modernization of its armed forces. First and foremost is the quality of the manpower. The population is largely illiterate and due to the sophistication of the hardware some 10,000 U.S. advisors, one for every six Saudi soldiers is required. "According to one estimate it would take at least seven years until the Saudi's could operate their equipment effectively."<sup>126</sup> Saudi's also suffer from lack of numbers as the population is small and the country huge. Further, there is a drain in the highly qualified who seek their wealth and fortunes in the ever expanding economy. Finally, having no home based military

industry as yet, the country remains highly dependent upon foreign powers for equipment, weapons and training.

Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia continues to be faced with numerous border disputes, external threats from revolutionary regimes and a reality that revolutions against royal governments have occurred in many countries of the region. Saudi leaders feel, especially with the fall of the Iranian monarch that it has no choice but to expand and modernize the military. Despite several incidents of infidelity and revolt (1969), the military forces will remain and grow as a bulwark of the traditional elite. At present the regime does not feel threatened by its military. The National Guard, the perquisites, training and equipment of the regular forces have been constantly updated, thus providing no grounds for complaint along those lines.<sup>127</sup>

e. The Middle Class

The one societal group in Saudi Arabia that can be attributed as being non-traditional is that of the rising middle class. A relatively new phenomena, the middle class has roots in the towns and cities of early Arabia, in particular Mecca and Medina. Their social position however was always denigrated by the more aristocratic Bedouin tribes since their lifestyle and lineage was always held in suspect. Traditionally, this class were the merchants and traders who frequently were of mixed stock and of ambivalent religious inclinations. Still they showed the basic societal qualities

of the Bedouin and were protected by ibn Saud from the Wahhabi fanatics. The protection was sorely needed as could be seen by the fanatical attacks on their property, and persons in Taif, Mecca and Medina in the early 1900's.<sup>128</sup> Further, ibn Saud himself had to break with his own religious convictions in order that the merchants in Hijaj could continue with its commercial activities.<sup>129</sup> Still the class represented the lowest in the social ladder. They were middle class in wealth and name only not power.

The lower levels of town society range from merchants, artisans, traders of moderate means and the lower echelons of government workers down through small shopkeepers, workmen, slaves, prostitutes, beggars and those of ignoble birth.<sup>130</sup>

Until World War II then was there a respectable and sizeable middle class. Only one or two score of commercial families achieved any respect.<sup>131</sup>

Because of the large influx of wealth due to the exploitation of oil and the profligate spending of the royal family, a comparatively large number of wealthy merchants and numerous government officials arose to a level commensurate with Western ideas of a middle class.<sup>132</sup> As a result of the economic revolution brought on by Aramco, a growing middle class was burgeoned with educated and experienced foreign Arab nationals. As the nation slowly took control over the industry an extensive program was initiated for the training of skilled and semi-skilled workers. The Arab Industrial Development Department (AIDD) was also established and financial

resources by Aramco to train indigenous personnel to serve as contractors and businessmen.<sup>133</sup> This development spilled over in other sectors of the society creating still a larger group of middle class. Many of them acquired land and had begun to send their sons to foreign schools. When these returned, they had acquired an education and Western background that rivalled and most times surpassed that of the royal family. This second generation capitalized on the opportunities prevalent in the society and became even more wealthy. Today merchants, contractors, businessmen and skilled workers may be found in increasing numbers throughout Saudi Arabia and "all indications are that, as industrialism and business expand, the growing middle group will become more politically conscious and powerful in promoting its own interest."<sup>134</sup>

The middle class today then, consists of the professionals, government workers and small businessmen, both modern and traditional. Although the middle class is larger than the upper class both are small in relation to the population as a whole. Yet the emergence of the new social order has significantly affected many elements of the population.

As modern secular knowledge has gained ground, traditional religious knowledge has lost exclusive authority; the main competitors of the new middle class for power and authority are not the upper class but members of the traditional middle class, especially graduates of the religious school system. Although family ties remain very important, the new demand for special knowledge and the new opportunities for amassing wealth have opened some careers to talent as well as connections.<sup>135</sup>

A classic case of this phenomenon is the rise to power of Oil Minister, Sheikh Zaki al-Yamani and Hishain Nazir, Minister of Cultural Planning Organization, and Ghazi al-Gossaibi, Minister of Industry and Electricity. All are commoners holding extremely important governmental posts.<sup>136</sup>

It is significant however to point out that the beneficial effects of the oil boom and bountiful funds has not filtered out to all levels of society. In particular, the Bedouin have not reaped the richest advantages of economic development. Because they generally receive little education, have few skills and hold a traditional disdain for cities and manual labor, they remain distant of the opportunities available to them. This will have dire consequences in future years as the rudimentary social stratification of old continues to break down in favor of economic ties and tribal or family. As the new middle class comes to prominence with the government, it is likely that the influence of the Bedouin will deteriorate even further.<sup>137</sup>

At present, there is plenty of room for growth and expansion of the middle class but in the near future limits undoubtedly will be faced. The days of 'go-go' growth are numbered and opportunities will decrease for fast and big money. Nevertheless, the society has created a new class, a class with no real precedence and experience (concerning power and influence). Their affect on the Saudi Arabian society has yet to be measured yet all agree that it will be revolutionary.<sup>138</sup>

### 3. Political Expression

As a final note to this section on the political structure of Saudi Arabia, something must be mentioned concerning the means for political expression. Since political consciousness has begun to emerge in the Saudi society, the traditional institutions and patterns of behavior have come under close scrutiny, pressure and sometimes attack. In previous times internal struggles for power were symptoms of tribal society and regional partisanship. With ibn Saud, the Wahhab movement and the benefits of oil wealth, these divisions were stifled though not eliminated. Once the resistance was overcome no new opposition expressed either in tribes, political parties and legislatures appeared.<sup>139</sup> Such institutions as legislatures and parties do not exist even today and no form of political expression is available to the population other than through the majlis.<sup>140</sup>

There are presently only six principal groups that have a voice in government and constitute the necessary consensus required by the king. They are the royal family, principal tribal leaders, the Council of Ministers, the Consultative Council, the ulema, and the armed forces. Left out are the middle class, government workers, industrial workers, farmers, and townsmen, in essence, the vast majority of the people. All political power rests with the king and political influence is based on affiliation with kings' office and those around him.

At present, there is no constitution other than the ambiguous references to the Quran. General elections and legislatures are only figments of the Arabian imagination. Each of the four monarch's of Saudi Arabia have pledged to formulate a constitution during his reign but the prevailing attitude is that it is not needed. Hence, the very nature and duties of the central authority and the extent of its powers have not been formalized. The typical response of the ruling elite can be summarized through the words of Crown Prince Fahd. Opposing the introduction of Western style democracy, he said it would not bring the country's most qualified - the young Saudis educated abroad, into positions of leadership. In his words, "We invested heavily in educating these young men and now we want to collect the dividend on our investments. But if we were to have elections, these young men would not be elected."<sup>141</sup>

Despite the lack of an explicitly stated and organized modern government, the monarchical regime has successfully led the country for close to fifty years utilizing traditional methods. Surprisingly no popular discontent has emerged as yet. Several attempts have been made to change the structure but these attempts originated with members of the ruling elite themselves. One attempt worth mentioning came from within the royal family. In 1965, Prince Khalid ibn Mussad attempted a coup but was foiled by loyalist forces. Significantly the attempt was made to stop the modernizing process and

reintroduce puritan Islamic principles according to the beliefs of the radical Moslem Brotherhood based in Egypt.<sup>142</sup>

The stability of the regime despite outside and internal pressures may be attributed to several elements. First, the immense wealth flowing into the country and the tremendous expansion has literally bought time for the ruling elite as it currently satisfies the growing pains of the new nation. The complex symbiotic relationships and alliances between the ruling dynasty and rural and urban elites have added to stability. The presence of the National Guard and excellent intelligence service provides strength to the rulers and deterrence to would-be revolutionaries.<sup>143</sup> These alone, however do not fully explain the regimes strength.

Perhaps the most important element providing for its durability has been the fact that the regime has successfully been the innovator for change, modernization and reform.

It is important to note that the Saudi family, as a collectivity concerned with the state, has demonstrated on a number of occasions since the death of ibn Saud that it responds to domestic pressures of various kinds and not solely to those provided by the religious notables.<sup>144</sup>

When threatened by the corruption of Saud the elite responded and removed him. When contested by the forces for change, the royal family responded with Faisal's Ten Point Program. When opposed by the religious factions it promoted implementation of government policies to preserve the culture and religious well-being of the people and the ulema. Thus, they have been successful in coopting the major rallying

points of would-be revolutionaries, whether they were traditional or modernist forces. Whether they can continue to represent the people in such a responsible way and whether they can adequately control the events around them will be the subject of the next section.

#### 4. Sources of Conflict

A myriad of social problems already alluded to, face modern Saudi Arabia and many have long concluded that the massive modernization process and its by products will destroy the society as well as the ruling elite. Though many elements present yesterday and today apply pressure on the social fabric of the people, they have as yet not rent it. Indeed, there have been many positive moves made by the government and inherent in the traditional system that have smoothed the rough road travelled by the society in its journey to the twentieth century. First, however, the negative forces present today will be reviewed and later they will be balanced with the positive influences.

The disruption of the Saudi social system did not occur with the exploration and exploitation of oil. It came about through the rise of King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud. As previously pointed out he and the Wahhabi movement dramatically changed the social system which had lasted for centuries. The changes already documented, were far reaching and helped establish the basis of a modern state. These changes did not come easily as over a century of warfare can attest. Further, these changes are far from complete as the divisive elements

found in ibn Saud's time and held in check by him, remain very much alive today.

Regional and tribal loyalties and factionalism exist today much to the detriment of many Saudi Arabians.<sup>145</sup> In an analysis of the top bureaucrats in Saudi Arabia, it was found that the highest positions in government went to people of the same socio-economic and regional background. Inferior positions went to people of mixed backgrounds.<sup>146</sup>

This phenomena may become an important factor in future political instability in that top bureaucrats control all the governments revenues and services and use their position to provide for their particular region, tribe or family. Specifically, the people of the Nejd control the most important posts and are the more numerous. Consequently, in a study of three basic social services provided by the government: health, education and social security, the Nejd comprises the vast bulk of the facilities with appalling discrepancies found in the Asii and al-Ahsa provinces.<sup>147</sup> This inequality of services is further exacerbated by another phenomena. Due to the fact that most top bureaucrats are from the major cities in particular Riyadh, they provide a gross amount of interest, funds, and facilities as compared to the villages and towns which need the services the most. As a result, there are great disparities in services and opportunities for the Bedouin, villages, towns, and peoples of certain provinces. The unification dreams of ibn Saud is far from a reality as the growing bureaucracy and government promote the very factionalism he wished to remove.

While this regional and tribal parochialism exists today a seemingly contradictory phenomena is also present. Tribal cohesiveness is reportedly falling apart due in large part to government efforts. Tribal sheikhs no longer receive subsidies from the government but instead their areas receive economic projects. This has the overall effect of denigrating the previously high position of the sheikh and weakens his hold over his tribe. Consequently, one of the major demands in the traditional consultation process, the tribal shiekh, no longer holds the power and influence he once had. This ultimately has created discontent among the shiekhs toward the ruling elite. Add to this the fact that the government bureaucracy is staffed by members of rival families and men of questionable ancestry, besides those who show distinct favoritism to other areas and one see the seeds of a future conflict.<sup>148</sup>

Another of ibn Saud's measures, the elevation of Wahhabi Islam has been battered down by the effects of oil wealth and sometimes by ibn Saud himself. Though stressing conservatism, ibn Saud opened the way for modern Western technology over the objections of the ulema. The king weakened their role in society by overturning their objectives punishing and/or coercing them and by supporting the weaker ulema who followed his whims. Ibn Saud further undercut their influence by secularizing the educational system, long the realm of their control over the population. Their voice in government

affairs has been drastically reduced as can be seen by the posts they hold within it. Though nominally in control of the Justice and Educational Ministries they are constantly being undercut by the imposition of men into the bureaucracy who hold secular, modernist educations. Yet they are still evidently heard and have recently recouped the valuable positions of the Ministry of Justice taken from them in 1970 by Faisal. However, the overall consensus is that they have lost considerable ground by the growth of Westernized, secularized educated Saudi's, now assuming more and more important governmental posts and influence.

Finally, due to the government's efforts to introduce modernization to the society, the ulema have had to make many concessions to their Wahhabi doctrine. It appears that any and every concession it makes, a corresponding loss of power results. With modernization and differing lifestyles becoming more a reality, more concessions will have to be made accelerating their loss of power. This will not come easy to an ulema with a history of Wahhabi power.

The rise of the middle class and a group of Western secular educated elite surely has and will continue to have profound effects upon the traditional system. The new middle class having first gained access to higher levels of government in the 1960's are increasing in numbers and influence. They are quietly gaining by positions as elaborated previously.<sup>149</sup> Of the five ministerial posts given by King Saud in 1960, two

were to commoners and four of those were educated in the secular and Nasserist atmosphere of Cairo. In fact most of today's top bureaucratic leaders have received their education abroad in Lebanon and Cairo and have certainly picked up Western ideas concerning democracy and secularization.<sup>150</sup> Today, increasingly, more and more young Saudis have renewed their education in the United States and other democratic Western states as well.

In the past decade only six royal family members have kept six of the fourteen ministerial posts. The six however, are the key controlling agencies of the government but even they are increasingly being staffed by non royal, western educated personnel.<sup>151</sup>

Saudis lacking a modern education still succeed in their society because of traditional factors such as family ties and connections but even these benefits are slowly eroding as competency in the field becomes paramount. This particular phenomena does not bode well for the traditional elites in the society anyway. Already young educated individuals are chafing and sometimes in conflict under the leadership of men ill trained for their jobs but well placed by their family ties. The situation will either result in the young retiring from their jobs and entering the more lucrative business field or if choosing to stay, cause growing resentment and the continuation of governmental inefficiency and corruption. One thing is for sure though, those men lacking modern education still feel they deserve the jobs and if denied, which

will slowly happen, will provide more seeds for future conflict.

Commensurate with this growth of a Western educated elite and middle class is the drive by many of them to speed up the process of modernization. Undoubtedly the ruling elite feels this pressure but their present policies embodied in the new five year plan places greater importance on preserving the cultural integrity of the nation.<sup>152</sup> Though also stressing massive modernization goals, much of them had been altered or scrapped in fear that they were too big, too fast. The regime, a constant modernizer, still has consistently braked and slowed down the process. This is however not enough for the conservative forces such as the ulema, some princes (Abdullah) and bedouin conservatives or too much for the new elites such as found in the new middle class. The ruling elite thus finds itself trying to please all the people all of the time while pleasing very few. The battle between the traditional forces and those for more modernization and relaxation of societal rules and barriers is a very real one and continues to divide the nation. Valid questions concerning the pace of modernization and the changes wrought abound. Many "wonder if the massive buildup is really progress at all or at least the kind of progress the Saudi's need."<sup>153</sup>

Can such a young man learn to know London and Geneva better than the Saudi towns of Tebuk and Qizan without becoming a hybrid too? And what will this mixture produce?<sup>154</sup>

One Saudi remarked that the pace of modernization had to go on regardless of its cost:

We have no choice but to try and build a viable economic base before our natural resources are depleted. The government plan provides for the creation of the base. What we are hoping for is that the fabric of our nation, our spiritual and moral values, will survive. It is our intention that it will.<sup>155</sup>

On the same plane of thought, how will the society handle the new class of women they are creating? Having opened up the schools to women (though still segregated), the Saudi regime has created an explosive issue of women's rights. At present, they are still veiled, and denied opportunities.<sup>156</sup> Transformation of the country and society cannot avoid such a large segment of society indefinitely.

The forces of traditionalism reinforced by the ulema are the biggest obstacles to progress for women and till now women have been tolerant of their inferior role for a variety of reasons.<sup>157</sup> Yet new lifestyles and perceptions of Western, modernized behavior have already affected women's self-image. With each succeeding generation, the women become more independent and undergo value changes. In a recent survey these changes were evident in their value priorities.<sup>158</sup> Where a families reputation was held high for members of three generations of women, those born after World War II (3rd generation) held individual achievement as high priority for the individual and piety, descent and wealth as a low priority.<sup>159</sup> Further, it was found that their role in the society

was expanding yet still unnecessarily stifling. One can only guess how long they will remain subservient and quiet as a whole in a society recognized by them and others as backwards and restrictive.

Many other elements exist pointing to present and future social and ultimately, political ferment. As mentioned before the bureaucracy has been corrupted by regional and familial tendencies. The corruption in government goes much further than that however.<sup>160</sup> The attitude of the public servants has proven to be selfish and extremely corruptible. Of a poll taken of hundreds of top bureaucrats most perceived their interest, mostly financial, as having the highest priority even if it is known that their actions would harm the public. More disquieting is the fact that while only 52% of the older section of the group answered affirmatively, over 83% of the younger group, most still in America answered the same way.<sup>161</sup> Corruption and self interest have thus become an accepted norm and the effects on the future efficiency and stability of the regime will be disastrous. But it does not end there, further problems exist for the government in other areas.

Top ministries have shown a propensity for having very little time for passing problems as much of their effort goes toward socializing and small problems. There is little delegation of authority and consequently many works are both needed or receive inadequate treatment.<sup>162</sup> The effects in

government grand schemes can be seen by the gross waste of resources and roughshod treatment of the society's culture.<sup>163</sup> Another problem is overstaffing. Young aspiring educated men are returning to find little opportunities or jobs requiring their skills.<sup>164</sup> At present, this doesn't appear to be a serious problem due to an expanding economy but surely it will turn cancerous unless new opportunities arise, especially if the economy slows down.

Lest one thinks that the corruption and organizational problems exist only at the top levels of government, it has been shown that at lower levels, in local governments it is worse.<sup>165</sup>

The overall effect of this phenomenon can be seen in the housing shortage, which is exacerbated by 6% urban growth, the spiralling inflation, land speculation and government waste.<sup>166</sup>

There is an ever widening gap between the 'haves' and 'have nots' as the urban educated elite, in particular from the cities of the Nejd grow more rich and powerful.<sup>167</sup>

With the above information, one can point out that if trouble comes, it may well come from the deprived populations of al-Aksa and Asir if not from the urban centers who may experience deprivations of a different sort, an end to the boom, lack of jobs, inflation and denied expectations.

Another major negative aspect found in the society is the large alien population consisting of Yemenis, Palestinians, Egyptians, Pakistanis, Koreans and Americans numbering

well over one million.<sup>168</sup> The threat to the stability of the regime from this foreign element is many and varied. First, the importation of expatriot labor fulfills the need for manual and service oriented labor. This does little to encourage Saudi Arabia's own population to overcome its aversion to such needed labor and become a productive element in society. Second, the importation of labor threatens to make the Saudi's a minority or at least ethnographically and demographically weak. Third, the mass influx of these people brings with it the importation of foreign customs, ideals and in particular, ideology. This may in turn introduce radical politics to a population long insulated from foreigners and create an untenable position for a regime trying to prevent unsavory elements and politics from entering the state. This leads us to the fourth problem, that is, the political unreliability of the foreigners. Their presence in vital services could prove harmful to the state if international politics take a sudden turn and their home countries become hostile or worse, enemies. Their presence then restricts freedom of maneuver in foreign policies and in worse cases, an undesirable element within the society. The Palestinians stand out in such a case.<sup>169</sup> The fifth problem lies within the field of law. One grievance in the Iranian revolution of 1979 was the immunity of foreigners to national laws. Foreigners have so far, especially Americans, maneuvered around the laws of the state. At present, violators are either

brought to the governor of the province and handled separately or quietly forgotten, most times at the expense of the nations laws.<sup>170</sup>

A sixth problem generally relates to the American presence. In previous times because of the oil production, the American presence was small in numbers but large in impact. As an example, even in the isolated town of Dharan the disparities between the rich American lifestyle and the poor country beside it were blatantly evident.<sup>171</sup> American influence in all affairs was and is today all pervasive. The claim of cultural imperialism can be made today due to this previous influence and especially now since the American presence has risen dramatically (filling management and leadership roles not manual labor). In 1976, Americans numbered about 1,600. Today that number has risen to above 10,000 just in military advisors alone and is expected to increase to well over 30,000 in the near future.<sup>172</sup> One should note that though the numbers are small they occupy key positions in government, military and business. Further, just about everything is conducted after American institutions have studied problems and provide American solutions to them, thus engendering a greater American influence than the numbers indicate. Further, the negative impact of such numbers and influence is already well documented in the Iranian revolution of 1979 and similar efforts perhaps not so intense may be provoked in Saudi Arabia.

Perhaps more important however is the fact that American military advisers are not only numerous (one for every six Saudi's) but their presence is required to maintain the recently bought sophisticated equipment. In times of national emergency can they be expected to support the country's military if it is not in the interest of the United States?

There are still more negative aspects to be found in Saudi society. One can be seen in the military. As previously noted, the military has made several attempted coups. Foremost among them stands the attempt made in September 1969 which resulted in the arrests of over 300 men.<sup>173</sup> Though many of the arrested were later released and allowed to reenter the service, the attempt nevertheless indicates a discontent within the armed forces and a tendency to force change in the government, in this case, for a republican government. Other plots were found in March 1970 and in October 1974, a number of National Guard officers were arrested on suspicion of plotting against the regime.<sup>174</sup> In 1974 executions of several men were reported including two military men in an attempt on King Faisal's life.<sup>175</sup> Still more, defections of military personnel were also noted in 1979 when a garrison commander and thirty seven men refused to obey government orders to quell a labor strike in Dharan. Not only did they mutiny, they fled to Iraq.<sup>176</sup>

All of these incidents point out that the military is not as reliable as commonly held nor are the checks and balances provided by the National Guard foolproof. The fact

that they were unsuccessful belies the point that the military arm, growing in numbers and equipment have been and can be in the future, a source of internal stability. Given the fact that there are few if non-existent channels for voicing discontent and the traditional role that military's have throughout the Middle East for revolt and modernizing reform, one cannot ignore the dangerous implications of the previous attempts.<sup>177</sup>

Another element to be identified pointing to the instability of the regime can be seen in the regime itself. There is already several precedences for revolt within the confines of the royal family. One case is that of the aborted coup attempt of Prince Khalid ibn Mussaid in 1965.<sup>178</sup> This attempt reflected an armed rebellion against those forces within the royal family seeking modernization and reform. Supported by the Moslem Brotherhood, Prince Khalid had attempted to turn back the clock in the cause of Islamic traditionalist forces.<sup>179</sup> In the other extreme, there is the attempt, then defection, of Prince Talal in 1962. Advocating the establishment of a democratic and constitutional form of government, he and a band of his supporters to the cause of Arab nationalism were forced to flee to Egypt. Again this reveals not only royal attempts to change the government but the totally divergent political outlooks of some of its members.<sup>180</sup>

Since that time, the royal family has shown remarkable resiliency and compromise on important issues. With the

murder of King Faisal in April 1975, they again showed maturity and responsibility in electing King Khalid quickly and efficiently.<sup>181</sup> However, the murder itself dramatically points out the inherent weakness of the regime. The first is that no king is safe from assassination and new leaders can be imposed by virtue of his death. Secondly, the blood feud and family ties are still strong enough in the House of Saud to motivate murderous vengeance even over a lengthy time period.<sup>182</sup> Third, the selection process, the succession of a new king, though smooth last time, promises to be more hazardous the next. The problems of succession remains a peculiar problem in Saudi Arabia given the family rivalries of the House of Saud and the critical crossroads that the country finds itself in; both politically vis-a-vis the United States and the Arab World and economically.<sup>183</sup> The anomalous practice of placing two powerful figures in the position of leadership, King and Crown Prince, may prove to be destabilizing in the future.<sup>84</sup>

To conclude that the royal family remains a unified bloc of one voice would be erroneous. The cases of Prince Talal and Prince Mohammad in the 1960's should disprove that. Further, there exists sufficient indicators that there are "divisions, rivalry, dissension and jealousy motivated by political or personal differences that could precipitate a power struggle within the ruling group."<sup>185</sup> Resentment and opposition lies in several factions, particularly with the

Abdul Aziz faction and the pre-eminent "Sudairi Seven."<sup>186</sup> Problems arise not only from family jealousies but also due to government policies and politics. For example, a leadership feud has become evident concerning the Saudi's foreign policy.<sup>187</sup> It is currently believed that Prince Fahd has fallen to disfavor because of his opposition to an economic and political boycott of Egypt following the latter's peace initiative with Israel.<sup>188</sup> Opposition to Fahd and other certain members of the elite emanates also from their pro-United States stand which is seen by many as detrimental to the cause of Islamic unity and confrontation with Israel.

Finally, a simmering feud not yet evident but perhaps more debilitating to the regime lies with the group of young princes a full generation behind the present leaders. The succession system as it stands today will not allow these young men to rise in power due to the relatively young ages of the present leaders. Yet these Euro/American educated young princes will not likely give countenance to a system which not only doesn't allow for a greater voice, post in government or succession but is perceived as politically and socially backward. Significantly, these men "have more in common in terms of their expectations for the future of the Kingdom with members of the intelligentsia than with their peers and elders in the ruling house."<sup>189</sup> Since Prince Talal's campaign for a democratic constitutional government failed in the early 1960's for lack of an echo in Saudi society, his

call embodied in these new leaders surely will promote their push for power if it comes for such a change.

Internal dissent from other sources have thus far been muted. There have been several elements that indicate that it is alive though. Certainly this fear of internal and external threats is evident within the Saudi regime. Recently, Prince Najif, the Interior Minister, urged officials in all Islamic countries to draw up legislation on the local and regional level to combat subversive ideas.<sup>190</sup> Crown Prince Fahd commented on the problem of "internal divisions" and the role of the National Guard to combat them.<sup>191</sup> Both have good reason to be concerned; for there exists groups outside and within the country seeking social and political change. One such group, the Saudi Council for Solidarity and Peace evidently based in Iraq continues to stir ferment in the society. In a recently published document they attacked the Saudi regime for alleged abuses and problems in the domestic sphere. They also voiced bitter condemnation of the Saudi foreign policy, arms purchases, Petroleum policy, and the "so-called free economy."<sup>192</sup>

In essence the group blasts Saudi dependence on the United States presence and arms, its government extravagance and corruption and failure to use the oil weapon. These points are not without merit and obviously strike responsive chords in the ears of many young Saudi's.

Another group capable of provoking domestic conflict is the sizeable Shiite population located in the Eastern

province. Long discriminated against because of their faith and tribal background, a strong case can be made that this group may erupt.<sup>193</sup> Exacerbating this situation is the present call for Islamic radicalism as embodied by the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Iranian revolution. Whether Khomeini has any sway with the Saudi Shiites has yet to be proven. Nevertheless, the Saudi's should be disturbed by the radicalism and its rejection of the institution of the monarchy, its hostility to the West and Western oriented regimes. The call may be heard by Sunni's and Shiites alike.<sup>194</sup> The Shiites regardless of their ties to Khomeini could find Khomeini's call attractive.

In conversations with high officials, Professor Abbas Amirie found that they were indeed aware of the Shiite threat, real or imagined, and indicated their concern by their efforts to locate and closely monitor their Shiite population in Saudi Arabia.<sup>195</sup>

For a variety of reasons then, the Saudi regime's stability today and in the near future should be questioned. Due to the plethora of factors, its legitimacy and power can and will be subject to attack from forces within the country. In summary, the following items support this thesis: the continuing and disparaging gap between the rich and poor, the bureaucratic inefficiency, waste and corruption, the discrimination by the government of certain peoples, provinces and villages, the increasingly large influx of foreigners, increasing dependence and dominance of Americans, the continued

presence of regional and tribal factionalism, the denigration of the roles of the ulema and tribal sheikhs, the rise of a middle class and intelligentsia, the feuds within the monarchy, the conflict within the monarchy and society in regards to the pace of modernization, the culturally destructive effects of modernization itself, the massive rearmament and questionable political reliability of the military, the rise of a disenfranchised generation of Saudi princes, the predicted instability of the succession process and the presence of internal and external dissent and radicalism. All combine to paint a dismal picture for the future of Saudi Arabia.

The basic conflicts inherent in a backward society rushing to the twentieth century are all evident and are best summarized by Richard Snager, who wrote of a scene near an oil facility in Saudi Arabia:

Sometimes in the gathering twilight he, an Aramco worker and his son, sit with other fellow workers on the concrete porch in front of the barracks. They look across the green shrubs and flowers beginning to take hold at the entrance to their building and over the roof of the million-aiyal Arab hospital. Beyond the well oiled road which runs to the airport, a prominary of Jebel Dhahaan sticks out toward the Persian Gulf. Under the rim-rock are a series of caves inhabited by bedouin who have not yet taken the plunge into the twentieth century. Their long haired figures stand out in sharp silhouette against the evening fires. There is no water up there, little food, no regular pay, no medical attention, no school, and little chance to buy even the necessities of bedouin life. The worker and his son are only across the road, to be sure, but they have journeyed into a new era.<sup>196</sup>

## 5. Sources of Stability

Though there are many negative elements evident within Saudi Arabia, many writers allude to an assortment of counterbalancing positive traits. Among them, Manfred W. Wenner advances the thesis that the Saudi regime will remain stable for the following five reasons. 1) There is no clear relationship between dependence on foreign labor and expertise and political instability, 2) the continued rapid growth and economic growth rate of the country has resulted in an expanding bureaucratic apparatus which is able to absorb the newly graduated Saudis, 3) there exists next to no opportunities for public discussion of change in the existing social and political framework, 4) the overwhelming position of the population disaffected by the "claustrophobic atmosphere of the country" can seek their pleasure outside of the country, and 5) the overwhelming majority of the population supports the present arrangements.<sup>197</sup>

Wenner also points out that the military because "perquisites, training and equipment of the regular forces have been continually updated, consequently providing no grounds for complaint along these lines."<sup>198</sup> Plus the army would be required to handle the large area and the population scattered in it, both of which it is physically incapable of doing.

Upon reviewing the above characteristics one can immediately recognize the close parallels to what was said of Iran and other countries a few years ago. The Iranian revolution and the negative aspects recounted previously in

this paper seem to discount them. Yet they are salient points and sufficient differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia's societies exist to support them.

There are, however, more supportive arguments for Saudi Arabia's stability. First and foremost, is the notion that many of the Saudi Arabian ills can be eliminated by the action of the Saudi royal family. As in previous instances the Saudi royal family can make changes and thus coopt any serious attempts for change by reformists outside of the circles, be it ulema, military or middle class. For instance, in order to undercut the movement for representative government the royal family could establish piecemeal, certain government reforms. One such effort could be the establishment of a constitution written in a way which confirms the present political situation. Along the same vein, the time honored majlis might be expanded in such a way that a member of the House of Saud if not the king would be more accessible to the population. Thus a Bedouin form of representation would coopt efforts for democracy along western lines. The point is, however, that the royal family has previously responded to social pressures and could do so again. Similarly the point can be made that what is, is more important than what could be and thus, only the royal regime itself can determine its own political stability, before others do it for them.

According to James Bill and Richard Stooky, their stability is also limited to their solidarity. Obviously, the intra-family feuds and jealousies weaken the regime. Thus

far in three succeeding succession crises, they were able to overcome their differences and behave in a responsible fashion. The question must be asked, despite their track record, if they will be able to continue to do so in the future. History is resplendent with similar cases of royal families surviving for only limited times only to fall to intra-family and harem intrigue. Till now, the personal integrity and political maturity of the kings and ruling elite has been a matter of record but if the findings of al-Awaji concerning Western secular educated bureaucrats can be inferred to the Saudi regime, then this record appears to be short lived.<sup>199</sup>

For the present, the House of Saud has several factors working for its benefit. The military, especially the National Guard stand out as a bulwork for its defense. Organized as it is with a peculiar Bedouin makeup, training and loyalty, it stands as a potent counter to any military coup or insurgency. In Fahd's words the men of the National Guard as "dedicated soldiers," "full of vigor and confidence and belief in their religion, king and nation."<sup>200</sup>

By having the military and internal security forces under direct rule by the royal family, their reliability in times of internal crises becomes more assured. There is also the added security of dividing this rule between the more important factions within the House of Saud. While the Abdul Aziz group under Abdullah controls the National Guard, the Sudairi group maintains the regular and special internal security forces. One such group, the intelligence service

once under the Interior Department, now separate, also acts as an effective counter to insurgency and political dissent. In response to the possible nefarious actions of foreigners living in the country, Prince Nayif has required that all must now carry identification papers proving their lawful presence in the country. This decree significantly also requires Saudi citizens to carry identification cards as well.<sup>201</sup> In such a way, his department can more easily control and identify any "undesirables," foreign or domestic.

Another attempt to curtail the problem of foreign nationals is a current law forbidding them control of small business in the country. The idea is to filter more money down to Saudi citizens, and keep control of the nations economy. Most Saudi's lend their "name" to an enterprise and thus are able to reap some of the profits.<sup>202</sup> Also foreign contractors are now required to provide the necessary housing facilities for all personnel imported for labor. They also require the foreign contractors to limit the number of dependents following the workers into the country. The law has thus aided in the housing shortage problem and diluted the overall presence of the workers and families.<sup>203</sup>


The threat of outside intervention, however, cannot be adequately handled by the still small army and intelligence service. The Saudi regime, ever cognizant of this threat from the radical regimes in Yemen, Iraq, and other nations including the Soviet Union, has initiated several programs to forestall this threat. With Soviet backed Yemen, it has

recently contained its military adventures without outside help through diplomacy and military might. In regards to radical regimes and perhaps in response to its own weakness, it has allied itself with them in confrontation with Israel and boycotting Egypt. Also, the Saudi's have used to a great extent subsidies "aid" and payments to many Arab regimes around them in an effort to "buy off" any political ambitions they may entertain in Saudi Arabia. This method of political protection continues today, even to the Palestinian Liberation Movement. Their previous activities of caution, moderation and support of the United States efforts in the Middle East have been modified in response to the political realities of the region, especially after the fall of Iran.<sup>204</sup>

Not content to let diplomacy secure its borders or depend on the United State's security, the Saudi government has taken steps to modernize and expand its armed forces up to the point where it now is the single most important goal of the Saudi government.<sup>205</sup> Of \$32 billion allocated to the 1978 budget, close to \$10 billion or 30.2% of its provided for Defense.<sup>206</sup> The end result of all this effort provides for the present and near future security of the nation and hence the regime.

Aside from the positive aspects found in the royal family, the National Guard, military and intelligence service there are more fundamental characteristics of Saudi society that ensure its survivability in the near future. As Manfred W. Wenner alluded to in his work in the Survival of





MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART  
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

The Traditional Elites, the Saudis in general support the present political system. The rural and tribal population remains committed to the ideals of Wahhabi Islam despite the strains of modernization.<sup>207</sup> Wahhabi Islam is deeply ingrained into the majority of the population and consequently the traditional value system continues to have immediate significance and impact. One, then, cannot overestimate the internal solidarity provided by this Wahhabi religion which makes the Saudi's unique in the Islamic world nor its basic precepts of unqualified support of the king.

One should also add to this support based on religious and political experience, the feeling that most Saudi's hold in regard to the uniqueness of their government. It is perceived as a purely Saudi invention untainted by Western intervention and process. It is uniquely Arab, Islamic and conservative with no parallel in the region. Consequently, most Saudi's are proud of their past and present achievements.<sup>208</sup> This becomes more apparent when one notes the fact that practically all Saudi's abroad return home, an enviable fact that few countries can claim.<sup>209</sup> Equally surprising is the high proportion of young Saudi's who do accept all the restrictions of their society. Though easily adopting American lifestyles, they are prepared for the most part to abandon them on their return to Saudi Arabia.<sup>210</sup>

Concerning the impact of rapid modernization projects and government corruption, the Saudi's have implemented a series of actions designed to mitigate them. The extensive

effort employed by the government in construction of the second Five Year Plan will hopefully systematize and prioritize project's in such a way as to minimize gross waste, avoid 'white elephants' and maintain the cultural integrity of the nation.<sup>211</sup> One such instance was the cancellation of the \$7 billion deal led by Phillips electronics firm.<sup>212</sup> To control corruption a decree was set down regulating the relationship between foreign contractors and Saudi agents.<sup>213</sup>

Armed with these positive factors and irregardless of the problems faced by the economic development and commensurate social change, the Saudi government will continue with its present policies. The ruling elite appears confident that their cultural identity and their rule will survive. This attitude is best summed up in the words of Ghazi al-Gusaibi, Minister of Industry of Saudi Arabia, who said:

The foreign press used to complain that the Saudi people were sleeping, that they never moved and they were living in the 13th or 14th century. Now all of a sudden the press is complaining that we are moving too fast, that we are spending too much money. They say we are changing our own traditions, destroying our own society. I really don't know what we are expected to do. 'Look what they are doing to their way of life. The government is so greedy. It keeps all the money and the people suffer.' But when we spend it, they say, 'Look at the inflation. They are crazy. They are spending every penny they have.' So really, I am glad that we are not dying to please you, because if we were, we would get nowhere.<sup>214</sup>

## 6. Conclusions

After reviewing the negative and positive aspects of the present Saudi society, one cannot help but conclude that

the regimes time is limited, that a radical transformation of the government will come, either violently or peacefully. Its future security appears assured for only a limited time as the inexorable forces of change, already found apparent in its society, continue to build momentum.

The monarchical system, good or bad, cannot assist these changes. It must radically change the present ruling system, the pace of modernization, and its governmental inefficiencies as well as better prepare the society for the ongoing changes. Unless it joins or relinquishes part of or totally the command of government to the rising new elites underneath them, it will surely be wrestled away violently.

Herein lies the key to their past and future success, the ability to delegate responsibility to capable commoners important positions within the government has proven to be beneficial for the crown and the nation. Commensurately, their ability to self-instigate social reforms has proven salubrious for the society and will prove to be politically expedient in the future.

The experience of Iran, and more importantly, to many other Arab royal families, however, should point out that military strength, lipservice to democratic ideals, maintenance of exclusive and autocratic rule and swift modernization of a backward society are not enough to ensure internal stability for a royal family.

There are at present more than enough divisive factors present within the society to produce in the near future a

radical change in the government and society. Certainly the time for their eruption is limited. In sum, these are the forces for increased modernization against the forces of conservatism, forces for democratic change and forces for continuance of royal power, age-old conflicts between the people of the desert and of the towns, of religious conservatism and secularization, and the forces of the rich against the forces of the poor. Added to this are governmental waste and corruption, societal and cultural dislocation, rising new elites, in particular the middle class and disenfranchised young princes, inflation, housing shortages, increased numbers of foreign laborers and influence, hostile enemies on its borders, and feuds and rivalries within the royal family itself.

It appears that the forces of history and its commensurate societal evolution are against the grand experiment of the royal family. Trying to outmaneuver the pitfalls and obstacles that have previously plagued all other societies and governments in the region and world will prove futile.<sup>215</sup>

What then will be the future of Saudi Arabia? Since the ulema in Saudi Arabia lack a distinguished figure and organization to lead them, the prospect of a Khomeini style of Islamic Fundamentalist revolution appears unlikely. Besides the many and varied differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia (socially and politically) there is a great divergence in the Sunni and Shiite faiths. Where the Shiite faith is secretive by nature, historically at odds with any government,

fanatical and martyr oriented, and possessing a strong organizational and leadership base, the Sunni Wahhabi faith though fanatical is more associated with governments, lacks organization and leaders, and totally coopted by and intimately bound to the Saudi regime. Differences exist, but the power is lacking for the ulema in Saudi Arabia.

Where then could the opposition arise from? The middle class? The younger generation of princes? Or the military? It is the opinion of this writer that a social/political revolution or radical transformation of the present ruling system will come from a variety of sources, all working and fighting for change. Though not in agreement on what kind of change should be wrought, the middle class, the dislocated populations, the poor, the discontented elements of the tribal Bedouin society, the ulema and religious conservatives and the military, will all rise and force a change on the existing form of government. The motivating force for this change would come not from the deprivations that some in the society experience but rather from the frustrations derived from denied aspirations and opportunities. The denied opportunities for rule for the western educated young princes, the denied aspirations of the middle class for a stronger voice in government, the denied opportunities of the poor, of women, of the Bedouins, and the minorities for a share in the wealth of the state, for better employment and for the denied aspirations of some for a more conservative society and others, for

a more modern and less restrictive society; all will combine and ferment.

What is needed for an explosive change, for all these groups to struggle for change is an "X" factor, a spark. This "X" factor could be an assassination of top leaders, an international incident, a drastic change in direction of government policies, or a significant act of repression on the people, be it religious, political or economic. More than likely, it could come from the assassination of Crown Prince Fahd or both the king and the crown prince. This particular event could provoke a serious intra-family feud among the top ruling members of the House of Saud and set in motion a jockeying of constituents, a power play and a revolution.

Whatever the scenario, and no matter who wins the struggle, a dramatic social revolution and transformation is in the making. Whether it is a violent struggle or a peaceful evolution is strictly up the members of the House of Saud.

## V. CONCLUSIONS

At the onset of this thesis, it was postulated that Islam had and is currently playing a significant if not dominant role in the political life of the Middle East. Further, the supposition that Islamic fundamentalism as an extreme political movement had and does determine the internal stability of the region's governments also was proposed. Both views, as could be seen in the three case studies concerning Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia have adequately demonstrated the validity of these assumptions.

It was further hypothesized that Islamic fundamentalist movements have many socio-political phenomena in common that could be identified and applied by analysts to not only fully understand their birth and influence today, but in another time and area in the Middle East as well. The case studies, especially Saudi Arabia have proven to be ideal examples for understanding the fundamentalist movement's dynamics as well as providing the optimum conditions for their possible resurgence.

Given the validity of the above assumptions and the previous analysis of modern Saudi Arabia, the thesis that Saudi Arabia will undergo a radical transformation in regards to its domestic and international policies due to the pressures presented by Islamic fundamentalism appears sound. As a result, a review of the data studied and proven as well as its ramifications is presented here as a conclusion.

This thesis has shown that Moslem fundamentalist movements have many socio-political phenomena in common. These similarities in turn were used to provide a profile of conditions necessary for a future fundamentalist movement to succeed in other Moslem countries. In this case, Saudi Arabia has at present all the conditions outline in this work as well as some other unique ones and as such, will likely suffer from Islamic reactionary pressures. Some analysts may point out, however, that Saudi Arabia because of a unique history and government, will not undergo any drastic transformations in the near future. These arguments have already been presented in Chapter IV of this thesis and have been found to be lacking. It remains the thesis of this work that too many similarities exist in Saudi Arabia today which have helped formulate fundamentalist movements in the past. As such a review of these conditions is offered below.

The Moslem fundamentalist revolts in Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia showed a remarkable similarity to each other in regards to their roots, ideology and solutions for the social-economic-political malaise found in their countries. First, both Egypt's and Iran's Islamic reaction were shown to be a religious response to the political impact of the West. In Egypt's case, the Moslem Brotherhood arose as a response to British colonialism. In Iran's case, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States provided the causes for many Islamic revolts. The Saudi Wahhabi movement in turn, almost collapsed due to internal revolts against King Abdul

Aziz ibn Saud's attempts to introduce Western technology and government administration. Today, Saudi Arabia faces the critical problem of a large American and foreign nationals presence. It is this presence which has and will create a pretext for dissension and instability and opens the doors for a fundamentalist movement in the future.

Secondly, the creation of the state of Israel provided a cause celebré and renewed vitality to the movements, in particular for the Moslem Brotherhood and the Iranian revolution. Though Israel was not a factor for the Wahhabi movement, it remains a potentially destructive issue internally and internationally today. Saudi Arabia can no longer remain politically inactive in the Arab opposition to the Israeli occupation of Palestine. Already, a discernible hardening of Saudi Arabia's position vis-a-vis Israel and a reluctance to support the United States peace initiatives in the region has been documented but may prove to be inadequate in the eyes of the faithful and Saudi Arabia's neighbors. Hence, Israel's existence will provide further incentives for the development of a fundamentalist movement and most likely will be one of the major issues which will affect the stability of the regime in the future.

Third, the influx of Western technology and culture was shown to be a deciding factor in the formation of fundamentalist reaction. First in Egypt and later in Iran the Western influence was attacked vociferously and later violently by the

more traditional elements of their society on both nationalistic and religious grounds. Even in Saudi Arabia, King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud found it difficult to stifle the rebellious Ikhwan who fought against the introduction of foreign technology. Today, the invasion of Western, in particular American, technology and culture has created a radically changed society in Saudi Arabia which in turn has heightened the nationalistic fears and fervor of its people. It is a change that forebodes a Saudi and hence Islamic cultural backlash in the near future.

Fourthly, the rising secularization of Arab governments and societies had created resentment among the more traditional and religious segments of society in all three states studied. This resentment clearly emerged through the activities of the religious and traditional classes who found their age old power and ties with the people weakening. This was particularly true of the Iranian ulema and Bazaaris who chafed under the imposition of secular schools, judicial system and banking laws. Significantly, Egypt's response came through the society's lay circles (i.e., Hasan al-Banna) and not the ulema. In the study on Saudi Arabia, it was shown that the most likely leaders of a revolt would be secular as well.

It should be noted then, that religious, extremist activity is not the sole domain of the ulema. In fact, in many cases, the ulema has been shown to be entirely coopted by the central government and lacking the qualities, skills and pre-eminence

to lead such a revolt. Revolts, with or without the ulema nevertheless arose and one of the root causes for revolt was the secularization of society.

A fifth factor responsible for creating a fundamentalist reaction proved to be the alienation of Moslem intellectuals and certain traditional classes in the three societies. This factor proved to be a relatively modern phenomenon as the Moslem Brotherhood and the Wahhabi reaction filled its ranks with rural, less educated people and not an intellectual elite. However, as each nation modernized and created a class of intellectuals, large numbers of them emerged as supporters if not exponents of the fundamentalist cause. This was shown as significant as one would normally associate the intellectual elite as being more as modernizers and less as Islamic fundamentalists. However, as could be seen in the Moslem Brotherhood and the Iranian revolution in the late 1960's and 1970's, increasing numbers joined the fundamentalist camp.

How can one explain this contradictory and ironical phenomenon? In both cases of Egyptian and Iranian intellectuals it appears that intense nationalism and a hatred for the perceived corruptions of modern Western society (commercialism, crime, prostitution, loss of national identity and culture) were some of their reasons for accepting the fundamentalist movements. As the experience of Iran and later in the 1960's, Egypt, the intellectual elite and professional middle class joined the religious movements because the

reactionaries were the only real and active opposition to the corrupt, modernizing regimes. In any event, as a new intellectual elite and professional middle class grows in Saudi Arabia, tensions undoubtedly will rise between them and the government and any opposition movement, even an Islamic reactionary one will appear to be a brighter prospect than an autocratic, monarchial regime.

Perhaps the most important element for the successful emergence of a fundamentalist movement was found to be the discontent of the people resulting from a nation's deteriorating economic situation. Both Egypt and Iran's movements benefitted directly from the economic dislocation found in the rural, urban and highly traditional populace. As the gap widened between the "haves" and the "have nots," as the economy suffered more and more inflation, housing shortages and related economic problems, many people looked to the opposition movements for relief, in particular, the Islamic fundamentalists. In both Egypt and Iran, the fundamentalists achieved their greatest power and members during periods of economic failure and their lowest support during times of prosperity. Saudi Arabia does not have a serious problem now but as the inflationary, housing, and food problems mount and the present boom in the economy slows down or collapses, one can foresee many of the deprived (whether in aspirations or in basic necessities of life) joining the ranks of a movement for change.

As for the seventh factor required for the growth and success of the fundamentalist movement, it was found necessary that the nation have a population inculcated with traditional Islamic education and upbringing. In all cases, this proved to be a critical element as those segments of the population which maintained a strict Islamic background were very susceptible to the religiously veiled calls for political activism. This explains why in all countries, the religious elements were able to exploit their hold over the faithful by claiming to be their defenders as well as guardians of the Islamic faith. Their use of the mosque as a rally center and locus of dissent as well as their religiously couched goals always struck a responsive chord among the traditional elements of the society and provided added legitimacy to their programs.

The traditional Islamic education and upbringing of the people was exploited in another manner too. Due to their Islamic background and history, many of the populace faced a severe crisis of alienation in their own communities as the modernization process brought many unique and foreign social-political changes. Further, these changes were perceived by many to be denigrating or destroying centuries held Islamic values. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the writings and speeches of dissident Iranians mentioned in Chapter III of this thesis. Saudi Arabia, as pointed out in Chapter IV of this work, faces a similar crisis perhaps even greater than that faced by Egypt or Iran. Having only recently emerged in

the modern world, the Saudi population must face greater degrees of change and in a shorter time span due to the massive development plans of the ruling elite initiated in the 1970's. These rapid changes, already acknowledged by the Saudi elite as debilitating but necessary, cannot help but create an alienation problem and hence growing resentment toward the perceived cultural imperialism of the West.

Finally, all the fundamentalist movements were similar in their simplistic, religiously inspired solutions to the complex social and political problems in their countries. All sought a return to the Quran and its laws, an invigoration of the Islamic faith and culture and the denial of Western secularism, imperialism and culture. All the leaders of the Moslem Brotherhood, Iranian Revolution and the Wahhabi revolts avoided potentially divisive issues and instead preferred to espouse simple or obscure goals and tenets. The faithful at the grass roots level eagerly accepted these calls for their simplicity and the belief that they would quickly resolve their social, economic and political plight.

There were some exceptions to this emphasis on simplicity. Only the Moslem Brotherhood was capable of providing sophisticated principles as well as activities. Their efforts and success in building an ideology, schools, business ventures and communes remained unique among the fundamentalist movements. Still they preferred to avoid controversial subjects such as the rights of women, business laws and the acceptable

level of modernization. It is interesting to note also that whenever they proceeded to develop their socialist ideals they fell into disunity and lost much of their support from its members and potential recruits. Hence, the Moslem Brotherhood failure has proven that if a fundamentalist movement hopes to be successful, it must rely on simplistic, obscure goals and solutions at the onset for if any attempt is made to refine their ideology, their support will surely suffer. Because Ayatollah Khomeini kept his programs simple and avoided potentially divisive subjects, the Iranian revolution was able to garner the support of mutually exclusive political groups and hence insured its success. If a movement were to appear in Saudi Arabia, then, it must do the same thing if it too wishes success.

Though other phenomena were discernible in the three case studies, these eight factors remain the most common. As such, an analyst can apply them to other country studies and determine whether an Islamic fundamentalist movement is feasible and has a chance for development and success. In the case of Saudi Arabia, all eight indicators were found relevant and in some ways have greater impact than in other movements. These eight factors which already have shown to be enough to ferment a fundamentalist revolt are joined by several other unique factors which make Saudi Arabia even more susceptible to fundamentalism.

Note that Saudi Arabia remains unique in the Middle East in that it has already had a successful fundamentalist movement,

one which in fact created the modern state. It is further differentiated from other Arab countries in that it was ranked among the most underdeveloped nations in the region earlier this century and is now because of its oil wealth, attempting to leap from the fifteenth century to a twenty-first century lifestyle. Considering its unique role as the birthplace of Islam, and as protector of its two most holy cities (Mecca and Medina) as well as its unique Bedouin population and government, the country is more than well suited for an Islamic fundamentalist revolt.

In the course of analysis of fundamentalist movements a few other similarities arose among the three cases which may be added to the eight indicators above and may have an impact on any further fundamentalist movements. Most striking among all the movements was the necessity of a charismatic and eloquent leader. Hasan al-Banna, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, al-Wahhab and King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud all represent perfectly such a leader. The necessity for such a leader became all too apparent upon review of the Moslem Brotherhood's ill fortune under the less able management of Hasan al-Hudaybi. Lacking the skills, eloquence and charisma of al-Banna, the Moslem Brotherhood fell easily into internal disputes and jealousies which severely undercut their strength.

The use of violence to achieve their goals was also common among all the cases studied. In each case, however, it varied in style and intensity. For instance, the Ikhwan of Saudi

Arabia were feared for their fanatic violence and their armies represented the use of force on a grand and organized scale. Conversely, the Rovers and secret terrorist cells of the Brethren illustrated more modern and smaller terrorist forms of violent activity in fundamentalist movements. Similarly, the Iranian fundamentalists used isolated terrorist activity to a certain extent but during the revolution, its leaders employed massive demonstrations and riots to bring themselves into power. All of the groups, however, effectively played upon the notion of martyrdom in order to enthuse their followers and inspire fanaticism.

Commensurate with this propensity for violent activity was the common lack of control over their perpetrators. This lack of control created the needed pretext for Nasser's crushing repression of the Brethren in the 1950's. In Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini has yet to effectively control his revolutionary Komitehs and guerrillas and quite possibly this will result in his own downfall as well. Even King ibn Saud had to launch a full scale offensive against the rebellious Ikwan in order to preserve his throne and the new nation's integrity.

Finally, in all cases the ruling elites were attacked by the fundamentalists because of their inadequate leadership, corruption and/or repression. The failure of the ruling elite was best exemplified by both Egypt's and Iran's leader's political corruption and economic mistakes. In Saudi Arabia, in the early period, the need for a religiously inspired and

nation unifying ruling elite was apparent as the country was stricken with factionalism.

In sum, then, the above similarities all contributed to the growth and vitality of the movements albeit, in a negative fashion. Each item, if added to the previous checklist of indicators should provide a sound basis for the analysis of Islamic fundamentalism.

It should be noted, however, that though many similarities exist among the various movements, just as many dissimilar phenomena were documented as well.

First, a history of colonial subjugation was readily apparent in the case of Egypt which experienced British imperialism and in Iran which fell under the influence of Great Britain, Russia, and to a lesser extent, the United States. Saudi Arabia does not share this experience of exploitation in its cruder forms by Western powers. It did feel the yoke of Ottoman (Turkish) rule but since the early twentieth century it has been relatively free of the derisive effects of colonial rule. The effect of this experience upon the Saudi population has been significant. King ibn Saud actually had to nurture and build the concept of nationalism in his people and up until recently the nation has not reflected the intense nationalism like that of Egypt or Iran. The massive presence of Americans and foreigners, however, may promote the rise of nationalism, the level of which Saudi Arabia has never experienced. Further, there was shown to be a growing resentment

toward what is perceived as "cultural imperialism" by Western nations and this may act as an even greater catalyst for xenophobic activities, activities which would undoubtedly benefit any Islamic fundamentalist movement.

Another dissimilarity between the states in study could be seen in the relative stage of development that each nation found itself when afflicted by the various movements. Both Egypt and Iran were much more developed economically, socially and politically than Saudi Arabia when the movements struck. Iran, in particular, had become the most modernized state in the region before it fell to the revolutionaries. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, had what was best described as a medieval society during the Wahhabi revolt. This seemingly contradictory phenomenon, does not disturb the thesis concerning Saudi Arabia's future as one might expect, for it proves that an Islamic fundamentalist revolt can occur during any stage of a nation's development, especially during a nation's efforts to modernize itself.

As mentioned earlier, Saudi Arabia has had the distinction of only recently emerging as a modern state. As a result of this development, historians and Saudi's alike, know that the creation of the modern state with all its social, political and economic strains it presents, makes fertile grounds for revolutionary activity. Indeed, it is the expressed hope of the Saudi ruling elite that they can avoid or overcome those strains and not repeat the mistakes of its neighboring regimes. It appears, however, in reviewing this thesis' analysis of

modern Saudi Arabia, that they cannot escape the inexorable forces of the social pressures and survive as it wishes to.

A third dissimilarity between the nations lay in the relative wealth of each state. Egypt was and still continues to be a resource poor state and lacks the enormous wealth of Saudi Arabia. Similarly, Iran, though having oil revenues, was found to be financially weak at the time of its revolution. Saudi Arabia on the other hand, has more money than it can literally spend and hence financial difficulties appear out of the question for the near future. This wealth presents Saudi Arabia, then, with an effective tool which can deny some of the social-economic problems that fundamentalist movements prey on. It can also be, however, a two-edged sword since it can lead to misappropriation and waste of funds and resources as it did in the 1950's and 1960's.

A fourth dissimilarity can be found in the organizational structures and ideological platforms which existed in each movement. The Moslem Brotherhood in this case proved to be the most highly organized and detailed in structure resulting in a closely controlled and coordinated membership. They created and actively pursued a detailed plan of social, economic and political activities such as the construction of schools, mosques, business ventures, and social welfare programs and party politics. The Wahhabi's of Saudi Arabia were seen as organized as well but to a lesser extent than the Brethren. At first, a loosely tied army of fanatics, they soon developed the Ikhwan with their carefully planned

cantonments. The Iranian revolutionaries on the other hand appeared less organized compared to the other movements. Other than the central figurehead of Khomeini and the ulema/Bazaari leadership, there was never an organization or platform comparable to the Brethren or the Wahhabi's. Significantly, they were still successful in their revolt and may reflect the hypothesis that the simpler the program the easier it is to lead the revolt.

Finally, the leadership of each movement showed disparities as well. While the Brethren were led by secular leaders and even opposed at times by the ulema, the Iranian revolutionary leadership proved to be strictly religious, ulema led. Striking a balance between the two movements, the Wahhabi movement contained both lay and religious leaders in the personage of al-Wahhab and later King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud who acted as both religious leader and politician.

Consequently, the leadership of fundamentalist movements can come from a variety of sources. In fact, any analysis of the fundamentalist movements' future should include the distinct possibility that the leadership will be secular in personage as many lay revolutionaries will be sure to exploit the current wave of Islamic fundamentalism not for religious reasons but for their own covert secular ones.

The above mentioned dissimilarities, then, should be recognized and noted by the reader in order to fully comprehend the fundamentalist movements of the past, present and future. They point out that each revolt was unique in themselves

and that any future one will surely be colored differently.

With this in mind, the reader should avoid looking for a repetition of the Brethren, Iranian and especially the Wahhabi movements activities in other Moslem states, in particular Saudi Arabia. Instead one should foresee a rather different movement; a movement which encompasses at one time many of the phenomena outlined above and at the same time reflects the unique history, society and problems found in that state. This will certainly be the case for Saudi Arabia.

There is one final area alluded to throughout this thesis which requires review and further study; the Western misconceptions of Islam. No study of Middle Eastern politics will ever be complete without a complete understanding of the many facets of the Islamic faith. In fact, the recurring unwillingness to recognize the very nature of Islam, its pervasiveness in all elements of Middle Eastern life and its central role in the regulation and formation of the society has been the greatest weakness of Western analysts and policy makers. It remains the root cause for many of the West's political mistakes in the past and if ignored, for many mistakes in the future.

Consequently, to fully appreciate and accurately estimate the political impact of Islam and its fundamentalist movements, further research and education is required by Western analysts and decision makers. Until the West can recognize that religion has a dominant and central place in Middle

Eastern domestic and international affairs, until the Western mind can conceive that men will fight and die in great numbers for religious causes and until we acknowledge that there is no division between Church and State in Islam, all policy decisions and intelligence estimates will remain error prone and meaningless.

The ramifications of these misconceptions for the United States' economic and political well being are many and obvious. The Moslem Brotherhood, the Iranian Revolution and the Wahhabi experience are not the only examples of militant Islam. Today, there are many religiously based and inspired movements in various Islamic countries. There are; The Organization of Algerian Ulema, the Tijaniyya Brotherhood, the National Salvation Party in Turkey, and the Basmuchi Movement in Soviet Central Asia, to name only a few. Can the United States afford to ignore these movements as it did in Iran?

Further, as was previously noted, the regimes of various Moslem states are becoming more, not less, selfconsciously Islamic both in the respect they accord their own religion and their treatment of others. Already Pakistan has reorganized its laws to reflect the Quranic teachings. Afghanistan is presently undergoing a religious civil war because of the central governments' secular and pro-communist policies. Syria too, has serious internal problems due to a resurgence of the Moslem Brotherhood and internecine strife between the Alawites and Sunnis.

In sum, nationalist movements throughout the region are becoming more popular, less nationalistic and more religiously oriented. Does the United States recognize this fact and formulate its policies accordingly? At the present, the answer appears negative, for the turmoil in Iran, the animosity of the last Arab League Conference, the bitter division created by the latest Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the growing disenchantment of the Persian Gulf states (notably Saudi Arabia), the continuing conflict in Yemen and the extremism of many Arab states have all been exacerbated by United States' actions or more often than not, by its lack of it.

As this appears to be the case, the United States faces grave political problems in the Middle East, especially in Egyptian and Saudi Arabian affairs. The recent growth of the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt may undermine the current peace initiatives between Israel and Egypt. More important however, is the questionable future stability of Saudi Arabia, currently the linchpin of American foreign policy in the region. If this thesis proves correct and Saudi Arabia falls to the pressures of rising Islamic militancy, the United States will not only suffer the loss of an important strategic ally but may face a grave economic crisis in the possible loss or reduction of that country's oil exports.

Obviously, then, the United States can no longer ignore the political impact of Islam or its fundamentalist movements if it wishes to retain its strategic position and power in the

Middle East. Further the United States' intelligence community must recognize this fact as well and refrain from using the criterion of economic advancement as a reflection of political stability and computer analysis as a determinant of past and potential human behaviors. If this thesis has proven anything, it is that the intelligence community must study and understand the complex mass of religious, tribal and other societal influences before an adequate prognosis of a nation's political future can be ascertained. Hopefully, this thesis has done just that.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER II

<sup>1</sup>Harris, Christina Phelps, Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1964), p. 14.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 144-146.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 146.

<sup>4</sup>Mitchell, Richard P., The Society of the Moslem Brothers (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 5.

<sup>5</sup>Husaini, Ishak Musa, The Moslem Brethren - The Greatest of Modern Islamic Movements (Beirut: Khayat's College Book Cooperative, 1956), p. P11, quoting from the Memoirs of Al-Banna (unknown), p. 86.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 15, quoting from Memoirs of Hassan Al-Banna, p. 31.

<sup>7</sup>Mitchell, The Society of the Moslem Brothers, p. 30.

<sup>8</sup>Husaini, The Moslem Brethren - The Greatest of Modern Islamic Movements, p. 16.

<sup>9</sup>For example, note al-Banna's attempt to run for the 1941 Parliament elections. See Mitchell, The Society of the Moslem Brothers, p. 27.

<sup>10</sup>Husaini, The Moslem Brethren - The Greatest of Modern Islamic Movements, p. 17, quoting al-Banna (source unknown).

<sup>11</sup>Harris, Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt, p. 17.

<sup>12</sup>Mitchell, The Society of the Moslem Brothers, p. 24, and Sadat, Anwar El, In Search of Identity, (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1978), pp. 22-24.

<sup>13</sup>Mitchell, The Society of The Moslem Brothers, p. 24. See also Sadat, In Search of Identity, pp. 22-24 and pp. 49-50.

<sup>14</sup>For example, al-Banna met frequently with the Mufti (chief religious leader of the Moslem community in Egypt).

<sup>15</sup>Mitchell, The Society of the Moslem Brothers, p. 35.

<sup>16</sup>Husaini, The Moslem Brethren - The Greatest of Modern Islamic Movements, p. 18.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 22.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., pp. 114-115.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 113.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid. p. 128.

<sup>21</sup>Nasser himself was accused by Ibrahim Abd-al-Hisli of collaborating with the Brethren on the grounds that he trained them before and during the 1948 war. See Husaini, The Moslem Brethren - The Greatest of Modern Islamic Movements, p. 127.

<sup>22</sup>Explained later in more detail in the latter portion of this paper.

<sup>23</sup>Mitchell, The Society of the Moslem Brothers, pp. 116-133.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 160. See also The New York Times, 6 December 1954 and 9 Dec 1954.

<sup>25</sup>See a reprint of the dissolution document in Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 12 (March 1954), pp. 94-100.

<sup>26</sup>New Times, No. 8 (Feb 1978), p. 12.

<sup>27</sup>The New York Times, 19 August 1958, The Times (London), 29 Oct 1960 for activity in Jordan. For Syrian activity see The New York Times, 20 April 1964 and 22 April 1964.

<sup>28</sup>The New York Times, 29 August 1965 and The Times (London) 31 August 1965.

<sup>29</sup>The Times (London), 31 August 1965, and 23 Feb 1966.

- <sup>30</sup>Time (17 Sept 1965), p. unknown.
- <sup>31</sup>The New York Times, 5 Oct 1965 - Significant also was the presence of the military in the plot which included several retired generals and colonels.
- <sup>32</sup>The Times (London), 22 Aug 1966.
- <sup>33</sup>The New York Times, 22 Aug 1966.
- <sup>34</sup>The Times, 31 Aug 1966 and The New York Times, 3 Sept 1966.
- <sup>35</sup>The New York Times, 11 Nov 1967.
- <sup>36</sup>The New York Times, 29 Nov 1968.
- <sup>37</sup>The New York Times, 1 Dec 1968.
- <sup>38</sup>An-Nahar Report, Vol 6, No. 24 (16 June 1975), p. 1.
- <sup>39</sup>The New York Times, 22 April 1974 and 28 April 1974.
- <sup>40</sup>The New York Times, 28 April 1974.
- <sup>41</sup>The Times (London), 29 July 1974.
- <sup>42</sup>Who it is said shares their relatively world view, see The New York Times, 8 Aug 1976.
- <sup>43</sup>Middle East Intelligence Survey, Vol. 4, No. 8 (July 1976), p. 64.
- <sup>44</sup>Arab Report and Record (1-15 Feb 1977).
- <sup>45</sup>An-Nahar (16 June 1975).
- <sup>46</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>47</sup>New Times, No. 8 (February 1978) and Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), (30 August 1977), p. D15.

- <sup>48</sup>FBIS, 13 Oct 1978, p. D6.
- <sup>49</sup>FBIS, 16 April 1979, pp. D6-D33. Note that the Sadat speech declares war on the Moslem Brotherhood's student demonstrations and promises their severe punishment.
- <sup>50</sup>U.S. Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), No. 1884, (21 December 1978), pp. 37-45.
- <sup>51</sup>Harris, Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt, pp. 56-110. This section of her book covers in detail the British activities in Egypt.
- <sup>52</sup>Al-Banna, Al-Shaheed Hasan, What is Our Message (Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1978), p. 4.
- <sup>53</sup>Mitchell, The Society of the Moslem Brothers, p. 223.
- <sup>54</sup>Covered by Harris, Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt, pp. 111-142.
- <sup>55</sup>Not only then but today as well, see Lazarus-Yafeth, Hava, "Contemporary Religious Thought Among the Ulema of al-Azhar," Asian and African Studies, Vol. 7 (1971), pp. 211-236.
- <sup>56</sup>Husaini, The Moslem Brethren: The Greatest of Modern Islamic Movements, p. 96.
- <sup>57</sup>Ibid., pp. 41-43.
- <sup>58</sup>Ibid., pp. 42-44.
- <sup>59</sup>Al-Banna, What Is Our Message, p. 16.
- <sup>60</sup>Ibid., p. 32.
- <sup>61</sup>Ibid., p. 18.
- <sup>62</sup>Husaini, The Moslem Brethren: The Greatest of Modern Islamic Movements, p. 90.
- <sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 92.

<sup>64</sup> Mitchell, The Society of the Moslem Brothers, pp. 165-182, covers the organization of the brotherhood in great detail.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., p. 183.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., pp. 200-201.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., p. 203.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., p. 205.

<sup>69</sup> Note Hedaybi's surprise of the assassination attempt on Nasser. It was evident, however, that their fanaticism went beyond Hedaybi's and certain elements were uncontrolled by both leaders of the Brotherhood.

<sup>70</sup> Harris among them, see Harris, Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt, p. 224.

<sup>71</sup> FBIS (13 Oct 1978), pp. D5-6, and JPRS, No. 1891 (9 Jan 1979), pp. 11-15.

<sup>72</sup> FBIS (16 April 1979), pp. D6-33. In FBIS (13 Oct 1978), pp. D5-6, the Brethren are quoted as declaring their opposition to the Sadat regime.

<sup>73</sup> See Enayat, Hamid, "Islam and Socialism in Egypt," Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, (Jan 1968).

<sup>74</sup> Husaini, The Moslem Brethren: The Greatest of Modern Islamic Movements, p. 122, where he writes of their fatwa's against the Brethren and on p. 183, the ulema's support of the Nasir regime to the detriment of the Brethren.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., p. 96.

<sup>76</sup> The Times (London) consisted reportedly these numbers on several dates previously mentioned.

<sup>77</sup> Mitchell, The Society of the Moslem Brothers, pp. 228-229.

<sup>78</sup> Currently ten percent of the population, see The Christian Science Monitor (CSM), 2 Dec, 1972.

<sup>79</sup>FBIS, 16 April 1979, pp. D6-33 where Sadat speaks of the government's successful efforts in building industries, housing and schools.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid., pp. D6-33, also note JPRS, No. 1891 (9 Jan 1979), pp. 11-15 where a dismal picture of Egypt and its problems are counterbalanced by Sadat's speech noted above, especially on pp. D12 and D13.

<sup>81</sup>FBIS, 13 Oct 1978, pp. D5-6, FBIS, 13 Mar 1979, p. F5, FBIS, 16 April 1979, pp. D16-17, and pp. D20-21.

### CHAPTER III

<sup>1</sup>See Walter Laqueur, "Why The Shah Fell," Commentary, Vol. 67, No. 3 (March 1979), p. 47.

<sup>2</sup>Almost 98% of the population are Moslems, of which about 90% are Shiite and 8% Sunnis. The rest of the population are Jews, Armenian-Christians, Baha'is, and Zoroastrians. See Richard F. Nyrop, ed., Iran: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: The American University, 1978), pp. XVI and 109.

<sup>3</sup>See Kenneth W. Morgan, ed., Islam - The Straight Path (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1958), pp. 188-191.

<sup>4</sup>Leonard Binder, Iran: Political Developments in a Changing Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), p. 71.

<sup>5</sup>The various sects became known by the Imam's name or number, i.e., the "Fivers", the "Twelvers", or the "Ismaili's". See Kenneth Morgan, op. cit., pp. 199-202 as well as Phillip Hitti, Islam - A Way of Life (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1970), pp. 51-52.

<sup>6</sup>Phillip Hitti, op. cit., p. 51.

<sup>7</sup>Leonard Binder, op. cit., p. 71.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 72.

<sup>9</sup>By dissimulation it is meant that those of the Shiite faith could conceal their belief from the Sunnis. In essence, if in their presence, the Shiites could declare themselves as belonging to the Sunni faith without loss of their faith, and most certainly, their lives.

<sup>10</sup>See Leonard Binder, op. cit., p. 73.

<sup>11</sup>Roger M. Savory, "Saffavid Persia", in P.M. Holt, ed., The Cambridge History of Islam - Volume I, pp. 394-395.

<sup>12</sup>Vladimir Minorsky, "Iran: Opposition, Martyrdom, and Revolt", in G.E. Von Grunebaum, ed., Unity and Variety in Moslem Civilization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 183-206.

<sup>13</sup>Leonard Binder, op. cit., p. 73.

<sup>14</sup>Vladimir Minorsky, op. cit., pp. 196-197.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 197.

<sup>16</sup>For a detailed study of the ulema's role in the Tobacco Revolt, see Nikki R. Keddie, Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Iranian Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892 (London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1966). For the Constitutional Revolt, see Edward G. Browne, The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909, (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1966).

<sup>17</sup>Vladimir Minorsky, op. cit., p. 201.

<sup>18</sup>The other schools of jurisprudence are: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii, and Hanbali. For a short but detailed review of their tents, see Sayyid 'Abd al-Wah Hab Bukhari, "The Codification of Islamic Law - Its Origins and Development," The Islamic Review and Arab Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 5 (May 1970), pp. 32-37.

<sup>19</sup>See Leonard Binder, op. cit., p. 72 and H.A.R. Gibb, Mohamedanism (London: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 85.

<sup>20</sup>In Iran 1979, there were five Ayatollas including Khomeini. In fact, Ayatollah Shariat-Madari was considered the most pre-eminent until 1979. There are some 1,200 Ayatollahs in the Shiite world, of which over 1/3 are in Iran. The top five in Iran are, besides Khomeini, Mohammad Kazim Shariatmadari, Mohammad Hossein Khonsam, Mohammad Reza Golpayegani and Ayatollah Taleghani. See Ray Vicker, "Allah's Agents", The Wall Street Journal (1 Feb 1979). See also, Joseph Eliash, "Misconceptions Regarding the Juridical Status of the Iranian Ulema", in International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Feb 1979), pp. 9-25.

<sup>21</sup>Nikki R. Keddie, op. cit., p. 11. See also Ann K.S. Lambton, "Persian Society Under the Qajars", Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. XLVIII, No. 2 (April 1961), pp. 123-139.

<sup>22</sup>Nikki R. Keddie, op. cit., p. 10.

<sup>23</sup>See U.S. Joint Publications Research Service (Hereafter JPRS), No. 72663 (19 Jan 1979), p. 14.

- <sup>24</sup> Edward G. Browne, op. cit., p. xvi.
- <sup>25</sup> Abbas Amirie, Lecture delivered at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 7 May 1979.
- <sup>26</sup> See Hossein Amirsadeghi, ed., Twentieth Century Iran (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1977), pp. 190-191.
- <sup>27</sup> Note the expressed fears demonstrated by the Shah and his military during Moharram, December, 1978. See "Hard Choice in Teheran", Time (25 Dec 1978), pp. 32-37.
- <sup>28</sup> Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism In Iran (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964), pp. 134-137.
- <sup>29</sup> The concession granted Major Talbot full monopoly over the production, sale and export of tobacco for fifty years. See Nikki R. Keddie, op. cit., p. 35.
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid., pp. 65-66.
- <sup>31</sup> Ibid., p. 67.
- <sup>32</sup> Ibid., p. 90.
- <sup>33</sup> Ibid., p. 69.
- <sup>34</sup> Ibid., pp. 114-117. See also Edward G. Browne, op. cit., pp. 52-55.
- <sup>35</sup> Edward G. Browne, op. cit., pp. 146-148.
- <sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 262.
- <sup>37</sup> Ibid., p. 262.
- <sup>38</sup> Richard Cottam, op. cit., p. 141.
- <sup>39</sup> See Ervand Abrahian, "The Crowd in the Persian Revolution," Iranian Studies, No. 2 (Autumn, 1969), pp. 128-150.
- <sup>40</sup> Leonard Binder, op. cit., p. 87.
- <sup>41</sup> Peter Avery, Modern Iran (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965), p. 284.

- <sup>42</sup> Ibid., pp. 289-290.
- <sup>43</sup> Hossein Arsedeghi, op. cit., p. 188.
- <sup>44</sup> Ibid., p. 188.
- <sup>45</sup> Peter Avery, op. cit., p. 291.
- <sup>46</sup> Ibid., p. 292.
- <sup>47</sup> Walter Laqueur, op. cit., p. 51. See also Peter Avery, op. cit., p. 440.
- <sup>48</sup> Laraine N. Carter, "History of the People" in Richard F. Nyrop, ed., Iran: A Country Study, pp. 62-64, and Rinn-Sup Shinn, "Governmental System", in the same book, pp. 179-221.
- <sup>49</sup> Peter Avery, op. cit., p. 458.
- <sup>50</sup> Bahman Nirumand, Iran: The New Imperialism in Action (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), pp. 95-99.
- <sup>51</sup> Peter Avery, op. cit., p. 457.
- <sup>52</sup> Bahman Nirumand, op. cit., pp. 96-97.
- <sup>53</sup> Peter Avery, op. cit., p. 450. For the U.S. role in rebuilding the military, see Bahman Nirumand, op. cit., p. 94. Concurrent with this buildup was the presence of many American military experts and IDA specialists.
- <sup>54</sup> Yahya Armajani, Iran (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1972), p. 171.
- <sup>55</sup> Robert Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 68.
- <sup>56</sup> Peter Avery, op. cit., p. 458.
- <sup>57</sup> Ibid., pp. 480-481.
- <sup>58</sup> Ibid., p. 490.

- <sup>59</sup> Ibid., p. 493.
- <sup>60</sup> Peter Avery, op. cit., pp. 496-497.
- <sup>61</sup> For the deterioration of the Iranian economy, see Hossein Amirsadeghi, op. cit., pp. 130-135 and Helmut Richard, "America's Shah Shahanshan's Iran", MERIP Reports, No. 40 (Special Edition), pp. 16-17.
- <sup>62</sup> Helmut Richard, op. cit., p. 16.
- <sup>63</sup> For the Shah's views on land reform see, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, The White Revolution (Teheran: Kayhan Press, 1967), pp. 25-50. For a negative view, see Bahman Nirumand, op. cit., pp. 122-133.
- <sup>64</sup> Roger M. Savory, "Social Development in Iran During the Pahlavi Era," in George Lenczowski, ed., Iran Under the Pahlavis (Standord: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), p. 104. See also, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, The White Revolution.
- <sup>65</sup> Helmut Richard, op. cit., pp. 13-16.
- <sup>66</sup> Peter Avery, op. cit., p. 494.
- <sup>67</sup> Ibid., p. 505.
- <sup>68</sup> Hafez F. Farmayan, "Politics During the Sixties: A Historical Analysis", in Ehsan Yar-Shater, ed., Iran Faces the Seventies (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 104.
- <sup>69</sup> Al-Bayan Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 11/12 (December 1978), p. 2.
- <sup>70</sup> Ibid., p. 2.
- <sup>71</sup> Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, op. cit., p. 86; for his views on the emancipation of Iranian women and his attempt to rationalize it on Islamic grounds.
- <sup>72</sup> Walter Laqueur, op. cit., p. 51.
- <sup>73</sup> Quoted in Hafez Farmayan, "Politics During the Sixties", in Ehsan Yar-Shater, Iran Faces the Seventies, p. 105.

- <sup>74</sup> Al-Bayan Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 11/12 (December 1978), p. 2.
- <sup>75</sup> Harez Farmayan, op. cit., p. 107.
- <sup>76</sup> Leonard Binder, "Factors Influencing Iran's International Role," (RAND Corporation, 1969), p. 19 and The Christian Science Monitor (7 June 1965).
- <sup>77</sup> Hafez Farmayan, op. cit., p. 107 and Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 65-66. For details of Khomeini's arrest, see Helmut Richard, op. cit., p. 18.
- <sup>78</sup> Marvin Zonis, op. cit., pp. 45 and 114.
- <sup>79</sup> Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, op. cit., p. 37.
- <sup>80</sup> Ervand Abrahamian, "Iran in Revolution: The Opposition Forces," MERIP Reports, No. 75/76 (Special Edition), p. 6.
- <sup>81</sup> Richard Cottam, op. cit., p. 309.
- <sup>82</sup> Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran, pp. 46 and 115.
- <sup>83</sup> For the full text of the sermon see JPRS, No. 1902 (29 Jan 1979), pp. 1-5.
- <sup>84</sup> Ibid., p. 1.
- <sup>85</sup> Ibid., p. 3.
- <sup>86</sup> Ervand Abrahamian, "Iranian Revolution: The Opposition Forces," p. 6.
- <sup>87</sup> Robert Graham, op. cit., p. 69.
- <sup>88</sup> Keith S. McLachlan, "The Iranian Economy, 1960-1976" in Hossein Amirsadeghi, ed., Twentieth Century Iran, pp. 129-170.
- <sup>89</sup> See Al-Bayan Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 11/2 (December 1978), p. 2.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>91</sup>Both works are summarized in JPRS, No. 8403 (17 April 1979). See p. 14. See also Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, "Islamic Government" in JPRS, No. 1897 (19 Jan 1979), pp. 1-145.

<sup>92</sup>JPRS, No. 8403 (17 April 1979), p. 19.

<sup>93</sup>Except for communist movement which dominated radical politics in the 40's and 50's.

<sup>94</sup>For a detailed study of these groups, see Hubert Otis Johnson, "Recent Opposition Movements in Iran," (Master of Arts Thesis: University of Utah, 1975).

<sup>95</sup>Ibid., p. 278.

<sup>96</sup>Ibid., p. 22. Those assassinated included a Court Minister in 1949, a Prime Minister in 1951, and an attempted murder on Prime Minister Hossein Ala in 1953.

<sup>97</sup>New York Times, 24 Jan 1965, and Times (London), 10 May 1965.

<sup>98</sup>Hubert O. Johnson, op. cit., p. 281.

<sup>99</sup>Hamid Algar, "Oppositional Role of the Ulema in Twentieth Century Iran," in Nikki, R. Keddie, ed., Scholars, Saints and Sufis: Moslem Religious Institutions Since 1500 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 254.

<sup>100</sup>"Allah's Agents," The Wall Street Journal (1 Feb 1979).

<sup>101</sup>Hubert O. Johnson, op. cit., p. 305.

<sup>102</sup>Ibid., p. 299.

<sup>103</sup>Leonard Binder, Factors Influencing Iran's International Role, p. 21.

<sup>104</sup>Hamid Algar, op. cit., pp. 250-251. Dr. Abbas Shaybani received a 15 year sentence while Taleghani was released within a week.

- 105 Hubert O. Johnson, pp. 302-303.
- 106 "Behind the Masks," Newsweek (26 Feb 1979), p. 28.
- 107 David Husego, "A Survey of Iran," Economist, (28 Aug 1976), pp. 27-28.
- 108 Ibid., pp. 27-28.
- 109 Peter Avery, op. cit., p. 479.
- 110 Walter Laqueur, op. cit., p. 47.
- 111 Robert Graham, op. cit., p. 77.
- 112 Ibid., p. 80.
- 113 Ibid., see p. 83 for specifics of this growth. See also Darrel R. Eglin, "Character and Structure of the Economy" in Richard F. Nyrop, ed., Iran: A Country Study, pp. 246-247.
- 114 Donald Wilbur, Iran: Past and Present (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 344 for an idea of the 'bottleneck' problems as well as Charles Issawi's "The Iranian Economy 1925-1975," in George Lenczowski, ed., Iran Under the Pahlavis, pp. 155-159.
- 115 Robert Graham, op. cit., p. 85.
- 116 Financial Times, 21 Oct 1976.
- 117 Alvin J. Cottrell, "Iran's Armed Forces Under the Pahlavi Dynasty, in George Lenczowski, ed., op. cit., pp. 425-427.
- 118 Fred Halliday, "Iran: The Economic Contradictions," MERIP Reports, No. 69 (Special Edition), p. 14.
- 119 Ibid., p. 14.
- 120 Darrel R. Eglin, op. cit., pp. 246-247.
- 121 Donald Wilbur, Iran, Past and Present, p. 334.

- <sup>122</sup>Ibid., p. 334 and Robert Graham, op. cit., pp. 105-106.
- <sup>123</sup>For a review of the strikes and the government responses, see Fred Halliday, "Iran: Trade Unions and the Working Class Opposition," MERIP Reports, No. 71 (Special Edition), pp. 12-13.
- <sup>124</sup>Robert Graham, op. cit., p. 24.
- <sup>125</sup>Ibid., p. 24.
- <sup>126</sup>David S. McMorris, "Demographic Setting and Education" in Richard F. Nyrop, ed., op. cit., p. 74 and Shahpour Rassekh, "Planning For Social Change," in Ehsar Yar-Shater, ed., op. cit., pp. 146-147.
- <sup>127</sup>Donald Wilbur, Iran: Past and Present, p. 193.
- <sup>128</sup>Robert Graham, op. cit., p. 29.
- <sup>129</sup>Ibid., p. 29. See also Wilhem Eilers, "Educational and Cultural Development in Iran During the Pahlavi Era," in George Lenczowski, ed., op. cit., pp. 303-313.
- <sup>130</sup>Donald Wilbur, Iran: Past and Present, p. 193. Gives an idea of what faced other classes as well as the highly traditional and religious rural people in the cities.
- <sup>131</sup>Bahman Nirumand, Iran: The New Imperialism in Action (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), pp. 170-171. See also Donald Wilbur, Iran: Past and Present, pp. 128-130 and Reza Baraheni, The Crowned Cannibals: Writings On Repression In Iran (New York: Vintage Books, 1977).
- <sup>132</sup>Bahman Nirumand, op. cit., p. 172.
- <sup>133</sup>Michael M.J. Fischer, "Persian Society: Transformation and Strain," in Hossein Amirsadeghi, ed., op. cit., p. 182.
- <sup>134</sup>Ibid., p. 182.
- <sup>135</sup>The Bazaari Lifestyle, the government pressures on it, and their response to them, is covered in Gustav Thaisi, "The Bazaar as a Case Study of Religion and Social Change," in Ehsan Yar-Shater, ed., op. cit., pp. 189-214.

- 136 Robert Graham, op. cit., p. 136.
- 137 Ibid., p. 137.
- 138 Ibid., p. 129. See also James A. Bill, "The Patterns of Elite Politics in Iran," in George Lenczowski, ed., Political Elites in the Middle East, (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), pp. 17-40.
- 139 Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 133.
- 140 George Lenczowski, ed., Iran Under the Pahlavis, p. 452.
- 141 Ibid., p. 453. See also the Shah's own views in FBIS (28 Oct 1976), p. R3.
- 142 Iran Almanac, "Echo of Iran," Teheran (1977), p. 16 as quoted in Robert Graham, op. cit., p. 134.
- 143 Robert Graham, op. cit., p. 145 and Reza Barahevi, op. cit., pp. 9 and 110-130.
- 144 Reza Barahevi, op. cit., p. 9.
- 145 Robert Graham, op. cit., p. 146.
- 146 Reza Barahevi, op. cit., p. 16 and Robert Graham, op. cit., p. 146.
- 147 Amnesty International's Annual Report 1974/75, quoted by Reza Barahevi, op. cit., p. 16.
- 148 Amnesty International, Annual Report 1974/1975, p. 129 quoted in Reza Barahevi, op. cit., p. 7. See Walter Laqueur's contradictory view in "Why the Shah Fell," p. 48.
- 149 See MERIP Reports, No. 43 (Special Edition), "Land Reform and Agribusiness in Iran," pp. 3-24.
- 150 As quoted in Walter Laqueur's article, op. cit., p. 52.
- 151 Ibid., p. 51.

152 See Bernard Lewis, "The Return of Islam," Commentary, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Jan 1976), pp. 39-49.

153 Water Laqueur, op. cit., p. 51.

154 Ibid., p. 52.

155 JPRS, No. 1930 (28 March 1979), p. 65.

156 Interview with Ayatollah Khomeini in MERIP Reports, No. 75/76 (Special Edition), p. 7.

157 Walter Laqueur, op. cit., p. 52.

158 See MERIP Reports, No. 69 (Special Edition), p. 5 for a review of the external pressures and the Shah's efforts to placate them.

159 Ibid., p. 5.

160 Ibid., p. 6.

161 Ibid., p. 6.

162 Ibid., p. 6.

163 See MERIP Reports, No. 75/76 (Special Edition), p. 13 and Loren Jenkins, "Teetering Shah," Newsweek (25 Dec 1978), p. 48.

164 FBIS (21 Feb 1968), p. R2.

165 FBIS (23 Feb 1978), p. R1.

166 FBIS (31 Mar 1978), p. R1.

167 Ibid., pp. R3-R4. I.e., "the Agents of Red and Black Colonialism." See also FBIS (29 Mar 1978), p. R1.

168 JPRS (30 April 1978), p. 23.

169 Ibid., p. 23.

170 FBIS (14 Aug 1978), pp. R-1 - R-7.

171 FBIS (21 Aug 1978), pp. R1 - R2.

172 See Don Schanche, "Shoemaker's Role in the Shah's Fall," San Francisco Chronicle (17 Jan 1979) for the modern role and power of the Bazaaris during the revolution.

173 Abbas Amirie, Lecture given at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 7 May 1979.

174 "Bubbling to the Surface," Economist (3 Feb 1979), pp. 36-37.

175 See FBIS (2 April 1976), p. R1, (8 Dec 1976), p. R1, (26 Oct 1977), p. R1, and MERIP Reports, No. 69 (Special Edition), p. 5.

176 "The Shah Mollifies the Mullahs," Time (11 Sept 1978), p. 31 and FBIS (25 July 1978), p. R1.

177 FBIS (11 Sept 1978), p. R1.

178 "The Shah Mollifies the Mullahs," Time (11 Sept 1978), p. 31.

179 Loren Jenkins, "Teetering Shah," Newsweek (25 Dec 1978), p. 48.

180 Ibid., p. 48.

181 "Hard Choices in Teheran," Time (25 Dec 1978), pp. 32-37.

182 "Iran At The Brink," Newsweek (8 Jan 1979), pp. 14-19.

183 "Iran's Eleventh Hour," Newsweek (22 Jan 1979), pp. 36-37.

184 Ibid., p. 36.

185 "Iran After the Shah," Newsweek, (29 Jan 1979), p. 39.

186 The Arab World Weekly (10 Feb 1979), p. 23.

187 The Arab World Weekly (17 Feb 1979), pp. 19-23.

- 188 The Arab World Weekly (24 Feb 1979), p. 2.
- 189 Al-Bayan Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 11/12 (December 1978), p. 1.
- 190 Ibid., p. 1.
- 191 Ibid., p. 1.
- 192 Ibid., p. 2.
- 193 "Struggle of Khomeini Revealed by His Brother," JPRS, No. 1919 (8 Mar 1979), p. 21.
- 194 Walter Laqueur, op. cit., p. 49.
- 195 Peter Avery, op. cit., p. 481.
- 196 See "Allah's Agents," The Wall Street Journal (1 Feb 1979) as well as Sepehr Zabin, Iran's Revolutionary Upheaval: An Interpretive Essay (San Francisco: Alchemy Books, 1979), pp. 22-23, and "The Other Ayatollah," The Economist, (21 April 1979), pp. 85-87.
- 197 "Allah's Agents," The Wall Street Journal (1 Feb 1979).
- 198 See "Feuding Ayatollahs," Newsweek (30 April 1979), pp. 44-45.
- 199 Michael Fisher, "The Qum Report," The New Yorker, p. 135.
- 200 Ken Freed, "Other Ayatollahs Concerned with Some Khomeini Tactics," Los Angeles Times (7 Feb 1979).
- 201 "Imam or Caliph," The Economist (3 March 1979), p. 51.
- 202 Translated in JPRS, No. 1897 (19 Jan 1979), pp. 1a-74.
- 203 Ibid., p. 17.
- 204 Ibid., p. 3.
- 205 Ibid., p. 17.

- 206 Ibid., p. 4.
- 207 Ibid., p. 7.
- 208 Ibid., p. 16.
- 209 Ibid., p. 19.
- 210 Ibid., p. 37.
- 211 Ibid., p. 54.
- 212 Ibid., p. 55.
- 213 Quoted from Ayatollah Khomeini's "Islamic Government," in the Washington Post (21 Jan 1979).
- 214 Ayatollah Khomeini, "Islamic Government," JPRS, No. 1897 (19 Jan 1979), p. 58.
- 215 Walter Laqueur, op. cit., p. 52.
- 216 See "Khomeini's Chaos: Report From the Scene," U.S. News & World Report (13 August 1979), pp. 69-70.
- 217 See JPRS (17 April 1979), pp. 15-16.
- 218 JPRS, No. 1897 (19 Jan 1979), p. 57.
- 219 JPRS (17 April 1979), pp. 15-16.
- 220 Ibid., p. 16.
- 221 JPRS, No. 1897 (19 Jan 1979), p. 64.
- 222 See "Iran Who's in Charge," Newsweek, (19 March 1979), pp. 47-49.
- 223 Quoted from Der Spiegel (12 Feb 1979) in JPRS, No. 1930 (28 March 1979), p. 56.
- 224 "Arab Response to the Iranian Rev-olution," JPRS, No. 1930 (28 Mar 1979), p. 53.

225 Walter Laqueur and George Lenczowski for two. See their works cited previously as well as the political cartoons concerning Khomeini found in American newspapers.

#### CHAPTER IV

<sup>1</sup>Actually, many deviations had earlier origins, but it didn't become so prominent and widespread until after the invasions.

<sup>2</sup>Thomas Kiernan, The Arabs: Their History, Aims and Challenge to the Industrialized World (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1975), pp. 373-374.

<sup>3</sup>William Spencer, Political Evolution in the Middle East (Philadelphia and New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1962), p. 292.

<sup>4</sup>For a review of pre-Islamic Arabia, see Alfred Guillaume, Islam (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), pp. 6-10.

<sup>5</sup>H. St. John Philby, Sa'udi Arabia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955), pp. 34-35.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>7</sup>For a review of ibn Taymiyya's teachings, see Fazhur Rahman, "Revival and Reform in Islam," The Cambridge History of Islam - Volume II, edited by P.M. Holt (London: Cambridge at the University Press, 1970), pp. 635-636. See also, Fazhur Rahman, "Post-Formative Developments in Islam," Islamic Studies, (Volume I, Number 4, 1962), p. 13.

<sup>8</sup>H. St. John Philby, Sa'udi Arabia, p. 36.

<sup>9</sup>The various schools of law are defined and described in Sayyid 'Abd al-Wahhab Bukhace, "The Codification of Islamic Law - Its Origins and Development," The Islamic Review and Arab Affairs (Volume 58, Number 5, May 1970), pp. 32-37.

<sup>10</sup>H. St. John Philby, Sa'udi Arabia, p. 39.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 40

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 59.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., pp. 80-81.

- <sup>14</sup>H.A.R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 27.
- <sup>15</sup>H. St. John Philby, Sa'udi Arabia, p. 111.
- <sup>16</sup>Peter Mansfield, The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 140.
- <sup>17</sup>H. St. John Philby, Sa'udi Arabia, p. 146.
- <sup>18</sup>William Spencer, Political Evolution in the Middle East, p. 296.
- <sup>19</sup>H.A.R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam, p. 26.
- <sup>20</sup>H. St. John Philby, Sa'udi Arabia, p. 147.
- <sup>21</sup>David Howard, The Desert King (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1964), p. 40.
- <sup>22</sup>William Spencer, Political Evolution in the Middle East, p. 296.
- <sup>23</sup>H. St. John Philby, Sa'udi Arabia, p. 159.
- <sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 169.
- <sup>25</sup>William Spencer, Political Evolution in the Middle East, p. 297.
- <sup>26</sup>Covered in much detail by David Howard, The Desert King, pp. 13-28.
- <sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 70.
- <sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 74.
- <sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 74.
- <sup>30</sup>See F.S. Vidal, "Date Culture in the Oases of al-Hasa," The Middle East Journal (Volume VIII, Autumn 1954), p. 424. See also George A. Lipsky, Saudi Arabia (New Haven: Hraf Press, 1959), pp. 1-8, and p. 63.

<sup>31</sup>Lawrence P. Goldrup, Saudi Arabia: 1902-1932: The Development of a Wahhabi Society (University of California, Los Angeles, Ph.D. Dissertation, 1971), p. 183.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., pp. 18<sup>3</sup>-4.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 186.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 106.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid. p. 188.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p. 190

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 190.

<sup>38</sup>George A. Lipsky, Saudi Arabia, p. 112.

<sup>39</sup>George Rentz, "Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia," in Derek Hopwood's The Arabian Peninsula: Society and Politics, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1972), p. 64. The actual number of settlements was reported between 75 to 500 depending on the author with Goldrup, op. cited, writing that probably only 125 actually existed. See Lawrence P. Goldrup, Saudi Arabia: 1902-1932: The Development of a Wahhabi Society, p. 229.

<sup>40</sup>Not to be confused with the Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Moslem Brotherhood) in Egypt which came later and had a different ideology.

<sup>41</sup>H. St. John Philby, Arabia of the Wahhabis, (London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1928), p. 353.

<sup>42</sup>Lawrence P. Goldrup, Saudi Arabia: 1902-1932: The Development of a Wahhabi Society, pp. 230-234.

<sup>43</sup>George A. Lipsky, Saudi Arabia, pp. 12-13. However, according to David Howard, they could field up to 60,000 warriors. See David Howard, The Desert King, p. 84.

<sup>44</sup>David Howard, The Desert King, p. 84.

<sup>45</sup>Lawrence P. Goldrup, Saudi Arabia: 1902-1932: The Development of a Wahhabi Society, pp. 237 and 240.

- <sup>46</sup> Ibid., p. 242.
- <sup>47</sup> David Howard, The Desert King, p. 85.
- <sup>48</sup> H. St. John Philby, Arabia of the Wahhabis, p. 21.
- <sup>49</sup> Fazhur Rahman, "Revival and Reform in Islam," The Cambridge History of Islam - Vol. II, p. 638.
- <sup>50</sup> Lawrence P. Goldrup, Saudi Arabia: 1902-1932: The Development of a Wahhabi Society, p. 12.
- <sup>51</sup> Fazhur Rahman, op. cit., p. 638.
- <sup>52</sup> Lawrence P. Goldrup, op. cit., p. 17.
- <sup>53</sup> Fazhur Rahman, op. cit., p. 638.
- <sup>54</sup> Lawrence P. Goldrup, op. cit., p. 10.
- <sup>55</sup> Ibid., p. 238.
- <sup>56</sup> H. St. John Philby, Sa'udi Arabia, p. 291.
- <sup>57</sup> David Howard, The Desert King, p. 159.
- <sup>58</sup> J. B. Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publisher, 1964), pp. 107-142.
- <sup>59</sup> David Howard, op. cit., pp. 136-137.
- <sup>60</sup> Ibid., p. 303.
- <sup>61</sup> H. St. John Philby, Sa'udi Arabia, p. 304.
- <sup>62</sup> Lawrence P. Goldrup, op. cit., p. 417.
- <sup>63</sup> H. St. John Philby, Sa'udi Arabia, pp. 299-300, discusses the significance of the Mahmal and the incident itself.
- <sup>64</sup> Lawrence P. Goldrup, op. cit., pp. 417-418.
- <sup>65</sup> Lawrence P. Goldrup, op. cit., pp. 419-420.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., p. 429.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., p. 431. Significantly, the tribal levies of ibn Saud partook very little in the battles. Content to watch more than fight.

<sup>68</sup> H. St. John Philby, Sa'udi Arabia, p. 313.

<sup>69</sup> Lawrence P. Goldrup, op. cit., p. 441

<sup>70</sup> H. St. John Philby, Sa'udi Arabia, p. 313.

<sup>71</sup> Lawrence P. Goldrup, op. cit., p. 457.

<sup>72</sup> The modern political state today has many new functions and organizations, including a modernized government, a huge bureaucracy and immense wealth, however, the borders, the general system of government and basis of rule (personal rule of family, majlis etc.,) still remain.

<sup>73</sup> David Howard, The Desert King, p. 272.

<sup>74</sup> James, A. Bill and Robert W. Stookey, Politics and Petroleum - The Middle East and the United States (Brunswick: King's Court Communications, Inc., 1975), p. 22.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., p. 24. Most of the politically expedient marriages were with the Thumayyan and filuwi branches as well as through the Al-al-Shaikh and other noble families.

<sup>76</sup> Ibrahim Mohammad al-Awaji, Bureaucracy and Society in Saudi Arabia (University of Virginia, Ph.D. dissertation, 1971), p. 457.

<sup>77</sup> Newsweek, August 21, 1939, p. 21.

<sup>78</sup> R. Stephen Humphreys, "Islam and Political Values in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria," The Middle East Journal (Volume 33, Number 1, Winter 1979), p. 15.

<sup>79</sup> Ramon Knaurhase, "Saudi Arabia: A Brief History," Current History (Volume 68, Number 402, February 1975), p. 78.

- <sup>80</sup>David Howard, The Desert King, pp. 260-261.
- <sup>81</sup>Ibid., pp. 265-266.
- <sup>82</sup>Ibid., pp. 266-267.
- <sup>83</sup>Ibn Saud did create a railroad, or rather permitted Armaco to build one but little else was done for the people other than the establishment of religious schools. See Richard H. Sanger, The Arabian Peninsula (New York: Cornell University Press, 1954), p. 39.
- <sup>84</sup>Newsweek, November 16, 1953, p. 49.
- <sup>85</sup>Richard Sanger, The Arabian Peninsula, p. 47.
- <sup>86</sup>Newsweek, April 7, 1958, pp. 32-34 - describes the showdown between Saud and Faisal. See also Newsweek, January 13, 1964, p. 34, for details on Faisal's seizure of power.
- <sup>87</sup>See Newsweek, 7 April 1975, pp. 21-25 and the New York Times Sunday Magazine, 6 July 1975.
- <sup>88</sup>See Newsweek, 22 January 1962, p. 19-20 on details of waste and corruption. For a quick summary of the Ten Point Program see Ramon Knauerhase, "Saudi Arabia: A Brief History," Current History (Volume 68, Number 402, February 1975), pp. 83 and 88.
- <sup>89</sup>George A. Lipsky, Saudi Arabia, pp. 117-120, and also Manfred W. Wenner, "Saudi Arabia: Survival of Traditional Elites," in Frank Tochan, ed., Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle East (New York: Schenkwan, John Wiley and Sons, 1974), p. 179.
- <sup>90</sup>Richard F. Nyrop et al, pp. 179-180.
- <sup>91</sup>James A. Bill and Robert W. Stockney, Politics and Petroleum - The Middle East and the United States, p. 23.
- <sup>92</sup>The Saudi prince's did not receive a secular, Western education but rather through the schools established for them by the king.
- <sup>93</sup>Richard F. Nyrop, et al, Area Handbook for Saudi Arabia, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 165.

<sup>94</sup> Abdul Rahman is the only one of his generation to have a college degree and remains the pivot point for all the brothers. Sultan is Defense Minister, Nayif - Interior, Turki - Deputy Defense Minister, Salman - Governor of Riyadh, and Akmad as Deputy Interior Minister. See Richard F. Nyrop, et al, Area Handbook for Saudi Arabia, p. 163.

<sup>95</sup> Richard F. Nyrop et al, Area Handbook for Saudi Arabia, p. 181.

<sup>96</sup> There has been some cases concerning ideological disputes. Prince Tallah's defection to Cairo after moves to democratize the state in the early sixties is a case in point.

<sup>97</sup> Gerald A. Haeger, The Politics of Under-Development (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974), p. 53.

<sup>98</sup> Even though there are many wholly secular schols in Saudi Arabia, even these schools devote much time to religious studies. Note also that religious schools still dominate the lower levels of education and have many higher level educational facilities totally dedicated to a religious curriculum.

<sup>99</sup> R. Stephen Humphreys, "Islam and Political Values in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria," The Middle East Journal, p. 9.

<sup>100</sup> Richard F. Nyrop et al, Area Handbook for Saudi Arabia, pp. 157, 161 and 171. For this role in Faisal's succession see Newsweek 13 January 1964, p. 34.

<sup>101</sup> For instance, the International Symposium of Islamic Youth, see JPRS (10 April 1979, #1940), pp. 3-5, The World Council of Mosques, see JPRS (2 April 1979, number 1933), pp. 1 and 2, and the Saudi Wema and religious organizations attacks on Libya's President al-Qadhaffi, JPRS, 28 March 1979, number 1930, pp. 93 and 94.

<sup>102</sup> H. St. John Philby, Arabia of the Wahhabis, pp. 14-15, recounts how he simply jailed one member of the ulema for disturbing the peace without repercussions.

<sup>103</sup> H. St. John Philby, Sa'udi Arabia, pp. 304-305.

<sup>104</sup> Manfred W. Wenner, "Saudi Arabia: Survival of Traditional Elites," Political Elites nad Political Development in the Middle East, pp. 175-176.

- 105 George A. Lipsky, Saudi Arabia, pp. 128-129.
- 106 George A. Lipsky, Saudi Arabia, p. 45, H. St. John Philby, Saudi Arabia, p. 111 and William Kugh, "Emergence of a New Middle Class in Saudi Arabia," The Middle East Journal (Volume 27, Number 1, Winter, 1973), p. 19.
- 107 Richard V. Weekes, Muslim Peoples - A World Ethnographic Survey (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1978), p. 33.
- 108 Richard Sanger, The Arabian Peninsula, pp. 73-88 describes in detail this lifestyle in his chapter "People of the Tent."
- 109 Richard V. Weekes, Muslim Peoples - A World Ethnographic Survey, p. 34.
- 110 Richard Sanger, The Arabian Peninsula, p. 30.
- 111 Ibid., pp. 80-81.
- 112 See Newsweek, 30 September 1963, pp. 37-38, Newsweek, 13 January 1964, p. 34 and Newsweek, November 16, 1964, pp. 50-52.
- 113 Manfred W. Wenner, op. cit., pp. 165-166.
- 114 Ibid., p. 166.
- 115 Ibid., pp. 167-168.
- 116 Previously noted in the previous Wahhabi Movement section of this paper.
- 117 Peter Mangold, Super Power Intervention in the Middle East, p. 89. See also how they are considered the bulwark of the traditional forces in the Prince Fahd interview in JPRS, 30 March 1979, pp. 51-55.
- 118 George A. Lipsky, Saudi Arabia, p. 125.
- 119 See Newsweek, January 13, 1964, p. 34.
- 120 New York Times, December 15, 1976, Section one, p. 11.

121 It is calculated that the total national defense costs increased by 306% from 1969 to 1974 and still increasing geometrically. See Richard F. Nyrop et al, Area Handbook for Saudi Arabia, pp. 321-322.

122 Ramon Knauerhase, The Saudi Arabian Economy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 305.

123 The Middle East, May 1978, p. 30.

124 Ibid., p. 30.

125 R.K. Ramazam, "Security in the Persian Gulf," Foreign Affairs (Volume 57, Number 4, Sprint 1979), pp. 821-835, and U.S. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations Special Subcommittee on Investigations, The Persian Gulf 1975: The Continuing Debate on Arms Sales (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976).

126 Peter Mangold, Super Power Intervention in the Middle East, p. 89. See also Washington Post, 22 May 1975.

127 Manfred W. Wenner, op. cit., p. 180.

128 David Howard, The Desert King, p. 147.

129 H. St. John Philby, Sa'udi Arabia, p. 304 - discusses the problem of great economic consequences concerning the tobacco merchants.

130 George A. Lipsky, Saudi Arabia, p. 87.

131 Richard F. Nyrop et al, Area Handbook for Saudi Arabia, p. 145.

132 See William Ruggle's article, "Emergence of a New Middle Class in Saudia Arabia," op. cit.

133 George A. Lipsky, Saudi Arabia, p. 89.

134 Ibid., p. 90. See also The Middle East, October 1978, pp. 86-93, "The Empire Builders" and New York Times Sunday Magazine Section 6, 25 March 1979, pp. 23-55.

135 Richard F. Nyrop et al, Area Handbook for Saudi Arabia, p. 147.

<sup>136</sup>Peter Hobday, Saudi Arabia Today - An Introduction to the Richest Oil Power (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), pp. 73-89. Hobday covers their rise and sources of power and influence in detail of all three men.

<sup>137</sup>See William Rugh, "Emergence of a New Middle Class in Saudia Arabia," op. cit., p. 20.

<sup>138</sup>Peter Hobday, op. cit., p. 89.

<sup>139</sup>George A. Lipsky, Saudi Arabia, p. 92.

<sup>140</sup>Time, May 22, 1978, p. 46 - discusses the majlis system today.

<sup>141</sup>Ibid., p. 38.

<sup>142</sup>New York Times, September 26, 1965. Note also Prince Talal, earlier attempted to "democratize" the government and was forced to flee to Egypt.

<sup>143</sup>Manfred W. Wenner, op. cit., p. 183.

<sup>144</sup>Ibid., p. 175.

<sup>145</sup>Ibrahim Mohammad al-Awaji, Bureaucracy and Society in Saudi Arabia (University of Virginia Ph.D. dissertation, 1971), pp. 49-51.

<sup>146</sup>Ibid., pp. 169, 175 and 179.

<sup>147</sup>Ibid., pp. 49-51, p. 236, and pp. 246-248.

<sup>148</sup>Ibid., pp. 56-58, and James A. Bill and Robert W. Stookey, Politics and Petroleum - The Middle East and the United States, p. 28.

<sup>149</sup>See William Rugh, "Emergence of a new Middle Class in Saudi Arabia," pp. 12-13.

<sup>150</sup>Ibrakim Mohammad al-Awaji, Bureaucracy and Society in Saudi Arabia, p. 174.

<sup>151</sup>The six posts are Defense, Interior, National Guard, Finance, Public Housing and Public Works and Foreign Affairs. The increasing influence of non royal members can be seen in William Rugh's article, op. cit., p. 13.

152 Robert D. Crane, Planning the Future of Saudi Arabia (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978), discusses in detail the relative weights of government priorities, maintenance of the faith and cultural being the highest.

153 New York Times, Sunday Magazine, Section 6, March 26, 1979, p. 26.

154 Ibid., p. 50.

155 Fortune, July 31, 1978, p. 112.

156 Peter Mansfield, The Arabs, p. 407.

157 Raphael Patai, The Arab Mind (New York: Charles Scribners and Sons, 1976), p. 31-2 describes how the women are taught their roles at the early stages of childhood. Their position is constantly reinforced by the family, society and religion.

158 Soraya Mohamed Altorki, Religion and Social Organization of Elite Families in Urban Saudi Arabia (University of California, Berkely, Ph.D. dissertation, 1973), discussed role changes and value changes among Saudi elite women as well as changes in social customs of the society at large.

159 Ibid., Chapter one, pages unknown.

160 See also the financial corruption and consumption in New York Times, November 14, 1976, Section 6, p. 21.

161 Ibrahim Mohammad al-Awaji, op. cit., p. 181.

162 Ibid., p. 210.

163 Fortune, July 31, 1978, p. 111. Besides destroying occupied housing, cultural landmarks, they are creating what it is admitted as tomorrow's slums.

164 Ibrahim Mohammad Al-Awaji, op. cit., p. 221 - reports that the number of jobs the government can provide is too few for the returning men. This is partly because many of the jobs have had unskilled and uneducated men placed there previously and they refuse to leave or retire.

165 Ibid., p. 130.

<sup>166</sup>Richard Nyrop et al, Handbook for Saudi Arabia, pp. 66, 69 and 72-73.

<sup>167</sup>Ibid., p. 92.

<sup>168</sup>Numbering 45,786 in 1969, they had risen to a size of 700,000 in 1972 to an estimated one million today. See Manfred W. Wenner's article, op. cit., p. 171.

<sup>169</sup>Crown Prince Fahd voices this concern of Palestinians in JPRS, March 30, 1979, Number 1931, pp. 53-54. See also New York Times, December 10, 1976, Section 1, p. 1.

<sup>170</sup>Richard Nyrop et al, Handbook for Saudi Arabia, pp. 342-5.

<sup>171</sup>Newsweek, May 13, 1957, p. unknown.

<sup>172</sup>The Middle East, May 1978, p. 30. One source puts the total American presence at over 30,000 today. See JPRS March 28, 1979, number 1930 p. D2.

<sup>173</sup>New York Times, September 8, 1969, P. A1 and p. 6, and September 9, 1969, p. 3.

<sup>174</sup>James A. Bill and Robert W. Stookey, op. cit., p. 29.

<sup>175</sup>See JPRS July 11, 1974, p. 3 and see also FBIS, July 11, 1974, p. 3.

<sup>176</sup>San Francisco Chronicle, March 18, 1979, Sunday Magazine, p. unknown by Dan Dorfman.

<sup>177</sup>For the role of the military in politics and revolution see J.C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1969).

<sup>178</sup>See New York Times, September 26, 1965, p. unknown.

<sup>179</sup>Arab World Weekly, April 12, 1969, p. unknown, under the title, "Muslim Brotherhood in Arabia."

<sup>180</sup>A.R. Kelidar, "The Problem of Succession in Saudi Arabia," Asian Affairs (Volume IX (Old series Vol. 65), Part 1, February 1978), pp. 25-26.

- 181 Washington Post, March 27, 1975, p. 16.
- 182 Newsweek, April 7, 1975, pp. 21-25. Describes the murder, the reaction, and the murderer's profile and motives.
- 183 A.R. Kelidar, op. cit., pp. 23-30.
- 184 Ibid., p. 25.
- 185 Ibid., p. 25.
- 186 Ibid., pp. 26-27.
- 187 Newsweek, March 12, 1979, p. 68 and April 30, 1979, p. 27. See also San Francisco Chronicle, March 8, 1979, p. 8.
- 188 The Economist (London), April 14, 1978, p. 68.
- 189 A.R. Kelidan, op. cit., p. 30.
- 190 FBIS July 10, 1978, pp. C2-C3.
- 191 See JPRS, March 30, 1979, p. 53 and also FBIS, October 4, 1977, p. C6.
- 192 See FBIS, October 4, 1977, p. C4.
- 193 George A. Lipsky, Saudi Arabia, pp. 63 and 79. See also the previous section on Wahhabi Movement in this paper.
- 194 Middle East Intelligence Survey, February 1-15, 1979, p. 164 (Volume 6, number 21).
- 195 Lecture given at the Naval Post Graduate School, May 1979 by Professor Attas Amicie.
- 196 Richard Sanger, The Arabian Peninsula, p. 112.
- 197 Manfred W. Wenner, "Saudia Arabia: Survival of Traditional Elites," op. cit., pp. 172-173.
- 198 Ibid., p. 180.

199 Ibrahim Mohammad al-Awaji, Bureaucracy and Society in Saudi Arabia, op. cit.

200 JPRS, March 30, 1979, number 1931, p. 52.

201 FBIS, July 7, 1978, p. C-4.

202 New York Times, Sunday Magazine, Section 6, March 25, 1979, p. 26.

203 Fortune, July 31, 1978, p. 112.

204 Middle East Intelligence Survey, January 1-15, 1979, p. 147, and February 1-15, 1979, pp. 164-166, and JPRS, March 12, 1979, pp. 1-3. All discuss the ramifications of the fall of Iran, Gulf security, the role of Saudi Arabia concerning the Israeli Egyptian peace treaty, and the changing realities of politics in the Middle East in general. See The Economist, April 14, 1979, pp. 67-68, for Saudi Arabia's changing political stance in the Middle East and Time, May 22, 1978 pp. 34-36 for a description of the Soviet threat.

205 Robert D. Crane, op. cit., p. 116. Economic growth is second to Defense on the list of priorities.

206 The Middle East, May 1978, p. 28.

207 Manfred W. Wenner, op. cit., p. 173.

208 Peter Mansfield, op. cit., p. 408 At the same time he notes a rising phenomena of young Saudis not retaining such pride but rather discontent. Evidently enamored with the West, a growing number negatively compare Saudi Arabia's political and social background with the West's.

209 Time, May 22, 1978, p. 37.

210 Peter Mansfield, op. cit., p. 407. Though not borne out by western educated women returning whom who experience great difficulty readjusting to their society. See Soraya Mohammed al-Tarki thesis, op. cit.

211 Fortune, July 31, 1978, pp. 114 and 116.

212 Ibid., p. 116.

213 The Arab World Weekly, January 27, 1979, pp. 12-14.

214 The New York Times, July 10, 1977, p. 6.

215 As is well accounted in Manfred Halperin's The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1963), Daniel Lerner's The Passing of Traditional Society (New York: The Free Press, 1958) and Raphael Patai's Society, Culture and Change in the Middle East (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1967) - all three authors describe the attempts of governments to handle social change; all unique attempts, all failures. Social revolution appears to be the inevitable byproduct of modernization as does the fall of kings and presidents.

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