

AD-A081 200

DENVER UNIV COLO

F/6 5/4


INTERNATIONAL DISASTER RESPONSE: THE SAHELIAN EXPERIENCE, (U)
JUN 76 B J BROWN, J C TUTHILL, E T ROWE


UNCLASSIFIED

FAR-25093

NL

1 OF 3
AD
A081200





MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

①
ms

~~SECRET~~

⑥

INTERNATIONAL DISASTER RESPONSE:
THE SAHELIAN EXPERIENCE

⑫ 2072

⑱ FAR

⑲ 25093

108650

An Abstract of the Report

of

⑩

Barbara J./Brown
Janet C./Tuthill
E. Thomas/Rowe

Graduate School of International Studies
University of Denver

⑪

Jun 76

DTIC
ELECTE
S FEB 29 1980 D

B

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

108650 alt

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, a severe drought struck the sub-Saharan region of West Africa known as the Sahel. The drought produced enormous hardship for the people of the area, and necessitated large-scale international relief assistance. This report examines disaster relief activities in the Sahel of inter-governmental agencies within the United Nations system and of nongovernmental organizations. Relief efforts of these organizations were complementary to those of major bilateral donors, but constituted a significant portion of total Sahelian relief. Some sources have estimated that \$500 million were spent on relief during the 1973-1975 period. This study finds that approximately \$99 million were contributed by the United Nations agencies and some \$25 million by voluntary agencies during the same time period.

The response of the international community to the Sahel disaster provides an important case for study in order to identify the problems involved in disaster relief and to suggest changes which might improve international capabilities to respond to future disasters in the Sahel or other areas. Information was gathered by mail and through interviews from UN and voluntary agencies in North America, Europe, Australia, and West Africa. Over two hundred and fifty interviews were conducted with headquarters and field personnel, and over sixty questionnaires were distributed by mail. In addition, several West African government personnel and representatives of regional organizations were interviewed in Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta. Finally, officials of the United States Department of State and the Agency for International Development, as well as many private individuals provided important information and advice.

The study determined that while there are many differences in procedures and resources, as well as goals, voluntary and United Nations system agencies operate under similar constraints. While their goals, processes, and rationale may be divergent, their problems and limitations in terms of awareness and alert, development and implementation of response, and cooperation and evaluation are parallel, if not identical.

The main problems encountered by both UN and voluntary agencies in the initial awareness and alert stage of disaster response are related to information, field personnel, and authority. There was no adequate and reliable information gathering system, and this deficiency was coupled with a severe shortage of field personnel, inadequate training programs, a weak reporting system, and insufficient communications between agencies and between headquarters and field personnel. Moreover, all agencies were required to wait for an official government request before making more than a small step-up in activities and the FAO Early Warning System and other UN agencies were authorized to take no actions beyond simply reporting information. No authority existed to make recommendations or take other action to deal with the implications of the information.

In implementing these recommendations, UNDR0 should also pay special attention to developing the special skills and techniques required for coping with regional emergencies. UN agency Emergency Units can play a supportive role in this regard by (1) defining their working relationships and responsibilities with UNDR0 and other agency emergency units; (2) making plans to research, develop, and implement pre-disaster contingency plans; (3) developing evaluation procedures; and (4) conducting disaster relief training programs, mandatory for any UN personnel accepting field positions.

To create a more reliable information gathering and monitoring system, a variety of measures are desirable: (1) improvements in the Early Warning System and the development of similar surveillance systems in the health sector and other critical areas; (2) development of training programs for local government officials and for local medical and paramedical personnel to ensure more effective monitoring and assessment of conditions by governments in disaster-prone areas; and (3) an increase in UN field staff, particularly junior professional positions.

The problem of delay in alerting the UN system to the need for disaster relief suggests recommendations for increased United Nations authority, including giving the Director-General of FAO authority to make recommendations to potential donors and to governments on the basis of Early Warning System information, extending more assistance to disaster-affected populations through on-going programs, enhancing the ability of the UN field offices to react prior to a government request by increasing their emergency funds, and giving the UN system some sort of generalized permission to take limited preparatory action prior to an official request.

A clearer and more effective response to relief situations also indicates the need for improved emergency request processing and more clearly established reporting requirements. Major additional needs in the UN system are for pre-disaster contingency planning and more effective coordination between UN agencies with donor countries and with recipients, and the institutions of a rigorous and comprehensive relief evaluation of all policies, procedures, and programs.

A variety of changes are also necessary for voluntary agencies to enhance the useful roles they can play in disaster relief. There is a need, for instance, for more formal, direct contact with other voluntary agencies, with UN agencies, and with bilateral donors, so that mistakes and successes can be shared on all sides. For this to be fully successful, however, may require more receptive and informed attitudes toward each other on all sides.

Voluntary agencies must recognize their organizational limitations, learn to rely on others for information and implementation, put less emphasis on avoiding duplication, and, in general, exhibit greater trust and confidence in each other if they are to make possible more effective and efficient relief response. Where they do not exist, links should be developed with large national and international information and coordination groups. Voluntary agencies should also support regional organizations, such as CILSS, and local collaborative organizations, such as SPONG and GAP, and should encourage the formation of such local groups where they do not yet exist.

Once the disaster was recognized and requests for international assistance received, there were severe problems in gathering and distributing information and in coordinating relief activities. In the case of the UN system, the inability of UNDRO to assume relief coordination responsibility led to a search for a coordinator. This delay hampered effective action by and cooperation among all donors during the initial stage of relief operations. Similarly, the absence of contingency planning and inadequate information both on local needs and facilities and on the availability of supplies and transport internationally made the development of an effective relief response and the execution of relief programs more difficult.

The amount and immediate availability of funds for relief were important limiting factors for the UN and voluntary agencies. The initial funding was obtained by the UN system through an appeal of the Director-General of FAO. WFP and UNICEF, however, had emergency funds to begin relief activities. Similarly, for the voluntary agencies, the time required to respond depended on whether funds were already available or had to be raised. Smaller agencies channelled funds through agencies already in operation in the field to purchase specific supplies, and voluntary agencies contributed large amounts to transport of emergency supplies and road maintenance. Most of the voluntary agencies focused on a specific relief need, rather than on mounting massive distribution programs, and most preferred spending on development programs, rather than on direct relief. Some problems in the program initiation and implementation phases were caused by the "pressure to spend" phenomenon in voluntary agencies.

Systematic and coordinated execution of relief programs was hindered for both the UN system and voluntary agencies by a lack of communication between headquarters and field offices, between the agencies and other donors, and between all donors and the affected governments. Serious delays and losses were also caused by insufficient transport facilities and congestion at the ports, as well as by inadequate storage facilities and infestation of donated food.

The lack of systematic and comprehensive program and procedure evaluation was a serious deficiency in both the UN system and the voluntary agencies and hindered improvement in the disaster relief response of the international community.

To deal with the problems evident in the Sahel and to develop more effective disaster relief response will require substantial changes in policies and attitudes by the United Nations and voluntary agencies, and by potential donor and recipient governments. The changes suggested for the UN include a considerable enhancement in the capability and authority of UNDRO. This might be accomplished by instituting a disaster watch to maintain surveillance on disaster-prone areas during periods when there is no immediate crisis; producing a comprehensive UN field manual describing all UN agency responsibilities in disaster relief; developing a funding strategy that would enable potential donors to make specific prior commitments in principle; and developing a disaster relief training course for UNDP field representatives.

Voluntary agencies should also attempt to extend host country relations beyond the high official level to ensure cooperation in program implementation and survival in times of political change. Contact with middle-level and local officials might involve funding them to design and elaborate their own programs, thereby decreasing dependence on foreign planning.

Of particular importance for a more effective role is the development of more comprehensive evaluation procedures at all levels of voluntary agency activity. This need must be seen as an essential cost for effective assistance, and might be accomplished through the establishment of some jointly-funded evaluation program. These and other changes would greatly enhance the effectiveness of voluntary agency programs.

The Sahelian experience offers no easy formula to improve the international disaster relief system. The initiative for change and reform clearly lies with the governments of disaster-prone countries, governments of potential donor countries, international organizations, and voluntary agencies. Support from all will be necessary to improve humanitarian assistance. Moreover, the rights of the peoples of the developing world to determine their own futures must not be overlooked by those who wish to relieve human suffering. In the desire to provide assistance to disaster-stricken populations, donors must take care to respect the integrity and dignity of those in need and to avoid fostering a dependency for foreign assistance. The peoples of the developing world recognize that their hope for the future lies within themselves and others must have a similar understanding.

ACCESSION for	
NTIS	White Section <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DOC	Buff Section <input type="checkbox"/>
UNANNOUNCED	<input type="checkbox"/>
JUSTIFICATION _____	
BY _____	
DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY CODES	
Dist. AVAIL. and/or SPECIAL	
A	

INTERNATIONAL DISASTER RESPONSE:
THE SAHELIAN EXPERIENCE

Barbara J. Brown
Janet C. Tuthill
E. Thomas Rowe

Graduate School of International Studies
University of Denver

June 1976

This research was made possible by Grant Number 1722-520147 of the United States Agency for International Development and the United States Department of State. The opinions expressed in the report are solely the responsibility of the researchers and do not necessarily represent the views of the organizations studied or the sponsoring institutions.

Acknowledgments

We gratefully acknowledge the cooperation of all those United Nations, voluntary agency, and United States government personnel who generously gave of their time for interviews and provided valuable insight into the problems of the Sahel and disaster relief. Thanks also to all those who provided information by mail.

Alan Smith, Community Aid Abroad (Australia), and Michael H. Glantz, National Center for Atmospheric Research (Boulder, Colorado) served as special consultants and provided valuable suggestions for the completion of the report. Their assistance was greatly appreciated.

Special thanks are due to David Shear and James Kelly, U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C.; Mr. Dabell and Robert Golding, FAO Office for Special Relief Operations (OSRO), Rome; Mr. Bethke, World Food Program, Rome; J. Reyntjens, FAO, Rome; Timothy Brodhead, ACORD, London; Robert Quinlan, Catholic Relief Services, Geneva; Hans Dall and Antoine Fayossewo, FFH/AD, Rome; David Klugman, Tailoring Institute, Dakar; Michael Behr, OXFAM, Ouagadougou; and Arlene Epstein and Colleen Arnold, ACVA, New York, all of whom were especially helpful during the research.

A special thanks to John de Gara, UNITAR, for his faith, unfailing support, and encouragement in the early stages of the research.

George Shepherd and John McCamant of the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, provided helpful comments on the draft report. Their efforts are greatly appreciated.

A special thanks to Mrs. Elizabeth Brooks, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, for her many kindnesses and expert financial assistance in administering this project.

We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Shirley L. Taylor, who served as editor and lent her special artistic and stylistic talents to the preparation of the final report.

Barbara J. Brown
Janet C. Tuthill
E. Thomas Rowe

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Map

<u>THE NATURE OF THE STUDY</u>	IR 1
<u>SECTION I - THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM</u>	
List of Organizations and Abbreviations	UN 2
INTRODUCTION	UN 3
<u>Agencies and Emphases in the Sahel</u>	UN 3
<u>Chronology of Events</u>	UN 4
<u>Organization of the Report</u>	UN 7
DISASTER AWARENESS AND ALERT	UN 8
<u>Information and Reporting</u>	UN 8
<u>Personnel</u>	UN 12
<u>Authority</u>	UN 12
<u>Recommendations</u>	UN 14
DEVELOPING A RELIEF RESPONSE	UN 17
FAO/Office for Sahelian Relief Operations ...	UN 17
World Food Program	UN 19
World Health Organization	UN 22
United Nations Children's Fund	UN 24
<u>Recommendations</u>	UN 24
IMPLEMENTATION - PROBLEMS IN COORDINATION	UN 29
<u>Emergency Request Approval (WFP)</u>	UN 29
<u>Procurement of Commodities (WFP)</u>	UN 30
<u>Coordination of Transportation</u>	
<u>Facilities (OSRO)</u>	UN 30
<u>Condition of Donated Food</u>	UN 33
<u>Organization of Field Reporting System</u>	UN 34
CASE STUDY OF UN-NGO RELIEF COOPERATION: <u>WHO AND THE NIGER MEDICO-NUTRITIONAL TEAMS</u>	UN 35
THE SPECIAL CASE OF UNICEF	UN 38
<u>Conclusions</u>	UN 40
OTHER UN RESPONSES IN DROUGHT RELIEF	UN 42
UNESCO	UN 42
Gift Coupon Fund	UN 42
Man and the Biosphere Programme (MAB)	UN 42
World Meteorological Organization	UN 43
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	UN 44

UNDP	UN 45
UNHCR	UN 45
UNSO	UN 46
DEVELOPING A RELIEF RESPONSE	UN 48
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	UN 51
<u>Relief Coordination Responsibilities</u>	UN 51
<u>Disaster Awareness and Alert</u>	UN 53
<u>UN Authority</u>	UN 54
<u>Developing a Relief Response</u>	UN 54
Footnotes	UN 56


SECTION II - VOLUNTARY AGENCIES

INTRODUCTION	VA 2
<u>Voluntary Agencies Included in the Study</u>	VA 3
<u>Kinds of Voluntary Agency Relief Programs</u>	VA 3
<u>Voluntary Agencies and International Response</u>	VA 3
<u>Classification of Voluntary Agency Activities</u>	VA 3
RELIEF RESPONSE	VA 5
<u>Initiation and Implementation of Relief</u>	VA 5
<u>Types of Relief Commodities and Activities</u>	VA 7
<u>Problems in Sahel Relief</u>	VA 8
DEVELOPMENT RESPONSE	VA 9
<u>Program Initiation and Implementation</u>	VA 9
<u>Types of Development Programs</u>	VA 11
<u>Problems in Sahel Development</u>	VA 11
<u>Special Cases</u>	VA 12
COORDINATION EFFORTS	VA 13
<u>Extra-African Cooperation</u>	VA 13
ICVA	VA 13
ACVA	VA 15
FFH/AD	VA 15
LICROSS	VA 16
WCC	VA 17
<u>Cor Unum</u>	VA 17
ACORD	VA 17
<u>Regional Cooperation</u>	VA 17
CILSS-NGO Liaison	VA 18
AALC	VA 18
<u>Local Cooperation</u>	VA 18
SPONG	VA 18
GAP	VA 19

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	VA 20
PROSPECTS FOR VOLUNTARY AGENCY COORDINATION AND COOPERATION	VA 20
<u>Mauritania</u>	VA 20
<u>Senegal</u>	VA 20
<u>Mali</u>	VA 21
<u>Upper Volta</u>	VA 21
<u>Niger</u>	VA 21
<u>Chad</u>	VA 22
<u>Relief Coordination</u>	VA 22
<u>Development Coordination</u>	VA 23
THE NEED FOR EVALUATION PROCEDURE	VA 25
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	VA 26
<u>Conclusions</u>	VA 26
<u>Recommendations</u>	VA 28
Footnotes	VA 31
 <u>SECTION III - INTERRELATIONS IN DISASTER RESPONSE</u>	IR 5
<u>Differences in UN and Voluntary Agency Response</u>	IR 6
<u>Disaster Awareness and Alert</u>	IR 7
<u>Development of Response</u>	IR 7
<u>Execution of Relief Response</u>	IR 8
<u>Evaluation of Relief</u>	IR 9
<u>Patterns of Interaction</u>	IR 9
 <u>CONCLUSION</u>	IR 11
 <u>APPENDICES</u>	
THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM	UN I - VIII
VOLUNTARY AGENCIES	VA I - VIII

INTERNATIONAL DISASTER RESPONSE:
THE SAHELIAN EXPERIENCE




DROUGHT IN SUB-SAHARA AFRICA



BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE

500 1000 MILES
500 1000 KILOMETERS

2006 10 74 STATEIRGEI

-  The six countries of the Sahel studied
-  The four Sahelian countries visited for the study ● Capitals
-  Other drought-affected areas of Sub-Saharan Africa

**INTERNATIONAL DISASTER RESPONSE:
THE SAHELIAN EXPERIENCE**

15

THE NATURE OF THE STUDY

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, a severe drought struck the sub-Saharan region of West Africa known as the Sahel. Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta, with an estimated total population of twenty-five million, were the most severely affected countries. As in other less-developed areas of the world where existence is marginal, even under the best conditions, the drought in the Sahel meant increased malnutrition, famine, and death for the people of the region. Conservative estimates state that more than 100,000 people died and approximately forty per cent of all livestock were lost, even as massive international relief assistance got underway.

Famine in the Sahel is symptomatic of the widespread problem of world hunger. The critical nature of the world food situation emphasizes the need for examining the capacity of the international community to respond to future world crises. Increasing scarcity of world food reserves limits the ability of international donors to respond to all disasters and calls for more effective use of available resources. Examination of the impact of the Sahelian relief effort can serve as an important opportunity to improve the utilization of these resources in other drought relief situations.

Recent criticism of international relief response to drought-stricken Africa has focused on bureaucratic inefficiency, the inadequacy of traditional diplomatic practice, and the failure to react promptly to the first indications of disaster conditions. Some studies have recommended revolutionary changes in the international system. This report is based on the premise that certain changes can be made within the present international system to facilitate more effective and efficient relief operations. The Sahelian case challenges the capacity of the system to respond and can provide the impetus for developing better responses within existing structures.

The Sahelian experience reveals that international relief is too important and too complex to leave largely to USAID or the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, because disaster assistance is neither a major function nor a special competence of these organizations. In every disaster, a wide spectrum of responses is required to meet the needs of the affected population. The contributions of the United Nations specialized agencies and of voluntary organizations constituted a significant portion of total Sahelian relief, which some sources have estimated at \$500 million. This study found that during the 1973-1975 period, the United Nations agencies contributed approximately \$99 million and the voluntary organizations provided around \$25 million. (These figures are conservative estimates and do not reflect development spending in the Sahelian Zone by these organizations -- over \$32 million in the case of the voluntary agencies, for example.)

The study determined that while there are many differences in procedures and resources, as well as goals, voluntary and United Nations system agencies respond to disasters in much the same way and they operate under similar constraints. While their goals, processes, and rationale may be divergent, their problems and limitations in terms of awareness and alert, development and implementation of response, and, above all, cooperation and evaluation are parallel, if not identical.

Most voluntary agencies, as well as the UN system, learned of the drought crisis in the Sahel through the FAO Early Warning System and their field representatives. At the root of the various problems in drought awareness was the lack of an adequate and reliable information-gathering system coupled with a severe shortage of field personnel. In the case of the UN system, the inability of UNDRRO to assume relief coordination responsibility led to a search for a disaster relief coordinator. This delay hampered effective cooperation among all donors during the initial stage of relief operations. Major relief operations were also delayed by the lack of authority to recommend the initiation of relief prior to a government request. Even agencies with field personnel in the Sahel were forced to wait for an official government declaration of the disaster before making more than a small step-up in activities, and a large number of the voluntary agencies had no field personnel or partner organizations in the area when the disaster was declared. Further, at the time relief began, the Sahelian governments had little experience in dealing with voluntary agencies, and while voluntary agencies have greater flexibility than large donors, they cannot act without heed to local political constraints in the host country.

The failure of the Sahelian governments to provide WHO and UNICEF with specific information on health needs hampered their relief efforts until independent assessments could be made. Mobilization and monitoring of relief by voluntary agencies depends on the availability of field representatives or contacts to handle it. Few voluntary agencies discuss or share information on programs with UN system or bilateral donors unless a contact relationship has been established, though in the Sahelian case, an effort was made to share information with other groups while developing relief. Some agencies were reluctant to work with CILSS when it did not meet their early expectations. Initial projects submitted to voluntary agencies by CILSS were not suited to their priorities or scale of operations, but the organization has made important contributions and an understanding on both sides was slowly reached.

The initial funding for relief operations in the Sahel was obtained by the UN system through an appeal of the Director-General of FAO. WFP and UNICEF had emergency reserve funds, however, to begin relief activities. The time needed to respond to a disaster appeal depended, for the voluntary agencies, on whether funds were already available or had to be raised. Smaller agencies gave funds to agencies already in operation in the field to purchase specific relief supplies, and voluntary agencies contributed large amounts to transport of emergency supplies and road maintenance. Most of the voluntary agencies focused on a specific relief need, rather than

mounting massive distribution programs and most voluntary agencies studied prefer spending on development programs, rather than on direct relief. Some problems in the program initiation and implementation phases are caused by the "pressure to spend" phenomenon in voluntary agencies. In the case of the UN system, while Sahelian assistance requests were processed more quickly than usual, problems in the procurement and shipping of relief supplies slowed down the response time. Moreover, lack of contingency planning in the area of drought relief administration hindered the UN bureaucracies in reacting quickly and effectively.

Systematic and coordinated execution of relief programs was primarily hindered for both the UN system and the voluntary agencies by a lack of communication between headquarters and field offices, between the agencies and other donors, and between all donors and the affected governments. Serious delays and losses occurred because of insufficient transport facilities and congestion at the ports, as well as inadequate storage facilities.

Special relief efforts were made by other UN agencies (UNDP, UNESCO, IBRD, UNHCR, WMO, UNSO) and many activities that emerged as direct reactions to the drought disaster played an important supportive role in Sahel relief.

The lack of systematic and comprehensive program and procedure evaluation is a serious deficiency in both the UN system and the voluntary agencies and prevents improvement in the disaster relief response of the international community.

While there is room for improvement at all stages of the relief response and development program process, the most serious deficiencies were found in the areas also considered most vital: coordination of effort and cultivation of cooperative attitudes. Since the projects and programs of the various organizations involved in disaster response frequently and inextricably intertwine, there is an urgent need for better communication, for more effective use of resources, for more sensitive long-range planning, for greater foresight, and for more effective means of educating and listening to the international public. There is urgent need, too, for evaluation procedures capable of detecting effective or ineffective programs and of defining the future needs of specific areas. Serious attention must be paid to these considerations if the international community is to respond more effectively to the needs of the world's people.

SECTION I

THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

List of Organizations and Abbreviations

ASECNA	<u>Agence pour la sécurité de la navigation aérienne en Afrique et à Madagascar</u>
CILSS	<u>Comité Permanent Interétats de Lutte contre la Secheresse dans le Sahel</u>
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
FAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
FED	European Development Fund
IBRD/IDA	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ International Development Association
LICROSS	League of International Red Cross Societies
OMVS	<u>Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Sénégal</u>
OSRO	FAO Office for Sahelian Relief Operations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNDRO	United Nations Disaster Relief Office
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSO	United Nations Sahelian Office (also known as SSO - Special Sahelian Office)
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization

INTRODUCTION

In 1972, the United Nations system was called upon to deal with the largest disaster relief operation it had ever experienced. The crisis involved the World Food Program, in particular, in the supply of emergency assistance on a scale never before encountered in connection with a single natural disaster. The drought, which occurred in the sub-Saharan region of West Africa, challenged the capacity of the UN system agencies (as well as bilateral donors) to react quickly and appropriately to relieve human suffering on a regional scale encompassing six countries.*

A number of criticisms have been directed toward the international relief efforts that went on from 1973 through 1975 in the Sahel. Hal Sheets and Roger Morris raised serious questions in their 1974 report concerning the relief operations, particularly the responses of the United Nations and the United States. The relief effort, they argued, seemed "haunted by rudimentary failures to heed early warnings, to plan in advance, and to monitor and coordinate rescue efforts." They also charged that the "bureaucracies were often unprepared, or unable to take measures that might have further reduced the tragedy."¹ Others have alleged that in the related, but very different case of Ethiopia, the international community "went along with its own coverup and remained silent despite what its members knew was happening to the Ethiopian people."² It has been charged that these reports contain several inaccuracies, but nevertheless, such reporting serves a useful purpose, in that it points up the need to reform certain aspects of the disaster response network that proved inadequate to meet the exigencies of these situations. Exposés, however, generally do not offer alternatives or specific recommendations, and the purpose of examining the relief operations in the Sahel should be to improve the ways communities respond to disasters, to discover ways in which relief problems might be solved.

While the type, depth, and range of problems differ from agency to agency, and from situation to situation, some basic common aspects can be identified. An analysis of both the common and unique problems of Sahelian relief will be useful in formulating more positive and concrete recommendations for more effective action in comparable future situations.

Agencies and Emphases in the Sahel

Among the UN agencies and programs most active in Sahelian relief were: the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the World Food Program (WFP). Extensive documentation on the relief operations was examined

* See Appendix UN I for breakdown of relief contributions by organization.

from the point of view of each agency involved. Headquarters and field personnel officers in Senegal, Mali, Upper Volta, and Niger were interviewed for their opinions on UN relief operations and for their recommendations for better cooperation with major bilateral donors.*

There is also a growing concern among the UN agencies not involved in relief with concentrating their efforts on forecasting drought and on long-term development planning. The purpose of such activity is to help disaster-prone countries become less dependent on foreign intervention and to make it possible to mitigate the impact of a natural disaster, such as a drought, and prevent its becoming a major human disaster, as in the Sahel. The roles of such UN agencies as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the World Meteorological Organization (WHO), the United Nations Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO), the United Nations Special Sahelian Office (UNSO), and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) will also be examined as potential contributors to the resolution of fundamental problems in the Sahel.

The following discussion summarizes some of the more important developments from the time the UN was alerted to the drought disaster until relief operations were phased into short-term reconstruction and rehabilitation programs.

Chronology of Events

The first signs that a serious drought situation was developing in the Sahel were recognized early in 1972. In the spring of that year, the Intergovernmental Committee of WFP discussed a proposal of the Director-General of FAO that the Sahelian countries be given special treatment in the matter of emergency food assistance because of the endemic nature of drought to the area. In September 1972, the FAO/WFP Early Warning System signalled an acute emergency situation developing over extensive areas because of poor harvests throughout the Sahel. As the food shortage worsened, the governments concerned stepped up their requests for food from WFP and external donors.

In January 1973, the inter-country Liptako Gourma Authority (a regional authority comprised of the Sahelian countries of Mali, Upper Volta, and Niger and concerned with the long-term development potential of the area) requested that two FAO specialists carry out an emergency mission to assess the magnitude of damage to livestock in its region. Their report led to the establishment of a field task force to coordinate information on the livestock situation and to assist local governments in alleviating the problem. Also in January, a joint UN/UNDP/FAO Mission went to Chad, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal to study water problems and to formulate the emergency measures required in hydrology and hydrogeology. At the end of February, the Director-General established the Interdepartmental Working Group on the Problems of the Sahelian Zone to

* See Appendix UN II for U.S. contribution to WFP.

develop and put forward proposals for emergency action in the food and livestock sectors and to develop proposals for an integrated, long-term approach to agricultural development in the area.

The ECA Conference of Ministers adopted a resolution (Accra, 19-23 February 1973) recommending that the Sahel governments declare the zone a disaster area. This was done at a meeting of the Ministers of Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta, 23-26 March 1973, at Ouagadougou, at which time also the Permanent Interstate Committee on Drought Control (CILSS) was formed.

In the context of these developments, the Director-General appointed Mr. Raymond Scheyven, former Minister of Economic Affairs in Belgium, former Minister of Development Cooperation, and past President of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), to promote new initiatives to alleviate the crisis and contribute to the recovery of the region. Mr. Scheyven outlined the scope of his mission to an ad hoc consultative group which included representatives of donor nations, the African countries concerned, and of the FED, WFP, and IBRD. At this meeting on 29 March, it was recommended that a special unit be formed to deal with the crisis because the Interdepartmental Working Group would not be able to cope with the magnitude of the Sahelian situation. It was not until late May 1973 that such a unit, OSRO, was established.

After the March meeting, Mr. Scheyven visited the region for two weeks in mid-April 1973. On the basis of his discussions with the government authorities concerned and the representatives of external aid agencies in the region, he subsequently reported on the need for assistance not covered by established programs and on the urgency of distributing supplies before the arrival of the rains. His findings were drawn to the attention of a second consultative group which met 4 May at FAO headquarters with representatives of some donor and recipient governments and some international organizations. On 10 May, the Director-General issued an appeal to twenty donor governments and a number of nongovernmental agencies. He urged contributing governments to do their utmost to expedite delivery to recipient countries of supplies promised or en route, and appealed for urgently-needed cash donations to the FAO Sahelian Zone Trust Fund. The appeal was followed by Mr. Scheyven's discussions with a number of potential donors in North America and Europe. At the same time, public opinion was aroused by the mass media, which was given basic data on the affected countries in an effort to create worldwide awareness.

While Mr. Scheyven was in New York to consult with the Secretary-General, ECOSOC adopted Resolution 1759 (LIV) on 18 May 1973, which called on Member States to support the appeal of the Director-General of FAO for emergency assistance and asked the Secretary-General

. . . to organize as soon as possible, in collaboration with the organization of the United Nations system -- each within the framework of its items of reference -- the necessary assistance action in order to respond to the requests of the

governments of this region with regard to their medium-term and long-term needs.

In response to the resolution, the Secretary-General consulted with the Director-General of FAO in Rome on 20 May 1973, and it was decided that FAO should serve as the focal point within the United Nations systems for emergency relief operations.

By diverting regular and experienced staff, the Director-General established in Rome in late May the Special Office for Sahelian Relief Operations (OSRO), under the leadership of J.V.A. Nehemiah, Director of the FAO Office for Inter-Agency Affairs. Further, the Director-General established in Ouagadougou a mechanism for ensuring, in cooperation with the governments concerned, that the necessary supplies reach the affected populations in time. This operation was headed by Moise Mensah, FAO Assistant Director-General and Regional Representative for Africa. Also in May, the Secretary-General designated Undersecretary-General Bradford Morse to be his coordinator in New York for the relief operations.

In accordance with the provisions of ECOSOC Resolution 1759(LIV) dealing with medium- and long-term assistance, a meeting on this subject was convened in Geneva at the Palais des Nations by the Secretary-General, 28-29 June 1973. The meeting was chaired by Bradford Morse and included representatives of all interested bodies of the UN system, of a number of governments, including those of the drought-stricken countries, and of concerned nongovernmental organizations. Among the resolutions adopted by this convention and subsequently approved by the Secretary-General was the establishment of a small, temporary staff (the Special Sahelian Office, UNSO) to

. . . serve as the focal point for the coordination of efforts of the UN system for mid- and long-term assistance to the affected countries . . . [and to undertake] a technical preparation process, with a view to ensuring that a coherent, integrated and coordinated response by the international community to requests that may be anticipated following elaboration of needs by the Permanent Inter-State Committee.³

These recommendations were endorsed by ECOSOC on 11 July 1973.⁴ On 19 July, the Permanent Representatives to the UN of Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta requested the inclusion in the provisional agenda of the 28th Session of the General Assembly of the item, and it was placed on the agenda on 21 September.

On 9 October, His Excellency President Sangoule Lamizana of Upper Volta addressed the General Assembly.⁵ In addition, the Assembly had before it a document outlining actions taken or proposed by the UN system in dealing with the Sahelian crisis.⁶ The document also contained materials from the meeting of CILSS, held from 31 August to 12 September 1973, including proposed priority programs requested by the Committee with a view to overcoming the effects of the drought. In all, there were one hundred and twenty-three proposals, carrying an estimated cost of \$US 850 million. On 17 October,

the General Assembly adopted a comprehensive resolution (3654, XXVIII) on the subject, and a special resolution concerning aid to the Sudano-Sahelian populations threatened with famine.⁷

At a meeting of the CILSS held on 19 and 20 December 1973, among other matters considered, the inclusion of Gambia as a member of the Committee was recommended. By mid-January 1974, a project compendium, consisting of supplemental information about the one hundred and twenty-three projects proposed by CILSS had been prepared, subject to the inclusion of certain projects for Chad, Gambia, and Mauritania. The compendium was approved by the Coordinator of CILSS and was circulated to all Member States of the UN, non-member states, all concerned elements of the UN system, and to several intergovernmental and nongovernmental agencies.

During the course of 1974, the situation in the Sahel was considered by ECOSOC at its 56th and 57th Sessions. At the 56th Session, the resolution concerned the progress achieved on medium- and long-term programs.⁸ At the 57th Session, ECOSOC considered another progress report from the Secretary-General.⁹ The adopted resolution noted with satisfaction the role played by OSRO, as well as that of UNSO, and urged the UN agencies and the international community as a whole to intensify their efforts toward the achievement of the objectives of relief, recovery, and rehabilitation programs.

Following the 57th Session, the Secretary-General took further measures to strengthen the cooperation between UNSO and CILSS. With the completion of many preparatory steps for medium- and long-term programs, and with the beginning of recovery and rehabilitation activities, the Secretary-General transferred a number of major functions of UNSO from New York to the Sahel. With the approval of the Minister Coordinator of CILSS, a Sahelian office was established in Ouagadougou, Upper Volta, in October 1974, and Mr. Galal Magdi was appointed its director.

Organization of the Report

Disaster relief activity may be described in three phases: 1) awareness and alert, 2) development of relief responses, and 3) implementation. The following three sections of this report deal with the three stages in order. The remaining sections consider, first, other UN agency response and the activity of those which played a supportive role in relief operations or were concerned with longer range development in the Sahel; second, the need for a relief evaluation procedure for UN system disaster response; and, finally, some of the major conclusions drawn from the Sahel experience.

All of the recommendations emerging from this report are directed toward developing a more positive and effective response to the challenge the Sahelian drought crisis presented to the United Nations system -- a response that could prove vitally important in the future.

DISASTER AWARENESS AND ALERT

The United Nations system did not move quickly to take the lead in alerting the international community to the Sahelian drought. There were several reasons why various agencies were unable to respond earlier than they did. To identify the major factors inhibiting UN response, officials of the major relief agencies were asked the following questions:

- How did the organization become aware of a developing disaster situation in the Sahel?
- How were the various elements of the UN system alerted to the need for relief assistance?
- What kind of immediate response was initiated?

Three critical factors emerged as central problems in response to the Sahelian crisis for the UN system, and should, therefore, be key elements in designing an improved alert system at the field level: 1) Information and Reporting; 2) Personnel; and 3) Adequate authority to act upon information received. These problem areas and the specific steps taken by the agencies involved in relief require a detailed examination.

Information and Reporting

At the root of the UN's problems in drought awareness and alert was the absence of an adequate and reliable information-gathering system coupled with an ineffective reporting system to relay such information. While obtaining reliable information about almost everything pertaining to the Sahelian relief situation was difficult throughout the entire operation, the lack of data at the beginning of the relief period predetermined the nature of the assistance subsequently given.

FAO/WFP Early Warning System

Since 1969, monthly crop and food shortage situation reports for each country have been submitted to the FAO headquarters for inclusion in a monthly global review which is distributed to the governments supplying the information and to interested potential donors. The reporting "system" usually consists of one person filling out a report form, which is transmitted through normal channels by mail. The report form requests the following judgments regarding the current situation in a country:

1. The main food crop in the reporting year as a percentage of the previous year's crop.

(Comparing the current situation to a previously-existing status quo may be adequate for reporting a dramatic change in food production, but may not be sufficient for reporting a slowly worsening condition, such as a gradually developing drought crisis.)

2. Crop conditions.
3. Planting situation.
4. Progress on the harvest.

These judgments are made on the basis of the following criteria:

- A = Above average/early
- B = Average/normal
- C = Below average/delayed
- D = Partial failure/sharp reduction

The rainfall condition is reported on a similar scale and numerical values of 1 through 5 are assigned to indicate the following situations:

- 1 = Very dry
- 2 = Dry
- 3 = Normal
- 4 = Wet
- 5 = Very wet

The quality of this information (even if it were adequate in scope to cover such situations as drought) depends on several factors, such as the experience and interest of the representative making the report, his sources of information, its reliability and replicability, and his ability to judge what is "normal" for the area.

As early as 15 January 1972, all six Sahelian countries were listed in the Early Warning System reports as suffering from food shortages, but these needs were presumably being met by WFP food aid in all the countries except Niger. It is difficult, then, to pinpoint when an awareness revealed in the warning system should have received closer attention and definitive action, but it is quite clear that better communications among agencies and with the field are required. Another critical problem is that the Director-General has no mandate to request that donors act on the basis of warning system information. The data was made available to potential donors on a monthly basis, but other than routine reporting of information, the Early Warning System has no direction or responsibility to make recommendations, nor any authority to see that action is taken to alleviate the conditions it reports.

The Early Warning System information received by FAO headquarters varied greatly in quality. It was not only incomplete, but often erroneous

and contradictory. These conditions led to confusion and delay in reacting to the developing disaster situation. By September 1972, enough information had accumulated to indicate that a crisis situation existed throughout the entire region. Once FAO was alerted to this fact, however, it still had to wait for the governments concerned to take official action to meet the crisis by requesting food from external aid donors and WFP. In January 1973, a livestock study was conducted in Mali, Niger, and Upper Volta by the Accra Office, but the report was not received at headquarters until March, so FAO was unable to take an decisive action from September through March because of a lack of reliable information and the absence of a formal request for assistance from the governments concerned.

WFP in the Field

Each year since 1968, the World Food Program has assisted in at least one country in the Sahel. The request for aid underwent only cursory appraisal and everyone became accustomed to the fact that the Sahel is a chronically drought-prone area. It became an accepted attitude that the UN would routinely provide supplemental food for the Sahelian countries. How could WFP personnel evaluate the situation? How could it measure what was happening year by year? For many, even without reliable data, the conviction slowly grew that the Sahelian people could not survive under conditions that, each year, grew increasingly severe, but the question remained: How could a man in the capital city, for example, adequately evaluate the situation and predict its future course? The rainfall yearly averages, available through the Agence pour la sécurité de la Navigation aeriennne en Afrique et à Madagascar (ASECNA), were indicators of drought, but the organization of meteorological services in the Sahelian countries has historically been designed to meet the needs of aviation. On behalf of the governments, ASECNA has acted as the operating agency. The countries of the Sahel were lacking, however, a meteorological service which would coordinate effort and centralize data and knowledge in all sectors of meteorological activity and relate this information to the agricultural sector. Without this vital link, the meteorological information that was available did not yield meaningful data for predicting disastrous drought conditions in the Sahel.

A long cable concerning drought conditions arrived at headquarters from the Ouagadougou UNDP office between Christmas and New Year's 1972, when most of the personnel were away for the holidays. Not until March 1973 did WFP indicate some awareness of the crisis in the whole of the Sahel -- an awareness brought about, even then, largely through USAID efforts to persuade WFP to assume a leadership position as an information source and coordination point for relief operations. The initial hesitancy of WFP to assume these responsibilities, the inability of its personnel to handle such a large-scale operation, and the uncertainty about the extent to which WFP should assume relief authority, all contributed to the confusion and delay in mobilizing relief in the March-May period.

WFP did attempt to obtain and publish shipping schedule information in its March-May newsletters, but the information was difficult to gather from donors for, among others, the following reasons: 1) WFP had not been assigned coordination responsibility by UN action. Donors involved in early relief activities (chiefly the United States) urged WFP to assume this role, but no UN authority had designated WFP as a disaster relief coordinator. This lack of legitimacy and authority undoubtedly made WFP officials reluctant to pursue bilateral donors for information about their shipping schedules when it was not readily given. This lack of authority must also have influenced the degree to which bilateral donors took WFP's activities seriously. 2) WFP had very few personnel in the Sahel before March 1973 to handle the work-load that coordination responsibility requires. Information obtained from bilateral donors and multilateral organizations had to be coordinated with information provided by representatives of the principal clearing and forwarding agents in the major ports in West Africa. Such a complex task surpassed the capacity of the field personnel to handle it. 3) Some donors were reluctant or unable to provide accurate shipping information for reasons of their own not explained by WFP. While these problems were alleviated to some extent, there was still room for vast improvement in reporting and coordinating such information.

WHO and UNICEF

Other UN agencies also reported information problems. WHO headquarters, for example, cited UNDRO -- not its field representatives -- as its first source of information on the situation in the Sahel. Once again, however, even after the agency was alerted to the crisis, it was necessary to wait for a government request for assistance, which did not come until July 1973, despite the involvement of WHO personnel in assessing health needs. WHO was not really in a position to act much earlier than it did because, basically, WHO has an advisory role in disaster relief and is not an executing relief agency. It normally uses the existing field staff in the area and may mobilize required staff from other areas. If necessary, WHO recruits temporary personnel to assist in emergency relief operations. The primary responsibility of WHO in disasters is to coordinate emergency measures taken in relation to health by the United Nations organizations, with the assistance of voluntary agencies and national and nongovernmental groups outside the affected region. The technical assistance of WHO in disasters is limited to the provision of skilled personnel and urgently-needed supplies, equipment, and transport until other outside agencies can assume these functions. The World Health Organization will assist in evaluation of the medical and health aspects of emergency relief, in assessment of needs, and can facilitate the immediate movement of drugs or vaccines if requested by the concerned government.

UNICEF responded to an emergency request from Mauritania in March 1973, but reported that it had been informed of the increasing gravity of the situation much earlier by the Dakar office. In the event of disaster, UNICEF field personnel are expected to alert the headquarters and to assist the government, if requested, in assessing the most urgent needs of children and mothers. Following its assessment of the situation and identification of needs, UNICEF field staff are instructed to inform headquarters of the terms

of the assessment and to take action locally to meet the immediate needs of children. The decision on diversion of supplies and equipment already in a country and/or local procurement to this end is left to the UNICEF field office, but it is expected that when supplies are under the control of a government department not actively involved in relief, necessary consultations will precede any diversions of supplies. Representatives are authorized to divert the supplies and funds of regular programs to a total of \$25,000 without reference to headquarters. Funding within this authorization is against current country commitments. However, UNICEF representatives, usually anxious to maintain untroubled relations with their hosts, are generally reluctant to release such funds, for their appropriation implies disaster conditions and UNICEF is unwilling to make this implication without the approval of the government of the country, regardless of the severity of the situation. This diplomatic restraint may have prevented UNICEF from acting on early information relayed to headquarters by the Dakar office.

Personnel

The second serious problem hindering the verification of need and distribution of information within the UN agencies is the lack of field personnel. With the exception of the UNDP office, UN agency field offices are often one-person operations. This difficulty is especially serious for UNICEF, which has three regional offices (Dakar, Brazzaville, and Abidjan) responsible for the Sahel region and suffers the most severe shortage of field personnel of any agency involved in relief in West Africa. Most WFP offices are expecting an increase in staff positions, which means, as in Mali, for example, there will now be two WFP officers. These representatives will be responsible for monitoring food shipments and possible food shortages, and will undertake extensive in-country travel. While this is certainly an improvement in the situation for WFP, it is hardly adequate, and other agencies did not indicate any anticipated increase in staff positions in the near future.

In addition to the shortage of field personnel, some UN agencies reported difficulty in recruiting experienced people for duty in West Africa. Based on observations of the composition of the field staffs interviewed for this study, there were very few junior professional posts. This fact places an inordinate burden on the senior representative and further indicates the lack of UN emphasis on the development of a field career service. In addition, most of the field representatives indicated little or no prior experience with disaster or the problems of drought relief. While the study did not include a formal analysis of the quality of UN field staff in West Africa, it does appear that the lack of drought-experienced personnel and junior professional posts hinders more effective administration of UN programs in the region.

Authority

Complex political reasons underlie many of the problems in the Sahel -- the possible effect on a population if it were known, for example,

that the government was mismanaging or not coping with the situation in a country. There are many influences and forces at work which would welcome the information that there was going to be a massive crop failure in a certain country, particularly if the marketing or producing countries concerned had surpluses which could be directed there for profit.

In the Sahel, the inability or unwillingness of the Sahelian governments to respond earlier than they did led to charges of political coverups and UN bureaucratic bungling. In defense, UN officials blamed the governments involved for minimizing the disaster situation and for inaccurately assessing the needs of their populations. One of the most pervasive issues that arises in connection with the UN and disaster relief is the question of the limitations of UN authority. The Sahelian relief operation causes one to question the extent to which the UN may act without prior government authorization. To what extent may it act on behalf of the world community to assist victims of disaster, whether natural or man-made, when faced with inaction or incompetence on the part of the governments concerned?

The United Nations Charter defines the limits of UN authority in this regard in Article 2(7), which states:

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene within matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state

Apparently this Charter provision is strictly interpreted, for the United Nations can give no aid, even during a disaster, without the specific request and cooperation of the recipient country. So long as this time-worn diplomatic practice prevails, the major decisions in disaster relief will likely remain with the government officials of the afflicted countries.

There are those who believe, however, that international humanitarian law demands that the international community intervene when governments do not act on behalf of disaster victims. In fact, there exists an overwhelming consensus of Member States that insists upon coercive action by the United Nations in the area of human rights -- an area where the rights of disaster victims must belong. Jack Shepherd argues,

. . . clearly, there should be an international fail-safe system which can be activated when a government cannot or will not act, for the fiasco in Ethiopia was not unique or even unusual. Recently, the "acknowledgement problem" occurred again in famines in India and in Haiti [New York Times, June 9, 1974 (Haiti); August 30, September 3 and 5, 1974 (India)]. The price is heavy for this form of national sovereignty: In spite of all the good will, the international disaster relief system is a non-system. 10

The question of whether or not the UN system or the international community should be competent to initiate relief action prior to a request from the governments concerned cannot be discussed in isolation. On the one hand, the nature of UN authority in disasters is a function of the type of organization and operational method that has evolved over the past thirty years. On the other hand, it is, or should be, a cooperative enterprise with the countries concerned, and one cannot draw a firm line indicating precisely where the definitive constraints lie, since "authority" must be a joint concept. One cannot discuss, therefore, extending the authority of the UN, without also considering the responsibilities of governments. A clarification of the boundaries of responsibility on both sides is essential for formulating ways in which the authority and resources of the UN system might be better utilized.

Recommendations

Information Reporting and Personnel

Given the shortage of field personnel and the lack of hope for any substantial improvement in this situation, what other measures are being taken to ensure that more reliable information about a developing crisis, such as a drought situation, will be available in future disasters? The instituted reforms in the Early Warning System (EWS) should help to alleviate some information problems. Between the months of May and October 1973, the EWS was supplemented by a "Special Early Warning System" which reported weekly (as opposed to monthly) on rainfall conditions and its information was forwarded by cable, rather than by mail. The change was apparently helpful in predicting food shortages, because in September 1973, donors knew that additional relief would be needed in 1974. This exercise was used only in 1973, however, and in 1974 and 1975, reports were made on a ten-day basis between May and October. This technique for tracing the progress of rainfall during critical periods of drought or monsoon has now come under the auspices of FAO and reportedly will be a permanent feature of the EWS.

In addition to a rainfall-crop production Early Warning System, a health sector early warning alarm would be a useful backup system to help determine the scope and magnitude of relief needs. Work now underway on a nutritional surveillance system for West Africa (by the London Technical Group), as well as work being done at the University of Louvain (Centre de Recherche sur l'Epidemiologie des Désastres, École de Santé Public, under the direction of Professor Michel F. Lechat) along the same lines should prove useful for early reporting.

UN field representatives offer three suggestions that could be instituted to improve information gathering and reporting systems in developing drought situations:

1. Increase the number of field personnel in West Africa -- specifically, add more junior professional posts -- to enhance the UN's capacity to independently monitor and

assess developing food shortage crises or, at least, to assist government officials in doing so.

2. Employ the ten-day monitoring feature of the Early Warning System every rainy season, not just when crop failure is suspected.
3. Develop alternative disaster alert systems, such as a health and nutritional surveillance system, to provide additional information on the nature and scope of the human population needs.

The personnel increase probably cannot be realized in any substantial way, as the UN suffers from financial, as well as recruitment, problems in West Africa. The best hope for improvement lies in employing several different kinds of monitoring strategies in a variety of sectors and independent of government crop-yield estimates.

In terms of developing the capability of independent monitoring, it is questionable whether the UN would be able to pioneer such an effort in West Africa. Little real confidence exists among UN agency personnel that the individual agencies have the ability to advocate major changes without bilateral support. The reasons for this lack of confidence are administrative as well as financial. The fact that less monetary and human resources are available to the agencies than to major bilateral donors hinders substantial investment in the Sahel's future and necessarily places the UN agencies in a subordinate role.

Authority

Given the present limitations of UN authority to act in a crisis, what steps can be taken to (a) encourage governments to make relief requests earlier and more realistically, and (b) to ensure their cooperation in distributing relief assistance?

There are some opportunities for UN representatives to play a more active role in encouraging governments to move more quickly in recognizing a disaster situation and requesting relief assistance, in advising both the governments and potential donors of the developing exigencies of a situation. Leaking information to the press about governmental or UN inaction in the face of a developing food shortage may not be the best way to get bureaucracies moving. Media pressure often reinforces the defensive attitudes of those governments already extremely sensitive to criticism and insecure about their political situations as well as their ability to meet the food requirements of their populations. Public pressure certainly calls attention to a problem, but it does little to foster a cooperative relationship between donors and recipients.

There are not just two possibilities, however, for expansion of UN authority in disaster relief -- that is, present authority coupled with more efficient data-gathering or full authority to undertake operations

in sovereign countries without permission of their governments. There are, in fact, several possibilities in between those two extremes. The interpretation of Article 2(7) to allow for disaster assistance does not have to be so broad that the confidence of the Member States is forfeited, for this would ultimately discourage participation in United Nations programs. Reasonable recommendations for the expansion of UN authority might include:

- 1) The Director-General of FAO be given authority to make recommendations for relief assistance to potential donors or to the governments involved on the basis of information made available by the Early Warning System;
- 2) Generalized permission be given to the UN system to take some limited preparatory actions for mobilizing disaster relief without specific government approval;
- 3) The UN system be allowed to extend more assistance to disaster-affected populations through the kinds of programs already established than it is presently capable of doing;
- 4) UN field offices be allotted a larger disaster fund, which could be used whenever the need arose without fear of reprisal from the host governments or UN headquarters.

The UN cannot be held responsible for timely and efficient disaster relief assistance unless it is given the authority to take decisive action. In addition, the UN must develop the capability to monitor slowly-developing disasters through a variety of strategies designed to indicate the nature, scope, and severity of potential relief situations. With expanded but still limited authority, the UN would be better able to respond to future disaster situations in the Sahel and elsewhere.

DEVELOPING A RELIEF RESPONSE

The UN system again encountered many difficulties in developing a coherent relief response to the Sahelian drought. Some of the problems arose from lack of information concerning the extent of the population's needs (nutritional and other), the lack of leadership to coordinate relief efforts, and the inability of the UN organizational procedures to facilitate a quick and effective response.

A number of decisions must be made quickly during this early phase of relief response:

- Who will be responsible for organizing the relief response?
- How will funding be obtained?
- What sources of information yield useful data for assessing the needs?
- How will supplies be procured and processed?

Answers to these and similar questions determine the nature of an organization's relief response. Some of the major factors considered by each organization in developing an appropriate relief response merit detailed examination.

FAO/Office for Sahelian Relief Operations (OSRO)

Since FAO is not normally a relief agency, it lacked an emergency fund to draw on to initiate a relief effort. The Director-General, therefore, issued an appeal to twenty donor governments and a number of nongovernmental agencies on 11 May 1973. The appeal called for cash donations to the FAO Sahelian Zone Trust Fund, with estimated requirements of \$15 million. While considerable funds were pledged (some \$4,055,200 by June), the cash was slow in coming in. As an exceptional measure, the Director-General drew \$900,000 from the FAO Working Capital Fund, to be reimbursed when the pledges were paid. At a June meeting, UNDRO assisted the Sahel with a cash grant of \$100,000 from the United Nations Working Capital Fund to the FAO Sahelian Zone Trust Fund, and by handling arrangements for the airlifting of supplies for UNICEF and WHO, at no cost or at reduced rates. A total of 124 MT of relief goods were transported, representing a savings of more than \$157,000. By 26 November, the total contributions channelled through the Fund amounted to \$9,098,563, and on that date, the Secretary-General and the Director-General made another appeal, as it was apparent that relief operations would have to continue through 1974. Between November 1973 and February 1975, \$17,034,620 were transferred into the Fund (see Appendix UN III for breakdown of contributions).¹¹

There is no evidence that the "bungling" in the FAO Sahelian Zone Trust Fund feared by some Member States occurred. The Fund provided valuable help to the Sahel and acted as a convenient means for handling contributions from governments and individuals not previously involved in aid to the area. While FAO suffered initially from a lack of funds, the use of monies from the Working Capital Fund enabled relief assistance to proceed before the pledged donations from two fund-raising campaigns materialized. However, if a more coherent funding strategy had been employed, there would have been fewer delays caused by FAO's lack of preparation and lack of commitments to Sahelian relief. A preferable system might involve a specific prior commitment in principle by Member States, to be used in the event of a disaster in which relief assistance is required. By anticipating a need for greater emergency assistance than the \$200,000 a year presently allocated to UNDRO, the restriction of spending \$20,000 per country would be removed and the UN system have greater flexibility and resources with which to respond.

Because there was so much contradictory information at the outset of 1973 about the nature of the drought situation in the Sahel, FAO created the Interdepartmental Working Group on the Problems of the Sahelian Zone in February 1973. The procedures adopted by this group, however, soon proved inadequate to meet the needs of the existing situation. Several factors contributed to its inadequacy: 1) attempts by the Working Group to communicate with the various divisions of FAO and to coordinate relief activities proved too cumbersome; 2) reaction proved much too slow to cope with the emergency; 3) the structure of UNDRO was not equipped to handle a coordination effort of this magnitude; and 4) many donors were urging FAO to take more positive steps to deal with the crisis. Another solution was found when, in May, the Director-General created the Office for Sahelian Relief Operations (OSRO) within FAO to act as the focal point for the UN emergency relief operations, following a precedent set by the July 1971-July 1972 East Bengal Refugees in India relief effort of the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). FAO's mandate included the coordination of UN system efforts only, but it is important to note that the bulk of relief supplies came, in fact, from bilateral donors. Due to the willingness of some major bilateral donors, chiefly the United States, OSRO was able to expand its initial responsibility and serve as an information source for donors outside the UN system.

Cooperation in providing OSRO with information, however, was also slow to develop. In September 1973, OSRO began issuing weekly reports on food commitments and shipments, similar to those used previously by WFP. The FAO reports, however, were not sufficiently detailed to permit donors to use them effectively. Revisions of the reporting format were made in April 1974 and included such information as tentative shipping schedules, which helped to identify possible bottlenecks at the ports. Unfortunately, the inability or unwillingness of some donors to revise their shipping schedules made the value of this information questionable. A more successful attempt was made in August, when a formal, coordinated shipping schedule was devised for the period November 1974-March 1975. This time, by acting before the donors had made shipping commitments, OSRO facilitated better cooperation.

There is no evidence that the "bungling" in the FAO Sahelian Zone Trust Fund feared by some Member States occurred. The Fund provided valuable help to the Sahel and acted as a convenient means for handling contributions from governments and individuals not previously involved in aid to the area. While FAO suffered initially from a lack of funds, the use of monies from the Working Capital Fund enabled relief assistance to proceed before the pledged donations from two fund-raising campaigns materialized. However, if a more coherent funding strategy had been employed, there would have been fewer delays caused by FAO's lack of preparation and lack of commitments to Sahelian relief. A preferable system might involve a specific prior commitment in principle by Member States, to be used in the event of a disaster in which relief assistance is required. By anticipating a need for greater emergency assistance than the \$200,000 a year presently allocated to UNDRO, the restriction of spending \$20,000 per country would be removed and the UN system have greater flexibility and resources with which to respond.

Because there was so much contradictory information at the outset of 1973 about the nature of the drought situation in the Sahel, FAO created the Interdepartmental Working Group on the Problems of the Sahelian Zone in February 1973. The procedures adopted by this group, however, soon proved inadequate to meet the needs of the existing situation. Several factors contributed to its inadequacy: 1) attempts by the Working Group to communicate with the various divisions of FAO and to coordinate relief activities proved too cumbersome; 2) reaction proved much too slow to cope with the emergency; 3) the structure of UNDRO was not equipped to handle a coordination effort of this magnitude; and 4) many donors were urging FAO to take more positive steps to deal with the crisis. Another solution was found when, in May, the Director-General created the Office for Sahelian Relief Operations (OSRO) within FAO to act as the focal point for the UN emergency relief operations, following a precedent set by the July 1971-July 1972 East Bengal Refugees in India relief effort of the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). FAO's mandate included the coordination of UN system efforts only, but it is important to note that the bulk of relief supplies came, in fact, from bilateral donors. Due to the willingness of some major bilateral donors, chiefly the United States, OSRO was able to expand its initial responsibility and serve as an information source for donors outside the UN system.

Cooperation in providing OSRO with information, however, was also slow to develop. In September 1973, OSRO began issuing weekly reports on food commitments and shipments, similar to those used previously by WFP. The FAO reports, however, were not sufficiently detailed to permit donors to use them effectively. Revisions of the reporting format were made in April 1974 and included such information as tentative shipping schedules, which helped to identify possible bottlenecks at the ports. Unfortunately, the inability or unwillingness of some donors to revise their shipping schedules made the value of this information questionable. A more successful attempt was made in August, when a formal, coordinated shipping schedule was devised for the period November 1974-March 1975. This time, by acting before the donors had made shipping commitments, OSRO facilitated better cooperation.

OSRO also formulated an approach to assessing food needs, which helped donors to develop their relief responses. Multi-donor Mission (MDM) surveys in the fall of 1973 and 1974 attempted to establish mutual agreement between the Sahelian governments and major donors on the amounts and kinds of food needs. The first MDM reported that its visits "made it possible to utilize a reciprocally coherent and comparable methodology." The MDM assessment presented information provided by the governments and others, and put together sectoral reports in a broader country report. There was no opportunity, however, to check on the methodology used to obtain the data presented. In addition, the comparability of each country's assessment figures was questionable, and while members of the Mission expressed dissatisfaction with the results, no alternative methods of gathering such information seemed to be available at the time.

An effort was made to improve the approach by using a Technical Evaluation Team (TET) to precede the second MDM (20 November-2 December 1974). The purpose of the TET was to refine the methodology and it did what it could to obtain more accurate information. There was some improvement in this regard, but little overall change. In many cases, members of the TET were also members of the MDM 2, and it was felt by some that MDM 2, from the point of view of creating an awareness of technical needs, was unnecessary. However, it did serve a public relations, or political purpose, which was also important to the affected governments at that point.

World Food Program (WFP)

The Sahelian drought involved the WFP in the largest emergency operation necessitated by a single natural disaster in a particular region ever undertaken. By early 1973, WFP had contributed almost \$9 million to the Sahel (including Gambia) -- a sum which largely preempted its total emergency allocation of \$10 million for the rest of the year for the entire world. In view of this fact, and in consideration of the exceptional circumstances prevailing in 1973, the Committee agreed that the allocation of resources for the purpose of giving emergency aid should be increased by \$5 million.¹²

Among UN organizations, WFP dispenses the largest amount of resources for disaster relief. However, in terms of total relief given, WFP is a relatively minor contributor. In the Sahel case, WFP's contribution represented only about ten per cent of the total food donation (see Appendix UN IV). The Program is permitted to accept, without reference to the quantity of resources already allocated or reserved for emergency operations, donations offered in response to specific appeals for additional food aid. Such donations must be accompanied by adequate cash to cover freight, insurance, superintendance, and associated administrative expenses, although the cash flow is sometimes insufficient -- as in the Sahelian case -- to meet these expenses. The inadequate administrative and financial arrangements to take delivery of the foodstuffs provided and to transport them to the affected regions increased the costs of the Sahel operation substantially.

From 1973 through 1975, fifty-one percent of all WFP emergency resources went for drought relief.¹³ The magnitude of the Sahelian drought inflated this figure over previous levels, and also affected the WFP's regional distribution of emergency assistance (see Appendix UN V). Such a high proportion of resources devoted to drought relief must, in the long run, be considered too high and is a comment on the inadequacy of the Early Warning System. The fact that a multilateral organization such as WFP, which should have access to all the available information on developing drought conditions, still allocates over half its total emergency resources to drought relief indicates that much remains to be done in the areas of crop and weather forecasting, early warning of food shortages, and organizational and administrative pre-disaster planning.

In the past, there had frequently been a long time lag between a request for assistance and its approval, and between its approval and the actual arrival of commodities in recipient countries. Since 1973, these delays have been gradually reduced by some improvements in WFP administrative procedures and by a more systematic initial borrowing of commodities from local stocks.¹⁴ Some delays, however, are inherent in the structure, which is primarily designed for long-term development projects, rather than for quick emergency action. The suitability of WFP as an agent for emergency relief has been questioned and the opinion often expressed that WFP should concentrate its efforts and resources on post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction programs. Rather than handing out direct food assistance, WFP could address its efforts to development projects designed to alleviate the impact of drought or to prevent its recurrence. Project aid such as food-for-work programs would not only be more productive in the sense of promoting longer range development objectives, but more dignified as well. The demoralizing effect often connected with direct relief distribution might be avoided, particularly when, as in the Sahel and Ethiopia, the disaster conditions prevail over several years.

In considering WFP emergency assistance to the Sahel for 1974, the Director-General of FAO and the Executive Director of WFP felt that the needs of the countries affected would be met by bilateral and other donors. It was agreed that no allocation would be made by WFP as emergency assistance, though food distribution would be continued in the framework of self-help rehabilitation programs. In 1974, therefore, WFP utilized a quick-action procedure involving the same basic processes and activities as those for development programs, except that processing time is shortened by eliminating technical scrutiny.¹⁵ The food-for-work projects are an outgrowth of this type of procedure. The most salient features of such quick-action programs include the following:

- Dispensing with the usual technical consultations (with recourse to full technical consultations if a project approved under the procedure is to be expanded in scope and size);
- Preparation and expeditious negotiation of a simplified plan of operations;

- Receipt by headquarters of a "letter of readiness" before shipment of commodities can be made;
- Adoption of a simplified reporting system;
- Charging of costs of quasi-emergency projects against the resources earmarked for development, rather than for relief, projects.

To evaluate the degree to which the quick-action procedure speeds up the processing of food assistance, it is necessary to examine the key events in the management of requests. There are six steps involved between the time a request is made and the termination of the project:

- 1) Receipt of the official request at WFP headquarters;
- 2) Approval of the project;
- 3) Signature of the plan of operations;
- 4) Acceptance of the letter of readiness;
- 5) Distribution of WFP commodities to the beneficiaries of the project, marking the beginning of its implementation;
- 6) Termination of the project (operational life of projects is limited to twelve months).

The time involved in getting requests to headquarters is not significantly shortened under the quick-action procedure (although WFP project officers are specifically requested to assist the recipient in speeding up the preparation of such requests), but the time between the receipt of the request and the date of its approval is much decreased by dispensing with technical scrutiny, and the time lapse between approval and signature of the plan is also lessened, since the pro-forma utilized is greatly reduced. The letter of readiness can be dispatched soon after the signature of the plan of operations, so the first distribution of commodities can take place much sooner than in the case of development projects. In normal development projects, the average time lapse between receipt of the request and the initiation of shipment is estimated at twelve months; quasi-emergency projects generally require only some sixteen weeks for implementation.

While there are obviously advantages in the administrative short-cuts the quick-action procedure provides, the type of project the procedure produces is necessarily a short-term expedient. It offers no solution to situations where large numbers of displaced persons are involved, where the drought persists, or where the government is not able to follow up emergency relief operations with development activities. The lack of technical scrutiny raises serious questions about development objectives and the projects' integration with other, longer-term projects. Food-for-work projects should be

used only when, as in the Sahel case, the normal procedures would entail intolerable delays that would worsen the food deficiencies and other conditions in the affected population. Some grave reservations about food-for-work projects in the Sahelian context were expressed by WFP personnel. An evaluation of these programs as alternatives to long-term, direct food assistance should be undertaken to determine their possible negative aspects.

World Health Organization (WHO)

While WHO has programs in the Sahelian region as part of its regular budget, its role in the emergency activity was generally advisory. It was engaged in joint nutritional surveys with FAO in collaboration with UNICEF. In Niger, WHO also worked with OSRO, UNICEF, and the League of Red Cross Societies in meeting the health needs of displaced persons in temporary camps in the drought zone. FAO provided WHO a sum of \$1 million for the purchase and shipment of vaccines, intravenous feeding fluids, mineral electrolytes for oral rehydration, drugs, and other medical supplies. WHO also carried out an in-depth study on future assistance in rehabilitation and construction, and formulated a set of proposals for a program to control the repercussions of the drought on public health.¹⁶

In May 1975, WHO authorized a fund of \$1 to \$2 million to be used at the discretion of the Director-General to establish projects not usually funded by the organization. The fund, becoming operational in 1976-77, provides WHO with a flexibility it lacked in 1973 to respond to the needs of the Sahelian region.

Once the nature of relief needs are known, it is necessary to reconcile the availability of funds and supplies with the time required for delivery. This is done at WHO headquarters, where requests are screened for duplication and inaccuracies. In the Sahel case, roughly ten per cent of the original requests were not approved for these reasons. The availability of funds was and is a recurrent problem for the agencies involved in relief. Prior to the FAO appeal, WHO relief funds for the Sahel were drawn from the Voluntary Fund for Health Protection, but this proved wholly inadequate for dealing with a large-scale and long-term disaster. In July 1973, WHO requested funds (\$50,000) from OSRO and supplied a like amount from its regular budget to meet relief needs. WHO received \$5 million from the November 1973 appeal and \$2 million from a common health fund designated for health needs to be met by WHO and UNICEF jointly. With the money left over after purchasing medical supplies, WHO purchased food. Procurement of supplies was done at headquarters, with the Brazzaville Regional Office assisting in the process by providing information on local availability and prices. (As a general rule, because of the critical time factor, WHO is willing to accept a fifteen per cent markup in prices for quick delivery.) OSRO was instrumental in providing funds to defray air freight costs for WHO; supplies were delivered through existing health care channels, although WHO personnel in the area were employed to assist as needed in the relief operations.

were:

The major problems in developing a relief response for WHO

1. Availability of funds. This common problem was aggravated by the way in which donors responded to the first FAO appeal. Neither supplies nor transportation can be obtained, in many cases, without cash payment. While the appeal elicited pledges for large amounts of money, the actual funds were slow in coming in, which presented major problems to those responsible for disaster relief arrangements.
2. Availability of medical supplies on the market and limitations of transport. The production of medical supplies and their transport depends on the ability of a petroleum-based market to supply and move the relief goods. The difficulty of acquiring a promise of an exact, rather than an approximate, delivery date is increased when relief agencies must deal with firms unfamiliar with the processes required for relief assistance.
3. Lack of accurate information on the needs of the affected countries. In an emergency, governments need, for example, a medical supply list with generic, not brand, names. At WHO headquarters, the officer responsible for emergency relief has a background list of supplies focusing on specific area needs. To reconcile a request stated in terms of brand names with his generic name list requires some research, which also slows down the time it takes to process a request. Another factor affecting the adequacy of the information given in a request is the extent to which a government is informed about its present stock situation. Governments have often tried to replenish depleted stocks with relief supplies, and over-estimating needs may become simply a matter of procedure. Governments know they will not get everything they ask for, so a "budget padding" strategy is employed as a matter of course, while others see over-estimation as a way to exploit the situation for profit, to create another channel for development assistance, or as an act of desperation in view of their relative decline on the poverty scale. Further, for a variety of reasons, a government is just as likely to underestimate its disaster needs as to overstate them.
4. Unrealistic requests. Finally, a request may be made in terms of what a government thinks a donor is most likely to give, rather than in terms of a realistic assessment of what is actually needed and what could be procured locally.

These problems all influence how relief funds will be allocated and the nature of the disaster response. They also provide compelling evidence of the necessity for an outside evaluation of the situation and rapid dissemination of accurate information.

United Nation's Children's Fund (UNICEF)

To initially finance its Sahelian relief operations, UNICEF released \$200,000 of emergency reserve funds in May 1973 and an additional \$100,000 in August. The organization also advanced \$600,000 from already committed projects in the Sahelian countries.¹⁷ In raising funds, UNICEF relied partly on the two general appeals in May and November for emergency funds made by the Director-General of FAO. UNICEF also invited its National Committees to provide funding, and some were responding with appeals as early as the autumn of 1973. Further, some private donor groups and some governments were approached for special contributions. These appeals were undertaken after consultation with the Director-General of FAO and the UN Under-Secretary for Political and General Assembly Affairs, and were not to interfere in any way with the general appeals for emergency funds for the Sahel.

In the field, three UNICEF officers were involved in relief. The Regional Office in Abidjan coordinates UNICEF assistance for all the countries in the region and has direct responsibility for Upper Volta and Niger. An area officer in Dakar serves Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal. There is also a UNICEF office in Brazzaville, which serves Chad and maintains a liaison concerning child health care with the WHO African Regional Office in that city. In addition, by the end of 1973, UNICEF had stationed liaison officers (provided by national volunteer sponsoring organizations through the UN Volunteers) in Nouakchott, Bamako, Niamey, and N'Djamena.

Emergency relief aid began in March 1973 when, on urgent government request, twenty tons of corn-soya milk (CSM) were shipped to Mauritania from emergency stock in the Copenhagen warehouse. In addition to CSM, UNICEF supplied the Sahel with drugs, intravenous rehydration, feeding fluids, vaccines, blankets, and vehicles to aid in distribution throughout 1973 and 1974. UNICEF emergency assistance continued through 1975 and included further shipments of CSM, drugs, medical supplies, sugar for sweetening CSM, and the provision of UNICEF consultants. On the basis of technical data from a number of surveys by a UNICEF hydrologists, it also agreed to join UNDP in a combined assistance program for water supplies in Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta. This program was an emergency well-digging project, to be extended for three years, which fielded water-digging brigades at a cost of approximately \$3.7 million. In the joint program, the focus of UNICEF concerned drinking water, while UNDP's responsibility involved agricultural and pastoral requirements. Another aspect of the UNICEF relief effort was devoted to strengthening and enlarging mobile medical teams which travelled from camp to camp and village to village, giving particular attention to the health needs of children and mothers from nomadic families (see Appendix UN VI for a breakdown of UNICEF assistance to the Sahel).

Recommendations

Problems in developing a disaster relief response focus on a) lack of funds, b) lack of pre-disaster planning, and c) confusion among headquarters, regional, and field office responsibilities. The following discussion presents

recommendations in each of these three problem areas.

Funding.

Some of the funding problem was due to the fact that FAO is not usually a relief agency and, therefore, had no disaster contingency funds. However, the issue goes beyond the question of FAO involvement. The funding problem is a serious one, and recent experience in disaster relief financing indicates the very real need to increase the level of UN financial commitment. The experience of the UN Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO) reveals that in each year, some twenty disasters in which United Nations assistance is requested occur. The level of \$200,000 as the normal ceiling for emergency relief per disaster was established in 1965 by the General Assembly. Currency fluctuations and increased costs of relief supplies and services has greatly reduced the purchasing power and effectiveness of this amount. While the maximum allocation is not made in every case, an increase in the ceiling to compensate for the increase in costs and inflation would appear to be essential in such larger disasters as the Sahel drought. Since it is probably not possible to raise the present limit of \$200,000 per year within the UN's regular budget, additional resources for disaster assistance must come from voluntary contributions. It would seem logical to use the existing UNDRO trust fund as a framework for such contributions.

Pre-Disaster Planning.

The second recommendation for improving relief response in such disasters as the Sahelian drought is to institute pre-disaster contingency planning. While USAID field offices reported that such information was requested by Washington, UN field offices reported no comparable planning. The need for pre-disaster contingency planning, however, is not universally accepted by the UN community. Four general arguments are invoked in opposition: 1) Disaster preparedness is the responsibility of the governments concerned; 2) Disaster response must maintain maximum flexibility and such planning would excessively restrict relief activity; 3) The next widespread drought in the Sahel will be substantially different from the last one, so contingency planning is useless; and 4) There will never again be a major drought that will require massive relief like the 1973-1975 effort. Addressing these arguments in reverse order, the contention that increased development assistance will preclude the future recurrence of a widespread drought in the Sahel gives much unwarranted credit to the wisdom and capability of development assistance. This view was expressed only by headquarters personnel -- not by field officers intimately acquainted with the problems of the Sahel. The validity of the argument is dubious and there exists ample historical evidence to the contrary. The contention that the circumstances of relief for the next drought in the area will be materially different is based on the belief that most conditions in the Sahel (roads, communications, transportation, agricultural production, public health, water supply, and the like) will appreciably improve over the years and a future relief effort will, therefore, be much easier, negating the value of contingency planning based on past experience. That this kind and extent of improvement in the Sahel will occur can by no means be assumed.

In several cases, UN personnel have pointed out that just the opposite is true. While disaster planning should certainly be revised according to changing conditions, the fundamental problems of the Sahel will be only very slowly resolved and will remain major obstacles for any relief operations for a great many years. Things may well get worse, rather than better, in the Sahel. Contingency planning must account for that possibility.

The view that pre-disaster preparedness means establishing strict rules of behavior which would hinder relief that requires flexibility is an argument of a different order than that which assumes that nature or providence will somehow take care of everything in the Sahel. Contingency planning should not develop a rigid, administrative structure for drought relief, but it could establish clearer lines of responsibility and authority among all concerned, and it should allow more flexible alternatives for effective relief action. Improvisation in contingency planning must be given consideration, as the ability to react in a flexible manner is especially valuable in an emergency operation. However, improvisation should not be a substitute for planning and foresight.

A positive step toward contingency planning is evident in a joint FAO/WMO project. The World Food Conference designated FAO and WMO to cooperate in the establishment of a multi-faceted system designed to assimilate and to analyze all relevant data for forecasting basic food availability and country requirements. Preparations for the establishment of such a system are presently underway in FAO and consultations have begun with WMO. The system will eventually comprise data on production (crop forecasts, conditions), stocks, utilization, trade (exports, imports), aid (availability, commitments), prices (national and international), weather and climatic conditions, and important features of national policies.¹⁸ However, no projected date for the completion of the project was available. A strong recommendation should be made to institute this system as soon as possible and to ensure that it is operational in the Sahel, as well as other areas of the world that suffer from food shortages.

Headquarters, Regional, and Field Office Responsibilities.

A third recommendation that might be made involves defining more clearly the UN's headquarters, regional, and field office responsibilities in disaster relief. Because of the widely disparate functions and divisions of labor of the different UN agencies involved in Sahelian relief, it is difficult to arrive at a meaningful assessment of contingency plans. With the possible exception of WHO, all the UN agencies lack a clear mandate concerning regional responsibility. This has led to charges of duplication and confusion among regional offices, and between them and headquarters. WHO follows a policy of decentralization, with such regional offices as Dakar and Abidjan having responsibility for

- planning and programming;
- finance control and analysis of allotments incurring obligations for execution of programs;

- execution -- implementation of programs and supervision of personnel, recruitment within the region, except for senior professional and administrative officers;
- evaluation, in "tactical", as opposed to "strategic" terms (a WHO distinction).

WHO headquarters is responsible for general policy and strategy, while the regional officers are responsible for the application of policy and the execution of strategy. Because of this management structure, support for pre-disaster planning might most logically be encouraged in Dakar and Abidjan, or even in the country offices. The close cooperation of WHO representatives with the national Ministries of Health places at least one organ of the UN in a position to encourage governments to establish plans for organizing bureaucracy and for mobilizing resources in disaster cases requiring medical assistance.

In the case of FAO, while regional officers assist in the programming process, they are not a direct link in the chain of command (as are WHO officers) and project and program formulation is centralized. Execution is a headquarters responsibility, although the country offices may do some backstopping. There is no delegation of financial authority to FAO regional offices for country programs and projects. There is interest at FAO in contingency planning, however, perhaps because of its very close involvement with Sahelian relief through OSRO. FAO and WFP field representatives supported the idea that some of the confusion and delay that occurred in the Sahel case can be avoided next time, if some planning is effectually instigated. Since execution of any FAO program designed to encourage governments to plan for future periods of drought relief is the responsibility of FAO headquarters, this would be the place to begin positive action toward that end.

Since UNICEF has no country offices in the Sahel (the Ouagadougou office is for liaison with CILSS), concern about drought relief centers on regional and headquarters relationships. Regional offices are concerned with planning and programming country activities and with supplying equipment. Based on information made available by UNICEF, the unique character of each disaster situation should be stressed and caution should be exercised in developing disaster preparedness proposals to avoid inflexible plans.

Coordination between UNDP and the officers of other UN agencies has generally been conducted on an ad hoc basis. While there were certainly instances of good communication and cooperation at the field level between the agencies during the relief period, UNDP has not been given the necessary capability to coordinate relief programs. From an administrative point of view, the effectiveness of the UN system in disaster response can only be described as less than satisfactory. The lack of a coherent pattern of agency responsibility in disaster relief is due to two related factors which inhibit better cooperation: 1) Different regional divisions have jurisdiction over the Sahel, and 2) Different scopes of responsibility are assigned to UN country offices.

This is undoubtedly confusing to the governments that must deal with a variety of agency offices operating under different mandates. A more effective pattern of UN field responsibility should be devised, with inter-agency cooperation in mind. Field offices could better cooperate with one another in times of disaster if the lines of responsibility were coordinated and clearly stated. The UN agencies, in cooperation with UNDRO, should endeavor to generate a comprehensive UN field manual, describing the responsibilities and interactions of all UN agencies in disaster relief.

Finally, these recommendations cannot be implemented without the support of the UN Member States and other organizations. Governments and other organizations must become more involved in pre-disaster planning and research. The UN may desire to initiate reform and move the major bilateral donors to support change in disaster relief policies, but success depends on the acceptance and involvement of those outside the United Nations system. Support for an improved disaster relief funding strategy and a redefinition of intra-agency responsibility and interagency cooperation would lead to an improved disaster response network.

IMPLEMENTATION: PROBLEMS IN COORDINATION

The UN system suffered from many problems during the execution of their relief programs. Within the wide range of aspects of assistance to the Sahel, one factor seems to emerge in each case as the key to successful implementation -- coordination.

In examining the problems of implementing relief programs, the following kinds of information were sought:

- What attempts at coordination were made?
- What factors hampered coordination efforts?
- What role did the recipient government play?

Systematic and efficient execution of UN relief programs was hindered by a number of factors. Most of the difficulties arose from insufficient transportation facilities or congestion at ports available. Lack of information and coordination at all levels hampered maximum utilization of the facilities that were available.

These problems of implementation are complex and multi-faceted, and they relate to several aspects of the Sahelian experience, including,

- Emergency request approval;
- Procurement of supplies;
- Coordination of transportation facilities;
- Condition of donated food;
- Organization of the field reporting system.

The emergency operations conducted and coordinated by FAO/OSRO, WHO, and UNICEF were adversely affected, to varying degrees, by these kinds of problems. Let us consider each of these factors separately.

Emergency Request Approval (WFP)

Emergency requests at WFP are handled by the regional branches of the Project Management Division (specifically, the desk officers) responsible for the kind of operation involved. This arrangement has obvious disadvantages when a large-scale, regional operation, such as Sahelian relief, is involved. Coping with emergency situations through a variety of branches and desk officers leads to a proliferation of contacts with other agencies, which is uneconomical and tends toward duplication of effort.

Requests follow a detailed pro-forma and field officers are given a specific checklist to complete with required information. Not all WFP officers are equally qualified, however, to handle difficult and complex emergency requests. The time for processing emergency requests is limited to a few weeks, as a rule, and is sometimes shortened to a matter of days. The critical step determining precisely how long processing takes is the degree to which the availability of the required commodities can be confirmed. While records are kept which allow the Executive Director to withdraw a certain quantity from pledges, the factor which must be confirmed is the ability or willingness of individual donors to supply food for a specific emergency. Recent increases in WFP resources have lessened, to some extent, the time lag which exists in seeking this information.

An examination of WFP processing time for food requests during the Sahelian drought emergency in 1972-1973 indicates that there was an average of over sixty days between receipt of the request and its approval (see Appendix UN VII). If calculated on the basis of the operations approved over the last three years, however, the figure for the average duration of time between the receipt of a request and the approval of WFP emergency aid by the Director-General of FAO is between two and four weeks, including time for the confirmation of the availability of commodities. Apparently, during the 1973-1975 period of relief assistance to the Sahel, requests were processed more quickly than usual.

Procurement of Commodities (WFP)

The Program has yielded a number of approaches to speed up deliveries of urgently-needed commodities. The majority of WFP emergency operations started with borrowed goods. In the Sahelian Zone, however, WFP had almost no project stocks or supplies en route to allow for significant borrowing. A further problem -- which is outside WFP's control, but which can delay borrowing operations -- is the requirement of some donors that they be consulted before their pledges are allocated. If these donors would revise their internal approval procedures, the Program would have more flexibility to meet emergency situations expeditiously.

In addition to borrowing, local or semi-local purchase of commodities can contribute significantly to the speeding up of initial deliveries. At times, WFP is able to take advantage of lower prices and freight rates. During recent years, there has been a growing number of emergencies in which supplies were approved in installments, following a review of the needs of the area, as well as of its available resources. A vital requirement for such phasing is the continuing flow of information -- that is, an improved monitoring system to report on the progress of emergency operations.

Coordination of Transportation Facilities (OSRO)

The landlocked situation of most of the countries of the Sahel, its inadequate transportation and communications systems, and its lack of trained manpower posed extremely difficult problems for the conduct of relief

operations. Much of the 1973 emergency food arrived too late to transport sufficient quantities inland before the rainy season. However, during its involvement in the Sahelian disaster response, OSRO did develop mechanisms to assist donors in programming and shipping emergency food aid. Among these mechanisms were arrangements to defray internal transport costs for the recipients, the creation of port committees, and the use of all modes of transport (railway, road, animal, airlift, and human resources) for the distribution of goods. Even when transportation was available, the governments were not always able to meet operational costs. To help remedy the situation, the Intergovernmental Committee (IGC) of WFP agreed upon the sale of WFP commodities, allowing the sale of up to twenty-five per cent of supplies to defray the costs of internal transport and distribution of food. At the request of the governments, another part of these costs was met by OSRO out of its own cash reserves.

The assistance given to recipient governments to defray the costs (at least in part) of internal transportation was an immensely valuable contribution. The accounting of these funds, however -- though the responsibility of the recipient governments -- put new burdens of control and monitoring on the UN field staffs.

On a few occasions, due to rail strikes (which were resolved by government intervention) and the lack of storage space, financial problems were incurred by donors and, since resolution of that kind of difficulty would have resulted in intolerable delay, OSRO advanced funds to permit immediate action. Similarly, funds were advanced for expenditures for such unforeseen needs as rebagging of damaged goods to expedite their evacuation from the ports.

At one point, it was proposed that OSRO have the overall responsibility and authority for deciding where and how each donor's shipment would be transported inland, as well as for making comprehensive contractual arrangements. This would have been accomplished by donors' contributions to the FAO Sahelian Zone Trust Fund to cover the cost of inland transportation. There was considerable interest in this idea for awhile, but it was not implemented. By May 1973, a computerized system for shipping records was instituted in the Transport Branch of WFP. The system was designed for the collecting, checking, updating, selecting, and presenting of quantitative data on commodity shipments to WFP projects. It was not fully operative until August 1973, which may have caused some problems for the WFP in the early period of their food relief effort to the Sahel.

In 1974, the problems were particularly severe because food needs were much greater than in 1973 and larger quantities of food were delivered to the affected countries. While most of the grain arrived in the ports before the rainy season, inland transportation was again unable to evacuate it quickly. Further, food supplies donated by and purchased from the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China caused congestion in the port of Dakar, since information about their shipments was not made available to OSRO. To ease some of these conditions, OSRO created port committees, which represented

the port country, the recipient country, OSRO, WFP, and the donors. The committees provided an improved mechanism for flexible response when quick decisions were needed on alternative methods of transporting goods and on problems created by price increases. They helped to alleviate some of the competition among donors for the use of transport facilities and contributed substantially to easing the situation generally. The introduction of greater flexibility by the use of roads, instead of rail, transport when the rail facilities were overburdened, was also of value. Limitations of rail transport between Dakar and Bamako, and the rail capacity of the R.A.N. from Abidjan, overburdened by shipments to Mali, Upper Volta, and Ivory Coast, made evacuation from congested port areas extremely difficult. In many cases, special efforts were made to transport commodities by road, which involved a cost to donors of twenty-five to thirty percent over the cost of rail transport.

Road transport, however, is subject to adverse weather conditions, as there exist very few all-weather roads into remote areas. Efforts to keep supplies moving were hampered by lack of funds for the running and maintenance of vehicles, and also by lack of transport vehicles. Since one of the most critical areas in the delivery system was the last link -- from the tertiary arrival points to the remote regions -- it was necessary to resort to other means when the use of the roads became difficult, if not impossible. In such cases, the UNDP Resident Representatives and OSRO field staff, with the cooperation of the governments, arranged for transportation, using head-loads, camel corps, and trans-Sahara truck convoys.

In 1973, FAO expressed concern about supplies not reaching their destination before the expected June rains, when most roads would become impassable. Faced with these difficulties, the decision was made to airlift over 20,000 MT of food during the May-October period. Of this total, FAO/OSRO was responsible for airlifting almost 3,000 MT, valued at nearly \$1.5 million (see Appendix UN VIII for quantity and cost per country for the airlift).

Airlifting supplies was a critical factor in emergency relief in the Sahel. Three kinds of operations were required: 1) the airlift of bulk supplies from ports to the main airports in the interior; 2) airlift by smaller planes to distribution centers and airstrips; and 3) special arrangements for airdrops in isolated areas with urgent needs. The resources required for these operations were beyond those available to the UN system. However, various donors (including Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, England, and the United States), provided planes for transport of grain, either directly from the ports of entry to final destination, or from the capitals and other central points to the outlying districts. In one special case, a whole shipment of WFP grain was airlifted from Lagos to points in northern Niger, partly by means of commercial aircraft paid for out of the Sahelian Trust Fund. The cost of the airlifts represented a major portion of the total value of the relief effort of 1973. UNICEF sources report that all foreign aid relief that year was estimated at \$150 million, including \$25 million (seventeen per cent) for the airlifts and \$15 million (ten per cent) for non-air transport.¹⁹

Once the rains stopped, increased use of road transport lessened the need for further massive airlifts of supplies from the ports to the interior. Selective airlifts to move supplies to isolated areas cut off by the rains were undertaken in 1974, but the scale was considerably reduced. Construction of all-weather roads into remote areas that have been isolated during the rainy season would eliminate the need for massive and costly airlifts in the future.

This is one area in which governments can be more involved in relief assistance. An outstanding example in Sahelian relief was the case of West Germany, which provided airplanes from its air force for an extended period of time, for nongovernmental as well as governmental relief efforts undertaken out of Germany. These planes were available to other groups as well. In the long run, only governments can provide the resources to assist in times of emergency, as when massive airlifts are required. A system of prior commitment, in principle, to airlift and other large freight operations could be devised, so that activities like the Sahelian airlift could be organized more quickly and efficiently.

Despite these transportation difficulties, the Sahelian drought relief effort had its wizards. As one logistics expert assigned to OSRO has pointed out,

A number of national and internal civil servants and diplomats worked very intensely on grain and other commodity flow and attended to problems as they arose. For some these activities were "political", the effort of special importance or opportunity to a few persons in each country, in each locale. They were Ministers, Ambassadors, and their Attaches, senior and middle-level Secretaries of Chiefs of Administrative Divisions, technicians, general administrators and appointed and traditional local leaders. There were many important actions related directly to the drought by relatively few people with specific responsibilities. The other, and I believe (but cannot document) more significant aid was familial, customary, and virtually universal. 20

Condition of Donated Food

Insufficient warehouse facilities to protect food during its delay in transit caused some stores to spoil or become infested. This situation was aggravated by stockpiling infested or wet grain with dry or newly-arrived shipments. Governments were either unable or unwilling to provide information about spoilage, infestation, or theft. Staff people from several agencies complained of this problem. No accurate records were kept to verify the severity of the problem, but several FAO officials indicated that the incidence of theft was no more serious than they had encountered elsewhere in relief situations.

In early 1975, OSRO hired a consultant to survey the problem in Mali. The report, released in April, indicated that of 64,000 MT surveyed, 34,000 MT required immediate fumigation and restacking to prevent it from becoming unfit for consumption, and 15,000 MT were already ruined. Some UN officials feel that this kind of problem is inevitable in disaster relief. Beyond taking measures to ensure that donated food is not infested when it arrives, there is apparently little that can be done by the UN to prevent spoilage, infestation, and theft after arrival. However, it is clearly possible to do a great deal, with prior planning, to ensure that adequate warehousing is available and that fumigation methods are employed on a regular basis.

The problems of waste through infestation and lack of adequate storage facilities are issues that are not given enough emphasis anywhere at present. A small staff at FAO is working on grain and food storage problems, but this is an area which requires concentrated study by FAO, governments, and other non-UN bodies. Reference is often made to the need for statistics on crop waste, but we really don't know the extent of this problem or the reasons why it occurs. A strong recommendation is made to strengthen the existing units working on these kinds of problems at FAO and in other parts of the world.

Organization of Field Reporting System

In May 1973, the Director-General of FAO established in Ouagadougou a mechanism for ensuring, in cooperation with the governments concerned, that the necessary relief supplies reached the affected populations in time. The FAO Regional Office, headed by Mr. Moise Mensah, Assistant Director-General and Regional Representative for Africa, had overall responsibility for field coordination. By the end of June, a logistics officer from WFP had joined Mr. Mensah in Ouagadougou. His responsibilities included coordinating air, sea, road, and rail transport of supplies channelled through OSRO; assisting in gathering information on the food stockpile situation; and assisting in the organization of airlifts. He was given the authority to make arrangements to expedite the transport of relief supplies by resorting to such measures as the diversion of ships, the mobilization of facilities for internal transport, and the like. Throughout the relief operations, OSRO supported this logistics officer with additional personnel who were to advise on various aspects of improving the delivery and distribution of supplies.

The UNDP Resident Representative served as a focal point at the national level and was supported by FAO and WFP staff when necessary. WFP field arrangements were reorganized, so that WFP offices could perform most OSRO tasks concerning food supplies and act as OSRO's operational arm. As many as fourteen WFP officers participated in all activities connected with assessment of food needs, including the MDMs. They were requested by OSRO to contribute to the reporting system. A baseline report was requested to recapitulate all government relief targets endorsed by the Resident Representatives, with an indication of priorities and timing, and the extent to which targets were being met. This report was to be followed by a weekly report, beginning 1 June 1973, covering developments in the overall situation,

adjustments in the relief targets and assistance promised, a review of deliveries from all sources, movement to distribution centers, and final distribution to beneficiaries. An interim report was to be dispatched between each weekly report.

Funds were transferred to the offices of the UNDP Resident Representatives for purchase and transport operations and instructions were sent for the preparation of accountability reports. These reports were to indicate not only the financial transactions, but also the nature and result of all operations, including the end use of the commodities supplied. They formed the basis for reporting to the FAO governing bodies and to donors at the conclusion of the relief operations.

Communications between Ouagadougou, Bamako, Niamey, and Rome remained a difficult problem throughout the relief operations. Inadequate telecommunications facilities to and between the countries concerned posed serious problems. Initially, UNDP Resident Representatives were required to use the radio communications facilities of the French Mission in Bamako, Niamey, and Ouagadougou. The FAO Regional Office in Ouagadougou made use of the FED telex facilities. By the end of June, the situation had improved somewhat, with the installation of a telex in Ouagadougou and a transceiver which operated via Kinshasa and Addis Ababa.

During the 1974 relief effort, OSRO strengthened its field staff. Apart from reviving the post of logistics officer, with the assistance of the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) and WFP, OSRO posted volunteer officers in the ports and main distribution centers. By June 1974, the field reporting system was much improved, as UNDP Resident Representatives and FAO/WFP officers were more reliable in submitting weekly, interim, and sometimes, daily reports. In addition, those at the ports kept close watch on arrivals and worked with forwarding agents to expedite evacuation.

While the organization of the field reporting system improved, there still remained problems in reporting on the distribution process. The UN required recipient governments to submit periodic reports showing the quantity of food distributed and the number of people who benefitted. Agencies do not require their missions to conduct independent monitoring of the distribution program. In the Sahel, the recipient governments usually maintained no records to document use of the food received, and WFP and OSRO staffs were too small to check systematically on the distribution process. There is no question that an efficient, independent check and report system is needed.

WHO AND THE NIGER MEDICO-NUTRITIONAL TEAMS: A CASE STUDY OF UN-NGO RELIEF COOPERATION

Despite the problems of coordinating transport and distribution for donors in drought relief, there was a relative successful and encouraging experience in Niger with LICROSS, WHO, and UNICEF coordination in the health

sector. This case study focuses on the program from the perspective of WHO involvement.

One of the most interesting and innovative projects in relief execution in the Sahel was the cooperative effort of a United Nations organization, WHO, and nongovernmental agencies in a medico-nutritional program in Niger, which took place from July to December 1974. The program was an example of how several agencies with expertise in the health field could coordinate their efforts to implement a project with much broader impact than would have been possible if WHO had acted separately.

The request for implementation of the joint program was submitted by the government to the UNDP Resident Representative in Niger. A protocol of inter-organizational agreement determined the responsibilities of each of the organizations party to the protocol in executing the project. LICROSS was designated as the principal executing agency, with the participation of WHO, OSRO, and UNICEF.

The medical and nutritional objectives defined in the Niger government's initial request of 28 May 1974 were:

- giving elementary medical attention;
- helping in the nutritional rehabilitation of children and, secondarily, of expectant and young mothers;
- improving hygiene and welfare in the refugee camps.

The project was originally conceived as an emergency relief operation for a famine-stricken population. It was realized by the end of August 1974 that the Sahelian situation had reverted to one of endemic malnutrition, typical of most developing countries.

The Coordination Committee, with the UNDP Resident Representative as its chairman, was composed of a national coordinator nominated by the government, a Chief Delegate, representing LICROSS, and a UNICEF representative. The unique part played by the Coordination Committee in steering the project cannot be sufficiently emphasized.

The numbers of children, pregnant women, and nursing mothers reached by the program never reached the expected figure. According to the official government request of May 1974, some 106,000 to 110,000 people in those categories were suffering from the effects of famine in the camps in Niger. In September, the project's interim report listed 70,000 affected persons. A tent census toward the end of the project listed 37,000 people left in the camps.²¹ Obviously, from the end of September on, the number of beneficiaries declined very rapidly. Nutritional and medical activities varied considerably from one day to the next, depending on the local situation.

It is no wonder, then, that orders for food placed by the Coordination Committee proved to be excessive. Deterioration in some goods (GSM and FPC), as well as orders for foods both unfamiliar to the affected peoples and of inferior quality (such as maize) were sources of concern to logistics officers.

Unaware of the nutritional aspects of the food problem, they instructed the teams to distribute the food without regard to its suitability.

While there were many difficulties for those implementing this program (not the least being the eighty-nine expatriate participants), the administrative problems and how WHO worked within the project framework are important to note. The general administrative organization left much to be desired -- no secretariat assistance for several months, inadequate staffing of the management team, material considerations too long neglected, and shortages of supervisory staff. It was the general opinion that communications and information exchange between those implementing the project and those supervising and coordinating activities were unsatisfactory. The main causes for this were the infrequency of field visits (due, in part, to inadequate transport), the constantly-changing situation, the governmental delay in confirming approval of the project, and the dispersal of teams.

A system of activities assessment was worked out only after several months, so measures necessary to adapt the operations had to be improvised for a long period. A mobile evaluation team was responsible for a considerable improvement in the project's execution. Constant assessment of the work done during an emergency relief period, no matter how severe the situation, must be given priority. There seems to be support in Niger for a relief evaluation system, perhaps because of the experience with this project.

Continuity in management was also a problem for the project. Personnel pointed out the need for an assistant manager who, among other duties, would discharge supervisory functions, ensuring that there was a permanent control and an administrative assessment system.

WHO supplied medicaments as part of its share in the project. A list of fifteen basic medicaments was drawn up in June, but grew to forty products as the result of additions by doctors without African experience. By the end of August, more than sixty expensive medicaments had been ordered locally. For example, considerable stocks of valium and antibiotics unsuited to African conditions were handed over to the government during the operation, since their use by teams was against program policy and the principles of African rural medicine.²² In fact, only a very limited number of medicaments proved of real use in the Sahel.

Despite these problems, the program was regarded as a success by the authorities and the agencies involved. The critical analysis should not give the impression that the achievements of the project as a whole were negligible or the results doubtful. The collaborative effort enabled the UN and LICROSS to contribute the services at which each excelled: for UNICEF, the dietary supplements of CSM and FPC; for LICROSS, the voluntary personnel required to execute such a large project; and for WHO, the medical supply function. The overall impact was much greater than what each agency could have accomplished separately. Further, the national public health policy underwent a reassessment during the project. The authorities were particularly anxious to avoid creating an artificial need for sophisticated

(and therefore inappropriate) forms of medicine. Similarly, any artificial concentration of the populace (such as the establishment of temporary dispensaries) was to be avoided. In practice, this policy is difficult to apply and often unpopular, but it is, perhaps, the only reasonable one for developing countries with few natural resources.

WHO/Niger felt the project was a worthwhile endeavor and would recommend further involvement of this kind. The relative success of the coordinated effort by several UN agencies and nongovernmental organizations could serve as a useful precedent, not only for joint interventions in the field of medical and nutritional assistance, but also for other kinds of inter-agency action.

THE SPECIAL CASE OF UNICEF

UNICEF, perhaps more than any other single agency, suffered from massive distribution difficulties in implementing its Sahelian relief operations. In September-October 1974 in Chad, UNICEF had problems distributing CSM during the rainy season. Fourteen tons was airlifted at a cost of \$6,250. Because this form of distribution was formidably expensive, further air shipping efforts were not requested. The Coordination Committee created by the government was not functioning due, in part, to internal political problems, and for this reason, various donors worked in a disorderly manner. This might explain why a relatively small amount of food was distributed, despite the existence of an adequate transport fleet which could have evacuated a minimum of 200 MT per day.

In Mali, the major problem was, and continues to be, inadequate storage facilities. When the September 1974 shipment of CSM arrived in Bamako, serious problems arose. Government stores were filled with grain and foodstuffs. In some cases, CSM was left in the open, unprotected, subject to theft, infestation, and disintegration. In addition, in Mali, it was not possible to reserve CSM exclusively for children, lactating mothers, and pregnant women, when the entire populace was in need of food. Neither was it possible to respect the ration advised. These were problems faced elsewhere in the Sahel as well.

Despite these difficulties (among others), the Mali government continued to request CSM distribution. The Dakar office had doubts concerning bottlenecks and possible damage to the CSM from the floods, which had destroyed quantities of FED milk powder in Bamako. The Dakar office requested UNICEF headquarters in New York to suspend all future shipments of CSM to Mali, pending a careful investigation of the conditions in the country. Later, the storage problem was apparently alleviated, at least to the point that a CSM reporting team of nutrition experts decided that Mali was prepared to receive its 1974/75 allotment.

In Niger, UNICEF had problems with CSM not being ventilated at regional distribution points before redistribution to its final destination. Because there was question as to the need of more CSM in Niger, USAID/Niamey recommended, at one point in 1973, complete suspension of CSM distribution

by UNICEF. The USAID Regional Coordinator in Abidjan met there with the UNICEF Regional Director to propose diverting a CSM shipment to countries outside the drought-stricken zone. Distribution to Niger continued, however, following assurances from the UNICEF officer in Niamey and the Minister of Health and Social Welfare that additional CSM was needed. Contradictory information on whether or not shipments were actually needed after they had been requested hindered efficient management of the distribution process.

In Upper Volta, UNICEF experienced distribution problems at the onset of the rainy season. Uncertainty about the quantities actually needed, after shipments had arrived, created some problems and plans were made to divert some of the shipments through USAID/Abidjan.

UNICEF experienced some of its most serious problems in Senegal, where there was difficulty in getting the government interested in CSM distribution. Internal distribution, therefore, had to be assumed by whatever personnel UNICEF could hire at its own expense. UNICEF reported making several attempts to contact the Drought Commissioner of the Senegalese government without result. USAID/Dakar assisted UNICEF in diverting some further shipments of CSM out of the region, as 40 MT of a previous order had disintegrated due to inadequate storage facilities and to neglect. There was apparently a total lack of interest on the part of the government, either in discussing why the shipment had been destroyed or how to improve the situation.


Many of UNICEF's distribution problems can be attributed to difficulties related to their relationships with the Sahelian governments, UNICEF's lack of planning, and inadequate information. The extent to which USAID must assume partial responsibility for UNICEF's CSM distribution should be more carefully considered. Not only did UNICEF suffer from distribution problems due to lack of personnel, storage capacity, and support from the affected governments, but it also operated with almost total lack of knowledge about the final destination of the CSM. With no reports coming in from the affected governments and inadequate field staff to service the area, large quantities of CSM were wasted, particularly in Senegal, with some of it later discovered undistributed in storage areas. Some of this negligence was due to lack of trucks and fuel to transport the CSM to the interior. UNICEF officials also tended to blame these incidents on a lack of interest in the Senegalese government in distributing the CSM. Consequently, UNICEF had to provide for the internal distribution of food supplements it had supplied.

Additional problems were encountered with the preparation of CSM. For example, quantities of the instant variety were often mixed with regular CSM which requires cooking, and in other instances, improper preparation led to diarrhea. After experiencing such problems with CSM, many people were reluctant to eat it. As a result, in October 1974, UNICEF took action to curtail its CSM program in the Sahel because, in the opinion of UNICEF headquarters, these problems indicated that the Sahel governments were

unable to absorb more quantities of CSM and that the populations were generally unable to utilize it.

Conclusions

Based on these observations of the execution of UN relief programs in the Sahel, it appears that most of the significant problems arise from a lack of coordination with other donors or lack of cooperation with the recipient countries. Coordination is a vital element in any successful and effective relief operation and affects a number of areas, including 1) Assessment of food and other emergency requirements; 2) Procurement of commodities; 3) Transportation facilities (delivery to ports and internal distribution); 4) Storage facilities and protection of goods; 5) Communications of field staff with headquarters; 6) Communications among various field agencies; 7) Communications between donors in the field and at headquarters; 8) Communications between donors and recipients. Specific improvements have already been made in regard to many of these problems. The area of communications, however, still needs concentrated effort to remove the obstacles preventing information exchange. Some idea of how complex communications problems become can be derived from the following schematic drawing of a few of the possible communications linkages involving UN headquarters, regional offices, and country offices, as well as major bilateral donors.



If one adds voluntary agency and other bilateral and multilateral donors within and outside the states represented to this communications network, it is evident that the complexity of the communications problem is formidable. Nevertheless, only by improving the frequency of communications and the quality of information communicated among all concerned can more effective coordination of relief become a reality.

OTHER UN RESPONSES IN DROUGHT RELIEF

A number of UN system agencies which are not normally concerned in disaster relief became involved in the Sahelian drought assistance effort because of the exceptional situation. Their involvement took the form of financial allocations to meet immediate needs, fund-raising appeals, short-term drought-related projects, and in some cases, direct action in some aspect of relief operations.

Important research on the problems of the Sahel is now being undertaken by several UN agencies, and many medium- and long-term programs have been identified and are in the process of implementation. It is beyond the scope of this study to evaluate these efforts, except in those cases where interest in the Sahel represents a new focus or direction for an agency's program. The major focus of this section is to identify and discuss special relief efforts that were made by the UN system or activities that emerged as direct reactions to the drought disaster in the Sahel.

UNESCO

UNESCO has long been involved in the general problems of arid and semi-arid regions of the world. One of its recent research programs that could have important implications for future drought relief assistance to the Sahel is the Man and the Biosphere Programme (MAB). Actual relief assistance was provided by UNESCO through its Gift Coupon Fund. A summary of these different types of UNESCO involvement in the problems of the Sahel follows.

Gift Coupon Fund

Approximately \$25,000 was collected between 1973 and 1975 through the UNESCO Gift Coupon Fund. In collaboration with WFP, the GCF (now known as the Cooperative Action Programme) provided for the purchase of equipment for refugee camp schools in Timbuktu and Agadez. Interest in the Sahel continues, and Action Programme staff plan to encourage the establishment of libraries and nutritional educational programs in the region.

Man and the Biosphere Programme (MAB)

MAB was officially launched in 1970 at the 16th Session of the General Conference of UNESCO and the broad outlines of the Programme's responsibilities were established in November 1971. MAB represents an integrated approach to research, training, and action aimed at improving man's relationship with the environment. Fourteen project areas have been identified. The general objective of research and training activities of MAB Project 3 in the Sahelian Zone is to help governments in the region organize a long-term program to improve the methods and kinds of management

of semi-arid lands within the framework of the socio-economic policies of the governments.

In March 1974, a regional meeting on integrated ecological research and training needs in the Sahelian Zone was held at Niamey at the invitation of the government of Niger. The meeting was organized by UNESCO with the financial support of UNEP. In the context of the MAB Programme, the focus of the meeting related to MAB Project 3, and Project 4, which deals with the effects of irrigation. This meeting represented the first step in translating recommendations into operational field projects on the regional level.

As of September 1975, there were no fixed projects in the Sahel. A MAB National Committee now exists in Senegal and UNESCO headquarters personnel are hopeful that similar committees will soon be formed in Niger and Mali.

World Meteorological Organization and Special Sahelian Activities

At its first meeting in September 1973, CILSS adopted resolutions requiring the development of

- 1) Studies in hydrometeorology, agrometeorology, and climatology;
- 2) Networks of agrometeorological stations; and
- 3) Creation of sub-regional centers for applied meteorology, including,
 - a) training of personnel,
 - b) studies in agrometeorology for early warning of crop failure, and
 - c) experiments with rainfall augmentation.

From the beginning of their activities in the drought-affected countries, UNDP and WMO have worked with CILSS representatives with a view to developing a technical cooperation program meeting these objectives. To this end, a UNDP-financed WMO/FAO Mission (May-July 1974) prepared a program for strengthening the "Agrometeorological and Hydrological Services of the Sahelian Countries" and establishing a Center for Training and Applications of Agrometeorology/Operational Hydrology.

Other international meteorological research efforts are directed toward GARP (Global Atmospheric Research Program), which is jointly sponsored by WMO and the International Council of Scientific Unions (ISCU). Its purpose is to study the physical processes in the atmosphere with a view to increasing the accuracy of forecasting over periods of from one day to several weeks.

Activities of immediate relevance to the Sahelian relief period that involved WMO were part of the GARP Atlantic Tropical Experiment (GATE). During the period from June through September 1974, regular World Weather Watch observations from the area were augmented by observations from forty specially-equipped ships, twelve aircraft, and several meteorological and oceanographic buoys. The SMS-1 Geostationary Satellite, whose operational center is located in Dakar, played a vital role in this program.

By definition, the activities of WMO are of a forecasting nature, and such programs will benefit the Sahelian governments in the prediction of future drought conditions. However, the direct application of this kind of knowledge, given the need for increasing food production in the Sahel, is even more valuable in view of the need for self-sufficiency.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/International Development Association (IBRD/IDA)

IBRD/IDA became involved in Sahelian relief when the governments of Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta asked for IDA assistance in recovering from the effects of the drought. Under the project, lines of credit were extended to each of the six countries for financing sub-projects aimed at reestablishing the productive bases of areas particularly stricken by the drought. The project was neither designed to provide such emergency relief as food supplies, nor intended to substantially diminish the potential impact of future droughts. Rather, it had the immediate objective of helping people to redevelop their farms and herds, and thus their livelihoods. Credits totalling \$14 million were proposed, which were in addition to IDA funds allocated to the six countries in the Bank's current five-year lending program. It was proposed that the six individual credits be allocated in the following amounts: Chad, \$2 million; Mali, \$2.5 million; Mauritania, \$2.5 million; Niger, \$2 million; Senegal, \$3 million; and Upper Volta, \$2 million. The size of the individual credits was based on considerations of total population, ability to use the credit within the subsequent 18-24 months, sub-projects proposed by the governments, and the apparent extent to which each country had suffered from the drought.²³

The IDA credits were made to the governments on standard terms, to meet 100 per cent of the cost of approved sub-projects net of import duties and taxes on consultant and technical assistance contracts. Such a level of financing is believed appropriate, given the extent of the drought and its fiscal implications. It was further proposed that IDA pre-finance project activities. Experience in all six Sahelian countries indicates that cash availability is the major factor limiting the rate of project implementation and, consequently, the rate of IDA credit disbursement. For this reason, in five of the six countries, IDA credits were channelled through Government Development Banks and, for the same reason, immediately after credit effectiveness, IDA made an initial disbursement of \$200,000 into a specially-created revolving account.

While the Bank was not involved in the initial stages of drought relief, a number of exceptions were made in the lending criteria because of the extent of the disaster. Extending credit in the form it was actually provided established a valuable precedent for the Bank to consider in future disaster situations.

United Nations Development Program (UNDP)

Although ordinarily concerned with development activities, in June 1973, the UNDP Governing Council approved a \$5 million allocation to be utilized in the CILSS countries on specifically drought relief-related projects. Further, a UNDP review of the six Sahelian country programs was undertaken to determine which adaptations of projects already in existence (or about to be launched) might be useful. The conclusion of the review was that since there are fewer development projects planned in the Sahel (drought-related or not) at present than in the past, it might not be possible to revise many programs. The importance of UNDP's medium- and long-term development projects in cooperation with OMVS, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, and others should not be underestimated. However, in terms of relief assistance to the Sahel, the most valuable contribution of UNDP was the action of its Resident Representative, whose role in coordinating many activities as UN focal points was noted earlier.

United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)

By the end of 1973, more than 10,000 nomads were living in a camp known as Lazaret on the outskirts of Niamey. At the request of the President of Mali, the Secretary-General invited the High Commissioner to visit Bamako to discuss the problem of nomadic populations presumed to be of Malian origin living in the neighboring countries. In March 1974, the High Commissioner went to Bamako and was followed by other UNHCR missions that went to the area to assess the situation more closely.

A dialogue with the Nigerien government suggested that the nomads might not be drought refugees at all, but people who had fled Mali because of political persecution. The Malian officials denied these allegations and stated that the nomads were seeking new pasture lands and, therefore, their departure from Mali was drought-related. The UNHCR investigation was designed to determine whether or not the High Commissioner's Office was competent to deal with this issue, for if the refugees were exclusively victims of the drought, the UNHCR could not intervene.

In August 1974, following the signatures of the government of Niger and the UNHCR on an agreement concerning assistance to the floating populations of Malian origin residing in Niger, an amount of \$100,000 was allocated for the transfer and resettlement of the population of Nazaret to a site about forty kilometers east of Niamey. This move was necessitated by the poor sanitary conditions in the camp and the strain on the Nigerien capital city as a result of the influx of nomads.

The UNHCR financed the creation of an infrastructure at the new site for the nomad population, including the building of an access road, wells, and food storage facilities. A dispensary was also established at the camp. The purchase and transportation of food for the camp's population were provided by the UNHCR as well. In December 1974, at the request of the government of Niger, the initial budget was modified to permit \$26,786 initially earmarked for the purchase of a truck to be used for the purchase of additional food. Due to the continuing critical food shortage, this amount was further increased by \$8,000.

The entire project was administered by the government of Niger and coordinated with the UNDP/Niamey Office and a UNHCR Program Officer. Several other organizations, notably Caritas-Niger and the Red Cross, contributed to the execution of the project.

The Malian and Nigerien governments agreed that the nomads would be relocated. A report on the relocation operations was to be submitted to the UNHCR by 30 June 1975, but as of January 1976, no such report had been received. Unsubstantiated reports from a number of different sources indicated that the refugees were transported by truck into Malian territory. Their fate upon reaching Mali is not known.

United Nations Sahelian Office (UNSO)

In May 1973, the Secretary-General designated Undersecretary-General Bradford Morse to be his coordinator in New York for the relief operations in the Sahel. By the end of June, the responsibilities of this office included serving as a focal point for the coordination of medium- and long-term assistance. A small, temporary staff was provided by Mr. Morse for this purpose. The New York-based activities concentrated largely on finalizing the main documents dealing with an integrated sectoral approach to medium- and long-term programs in the Sahel. These studies were intended to guide the UN system in a coherent response to the needs and requests of the countries affected by the drought. However, the reports are actually sectoral analyses and do not represent an integrated approach to a country or a region.

In October 1974, the Secretary-General transferred a number of principal functions from the UNSO office in New York to a new Sahelian office in Ouagadougou under the direction of Galal Magdi. The main functions of this office are:

- 1) Direction, including immediate contact with CILSS, in all matters relating to UN ~~participation~~ and contribution to drought-related recovery and rehabilitation programs;
- 2) Assistance in the mobilization of all available resources and expertise necessary for the effective execution of programs and projects foreseen by CILSS;
- 3) Coordination and harmonization of a wide spectrum of UN interrelated activities in the medium- and long-term, and assurance that these are consistent with the aims of CILSS and the Sahelian countries; and

- 4) Monitoring of the activities of the agencies of the UN system.

Fifty-three CILSS projects from the compendium have been identified as targets for drought rehabilitation by UNSO. The Office assists the governments in the Sahel in finding donors for these projects, providing basic information to potential donors about developments in the commitments and interests of other donors, assisting in the formulation of project specifications, and coordinating negotiations with executive agencies and donors. At least ten of the fifty-three projects have found donors.

The remaining functions of UNSO performed in New York can be summarized as follows:

- 1) Providing staff support in efforts to mobilize requisite financial assistance for the successful implementation of the medium- and long-term programs;
- 2) Acting as liaison between the Ouagadougou office and elements of the UN system in New York which play an active role in rehabilitation in the Sahel;
- 3) Coordinating the development of a proposed data-processing information system which will include all relevant data on projects contemplated within the recovery and rehabilitation program; and
- 4) Maintaining public awareness of the problems of the Sahelian countries and sustaining interest in the implementation of the CILSS program.

In an interview in August 1975, Undersecretary-General Bradford Morse tentatively projected a six- to twelve-month life for UNSO, but personnel in Ouagadougou felt that such a deadline was premature and speculated that UNSO might eventually be absorbed by UNDP.

DEVELOPING A RELIEF EVALUATION SYSTEM

The final and perhaps most important stage of disaster relief is evaluation of relief activities. The investigation revealed very little information about the UN system's efforts to evaluate its emergency responses. While financial reports and descriptive accounts of agency activities are available, there are no administrative evaluations to determine whether the procedures employed in a given disaster situation were the most efficient and effective means available to the agency, nor have there been evaluations of coordination with other donors and with governments to establish criteria for more effective cooperative action.

The ultimate purpose of any evaluation system must be the improvement of future relief operations. Among the important techniques to be developed in relief evaluation, then, are the means of identifying weak points, analyzing the underlying causes of weaknesses, and recommending solutions to problems and improvements in future actions.

WFP is clearly ahead of other UN relief donors in recognizing the need for a relief evaluation system. While there was some thought given to relief evaluation in connection with WHO's experience in the Niger medico-nutritional team operation, WFP has consistently voiced the opinion that evaluations are vitally important.²⁴ As early as 1967, for example, WFP expressed its concern about evaluation when it hired a consultant to conduct a comparative study of four relief operations.²⁵ The consultant visited Mali and Senegal (as well as Afghanistan and Greece) to assess the utilization of emergency food assistance from WFP. His report (WFP/IGC:13/6) concluded that WFP assistance in these emergency operations was justified and that the recipient countries made good use of it.

Another study, using aggregate data, attempted to identify certain patterns that seemed to evolve concerning the type and location of disasters. This report revealed that since the inception of WFP in 1963, emergency food assistance has formed the following patterns:

- 1) 36% of all emergency operations were drought-related;
- 2) 41% of all emergency operations took place in Africa south of the Sahara;
- 3) 30% of all commitments were to operations in Africa south of the Sahara;
- 4) 46% of all commitments were for drought-related operations.²⁶

Since the basic problems are usually the same in emergency situations throughout the world, lessons can be learned from typical cases which would be applicable to many different kinds of relief operations. Kinds of recurring

disasters which would provide good case studies might include: hurricanes and floods in Bangladesh; hurricanes and earthquakes in the Caribbean and Central America; typhoons in the Philippines; and droughts in the Sahelian Zone. Studies along these lines are a positive step toward building relief evaluation procedures. At the present time, however, similar evaluations are being undertaken by other UN agencies. The nearest thing to an evaluation of disaster response for most agencies is a summary report submitted when relief assistance is terminated.

An evaluation procedure should be designed to be generally applicable to several different situations and areas, but specific enough to provide definitive information concerning the effectiveness of various processes in differing circumstances. Common problems that arise in various types of emergency relief operations have been identified by WFP personnel and form the basis for developing an evaluation framework applicable to other UN agencies regularly dealing with disaster relief:

- a) General national procedures for dealing with emergency situations;
- b) Coordination of disaster relief efforts at the country level and approaches to various external agencies for food and non-food aid;
- c) Rapid and accurate assessment of the situation, identification of the needs of the affected population, and formulation of request to the agency concerned;
- d) Internal procedures of the donor countries in regard to confirmation of availability of food required, its procurement and delivery;
- e) Logistics after arrival of commodities (receipt, handling, storage, transport, distribution);
- f) Timely cessation of food distribution to avoid development of excessive dependence on such aid or creation of disincentives to the local population to provide fully for itself;
- g) Reporting.²⁷

A number of these items would be most amenable to evaluation by several agencies. It would also be beneficial to encourage the recipient countries to undertake their own evaluation process.

The following questions might provide a foundation for developing criteria for evaluating "general national procedures for dealing with emergency situations."

1. Were the means used to detect the disaster capable of indicating the scope and magnitude of the situation at a sufficiently early stage?

2. Was the assessment of the needs of the population reasonably accurate and completed in an expeditious manner?
3. How soon after the recognition of the disaster was a relief request submitted?
4. Were the power structures (governments, both central and local, landowners, and the like) able to handle the relief assistance?
5. Did the country have the managerial ability and the human resources to conduct relief operations adequately?
6. Was the reporting system used by the recipient countries adequate to meet the needs of the donor?
7. What was the degree and quality of information exchange and cooperation among all parties concerned in the relief operation?

Similar criteria might be used for each of the evaluation subjects outlined.

General evaluations are more easily accomplished immediately after the termination of relief activities. However, in order to be useful, disaster relief evaluation must be part of the process, not an afterthought. While it is often argued that in emergency situations, local authorities and representatives of relief agencies are overloaded with work and have limited time and attention to devote to an evaluation process, agencies should be flexible enough to permit adjustments in ongoing activities that would improve the quality of the relief operation. In addition, pre-disaster contingency plans should anticipate future evaluation needs.

Inevitably, each agency within the UN system has its own procedures for handling relief assistance. Over the years, a pattern of how these procedures work in responding to disasters has evolved. The patterns suggest standards from which the criteria for evaluating the performance of an agency may be derived. Just as we cannot reasonably evaluate how one part of the body performs its function in isolation from the others, we cannot determine the effectiveness of the UN system response in disaster situations by conducting a series of independent agency investigations. What is required is an evaluation procedure designed to take into account the differences among UN agencies, and yet be generally applicable to the system's total response in a variety of emergency situations. If all UN agencies were examined from similar points of view, a systemic evaluation of relief operations could be produced that would be valuable in assessing agency relationships during disaster relief. The results of such a systemic evaluation could produce recommendations for integrating the UN's approach to relief assistance and thereby immeasurably enhance its effectiveness.

There is support within the UN bureaucracy for a rigorous and comprehensive evaluation procedure. This interest should be supported by Member States by encouraging feasibility studies of various methods of implementing an evaluation of UN relief activities.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Sahelian relief experience is a significant case study for many reasons. Most importantly, it served to awaken the UN system to the longer term needs of the region. It also served to initiate a number of reforms in the initiation, development, and implementation of large-scale disaster relief operations. Several areas of concern have been identified, and a summary of the major conclusions and recommendations of the study is presented below.

Relief Coordination Responsibility

The case study of the Sahelian relief effort clearly shows the need for an effective international disaster relief agency fully capable of mounting and carrying out large-scale, coordinated disaster relief operations.

The UN Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO), the mechanism for coordinating natural disaster relief efforts, did not become involved in the Sahelian operation except in an advisory capacity. It was unable to conduct a relief effort to meet this crisis because of inexperienced and insufficient staff, and inadequate resources. Consequently, there was a scramble to find an authority to assume the responsibility for coordinating the effort. It seemed logical to look for a coordinator within the UN system, given the precedent set in 1971 when UNHCR coordinated the East Bengal Refugees in India relief operation..

Encouraged and supported by the United States and other donors, WFP agreed to assume the responsibility for coordinating food relief to the Sahel. The relief effort was already well underway by the time they got involved, which prevented WFP from taking essential steps in coordination.

Once again, bilateral donors searched for a focal point and finally found one in OSRO. It was necessary, however, to create an ad hoc agency to fill this gap in the UN organization. FAO's coordination mandate was limited to the jurisdiction of the UN system. It did not initially accept responsibility for managing and coordinating the entire relief response, most of which came from bilateral donors. Over a period of time, however, OSRO gradually assumed responsibility for coordinating a number of aspects of the relief effort outside the UN system.

Most significant in the Sahelian case is the fact that there was a United Nations Disaster Relief Office already in existence and there should have been no need to create an ad hoc agency for coordination. True, the Office had only been functioning for about a year, but the fact that it was by no means capable of handling Sahelian relief reveals several interesting points about the UN system:

- 1) The fact that the UN suffers grave financial difficulties does not excuse creating an office with such a broad -- and critically important -- mandate without providing the necessary resources to fulfill its function. This can only suggest that there may have been no general consensus that the office was necessary.
- 2) While plans for increasing UNDRO disaster relief coordination capacity have been discussed for some time, it cannot be denied that the Sahelian drought crisis acted as a catalyst, compelling Member States to recognize the imperative need for such capacity in the system.
- 3) UNDRO still does not have the capability to respond to a disaster on the scale of the Sahelian relief situation. It required coordination assistance from OSRO in Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Somalia, and Mozambique.

Recognizing the need for disaster relief coordination and the substantial problems that still exist in this regard, and given that considerable resources have been given to increase UNDRO's capacity to perform this function, the following recommendations are proposed:

1. UNDRO should be given more or, perhaps, complete authority to coordinate all disaster relief activities, both within and outside the UN system.
2. UNDRO should be given the authority to institute a disaster watch which would maintain surveillance on disaster-prone areas during periods when there is no immediate crisis.
3. UNDRO, in cooperation with the UN agencies, should endeavor to produce a comprehensive UN field manual, describing all UN agency responsibilities in disaster relief.
4. UNDRO should develop a funding strategy that would enable potential donors of disaster relief to make specific prior commitments in principle to be used in the event that relief assistance is required.
5. UNDRO should ensure that in its efforts to increase its organizational capacity that special attention be paid to developing the special skills and techniques required for coping with regional drought emergencies.
6. UNDRO should develop a disaster relief training course for UNDP Resident Representatives.

In addition to assigning more responsibility to UNDRO, the emergency units within the UN specialized agencies can provide an important supportive role. The Sahelian relief experience may have acted as a catalyst

for organizational change in this regard. UNICEF and WHO have emergency units within their organizations, and WFP is in the process of creating a corresponding office. With reference to the agency emergency relief units, the following recommendations are made:

1. All emergency units are encouraged to define their working relations and responsibilities with UNDRO and with the other UN emergency units in advance of a disaster situation.
2. Emergency units should make immediate plans to research, develop, and institute pre-disaster contingency plans for their agencies.
3. Emergency units should institute immediate plans for developing evaluation procedures, with a view to providing guidelines for future relief operations wherever they occur.
4. WFP should immediately institute an Emergency Unit which would handle all emergency food requests without regard to geographic location.
5. Emergency units should be responsible for seeing that disaster relief training becomes a mandatory part of any training course that prepares UNICEF, WHO, FAO, and WFP personnel for field positions.

Disaster Awareness and Alert

At the root of the UN system's problems in drought awareness and alert was the lack of a credible information-gathering system, the lack of an adequate reporting system, and a severe personnel shortage. With this in mind, the following recommendations are proposed as suggestions for improving the disaster alert system:

1. Institute the Special Early Warning System every May through October in the Sahel, issuing reports by telex at least every ten days.
2. Develop a training course to teach the local personnel how to monitor developing food shortages and how to assess the severity of a drought situation.
3. Increase the number of UN field personnel in West Africa and, specifically, create more junior professional posts to enable the UN to independently monitor and assess food availability and requirements, or at least to assist governments in doing so.
4. Develop alternative disaster alert systems, such as a health and nutritional surveillance system, to provide additional information on the nature and scope of the human population needs.

5. Create permanent UNICEF and WHO country offices in every Sahelian country to monitor a health surveillance system.
6. Develop a training course to teach paramedical and medical personnel about the importance of analyzing health statistics for changes that might indicate that special assistance is or will be required.

UN Authority

In the Sahel, the delay in alerting the UN system to the need for disaster relief has been ascribed to political coverups or bureaucratic incompetence. These problems raise important questions concerning the limitations of UN authority in disaster relief and suggest the following recommendations:

1. The Director-General of FAO should be given the authority to make recommendations for relief assistance to potential donors or to the governments involved on the basis of information received through the Early Warning System.
2. The UN system should be allowed to extend more assistance to disaster-affected populations through ongoing programs than it is presently capable of doing without prior government authorization.
3. UN field offices should have a larger disaster fund, which could be used whenever the need arises without fear of reprisal from the host governments or agency headquarters.
4. Some sort of generalized permission to take limited preparatory action for mobilizing disaster assistance prior to a government request for aid might be given to the UN system.

Developing a Relief Response

A wide variety of problems were incurred in developing and implementing UN relief programs in the Sahel. Some of the problems were resolved during the course of relief operations, while others remain obstacles that impair UN relief response. The following recommendations address some of these more basic issues:

1. All agencies should improve their emergency request processing to avoid unnecessary delays.
2. Donor governments should revise their internal approval procedures, in order to make their willingness or ability to commit relief supplies for specific emergencies more readily known to UN agencies.

3. UNICEF should reexamine its CSM emergency feeding operations in the Sahel with a view to developing methods of more accurately assessing population needs and improving the distribution system.
4. The example of UN-voluntary agency collaboration set by UNICEF and WHO in the Niger medico-nutritional project should be followed by other UN agencies.
5. Donors should direct their country offices to become familiar with the emergency food distribution and reporting system operating in each country and establish reporting requirements for future relief programs.
6. Modify and reinforce the reporting requirements regarding sales proceeds in future assistance programs. Make these requirements clear to the governments concerned. Follow-up accounting of distribution costs must be provided to donors to ascertain whether or not further assistance is essential.
7. Institute logistic contingency plans and continually update these plans for use in the event of future relief operations.

These recommendations, as well as others suggested in the conclusions of this study, could be useful in the creation of an improved relief response network. The implementation of such reforms, however, depends on the understanding of the international community of their necessity, as well as on the willingness of the United Nations system to coordinate its efforts and to encourage Member States to prepare their own disaster contingency plans. Only by analyzing and utilizing the experience of past relief operations can we hope to minimize suffering and the loss of human life in the future.

FOOTNOTES

THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

- 1 Hal Sheets and Roger Morris, Disaster in the Desert: Failures in International Relief in the West African Drought, Humanitarian Policy Studies (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1974), p.2.
- 2 Jack Shepherd, The Politics of Starvation (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1975), p.x.
- 3 UN Document E/5374, 5 July 1973, Annex.
- 4 UN Document E/Res/1797 (LV), 11 July 1973, para.4.
- 5 UN Document A/9178, 5 October 1973.
- 6 UN Document A/PV/2145.
- 7 UN Document A/Res/3153 (XXVIII), 14 December 1973.
- 8 UN Document E/Res/1834 (LVI), 14 May 1974.
- 9 UN Document E/5554, 28 June 1974 and E/5554/Corr 1.
- 10 Shepherd, The Politics of Starvation, p.91.
- 11 FAO Office for the Sahelian Relief Operation, Report No.13 on the drought situation in the Sahelian Zone and relief measures taken by the UN system (Rome, 28 February 1975), Annex II.
- 12 UN Document WFP/IGC: 23/19, April 1973.
- 13 UN Document WFP/IGC: 28/5-B, August 1975, p.5.
- 14 UN Document WFP/IGC: 28/5-C, August 1975, p.3.
- 15 UN Document WFP/IGC: 25/14, March 1974.
- 16 World Health Organization, Proposals for a Programme to Control the Repercussions on Public Health of the Drought in the Sudano-Sahelian Regions of Africa (Geneva, 1974).
- 17 UN Document E/ICEF/L.1291, 20 November 1973, p.2.

- 18 UN Document WFP/IGC: 28/5-B, August 1975, p.7.
- 19 Ibid., p.12.
- 20 Robert M. Golding, "A Logistician's Notes: A Report on Transport and Other Matters in the Sahel During the 1973 Drought Relief Program," unpublished report for the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), 1974.
- 21 League of Red Cross Societies, Joint Medico-Nutritional Programme in the Niger Republic (Geneva, July-December 1974), Part Two, Nutritional Table 1.
- 22 Ibid., p.32.
- 23 IRBD, West Africa Drought Relief Fund Project (Washington, D.C., 1973).
- 24 UN Document WFP/IGC: 28/5-B, August 1975, Annex I.
- 25 UN Document WFP/IGC: 28/5-C, August 1975.
- 26 Ibid., p.6.
- 27 Ibid., pp.1-2.
-

SECTION II

VOLUNTARY AGENCIES

INTRODUCTION

The participation of nongovernmental voluntary agencies in a major international relief effort has not been adequately examined in works on disaster relief.¹

This analysis focuses on the international position, problems, and contributions of voluntary agencies in the response to the Sahelian drought. This particular response is worth investigating because it represents in many ways the personal response of the peoples of the rest of the world to this disaster. The report which follows deals with voluntary agency participation in relief and development efforts.

Voluntary Agencies Included in the Study

The data on which this analysis is based were gathered from documents, reports, and extensive interviews at both field and headquarters levels of sixty-three voluntary agencies. Some twenty agencies provided responses by questionnaire alone. The conclusions, findings, and figures contained herein represent the researcher's interpretation of the data given her by the voluntary agencies.

In all, one hundred interviews of voluntary agency personnel were conducted. The agencies included in this study represent a significant proportion of those involved in Sahelian relief or development work. ~~Only~~ those agencies either operational in the Sahel or directly funding such operational agencies conducting programs are included, although other groups were contacted in preliminary research.

Organizations located in North America, Australia, and Europe were included, as well as local Sahelian voluntary groups. A complete listing of these agencies is found in the Appendix, together with basic background information on each group's participation in Sahel relief and development.

Kinds of Voluntary Agency Relief Programs

Relief efforts in the Sahel ranged from the large programs coordinated by ecumenical agencies through teams located in the Sahel to sums of a few thousand dollars given by small private groups. The dimensions which differentiate the various voluntary agencies involved in relief activities in the Sahel include:

- 1) whether the group simply supports or actively operates programs;
- 2) whether the group is primarily involved in relief activities, development programs, or both;

- 3) whether or not they are essentially religious, or missionary, in purpose; and
- 4) whether they direct their efforts to assisting individuals or whole communities.

Despite the variety of organizational characteristics, the agencies examined in this study represent the extent of the response of the private individual and special, nongovernment groups throughout the world to the needs of the Sahelian peoples. The financial contribution of some governments to the work of voluntary agencies indicates their realization of the importance of these agencies. Voluntary groups act not only as channels through which relief and development funds may be directed, but also as independent organizations with recognized and legitimate private constituencies which cannot be ignored by governments.

Voluntary Agencies and International Response

Within the spectrum of international response to the Sahel drought, voluntary agencies have made and continue to make a significant contribution both financially and operationally. The sixty agencies included in this study alone contributed over \$62 million to relief and development efforts in the Sahel. This figure is conservative, as it does not include amounts committed by agencies studied which did not make such data available, nor does it include figures on any projects or programs which have not been finalized with local governments. The real value figure would probably be several million dollars higher. Of the \$62 million, \$25 million were spent on relief operations and \$32 million on development programs. Approximately \$5 million belong in the undifferentiated relief and development category (see Appendix VA VII for breakdown). The \$62 million figure obviously places the total voluntary agency contribution on a level with that of some bilateral or multilateral donors.

Because voluntary agencies are more likely to fund smaller development projects which are not highly visible, or to supplement ongoing relief activities in smaller amounts, there is a tendency to assume that their total contribution is minimal in relation to that of governmental organizations. The data collected here dispute that point of view. Although voluntary agency contributions are often spread over a wide range of assistance programs, certain patterns of activity do emerge, along with areas of special competence and particular problems.

Classification of Voluntary Agency Activities

Early in the research, it became apparent that an examination of relief efforts without a corresponding examination of development efforts would produce an incomplete picture of the response of voluntary agencies. As the \$25 million figure testifies, a good deal of money was spent directly on relief, but it is fair to say that the majority of the organizations would prefer to spend money on short- or long-term development. This is due

to the philosophic orientation of many voluntary agencies: most would like to contribute to the long-term needs of the Sahel area, which requires much more than distributing food or medical supplies during a famine. The voluntary agencies interviewed are interested in the future wellbeing of the people they assist as well as in their present critical needs. This philosophy can be paraphrased in the saying which often appears in development information: "If you give a person a fish, he eats it in one day. If you teach him how to fish, he can feed himself." The two aspects of voluntary agency response -- relief and development -- will therefore be examined separately in this report.

For the purposes of this study, relief is defined as activities which are undertaken to fulfill an immediate need of the affected population to preserve their lives from imminent destruction. In the case of the Sahel, this will be defined as food or medical assistance, and the transportation of food or medical supplies. While other kinds of emergency assistance, such as emergency well-drilling, may be considered relief activity under some definitions, this type of emergency development will be considered, in this report, in the development category.

Relief activities include: 1) food distribution; 2) all aspects of emergency medical and nutritional care; 3) all aspects of the transport of food and medical commodities; and 4) emergency road maintenance. This narrow definition allows a more careful examination of the two overlapping phases of the Sahelian disaster response -- relief and development.

Development activities undertaken in the Sahel cover a very wide range of programs. These can be generally defined as being concerned with the rehabilitation of the drought-devastated areas as well as improvement of the marginal areas. The greater part of voluntary agency work in development is centered on the improvement of water resources or agriculture, with an emphasis on integrated rural development, although a variety of other projects have been initiated.

RELIEF RESPONSE

Of the sixty organizations involved in operating or funding relief and development, only sixteen were concerned primarily with relief alone. Thirty-one combined relief work with a development commitment. This primary group of forty-seven organizations participating in relief work includes twenty-five groups which channelled funds through other voluntary organizations which were operational in the field, or through local agencies.

Initiation and Implementation of Relief

The pattern of voluntary agency response begins in a way similar to the reaction of the rest of the world. Those with field offices, such as African-American Labor Center (AALC), Africare, Care, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Church World Service (CWS), Frères des Hommes, Oxfam, and a number of missionary and evangelical groups (see Appendix VA I for complete listing), were forced to await the public declaration of disaster. Other organizations which worked through local voluntary groups were in a similar situation.

One of the earliest to respond among this set of agencies was CIMADE in March 1973. It informed the World Council of Churches (WCC) Commission on Interchurch Aid, Refugee and World Service (CICARWS) of its efforts to respond soon after the disaster was officially declared. This does not mean that the agencies were unaware of the crisis earlier, but even those with field representatives who were notified were forced to wait, as were other international and governmental organizations, for the official request for assistance before making more than a small step-up in activities. The mobilization and monitoring of relief was then dependent on the availability of field personnel to handle these operations.

Organizations such as CIMADE had a few partner groups to which they could send assistance immediately, but there was, throughout the Sahel, a critical lack of ongoing field activity, partner organizations, and coordination structures to be utilized. This fact, of course, made both relief activities and the development of rehabilitation programs more difficult. Most groups had to rely on field visits during relief and while developing programs to compensate for the lack of field reports. Rather than send inappropriate or unneeded supplies, many agencies depended on the judgment of those with field personnel. Some organizations, such as Oxfam and CRS, give their field directors freedom to commit funds from existing reserves in an emergency, but even for these, only small amounts can be used to alleviate a crisis situation until an official government declaration of disaster is made.

While it is true that many voluntary agencies in the field have greater organizational flexibility than UN or bilateral donors, it cannot be said that they can act without heed to the local political constraints. The view of the nongovernmental agency as a "non-political" -- and therefore neutral -- actor is one which is sometimes perpetuated by various headquarters in their publicity, but it is not borne out in fact. All the governments in

the Sahel considered foreign assistance just that -- foreign.

The time of reaction varied widely among the various organizations and probably depended heavily on whether funds were immediately available for commitment or whether rapid fund raising was necessary. The question of funds raised and their relation to the Sahel disaster response will be discussed in more detail later.

At the field level, two major attempts to coordinate outside voluntary relief were carried out by Caritas Internationalis and the League of Red Cross Societies (LICROSS), with varying degrees of success. Efforts to coordinate voluntary agencies in the development phase were made by the World Council of Churches (WCC), ACORD, Freedom from Hunger/Action for Development (FFH/AD), American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service (ACVA), International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), and the NGO Office of the Permanent Interstate Committee (CILSS). These will also be discussed later in the report.

Caritas works very closely with local affiliates which, in this case, were not very strong since most of the countries involved are largely Moslem. Much of Caritas' relief was channelled through CRS and local missions. Visits to the relief operations were made by officials from the Rome headquarters on several occasions. During emergency situations, activities are supposed to be coordinated through the international desk of Caritas to assure maximum coordination with other agencies working in the area. In the Sahel case, CRS was probably more involved in directing relief and cooperating with local Catholic groups in those countries (Senegal and Upper Volta) where they had field directors. In other countries, Caritas worked directly with local African Caritas groups or Catholic Missions.

The League of Red Cross Societies was aware of the disaster from FAO and news reports, but could not respond until asked by their member societies. In this case, the Mauritanian Red Crescent contacted Geneva first with a request for assistance. Other Sahelian Red Cross societies followed suit, depending on the particular political environment and their relations with their governments.

Operations of the League of Red Cross Societies in the Sahel were hampered by the absence of strong Red Cross affiliates in the area. There had been no official visits to the local societies before the first appeal. Therefore, relief activities relied heavily on the information provided by delegates sent to the Sahel by LICROSS. It was very difficult to get accurate estimates of relief needs without extensive travel. Standard procedures include checking with WHO for medical estimates and also, now, with UNDRP for estimates on all kinds of relief. LICROSS decided early in the disaster period to confine its activities to supplemental feeding which could not be carried out by FAO or USAID, and to providing essential equipment, medical supplies, and other requested items.

Through circulars detailing amounts sent and current relief needs, LICROSS tried to maintain an information flow with donor societies. The

circulars also include shipping instructions and serve to prevent, as far as possible, the shipment of inappropriate relief supplies. In some cases, this type of supply can be "postponed" to another disaster. LICROSS publicly acknowledged the receipt of money and supplies in the name of the local society. Many of the gifts for the Sahel were in the form of money, which LICROSS could use to purchase needed supplies either in the affected countries or elsewhere. LICROSS disaster circulars are also sent to the NGO members of the ICVA emergency relief committee, all diplomatic missions in Geneva, UN agencies, and any group which requests them. The main problem with dissemination of information through circulars is that it is difficult to indicate a delicate political situation which may be affecting relief by this means.

The total amount of relief channelled through LICROSS amounted to \$10 million, which is a large share of the \$25 million total of relief funds. There is no doubt that without the presence of LICROSS, many national Red Cross societies would have been trying to mount separate relief operations on their own, thereby adding to an already strained situation.

LICROSS is the only one of these groups to have a formal monitoring system in the form of special delegates who are sent to work with the various national societies and assist them in carrying out relief operations. These delegates report regularly to Geneva on relief progress and needs, and national societies are required to accept their participation in disaster relief activities. It must also be said that the operations staff in Geneva is experienced and very aware of problems in relief coordination and distribution.

Types of Relief Commodities and Activities

Most of the voluntary agencies included in this study focused on specific relief needs rather than on mounting massive distribution programs of their own. Even such large organizations as LICROSS limited their role largely to one of supplemental feeding and medical help specifically to the refugee camps. CRS concentrated on high value relief cargoes (vitamins, medicines, baby food) to supplement ongoing activities. Smaller agencies gave funds to organizations already operational to buy specific relief supplies. This aspect of the relief response was commendable, as it helped to assure the continuation, in many cases, of ongoing operations without straining fragile support structures by starting new ones.

Another important voluntary agency contribution was in purchase and maintenance of vehicles for use in ground distribution. The road to Gorom-Gorom in Upper Volta was reinstated largely through the efforts of Freres des Hommes. A ferry to cross the river between Senegal and Mauritania was partly purchased by Christian Aid when the existing one was no longer operational. Many organizations assumed the gasoline costs for vehicles distributing food. Without these small contributions, quantities of food and supplies would have been undeliverable. Many groups relief on larger agencies, such as CRS or CWS, for shipment of supplies and facilitation of customs clearance during the period of direct relief operations.

Problems in Sahel Relief

The more general problems of relief monitoring and distribution which affected the efforts of other donors also affected the work of voluntary agencies. These general problems in disaster relief have been discussed at length in other contexts, but bear repeating briefly here. A major problem in any relief distribution, and the one which was most important in the Sahel, is transportation and communication. With the exception of the more-favored Senegal, the French left little in the way of even used infrastructure. Since there was no commercial value in roads, few were built, and this example can be extended to all aspects of communication and transportation, within each country and with its neighbors. It is possible to be within a few miles of a severely distressed community in the Sahelian Zone and be totally unaware of its plight. Unlike sudden natural disasters in which the victims are immediately obvious, the gradual affliction of the drought created a situation in which it was sometimes necessary to actively seek out those in need of aid.

The Sahelian crisis posed another special problem for voluntary agencies: few of them had any experience in the area before the drought. The OECD-ICVA Directory of Development Aid of NGOs in 1967 listed only ten voluntary agencies working in the Sahel. Several of those were local Catholic or Red Cross organizations operating on a very limited scale. For such organizations as the World Council of Churches, accustomed to identifying and working through local partners in relief and development assistance, the Sahel countries presented a difficult problem, since it was necessary not only to rapidly locate and organize such partners as already existed, but also to convince member churches of the need to work with local governments directly. CRS and Oxfam already had working relationships with the governments in many cases and were able to build on these.

Ad hoc organizations which are often considered a threat to relief efforts in disaster situations were not a problem in the Sahel case. The one group of this nature which was formed for this disaster, RAINS, worked through CILSS and did not try to compete with other organizations. Most smaller organizations, as already noted, funded groups already carrying on programs. In long-term disasters, it is doubtful that ad hoc organizations would be able to impede relief activities as they might in short-term relief situations, since they would be unable to set up parallel programs without the notice of established organizations. On the funding end of the relief chain, it is not likely that ad hoc groups would seriously divert funds from organizations with field experience.

Further, the Sahelian governments had little experience in dealing with voluntary agencies and, since they were largely Moslem states, were not always willing to accept church groups without suspicion. Nevertheless, the direct relief period witnessed the establishment of some important working relationships with host governments which carried over into the implementation of development programs.

DEVELOPMENT RESPONSE

At the development phase of disaster response, competition among agencies becomes evident. The problems of coordination at this stage are exacerbated by the competitive desire to be recognized for "doing something" and are rooted in the dichotomy between the environment of the headquarters decision-makers and the realities in the field. A more detailed analysis of formal coordination and collaboration will be made in the next section, but the informal forces at work within the organizations which lead to an unwillingness to work together except on the most superficial level, are a problem for many, though not all, agencies.

Program Initiation and Implementation

It appears that many agencies have problems at the program initiation and implementation stage because of a phenomenon best described as "pressure to spend". The phenomenon runs in a cycle and certain clear stages are involved at both headquarters and field levels:

- 1) Agency responds to disaster by launching public appeal;
- 2) Agency sends relief supplies through whatever channels are available;
- 3) Money begins to roll in from appeals;
- 4) Decision is made to spend this money on development, once immediate relief period has passed;
- 5) Headquarters pressures field personnel or sends staff to find suitable projects;
- 6) Field responds by submitting whatever projects it has obtained from local voluntary agencies or governments;
- 7) "Shelf-projects" -- those which have been waiting for a donor since before the disaster and which may not be suitable to present conditions -- are considered first;
- 8) Field resists pressure for more projects if it can;
- 9) Headquarters replies that it is under public pressure to commit funds;
- 10) Field may placate headquarters by promising that projects being designed will be submitted shortly;
- 11) Pressure is then transferred to local government or voluntary agency contacts (which are usually extremely understaffed)

to produce well-designed projects immediately. These same people are usually also under pressure from multilateral and bilateral groups who want similar projects.

The key to this cycle of voluntary agency development involvement is found at Step 9. Most headquarters personnel will admit that as relief and development assistance to the developing world increases, it is essential to educate the contributing public to the real needs of the developing world. So far, there is little evidence that such an effort is being made. Trocaire is an example of an agency heavily committed to public information which does go beyond the "starving child" syndrome so often employed in voluntary agency advertising. The important point to be made here is that the need for the donor group to help should not override the need for the affected area to have time and assistance in determining what its needs actually are. In other words, "good intentions" are not enough and cannot be used to explain away poorly designed and evaluated programs which may, in the long run, do far more harm than good.

Organizations such as Euro-Action (ACORD) represent a functional consortium of groups (in this case, six) which are attempting to implement a coordinated program. Field personnel are drawn from Oxfam, a member organization, and only one additional person has been sent to the field. Other organizations choose to spend more time designing and developing a program and therefore begin work later. The American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) and War on Want are other examples of this policy.

Experienced personnel in several agencies stressed the need to begin designing and researching development programs while the relief period is going on. Many expressed the opinion that waiting until the emergency phase was over before making such plans and decisions delayed the rehabilitation programs which were obviously needed. They did not, however, deny the need for careful planning of long-term projects.

World Council of Churches essentially acted as a clearing house and broker for member church agencies. A three-person team was sent to Upper Volta to find partners and set up government contacts for these agencies. Once the relationship was established, however, the agencies pursued the contacts on their own. While the WCC team was clearly instrumental in cutting down the number of field visits by member agencies and thereby relieving strain on local governments, it must be said that many member agencies are still reticent about working with Sahelian governments. The realities of social and political institutions in the Sahel demand close voluntary agency cooperation with the governments in development work. There is an opportunity for member agencies of the World Council to work more closely and effectively with local governments in elaborating a joint-development program if they choose to do so. This would not only set a significant precedent for inter-agency cooperation, but would also be welcomed by the Sahelian authorities.

The Federation des Eglises et Missions Evangeliques en Haute Volta (FEME) is an exemplary case of a locally-run, voluntary development agency which uses outside funds to develop projects specifically tailored to African

goals and needs. Skillful management has allowed this agency to resist the "pressure to spend" phenomenon discussed earlier and to avoid destructive competition with other agencies.

Types of Development Projects

The forty-five organizations involved in spending \$35 million in development include seventeen which fund operational agencies in the field, and a total of twenty-eight agencies are actually operational (see Appendix VA III).

Many groups are concentrating their efforts on short- and long-term integrated development programs. These projects heavily emphasize water resources, agriculture, and livestock. The list of organizations includes: Euro-Action (ACORD); Africare; American Friends Service Committee (AFSC); Care; Caritas-Senegal; Catholic Relief Services (CRS); Church World Service (CWS); Federation des Eglises (FEME); Frères Nos Frères; Lutheran World Federation (LWF); Lutheran World Relief (LWR); Oxfam; Frères des Hommes; and War on Want. Some agencies are more involved in health care or medical programs, and these include Terre des Hommes, Christian and Missionary Alliance, World Mercy Fund, and Worldwide Evangelization. It should be noted that CRS has been involved in an extensive maternal/child health program in the Sahel for many years.

The other organizations are involved in a variety of projects largely determined by their field contacts rather than by conscious decision for a particular kind of development work. More detailed information on each organization's involvement may be found in the Background Information section (see Appendix VA VIII).

Problems in Sahel Development

Apart from the communications and transportation problems which are shared with other relief efforts, development work in the Sahel presents a number of special problems for voluntary agencies.

Since many agencies were new to the Sahel and lacked local organizations through which to work, there was a tendency to begin development projects simply because it seemed like a good idea. While many agencies made an effort to share information to avoid duplication of projects, there was apparently little concern for discussing plans with UN or bilateral donors to avoid launching programs especially difficult to administer or evaluate. There is a tendency for voluntary agencies to avoid these other donors for political reasons, and the UN, in particular, is unlikely to seek out voluntary agencies to share information. Greater communication in the field could have led to better program development. Voluntary agencies with field personnel having experience in the area were not consulted by other agencies for philosophical and political reasons.

The obsession of headquarters staff with project duplication is also difficult to understand in the Sahel case. It is obvious from a field visit that there is plenty of need in the Sahel to go around. Why not

duplicate someone else's successful program in another area of the country? The WCC team has been trying to encourage this sharing among its member agencies. Since Sahelian needs are largely linked to agriculture, livestock, and water resources management, there is certainly no valid reason for agencies with successful projects not to share their information and designs with others attempting the same kinds of work. It is the observation of the researcher that inter-agency competition for projects begins and is most obvious at headquarters level. This view is often imposed on field personnel, who may not be in favor of competition between agencies.

It is difficult to adequately assess the development efforts of voluntary agencies in the Sahel at this point in time. Some have learned from their own mistakes what they could have learned, through more careful research, from the mistakes of others. The question of evaluation is a serious one which remains unresolved; its importance and implications will be discussed elsewhere in this report.

Special Cases

Several organizations must be classified separately because of their special nature. World ORT Federation operates in the Sahel under contracts with USAID or UN agencies to carry out specific, short-term manpower training projects. Near East Foundation is operating a livestock management program in Mauritania under contract with USAID. The African-American Labor Center (AALC) of the AFL-CIO operates in the Sahel at the request of the local trade unions, serving as a liaison between labor groups in the United States and their African counterparts. African trade unions design projects they would like to implement and AALC finds donors among U.S. labor groups to support them. During the drought emergency period, a great deal of money was raised by American labor through AALC for emergency assistance.

In short, the organizations involved in relief and development in the Sahel, which include several of the largest voluntary agencies in North America and Europe, church agencies, service organizations, and private groups, each has its own particular mode of operation, concept of assistance, and purposes, which range from the most specific projects to the most general humanitarian goals.

COORDINATION EFFORTS

To assess the efforts of voluntary agencies involved in both relief and development to establish effective cooperation, it is necessary to concentrate on formal undertakings. While most agencies participate in some kind of information sharing in implementing their Sahel programs, and these contacts occur both in the field and in headquarters, such activities are difficult to substantiate and difficult to pinpoint in terms of effectiveness. Participation in formal gatherings gives some indication of cooperation and can be used to evaluate overall cooperative efforts. By no means does this limitation intend to diminish the value of informal sharing and contacts among organizations.

Coordination and collaboration will be examined on three levels: 1) Extra-African; 2) Regional; and 3) Local. These categories are broad enough to allow for the full range of voluntary agency collaborative activities. Some activities may be seen to span two or even all three categories, but they have been classified, for clarity's sake, according to where the impetus for the activity originated.

Extra-African Cooperation

This category includes collaborative efforts made by groups headquartered in Europe or North American. These include: ICVA, ACVA, FFH/AD LICROSS, WCC, Cor Unum, and ACORD (Euro-Action Sahel). The activities of each of these organizations will be delineated separately and then some conclusions concerning their effectiveness will be drawn.

International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA)

The work of ICVA has centered around providing a neutral forum for the exchange of information and ideas for its members and other interested individuals or groups within the UN system. Members may participate in any of three commissions: Refugee and Migration, Emergency Aid, and Social and Economic Development. Monetary support for ICVA is based on the number of commissions in which an agency wishes to participate. Most of the agencies included in this study which belong to ICVA are participants in all three, and many of them are also included in the related Working Group on Integrated Rural Development (WOGIRD), through which much of the information on the Sahelian drought was distributed and discussed. This reflects the voluntary agency commitment to the overall development needs of the area, rather than on disaster relief alone.

Briefly, the activities of ICVA in Sahel information exchange were:

1. July 1973. An information paper proposing general development outlines was sent to members, which was an extract of the Geneva meeting convened by UNSO.

2. July 1973. An information paper by WOGIRD with a list of members with Sahel/Sudan programs was sent.
3. August 1973. An information paper outlining a proposed schedule of WOGIRD meetings and an invitation to provide documentation was circulated. Contact with FAO and UN was reported.
4. August 1973. Follow-up on the 3 August Information, including list of projects drawn up by UNSO to help members prepare for the September meeting was promulgated, as was UNICEF Project Memorandum.
5. September 1973. WOGIRD Meeting. Thirty-four voluntary agencies attended, together with six UN agencies. Summary of UNSO activities was given and note taken of ACVA meeting with Sahelian ambassadors. Attention was drawn to CILSS program document; Barrès bibliography drawn up with joint WCC-FFH/AD sponsorship; LICROSS delineated expanding national activities; a plea for coordination with CILSS was entered and a request for funds to meeting NGO program officer costs (Fayossewo seconded by FFH/AD) was made; and ICVA and UN were asked to increase their clearing house activities.
6. November 1973. Information paper on January 1974 meeting circulated along with UN documents.
7. December 1973. Information concerning January meeting, including FAO's proposed World Food Council documents, circulated.
8. WOGIRD meeting. Thirty-three voluntary agencies attended and eleven UN groups represented. FAO report on multi-donor mission presented; M. Mariko assumed CILSS NGO Officer position; agencies were asked to work closely with CILSS, limit exploratory missions, use ICVA clearing house, and work for local autonomy.

After January 1974, ACCORD was to assume some of ICVA's clearing house functions in the Sahel. At this point, most agencies had begun to establish or elaborate their Sahelian involvements and there may have been a corresponding decrease in interest in having ICVA continue this function. It must also be noted that the creation and support of a CILSS NGO Officer located in the Sahel was designed to move the clearing house/coordination function to the field. This effort will be discussed in the Regional Cooperation section.

Before discussing the next agency involved in coordination, it is necessary to note the continuing need for an agency like ICVA. Some of the more practical coordination responses, such as those of the LICROSS NGO Liaison Committee and the CILSS NGO Program Officer, were made possible through the exchange of information and priorities provided by ICVA. It would be indeed unfortunate if the world monetary problems severely affecting the Swiss-based ICVA forced it to discontinue its very useful activities.

American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service (ACVA)

The ACVA has made two important contributions to collaboration and coordination in the Sahel: the Technical Assistance Information Clearing House (TAICH) country reports, and the Situation Reports on the Sahelian Drought Disaster.

TAICH is funded through a grant from USAID and performs a valuable information function. Country reports are prepared and updated periodically on development assistance programs of U.S. non-profit organizations. The reports are made available to voluntary agencies, research groups, and the like, and include information on the development activities of a large number of organizations. A small staff has been able to accumulate and process a large amount of fairly accurate information on Mali, Niger, Chad, and Upper Volta, among the Sahelian countries. Information is collected on non-ACVA members as well and represents a comprehensive view of U.S. voluntary agency involvement in a given country. The country format is especially appreciated by those who require information organized by area rather than by agency.

In addition to the TAICH country reports, ACVA sponsored an Ad Hoc Committee on the drought, in which non-ACVA members were invited to participate and which produced a series of four Situation Reports. The first meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee took place in January 1973. Agencies made use of the information collected by ACVA in determining their involvement in the Sahel. During a disaster, ACVA is frequently called on by donors to supply information on potential channels for donated funds. The ACVA maintained regular contact with UN agencies and also tried to set up a coordinated information system for the Sahelian embassies. It was hoped this would avoid duplication of information and ensure its quick dissemination, but the system did not work out and ACVA returned to its original method of contacting each embassy when it had information to distribute.

The Situation Reports appeared in August 1973, November 1973, April 1974, and July 1974. Besides providing information on quantities and kinds of relief sent into the Sahel, the reports also responded to specific requests for information. Reports on fund-raising and lobbying activities were included, as well as information from CILSS, the UN, and the U.S. Disaster Relief Coordinator. Cumulative information on international relief activities was also supplied, as was biographical data on some of the voluntary agency field personnel. As the emphasis shifted from relief to development, the reports reflected the trend with information on UN and U.S. long-term assistance.

In direct response to the needs of the U.S. voluntary agencies, ACVA was able to collect and circulate an appreciable volume of much-needed information during the relief period and afterward. It is noteworthy that among the many U.S. agencies interviewed for this study, no negative comments were made concerning the work of ACVA in this context.

Freedom from Hunger/Action for Development (FFH/AD)

Because it is housed within FAO in Rome, FFH/AD has suffered from an identity problem, both within the organization and outside it. Originally,

begun as a voluntary, worldwide hunger eradication campaign, it evolved into a development channel in its own right. FFH/AD is a means of using the FAO network to cooperate with voluntary projects. Despite the questions other agencies may have had in the past concerning FFH/AD programs, it would be a mistake to continue to evaluate it in those terms. Serious problems emerged, for example, concerning what the voluntary agencies and the governments expected of each other. Some voluntary agencies abandoned their attempts to work through CILSS when proposed projects did not meet their expectations. This unfortunate circumstance colored later relations with CILSS and the voluntary agencies. Nevertheless, the efforts of FFH/AD in setting up the CILSS NGO program office and its involvement in coordination successes merit close examination.

A large body of information on the needs of the CILSS member states was disseminated through a series of Information letters and reports prepared by the temporary Program Officer seconded to CILSS. From July 1973 through June 1975, more than twenty reports and letters were completed, including a great deal of information gathered by missions and with CILSS collaboration. One of the purposes of collecting this data was to avoid increasing or to reduce the numbers of field missions operated by voluntary agencies -- a presence which had begun to severely try the patience of the Sahelian governments. Anywhere but in the climate of West African courtesy, some of these groups would have been told they were not welcome.

The FFH/AD documentation supplied detailed information of Sahelian development goals and opportunities for voluntary agencies to cooperate with the governments or local groups. Stress was placed on funding local organizations to enable them to elaborate their own programs, and on allowing time for CILSS to establish its priorities. Reports on UN multi-donor missions and NGO programs and partner identification missions including personnel not in the field were prepared. Long-term development needs were outlined as the result of missions to each country. Initially, the Sahelian governments proposed projects whose scale and funding requirements were more suitable for bilateral donors. Slowly, however, more realistic terms and objectives were agreed to on both sides.

Although the voluntary agencies were sometimes dissatisfied with the coordination efforts of FFH/AD, it must be said that the work of the organization was instrumental in informing the local governments about the goals and methods of operation of voluntary agencies. The work of the temporary NGO liaison officer in this area should be considered an important factor in creating a better relationship between voluntary agencies and the Sahelian states.

League of Red Cross Societies (LICROSS)

Drawing on its long history of relief work, LICROSS had a set of procedures already established for organizing its relief coordination. During emergencies, LICROSS uses a series of circulars to inform its national societies of relief needs and requests and of contributions of other members. These circulars serve as a cumulative report on relief shipments, amounts and values, and also provide information to donors on where to ship goods and who to go through. During the Sahelian emergency, LICROSS produced eleven such circulars from May 1973 through January 1975.

While the data provided in this way is of undoubted value, the main difficulty in using such a public methods of information exchange is that pertinent and extenuating political circumstances affecting relief cannot be discussed in the circulars.

World Council of Churches (WCC)

In addition to fielding the three-person team in January 1975 to serve as a channel for WCC member involvement in Sahelian development, the World Council also sponsored a Sahel seminar. Held in Lomé, Togo, April 22-25, 1974, the seminar served as a meeting ground for external church groups and the All-Africa Conference of Churches (AACC). The meeting represents an important effort to involve other African groups in the work of Sahelian development. Although some monetary contributions were made through WCC, the present status of African church involvement is not known. The seminar was organized into French and English linguistic groups and much time was devoted to participant interaction. The emphasis of the seminar was on sharing information and developing common approaches to Sahelian problems.

Cor Unum

This organization, headquartered in Rome, represents the desire of the Roman Catholic Pontiff to bring order and coordination to the large number of Catholic social welfare activities throughout the world. Informed sources admit that, to date, the attempt has not met with great success.

A meeting was organized in Rome, June 6, 1973, to discuss Sahelian drought assistance. An African ecclesiastical delegation participated, together with thirty unspecified representatives of Catholic welfare groups. Specific requests for seed grains were made by the African delegation, as were requests for wells. It was decided to process donations through local Catholic churches in the Sahel to CILSS for emergency seed. Unfortunately, no further information on Cor Unum's coordination activities is available.

ACORD (Euro-Action Sahel)

Mention was made earlier of the role of ACORD in Sahelian development. The organization deserves further mention in this section because it represents an important effort in functional coordination on the part of its member agencies. Rather than simply collaborating or dividing up projects, these agencies used existing field personnel (that of Oxfam) and fielded only one additional person to implement their programs. Emphasis is placed on working closely with local governments and supporting local voluntary agency groups, such as SPONG and GAP.

Regional Cooperation

Two regional coordination activities merit examination: the CILSS NGO program and liaison office, and the meetings of the African trade unions sponsored by the African-American Labor Center (AALC), AFL-CIO.

CILSS-NGO Liaison

The office of NGO Liaison and Program Officer was largely the product of work undertaken by FFH/AD and other voluntary agencies committed to better cooperation with regional authorities. After several months of work by the Officer temporarily seconded by FFH/AD, a permanent liaison person was appointed by CILSS. Work has been going on for two years in this office and, gradually, files of projects suitable for voluntary agency participation on a country basis have been established.

There is now a sizeable support for the office among field personnel. When the possibility of its termination by CILSS was discussed, several voluntary agencies offered to consider partially funding the office themselves to assure its continuation.

The CILSS-NGO office now has the capability to assist voluntary agencies working in the Sahel appreciably, whether or not they wish to make use of its projects. The information clearing house potential is great, if voluntary agencies will inform the office of their activities. It is to be hoped this voluntary agency support and cooperation will grow and that the recent resignation of the Liaison Officer will not occasion any enduring or serious problems for this very useful office.

African-American Labor Center (AALC)

Two conferences of African trade unionists were sponsored by AALC to consider Sahelian problems. One was held in Niamey, April 4-5, 1974, as a preparatory meeting for the second conference, held December 3-10 in the same year in Ouagadougou.

Bringing together twenty-eight high-ranking unionists from Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta, the conference focused on the concerns of organized labor in drought assistance. Recommendations included ways to meet the need of new agricultural policies, reforms, means of conserving land and water resources, the creation of peasant organizations, and a concerted emphasis on rural development.

Local Cooperation

Two local voluntary agency groups have been organized in the Sahel for cooperative purposes: the Secretariat Permanent des Organizations Non-Gouvernementales (SPONG) in Upper Volta, and Groupement des Agences Privées (GAP) in Niger.

SPONG

Organized in 1974, SPONG represents an important attempt to organize and coordinate voluntary agencies on the local level. SPONG has been successful in gaining credibility with the government, since it has functioned as a legitimate source of project funding. There is very strong support among Voltaique voluntary agencies for the umbrella organization which adds to its acceptability. Foreign influence in the organization is important but not dominant (see Appendix VA V for list of members).

AD-A081 200

DENVER UNIV COLO

F/6 5/4

INTERNATIONAL DISASTER RESPONSE: THE SAHELIAN EXPERIENCE, (U)

JUN 76 B J BROWN, J C TUTHILL, E T ROWE


UNCLASSIFIED

FAR-25093

NL

2 of 3
AD
A081200





GAP

Unfortunately, GAP in Niger has not enjoyed the success of SPONG. There are two obstacles to its development: one is the preponderance of expatriate agencies (twelve foreign as opposed to two local groups) in the organization; the other is the failure (continuing as of December 1975) to obtain from the government a written agreement concerning the establishment of GAP. Since there is a lack of local voluntary agency activity in Niger as a whole, it is unlikely that GAP can generate the interest and credibility that SPONG has created in Upper Volta without this internal support.

Nevertheless, there is strong support from a few of the foreign voluntary agencies for the development of GAP and their perseverance may win out eventually.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It is hoped that the observations, conclusions, and recommendations made in this report will help voluntary agencies to more effectively implement and coordinate their relief and development activities in the Sahel and perhaps elsewhere. Apart from preeminent humanitarian reasons for better voluntary agency cooperation, there is a practical imperative for cooperation in the Sahel. The major bilateral donors in Europe and North America have begun in the region a concerted development effort which they call the Club des Amis du Sahel. The projected assistance amount under discussion is around \$US 1560 million. For the voluntary agencies to continue the scope and scale of those projects which they are best prepared to implement, it will be essential for them to develop more effective structures of organization and cooperation, both on the headquarters level and in the field.

PROSPECTS FOR VOLUNTARY AGENCY COORDINATION AND COOPERATION

In assessing the future of coordination of voluntary agencies, it is important to consider the "climate" for cooperation that exists in each of the six Sahelian countries examined in this report: Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta. This environment will largely determine the possibilities for greater cooperation and effective action, both among the voluntary agencies and with host countries.

Mauritania

Before the drought, Mauritania had little contact with voluntary agencies except for the Caritas group and the African-American Labor Center. The Mauritanian Red Crescent Society was officially designated by the government as the channel for voluntary agency involvement in the country. Since that time, more avenues have opened and it is now possible for agencies to work directly with the government through formal agreements. In view of the willingness of the agencies to work through the Red Crescent in the past, the opportunity may now exist for voluntary agency coordination on a local level. Representatives of the Red Crescent Society might serve as coordinators for organizing such an umbrella group. CRS, Lutheran World Federation, and War on Want could be the nucleus of a well-integrated and efficient organization in Mauritania.

Senegal

There are fewer voluntary agencies operating in Senegal than in some other Sahelian states because it was less affected by the drought. The pattern there was for agencies already working in Senegal (such as CRS) to step up their activities in regions which most needed additional assistance. The small group of agencies working in Senegal (CRS, Caritas-Senegal) have large programs which are closely coordinated with the government. It is likely that smaller agencies (Young Men's Christian Association, World University Service) which operate less extensive single projects would

benefit most from locally-organized coordination. The government in Senegal, however, practiced in dealing with a few voluntary agencies on an individual basis and not with larger numbers of them simultaneously, may not see field cooperation among them as important or even desirable. It seems unlikely, therefore, that a local voluntary agency coordinating group will develop there.

Mali

The majority of voluntary agencies working in Mali began work there on a regular basis around 1974. Many organizations, of course, were involved in relief operations during the disaster period. The agencies grouped in Bamako (Care, Euro-Action, Africare, Service Universitaire Canadien Outre-Mer) and those outside (AFSC in Goundam) have an opportunity to develop, if they choose, an organization such as SPONG. The Malian government has indicated its willingness to cooperate with an organized voluntary agency community and has asked the Euro-Action (ACORD) representative to serve as a focal point for these agencies.

As in several Sahelian countries, efforts toward coordination are hampered by the lack of local voluntary agencies to support the communal organization. Nevertheless, since most of the foreign voluntary agencies have recently begun development operations in Mali, there is an excellent opportunity to organize a viable group for information exchange and, hopefully, joint planning.

Upper Volta

As discussed earlier, the SPONG coordinating group in Upper Volta has been functioning on a regular basis and with considerable effect. There is good local support from both Voltaique agencies and foreign agency field personnel (particularly that of Oxfam), and if present levels of support continue, SPONG can assume an increasingly important and effective coordinating role for its member agencies. Local government has begun to bring projects to SPONG on a regular basis for consideration and possible funding. There appears to be every reason to hope that this good organizational beginning will flourish.

Niger

The discussion of GAP earlier in the report cited some of the problems of voluntary agency cooperation in Niger. Until formal agreements can be worked out with the government, the utility of GAP will be minimal, except as an information source for agencies operating in Niger. As in all coordinating organizations, the working out of functional arrangements in GAP will require time and sustained effort on the part of all participants. It is unlikely that much beyond information sharing can be done without government support, but it is to be hoped that the goals of reaching an understanding with the government and organizing an active coordination group will be pursued in Niger as elsewhere throughout the Sahel.

Chad

The researcher found little information on the prospects for voluntary agency cooperation in Chad. Since church-related groups have been asked to leave the country during the past year -- indicating that the government may not be friendly to all voluntary agencies who wish to work there -- it would appear that inter-agency coordination is secondary to the need for a special effort to encourage government cooperation in Chad.

In general, the potential for developing voluntary agency coordinating organizations exists in at least five of the six Sahelian countries considered in this study, whether in the form of germinal configurations or already-active groups. In all cases, there is a need for these umbrella groups to coordinate planning, promote cooperation and understanding with the governments and people of the region, and to bring more effective assistance to the Sahel. In all cases, too, there is a need for the sustained effort and willing cooperation require to bring such organizations to their full potential.

Together with the examination of the need and structures for greater cooperation in the Sahel in terms of the particular problems and prospects of the individual countries, it is necessary to consider the possibilities for voluntary agency coordination in connection with the often separate functions of relief and development.

Relief Coordination

Steps have already been taken to ensure better cooperation during disasters by the large international voluntary agencies. Under the sponsorship of LICROSS, these agencies (CRS, WCC, Oxfam, and Lutheran World Federation) meet monthly to exchange information on ongoing activities, disaster preparedness, and planning. Telex links between these five groups and UNDR0 are a commonly used means of communication in emergencies. The LICROSS-Volag Steering Committee has also initiated country fact sheets for disaster-prone areas, a survey of disaster preparedness plans, and a revised disaster handbook. All these measures are positive steps in the right direction, but this kind of information exchange alone will not ensure appropriate and effective operations during a disaster. Even if the larger agencies were to form a pact on emergency procedures (as has been suggested), this would not lead automatically to better relief distribution. The question of which field personnel are best able to handle each crisis would still be raised. Unfortunately, many agencies remain convinced that they alone know how to handle relief distribution adequately. An atmosphere of greater trust among agencies -- such as often exists in the field where interdependency may be a prerequisite for survival -- must be seriously cultivated at the headquarters level.

The role of smaller agencies in relief coordination is also crucial. Larger agencies sometimes accuse smaller ones of responsibility for inappropriate relief goods, shipping backups, and the like, but these charges are by no means always accurate. Relief shipments from ad hoc groups were often rechannelled in the donor country and seldom reached West Africa at all.

The pattern of the majority of smaller agencies in the Sahel disaster was to work through field personnel of agencies with philosophical or religious affinities, or to channel funds directly to known agencies operating in the area. Small agencies should be recognized by larger groups as representing the legitimate responses of significant constituencies, not regarded as "bothersome" and pretentious upstarts. These smaller agencies should be encouraged, of course, to make their responses through operational groups whenever possible and to establish links with such large collaborative organizations as ACVA and ICVA, or with church organizations with good field contacts to use in times of disaster.

This kind of cooperation among large and small agencies on all levels could lead not only to more effective use of relief resources to help victims, but also to less destructive competition.

Development Coordination

The earlier discussion of development outlined some problem areas in voluntary agency cooperation in this area. Precedents now exist for greater development coordination and new alternatives to previous patterns of interaction are now available.

The information sharing function of such groups as ACVA and ICVA continues to be of great importance in coordinating development activities. Without basic information on the principal actors and actual conditions in an area or a country, it is impossible to organize collective action or devise relevant plans. The groups which are formed to exchange data during a disaster should not automatically dissolve once each group gets its foothold on its own development "niche." This kind of forum can be used as a base for coordinated action, if it can be organized around functional groups of those voluntary agencies involved in development work. Some basic groups for the Sahel might include: health care; water resources development; livestock improvement; assistance to cooperatives; and any number of others.

The next step beyond information sharing is the most difficult one for voluntary agencies. To agree to work together for collective action and sharing of resources and personnel calls for a basic shift in operational policy for many groups. It requires a fundamental trust among agencies which must be built slowly. It need not mean sacrificing the integrity of participating groups or changing each group's relationship with its constituency. It does mean, however, that the public must be educated to the benefits of operational cooperation in the field. As in the "pressure to spend" phenomenon, the contributing public must not be seen as an amorphous mass which responds only to sensational news and publicity. There are growing groups in the donor societies who sincerely wish to do something about world hunger and rural development. These people can -- indeed, must -- be informed about changing priorities and means of operation of voluntary agencies. It is selling the public short to assume that this cannot be done.

New patterns of cooperation with host countries, particularly in the Sahel, must be developed. Many groups have already realized the necessity of this, but some are still fixated on the "partner" agency concept. In countries where the government is the only institution through which programs can be implemented, it is scarcely wise to attempt to bypass it. Cooperation with host governments is essential, moreover, on deeper levels than formal agreements. If a voluntary agency's only connection is with a high-level official and not with rural leaders or middle-level government people, the chances of implementing its programs are narrowed and the chances of their cancellation are great. In some cases, increased cooperation might be effected by funding local leaders, rather than expatriate agencies, to do their own field work and development planning.

Many field personnel of the voluntary agencies are very aware of the need for increased inter-agency and host-country cooperation. This is manifested in their active support of such groups as SPONG. However, effective progress in development cooperation must occur at both the field and headquarters level to be productive. Without this kind of cooperation, the very special experiences and contributions of voluntary agencies in the development process may well lose their potential impact in improving the lives of those they most want to help. The new direction for cooperation in the Sahel can best be summed up in the words of the Report of the World Council of Churches Seminar held in Lomé, Togo, in April 1974:

It is quite obvious that coordination between both ends of the chain, in the region concerned and countries or agencies supplying aid, is the only way to obtain optimal results without excessive waste of time and resources.

Under circumstances like these, there is a great risk that effort will be divided, with each agency or country "doing its own thing," and pursuing its own objectives in competition with one or more of the others. The result is fragmentation: numerous small units of activity scattered about without any real impact on fundamental causes of the drought. To eliminate this risk may seem unrealistic in a relatively "technical" context, but damage is being done and it must be reduced.

Ideologically viewed, this kind of fragmentation can encourage the "natural" tendency for charity to become "alms-giving", which lies very close to the surface in many types of aid, with greater importance being attached to the sense of self-satisfaction and of identification with the victim than to acknowledging the right of one's fellow-man to become master of the land he holds and architect of his own freedom.

Until the voluntary agencies forge the link of committed and meaningful cooperation among themselves and between the "two ends of the chain," they will do less than justice to their own intentions and potential, less than enough for the humanitarian cause they represent.

THE NEED FOR EVALUATION PROCEDURES

The lack of comprehensive program evaluation is a shortcoming in both relief and development activities undertaken by voluntary agencies. Without clear objectives and the means of assessing them, it is not possible to determine which operational or development strategies are successful or even appropriate. It is also possible to share successes or failures with other agencies, which means that invaluable experience is wasted.

LICROSS is the only one of the relief groups which has anything resembling an evaluation procedure. All of them, of course, have public accounting procedures, but these have not been expanded into evaluations. Caritas, for example, has kept records on Sahelian relief and expressed the wish to have a systematic evaluation of these records made. Constraints on staff time have precluded an evaluation up to this time. LICROSS requires all delegates sent to the field to submit a final report on relief activities after operations have ended. The Emergency Preparedness section is planning to develop a more rigorous evaluation procedure in the future. CRS also produces relief operations reports, but again, they have not been developed into an evaluation system.

If the administration of relief operations is ever to be improved, all agencies must make complete evaluations of relief activities as soon after operations are completed as possible. This will entail additional expenditures for administration, which is generally unacceptable to many voluntary agencies. This attitude is short-sighted, however, for even if ninety cents of every dollar is sent to the victims of a disaster, it makes no sense if any part of that assistance is wasted because there were no means of accurately assessing its usefulness. The purpose of any evaluation should be to improve future disaster relief operations.

There is also a need for better development planning with built-in evaluation procedures. This calls for improvement of the existing processes within the organizations. Most voluntary agencies with field personnel require at least biannual formal reports. Some organizations supplement these with yearly field visits, which may be more frequent when a program is in the initial stages. This is the extent of program evaluation for most agencies.

CIMADE has developed a system of "autoevaluation" for its partner organizations. The standard procedure for most voluntary agencies in a cooperative system is for an officer to solicit a field report, which is then passed to the appropriate program officer. If there is an executive board or committee, the staff then passes the report on to it for final approval. Most suggestions for changes come from field or staff levels. Several groups, such as CWS and Care, are developing evaluation procedures. Oxfam has a separate evaluation of the programs under its auspices made by an independent organization which is knowledgeable in the area receiving assistance. This process supplements its regular field reports. ACORD produces reports on its Sahelian projects (Mali and Upper Volta at this time), which speak realistically concerning success in meeting development objectives. In a similar format, AFSC has done a regular evaluation of its

project at Tin Aicha, Mali. Care is developing a multi-year plan for each of the countries where it is involved and is also working on a ninety-day evaluation system for all its projects. International Union for Child Welfare (IUCW) has produced project reports with very good and detailed information, as has CIMADE. Of all the voluntary agency annual reports considered in this study, Oxfam has the most useful format for evaluation purposes. (Its report is also produced on light-weight, money-saving newsprint.) An examination of this annual report provides an overview of Oxfam's total world involvement in relief and development, as well as its individual country commitments.

These efforts toward improving evaluation procedures are certainly helpful, but they still fall far short of the kind of comprehensive and systematic evaluation required for efficient and appropriate relief and development planning and implementation.

As far as program development is concerned, few organizations employ a pre-implementation study approach. Most are more secure using development strategies they have used before -- usually elsewhere -- rather than generating a new strategy to fit a particular need. This attitude also leads to a lack of evaluation procedures for determining the success or failure of these strategies, or of a technique or program. A few groups, such as War on Want and ACORD, do produce research on planned projects before they are implemented, which makes later evaluation easier and more meaningful.

While all these measures are commendable, it is obvious that more emphasis on evaluation is urgently needed by voluntary agencies and coordinating groups.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

From the many issues and implications which arise in the course of condensing the data collected in this study of the important work, with both its contributions and shortcomings, of the voluntary agencies in relief and development in the Sahel, a number of considerations stand out. The following is a point-by-point outline summary of the conclusions and recommendations made in this report.

Conclusions

1. Voluntary agencies have contributed more than \$62 million to Sahel relief and development.
2. Most voluntary agencies studied preferred spending funds on development programs rather than on direct relief.
3. Voluntary agencies respond to disasters in much the same way as do bilateral and multilateral donors and they operate under similar constraints.

4. Even agencies with field personnel in the Sahel were forced to wait for an official government declaration of the disaster before making more than a small step-up in activities.
5. Mobilization and monitoring of relief by voluntary agencies is dependent on the availability of field representatives or contacts to handle it.
6. A large number of the voluntary agencies had no field personnel or partner organizations in the Sahel when the disaster was declared.
7. Although voluntary agencies have greater organization flexibility than large donors, they cannot act without heed to local political constraints in the host country.
8. The time needed to respond to a disaster appeal by the voluntary agencies depended on whether funds were already available or had to be raised.
9. Even organizations with widespread world affiliation, such as LICROSS, must wait for a request from their organization in the affected country before responding to a disaster.
10. Most of the voluntary agencies studied focused on a specific relief need rather than mounting massive distribution programs. These included medical help to refugee camps and target groups, supplemental food, and clothing distribution.
11. Smaller agencies gave funds to agencies already in operation in the field during the relief period to purchase specific relief supplies.
12. Voluntary agencies contributed large amounts to transport of emergency supplies and to road maintenance.
13. Some groups relied on larger agencies (CRS or CWS) for shipment of supplies and facilitation of customs clearance during the period of direct relief operations.
14. At the time relief began, the Sahelian governments had little experience in dealing with voluntary agencies. Later, working relationships were established with the host governments which carried over into the development phase of involvement.
15. More competition between voluntary agencies is evident during the development phase of assistance and competition is more apparent at the headquarters level than in the field.
16. Some problems in the program initiation and implementation phases are caused by the "pressure to spend" phenomenon.

17. Many voluntary agencies are concentrating on integrated development programs with emphases on water resources, agriculture, livestock, and health.
18. Organizations not involved in these activities choose programs based on field contacts rather than on a preference for a particular development activity.
19. Few voluntary agencies discuss or share information on programs with UN or bilateral donors in the field unless there is a contract relationship established.
20. Headquarters personnel show less concern for interagency cooperation than field personnel.
21. Most voluntary agencies participated in some kind of information sharing activities with other groups while developing relief or development programs, but these have not been sufficiently pursued in cooperative coordinating organizations.
22. Important contributions in formation sharing were made by such agencies as ICVA, ACVA, FFH/AD, WCC, and AALC.
23. Some agencies were reluctant to work with CILSS when it did not meet their early expectations. Initial projects submitted to voluntary agencies by CILSS were not suited to their priorities or scale of operation, but the organization has made important contributions and an understanding on both sides was slowly reached.
24. The establishment of SPONG in Upper Volta is a most significant development in program coordination among voluntary agencies and should be a precedent.
25. The lack of comprehensive program evaluation is a serious deficiency in both relief and development activities of voluntary agencies.

Recommendations

1. As Third World development programs increase, it is necessary for the voluntary agencies to educate the contributing public to the real needs of the developing world.
2. It is necessary for voluntary agencies to begin researching and designing rehabilitation and development programs while relief is still in progress to avoid the erosion of delay.
3. There should be more formal, direct contact with UN and bilateral donors, so that mistakes and successes can be shared on all sides.

4. There is too much emphasis on the part of voluntary agencies on avoiding "duplication" of projects of other agencies. A well-designed and successful project should be replicable in other locations within the Sahel. Emphasis should be on good, workable programs designed to meet the needs of the Sahelian people -- not on who designed the program.
5. Voluntary agencies should support regional organizations such as CILSS and support their efforts in program elaboration.
6. Maximum support should be given to local collaborative organizations such as SPONG and GAP. Where the opportunity exists to establish new umbrella organizations (such as Mali and Mauritania), it should be seized and where there are difficulties (Niger and Chad, for example), every effort should be made to overcome them.
7. To make more effective and efficient disaster relief response possible, greater trust and confidence among voluntary agencies must be sought at all levels. Voluntary agencies must recognize their own organizational limitations and, where necessary, learn to rely on others for information and implementation.
8. Agencies which do not have links with large national or international information and coordination groups should try to establish them to avoid problems when a coordinated response is needed.
9. After a disaster relief operation is concluded, the ad hoc groups formed for information sharing and emergency action should be reorganized around functional areas for use by voluntary agencies engaged in development activities.
10. The member agencies of the World Council of Churches have an opportunity to work more closely together in implementing a joint development program in the Sahel, if they so choose.
11. The public must be educated to realize the benefits -- indeed, the necessity -- of inter-agency cooperation in development, as well as to recognize the true needs of the developing world.
12. Voluntary agencies should extend host country relations beyond the high official level whenever possible to ensure cooperation in program implementation and survival in times of political change. Contact with middle-level and local officials might involve funding them to design and elaborate their own programs, thereby decreasing dependence on foreign planning.
13. For inter-agency cooperation to be successful, it must be implemented at field and headquarters levels at the same time.

14. Priority must be given to increasing organizational and public support for more comprehensive evaluation procedures at all levels of voluntary agency activity. This need must be seen as an essential cost for effective assistance.
15. An agency such as ICVA might be used to design an evaluation procedure for voluntary agencies. Agencies could contract with such an agency for specific evaluation needs when they arise.

In summary, it is clear that a recurrent and insistent theme threads through this report: good work has been done and more begun by the voluntary agencies involved in relief and development in the Sahel and throughout the world, but it is time for evaluation, for reappraisal of present programs and procedures, for casting off outworn attitudes and methods and designing new and effective directions for the future. Above all, there emerges from this study an imperative for greater understanding. Recognizing the needs of the developing countries, voluntary agencies must make a strenuous effort toward full cooperation with the host countries and with each other in the common cause of effective service to the people. Voluntary agencies and their constituencies must be dedicated to that service and willing to undertake periodic re-examination -- not only of the procedures under which they operate and the programs in which they expend their energies and resources -- but also of the values which are the raisonne d'être of these organizations.

FOOTNOTES

VOLUNTARY AGENCIES

1

Michael Glantz (ed.), The Politics of Natural Disaster: The Case of the Sahel Drought (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), and Hal Sheets and Roger Morris, Disaster in the Desert: Failures of International Relief in the West African Drought, Humanitarian Policy Studies (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1974).

INTERRELATIONS OF DISASTER RESPONSE

The one fact that emerges clearly from an examination of the Sahelian case is the need for increased cooperation among donors. While lack of transportation and communication infrastructures were always problems to some degree in relief operations, the severity and regional nature of the Sahel drought made the need for cooperation even more important than it normally is in other kinds of disasters. To examine the possibilities for greater United Nations and voluntary agency cooperation in relief, it is necessary to compare the ways in which they responded.

There were a number of common characteristics and problems in the responses of the UN and voluntary agency communities to the Sahelian drought situation. There were also differences in their relief responses, as well as points of interaction. From the efforts of these communities in the Sahelian relief response emerge possibilities for increased cooperation between the systems and some tentative recommendations for solutions to common problems.

While the basic international relief response occurred between 1973 and 1975, voluntary agencies also initiated development activities toward the later part of the period. Information on UN activities presented earlier focused on its relief efforts, although these comprised only one aspect of UN assistance to the Sahel. The smaller scale of the voluntary agency response permitted an analysis of both relief and development undertakings by these agencies. An examination of the common problems and points of interaction between the two systems during the relief period should yield some insight into how future relief operations might be better organized.

Differences in UN and Voluntary Agency Response

The magnitude of financial assistance in relief efforts is often an inadequate means of comparing the value of the contributions of various organizations. There are many important roles which must be filled in any relief operation. Within the total spectrum of relief response, there are many needs which cannot be met by massive food assistance. The very nature of the Sahel disaster emphasized the inadequacy of conventional relief techniques. There is an assumption among some donors, for example, that voluntary agencies are primarily involved in small activities which are considered insignificant when compared to massive aid programs. Further, bilateral donors are reluctant to channel more assistance through the UN system because they often find it more expedient to act on a direct government-to-government basis.

No single method of relief distribution characterizes the UN system. Each specialized agency uses the means most appropriate to the commodity it provides. While in some instances massive food distribution was appropriate,

in other cases, a more individualized effort was needed. Similarly, voluntary agencies, though not involved in massive food programs, engaged in diverse relief activities and often made efforts to reach victims not being assisted by other relief programs. Within the voluntary agency community, there is as wide a variety of response as that within the UN system. It should be remembered, too, that voluntary agencies operate under the same constraints as do other donors.

In general, relief response can be examined in four phases:

- 1) Disaster Awareness and Alert;
- 2) Development of Response;
- 3) Execution of Relief Program;
- 4) Evaluation.

There are points of comparison and contrast between the two systems in each of these phases of disaster relief response.

Disaster Awareness and Alert

In the Sahel case, there were problems in recognizing both the slowly-encroaching disaster conditions and in declaring the fact of an emergency situation. External donors have no authority to begin relief activities until it is evident that assistance is required. The following conclusions can be drawn about the UN and voluntary agency roles in this stage of response:

1. Donors must receive a government request for assistance before initiating substantial relief activities.
2. All donors were hindered by a lack of accurate information.
3. Voluntary agencies rely on the media for public awareness of disasters.
4. UN agencies rely on field reports and direct contact by Member States for awareness of disasters.

Development of Response

This phase involves obtaining funding, assessing needs, processing requests, and information exchange. In this stage of disaster response, there are more contrasts than similarities in the way systems operate.

1. Both UN and voluntary agencies rely on public appeals for fund raising, as well as on diversion of funds from regular programs.

2. Some UN agencies can also draw on emergency funds or special funds. Few voluntary agencies have contingency funds of this kind.
3. For all donors, no general conclusions can be drawn concerning response time, since many different and variable factors are involved.
4. All agencies (UN and voluntary) have definite procedures for processing requests for assistance.
5. UN agencies depend on government reports in assessing the extent of a disaster, and UN field personnel participate in the formulation of requests for assistance.
6. Voluntary agencies depend on field personnel or local agency contacts for assessment of requests.
7. Unreliable estimates of needs made processing of requests difficult for UN agencies.
8. Voluntary agencies were usually asked for smaller amounts of assistance and therefore had less problems in assessing requests.
9. Although the UN system had an existing focal point for disaster relief coordination, both it and voluntary agencies relied on ad hoc groups to perform this function.

Execution of Relief Programs

This phase of relief response concerns distribution and monitoring of goods and services. Both UN and voluntary agency donors had chronic problems in transportation, communications, and monitoring of relief actions. A statement of common problems experienced in these areas, then, would not be useful, and since each group handled different kinds of quantities of relief commodities, the specific difficulties encountered by each are not fruitful for comparative purposes. A few conclusions may be drawn, however.

1. Both UN and voluntary agency donors saw their roles in disaster relief as supplemental to major bilateral donors' activities.
2. UN agencies depend more on government personnel to distribute and monitor assistance than do voluntary agencies.
3. There is a greater emphasis on accounting for relief supplies and reporting on the progress of operations within UN agencies.

Evaluation of Relief

In the area of relief evaluation, both UN and voluntary agencies suffer the greatest deficiency. There appears to be some support within both communities for developing efficient evaluation procedures. The present state of relief evaluation can be summarized in the following points:

1. No systematic relief evaluation procedure exists for either the UN or voluntary agencies.
2. Both donors produce descriptive reports of relief activities as their method of evaluation.
3. Evaluation is considered only in administrative and financial terms.
4. No attempt is made to assess the long impact of relief activities on the affected population.

While there were many similarities in the ways the two sets of organizations became aware of the Sahel disaster and executed their relief programs, there were differences in the way they developed their responses. Most of the differences were due to size and availability of resources. The most serious area of deficiency in both groups is evaluation of relief programs, but there appears to be some support for developing comprehensive procedures.

Patterns of Interaction

The similarities in relief response would seem to form a basis for greater interaction between UN and voluntary agencies. Examining the patterns of interaction, then, should lead to a better understanding of the factors which hinder cooperation.

The two most important forms of UN and voluntary agency contact in the Sahel were information sharing and technical assistance. Additional information about organizations may be conveyed through personal contacts, but this is not always the case. During disaster relief, contact between UN and voluntary groups most often takes the form of information sharing. In the Sahel case, OSRO, ICVA, and ACVA and FFH/AD facilitated information exchange. Most information coming to voluntary agencies from the UN was in document form, while most of the information shared with the UN by voluntary agencies was informal.

Technical assistance during Sahelian relief was generally confined to specific relief operations. In almost all cases, voluntary agencies provided UN organizations with supplemental assistance. This took the form of assistance in food distribution and supply of small quantities of goods.

The greatest benefit that could be derived from UN and voluntary agency interaction would be in the area of increased information sharing. If both sets of organizations were more aware of each other's field operations, relief activities could be better coordinated. The UN could provide more comprehensive information on the status of relief shipments from donors, and the voluntary agencies could provide information on possible field distribution network facilities. Furthermore, if all of this information were available to the Director of Disaster Relief Operations of the government concerned, each country would be better able to direct and coordinate relief efforts.

There are, however, certain legitimate arguments which influence the nature of UN and voluntary agency cooperation. The UN agencies would prefer to deal with a central disaster-information point for the voluntary agencies to receive and relay information. Some information exchange on this basis is undertaken by the LICROSS-NGO Steering Committee, but this involves only five major agencies. In the field, UN representatives feel that the visibility of the Resident Representative's office should prompt voluntary agencies to contact the UN directly. The voluntary agencies, on the other hand, would also prefer to deal with a central disaster-information point for the UN, but have found UNDR0 inadequate, at times, for this purpose. These agencies also feel that sharing information with the UN will lead to a loss of recognition of their contributions to the relief effort.

These attitudes are based on two erroneous assumptions: first, that voluntary agencies and UN organizations are homogeneous groups whose members invariably act in similar ways, and, second, that organizations will always behave as they have in the past, whatever the circumstances. Just as it is incorrect to assume that one specialized agency represents the entire UN system, so is it invalid to apply this notion to voluntary agencies. Further, organizations can change over time and past experience should not unduly influence the willingness of agencies to work together. As long as these attitudes prevail, however, it is unlikely that there will be an appreciable increase in interaction between the two groups.

Better cooperation among agencies and between sets of organizations will not be realized as long as this is not a priority for all concerned. Structural changes alone are not sufficient to provide the atmosphere conducive to increased cooperation. The setting up of committees or focal points for disaster relief coordination, for example, does not automatically guarantee closer cooperation. While all agencies pay lip service to better cooperation, very few are truly committed to this ideal. If the United Nations and voluntary agencies are sincerely concerned about humanitarian assistance, they must begin to change their attitudes toward each other.

CONCLUSION

This study has examined the components of relief assistance to the Sahel from the perspective of the United Nations system and of the voluntary agencies involved in the response to the West African drought disaster. Possibilities for more effective relief response through better coordination and increased cooperation have been explored. The organizational and functional attributes of a more efficient international relief system have been suggested. These include:

- 1) An information system capable of monitoring areas vulnerable to drought, including an early warning mechanism reaching both victims and donors, a data retrieval and processing method, and a communications network capable of relaying collected information rapidly;
- 2) A planning and operations system responsible for the mobilization and shipment of relief supplies, sustaining coordination of all donors with the recipients to ensure adequate transport and effective distribution of relief;
- 3) A relief monitoring system which provides information about the flow of supplies, reassesses needs, and reports on any abuse or malfunction in the operations;
- 4) A comprehensive relief evaluation system which empirically assesses the impact of relief on the affected populations and the competency of organizational procedures.

These attributes were lacking or inadequate in the Sahelian case, and have been factors in prohibiting more effective relief response in large-scale disasters over the last thirty years.

The Sahelian experience offers no easy formula to improve the relief response system. The initiative for change and reform clearly lies with governments, the international organizations, and the voluntary agencies, whose support is essential to improve humanitarian assistance. Organizations truly committed to this purpose must place the needs of those they are assisting above their own.

The rights of the peoples in the developing world, who are by definition the most severely affected by natural disasters, to determine their own futures must not be overlooked by those who feel the need to relieve human suffering. In the desire to provide assistance to disaster-stricken populations, donors must take care to respect the integrity and dignity of those in need and avoid fostering a dependency on foreign assistance.

The peoples of the developing world recognize that their hope for the future lies within themselves.

Genie de mes ancêtres,
Je viens en ce petit matin
Sous l'arbre des offrandes
Implorer votre miséricorde
Afin qu'il n'y ait plus de récoltes avortées

Ni de haine entre frères
Mais toujours plus d'amour
Et notre Afrique par ses racines
Repoussera, et montera
Le front haut vers la lumière.

Mohamed Bashir

Niger, no.22, avril 1974

APPENDICES

CONTENTS OF APPENDICES

THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

- UN I Tentative Breakdown of Total UN Drought Relief Assistance to the Sahel
- UN II World Food Program: Cumulative Distribution of Shipments from Major Donors (1972, 1973, and first half of 1974)
- UN III Contributions to the FAO Sahelian Relief Fund (11 May 1973-28 February 1975): Governments, Nongovernmental Organizations, Other Donors, UN Agencies
- UN IV WFP Emergency Operations in the Sahel (Cumulative Data in \$US Millions)
- UN V WFP Cumulative Commitment of Emergency Aid by Region
- UN VI UNICEF CSM Consignments Received and Requested for West African Drought
- UN VII WFP Emergency Request Processing: The Sahel, 1972-1973
- UN VIII FAO Airlift to the Sahel

VOLUNTARY AGENCIES

- VA I Operational Agencies with Field Offices in the Sahel which Participate in Relief
 - VA II Agencies which Funded Relief through Others
 - VA III Operational Development Agencies
 - VA IV ICVA Membership - WOGIRD Participation
 - VA V SPONG and GAP Member Agencies
 - VA VI Agencies Sponsoring Collaborative Activities for Voluntary Agencies Involved in the Sahel
 - VA VII Tentative Contributions of Voluntary Agencies Studied to Sahelian Relief and Development
 - VA VIII Background Information on Voluntary Agencies Included in the Study which Operated or Funded Relief and/or Development Programs
-

THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

APPENDIX UN I

TENTATIVE BREAKDOWN OF TOTAL UN DROUGHT RELIEF
ASSISTANCE TO THE SAHEL (1973-1975)¹

<u>Source</u>	<u>Estimated Contribution</u> (\$US)
<u>FAO Sahelian Trust Fund</u> ²	26,778,204
<u>WFP</u> ³	53,400,000
<u>IBRD/IDA</u> ⁴	14,000,000
<u>UNESCO</u> ⁵	25,000
<u>UNICEF</u> ⁶	<u>5,591,211</u>
TOTAL UN RESPONSE	99,794,415

¹Figures represented are highly tentative and do not reflect regular UN program expenditure. They represent contributions to Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta only. In most cases, very different estimates are presented within various UN documents, but an effort has been made to present what seemed to be the most reasonable. In other cases, documents were not available and estimates had to be obtained through interviews with UN personnel. There also exist many problems in data comparability because of the differences in UN agency accounting procedures, the duplication in the source of some contributions, and the inclusion of projected expenditure and rehabilitation assistance in some data. This data does not reflect official estimates.

²Includes UNDP, UNHCR, and UNDRO pledges. Funds for WHO and some of UNICEF's activities in relief are also included in this figure. Amount includes value of contributions pledged in kind as well.

³Source: WFP/IGC, 28/5-B August 1975, Annex II. The proportion of this amount that came from the FAO Sahelian Trust Fund is unknown. At least \$US9 million was authorized from WFP sources in 1973.

⁴Source: IBRD, West Africa Drought Relief Fund Project (Washington, D.C., 1973).


⁵Interview, 12 January 1976, with Ms. Helga Barraud, Director of UNESCO's Cooperative Action Programme.


⁶Calculated from E/ICEF/1./29/Add.2, 12 December 1974, Table I, by subtracting Gambia from the total. Figure does not represent 1975 expenditure.

APPENDIX UN II

WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME

CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF SHIPMENTS FROM MAJOR DONORS
(1972, 1973 and first half of 1974)

From:  USA  Canada  EEC  Europe  Others



Explanatory Note: The above chart is reproduced from WFP/IGC: 26/17, page 16. It shows the cumulative distribution of WFP shipments from the U.S., Canada, EEC, Europe (exclusive of EEC cargo), and Others according to WFP's seven principal shipping routes. The tonnages for EEC and Europe reflect the entry of the U.K., Denmark, and Ireland into the EEC as of 1 January 1973.

APPENDIX UN III

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FAO SAHELIAN TRUST FUND
(11 May 1973 - 28 February 1975)

PLEGGED		Value in \$US	Cash Currency	Equivalent \$US	Total \$US	Transferred to Trust F.	Remarks
GOVERNMENTS	Kind						
Australia			\$US 125,000	125,000	125,000	\$US 125,000	For seed projects For CILSS Office For animal health in Senegal, Mauritania
Austria			Sch 3.2 m	178,950	178,950	178,950	
Barbados			\$US 984	984	984	984	
Belgium			B.Fr 13 m	348,464	348,464	348,464	
Botswana			\$US 20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	\$1m for purchase/ running costs of 30 trucks; \$18,000 for seed instruction course; \$25,000 for food transport, Chad
Burma			1,000	2,326	2,326	2,326	
Canada			\$Ca 2,465,259	2,494,465	2,494,465	2,494,465	
Cyprus			Cy 115.8	271	271	271	271 398,942
Denmark			Da Kr. 2 m	398,942	398,942	398,942	
Fiji			\$F1 500	633	633	633	633 83,000
Finland	wheat	132,000	\$US 83,000	215,000	215,000	215,000	
F.R.G.			Dm. 16,682,850	6,828,248	6,828,248	6,828,248	Transport of wheat
Indonesia			Rp. 1 m	2,410	2,410	2,410	For purchase and transport of agri. inputs, esp. seeds, from FRG or elsewhere; for Niger, for seeds (for local purchase)
Iran			\$US 35,000	35,000	35,000	35,000	
Iraq			\$US 10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	
Israel			\$US 10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	
Italy			L. 100 m	177,620	177,620	177,620	
Japan			Yen 760 m	2,766,846	2,766,846	2,766,846	
Kuwait			\$US 100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	

(continued)

PLEGGED							
GOVERNMENTS	Kind	Value in \$US	Cash Currency	Equivalent \$US	Total \$US	Transferred to Trust F.	Remarks
Lebanon			\$US 10,204	10,204	10,204	10,204	
Liberia			\$US 20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	
Liechtenstein			S.Fr. 30,000	9,815	9,815	9,815	
Malta			\$US 1,100	1,100	1,100	1,100	
Netherlands	biscuits	274,692	FL. 790,000	295,892	816,739	295,892	FLs.40,000 for inland transport of food for health measures: 688t of survival biscuits, incl. transport, 64t canned fish
Nigeria	baby food	96,153					
Norway	butteroil	96,153					
Oman	fish	53,849					
Saudi Arabia			Naira 20,000	32,250	32,250	32,250	
Somalia			Nr.Kr. 12.5 m	2,308,816	2,308,816	2,308,816	
Swaziland			\$US 20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	
Sweden			\$US 10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	
			SoSh. 100,000	16,000	16,000	16,000	
			Lit. 5,145,000	8,720	8,720	8,720	
			Sw.Kr. 15,940,000	3,764,432	3,764,432	3,147,149	Kr. 1m for airlifting in Niger; 2.5m for transport for health measures
Thailand			\$US 11,000	11,000	11,000	11,000	
United Kingdom			80,000	1,198,159	1,198,159	1,198,159	
U.S.A.			\$US 3,293,000	3,293,000	3,293,000	3,293,000	\$600,000 for purchase of 12 trucks for Niger; for UNICEF and WHO and other UN units
Vietnam			\$US 4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	
Yugoslavia			\$US 140,000	140,000	140,000	140,000	
SUB-TOTAL		652,847		25,502,207	26,155,054	424,884,924	

PLEGGED							
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS	Kind	Value in \$US	Cash Currency	Equivalent \$US	Total \$US	Transferred to Trust F.	Remarks
Australia FFH			\$Au 40,000	58,993	58,993	58,993	For protective foods
Belgium Femmes Provoiantes Socialistes			B.Fr. 200,000	5,571	5,571	5,571	For seed purchase
Canada FFH			\$US 11,550	11,550	11,550	11,550	For butteroil purchase/transport
Canada Oxfam			\$US 35,000	35,000	35,000	35,000	For seed instruction course
Christian Aid			\$US 25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	
F.R.G. Misereor			\$US 128,000	128,500	128,500	128,500	For seed purchase
Deutsche welthung			\$US 27,500	27,500	27,500	27,500	For seed purchase
Israel	maize, seed	500			500		
Italy			L. 1,030,000	1,745	1,745	1,745	
Japan			Yen 10 m	37,580	37,580	37,580	
Japan, African Society of			\$US 56,253	56,253	56,253	56,253	
Kenya FFH			L. 901,697	1,376	1,376	1,376	
Netherlands			FL. 250,000	90,556	90,556	90,556	
SUB-TOTAL		500		481,400	481,900	481,400	

OTHER DONORS		PLEDGED					Transferred Trust Fund	Remarks
	Kind	Value in \$US	Cash Currency	Equivalent \$US	Total \$US			
Alitalia	air freight	2,550			2,550			
A&L Block Foundation			\$US 1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000		
African Students, St. Louis African Students			\$US 147	147	147	147		
Organization U. of Illinois			\$US 750	750	750	750		
Bennet High School (N.Y. Brotherhood Fund, Dist. 1199 (N.Y.))			\$US 151	151	151	151		
Community of Chattanooga			\$US 1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500		
Christian Community (Ryadh)			\$US 3,700	3,700	3,700	3,700		
Colby College (Maine)			\$US 500	500	500	500		
Community of Cermerate (Italy)			\$US 1,594	1,594	1,594	1,594		
Dutch B. Lenten Campaign			L. 100,000	177	177	177		
FAO Staff			FL. 100,000	39,370	39,370	39,370		
France			L. 3,261,749	5,360	5,360	5,360		
French International School			\$US 22	22	22	22		
International World Affairs Inc. (Conn.)			\$US 1,064	1,064	1,064	1,064		
			\$US 200	200	200	200		

For purchase of protein-rich food

(continued)

OTHER DONOTS	PLEGGED				Transferred to Trust F.	Remarks
	kind	Value in \$US	Cash Currency	Equivalent \$US		
ISPA						
Italy			US\$ 2,340	5,695	5,695	
Japanese Catholics			L. 57,000	87	87	For animal health
Kapuna Hospital (New Guinea)			\$US 6,376	6,376	6,376	
N. Port High School (N.Y.)			\$US 1,000	1,000	1,000	
NAACP (NYC Branch)			\$US 384	384	384	
Oakland Fund Inc. (N.Y.)			\$US 1,200	1,200	1,200	
Pilgrim's Progress Missionary Church (New Orleans)			\$US 1,000	1,000	1,000	
Presbyterian Church of Kylertown & Winberg			\$US 100	100	100	
Roosevelt High School (Wyo.)			\$US 158	158	158	
Spanish Club, Marvista High School (Calif.)			\$US 106	106	106	
Trio dell'Agula			\$US 233	233	233	
SONY Corp. (Japan)			L. 112,000	168	168	
UN Women's Guild (Rome)			Yen 442,667	1,167	1,167	
UNDP/UNFPA Staff			L. 150,000	230	230	
UNROB Staff			\$US 530	530	530	
UN Assoc. (U.K.)			\$US 444	444	444	
United Kingdom			56	135	135	
United States			43.34	100	100	
			\$US 11,595	11,595	11,595	

(continued)

PLEGGED							
OTHER DONORS	Kind	Value in \$US	Cash Currency	Equivalent \$US	Total \$US	Transferred to Trust F.	Remarks
Wayne Hills High School (N.J.)			\$US 633	633	633	633	
Waterville High School (Maine)			\$US 150	150	150	150	
West Angeles Church (Calif.)			\$US 1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	
SUB-TOTAL		2,550		138,700	141,250	138,700	

PLEGGED							
UN AGENCIES	Kind	Value in \$US	Cash Currency	Equivalent \$US	Total \$US	Transferred to Trust F.	Remarks
UNDP			\$US 518,783	518,783	518,783	518,783	For seed projects
UNDRO			\$US 100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	
UNHCR			\$US 10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	For refugees in Senegal
SUB-TOTAL				618,783	618,783	618,783	
GRAND TOTAL		655,897		26,122,307	26,778,204	25,505,024	

Source: FAO Office for the Sahelian Relief Operation, Report No.13 on the drought situation in the Sahelian Zone and relief measures undertaken by the UN System (Rome, 28 February 1975) Annex II a, b, c.

APPENDIX UN IV

WFP EMERGENCY OPERATIONS IN THE SAHEL
(Cumulative Data in \$US Millions)

Countries	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	30 June 1975	TOTAL
CHAD	-	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	7.8
MALI	-	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.5	3.1	3.1	3.1	15.4
MAURITANIA	-	-	-	0.6	0.6	2.2	4.6	5.4	5.4	5.4	24.2
NIGER	-	-	-	0.3	1.4	1.3	2.0	3.9	3.9	3.9	16.7
SENEGAL	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.8	0.8	1.3	1.7	2.4	2.4	2.4	12.9
UPPER VOLTA	-	-	-	-	-	0.6	0.6	1.4	1.4	1.4	5.4
TOTAL	0.3	1.5	1.6	2.9	4.0	6.7	12.0	17.8	17.8	17.8	82.4

Note: Some of the earlier figures of emergency assistance may not be drought-related.

Source: WFP/IGC; 28/15-B August 1975, Annex II.

APPENDIX UN V

WFP CUMULATIVE COMMITMENT OF EMERGENCY AID BY REGION

REGION	1963 to 1972	1973 to 1975	
Latin America and the Caribbean	9	1	(% of value)
Southern Europe	3	-	
Northern Africa and the Near East	24	15	
Southern Africa and the Sahara	24	48	
Asia and the Far East	40	36	

Source: WFP/IGC: 28/5-B August 1975

APPENDIX UN VI

UNICEF CSM CONSIGNMENTS RECEIVED AND REQUESTED FOR WEST AFRICAN DROUGHT

	<u>Initial Consignment</u> <u>Summer 1973</u>	<u>Second Consignment</u> <u>Nov. 73-Aug. 74</u>	<u>Third Consignment</u> <u>Sept. 74-June 75</u>	<u>Total Consignments</u>
CHAD	-	700	463	1,163
MALI	467	2,375	2,656	5,498
MAURITANIA	421	266	303	990
NIGER*	-	2,769	809	3,578
SENEGAL	570	500	-	1,070
UPPER VOLTA*	-	3,755	495	4,250
TOTAL:	<u>1,458</u>	<u>10,365</u>	<u>4,726</u>	<u>16,549</u>

* In addition, in 1975, these two countries received 300 mt and 200 mt respectively of powdered milk donated by the EEC.

Source: E/ICEF/L.1291/Add.3, 25 August 1975.

APPENDIX UN VII

WFP EMERGENCY REQUEST PROCESSING:
THE SAHEL: 1972-73

Country and Project Number	Date of Official Request	Date of Approval	First Arrival of WFP Food	Distribution Started	Distribution Completed
*UPPER VOLTA #957	11/24/71	4/19/72	January 1972	June 1972	February 1973
*MALI #960	2/23/72	3/1/72	July 1972	August 1972	September 1973
NIGER #964 (Phase I&II)	^a 3/17/72 ^b 4/19/72	5/19/72	mid-July 1972	August 1972	March 1973
MAURITANIA #972 (Phase I&II)	10/16/72	^a 11/21/72 ^b 1/19/73	February 1973	February 1973	October 1973
CHAD #974	10/30/72	12/4/72 3/13/73	2/24/73	April 1973	December 1973
SENEGAL #976	12/11/72	1/19/73	July 1973	August 1973	December 1973
NIGER #979	12/11/72	2/22/73	July 1973	July 1973	December 1973
MALI #982	12/12/72	4/5/73	June 1973	June 1973	December 1973
UPPER VOLTA #983	12/15/72	4/16/73	August 1973	June 1973 (with borrowed commodities)	December 1973

(continued)

Country and Project Number	Beneficiaries	Commodities (tons)	Food Cost (\$US)	Total WFP Cost (\$US)	Duration
*UPPER VOLTA #957	150,000	2500	238,000	474,000	8 months
*MALI #960	250,000	5000	300,000	652,000	1 year
NIGER #964 (Phase I&II)	155,000	3480	232,950	656,550	6 months
MAURITANIA #972 (Phase I&II)	500,000	a 10,000 b 5,000	a 810,000 b 522,870	a 1,364,180 b 817,710	7 months
CHAD #974	250,000	7025	764,000	1,518,800	9 months
SENEGAL #976	200,000	5000	423,374	625,674	4 months
NIGER #979	166,000	10,000	750,000	1,854,500	5 months
MALI #982	365,000	10,092	901,200	1,951,900	9 months
UPPER VOLTA #983	125,000	4000	572,125	1,160,782	7 months
TOTALS:	2,161,000	62,097	5,514,519	11,076,096	

* As of October 1973
a Phase I
b Phase II

Source: WFP/IGC: 24/5-B and WFP/IGC: 26:50B

APPENDIX UN VIII

FAO AIRLIFT TO THE SAHEL - 1973*

Country	Tonnage	Cost - Chartered Flights
CHAD	1,142/food, seed	\$529,517
MALI	-	-
MAURITANIA	182/seed	\$130,954
NIGER	1,338/food	\$450,425
SENEGAL	240/seed	\$333,500
UPPER VOLTA	-	-
TOTAL	2,902	\$1,144,396

* Courtesy OSRO

VOLUNTARY AGENCIES

APPENDIX VA I

OPERATIONAL AGENCIES WITH FIELD OFFICES IN THE SAHEL
WHICH PARTICIPATED IN RELIEF

African-American Labor Center (AALC)
Africare
Care, Inc.
Catholic Relief Services (CRS)
Church World Service (CWS)
Frère des Hommes
Oxfam
Southern Baptist Convention
United World Mission
Worldwide Evangelization Crusade

APPENDIX VA II

AGENCIES WHICH FUNDED RELIEF THROUGH OTHERS

American Freedom from Hunger Foundation, Inc.
American National Red Cross
Australian Freedom from Hunger Campaign
Baptist World Alliance
Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace
Caritas Internationalis
Catholic Medical Mission Board, Inc.
Christian Aid
Christian Reformed World Relief Committee
Comité National du Mouvement de la Paix pour l'Indépendance
et le Développement (CNID)
CROP
Entreaide Protestante Suisse
League of Red Cross Societies (LICROSS)
Lutheran World Federation (World Service)
Misereor
Oxfam-Canada
RAINS
Reformed Churches of the Netherlands
Secours Catholique
Secours Populaire Français
Terre des Hommes
Trocaire
United Methodist Committee on Relief
World Gospel Crusades
World Relief

APPENDIX VA III

OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES

ACORD (Euro-Action Sahel)
 African-American Labor Center (AALC)
Africare
 American Friends Service Committee
Care, Inc.
Caritas-Senegal
 Catholic Relief Services (CRS)
 Christian and Missionary Alliance
 Church World Service
Comité Catholique contre la Faim et pour le Developpement (CCFD)
Federation des Eglises et Missions Evangeliques en Haute Volta (FEME)
Freres des Hommes
Freres de Nos Freres
 Lutheran World Federation
 Lutheran World Relief
 Mennonite Central Committee
 Near East Foundation
Oxfam
Service Universitaire Canadian Outre-Mer (SUCO)
 Seventh Day Adventist World Service
 Southern Baptist Convention
Terre des Hommes
War on Want
 World Mercy Fund, Inc.
 World ORT Federation
 Worldwide Evangelization Crusade
 YMCA-International Division

APPENDIX VA IV

ICVA MEMBERSHIP - WOGIRD PARTICIPATION

	Sep 73	Jan 74		Sep 73	Jan 74
ACORD	x	x	IUCW	x	x
AFSC *		x	LICROSS (ICRC)	x	x
BWA			LWF *	x	x
Can Hung Found		x	LWR		
Care			Oxfam *	x	x
CCFD (non-member)		x	War on Want	x	x
CI	x	x	World Alliance (YMCA)	x	x
CRS *	x	x	WCC (CICARWS)	x	x
Christian Aid			World ORT *	x	x
CWS			WUS *	x	x
Heifer Project					

* = 1975-76 Governing Board

APPENDIX VA V

SPONG MEMBER AGENCIES

Caritas Voltaique

FEME (Federation des Eglises et Missions Evangeliques)
CRS

Association des Femmes Voltaiques

FOVODES

Oxfam

Freres des Hommes

Fondation Voltaique pour la Promotion de l'Homme

SOS Interconfessional

SAED (Société Africaine d'Etudes et de Developpement)

WCC (observer)

UNA Volunteers - United Kingdom

7th Day Adventists

Africare

Federation Inter-Africaine de Cooperation (FIAC)

Cooperative de Consommation de Manga

SUCO

Union Fraternelle des Croyants de Dori

INADES

GAP MEMBER AGENCIES

CWS

Oxfam

LWR

Care

CIMADE

Caritas-Niger

Sudan Interior Mission

SUCO

Africare

Catholic Mission

EERR

UNA Volunteers

Misereor

APPENDIX VA VI

AGENCIES SPONSORING COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES FOR VOLUNTARY
AGENCIES INVOLVED IN THE SAHEL

American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service
(ACVA)
200 Park Avenue South
New York, New York 10003 USA Tel. 212-777-8210

International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA)
17 Avenue de la Paix
1202 Geneva
Switzerland Tel. 33 20 25

Freedom from Hunger/ Action for Development (FFH/AD)
Food and Agriculture Organization
via del Terme di Caracalla
00100 Roma
Italy

Commission on Interchurch Aid, Refugee and World Service (CICARWS)
World Council of Churches (WCC)
150 route de Ferney
1211 Geneva 20
Switzerland

Secretariat Permanent des Organisations Nongouvernementales (SPONG)
(May be contacted through OXFAM-Upper Volta)
B.P. 489
Ouagadougou
Upper Volta

APPENDIX VA VII

TENTATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS OF VOLUNTARY AGENCIES STUDIED
TO SAHELIAN RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT

The figures presented here represent the researcher's conservative estimate based on information obtained in questionnaires, interviews, and documents. They are in no way to be considered the official financial statements of the agencies that so graciously cooperated in the study.

<u>Organization</u>	Relief \$US	Development \$US	Both \$US
ACORD	none	5,072,162	-----
AALC	NA	NA	-----
<u>Africare</u>	214,465	1,070,000	-----
American FFH	35,000	none	-----
AFSC	500	240,000	-----
American Red Cross	253,555	none	-----
Australian FFH/AD	118,000	446,716	-----
Baptist World Alliance	-----	-----	102,790
Brother's Brother Foundation	17,000	none	-----
Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace	57,000	536,400	-----
Canadian Hunger Foundation	NA	NA	-----
CARE	5,400,000	NA	-----
<u>Caritas Internationalis</u>	NA	NA	-----
<u>Caritas-Senegal</u>	NA	NA	-----
CMMB	482,976	none	-----
CRS	943,818	10,963,223	-----
Christian Aid	332,270	384,300	-----
Christian Missionary Alliance	350,000	NA	-----
Christian Reformed Relief	138,000	NA	-----
CWS	166,638	1,204,772	-----
CIMADE	200,000	2,777,000	-----
	87,142	135,833	-----
CCFD	62,000	none	-----
CNID	64,771	50,000	-----
CROP	427,550	572,020	-----
<u>Entreaide Protestante Suisse</u>	18,604	NA	-----
FEME	NA	NA	-----
<u>Frere des Hommes</u>	NA	NA	-----
<u>Frere de Nos Frere</u>	none	3,000	-----
Heifer Project	none	1,001,652	-----
IUCW	10,843,935	none	-----
LICROSS			

(continued)

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Relief</u>	<u>Development</u>	<u>Both</u>
LFW	10,000	1,302,000	-----
LWR	122,000	158,000	-----
MCC	375,000	937,787	-----
<u>Misereor</u>	-----	-----	3,761,242
NEF	none	NA	-----
<u>Oxfam-Canada</u>	-----	-----	596,807
<u>Oxfam</u>	299,065	619,445	-----
RAINS	200,000	NA	-----
Reformed Churches, Netherlands	-----	-----	170,000
<u>Secours Catholique</u>	1,118,181	NA	-----
<u>Secours Populaire Francaise</u>	113,720	93,301	-----
SUCO	NA	NA	-----
Seventh Day Adventists	none	NA	-----
SIM	29,146	NA	-----
Southern Baptist Convention	NA	NA	-----
<u>Terre des Hommes</u>	26,000	NA	-----
<u>Trocaire</u>	65,000	187,600	-----
UMCOR	100,000	454,000	-----
United World Mission	5,000	-----	-----
War on Want	-----	-----	640,500
WCC-CICARWS	2,090,247	3,237,294	-----
World Gospel Crusade	15,000	-----	-----
World Mercy	NA	NA	-----
World ORT	none	NA	-----
World Relief	126,438	none	-----
WUS	none	NA	-----
World Vision	300,000	800,000	-----
Worldwide Evangelization	100,000	NA	-----
YMCA	none	100,000	-----
TOTALS	\$25,308,121	\$32,346,505	\$5,271,339

GRAND TOTAL: \$62,925,965

1 x 0

APPENDIX VA VIII

BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON VOLUNTARY AGENCIES INCLUDED IN THE STUDY WHICH OPERATED OR FUNDED RELIEF AND/OR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

The agencies are listed in alphabetical order.

NA means that the information is either not applicable or unavailable.

The figures presented here represent the researcher's conservative estimate based on information obtained in questionnaires, interviews and documents. They are in no way to be considered the official financial statements of the agencies who so graciously cooperated in the study.

Abbreviations:

ACVA - American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service

ICVA - International Council of Voluntary Agencies

FFH/AD - Freedom from Hunger/ Action for Development

WCC(CICARWS) - World Council of Churches (Commission on Interchurch Aid
Refugee and World Service)

SPONG - Secretariat Permanent des Organisations Nongouvernementales
(Upper Volta)

GAP- Groupement des Agences Privées (Niger)

CRS- Catholic Relief Services

CWS- Church World Service

LICROSS- League of Red Cross Societies

LWF- Lutheran World Federation

LWR - Lutheran World Relief

FEME - Fédération des Eglises et Missions Evangeliques en Haute Volta

ACORD (Euro-Action Sahel)
International Development Centre
Parrell House
25 Wilton Road
London SW1V 1JS
United Kingdom

Consortium of six agencies: Centre National de Coopération (Belgium),
Comite Catolico de CCH (Spain), Deutsche Welthungerhilfe (Germany),
Mani Tese (Italy), NOVIB (Netherlands), and OXFAM (United Kingdom).

Founded: 1974

Primary goal: Long term integrated rural development in Sahel

In Sahel since: 1972 (as IACOD)

In Africa since: 1972

Field representatives: Mali, Niger, Upper Volta

Source of funds: Contributions from each of the six agencies.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES : NONE

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Mali, Upper Volta, Niger

Amount budgeted: \$5,072,162 (1974-78)

Funds channelled: From voluntary agencies in consortium through
Seceretariat in London

Time span: Long term program at least through 1978

Type of projects or programs: Reorganization of cooperatives, training,
road improvement, livestock, water resources, health care.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

FFH/AD , SPONG, GAP, ICVA

African-American Labor Center
345 E. 46th St., Suite 200
New York, New York 10017
USA

Founded: 1964

Primary goal: Working with African trade unions to help them meet their needs.

In Sahel since: 1971

In Africa since: NA

Field representative: Senegal

Source of funds: American trade unions

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Upper Volta, Chad

Amount budgeted: NA

Funds channelled: Directly to local unions, also to CRS (Senegal)

Time span: 1972-74

Type of relief: Medical, food supplies

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Mali, Upper Volta, Niger, Mauritania, Chad.

Amount budgeted: NA

Funds channelled: To Training Institute (Dakar) and directly to local unions.

Time span: 1964 - indefinitely

Type of projects or programs: Regional Tailoring Institute, cooperatives, health, workers education, sponsor African trade union participation in world conferences, communication supplies, loans to unions.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

ACVA, sponsored regional meetings in African for trade unionists on drought.

Africare
1424 16th St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
USA

Founded: 1971

Primary goal: Long term development

In Sahel since: 1971 (Niger)

In Africa since: 1971

Field representatives: Mali, Upper Volta, Niger

Source of funds: Private contributions, USAID, Lilly Endowment

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Mali, Niger, Chad, Upper Volta (Gambia)

Amount budgeted: \$ 214,465

Funds channelled: Directly and through AFSC, CRS, MCC, UNICEF

Time span: 1973-74

Type of relief: Emergency well-drilling, camp supplies, medical supplies, food purchase, replacement animals, tools, transportation costs.

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Mali, Niger, Upper Volta, Mauritania, Senegal, Chad

Amount budgeted: \$1,070,000 (Approximately) through 1976-77

Funds channelled: Directly in cooperation with local governments.

Time span: 1973- indefinite

Type of projects or programs: Water, resources, rural development, agriculture, nutrition education and sanitary training.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

FFH/AD, GAP, SPONG

American Freedom from Hunger Foundation, Inc.
Suite 719
1625 "I" St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
USA

Founded: 1961

Primary goal: Campaign against hunger originally, now - information sharing and workshops for regional development in Third World.

In Sahel since: Non-operational agency

In Africa since:

Field representatives: None

Source of funds: Private contributions

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: NA

Amount budgeted: \$35,000

Funds channelled : Through CARE, FAO, LWR, CRS, UNICEF, CWS and Africare

Time span: 1973

Type of relief: Fundraising only.

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES NONE

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

FFH/AD

American Friends Service Committee
1501 Cherry St.
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102
USA

Founded: 1917

Primary goal: Long term development

In Sahel since: 1973

In Africa since: NA

Field representative: Mali

Source of funds: Private donations, Friends Meetings, foundations

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Country: Mali

Amount budgeted: \$500

Funds channelled: Directly

Time span: 1973

Type of relief: Medical supplies

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Country: Mali

Amount budgeted: \$240,000 through 1977

Funds channelled: Directly to local government for support of project.

Time span: 1975-77

Type of project: Nomad pilot re-settlement project in Tin Aicha, 6th region

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

ACVA, FFH/AD, ICVA

American National Red Cross
National Headquarters
Washington, D.C. 20006
USA

Founded: 1892

Primary goal: Relief work

In Sahel since: NA

In Africa since: NA

Field representative: None

Source of funds: NA

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Niger, Chad

Amount budgeted: \$253,555

Funds chanelled: Through LICROSS exclusively.

Time span: 1973-74

Type of relief: Medical, supplies for refugees, etc.

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES NONE

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

ACVA

Australian Freedom from Hunger Campaign
Action for Development
GPO Box 3930
Sydney 2001
Australia

Founded: 1960

Primary goal: Providing funds for ongoing development programs.

In Sahel: 1973

In Africa since: NA

Field representatives: None

Source of funds: Private contributions, government, private endowment.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Mali, Upper Volta, Niger, Mauritania, Chad

Amount budgeted: \$ 118,000

Funds channelled: Through UNICEF

Time span: 1973

Type of relief: Unspecified

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Niger, Chad.

Amount budgeted: \$446,716

Funds channelled: Through UNICEF, FAO, FFH/AD, CILSS NGO secretariat

Time span: 1973-75

Type of programs: Replanting, water resources, support for CILSS NGO Secretariat loan fund and operating expenses.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

FFH/AD

Baptist World Alliance
1628 16th st., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009
USA

Founded: 1943

Primary goal: Relief and missionary

In Sahel since: 1973

In Africa since: NA

Field representatives: Senegal, Niger, Upper Volta (Through Southern Baptist Convention)

Source of funds: Contributions from Baptist groups.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Niger, Upper Volta

Amount budgeted: \$102, 790

Funds chanelled: Through Foreign Mission Board, Southern Baptist Convention

Time span: 1973-74

Type of relief: Food, health care, water resources, agriculture.

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Same as above - Figures are for both combined.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

ACVA, ICVA

The Brother's Brother Foundation
824 Grandview Avenue
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15211
USA

Founded: 1958

Primary goal: Providing medical assistance and mass immunization.

In Sahel since: 1974

In Africa since: 1958

Field representative: None

Source of funds: Baptist World Alliance, Catholic charities, evangelical churches, Congregational, Episcopal, Lutheran, Mennonite, Methodist, Presbyterian, Friends, Mormons, United Brethren, Jewish congregations, foundations, private industry and private contributions.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Niger

Amount budgeted: \$17,000

Funds channelled: Directly

Time span: 1974

Type of relief: Medical supplies (vitamins, vaccine)

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES NONE

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

ACVA

110

Canadian Catholic Organization
for Development and Peace
1452 Drummond St.
Montreal 107, Quebec
Canada

Founded: 1967

Primary goal: Development work and education about Third World.

In Sahel since: NA

In Africa since: NA

Field representative: None

Source of funds: Private contributions (Lenten campaign)

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Mali, Upper Volta, Niger, Chad, Mauritania

Amount budgeted: \$57,000

Funds channelled: Through Caritas Internationalis, local Caritas groups, local Catholic missions, SOS Sahel, government.

Time span: 1973-74

Type of relief: Food and transportation

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Mali, Upper Volta, Niger, Chad, Mauritania

Amount budgeted: \$536, 400

Funds channelled: Through same organizations as above.

Time span: 1973-75

Type of projects or programs: Water resources, agriculture, support for CILSS, transportation, education, cooperatives, maternal/child health care.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

FFH/AD

Canadian Hunger Foundation
75 rue Sparks St.
Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5A5
Canada

Founded: 1963

Primary goal: NA

In Sahel since: NA

In Africa since: NA

Field representative: None

Source of funds: NA

RELIEF ACTIVITIES NONE

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Country: Niger

Amount budgeted: NA

Funds channelled: NA

Time span: NA

Type of projects or programs: Animal husbandry, cooperatives, water resources, solar energy.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

FFH/AD, ICVA

CARE, Inc.
660 First Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10016
USA

Founded: 1946

Primary goal: Voluntary international aid and development (also relief).

In Sahel since: 1973

In Africa since: 1962

Field representatives: Mali, Niger, Chad

Source of funds: Private contributions, USAID and local government, foundation grants.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Mali, Niger, Chad

Amount budgeted: \$5,400,000 (approximate value)

Funds channelled: Directly

Time span: 1973-74

Type of relief: Survival biscuits, baby food, medical supplies, transportation.

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Mali, Niger, Chad

Amount budgeted: NA

Funds channelled: Directly

Time span: Indefinite (long term programs)

Type of projects or programs: Water resources, agriculture, education, training, school construction, nutrition.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

ACVA, FFH/AD, GAP, ICVA

Caritas Internationalis
16 Piazza San Callisto
Roma 00153
Italy

Founded: 1951

Primary goal: Coordination of worldwide Caritas organizations.

In Sahel since: NA

In Africa since: NA

Field representative: None

Source of funds: National Caritas organizations

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Niger, Chad.

Amount budgeted: NA

Funds channelled: To local Caritas organizations

Time span: 1973-74

Type of relief: Medical supplies, food, transportation

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES (Unknown)

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

ICVA, WCC(CICARWS), FFH/AD

Caritas Senegal
B.P. 439
Dakar
Senegal

Founded: NA

Primary goal: Village level development work.

In Sahel since: NA

In Africa since: NA

Field representative: Local organization

Source of funds: Caritas groups in Europe (Germany, Netherlands, Austria and Switzerland in particular) also Caritas groups in Africa.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Country: Senegal

Amount budgeted: NA

Funds channelled: From Senegalese government, European Caritas and African Caritas directly to Caritas Senegal.

Time span: 1972-74

Type of relief: Food, clothing, baby food, medical supplies, transportation.

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Country: Senegal

Amount budgeted: NA

Funds channelled: From European Caritas organizations through Caritas Senegal.

Time span: 1974- indefinite.

Type of projects or programs: Water resources, agriculture, medical dispensaries.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

Through Caritas Internationalis

Catholic Medical Mission Board, Inc.
10 West 17th St.
New York, N.Y. 10011
USA

Founded: 1928

Primary goal: Providing medical supplies worldwide, primarily to Catholic missions.

In Sahel since: NA

In Africa since: NA

Field representatives: None for CMMB-work through missionaries and CRS.

Source of funds: Private contributions, goods donated by pharmaceutical companies.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Upper Volta

Amount budgeted: \$482,976

Funds channelled: Through CRS and local missions (no money just supplies).

Time span: 1973-74

Type of relief: Medical supplies, vitamins, food supplements.

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Not on regular basis. Supplies are sent to medical missions as orders can be filled.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

ACVA

Catholic Relief Services
Catholic Center
1011 First Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022
USA

Founded: 1943

Primary goal: Meet relief and welfare needs caused by underdevelopment.

In Sahel since: 1960s

In Africa since: NA

Field representatives: Senegal, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Chad

Source of funds: Private contributions (Lenten appeal), Foundations, USAID contracts, organizations in Europe and U.S., local governments.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, Upper Volta

Amount budgeted: \$943,818

Funds channelled: Directly and through local organizations.

Time span: 1972-74

Type of relief: Medicines, baby supplies, specialty foods, blankets, clothing, help for the aged, transportation.

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Mauritania, Upper Volta

Amount budgeted: (1972-75) \$10,963,223

Funds channelled: Directly and through local groups.

Time span: 1972- indefinite

Type of projects or programs: Water resources, agriculture, maternal/child health, reforestation, support for SPONG.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

ACVA, ICVA, SPONG, LICROSS NGO Steering Committee.

Christian Aid
PO Box no. 1
2 Sloane Gardens
London SW1W9BW
United Kingdom

Founded: 1950

Primary goal: Serve as social welfare arm of British Council of Churches.

In Sahel since: 1973

In Africa since: NA

Field representatives: None

Source of funds: Through Church appeals and Disaster Emergency Committee.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Mali, Niger, Upper Volta, Chad, Mauritania

Amount budgeted: \$332,270

Funds channelled: Through WCC, FEME, CWS, Catholic church in Mali and Niger.

Time span: 1973

Type of relief: Food supplies, transportation.

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Mali, Upper Volta, Niger, Chad

Amount budgeted: \$384,300

Funds channelled: Through WCC, FEME, CWS, Wunderman Foundation, Catholic Church in Mali and Niger.

Time span: 1973-indefinite

Type of projects or programs: Health care, water resources, education, agriculture, forestry.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

WCC Conference (Lome, Togo), FFH/AD, ICVA , Disaster Emergency Committee(U.K.)

Christian and Missionary Alliance
Nyack, N.Y. 10960
USA

Founded: 1887

Primary goal: Evangelism and medical work

In Sahel since: 1923

In Africa since: NA

Field representatives: Mali, Upper Volta

Source of funds: Through churches (private contributions) and missionary conventions.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Mali, Upper Volta

Amount budgeted: \$350,000

Funds chanelled: Directly

Time span: 1973-75

Type of relief: Food, health needs

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Mali, Upper Volta

Amount budgeted: NA

Time span: Began before drought

Type of projects or programs: Medical dispensaries

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

ACVA, World Relief Commission, MCC, Medical Assistance Programs, Inc.,
Billy Graham Evangelistic Association

Christian Reformed World Relief Committee
2850 Kalamazoo Avenue, S.E.
Grand Rapids, Michigan 49508
USA

Founded: 1962

Primary goal: NA

In Sahel since: 1973

In Africa since: NA

Field representative: Niger

Source of funds: Contributions from church members

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Niger, Chad

Amount budgeted: \$138,000

Funds chanelled: Through CWS, SIM, Medical Assistance Programs, Orthydox Presbyterian Church Mission, World Relief Commission, World Presbyterian Mission, Christian Reformed Board of Foreign Missions.

Time span: 1973-75

Type of relief: Food, health care, water resources.

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES UNKNOWN

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

ACVA

100

Church World Service
475 Riverside Drive
New York, N.Y. 10027

Founded: 1948

Primary goal: Development and social welfare arm of National Council of Churches

In Sahel since: 1968

In Africa since: NA

Field representative: Niger

Source of funds: Private contributions, CROP, USAID, Protestant denominations, Christian Aid, Dutch and Danish Interchurch Aid, Bread for the World, Lilly Foundation.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Country: Niger

Amount budgeted: \$166,638

Funds channelled: Directly, Through Niger Red Cross and with government

Time span: 1973-74

Type of relief: Food, mobile medical team

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Niger, Mali

Amount budgeted: \$1,204,772 (exclusive of USAID or WCC funds)

Funds channelled: Directly and with government

Time span: 1968-78 (indefinite)

Type of projects or programs: School gardens, oasis redevelopment, fishing, agriculture, cattle raising, water resources, reforestation, vocational school, nomad cooperative.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

WCC(CICARWS), FFH/AD, GAP, ICVA

CIMADE
176, rue de Grenelle
Paris 75007
France

Founded: 1939

Primary Goal: Cooperative development

In Sahel since: 1950s (Senegal)

In Africa since: NA

Field representatives: None

Source of funds: French Protestant churches, private contributions, European Protestant organizations, CCFD.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Upper Volta, Niger

Amount budgeted: \$200,000

Funds channelled: Through local groups, government and directly.

Time span: 1973

Type of relief: Medicines, food, veterinary needs, transportation.

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Upper Volta, Niger, Mali

Amount budgeted: \$2,777,000

Funds channelled: Through local groups or with government.

Time span: 1950s - indefinite

Type of projects or programs: Ophthalmology clinic, water resources, cooperatives, training, animal husbandry, solar energy, assistance to nomads, cereal bank.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

WCC(CICARWS), GAP

Comité Catholique Contre La Faim et
Pour le Developpement (CCFD)
47, quai des Grands Augustins
Paris 75262
France

Founded: 1961

Primary goal: Combatting hunger through development work.

In Sahel since: NA

In Africa since: NA

Field representatives: NA

Source of funds: Private contributions (Catholic church collections),
and private donations.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Upper Volta, Mali, Senegal, Chad, Niger

Amount budgeted: \$87,142 (1973 only)

Funds channelled: Directly and with CIMADE to local groups.

Time span: 1973

Type of relief: Emergency sowing, medical supplies, transportation.

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Upper Volta, Mali, Senegal, Chad, Niger

Amount budgeted: \$135,833 (1973 only)

Funds channelled: Directly and with CIMADE to local groups.

Time span: 1973- indefinite

Type of projects or programs: Water resources, agriculture, cooperatives.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

WCC(CICARWS), FFH/AD, ICVA(non-member, attended meetings on drought).

Comite National du Mouvement de la Paix
pour l'Independence et le Developpement (CNID)
35 rue de Clichy
Paris 75009
France

Founded: 1950

Primary goal: Promote peace throughout the world.

In Sahel since: NA

In Africa since: NA

Field representative: None

Source of funds: Public appeal

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries : Niger, (Southern Algeria)

Amount budgeted: \$62,000

Funds chanelled: To medical contacts in the field.

Time span: 1974

Type of relief: Medicines, vaccines, vitamins.

N.B. Action was taken to awaken French concern for the Sahel.

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES NONE

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES NONE

CROP
2619 Phillips St.
Box 968
Elkhart, Indiana 46514
USA

Founded: NA

Primary goal: Fund raising for CWS hunger and development programs.

In Sahel since: NA

In Africa since: NA

Field representatives: None

Source of funds: Public appeals, foundations, private contributions,
(Earmarked funds go to designated agencies besides CWS).

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Country: Niger

Amount budgeted: \$64,771

Funds channelled: Through CWS

Time span: 1974

Type of relief: Food and transportation

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Country: Niger

Amount budgeted: \$50,000 possibly more (\$25,000 per year).

Funds channelled: Through CWS

Time span: 1974-75, perhaps longer.

Type of projects or programs: Gardening, Health care and nutrition.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

Through CWS participation.

Entreaide Protestante Suisse
Postfach 168
8035 Zurich
Switzerland

Founded: 1946

Primary goal: Development work in Third World.

In Sahel since: NA

In Africa since: NA

Field representative: None

Source of funds: Public appeals, church collections.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Mali, Upper Volta, Niger, Chad, Mauritania

Amount budgeted: \$427,550

Funds channelled: Through WCC and CIMADE.

Time span: 1973

Type of relief: Mobile clinic, food, help for refugees, transportation.

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Upper Volta

Amount budgeted: \$572,020

Funds channelled: Through WCC and CIMADE

Time span: 1973-75

Type of projects and programs: Scholarships, school construction, water resources, building materials, grain storage.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

FFH/AD, WCC

Fédération des Eglises et Missions
Evangeliques en Haute Volta
B.P. 108
Ouagadougou
Upper Volta

Founded: 1972

Primary goal: Development work with local design and execution.

In Sahel since: Local organization

In Africa since: NA

Field representative: NA

Source of funds: European church groups; Entreaide Protestante Suisse,
Brot fur die Welt, World Vision, Baptist organizations (U.S.)

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Country: Upper Volta

Amount budgeted: \$18,604

Funds chanelled: Directly through Upper Voltan government.

Time span: 1972-73

Type of relief: Food

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Country: Upper Volta

Amount budgeted: NA

Funds chanelled: Same agencies as above and Christian Aid.
To local projects.

Time span: 1974-indefinite

Type of projects or programs: Agriculture, reforestation, cooperative system
whcih generates new funds, water resources, education, health care.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

FFH/AD, WCC (CICARWS), SPONG

Frères des Hommes
9 rue de Savoie
Paris 75006
France

Founded: 1965

Primary goal: Humanitarian volunteer projects in Third World to promote "self-development".

In Sahel since: 1967

In Africa since: NA

Field representative: Upper Volta

Source of funds: Private contributions, public appeals.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Country: Upper Volta

Amount budgeted: NA

Funds channelled: Directly

Time span: 1973-74

Type of relief: Road construction and repair of routes needed for food transport.

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Country: Upper Volta

Amount budgeted: NA

Funds channelled: Directly and in cooperation with government.

Time span: Indefinite

Type of projects or programs: Agriculture pilot projects, functional education, health care teams, training artisans, water resources, school canteens.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

SPONG

Frères de Nos Frères
22 rue Michel-Chauvet
Ecole des Contamines
1208 Geneva
Switzerland

Founded: 1965

Primary goal : Swiss branch of Frères des Hommes (same objectives)

In Sahel since: 1968

In Africa since: NA

Field representative: Niger

Source of funds: Private contributions and public appeals.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES UNKNOWN

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Country: Niger

Amount budgeted: NA

Funds chanelled : Directly

Time span: 1974-indefinite

Type of projects or programs: Fundamental education, cooperatives, agriculture.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

None

Heifer Project International
P.O. Box 808
Little Rock, Arkansas 72203
USA

Founded: 1944

Primary Goal: NA

In Sahel since: NA

In Africa since: NA

Field representative: none

Source of funds: NA

RELIEF ACTIVITIES None

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Country: Niger

Amount budgeted: \$3,000

Funds chanelled: Through CWS

Time span: 1974-?

Type of project: Draft animal project

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

ICVA

International Union for Child Welfare
Centre International
1 rue de Varembe
1211 Geneva 20
Switzerland

Founded: 1920

Primary goal: Promote child welfare throughout the world.

In Sahel since: NA

In Africa since: NA

Field representatives: None - Cooperates with local child welfare authorities.

Source of funds: Private contributions, foundations, church groups, governments, Swiss local governments, member organizations in North America and Europe.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES NONE

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Upper Volta, Niger

Amount budgeted: \$1,001,652

Funds channelled: Through local government

Time span: 1974- indefinite

Type of projects or programs: Child welfare, water resources, community development, nutritional education, training rural youth.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

ICVA, WCC(CICARWS), FFH/AD

League of Red Cross Societies
C.P. 2099
1211 Geneva 19
Switzerland

Founded: 1919

Primary goal: Provide relief and coordinate national Red Cross organization responses to natural disasters.

In Sahel since: NA

In Africa since: NA

Field representatives: None- Special delegates sent during emergencies to assist national organizations.

Source of funds: National Red Cross organizations (also Red Crescent and Red Lion and Sun)

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Niger, Chad (Algeria)

Amount budgeted: \$10,843,935

Funds channelled: Through local Red Cross and Crescent societies.

Time span: 1973-74

Type of relief: Food, camp supplies for refugees, medical teams and supplies, transportation.

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES NONE

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

ICVA, FFH/AD, sponsor of LICROSS NGO Steering Committee.

Lutheran World Federation (World Service)
150 route de Ferney
1211 Geneva 20
Switzerland

Founded: 1952 (World Service branch)

Primary goal: Development work

In Sahel since: 1974

In Africa since: NA

Field Representative: Mauritania

Source of funds: LWF national committees, related church agencies, public appeals and private contributions.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Country: Mauritania

Amount budgeted: \$10,000

Funds channelled: Through Red Crescent Society (Mauritanian)

Time span: 1974-75

Type of relief: Transportation of relief commodities.

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Country: Mauritania

Amount budgeted: \$1,302,000 (through 1976)

Funds channelled: Through Mauritanian Red Crescent

Time span: 1974- indefinite

Type of projects or programs: Water resources, agriculture, reforestation, storage construction, health care.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

ICVA, WCC(CICARWS), FFH/AD, LICROSS NGO Steering Committee

Lutheran World Relief
315 Park Avenue South
Suite 1940
New York, N.Y. 10010 USA

Founded: 1945

Primary goal: Short and long term development work

In Sahel since: 1973

In Africa since: NA

Field representatives: Niger

Source of funds: Three U.S. Lutheran church bodies

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Niger, Mauritania (by Lutheran World Federation)

Amount budgeted: \$122,000

Funds channelled: Directly and through CWS

Time span: 1973

Type of relief: Food, transportation

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Niger, Mauritania(through LWF)

Amount budgeted: \$156,000 (through 1976)

Funds channelled: Directly and through CWS and LWF.

Time span: 1973-indefinite

Type of projects or programs: Agricultural development and water resources.
In the process of elaborating more programs.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

ICVA, ACVA, GAP

Mennonite Central Committee
21 S. 12th St.
Akron, Pennsylvania 17501
USA

Founded: 1920

Primary goal: Relief and service agency for Mennonite and Brethren in Christ churches.

In Sahel since: 1973

In Africa since: NA

Field representatives: Upper Volta, Chad

Source of funds: Mennonite, Brethren in Christ, Amish church contributions.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Mali, Chad, Upper Volta

Amount budgeted: \$375,000 (low estimate)

Funds channelled: Directly and through local missions and churches.

Time span: 1973-74

Type of relief: Food, medicines, vitamins, transportation.

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Upper Volta, Chad (recently left)

Amount budgeted: \$937,787 (includes some relief)

Funds channelled: Same as above.

Time span: 1973-idefinite

Type of projects and programs: Water resources, health care, agriculture.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

ACVA

Misereor
Mozartstrasse 9
51 Aachen
Federal Republic of Germany

Founded: 1958

Primary goal: Catholic development world service organization.

In Sahel since: 1962

In Africa since: 1960

Field representative: None

Source of funds: Private contributions (Lenten collection), government funds, diocesan support.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Mali, Niger, Chad, Upper Volta

Amount budgeted: Included in development figure.

Funds channelled: Through local Catholic organizations.

Time span: NA

Type of relief: Health care, transportation.

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Mali, Niger, Chad, Upper Volta

Amount budgeted: \$3,761,242 (includes relief)

Funds channelled: Same as above.

Time span: 1973-74

Type of projects or programs: Health care, water resources, education, agriculture.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

FFH/AD, GAP

Near East Foundation
54 East 64th St.
New York, N.Y. 10021
USA

Founded: 1929

Primary goal: Technical assistance to developing countries.

In Sahel since: 1973

In Africa since: 1950s

Field representative: Mauritania

Source of funds: USAID contract (in Africa only)

RELIEF ACTIVITIES NONE

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Country: Mauritania

Amount budgeted: NA

Funds chanelled: Directly

Time span: 1975

Type of project: Technical assistance(Livestock survey). Similar projects previously conducted in Chad and Mali.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

ACVA

OXFAM
274 Banbury Road
Oxford, OX2 7DZ
United Kingdom

Founded: 1942 (Federal charter 1966)

Primary goal : Development activities to increase world food supply for developing nations.

In Sahel since: 1972

In Africa since: 1965 (West Africa)

Field representative: Upper Volta

Source of funds: Private contributions, Oxfam cooperative stores, Christmas cards, pledged gifts, legacies.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Niger

Amount budgeted: \$299, 065

Funds channelled: Directly and through local voluntary agencies, CRS, UN agencies.

Time span: 1973

Type of relief: Food, medical supplies, needs of refugees in camps, transportation.

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Niger, Chad

Amount budgeted: \$619,445

Funds channelled: Same as above.

Time span: 1973-indefinite

Type of projects or programs: Agriculture, water resources, health care, evaluation of project by Upper Voltan research group, training.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

ICVA, FFH/AD, Disaster Emergency Committee (United Kingdom), ACORD (Euro-Action Sahel), WCC (CICARWS), SPONG, GAP, LICROSS NGO Steering Committee

OXFAM-Canada
251 Laurier Avenue West
Room 301
Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5J6
Canada

Founded: 1962

Primary goal: Humanitarian development assistance to Third World.

In Sahel since: 1973

In Africa since: NA

Field representative: Upper Volta (through Oxfam-U.K.)

Source of funds: Public appeals, government, combined appeals with other voluntary agencies.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Mali, Niger, Chad, Upper Volta

Amount budgeted: See below

Funds channelled: Through OXFAM-U.K., OXFAM-Belgique, CRS, FAO

Time span: 1973-74

Type of relief: Food, transportation.

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Mali, Niger, Chad, Upper Volta

Amount budgeted: \$596,807 (includes relief)

Funds channelled: Same as above

Time span: 1973-indefinite

Type of projects or programs: Water resources, education, health care, agriculture.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

Same as for OXFAM (U.K.)

RAINS
c/o IFCO
475 Riverside Drive
New York, N.Y. 10027
USA

Founded: 1973

Primary goal: Provide relief directly to people of Sahel.

In Sahel since: 1973

In Africa since: 1973

Field representative: None

Source of funds: Private contributions, coalition of member organizations.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: All CILSS members: Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad, Upper Volta, Senegal, Gambia.

Amount budgeted: \$200,000

Funds channelled: Through CILSS directly.

Time span: 1973-75

Type of relief : Water resources(emergency), undetermined relief as designated by CILSS.

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES UNKNOWN

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

FFH/AD

180

Reformed Churches of the Netherlands
Algemeen Diakonaal Bureau
Koningslaan 7
Utrecht
Netherlands

Founded: 1960

Primary goal: Development work.

In Sahel since: 1974

In Africa since: NA

Field representative: None

Source of funds: Grants by church members (privately and through parishes)

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Country: Chad

Amount budgeted: See below

Funds channelled: Through WCC(CICARWS)

Time span: 1974

Type of relief: Food

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Country: Chad

Amount budgeted: \$170,000 (includes relief)

Funds channelled: Through WCC (CICARWS) and Euro-Action Sahel (ACORD)

Time span: 1974-indefinite

Type of projects or programs: Health care, agriculture

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

WCC(CICARWS), ACORD(Euro-Action Sahel)

Secours Catholique
106 rue du Bac
Paris 75341
France

Founded: 1946

Primary goal: Support development projects of local Catholic groups.

In Sahel since: NA

In Africa since: 1961

Field representative: None

Source of funds: Private contributions, church collections.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Upper Volta

Amount budgeted: \$1,118,181

Funds channelled: Through local Caritas and Catholic missions.

Time span: 1974

Type of relief: Food, medication, blankets, transportation.

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Upper Volta

Amount budgeted: NA

Funds channelled: Same as above

Time span: NA

Type of projects or programs: Microréalisation (Small scale agricultural projects)

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES UNKNOWN

Secours Populaire Francais
9, rue de Froissart
Paris 75003
France

Founded: 1926

Primary goal: To promote solidarity between developed and developing worlds through assistance to Thrid World.

In Sahel since: 1972

In Africa since: NA

Field representative: None

Source of funds: Private contributions, special appeals, community fund raising.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Upper Volta, Chad, Niger, Mali, Senegal, Mauritania

Amount budgeted: \$113,720

Funds chanelled: Through local contacts (medical teams, etc.)

Time span: 1973-74

Type of relief: Food, medical supplies, transportation.

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Upper Volta, Chad, Niger, Mali, Senegal, Mauritania

Amount budgeted: \$93,301

Funds chanelled: Same as above

Time span: 1973-indefinite

Type of projects or programs: Health care, schools, agriculture cooperative, water resources

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

UNKNOWN

Service Universitaire Canadien OutreMer
4824 Cote-des-Neiges
Montreal
Canada

Founded: NA

Primary goal: NA

In Sahel since: NA

In Africa since: NA

Field representatives: Senegal, Mali

Source of funds: NA

RELIEF ACTIVITIES UNKNOWN

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Upper Volta, Mali, Chad, Niger, Senegal

Amount budgeted: NA

Funds chanelled: From OXFAM and other unknown sources.

Time span: NA

Type of projects or programs: Cooperatives, cattle raising, agriculture, health care, water resources, technology transfer.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

FFH/AD, GAP, SPONG

Seventh Day Adventist World Service
6840 Eastern Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20012
USA

Founded: NA

Primary goal: NA

In Sahel since: 1976

In Africa since: NA

Field representative: Unknown

Source of funds: NA

RELIEF ACTIVITIES NONE

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Chad, Upper Volta

Amount budgeted: NA

Funds channelled: Directly

Time span: 1976-indefinite

Type of projects or programs: Agricultural (being negotiated)

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

SPONG, ACVA

Southern Baptist Convention
Foreign Mission Board
Box 6597
Richmond, Virginia 23230
USA

Founded: 1845

Primary goal: Missionary work and social service.

In Sahel since: 1969

In Africa since: NA

Field representative: Upper Volta, Senegal, Niger

Source of funds: Private contributions through member churches.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Upper Volta, Senegal, Niger

Amount budgeted: NA

Funds channelled: Through local organizations , CRS, FEME

Time span: 1973

Type of relief: Food

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Upper Volta, Niger, Senegal

Amount budgeted: NA

Funds channelled: Through local organizations.

Time span: 1969-1976

Type of projects or programs: Water resources, training of mason.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

With Baptist World Alliance

Sudan Interior Mission
Cedar Grove, New Jersey 07009
USA

Founded: 1893

Primary goal: Missionary work

In Sahel since: 1973

In Africa since: 1893

Field representatives: Niger, Upper Volta

Source of funds: Voluntary contributions (no solicitation is done)

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Niger, Upper Volta

Amount budgeted: \$29,146

Funds chanelled: Directly

Time span: 1973-74

Type of relief: Transportation

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Niger, Upper Volta

Amount budgeted: NA

Funds chanelled: Directly

Time span: 1973-indefinite

Type of projects or programs: Community development, training in agriculture, irrigation, water resources.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

GAP

Terre des Hommes
27 route du Signal
Lausanne
Switzerland

Founded: 1960

Primary goal: To protect and help threatened children throughout the world.

In Sahel since: 1973

In Africa since: 1968

Field representative: None

Source of funds: Private contributions, special appeals.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Algerian border area near Mali

Amount budgeted: \$26,000

Funds channelled: Through OXFAM-Belgique

Time span: 1974

Type of relief: Aid for Tuaregs from Sahel countries (Food and basic supplies)

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Upper Volta, Senegal

Amount budgeted: NA

Funds channelled: Through local groups and individuals.

Time span: NA

Type of projects: Medical dispensaries

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES UNKNOWN

Trocaire
130 Booterstown Avenue
Dublin
Ireland

Founded: 1972

Primary goal: Irish Catholic church agency for Third World development.
Emphasis on development education of public.

In Sahel since: 1973

In Africa since: NA

Field representative: None

Source of funds: Private contributions (Lenten campaign)

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, Upper Volta

Amount budgeted: \$65,100

Funds channelled: Through CCFD, IUCW, FAO

Time span: 1973-75

Type of relief: Food, emergency seeding, transportation

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Upper Volta

Amount budgeted: \$187,600

Funds channelled: Same as above

Time span: 1973-77

Type of projects or programs: Health care, water resources, education, agriculture, solar energy, reforestation.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

FFH/AD

United Methodist Committee on Relief
475 Riverside Drive, Room 1470
New York, New York 10027
USA

Founded: 1940 (restructured 1972)

Primary goal: Relief arm of United Methodists Board of Global Ministries.

In Sahel since: NA

In Africa since: NA

Field representative: None

Source of funds: Special church collections, private contributions.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Mali, Niger

Amount budgeted: \$100,000

Funds channelled: Through CWS and WCC

Time span: 1973-75

Type of relief: Health teams, unspecified relief.

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Mali, Niger

Amount budgeted: \$454,000 (not total)

Funds channelled: Same as above

Time span: 1973-indefinite

Type of projects or programs: Support for desert oasis agricultural development, food production, health care, cooperatives, training, water resources.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

ACVA, WCC(CICARWS), FFH/AD

198

United World Mission
Box 8000
Petersburg, Florida 33738
USA

Founded: 1946

Primary goal: Missionary service

In Sahel since: 1955

In Africa since: NA

Field representatives: Senegal, Mali

Source of funds: Public appeals, private contributions

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Mali

Amount budgeted: \$5,000

Funds channelled: Through World Relief Commission and directly

Time span: 1974-75

Type of relief: Food

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES NONE

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES UNKNOWN

AD-A081 200

DENVER UNIV COLO
INTERNATIONAL DISASTER RESPONSE: THE SAHELIAN EXPERIENCE, (U)
JUN 76 B J BROWN, J C TUTHILL, E T ROWE

F/6 5/4

UNCLASSIFIED


FAR-25093

NL

3 of 3
AD
A081200



END
DATE
FILMED
3-80
DOC



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

War on Want
467 Caledonian Road
London N7 9BE
United Kingdom

Founded: NA

Primary goal: Campaign against world poverty.

In Sahel since: 1973

In Africa since: NA

Field representative : None in 1975

Source of funds: Private contributions and Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC)
(for relief)

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Country: Senegal

Amount budgeted: See below

Funds channelled: Directly and through DEC coordination

Time span: 1973-74

Type of relief: Water trucks, transportation

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Mauritania(Senegalese border area)

Amount budgeted: \$640,500 (includes some relief)

Funds channelled: Directly and with governments

Time span: 1976 - indefinite

Type of projects or programs: . Integrated village level regional develop-
ment projects.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

FFH/AD, ICVA, Disaster Emergency Committee

World Council of Churches
 Commission on Interchurch Aid,
 Refugee and World Service
 PO Box no. 66
 150 route de Ferney
 1211 Geneva 20
 Switzerland

Founded: 1948

Primary goal: Ecumenical world service in developing countries.

In Sahel since: 1973

In Africa since: NA

Field representatives: Three person team for region located in Upper Volta during 1975-76 (temporary to identify projects and partners).

Source of funds: WCC member churches service organizations, African churches, special appeal

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Niger, Chad

Amount budgeted: \$2,090,247 (represents WCC members total)

Funds channelled: through local groups, governments, Red Cross

Time span: 1973-74

Type of relief: Food, medical supplies, transportation

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Niger, Chad

Amount budgeted: \$3,237,294 (represents WCC members total)

Funds channelled: Same as above

Time span: 1973-indefinite

Type of projects or programs: Support for CILSS NGO office, mobile clinics, water resources, agriculture, livestock, transportation.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

ICVA, FFH/AD, LICROSS NGO Steering Committee, SPONG (observer), GAP

World Gospel Crusades
PO Box 3
Upland, California 91786
USA

Founded: 1959

Primary goal: NA

In Sahel since: 1973

In Africa since: NA

Field representative: None

Source of funds: Public appeals, foundation grants

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Niger

Amount budgeted: \$15,000

Funds chanelled: Through Food for the Hungry, Sudan Interior Mission

Time span: 1973-74

Type of relief: Food, medical supplies, transportation

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES NONE

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

ACVA

World Mercy Fund, Inc.
526 North Washington St.
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
USA

Founded: 1968

Primary goal: Medical assistance to West Africa

In Sahel since: 1968

In Africa since: 1968

Field representative: Nigeria

Source of funds: Private contributions, foundations, international and .
U.S. corporations, USAID

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Mali, Niger (northern Nigeria)

Amount budgeted: NA

Funds channelled: Directly

Time span: 1972-74

Type of relief: Food, medical supplies

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Mali, Niger

Amount budgeted: NA

Funds channelled: Directly, through local contacts, with CRS

Time span: 1968-indefinite

Type of projects or programs: Water resources, medical care

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES UNKNOWN

World ORT Federation
3, rue de Varembe
1211 Geneva 20
Switzerland

Founded: 1880

Primary goal: Rehabilitation through training.

In Sahel since: 1962

In Africa since: 1960

Field representative: None

Source of funds: USAID contracts(Sahel only) and World Bank contracts.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES NONE

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Niger, Mauritania, Mali, Chad

Amount budgeted: NA

Funds channelled: Directly from USAID through American ORT and from World Bank contracts.

Time span: 1962- ?

Type of projects or programs: Technical assistance for specific training programs, analysis of rural MCH programs.

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

ACVA, ICVA, FFH/AD

World Relief
PO Box 44, Davis Road
Valley Forge, Pennsylvania 19481
USA

Founded: 1944

Primary goal: Overseas relief agency for National Association of Evangelists.

In Sahel since: NA

In Africa since: NA

Field representative: None

Source of funds: Private contributions, churches

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta

Amount budgeted: \$126,438

Funds channelled: Through Sudan Interior Mission, Baptists, Christian and Missionary Alliance, Worldwide Evangelization Crusade.

Time span: 1973-74

Type of relief: Food and medical

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES NONE

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

ACVA

World University Service
5 Chemin des Iris
1216 Cointrin (Geneva)
Switzerland

Founded: 1920

Primary goal: Bring university students and staff together worldwide to work for economic and social development and justice.

In Sahel since: 1974?

In Africa since: NA

Field representative: None

Source of funds: NA

RELIEF ACTIVITIES NONE

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Senegal, Mali

Amount budgeted: NA

Funds chanelled: Directly and through governments

Time span: 1975-indefinite

Type of projects or programs: Rural animation, women's training

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

ICVA, FFH/AD

World Vision International - Africa
PO Box 30646
Nairobi
Kenya

Founded: 1975

Primary goal: Work through national evangelical churches.

In Sahel since: 1975

In Africa since: 1975

Field representative: None

Source of funds: Foundations, public appeals.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Upper Volta, Niger

Amount budgeted: \$300,000

Funds channelled: Through FEME

Time span: 1974-75

Type of relief: Food, blankets

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Upper Volta, Niger, Senegal, Mali, (Gambia)

Amount budgeted: \$800,000

Funds channelled: Through FEME and other local organizations

Time span: 1975-76

Type of projects or programs: Water resources, livestock, medical and community health programs

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

FFH/AD

Worldwide Evangelization Crusade
PO Box A
Fort Washington, Pennsylvania 19034
USA

Founded: 1913

Primary goal: Missionary service

In Sahel since: 1936

In Africa since: NA

Field representatives: Chad, Upper Volta, Senegal

Source of funds: World Relief Commission, TEAR-U.K., free will gifts (no solicitation)

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Countries: Chad, Upper Volta, Senegal

Amount budgeted: \$100,000

Funds channelled: Directly

Time span: 1973

Type of relief: Food, medical supplies

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Countries: Chad, Upper Volta, Senegal

Amount budgeted: NA

Funds channelled: Directly

Time span: NA

Type of projects or programs: Medical, agriculture, water resources

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

ACVA

YMCA- International Division
291 Broadway
New York, New York 10007
USA

Founded: 1855

Primary goal: Youth work in developing countries

In Sahel since: 1973

In Africa since: NA

Field representative: Senegal

Source of funds: National Council of YMCA's

RELIEF ACTIVITIES NONE

DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Country: Senegal

Amount budgeted: \$100,000

Funds channelled: Through government

Time span: 1974-84

Type of project: Rural youth development in agricultural management and training

PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES

ICVA