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A PRELIMINARY REPORT
NAVAL RESERVE PERSONNEL ATTITUDE SURVEY 1979
READINESS COMMAND REGION SEVEN


RETENTION -

Milton L. Boykin, Ph.D, Commander, USNR-R

Hardy L. Merritt, M.P.A., Lieutenant Commander, USNR



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REGION SEVEN

RETENTION STUDY

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READINESS COMMAND REGION SEVEN

RETENTION

⑨ Preliminary report
⑩
Milton L. Boykin Ph.D, Commander, USNR-R

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REPORT NUMBER ONE

A Preliminary Report Concerning Descriptive Statistics
of those Social and Psychological Attitudes and Back-
ground Characteristics Associated with Retention in
REDCOM REG SEVEN

October 1979

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None of those who so generously have given of their time and energy have any responsibility for errors in the analysis or mistaken interpretations. These are the responsibility of the authors.

↓

ABSTRACT

This report examines retention. It provides a socioeconomic profile of the reservists in Naval Reserve Readiness Command Region SEVEN, and a statistical description of their attitudes, opinions and beliefs about the Naval Reserve. After an extensive review of the literature, it investigates the areas of how closely reservists identify with the Navy as a subculture, their level of satisfaction with various aspects of the reserve program (i.e. drill, WETS, ACDUTRA), the kinds of leadership styles believed most effective (authoritarian/democratic) and their sense of civic responsibility. The purpose is to show how these attitudes and values are related to the intention of reservists to reenlist in the Naval Reserve.

↗

DISAVOWAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY POLICIES

The opinions, assertions, and interpretations contained in this paper are the views of the authors and are not to be construed as official or as necessarily reflecting the views of the Commander, Readiness Command Region SEVEN, the Chief of Naval Reserve, the Department of the Navy or the Department of Defense.

Little, D. P. C.

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STUDY HIGHLIGHTS

REVIEW AND FINDINGS

Problem

The purpose of this research is to investigate and to identify accurately those practices which, in the minds of Naval Reservists, cause selected reservists to remain in the U. S. Naval Reserve or conversely induce drilling reservists to leave, consequently reducing the operational readiness of the U. S. Navy.

Objectives

The objectives of this study are:

1. To provide a general description or profile of the Selected (drilling) Reservists, and to further identify specific characteristics of those reservists who are lost prior to EOS.
2. To review the literature, develop a theoretical frame of reference and explore the predictive capability of this Generic Model for understanding retention.
3. To determine if background characteristics, cultural socialization, leadership styles, and civic responsibility are statistically related to retention.
4. To consider if it is possible to develop a survey instrument to assist in military counseling so that retention problems can be identified early and corrective action taken.
5. To offer the results to various Navy commands for retention and recruiting use as applicable.

Approach

To reach these objectives, the following methods were employed:

1. Utilization of existing statistics (CNAVRES, BUPERS, DOD, REDCOM NINETEEN, REDCOM TWENTY).
2. Analysis of REDCOM SEVEN Gain and Loss Reports for FY 1978 and FY 1979.
3. In-depth interviews with a stratified random sample of eighteen selected reservists representative of the region.
4. Content analysis of letters solicited from reservists involuntarily terminated, 47 responses of 157 letters received.

Highlights

The findings about the social and psychological characteristics of Naval Reservists and their intentions to reenlist are as follows:

1. Most reservists either definitely intend to reenlist or hope to reenlist.
2. Most reservists questioned never or rarely think of getting out.
3. They are career motivated. Over half of the reservists give themselves a 90 percent chance or better of remaining in a drilling unit for another year. Also, over 50 percent of the reservists give themselves an 80 percent chance or better of staying for another three years or another twenty years.
4. The most important reasons given for joining the Naval Reserve are drill pay and retirement benefits with patriotism a poor third.
5. Most Naval Reservists are white, Protestant, married males with approximately two dependents. They are well-educated, have a good job and think of themselves as either working class or middle class.
6. These socioeconomic characteristics are positively associated with the intention to reenlist. The higher the socioeconomic status, the more likely one intends to reenlist in the Naval Reserve.
7. Among reservists whose family, peers and employers support their Naval Reserve activities, intention to reenlist is high. For example, only 4 percent of those reservists who have strong family support say they definitely will not reenlist.
8. Reservists are not alienated from their civilian pursuits. They feel useful and are serious about their work. They are almost never harassed, and rarely bored.
9. Those who are most satisfied with their civilian jobs are most likely to reenlist.
10. A major finding is that environmental and situational characteristics are much less significant than supposed. Distance to the drill site, time of commuting, the area of the country in which one was reared, and the location of one's current residence does not explain why some reservists intend to reenlist and others do not.
11. The fact that one comes from a military family is unimportant in predicting the intention to reenlist as is the length of time a reservist was assigned to an afloat command on active duty.

12. Military rank/rate is strongly related to the intention to reenlist as are age, longevity, number of ACDUTRA's and WET's attended. As experience with the Naval Reserve increases, the more likely reservists intend to continue their participation.

13. Most Naval Reservists are strongly identified with the Navy as a subculture. They like things typically Navy such as calling floors, "decks"; walls, "bulkheads"; and ceilings, "overheads." The reservists' image of the Navy is extremely positive.

14. They remember their experience on active duty as useful, and they almost never recall feeling any hostility.

15. Reservists who are most strongly identified with the Navy are likely to reenlist.

16. Reservists are pleased with their reserve units, the comradeship they experience during drill and the personal appearance regulations.

17. Reservists are dissatisfied with their sense of accomplishment, how the drill compliments their civilian occupation; how their talents are utilized, and their amount of responsibility. They feel that both the training and equipment are inadequate.

18. They feel that more time should be given to rate training and less time to administrative matters such as meetings and writing reports.

19. They place great value on ACDUTRA and WETS and are more satisfied with these activities than they are with the experiences they have in the Naval Reserve Centers.

20. The greater the satisfaction with various aspects of the Naval Reserve, the more likely they plan to reenlist.

21. Reservists are not displeased with the uniform requirements and personnel policies; however, these matters remain sensitive predictors of retention.

22. Although reservists are not satisfied with the equipment or training aspects of their reserve experience, these variables do not predict the intention to reenlist.

23. Naval Reservists think that their Commanding Officers provide strong leadership to their units.

24. Democratic leadership styles are widespread and preferred to authoritarian leadership styles.

25. Most reservists believe they are treated fairly and that favoritism is discouraged.

26. Women have been well integrated into the Naval Reserve. Their attitudes do not differ substantially from those of men.

27. Blacks do not feel that they are treated fairly, at least not by comparison with whites.

28. The general attitude toward work among all Naval Reservists is to place great value on intrinsic benefits and less emphasis on extrinsic material rewards. This is so despite the fact that they list economic reasons for initially joining the Naval Reserve.

29. Reservists have a high sense of civic responsibility and feel a duty to their country. They feel that a citizen should be willing to engage in some form of full-time community service for at least two years.

30. Most agree that conventional war is likely but are not convinced that all out nuclear war is realistic possibility in the next 15 years.

31. Although war may be likely, they feel their chances of being recalled are remote.

32. Reservists are well aware of some of the moral implications of war (57% said they did not think the Vietnam War was just); however, very few reservists thought their participation in the Naval Reserve raised a moral problem for them personally.

33. Naval Reservists are highly involved in community affairs. They express a great deal of interest in politics, for example, and if what they tell us is true, they talk politics, vote, and even campaign at much higher levels than do Americans generally.

34. The party identification of Naval Reservists reflects the partisan alignment of the American public generally. Proportionally there are about the same number of Republicans and Democrats in the Naval Reserve as in the country as a whole. Party identification is also statistically unrelated to the intention to reenlist.

35. Although partisanship does not predict intention to reenlist, ideological orientation is important. The more conservative a reservist sees himself, the more likely he intends to reenlist.

36. Generally we find that the higher the sense of civic responsibility, the greater the likelihood of reenlistment.

Recommendations

1. Sensitize active duty personnel to the absolute requirement that administrative support willingly provided for drilling reservists is the summum bonum of their professional life. This is especially critical during the first three to six months of of an enlistee's affiliation. It is during this time that administrative indifference wrecks the most havoc; this is the time when the recruiters' promises are put to the initial test and when expectations and reality are compared in terms of satisfaction. Command attention, sensitivity training, and indoctrination divisions are strongly recommended. It goes without saying that receipt of the paycheck is the single most important item which must be accomplished. This study has repeatedly affirmed that financial consideration is the prime mover of participation.

2. Involve the family (especially the wife) in Reserve participation. Center and unit Commanding Officers should initiate contact with the wife and family through personalized correspondence and family-oriented social events such as cook-outs and short tours of nearby Naval and civilian points of interest.

3. Conduct a skills inventory of each unit and center, concentrating on interest and abilities other than those related to the reservists' rate. Then, use those skills to the benefit of the community and the Naval Reserve.

4. Increase reservists' participation in civic projects at the local level. Do this as a unit on drill week-ends, other than WET's. This accomplishes two purposes: (1) It reduces the well-documented dissatisfaction with boring classroom lectures, and (2) It meets the demonstrated need of reservists to increase civic involvement.

5. Increase WET opportunities to provide realistic hands-on training. Reprogram money accordingly.

6. Increase efforts to upgrade equipment available in the Reserve Centers. The SBS program should be accelerated and emphasized in any cost trade-off analysis.

7. Screen prospective unit Commanding Officers for unacceptably high levels of authoritarian leadership tendencies. Validated tests are available for this and are being used in industry.

8. Recognize outstanding performance by letters of commendation and such programs as "sailor of the quarter." Make awards at morning quarters.

9. Periodically contact civilian employers and, most especially, immediate supervisors and tell them that the Naval Reserve appreciates their support. Emphasize that the reservist is doing a good job and infer that this is the result of good leadership and supervision on the part of the employer.

10. Periodically invite employers and supervisors to organized social activities.

11. Provide opportunities for segmental drilling when job conflict is apparent.

12. Increase the efforts to overcome the feelings among minority groups that they are being treated unfairly. This should be done by recognizing their contribution to achieving organizational objectives rather than through paternalism.

13. Do not underestimate the effectiveness of appeals to patriotism and civic duty. Pay is a necessary cause of initial affiliation but is not always sufficient to retain the better reservists.

14. Undertake a hard look at the training program with a view to developing innovative alternatives to what many reservists see as a dull and dreary exercise. For example, it might be possible to reschedule drills to take advantage of college or technical courses offered in the community or bring in trained teachers to offer a series of courses relevant to the units' needs.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page number
Cover Page -----	i
Acknowledgments -----	ii
Abstract -----	iv
Statement of Problem -----	v
Objectives -----	v
Approach -----	v
Highlights -----	vi
Recommendations -----	ix
Table of Contents -----	xi
List of Tables -----	xiv
List of Figures -----	xvi
 <u>Introduction</u>	 1
 I <u>Theoretical Framework and Literature Review</u>	 7
Generic Retention Model	8
Models of Man	10
Review of Previous Research	12
Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs	13
Kohlberg and Converse	15
Herzberg's Two Factor Theory	17
Expectancy Theory	19
Equity Theory	21
Satisfaction Theory	22
Role Theory	24
Retention in the Active-Duty Navy	25
 II <u>Background and Methodology</u>	 30
REDCOMREG SEVEN Retention Studies	31
Gain and Loss Reports	31
Responses from Reservists Involuntarily Terminated ...	31
In-Depth Interviews	34
The Survey Instrument	36
Preliminary Administrative Procedures	37
Pretest	38
Administration of the Questionnaire	38
Time Schedule	38
Computer Processing Procedures	38
Statistical Analysis	39
 III <u>Scope of the Retention Problem</u>	 40
Types of Attrition	41
Retention Statistics 1978	43
The Intention To Reenlist or Extend	45
Summary	49

IV	<u>Background Characteristics and The Intention To Reenlist</u>	51
	Reasons for Joining the Naval Reserve	52
	Relationship Between Socioeconomic Characteristics and Retention	54
	Support from Family, Peers and Employers	62
	Military Status Characteristics	66
	Situational Environmental Characteristics	69
	Summary	70
V	<u>Cultural Socialization</u>	73
	Attitude Toward Active Duty Experience	75
	The Reservist's Image of the Naval Reserve and his Intention to Reenlist	79
	Summary	80
VI	<u>Satisfaction</u>	81
	Levels of Satisfaction	82
	Comparison with REDCOM Los Angeles and REDCOM San Francisco	85
	Satisfaction with Training	88
	Civilian Job Satisfaction	88
	Relationship Between Satisfaction and Intention to Reenlist	88
	Summary	92
VII	<u>Leadership</u>	95
	Leadership Style	96
	Democratic Leadership	99
	Authoritarian Leadership	99
	People Orientation	102
	Equity	102
	Attitudes of Women Reservists	105
	Attitudes of Blacks in the Naval Reserve	107
	Inequity vs Reenlistment	107
	Summary	110
VIII	<u>Civic Responsibility</u>	112
	Citizen Duty	113
	Attitudes Toward War	116
	Political Activity	118
	Summary	120
IX	<u>Conclusions and Recommendations</u>	121
	Social and Economic Profile	122
	Role	122
	Impact of Family	122
	Economic Incentives	123
	Self Actualization and Satisfaction	123
	Leadership and Equity	123
	Moral Obligation	124
	Recommendations for Changes	125
	Specific Proposals	125
	Future Research	127

X	Selected Bibliography	128
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XI	Appendices	137
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Appendix A: Background Letter From Commander Naval Reserve Readiness Command Region SEVEN To All Commanding Officers/Officers-In-Charge.

Appendix B: Letter Of Instruction From Commander Naval Reserve Readiness Command Region SEVEN To All Commanding Officers Of Naval Reserve Centers and Voluntary Training Units.

Appendix C: Naval Reserve Readiness Command Region SEVEN Notice 1040 Directing The Retention Survey.

Appendix D: General and Verbatim Instructions For The Administration Of The Retention Survey Questionnaire.

Appendix E: The Retention Survey Questionnaire.

Appendix F: Computer Data Card Layout.

LIST OF TABLES

2.1	Reasons For Termination FY 78	32
4.1	Comparison Of The Most Important Reason For Affiliating With The Naval Reserve Among Reservists In REDCOM SEVEN, REDCOMSANFRAN-LOSA	33
4.2	Relationship Between Social Variables And The Intention To Reenlist	36
4.3	Relationship Between Perceived Social Class, Education, Nature Of Employment, And The Intention To Reenlist	61
4.4	Relationship Between Support From Family, Peers And Employer And Retention	63
4.5	Relationship Between Level Of Social And Economic Disruption Caused By A Recall To Active Duty And Intention To Reenlist	65
4.6	Relationship Between Military Rank And Intention To Reenlist	67
4.7	Relationship Between Longevity In The Naval Reserve And Intention To Reenlist	68
5.1	Attitudes Toward Active Duty Experience (Officer And Enlisted)	76
5.2	The Reservist's Image Of The Naval Reserve	77
5.3	Relationship Between Image Of The Navy And Intention To Reenlist	79
6.1	Satisfaction With Various Aspects Of The Naval Reserve Drill Experience, Officers And Enlisted	83
6.2	Naval Reserve Time Utilization	84
6.3	Comparison Of RESCOMREG SEVEN And REDCOMSFRAN And LOSA's Mean Scores For Naval Reserve Satisfaction Among Enlisted Personnel	86
6.4	Relationship Between How Reservists Feel About The Naval Reserve And Their Intention To Reenlist	87
6.5	Attitude Toward Civilian Job	90
6.6	Relationship Between The Percent Of Reservists Who Will Definitely Reenlist And Their Attitude Toward Their Civilian Job	91
6.7	A Comparison Of The Level Of Satisfaction With Various Aspects Of The Naval Reserve Experience While On Reserve Drill, WETS, And ACDUTRA	93
6.8	Comparison Of Satisfaction With Various Aspects Of The Naval Reserve: Drilling Unit, Future Expectations, ACDUTRA And WETS	94

7.1	Evaluation Of Officer Leadership Strength With The Naval Reserve Unit	97
7.2	Comparison Of Commanding Officer's Perceived Leadership Strength And The Intention To Reenlist	98
7.3	Attitudes Toward Navy Supervisors: Authoritarian Or Democratic Leadership Styles	100
7.4	Relationship Between Leadership Style And The Intention To Reenlist	101
7.5	Desirable Qualities In A Navy Supervisor	103
7.6	Attitudes About Work Generally	104
7.7	Comparison Of Attitudes Concerning Equity In The Naval Reserve Among Blacks, Women And Others In The Naval Reserve	106
7.8	Attitudes Of Black Reservists Toward The Naval Reserve	108
7.9	Relation Between Concepts Of Equity And Intention To Reenlist	109
7.10	Relationship Between Equity And Retention Among Black Naval Reservists	111
8.1	Sense Of Civic Responsibility	114
8.2	Relationship Between Sense Of Civic Responsibility And The Intention To Reenlist	115
8.3	Attitudes Of Naval Reservists Toward War	117
8.4	Relationship Between Political Involvement And Intention To Reenlist	119

LIST OF FIGURES

1.1	Generic Retention Model	9
1.2	Models Of Man	10
1.3	The Relationship Between The Motivation-Hygiene Theory and Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs	14
1.4	Factors Affecting Job Attitudes	18
3.1	Retention 1978	43
3.2	The Intention To Reenlist	46
3.3	The Frequency Reservists Talk About Getting Out Of The Naval Reserve	48
3.4	Cumulative Frequency Of Self-Rated Chance Of Remaining In A Drilling Unit	50
4.1	Relationship Between Age And Intention To Reenlist	58
4.2	Relationship Between Enlisted Income And The Intention To Reenlist	59
4.3	Relationship Between Miles To Drill Site And Intention To Reenlist Among Enlisted Personnel	71

INTRODUCTION

The management of human resources has become the number one priority of all modern complex social organizations. This is exemplified by the emphasis now being placed on retention by the leadership of the U. S. Naval Reserve. According to Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard:

Most managers, if asked what they would do if they suddenly lost half of their plant, equipment, or capital resources, are quick to answer. Insurance or borrowing are often avenues open to refurbish plant, equipment, or capital. Yet when these same managers are asked what they would do if they suddenly lost half of their human resources--managers, supervisors, and hourly employees--they are at a loss for words. There is no insurance against outflows of human resources. Recruiting, training, and developing large numbers of new personnel into a working team takes years. In a competitive environment this is almost an impossible task. Organizations are only beginning to realize that their most important assets are human resources and that the managing of these resources is one of their most crucial tasks. (Hersey and Blanchard, 1977, p. 72).

Over the past few years retention of military personnel has become increasingly important to national security. (President's Commission Report, 1970). The overall Naval balance between the Soviet Union and the United States is difficult to determine, yet unquestionably the Soviets have made great progress in the sphere of material matters. Commensurate with these developments, "there have been drastic cuts made to the U. S. Naval program--the deletion of six submarines and 20 major warships, the erasure of 13 important conversions and the reduction of the Naval Reserve by nearly half can only have a weakening effect on material readiness and morale." In comparing the Navies of the Soviet Union and the United States, the editors of Jane's Fighting Ships say, "The advantage accruing from the education and training of the all-volunteer U. S. Navy, with its emphasis on initiative, must however provide a position of strength compared with a Navy manned by conscripted junior ratings, no matter how detailed the technical training of their superiors." (Jane's Fighting Ships, 1978-79, p. 129). This advantage resulting from superior manpower may rapidly erode if the retention problem of the U. S. Navy is not solved.

Retention is an old problem in the U. S. Navy. Throughout the 19th century desertion was at a very high level and at times almost amounted to mass flight. Frederick S. Harrod in his recently

published book, Manning the New Navy, The Development of a Modern Naval Enlisted Force 1899 - 1940, quotes Captain William G. Temple of the Tennessee as reporting in 1871 that fifty-one of his crew deserted during just two weeks at the New York Navy Yard. (Harrod, 1978, p. 13). In another incident, Commander Francis H. Roe complained, "My ship's boats would go ashore and men would leap out and run. If the officers followed, the whole boat's crew would likely desert!" (Harrod, 1978, p. 13). More recently Captain Charles McIntosh, USN, points out, "A well remembered DesLant Bulletin in the very early 1950's bemoaned the 3 percent reenlistment rate then current." (McIntosh, 71, p. 79).

If poor retention is neither new nor more accurate, what is different is the amount of attention it is receiving. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) recently indicated that retention is his number one priority. His keen interest in this subject is shown in a memorandum stating CNO Objectives. In this memorandum, CNO stresses the need to change our way of doing business to eliminate those practices which drive good people out of the Navy, and to make a naval career as attractive and satisfying an experience as possible." (CNO MEMO dtd 17 Oct. 78). The Reserve aspect of this problem is important because with the evolution of the "One-Navy" concept, the U. S. Naval Reserve is recognized as an essential element of its active-duty counterpart.

The purpose of this research is to investigate the problem of retention and to identify more accurately some of those practices which, in the minds of Naval reservists, drive people out of the Naval Reserve and consequently reduce the operational readiness of the U. S. Navy. This study is an exploration into the social and psychological aspects of attrition in the Naval Reserve of Readiness Command Region SEVEN.

To accomplish the general and specific goals of the current project, a survey research design was employed involving the administration of a 349-item structured questionnaire to a universe of approximately 2,000 Naval reservists in Readiness Command Region SEVEN. These reservists attend drill at 11 Naval Reserve Centers in Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina. The research will result in eight reports.

Report Number 1 - A Preliminary report concerning descriptive statistics of those social and psychological attitudes believed to be associated with retention.

Report Number 2 - An investigation into the relationship between job satisfaction and retention.

Report Number 3 - An investigation into the relationship between perceptions of equity and retention.

Report Number 4 - An investigation into the relationship between expectancy and retention.

Report Number 5 - An investigation into the relationship between role perception and retention.

Report Number 6 - An investigation into the relationship between cultural socialization and retention.

Report Number 7 - An investigation into the relationship between socioeconomic, military, environmental characteristics and retention.

Report Number 8 - An evaluation of the determinants of retention and recommendations for change.

Special Reports - A series of computer printouts showing the frequency distributions of the questionnaire responses of officers and enlisted personnel assigned to the units which drill at that Reserve Center.

This study examines retention from several perspectives. As a result of this eclectic approach, it is anticipated that a greater insight can be gained into the determinants of attrition in the Naval Reserve of REDCOMREGSEVEN. If an explanation of retention is forthcoming, Commanding Officers may be able to predict potential retention problems and then take corrective measures. Higher levels of management can take action to develop programs that are relevant to the needs of the reservists, and in this way increase the support from Naval Reserve personnel necessary for operational readiness. It is hoped this analysis will provide the knowledge necessary to adjust Naval Reserve Programs so as to retain the better qualified and more highly trained reservists.

Statement of the Problem

To explain a reservist's decision to continue participating in the Naval Reserve, it is helpful to ask why the individual joined the Naval Reserve, what does he think of the program and is he likely to withdraw? Why does a reservist choose to reenlist or not to reenlist? The answer to these questions in part can be given by an examination of the background characteristics of the reservists, and in part by the organizational structure of the Navy. We have known for a long time, for example, that an individual with low intelligence scores and a poor educational background is unlikely to perform well.

It is also clear that some institutional practices and policies of the Navy make it difficult for some reservists to maintain a satisfactory level of participation. It is necessary, however, to move beyond these explanations and focus on selected social and psychological influences which affect the reservist's decision. What we want to know are the attitudes, values, and behavior patterns associated with the decision to continue participating in the program. Knowledge of this kind is not found through speculation but by an empirical investigation. The following general questions are used to guide our inquiry:

QUESTIONS:

1. How highly do reservists value their active duty experience? It could be that the first experiences one had in the Navy established the orientation toward the service for the rest of the individual's life. If positive experiences are reinforced by good leadership when the individual joins the Reserve, then he may become an enthusiastic reservist. On the other hand, many people leave active duty dissatisfied and find the Reserve program unresponsive and irrelevant to their professional and social needs.
2. How do reservists view the role they play in the Naval Reserve? Do they think of themselves as having a Naval career? Is it simply a part-time job? Do they feel like they are "doing time" and as soon as their legal obligations are satisfied do they plan to get out? What is their level of commitment to the service?
3. Do reservists experience a role conflict between what the Navy expects of them and what their family, friends and work associates expect? Is the Navy considered a lower status job? Do the reservists have to make radical changes in their appearance and ways of relating to people when they come into a military environment? Are their moral beliefs compatible with what the Navy expects of them? Do reservists see a conflict between organizational and personal goals?
4. What do reservists expect to get out of their participation in the program? Does the Navy fulfill their expectations in so far as the development of job skills, social life or monetary benefits? What aspects of the program do they consider valuable and what do they think is worthless relative to fulfilling their personal goals and objectives? How much do they need the Naval Reserve?

5. What do reservists like about the Reserve and what do they dislike? Do they feel adequately and fairly compensated? Is the training considered good? What aspects of the program do they find interesting? Essentially do they think of the Navy as a "good deal?" Do reservists who enjoy their civilian occupations also find satisfaction in the Reserve program? Do they think military customs and courtesies reinforce a positive attitude or are they viewed as obstacles to overcome? Are the reservists happy with what they are doing?
6. What do reservists think about their work? Is it meaningful or do they have a sense of alienation? What do they expect of their leaders, job content, and group climate? How do they perceive the organizational and administrative practices? Is what they do at drill considered an activity in which they can become deeply involved?
7. How do reservist perceive alternatives to the weekend drill such as leisure-time activities and work opportunities? Are these competing claims on the reservist's time? Are they so highly valued that the reservist thinks he is making a sacrifice to attend drill?
8. To what extent do reservists feel they have a sense of social responsibility or duty to serve their country in some way? How important is patriotism? Is there a feeling that by participating in the Naval Reserve they are serving their country? Do they have a sense of pride in their uniform?

It is our general reasoning that reservists who view their role in the Naval Reserve as a career involving a long-term commitment are more likely to reenlist than those who think of it as a temporary part-time job. Reservists whose expectations about the Navy are fulfilled in terms of job skills, social life, and monetary benefits, are more likely to stay than those who are dissatisfied. Reservists who are happy with what they are doing in the Reserve will more likely reenlist than those who dislike going to drill. Reservists who feel that their work is meaningful will more likely reenlist than those who are alienated. Reservists who experience congruence between what their family, friends and work associates expect will more likely continue in the program than those who experience role conflict. Reservists who see the Naval Reserve as complementing their discretionary time activities and/or job alternatives will be more likely to stay in the program than those who see the Navy as

interfering with what they had rather be doing or should be doing. The more individuals need the Naval Reserve and see their participation as beneficial to their interest, the more likely they will decide to reenlist. The problem, of course, is to clarify these expectations and show how they relate to retention. An empirical investigation of the individual's perceptions of his place in the Naval Reserve will provide a better understanding of the factors associated with the decision to remain in the Naval Reserve in this region; however, the study in REDCOM REG SEVEN may be thought of as a pilot study which if successful could be extended to the entire Naval Reserve. A longitudinal study over a period of three years, sampling the reservist's attitudes at the time he enlists in the Naval Reserve, six months later, and then at the end of the second and third year, would show how attitudes change as a result of the reservist's experience. For the present, however, this study seeks to identify more accurately some of those practices, which in the mind of the reservist in REDCOM REG SEVEN drive people out of the Naval Reserve. The results should not be generalized to the entire country since regional differences can and do have a significant affect. However, many of the variables associated with retention in this area are no doubt associated with retention in other regions as demonstrated by comparing the results of a 1974 survey conducted in California among Naval reservists there.

CHAPTER I

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

If we can understand the common social and psychological characteristics of individuals, their perception of the world about them, and the nature of the circumstances surrounding their decision, then we may be able to explain why we retain some in the Naval Reserve and lose others. The unit of analysis is the individual Naval reservist. Although it is possible to compare groups such as Reserve Units or Reserve Centers, such an approach often results in what is called an ecological fallacy (Robinson, 1950).

The fallacy lies in the inappropriate transfer of group characteristics to the individuals who make up that group. Statistics based on aggregate data such as Gross Retention or Net Retention Rates are useful managerial tools, but they do not describe individual behavior. The present survey design avoids the pitfalls associated with group-level analysis because it is possible to associate directly an individual's response to one question (i.e. intention to stay in the Naval Reserve), with his response to various other questions (i.e. job satisfaction). We are interested in the problem of retention in the entire Naval Reserve, but in this study the theoretical population is comprised of the reservists in Readiness Command Region SEVEN.

Figure 1.1 outlines a Generic Retention Model. It is essentially a frame of reference designed to focus on those areas which provide a possible explanation for retention. An exhaustive test of all the components of the model is beyond the scope of this preliminary report. However, such an analysis will be conducted in the future. This report will be limited to a bivariate analysis showing the relationships among selected variables and the intention to reenlist. The model suggests those observable characteristics, attitudes or values which are important. Within each of these areas of interest, several concepts may be formulated such as age, sex, income or education. It is our conjecture that individuals who differ in these properties will behave differently. If these generalizations are supported by empirical investigation, then we have an explanation of that behavior. According to Fred N. Kerlinger, a theory is simply, "a set of interrelated concepts, definitions, and propositions that presents a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relationships among variables, with the purpose of explaining and predicting the phenomena." (Kerlinger, 1973, p. 9). The behavior we are interested in here is related to the decision to continue participating in the Naval Reserve.

As seen in Figure 1.1, this study focuses on several major theoretical approaches: Job Satisfaction, Equity, Expectancy, Instrumentality, Role, Socialization, and Socioeconomic Theory. This broad-based systems approach provides an umbrella for various investigations. The major dependent variable is retention defined in terms of the decision to continue participating in the U. S.




FIGURE 1.1 Generic Retention Model

Naval Reserve. Although there are many different indicators of retention, in this study it is conceptualized as both psychological and behavioral. First, it is the intention to reenlist or extend, and second it is the act of reenlisting or extending. One interesting aspect of this study is to see what correlation exists between intention and actual behavior. In the preliminary reports, however, we will be concerned with intention, since six to twelve months will be required to collect the data on actual losses.

Models of Man*

In explaining retention, the direction one takes depends to a rather large degree on one's assumptions about the nature of man. Figure 1.2 indicates that there are many "models of Man." (Porter, 1975, p. 32). Although Herbert Simon (1977) thinks differently, it cannot be assumed that man is an organism little different from a computer. The emotional side to Man's life is equally as important as the rational. Although thoughtful men have always known this, modern scholars since the time of Freud have emphasized that men are frequently controlled by their emotions. Behaviorists such as B. F. Skinner insist that regardless of this emotional aspect of Man, his behavior can best be understood in stimulus-response terms; whereas, phenomenologists insist that we must somehow get inside the head of the person because that is where the determinants of his behavior reside. (Porter, 1975, p. 33). Other scholars have conceptualized Man in purely economic terms. An excellent example of one such intellectual was Karl Marx. Others of a more humanistic tradition, such as McClelland and Maslow, conclude that Man cannot be adequately described solely in economic or physiological terms. Instead, in an almost Aristotelian way, they believe that man is concerned with self-actualization. (Porter, 1975, p. 35).




Figure 1.2 Models of Man

*The authors are not insensitive nor unsympathetic to the problems of sexual bias in American society generally in the Naval Reserve particularly; however, the short comings of the English language in not providing more neutral words to refer to both sexes cannot be resolved in this paper. Therefore, wherever one reads the word "man" or its derivatives; the work is intended to apply to both men and women equally. It is used here as a generic concept.

In this paper we do not come down firmly in support of any one of these models of Man. At one time or another a man may behave rationally, and at other times he may behave emotionally. Thucydides, the great Greek historian, noted in his History of the Peloponnesian War that decisions based on "reason" are sound and lead to actions which enhance the individual or the state; whereas, decisions based on "passion" lead to disaster. Although in this paper we agree with Herbert Simon (1945) that Man is capable of making rational decisions, there is also a strong bias for those generalizations based on the view that what goes on in one's head is extremely important in understanding decision making. We are interested in how reservists subjectively evaluate their situation. It is assumed that men are so constituted that they seek to engage in activities that are not only economically beneficial but are also concerned with more idealistic matters such as public service. Yet, the major assumption is that men seek to maximize their own self interest, however conceived. It is basically a rational utilitarian approach as presented by Chester Barnard (1940).

If decisions are made by rational minds, we can assume that men try to maximize their values (Downs, 1957) or fulfill their life plans for themselves with as little waste and as much efficiency as their knowledge of the situation permits. Naturally, such a person must be able to make a decision when confronted with alternatives. He must be able to rank the alternatives in a priority order that is transitive, and he must choose the alternative which he feels is most likely to advance his interest. There may be times when altruism takes precedence over self-interest, but however important these particular decisions may be, they are rare. Most people, most of the time, will attempt to engage in rational, comprehensive decision-making concerning activities which are thought to be beneficial to them personally and/or to their families (Allison, 1971, p. 29).

To provide an explanation of the decision to reenlist or extend in the Naval Reserve, an examination of the literature will be helpful.

Review of Previous Research

This study presents an attempt to synthesize several major theoretical approaches to the question of why individuals either remain with or leave organizations. This synthesis is accomplished via the processes of general system theory and systems analysis as discussed by Easton (1965), Ackoff (1960) and Bertalanffy (1950). As Garson (1966, p. 63) puts it, this approach ". . . emphasize(s) (the) analysis of whole systems and the danger of seeking to understand system elements in isolation from research concerning their relation to each other system element and the dynamic of the system itself."

Previous to 1973, the vast bulk of research concerning job attrition and/or employee turnover rates (retention) concentrated on bivariate analyses of specific problem areas. These areas included such items as pay, status, comfort, satisfaction, social background, and reward equity. Mobley, et al. (1978) provides an excellent review of this literature. However, as Mobley, et al. (p. 50) points out, the process of attempting to explain retention in terms of a single contributing factor (bivariate analysis) was only successful in explaining between 5 percent - 10 percent of the variance. In other words, the problem of retention remained 90 percent unexplained.

More recent research such as Porter and Steers (1973) and Price (1977) empirically affirmed the intuitively obvious understanding that many factors contribute to an individual's decision to leave an organization. The task now becomes that of selecting and appropriately combining those elements (sub-systems) which in toto, define the retention decision system.

As Garson states:

Thus systems analysis may be most useful at a late stage in research when one may wish to present one's findings under a comprehensive theoretical 'umbrella' broadly accepted by American political scientists. In the earlier stages of theory construction, however, the researcher may find it more fruitful to avoid frameworks at this level of generality in favor of comparing and synthesizing less inclusive but far stronger theories in relation to empirical evidence. (Garson, p. 66)

We agree with the caveat of avoiding systems analysis at the sub-system level (Garson's "earlier stages"), preferring to use systems theory as a unifying construct giving overall coherence to the research model. We will, therefore, initially analyze each major portion of the generic system model (Figure 4.1) independently, utilizing the central theme of the sub-system in question as the criterion by applying various non-parametric statistical procedures.

The methodology of causal analysis will subsequently be utilized to establish the relative importance of each factor within the generic model in accordance with general systems theory. A number of other analytic techniques such as factor analysis, multiple regression and discriminant analysis will be used in future reports.

Each major sub-system of the generic model represents an established theory of individual behavior in organizations. Prior to operationalizing the various sub-systems, it is necessary to discuss these various theories in order to arrive at an understanding of their relative conceptual importance in our research. The theories under consideration are:

1. Expectancy Theory
2. Equity Theory
3. Satisfaction Theory
4. Role Theory
5. Socialization Theory

In addition to the above, a discussion of Herzberg's Two Factor Theory, Maslow's Need Hierarchy Theory and other supporting research are included although they are not specifically identified in the generic model. This should be done because the ideas present in these theories have nurtured and given form to the topics specifically identified above.

Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs

Abraham Maslow (Maslow, 1943), in a major innovative research effort, posited a unique developmental paradigm of human nature. This paradigm defined human nature as being comprised of two theories: innate needs and perceptual or learned needs. A discussion of acquired needs is not germane at this point. However, research concerning innate needs is central to our present effort.

Maslow proposed a hierarchical taxonomy of needs, the progressive fulfillment of which defines an individual's motivation and total developmental pattern. This taxonomy is illustrated in figure 1.3 and is prepotent, that is to say, more basic needs must be fulfilled prior to the attainment of higher-order needs.

The first and most basic needs are of a physiological nature such as food, water, sleep, and shelter. "Freedom, love, community feeling, respect, philosophy, may all be waved aside as ---unless, since they fail to fill the stomach" (Maslow, 1970, p. 37).




Figure 1.3 The relationships between the motivation-hygiene theory and Maslow's hierarchy of needs

Source: Hershy & Blanchard, Management of Organizational Behavior, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977) p. 67.

Next in the hierarchy is safety which includes such concepts as security, protection, law, and freedom from fear. Life experienced exclusively at this level can be likened to what philosopher Thomas Hobbs termed the "State of Nature." Here, the environment is one of total warfare and life is "nasty, brutish and short" (Hobbs, 1965 ed.) Since freedom without order is null, even oppressive dictatorship is preferable to chaos.

Third in order of precedence is the level which includes the need for love and belonging. The individual is motivated by peer group pressures and derives gratification from belonging to a close-knit organization. In general, the more strongly that deprivation is experienced at this level, the more extreme the group is likely to be. The more radical anti-war groups of the 1960's are representative (Keniston, 1968).

The next highest level of the hierarchy is that of self-esteem. Maslow distinguishes between two varieties of this need (Maslow, 1970); an individual's view of oneself, and the individual's perception of how others view him. At this point, needs are concentrated around competence, independence, and mastery on the one hand and fame, glory, recognition, and appreciation on the other. Existence at this level is defined in terms of self-identity and self-respect. "The individual attains self-esteem by making decisions and bearing their consequences." (Van Dalen and Zeigler, 1977, p. 34).

Individuals who possess a high degree of self-esteem are motivated by a desire for development and growth which emerges fully in self-actualization. At this level, one is successful in developing personal talents and skills to the greatest extent possible. A self-actualized person is future-oriented and goal-directed; he possesses a strong, resilient personality, a concern for humanity, and a totally realistic self-concept. It is because of this cadre of enlightened individuals that democratic societies are able to function and endure.

Hierarchical Development and Participation: Kohlberg and Converse

Kohlberg

Using an approach similar to Maslow, Lawrence Kohlberg (1969) postulated a sequential theory of human growth ranging from pain avoidance at the lowest level to abstract ethical principles at the highest.

At stage one, the individual is totally concerned with avoiding punishment by another individual who has power over him. This pain-induced obedience orientation has been exemplified by the German concentration camp experiences of World War II (Wrightman, 1972).

The second stage corresponds to Maslow's second level of safety and security. At this level, individuals attempt to maximize short-range advantages in a totally materialistic fashion. Banfield (1958) has termed this type of existence "amoral familism" wherein people do not and are not expected to participate in any extended organizational activity.

Existence at the third level is characterized by "conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or 'natural' behavior" (Kohlberg, 1968, pg. 26). As with Maslow's 'love and belonging' stage, peer group pressure is the norm here. Moral judgment is reduced to that of group consensus.

Stage four is an extension of the parameters of stage three, including conformity with the norms of society as a whole. Individuals at this level are primarily concerned with the maintenance of the existing social order, carrying out one's "duty", respect for authority, and conserving the status quo. Here, organizational change results in anxiety and resistance to innovation.

At stage five, individual moral consciousness is expanded from automatic acceptance of historical absolutes to a consideration of subjective values underlying societal mores. In Kohlberg's words, "There is an emphasis upon change in terms of rational consideration of social utility rather than freezing it (values) in terms of 'law and order'." (Kohlberg, 1968, p. 26). This is the best exemplified by the writers of the Constitution.

The criterion for stage six is individual determination of moral principle. These principles are abstract and are universal in terms of human dignity and justice. Human activity is judged from a "numenological" perspective (Kant, 1945), and is subjected the most rigorous ethical guidelines. Existence at this stage borders on the metaphysical.

Converse

Similar research has been conducted by Philip Converse (1964), dealing with levels of conceptualization. Five such levels emerged.

The topmost level includes individuals who utilize abstract mental constructs as measuring devices over time. These constructs are organized along a liberal - conservative continuum. Such individuals are given the term 'ideologue'.

The second level is labeled "near - ideologue" and is very similar to the first level. However, ideological yardsticks are used with less consistency.

The third level contains individuals who base decisions on group preference. This is very similar to both Maslow's "love and belonging" stage and Kohlberg's "stereotype" level of normal growth.

The fourth level is characterized by individuals who are generally aware of national issues, but possess little concern for particular policy issues.

The final level includes those individuals who conceptualize existentially. It is characterized by a high degree of ignorance concerning any factors other than those which relate to personal survival and gratification of desires.

Converse's findings are significant because they are based on a national sample while Maslow and Kohlberg were restricted in their research to much smaller populations. It is important to note that Converse empirically validated the essence of Maslow's and Kohlberg's conclusions.

An analysis of Converse yields the following information:

1. Only 2.5% of the population can be termed "ideologue."
2. The majority of the population (42%) resides in the third or group preference level.
3. The two lowest levels contain more than four times as many individuals as do the two most sophisticated levels.

A more recent national survey conducted by Nie, Verba, and Petrocik (1976) found that while the proportion of the population which could be classified "ideologue" had risen to 6.9%, there was no change in the lowest two levels.

Herzberg's Two Factor Theory

Fredrick Herzberg, in a comprehensive analysis of work motivation, concluded that individuals possess two categories of human needs that are basically independent of each other (Herzberg, et al., 1959). Satisfying factors such as achievement, recognition, and responsibility are labeled "motivators" or "satisfiers." On the other hand, frustrating factors such as company policies, working conditions, money, and status are labeled "hygienes" or "dissatisfiers." Motivators affect individuals in an increasingly positive fashion commencing from a condition of indifference, and hygienes independently work in an increasingly negative direction commencing from the same indifference point. As illustrated by Figure 1.4, various factors impact on an individual's motivation (either positively or negatively) separately in contrast to Maslow's research which posited a hierarchical,




Figure 1.4 Factors Affecting Job Attitudes, as reported in 12 investigations.

Source: Fredrick Herzberg, "One More Time: How do you Motivate Employees",
Harvard Business Review (Jan-Feb 1968).

sequential ordering. As explained by Hersey and Blanchard (1977):

Hygiene needs, when satisfied, tend to eliminate dissatisfaction and work restriction but do little to motivate an individual to superior performance or increased capacity. Satisfaction of the motivators, however, will permit an individual to grow and develop in a mature way, often implementing an increase in ability. Herzberg encourages management to design into the work environment an opportunity to satisfy the motivators. (p. 69)

Dissatisfaction occurs only when the negative tendencies contained within the hygienes are present. However, by removing them, indifference rather than satisfaction will result. The same is true for motivators and satisfaction. Job satisfaction is therefore interpreted as a two-dimensional construct; hence, "Two-Factor Theory."

Because of the similarities between Herzberg and Maslow, it is sometimes convenient to merge the two theories. Maslow identifies needs and motives, and Herzberg provides an insight into goals and incentives. Figure 1.3 illustrates this relationship.

A number of writers have criticized Herzberg on both substantive (Gwen, 1964; Graen, 1969; Hulin & Smith, 1965) and methodological (Burke, 1966; Vroom, 1964; House & Wigdor, 1967) grounds. As stated by Dunnette, Campbell & Hakel (1967, p. 387), "The two-factor theory is an oversimplification of the relationships between motivation and satisfaction." It has been labeled "ambiguous" (Linsay, et al., 1967) and "inconsistent" (King, 1970). The most significant criticism, however, is that Herzberg fails to recognize that individuals differ in terms of their preferences for various reinforcers in jobs (Weiss, 1969). This is a serious weakness. It is readily apparent that individuals do differ in terms of aptitudes, interests, and needs. Since no mechanism is built into either Maslow's hierarchy or Herzberg's theory to address individual differences, it becomes necessary to investigate those models of human behavior which do specify the individual as the unit of analysis. This is not to say that the foregoing is without value; the topics addressed by Maslow and Herzberg are germane to all behavioral research as general frameworks of reference.

Expectancy Theory

Expectancy or instrumentality theory addresses a number of variables which impact motivation to work. It is an attempt to explain those factors which affect an individual's choice among alternative actions or behavior patterns. It is based on the assumption that individuals attempt to maximize positive outcomes (utility) when faced with work alternatives. Of all the theories discussed in this analysis, it is perhaps the most promising theory of work motivation. However, its development thus far in the literature has led to conflict with equity

considerations which will be discussed in the next section. Briefly, utility maximization can result in overpayment inequity which possibly would be dissatisfying. This potential conflict further identifies the need for a generalized, multi-variate model of decision making.

The first major development of expectancy theory was accomplished by Vroom (1964). He began with the basic assumption that individuals order their preferences. These preferences (outcomes) possess degrees of attraction varying from negative (-1) through indifference (0) to positive (+1). Vroom terms this attraction "valence". This should be anticipated satisfaction and value is realized satisfaction.

The second factor in Vroom's analysis is "instrumentality." In order to understand this term, it is necessary to revise the concept of "outcome." Galbraith and Cummings (1967) suggested using "first" and "second" level outcomes. First-level outcomes are basically organizational goals such as efficiency. Graen (1969) further modified the first level to include attaining a work role or becoming a job holder. Second-level outcomes are individual goals such as intrinsic and extrinsic rewards (pay, status, etc.). Instrumentality, then, is defined as the likelihood that a first-level outcome will lead to a particular second-level outcome, it's value ranges from -1 indicating certainty that a second-level outcome will not be attained, to +1 which indicates certainty that it will be attained. In effect, instrumentality becomes the correlation between the first- and second-level outcomes. According to Vroom (1964), job satisfaction can be defined as an individual's perception of the relationship of a work situation's valence and instrumentality. It is the sum of all specific valence X instrumentality products which define the situation.

The third factor in Vroom's analysis is "expectancy" which is defined in probabilistic terms. It is the subjective, perceived probability that an action will lead to a specific first-level outcome. It's value ranges from 0 to +1.

The fourth factor is "force" which is a measure of an individual's motivation to attempt a work task. It is the sum of all specific valence X expectancy products which surround the task and can be considered to be the amount of effort which an individual will put forth in attempting a task.

In Vroom's terms, an individual will evaluate his participation in an organization by making a series of judgments: (1) What rewards can the organization provide? (2) How valuable are these rewards? (3) What degree of certainty is there between organizational participation and receiving rewards? (4) How much effort will be required? (5) What is the probability that individual participation will "make a difference" in furthering the organization's goals?

Lawler and Porter (1967a, 1967b) significantly advanced expectancy theory by enlarging upon Vroom's work and modifying it to more explicitly address motivation and performance. They combined the concepts of expectancy and instrumentality (eliminating first- and second-level outcomes) to form a variable termed "effort-rewards probability." This is defined as the subjective expectancy that certain amounts of effort will yield certain desired rewards. Thus, as reward value increases and as the relationship between effort and reward strengthens, the greater will be the effort expended in a given work situation.

Also included in this model are the variables of ability and role perception which intervene between effort and performance. Ability is a measure of an individual's basic suitability for the task and is a fundamental characteristic of the individual. Role perception is a subjective self-evaluation by an individual relating to the types of activity which the individual determines to be appropriate and necessary to accomplish the task.

Lawler and Porter (1967b) also introduce a differentiation between "extrinsic" and "intrinsic" rewards. Extrinsic rewards are tangible items such as pay and promotion, and intrinsic rewards are intangible items such as feelings of accomplishment and self-esteem. They found that performance is more directly related to intangible rewards and that satisfaction is dependent upon receiving a fair distribution of these rewards.

The significant difference between Vroom's model and Lawler and Porter lies in the manner in which satisfaction is treated. For Vroom, satisfaction is a future event; it is concerned with expected fulfillment. For Lawler and Porter, satisfaction is dependent on past events (Porter and Lawler, 1968) and the subjective fairness of the reward distributions resulting from them. This is important to the present study. The proposed general model allows for the interplay of both past and future events.

Equity Theory

As discussed by Tuttle and Hazel (1974, p. 11), "the basic assumption of equity theory is that individuals have an expectation of a 'fair' or 'equitable' rewards level which they should receive from a social exchange. To the extent that this equitable level is not met by the actual rewards, feelings of inequity are generated." Inequity is assumed to be unpleasant, it is also assumed that attempts are made by individuals to reduce it. Although several approaches to this topic have been made (Adams, 1963; Homans, 1961), we will follow Tuttle and Hazel (1974) in using Adams (1963) for the present discussion.

According to Adams, social (work) exchanges are composed of inputs and outcomes. Inputs are those attributes such as ability and

motivation which are brought to the exchange, and outcomes are the individual's return on the exchange. These outcomes can be positive (pay, status) or negative (monotony, injury) and they must have marginal utility to the individual. They must also be perceived by the individual as outcomes.

Inequity is a relative phenomenon. It exists in relation to the social comparison of the inputs and outcomes of other individuals. From this comparison, the individual develops subjective expectations of fairness in the exchange process. It is also a composite measure in that there are many basic exchanges in any complex decision to join or remain with an organization. In general terms, the value of all inputs must be perceived to equal the value of all outcomes in order for a state of equity to exist.

Since inequity is assumed to be unpleasant, Adams (1965) describes six possible methods available to individuals in their attempts to reduce it. (1) He may raise or lower his inputs, (2) He may attempt to change his outcomes (union activity), (3) He may cognitively distort the value of inputs and outcomes as discussed by Festinger (1957), (4) He may quit, (5) He may sabotage the people with whom he is being compared, or (6) He may change the object of comparison.

It is interesting to note that inequity can result from both overpayment and underpayment. Also, Fritchard (1969) suggested that an individual can serve as his own object of comparison. Feelings of low self-esteem and psychological alienation can arise from a perceived inability to live up to one's internal standards. Similarly, feelings of anomie can be triggered by a sense of being "different" or "better" than one's associates because of being overcompensated.

Satisfaction Theory

Many studies of job satisfaction have indicated a strong negative relationship between overall satisfaction and retention. These studies include Mangione (1973), Marsh and Mannari (1977), and Mobley, et al. (1978). A significant exception to these findings is Koch & Steers (1978) who found that the relationship was statistically insignificant. Of particular interest in the military setting is a study by Graen & Ginsburgh (1977) in which satisfaction with leadership was strongly correlated with retention. The satisfaction dimension was identified as the quality of leader-member exchanges.

Our research follows the lead of Smith, et al. (1969) who address job satisfaction in terms of multiple satisfactions related to "feelings or affective responses to facets of the situation" (Smith et al., 1969, p. 6). As quoted in Tuttle & Hazel (1974), Smith et al. describe satisfaction as follows:

We hypothesize that these feelings are associated with a perceived difference between what is expected as a fair and reasonable return (or, when the evaluation of future prospects is involved, what is aspired to) and what is experienced, in relation to the alternatives available in a given situation. Their relation to behavior depends upon the way in which the individual expects that form of behavior to help him achieve the goals he has accepted (Smith et al., 1969, p. 6).

We focus on satisfaction in a similar manner to that addressed by Smith et al. and Tuttle & Hazel. This strategy is summarized as follows:

1. An adequate model of satisfaction must take into account interactive effects among variables.
2. Relationships between satisfaction and overt behavior vary from situation to situation.
3. Relationships between satisfaction and behavior cannot be reasonably expected unless the behavior can be considered to be an appropriate means of expressing satisfaction and dissatisfaction.
4. The manner in which questions are asked affects the time perspective of the respondent, and therefore affects the alternatives he considers.
5. "Satisfaction is a product of other variables, and it may or may not serve as a cause in itself (Smith et al., 1969, p. 162)."
6. There may be a relationship between satisfaction and behavior since the same variables producing the satisfaction might also produce the behavior, or changes in behavior may act to change the situation and, therefore, satisfaction.
7. The relationship between satisfaction and performance will vary depending on the aspect of the job being studied.
8. The importance of each aspect of the job situation influences the individual's feeling of satisfaction. Importance is considered to be a function of the discrepancy between the existing situation and the alternatives available.
9. Legitimacy, the group norms defining the legitimate requirements for a job for a specified group, influence the acceptance of a task and the attitude toward it.

10. "It is, therefore, the interrelationships of objective factors of the job, of individual capacities and experience, of alternatives available in the company and the community, and of the values of the individual, that can be expected to predict satisfaction and performance (Smith et al., 1969, p. 165)."

Role Theory

Role refers to the set of behavior patterns ascribed by society to individuals occupying positions. A role is the expected behavior associated a normative cultural pattern. According to Newcomb (1952), Parsons (1951), and Lieberman (1977), a fundamental postulate of role theory is that an individual's attitudes are influenced by the role which that person occupies in a social system. However, this must be viewed multi-dimensionally due to the fact that individuals play several roles concurrently because of the complex nature of modern society. Each role has certain rights and duties associated with the particular position held, and at times these roles may conflict.

Louis A. Zurcher, Jr. (1965, 1968, 1977) has differentiated the various roles which individuals assume in terms of "dominant" role and "ephemeral" role. He further disaggregates the dominant role into two categories: operating dominant roles which are those roles currently being enacted, and model dominant roles which are either previously abandoned roles or ideal, potential roles. He discusses ephemeral roles as "temporary or ancillary position-related behavior patterns chosen by the enactor to satisfy individual needs incompletely satisfied by the more dominant roles." (Zurcher, 1977, p. 753).

In the present study, one's position with the Naval Reserve is defined as an ephemeral role. Following Zurcher (1977), the purpose of this is to examine the impact of conflict between dominant (civilian) roles and the Naval Reserve (ephemeral) role. It is posited that civilian (dominant) role satisfaction is correlated with Naval Reserve (ephemeral) role satisfaction and that this relationship is a predictor of retention.

Lieberman (1977) discussed the distinction between the effects of roles on people's attitudes and the effect of roles on their actions. This is important to the present study because we are addressing the relationship between the intention to reenlist (attitude) and the fact of reenlistment (action). Since actions are overt and directly observable, a person who fails to behave in ways appropriate to his role can be identified and counseled.

Attitudes, however, are not overt. Although a person may behave in such a way as to reveal his attitudes, more often his behavior is a protection against such revelations. If we assume a need for people

to have attitudes that are internally consistent with their actions, a change in attitude will enable a role occupant to make a rational change in his actions. However, actions are antecedant to attitudes and must therefore be addressed via attitudinal modifications.

Lieberman (1977) found that attitudes are influenced by roles. Therefore, the intention to reenlist (attitude) must be addressed not only in terms of ephemeral role satisfaction, but additionally from an understanding of the role position of the individual in the Naval Reserve. Consistent changes in attitudes have been found when role positions are modified so as to provide such items as increased leadership capability and increased work responsibility (Lieberman, 1977, p. 171; Stouffer, et al., 1949).

As the generic model (Figure 1.1) illustrates, a synthesis of these role factors provides a personality base line from which expectancy can be addressed.

Retention In the Active-Duty Navy

Before examining attrition in the Reserves, it would be beneficial to review some of the reported difficulties in retaining personnel in the active-duty Navy. Most articles on retention are descriptive essays relying on the insights of individuals to penetrate beneath the surface, to evaluate the situation, and to recommend solutions. Recent articles in the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings cover the water front including discussions of the surface Navy, aviation activities, and submarine forces. The titles of some of these essays give one an impression of their concerns-- for example, "The Frustration Factor,"; "The Effect of Sea Pay on Retention,"; "The Quiet Crisis In The Silent Service," and "A Solution to Retention: The Open-Ended Enlistment."

These articles merit close attention for two reasons. One, they reflect the ideas and attitudes of articulate and thoughtful Navy men who are willing to share their insights into the problem of retention; and two, these essays selected by the editors of the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings are an indication of what the Navy considers serious problem areas in manning. More importantly, these articles demonstrate a willingness to confront the retention problems directly even if this subjective approach provides little empirical information upon which to base a retention policy.

LTJG F. G. Dengler, in discussing retention in the surface Navy says, "Every separation is a silent rejection of a system that seems not to hear too well the questions nor consider too long the answer." (Dengler, 1971, p. 34). "Well-educated young men, reared in a culture that encourages vocal advocacy of individual rights, are impatient and mystified by an organization that tolerates poorly equipped ships,

senseless drills on task that the ships clearly aren't capable of fulfilling, inadequate technical training and lack of knowledge of the enemies' capabilities by the men who man these ships." (Dengler, 1971, p. 36). "They leave because they do not know whether they are a vibrant part of our defense force or run-of-the-mill officers manning an antiquated patrol force of militarily inconsequential ships." (Dengler, 1971).

"Obviously the Navy is not providing the sort of environment in which today's young man wants to pursue as a career." (Harris, 1971, p. 30). LT Malcolm S. Harris says the military seems to be far from the main stream of American life. Young people who have only recently come from colleges and universities where they were encouraged to question, to analyze, to remain open and to be creative, find themselves in a cloistered, insular, isolated world where like-minded people almost uniformly identify their conservative political opinions with patriotism. "The young officer sees a career pitch which emphasizes retirement plans, fringe benefits, and other aspects of a womb-like security rather than a well-reasoned delineation of the Navy's opportunities and future relevance." (Harris, 1971, p. 31). What the Navy should emphasize, according to LT Harris, is the challenge of command at sea, the fantastic responsibilities of being on OOD underway, the chance to serve one's country, and the excitement of foreign travel. The older people who are concerned with pay and benefits, make an appeal based on their status in life, forgetting that the young "guys" are somewhere else. Instead of the dreary benefit pitch, what we need is a new professionalism rooted in public service and individual achievement. (Harris, 1971, p. 31).

In an article on retention of Naval aviators, CAPT James E. Williams, points out that a 1966 Pilot Retention Study showed that "deprivation of family life" was the number one reason why most airmen left the Navy during the previous five years; and a second survey of pilots still on active duty indicated that the factor which would most influence them to remain in uniform would be "more time at home." (Williams, 1972, p. 50). It has long been the conviction of CAPT Robert W. Dickieson that "The retention rate of Navy men would go up significantly, if we paid more attention to the manner in which the families of our sailors are treated." (Dickieson, 69, p. 140). Yet the Navy in trying to soften the legitimate difficulties of the "brown-baggers" raises questions of discrimination against the young single sailors. Most of the "benefits" that are important to the older men and his family are unimportant to young single people. The Commissary is useless, the Exchange offers little, and given the rigorous physical requirements to get into the Navy, the Medical/Dental services are seen as another example of someone else's benefits - mostly dependents. (Harris, 1971, p. 26).

There seems to be wide agreement that pay alone is not the answer to the Navy's retention problem. Despite raising pay rates, retention is declining. (Harris, 1971, p. 26). However, CDR O. H. Gress, points out that it is imperative that the Navy provide just compensation for work done. The retention problems of the Army and Air Force, for example, cannot be justly equated with those of the Navy. Special rewards are needed for going to sea. (Gress, 1973, p. 117, 118).

John Roger Fredland wonders, "How to keep the junior officers and enlisted men in uniform now that they have seen the great society." (p. 44). In a basically hedonistic culture, with built in full employment he feels that pay equivalence is not enough to overcome the tedium of barracks (shipboard life), physical discomfort and grubbiness, protracted separations from family, unexpected changes of orders that disrupt family life, frequent unsatisfactory housing and often being viewed by the civilian population as second-class citizen. The critical variable is to build pride in uniform and internal esprit de corps, but it is also necessary to improve the material well being of the average sailor by providing private rooms, good cafeterias, a 32-hour work week, liberal leave and liberty policies, military sabbaticals and leaves of absence for as long as three or four years. (Fredland, 1970, p. 44-47).

Not everyone is convinced that these benefits are necessary to maintain high retention. CDR F. B. Shemanski provides a chronicle of the trials and tribulations of building a team that was able to endure a long eleventh-month deployment off the coast of Vietnam. In spite of bad weather, poor equipment and other adversities, he was able to develop a capable closely-knit crew. After the ship finally returned to California, the team was decimated by what he considered to be callous enlisted detailors who reassigned the men to other ships which were soon to go on other long deployments. The result was that his retention rate dropped from a high of 85 percent to a low of 20 percent. The men who were not transferred wanted to get out because they said they were afraid that what happened to their former shipmates would soon happen to them. (Shemanski, 1971, p. 29).

According to CDR Shemanski:

"No amount of money, no increase in pay, no mushrooming of four bedroom, two bath, modern housing units; no plethora of gleaming commissaries and free parental care will compensate for the frustration factor when it insidiously infiltrates itself into the soul of a man or a ship. If we don't stop outraging our young men (by senseless assignments, broken career patters, long tours at sea in the same job and a constant shattering of personnel system) as a routine matter of course, regardless of the financial structures that lead us to these regrettable actions, we will have nothing but admirals, captains and boot seamen draftees to run the superb new ships . . . competent as the aging captains may be, they won't make it out

of the harbor entrance, much less be able to face an implacable enemy with any efficiency or expertise in the practice of war. Except for the Nuclear deterrent . . . the rest of our fleet is as unready as a paper fleet manned by statistics and as vulnerable as a congeries of soap bubbles, mostly for the lack of experienced men, and mostly because of the frustration factor." (Shemanski, 1970, p. 32).

There seems to be general agreement that what the Navy needs is "leadership - men who are not afraid to stick out their necks and stake their careers on needed reforms." (Thamm, 1971, p. 31). What is missing is "the lack of individuals to assume total responsibility for those serving under them." What we have today are "politicians-in-uniform" who have been advanced because they recognize that it is more important to be "diplomatic," "acceptable," and "dependable" than "effective." They have forgotten the virtues of "self-sacrifice," "humility," and "commitment." Is it any wonder that historically the leaders in war have come to prominence as a result of deep selections. (McIntosh, 1971, p. 59-63).

In concluding his almost Nietzsche-like call for strong leadership, CAPT McIntosh offers a creed for Naval Officers:

1. I Shall weigh my every action against its ultimate effects on each man and officer in my command.
2. I shall not hesitate to risk or sacrifice my personal welfare in order to gain the well-being of those entrusted to me to lead.
3. I shall lead my immediate subordinates, not command them impersonally, and I shall demand that those subordinates in turn lead their own subordinates.
4. I shall never forget that I owe to each subordinate an amount greater than that individual owes to me.
5. I shall bear individual responsibility for each person under me.
6. I shall realize that no one must believe my words but that all will believe my actions. (McIntosh, 1971, p. 63).

CDR Arthur M. Osborne also reasons that the most important element in the retention effort is the personality of the Commanding Officer and his ability to inspire patriotism, provide a challenge, develop a feeling of responsibility, and make serving on his ship an enjoyable experience for his junior officers. The commanding officer must guard against making life dreary, overburdened with paper work, watches, journals and a tempo of operations that has no end in sight. (Osborn, 1972, p. 121).

Yet it must be admitted says RADM Bruce Keener, III, that when a young person joins the Navy, he may never have been away from home before and may not respond to strong leadership. In our permissive society, he may have been catered to and coddled by overly indulgent parents and teachers. The Navy can be a rude awakening for such a person and a difficult retention problem for a Commanding Officer. RADM Keener offers an interesting case study of his experience with a young 20-year-old sailor who continually got into trouble and who was eventually discharged for administrative unsuitability. After a series of Captain's Masts, numerous letters to his parents, and other efforts to cajole and correct this young seaman, one cannot help but come to the conclusion that even painstaking care by an understanding Commanding Officer is not always enough to overcome the problems of growing up. In a kind of fatalistic recognition of the intractability of the problem, the Captain of the USS Seattle (AOE3) wrote the following letter to the parents of this young man:

"I am not saying that life in the Navy is easy. It damned well isn't and only men can survive it. Neither am I saying that it is or should be popular. It never will be, and certainly not now. However, it is very necessary that our country have a Navy, and if it is not manned by your son and people like him, then who?"

In addition to managerial, training, and leadership difficulties so poignantly discussed in the articles of the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, a number of other kinds of problems have increased the retention problem. For example, there has been a general decline in the number of people in the primary recruiting age group, a reduction of the manpower pool after the Vietnam War, and the development of an all-volunteer military force. The potential impact of these changes have been discussed extensively in other forums, but they have not been clearly understood nor have the problems raised been resolved.

CHAPTER 11

BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

Background REDCOM REG SEVEN RETENTION STUDY

The present research project has a considerable history pertinent to understanding the concepts suggested as explanations of retention and the development of the questionnaire used to measure these concepts. The design and content of the project is based on a review of the Loss and Gain Reports submitted each month by Commanding Officers of the respective units, responses from letters written to all personnel who were involuntarily terminated, a series of in-depth interviews conducted by the retention officer of REDCOM REG SEVEN in three Reserve Centers, and from the literature in the social sciences. These preliminary investigations formed the basis of the current more comprehensive 1979 survey research project. The 1979 Retention Study is an effort to determine if these findings are representative of attitudes in the Readiness Command generally, and to develop a profile of those lost prior to EOS.

Gain and Loss Reports

An analysis of the Gain and Loss Reports as shown in Table 2.1 indicates that the largest percentages of losses result from poor attendance, work conflict, and personal conflicts. Forty-six percent of the losses resulted from poor attendance, 29 percent from some type of work conflict and 11 percent from a personal conflict. The remaining reasons trailed off into figures of less than 5 percentage points. The reasons for FY 79 losses paralleled those in FY 78 with attendance representing 42 percent, work conflicts 34 percent, and personal conflicts 6 percent of the reported losses. These figures are reported as of 7 May 1979. The only noticeable difference here seems to be an increase in work conflict as an explanation for attrition. In FY 78 work related problems were given as a reason in 29 percent of the cases, whereas in FY 79 this figure had increased to 34 percent.

Responses from reservists involuntarily terminated

On 12 January 1978 Region SEVEN's Retention Team commenced a nine-month program in which letters were sent to reservists who were terminated from active drilling status for unsatisfactory performance. They were asked to explain the circumstances surrounding their termination and to express their feelings about the Navy. About 47 replies were received representing 30 percent of the letters sent out. A personal letter has been sent to each of these men thanking them for taking the time to give us a better understanding of our retention problem. Also, an effort was made to deal with the specific items raised by their individual comments.

All but one of these individuals were controllable losses and all have severed their tie with the military. Many of them, however, would like to return to the Naval Reserve if given an opportunity. Almost all of the respondents expressed appreciation for having a chance to give their

TABLE 2.1 REASONS FOR TERMINATIONS FY 78

Reason	Percentage
Attendance	46%
Work Conflict	29
Personal Conflict	11
Moved	4
School Conflict	3
Family	2
Active Duty	2
Transferred Non-Pay	2
Medical Disability	1
Total = 100%	
N = 292	

Source: Loss and Gain Reports mailed by NRC and Unit Commanding Officers
FY '78. REDCOMREGSEVEN.

opinions and most of them claimed to be proud of having been in the Navy. Although this is encouraging, it also means that the criticisms made of the program are from that 30 percent who have the most positive attitude toward the Navy. We haven't heard from the 70 percent who are most disgruntled. Therefore, the attitudes expressed cannot be interpreted as reflecting the general attitude of all reservists or even those who have been involuntarily terminated. In some ways, however, what they have to say is important because they are from reservists who would like to have stayed in the program but were "forced" out.

Of the total number of responses, 42 percent indicated job conflict as the single most important reason for the termination of their drill status. The second major reason given was boredom. From their individual narrative replies, we begin to get an insight into some underlying reasons for terminations which are associated with poor drill attendance. Some excerpts from the replies to the Retention Officers letters is illustrative of the kinds of problems noted.

"I had written my commanding officer . . . that I would not be drilling . . . because of a job conflict before I ever missed a drill. The only reply I received were missed drill notices.

I was very dissatisfied because of the disrespect for the reserves . . . I'm not going to drive 400 miles (round trip) for experiences such as this.

The Program I was in was excellent but the OIC was slack . . . (On) one occasion he and (leading PO) left (us) to return home (on our own) after a weekend drill (WET) because the military flight had been cancelled . . . some of us didn't have enough money to catch another flight. We had to borrow money to catch a bus and were out one day's work.

My thoughts of the Naval Reserve were good until I went to the meetings. I was bored to death.

I joined the Naval Reserve to better myself and learn . . . I did not join just to go, sit down, and clean up all the time.

I would have liked to stay in the reserves, but I didn't care for the lectures that didn't pertain to my rate."

The major source of difficulty seems to be the perceived unresponsiveness of unit personnel to problems of the reservists. This is especially evident in regard to drilling difficulties, rate changes, and loss of billets.

The second major area of concern was training. About half of the responses indicated that the men were bored. Many believed their training

was irrelevant and out of date. Some mentioned equipment problems, hostility to the lecture method, and dissatisfaction with too much time spent on such items as drug programs. The main thrust of their remarks seemed to be that much of the training simply was not meaningful.

The third major problem area concerned personality conflicts either with reserve personnel or active-duty support personnel. In an indirect way they also relate to the first problem discussed which was the unresponsiveness of the unit to the individual's personal and professional difficulties.

These replies are instructive for what they omit as well as for what they include. For example, only one reservist mentioned hair or the uniform. Only a few complained about money, and there were no remarks which could be interpreted as anti-military. Most of the men seemed to like the Navy but were dissatisfied with the responsiveness of the unit to their personal problems and with the training they were receiving.

In-Depth Interviews at Selected Reserve Centers

In the fall of 1978 a series of in-depth interviews were conducted at three Naval Reserve Centers. One of these centers was on the coast, the other in the midlands and the third in the mountains thus representing a geographical cross section of REDCOMREGSEVEN. At each of these reserve centers six people including two commissioned officers, two petty officers and two seamen were interviewed for approximately an hour. They were assured that these interviews were confidential and that their name would not be connected to any of the remarks they made. After a short warm-up period these sailors talked openly about what they thought was right and wrong with the Naval Reserve. The following are some representative selections from these discussions. They represent a compilation and should not be attributed to one person.

Things are so disorganized that right after muster everything falls apart and it stays that way until we leave. People just lay around and fall asleep . . . why not? We must have heard that same old lecture a thousand times. Anyway, there's no equipment and even when you go on a Weekend Away (WET) and have equipment, nobody bothers to help you. Training is a waste of time. There's no incentive to advance. Why work for second class when all you are going to do is sit around. I'd be embarrassed to go back on active duty because I don't know my job. If you don't know what you are supposed to do, they'll treat you like a boot. It's really a waste of time to come out here.

It's really easy to get your back to the wall around this place. The CO of the Reserve Center is pretty understanding, but I have had them sit on such things as a waiver request until it's too late for me to do anything about it. Also, if you have a legitimate excuse for missing a drill, why do they treat you like it's a punishment, and make you do things like cut the grass or sweep or paint? These are the

things a janitorial service should do. We ought to be concerned with training. There has been a great deal of improvement, but it's still bad. At least it's better than my last duty station where the only thing that was any good was the food.

When I first got in the Naval Reserve, I went on a destroyer out of Alexandria, Virginia. The CO of the ship had a meeting when we got back and confessed that he was worried about going to sea with a bunch of reservists, but he wanted us to know that he was really proud of the way we performed and he'd go to sea with us anytime. That really meant a lot to me . . . I've never forgotten it.

I just got advanced and I got to thinking that I would really miss the drills if I got out. When we changed to weekend drills, it made it possible to make lasting friendships. The unit cruises also gave us an opportunity to get together off duty and have a good time. The last time we went on a WET, we took our baseball gear and really enjoyed playing ball together. I took my family on ACDUTRA and it was nice to get away and do something different. I even got to fly in a helicopter.

The most important thing is training. The men want something important to do. They need specific jobs so they don't become floaters. This is especially true of the Chiefs. As a counselor, I need a private place to talk to the men . . . a place where they can swear . . . when a man starts swearing, you know he's telling the truth. We also need to have more fun and more recognition. The officers should recognize the assistance Chiefs have given them in their own advancement. One time a Navy Captain told me that I was responsible for his having those four stripes . . . That meant a lot to me.

In the Naval Reserve, a good deal of attention has been given to factors believed to be associated with high levels of retention. These include the quality of leadership, level of professionalism, and awareness of the retention problem by all personnel in the Naval Reserve. Furthermore, it has been assumed that good communications and smooth working relationships promote high levels of retention. Clearly a meaningful training program and a responsive administrative system are thought to be important. The effectiveness of the Retention Performance System, made up of the retention officer, career counselor, senior petty officers, commissioned officers and the reserve center personnel, as well as those officers on the Readiness Command Staff, contributes to achieving retention goals. In addition to management influences on retention, environmental circumstances may either support or discourage reserve participation. For example, in times of economic prosperity, individuals become less dependent on the income they earn by participating in the

Reserve. In periods of wide-spread anti-military attitudes, reservists may be uninterested in being identified with the Naval Reserve lest they subject themselves to criticism from their peers and the inconvenience of being called back to active duty. Despite the attention given to these important factors, the Naval Reserve has continued to experience unacceptable losses. Perhaps a better understanding of retention can be gained by studying the perceptions of the reservist and those variables associated with the decision to stay in the program.

The Survey Instrument

In the winter of 1978-1979 a structured (closed-ended) questionnaire based on the preliminary studies done in REDCOM REG SEVEN and a review of the retention literature was developed. Of particular importance was the study done by Louis A Zurcher in the San Francisco and Los Angeles Readiness Commands in 1974. (Zurcher, 1974). The Survey of Marine Corps Enlisted Personnel 1976-1977 conducted by a research team at the University of South Carolina (Mobley, 1976), the Navy Human Resources Management Survey (Navy, 1978), and Frank L. Mixner's study of the attitudes of the United States Naval Officer toward Human Relations Management (Mixner, 1978) were also helpful. The comments and criticisms of the students in a class in Scope and Methods at the Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina were beneficial. By early June 348 structured questions had been developed. One open-ended item was added in case the respondents had additional comments they wished to make. The survey instrument covered the following general areas of interest:

QUESTIONNAIRE

Introduction

1. Letter from RADM GILMORE, USNR
2. Protection of Privacy Statement
3. Instructions

Part I Standard Background Item

Part II Retention

- a. Retention Measures
- b. Reason for Joining
- c. Recall to Active Duty

Part III Satisfaction Scales

- a. Civilian job and Active Duty
- b. Naval Reserve Drill
- c. Expected Satisfaction
- d. ACDUTRA/WETS

- Part IV Time Utilization
 - a. At Home
 - b. At Work
- Part V Training
- Part VI Leadership
 - a. Supervisor's Performance
 - b. X/Y Supervisor Rating
- Part VII Attitudes Toward Work Generally
- Part VIII Attitudes Toward Naval Reserve
 - a. Social Climate (Culture)
 - b. Unit cohesiveness
- Part IX General Social/Political Attitudes
 - a. Social
 - b. Political
 - c. Economic

Preliminary Administrative Procedures

During the Spring of 1979 the Commanding Officers and Officers-in-Charge of the Naval Reserve units, and the Commanding Officers of the Naval Reserve Centers in REDCOM REG SEVEN were briefed on the need for a command-wide retention study. They were given an opportunity to express their opinions concerning the possible explanation for attrition and advised that their cooperation would be needed if the study proposed for the summer was to be a success. On 11 June 1979 Rear Admiral William J. Gilmore, USNR, wrote a personal letter (See Appendix A) to each Commanding Officer and Officer-in-Charge advising them that this study would not be used for inspection purposes nor would the findings be reflected in their fitness reports. Also on 11 June 1979 he wrote a letter (See Appendix B) to the Commanding Officers of each Naval Reserve Center and the Commanding Officers of the VTU's instructing them to administer the questionnaire in accordance with the forthcoming instructions to be found in NAVRESREDCOM REGSEVENNOTE 1040 of 12 June 1979. This Notice (See Appendix C) along with the verbatim instructions (Appendix D) provides the detailed instructions for administration of the survey. There is also a letter to each reservist on the first page of the Questionnaire Booklet (Appendix E) which stresses the importance of retention, requests the cooperation of each individual in the Naval Reserve in providing this information, and points out that the questionnaire is voluntary. If a reservist consents to answer these questions, his privacy is protected.

Pretest

Fifty copies of the survey booklet were duplicated and pre-tested using two groups of reserves. One group was composed of approximately ten reservists completing their Active Duty for Training (ACDUTRA) at the Readiness Command, and another group was drawn from reservists drilling at the Charleston Reserve Center. It required about 10 minutes to read the instructions and approximately 1½ hours to answer the questions. After correction of several errors and clarification of the instructions, the questionnaire was sent to the printers on 3 June 1979. Three thousand five hundred copies were printed for distribution to Naval Reserve Centers in Asheville, NC; Augusta, GA; Charleston, SC; Charlotte, NC; Columbia, SC; Greensboro, NC; Greenville, SC; Raleigh, NC; Savannah, GA; Winston-Salem, NC; Wilmington, NC and the REDCOM REG SEVEN Staff.

Administration of the Questionnaire

These questionnaires were administered in accordance with standardized instructions similar to those used for Navy Advancement Examinations. They were conducted by the active duty support personnel with the assistance of the Voluntary Training Units. It was not to be administered by anyone in the unit of the reservists taking the questionnaire. The respondents were divided into three groups by rank and rate. The first group was composed of officers, the second of E-6 and above, and the third of E-5 and below. Although some bias is inevitable, an effort was made to reduce the difficulties created by having a person evaluate his supervisor while the supervisor was present.

Time Schedule

The questionnaire was administered to the units beginning the third weekend in June 1979 and ending on the third weekend in August, 1979. This allowed two months to collect the data. Since 90 percent drill attendance is required to maintain satisfactory drill participation, this time frame made it possible to survey almost all reservists in REDCOM REG SEVEN. Commanding Officers of the Naval Reserve Centers were responsible for giving each reservist an opportunity to take the questionnaire. Since this constituted almost the entire universe of the personnel with which we are concerned, the results are biased only slightly by sampling errors.

Computer Processing Procedure

Upon receipt of the answer sheets from the various Reserve Centers, they were key-punched into data cards (See Appendix F). There were five data cards for each case and a sixth identification card which was stored separately to protect the privacy of the respondents. Key punch controls to improve accuracy were built in to assist the operators. For example, each page of the answer sheet represents one data card. The information was stored on disks and available for analysis using an IBM 370/168 computer.

The statistical analysis was accomplished using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). The study was first established as an SPSS file (See Appendix G) and then processed using the various statistical programs.

Statistical Analysis

Since this initial report deals with descriptive statistics, the more sophisticated techniques of multiple regression analysis, factor analysis, and a discriminant analysis have been deferred in favor of a straightforward presentation of the data. Later reports in this series will utilize the above-mentioned processes to strengthen the general model presented here. Descriptive differences in mean population characteristics will be illustrated through the use of means comparison charts as the first method of analysis (Blalock, Chapter 5). This technique is quite effective in identifying the factors that relate to the choice of one situational characteristic over another.

Relationships among variables will be illustrated through the use of cross-tabulated contingency tables. Unlike means comparisons, this technique will indicate the strength or degree of relationships among variables (Blalock, p. 275). It will also permit certain characteristics to be isolated. As Blalock states (p. 303), "In most practical problems, it is necessary to control for one or more additional variables which may be obscuring a relationship. The phrase 'other things being equal' is used to emphasize this fact."

In addition to the above, histograms and trend charts will be utilized to visually assist in the discussion of decision preferences and changes over time.

CHAPTER III

SCOPE OF RETENTION PROBLEM

Since the Naval Reserve is comprised predominately of Navy Veterans, many of the retention problems in the U. S. Navy are reflected in its reserve forces. The problem comes in keeping these veterans productively employed in the Naval Reserve after they have been trained on active duty. According to the Chief of Naval Reserve (CNAVRES), "The institutions have done an admirable job in soliciting former active duty personnel into joining the Naval Reserve, the critical area is in retaining them." (CNAVRES ltr 30 May 78).

The decision to stay or to leave the Naval Reserve is, after all, an individual matter. While this decision may be affected by unique personal factors, the excessive number of controllable losses indicates that some general reasons may contribute to this attrition. With the removal of conscription, the decision to join the Navy in the first place is a choice made by the individual who is not operating under any legal compulsion. The choice of a Naval Reserve career is even more of a free choice. In the Naval Reserve 81 percent of the drillers are voluntary drillers. In the real sense of the word, everyone is a volunteer. Moreover it is a decision which must be renewed frequently when the reservist is called upon to reenlist. If we can predict this decision, which is more often than not a decision to get out; it may be possible, as CNO directs, to remove the major obstacles to retention.

There are many official reasons for losing Naval Reservists:

TYPE OF ATTRITION

- L1 - Discharged (a final or complete discharge which severs all contractual service of obligation/obligations)
- L2 - To Extended Active Duty (any service)
- L3 - Transfer to another Reserve Component (other than the U. S. Naval Reserve)
- L4 - Transfer to Individual Ready Reserve (same component)
- L5 - Transfer to Standby Reserve (same component)
- L6 - Transfer to Retired Reserve
- L7 - Death
- L8 - From Enlisted to Officer Status
- L9 - Other Losses

This study focuses on those who are eligible to reenlist or extend but choose to drop out.

Figure 3.1 shows the scope of the retention problem in REDCOM REG SEVEN in FY 78. Of the 1568 enlisted onboard, the total retained was 54% (852) and the total attrition was 46% (716). The Readiness Command lost 31% (483) of the onboard strength prior to the end of their enlistment (EOS). Ten percent (149) were discharged because they failed to reenlist or extend at the time their reserve military obligation expired and 5% (84) did not reenlist for other reasons such as retirement or death.

The major retention problem is with those Reservists who are lost prior to their EOS. This is further dramatized when you realize that of the 716 attrites, 67 percent were lost prior to EOS, 20 percent were discharged, and 12 percent were lost for other reasons. Many of these reservists simply stopped coming to drill. The reason for their departure may never be known and when reasons are forthcoming they often are those which they believe will most easily be accepted as legitimate by their Commanding Officer. One purpose of this study is to develop a profile of those reservists who are lost prior to EOS, and to provide an analysis which moves beyond surface explanations.

In this Readiness Command only 24% (383) of those onboard reenlisted or extended. This is moderated by the stability sector representing 30% (469) of the reservists whose enlistments did not expire nor did they discontinue drilling. Actually 54% (852) of the reservists were retained. The Gross Retention Rate was 35 percent which is extremely important since this statistic is considered by CNAVRES as the most significant indicator of retention. Gross retention is calculated by dividing the total eligible plus the total ineligible into the total reenlisted and/or extended. Net Retention in the Readiness Command was 72 percent. Net Retention is calculated by dividing the total reenlisted plus extended by those eligible to reenlist and/or extend. These figures are used to calculate trends.

A somewhat sobering fact is that in 1978, the Readiness Command recruited 706 reservists and lost 716. Despite an outstanding recruiting record, the Command found itself with a deficit of -10 at the end of the FY 78. As of 31 May we are +344 which is a considerable improvement. Since recruiting trends are steady, gain is a result of retention. In the Naval Reserve, the tradition has been that individuals are going out the back door as fast as they can be brought in the front. This may not be a problem, if the new recruits are more capable and more highly trained than those lost, but this seems unlikely given the loss to the Navy of personnel trained in Navy schools and indoctrinated in Naval customs. As it turns out, many of the new recruits are brought into the Reserves on the Advanced Pay Grade (APG) program in which civilians with no previous military experience are given military rate or rank based on their professional background. The APG program increases the skill pool in the Reserve, but this is purchased at the price of a greatly reduced military indoctrination. At the present time the APG's constitute about five percent of the reservists in Readiness Command Region SEVEN.




Figure 3.4 Retention 1978

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The number of personnel who are lost in this Readiness Command, would be less disturbing if REDCOM REG SEVEN were among the worst Readiness Commands in the nation. In fact, REDCOM REG SEVEN is among the best! In 1978, this Command was never below average in any of the retention statistics, and most often was found among the top two or three. As of 31 May 1979 the Gross Retention Rate for REDCOM REG SEVEN was 38 percent, whereas the CNAVRES Average was 31.1 percent. The Net Retention Rate for the Command was 74.6 percent, whereas the Net retention Rate for CNAVRES was 67.4 percent. Clearly, REDCOM REG SEVEN is well above average compared to the other Readiness Commands.


The Intention to Reenlist or Extend

In this study retention is measured by asking the following questions:

1. Do you intend to reenlist in the Naval Reserve when your enlistment expires?
2. If you had to make the decision at this time, what would you do?
3. How frequently do you think about trying to get out of the Naval Reserve?
4. If you had to rate your chances of staying in the Naval Reserve on a scale from zero (0) to ninety-nine percent (99%), what would you say are the chances you would remain in a drilling unit for another year? For another three years? For twenty years?

Figure 3.2 shows that 37 percent of the reservists said they definitely would reenlist, 16 percent hope to reenlist, and 27 percent were uncertain. Only 6 percent thought reenlistment was unlikely and 9 percent said they definitely were going to get out of the Naval Reserve. Clearly those giving negative responses were in a small minority. The difference between officer and enlisted intentions is substantial. Sixty-two percent of the officers compared with 34 percent of the enlisted say they definitely will reenlist. As is well known the major retention problem is within the enlisted population. If intentions among both officers and enlisted correlate positively with actual behavior, the prospect for higher retention rates in Readiness Command Region SEVEN looks extremely good. There are only a few who have definitely made up their mind to get out, a larger number who are undecided, but most reservists either hope to or definitely plan to reenlist.

This picture may be deceptive if the undecided reservists shift to the negative end of the spectrum. These 519 undecided reservists combined with 313 reservists who think reenlistment is unlikely compose approximately one-half of the individuals in the Naval Reserve in this Readiness Command.



Reenlist

Figure 3.2 The Intention to Reenlist (Q. 34)

Like the swing vote in an American election, they are the deciding factor in the success of our retention efforts. If they could be persuaded to stay, our retention problem would be solved.

The majority of the reservists are leaning toward reenlistment and are positively disposed toward the Navy; but according to the 31 July 1979 retention statistics, Gross Retention is holding steady at 34 percent and Net Retention is 73 percent. Although most reservists intend to stay, a rather large percentage of these undecided reservists change their minds and decide to get out. Nevertheless, most reservists say they seldom think about getting out of the Naval Reserve and when asked if they would reenlist again at this time 71 percent of the enlisted reservists answer affirmatively.

Figure 3.3 indicates that 29 percent of all reservists say they never think about getting out, 27 percent rarely consider such a prospect, and only 29 percent sometimes give this matter any attention. When one moves to the negative end of the continuum, 9 percent say they think of leaving often and 4 percent think of getting out constantly. Most reservists intend to stay in the Navy and rarely consider leaving, and this is true whether they are officers or enlisted. Thirty-four percent of the officers compared with 28 percent of the enlisted say they never think of getting out. There are, of course, 6 officers and 61 enlisted personnel who say they think about it constantly.

If a reservist's expectations of his chances of staying in the Naval Reserve are any indication of his commitment, most reservists are career motivated. In the cumulative frequency of reservists' self-rated chances of staying in the Naval Reserve for one, three and twenty years, over 50 percent of the reservists give themselves a 90 to 99 percent chance of staying for another year. When asked what their chances of staying for three years over 50 percent of the reservists give themselves an 80 percent chance of remaining in the Naval Reserve. A similar number think they have a chance to stay for twenty years. We might infer that reservists who expect to stay for at least three years are likely to stay for a full career if given the opportunity. Of all those questioned only 10 percent say they have less than a 20 percent chance of staying in the Naval Reserve for another three years, and 11 percent of the reservists say they have a 20 percent chance of staying for twenty years. Clearly most reservists think the odds are in favor of their continued participation. This bears out Chester Barnard's Theory (Barnard, 1940) that the majority of an individual's decisions fall into a "zone of indifference". Indifference in this context does not mean that one does not care about the Naval Reserve; rather, it infers that many decisions such as the one to continue to participate in organizations are made relatively automatically. The prior decision to initially participate gives impetus to continue, much as inertia will continue to move an object after it is initially propelled.




Figure 3.3 The Frequency Reservists Think About Getting Out of the Naval Reserve

If we control on rank, we see that over half of the enlisted reservist give themselves a 90 percent chance of remaining for another year, an 80 percent chance of staying for three more years and a 77 percent chance of staying for twenty. The most frequently mentioned (mode) estimate for all three time periods was 99 percent. These estimates are not essentially different for the entire reserve population presented in figure 3.2; although, when the officers opinions are added to those of the enlisted personnel, the median scores are increased.

The major findings in this chapter are that most Naval Reservists intend to reenlist, rarely think of getting out of the Naval Reserve, and believe their chances of staying for 20 years are quite high. Naval reservist are career motivated. Nevertheless, past retention records show that attrition is high, that many reservist do drop out of the program and that the manpower managers in the Naval Reserve do not fully understand why. The following chapter provides an analysis of the social and economic variables associated with retention.




Figure 3.4 Cumulative Frequency of Self-Rated Chance of Remaining in a drilling unit of the Naval Reserve for One Year, Three Years and Twenty Years.

CHAPTER IV

BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS AND THE INTENTION TO REENLIST

To this point, retention has been discussed without examination of the forces behind these patterns. There are a wide range of social, economic, military and situational factors to account for the reservists intentions and expectations about the Naval Reserve. While all of these relationships exist and are important in understanding and interpreting levels of retention in the Naval Reserve, one must be careful not to overstate the case for any single social or economic characteristic. Often a particular socioeconomic variable is simply an indicator of a cluster or pattern of relationships that exist as a determinant of individual behavior. For example, age is important because it indicates a number of things about a person's situation; however, age in and of itself does not necessarily "cause" an individual to behave in one way rather than another. After examining several of the more important background characteristics, it is apparent that several are related to retention.

Before analyzing these sociological determinants of individual behavior, let us turn to an examination of why the reservists themselves say they initially enlisted in the Naval Reserve and why they continue to participate. This subjective assessment conforms to Vroom's (1964) definition of expectancy as being perceptual rather than objective. Table 4.1 shows a rank ordering of these motivations for reservists in Readiness Command Region SEVEN compared to the attitudes of all Reservists in Readiness Command, San Francisco and Readiness Command, Los Angeles. These California reservists were sampled by Lieutenant Commander Louis A. Zurcher as part of a retention study conducted in 1974.

The relationship between the attitudes of reservists in this Readiness Command and those of reservists in California in 1974 are almost perfectly correlated. The rank ordering of what is most important is practically identical. The primary motivation is economic. This strongly supports Downs' (1957) Theory of why individuals join organizations. Twenty percent of all the reservists in Readiness Command Region SEVEN and 23 percent of all the reservists in California give drill pay as the most important reason for initially enlisting in the Naval Reserve. Retirement is a close second with 23 percent in REDCOMREG SEVEN and 31 percent in REDCOMS SFRAN and LOSA giving this as the most important reason for joining the Navy. When you look only at enlisted personnel in REDCOMREG SEVEN, 28 percent gave drill pay as the most important reason for joining the Naval Reserve and 22 percent indicate retirement was their primary reason. Over 50 percent in all categories gave either drill pay or retirement as the reason why they joined the Naval Reserve. When asked why they continued to participate, 30 percent of the reservists in Readiness Command Region SEVEN gave retirement as the number one explanation and about 26 percent gave drill pay. It appears that reservists continue to drill for the same reason they signed up to begin with.

The second most important reason for initially joining the Naval Reserve is that reservists were either mandatory drillers or they acted out of a sense of patriotism. California had more mandatory drillers and was slightly more patriotic than the Southeast, but the percentage figures

TABLE 4.1

COMPARISON OF THE MOST IMPORTANT REASON FOR AFFILIATION WITH THE NAVAL RESERVE AMONG RESERVISTS IN REDCOMREG SEVEN, REDCOMSANFRAN-LOSA

Reason	REDCOMS SFRAN & LOSA % (1974) N	REDCOMREG SEVEN % (1979) N
<u>Most Important</u>		
Drill Pay	23% (728)	29% (563)
Retirement	31% (679)	23% (435)
<u>Second Most Important</u>		
Mandatory	31% (679)	12% (231)
Patriotism	12% (375)	11% (217)
<u>Third In Importance</u>		
Other	8% (241)	7% (136)
Change of Pace From Civilian Employment	5% (169)	5% (88)
<u>Fourth In Importance</u>		
Professional Advancement	4% (121)	2% (42)
Drill Training	1% (39)	2% (41)
ACDUTRA	2% (53)	2% (33)
Friends	2% (45)	2% (28)
Change of Pace From Family	2% (47)	1% (26)
Recruiters Influence	1% (27)	1% (24)
<u>Fifth In Importance</u>		
Business Contacts	.2% (7)	.5% (9)
Ceremonies and Uniforms	0% (0)	.3% (6)
Influence and Authority	.2% (7)	.2% (4)
Social Events	0% (0)	.4 (4)
Status	1% (14)	.2% (4)
Exchange Privileges	1% (18)	.1% (1)

Source: 1979 REDCOMREG SEVEN Retention Study, and 1974 Naval Reserve Personnel Attitude Survey by LOUIS A. ZURCHER

*Percentage figures that do not total 100 percent are due to rounding errors.

are very close. Eleven percent of those in REDCOM SEVEN and 12 percent in California gave patriotism as the reason for enlistment. Third in importance, reservists listed a change of pace from their civilian employment and a rather large percentage (7) gave "other" as an answer indicating that their reason for enlisting was not given or that they couldn't make up their mind.

Two thirds of the reasons listed on the questionnaire received little consideration. Few reservists enlisted for training or professional advancement. Only 2 percent gave these kinds of explanations for their reason for joining the Naval Reserve. Even if one adds the three categories of professional advancement, drill training and ACDUTRA together one obtains a percentage figure of approximately 6 percent who came into the program because they were impressed with the training opportunities. When asked why they continue to drill, only 1.6 percent listed training as the primary reason. For an organization that spends most of its time training reservists, this is an important fact. One reason why 35 percent of reservists say that classroom sessions are what they like least about the Naval Reserve may be that training was very low on their list of reasons for coming into the program. When one reaches the bottom of the list, one sees that least important of all are business contacts, cere-
monies and uniforms, influence and authority, social events, status and exchange privileges. In fact, only one person in this Readiness Command claimed that exchange privileges were his number one concern.

It should be noted that although some of the reasons given for joining the Naval Reserve are not indicated as primary, they still may be important as part of a pattern of incentives for continuing that participation. The message of these responses, however, is that economic motivations are head and shoulders above everything else. This is true whether one is an officer or an enlisted person. This was true five years ago in California and it continues to be true presently in the general environment of South Carolina, North Carolina, and Georgia.

Relationship Between Background Characteristics and Retention

Turning our attention to the relationship between background characteristics and the intention to reenlist, we group these variables into three categories: Socioeconomic, Military and Situation Environmental. These variables will be discussed as primary conditions for explaining retention.

Socioeconomic Characteristics are those attributes derived from an individual's membership in social groups. These characteristics are easily recognizable because they have to do with objective factual aspects of the individual. Most of these variables are associated with a person's status in society. It is assumed that individuals who share these attributes tend to respond to the world about them in similar ways because they have had common life experiences that are likely to affect their behavior. A significant body of literature supports this assumption.

See Merton (1957), Kerlinger (1973), Robinson (1950), Nie, et al. (1977), and Forcese & Richer (1970). Obviously social characteristics such as education, age, income, race et. cetera are important in many areas of life and they provide one set of parameters which guide the career of a Naval reservist.

Table 4.1 shows a profile of the typical Naval reservist and how these socioeconomic characteristics are related to retention. Looking at the last column under "number" in this table, we see that 91 percent of the reservists are males, 84 percent are whites, 65 percent Protestants, 74 percent are married with an average of about 2 dependents each. The Naval Reserve in Readiness Command Region SEVEN is predominantly male, white, Protestant and married with several dependents.

The relationship of these social characteristics to retention is also presented in Table 4.2. Under the first column, we see that 41 percent of the males compared to 28 percent of the females say they definitely will reenlist; 43 percent of the whites compared to 19 percent of the blacks say they definitely will reenlist*; and 45 percent of the married reservists compared to 16 percent who are single say they definitely will reenlist. When you control on rank, 36 percent of the enlisted males, 38 percent of the enlisted whites, and 40 percent of those enlisted who are married, will definitely reenlist. The percentage figure for blacks is unchanged, but the percentage of single enlisted personnel who say they definitely will reenlist drops 3 percentage points and among women it drops 4 percentage points. Although the differences in percentage are slightly decreased, the positive relationship between these socioeconomic variables and intention to reenlist persist. There is little difference between Protestants and Catholics; however, Jews and other religious groups are less likely to have made the decision to stay than individuals in either of these major religious categories.

The most significant trend in explaining retention is the number of "dependents" a reservist may have. As the number of dependents increases from "none" to "five plus", the percentage figures increase from 23 percent, to 38 percent, to 45 percent, to 51 percent, to 47 percent to 59 percent who say they will reenlist. The greater the number of dependents, the more likely the reservists intend to remain in the Naval Reserve. One reason for this is pure economic need, but it could be that participation in the Reserves also provides an alternative social environment since only 1 percent of the reservist claim that a change of pace from family was their primary reason for affiliating and almost 30 percent indicate drill pay as the most important motivation, economic vice social variables must be dominant.

*Since there were only 12 Indians, 5 orientals and 10 others in the sample, they were excluded from the analysis.

TABLE 4.2

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELECTED SOCIAL VARIABLES AND THE INTENTION TO
REENLIST IN NAVAL RESERVE

	REENLISTMENT INTENTION					
	Definitely Will	Hope To	Don't Know	Unlikely	Definitely Will Not	Number
<u>Sex</u>						
Male	41%	17%	27%	6%	9%	91% (1,683)
Female	28%	21%	39%	5%	7%	9% (168)
<u>Race</u>						
White	43%	17%	24%	6%	10%	84% (1,538)
Black	19%	18%	49%	7%	7%	15% (272)
<u>Religion</u>						
Prot.	46%	18%	25%	6%	5%	65% (1,166)
Cath.	43%	19%	24%	4%	19%	18% (232)
Jew	28%	23%	28%	4%	17%	3% (47)
Other	21%	14%	37%	8%	20%	15% (262)
<u>Marital Status</u>						
Married	45%	18%	25%	5%	7%	74% (1,370)
Single	16%	13%	40%	12%	20%	18% (329)
<u>Dependents</u>						
None	23%	14%	35%	10%	18%	27% (493)
One	38%	18%	25%	6%	14%	18% (331)
Two	45%	19%	25%	5%	5%	23% (429)
Three	51%	17%	25%	4%	2%	20% (374)
Four	47%	21%	26%	3%	2%	8% (148)
Five or More	59%	10%	27%	1%	3%	4% (70)

Source: 1979 REDCOMREG SEVEN Retention Study

*Percentage figures that don't total 100 percent are due to rounding errors.

One of the most important indicators of social status and one's attitudes toward the Navy is age. The Navy has been in a state of rapid social transition since around 1970. Zurcher says in his 1974 study, "that the Navy of eight years ago was very different from the Navy of three years ago, especially concerning personnel policies, technical sophistication, and preceptions of the value of war". (Zurcher, p. 85). Today these changes are no less significant and are no doubt reflected in the attitudes of Naval Reservists. It is also true that as individuals grow older they inevitably incur increased responsibilities, and their attitude toward life generally is modified. The "carefree" life of one's twenties rapidly is transformed into the "burdens" of middle age. Children appear, mortgages are acquired, and taxes have to be paid. Aside from economic responsibilities that might encourage one to continue his participation in the Naval Reserves as he becomes older and the vested interest incurred in the system, people are also creatures of habit. Once a pattern of participation is established, it will be continued if that behavior is rewarding.

This reasoning implies that as one becomes older, the more likely he will be retained in the Naval Reserve. Figure 4.1 bears out this logic. The percentage figures of those in their early twenties who intend to reenlist are very low averaging about 12 percent. After age twenty-seven, it climbs so that within the age group of the early thirties, intention to reenlist is about 35 percent. In the middle to late thirties well over half of the reservists intend to reenlist, and this trend continues. The older you are the more likely you intend to reenlist.

Since drill pay was given as the most important reason for initially affiliating with the Naval Reserve, one might expect that those who had the least income would be most likely to intend to reenlist. Figure 4.2 shows that this is not the case. As income increases, the percentage of enlisted reservists who say they intend to reenlist increases. Those least likely to reenlist are in the income category of \$3,000 to \$5,999 and those most likely to reenlist are in the income category \$24,000 to \$26,999. The positive relationship between income and retention increases isomorphically until you reach an income of over \$40,000 and then the curve begins to turn down. It does not, however, drop to the level of those in the lower income categories. Of those in the lowest income brackets only about 20 percent plan to reenlist, of those in the middle income brackets more than 50 percent plan to reenlist and those in the highest income categories about 80 percent will reenlist.

These findings tend to support Maslow's Theory that individuals whose existence is primarily in the lower levels of his posited hierarchy are unable to formulate long term goals. Alland and Verba (1963) found similar attitudes among "blue-collar" individuals who were reluctant to participate in organizations.




Figure 4.1 Relationship Between Age and Intention to Reenlist in the Naval Reserve

Percent Definitely
Will Reenlist




Figure 4.2 Relationship Between Enlisted Income and
Intention to Reenlist

We see in Table 4.3 that 53 percent of the reservists view themselves as middle class citizens and 25 percent think of themselves as working class. This squares with their reported income. Most Naval Reservists are middle income people. On the extreme end of the class continuum, only 6 percent claim to be upper class and 1 percent claim to be lower class. Twelve percent reject the idea of class as describing their social status.

Reservists are also employed primarily in white-collar jobs. Fourteen percent claim to be high-level executives, 16 percent business managers, 12 percent administrative personnel and 12 percent in clerical work or sales. When one turns to blue-collar jobs, we see that 28 percent, almost twice as many as in any other single category, are skilled workers. There are only 2 percent unskilled and 1 percent whose primary responsibilities are in the house or taking care of children. The 9 percent of the population who are students should be classified as white-collar. Although this classification by the color of ones collar has lost much of its meaning, the breakdown by employment does provide an insight into the social and economic characteristics of the reserve population.

The educational level of Naval Reservists is quite high. Twelve percent have some college and 23 percent are high school graduates. Only about 5 percent did not finish high school. Nineteen percent either gained an associate degree or attended technical school, and 13 percent either went to graduate or professional school. Because of the educational requirements to become an officer, most of those in higher educational categories are officers although almost 30 percent of the enlisted say they had some college.

It is a common finding in the literature of participation that persons of higher socioeconomic class tend to participate at greater levels than persons of lower socioeconomic status. This process is known as the "standard socioeconomic model of participation" (Verba, et al., 1971) and is presented below:

Socioeconomic Status --> Organizational Orientation --> Participation

The explanation for this relationship has been thoroughly documented by Verba & Nie (1972); Verba, Nie, and Kim (1971); and Rusk (1976). It is that increased levels of the components of socioeconomic status are generally accompanied by more positive attitudes about organizational lifestyles. These positive orientations tend to move the individual to higher levels of participation.

Most Naval Reservists are well paid, highly educated and have good jobs. They think of themselves as Americans who come from either working or middle class backgrounds. We have shown that age and income are related to the intention to reenlist, but is this also true for social class, employment and education?

TABLE 4.3

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERCEIVED SOCIAL CLASS, EDUCATION, NATURE
OF EMPLOYMENT, AND THE INTENTION TO REENLIST

	REENLISTMENT INTENTION					
	Definitely Will	Hope To	Don't Know	Unlikely	Definitely Will Not	Number
<u>Social Class</u>						
Upper	61%	14%	11%	7%	8%	6% (102)
Middle	47%	17%	24%	6%	7%	53% (972)
Working	28%	20%	35%	5%	10%	25% (465)
Lower	16%	16%	21%	16%	32%	1% (19)
Reject Class Idea	28%	13%	38%	7%	15%	12% (216)
<u>Employment</u>						
High Executives	62%	17%	15%	2%	3%	14% (258)
Busn. Mgr.	55%	16%	17%	5%	7%	16% (295)
Admin. Pers.	46%	17%	28%	5%	5%	12% (224)
Clerical/Sales	29%	20%	34%	9%	8%	12% (210)
Skilled Emp.	33%	18%	33%	5%	11%	28% (505)
Semi-skilled	27%	15%	36%	6%	22%	6% (107)
Unskilled	21%	18%	41%	3%	18%	2% (34)
Students	14%	12%	39%	19%	16%	9% (170)
Household Worker	39%	15%	23%	8%	15%	1% (13)
<u>Education</u>						
Eight Grade or Less	55%	27%	9%	9%	0%	1% (11)
Some High School	32%	17%	27%	8%	17%	4% (66)
High School Graduate	32%	18%	30%	5%	14%	23% (429)
Some College	29%	14%	34%	10%	12%	24% (450)
Associate Degree	36%	16%	35%	6%	8%	12% (223)
Technical School	37%	18%	35%	4%	7%	7% (123)
College Graduate	50%	22%	18%	5%	5%	16% (286)
Graduate School	61%	12%	20%	4%	2%	8% (159)
Professional School	65%	16%	12%	7%	0%	5% (100)

Source: 1979 REDCOMREG SEVEN Retention Study

*Percentage figures that do not total 100 percent are due to rounding errors.

Looking at Table 4.3, it is clear that the higher the perceived class, the more likely one is to stay in the reserves. As one moves down the column from upper class to lower class the percentage figures drop from a high of 61 percent to a low of 16 percent. Looking at the employment categories, a more objective measure, we see that a similar pattern prevails. There is a slight irregularity between clerical and skilled employees and another anomaly if you consider household workers, however, the percentage figures start with 62 percent among unskilled workers. The higher the employment category the higher the retention rate. Reservists who think of themselves as upper or middle class and who have good jobs, intend to continue their Naval Reserve participation. Those who are working class are more uncertain, but only 15 percent of these believe that reenlistment is unlikely or impossible. This class-related decrease in organizational activity has been noted by Phillip Converse (1964) in his study of mass publics.

Education is somewhat more complicated but the trend still persists. Among high school graduates, 32 percent intend to definitely reenlist, whereas, among college graduates, over 50 percent intend to stay. When one controls on rank we find that 41 percent of the enlisted college graduates definitely plan to reenlist. The one exception to this positive correlation between education and retention is among that 1 percent of the reservists with less than an eighth-grade education. Fifty-five percent of these poorly educated reservists say they definitely will reenlist. When military rank is controlled, the relationships between social class, education, employment and intention to reenlist is essentially unchanged. The higher the socioeconomic status, the greater the likelihood one intends to reenlist.

Support from Family, Peers, and Employers

It is reasonable that reservists who receive support from their family, peer group and employer would be more likely to reenlist than those who do not and who have to maintain their military responsibilities in opposition to the opinions of those groups with which they most closely identify. Table 4.4 shows that 67 percent of those whose spouses are supportive definitely will reenlist, whereas only 23 percent of those whose spouses provide weak support plan to reenlist. The same pattern persists for peer groups and employers. Norman Ryder (1965) found similar peer group and familial support to be evident in an individual's continued participation in other organizations such as political parties. The percentage figures for reservists who have strong peer group encouragement and employer goodwill show that the higher the support the more likely the intention to reenlist. For example, under the column entitled "definitely will" reenlist, as the peer group support declines, the percentage of reservists who will reenlist declines from 67 percent to 30 percent and to 19 percent. The same is true for employer support although not as much of a drop occurred.

TABLE 4.4

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUPPORT FROM FAMILY,
PEERS AND EMPLOYER AND RETENTION

<u>INTENTION TO REENLIST</u>						
	Definitely Will	Hope To	Don't Know	Unlikely	Definitely Will Not	Number
<u>Family Support*</u>						
Very Strong	67%	15%	13%	1%	4%	18% (263)
Moderately Strong	46%	21%	25%	4%	4%	54% (776)
Don't Know	26%	13%	44%	6%	11%	9% (132)
Moderately Weak	26%	15%	37%	10%	12%	14% (203)
Very Weak	23%	9%	15%	16%	36%	5% (67)
<u>Peer Support**</u>						
Very Strong	67%	16%	12%	3%	3%	7% (120)
Moderately Strong	49%	18%	24%	3%	6%	39% (693)
Don't Know	32%	17%	35%	8%	8%	34% (601)
Moderately Weak	30%	17%	29%	9%	15%	16% (288)
Very Weak	19%	8%	30%	12%	30%	5% (87)
<u>Employer Support***</u>						
Very Strong	61%	11%	24%	2%	2%	11% (200)
Moderately Strong	45%	20%	25%	5%	5%	35% (630)
Don't Know	26%	17%	33%	11%	11%	28% (504)
Moderately Weak	37%	15%	28%	5%	14%	18% (328)
Very Weak	37%	15%	24%	3%	20%	7% (128)

Source: 1979 REDCOMREG SEVEN Retention Study

Note:

*Family Support was determined by asking whether the reservists agreed or disagreed with the following statement, "My spouse is very supportive of my participation in the Reserve program."

**Peer Support was determined by asking, "Most of my friends think I am smart to be in the Naval Reserve."

***Employer Support was determined by asking, "My civilian boss is not particularly happy about all the time I spend at the Reserve Center."

Where there is support from these outside groups, very few reservists say they are going to get out of the Naval Reserve. In cases where there is strong support from the spouse, only 4 percent definitely will not reenlist; where there is strong peer support only 3 percent definitely will not reenlist; and where there is strong employer support only 2 percent definitely will not reenlist. Group support is one important explanation of retention.

It is also true that most Naval Reservists think that the general public holds a Naval Career in high regard. Sixty-three percent of those questioned were of this opinion compared to only 31 percent who thought otherwise. Reservists who believe the Navy projects a positive image are also more likely to reenlist than those who do not. However, of the 659 reservists who did believe that the public holds a Naval Career in low regard, almost one-third of them said they definitely would reenlist and another third indicated they hoped to reenlist. Public opinion is not as much of a deterrent to reenlistment as the pressure from family, peers and employers. The closer the group is to the reservist the more influence it is likely to have. Prudence dictates that if you want to retain the Naval Reservists, a good place to start would be with improving the attitude of his family toward Naval Reserve activities.

If support from these social groups is important in buttressing Naval Reserve participation, it could be that reservists who see a recall to active as disruptive to their family, economic status and employment position would be less likely to reenlist than those who believe such an eventuality would not be too disruptive. Table 4.5 shows that 44 percent of the reservists think a recall to active duty would be highly disruptive to their family, 40 percent believe it would be highly disruptive to their economic status and 43 percent are of the opinion it would be highly disruptive to their employment position. Yet approximately one-third of the reservists in each of these categories intend to definitely reenlist. Even so, the trend is still in the predicted direction with only 31 percent of those who say a recall would be highly disruptive to their family and 50 percent of those who see it causing little inconvenience definitely reenlisting. The same pattern exists among those who perceive a disruption to their economic status and employment position. These findings support our earlier conclusions concerning the importance of group support to continued reserve participation.

The fact that a large percentage of reservists still plan to reenlist despite their feelings about the disruption it would cause to their social group may be explained by the answers to the following question: "What do you think is the probability of your being recalled to active duty during the next five years?" Twenty-four percent believed there was a zero percent chance of a recall and 32 percent thought there was a 20 percent chance. Well over 50 percent of the reservists see little or no chance of being recalled any time in the near future. If they were recalled, however, 5 percent would accept eagerly, 30 percent accept willingly, 26 percent accept neutrally, 23 percent accept unhappily, and 7 percent would resist. Ten percent were uncertain. Although a rather large number of reservists have some reservations about a recall, most of them would "turn to" when the time comes.

TABLE 4.5

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEVEL OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DISRUPTION
CAUSED BY A RECALL TO ACTIVE DUTY AND INTENTION TO REENLIST

	<u>INTENTION TO REENLIST</u>					
Disruption To Social Group	Definitely Will	Hope To	Don't Know	Unlikely	Definitely Will Not	Number
<u>Family*</u>						
Don't Know	35%	18%	33%	6%	9%	9% (163)
None	50%	9%	27%	3%	9%	5% (97)
Little	47%	18%	27%	4%	5%	12% (218)
Moderate	49%	17%	24%	4%	4%	29% (543)
High	31%	16%	30%	9%	14%	44% (819)
<u>Economic Status**</u>						
Don't Know	27%	16%	35%	10%	12%	6% (110)
None	43%	23%	25%	3%	6%	11% (198)
Little	46%	18%	25%	5%	7%	14% (257)
Moderate	46%	17%	26%	4%	6%	30% (544)
High	33%	14%	30%	9%	13%	40% (731)
<u>Employment***</u>						
Don't Know	27%	18%	37%	9%	8%	9% (164)
None	46%	20%	23%	5%	6%	11% (199)
Little	44%	20%	27%	4%	4%	11% (209)
Moderate	45%	18%	27%	4%	6%	26% (483)
High	35%	15%	28%	8%	13%	43% (789)

Source: 1979 REDCOMREG SEVEN Retention Study

*Disruption to family was measured by asking, "How disruptive would recall to Active Duty be to your family life?"

**Disruption to economic status was measured by asking, "How disruptive would recall to Active Duty be to your economic situation?"

***Disruption to employment was measured by asking, "How disruptive would recall to Active Duty be to your employment status?"

Military Status Characteristics are those attributes derived from an individual's experience in various military organizations. These attributes determine an individual's military status, and in this study refer mostly to the U. S. Naval Reserve. As everyone knows who has had the slightest brush with any military organization, it is a highly structured, class conscious society. Everyone wears a uniform with numerous insignia designating who you are and where you belong in the military establishment. Not only military courtesy is involved, but authority relationships are clearly spelled out. These characteristics of the military society are very important if the organization is to perform its function. Where one fits in the Naval Reserve will undoubtedly have a good deal to do with whether the individual decides to reenlist or extend.

Table 4.6 shows the relationship between military rank/rate and intention to reenlist. The higher the rank or rate the more likely the intention to reenlist. Sixty-eight percent of the Captains (CAPT's), 67 percent of the Commanders (CDR's), 69 percent of the Lieutenant Commanders (LCDR's), 52 percent of the Lieutenant (LT's), 56 percent of the Lieutenants Junior Grade (LTJG's), and 25 percent of the Ensigns (ENS) intend to definitely reenlist. Seventy percent of the Warrant Officers (WO) definitely intend to reenlist.

When you turn to the relationship between enlisted rate and intention to reenlist, a similar pattern emerges with one major exception. Only 45 percent of the Master Chief Petty Officers (MCPO's) definitely intend to reenlist. This is probably explained by the fact that most Master Chief Petty Officers are on the verge of retirement. However, starting with Senior Chief Petty Officers (SCPO's), we find that 67 percent definitely intend to reenlist, 58 percent of the Chief Petty Officers (CPO's), 47 percent of the First Class Petty Officers (PO1's), 34 percent of the Second Class Petty Officers (PO2's), 20 percent of the Third Class Petty Officers (PO3's), 12 percent of the Seamen (SN's), and none of the Seamen Apprentice or Seamen Recruits (SA/SR's) definitely intend to reenlist. This downward trend is disturbing since by far the largest percentage of the individuals in the Naval Reserve are in the lower rates and particularly in the Petty Officer Class. Among all Naval Reservists in Readiness Command Region SEVEN, 25 percent are Second Class Petty Officers and 17 percent are either First Class or Third Class Petty Officers. Most of these individuals are undecided. Clearly this is an extremely important target group for retention.

As with the relationship between age and intention to reenlist, Table 4.7 shows that a similar relationship exists between longevity in the Naval Reserve and retention. The longer one participates in the program, the more likely he will decide to stay. Looking at the first column, we see that a major jump occurs between the fourth and fifth years. For those who have been in the Naval Reserve, 37 percent intend to reenlist; whereas for those who have been in for five years, 51 percent intend to definitely reenlist; and for those who have been in as long as eight years, 65 percent intend to stay. If one can persuade a reservist to continue to participate longer than four years, he is likely to stay for twenty.

TABLE 4.6

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MILITARY RANK AND INTENTION TO REENLIST

Rank/ Rate	INTENTION TO REENLIST					Number
	Definitely Will	Hope To	Don't Know	Unlikely	Definitely Will Not	
CAPT	68%	14%	14%	4%	0%	2% (28)
CDR	67%	12%	13%	3%	5%	3% (61)
LCDR	69%	13%	16%	0%	1%	7% (130)
LT	52%	28%	17%	1%	1%	5% (88)
LTJG	56%	17%	6%	11%	11%	1% (18)
ENS	25%	00%	50%	25%	0%	.2% ()
WO	71%	14%	14%	0%	0%	.4% ()
MCPO	45%	9%	36%	0%	9%	.6% (11)
SCPO	67%	8%	21%	0%	4%	1% (24)
CPO	58%	21%	13%	1%	7%	7% (129)
PO1	47%	19%	26%	4%	4%	17% (305)
PO2	34%	18%	35%	9%	5%	25% (449)
PO3	20%	17%	34%	12%	17%	17% (305)
SN	12%	15%	35%	9%	29%	10% (177)
SA/SR	0%	4%	39%	8%	50%	1% (26)

Source: 1979 REDCOMREG SEVEN Retention Study

TABLE 4.7

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LONGEVITY IN THE NAVAL RESERVE AND
INTENTION TO REENLIST

	<u>INTENTION TO REENLIST</u>					
	Definitely Will	Hope To	Don't Know	Unlikely	Definitely Will Not	Number
<u>Longevity</u>						
Six months	13%	17%	46%	7%	17%	16% (296)
One year	21%	18%	37%	10%	14%	11% (206)
Two years	18%	13%	38%	14%	17%	10% (177)
Three years	24%	19%	35%	12%	11%	9% (162)
Four years	37%	21%	32%	3%	7%	5% (91)
Five years	51%	16%	22%	4%	7%	8% (154)
Eight years	65%	16%	17%	2%	1%	13% (242)
Twelve years	60%	20%	16%	2%	2%	10% (175)
Fifteen plus	59%	16%	15%	4%	6%	19% (344)

Source: 1979 REDCOMREG SEVEN Retention Study

The length of time a reservist spent on active duty in an afloat command was not a predictor of one's intention to reenlist. Forty percent of those who spent one year afloat and forty-two percent of those with five years afloat said they definitely intended to reenlist. The difference of 2 percentage points is too small to be of any significance.

It was anticipated that those who came from military families would be more likely to reenlist than those who did not. No such relationship emerged. In fact, there was a slight negative correlation. What did emerge was that almost 90 percent of the reservists said they did not come from a military family and 40 percent of these said they definitely plan to reenlist.

It is also true that as the number of times on ACDUTRA and WETS increase, the more likely one intends to reenlist. About one-third of the reservists have not been on any WETS, one-third have been on one to three WETS and one-third on four or more. As one moves from no ACDUTRA to five or more, the percentage of those who say they will definitely reenlist goes from 16 percent to 20 percent to 28 percent to 42 percent to 60 percent. The rise in percentage as one moves from no WETS to five or more is less steep but the pattern is similar. Thirty percent of those who have not been on any WETS say they definitely will reenlist and 51 percent of those who have been on five or more say they definitely will reenlist.

Mandatory drillers are those reservists who have a legal obligation to drill. All other reservists are voluntary participants. Among the 275 mandatory drillers questioned only 6 percent say they definitely will reenlist whereas among all categories of voluntary drillers approximately 40 percent say they definitely will reenlist. Since the mandatory drillers are recently off active duty and presumably are the most up to date reservists in the Readiness Command, the extremely small percentage who are interested in continuing represent a serious retention problem. Among mandatory drillers 40 percent say they definitely will not reenlist, 19 may but think it unlikely, 29 percent don't know, 7 percent hope to and 6 percent definitely will reenlist.

To increase the skill pool in the Naval Reserve, the Advanced Pay Grade (APG) Program was established. These are individuals with no previous military experience but who have civilian jobs or talents that the Navy needs. They are brought into the Naval Reserve and given a rank on rate commensurate with their level of expertise. Among the 296 APG's, 38 percent say they definitely plan to reenlist compared with 33 percent of the Navy veterans. The difference is not great but the APG seems to be a slightly better retention risk than regular Navy personnel.

Situational Environmental Characterization are those aspects of an individual's surroundings that place limits on behavior. They are the constraints of time, distance and place. The critical significance of the ecological setting has long been recognized by social scientists such as Skinner (1971), Maslow (1970) and Davies (1963). Individuals from the city are different from those in the country. Regional differences in the United

States are substantial given the great distances and varied soil and climatic conditions. The time it takes to get to drill, the drill schedule, and many other situational factors may explain why someone comes to drill regularly or is a poor attender. Although not all situational factors can be changed, clearly some might be modified if it were found to be important in improving retention. By in large, however, it was found that situational factors provided only a limited explanation for intention to reenlist.

In Readiness Command Region SEVEN it was found that the size of the community in which one is reared and the area where one lives are not highly related to retention; although, people who are from large cities and individuals who currently live in the suburbs are more inclined to reenlist than others. Area of the country also seems to be relatively unimportant. However, those 122 sailors from the landlocked Midwest seem more interested in reenlisting than their neighbors from the North, West and South. Forty-eight percent of those from the Midwest say they definitely will reenlist compared to 33 percent from the North, 40 percent from the West and 40 percent from the South. The differences in percentage are small and, therefore, we must conclude that one geographical location is just about as good as another as a source of personnel.

The number of miles a reservist drives to drill is not inversely related to the intention to reenlist. Figure 4.3 shows that as the distance to the Naval Reserve Center increases, there is no commensurate decline in intention to reenlist. The time required to commute to drill also is insignificant. Among enlisted Naval Reservists, 38 percent of those who drive only 15 minutes to drill and 37 percent of those who drive five hours or more definitely plan to reenlist.

It must be pointed out, however, that as gasoline prices increase this could easily change. Just because distance and time were no obstacle to drill attendance in the past does not mean that a change in the environmental situation would not be reflected in the reservist's willingness to participate, especially since his primary motives seem to be economic. The trend line for officers and enlisted are essentially similar. Controlling on rank does not change the relationship.

The relationship between a reservist's preference for weekend or weekday drill and his intention to reenlist is not strong. However, it is clear that most reservists like weekend drills. Seventy-seven percent say they prefer weekend drills and only 9 percent prefer weekday drills.

In summary we find that the most important reasons given for initially affiliating with the Naval Reserve are drill pay and retirement with patriotism a poor third. Most Naval Reservists are white, Protestant, married males with a couple of dependents. They are well educated, have a good job and think of themselves as either working or middle class Americans. We find that the higher the socioeconomic level, the higher the intention to reenlist. Among reservists who have the support of their




Figure 4.3 Relationship Between Miles to Drill Site and Intention to Reenlist Among Enlisted Personnel

family, peers, and employers, intention to reenlist is high. Military rank and rate are strongly associated with the intention to reenlist as is age, longevity and the number of WETS and ACDUTRA's. Environmental and situational characteristics were much less significant than supposed. Distance to the drill site, time of commuting, area of the country, and location of ones residence were relatively poor predictors of intention to reenlist.

CHAPTER V

CULTURAL SOCIALIZATION

So much of what one thinks about his proper role in society depends on early cultural socialization. CULTURAL SOCIALIZATION refers to the whole process by which people with certain behavioral characteristics learn to adopt the norms, values attitudes and behaviors acceptable and practiced by the ongoing social system. The process specifies the range of what is customary and acceptable, but it also involves the development of an affective moral commitment to the social society whether it be civilian or military. (Sigel, 1970, xii; Lawler, 1971; Child, 1954, p. 655).

The socialization of a sailor is a process whereby a "landlubber" learns the elaborate set of values, beliefs, roles, norms and expectations that will make it possible for him to become part of the Navy. All societies establish procedures through which their culture can be transmitted and perpetuated to succeeding generations. This is even more true of subcultures which must maintain their bulkheads against the continual eroding effects of changing social currents. The indoctrination of a sailor begins in boot camp, is completed aboard ship and may be indefinitely extended through participation in a reserve unit.

Louis A. Zurcher, Jr., has brilliantly described these experiences in two articles: one on Naval recruit training and the other on the sailor aboard ship. (Zurcher, 1968 and 1975). In both articles he focuses on role assimilation and role behavior in a "total institution". A total institution is a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals cut off from the wider society for an appropriate period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life." (Goffman, 1961, xiii). In the Navy both boot camp and a ship resemble a total institution whose function is to "de-civilianize" the individual and prepare him for war.

This intense socialization experience occurs at a time in a young persons' life when he may be going through what Eric Erickson calls an identity crisis, a period of uncertainty when their youth has ended and they have not yet become mature adults. "Out of this emotional and intellectual turmoil," says Erickson, "each person must forge for himself some central perspective and direction, some working unity out of the effective remnants of his childhood and the hopes of his anticipated adulthood he must detect some meaningful resemblance between what he has come to see in himself and what his sharpened awareness tells him others judge and expect him to be." (Erickson, 1958, p. 14)

Obviously boot camp is a kind of "shock treatment", that is incisive in its deprivations. There is a kind of "knifing off of past experiences" and a grafting on of a different self image. The individual has a new picture of himself as a physical and psychological person who has been initiated into a new culture. The assimilation is completed aboard ship where the "new man" soon finds his place and learns the Navy's myths, traditions, rituals, and customs - he becomes a "squared-away" sailor.

Attitude Toward Active Duty Experience

In studying the retention problem of the Naval Reserve, the relevance of this early socialization experience may be extremely important especially if there is no break in service. The Navy Reservist may leave active duty and immediately start drilling once a week; or one weekend each month. At their Naval Reserve Centers there is an effort to maintain the values of the Navy subculture - walls are "bulkheads", floors are "decks", stairs are "ladders", ceilings are "overheads", et cetera.

The Navy Reservist is also required to go back on 14 days ACDUTRA (Active Duty for Training) each year where he gets a kind of "booster shot" to strengthen his ties to the service, refresh his skills, and remind him of who he is - a "card-carrying member" of the Naval Establishment.

If the procedures designed to inculcate Navy values into the individual were effective in producing a "squared-away sailor," then we would expect that the frequent refresher experience he receives as a member of a drilling reserve unit would be sufficient to retain him as an active and enthusiastic member of the Naval establishment.

The fact is the initial experience may not have been positive, the experience on active duty may have been a disaster, and the Reserve drill may seem dull and tedious.

When asked about their active duty experience, we see in Table 5.1 that most reservists had extremely positive attitudes regarding their active duty experience. Sixty percent said they remember being serious, 55 percent accepted, 53 percent useful, 39 percent respected and 26 percent influential. Looking under the negative attitudes, we see that only 17 percent remember being disgusted, 15 percent bored, 15 percent wasteful, 16 percent harassed and 8 percent hostile. Only a small percentage of those in the Naval Reserve remember their active duty experience as unpleasant.

Table 5.2 shows levels of agreement and disagreement with a series of statements concerned with the reservist's attitude toward the U. S. Navy in general and the Naval Reserve in particular. It is an effort to understand how closely reservists identify with the Navy as a subculture. Do they continue to have positive or negative feelings about the group? Is it a special world with a unique language that makes them feel at home; or is it the kind of association where they are constantly harassed, bored, and uncomfortable.

Looking at the series of questions under "positive images" in Table 5.2, we find that 61 percent of the reservists like to call things by their Navy names such as "deck", "bulkhead", and "overhead", 60 percent think the Naval Reserve is a special world that not everyone belongs to, and 59 percent say the Navy is like being part of a big family. Most reservists have a strong sense of identity with the Navy. They are part of this culture and they feel at home and comfortable. Despite the overall positive association with the Navy world, the reservist stops short of giving enthusiastic support to the "idea of going to sea." Only 35 percent

TABLE 5.1

ATTITUDES TOWARD ACTIVE DUTY EXPERIENCE (OFFICER AND ENLISTED)*

<u>How Do These Words Describe How You Felt While on Active Duty?</u>			
<u>Descriptive Words</u>	<u>To A Great or Very Great Extent</u>	<u>To Some Extent</u>	<u>To Little or No Extent</u>
<u>Positive Attitudes</u>			
Serious	60%	31%	9%
Accepted	55%	35%	11%
Useful	53%	34%	14%
Respected	39%	40%	21%
Influential	26%	41%	33%
<u>Negative Attitudes</u>			
Disgusted	17%	30%	54%
Bored	15%	33%	52%
Wasteful	15%	27%	59%
Harassed	16%	24%	60%
Hostile	8%	16%	81%

Source: 1979 REDCOMREG SEVEN Retention Study

*Percentage figures that don't total 100 percent are due to rounding errors.

TABLE 5.2

THE RESERVE'S IMAGE OF THE NAVAL RESERVE *

Item	Level of Agreement		
	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree
<u>Positive Images</u>			
1. I like to call things by their Navy names such as "deck," bulkhead" and "overhead."	61%	16%	22%
2. The Naval Reserve is a special world that not everybody belongs to.	60%	14%	26%
3. The Navy is like being part of a big family.	59%	16%	25%
4. I like things that are thought of as typically Navy.	57%	18%	26%
5. The slogan, "it's not just a job, it's an adventure" is really true.	52%	15%	33%
6. The lot of the average sailor is improving.	48%	27%	24%
7. The whole idea of "going to sea" is a romantic and appealing idea to me.	35%	16%	50%
<u>Negative Images</u>			
8. Harassment is a constant part of life when I am at drill.	18%	10%	72%
9. I would not mind coming to drill as much if I did not have to get all dressed up.	21%	11%	67%
10. You can't help wondering whether anything concerning the Navy is worthwhile.	19%	16%	64%
11. Most of what passes for training is useless and boring.	42%	10%	48%
12. The Navy seems to be more interested in my appearance than my ability to do the job.	43%	11%	46%
13. To pretend you are on a real ship when you are at the Naval Reserve Center is absurd.	48%	18%	35%
14. A major problem is the amount of "Mickey Mouse" things that go on in the military.	64%	12%	25%

Source: 1979 RENCOMREG SEVEN Retention Study

*Percentage figures that don't total 100 percent are due to rounding errors.

could say that the idea of going to sea is still "romantic"; however, 52 percent still think the slogan, "it's not just a job, it's an adventure" is really true. Some of the romance might have worn off, but most reservists are excited about their association with the Navy.

This positive orientation is further reinforced when you take into account the responses to negative statements about the Naval Reserve. These sentiments are sometimes expressed around the Reserve Center, but just how deep is the discontent? Is it just the grumbling of a few "malcontents" or are these feelings widespread? Looking at the series of statements under "Negative Images" in Table 5.2, we see that most reservists are not in agreement with many of these criticisms. Seventy-two percent disagree that harassment is a constant part of life when at drill, 67 percent disagree that getting dressed up (in uniform) to come to drill is a problem, and 64 percent disagree that the Navy is not worthwhile.

Most reservists may reject these statements because they are phrased in absolute terms such as, "harassment is constant" or "you can't help wondering whether anything concerning the Navy is worthwhile." When you substitute more moderate phrases such as most instead of all, a greater percentage of reservists are inclined to accept the criticism as having some merit. For example, 64 percent of the reservists are of the opinion that a major problem with the military in general and the reserve in particular is the amount of "Mickey Mouse" things that go on, and 48 percent agree that to pretend you are on a real ship when you are at the Naval Reserve Center is absurd. These reactions indicate that a good deal more realism may be appropriate since some of the criticism of the Naval Reserve are genuine and widespread. The overall pattern of responses, however, leads the reader to the conclusion that most Naval Reservists are closely identified with the Navy.

The question remains as to whether those reservists who closely identify with Navy, accepting its good points and rejecting its bad points are those who are most likely to reenlist. Table 5.3 shows that reservists who have a positive image of the Navy are much more likely to reenlist than those who have a negative image. Sixty-six percent of those who strongly agree that they like things that are typically Navy and only 12 percent of those who strongly disagree will definitely reenlist. Among those who strongly agree that the Navy is like being in a big family, 61 percent intend to reenlist whereas only 17 percent of those who strongly disagree with this statement will reenlist. Looking at the two negative items, the same message is communicated. Only 20 percent of those who think harassment is a constant part of their drill experience say they intend to reenlist and 58 percent of those who disagree intend to reenlist. It is also true that only 22 percent of those who strongly agree that the Navy seems more interested in their appearance than their ability to do the job intend to definitely reenlist. In all four cases the percentage figures run in the predicted direction.

TABLE 5.3

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IMAGE OF THE NAVY AND INTENTION TO REENLIST *

Statement		Intention Reenlist					N
		Will	Hope	Don't	Unlikely	Will	
		To	To	Know		Not	
<u>Positive Items</u>							
I like things that are thought of as typically Navy.	SA	66%	19%	11%	00%	3%	10% (175)
	A	48%	20%	23%	4%	6%	47% (848)
	DK	29%	17%	36%	9%	9%	18% (324)
	D	14%	13%	39%	9%	13%	21% (386)
	SD	12%	6%	28%	19%	34%	5% (89)
The Navy is like being part of a big family.	SA	61%	16%	17%	2%	4%	10% (177)
	A	44%	20%	26%	4%	6%	49% (896)
	DK	34%	17%	30%	10%	9%	16% (298)
	D	32%	13%	34%	9%	14%	19% (339)
	SD	17%	7%	34%	14%	28%	6% (109)
<u>Negative Items</u>							
Harassment is a constant part of life when I am at drill.	SA	20%	9%	34%	8%	28%	4% (76)
	A	29%	16%	31%	9%	15%	14% (255)
	DK	21%	17%	41%	10%	10%	10% (185)
	D	42%	19%	27%	5%	7%	55% (997)
	SD	58%	13%	17%	5%	7%	17% (308)
The Navy seems more interested in my appearance than my ability to do the job.	SA	22%	11%	3%	13%	23%	15% (273)
	A	35%	18%	31%	8%	8%	28% (511)
	DK	29%	17%	37%	7%	10%	11% (196)
	D	50%	18%	24%	3%	5%	41% (755)
	SD	66%	15%	11%	0%	8%	5% (89)

Source: 1979 REDCOMREG SEVEN Retention Study

*Percentage figures that don't total 100 percent are due to rounding errors.

In summary we find that reservists who have been positively socialized into the Navy culture intend to reenlist, but those who feel like they are outsiders or like they are abused will decide to leave. Most Naval Reservists strongly identify with the Navy. The transition from "landlubber" to sailor is complete. Their experience on active duty was extremely positive and they feel comfortable as part of an organization that has many special qualities. Those who like things that are typically Navy are glad to have an opportunity to continue their participation in the Naval Reserve.

CHAPTER VI

SATISFACTION

The reasons reservists give for joining the Navy are their expectation of tangible rewards in the form of pay and retirement benefits. These same reasons are given for continuing their participation, except when they are asked what they expect from their work experience, they inevitably express the need for greater intrinsic rewards such as feelings of accomplishment and self-esteem. It is our conjecture that the greater their level of satisfaction with their work in the Naval Reserve, the more likely they intend to reenlist. This chapter investigates the levels of satisfaction reservists have with various aspects of the Naval Reserve and shows how these attitudes relate to the intention to reenlist.

In order to determine the level of satisfaction of reservists with their Naval Reserve experience, each reservist was asked whether he was satisfied or dissatisfied with various aspects of the Reserve program. As previously stated in Chapter I, this strategy follows the lead of Smith, et al. (1969). They address satisfaction in terms of multiple satisfaction in relation to affective responses to many facets of the job situation. These items were first formulated in Zurcher's 1974 Study of the Attitudes of Reservists in two California Readiness Commands. They are used here to test the reliability of the satisfaction scale and to make a comparison of reservists' attitudes in REDCOM REG SEVEN with those of reservists in REDCOMSFRAN and LOSA.

These items are ranked in Table 6.1 according to the percent of satisfied responses obtained. The aspect of their Naval Reserve experience they are most satisfied with is comradeship and the one they are least satisfied with is equipment. Reservists are not very satisfied with some of the most important aspects of the Naval Reserve Program. Only 19 percent were satisfied with the equipment, and only 26 percent were satisfied with training. Equipment and Training should be two of the most attractive aspects of the Naval Reserve, but in the opinions of reservists, they rank right at the bottom of the list. Associated with the dissatisfaction concerning equipment and training, we find that reservists are not pleased about their "sense of accomplishment", "how the drill compliments their civilian occupation", "how their talents and abilities are utilized", and "their amount of responsibility."

Table 6.2 provides an insight into the reservist's evaluation of how his time is utilized at reserve drill. The top ranking activities for spending too little time relates to rate training and professional reading. Reservists also feel that they would benefit by having an opportunity to talk with people outside their unit. More time, they feel, should be spent on counseling. They also feel too much time is consumed in writing reports and attending meetings. Reservists would like to reduce the amount of time they spend engaged in such useless activities as idle chatter, sitting, staring and daydreaming. Clearly Naval reservists want to minimize wasted time and increase the amount of time they spend doing their job. Even though much of this must be regarded as a criticism of themselves as well as the Naval Reserve, it is obvious that Naval Reservists would prefer to work in a more productive environment.

TABLE 6.1

SATISFACTION WITH VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE NAVAL RESERVE
DRILL EXPERIENCE OFFICERS AND ENLISTED

Aspect of Naval Reserve	Percent Satisfied	Aspect of Naval Reserve	Percent Satisfied
Comradeship	66%	Drill Experience	42%
Personal Appearance		Amount of Authority	41%
Regulations	66%	Rank and Rating	41%
Uniform Rqr.	63%	Opportunity for	
Drilling Unit	57%	Promotion	40%
Designator/Rate	53%	Responsibility	37%
Unit Admin. Support	51%	Readiness Command Support	37%
Drill Schedule	50%	Talents and Ability	
Supervisor	49%	Utilization	35%
In General	48%	How Drill Compliments	
Recognition Received	47%	Occupation	35%
Res. Center AcDu		Fringe Benefits	34%
Support	43%	Unit Social Events	30%
Amount Drill Pay	43%	Sense of Accomplishment	27%
Status	42%	Training	26%
Drill Time	42%	Equipment	19%

Source: 1979 REDCOMREG SEVEN Retention Study

TABLE 6.2

NAVAL RESERVE TIME UTILIZATION

Activities	Percentage Who Agree
<u>Too Little Time</u>	
1. Working in Rate	44%
2. Reading professional material	37%
3. Talking with people outside the unit (i.e. REDCOM Staff, people in other units and ACDU personnel)	28%
4. Assessing needs of people you serve and counseling	27%
5. Scheduling Time	25%
<u>Too Much Time</u>	
1. Writing Reports	18%
2. Attending Meetings	17%
3. Idle Chatter	17%
4. Sitting and Staring	13%
5. Daydreaming	13%

Source: 1979 REDCOMREG SEVEN Retention Study

When a comparison is made between the attitudes of enlisted reservists in REDCOMSEVEN/LOSA in 1974 and REDCOMREG SEVEN in 1979, we find that the rank order of mean satisfaction scores are very similar. In both cases as shown in Table 6.3, comradeship is ranked number one, and equipment is on the bottom of the list. These scores range from a high of 5 to a low of 1. The average score on each question is the mean. The similarity in means is quite close on a number of important items. For example, when we look at the level of satisfaction with their current unit, the mean scores are 2.633 and 2.734. In the last few years there seems to be little change in the level of satisfaction that reservists have regarding their units, their pay and their training experience.

Reservists in REDCOM SEVEN do seem more satisfied with military requirements such as uniform and personal appearance, whereas reservists in REDCOMSEVEN and LOSA were more satisfied with their promotion potential and general reserve experience; however, the major impression one has in comparing these columns of mean satisfaction scores is that things haven't changed much in the Naval Reserve, and that reservists in this area of the Southeastern United States and those in California have similar attitudes and opinions about their Naval Reserve experience. In most cases reservists are satisfied and dissatisfied with the same aspects of the Naval Reserve.

Even though few reservists in REDCOMREG SEVEN are dissatisfied with what might be considered the military environment, Table 6.4 shows the variables which are the most sensitive predictors of retention. The Gamma measure of association between satisfaction with uniform requirements and the intention to reenlist is .476. Personal appearance requirements are not far behind with a gamma of .456. If reservists are not too unhappy with the way the Navy expects them to look, then they most likely will continue their participation. The fact that so few reservists are dissatisfied with these aspects of the Naval Reserve reduces its importance in explaining why such large numbers decide to drop out; however, it remains a sensitive issue.

Probably a better predictor of retention is the attitudes concerning the general reserve experience and the drill experience of the reservists. This must represent a composite of many opinions and in some ways may be considered a kind of balance sheet in which the reservist subjectively weighs the pros and cons and comes up with an individual evaluation of his experience.

We learned earlier that 48 percent of the reservists in REDCOMREG SEVEN are satisfied with their general reserve experience and about 42 percent are satisfied with their drill experience. Table 6.4 indicates that the more satisfied one is with these experiences, the more likely he intends to reenlist. The Gamma measures of association are .467 and .442 respectively. These two variables are the best predictors of the intention to reenlist with the exception of uniform requirements and personal appearance variables.

TABLE 6.1

COMPARISON OF REDCOMREG SEVEN AND REDCOMSEFRAN AND LOSA'S MEAN SCORES
FOR NAVAL RESERVE SATISFACTION AMONG ENLISTED PERSONNEL

Satisfaction With	REDCOMSEFRAN And LOSA Mean Score (1974)	Rank	REDCOMREG SEVEN Mean Score (1979)	Rank
Comradeship	3.766	(1)	3.763	(1)
Uniform Requirements	3.396	(6)	3.718	(2)
Personal Appearance	3.209	(10)	3.632	(3)
Current Drill	3.495	(2)	3.582	(4)
Drill Schedule	3.435	(5)	3.676	(5)
Recognition	3.282	(8)	3.594	(6)
Supervisors	3.441	(4)	3.366	(7)
Time Required	3.251	(9)	3.282	(8)
Status	3.136	(12)	3.237	(9)
Authority	3.066	(14)	3.275	(10)
Drill Experience	3.062	(15)	3.222	(11)
Pay	3.386	(7)	3.214	(12)
Responsibility	3.002	(16)	3.167	(13)
Promotion	3.470	(3)	3.028	(14)
Fringe Benefits	2.755	(17)	3.001	(15)
CIVILIAN LIFE	2.734	(19)	2.992	(16)
Talents and Abilities	2.747	(18)	2.921	(17)
Social Events	3.093	(13)	2.877	(18)
Training	2.633	(20)	2.734	(19)
General Reserve Exp.	3.148	(11)	2.673	(20)
Facilities and Equipment	2.414	(21)	2.670	(21)

Source: REDCOMSEFRAN and LOSA 1974 Survey and REDCOMREG SEVEN 1979 Survey
of Naval Reserve Personnel

*The higher the mean score the higher the level of satisfaction. Scores on each item range from 1 to 5.

TABLE 6.4

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HOW RESERVISTS FEEL ABOUT THE NAVAL RESERVE
AND THEIR INTENTION TO REENLIST

Naval Reserve Experience	Gamma*	Naval Reserve Experience	Gamma
Uniform Requirements	.476	Authority	.358
General Reserve Experience	.467	Current Unit	.352
Personal Appearance		Rank or Rate	.347
Requirements	.456	Supervisors	.329
Drill Experience		Talent Utilization	.326
Generally	.442	Drill Pay	.303
Amount of Time		Training	.294
Required to Drill	.425	Rate or Rating	.283
Amount of Status	.415	Unit Social Events	.275
Drill Compliments		REDCOM Support	.255
Civilian Occ.	.397	Fringe Benefits	.232
Amount of Recognition	.369	Opportunity for Promotion	.223
Responsibility	.365	Station Keeper Support	.189
Comradeship	.365	Equipment	.168

Source: 1979 NAVREDREG SEVEN Retention Study

*The Gamma Measure of Association is used. A gamma approaching +1 indicates a strong positive association; and a gamma approaching -1 indicates an inverse relationship. Those gamma's near zero indicates a weak relationship.

As one moves down the column of gamma measures of association in Table 6.4, it becomes clear that there are no negative associations. All of the variables concerned with satisfaction of various aspects of the Reserve program are positively related to the intention to reenlist. Although some are more important than others, the level of satisfaction is associated with the intention to reenlist. This supports the theoretical literature of Vroom (1964), Mobley, et al. (1978) and Koch and Steers (1978) that consistently finds a strong association between satisfaction and retention.

Among the predictors of intention to reenlist, satisfaction with training appears about two-thirds of the way down the list and satisfaction with equipment is least significant. Although a large number of reservists don't find the training and equipment satisfying, these feelings aren't sufficiently strong to discourage reenlistment. From the point of view of those charged with the responsibility of improving the operational readiness of the Naval Reserve, these two items are critically important, but for the reservist they are not highly correlated with his intentions to reenlist.

It should be mentioned that the fact that a reservist is not subjectively satisfied with the training does not indicate that the training is poor. In fact, it may be outstanding. Students frequently don't like some courses because they are too technical or difficult. In this study no effort was made to evaluate the quality of Naval Reserve training or its relation to the operational readiness of the units. These kinds of judgments are made by inspection teams with the expertise to make such judgments. Here we are merely concerned with the reservists' subjective perceptions of training and how these perceptions might be related to the intention to reenlist.

Part of the explanation for these attitudes might be the satisfaction of the reservist with his civilian job. The kind of civilian occupation an individual has will undoubtedly determine much of his lifestyle and the opportunities he has for participation in the Naval Reserve. If an individual is satisfied with his civilian job it may indicate that he is the type of person who will be satisfied in his other pursuits. On the other hand someone who is unhappy in his civilian job may seek to satisfy his unfulfilled social and psychological needs in an ephemeral role such as the Naval Reserve. Civilian job satisfaction is the affective orientation of the individual toward his civilian employment. It has to do with how one feels while engaged in his primary work role.

The relationship between the reservist's civilian job satisfaction and his attitude toward the Navy would seem to be very close. If a worker has achieved a plateau in his profession or occupation, he may seek to satisfy his needs for achievement by participating in public service activities. The Naval Reserve may fall into this category for such an individual. For those who are young, just married and beginning a family, the Naval Reserve may be perceived as interfering in his attaining stability in his life. He is too preoccupied with getting established to

have time for such an ancillary activity. Many other aspects of one's civilian job are important such as its social status, work schedules, and opportunity for self-actualization. It is our conjecture that the type of job and the individual's level of satisfaction with his occupation is a major contributor to how the reservist sees his role in the Navy.

Table 6.5 shows that reservists have extremely positive attitudes about their civilian job experience. Eight percent feel useful, 78 percent accepted, 76 percent serious, 61 percent respected and 48 percent influential. Looking at the percentage figures under negative attitudes, we see that only 3 percent feel harassed, 5 percent hostile, 6 percent wasteful, and 7 percent bored and 7 percent bored to any great extent. Reservists have even better feelings about their civilian jobs than they did about their active duty experiences. Clearly reservists are not the outcast of society who are dissatisfied with their civilian jobs; they are in fact well pleased with their work.

Table 6.6 shows that the more positive the reservist's attitude toward his civilian job the more likely he will definitely reenlist. The percentage figures in this table represent the percent of reservists who definitely plan to reenlist in each category. Nineteen percent of the reservists who feel useful "to no extent" plan to reenlist, whereas 45 percent of those who feel useful "to a very great extent" plan to reenlist. Reading across the columns, we find that as one's attitude improves concerning his civilian job, the greater the percentage of those who intend to reenlist. The reverse is true for those with negative attitudes. The more harassed one feels in his civilian job, for example, the less likely he is to reenlist. These trends persist for each attitude examined. Reservists who are pleased and satisfied with their civilian jobs are those most likely to reenlist in the Naval Reserve.

From what has been learned so far about Naval manpower, we are concerned with an individual who had very positive experiences on active duty and likes his civilian job. He is, however, dissatisfied with the training he gets and the equipment with which he must work in the Naval Reserve. Reservists are committed to their units, but would like to see their time better utilized.

From the perspective of the Naval Reservist, what is it about the training program that is a problem? Thirty-six percent indicate that classroom sessions were the least significant part of their training. Naval Reservists want hands-on exercises and practical training. They derive a great deal of satisfaction from working with their active-duty counterparts. When asked how they felt about drilling more often aboard ships and stations of the active forces during regular drill as well as on ACDUTRA, 62 percent generally approved and only 18 percent showed any disapproval. The most significant type of training they currently receive according to their responses, is ACDUTRA.

TABLE 6.5

ATTITUDES TOWARD CIVILIAN JOB *

<u>How Do These Words Describe How You Feel On Your Civilian Job?</u>			
<u>Descriptive Words</u>	<u>To A Great or Very Great Extent</u>	<u>To Some Extent</u>	<u>To A Little Or No Extent</u>
<u>Positive Attitudes</u>			
Useful	80%	14%	7%
Accepted	78%	17%	5%
Serious	76%	19%	7%
Respected	61%	30%	10%
Influential	48%	38%	14%
<u>Negative Attitudes</u>			
Harassed	3%	9%	90%
Hostile	5%	15%	81%
Wasteful	6%	13%	81%
Bored	7%	21%	72%
Disgusted	7%	22%	71%

Source: 1979 REDCOMREG SEVEN Retention Study

*Percentage figures that don't total 100 percent are due to rounding errors.

TABLE 6.6

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PERCENT OF RESERVISTS WHO WILL DEFINITELY
REENLIST AND THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD THEIR CIVILIAN JOB

<u>Percent Who Will Definitely Reenlist in Each Category</u>					
	To No Extent	To A Very Little Extent	Some Extent	Great Extent	Very Great Extent
<u>Positive Attitudes</u>					
Useful	19%	22%	28%	42%	45%
Accepted	23%	31%	25%	43%	46%
Serious	27%	32%	29%	41%	47%
Respected	23%	30%	33%	44%	48%
Influential	20%	30%	34%	49%	47%
<u>Negative Attitudes</u>					
Harassed	42%	40%	33%	35%	18%
Hostile	43%	34%	34%	29%	25%
Wasteful	42%	39%	34%	35%	30%
Bored	46%	41%	31%	33%	21%
Disgusted	45%	43%	31%	25%	17%

Source: 1979 REDCOMREG SEVEN Retention Study

Note: The percentage figures in this table are presented somewhat differently than those in the other tables in this report. In the other contingency tables the relevant comparisons were made by reading down the columns. In this table you must read across columns. For example, read from 19% to 22% to 28% etc.

Table 6.7 is a comparison of the level of satisfaction with various aspects of the Naval Reserve experience while on Reserve Drill, WETS, and ACDUTRA. In every category except comradeship, ACDUTRA is rated higher than similar experiences on WETS and on regular reserve drill. Reservists enjoy their associations at drill, but are less satisfied with some of the more substantive concerns and they particularly dislike classroom sessions. The Ship Board Simulator (SBS) should go a long way in fulfilling not only the need for equipment, but for a more realistic training experience.

Part of the problem with classroom sessions may be that the instructors are inexperienced. This attitude was not directly measured, but when asked how they felt about a greater use of the Navy Schools Command facilities for Reserve Drills, 84 percent approved, 13 percent were neutral and only 2 percent disapproved. This may reflect the hope that in the School Command you might find not only better instruction but better equipment.

When this analysis is extended to include a comparison of ACDUTRA, WETS, Drill Experience and Future Expectations, we find in Table 6.8 that enlisted reservists in REDCOMREG SEVEN are optimistic about the future. In every case except comradeship, the mean satisfaction score for future activities is higher than the current score involving their drilling unit. It is also apparent that satisfaction with ACDUTRA and WETS is higher than the current and expected level of satisfaction with the drilling unit. This finding is supported by Vroom (1964) who treats satisfaction as a future event which is to be expected or anticipated.

In spite of poor attitudes about the training and equipment of the Naval Reserve Centers, the reservists by and large are quite optimistic about their chances for advancement. Twenty-nine percent give themselves a 50/50 chance of advancing, 23 percent of the reservists think they have a 75 percent chance and 15 percent are so confident as to believe they have a 100 percent chance of advancing in rate.

To summarize we find that reservists are pleased with their units and the comradeship but are dissatisfied with the training and equipment. They feel too little time is spent working in their rate and reading professional material, and too much time writing reports and attending meetings. They place great value on ACDUTRA. The closer they get to active duty, the better they like it. The greater the satisfaction with various aspects of the Naval Reserve, the more likely the intention to reenlist. The most sensitive predictors are the attitude toward uniform requirements and their general reserve experience. Although they are not satisfied with training, their attitude regarding this highly important activity does not explain why they drop out of the program. We find that the more satisfied they are with their reserve experience and their civilian occupation, the more likely they will reenlist. These findings support the literature that satisfaction is one of the better predictors of retention.

TABLE 6.7

A COMPARISON OF THE LEVEL OF SATISFACTION WITH VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE
NAVAL RESERVE EXPERIENCE WHILE ON RESERVE DRILL, WETS, AND ACDUTRA

Aspect of Reserve Training	<u>The Percentage Satisfied With Training Experienced</u>		
	Reserve Drill	WETS	ACDUTRA
General Experience	48%	43%	58%
Talent Utilization	35%	37%	52%
Supv. and Instruction	49%	44%	56%
Training	26%	40%	52%
Equipment	19%	41%	55%
Lodging	NA	35%	44%
Comradeship	66%	53%	57%
Sense of Accomplishment	27%	41%	53%

Source: 1979 REDCOMREG SEVEN Retention Study

TABLE 6.8

COMPARISON OF SATISFACTION WITH VARIOUS ASPECTS OF NAVAL RESERVE:
 DRILLING UNIT, FUTURE EXPECTATIONS, ACDUTRA AND WETS

<u>SATISFACTION WITH NAVAL RESERVE</u>				
	Future Expectations Drilling Unit 1980+	Drilling Unit 1979	ACDUTRA 1979	WETS 1979
Comradeship	3.650	3.763	3.601	3.525
Supervision	3.351	3.346	3.544	3.307
General Experience	3.194	2.673	3.477	3.259
Training	2.961	2.734	3.401	3.222
Equipment	2.834	2.409	3.479	3.208
Lodging	NA	NA	3.101	2.990

Source: 1979 REIDCOMREC SEVEN Retention Study

*Mean: The higher the mean score, the higher the satisfaction scores on each item range from 1 to 5.

CHAPTER VII

LEADERSHIP

What a reservist thinks about the Naval Reserve may depend on the leadership style of the Commissioned Officers and Petty Officers in his unit. "A leader is a person who is able to unite people in pursuit of common goals," according to Herbert Simon (Simon, 1950, p. 103). Leadership Style is the characteristic way in which a leader goes about accomplishing this task. As discussed in Chapter 1, the assumptions one accepts about the nature of man will influence his ideas about the most effective type of leadership. Some leaders believe that people inherently dislike work and therefore they must be coerced, threatened and directed. Others are of the opinion that work is natural and that people seek greater responsibility. (McGregor 1960, p. 38, 37). These leaders believe that their major function is to create a situation where people can exercise their imagination and ingenuity. Since men exercise self-direction in the service of objectives to which they are committed, the proper leadership style is democratic instead of authoritarian. It is this kind of leadership stressed in the recent Navy retention film, "The People Principle."

It is quite possible that different personality types may respond to different leadership styles. Some people obviously need very close supervision and others work better when they are left to their own devices. It is our conjecture that given the democratic environment in which most Americans are reared, they will be more likely to respond to non-authoritarian leadership styles. This inclination to respond more readily to democratic leadership will probably increase as the technical speciality becomes more sophisticated. Although this is what is expected, the reverse may well be the case, since the Navy is admittedly a conservative institution, and the military by its nature is authoritarian. People who are satisfied in military societies may feel more comfortable never questioning authority and always complying with orders rather than responding to suggestions and initiating their own activities.

Table 7.1 shows that the reservist's evaluation of naval leadership is quite positive. In response to the statement, "The Commanding Officer always provides strong leadership to this unit," 36 percent said "always", 28 percent responded "often", and 23 percent said "occasionally". Looking over the next two statements in this table, we see that 29 percent felt that the Commanding Officer "always" took a personal interest in the individual's naval career and 44 percent thought that they had always been treated fairly by the Commissioned Officers in their units.

Table 7.2 shows the relationship between the perceived leadership strength of the Commanding Officer (CO) and the intention of reservists to reenlist. It was found that 46 percent of those who see their CO as always providing strong leadership definitely intend to reenlist. As the perception of leadership strength declines, the percentage of those who intend to reenlist declines from 46 percent to 34 percent to 26 percent to 27 percent to 17 percent. Where you have the perception of a strong leader, you are likely to have relatively high reenlistment rates.

TABLE 7.1

EVALUATION OF OFFICER LEADERSHIP STRENGTH WITH THE NAVAL RESERVE UNIT

Statement	Never	Seldom	Occasionally	Often	Always
The Commanding Officer provides strong leadership to this unit.	4%	9%	23%	28%	36%
The Commanding Officer takes a personal interest in my naval career.	7%	14%	27%	23%	29%
In dealing with the Commissioned Officers in my unit, I have been treated fairly.	2%	5%	17%	34%	44%

Source: 1979 REDCOMREG SEVEN Retention Study

TABLE 7.2

COMPARISON OF COMMANDING OFFICERS' PERCEIVED LEADERSHIP STRENGTH*
AND THE INTENTION TO REENLIST

Provides Strong Leadership	Intention to Reenlist					Total** %
	Definitely Will	Hope To	Don't Know	Unlikely	Definitely Will Not	
Always	46%	15%	27%	5%	7%	100%
Often	34%	21%	29%	9%	7%	100%
Occasionally	26%	17%	35%	7%	15%	100%
Seldom	27%	19%	31%	6%	16%	100%
Never	17%	12%	37%	12%	23%	100%

Source: 1979 REDCOMREG SEVEN Retention Study

*Note: Perceived leadership strength was measured by asking respondents whether they thought the Commanding Officer provided strong leadership to the unit. If they answered "always" it is considered very strong and if "never" it was considered not strong at all. "Seldom," "occasionally" and "often" are intermediate categories.

**Percentage figures that do not total 100 percent are due to rounding errors.

The percentage of reservists who thought that Petty Officers in their unit were forceful was considerable less than the percentage who believed the Commanding Officer provided strong leadership. Only 5 percent claimed that Petty Officers always were forceful. The most that reservist could say about the strength of their Petty Officers was that they were forceful occasionally. Although the Commanding Officer and Commissioned Officers generally go through more careful selection processes than Petty Officers and would naturally be expected to exercise stronger leadership, the fact that 38 percent of the reservist say their Petty Officers are "never" or "seldom" forceful suggest a possible weakness in the Chain of Command.

The forcefulness of a Petty Officer may be confused with an authoritarian leadership style and lack of forcefulness may be identified with a democratic leadership style. Since Chester Barnard in the 1930's discussed the reciprocal nature of authority relationships, most knowledgeable administrators have been aware that authority is grounded in consent and that disregard for the views of ones subordinates leads to ineffective leadership (Barnard, 1990). Nevertheless, democratic leadership can easily be confused with indecisiveness. Before we assume that Petty Officers are providing weak leadership, a more in-depth investigation into this matter is appropriate.

Some people have argued that Barnard's concept of authority is what has weakened the military establishments; but whether this is true or not, leadership principles based on the human relations approach have become orthodoxy. Table 7.3 shows that the democratic approach to leadership is dominant in the Naval Reserve. Only 3 percent of the reservists say their supervisor always rules with an iron hand and only 8 percent claim that this often happens. Rarely in the Naval Reserve do we find supervisors acting without consulting the members of the unit. The responses to question 2 under Authoritarian Leadership show that 5 percent say that their supervisor always acts without consulting them and only 16 percent say this often happens. By contrast, 50 percent claim that their supervisor is always approachable and 27 percent believe that he always cares what the reservists think. The democratic leadership style is far more popular than the traditional authoritarian manner of handling people in the Naval Reserve.

It has been shown repeatedly that a democratic leadership is often effective in improving performance, but does it contribute to an atmosphere that encourages retention? Table 7.4 shows that 50 percent of the reservists who are of the opinion that their supervisor always cares what they think, definitely intend to reenlist; and only 22 percent of those who believe their supervisor is unconcerned with what they think, plan to reenlist. Democratic leadership style does contribute to higher retention.

The relationship between authoritarian leadership and retention, however, is not well established. Looking at the item under Authoritarian Leadership Style in Table 7.4, we find that 25 percent of those who believe that their supervisor always rules with an iron hand, intend to reenlist; and 34 percent of the reservist who say their supervisor never rules with

TABLE 7.3

**ATTITUDES TOWARD NAVY SUPERVISORS:
AUTHORITARIAN OR DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP STYLES***

Statements	Never	Seldom	Occasionally	Often	Always
I. Authoritarian Leadership Characteristics					
1. My supervisor rules with an iron hand.	19%	36%	35%	8%	3%
2. My supervisor acts without consulting the members of the unit.	14%	37%	32%	13%	5%
3. My supervisor keeps to himself.	20%	39%	30%	10%	2%
4. My supervisor assigns members to particular task.	4%	8%	29%	43%	15%
Non-Authoritarian Consultative Type Leader					
1. My supervisor is approachable.	2%	5%	16%	27%	50%
2. My supervisor cares what people like me think.	6%	12%	27%	28%	27%
3. My supervisor does little things to make it pleasant to be a member of this group.	8%	17%	39%	29%	8%
4. My supervisor lets unit members know what is expected of them.	3%	7%	21%	35%	34%

Source: 1979 REDCOMREG SEVEN Retention Study

*Percentage figures that do not total 100 percent are due to rounding errors.

TABLE 7.4

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEADERSHIP STYLE AND THE INTENTION TO REENLIST*

Statement	Intention to Reenlist				
	Definitely Will	Hope To	Don't Know	Unlikely	Definitely Will Not
<u>Democratic</u>					
My supervisor cares what people like me think.					
Always	50%	16%	22%	6%	7%
Often	35%	23%	27%	6%	9%
Occasionally	25%	15%	37%	9%	13%
Seldom	33%	16%	34%	5%	13%
Never	22%	11%	33%	11%	23%
<u>Authoritarian</u>					
My supervisor rules with an iron hand.					
Always	25%	10%	35%	13%	18%
Often	40%	15%	31%	2%	12%
Occasionally	36%	18%	30%	6%	9%
Seldom	34%	19%	29%	8%	11%
Never	34%	15%	30%	8%	11%

Source: 1979 REDCOMREG SEVEN Retention Study

*Percentage figures that do not total 100 percent are due to rounding errors.

an iron hand, intend to reenlist. In fact, 40 percent of those who see their supervisor ruling with an iron hand often plan to reenlist. It would seem that authoritarian leadership does not raise an obstacle to reenlistment, but neither does it encourage retention whereas democratic leadership does have the tendency to promote retention.

Table 7.5 shows that reservists prefer a positive approach to supervision. They also place emphasis on clearly established goals and objectives. Close supervision as long as it is positive is thought to be highly desirable. Fifty-two percent of the reservists would make a great effort to check with their subordinates daily to see if they need help but only 22 percent would make a great effort to push their people to meet schedules. The proper approach, they feel, is to encourage rather than force compliance.

People Orientation

Naval Reservist's attitudes about work generally, not just the activities associated with the Reserve, further reinforce the proposition that a humanistic people oriented approach is given great value. Table 7.6 shows that 61 percent think it is very important to have a sense of accomplishment, 60 percent expect fair treatment, and 54 percent want independence in work. It is also very important to be able to learn new things and work in a stimulating environment. The Naval Reservists say they want a challenge. If we combine the first two categories in Table 7.5, ninety-five percent say a sense of accomplishment is either very important or important to them in their work. A far greater percentage placed value on these kinds of incentives than on the more materialistic benefits such as pay, security, retirement.

From our earlier discussions, we discovered that the main reasons individuals join the Naval Reserve are for pay and for retirement; however, they certainly expect a good deal more from their related activities than these economic incentives. In Maslow's hierarchy of needs economic drives are primary, but once this need is satisfied, the level of expectations rise. If these high expectations about what they should get from their work are not satisfied then they very likely will fail to reenlist, thus the current crisis in retention.

Equity

A related problem is concerned with whether reservists think they are being treated fairly and whether work is sensibly organized. It is hypothesized that the greater the sense of inequity the less likely the intention to reenlist. In addition to the effects of perceived inequity on the individuals themselves, to run roughshod over people's feelings at what is fair contributes to a decrease in the cohesiveness of the unit which inevitably leads to general personnel problems. Because of the history of racial and sexual discrimination in this country, minority relations is an area of special significance where leadership is critically important if the unit is to work effectively.

TABLE 7.5

DESIRABLE QUALITIES IN A NAVY SUPERVISOR

If I were supervisor I would try to:	Make a Great Effort To Do This
Check with subordinates daily to see if they need help.	52%
Encourage my subordinates to set their own goals and objectives.	51%
Set goals and objectives for my subordinates and sell them on the merits of my plan.	41%
Set up controls to assure that my subordinates are getting the job done.	36%
Step in as soon as reports indicate that the job is slipping.	35%
Make sure work is planned.	33%
Allow subordinates to make important decisions.	31%
Closely supervise to get better work.	26%
Push my people to meet schedules if necessary.	22%

Source: 1979 REDCOMREC SEVEN Retention Study

TABLE 7.6

ATTITUDES ABOUT WORK GENERALLY*

Item	<u>Degree of Importance</u>		
	Very Important	Important	Neutral or Unimportant
1. Sense of worthwhile accomplishment	61%	34%	4%
2. Fair treatment from my supervisor	60%	36%	5%
3. Chance to exercise independent thought and action	54%	39%	7%
4. Opportunities to learn new things from my work	54%	40%	5%
5. Stimulating and challenging work	54%	40%	6%
6. Opportunities for personal growth in my job	51%	43%	6%
7. A sound retirement plan	48%	41%	10%
8. Great job security	46%	39%	15%
9. High respect from my co-workers	45%	45%	10%
10. Pleasant working climate	39%	50%	11%
11. Fringe benefits	39%	49%	12%
12. High salary	35%	50%	16%
13. Quick promotions and advancement	27%	51%	23%

Source: 1979 REDCOMREG SEVEN Retention Study

*Percentage figures that do not total 100 percent are due to rounding errors.

Looking at Table 7.7, it becomes clear that among most all reservists, there is a strong feeling that they are being treated fairly and equally. The one exception is among black Naval Reservists. Among most reservists, however, 57 percent agree that work is sensibly organized, 58 percent think favoritism is discouraged, and 65 percent believe that people work together to solve unit problems. Seventy-five percent of all reservists believe that people are quickly integrated into the unit, 64 percent think the chain of command is receptive to new ideas and 53 percent say that their unit is a closely knit group. Very few are fearful to express their opinions and the level of hostility among unit members is quite low. These positive feelings are present even though 85 percent of the reservists believe that their unit contains members with widely varying backgrounds. The facts from our earlier study of background characteristics do not support this perceived cultural diversification, but reservists believe they are participating in a group that is made up of many different kinds of people. They also accept the idea that these individuals have a right to be there. Eighty-two percent of the males, for example, reject the idea that women should not be in the Navy. There is a feeling of cohesiveness in that a majority of all groups believe that people work together to solve unit problems.

Attitudes of Women Reservists

When we turn our attention to the attitudes of women reservists, we find that the attitudes of most women are consistent with those of the entire group. Sixty-nine percent of the women reservists say that they are treated fairly, 76 percent think that people are quickly integrated into the unit, 69 percent think people work together to solve unit problems, and 62 percent believe the chain of command is receptive to new ideas. Fifty-two percent of the women reservists say that favoritism is discouraged and 55 percent believe that the unit is a closely knit group.

A comparison of the attitude of women with those of men in the Naval Reserve, reveals that there is very little difference. In fact, women believe they are treated more fairly than men do, although the difference is so small as most likely to be accounted for by chance. Fifty-two percent of the women think favoritism is discouraged and 59 percent of the men agree. Seventy-six percent of the women think people are quickly integrated into the unit and 75 percent of the men agree. The greatest disagreement is concerned with whether work is sensibly organized. Only 47 percent of the women think that it is, whereas 57 percent of the men believe that work is sensibly organized. It would be interesting to probe and find out why women believe an improvement in this area is needed but the survey design doesn't permit this luxury.

TABLE 7.7

COMPARISON OF ATTITUDES CONCERNING EQUITY IN THE NAVAL RESERVE AMONG
BLACKS, WOMEN AND OTHERS IN THE NAVAL RESERVE

	<u>Percentage Who Agree That The Statement Is True or Mostly True</u>				
	Blacks	Whites	Women	Men	All Reservist
Blacks are treated fairly	40%	83%	71%	77%	76%
Women are treated fairly	55%	68%	69%	66%	61%
Favoritism is discouraged	36%	62%	52%	59%	58%
People are quickly integrated into this unit	64%	77%	76%	75%	75%
People work together to solve unit problems	63%	78%	69%	76%	65%
The Chain of Command is receptive to new ideas	49%	67%	62%	65%	64%
Work is sensibly organized	49%	57%	47%	57%	57%
This unit is a closely knit group	40%	56%	55%	53%	53%
*Some members are hostile to other members of this unit	25%	14%	19%	16%	16%
*Members fear to express their true opinions	28%	14%	15%	16%	16%

Source: 1979 REDCOMREG SEVEN Retention Study

Note: Items with a star (*) indicate that agree responses represent a
negative opinion concerning the degree of equity in the unit.

Attitudes of Blacks in the Naval Reserve

When we turn our attention to the attitude of blacks in the Naval Reserve concerning fairness and equal opportunity, we find considerable differences between their opinions and those of their white shipmates. When asked whether they thought it was true that blacks are treated fairly in the Naval Reserve, 40 percent of the blacks agreed that they did; however, 83 percent of white reservists said they thought blacks were treated fairly. This represents a difference in percentage of 43 percentage points. Most whites think that blacks are being treated fairly, but most blacks are not persuaded that this is true. In every category in Table 2.7, blacks have much less confidence in the equity of the system than whites. Only 36 percent of the blacks compared to 62 percent of the whites believe that favoritism is discouraged; only 40 percent of the blacks compared to 57 percent of the whites think their unit is a closely knit group; and only 49 percent of the blacks compared to 67 percent of the whites are of the opinion that the Chain of Command is responsive to new ideas. As has been found in so many other studies in ethnic politics, the perceptions of blacks and whites vary widely regarding the equity of the social system in which they both participate. Although improvements may have been made in reducing discrimination against blacks in the Navy, there is still a considerable gap between the perceptions of blacks and whites in the degree of equity present in the system.

Although blacks are definitely more skeptical than white reservists concerning the equity of the system, Table 2.8 shows that there is a large contingent of blacks who are undecided about these matters. Looking under the "Undecided" column, we see that the percentage figures range from 23 to 41 percent who have not made up their mind. The majority of blacks on most of these questions feel that they are being treated fairly. It is only by comparison with whites that their level of discontent is evident. Only 21 percent of the black reservists believe that blacks in their units are treated unfairly, 19 percent say that there is no equal opportunity in job assignments and 24 percent believe that there is favoritism. It is true that 47 percent of the blacks say that they fear to express their opinion and a similar number believe that some of the unit are hostile to other members, but the overall pattern indicates that blacks in the Naval Reserve feel they are treated fairly. Still there is a vast difference between the perceptions of blacks and whites regarding these matters. This raises questions as to how feelings of inequity relate to retention.

Inequity vs. Recruitment

Table 2.9 shows that feelings of inequity are related to the intention to reenlist. Fifty-six percent of those who believe there is equal job opportunity will definitely reenlist, whereas, only 19 percent of those who believe there is inequality plan to stay in the Reserve. Those who think favoritism is discouraged are more likely to stay than those who disagree, and those who feel that they are part of a closely knit group are more likely to reenlist than those who don't. The greater the perceived equity the higher the percentage of those who intend to reenlist.

TABLE 7.8

ATTITUDES OF BLACK RESERVISTS TOWARD THE NAVAL RESERVE

Statement	Percentage*				
	Definitely False	False	Undecided	True	Definitely True
Blacks are treated fairly	9%	12%	39%	35%	5%
Equal Opportunity in Job Assignments	7%	12%	30%	42%	9%
Favoritism Discouraged	7%	17%	41%	28%	8%
People quickly integrated into unit activities	3%	9%	23%	49%	16%
Some members are hostile to other members of the unit	11%	37%	27%	18%	7%
Members fear to express their opinions	13%	34%	26%	23%	4%
This unit is a closely knit group	5%	20%	35%	31%	9%

Source: 1979 REDCOMREG SEVEN Retention Study

*Note: The total number of blacks surveyed was 288.

TABLE 7.9

RELATION BETWEEN CONCEPTS OF EQUITY AND INTENTION TO REENLIST

Statements*		Intend to Reenlist					Number
		Definitely Will	May	Don't Know	Unlikely	Definitely Will Not	
Equal Opportunity In Job Assignment	Def. T.	56%	17%	18%	3%	6%	27 (481)
	True	42%	18%	26%	6%	8%	46 (845)
	DK	22%	14%	42%	9%	13%	16 (289)
	False	21%	18%	38%	6%	17%	8 (138)
	Def. F.	19%	9%	38%	14%	20%	4 (64)
Favoritism Discouraged	Def. T.	58%	17%	15%	4%	6%	16 (287)
	True	48%	20%	23%	4%	5%	42 (755)
	DK	24%	15%	40%	10%	12%	29 (520)
	False	32%	15%	31%	6%	16%	10 (177)
	Def. F.	25%	12%	30%	9%	24%	4 (76)
Unit is a closely knit group	Def. T.	58%	16%	15%	4%	7%	10 (186)
	True	48%	19%	23%	4%	6%	43 (770)
	DK	27%	15%	36%	10%	10%	27 (487)
	False	31%	15%	34%	5%	15%	17 (300)
	Def. F.	27%	12%	28%	12%	21%	4 (67)

Source: 1979 REDCOMREG SEVEN Retention Study

*Note: Def. T. = Definitely True, DK = Don't Know, Def. F. = Definitely False

The relationship between the perceived inequity of the system by blacks, and their intention to reenlist is very weak. Table 7.10 shows that 23 percent of those blacks who reject the statement that, "Blacks are treated fairly," say they definitely intend to reenlist whereas 21 percent of those who feel that the statement is true definitely reenlist. The difference between 23 percent and 21 percent is only 2 percentage points. The attitude of blacks concerning the equity of their treatment does not predict whether they intend to reenlist. The explanation for this may be because they are treated as fairly or more fairly in the Naval Reserve than in other outside types of activities. It could also be accounted for because there are other overriding considerations such as pay which make it worth the effort although they feel they are not being treated as equitable as do whites. Our earlier analysis on background characteristics showed that far more whites than blacks intend to reenlist. The explanation for this, however, must lie elsewhere than in the perceived fairness of the Naval Reserve.

Although improving the perception of blacks concerning the fairness of the Naval Reserve may not increase retention rates, it is important to reduce these feelings for a number of other reasons. In the first place, the Navy is committed to policy of equal opportunity. Second, feelings of being treated unfairly probably affect performance and the operational readiness of the Reserves. Most important, however, is the need to develop a system where merit is the overriding criteria rather than one's position in the society. No system where there is a minority of people who feel mistreated will function as well as one where all the people feel that they are getting their fair share and advancement is open to all who are willing to make the effort.

Summary

In summary, we find that Naval reservists think that their Commanding Officers provide strong leadership to their unit, although they are not as impressed with the leadership of their Petty Officers. Democratic leadership styles are widespread and preferred over authoritarian leadership styles. Most reservists believe they are treated fairly and that favoritism is discouraged. Women have been integrated into the units very well but blacks still feel that they are not treated as fairly as whites. The general attitude toward work is to place great value on intrinsic benefits and less emphasis on extrinsic rewards. The generalization that a consultative leadership style encourages retention is confirmed.

TABLE 7.10

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EQUITY AND RETENTION AMONG BLACK NAVAL RESERVISTS

		<u>Intention to Reenlist</u>					Number
		Definitely Will	Hope To	Don't Know	Unlikely	Definitely Will Not	
Blacks are Treated Fairly	Definitely False	23%	9%	41%	9%	18%	8 (22)
	False	12%	12%	64%	6%	6%	12 (33)
	Undecided	20%	20%	47%	6%	6%	39 (103)
	True	19%	16%	51%	7%	6%	35 (94)
	Definitely True	21%	29%	36%	14%	0	5 (14)

Source: 1979 REDCOMREG SEVEN Retention Study

CHAPTER VIII

CIVIC RESPONSIBILITY

The analysis so far has focused on socioeconomic background characteristics and satisfaction with various aspects of the Naval Reserve and leadership. We have shown that economic motivations and attitudes toward work are important explanations of the intention to reenlist, and that leadership styles can influence behavior in desirable ways, but could it not also be possible that reservists feel an obligation to serve their country and a sense of citizen duty which is associated with their continued participation with the Naval Reserve? This section is an investigation into the role of civic responsibility or what might be called patriotism.

Reservists in this Readiness Command, according to Table 8.1, have a high sense of civic responsibility. Seventy-six percent feel that ordinary citizens ought to engage in some form of public service, 71 percent agree that a good citizen has a duty to help out in the community and 65 percent say that they would have felt like they had neglected their duty if they had not joined the military. In our earlier discussion concerning the primary reason for initial affiliation with the Naval Reserve, 11 percent of the reservists gave patriotism as their primary reason for joining the Navy. Although this ran behind drill pay, retirement and mandatory obligation; it still ranked fourth out of a possible list of 18 reasons that might have been given for joining the Navy.

Citizen Duty

Not only do these respondents feel a high sense of citizen duty to serve their country, they also believe that once they have committed themselves to a job they have an obligation to do their best. Ninety-three percent of those questioned said that it is the duty of a person to do his job the very best he can, and the same percentage indicated that they felt very badly when they failed to finish a job they had promised to do. Critics may charge that these are "leading questions" and certainly more work on testing the validity of these items is necessary; however, the initial results are interesting given the fact that the preponderance of behavioral literature runs contrary to these findings.

Looking at the relationship between a sense of civic responsibility and the intention to reenlist, we find in Table 8.2 that 56 percent of those who "strongly agree" that one has an obligation to do public service, intend to reenlist; whereas, only 23 percent of those who "strongly disagree", plan to reenlist. The same relationship exists when you consider the reservists' attitudes toward citizen duty. Fifty-five percent of those who "strongly agree" that individuals have a duty to help in the community, definitely intend to reenlist; whereas, only 33 percent of those who "strongly disagree" with this statement plan to reenlist. Among those who grew up with the idea that they had military responsibilities as well as general community obligations, we find that 58 percent definitely plan to reenlist and among those who "strongly disagree" with this norm 24 percent plan to stay in the Reserves. The pattern of responses indicate that Naval Reservists have an extremely high sense of civic responsibility and serving in the Naval Reserve is one way to fulfill these obligations.

TABLE 8.1

SENSE OF CIVIC RESPONSIBILITY

General Statements Civic Responsibility	Percentage*		
	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree
1. Ordinary citizens ought to feel obligated to engage in some form of public service (not necessarily military) while they are young.	76%	11%	13%
2. A good citizen has a duty to help out in the community.	71%	12%	18%
3. I would have felt like I neglected my duty if I had not joined the military.	65%	19%	28%

Source: 1979 REDCOM REG SEVEN Retention Study

*Percentage figures which do not total 100 percent are due to rounding errors.

TABLE 8.2

**RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SENSE OF CIVIC RESPONSIBILITY
AND THE INTENTION TO REENLIST***

Statement**		<u>Intention to Reenlist</u>					Number
		Definitely Will	Hope To	Don't Know	Unlikely	Definitely Will Not	
Obligation to do public service	SA	56%	15%	20%	5%	5%	31% (569)
	A	36%	20%	31%	5%	9%	45% (812)
	DK	25%	14%	34%	13%	13%	11% (202)
	D	31%	17%	33%	7%	13%	11% (192)
	SD	23%	7%	30%	7%	34%	3% (44)
Duty to help in the community	SA	55%	16%	19%	4%	6%	23% (417)
	A	40%	19%	29%	5%	8%	48% (870)
	DK	19%	15%	39%	13%	14%	12% (214)
	D	34%	15%	31%	7%	13%	14% (261)
	SD	33%	9%	24%	13%	22%	3% (55)
Neglect ones duty if hadn't joined the military	SA	58%	16%	16%	5%	4%	25% (445)
	A	45%	19%	26%	3%	7%	35% (640)
	DK	27%	17%	36%	11%	9%	13% (239)
	D	23%	17%	38%	9%	13%	22% (349)
	SD	24%	7%	31%	8%	29%	5% (96)

Source: 1979 REDCOM REG SEVEN Retention Study

*Percentage figures which do not total 100 percent are due to rounding errors.

**Note: These concepts were measured by asking respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statements: Ordinary citizens ought to feel obligated to engage in some form of full-time public service (not necessarily military service) while they are young, a good citizen has a duty to help out in the community like doing church work or belonging to a civic club, and I would have felt like I neglected my duty if I had not joined the military. Strongly Agree = SA, Agree = A, Don't Know = DK, Disagree = D, Strongly Disagree = SD.

Although they inevitably give economic reasons for joining the Naval Reserve; and these motivations are no doubt legitimate, they also have a moral obligation to do their duty by participating in the civic affairs of their community."

Attitudes Toward War

This raises questions about the attitude of reservist toward war. If they are individuals who not only are motivated by basic economic needs but by a sense of morality, what do they think about participating in an organization that is for the purpose of fighting wars? The activities of many Americans during the Vietnam War, for example, were a result of their view that the war was immoral. Hundreds of young men sought refuge in Canada and Europe to escape the draft because they claimed the war was unjust. These feelings have subsided, but the relationship between the level of moral awareness and military responsibilities remains intriguing.

This relationship may be clarified partially by determining whether reservists believe war is likely in the near future. If there is little likelihood of war, the moral questions can be pushed into the background. When asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement that conventional war between the United States and another nation is a real possibility, Table 8.3 shows that 82 percent agreed, 10 percent didn't know, and 8 percent disagreed. The possibility of war is very real to Naval Reservists; however, in response to an earlier question about the possibility of the Naval Reserves being recalled to active duty we found that 55 percent of the reservists thought the chances of a recall was about 20 percent or less. Although they believe war is likely, they think the chances of their being asked to fight are fairly remote.

When reservists were asked about the possibility of an all out war, their responses were not so straightforward. Most simply said they didn't know. However, Table 8.3 shows that 35 percent agreed, 42 percent didn't know and 23 percent disagreed that all out war was likely within 15 years. Although the chances of conventional war perceived as much greater than all out war, it is not beyond the realm of possibility for over one-third of the reservists questioned. Reservists view the possibility of a limited nuclear war between the U. S. and Communist forces within the next 15 years as having about the same chance of occurring as all out war. Apparently reservists are somewhat less able to make the kinds of refined distinctions along the "escalation ladder" that are made by such high-level strategist as Herman Kahn (Kahn, 1967).

TABLE 8.3

ATTITUDES OF NAVAL RESERVIST TOWARD WAR*

Statement**	Percentage		
	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree
1. Conventional war between U. S. and another nation is always a real possibility.	82%	10%	8%
2. All out war is likely within 15 years.	35%	42%	23%
3. Limited nuclear war between the U. S. and Communist forces is likely within 15 years.	31%	43%	26%
4. All wars are immoral.	31%	21%	47%
5. World War II was a just war.	48%	19%	33%
6. The Vietnam War was a just war.	21%	22%	57%
7. It sometimes bothers me that I am a member of an organization, the Naval Reserve, that is organized for the purpose of fighting wars.	17%	10%	73%

Source: 1979 REDCOM REG SEVEN Retention Study

*Percentage figures which do not total 100 percent are due to rounding errors.

**Note: These concepts were measured by asking the respondent whether he agreed or disagreed with the following statements: Conventional war between the U. S. and another nation is always a real possibility, all out war is likely within 15 years, and limited nuclear war between the U. S. and Communist forces is likely within 15 years.

When you examine the attitude of reservists toward the morality of war or the concept of a "just war," we find that almost one-third of the reservists think that all wars are immoral. Forty-eight percent accept the idea that World War II was a just war, but only 21 percent agree that the Vietnam War was just. The affect of these attitudes toward the Vietnam War is moderated when you realize that it has been almost 10 years since that unpopular war was concluded. Most young people in the Navy were in grade school during the 1960's and for them the war is something they read about in the history books. It is no doubt true, however, that when 57 percent of the reservists feel that the purpose for which they might have been called on to fight was immoral, retention is made more difficult. These questions concerned the past. A more relevant item involves the present. When asked if it sometimes bothered them to be a member of an organization, the Naval Reserve, that is organized for the purpose of fighting wars, 73 percent responded that it did not bother them. Naval Reservists, like other Americans, are aware of the ethical implications of their activities, but they do not feel that their participation in the Naval Reserve creates any moral problems for them.

Even if reservists do not function at the level of grand strategy, they are involved in politics and other forms of civic life. The question is, whether community involvement detracts from their Naval Reserve participation or reenforces it? The old adage that if you want something done, give the job to a busy person may well apply to Naval Reservists who are active in their community.

Political Activity

Naval Reservists naturally spend most of their time in civilian pursuits, which include various community activities. Such community service often involves politics. It should, therefore, be no surprise that Naval Reservists are very politically active. They say they are interested in politics, they vote and some campaign.

Table 8.4 reveals that Naval Reservists are far more involved in politics than most Americans. Seventy-eight percent of the respondents were registered to vote, 71 percent expressed some interest in politics, and 69 percent claimed to have voted in the last general election. It is only with such activities as campaigning that the percentage figure drops to 26 percent but even this is far in excess of national average. This level of involvement is probably explained because of the relatively high socioeconomic level of most Naval Reservists.

Not only are Naval Reservists highly involved in politics, but those who are most involved are most likely to intend to reenlist. Table 8.4 shows that as one's involvement in politics increases, the decision to reenlist is more likely. Forty-five percent of those who are registered to vote compared to 22 percent who aren't, say they definitely will reenlist; 42 percent of those interested in politics compared to 32 percent who are not say they definitely will reenlist; 47 percent of those who voted in the last general election compared to 25 percent who did not

TABLE 8.4

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT AND INTENTION TO REENLIST

Political Involvement*		Intention to Reenlist					Number
		Definitely Will	Hope To	Don't Know	Unlikely	Definitely Will Not	
1. Registered to Vote	Yes	45%	18%	25%	5%	6%	78% (1,415)
	No	22%	14%	35%	9%	21%	20% (365)
2. Interested in Politics	Yes	42%	17%	26%	6%	8%	71% (1,291)
	No	32%	19%	32%	7%	11%	14% (260)
3. Voted In last General Election	Yes	47%	19%	24%	5%	6%	69% (1,242)
	No	25%	14%	36%	10%	16%	30% (545)
4. Talk Politics	Yes	45%	17%	25%	6%	7%	64% (1,159)
	No	32%	18%	31%	7%	13%	28% (504)
5. Campaigned	Yes	53%	14%	22%	4%	7%	26% (473)
	No	36%	18%	29%	7%	10%	69% (1,243)

Source: 1979 REDCOMREG SEVEN Retention Study

Note*: The Uncertain category was not listed since it represented a very small number of respondents, only 3% were uncertain whether they campaigned, 9% were uncertain whether they voted, 2% were uncertain whether they were registered, and 8% were uncertain whether they talked politics.

say they definitely will reenlist; 45 percent of those who talk politics compared to 32 percent who do not, say they definitely will reenlist; and 53 percent of those who campaigned compared to 36 percent who did not, say they definitely will reenlist. At every level of political participation, reservists who are involved in politics are more likely to reenlist than those who are not involved in the political process.

If political involvement offers a possible explanation for retention, political party identification does not. Forty-two percent of the Democrats, 44 percent of the Independents and 46 percent of the Republicans say they would definitely reenlist. Well over half of the respondents (1,211) are either uncertain or believe that both parties are about the same when it comes to national defense spending.

Although partisanship seems unimportant, ideological orientation is significant. The more conservative one sees himself the more likely he will reenlist. About 40 percent of the reservists were conservative, 30 percent were liberal and 17 percent said they didn't think in ideological terms. However, most Naval Reservists are either conservative or moderate. Of those who claim to be conservative, 50 percent will definitely reenlist, whereas only 25 percent of the liberals say they will reenlist. The moderates fall closer to the conservative end of the scale with 43 percent saying that they will reenlist. Political involvement is positively associated with one's Naval Reserve participation but partisan feelings seem to be relatively unimportant in explaining retention.

Summary

In summary we find that reservists have a high sense of civic responsibility and feel a duty to serve their country. They agree that conventional war is likely but are not convinced that all out nuclear war is inevitable. Even if there is a war, they think their chances of being recalled to active duty are remote. They believe war is immoral but they experienced no apparent problems with the possibility of being recalled in the event of national emergency. The members of the Naval Reserve are involved in politics. They are interested in politics, talk politics, vote and campaign at higher levels than most Americans. Although party identification does not predict intention to reenlist, ideological orientation is significant. The more conservative one sees himself, the more likely he will reenlist. Generally, we find that a high sense of civic responsibility and political involvement is positively associated with retention.

CONCLUSIONS
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this research is to explain a reservist's decision to continue participating in the Naval Reserve. We found that most reservists have every intention of continuing their affiliation with the Naval Reserve. Most of those questioned never or rarely think of getting out. Over half of the reservists, for example, give themselves a 90 percent chance or better of remaining in a drilling unit for another year and an 80% chance of remaining in the Reserve for twenty years. They are career motivated. Certainly we have moved a long way from the days when Commander Roe was afraid that if his ships' boats were unattended by officers, the crew would leap and run.

Social and Economic Profile

The social and economic profile of the Naval Reservist shows that in civilian life he is relatively successful, likes his work, and thinks of himself as either a working or middle class American. Most are white, Protestant, married males with approximately two dependents. These reservists have a high sense of civic responsibility, feel obligated to participate in community activities, and think that all Americans have a duty to serve their country. However far the regular active duty sailor may be from the mainstream of American life, the Naval Reservist is squarely in the middle.

Role

The Naval Reservist was not alienated by his active duty military experience, but remembers those days in an extremely positive way. He continues to feel a strong sense of identity with the Navy. As one might suspect, these feelings become more intense as age, longevity, and rank/rate are increased. From what we found, reservists experience very little role conflict between their civilian life style and their military norms. Unlike the problems of the 1960's with counter-culture pressures and anti-military attitudes, these reservists are very comfortable in the Navy. An explanation for this is probably a combination of social changes and more flexible Naval personnel policies which reduce the force of the cross-pressures on the reservists. These findings support the preliminary indepth interviews of reservists given before the survey. The socialization process which transforms civilians into military roles has been successful.

Impact of Family

Capt. James E. Williams' recognition of the importance of the family is extremely accurate. Reservists who have the support of their spouse are far more likely to reenlist than those who do not. This is especially important given the fact that the Naval Reserve is a married man's outfit. It was also established that the greater the number of dependents, the greater the likelihood of reenlistment. No doubt more attention should be given to the reservists' family than is currently being done. This would have a positive affect on the retention rate.

Economic Incentives

When asked why they joined the Naval Reserve, the responses most often given were economic benefits, although 11 percent indicated their primary reasons were patriotic. Very few gave professional advancement and even fewer gave social reasons. It is disappointing to learn that only 2 percent of the respondents said they joined the Naval Reserve because of the training they might expect. The explanations for joining the Reserves given by reservists in REDCOM REG SEVEN correlate almost perfectly with those given several years ago in REDCOMSFRAN and LOSA. It would seem that despite vast reorganization and increased operational readiness, individuals join the Reserves now pretty much for the same reasons they used to join - pay and retirement benefits. Though they joined the Reserve for pay and retirement, they expect a great deal more from their drill experience.

Self-Actualization and Satisfaction

Naval Reservists are operating at Maslow's higher levels of his hierarchy of needs which include self-esteem and self-actualization. They say they want the opportunity to have a sense of accomplishment, to exercise independent thought and action, and to work in a stimulating and challenging environment. They are dissatisfied with how the drill compliments their civilian occupation, how their abilities are utilized and the amount of responsibility they have been given. They feel that more time should be devoted to rate training and professional reading, and less time spent on going to meetings and writing reports. Like the sailors in the surface fleet discussed by LTJG Dengler, Naval Reservists are impatient with a system that tolerates poorly equipped Naval Reserve Centers. They find the classroom boring and prefer hands-on-type training experiences. These findings clearly reenforce the critical need for the SBS Trainer. It is important to recognize that, as Vroom (1964) hypothesized, satisfaction, although not necessarily a good predictor of performance, is an explanation for retention. The higher the level of satisfaction with various aspects of the Naval Reserve experience, the higher the intention to reenlist.

Leadership and Equity

Reservists generally feel that the leadership and supervision they receive in their units are good. Their Commanding Officer, they say, provides strong leadership. It is also true that democratic instead of authoritarian leadership styles are widespread and preferred. Most Naval Reservists have an expectation of fair and equitable treatment by their officers. They feel favoritism is discouraged and there is equal opportunity in job assignments. Women have been well integrated into most units and their attitudes are in most respects similar to men. Blacks, however, do not feel that they are treated as fairly as do whites. Even so, most blacks believe that they are part of a closely knit group that treats them equitably. The leadership of the Naval Reserve from these survey results appears to be effective in integrating both women and blacks into their units. The generalization that a consultative leadership style encourages retention is confirmed.

Moral Obligation

The Naval Reservist, as we have said, is very much a part of the mainstream of American life. They feel a high sense of citizen duty, and a strong need to do their job the very best they can. In fact, 60 percent of the reservists said they would have felt like they neglected their duty if they had not joined the military. This loyalty is combined with an awareness of the moral implications of war. According to Kohlberg's levels of moral development, Naval Reservists would probably be on level four which means they are concerned with carrying out their duty, have respect for authority and are concerned with stability and order. Although many reservists think there is some question about the morality of all wars and especially the Vietnam War, most do not think that their participation in the Naval Reserve raises any moral problems.

We find that Naval Reservists are highly involved with politics. They talk politics, vote, and campaign at levels much higher than the average American. Although partisanship does not predict retention, ideological orientation does. The more conservative, the greater the likelihood one intends to reenlist. One of the most important findings is that the greater the involvement in community affairs, the more likely the intention to reenlist.

Based on these findings, a major thrust of a retention program should probably be directed at the principal clientele group which are middle-class Americans. These are the people who compose most of the Naval Reserve and who are likely to make or break the group's effectiveness. However, individuals who fall outside of these categories should also be encouraged to remain a part of the program. The Navy has a unique opportunity to strengthen its manpower pool by demonstrating that it offers an equal opportunity for everyone to professionally advance. A likely candidate for dropping out of the Naval Reserves in REDCOMREG SEVEN is someone in their mid-twenties at about the end of four years of service. They are likely to have a low income and be relatively uninvolved in the community. As young adults move into more responsible positions in society, the Naval Reserve is more likely to become an important part of their life. If one is developing a strategy to improve retention, it is critically important to focus attention on reservists in their early twenties so that when the natural social and economic pressures promoting retention begin to take effect, the most talented personnel will still be around. By the time a reservist is in his thirties, he probably intends to stay with the program.

Recommendations for Change

It is apparent from this initial descriptive analysis of the reservist population of REDCOM SEVEN that retention is a selective problem. Therefore, recommendations for change should be targeted for that sector of the population which suffers most severely from the affliction. This sector is composed of enlisted personnel who are between twenty and thirty years of age, who are either unmarried or have few dependents, who are financially constrained, and who are junior in rank with less than five years of service.

In addition to concentrating on the locus of the problem, specific qualitative issues within this location must be addressed. The issues thus far identified include family involvement, training, administrative support, misuse of skills, civic involvement, leadership, civilian job conflict, and boredom.

The following policy recommendations in relative order of importance are suggested. It should be noted that these recommendations are neither revolutionary nor are they particularly new. Indeed, many have been implemented in a variety of contexts. However, these recommendations take on new importance when viewed from the perspective of the foregoing descriptive analysis. If they are implemented systematically rather than piecemeal (as has been done previously) with a clear understanding of their combined potential for increased retention, then the problem of retention may be significantly reduced.

Specific Proposals

1. Sensitize active duty personnel to the absolute requirement that administrative support willingly provided for drilling reservists is the summa bonum of their professional life. This is especially critical during the first three to six months of an enlistee's affiliation. It is during this time that administrative indifference wreaks the most havoc; this is the time when the recruiters' promises are put to the initial test and when expectations and reality are compared in terms of satisfaction. Command attention, sensitivity training, and indoctrination divisions are strongly recommended. It goes without saying that receipt of the paycheck is the single most important item which must be accomplished. This study has repeatedly affirmed that financial consideration is the prime mover of participation.

2. Involve the family (especially the wife) in Reserve participation. Center and unit Commanding Officers should initiate contact with the wife and family through personalized correspondence and family-oriented social events such as cook-outs and short tours of nearby Naval and civilian points of interest.

3. Conduct a skills inventory of each unit and center, concentrating on interest and abilities other than those related to the reservists' rate. Then, use those skills to the benefit of the community and the Naval Reserve.
4. Increase reservists' participation in civic projects at the local level. Do this as a unit on drill week-ends, other than WET's. This accomplishes two purposes: (1) It reduces the well-documented dissatisfaction with boring classroom lectures, and (2) It meets the demonstrated need of reservists to increase civic involvement.
5. Increase WET opportunities to provide realistic hands-on training. Reprogram money accordingly.
6. Increase efforts to upgrade equipment available in the Reserve Centers. The SBS program should be accelerated and emphasized in any cost trade-off analysis.
7. Screen prospective unit Commanding Officers for unacceptably high levels of authoritarian leadership tendencies. Validated tests are available for this and are being used in industry.
8. Recognize outstanding performance by letters of commendation and such programs as "sailor of the quarter." Make awards at morning quarters.
9. Periodically contact civilian employers and, most especially, immediate supervisors and tell them that the Naval Reserve appreciates their support. Emphasize that the reservist is doing a good job and infer that this is the result of good leadership and supervision on the part of the employer.
10. Periodically invite employers and supervisors to organized social activities.
11. Provide opportunities for segmental drilling when job conflict is apparent.
12. Increase the efforts to overcome the feelings among minority groups that they are being treated unfairly. This should be done by recognizing their contribution to achieving organizational objectives rather than through paternalism.
13. Do not underestimate the effectiveness of appeals to patriotism and civic duty. Pay is a necessary cause of initial affiliation but is not always sufficient to retain the better reservists.
14. Undertake a hard look at the training program with a view to developing innovative alternatives to what many reservists see as a dull and dreary exercise. For example, it might be possible to reschedule drills to take advantage of college or technical courses offered in the community or bring in trained teachers to offer a series of courses relevant to the units' needs.

Retention is a multi-faceted problem. It must be attacked by all levels of command, but the needs of the drilling reservist must comprise the battleground. The foregoing recommendations partially blueprint a strategy of change, but more refined analysis is necessary to more specifically isolate those factors which will require attention by all who are concerned friends of the Naval Reserve.

Future Research

The literature suggests numerous alternative explorations in the analysis of retention. This preliminary report provides an overview of what has been learned, but more narrowly focused indepth analyses of various aspects of this behavior are required. Although the data collected in Readiness Command Region SEVEN provides grist for this mill, a national study would be more comprehensive and provide greater confidence in its results.

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APPENDICES



NAVAL RESERVE READINESS COMMAND REGION SEVEN

NAVAL BASE

CHARLESTON S. C. 29408

11 JUN 1979

PERSONAL

To: Commanding Officers/Officers in Charge

Subj: Retention Study

1. During the Commanding Officers' Conference you attended recently, you were briefed on a retention research project that would be conducted this summer within Readiness Command Region SEVEN. The purpose of this study is to help us better understand some of the strengths and weaknesses in the Naval Reserve and to determine what kinds of changes we ought to consider in order to improve the quality of the Naval Reserve.
2. The information collected is confidential and will be analyzed statistically to explain the unacceptably high levels of attrition in the Naval Reserve. The data will not be used for inspection purposes nor will the findings be reflected in your fitness report. It is an effort to develop generalizations about the levels of satisfaction with various aspects of the Naval Reserve and how these attitudes are related to the intention to reenlist. A profile of those reservists lost prior to their EOS or who fail to reenlist will be constructed so that we can determine if there is a pattern of attitudes, beliefs and opinions associated with attrition. As soon as an analysis of the data is complete, you will be forwarded copies of the reports.
3. You will be receiving instructions shortly about the administration of the questionnaire. It should require about two hours. Your cooperation in modifying your schedule so that this survey can be completed expeditiously is appreciated.

(Signature)

Wm. J. GILMORE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Commander



NAVAL RESERVE READINESS COMMAND REGION SEVEN

NAVAL BASE

CHARLESTON, S. C. 29406

11 June 1979

From: Commander, Naval Reserve Readiness Command Region SEVEN
To: Commanding Officers, Naval Reserve Centers
Commanding Officers, VTU's

Subj: Readiness Command Region SEVEN Retention Study, 1979

1. As all of you know from your briefing at the Reserve Center Commanding Officers' Conference in Charleston last spring, Readiness Command Region SEVEN is conducting a study into the problems of retention. Your cooperation and assistance in the research effort are appreciated.
2. You will, in the next few days, receive a package of survey materials. The Commanding Officer of the Reserve Center is responsible for administering the questionnaire with the assistance of the Commanding Officer of the VTU, to all officer and enlisted reserve personnel in the Reserve Center. It is mandatory that each person in the Readiness Command have an opportunity to answer the questions on the survey. If this information is to be useful, however, uniform procedures and instructions must be carefully followed. It is particularly important that the confidentiality of the participants be protected. Your attention is directed to the detailed instructions in NAVRESREDCOMREGSEVENNOTE 1040 of 12 June 1979 and to the General and Verbatim Instructions for administration of the questionnaire.
3. As soon as the analysis of the data is complete, you will be forwarded reports based on this information. Retention is extremely important. From this research, it may be possible to develop policies and programs that will make the Naval Reserve a more attractive career, and strengthen our national defense effort. I urge you to give this survey your personal attention.

Wm. J. GILMORE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Commander

APPENDIX B.1



NAVAL RESERVE READINESS COMMAND REGION SEVEN

NAVAL BASE

CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA 29408

IN REPLY REFER TO:

Code 52:MLB

June 12, 1979

MEMORANDUM FROM THE RETENTION OFFICER

To: Distribution List

Subj: Retention Study

Ref: (1) NAVRESREDCOM REG SEVEN NOTICE 1040 of 12 June 1979
(2) RADM Gilmore's ltr dtd 11 June 1979

Encl: (1) General and Verbatim Instructions for administration of survey

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) Readiness Command Region SEVEN will conduct a survey of the officers and enlisted personnel assigned to the Readiness Command. Enclosure (1) is a copy of the General and Verbatim Instructions for administration of the questionnaire. Additional copies will be forwarded with the questionnaire books in the next few days.
2. As you know the purpose of this project is to collect information which will be of help to all of us in understanding retention. I want to assure you that our findings will be made available to you, and that the information will be used constructively.
3. I recognize that it is always difficult to rearrange the drill schedule on short notice. Your cooperation in conducting this research is greatly appreciated.

M.L. Boykin
M.L. Boykin
CDR USN-R

Distribution:
NAVRESREDCOM REG SEVEN List 11



NAVAL RESERVE READINESS COMMAND REGION SEVEN

NAVAL BASE

CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA 29408

Canc: Nov 79

IN REPLY REFER TO:

NAVRESREDCOMREGSEVENNOTE 1040
Code 52

NAVRESREDCOM REG SEVEN NOTICE 1040

Subj: Naval Reserve Retention Study

1. Purpose. To assign responsibilities in connection with the administration of a personnel attitude survey being conducted within Readiness Command Region SEVEN Reserve population.

2. Discussion

a. The survey is to determine opinions of Reservists concerning various aspects of their participation in the Naval Reserve. The data collected will give an indication of the role the reserve plays in their life, their feelings about their reserve activities, and their attitudes concerning various social issues. The purpose of this research is to provide an explanation of the excessive number of controllable losses with a view to eliminating those practices which drive good people out of the Naval Reserve.

b. A questionnaire has been developed to be administered to all reserve officers and enlisted personnel assigned to Readiness Command Region SEVEN. Copies of the questionnaire, answer sheets, and instructions for administration of the survey will be mailed to the Naval Reserve Center Commanding Officers. The questionnaire should be given to each Reservist during period alpha on the drill following receipt of the survey material.

c. The Commanding Officer of the Naval Reserve Center will receive a package of questionnaires that are serially numbered. An inventory by unit is provided so that control of which units have responded and which have not can be maintained. There will be at least one questionnaire for each Reservist.

d. To reduce the likelihood of bias caused by having one's supervisor present, the questionnaire should be administered and proctored by someone not in the unit. It is suggested that the administration of the survey be done by officers attached to the VTU, in cooperation with the Retention Team, and under the direct supervision of the Commanding Officer of the Naval Reserve Center. Active duty support personnel may be used as proctors if needed. Although Reservists may take the questionnaire with people from other units, they should be divided into at least three groups by rank and rate: Officers E9-E6, E5 - E1), and "tested" in separate spaces. It is important that all Reservists take the questionnaire under similar

NAVRESREDCOMREGSEVENNOTE 1040

conditions. Therefore, the procedures and arrangements normally followed in giving Navy Advancement examinations should serve as a model.

e. To protect the confidentiality of each Reservist, the proctor must collect the answer sheets, and put them into a sealed envelope. This information must not be shown to anyone in the unit and should not be analyzed locally. The completed answer sheets should be forwarded to Readiness Command Region SEVEN (Code 52) within five days. The Reserve Centers Commanding Officer is responsible for maintaining a record of the Reservists in each unit who did not take the questionnaire and of making arrangements for these people to be surveyed at the first available opportunity.

3. Action

a. Commanding Officers of Naval Reserve Centers: Administer questionnaire to all Reservist supported by his center in accordance with instructions provided and return answer sheets to REDCOM REG SEVEN (Code 52).

b. Unit Commanding Officers: Coordinate with reserve center commanding officers on planning of a drill date and time for unit personnel to answer survey questionnaires. The target date is the June drill but no later than the July drill.

c. The survey coordinator is:

CDR Milton Lee BOYKIN, USNR-R

REDCOM REG SEVEN (Code 52)

Charleston, SC 29408

Phone: FTS - 794-6025/4712

Commercial - 803-743-6025/4712

Home - 803-577-0716

All answer sheets shall be returned to the Survey Coordinator ASAP. The questionnaires should be returned when convenient.

Distribution:

NAVRESREDCOM REG SEVEN DIST LIST

11, III

GENERAL AND VERBATIM INSTRUCTIONS
FOR THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE COMMAND-WIDE NAVAL RESERVE SURVEY

APPENDIX D

GENERAL AND VERBATIM INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE

ADMINISTRATION OF THE COMMAND-WIDE NAVAL RESERVE SURVEY

.....

The Commander Naval Reserve Readiness Command Region SEVEN is conducting a survey of all naval reserve personnel in the Readiness Command.

It is important to maintain standardized procedures in the administration of the questionnaire. The answer of individual respondents will be of value only if all administrators give the same instructions. Personnel acting as proctors of this survey should be thoroughly familiar with the general instructions and the verbatim instructions.

I. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

1. The survey shall be administered by active duty support personnel if possible or by members of the VLB. It must not be administered by anyone in the unit of the reservists taking the questionnaire.

2. The survey should be administered the first day of Drill during Period Alfa. (Saturday morning). If a personnel inspection is scheduled by the REDCOM, then the questionnaire shall be administered immediately after the inspection.

3. Allow approximately two hours for completion of the questionnaire. It requires about 10 minutes to read the verbatim instructions and about 1 1/2 hours to answer the questions in the survey book.

4. The questionnaire shall be administered to "split" groups.

1. Officers
2. E-6 and above
3. E-5 and below

5. The survey must be monitored continuously to insure that a serious and orderly atmosphere is maintained.

6. Survey books should not be placed on desks or tables prior to administration of this survey. When respondents are seated, proctors should hand out the material to the individual respondents and then read aloud the Verbatim Instructions which set forth the procedure for answering the survey.

7. When questions arise, during the administration of the survey, advise the respondent to bring the question to the attention of the proctor. The proctor can answer factual questions for the respondent. (i.e. He may tell the respondent that a "CT" is a Communications Technician.) The proctor should not, however, provide information which calls for an opinion on the part of the respondent.

8. Given the complexity of some of the instructions at the beginning of each subsection, the proctor should read these carefully so he/she will be able to clarify these instructions as necessary.

9. On completion of the questionnaire, answer sheets will be placed in the envelope provided and when the last answer sheet is turned in, the envelope will be sealed in the presence of those taking the questionnaire and returned to the Commanding Officer of the Reserve Center. He will then forward these directly to the Retention Officer, Readiness Command Region SEVEN (Attn: Code 52).

10. After 45 minutes a short break should be provided so that Reservists may rest; however, the proctor must guard against any "ball sessions" developing concerning the subject material. Standing in place is recommended; however, Reservists may go to the head if necessary.

11. As each respondent completes his questionnaire, the proctor should insure that the following material is turned in: The serialized booklet, the answer sheet, and the pencil.

12. Once the answer sheet has been turned in to the proctor, no one else in the reserve center will have access to the answer sheet. The senior proctor will ensure that all answer sheets are placed in the envelope provided and the envelope is sealed.

13. The proctors should take the questionnaire themselves before administering it to other Reservists. VU proctors should forward their answer sheets directly to the Retention Officer, Readiness Command Region SEVEN (ATTN: Code 52). Active duty support personnel may destroy their answer sheets.

14. Now turn to the Verbatim Instructions and read them aloud to the Reservist.

11 VERBATIM INSTRUCTIONS (READ SLOWLY AND DISTINCTLY)

1. GOOD MORNING.
2. YOU SHOULD HAVE IN FRONT OF YOU A QUESTIONNAIRE, ANSWER SHEET, AND A PENCIL. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE ANY OF THESE ITEMS, RAISE YOUR HAND AND A PROCTOR WILL ASSIST YOU IN OBTAINING THEM.
3. I WOULD LIKE TO DIRECT YOUR ATTENTION TO A LETTER IN THE FRONT OF YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE FROM RADM WILLIAM GILMORE, USNR, COMMANDER, READINESS COMMAND REGION SEVEN. (TURN TO THE LETTER AND READ ALOUD)
4. I WILL NOW READ YOU THE PRIVACY STATEMENT. (READ ALOUD THE PRIVACY STATEMENT ON PAGE 1 IN THE QUESTIONNAIRE).
5. THIS SURVEY CONTAINS A SERIES OF QUESTIONS DEALING WITH WHAT YOU THINK ABOUT A VARIETY OF ISSUES RELATED TO THE NAVAL RESERVE. YOUR ANSWERS ARE COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL. NO ONE IN YOUR UNIT WILL SEE YOUR RESPONSES SINCE ALL REPORTS WILL BE SUMMARIES OF A LARGE NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS. WE WILL ASK FOR YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER AND OTHER UNIT INFORMATION, NOT IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY YOU, BUT TO PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR GROUP COMPARISONS IN FUTURE ANALYSIS. PLEASE DO NOT PUT YOUR NAME ON THE ANSWER SHEET. AS SOON AS THE INFORMATION HAS BEEN ANALYZED YOUR ANSWER SHEETS WILL BE DESTROYED AND YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS WILL BE DELETED FROM THE DATA FILE. IN THIS WAY IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO IDENTIFY YOU WITH ANY OF THE ANSWERS YOU HAVE GIVEN.
6. WAIT FOR INSTRUCTIONS PRIOR TO COMPLETING ANY BLOCKS ON YOUR ANSWER SHEET! ACCURACY IN FILLING OUT YOUR ANSWER SHEET IS REQUIRED IN ORDER THAT THE QUESTIONNAIRE MAY BE PROPERLY READ.

7. AFTER YOU HAVE READ EACH QUESTION, INDICATE YOUR RESPONSE BY CIRCLING THE CORRECT NUMBER ON THE ANSWER SHEET. DO NOT WRITE IN THE SURVEY BOOK.

FOR EXAMPLE:

<u>QUESTIONNAIRE</u>		<u>ANSWER SHEET</u>
1. ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE NAVAL RESERVE?		
1. YES	2. NO	(1) ① 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
2. WHAT IS YOUR AGE? (ASSUMING YOU ARE 23 YEARS OLD)		(2) 1 ② 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 ③ 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
3. WOULD YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE THAT PEOPLE IN THE NAVAL RESERVE ARE GENERALLY PAID WHAT THEY DESERVE?		(3) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
1. STRONGLY AGREE		
2. AGREE		
3. UNCERTAIN		
4. DISAGREE		
5. STRONGLY DISAGREE		

(CIRCLE WHAT YOU THINK IS THE APPROPRIATE ANSWER: IF YOU AGREE WITH THAT STATEMENT, THEN YOU WOULD HAVE CIRCLED A "2"; AND IF YOU DISAGREE, THEN YOU WOULD HAVE CIRCLED A "4").

8. GIVE ONLY ONE ANSWER TO EACH QUESTION. IF YOU CHANGE YOUR MIND PLEASE ERASE YOUR OLD ANSWER. ALSO REMEMBER TO GIVE YOUR ANSWER BESIDE THE APPROPRIATE QUESTION NUMBER ON THE ANSWER SHEET.

9. READ THE FOLLOWING ITEMS INDICATING WHAT YOU BELIEVE TO BE THE CORRECT RESPONSE. THERE ARE NO "RIGHT" AND "WRONG" ANSWERS. WE SIMPLY WANT YOUR OPINION. IF YOU THINK THERE ARE TWO GOOD ANSWERS, THEN SELECT THE ONE YOU BELIEVE TO BE THE MOST APPROPRIATE. IN SUCH MATTERS, IT IS USUALLY BEST TO PUT DOWN

Nº 2026

SURVEY OF
NAVAL RESERVE READINESS COMMAND
REGION SEVEN

RETENTION STUDY
1979



NAVY
CHARTER, SC 29408



NAVAL RESERVE READINESS COMMAND REGION SEVEN

NAVAL BASE

CHARLESTON, S. C. 29408

Dear Naval Reservist:

An interesting research project is being conducted in Readiness Command Region SEVEN and I am writing you at this time to request your participation in this important study.

The object of this research is to help all of us better understand some of the strengths and weaknesses of the Naval Reserve. No one is in a better position to know these than you. A questionnaire has been developed so that you can have an opportunity to express your attitudes, opinions and beliefs about the function of the Naval Reserve and about your role in this organization.

This survey is one way of finding out what kind of changes we ought to consider, so that we can comply with the instructions of the Chief of Naval Operations that, "We must change those practices which drive good people out of the U. S. Navy and make a naval career as attractive and satisfying experience as possible". I can assure you that your help is greatly appreciated and that your observations will be taken seriously.

Thank you for taking the time to answer these questions.

Sincerely,

Wm. J. GILMORE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Commander

SURVEY OF NAVAL RESERVISTS

REDCOM 7

PROTECTION OF PRIVACY

Public Law 93-579, entitled to Privacy Act of 1974, requires that all individuals be informed of the purposes and uses to be made of the information which is solicited. The following is furnished to explain why the information is requested and the general uses to which that information may be put.

Authority: The information requested is being collected as part of a study conducted by the Retention Office, Naval Reserve Readiness Command Region SEVEN (REDCOM SEVEN) and sponsored by CNAVRES/REDCOM SEVEN.

Purpose: The purpose of this survey is to provide an insight into the problem of retention in the Naval Reserve. The information obtained will be used to analyze those social and psychological characteristics associated with high levels of turnover and to develop a profile of the "loss prior to EOS" personnel in the Naval Reserve of REDCOM SEVEN.

Uses: Individual responses are Confidential. Summarized statistical data which do not contain individual identifiers may be provided to the CNAVRES, The Office of Naval Research, and other researchers for use in analysis related to personnel policies and issues.

Effects of Non-Disclosure: Participation in the survey is voluntary. No penalty will be imposed for failure to respond to any particular questions.

INSTRUCTION:

This survey contains a series of questions dealing with what you think about a variety of issues related to the Naval Reserve. Your answers are completely confidential. No one in YOUR UNIT will see your individual responses since all reports will be summaries of a large number of individuals. We have asked for your social security number and other unit information, not in order to identify you, but to provide an opportunity for group comparisons in future analysis. Please do not put your name on the answer sheet.

Read the following items indicating what you believe is the correct response. There are no "right" and "wrong" answers. We simply want your opinion. If you think there are two good answers, then select the one you believe is most appropriate. In such matters, it is usually best to put down what comes to your mind first.

Mark all your answers on the specially prepared answer sheet provided. Give only one answer to each question. If you change your mind please erase your old answer. Also remember to give your answer beside the appropriate question number on the answer sheet.

After you have read each question, indicate your response by circling the correct number on the answer sheet.

For Example:

<u>Questionnaire</u>		<u>Answer Sheet</u>
1. Are you a member of the Naval Reserve?		1. ① 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
1. Yes 2. No		
2. What is your age?		2. 1 ② 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
(assuming you are 23 years old)		1 2 ③ 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
3. Would you agree or disagree that people in the Naval Reserve are generally paid what they deserve?		3. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
1. Strongly Agree		
2. Agree		
3. Uncertain		
4. Disagree		
5. Strongly Disagree		

(Circle what you think is the appropriate answer:
If you agree with that statement, then you would have circled a "2"; and if you disagree, then you would have circled a "4").

If the survey is to be helpful in improving the Naval Reserve for present and future sailors, it is important that you provide honest and thoughtful answers, and that you "tell it like it is!" Please answer all the questions.

IF YOU DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE DIRECTIONS, ASK THE SURVEY ADMINISTRATOR FOR HELP.

PART I: STANDARD BACKGROUND ITEMS

The following questions relate to your naval and personal background. Your answers are confidential and will be used only in statistical summaries.

Instructions: Please answer each of the following by selecting an answer listed below the question.

Questions

1. What is your sex?
 1. Female
 2. Male
2. What is your Race?
 1. Negro (Black)
 2. Caucasian (White)
 3. Indian (American)
 4. Oriental
 5. Other
3. Marital Status?
 1. Single (never married)
 2. Married and living with spouse
 3. Divorced
 4. Separated
 5. Widowed
 6. Common Law Marriage
 7. Other
4. How many dependents for Tax purposes do you have other than yourself?
 1. NONE
 2. 1
 3. 2
 4. 3
 5. 4
 6. 5 or more
5. What is your educational level?
 1. Eight grade or less
 2. Some High School
 3. High School Graduate
 4. Some College
 5. Associate Degree (Two year Program)
 6. Technical School Graduate
 7. College Graduate (Four year Program)
 8. Graduate School
 9. Professional School (Law School/Medical School)

6. What is your status in the Naval Reserve?
 1. Drill Pay
 2. Non-Pay
 3. No longer active in the Naval Reserve
 4. Other
7. Did you come into the Reserve under the Advanced Pay Grade Plan?
 1. Yes
 2. No
8. When do you drill?
 1. One weekend per month
 2. One weekday evening per week
 3. Two weekday evenings per month
 4. Incremental (No specific scheduled time)
 5. Other
9. When would you prefer to drill?
 1. One weekend per month
 2. One weekday evening per week
 3. Two weekday evenings per month
 4. Incremental (No specific scheduled time)
 5. Other
10. Have you ever been in a Non-Pay status?
 1. Yes
 2. No
11. Which of the following categories best fits you?
 1. Mandatory driller
 2. After completing my legal reserve obligation, I reenlisted as a voluntary driller
 3. I was formally Regular Navy (USN) but enlisted in the Reserve after my enlistment expired
 4. I had active duty with another service before enlisting in the Naval Reserve
 5. I have had no former military experience
 6. Other
12. What is your present Rank or Rate? (Indicate the two digit number to the left of your rank or rate on the Answer Sheet. For example - if you are a PO2, write 12 on the Answer Sheet.)

01. CAPT 0-6	09. SCPO E-8
02. CDR 0-5	10. CPO E-7
03. LCDR 0-4	11. PO1 E-6
04. LT 0-3	12. PO2 E-5
05. LTJG 0-2	13. PO3 E-4
06. ENS 0-1	14. SN E-3
07. WO W1, 2, 3, & 4	15. SA, SR E-2 or E-1
08. MCP0 E-9	

13. What is your designator?

- | | |
|--|------------------------------------|
| 01. Not applicable, I am not an officer | 14. 1645 |
| 02. I am a Warrant Officer therefore
my designator is not listed below. | 15. 1655 |
| 03. 1105 | 16. 1685 |
| 04. 1115 | 17. 1705 |
| 05. 1125 | 18. 2105 |
| 06. 1135 | 19. 2205 |
| 07. 13X5 (aeronautical related designators) | 20. 2305 |
| 08. 19X5 (under instruction designators) | 21. 2505 |
| 09. 1405 | 22. 2905 |
| 10. 1515 | 23. 3105 |
| 11. 1525 | 24. 4105 |
| 12. 1615 | 25. 5105 |
| 13. 1635 | 26. My designator is
not listed |

14. What is your present Rating? (Indicate on the Answer Sheet the three digit number to the left of your rating. For example - if you are an ABE, write 020 on Answer Sheet.)

020 ABE	220 DK	470 MN
021 ABF	230 DM	480 MS
023 ABH	240 DP	490 MT
030 AD	250 DS	500 MU
031 ADR	260 DT	510 NC
040 AE	270 FA	520 OM
050 AF	280 FM	530 OS
060 AG	290 EN	540 OT
070 AK	300 EO	550 PC
080 AME	310 EQ	560 PI
081 AMH	320 ET	570 PH
082 AMS	321 ETN	580 PM
090 AO	322 ETR	590 PN
100 AQ	330 EW	600 PR
110 AS	340 FT	610 QM
111 ASE	341 FTB	620 RM
112 ASH	342 FTG	630 SK
113 ASM	343 FTM	640 SM
120 AW	350 GM	650 SH
130 AT	351 GMG	660 ST
140 AX	352 GMM	661 STG
150 AZ	353 GMT	662 STS
160 BM	360 HM	670 SW
170 BT	370 HT	680 TD
180 BU	380 IC	690 TM
190 CE	390 IM	700 UT
200 CM	400 IS	710 YN
210 CTA	410 JO	720 AN
211 CTI	420 LI	730 FN
212 CTM	430 LN	740 CN
213 CTO	440 MA	750 DN
214 CTR	450 ML	760 SN
215 CTT	460 MM	770 Other

15. How many times have you been on Active Duty for Training (ACDUTRA)?
1. One
 2. Two
 3. Three
 4. Four
 5. Five or more
 6. None
16. How many times have you been with your unit on a weekend training exercise (WET)?
1. One
 2. Two
 3. Three
 4. Four
 5. Five or more
 6. None
17. Approximately how many years of Active Duty with the Navy did you complete?
1. None
 2. One year or less
 3. Two years
 4. Three years
 5. Four years
 6. Six years
 7. Eight years
 8. Ten years
 9. Over ten years
18. Have you been on Active Duty with a military service other than the Navy?
1. No
 2. Air Force
 3. Army
 4. Coast Guard
 5. Foreign Military Organization
 6. Other
19. How much time did you spend on Active Duty assigned to an Afloat Command?
1. Never on AcDu
 2. Always assigned to a shore station
 3. One year afloat
 4. Two years afloat
 5. Three years afloat
 6. Four years afloat
 7. Five years afloat
 8. Six years afloat or more

20. Approximately how long have you been a drilling member of the Naval Reserve?

1. Six months or less
2. One year
3. Two years
4. Three years
5. Four years
6. Five years
7. Eight years
8. Twelve years
9. Fifteen years or more

21. About how much time do you spend driving to and from your Reserve drill per month? (Roundtrip for the entire weekend)

1. One-quarter hour (15 minutes)
2. One-half hour (30 minutes)
3. One hour
4. Two hours
5. Three hours
6. Four hours
7. Five hours or more

22. Approximately how many miles to the Naval Reserve Center from your home (Round trip)?

- | | |
|--------------|------------------------|
| 01. 1 mile | 11. 11-15 miles |
| 02. 2 miles | 12. 16-20 miles |
| 03. 3 miles | 13. 21-25 miles |
| 04. 4 miles | 14. 26-30 miles |
| 05. 5 miles | 15. 31-40 miles |
| 06. 6 miles | 16. 41-50 miles |
| 07. 7 miles | 17. 51-75 miles |
| 08. 8 miles | 18. 76-100 miles |
| 09. 9 miles | 19. 101-150 miles |
| 10. 10 miles | 20. 151 and over miles |

23. What is your approximate income from all sources including spouse's earnings if applicable?

- | | |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| 01. \$0000 - \$2,999 | 11. \$30,000 - \$32,999 |
| 02. \$3,000 - \$5,999 | 12. \$33,000 - \$35,999 |
| 03. \$6,000 - \$8,999 | 13. \$36,000 - \$38,999 |
| 04. \$9,000 - \$11,999 | 14. \$39,000 - \$48,999 |
| 05. \$12,000 - \$14,999 | 15. \$49,000 - \$58,999 |
| 06. \$15,000 - \$17,999 | 16. \$59,000 - \$68,999 |
| 07. \$18,000 - \$20,999 | 17. \$69,000 - \$78,999 |
| 08. \$21,000 - \$23,999 | 18. \$79,000 - \$88,999 |
| 09. \$24,000 - \$26,999 | 19. \$89,000 - \$98,999 |
| 10. \$27,000 - \$29,999 | 20. \$99,000 - and above |

24. What is your age as of your last birthday? (Indicate age on Answer Sheet.)

25. Do you think the general public holds a Naval career in low regard?

1. Yes
2. No

26. How do you rate your social class?

1. Lower Class
2. Working Class
3. Middle Class
4. Upper Class
5. Other
6. Don't Know
7. Refuse to accept idea of class

27. How would you rate your parent's social class?

1. Lower Class
2. Working Class
3. Upper Working Class
4. Middle Class
5. Upper Class
6. Don't Know
7. Refuse to accept idea of class

28. Where were you reared as a child?

1. Country
2. Town
3. Small City
4. Large City
5. Combination of Communities
6. Other
7. Don't Know

29. Where do you reside?

1. Central City
2. Suburbs
3. Rural
4. Other

30. What region of the country do you come from originally?

1. Northeast
2. Midwest
3. Plains
4. South
5. West
6. Other

31. Are you from a career military family?

1. Yes
2. No

32. What is the nature of your employment (Check the category which most nearly describes what you do)?

1. Higher executives of large concerns, owners of large businesses, major professionals (Examples: directors and officers of large companies, brokers, large dealers, accountants (CPA), dentists, engineers, lawyers, doctors, professors)
2. Business managers, owners of medium-sized businesses, and lesser professionals (Examples: branch managers, district managers, executive assistants, postmaster, store managers, contractors, jewelers, correction officers, nurses, librarians, pharmacists, social workers)
3. Administrative personnel, owners of small businesses, and minor professionals (Examples: chief clerks, credit managers, private secretaries, sale representatives, service managers, local business owners, artists, reporters interior decorators, travel agents)
4. Clerical and sales workers, technicians, and owners of small businesses (Examples: bank tellers, business machine operators, clerical or stenographic workers, sales clerks, shipping clerks, draftmen, instructors, inspectors, technical assistants, corner grocery, tailor shops, etc.)
5. Skilled manual employees (Examples: barbers, butchers, carpenters, electricians, firemen, linemen, machinists, painters, plumber, policemen, postmen, sheetmetal workers, tool makers, weavers welders)
6. Machine operators and semi-skilled employees (Examples: apprentices, assembly line workers, bus drivers, deliverymen, garage and gas station attendants, guards, meter readers, roofers, truck drivers, wrappers)
7. Unskilled employees (Examples: parking lot attendants, counterman, farm helpers, freight handlers, janitors, laborers, street cleaners, unskilled factory workers, window cleaners)
8. Student
9. Housewife, primary responsibilities are in the house, take care of children.

GO TO THE NEXT PAGE

33. What type of unit are you presently drilling with? (Write on the Answer Sheet the four digit number appearing to the left of your unit.)

ASHEVILLE, NC

0101 NR FF-1095 T. C. HART
0102 NR 2 MARDIV MED E 607

0103 RNMCB 24 DET 1324
0104 NR SIMA CHASN 1007
0105 VTU

AUGUSTA, GA

0201 NR MARDIV MED A 207
0202 RNMCB 14 DET 1214

0203 NR CBC GULFPORT DET B
0204 VTU
0205 NR HM 1407

CHARLESTON, SC

0301 NR AS 18 ORION DET 107
0302 NR COMINWARCOM 107
0303 NR MOMAG DET 1107
0304 NR COMNAVSURFLANT DET 707
0305 NR CARGO HD BN 4 DET C 407
0306 NR 2 MARDIV MED HQ 107
0307 USS CONE DD 866
0308 USS FEARLESS MSO 442
0309 NR SIMA CHASN DET 207
0310 NR SECGRUACT HOMESTEAD 407
0311 NR TELCOMABFC C3A2 107
0312 NR NRDC CHASN PI DET A 107

0313 NR NWTRAL 107
0314 NR COMTRALANT 107
0315 NR FTG SDDT 107
0316 NR SIMA 307
0317 FRSA LANT DET CHASN 107
0318 NR NSY CHASN HQ 107
0319 NR NRDC CHASN PI HQ 107
0320 COMMINERON 12 (NRF)
0321 COM DESTROYER SQDRON 34
0322 RNMCB 14 DET 0914
0323 NISO 1407
0324 VTU

CHARLOTTE, NC

0401 NR DDG-2 C. F. ADAMS 207
0402 NR DD-338 INGRAM 3007
0403 NR CARGO HD BN 4 HQ 407
0404 NR 2 MARDIV MED C 407
0405 NR SECGRUDEPT HONO 107
0406 NR PHIBBASE LCK FDSD
0407 NR TELCOMSTA BALBOA 207

0408 NR NRDC CAMP LEJ DET A
0409 NR ASB LG 307 HQ
0410 NR EFD SO DET 107
0411 NR NRDC CAMP LEJ HQ 107
0412 RNCB DET 2024
0413 SIMA CHASN 1807
0414 VTU

COLUMBIA, SC

0501 NR AD 18 SIERRA DET 207
0502 NR CARGO HD BN 4 DET A 407
0503 NR 2 MARDIV MED B 307

0504 NR LSO CHASN 107
0505 RNMCB 24 DET 0124
0506 VTU
0507 NR HM 1607

GREENSBORO, NC

0601 NR DDG-44 W. V. PRATT DET 10
0602 NR SECGRUDEPT DGARCIA 107
0603 NR TELCOMSTA BALBOA 107

0604 NR CLANTFLT DET 307
0605 RNMCB 24 DET 0824
0606 DIA HQ NRU 307
0607 VTU

GREENVILLE, SC

0701 NR MOMAG DET 1207
0702 NR DDG-38 LUCE 3807
0703 NR DD-942 BIGELOW 4207
0704 NR CARGO HN BN 4 DET D 407
0705 NR 2 MARDIV MED D 507

0706 NR CONVCOM CHASN/PLMS 207
0707 NR TELCOMABFC C3A1 407
0708 NR COMNAVFOR CARIBBEAN 107
0709 NR SIMA CHASN 907
0710 VTU
0711 RNMCB 24 DET 0324

RALEIGH, NC

0801 NR MSCO NC/NCR/TUN 107
0802 NR CONVCOM NORVA 107
0803 NR TELCOMABFC C3A1 307
0804 NR SURGICAL TEAM 107

0805 NR LSO NORVA DET 107
0806 NR U/W ERT 107
0807 NR MAF REL 107
0808 VTU

SAVANNAH, GA

0901 NR DD-937 DAVIS 3707
0902 NR CARGO HD BN DET F 407
0903 NR NCSO SAVANNAH 207
0904 NR NAVSTA CHASN FDSD 107

0905 NR WEAPSTA CHASN DET A29
0906 RNMCB 14 DET 0714
0907 NR WEPSTA CHASN Hq 207
0908 VTU

WINSTON-SALEM, NC

1001 NR DDG-45 DEWEY 4507
1002 NR 2 MARDIV MED F 707
1003 NR ABFC B5C LTR DET 1007

1004 NR PHIBBASE LCK FDSD
1005 NR PERSMOBTM 1007
1006 NR FTG SE DET 207
1007 VTU

WILMINGTON, NC

1101 NR MSO-490 LEADER 9007
1102 NR FF-1075 TRIPPE 7507
1103 NR CARGO HD BN 4 DET B 407

1104 NR NCSO WCM/SAMEREAST 107
1105 NR SIMA 1107
1106 VTU

1200 REDCOM 7 STAFF

GO TO THE NEXT PAGE

PART II: RETENTION

A. Instructions: Please answer each of the following questions by selecting the answer which comes closest to what you believe.

34. Do you intend to reenlist in the Naval Reserve when your enlistment expires?

1. I definitely will reenlist.
2. I hope I will be able to reenlist.
3. I do not know at this time.
4. I may reenlist but it is unlikely.
5. I definitely will not reenlist.


35. If you had to make that decision at this time, what would you do?

1. I would reenlist.
2. I would not reenlist.


36. How frequently do you think about trying to get out of the Naval Reserve?

- 1) Never 2) Rarely 3) Sometimes 4) Often 5) Constantly


37. If you had to rate your chances of staying in the Naval Reserve on a scale from zero (0%) to ninety-nine percent (99%), what would you say are the chances you would remain in a drilling unit for another year? (Write the percentage figure on the Answer Sheet.)



38. Using the same scale, what are the chances of you staying in for another three years?



39. Using the same scale, what are the chances of you staying in for at least twenty years?



B. Instructions: We are interested in gaining some information as to why you joined the Naval Reserve and why you continue to participate. Select from the following list of possible answers the one you think is most appropriate. (Write the number on the Answer Sheet.)

POSSIBLE REASONS

01. Drill Pay
 02. Exchange privileges
 03. Retirement benefits
 04. ACDUTRA
 05. Drill training
 06. Wearing uniform
 07. Opportunity for business contacts
 08. Status
 09. Change of pace from civilian employment
 10. Sense of patriotism
 11. Interaction with friends
 12. Unit social events
 13. Participation in ceremonies
 14. Recruiter influence
 15. Mandatory obligation
 16. Change of pace from family life
 17. Influence and authority
 18. Promotion/Advancement
 19. Other
40. Why did you affiliate with the Naval Reserve? Select the MOST important reason from the above list of possible answers.
41. Why did you affiliate with the Naval Reserve? Select the SECOND MOST important reason from the above list of possible answers.
42. Why do you continue your participation in the Naval Reserve? Select the MOST important reason from the above list of possible answers.
43. Why do you continue your participation in the Naval Reserve? Select the SECOND MOST important reason from the above list of possible answers.
44. To what extent has your experience to date in the Naval Reserve been what you expected when you first signed up in the program.
- 1) Much worse 2) Worse than 3) About what 4) Better 5) Much better
than expected expected expected than expected than expected
45. How accurately did your recruiter describe what the Naval Reserve would be like?
- 1) Very 2) Mostly 3) 50/50 4) Mostly 5) Very
Inaccurate Inaccurate Accurate Accurate

C. Instructions: Although we do not anticipate your being recalled to Active Duty, would you give us your feelings about returning to Active Duty in case of national emergency.

46. What do you think is the probability of your being recalled to Active Duty during the next five years?

1. 100% probable
2. 80%
3. 60%
4. 40%
5. 20%
6. 0%

47. How disruptive would recall to Active Duty be to your family life?

1. Highly disruptive effect
2. Moderately disruptive effect
3. Little disruptive effect
4. No disruptive effect
5. Don't know

48. How disruptive would recall to Active Duty be to your employment status?

1. Highly disruptive effect
2. Moderately disruptive effect
3. Little disruptive effect
4. No disruptive effect
5. Don't know

49. How disruptive would recall to Active Duty be to your economic situation?

1. Highly disruptive effect
2. Moderately disruptive effect
3. Little disruptive effect
4. No disruptive effect
5. Don't know

50. How would you feel about being recalled to Active Duty?

1. Accept eagerly
2. Accept willingly
3. Accept neutrally
4. Accept unhappily
5. Would resist
6. Don't know

GO TO THE NEXT PAGE

PART III: SATISFACTION WITH WORK

A. Instructions: Below is a list of words which describe moods or feelings. Indicate the extent to which each of these words describes how you feel when you are at work. If retired or unemployed, indicate how you felt on your former job.

Example: a) How "important" do you feel at work?

To No Extent	To A Very Extent	To Some Extent	To A Great Extent	To A Very Great Extent
1	2	3	4	5

If you feel important at work to a great extent, you would mark "4" as was done here. If one of the other answers came closer to how you felt, you would mark the appropriate number on the answer sheet.

HOW DO THESE WORDS DESCRIBE HOW YOU GENERALLY FEEL WHILE ON YOUR CIVILIAN JOB?

	<u>Descriptive Words</u>	<u>To No Extent</u>	<u>To A Very Little Extent</u>	<u>To Some Extent</u>	<u>To A Great Extent</u>	<u>To A Very Great Extent</u>
51.	SERIOUS	1	2	3	4	5
52.	BORED	1	2	3	4	5
53.	DISGUSTED	1	2	3	4	5
54.	WASTEFUL	1	2	3	4	5
55.	RESPECTED	1	2	3	4	5
56.	INFLUENTIAL	1	2	3	4	5
57.	ACCEPTED	1	2	3	4	5
58.	USEFUL	1	2	3	4	5
59.	HOSTILE	1	2	3	4	5
60.	HARASSED	1	2	3	4	5

HOW DO THESE WORDS DESCRIBE HOW YOU FELT WHILE ON ACTIVE DUTY? (If no Active Duty skip to next section.)

	<u>Descriptive Words</u>	<u>To No Extent</u>	<u>To A Very Little Extent</u>	<u>To Some Extent</u>	<u>To A Great Extent</u>	<u>To A Very Great Extent</u>
61.	SERIOUS	1	2	3	4	5
62.	BORED	1	2	3	4	5
63.	DISGUSTED	1	2	3	4	5
64.	WASTEFUL	1	2	3	4	5
65.	RESPECTED	1	2	3	4	5
66.	INFLUENTIAL	1	2	3	4	5
67.	ACCEPTED	1	2	3	4	5
68.	USEFUL	1	2	3	4	5
69.	HOSTILE	1	2	3	4	5
70.	HARASSED	1	2	3	4	5

B. Instructions: Now, we are interested in your level of satisfaction with the Naval Reserve. Listed below are a number of statements which tend to indicate how you feel at present. Rate each statement in terms of your level of satisfaction.

Example: a) About having a well qualified leader.

Completely Satisfied	Mostly Satisfied	About Average	Mostly UNsatisfied	Completely UNsatisfied
1	2	3	4	5

If you are satisfied that you have a "well qualified leader," you will mark "3" as has been done here. If one of the other answers came closer to how you felt, you would mark the appropriate number.

.....
For each of the following items, mark the number on the answer sheet which comes closest to describing how you feel about each item.

Completely Satisfied	Mostly Satisfied	About Average	Mostly UNsatisfied	Completely UNsatisfied
1	2	3	4	5

STATEMENTS

- | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 71. In general about all your Inactive Duty Reserve experience. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 72. In general about your drill experience. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 73. About the amount of authority you have at drill. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 74. About the amount of status you have at drill. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 75. About the use of your talents and abilities at drill. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 |
| 76. About the supervisors you have at drill. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 77. About the comradeship you have at drill. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 78. About the amount and kind of recognition you get for work well done during drill. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 79. About the opportunity for promotion during Inactive Duty. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 80. About the training you get at drill. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

Completely Satisfied	Mostly Satisfied	About Average	Mostly Unsatisfied	Completely Unsatisfied
1	2	3	4	5

81.	About the facilities or equipment at drill.			
1	2	3	4	5
82.	About the amount of drill pay (if in non-pay, skip unless you wish to answer).			
1	2	3	4	5
83.	About the amount of fringe benefits you receive during Inactive Duty.			
1	2	3	4	5
84.	About the opportunity for a sense of accomplishment you have in drill.			
1	2	3	4	5
85.	About the amount of responsibility you have in drill.			
1	2	3	4	5
86.	About your current rate/rank (i.e. PO2/LTJG).			
1	2	3	4	5
87.	About your current rating/designator (i.e. PN2/1105).			
1	2	3	4	5
88.	About the unit with which you are currently affiliated.			
1	2	3	4	5
89.	About the way drill complements your occupation or profession.			
1	2	3	4	5
90.	About the amount of time required for drill participation.			
1	2	3	4	5
91.	About the days scheduled for your drill participation.			
1	2	3	4	5
92.	About the requirement to wear a uniform.			
1	2	3	4	5
93.	About the regulations for personal appearance.			
1	2	3	4	5
94.	About the unit social events.			
1	2	3	4	5
95.	About the support you get from Reserve Center Active Duty personnel.			
1	2	3	4	5
96.	About the support you get from unit administrative personnel.			
1	2	3	4	5
97.	About the support your unit receives from the Readiness Commander's staff.			
1	2	3	4	5

C. Instructions: You have been involved in evaluation of the Naval Reserve as it currently is. Now, I would be interested in knowing if you expect conditions to change next year. Please use the following code to indicate how you expect things to be one year from now in your unit.

.....

Completely Satisfied	Mostly Satisfied	About Average	Mostly UNSatisfied	Completely UNSatisfied
1	2	3	4	5

STATEMENTS

98. In general about what you expect of your drill experience next year.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

99. About the use of your talents and abilities at drill next year.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

100. About the supervisors you will most likely have at drill next year.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

101. About the comradeship you may expect at drill next year.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

102. About the amount and kind of recognition you may expect for work well done during drill.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

103. About the training you are likely to receive at drill next year.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

104. About the facilities or equipment you expect to have access to next year.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

GO TO THE NEXT PAGE

D. Instructions: Now I would like to ask you a few questions about your recent experiences while you were on Active Duty for Training (ACDUTRA) or while you were on Weekend Away Training (WET). Please indicate your level of satisfaction with each item. (If you have not been on ACDUTRA or WET, skip this section.)

.....

Completely Satisfied	Mostly Satisfied	About Average	Mostly Unsatisfied	Completely Unsatisfied
1	2	3	4	5

STATEMENTS

- | | | | | | | |
|------|--|---|---|---|---|---|
| 105. | About your experience generally on ACDUTRA. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 106. | About the use of your talents on ACDUTRA. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 107. | About the supervisors or instructors you had on ACDUTRA. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 108. | About your training generally on ACDUTRA. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 109. | About the equipment on ACDUTRA. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 110. | About the lodging on ACDUTRA. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 111. | About the comradeship on ACDUTRA. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 112. | About your sense of accomplishment on ACDUTRA. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 113. | About your experience generally on WET. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 114. | About the use of your talents on WET. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 115. | About the supervisors or instructors you had on WET. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 116. | About your training generally on WET. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 117. | About the equipment on WET. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 118. | About the lodging on WET. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 119. | About the comradeship on WET. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 120. | About your sense of accomplishment on WET. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

PART IV: TIME UTILIZATION

A. Instructions: The following questions have to do with how you spend your time both at home and at drill. Indicate, using the scale below how you feel you spend your time at each of the activities listed. If the activity is one you don't engage in, then select "not applicable."

.....

Spending too much time (TM)	Spending too little time (TL)	Spending the right amount of time (JR)	Not applicable (N/A)
1	2	3	4

WHILE AT HOME:

	TM	TL	JR	N/A
121. Commuting	1	2	3	4
122. Lawn Work	1	2	3	4
123. Home Repairs	1	2	3	4
124. Household Chores	1	2	3	4
125. Work on Car	1	2	3	4
126. Attending Church	1	2	3	4
127. Attending Clubs	1	2	3	4
128. Talking with Spouse	1	2	3	4
129. Talking with Children	1	2	3	4
130. Reading	1	2	3	4
131. Newspapers	1	2	3	4
132. Magazines	1	2	3	4
133. Books	1	2	3	4
134. Listening to Radio	1	2	3	4
135. Watching TV	1	2	3	4
136. News	1	2	3	4
137. Sports	1	2	3	4
138. Movie	1	2	3	4
139. Specials on P.B.S.	1	2	3	4
140. Regular Prime-Time Shows	1	2	3	4
141. Shopping	1	2	3	4
142. Budget Planning	1	2	3	4
143. Woodwork	1	2	3	4

Spending too much time (TM)	Spending too little time (TL)	Spending the right amount of time (JR)	Not applicable (N/A)
1	2	3	4

WHILE AT HOME:

	TM	TL	JR	N/A
144. Going to Movies	1	2	3	4
145. Visiting Relatives	1	2	3	4
146. Sailing	1	2	3	4
147. Fishing	1	2	3	4
148. Hunting	1	2	3	4
149. Bowling	1	2	3	4
150. Tennis	1	2	3	4
151. Basketball	1	2	3	4
152. Golf	1	2	3	4
153. Picnics at Beach	1	2	3	4
154. Listening to Stereo/Phono/Tapes	1	2	3	4
155. Photography	1	2	3	4
156. Gardening	1	2	3	4
157. Eating Meals	1	2	3	4
158. Going to Parties	1	2	3	4
159. Night Life generally	1	2	3	4
160. Weekends with Family	1	2	3	4
161. Planning How to Use Future Time	1	2	3	4
162. Sitting and Thinking	1	2	3	4
163. Continuing Education	1	2	3	4
164. Technical School	1	2	3	4
165. College Courses	1	2	3	4
166. Self-Improvement Seminars	1	2	3	4
167. Adult Education	1	2	3	4
168. Studying	1	2	3	4
169. Looking for a Better Job	1	2	3	4

GO TO THE NEXT PAGE

Spending too much time (TM) 1	Spending too little time (TL) 2	Spending the right amount of time (JR) 3	Not Applicable (N/A) 4
-------------------------------------	---------------------------------------	--	------------------------------

<u>WHILE AT NAVAL RESERVE DRILL (WORK):</u>	TM	TL	JR	N/A
170. Attending Meetings	1	2	3	4
171. Writing Reports	1	2	3	4
172. Reading Official Correspondence	1	2	3	4
173. Talking to Visitors	1	2	3	4
174. Making Phone Calls	1	2	3	4
175. Planning Training Evolutions	1	2	3	4
176. Writing Memos	1	2	3	4
177. Watching Movies	1	2	3	4
178. Evaluating your Work	1	2	3	4
179. Talking with Supervisor	1	2	3	4
180. Talking with Subordinates	1	2	3	4
181. Talking with Peers	1	2	3	4
182. Talking with People in Other Units	1	2	3	4
183. Talking with Active Duty Personnel	1	2	3	4
184. Talking with People on REDCOM Staff	1	2	3	4
185. Making Decisions	1	2	3	4
186. Reading Instructions	1	2	3	4
187. Lunch	1	2	3	4
188. Coffee Breaks	1	2	3	4
189. Idle Chatter	1	2	3	4
190. Making Visits	1	2	3	4
191. Counseling	1	2	3	4
192. Daydreaming	1	2	3	4
193. Typing	1	2	3	4
194. Planning Projects	1	2	3	4
195. Evaluating People	1	2	3	4
196. Scheduling your Time	1	2	3	4
197. Sitting and Staring	1	2	3	4
198. Reading Professional Material	1	2	3	4
199. Assessing Needs of People You Serve	1	2	3	4
200. Working in Rate	1	2	3	4

PART V: TRAINING

A. Instructions: The following section is concerned with training and the structure of the Naval Reserve. Please indicate what you think is the most appropriate answer to each of these questions.

201. Of the training you have received in the Naval Reserve which type listed below has been the most significant and meaningful to you?

1. Classroom sessions
2. Practical Team Training
3. Hands on Exercises
4. Individual Study (Correspondence Courses)
5. ACDUTRAS
6. WETs
7. Administrative Assignments
8. Contributory Support Activities
9. Other

202. What type of training listed below has been the least significant and meaningful?

1. Classroom sessions
2. Practical Team Training
3. Hands on Exercises
4. Individual Study (Correspondence Courses)
5. ACDUTRAS
6. WETs
7. Administrative Assignments
8. Contributory Support Activities
9. Other

203. Is the training you received drilling with your unit appropriate to your rating/designator?

1. Yes, fully related
2. Moderately related
3. No, not related at all
4. Not applicable, did not receive any training

204. How do you rate the training you are receiving in the Naval Reserve as compared to what you expected?

1. Outstanding
2. Excellent
3. Good
4. Poor
5. Unsatisfactory

205. From which of the following types of Naval Reserve participation do you gain the greatest satisfaction?
1. Training programs located within the Reserve Center
 2. Directly working with active duty counterpart (afloat)
 3. Directly working with active duty counterpart (ashore)
 4. Community action programs
 5. Administration/lecture assignments
 6. Other
206. If you receive the greatest satisfaction from Contributory Support would you be willing to adjust your personal schedule to accommodate irregular contributory drill assignments?
1. Not applicable, I don't receive greatest satisfaction from Contributory Support.
 2. Yes
 3. No
207. Are you familiar generally with the restructuring of the Naval Reserve in the last few years?
1. Yes
 2. No
208. If yes, what effect do you think the restructuring of Naval Reserve Units has had on your Naval Reserve training?
1. Positive effect
 2. Negative effect
 3. No effect
 4. Don't know
 5. Not applicable, I did not answer yes to the previous question
209. What effect do you think the restructuring of the Naval Reserve Units will have on your continued affiliation in the Naval Reserve?
1. Positive effect
 2. Negative effect
 3. No effect
 4. Don't know
 5. Not applicable, I did not know about the planned restructuring
210. Have you heard about the Naval Reserve Readiness Command Concept?
1. Yes
 2. No
211. If yes, what effect do you think the Naval Reserve Readiness Command Concept has had on your own Reserve Training?
1. Positive effect
 2. Negative effect
 3. No effect
 4. Don't know
 5. Not applicable, I did not answer yes to the previous question

212. How do you feel any restructuring of the Naval Reserve program should be accomplished?
1. Keep "as is" without change
 2. Restructure under the Readiness Command Concept
 3. Make small changes only
 4. Eliminate the Naval Reserve
 5. Eliminate periodic drilling and replace with improved ACDUTRA opportunities
 6. Modify programs in some other manner not suggested above
 7. Don't know
213. How would you feel about drilling more often aboard ships and stations of the active forces, ensuring regular drill as well as on ACDUTRA?
1. Strongly approve
 2. Approve in general
 3. Neutral
 4. Disapprove in general
 5. Strongly disapprove
214. How would you feel about a greater use of the Navy Schools Command facilities for Reserve Drills?
1. Strongly approve
 2. Approve in general
 3. Neutral
 4. Disapprove in general
 5. Strongly disapprove
215. How would you feel about fulfilling your drill and ACDUTRA obligation totally during a 30-60 day unit-oriented training program (thus having no drills during the rest of the year)?
1. Strongly approve
 2. Approve in general
 3. Neutral
 4. Disapprove in general
 5. Strongly disapprove
216. Have you heard about the efforts of the Department of Defense to inform your employers of the National Council for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve?
1. Yes
 2. No
217. Have you heard about the efforts of the Department of Defense to inform your employers of your increased value to them as a result of the skills leadership, and training you receive from your Reserve experience?
1. Yes
 2. No
218. If yes, do you think this information will raise your status in the eyes of your employer?
1. Yes
 2. No
219. What are the chances of advancing in rate/rank to a position that is in keeping with your abilities?
1. No chance
 2. 25% chance
 3. 50% chance
 4. 75% chance
 5. 100% chance

PART VI: LEADERSHIP

A. Instructions: For this section we are interested in how you would describe the leadership in your Naval Reserve unit. In answering these questions, first ask yourself, "Who is my immediate supervisor?" Now read each item and determine how each statement applies to his/her leadership. The last few questions apply to your officers rather than your immediate supervisor.

	Never	Seldom	Occasionally	Often	Always
	1	2	3	4	5
220. My supervisor does little things to make it pleasant to be a member of this unit.	1	2	3	4	5
221. My supervisor rules with an iron hand.	1	2	3	4	5
222. My supervisor criticizes poor work.	1	2	3	4	5
223. My supervisor keeps to himself.	1	2	3	4	5
224. My supervisor assigns unit members to particular tasks.	1	2	3	4	5
225. My supervisor acts without consulting the members of the unit.	1	2	3	4	5
226. My supervisor is approachable.	1	2	3	4	5
227. My supervisor asks that unit members follow the chain of command.	1	2	3	4	5
228. My supervisor lets unit members know what is expected of them.	1	2	3	4	5
229. My supervisor shows little if any concern for my individual welfare.	1	2	3	4	5
230. My supervisor cares what people like me think.	1	2	3	4	5

NEVER	SELDOM	OCCASIONALLY	OFTEN	ALWAYS
1	2	3	4	5
231.	My supervisor attempts to work out conflicts in our work group.			
1	2	3	4	5
232.	The Commanding Officer provides strong leadership to this unit.			
1	2	3	4	5
233.	In dealing with the Commissioned Officers in my unit, I have been treated fairly.			
1	2	3	4	5
234.	The Commanding Officer takes a personal interest in my Naval Career.			
1	2	3	4	5
235.	The Petty Officers in my unit are forceful.			
1	2	3	4	5
236.	The Petty Officers in my unit are pessimistic about the Navy.			
1	2	3	4	5

GO TO THE NEXT PAGE

B. Instructions: The following are various types of behavior which a supervisor (manager, leader) may engage in in relation to subordinates. Read each item carefully and then mark the answer that indicates what YOU would do if you were in your Naval Reserve supervisor's position.

Make a Great Effort to do this	Tend to do this	Tend to Avoid doing this	Make a Great Effort to Avoid this
1	2	3	4

IF I WERE THE SUPERVISOR, I WOULD TRY TO:

- | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|
| 237. Closely supervise my subordinates in order to get better work from them. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 238. Set the goals and objectives for my subordinates and sell them on the merits of my plans. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 239. Set up controls to assure that my subordinates are getting the job done. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 240. Encourage my subordinates to set their own goals and objectives. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 241. Make sure that my subordinates work is planned out for them. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 242. Check with my subordinates daily to see if they need any help. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 243. Step in as soon as reports indicate that the job is slipping. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 244. Push my people to meet schedules if necessary. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 245. Have frequent meetings to keep in touch with what is going on. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 246. Allow subordinates to make important decisions. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

PART VII: ATTITUDES ABOUT WORK GENERALLY

A. Instructions: Listed below are a number of characteristics which could be present on any job. People differ about how much they would like to have each of these present in their own jobs whether they are military or civilian. We are interested in learning how much you personally would like to have each one present in your job.

Very Important	Important	Neutral	Unimportant	Very Unimportant
1	2	3	4	5

STATEMENTS

- | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|
| 247. High respect from my co-workers. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 248. Fair treatment from my supervisor. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 249. Stimulating and challenging work. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 250. Chances to exercise independent thought and action in my job. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 251. Great job security. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 252. Very friendly co-workers and pleasant working climate. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 253. Opportunities to learn new things from my work. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 254. High salary. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 255. Good fringe benefits. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 256. Quick promotions and advancement. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 257. Opportunities for personal growth and development in my job. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 258. A sense of worth while accomplishment in my work. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 259. A sound retirement plan. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

PART VIII: PARTICIPATION IN THE NAVAL RESERVE

A. Instructions: In this section you are asked whether you agree or disagree with the following statements about your participation in the Naval Reserve. Use the following codes.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1	2	3	4	5

STATEMENTS

260. One of the things I like about being in the Naval Reserve is that it is really a special world that not everybody belongs to.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

261. I like things that are generally thought of as typically Navy.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

262. It is important to remind ourselves that being in the Navy is like being part of a big family.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

263. The whole idea of "going to sea" is a romantic and appealing idea to me.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

264. The slogan, "It's not just a job, it's an adventure," is really true.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

265. I do not like to call things by their Navy names such as "decks," "bulkheads," "overheads," etc.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

266. To be a "Shellback" or a member of the "Order of Magellan" is a high honor.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

267. Nothing seems more absurd to me than to try and pretend you are on a real ship when you are at the Naval Reserve Center.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

268. One of the major problems with the military in general and the reserve in particular is the amount of "Mickey Mouse" things that goes on.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

269. Harassment is a constant part of life when I am at drill.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

270. Most of what passes for training is useless and boring.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Strongly Agree	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1	2	3	4	5

271. The Navy seems to be more interested in my appearance than my ability to do the job.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

272. I would not mind coming to drill as much if I did not have to get all dressed up.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

273. In spite of what some people say, the lot of the average enlisted Reserve member is getting better not worse.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

274. I always encourage my friends to join my unit if they are eligible.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

275. I personally feel that our unit has a great future.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

276. You can't help wondering whether anything concerning the Navy is worthwhile.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

277. My civilian boss is not particularly happy about all the time I spend at the Reserve Center.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

278. Most of my friends think I am smart to be in the Naval Reserve.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

(If not married, skip to question 281)
279. My spouse is very supportive of my participation in the Reserve program.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

280. My spouse is understanding about my having to go on Active Duty for Training (ACDUIRA).

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

GO TO THE NEXT PAGE

B. Instructions. Listed below are a number of statements that may describe various Naval Reserve units. Rate how true or false you think each statement is.

Definitely False False Undecided Mostly True Definitely True

1 2 3 4 5

STATEMENTS

281. The work activities in this unit are sensibly organized.

1 2 3 4 5

282. This unit does a poor job in putting out the word.

1 2 3 4 5

283. The chain of command is receptive to ideas and suggestions.

1 2 3 4 5

284. Members of this unit work together to solve job related problems.

1 2 3 4 5

285. Women should not be in the Naval Reserve.

1 2 3 4 5

286. Women are treated fairly in the Naval Reserve.

1 2 3 4 5

287. Members of ethnic minorities such as Blacks and Orientals are treated fairly in the Naval Reserve.

1 2 3 4 5

288. There is equal opportunity for job assignment in this unit.

1 2 3 4 5

289. People in this command discourage favoritism.

1 2 3 4 5

290. If I had a buddy who was probably going to drop out of the unit, I would talk with him and try to change his mind.

1 2 3 4 5

291. If there were a person in the unit who needed help badly because he was out of work, the members of this unit would most likely come to his assistance.

1 2 3 4 5

Definitely False	False	Indecisive	Mostly True	Definitely True
1	2	3	4	5

292. This command quickly integrates new people into the activities and the work of the Reserve unit.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

293. This command often provides information to the families of the reservists so they will better understand the Navy.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

294. One of the things that really bothers me about the Navy is the bad language or profanity that is so often used.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

295. Drugs and alcohol are not a problem in this unit.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

296. Members continually gamble about the work they do for the unit.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

297. Certain members of the unit are hostile to other members.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

298. The unit contains members with widely varying backgrounds.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

299. Members in this unit fear to express their real opinion.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

300. This unit is a closely knit group.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

301. I would be embarrassed to go back on Active Duty with this unit.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

302. Sometimes the Navy seems so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

303. If people like me didn't attend drill this unit would really be in bad shape.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Definitely False	False	Undecided	Mostly True	Definitely True
1	2	3	4	5

304. If I were offered a good job in another location, I would consider whether there was a Naval Reserve Center nearby before accepting the position.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

305. My civilian job requires my working irregular hours.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

306. In my civilian job, I work shifts.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

307. I often have a conflict between my civilian work schedule and my Naval Reserve drill.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

GO TO THE NEXT PAGE

PART IX: GENERAL SOCIAL QUESTIONS

A. Instructions: Now I would like to ask you a few questions about your ideas concerning American society generally. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each statement.

Strongly Agree	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1	2	3	4	5

-
308. Ordinary citizens ought to feel obligated to engage in some form of full-time public service (not necessarily the military service) while they are young.
- | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
309. A good citizen has a duty to help out in the community like doing church work or belonging to a civic club.
- | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
310. I would have felt like I neglected my duty if I had not joined the military.
- | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
311. In these days, loyalty to the established American way is the most important requirement of a good citizen.
- | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
312. The average American citizen does not show enough respect for the U.S. Flag.
- | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
313. Young people should be taught to be more obedient and to have more respect for authority.
- | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
314. Whatever best serves the interests of our government is generally right.
- | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
315. America has reached a higher state of civilization than any other country in the world and as a consequence has a culture which is superior to any other.
- | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
316. It is the duty of a person to do his job the very best he can.
- | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|

Strongly Agree	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1	2	3	4	5

317. I feel very bad when I have failed to finish a job I promised I would do.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

318. Because many of the minor political parties merely confuse national issues, all political parties except the two major ones should be abolished.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

319. A large percentage of taxes which citizens pay is wasted in an effort to educate individuals who are not worthy of being educated.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

320. Certain religious sects whose beliefs do not permit them to salute the flag should either be forced to conform or else be abolished.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

321. Minor forms of military training such as drill, marching, and simple commands should be made a part of the elementary school educational program.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

322. Conventional war between the U.S. and another nation is always a real possibility.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

323. All out war is likely within 15 years.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

324. Limited nuclear war between the U.S. and Communist forces is likely within 15 years.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

325. The Vietnam Conflict is a good example of the fact that the Communists are determined to conquer the world.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

326. All wars are immoral.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Strongly Agree	Agree	Don't Know	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
----------------	-------	------------	----------	-------------------

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

327. World War II was a just war.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

328. The Vietnam War was a just war.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

329. It sometimes bothers me that I am a member of an organization, the Naval Reserve, that is organized for the purpose of fighting wars.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

330. People mostly just look out for themselves.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

331. Generally speaking most people can be trusted.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

332. Most of the time, people try to be helpful.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

333. Most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

334. You cannot be too careful in dealing with people.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

335. Our country would be a lot better off if we didn't have so many elections and people didn't have to vote so often.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

336. What this country needs is strong leaders who do what they think is right regardless of public opinion.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

GO TO THE NEXT PAGE

B. Instructions: In this section, select an answer that appears under each question.

337. Are you very interested in politics?

1. Very interested
2. Somewhat interested
3. Neutral
4. Not much interest
5. Not interested at all

338. Do you talk politics?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Uncertain

339. Are you registered to vote?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Uncertain

340. Did you vote in the last general election for President?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Uncertain

341. Have you ever done any campaigning other than giving money?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Uncertain

342. Do you think of yourself as Republican, Independent, Democrat or some "Third" party?

1. Strong Democrat
2. Weak Democrat
3. Independent
4. Weak Republican
5. Strong Republican
6. Weak Third-Party Member
7. Strong Third-Party Member
8. I don't think of political parties at all
9. Uncertain

343. Do you tend to think of yourself as politically Conservative or Liberal?
1. Very Conservative
 2. Conservative
 3. Moderate
 4. Liberal
 5. Very Liberal
 6. I have never thought of it before
344. When it comes to foreign policy, do you think we should be forceful or restrained?
1. Very forceful
 2. Forceful
 3. Moderate
 4. Restrained
 5. Very restrained
 6. Uncertain
345. Some people think that the National Government is not doing enough in the area of National Defense. Do you?
1. Strongly agree
 2. Agree
 3. Don't know
 4. Strongly disagree
346. Now do you think there is any difference between the way the Democrats and the Republicans or other parties feel on this issue?
1. Democrats will normally spend more on defense than other parties
 2. Republicans will normally spend more on defense than other parties
 3. Both major parties are about the same
 4. I'm not sure
347. What is your religion?
1. Protestant
 2. Catholic
 3. Jewish
 4. Other
 5. None
348. Do you tend to think of yourself as a religious person?
1. Very religious
 2. Moderately religious
 3. Not religious
 4. Not religious at all
 5. Uncertain
349. If you have any general comments concerning the Naval Reserve, please write them on the back of the answer sheet, and circle number 349 on the answer sheet.

ANSWER SHEET/NAVRESREDCOM REG SEVEN RETENTION STUDY 1979

INSTRUCTIONS: Circle the appropriate number for each question.
Note that for question 24 you should circle your
actual age as of your last birthday.

SER **Nº** **1801**

PLEASE ENTER YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER HERE 

PART I Standard Background Questions

1. 1 2
2. 1 2 3 4 5
3. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. 1 2 3 4 5 6
5. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
6. 1 2 3 4
7. 1 2
8. 1 2 3 4 5
9. 1 2 3 4 5
10. 1 2
11. 1 2 3 4 5 6
12. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
13. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 2 3 4 5
14. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1 2 3 4 5
15. 1 2 3 4 5 6
16. 1 2 3 4 5 6
17. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
18. 1 2 3 4 5 6
19. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
20. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
21. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

22. 0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
23. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
24. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
25. 1 2
26. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
27. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
28. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
29. 1 2 3 4
30. 1 2 3 4 5 6
31. 1 2
32. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
33. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

PART II Section A Retention

34. 1 2 3 4 5
35. 1 2
36. 1 2 3 4 5
37. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
38. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
39. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

SECTION B

40. 0 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
41. 0 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
42. 0 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
43. 0 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
44. 1 2 3 4 5
45. 1 2 3 4 5
46. 1 2 3 4 5 6
47. 1 2 3 4 5
48. 1 2 3 4 5
49. 1 2 3 4 5
50. 1 2 3 4 5 6
51. 1 2 3 4 5
52. 1 2 3 4 5
53. 1 2 3 4 5
54. 1 2 3 4 5
55. 1 2 3 4 5
56. 1 2 3 4 5
57. 1 2 3 4 5
58. 1 2 3 4 5

INSTRUCTIONS: Circle the appropriate number for each question.

SER _____

PART III SECTION A
Work Satisfaction (Cont'd)

59. 1 2 3 4 5
60. 1 2 3 4 5
61. 1 2 3 4 5
62. 1 2 3 4 5
63. 1 2 3 4 5
64. 1 2 3 4 5
65. 1 2 3 4 5
66. 1 2 3 4 5
67. 1 2 3 4 5
68. 1 2 3 4 5
69. 1 2 3 4 5
70. 1 2 3 4 5

SECTION B

71. 1 2 3 4 5
72. 1 2 3 4 5
73. 1 2 3 4 5
74. 1 2 3 4 5
75. 1 2 3 4 5
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93. 1 2 3 4 5
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95. 1 2 3 4 5
96. 1 2 3 4 5
97. 1 2 3 4 5

SECTION C

98. 1 2 3 4 5
99. 1 2 3 4 5
100. 1 2 3 4 5
101. 1 2 3 4 5
102. 1 2 3 4 5
103. 1 2 3 4 5
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118. 1 2 3 4 5
119. 1 2 3 4 5
120. 1 2 3 4 5

PART IV Time Utilization

121. 1 2 3 4
122. 1 2 3 4
123. 1 2 3 4
124. 1 2 3 4
125. 1 2 3 4
126. 1 2 3 4
127. 1 2 3 4
128. 1 2 3 4
129. 1 2 3 4
130. 1 2 3 4
131. 1 2 3 4
132. 1 2 3 4
133. 1 2 3 4

INSTRUCTIONS: Circle the appropriate number for each question.

SER _____

PART IV SECTION A (Cont'd)

134. 1 2 3 4

135. 1 2 3 4

136. 1 2 3 4

137. 1 2 3 4

138. 1 2 3 4

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194. 1 2 3 4

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196. 1 2 3 4

197. 1 2 3 4

198. 1 2 3 4

199. 1 2 3 4

200. 1 2 3 4

PART V: SECTION A
Training

201. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

202. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

203. 1 2 3 4

204. 1 2 3 4 5

205. 1 2 3 4 5 6

206. 1 2 3

207. 1 2

208. 1 2 3 4

INSTRUCTIONS: Circle the appropriate number for each question. SER _____

PART V SECTION A
(Continued)

209. 1 2 3 4 5
210. 1 2
211. 1 2 3 4 5
212. 1 2 3 4 5 6
213. 1 2 3 4 5
214. 1 2 3 4 5
215. 1 2 3 4 5
216. 1 2
217. 1 2
218. 1 2
219. 1 2 3 4 5

PART VI SECTION A
Leadership

220. 1 2 3 4 5
221. 1 2 3 4 5
222. 1 2 3 4 5
223. 1 2 3 4 5
224. 1 2 3 4 5
225. 1 2 3 4 5
226. 1 2 3 4 5
227. 1 2 3 4 5
228. 1 2 3 4 5
229. 1 2 3 4 5
230. 1 2 3 4 5
231. 1 2 3 4 5
232. 1 2 3 4 5
233. 1 2 3 4 5
234. 1 2 3 4 5

235. 1 2 3 4 5
236. 1 2 3 4 5

SECTION B

237. 1 2 3 4
238. 1 2 3 4
239. 1 2 3 4
240. 1 2 3 4
241. 1 2 3 4
242. 1 2 3 4
243. 1 2 3 4
244. 1 2 3 4
245. 1 2 3 4
246. 1 2 3 4

PART VII SECTION A
General Attitudes about Work

247. 1 2 3 4 5
248. 1 2 3 4 5
249. 1 2 3 4 5
250. 1 2 3 4 5
251. 1 2 3 4 5
252. 1 2 3 4 5
253. 1 2 3 4 5
254. 1 2 3 4 5
255. 1 2 3 4 5
256. 1 2 3 4 5
257. 1 2 3 4 5
258. 1 2 3 4 5
259. 1 2 3 4 5

PART VIII Section A
Participation in the
Naval Reserve

260. 1 2 3 4 5
261. 1 2 3 4 5
262. 1 2 3 4 5
263. 1 2 3 4 5
264. 1 2 3 4 5
265. 1 2 3 4 5
266. 1 2 3 4 5
267. 1 2 3 4 5
268. 1 2 3 4 5
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SECTION B
281. 1 2 3 4 5
282. 1 2 3 4 5
283. 1 2 3 4 5

INSTRUCTIONS: Circle the appropriate number for each question.

SFR _____

PART VIII SECTION A
(Continued)

284. 1 2 3 4 5

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PART IX SECTION A
General Social Questions

308. 1 2 3 4 5

309. 1 2 3 4 5

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336. 1 2 3 4 5

SECTION B

337. 1 2 3 4 5

338. 1 2 3

339. 1 2 3

340. 1 2 3

341. 1 2 3

342. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

343. 1 2 3 4 5 6

344. 1 2 3 4 5 6

345. 1 2 3 4

346. 1 2 3 4

347. 1 2 3 4 5

348. 1 2 3 4 5

349. If you have any general comments concerning the Naval Reserve, please write them on the back of the answer sheet and circle this number (349.) THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE THIS QUESTIONNAIRE!



NAVAL RESERVE READINESS COMMAND REGION SEVEN

NAVAL BASE

CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA 29408

IN REPLY REFER TO:

Code 52

20 DEC 1979

From: Commander, Naval Reserve Readiness Command Region SEVEN
To: Distribution

Subj: Naval Reserve Retention Survey

Encl: (1) Naval Reserve Readiness Command Region SEVEN Retention Study
Report Number One

1. Enclosure (1) is the first in a series of reports resulting from a recently completed command-wide retention survey in which all Naval Reserve personnel drilling in Region SEVEN participated. Future reports in this series will more narrowly focus on specific retention subjects identified herein.
2. Although this report addresses retention in Region SEVEN, it is interesting to compare the results with a 1974 study conducted by the Chief of Naval Reserve within the Eleventh Naval District. Such a comparison lends support to the possibility that the retention problems identified in Region SEVEN may not be particular to this Region but are, in fact, generally prevalent throughout the Naval Reserve.
3. Because Naval Reserve personnel retention is such a key, important issue and national input is needed in this regard, the Chief of Naval Reserve has directed that a national random sample survey be conducted. The national survey will be supervised by Readiness Command Region SEVEN and will be conducted during January - March 1980. The findings of this national effort are expected to be disseminated during August, 1980.
4. Your comments are invited and will be welcomed as constructive additions to the resolution of a major problem within the Naval Reserve. Point of contact is CDR M. L. Boykin (REDCOM SEVEN Code 52) or LCDR H. L. Merritt, Autovon 794-4402/FTS 679-4402.

Wm J Gilmore

Wm. J. GILMORE

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