

AD-A081 032 GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV WASHINGTON D C INST FOR SINO--ETC F/G 5/4
SOVIET POLITICS AND THE REVIVAL OF RUSSIAN PATRIOTISM, SOVIET R--ETC(U)
1980 C A LINDEN

UNCLASSIFIED FAR-23685 NL



END
DATE FILMED
3-80
DDC


1.0
1.1
1.25
1.4
1.6
2.8
3.2
3.6
4.0
2.5
2.2
2.0
1.8
MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

DDC FILE COPY
AD A081032

(1) (19) (18) FAR-23685

Quotation for publication, whether governmental or private, from the contents of this document may not be made without the prior consent of the author.

(6) SOVIET POLITICS AND THE REVIVAL OF RUSSIAN PATRIOTISM,

Soviet Rulers, Dissident Patriots, & Solzhenitsyn,

(10) Carl A. Linden
The Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies
The George Washington University

(11) 1980

(12) 84

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release
Distribution Unlimited

DTIC
ELECTE
FEB 2 6 1980
S D
A

406278

SOVIET POLITICS AND THE REVIVAL OF RUSSIAN PATRIOTISM

Soviet Rulers, Dissident Patriots, & Solzhenitsyn

Contents

Summary and Conclusions..... i-viii

Introduction

Russian Nationalism and the Party-State: General Considerations... 4

Who and Where Are the Russian Patriots?: The Spectrum of Elements... 9

Contending Notions of Polity: Latent and Actual in Soviet Politics.. 14

The Soviet Rulership and Russian Patriotism From Stalin..... 17

Brezhnev and the Patriotic Issue..... 21

Cross-Pressures in the Rulership: The Veche Affair..... 26

Solzhenitsyn Joins the Fray as Russia's Champion..... 42

The Great Debate: The Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov, Medvedev Triangle.... 49

Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov: The Pro and the Con About Russia..... 54

The Consensus Behind the Debate..... 67

Western Perspective and the "Patriotic" Dissidents..... 71

Accession For
NTIS GRA&I
DTIC TAB
Unannounced
Justification
Letter on file
By
Distribution/
Availability Codes
Dist | Avail and/or special
A

SOVIET POLITICS AND THE REVIVAL OF RUSSIAN PATRIOTISM

Soviet Rulers, Dissident Patriots and Solzhenitsyn

Summary and Conclusions

Soviet politics over the past decade has been haunted by a reviving spirit of Russian national consciousness and patriotism. It has arisen unpredictably, at least for most observers, and without warning. It was not officially inspired, though Brezhnev and the oligarchs of the Politburo have not been slow to react to its presence. Rather, it arose separately from and in contra-distinction to the persistent official propagandizing of the amorphous "Soviet patriotism," originally brought into being by Stalin's ideologues. While a broad and pervasive movement of feelings in a common direction, it contains powerful cross-currents. Its expressions, while unmistakable, have been, like Proteus, varied and multi-form. It has appeared in the spontaneous forming of associations--now numbering in the millions--for historical preservation of neglected monuments and churches, in revived popular and intellectual interest in Russian Orthodox Christianity, in the emergence of "Russite" writers and artists forcing the limits of official tolerance, in signs of a new assertiveness among half-hidden nationalistic and anti-Semitic elements in the officialdoms of the state, and far from least in importance, in formation of a new wing of religiously-oriented patriotic dissidents within the Democratic Movement. Solzhenitsyn himself spearheads its cause. The Russian patriotic tendency moves not only the sentiments and passions of nostalgic elders of the wartime generation, but principally the rising Soviet younger genera-

tion, who candidly seek "lost" ideals in Russian history and culture, its literature, thought, religion and art. The tendency affects both ordinary Russians and the new educated elite, elements in the officialdom and even the party, and not the least in the professional military class.

At the same time a complex, now hidden, now visible, pattern of contention and pulling and hauling over the patriotic issue has been taking place between various elements both within the party-state and in society at large. In its broadest dimensions what emerges is a kind of three-sided tug of war. On one side are the party guardians who seek to absorb or sublimate the new patriotic energy so that it poses no peril to party hegemony in Soviet society. On another side are the patriotic dissident circles aligned with Solzhenitsyn who seek ultimately the withering of the Soviet despotism and the rebirth of a Russian nation-state and culture. On the third side and in between the two above poles are a whole range of shadowy elements official, semi-official, non-official. Their dissidence is furtive or disguised. Occasionally, a document appears in Samizdat (e.g. Slovo Natsii) which expresses their views. Most of these elements incline toward highly nationalistic, often anti-Semitic and hegemonistic, strains of Russian patriotism or pseudo-patriotism. Some are relatively hard-headed and realistic, others are bizarre and extremist. From this element some kind of new nationalistic movement could emerge with extremist tendencies which both the party guardians and dissident-patriots fear for different reasons. Within each of the three above sides there are divisions both over tactics and principles.

The pulls and counter-pulls over the patriotic issue was epitomized in the last several years by a strange episode in the publication of the

first dissident "patriotic" journal. All of the three sides became embroiled in one way or another with the journal either in hindering or helping it. The editor, Vladimir Osipov, a patriotic dissident and Orthodox Christian convert, published a journal named Veche after the ancient Russian popular assemblies for three years from 1971 to 1974. Osipov characterized the journal as a "Russian patriotic" journal with a Christian tendency and published it in voluminous typescript editions in the traditional manner of Russian literary and social journals of the past. Manifestly, Veche could not have been openly published like the main dissident periodical, The Chronicle--without a tolerant or even sympathetic attitude of some influential element at the highest levels. In the spirit of dissident self-publishing journalism (samizdat) Osipov opened the journal's pages to a variety of patriotic views ranging from moderate to extreme. Toward the end of 1973 a subrosa element, anti-Semitic and highly nationalistic emerged among the journal's staff, forced a struggle in the editorial board and in 1974 finally drove Osipov and his followers out and through trickery captured control of the journal for a brief period before it faded from the scene Opponents of the venture as such in the regime evidently forced its final demise at the end of last year and at the same time arranged the arrest of Osipov on charges of anti-Soviet agitation. It is noteworthy that Osipov's own outspoken philosophy of patriotism was from the outset very close in spirit and content to that of the Christian patriotic dissidents associated with Solzhenitsyn. Indeed, members of that circle came to Osipov's defense in publicly protesting the authorities' suppression of Osipov and

his journal. They also, in effect, boldly continued Osipov's cause in their release at the end of 1974 of the anthology, From Under the Rubble.

The contention over Russian patriotism within limited elite circles--both official and dissident--would be of little consequence if there were no broader growth of patriotic sentiment in the state and society at large.

To view the signs of the revival of Russian national sentiments as a passing fashion or parochial affair would be a mistake. Rather the patriotic tremors mark a hidden fault in the Procrustean bed of the Soviet despotism affecting all things in contemporary Soviet life. Neither the rulers at one pole or the patriotic dissidents at the other see anything marginal in the potentialities of the patriotic issue or the ultimate stakes it involves.

Despite some peculiar resonances between elements in the party-state and the patriotic dissidents, the Brezhnevian version of Sovietized "patriotism" and the religio-ethical and populist patriotism of Solzhenitsyn and the patriotic dissidents around him are in profound counterpoint. Brezhnev's exploitation of the cult of might (meguchestvo) of the state contrasts with the theme of national self-limitation of Solzhenitsyn and other Christian-patriotic dissidents.

On this score, the latter see Brezhnev's and the rulership's motivation in stepping up its foreign ventures in a grim light--it not only reflects the imperative of revolutionary dogma but also a kind of psychological mechanism of compensation. The glory of the state's imperial might is offered in recompense of the denial of Russia's free expression

of its national personality in everyday life, tradition, philosophy, literature, art and religion--in point, of Russia's culture in its fullest sense. The rulership cannot, in other words, turn the Russian patriotic impulse to its own uses without perverting or distorting it.

By contrast, the religio-philosophical Russian "patriotism" of the dissidents around Solzhenitsyn is neither exclusivist or a form of narrow, politicized nationalism but rather proceeds from a concept of nations as such, including the Russian, as essential and not transient entities of human community. They raise the profound question of the place of the nation in the modern world and its links with human individuality and freedom. It is on this ground, the "patriotic" ground, that Solzhenitsyn challenges the Brezhnev oligarchy and the Soviet ideocratic despotism. The patriotic dissidents including the impressive intellectual circle who contributed to Solzhenitsyn's anthology From Under the Rubble and write for the dissident movement's new mouthpiece in exile, the "literary," social-political and religious journal, Kontinent (representing dissidents in both the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe) are contending for nothing less than the intellectual leadership and guidance of the reviving Russian national consciousness.

The classic question can however be asked: How many divisions do the patriotic dissidents have? If we exclude for argument the possibility of the presence of such elements in the army, they, indeed, are unarmed prophets of a reborn Russia. But, the same question could have been asked at one time of Lenin's small circle of Bolsheviks. A crisis in the rulership after the passing of the old Stalin generation of the Brezhnev

However, perhaps in the broadest sense we can affirm that it is in our national interest to encourage the rulership of Soviet Russia toward a more strictly national rather than the international-expansionist orientation which has become very strong in the Brezhnev rulership's overall policy. Further, those forces in Soviet society--intellectual and popular--which are disposed to moderate ~~and~~ the natural forms of Russian national consciousness and self-affirmation should not be deprived of our moral support. Such an approach conforms to the traditional American concept of a world community of nations, each free and self-determining within its own realm and to American opposition to state-power used for visibly expansionist purposes or as an agency of support for movements destructive of the cultures, traditions and political identities of other nations.

SOVIET POLITICS AND THE REVIVAL OF RUSSIAN PATRIOTISM

Soviet Rulers, Dissident Patriots and Solzhenitsyn

Introduction

Short of something equivalent to an earthquake in politics, the detection of shifts in the substrata of the political world is difficult enough. Amidst the urgencies of affairs on its surface the tremors signalling movement along a fault often go unnoticed. In the Soviet Union registering and measuring such tremors when they occur is complicated by the Soviet rulership's energetic dampening of any vibrations emanating from below. Readings of changes in the direction and intensity of public sentiment are not made available to outsiders. One such change in the USSR in recent years the shock-absorbing methods of the Soviet regime have not succeeded in wholly muffling.

In the decade or so since Khrushchev's downfall various spontaneous expressions of specifically Russian national feelings in the Russian population of the Soviet Union became manifest. These expressions ranged from such seemingly innocuous things as the revival in popular fashion of the traditional Russian rubashka or shirt among Russian men or the rise of wide popular interest, especially among the younger people, in pre-revolutionary Russia's historical monuments and ancient Christian Orthodox Churches, and the spontaneously formed Rodina (motherland) Clubs throughout Russia. The Soviet rulers did not manufacture these latter two movements "from above" but rather were impelled subsequently to seek to bring them under its organized direction. The result was the formation of societies for the preservation of these previously neglected monuments and churches.

The membership in these societies now numbers in the several millions. Less innocuous from the rulers' standpoint was the increasingly popular and intellectual interest in Russian Orthodox Christianity, a constituent element of traditional Russina patriotism. The same was the case with the growth of circles of "Russite" writers and artists (russity), whose ideological orthodoxy was perfunctory but whose interest in Russian tradition was enthusiastic, if not profound. The popular expression russity comprehends a wide range of outlooks from moderate and tolerant forms of Russian patriotic sentiment to extremist and intolerant strains of Russian nationalism. In sum, all these evidences of a quickening of the patriotic impulse pointed to a broad and spontaneous popular phenomenon not confined to narrow intellectual circles.

The causes of the resurgence of Russian national consciousness are in the nature of the case difficult to identify but a variety of factors seem implicated. They include: 1) the debunking of the Stalin myth by Khrushchev which Brezhnev has not been able to restore despite his patch up work, 2) Khrushchev's own failure to rejuvenate the official ideology with his new party program for communism just around the corner--it fell by the wayside with its author, 3) the conflict with China, which despite its intramural character of a struggle between rival communist leaderships, inevitably stirs the sense of a common menace to the Russian nation as such, 4) the tacit, if grudging, recognition in recent official policy of the "right" of Soviet Jews to reclaim their homeland in Israel (permitting by analogy a similar right for Russians to repossess traditional Russia), and, perhaps, 5) the delayed re-emergence of a popular sense of national affirmation which won powerful but brief expression in the war with Nazi Germany but which

was stifled after the war by Stalin.

The Brezhnev rulership has by no means been oblivious to the Russian patriotic revival--it may be ignored in theory but not in practice. Brezhnev has striven to harness and contain its force for his own purposes as well as reduce the dangers it carries within it for the party dictatorship. Even less have certain members of the Soviet dissident movement, above all Solzhenitsyn himself, neglected the quickening of the patriotic impulse. Rather, they have done everything possible to give it breath. Both sides, in any case, approach the revived Russian consciousness as a factor of great political-ideological potential. Between the ideological poles of the Brezhnev Politburo and the patriotic dissidents who broadly share philosophical and religious kinship with Solzhenitsyn there is a great range of elements in the state officialdom and Soviet society at large whose patriotic motivations are strong but ill-formulated, or half-expressed in disguised forms. The tug-of-war between the rulership and the patriotic dissidents loosely aligned with Solzhenitsyn represents a serious struggle for long term influence over the political-ideological orientation of the patriotic trend.

It is no accident that the conflict between the Brezhnev Politburo and Solzhenitsyn that led to his forced exile from the USSR raged especially fiercely over the issue of patriotism. The Central Committee agitation-propaganda department's nation-wide campaign of slander against Solzhenitsyn on the occasion of his expulsion focused not so much on his anti-Marxism or anti-Leninism--of this there was no doubt. Rather, the focus was on trying to pin Solzhenitsyn, a former front-line artillery officer, with the charge that he was a "traitor to the homeland" and,

according to Solzhenitsyn's observation, with the aim of "arousing the wrath of the masses." "Nobel prize is Judas pay for betraying the homeland" was the line taken against the author in the regime's nationwide closed lecture network. It was a riposte against Solzhenitsyn's defense of the ordinary but heroic Russian patriotism of the Russian army in his work August 1914 and his massive indictment in The Gulag Archipelago of the treachery of Stalin against masses of Russian soldiers, both officers and men, and Russian prisoners of war who were sent to the camps after the war. The potential danger of Solzhenitsyn's thrust against the Soviet communist rulership and to figures like Brezhnev, one of Stalin's ex-political generals, is obvious, namely that they were guilty of perfidy towards the Russian nation itself. The potency of the patriotic issue in the Politburo-Solzhenitsyn conflict may have prompted the regime to exile rather than imprison the great writer as much as its fear of hostile public reactions in the West.

Russian Nationalism and the Party-State: General Considerations

The re-emergence of the Russian patriotic issue in the '60's revealed that the Soviet Empire was not impervious to the worldwide rise of national consciousness among diverse peoples and ethnic groups even in its Great Russian heartland. Many observers indeed see increasing difficulties for the Soviet rulers in controlling the great and growing mass of non-Russian nationalities of the USSR. Yet, few have considered the possibility that Russian nationalism itself (which the rulers have striven to subject to their own purposes) now can also pose a challenge to them. In fact, from its inception in 1917 Lenin consciously designed the Soviet party-state, with a view to its intended function as an agency of revolution at home

and abroad, to be an autonomous entity with respect to the dominating ideological influences of the modern world. It was to master that great modern trinity of democracy, industrialism and, above all, nationalism. Much of Soviet history in fact has been a history of the rulers' struggles to harness and contain these nether powers. They have veiled totalitarian dictatorship behind democratic rhetoric and hidden its pervading power behind an elaborate but powerless superstructure of representative institutions. They have chained the forces of industrialism to the political aims of the party-state seeking to prevent "economics" from gaining sway over "politics" and "ideology." Their most complex and paradoxical self-appointed task has been the attempt to substitute a "class" notion of solidarity--i.e. "proletarian internationalism" for national consciousness while, at the same time, seeking to siphon away indigenous national sentiments into a new reservoir of "Soviet patriotism" representing no specific nationality.

Herein lies the peculiar predicament of Marxism-Leninism--its attempt to rest its claim to power and leadership on an impersonal diety of History, a demiurge of an anonymous collective humanity guided by a de-nationalized and uprooted 'proletariat' as its proxy. It acts in the name of no actual or existing people or nation but of an unknown and yet unseen future mankind. Yet, it is hard to doubt from modern history that the individuality, self-hood and personality of most human beings are tied by the very threads of their lives with the customs, laws, and character of their native lands. The modern world, despite its pretensions of universal progress, has shown that the ancient law "that each loves his own" has not been revoked. Only Titanic force and Promethean craft can suspend or alter its operation.

Nonetheless communist leaderships, following the Leninist and Stalinist example, make the attempt. They resort to coercion on unprecedented scales and to massive and systematic attempts at soul-reform through propaganda onslaughts on captive audiences. To rely, in principle, on national custom, law and character on the face of it must defeat the expressed purposes of the Marxist-Leninist revolution, yet such reliance is the precondition for winning genuine popular legitimacy. 'National-communist' party-states that try to bridge the dilemma by doing some of both are caught in a self-contradiction which is not inconsequential. Party-states which have left their first phases of revolutionary upheaval more and more grapple with this dilemma of policy and nowhere perhaps more intensely than in the inner life of today's USSR. The rise of Russian national consciousness in today's Soviet Union presents the Brezhnev Politburo not with a matter of mundane politics but an issue that touches the ideological and spiritual roots of the regime itself. The phenomenon poses a danger to the Marxist-Leninist "civil religion" of the party-state itself.

Why is this so in practical terms? The point perhaps can be made clear if the three interrelated and generic elements necessary to any political order are distinguished: namely 1) a "civil or political religion" or public orthodoxy which provides a basis of political consensus; (It may consist of a totalist ideology as in the Soviet case or of a set of principles or beliefs about the ultimate basis of political associations as, say, in the American case.) 2) a principle or notion of political rulership or authority which determines who, broadly speaking, shall rule or command and which lends legitimacy to those holding power in fact; and 3) the collective or communal identity of those ruled.

can undergo subtle changes, the part played by each element can vary in intensity and form, and at certain difficult to determine points may be ripe for transmutation. The latter kind of change can only lead to fundamental and unmistakable change in the political system itself.

The desirability of being able to discover the operation of this kind of change in its extent and depth is matched only by its inherent difficulty. Indeed, the difficult-to-trace power-political plays and factional conflicts in the ruling group or even the inner counsels and motivations of the rulership in its foreign political strategies are more easily assessed. Yet, the difficulty of weighing the evidence does not justify neglecting it.

Even that hard-headed clinician of politics, Machiavelli, does not at all soft-pedal the play of these elementary powers. His primer on power politics ends, for example, with a passionate invocation of Italian nationalism and of the idea of a unified Italy which some scholars cannot believe Machiavelli authored but perhaps simply attests to his insight. He calls for an Italian prince to rise and win glory as the "liberator" of Italy from foreign yoke; he does not appeal to the bare desire for power in the ambitious prince but for glory won through the ultimately uncoercible judgment of the people. He also places the founders of state religions--not far removed from what we call political ideology today--higher in rank than even the power-political builders of great states. Here he would put Marx before Lenin and Lenin before Stalin. For Machiavelli also it is crucial for the founder of a state religion, the indispensable basis for establishing lasting political institutions--to persuade men that it is not something he simply contrived or imposed

but that it was communicated or discovered to him by higher powers. This would be as true of Lenin's Marxist ideology as for Numa Pompilius, the founder of the state religion of ancient Rome. Furthermore, it was essential in Machiavelli's view that the rulers, even if they doubted the truth of the state religion which many of his exemplars do, must be perfect deceivers neither betraying in word or deed any such doubts. If that Italian writer-statesman were to return he would have undoubtedly seen in Khrushchev's attack on Stalin a profound breach in the ground rules for preserving the Marxist-Leninist political religion in Soviet Russia. While the judgment is not susceptible to easy verification, there is a widespread sense among Soviet dissidents of diverse persuasions that the magic that has held the Soviet system together has gone out of it and that indeterminable historical changes may come as a result.

Who and Where Are the Russian Patriots?: The Spectrum of Elements

If a significant process of change is to occur in the USSR as a result of, among other things, a resurgent Russian national consciousness that process must obviously find its ground of realization within key groups or strata in the Soviet party-state and in Russian society. They must each be increasingly moved or moveable by patriotic motives or appeals. Such a process of change, initially at least, need not affect great numbers of people in the rank and file. Because of the hierarchic character of the party-state and its bureaucracies and the privileges of rank enjoyed by its key professional groups staffing it, strategically located individuals and circles are, potentially at least, in positions to exert influence far out of proportion to their numbers. Solzhenitsyn

in From Under the Rubble notes, for example, that there are about 200 major figures in the Soviet intellectual elite whose international reputations give them a high degree of immunity from serious or decisive repression by the regime. Pressures can be brought to bear against them, but they cannot be put out of public circulation without very great political costs to the regime. The dangers they face in declaring their nonconformity are real but not mortal. Exile to the West is the only penalty of last resort available to the Politburo. Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov, Rostropovich, Shafareyvich (the Lenin-prize winner and world-known algebraist among the patriotic dissidents linked to Solzhenitsyn), and Tvardovsky (who sponsored Solzhenitsyn's works in the years before his recent death) are examples themselves of the members of this first privileged circle. Solzhenitsyn's and his associates' strategy seeks to win members of these groups over to the cause of Russia's revival. The signs of this struggle for souls is evident in the patriotic dissident anthology published in late 1974 and edited by Solzhenitsyn. Two authors decided to remain anonymous, one through pseudonym, another by initials, and a third, as Solzhenitsyn himself reveals, backed out of the project because of the dangers of self-identification.

Yet such conversions, so to speak, in the highest elite would pose only limited danger to the rulership if there were no broader potentials in state and society at large for the growth of followings. What is remarkable about the patriotic trend of the 60's and early 70's is its wide manifestation in the Soviet younger generation. It is not merely a matter of the stirring of the patriotic nostalgia of the old wartime generation, as real as that may be, for example, among the veterans in the Rodina

clubs . There is irony in this question of the succession of Soviet generations. The Soviet rulership has engaged in a persistent propaganda effort since Stalin's death, and even more intensively under Brezhnev than Khrushchev, to fire enthusiasm among youth for Bolshevik revolutionary traditions. Yet, that effort seems to have fallen on deaf ears. Instead, a love of Russian pre-revolutionary traditions and history has caught hold among Soviet Russian youth.

It is this phenomenon that makes the polemic between the Brezhnev Politburo and the Solzhenitsyn wing of patriotic dissidents more than academic. The contention is over the future attachments and loyalties of the mass of latter-day Russians who find themselves in a kind of ideological limbo between these polar opposites of today's Soviet Union. These are the Russians discovered by looking beyond the liberal and left-leaning democrats, the democratic socialists and "genuine" Marxist-Leninists (exemplified by Roy Medvedev) of the dissident Democratic Movement. Beyond the Solzhenitsyn circle itself there stand other dissidents, quasi-dissidents, and figures at the fringes of official toleration who are, if not more patriotic, are more nationalistic than they. For example, there were such among the contributors to Vladimir Osipov's openly published samizdat journal Veche which flourished in bulky editions for three years (1971 to 1974) before Osipov was forced out evidently through KGB machinations in its editorial board. Osipov identified Veche (a reference to the ancient Novgorodian democratic assemblies) as a "Christian-patriotic"journal. His own outlook represents a relatively moderate patriotic position although he liberally opened the journal's pages to a range of nationalistic outlooks, some considerably

more extreme in viewpoint than himself. Until a purge of the editorial board of the Komsomol organ Molodaya Gvardiya (Young Guard) in 1970 that journal had become the virtual mouthpiece of a whole cadre of younger nationalistic and patriotic writers. They had skated on and finally broke the thin ice of previous official tolerance. Some among them represented extreme nationalist, anti-foreign, anti-Semitic views or peculiar amalgams of nationalism and Leninism. Others occupied more moderate positions as defenders of Russian traditions. The group as a whole are called the Russites (russity) or the neo-Slavophils. Among these are writers of some talent, like Soloukhin and Dorosh. Their tolerance and enthusiasm for traditional Russia and Orthodox Church history, their love of the village and rural Russia, suggests that their inner sympathies are not so far distant from those patriotic dissidents, including the Solzhenitsyn circle, for whom Russian patriotism and Christian Orthodoxy are inseparable elements.*

Further over on the nationalistic spectrum, there is evidently a group of unknown size belonging to the middle or higher bureaucratic and professional officialdom, who are adherents of a kind of contemporary version of Pobedonostsev's triad combining a special position for Christian Orthodoxy as a state religion, an ideologically reoriented, centralized

---

* At a closed meeting of the Soviet Union of writers in 1969, one of the Molodaya Gvardiya authors boldly replied to a critic who charged that his neo-Slavophilism led to God, Orthodoxy and religious-idealistic philosophy by saying that this was precisely the case. He said: "We are searching for the lost ideal...I don't know what would have remained of Russia if it were not for Orthodoxy...we want to...move forward on the basis of their ethics and ideals." Reported in The Political Diary, Herzen Foundation Reprint, Amsterdam, 1972, (pp. 494-509).

and aristocratic but not despotic ruling power and a Russian nationalistic, if not racialist, consciousness. (The document, entitled A Nation Speaks (Slovo Natsii), and simply identified as a "Manifesto of Russian Patriots" expresses this group's viewpoint.) Another element evidently well represented in the agit-prop apparatus on middle and lower levels throughout the country expresses a virulently anti-Semitic and anti-Christian chauvinist and power-worshipping Russian ultra-nationalism. This is the element M. Agursky characterizes as a hotbed of a Russian version of Naziism. It peculiarly and explicitly combines Communism, Soviet Vlast' and Russian Nationality in its banner. Also, and by no means least there is the scarcely veiled Great Russian and imperial patriotism of many of the military and some of the higher state officialdom. The latter element carries us into the upper reaches and inner precincts of the party-state itself. The foregoing spectrum of elements needs to be taken into account in any examination or assessment of patriotic-dissident tendencies. They have been rather overlooked in Western journalism. The Democratic Movement, which resembles on the surface at least the familiar range of politics in the West, has held center stage until recently. Even here Western observers can mistake the liberal and left-leaning and humanistic elements of the Democratic Movement. It is risky to assume that no patriotic impulses move them. Nor should they be confused with the Vietnam War, post-patriotic generation of anti-establishment intellectuals in the United States. At the same time, it would also be incorrect to de-emphasize the latent Westernizing liberalism of much of the educated Soviet middle-class staffing the party-state. There is a natural resonance between them and the scientific and liberal-democratic views of a Sakharov or the

progressive-humanist positions of the Medvedevs'. In any case, the groupings briefly surveyed above in which nativist and patriotic impulses and nationalistic attitudes predominate outweigh the liberally-disposed members of the Soviet middle-class elite in potential political strength.

Contending Notions of Polity: Latent and Actual in Soviet Politics

While few of the patriotism-oriented groups have devised political programs and in fact many cases eschew them, they variously lean toward certain general concepts or notions of polity. Using the triadic scheme outlined earlier as a kind of shorthand, it might be of some use to project rather tentatively on a chart the notions of polity found among them. Admittedly, in a number of cases the notion of polity is found in implicit rather than fully expressed forms. These concepts or notions among the patriotic groups are placed in an approximate order of relationship to the other notions of polity, both realized and pretended to, which can be identified in the party-state and among the dissidents in recent years. (See the attached chart.) While the elements of the triad consisting of the ideology or public orthodoxy and the principle or notion of rulership differ widely, most of the triads rest on a common base which contains a notion of the people, the nation or the patria. The notable exception is again found in the purified form of the Leninist party dictatorship which is grounded on a collectivity identified as an "international proletariat." Especially in a democratic age, the legitimacy of any rulership or polity must be justified, whether in practice or by profession only--in terms of those who are ruled. No rulership or polity, including the totalist party-state can afford over the long run to be oblivious to

LIBERAL
SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY
(Sakharov)
1. Ethical Socialism and Scientific-Democratic Method
2. Rule of Law/Civil Rights
3. A Myth-Free, Progressive People

RUSSIAN NATIONAL IMPERIAL STATE
(Word to the Nation)
/Slovo Natsii/
1. Russian Orthodoxy as Ideology
2. Non-Totalitarian Elitist Rule
3. Imperial Russian Nation

RUSSIAN NATIONAL STATE
(Solzhenitsyn, V.Osipov, etc.)
1. Russian Christian Orthodoxy (not as official state religion)
2. Non-Despotic, (Law-abiding) National Political Authority
3. The Russian Land and People

Western Fourth Estate
in the USSR
(Journalists)
1. Secular Individualism or Liberal Humanism
2. Egalitarian- Democracy
3. Liberal Internationalists

UKRAINIAN
NATIONAL STATE
(Moroz)
1. Christianity as Nation's Tradition
2. Ukrainian National-Democratic Rule
3. Ukrainian People

THE JEWISH
NATIONAL STATE
(Soviet Jewry)
1. Zionism-Judaism
2. Parliamentary Republic
3. People of Zion/Israel

Schema: Type of Polity
(Representative or Spokesman)
1. Ideology or Public Orthodoxy
2. Principle or Kind of Rulership
3. Identity of Community or Collectivity Ruled

*The Soviet polity is shown as a dualistic entity combining differing and even divergent elements. The schema of the Khrushchev view of the party-state reformed is included for comparison.

**Cf. M. Agurskiy, "Intensification of the Neo-Nazi Danger in the Soviet Union," Appended Document No. 2, unsigned essay by an unidentified Russian ultra-nationalist.

this necessity of modern politics.

The peculiar dilemma that the communist leadership faces in a period of national awakening is that it shows itself more and more in the character of an alien faction than a legitimate national rulership. It becomes necessary to disguise increasingly its inner rationale as the leadership of an international revolutionary class rather than of a nation.

The attached chart is designed to give an overall impression of the political and ideological tendencies just under the surface of Soviet politics. These tendencies are not insulated from one another but are in dynamic tension and complex interrelation with one another. They impinge on one another much as colors and shadings do in light spectra.

Proceeding from the party-state as a starting point, the tendencies on the left-hand side of the chart can be seen as related to the rationalist and radical humanist element found in Marxist ideology. Moving down on the left the more moderate, liberal-democratic humanism of Western representative republicanism is approached. However, like Marxism, these tendencies contain non-patriotic (non-national) and universalist elements--the term "the people" is seldom tied closely to a national identity.

Alternately, again moving from the party-state, the tendencies on the chart's right-hand side proceed from the nationally conditioned factors affecting the character of the Leninist party-state, in fact giving it its dualistic features. The triad of elements listed on the left remains the essence or core of the party-state. It holds primacy in the dualism as the party-state's 'reason-for-being.' The movement downward from the party-state on the right side of the chart is toward increasingly purified nationality-oriented tendencies rooted in traditional Russian culture and Russian Orthodox Christianity.

The Jewish Zionist state--to which Soviet Jewry has been attracted like iron filings to a magnet--provides a peculiar antipode to the Soviet party-state. It is in profound counterpoint to the Marxist-Leninist view of man's historical purpose, namely, the counterpoint of a 'people' with a special God-related destiny against Soviet communism's professed mission to bring an earthly and atheistic paradise to all men indiscriminately. However, Zionism theologically is also at odds with Western agnostic rational humanism but politically in tune with its secular democracy--revealing a symbiotic element in its own concept. Similarly, there is point and counterpoint between Zionism and Russian nationalism. Russian patriotism tied to Orthodox Christianity in its moderated forms parallels the Jewish view of the nation's special relation to God--giving the nation its historical significance--but Russian nationalism carried to its more extreme forms becomes an anti-Semitic national messianism viewing Israel as a mortal rival. However, the strain of Russian racialist nationalism represented in the chart (cf. Document No. 2, etc.) is both anti-Christian and rabidly anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist. This strain of ultra-nationalism which, in effect, lacks any roots in a religion-based traditional culture, seems to sustain its force only by opposing itself to another force which it regards as the absolute contrary to itself.* Seeing communist ideology as a shield against a global Jewish conspiracy, it translates the Leninist-Stalinist "two-camp" class-war thesis into a bi-

* Agurskiy sees in this strain of Russian racialist nationalism a secularized Gnosticism or Manicheanism--a view of the world as rent in two by a good and an evil force in conflict. Cf. For example, M. Agurskiy, "Selling Anti-Semitism in Moscow," (review of Y. Ivanov's, Caution! Zionism, Moscow, 1969), New York Review of Books, November 16, 1972.

polar racial conflict between Russians and Jews. This extremist strain of nationalism which moves in the limbo between the "civilization" of the Marxist-Leninist party-state and traditional Russian national culture contrasts with the moderation of the patriotism of a Solzhenitsyn or an Osipov. The moderation of the latter can in part be accounted for by its dedication to Russian Christian Orthodoxy not as a state ideology but as an autonomous spiritual sphere and source of morality beyond the political realm and to which the latter is ultimately ordered and subordinate. The result is that Godhead and country are kept distinct and patriotism is not converted from normal human sentiment into the secular equivalent of religious fanaticism.

The Soviet Rulership and Russian Patriotism From Stalin

From the outset the Soviet party-state has approached Russian patriotism equivocally, even dialectically in a certain sense. A seemingly ineradicable phenomenon despite the Marxian expectation of its fading away, the rulership has sought alternately to destroy it, contain it, or utilize it. However, over much of its history the party-state has sought to draw upon the sublated energies of Russian patriotism as a key but secret additive to its power. It carries the brand-name, "Soviet patriotism,"which officially signifies loyalty and love of the new Soviet multinational, and not the historical Russian, state. The Soviet state is rather in this conception the creation of the Bolshevik revolution and expropriator of the territories of the old Russian Empire.

The most striking and decisive instance of the regime's exploitation of the patriotic impulse was Stalin's open appeals to old-time Russian patriotism and its twin of Russian Orthodoxy in World War II. Without

the invocation of this elemental force there was scarce chance for the party rulership's survival under the Nazi onslaught.

Stalin's tactic has left its ironical trace ever since in the official characterization of that war as the "Great Fatherland War" not the "Great Anti-Imperialist War" as the ideology of Marxism-Leninism obviously requires. Stalin, the Georgian, and the Marxist-Leninist, however, was promiscuous in his appeal to patriotic sentiments--much as Lenin was in his own exploitation of national feelings in seeking a formula for revolution in Russia before 1917.

The patriotic impulses not only of Russians were played upon. Milovan Djilas, the Yugoslav dissident and Tito's former right-hand man and ideologue, gives his own striking testimony of the warping of the patriotic impulse. In his Conversations with Stalin he describes how the Soviet ruler tried to win him over as the Tito-Stalin feud began to sharpen. Stalin played on his passionate devotion to the USSR and to himself. Djilas recalls that as he stepped off the plane on his first visit to Moscow, he had to resist the sudden impulse to kneel down and kiss Soviet soil. Djilas' "Soviet patriotism," it seems hard to doubt, was a peculiar displacement of or substitute for this Montenegrin's feelings of patriotism. The head of a Stalinist-Leninist moved in tandem with the heart of a patriot. Djilas records how he was awakened from his enchantment by his encounters with the hard reality of Soviet hegemonist ambitions. Ideologically speaking, he then returned to his home country.

From differing perspectives Djilas drew the same conclusion as Solzhenitsyn: the allegiance to the party ideocracy and ordinary patriotism were not only not the same but ultimately were contraries--whether it be

Montenegrin, Ukrainian or Russian patriotism.

The recurring task of the Soviet communist ruler then from this viewpoint--whether a Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, or Brezhnev--is preventing divorce in this forced marriage of opposites.

The antagonistic character of the tie was shown in a particularly sharp form in Stalin's post-war policy. His opportunistic promotion of the open expression of Russian patriotism and Orthodoxy during the crisis of war was followed after the war by a strenuous campaign to recontain those same forces. Such was a prime purpose of the ideological and terrorist deep-freeze imposed on Soviet society under the direction of Stalin's ideologue--lieutenant Zhdanov. The paradoxical strategy of the Zhdanovshchina was to fight fire with fire--the latent anti-Semitic and anti-foreign passions of the extreme forms of Russian nationalism was fanned as an aid in Stalin's work of suppression. The attack on "rootless cosmopolitanism"--the Zhdanovschina battle cry, was primarily calculated to excite anti-Semitism and xenophobia among Russians.

Stalin, the master of rule through ideology and terror thus also appropriated to himself the role of saviour of the "Fatherland" during the war and its lord protector against its alleged subverters after the war. A revealing evolution in the typical charge brought against those swept up in the secret police net is noted by Solzhenitsyn--in the 'twenties it was "counter-revolutionary," in the 'thirties, "enemy of the people," and since the war "traitor to the homeland."* The latter charge was raised against the vast number of Soviet soldiers sent to the camps after the war.

* Cf. Solzhenitsyn interview with Western correspondents, March 30, 1972.

Khrushchev's attack on Stalin which not only denounced his repressions but discredited his wartime reputation stripped the emperor of his new clothes. The attack produced not only immediate political costs but also deep and hidden damage to the living substance of the party-state. A hairline fracture between the antagonistic elements Stalin had forged together appeared. Its presence was early manifest in the psychic shock produced by Khrushchev's secret speech among the new generation of Sovietized and Stalinized youth--what Khrushchev later characterized as a case of nervousness. The comment of Vladimir Osipov is apt here. He recalls: "All of us, the future heretics, in the prime of our youth were Stalinists. Khrushchev's speech and the 20th Congress destroyed our faith, having torn out the core of the Weltanschauung. This core was Stalin, for such had been the propaganda of Marxism in the past 25 years..." (Grani, No. 80, 1971, p. 110).

Khrushchev boldly attempted to close the fissure he had produced by trying to find formulas for drawing the party dictatorship and the nation together on new bases. He sought to overcome the psychological, or perhaps better, psychic disorientation his attack on Stalin produced. He promoted a kind of populist party program. He called it "creative" Marxism-Leninism and his unsuccessful opponent Molotov in 1957 called Khrushchev a "narodnik" (i.e., a reference to the pro-peasant Russian revolutionaries of the last century). He promised an end to Stalin-style coercion by the party-state and to the material deprivation of the people at large. His party program revived the long dormant promises of attaining in the USSR the end-goals of Marxism-Leninism, the coming of the first

stage of an abundant communist society without the massive coercive mechanisms of the Stalinist order. Khrushchev spoke now of a party and state of "the whole people"--a novel notion for in strict Marxism a state, whether capitalist or proletarian, can only be the dictatorial instrument of a ruling class and not the expression of a "whole people." His attempt to build a new popular base of legitimacy for the party was combined with an effort to reduce the influence of a rival claimant to popular loyalties. He intensified regime propaganda and pressure against Christianity in both its orthodox and sectarian manifestations among the populace concurrently with his revival of the long-dormant vision of the coming of the earthly Marxist paradise to the USSR. The two courses of action went together.

Khrushchev's anti-Stalinism, however, not only stimulated the rise of ideological heterodoxies within the communist movement but permitted the birth of the anti-Stalinist literary-political movement in the USSR itself. Out of the anti-Stalinist literary movement, in turn, the openly dissenting Democratic Movement of the Brezhnev years grew.

Brezhnev and the Patriotic Issue

After Khrushchev's fall, Brezhnev made his first order of business the closing of the breach in the party's ideological monopoly over public opinion that Khrushchev's de-Stalinization had caused. As part of his effort to counter the ideological "indiscipline" of the Khrushchev years Brezhnev cautiously rehabilitated Stalin's reputation as the leader who led the country to victory in World War II. By his move, Brezhnev attempted to restore Stalin as the essential historical link between the party rulership and the Russian patria--a link which Khrushchev sought to sever

in symbol by his bold renaming of Stalingrad as Volgograd. Brezhnev's policy developed in a consistent pattern. He replaced the revivalism of Khrushchev's Marxist-populist ideology with a safe, if pale, Leninist orthodoxy. His pragmatic-conservatism, oscillating between anti-anti-Stalinism and neo-Stalinism, was combined with a steady, thinly veiled effort to draw support from Russian patriotic sentiments.

Brezhnev also has sought to consolidate the position of the party-state by an unprecedented reliance on the Soviet professional military. By contrast Khrushchev had resisted the military's claims on the state budget as part of his effort to rejuvenate the position of the party dictatorship with regard to the population at large through consumerism and internal relaxation. Where Khrushchev's relationship with the professional military leaders deteriorated, Brezhnev kept his fences mended and cultivated close ties with them. He also has relied on the army as a school for the indoctrination of youth in Soviet patriotism and as a means of insulating it from "pacifistic" or "alien" ideologies.

He has publicized his wartime services along with publicity for the old generation of wartime generals, especially of the late military hero, the popular Zhukov. Last, but not least, he has brought the military leadership in the person of Marshal Grechko into the Politburo. The action was a breach of the tradition of keeping the professional, as distinct from "political," generals out of the inner sanctum.*

* Khrushchev brought in Zhukov only briefly in recognition of his debt to the Marshal's crucial aid in seeing him through the June 1957 leadership crisis; a dangerous debt which he soon unilaterally cancelled by ousting Zhukov at the earliest opportunity. Brezhnev's elevation of Grechko was rather a premeditated move of policy.

Brezhnev's implicit appeal is to Great Russian patriotism of the imperial variety--the strain of patriotism which traditionally has been concentrated in the highest military and administrative elites of the state. He has especially promoted the cult of might (moguchestvo) of the Soviet state during his incumbency. At the Dvina military exercises in 1970 he, for example, stressed that "might" was the foundation of Soviet state policy (politika). That policy, in turn, he said, projected a global class struggle with periods of ebb and flow but always intensifying over the long term. The first public account of his exposition of basic policy was given in Sovetskaya Rossiya (Soviet Russia) (February 4, 1971 editorial), frequently a specifically Brezhnevian mouthpiece, on the eve of the 24th party congress. The editorial seemed calculated in part to reassure the army and higher officialdom that a hard and realistic policy was being pursued, despite the softer detente line to be trumpeted at the congress itself.

Brezhnev's own ploys in seeking to merge his identity as party head and the putative military chief of the Soviet army reached a high point in the recent period of celebration of the 30th anniversary of victory over Germany. Grechko in April 'promoted' Brezhnev to General of the Army from the rank of Lt. General, thereby skipping Col. General, and shortly thereafter Podgornyy pinned that rank's Marshal's star on him at a formal ceremony. These moves were manifestly calculated to reinforce the image Brezhnev has assiduously cultivated of an intimate kinship between himself as leader, the army and the nation.

The Brezhnev strategy, no less than the Khrushchevian, is not a wholly safe expedient for shoring the foundation of party rule in Russia. As Stalin well understood, spontaneous patriotic-nationalist trends not only can erode the ideological bases of party rule, but contain within them the seeds of alternatives to the Soviet party-state as such. Brezhnev's play on the patriotic impulse in itself shows the effects of the resurgent patriotic tendency on the behavior and character of the present rulership. However, it is precisely the seemingly practical, if not actual, compatibility between the party's demand upon the Soviet subject for total obedience to the party-state and a kind of traditionalist or fundamentalist patriotism toward the Russian imperium that has made the notion of a tacit alliance between them so attractive to Brezhnev. From the party-state's standpoint the patriotic trend appears exploitable as a counter-weight to the Westernizing tendencies found in the dissident Democratic Movement and samizdat. Brezhnev's strategy has meant at the same time enhancing the position of the military in the rulership. The danger of an alternative to party leadership arising out of the military, perhaps allied with other nationalistically-oriented elements in the higher administrative elite resting itself on a patriotic platform ever lurks in the background of Soviet politics. That danger edged forward under Brezhnev.

It is at least a question whether the weld between Marxist-Leninist ideocracy and Russian patriotism can long hold. Can the two disparate elements adhere without the presence of a single and supreme dictatorial personality with the torch of terror at his hand? On this issue Solzhenitsyn emerges as Brezhnev's most forceful ideological antagonist striking hard at the ideocracy's inherent antipathy to self-conscious Russian patriotism.

The Brezhnev Politburo's decision to exile Solzhenitsyn to the West rather than to send him to the camps in the USSR makes as good sense in terms of the patriotic issue as the intent to offset adverse public reactions in the West and the United States. Before his expulsion Solzhenitsyn had in the sharpest possible terms posed the question of the antagonism between Marxism-Leninism and Russian patriotism in his Letter to the Leaders calling on them to renounce the ideology and return in spirit to the Russian homeland.

Despite the political distance between them, Solzhenitsyn's Russia-centered and populist-patriotic platform is a peculiar blend and counterpoint of themes found in both Khrushchev's and then Brezhnev's efforts to find chords of response in the Russian people. He shared with Khrushchev the populist theme. Khrushchev was manifestly moved by the story of the peasant hero of One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich. But he rejected his anti-religious and Marxist Utopianism. Like Brezhnev, he plucks the strings of patriotic sentiment found typically among Russia's soldiers, but plays a profound counter-chord against the Brezhnevian cult of might. Solzhenitsyn seeks the revival of the inward-looking popular patriotism associated in its origins with Christian morality and love of the Russian soil. It is a patriotism with deep historical roots and perhaps reaches to the profoundest levels of Russia's consciousness of nationhood. Unlike "Soviet patriotism" it is not a product of an ideology as such nor is it an ideologized nationalism but an outgrowth of Russian culture. Despite important differences, it bears some resemblance in terms of the sentiments it evokes with the Anglo-Saxon or even traditional American notion of "love of country"--unpremeditated sentiments arising from the life, land and situa-

tion of the "country" itself. While the outward shows of the elitist cult of might are intimidating, the untapped potentials of a patriotic populism may ultimately be the / greater reservoir of strength on which political leadership can be built.

Cross-Pressures in the Rulership: The Veche Affair

Aside from Brezhnev's personal exploitation of patriotism the rulership itself has not been single-minded in grappling with resurgent Russian national consciousness. Its tactics toward its spontaneous public expressions, the Russite writers and artists, and even toward the patriotic dissidents engaged in samizdat have been uneven. Tactics have vacillated between official tolerance and even in some instances tentative quasi-sponsorship of patriotic expressions, to strong pressure and repressive action against individual figures associated with patriotic trends. The lack of consistency in policies reveals not only divided counsels over how to keep a complex and unpredictable force under control. The evidence, though limited and usually indirect, also indicates a continuing and complicated conflict among various elements within the regime most likely reaching into the Politburo circle itself. Some leaders evidently flatly oppose any encouragement of patriotic trends seeing them as uniformly menacing to the party-state. Others betray a tolerant attitude and perhaps sympathy for these trends.

Among the first group who see only danger in the patriotic trends are ideologues in the party Central Committee and principally Suslov himself, the aging ideologist-in-chief. A Kommunist article in 1971 condemning the nationalistic line taken by the Manifesto, A Nation Speaks, and Osipov's

samizdat journal, Veche, undoubtedly had Suslov's imprimatur. He also specifically endorsed the sharp criticism of Russian nationalistic expressions in the Literaturnaya Gazeta (Literary Gazette) article (November 15, 1972) by A. P. Yakovlev. Then chief of the Central Committee's Ideological Section, Yakovlev accused the Russites of excesses of Russian nationalism and glorification of Russia's past. Yet, Yakovlev himself was sacked from his post in April 1973 and reportedly left his job under criticism that he had been too critical of works motivated by Russian patriotism. The episode was a striking indication that powerful elements at the apex of the party-state were at odds on the patriotic issue.

Among the Politburo-level figures whom hearsay has repeatedly counted among the sympathizers of the Russites and patriotic trend is the Politburo member Polyansky. While Polyansky may be moved by genuine patriotic motives, there may be also a strong element of practical calculation in this ambitious younger Politburo politician's interest in the patriotic tendency. He undoubtedly has a perfectly good sense of the strength of the nationalistically inclined elements in the military, the KGB and the party itself. However, there even have been hints that he for a time may have been a protector of Osipov's Veche (Cf. p. 44). The ultimate collapse of Osipov's Veche venture in patriotic, openly published samizdat may in part be connected with the dip in Polyansky's fortunes and influence suffered in the Politburo group in early 1973.

The party secretary and Politburo candidate, Demichev, provides an example of a high figure who has played a sophisticated and ambiguous game in cultural policy. As the figure assigned responsibility for ideological control of cultural affairs, he has talked like a doctrinaire and as a

critic of nationalistic or deviant tendencies in literature and art, yet has engaged in sophisticated maneuvering with respect to such tendencies. In practice, he has often seemed tolerant of such tendencies opposing direct or crude repressive measures against them. He obliquely defended his sophisticated tactics toward nationalistic phenomena in Soviet society in Kommunist (No. 1, 1970) as sound Leninism. He argued that the party leader must start from a "correct position" of the Leninist theory of the existence of "two cultures" in every pre-socialist national culture. The implication of his view was that,while the "national" culture will eventually be replaced by one "socialist" culture, the former, nonetheless, remains an "objective" cultural force which cannot simply be erased by direct repressions against its spokesmen. Demichev said the party could not condone the extreme of "nihilism", i.e. a total rejection of national values. Demichev, thus, gave some elbow room for neo-Slavophilism and the Russites. Demichev's sophisticated line evidently provoked moves against him by more rigorous ideological hard-line elements. The epitome of such elements in the cultural bureaucracy of course is a figure like Kochetov and his circle in the journal Oktabr' (October). His ultra-Stalinist "proletarian" line rejects both "foreign" ideology and Russophilism as "anti-Soviet." Demichev's very ambivalence is not likely to be simply a matter of his political convictions but very likely also again reflects the sharp divisions within the cultural bureaucracy and in turn the rulership itself over how Russian nationalistic trends and patriotic dissidence is to be handled.

Nowhere has the complex tugs-of-war inside the rulership and officialdom and between the rulership and the dissidents over the Russian patriotic

issue been more clearly revealed than in the trials and tribulations of Vladimir Osipov's three-year long venture in "patriotic" samizdat. Osipov's type-script journal, Veche, was remarkable because it was not an underground publication like most samizdat but was published openly from the editor's home in what can be called domizdat. Before he was forced out by KGB-inspired machinations, Osipov published nine issues of Veche from 1971 to 1974 in very voluminous editions according to the old Russian practice of literary-cultural journals. Osipov publicly advertised Veche (named after the ancient Russian popular assemblies) as a forum for patriotically-oriented writing and discussion of specifically Russian national issues. In the dissident movement's tradition of free debate, Osipov opened the pages of Veche to various nationalistic and patriotic viewpoints, including some with which he sharply disagreed. Though associating himself and the basic trend of Veche with Russian patriotism and Christianity, he, for example, published in several installments the work of ultra-nationalist,M. Antonov, who seeks to blend Leninism and Slavophilism. Yet, Osipov personally sees the only route for a renaissance of Russia in a patriotic revival balanced with Christian personalism and values, a patriotism not intolerant of other national cultures or in conflict with basic liberties. Osipov in Veche's statement of editorial policy stressed that the journal was not clandestine, was loyal to the Soviet state order, as set out in the Soviet constitution, and avoided directly political issues as topics for the journal. He declared that the journal was not "chauvinist", as some initial Western news accounts had suggested, but only aimed at strengthening Russian national culture. Osipov himself is a youthful poet who was sent to prison camp for seven

years for his part in the organizing the famed poetry readings and debates at Mayakovsky Square in Moscow between 1958 and 1961. In camp he turned from being a "democrat" to Russian patriotism and Christianity. His transmigration had begun with his disillusionment with Stalinism after Khrushchev's "secret" speech.

Certain inferences can be drawn from the Veche affair. Firstly, Veche could not have survived at all over a three-year period without the presence of one or more powerful protectors at the highest levels of the rulership. In a conversation with M. Agurskiy, Osipov agreed that Veche had support from figures in the party. While Osipov did not specifically refer to Politburo member Polyansky as one of those figures, he did agree with Agurskiy that the judicial action begun against Veche and his editorship during 1974 may have been a move by Polyansky's adversaries to discredit him. Secondly, other elements in the rulership, again necessarily reaching to the highest levels, were bent on putting Veche out of existence. Suslov and Yakovlev most likely would be among them. Moreover, it may not be wholly coincidental that Veche began publication not long after the coterie of Russites lost their strong foothold in the editorial board of the Komsomol's Molodaya Gvardiya in early 1971. The chief editor, A. Nikonov, who had given wide range to the Russites was replaced by ideologically orthodox Ukrainian, F. Ovcharenko. The latter's Ukrainian origins suggest that Politburo members Kirilenko and Shcherbitsky were most likely associated with the

*

*The dissident cyberneticist who has written on anti-Semitic, ultra-nationalistic tendencies in the Soviet officialdom and most recently authored one of the articles in the Solzhenitsyn-edited dissident anthology, From Under the Rubble.

move to curb Russite influence. Some of the Russite elements may have also viewed Veche as a new outlet for the expression of Russite opinion. None of the Politburo members who took a dim view of the Russophilism of Molodaya Gvardiya would likely favor toleration of openly advertised Russian patriotic samizdat like the Veche enterprise.

Thirdly, it would seem that in addition to official or semi-official elements sympathetic to Osipov there were other elements whose aim was to infiltrate Veche and take it out of the hands of Osipov and the circle of Christian nationalists around him. According to M. Agurskiy's account, which roughly parallels Osipov's own comments, a sharp conflict within Veche developed at the end of 1973 which led to a split in the editorial board. In the same period a legal action was initiated by official sources against Veche with Osipov as prime target. In March 1974 Osipov was forced out as editor through the machinations of his opponents in the editorial board and secret police moves against some of his closest collaborators began to be taken. Osipov in a conversation with Agurskiy regarded his opponents as in collusion with the KGB.

The new editor of Veche, an I. V. Ovchinnikov, has had a strange career as an erstwhile emigrant and employee of Radio Liberty for a time, a returnee to the USSR and a subsequent prisoner in the camps. The name of one of Osipov's co-editors since the founding of Veche, A. M. Ivanov, pen-name Skuratov, gave the changeover the color of continuity. His signature

appeared below Ovchinnikov's in an open letter announcing the removal of Osipov and the publication of a tenth issue of Veche under the new management. That letter, betraying the earmarks of a rather clumsily conceived KGB-style slander, charged Osipov with moral turpitude. It drew a bizare analogy between Osipov's ouster and Nixon's Watergate and ridiculed Western journalists for accepting Osipov as a trustworthy and genuine dissident voice. Ivanov-Skuratov's association with Ovchinnikov--if not a falsification--is curious. Skuratov's articles in Veche show him following Osipov rather closely in outlook. For example, his article in the Veche No. 10--a commentary on the Sakharov-Solzhenitsyn exchange over the Letter to the Leaders gives a reasoned support of Solzhenitsyn's side of the argument. If Skuratov was engaged in dissembling, it remained remarkably consistent. In a brief reply initiated "A.S." to the West German Station, Free Germany, he voiced chagrin that the station viewed Osipov as a moderate nationalist and others in Veche as "racist." He rejected the latter label saying it made as much sense as accusing the West German Christian socialists or Franz Josef Strauss of "racism." Despite the disclaimers, there was not only reason to suspect the motives of Osipov's successors in Veche but their intentions were murky and ambiguous to say the least.

In any case, those who were behind the editorial coup obviously did not simply seek to abolish Veche outright, but evidently tried to preserve its existence. The new Veche No. 10--

the only one that has appeared--reflected no major or obvious shift in tone or content other than Ovchinnikov's and Skuratov's ill-defined and vague charges against Osipov for "immorality" and "intrigue." In his prefatory editorial statement, Ovchinnikov presented himself as a God-fearing Russian ready to serve Russia humbly and to bear Her cross. He lent no further light on the ouster of Osipov other than to allude vaguely to "adventurers" who suddenly turn against former colleagues and raise charges against them. The issue contained a Pascal letter of Orthodox Archibishop Pimen, a reprint of Berdyaev's essay "Russia's Fate" marking his 100th birth anniversary, and in a new section of the journal devoted to Religion and Science published a piece by the mathematician I. R. Shafaryevich, Solzhenitsyn's friend, in which he suggested a harmony between mathematical theoretical development and a religious view of the cosmos. The tenth issue also contained the completion of an exchange ending on a very friendly note between Veche's editor (presumably Osipov) and Agurskiy. The latter had questioned Veche's position on racial questions but had been reassured by the editor's reply to his queries. An explanation of the basically unchanged character of the tenth issue from its predecessors was plausibly provided by the group of dissidents who jointly protested Osipov's ouster. They declared No. 10 was simply an amalgam of materials from archives furtively taken from Osipov's home along with a few additions. Since no further issues of the new Veche have appeared, those

who sought to continue the project have evidently abandoned or were forced to abandon it by official decision. Perhaps the machinations behind Osipov's ouster were so clumsy and so well exposed by Osipov and his defenders among the dissidents that any further effort to present the new editorship as a spontaneous or autonomous voice of Russian patriotic dissidence was deemed useless by its promoters. In any case, it seems evident, that those forces in the officialdom favoring complete suppression of the journal had finally gained their point against those who sought toleration of it.

Osipov himself was not deterred by the episode and turned to publish the sequel of Veche, under the name of Zemlya (The Land.) He succeeded in publishing two issues during the remainder of 1974 before he was arrested in November on charges of engaging in "anti-Soviet" agitation.

According to Agurskiy's view of the Veche affair, the move against Osipov was undertaken by political circles in the officialdom who are proponents of a kind of an anti-Semitic Russian racism which is the analogue of Naziism in Germany before World War II. Such circles, he suggests, are strong in the KGB and in the agit-prop apparatus especially in the nation-wide lecture network. It was through this network incidentally that the campaign against Solzhenitsyn as a "traitor to the homeland" was mounted. The Y. Ivanov's and the Shevtsov's are representative of such elements and, as Agurskiy points out, their anti-Zionist tracts are, in fact, simply anti-Semitic

works masquerading as official propaganda against Zionism as a political movement.* These figures and others like them can be seen as a "crush-Israel" lobby and may have sparked the virulent Soviet propaganda attack on the victorious Israelis after the 1967 war, picturing them as worse than Hitler's Nazis. In a brief analysis of the neo-Nazi character of this grouping, Agurskiy appended two typical documents authored by unidentified figures whom he associates with this grouping. The first document, dated Nov. 1971, was a letter to Solzhenitsyn from an Ivan Samolvin (pseudonym) attacking him for alleged collusion with "world Zionism" in its alleged global conspiracy against Russia. The second unsigned document was a critique of Osipov's Veche sent to the editor at the end of 1973 at about the time of the beginning of the attack on Osipov's editorship from within the Veche group. The document violently attacked Veche's editorial policy in terms similar to the first document's attack on Solzhenitsyn, accusing Osipov of anti-patriotism and betrayal of Russia. Those sharing the extreme anti-Semitic nationalism mirrored in the Agurskiy documents may have initially been allied in support of the Veche venture but soon parted company as soon as Veche's moderate patriotic and religious orientation was sustained by Osipov. The coterie Agurskiy has described and analysed may well have been among these. Another element, perhaps less ready to abandon Veche because of its religious orientation under Osipov, could be those whose views are more

*Cf. M. Agurskiy, op. cit. p. 19

or less in tune with the type of Russian patriotism mirrored in the samizdat manifesto, A Word to the Nation (Slovo Natsii). The latter is strongly nationalistic but less extreme than the racialist nationalists. They reject any dismantling of the Russian imperium--a possibility which Osipov's moderate nationalism concedes may be necessary--but they also pay lip-service at least to the idea of cultural autonomy for other nationalities in a Russian state. Despite some of the extreme notes in their rhetoric, they advocate a non-totalitarian but elite rulership for a revived Russia and see themselves as hard-headed political realists unencumbered by the illusions of impassioned democrats. They also see the revival of Russian Orthodoxy as useful and necessary to a renewed Russia, though viewing Orthodoxy as the ideology of the state much as Pobedonostsev did. These themes put the latter grouping at least into some degree of resonance with the national and religious themes emphasized by Osipov and Solzhenitsyn, though beneath the surface of similarity profound differences on the nationality question and the understanding of religion's role in society are embedded. Indeed, the possibility arises that it may have been the support of such a grouping that gave Veche under Osipov the bouyancy to keep afloat for three years. If this were the case, it does not imply Osipov was in agreement with this grouping, but only that the latter saw value in Osipov's venture in patriotic journalism.

It may be pure coincidence that Solzhenitsyn wrote his Letter to the Leaders in late 1973 (September) at a time when the conflict around and in Veche intensified. Yet, he was undoubtedly in part moved to call upon the rulership to return to Russian patriotism and Orthodoxy in the belief that some of its members were attracted to the notion of unfolding a Russian patriotic platform for a future leadership.

While speculation in these matters is necessarily tenuous, Polyanskiy may be one of those who was not wholly deaf to the Solzhenitsyn appeal. It is at least noteworthy that the attack on Veche and Osipov developed after Polyanskiy suffered a dip in his fortunes. In early 1973 he moved down from first deputy Premier to Minister of Agriculture and incidentally probably suffered a dilution of his influence as a result of an expansion of the Politburo group from 11 to 16. Also, it may be more than a coincidence that Osipov was arrested at the end of 1974 at about the same time that Demichev lost ground and was moved from the Secretariat to the post of Minister of Culture. His somewhat gentler handling of non-conformist artists, circumspect action against the dissidents and quasi-tolerance of patriotic tendencies has been followed by a policy of harsher treatment of dissidence and dissidents of all persuasions across the board in early 1975.

In any case, one of the striking aspects of the Veche affair is the intellectual kinship that emerges between Osipov and his circle and the dissident contributors to the Solzhenitsyn-

edited anthology, From Under the Rubble. Both groups are dedicated to the revival of a Russian culture and a Christian-based patriotism.* Igor Shafaryevich, the world-known mathematician and Lenin-prize winner, and other authors of From Under the Rubble joined in a manifesto of protest over Osipov's arrest in November 1974. They strongly defended Osipov's integrity and loyalty as well as the legality of his activity and accused his persecutors of violating both the Soviet constitution and state order.** Almost at the same moment, Shafaryevich and Solzhenitsyn scheduled their simultaneous press conferences, the former in Moscow, the latter in exile, announcing the publication of From Under the Rubble. Again, the timing of Solzhenitsyn's and Shafaryevich's release of the anthology was undoubtedly calculated with some attention to the current circumstances of Soviet politics. As the authorities moved to close the book on Osipov's Christian-patriotic activities, Solzhenitsyn moved to give the cause to which Osipov was attached new life. He lent his prestige to a new circle of Christian-patriotic writers, making them known to the world public and identifying himself with them. Moreover, Solzhenitsyn

---

* In an interview some time before the issuance of From Under the Rubble, Osipov unhesitatingly referred to Solzhenitsyn as "one of our own" in terms of patriotic outlook.

** M. Agurskiy, the Jewish cyberneticist also signed. One of the dissident contributors to From Under the Rubble, he advocates a Jewish-Christian alliance against the danger of the emergence of a neo-Nazi barbarism in Soviet Russia.

was demonstrating that his exile had not isolated him from the dissident movement in Russia. At the same time there is every reason to believe that during the whole Veche episode the high officialdom was reasonably well-informed and attentive to the debates and conflicts over the patriotic issue. Roy Medvedev has pointed out that today's higher Soviet officials on a kind of 'know-your-enemy' justification enjoy ready access to "white books" containing all of the writings of the dissidents including even Solzhenitsyn's Gulag. Articles in the Soviet press often provide tangential evidence of the knowledgibility of the circles to which they are principally addressed. For example, a Literary Gazette article in early 1974 (by N. Yakovlev, Feb. 20, 1974)* criticized Solzhenitsyn then already in exile for favoring technocrats over politicians in guiding society. While his interpretation of Solzhenitsyn was a simplification, the criticism served as a tacit defense of Brezhnev's arguments at the party plenum the month before. At the plenum, Brezhnev defended the qualifications of party politicians for general, economic leadership in Soviet society over against the technocratic elite. It is peculiar to say the least that the author of the article should have been prompted to put Solzhenitsyn forward as the erring antagonist of a Brezhnev position on a key internal policy issue. The peculiarity is diminished when it is kept

* Not the A. Yakovlev mentioned earlier.

in mind that the regime itself through its internal publishing system is unavoidably promoting the circulation of political and topical information within the Soviet educated classes.

In sum, the Veche affair revealed the presence of the complex contest in Soviet politics over the control and direction of renascent Russian patriotism. On the regime side the dispute at least on the tactical level seems to turn on whether or not to risk toleration of expressions of Russian patriotism. Some have entertained hopes of channeling it; others insist on abiding by the tried principle that all spontaneity is dangerous to the party-state and must be repressed. Some may argue the first position on the grounds that Russian patriotism and devotion to the party-state can be made to work in tandem and give strength to the rulership's efforts to sustain dominance over the increasingly self-assertive non-Russian nationalities of the USSR.* Further, in favor of this position is the argument that the patriotic dissidents can serve as a counter-weight to the Westernizing wing of the Democratic Movement which has helped produce such a bad press for the regime in the West. Opposing this position, some evidently say that a policy of toleration can only embolden the nationalist forces held-in-check in the party-state to insinuate their own doctrines into the party line and ideology.

* However, for the party to move too far toward open promotion of Russian patriotism would undermine its rationale for rulership over the nations of the USSR and Eastern Europe, i.e. the notions of "proletarian internationalism" and the "socialist commonwealth."

Since late 1974 the forces favoring direct repressive measures against all dissident tendencies, including the patriotic, seemed to gain ground. Yet, no side seems to have won decisive advantage. A whole range of policy matters from Jewish emigration, U.S.-Soviet trade and detente have tended to get unstuck and internal debate over basic issues intensified as the 25th party congress in 1976 approached and the day of Brezhnev's swan song as leader comes into view. The nearing prospect of a transition of leadership concurrently with a change in political generations contains deep uncertainties.

At the other pole of Soviet politics, from the side of the patriotic dissidents around Osipov, Solzhenitsyn, and Shafaryevich the long-term goal is clear. They seek to inform and temper the renewed Russian patriotic consciousness by re-linking it with Christian values and making it conformable to a restored Russian culture. The party guardians by contrast are only concerned to re-sublimate the revived patriotic impulse into a kind of tamed and harnessed chauvinism and xenophobia serving the uses of the party-state. Here are opposed the culture-moulding and peculiarly irrepressible Great Russian literary tradition encompassing social, moral and political categories and the pervading but barren temporal power of the totalist ideocratic state. But between these polar opposites there rises the third potential that both the Christian-patriots and the party guardians fear, though for different reasons--the patriotic impulse could swing away from either the above alternatives and produce either suddenly or gradually some kind of new nationalistic movement

seeking other gods.

Solzhenitsyn Joins the Fray as Russia's Champion

The rapid public emergence of Solzhenitsyn as a champion of the patriotic dissidents since late 1973 is the latest and so far most dramatic chapter in the development of the patriotic trend in the dissident movement. Up to this point the patriotic dissidents and the issues they were raising were given only passing notice both in the dissident movement and in the West. With Solzhenitsyn's entrance into the fray on the side of the patriots neither the liberal democratic or left wing of the Democratic Movement nor Western journalism could treat their cause with disinterest. With his Letter to the Leaders, sent to the rulership in September 1973, Solzhenitsyn began to force the Democratic Movement to shift the focus of its attention away from earlier preoccupations to the question of Russia, not only what has become of her but what should become of her in the future. As the debate unfolded between Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov, Medvedev and other eminent figures among the dissidents, one thing became clear. His strategy and purpose was 'political'--not simply in the immediate contexts of the term--but in its deeper senses. Solzhenitsyn himself refuses to draw a sharp distinction between literature and politics as if they were unconnected spheres. In The Calf Butts the Oak (p. 326) he recalls his displeasure with the Swedes planning for his visit to Sweden to receive the Nobel Prize. They wanted to give Solzhenitsyn a quiet apartment away from the media to prevent "politics" intruding into the ceremonies for the literary

award. He explained that he wanted just the opposite, an opportunity to be heard. Solzhenitsyn observes: "But for us this is not politics (politika). This is life itself!" Perhaps "meta-political" better conveys the right sense. His aim is nothing less than to serve as the catalyst for the formation in today's Russia of a religio-philosophical and national-cultural alternative to the Soviet communist ideocratic civilization. It unfolds in a rapid sequence and outpouring of writings and speeches--the Letter to the Leaders, the letter nominating Sakharov for the Nobel Prize hitting the foibles of the liberal West, The Gulag Archipelago, his essays in the new dissident journal Kontinent which he helped inspire, his manifesto to Russians: Don't Live By the Lie, and in a culminating statement of broad principles in the patriotic-dissident anthology From Under the Rubble.

In the process Solzhenitsyn is revealed as the most uncompromising and "radical" of the dissidents in the strict sense of the term--a going down to the roots of the issues of human life. In the above writings he emerges as:

(1) a proponent of the revival of a Russian national state and of Russian intellectual culture. He emerges as a profound opponent of the now ruling concept of a Soviet communist cosmopolis.

(2) a profound antagonist not simply of Stalin and Stalinism but of Lenin and Leninism. He attacks the notion that the Soviet regime can be progressively reformed from with-

in. Only a break with it can lead to a change of the system. He goes further and rejects Marxism and the intellectual premises of the modern "left" East and West. Modern totalist "ideology" of whatever kind--revolutionary, nationalist, or even religious--he sees as a prime cause of the great human social and political catastrophes of the 20th century.

(3) a moral and spiritual "radical" opposed to contemporary political revolutionaries as the destroyers of the political and social conditions of human freedom. His demand that Russians undergo a moral conversion (e.g. Don't Live By the Lie) means not an inner quietism but a self-sacrificing and active refusal to submit to the "lies" of ideology.

(4) an advocate of the substitution of ideological by a religio-philosophical understanding of the world issuing from both a reflection on the thought of Russian genius preserved in the pre-revolutionary literary tradition and the experience of the human sufferings of modern Russia during Soviet rule.

(5) a libertarian and not a determinist. He sees in man's free will and its capacity to choose between good and evil the determination of whether he will experience servitude or freedom in society. Man's denial of the source of his spiritual being--of God Himself in Solzhenitsyn's view--and given expression in modern revolutionary movements is at the core of modern man's predicament.

It is just such categorical premises as these that produced the waves of shock and incomprehension in eclectic

among
liberal and "progressive" opinion / both the liberal and left dissidents and in the liberal West at the seeming change of Solzhenitsyn's public face. Earlier he had stirred no tempest in this climate of opinion. He was seen mainly as a great champion of intellectual freedom against despotic rulers--a correct perception as far as it went--but not noticed were the views of man and society implied in his literary works. Western liberal opinion was disposed to put Solzhenitsyn's unexpected views down to a peculiar Russian intellectual provincialism. In fact his views were no more parochial than those of a Berdyaev or a Toynbee or a T. S. Eliot with whom he shares notable points of agreement regarding modern culture. It is perhaps more accurate to say that he was simply posing fundamental issues which inevitably disturbed long-settled and long-unexamined opinions widely shared by the informed public in the West. One sign that this was the case was Solzhenitsyn's success in carrying his cause into the heartland of the liberal West, the United States. He did not fade into relative obscurity like some other recent Soviet exiles but his public statements precipitated furious public debate on basic principles of Western policy toward the USSR. The divisions of opinion he stirred in American politics peculiarly cut across usual liberal-conservative alignments suggesting that convictions were being shaken. Respect in Moscow for Solzhenitsyn's persuasive power was also evident. Suslov himself emerged from his Central Committee chambers to warn visiting U.S. Senators of "enemies

of detente," obviously with Solzhenitsyn specifically in mind.

In any case, what prompted Solzhenitsyn to move as he did in late 1973, entering the fray full tilt against the Soviet regime on the broadest grounds? A number of factors, immediate and longer term evidently were involved.

His deep Russian patriotism was nothing new. It is woven into the texture of his work. His major works published in the '60's from Ivan Denisovich to August 1914 are designed among other things to revive in Russians their sense of being a people of shared suffering, destiny and history. That design is especially apparent in August 1914. Also in his 1970 Nobel Address he stated the basic notion of the meaning of nationhood that is shared by the Russian patriotic dissidents with whom he has now openly aligned himself. In that address he spoke of nations, all nations, the Russian included, as "the wealth of mankind, its generalized personalities. The very smallest of them has its own specific coloring and embodies a facet of God's Purpose." Yet previously he had more or less kept his own personal expression of his patriotism at a low key.

Before 1973 it seems that, like Sakharov, he did not wholly despair of the possibility of budging the rulership into beginning to relax its grip on literature. He seemed to entertain some slight hope on this score despite his fierce conflict with the authorities over his and any author's right to publish without censorship. He recalls how in that period he even wrote a letter to Suslov on the off chance that he might

approve the publication of August 1914. The book would produce "no possible problem," he assured Suslov, since it simply tells of the "selflessness and personal efforts of Russian soldiers and officers" against the Germans despite inept Tsarist staff leadership. He dispatched the letter in October 1970 recalling a strange encounter he had with Suslov at the time of the publication of One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich.* At a reception in December 1960 Suslov, without any seeming ulterior motive, strode up to Solzhenitsyn congratulating him with great warmth,as if he were a sincere friend,on "Ivan Denisovich" thus defying all his expectations regarding the arch-priest of the official ideology. Solzhenitsyn may have linked this recollection with Suslov's seeming betrayal of his own deep attachment to Russia when he expressed surprise at Svetlana Stalin's desire to leave the country to join her husband in India some years ago. In no sense did Solzhenitsyn, however, see himself as a suppliant petitioning his superiors. In The Calf Butts the Oak he says he was not ashamed to address the rulership: "I acquired a position of strength"..."I spoke with it." He says further that he expected them to take the opportunity to make concessions, not the other way around. In his Letter to the Leaders he both played out the last thread of hope of encouraging a change of heart in the rulership and fired the opening gun in the new phase of his public career.

*Cf. p. 544 of Solzhenitsyn, The Calf Butts the Oak, (Telenok Dogadalsya C Dubom) YMCA Press: Paris, 1974.

Solzhenitsyn made his move at a point when the Democratic Movement and samizdat had suffered setbacks under the blows of the offensive the Politburo had initiated against it. The moral collapse of Peter Yakir at the hands of KGB interrogators and the spectacle in August 1973 of his making a publicly staged Stalin-style confession of his mistakes and alleged crimes threatened to cause a broad demoralization of the dissidents. Here the example of Sakharov's courage in taking the issue of regime repressions to the Western press and the U. S. Congress itself through support of the Jackson amendment may have reinforced Solzhenitsyn's resolve to join with him in similar tactics. Despite his differences with Sakharov Solzhenitsyn pays him the highest tribute for setting the example of moral courage.

Finally and quite crucially, Solzhenitsyn undoubtedly judged that the time had come to play explicitly and openly on the developing patriotic trend in Soviet society. Here was a deep, popular movement potent with future possibility and conceivably open to the influence of a dynamic intellectual moral leadership. He also saw simultaneous danger of its perversion either by an ideologically moribund rulership striving for new means of securing its power over the long term or of the patriotic stream turning and flowing down the channel of ultra-nationalism.

Solzhenitsyn wrote his Letter to the Leaders knowing it would inevitably be read in comparison with and in contrast

to the liberal-democratic political premises of the famed 1968 Sakharov-Medvedev-Turchin Letter to the Leaders. That Letter had called on the leadership to undertake its own evolutionary democratizing reform from within. Solzhenitsyn's Letter, in effect, is a refutation of its suppositions. On the contrary, it says that the force for significant change lies within the renewed Russian patriotic impulse. Moreover, in Solzhenitsyn's view, that impulse brought into unison with the marked popular revival of Orthodoxy yields a potent combination in continuity with Russian tradition.

The Great Debate: The Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov, Medvedev Triangle

With the Letter to the Leaders Solzhenitsyn embarked on the formidable task of turning the Democratic Movement around. To this end he precipitated a sharp debate among the dissidents. He saw in Roy Medvedev, the dissident historian, his prime intellectual adversary. The latter's advocacy of a "genuine" and liberalized Marxism-Leninism for the Soviet future, i.e., an evolution out of continuity rather than break with the Soviet system, puts him in the sharpest counterpoint to Solzhenitsyn among the leading dissidents. Behind this struggle, however, is a more serious struggle, at least in terms of Solzhenitsyn's view of the crucial importance of personality in history. It is their rivalry for Sakharov's support and commitment. Solzhenitsyn seeks to draw Sakharov away from his earlier liberal-democratic and socialistic sympathies toward his own

vision of a revival of Russian national culture. Medvedev, in turn, has sought to persuade Sakharov to remain ideologically in his camp. Neither has won Sakharov wholly over; he is, philosophically speaking, somewhere between them. Yet, Sakharov has changed his mind on various issues since 1968 and has been open to persuasion. The most crucial change in Sakharov's outlook toward the positions of Solzhenitsyn and his circle is his rejection of his earlier view that "socialism's" failures in the USSR stem from Russian traditions. He now accepts the view that the source of trouble lies in the "essence" of socialism itself. This thesis, for example, is powerfully argued in one of the major essays in From Under the Rubble, by Solzhenitsyn's friend, Igor Shafarevich, a scientific and mathematical genius of world rank like Sakharov himself.

Solzhenitsyn's effort to persuade Sakharov is part and parcel of his larger aim of the philosophical and moral conversion of the new Soviet educated class or at least its best and leading elements. Only Sakharov stands close to Solzhenitsyn in moral stature and with the latter's exile remains as the most prominent and influential dissident now in the USSR. Sakharov, the nuclear scientist and civil libertarian is representative par excellence of the new Soviet educated and professional class. Solzhenitsyn sees in Sakharov the qualities of character necessary to great intellectual and moral leadership in the best of that Russian tradition. For

Solzhenitsyn he meets the test of a genuine Russian intelligent i.e., he is not a person of mere fixed opinions necessary to his status, but one who has undergone a change of heart and has passed through the refining "filter" of lonely self-sacrifice. He refuses to bend to the "lies" of ideology and despotism. Such men, Solzhenitsyn believes, are the nuclei around which transforming social and spirtual movements aggregate and gather energy.

In his notion of leadership and struggle Solzhenitsyn sees the key to overcoming the gulf that has separated leaders and led, the educated elite and the ordinary Russian people in the modern history of Russia and the Soviet Union. He locates the core of the trouble in educated stratum and not in the people. That stratum is the great hope of Medvedev; it is the great stumbling block to change in Solzhenitsyn's view. This educated elite Solzhenitsyn characterizes as pseudo-educated. Solzhenitsyn's Sovietized -Russian coinage, obrazovanshchina is difficult to translate precisely. Perhaps something like the tribe of the pseudo-educated might catch some of its meaning. The English translator of From Under the Rubble does his best to capture its quality with the colloquialism, "the smatterers" conveying the notion of quasi-cultured diletantism. It has something of the contemptuous sense Marxists lend to the term "bourgeoisie" but without its ponderosity as a prime term in an interpretation of all history. Solzhenitsyn's sociology of the Soviet pseudo-educated stratum is similar to

Amalrik's in "Will the USSR Survive Until 1984?" but is not tinged with misanthropism or despair of that stratum's potential for change. The educated social stratum or "intelligentsia" is not for Solzhenitsyn a sociological but psychological entity--it has to do with a "state of soul" in the very literal sense of the word. Indeed, it cannot be changed by a mere change of opinion but only,in Solzhenitsyn's view, by moral change in individuals, a change in the "way" of life. The lump can be leavened Solzhenitsyn believes by courageous moral leadership. However, at present the stratum is disposed to entertain liberal and "progressive" if not Panglossian ideas about things changing for the better. It, therefore, tends to be quietest or apathetic in politics. Moreover, and this is crucial to Solzhenitsyn, it is characterized by either a scorn for patriotism, a post-patriotic attitude, or simply non-patriotism. At the same time, as Solzhenitsyn sees it, the Marxist-Leninst ideology has lost its power to inspire the best members of the stratum but not its dominance over it and the result is a reigning condition of spiritual inertia and cynicism within it.

Given its prevailing opinions the stratum's politically motivated members are strongly attracted to programs of "working from within" according to Solzhenitsyn's analysis. Roy Medvedev is the foremost exponent of this strategy in the Democratic Movement and Solzhenitsyn is convinced it leads up a blind alley. Their point of difference is classic. Solzhenitsyn's

strategy necessitates clear-cut action by individuals against the "lie"; Medvedev's melioristic and reforming activity from within. While Solzhenitsyn is the incarnation of an anti-Lenin and the antipode of the political revolutionary, there is more than a bare resemblance between his posture toward the Soviet order and Lenin's toward the Czarist. Similarly, there is some analogy between Medvedev and Miliukov, constitutional-democratic leader under the Czar, who hoped to guide Russia from autocracy to a constitutional republic. However, Medvedev with some prudence represents himself as a restorationist bent on restoring a sound theory corrupted by bad practice. For Solzhenitsyn it is rather the case of a bad theory flawed by basic moral error inevitably producing bad practice. Indeed, in this sense, Solzhenitsyn concedes a unity of theory and practice in Leninism.

There is much that is intuitive and even visionary in the unfolding of Solzhenitsyn's strategy. It is not rationalistic or programmatic as in Medvedev or the Sakharov of the 1968 essay on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom. It would, however, be rash to jump to the conclusion that his strategy is without reason or realism. His own unity of character, force of personality, moral intensity and genius is no minor weapon in politics. He makes an indelible impression on those around him and is indeed a mover of men. In this respect he is not unlike Lenin whose personal force and moral conviction was a key to his success as a "scientific" Marxist and maker of revolution.

There is also a resemblance in the way Solzhenitsyn in debate forces issues to a sharp point demanding decision rather than compromise or a smoothing over of differences. While fairer in polemic than the demagogic Lenin, and not vituperative of opponents, he is also relentless in driving his point home. He also does not hesitate to force a division among the dissidents as a way of turning the ground of battle to his advantage. In spite of this he does not strike his colleagues as closed-minded but rather seems open to superior--but only distinctly superior--counter-argument on what is to be done. He is no hair-splitter on programs of action. Moreover, Solzhenitsyn has no proclivity to produce irreparable "organizational" splits in the Lenin manner. Rather, while vigorous and resolute in polemic he remains profoundly dedicated to preserving a basic consensus and common front among the dissidents on questions of freedom and commitment to broadly-conceived philosophical, literary and religious culture. Here a great gulf separates a Solzhenitsyn and a Lenin. Also decisively unlike Lenin, for Solzhenitsyn, the Russian, whether intellectual or commoner, cannot leave his ethics, the traditional senses of good and evil, or his individuality and conscience behind him for the sake of a cause and yet remain a free man.

Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov: The Pro and the Con About Russia

Often the most significant controversies for the subsequent

course of affairs turn on a debate between but two key figures. Just as Lenin's debate with his one-time favorite Martov over the kind of members required in a Russian Marxist party was fateful for the future of Russian Marxism and Russia, the Solzhenitsyn-Sakharov dialogue could play a similar role in the dissident movement and potentially for the future of Soviet Russia. While Solzhenitsyn does not put all his eggs in one basket--he has left behind him in Russia a loose circle of like-minded associates, some of whom are impressive personalities in their own right, he obviously still regards his friendly dialectic with Sakharov as crucial,not despairing of gradually winning him over. Such a task is difficult because of a peculiar gap between them--it is the absence in Sakharov of the experience of the purgatory of the camps. Before being sent to the camps Solzhenitsyn himself was still a Marxist. While hating Stalin he admired Lenin. He was ideologically speaking about where Medvedev is today. It was the prisons and the camp and the intellectual encounters he underwent there that led to his own turn-around. This has very often been the case with other dissidents. The patriotic dissident, Osipov, is a parallel instance. What has encouraged Solzhenitsyn's expectations is the intellectual integrity and moral courage he sees in Sakharov, a scion of the new Soviet educated stratum and a recipient of the highest privileges and emoluments bestowed by the rulership for his service in providing it with the H-bomb. In From Under the Rubble, Solzhenitsyn

for the first time publishes a critique he drafted of Sakharov's famed 1968 essay and its socialist-liberalizing viewpoint. He tells the reader that he had shown it to Sakharov in 1969 but now decided to publish it with a further postscript (October 1973) written in the month after his own Letter to the Leaders was sent to them. The postscript is mainly designed to refute charges of critics of the Letter to the Leaders that it expressed undemocratic and authoritarian views and explaining that his view, that the democratic alternative was not a realistic path for the present in Russia, did not mean he was opposed to democracy as such. By attacking what he calls the "idols" of the 1968 Sakharov (e.g. "socialism," "progress," "intellectual freedom" as an end instead of a means, etc.) Solzhenitsyn obliquely levels a broadside at the Medvedev outlook which deeply influenced Sakharov at the time. It is not too late to publish the critique of these "illusions," he explains, "because in our country a massive section of educated society is still stuck fast in the way of thinking which Sakharov has passed through and left behind." Further, he indicates his concern is not with the Soviet educated class alone. He says he also publishes the essay because "several groups in the West apparently share the same hopes, illusions and delusions."

---

* Cf. From Under the Rubble, p. 3 ff.

The previously unpublished critique shows that Solzhenitsyn's main views of politics which are now well known were already formulated, if not elaborated, at least by 1969. Going to the public on broad political issues and the question of Russia's national future in the Letter to the Leaders was not a matter of formulating new views but of timing their full revelation. The critique, for example, already gives his slant on nationalism and nationhood, i.e., a year before the Nobel Prize lecture where he begins an explicit laying out his theory of nations and human personality. The critique chides Sakharov for his "contemptuous appraisal of nationalism," underestimation of the "vitality of the national spirit" and overlooking of the "possible existence of vital national forces in Russia." Here he strikes the note--in the form of a rhetorical question--that the nation no less than the individual is an irreducible human constituency. It is a thesis, said Solzhenitsyn, that the 20th century corroborates despite the internationalist's and Marxist's rejection of the nation's essentiality to human community.

At about the same time in the second Quarter issue of Kontinent Solzhenitsyn delineates the areas of agreement and the remaining points of difference between himself and Sakharov. It provides a useful resume of the chief issues dividing the Democratic Movement over the question of a Russian national revival. The article is a kind of balance sheet and status

report on the outcome of the two men's public debate since issuance of the Letter to the Leaders. While the questions of "socialism," "ideology" and "democracy" are key points of contention between them, their debate, as Solzhenitsyn correctly indicates in his article, turns on the question of Russia and Russian nationalism--is it in essence a destructive or constructive force? Should it be encouraged or discouraged? Neither man is concerned with nationalism as a usable but disposable energy to aid in making revolution as Lenin was--both reject "modern revolutions" as agencies of constructive change--for both, rather, it is a question of whether national feeling and consciousness is a necessary help or a sure hindrance to the creation both of an ethical and creative human culture. In the historical backdrop of the Solzhenitsyn-Sakharov debate is, of course, the great counterpoint between Hegel and Marx, the former treating the nation and its religious culture as the indispensable basis of developed human community and the latter making "class" the penultimate and the "classless" and nation-less society the end term of human culture. Solzhenitsyn's perspective, it should be added, however, regarding the nation and religion is Christian drawing on Orthodox theology and not specifically Hegelian while Sakharov's is no longer Marxist but broadly secular or rational humanist. Marxism rather emerged from the latter historically as one of its radical strains. Notably, and not accidentally, one of the Christian-patriotic dissidents,

Vadim Borisov, contributed a major essay to From Under the Rubble which is a searching critique aimed at the position Sakharov now occupies. Borisov, a young historian, faults the secular or rational humanist with a fatal flaw. Arguing from a Christian view of man and a view of nation and personality similar to Solzhenitsyn's, he submits that "so-called rationalist humanism actually lacks an adequate rational basis for its defense of the dignity and inalienable rights of the human personality--for which it has often risked both life and limb."* The outcome, says Borisov, is the incapacity of rational humanism logically and ultimately politically to resist successfully movements which demand disrespect or disregard for the individual human personality. While writing for a broad and educated audience, Borisov's arguments move in tandem with Solzhenitsyn's work of persuasion aimed at Sakharov, namely that it is the logic of his position not the admirable moral passion and courage which he commits to the cause of human rights and freedom which needs correcting.

Of course, a renascent Christianity-based Russian national culture is the ultimate corrective Solzhenitsyn and his circle offer Sakharov and the Soviet educated stratum. In sound proselytizing fashion they clear the old "rubble" away by showing that their alternative, though it may rest on the

---

*Borisov also argues here that the American Founding Fathers avoided the fault. In first propounding the "eternal rights of man and the citizen" they "postulated that every human being bears the form and likeness of God; he therefore has an absolute value, and consequently also the right to be respected by his fellows."

testimony of human historical experience and ultimately be grounded on articles of faith rather than on the tenets of a rationalistic social theory, does not suffer from either the ethical illogic of well-intentioned rational humanism or from the immorality of the political logic of its corrupted Marxist kin.

The Kontinent article contains the basic elements that Solzhenitsyn combines in his effort to change the outlook of the "stratum of those who can't without anger hear the words "a Russian national renaissance." Each element is fitted to his central premise that Russia herself was put under lock and key by the Bolshevik Revolution and that the Soviet power usurped its place. He argues, in effect, that a thorough change of constitution took place--the assertions of the new communist rulership that it was introducing something entirely new were indeed correct. The Russian and Ukrainian peoples underwent unparalleled suffering, says Solzhenitsyn, and thus they taken together were as great as, and even greater sufferers than the other nations that have felt the lash of Soviet rule inside and outside of Russia.

Sakharov in his public comment was taken aback by Solzhenitsyn's boldly stated and seemingly paradoxical thesis. Sakharov, however, allowed part of the thesis and rejected the other, especially the thought that the Russians themselves were among those who suffered most. Sakharov said: "the terrors of the Civil War, the liquidation of the kulaks, famine, terror, the

Second World War, unheard-of repressions of returned prisoners-of-war, persecution of the faithful--all this applies in equal degree to Russian and non-Russian Soviet citizens. And in general, such things as forced deportation, genocide, the suppression of nationalist liberation movements and eradication of national cultures, have been the "privilege" of the non-Russians." Even before Solzhenitsyn's own clarification of his thesis in Kontinent, V. Osipov caught its intended meaning and pointed it out to Sakharov in his comment on the Letter to the Leaders. The special victimization of the Russians in Solzhenitsyn's meaning, Osipov observed in answer to Sakharov, is so manifest that it is no longer noticed: "We are degraded and cheated first in that there is nothing truly Russian under the label "Russian": neither language, nor culture, nor religion, nor tradition. We bear a yoke that is not ours, nor yet of our making, which chokes and constrains us--and for this yoke we are insulted and slighted as for a national sin. Everyone has suffered--this is true--but he who is slandered suffers thrice."

In Kontinent Solzhenitsyn develops the same general point and "reminds" Sakharov that the horrors of civil war were far from experienced "in equal degree" (quoting Sakharov) by Russian and non-Russian Soviet citizens. Rather, he says pointing to the historical record, the Ukrainians and the Russians themselves bore the brunt. The civil war and the class war consciously directed by the Communists was conducted

under the rubric of destroying the class enemy--the aristocrats, clergy, merchants and peasants--"but who were destroyed were Russians and Ukrainians." Moreover, he says, Russian culture above all was repressed, the old intelligentsia ceased life, all things Russian from folklore to fine art were subjected to unrestrained communist and Leninist mockery, and Soviet poets rejoiced in triumph:

"Yes! We shot fat-assed baba Russia dead,
So Messiah-Communism on her could tread."

Solzhenitsyn is well aware that his thesis runs counter to widespread opinion among liberally inclined Soviets of the educated stratum: namely, that the communist-led Soviet Union is really the Great Russian Imperium in disguise and in magnified form. Solzhenitsyn accounts for Sakharov's sharp reaction to his thesis in part because Stalin cynically stimulated anti-Semitic ultra-patriotism and made use of a tamed religious Orthodoxy in support of his despotic purposes. He is also aware that the same opinion is held in liberal and left-wing circles in the West and is applied by analogy to communist revolutions from Cambodia to Cuba, namely, that they are unconsciously nationalistic or are led by nationalists who wrongly have convinced themselves that they are communists and not nationalists. Solzhenitsyn's counter-thesis of essential distinction between communism and nationalism is not at all idiosyncratic or new. Djilas, as has been noted, offered a similar view in The New Class and in Western scholarship, for

example, Hugh Seton-Watson regards it as misleading to attribute Soviet repression of local nationalities simply to "Great Russian nationalism" or "Russification" policy but more appropriately to the hegemonistic drive that characterizes totalitarian political structures. Solzhenitsyn in underscoring the same contention that, in fact, intra-nationality "contradictions" as a result of the Soviet system is ten-fold more "white hot"than they were in the past in Russia.

Solzhenitsyn's dispute with Sakharov on the role of ideology in the Soviet system is closely related to their debate over who suffered most under Soviet rule. Thus Solzhenitsyn rejects Sakharov's view that Soviet ideology is a facade, the mere hypocrisy of the power holders, but contends that that ideology has permeated and dominated the whole of Soviet life and that the rulers themselves are its "slaves." This contention is the companion of his main thesis that under the sway of the Marxist-Leninist ideology Russia, Russian national consciousness and Russian culture has been suppressed or perverted to the rulership's own uses.

Similarly on the question of the failures of democracy and socialism in the USSR Solzhenitsyn argues that it is not the authoritarian practices of pre-revolutionary tsarist Russia which should receive the burden of blame. He brushes aside the charge that his Letter showed him opposed to democracy per se with the point that he implied no more than that the burden of Soviet history makes the expectation that it could

be soon realized in todays USSR unrealistic, and that some kind of authoritarian but law-abiding and non-totalitarian rule would be likely in the meantime. However, he also indicates that theoretical considerations also stand behind his wariness of democracy viewed as panacea/rather than a fallible or a political 'faith' system of government with characteristic weaknesses. Some of his criticism of Western democratic practice--its ethical lapses and excesses of partisanship--are, however, not just peculiar Slavophil views but have much in common with the flaws Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, the Founding Fathers and numerous other Western thinkers have discerned in democratic principles applied without restraint or wisdom. Further, his seemingly radical thesis that Soviet totalitarianism arose not so much from the old authoritarian order of the Czars but rather out of a crisis of democracy in Russia, i.e. of the democratic movement which gained only a brief toehold on power in the first phase of the Russian revolution, has its forerunner in the work of Alexis De Toqueville. The latter discerned danger of unprecedented forms of despotism arising out of modern democratic movements. This potential, he argued, would grow out of its inherent tendencies if it were not tempered or guided by wise leadership. On the question of socialism, as has been noted, Sakharov has, in a crucial shift in view, moved over to Solzhenitsyn's position that not "Russian tradition" but something in the nature of socialism itself accounts for the defects it has displayed in the Soviet period.

Solzhenitsyn alludes in Kontinent to a number of other secondary points and counterpoints in his debate with Sakharov. He briefly suggests, for example, that Sakharov jumped to conclusions not implied in his Letter to the Leaders, namely that his project for Russia meant reducing international scientific ties, fencing off Russia from trade, people and ideas, shifting to communal organization of production, yielding up the resources of the state and results of scientific investigation to "enthusiasts of national-religious ideas and to create high returns for them," and so forth.

Despite the various differences of view between the two, the nub of their difference again turns on the question of Russia herself. Yet, while they differ in their view of the nation in general and the Russian nation in particular, they both oppose the forced retention of the non-Russian national republics within the country. Solzhenitsyn, however, has been the most emphatic on this point and in the Letter to the Leaders said that there can be no question "of any peripheral nation being forcibly kept within the bounds of our country." However, a problem arises with the question of the Ukrainians or Byelorussians whose populations have in part merged and mixed with the Russian both culturally and geographically to some extent. Solzhenitsyn implicitly acknowledges a practical difficulty in achieving a clear-cut separation of these peoples if it were desired by them and he offers no formula for resolving this potential issue. While there is obviously

no easy way of disentangling the Russians and the Ukrainians--perhaps the most potent of the latent nationality issues of the contemporary USSR--both he and Valentin Moroz, the leading Ukrainian nationalist-dissident, see the causes of the suppression of national cultures under the Soviet regime in a similar light and share similar conceptions of the requirements of a national cultural revival of Russia and the Ukraine respectively.

In any case, Solzhenitsyn's fundamentally anti-imperial anti-expansionist position--which is shared by the Christian patriotic dissidents around him--is underscored in his essay on "Repentence and Self-Limitation in the Life of Nations," in From Under the Rubble. (pp. 105-143) In the essay he argues that all nations, and above all Russia as his special concern, must cultivate an almost lost capacity for moral repentence for offenses against its neighbors and develop the ability to place ethical limits on its desires and ambitions in the world. Thus he does not facilely conclude, as might be expected, that because the Russians, in his view, have been crushed under the incubus of an alien ideocratic despotism that they therefore bear no responsibility for the injustices committed by it against other nations. "Even in the most totalitarian states, whose subjects have no rights at all, we all bear responsibility..." Solzhenitsyn asserts. (p. 113, From Under the Rubble, Boston, 1974.) He makes it clear also that he is not speaking of expressions of repentence or national self-limitation only in words but in deed

also. He not only recalls, in this context, the repentant mood of many of Russia's intelligentsia in the last century with regard to their country's misdeeds, but also notably for a Russian patriot, he praises the repentant actions of the West Germans in making amends for Nazi Germany's travesties and atrocities against other nations. In sum, Solzhenitsyn's outlook is Russo-centric; yet, it rests on a universal view of the responsibilities of nations as such to one another. While he does not deny a nation the right to defend itself, neither xenophobia or chauvinism find any room in his philosophy.

The Consensus Behind the Debate

The triangular Solzhenitsyn-Sakharov-Medvedev controversies indeed are not superficial but basic. At the same time there are grounds of consensus among the dissident controversialists which make them and most of the dissidents in samizdat members in common of a broadly conceived Democratic Movement or Opposition. The passion and rigor of their mutual debates should not be confused with mere intransigence or hair-splitting partisanship. They rather share a common dedication to the pre-revolutionary tradition of the public free airing of views (glasnost). There is a great deal of thinking out loud in the process and a testing of views which earlier could not see the light of day, as Solzhenitsyn explains in the preface to From Under the Rubble. However, these viewpoints are not set out simply for argument's sake but are advanced with

especially evident if we extend our vision to include the broad manifestations of religious "dissidence" in the USSR of recent years which includes numbers of adherents far greater in number than the several thousand dissidents of the "Democratic Movement" proper.

However, one thing remains obvious. The civility, basic liberality of culture and the ethical self-restraint which characterizes the Christian patriotic wing of the Democratic Movement cannot be applied across the board to the Russian patriotic trend as a whole, especially where it is not linked with a religious orientation. It cannot be applied to those shadowy, largely anonymous dissident or subrosa nationalistic elements in the officialdom to the "right" of V. Osipov, Solzhenitsyn and the Christian-patriots. The further "right" one moves along this twilight zone the closer one approaches totalitarian forms of nationalism, or nationalized-religious ideology or hybrids of nationalism and official ideology. Notably, Kontinent in its editorial statement did not omit reference to its intention to struggle against such strains of totalitarianism as well as the Marxist varieties. It is their hovering menace of which M. Agurskiy warns and which the Christian-patriotic dissidents dread. It is why the latter seek to avoid making Russian national sentiments and tradition into an "ideology," or Christianity into a statist political religion or Russian patriotism into an imperial nationalism asserting the prerogative of placing other nationalities under

with the H-bomb. In From Under the Rubble, Solzhenitsyn

its sway. Their perilous task, as they see it, is to free Russia from its Soviet enchantment and keep her from falling under a new spell. They hope to help guide her instead toward a broadly conceived and authocthonous national culture. From, say, Amalrik's pessimist-realist perspective the dissident patriots are undoubtedly visionaries. Solzhenitsyn concedes the point in stopping short of reproaching Sakharov and his convergence theory of Utopianism. He exclaims "how can we in our helpless position not attempt Utopia?" Yet the odds against a non-totalitarian "national" solution also should not be exaggerated. Most of the discernible extreme nationalistic trends lack the ideological coherence or integrity of outlook that political effectiveness normally demands. The more moderate dissident patriots under Solzhenitsyn's inspiration, by contrast, offer not an "ideology" but a comprehensive diagnosis and treatment for man and society in the Soviet Union. Their potential political base is not inconsequential--it lies in the popular revival of religion and genuine widespread enthusiasm for recapturing Russia's traditions of the past decade. It is true that the Christian-patriotic dissidents are also in a sense pre-political--they do not represent a politicizing nationalism, despite the fact that Solzhenitsyn possesses an acute sense of "politics" and is found in the middle of every important dispute not only in dissident politics but in East-West politics as well. However, they are pre-political not as non-political but as preparing in the realm of ideas the ground for change

as well as cultural
in the political/sphere. Solzhenitsyn's moral crusade is not so much designed to affect today's practical policy decisions--though it has already had some effect even here--but to influence political trends from within by affecting a change in basic attitudes of the educated elites in both East and West. Such a change, if it began to develop, would move in time to the surface of the political world. In the way of the successful unarmed prophets of history the aim is not to precipitate sudden upheavals through revolutionary force or fraud but to move mountains by stirring the forces of the human spirit.

Western Perspective and the "Patriotic" Dissidents

The danger of misreading or misrepresenting the Russian patriotic dissidents and underrating the political potentials of the patriotic trend in the Soviet Union is already evident in the West, and especially the United States. Western observers both journalistic and academic--but especially the former--for the most part failed to notice the marked signs of the revival of Russian national feeling and consciousness in the past decade. There were a few notable exceptions among specialized scholars and experts.* The open--not underground--publication of Osipov's Russian "patriotic" (samizdat) journal was hardly noted in the Western media, aside from a few Slavic

*The most detailed and informative treatment of the subject is provided by Dimitri Pospielovsky. For example, in his analyses for Radio Liberty, and his article, "Russian Nationalism in Samizdat," Survey, Winter 1973.

revival over the question of a Russian national revival. The article is a kind of balance sheet and status

journals, emigre publications and special academic publications. The benign neglect was in part the result of the Western media's focus on the libertarian and civil rights struggle of leading dissident figures against regime repressions. However, part of the reason for the exclusive attention was also the predisposition among Western journalists to fasten on to issues familiar to Western liberal-democratic politics, and disinclination to attend to seemingly peculiar dissident expressions of nativist or indigenous impulses. Also /a certain blinding effect of Western political prejudices seems to have operated here. This impression is strengthened by the kind of "culture shock" in reverse that was produced among Western journalists and intellectuals by Solzhenitsyn's Letter to the Leaders. It came with the belated discovery by many of them that the great Russian writer was a Russian patriot as well as a libertarian, a writer with a Christian rather than humanist view of man and society and a sharp critic of the vices of permissive democracy in the West and a doubter of the immediate practicality of democracy in the USSR. Indeed, if Solzhenitsyn himself had not come forth as a spearhead of a Russian revival among the dissidents, the "patriotic" issue in the Soviet Union might still have gone unnoticed.

Now, however, a different danger arises with the arrival in the West of Solzhenitsyn himself and the train of kindred spirits forced into exile by the Soviet regime. Now the pitfall is not simply one of neglect but of partisan misreading or

...as one of its radical strains. Notably, and not accidentally, one of the Christian-patriotic dissidents,

misrepresentation of the Russian patriotic-dissidents. Solzhenitsyn has dropped into the midst of American politics like a Jonah among the Ninevans. He calls on Americans to repent their ways of complacent affluence and recognize a mortal danger to Western freedom from the East, but, less like Jonah, he also sooths the American national ego bruised after Vietnam and Watergate. He praises American character, generousity and basic conduct toward the outside world. The Russian patriot comes as a defender of American national self-esteem against its detractors. A controversialist par excellence he challenges head on the main premises of the indictment of the American role in the world and American society not only of American "advocacy" journalism but of the entire liberal and left-leaning wing of contemporary American politics. Dare we concede that this wing of American society is not so far separated in general character from the educated stratum in the USSR which Solzhenitsyn knows so well, mercilessly criticizes and tries to win over?

It may be just because the "patriotism" v. "post-patriotism" issue is so much alive in American politics today that a fair and undistorted portrayal of Solzhenitsyn and the Russian dissident-patriots is so hard to come by.

The cause of serious debate and genuine understanding of Solzhenitsyn and the patriotic dissidents will be set back if only the appearances and not the substance of their arguments are addressed. This will happen if Americans--whether policy-

avoided the fault. In first propounding the "eternal rights of man and the citizen" they "postulated that every human being bears the form and likeness of God; he therefore has an absolute value, and consequently also the right to be respected by his fellows."

makers or informed citizens--succumb to the disposition to misconstrue their views as a throwback to a moribund Russian nationalism rather than a position growing out of deep reflection on the philosophical, religious and native roots of Russian culture at its best. The criticisms in Western press articles of Solzhenitsyn's Letter to the Leaders as "chauvinist," "isolationist," and "authoritarian" belied the reporters' preconceptions and not Solzhenitsyn's standpoints. Some of the stock-in-trade epithets of homegrown American liberal politics like "right-wingers" or "reactionaries" are also grossly inapplicable to the dissidents' politics or their life experience in the USSR. Solzhenitsyn's outlook, like most of the other Christian-patriots, profoundly respects the integrity of other nations, including the nationalities of the USSR, is least of all, anti-libertarian. Rather, the idea of individual human freedom, especially in the sense of the radical power of moral choice and a nation's moral responsibility for the good and evil of its actions as co-extensions of the powers of the human personality is at the core of his understanding. The typically superficial attack, as distinct from informed criticism, upon Solzhenitsyn's patriotic orientation is usually the result of snap judgment and mistaken identity--the real culprit being a type of nationalism with which Solzhenitsyn himself is in mortal combat. This type of nationalism is also the political and ideological adversary of the liberal West.

those who suffered most. Sakharov said: "the terrors of the Civil War, the liquidation of the kulaks, famine, terror, the

The other error of perspective to which many Western observers have been prone is seeing the patriotic dissidents as an aberrant circle of intellectuals living in enforced isolation. The truth is just to the contrary. They are acutely attuned to the subsurface pulsations within their own country and sophisticated interpreters of their rhythm and beat. The "public" audience of their discourse and debates is not limited to themselves but extend outward to the educated strata of today's Soviet Union. Despite the rulership's strenuous efforts to suppress public awareness of their conversation, the compartments of Soviet life are no longer well-sealed as in Stalin's day. A kind of rapid osmosis of communication continually operates.

The patriotic dissidents, like the dissident movement as a whole, speak to issues which the party rulership avoids as much as possible, disguises or distorts in its public expressions. Their writings--From Under the Rubble is the most striking recent example--go behind the official facade and open to view the complex problems not only posed by resurgent national feeling among the USSR's non-Russian peoples but of Russian national consciousness in the heartland of the Soviet Union. It has visibly disturbed the repose of the Politburo oligarchy and affected Brezhnev's tactics. The exchanges of the patriotic dissidents among themselves and, in turn, their developing and searching debate with the liberal and left wing of the Democratic Movement force into the light and define

the hidden dilemmas confronting today's Soviet Empire.