Soviet and American Strategic Doctrines: One More Time.
Abstract
It seems that, while Washington aims at 'deterrence' through the ability to inflict unacceptable damage, Moscow (at least as a matter of declaratory policy) has opted for a 'war-prevention' doctrine based on the ability to 'fight' and 'win' a nuclear conflict. Controversy in the discussion is primarily a matter of emphasis. It is not my objective in this paper to pronounce on these two positions or to mediate between them. The concern, rather, is whether we are not being led astray by an exclusive focus on only two doctrinal aspects -- U.S. deterrence and Soviet war-prevention. My thesis is that the U.S. has not been alone in having a purely punitive deterrence doctrine; the USSR has had one, too, and for some time. Nor, on the other hand, is the USSR alone having a war-prevention doctrine. I am not referring here to the emerging U.S. nuclear counterforce option, though this has to be taken into consideration. Rather, the reference is to the long-standing U.S. conventional and tactical-nuclear options, which (almost by definition) aim at preventing war through combat capabilities rather than the threat of punishment.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1980
- Accession Number
- ADA081192
Entities
People
- James Mcconnell
Organizations
- Center for Naval Analyses