

AD-A081 440

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES OFFICE --ETC F/G 13/12  
EMERGENCY DISASTER PREPAREDNESS IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY: A MULTI--ETC(U)  
SEP 79


DCPA01-78-C-0234

NL

UNCLASSIFIED

1 OF 2  
AD  
A081 440





MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART  
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

LEVEL II

12  
SC

ADA 081 440

FINAL REPORT

EMERGENCY DISASTER PREPAREDNESS  
IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY:  
A MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL DILEMMA

Prepared For:  
Federal Emergency Management Agency  
Contract: DCPA01-78-C-0234  
Work Unit 2614 E  
September 30, 1979

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE: DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY PRACTICABLE.  
THE COPY FURNISHED TO DDC CONTAINED A  
SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT  
REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.

SDTIC  
ELECTE  
MAR 6 1980  
D

A

Office of Program Development  
College of Continuing Education and  
School of Public Administration  
University of Southern California

411 625 B

80 3 04 145

WWW FILE COPY

## **DISCLAIMER NOTICE**

**THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY PRACTICABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED TO DDC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.**

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) EMERGENCY DISASTER PREPAREDNESS IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY: A MULTIJURISDICTIONAL DILEMMA		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Final 6/78-9/79
7. AUTHOR(s) Director and Staff of the Office of Program Development		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Office of Program Development, College of Continuing Education and School of Public Administration - Univ. of So. California RAN-388 University Park, Los Angeles, CA 90007		9. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s) DCPA01-78-C-0234 <i>kw</i>
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, DC 20472		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS 2614 E
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		12. REPORT DATE September 30, 1979
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 165
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES *Under subcontract to the State of California, Office of Emergency Services		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Management and Planning System, Multijurisdictional Policy Making Structure, Creation of Policy for Planning Emergency Preparedness, Development of cluster of cities, addressing common policy.		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This study addresses developing a management and planning system for emergency preparedness in the multi-jurisdictional setting of Los Angeles County. The study focuses on the management level of participation in the planning process and the development of methodology for a test cluster of cities to address emergency preparedness. Study recommendations address developing appropriate mechanisms for countywide planning, creation of a policy making structure and development of a specific policy for emergency preparedness.		

DD FORM 1473 1 JAN 73 EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE

UNCLASSIFIED  
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

*411625*

9  
FINAL REPORT, Jan 78 - Sep 79.

6  
EMERGENCY DISASTER PREPAREDNESS  
IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY:  
A MULTIJURISDICTIONAL DILEMMA.

BY  
The Director and Staff of the  
Office of Program Development  
College of Continuing Education and  
School of Public Administration  
University of Southern California

FOR  
Federal Emergency Management Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20472

15  
CONTRACT: DCPA 01-78-C-0234  
Work Unit 2614 E

11  
30 Sept 1979

FEMA Review Notice

12 184

"This report has been reviewed in the Federal Emergency Management Agency and approved for publication. Approval does not signify that the contents necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Federal Emergency Management Agency."

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE: DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DDC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By _____	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or special
A	23 CP

411625

Y/B

Prototype Agreements for the Management and Planning  
of Emergency Disaster Preparedness in Los Angeles County

EMERGENCY DISASTER PREPAREDNESS

IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY:

A MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL DILEMMA

By

The Office of Program Development  
University of Southern California

Prepared Under Contract to the State of California Office of Emergency Services

1979

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report documents one-and-a-half years of work toward developing a management and planning system for emergency preparedness in the extremely complex jurisdictional setting of Los Angeles County.

This study focused on the management level, e.g., city managers, administrators and key County department heads, recognizing that these were the people who could realistically address the subject. By their direct participation, they were included in the planning process, thus reflecting their individual and unique needs.

The first part of the study focused on obtaining opinions and attitudes toward emergency preparedness in an attempt to synthesize these into an action plan. This was accomplished through the existing management organizations, e.g., the League of California Cities (Los Angeles Division), and the city manager associations within the County. These organizations were characterized as representative of the interests of their members, and as such any of their recommendations were more likely to be accepted and implemented.

The second stage of the research began the process of developing the methodology for a cluster of cities to address emergency preparedness. Joint Powers Agreements were suggested as an appropriate vehicle in that they took into account the need to build upon existing structures. This subsequently proved to be less understood than expected, resulting in an inability to use them effectively at this stage.

Although the Joint Powers vehicle was presented at a meeting of the city managers of the test "cluster," this proved to be unacceptable in that it failed to spell out precisely what the nature of the agreement was. The managers felt that they

needed to have a much clearer understanding of what was involved and how they could benefit from such an agreement.

### Recommendations

#### 1) An Obligation to Continue

The interest generated by this study, and the expectations that have been raised among those who have been involved, suggest strongly that this study should not be allowed to end at this point. Significant progress was made, but as was indicated at the last major meeting of the city managers of the test area, much more work needs to be done in developing appropriate mechanisms for county-wide planning for emergency preparedness. The acceptance of any JPA is contingent upon an understanding of the policy-making structure which is implied and the relationship of emergency planning to this structure.

#### 2) Creation of a Policy-Making Structure

Before any policy can be developed involving a number of jurisdictions, a policy-making structure needs to be created. It is strongly recommended that this be done with a strong conceptual framework, so that it can be understood and transferred to other settings. This would be a conceptual model of the policy-making process which would take into account the generic aspects of a multijurisdictional context.

#### 3) Development of a Policy for Emergency Preparedness

Once a policy-making structure has been created and accepted by the relevant entities, then the question of a specific policy can be addressed. This policy should again be cognizant of the individual concerns of the range of organizational entities involved and focus on how they can best integrate their interests while at the same time maintain crucial linkages to other jurisdictional areas.

FINAL REPORT

EMERGENCY DISASTER PREPAREDNESS  
IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY:  
A MULTIJURISDICTIONAL DILEMMA

BY

The Director and Staff of the  
Office of Program Development  
College of Continuing Education and  
School of Public Administration  
University of Southern California

FOR

Federal Emergency Management Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20472

CONTRACT: DCPA01-78-C-0234  
Work Unit 2614 E

September 30, 1979

FEMA Review Notice

"This report has been reviewed in the Federal Emergency Management Agency and approved for publication. Approval does not signify that the contents necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Federal Emergency Management Agency."

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE: DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

## SUMMARY

This report documents one-and-a-half years of work toward developing a management and planning system for emergency preparedness in the extremely complex jurisdictional setting of Los Angeles County. The study focused on the management level, e.g., city managers, administrators and key County department heads, recognizing that these were the people who could realistically address the subject. By their direct participation, they were included in the planning process, thus reflecting their individual and unique needs.

The first part of the study focused on obtaining opinions and attitudes toward emergency preparedness in an attempt to synthesize these into an action plan. This was accomplished through the existing management organizations, e.g., the League of California Cities (Los Angeles Division), and the city manager associations within the County. These organizations were characterized as representative of the interests of their members, and as such any of their recommendations were more likely to be accepted and implemented.

The second stage of the research began the process of developing the methodology for a cluster of cities to address emergency preparedness. Joint Powers Agreements were suggested as an appropriate vehicle in that they took into account the need to build upon existing structures. This subsequently proved to be less understood than expected, resulting in an inability to use them effectively at this stage.

Although the Joint Powers vehicle was presented at a meeting of the city managers of the test "cluster," this proved to be unacceptable in that it failed to spell out precisely what the nature of the agreement was. The managers felt that they needed to have a much clearer understanding of what was involved and how they could benefit from such an agreement.

### Recommendations

#### 1) An Obligation to Continue

The interest generated by this study, and the expectations that have been raised among those who have been involved, suggest strongly that this study should not be allowed to end at this point. Significant progress was made, much more work needs to be done in developing appropriate mechanisms for county-wide planning for emergency preparedness. The acceptance of any Joint Powers Agreement is contingent upon an understanding of the policy-making structure which is implied and the relationship of emergency planning to this structure.

## 2) Creation of a Policy-Making Structure

Before any policy can be developed involving a number of jurisdictions, a policy-making structure needs to be created. It is strongly recommended that this be done with a strong conceptual framework, so that it can be understood and transferred to other settings. This would be a conceptual model of the policy-making process which would take into account the generic aspects of a multijurisdictional context.

## 3) Development of a Policy for Emergency Preparedness

Once a policy-making structure has been created and accepted by the relevant entities, then the question of a specific policy can be addressed. This policy should again be cognizant of the individual concerns of the range of organizational entities involved and focus on how they can best integrate their interests while at the same time maintain crucial linkages to other jurisdictional areas.

Further details on these recommendations are contained in Chapter V.  
One concluding point: Any subsequent research on this topic must be conducted  
by--

- a) An organization not directly involved in the policy-making process.
- b) By professional researchers who understand the concepts involved  
in policy-making structures and processes.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Executive Summary . . . . .	1
Introduction . . . . .	1
Chapter I - History of Emergency Services Organization in Los Angeles County . . . . .	3
Chapter II - Los Angeles County: Impediments to Area Wide Organization.	8
Chapter III - Approaches to Area-Wide Cooperation: Methodology . . . . .	15
Chapter IV - Continuing Agenda: Toward an Agreement to Agree . . . . .	45
Chapter V - Recommendations for Future Directions . . . . .	73

Appendix

1	Municipal Liability for Earthquake Losses?
2	History of Emergency Services
3	Emergency Preparedness Study Report - 1976
4	League of California Cities Survey - 1976
5	Public Safety Committee Materials
6	USC Workshop - January 25, 1979
7	Organizational Models (Draft)
8	Los Angeles County Civil Defense Areas
9	Public Safety Sub-Committee, February 13, 1979
10	Public Safety Sub-Committee, February 28, 1979
11	County Contract Cities Program

## INTRODUCTION

This report focuses on the elected city officials and administrative officers and their concerns regarding organizational change with respect to emergency preparedness.

The methodology of the study was based upon a premise that such projects must secure active involvement of mayors, council members and city managers, secure the cooperation of as many of the organized interests within the County as possible, and that all of these actors must participate in the proposals so that the probability of their participation in the implementation phase is enhanced.

Our approach to problem-solving has been one of building upon existing and known structural forms where available rather than creating new organizations. Such an approach has particular meaning in view of the strong home-rule bias of most California public officials. The assistance of the League of California Cities has been central to the project in this respect. Recommendations from that organization formed the basis of the final report, and the endorsement by the League should assist in obtaining subsequent city support for any change. Absence of this support has been the cause of failure for past efforts at re-organization.

The charge of this project was "the production of a county-level, multijurisdictional management and planning emergency preparedness agreement for Los Angeles County, California." The assignment actually entailed an analysis of past attempts at County organization, since this has been the history of emergency preparedness in Los Angeles County for the past 20 years.

The approach to the project has been pragmatic. Will it work? Will the jurisdictions be willing to "sign off" on this final agreement?

Prior to presenting alternatives, the history of the Civil Defense Agency in Los Angeles County was reviewed and the impediments to change which have plagued past reform proposals examined.

These proposals are based on an action-research model. The "actors" in the area, city and county elected administrative personnel, outlined the problems, proposed their conditions for an acceptable solution, reviewed the proposed plans and will eventually decide whether it is what they perceive as needed. Staff facilitated the process, assembled the interested and involved persons, reviewed the options and provided the feedback mechanism.

A word is in order about the timing of the current study. The recent reorganization of national agencies involved with natural disasters into the new Federal Emergency Management Agency anticipates a growing emphasis in this area. There is a new realization that disaster mitigation is going to be the cornerstone of any new push in this area by the Federal Government and that this has implications for local zoning and building regulations. California's earthquake potential seems also to assure federal concentration in this region while, at the same time, warnings have been issued regarding potential liability on the part of governmental agencies for damage or injury which may result from their inaction to mitigate. (Appendix 1) Such signs portend a renewed interest by local units in the subject of civil defense organization and functions. Such interest may also have been responsible for the high degree of cooperation received by the investigators during the study.

Throughout this report, mention is made of the fact that the subject of civil defense has been a low priority on local government agendas. If the attention of the local officials has been gained and their involvement in the current task obtained, DCPA and OES will have the obligation of pursuing the proposals made and recommendations offered.

Chapter I - History of Emergency Services Organization in Los Angeles County

It is the purpose of this group to evaluate the problems of possible civil defense disasters that would not recognize boundaries of public jurisdictions. Ours is necessarily a partnership of local governments.

--Mayor Ernest Dixon, Inglewood;  
President, Los Angeles Division,  
League of California Cities (1950).

The story of the emergency services systems in Los Angeles County, according to a review of the available data from the regional office of OES (Appendix 2), has been a series of changes in makeup and services, interposed with periodic studies and proposals for further change. This has been partly due to varying public attitudes toward the problem (depending on the proximity of perceived danger) and the vicissitude of budgetary conditions. Despite Mayor Dixon's claim, however, the full partnership did not flower and, instead, a loose co-existence of different systems evolved and remains until today.

Closest to such a partnership was the Civil Defense Committee, a policy-formation body which existed in 1950 and consisted of the Mayor of the City of Los Angeles, Fletcher Bowron, the Chairman of the Los Angeles Board of Supervisors, William Smith, and Mayor Dixon, representing the League of Cities.

The operational arm of the Committee was the Los Angeles County and Cities Civil Defense Planning Board, composed of three members from each of the same jurisdictions represented on the Civil Defense Committee. It was specified by the framers of the plan that the new organization was "expected to tie in completely with individual city and county disaster organizations." (Emphasis added.)


Activities during the next decade revolved primarily around organizational plans of the State Office of Civil Defense, Los Angeles County, and the City of Los

Angeles.

In 1951, O.C.D. restructured the state into ten regions. Region 9 (Los Angeles and Orange Counties) was, in turn, divided into eight operational areas. As the OES report states, "The separate activities of the Los Angeles County and Cities Civil Defense Planning Board and the regional office of the State Office of Civil Defense started a continuing clarification process on the topic of operational authority and the definition of an operational area." An example of the problem was the fact that Los Angeles County had already established its 13 sheriff stations into civil defense units with a differing geographic alignment from that which was created by the state. Each of these 13 districts, in turn, established seven functional (or operational) subdivisions. As this report deals specifically with administrative recommendations, however, we will follow that path.

The next change in organization occurred in 1956 (see Exhibit A). This was primarily an accommodation to concerns regarding natural disasters, as well as civil defense. At this juncture, the Civil Defense Committee became the Civil Disaster Council with the same membership, and the Planning Board changed its name to the Los Angeles County and Cities Civil Defense and Disaster Planning Board.

In 1958, the first attempt was made to bring the cities of the area activity into the organizational structure. This was the result of a recommendation from the Chairman of the Disaster Planning Board, endorsed by the County's Chief Administrative Officer, that 14 cities in the San Gabriel and Pomona Valleys enter into a Joint Powers Agreement for inter-city coordination for the handling of major disasters. It was hoped that this pilot program would be the basis of similar groupings of cities throughout the County.



LOS ANGELES COUNTY  
CHANGES IN EMERGENCY PLANNING STRUCTURE  
EXHIBIT A

The next significant change in structure occurred in 1961, when the County adopted an ordinance which changed the Planning Board into the Los Angeles County and Cities Disaster and Civil Defense Commission. The separate policy-making body, the Civil Disaster Council, was dissolved at that time. The current formula continued (i.e., three appointees from the County, three from the City of Los Angeles, and three from the League of California Cities). For the first time since its inception eleven years earlier, the body was not chaired by an elected legislative officer or a chief administrative officer.

An attempt to return to the original two-level form of the earlier period was made in 1967 with the creation of a three-man Executive Committee, composed of one member from each of the appointing authorities. The purpose of the change was to provide a policy-making body which would operate between sessions of the Commission. The resurgence effort was formalized the following year by a recommendation of a study committee that "the Disaster Council be formed again" with the same membership as the original body and that the Commission be tied over into the office of the County C.A.O. The proposal was subsequently rejected by the Commission members. The independence of the Executive Committee was also restricted by changing it to an Advisory Committee status.

The major administrative changes during the next six years pertained to staffing for the Commission activities, as County budget cutbacks necessitated a reduction of full-time personnel.

In 1973, the Commission again considered a change in its makeup. This time, the aim was to strengthen its affiliation with the County Board of Supervisors by having all the members appointed by that body. The City of Los Angeles and the League of Cities would nominate three appointees, but the County representation was to be increased to five members "in order to achieve a closer identification and liaison with your Board."

No change was made. Instead, the current "Emergency Preparedness Commission for the County and Cities of Los Angeles" was created in 1974, retaining the tri-partite arrangement of three appointees each from the County, the City, and the League. Funding of the Commission continued to be provided solely by the County.

The Commission's duties and functions are given in Section 806 of Los Angeles County Ordinance 10,937:

FUNCTIONS. The Commission shall: (a) Consult with the County, cities and other public authorities and coordinate the development of emergency and disaster plans and programs which are Countywide or affect numerous jurisdictions. Support and promote emergency planning improvements, simplification, and standardization.

(b) Consider and recommend to the Board and the governing bodies of cities and other operating authorities within the County programs and policies deemed advisable or necessary to establish and maintain viable emergency and disaster preparedness programs within this County.

(c) Consider and recommend emergency and disaster preparedness programs and policies in this County to local non-governmental organizations and to appropriate State and Federal agencies and public and private organizations.

(d) Recommend that the proper authority promote training and education programs in all phases of emergency and disaster preparedness within the jurisdictions represented by the Commission or in conjunction with the State or Federal emergency or disaster agencies, or both.

Another attempt at reorganization occurred in 1975 when, at the instigation of DCPA, the Los Angeles Commission authorized a study of existing structures and alternatives. The aim of the research was to achieve a coordinated, county-wide emergency preparedness system. That effort is discussed in greater detail later in this document. The current study, therefore, represents the fourth attempt to achieve that system in the past ten years.

## Chapter II - Los Angeles County: Impediments to Area-Wide Organization

The current study was undertaken with a sense of foreboding, since numerous past attempts at area-wide organization in Los Angeles County have come "upon the rocks" of frustration and resignation. We have attempted, therefore, to begin the project with an analysis of the factors which have impeded or militated against such efforts.

Among these have been issues relating to area history, attitudes, political makeup and organizational groupings. Such groundwork is routine in most research, yet none of the previous efforts in this subject have approached the task from quite the same vantage point. This is not to suggest that only one approach is current but, rather, is offered as the stage-setting for the recommendations which follow.

### Attitudes Toward Disaster Preparedness Organization

Studies have been published on this subject; however, we shall deal with only those relating to the California scene and the Los Angeles area, in particular.

One attempt to relate a general study to California was in research conducted by Mars (1967). This work followed up on findings published the previous year by the Department of Urban Studies of the National League of Cities.<sup>1</sup>

Research was conducted by NLC through a sampling of opinion in eight small and moderate-sized metropolitan areas of the United States. Of interest were replies relating to whether these officials saw civil defense programs as a function of local or regional government and how they viewed their own civil defense programs.

---

<sup>1</sup>Lawrence A. Williams & Peter D. Veillette and Andrew S. Bullis, Intergovernmental Civil Defense Organization and Programs (Washington: National League of Cities, 1965).

In his study, Dr. Mars found that: "Two basic conclusions emerged from the study and could be summarized as home rule and professionalism. With respect to the first, the respondents were very enthusiastic about keeping civil defense organization at the governmental level to which they were at the time allocated; they reacted quite negatively to having county governments staff civil defense agencies in cities, more negatively to giving the power to core cities in metropolitan areas, and yet more negatively to giving the power to the National Guard. With respect to professionalism, they liked the idea of having a full-time paid professional director running local civil defense programs . . ."

In 1966, Mars replicated part of this earlier study for city officials in California with questionnaires being sent to mayors, city council members, city managers/administrators, civil defense directors, police chiefs and fire chiefs in all cities with civil defense programs.<sup>2</sup>

Of the 303 responses, "only one-fifth thought that the goals and objectives of this national civil defense program are clear, while two-fifths felt similarly about local civil defense objectives. Only one-quarter thought that relationships between the various governmental levels involved in civil defense are satisfactory . . ." (Emphasis added.)

Despite the latter finding, the study disclosed that "there is relatively wide favor found by the proposition that some attempt should be made--through creating special districts or authorities--to place civil defense on an area-wide footing."

---

<sup>2</sup>David Mars, Civil Defense Programs and Organization: Views of California Local Government Officials, CDTP Report No. 5 (USC), April 1967.

Many of the same attitudes were expressed by elected officials and city managers interviewed during the current study. Although some cities have significantly reduced the staffing of their emergency services operations, there still is opposition to turning the entire function over to the County or to the City of Los Angeles.

Reasons for this seeming inconsistency can be seen when examining the nature of the civil defense operations. Though planning and administrative duties may be those assigned to a civil defense professional, the operations, responsibilities during any emergency are those of the regular line departments of the city, such as police, fire and public works. City officials do not care to turn over these functions to another jurisdiction, even on a temporary basis.

In a recent study on "Public Official Attitude Toward Disaster Preparedness in California" SSC 79-05 prepared by the California Seismic Safety Commission, it was found that "when asked what changes they would like to make in their approach to disaster planning, many city manager and county administrative officers wanted to modify existing service to provide better general police and fire protection rather than strengthening disaster preparedness per se." In fact, "personnel in emergency service offices separate from police or fire departments do not occupy a position of prestige in the eyes of most local leaders but are seen as a help to the city or county for compliance with minimum legal requirements from outside preparedness assistance."

Thus it was found early in the current investigation that the low priority civil defense is assigned by most local elected officials can best be dealt with if considered within the context of normal departmental operations and needs. Furthermore, even area-wide cooperation proposals would have acceptance, if the proposed projects are held within specified limits.

Los Angeles County Geography and Constituencies

From the standpoint of research on potential area-wide cooperation attempts, Los Angeles County is more than a recitation of demographics. There are several "cuts" possible to the body politic--all different and all relevant.

Though there are 81 separate incorporated jurisdictions (cities) within the County, there are actually almost 600 political entities when these are grouped by: those under supervision and control of the Board of Supervisors (282), those with their own governing bodies (53), school districts (100), and a grouping of others including cities, special districts and water districts, for which the County collects taxes (165). (Statistical data shown on Exhibit B.)

Another "cut" at the County is through the existence of its 19 charter cities and 63 general law cities or the fact that there are 31 contract cities and 51 full-service communities. Or that there exist recognized clusters of governmental units which, though not official, tend to operate with a distinct array of area interests. These are the foothill cities of the northeastern part of the County, or the coastal cities, or the central County cities. In addition, there are cities that have other common concerns which reflect their attitudes toward regional structures, i.e., industrial communities, minority and low-income cities, flood-prone areas, hazardous industry cities, etc.

Los Angeles County has a complex series of interests, jurisdictions, boundaries and history. Studies attempting to categorize or classify its elements must be sensitive to all these aspects or face certainty of their subsequent opposition. Evidence of such opposition in recent years includes abortive efforts to adopt the 911 response system and to create regional data-processing organizations.



### Governmental Associations

There is an array of interrelated professional organizations in Los Angeles which can confuse the casual viewer of the scene. Every city is a member of the League of California Cities (Los Angeles division) and can partake in its deliberative process through membership on committees, holding offices, or voting on proposals. However, the same cities may also belong to the Independent Cities of Los Angeles County (ICLAC) or to the Contract Cities Association but may find these organizations on different sides of the same political issue.

City managers have regional vs. county-wide organizational involvement through their city membership in the League and their own participation in either the San Gabriel Valley City Managers' Association, the Southeast Los Angeles County City Managers' group, or the South Bay City Managers' Association.

All of the factors impinge upon attempts at governmental restructure and may be considered impediments insofar as they can thwart efforts at a unified approach to problems of the area.

### Perceived Problem Areas

The final "impediments" encountered in this study were the viewpoints expressed by local officials in interviews and at general meetings. Although some of the statements may lack validity, they are "believed to be true" and, therefore, they should be factors in any future planning.

First was the belief that there is an absence of a clearly defined role assigned to each level of government in planning or responding to a major area-wide emergency. Though the Emergency Preparedness Commission has city repre-

resentation by virtue of the three appointees named by the League of California Cities, there exists no vehicle for the direct participation by each city in the county and, conversely, cities do not have a clear notion of their area-wide responsibility.

Second, there is a call for stronger leadership in civil defense organizations and realization that this continued participation of elected officials and city managers is vital if any structure is to survive. Many officials now believe that these organizations have been "taken over by the civil defense community and run for its own needs."

Third, there is required greater representation from the diverse "area differences" within the county in any new organization. (NOTE: This is related to the earlier discussion of Los Angeles County Constituencies.)

Consideration had to be given to all these factors in the course of the investigation by USC staff. Each organizational proposal was checked against this list of potential objections. Past studies and recommendations were examined from the same perspective in order to maximize their chances of acceptance.

Having thus set up the "obstacle course," the staff approached the task of charting a path through it.

Chapter III - Approaches to Area-Wide Cooperation: Methodology

1976 Study

The most recent prior attempt to restructure the disaster preparedness organization (described in Chapter I) was undertaken in 1976 under the auspices of the Los Angeles County Disaster Preparedness Commission. That body proposed a study Task Force composed of two representatives from each of the constituent agencies (i.e., the County, Los Angeles City, and two representing the Los Angeles Division of the League of California Cities). Signing the document, however, when it was finally submitted were two County sheriff members, an emergency services coordinator (read "civil defense") from a major city, and a staff member from the State Office of Emergency Services. No representative from the City of Los Angeles participated in the project. (Appendix 3)

Of the 33 local officials contacted by the Task Force during their study, only four were administrative officers (two from contract cities which have most of their services provided by the County), and no interviews were shown to have been conducted with county legislators or city council members. Most of the contacts were made with "law enforcement officers, fire personnel, and civil defense area coordinators."

After discussion and review by the Disaster Preparedness Commission members, two proposals were submitted to the Los Angeles Division of the League of California Cities through its Executive Committee. A three-page letter and ballot were subsequently sent to all the cities in the County with the request that they indicate their preferred (one of two) model and return the ballot to the League office.

The League took no stand on either model but, interestingly, discussed Model 2 in some depth in the covering letter:

Model 2 contemplates maintaining the area offices such as presently established and anticipates that the personnel now in the system would continue to be utilized inasmuch as they have already met the federally-established civil service criteria. It is expected that these offices would be augmented and also have available specialized expertise from a central office. On the other hand, Model 1 contemplates that the sheriff station commanders working with assistant district coordinators would be responsible for coordinating planning within each district.


The process was further complicated by an explanation that the responses from the cities "would be forwarded to the Commission," reviewed together with responses from Los Angeles County and the City of Los Angeles, and then "the Commission will decide which of the two models to recommend for state and federal consideration." (Appendix 4)

This cumbersome and confusing path was obviously one of the reasons for the lack of response from the League member cities. As a result, no recommendation was forthcoming from this source and nothing further was heard regarding the 1976 study. (Exhibit C)


Analysis of this aborted effort discloses that it was doomed due to its failure to deal with the unique characteristics of Los Angeles County governmental agencies discussed in Chapter II. Specifically, there was no contact with the sub-regional interest groupings, legislative and administrative representation was lacking in the process, city vs. county fears were not dealt with, the major city in the partnership did not involve itself in the study and, most important, no communication linkages were established with the various agencies during the study process. As a result, there existed no support clientele for the final

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE STRATEGIES

1976 MODEL



CURRENT MODEL  
(PHASE 1)



product. Indeed, several critics of the process simply dismissed the effort as "another attempt by the county to take over local government functions."

Such a characterization--even if ill-founded--is based upon the existing suspicion of county motives and methods among many of the local officials. Where the subject matter was, further, somewhat technical in nature (insofar as it dealt with communications systems, DCPA funding classifications, etc.), there was foreseeable lack of understanding and interest by city administrators, whose concurrence was vital to any such proposal.

The report did accurately reflect the consensus of most of the "independent cities" but erred in not contending with these attitudes in the discussion/implementation phase of the project. For example:

Attitudes (of cities) vary from desiring full autonomy and direct operational control over all services, to desires for central direction and control at the county level.

The difference in attitudes depends upon whether the respondents were "independent" or "contract" cities and could have been predicted. If perceptions prevailed that the proposal "was an attempt at another county takeover," the resultant disinterest by the "independent" cities would foredoom any effort at reorganization. The report continued:

Although many eye the county government with some suspicion regarding intrusion into their daily (including planning) activities and would thoroughly resent being told by some county authority what to do, practically all agree that some form of central coordinating authority is necessary and acknowledge that county services and resources would be requested and utilized.

This analysis was an accurate exposition of the "home rule" concept prevalent among most city officials and was also the probable basis for their preference

for the status quo. There was, in other words, no better solution offered to them--one which would deal with their concern for the maintenance of local control.

It should be emphasized that the 1976 study was a thoughtful and accurate analysis of what existed and was lacking in the structure of county-wide disaster preparedness. The study team was well aware of the operational deficiencies and requirements needed to create a stronger organization. Their task was made difficult by turn-over of its membership and absence of Los Angeles City representation. A major handicap faced by the writers, however, was absence of a commitment by the agencies involved in the total process. Since they had no stake in its formation, they had limited interest in its outcome. There existed no interested constituency to push for its enactment and acceptance.

The previous studies all were important and helpful in that they kept state and federal disaster preparedness personnel aware of the problems in Los Angeles County operations and administration. Indeed, it is not clear that these researchers were even given the charge to implement their recommended changes. Therefore, they concentrated on the examination of needs rather than an analysis of obstacles which lay in the path of any proposed changes.

#### 1978 Study: Phase I

On June 13, 1978, an agreement was entered into between the State of California, Office of Emergency Services and the University of Southern California, School of Public Administration, for the production of "a county-level multijurisdictional management and planning agreement for Los Angeles County."

The contractor shall analyze the jurisdictional relationships involved in the highly populated metropolitan county with numerous incorporated entities from the standpoint of

intra-county disaster planning and coordinated emergency operations.

The analysis should be applied to: 1) Determine practical solutions to management and planning requirements to assure a coordinated emergency operations capability; and 2) To produce a prototype management and planning agreement, endorsed by the governing bodies or executives of all political sub-divisions of such a county--to be used as an example or prototype for similar multijurisdictional metropolitan counties in the United States.

In discussions between OES and USC staff, the following plan of action was proposed: "The program would commence with the appointment of an advisory board of staff members from the offices of county supervisors, city council persons, USC, and Contract and Independent Cities Associations.

A strategy was proposed to deal with both the analysis phase and the implementation effort to follow. The plan stated: "This (advisory) board would determine the phasing of the rest of the project and, applying an Action Research methodology, concurrently develop the prototype agreement and facilitate its introduction into the requisite political arenas. The program will consist of project development, plan implementation through site visits and group meetings. Development of the prototype plan would be the result of these meetings, with concurrence attempted by those (advisory) board members and consultants participating in the project."

Prior to the formation of the Advisory Board, the USC project coordinator requested a position paper from one of the faculty consultants isolating the issues and goals of the proposed project. These were to be the basis of consideration by the attendees at the first board meeting and would serve to focus upon central elements of the investigation.

For purposes of the proposed project, local jurisdictions may be viewed as comprised of two elements: A policy-making component and the setting of operational agencies which carry

out the programs mandated by the policy-making component. In times of natural disaster, it is the designated agency which responds, and it is the relationship among these agencies which emergency preparedness agreements are meant to prescribe.

But even this simple, two-fold model of the structure of the local jurisdiction points up the kinds of questions which need to be addressed:

- 1) What role do the agencies themselves have in the setting of such agreements?
- 2) To what extent are the policy makers who formulate such agreements aware of the capabilities of agencies whose future activities are being presented?
- 3) How is the policy or agreement implemented by the operational agency once adopted?
- 4) How are new agreements and policies communicated by the policy maker to the agency?
- 5) Are there differences in the nature of cross-jurisdictional relationships at the policy-making level and at the operational level?

In short, two goals of the proposed project are: 1) To determine the appropriate role of both the operational agency and the policy maker at the local level in the setting of emergency preparedness agreements, recognizing that these are two different worlds; and, 2) What types of agreements need to be struck to facilitate the development of the desired inter-jurisdictional relationships in times of an emergency situation.

Fourteen public officials were contacted and invited to serve on the Advisory Board. They consisted of two area legislative officers (or deputies), three administrative officers (or assistants), two county department heads, the city department head, three disaster preparedness personnel, three representatives of area legislators' associations, OES and USC staff members.

In retrospect, it can be seen that this group still represented only a small portion of the diverse interests discussed in Chapter II. For example, six of

the 14 members were from the county organization, one from the City of Los Angeles and representatives of three of the "big cities"--Burbank, Long Beach and Pasadena. This indicates the difficulty of creating any such committee in a diverse county situation (i.e., a representative body, with all areas included, would be an unwieldy vehicle with which to work).

Another facet of the problems encountered by the initial approach of the project team is indicated by perusal of the list of approximately 22 area public officials interviewed prior to the formation of the advisory group. Most of these were later invited to attend the first meeting, but there were also others who expressed "interest" in the project without committing themselves to devote time to future deliberations. Of greater significance, however, is the fact that several did so commit themselves even though they were among the most busy and heavily time-constrained officials in the region.

A misconception in the initial strategy was the belief that such individuals would/could place the subject of disaster preparedness organization higher on their personal list of priorities--despite findings in all the literature to the contrary. (See Chapter II.)

Another hindsight evaluation arose from review of several field interviews conducted by OES staff prior to formation of the board. Law enforcement, fire and emergency services representatives who had been involved in county-wide emergency planning operations were asked what was the "best method of gaining acceptance" for a reorganization plan. All agreed that the level most significant in any such deliberation was that of the "city manager or the association of city managers."

Despite this perception, only three of the group proposed for Advisory Committee membership were city managers or their assistants and none of the manager

associations were represented. "Start with city managers; they are the ones to sell the city council," one of those interviewed counselled. Another advised to get "commitment from the County Board of Supervisors, League of California Cities, associations representing cities. (Need) support and blessings of the above organizations."

In the light of these observances and findings, it is no surprise to report that the meeting of July 26, 1978, had only six persons in attendance (in addition to OES and USC staff), three of whom were from the county. The others were disaster service representatives. None of the city managers invited were able to attend "due to press of other city matters."

In his monthly report to DCPA, the project manager stated, "A quick telephone survey of local government representatives indicated that various crises came up, that last-minute work arrived which needed attention and, in one case, dual calendaring which caused confusion for one person, thus having him miss the meeting . . . the cause of the non-attendance by local government representatives was and is of much greater significance. The low priority of emergency preparedness seems to have been demonstrated as other issues came up which took precedence over this earlier commitment . . . the lack of priority and, therefore, importance of the study area to the more important people in this project is a concern." (Emphasis added.)

Significant, also, is the fact that the meeting was called in the post-Proposition 13 "anxiety period" when local government officials were more concerned with reductions in operation and organization than they were in new structures.

Phase II

Because of the difficulty in getting people together around the issues and focused on the project, OES and USC teams embarked upon an in-depth series of interviews with all those who were committed to attend the July 26 meeting. An additional list of people from whom to solicit data will also be developed.

It is believed that this second iteration of the Action Research process will yield more detailed data of the type needed to proceed with the project, involve all key decision makers originally scheduled, integrate additional governmental personnel into the projection of data and, by the nature of the interview process, development commitment on the part of those interested in seeing that the project is successful.


So stated the July report by the project manager and, toward this end, a new work flow sequence was devised. (Exhibit D)

In view of the considerable difficulty of obtaining consensus or agreement among the diverse "group actors" in Los Angeles County, any program has to be adaptable and responsive to changing realities if it is to succeed. Failure of the earlier efforts to effect changes in organization suggested the folly of pursuing the same methodology. Reaction to changing circumstances and conditions necessitated an immediate re-evaluation by the team members, correcting the course plans and probing other approaches, all the while proceeding with the project and maintaining momentum toward the desired goals. As will be reported later in this analysis, all these efforts had a "Hawthorne effect" upon the personnel and organizations involved in disaster services in Los Angeles County.


The "revised tactics" approach produced by the OES/USC team staff considerably expanded the interview/involvement effort. A list of 40 persons was proposed, with OES concentrating upon operations personnel together with key county and Los Angeles City elected officials.

CURRENT MODEL

(Phase 2)



(Phase 3)



The USC interview list (for the first time) approached the task of seeking contact and input from all of the identifiable groups and jurisdictions considered central to such a project effort. These included: the officers and staff of the League of California Cities, Los Angeles Division; the Independent Cities Association of Los Angeles County; the Contract Cities Association; the three city manager organizations in the county; the "major city" representatives; "special problem" community clusters, and local officials who had previous area responsibility in disaster services.

Persons interviewed by both groups were asked to respond to a basic interview format which assumed that a county-wide structure would include the county area and special districts under their control, Los Angeles City, the contract cities and independent cities. Questions specifically related to distribution of functions and responsibilities between each level of government.

It soon became apparent that the persons interviewed by USC were not prepared to deal with these questions since their knowledge regarding operational functions was limited and because of their reluctance to partake in such a process as "spokesman" or "representative" for their membership until further study ensued. Of greater importance to them was the process by which any proposals evolved and would be reviewed by their membership.

Framework for work process (in Phase II) as proposed to DCPA/OES provided for:

- A) Compilation of responses from the field interviews;
- B) Analysis of the data to determine whether further interviews were required;
- C) Field testing the choice of options among a random sampling;

- D) Meeting with the Advisory group (same membership) to select an option;
- E) Developing the prototype agreement; and,
- F) Obtaining the sign off from cities through cooperation of the area professional associations.

As interviews began, it became immediately evident that part of the inability of local elected and administrative personnel to react to the questions was a lack of understanding about the history and organization of disaster preparedness in the county. There existed a wide disparity among those interviewed with respect to their background information or involvement with these programs.

Contract city managers, for example, relied entirely upon the sheriff's services and had little interest in the project. Major cities had (with varying degrees) some DP organization in city hall; however, the city managers had little familiarity with its effectiveness. Reactions of others ranged from disinterest, due to other priorities, to a general despair over any hopes of "getting the whole CD picture ever straightened out."

USC interviews proceeded during the months of August through September

Discussions with officers of the designated associations resulted in requests that sub-committees of member cities be appointed to consider the problem. More important, the organizations sought ways of relating their own concerns within the current project.

At a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Independent Cities Association, for example, the president recommended that the work of their sub-committee, studying county mutual aid agreements to provide fire protection, be considered part of any new area organizational study. The Association argued that the legal

obligation to protect property could be jeopardized by an employee strike, thus constituting a "disaster situation" within their definition. Such recommendations were not in the form of "bargaining" but, rather, an honest desire to deal with the entire intergovernmental relationship issue.

At this point in the project, the opportunity presented itself to assess progress to date, analyze the problems arising in the data-gathering phase and, subsequently, propose another modification in tactics (Exhibit D). Since the interview process was not proving a viable indicator of decision-maker attitudes, it was decided to adopt a modified approach within the action-research format.

### Phase III

The new USC staff assigned to the study had no previous affiliation with the disaster preparedness service arena. Instead, their experience was with the political and organizational units of California. Thus, their approach to the project was different in concept.

Discussions with DCPA and OES staff indicated that all parties to the contract agreed (thus concurring in the findings of "operations" personnel interviewed) that:

- 1) Any proposal must have the active involvement and approval of the legislators and managers;
- 2) The process had to have active participation by as many of the organized interests of the county as possible; and
- 3) Any agreement consummated had to be created by these participants themselves--not from an "outside" state or federal level or from the disaster service "community."

Central to legislative activity by cities in the state are the activities of the League of California Cities. As previously described, this organization, with its committee structure, has evolved as the vehicle for deliberating and formulating programs affecting California cities. All cities belong to the League and provide input into its process primarily through the participation of their mayors, councilmen and city managers.

Though many Los Angeles County cities also belong to either the Independent Cities Association or the Contract Cities group for more limited purposes, the League serves as the umbrella for most policy-making purposes. Through its staff assistance and centralized services, the organization has been able to serve as source of legislative efforts in the county. It, therefore, became evident that cooperation of the League staff was vital in the progress of the current project.

Involvement of the League also related to the three "conditions" referred to above in that an agreement created by this procedure would entail city manager inputs and represent local government interests.

Following "backgrounder" meetings with the executive director of the League, USC staff met with the board of directors of the organizations to discuss the importance of the project and the necessity of their becoming part of the planning design. The board agreed and assigned that task to the Public Safety Committee, chaired by a major-city council member.

A by-product of the preliminary discussions with the League personnel was a renewed interest in the existing disaster service organizations. For example, League representation to the Los Angeles County Disaster Preparedness Commission (discussed in Chapter I) had fallen to low priority over the years. The renewed concern by staff resulted in the appointment of a councilman and two city managers

to that body for the first time in several years. Part of the reason was that the probable new emphasis by federal and state officials necessitated a readiness on the part of cities to react to forthcoming directives and proposals.

Similar renewal of interest was expressed by some of the city managers who were interviewed and admitted to their ignorance regarding their city's membership in the disaster area organization. Many of the managers (and council members) were new to their cities and had not become aware of the preparedness plans until the subject was brought to their attention. More will be discussed on this subject in Chapter IV.

The Public Safety Committee of the Los Angeles Division of the League of California Cities consists of 30 members. Twenty of these are mayors, councilmen, and city managers. The remainder are police and fire chiefs. There is a balanced representation from contract cities (five), all of the large cities in the County, and the different geographic regions. (Such a spread of area, population, and title is typical of all League committees and is one of the reasons for the organization's viability.)

During the period of the study, the chairman of the Public Safety Committee, a council member from Santa Monica, was unable to participate in the deliberations. His replacement was a council member from one of the slide-prone, foothill cities (identified in Chapter II discussion) who is a political science professor at the Long Beach College campus. The acting chairman also served as chair of the sub-committee appointed to work on the project. Thus, a degree of continuity was available through the League's participation.

Following several meetings with League personnel preparatory to the meeting of the full Public Safety Committee, assignments were made for contacts to en-

courage committee member attendance at a workshop/planning session slated for December 14, 1978, on the USC campus. Calls were divided among League and USC staff to impress upon the mayors, councilmembers and city managers, primarily, the importance of their participation in the program. The point was made that "any proposal emanating from the League had to represent the wishes of the legislative officers if it was to have a chance of general acceptance."

Because of the overlapping membership in the League and the other two city organizations, USC staff also followed up these meetings with officers of the Contract Cities and Independent Cities organizations, keeping them informed of the League plans and encouraging the bridging of their "interests" into the considerations of the Public Safety Committee. As a result of these follow-up meetings, representatives of both associations were invited to participate in the program of the December 14 meeting.

In addition, chairmen of each of the three city manager organizations in the county were appraised of the planning and urged to attend together with their councilmembers who served on the League committee.

Thus, the Public Safety Committee of the League was intended as the fulcrum of all the efforts to date and as the leverage to obtain input, support and commitment on any document which would be proposed. The important change in strategy was that now it was the city officials, themselves, who were creating the agreement form and scope. The resultant document was designed by them and when submitted to the membership would be a League document rather than one created "outside" the system.

The time frame of the DCPA/OES project grant created a degree of urgency and the reason for the December meeting. Reality, however, interceded. Holiday plans and closed city hall schedules made postponement of the meeting necessary.

With the concurrence of the committee chairman, a new meeting date was set for January 25, 1979.

In the interim, the committee was provided with its own background materials, supplied by USC staff. (See Appendix 5.) Purpose of the mailings were to maintain interest in the assignment, provide a history of disaster service organizations in the area for those unaware of these facts, and to suggest the type of services and mitigation efforts cities could use and find beneficial.

All the staff members preparing for the January meeting agreed to their respective roles and responsibilities in advance of the session. League concern was with the fact that the city officials must feel their time and efforts had meaning. This attitude was brought to the attention of the OES personnel who agreed to press for attendance of the regional director of DCPA and the state director of OES so that the importance of the project could be reaffirmed.

OES was concerned that this meeting not be a repetition of the earlier Advisory body meeting attempt (see page 21), with no participation of the legislators or administrators. USC, OES and League staff, therefore, undertook to call on each committee member or city managers or councilmembers to brief them and obtain an advance commitment, where possible.

USC staff emphasized the strategy being used to get city officials to "buy in" to any subsequent agreement, by having them create the parameters and expressing their concerns in advance of any program. This concept was understood by the participants in the planning before the session was held.

A "position paper" was prepared by the project coordinator, reviewed and contributed to by faculty team members, which presented the scope of the project, a summary of attitudes and perceptions which had surfaced in the almost 30 meetings and interviews conducted by USC, a discussion of some of the obstacles or impediments toward area-wide organization which had to be dealt with, and a testing of the major unresolved questions. A separate listing of area organization models was prepared but not included in the handout materials. Reason for this approach will be seen when the agenda for the meeting is reviewed. (See Appendix 6.)

Twenty-one committee members or their deputies attended the January 25, 1979, meeting held on the USC campus. These included four mayors or councilmen, (one deputy mayor), four city managers, eleven police and fire chiefs, and two civil defense directors. Also present were the regional director of DCPA, the state director of OES, consultants, staff and faculty members.

The agenda was planned by the staff so as to focus upon "action" to be taken by the end of the day. Specific conditions or limitations were sought so that the drafters of the proposals had their direction closely charted. This charge to the committee was emphasized by the chairman in his opening remarks.

This was followed by statements from DCPA and OES directors who described threats of cut-offs of federal funding unless the county was able "to get its act together" in a workable organization. These statements served to emphasize the importance and relevance of the committee's efforts.

Also on the agenda was time for a presentation of other research papers relating to problems faced by disaster planners due to negative public attitude. The reports provided a sense of perspective for the discussion.

The interest of the League of California Cities' Board of Directors in the work of the committee was expressed by one of the officers, while the concerns of the Disaster Preparedness Commission were offered by one of the commissioners. The Independent Cities' Sub-Committee work on mutual aid was explained by the chairman of that study group.

Following an exchange on these presentations, a faculty member of the USC team offered a mini-seminar on organizational alternatives available for county-wide organization. (See Appendix 7.) As a discussion-generator, he proposed that the most effective option would be that of a City-County Joint Power Agreement (#1), whereby the county would assume centralized authority for disaster services under Joint Power Agreements with all the other jurisdictions.

Prior to the naming of a sub-committee to work with staff in formulating a final draft for Public Safety Committee approval, the attendees offered those "conditions" they felt should govern any plan and expressed a preference for a mix of two of the organizational options presented.

The "conditions" expressed were: 1) That any proposal must build upon the strengths of existing systems rather than introducing new structures; 2) That the proposal encompass the traditional home rule concepts, while recognizing the existence of regional obligations; 3) That consideration must be given to the need for proper funding of any organizational design.

There was also consensus on a "mix" between two of the structural alternatives presented: 1) "Sub-County Regions which would divide the county into clusters of cities with common disaster interests (e.g., flood-prone cities, coastal cities, etc.), designation of a lead city within each cluster, county provides technical assistance, evaluations, etc.; and, 2) City-County Joint Powers

Agreements which would include Los Angeles and as many other cities in the County as can be persuaded to join. The JPA would set up a governing or coordinating body, specify the powers and relations it has to the jurisdictions, and specify a funding formula."

With these "directions" from the Public Safety Committee, the USC staff and faculty members met to formulate the framework of a proposal for the forthcoming sub-committee session.

The initial "condition" enunciated (e.g., "to build upon the strengths of existing systems") has significance in that it argued against creation of new organizational forms. It also proposed examination of structures which existed to see if: a) Improvements were needed; and b) Whether the same models could be adopted elsewhere in the County. Such a strategy would also be significant in avoiding the potential opposition which would be created by imposing any new governing body into the existing systems. The other requirements of home-rule consideration and funding are central to any discussion of local government structure.

#### A. Sub-County Regions

Further analysis of the meeting results suggested an approach which could accommodate the wishes of the city representatives. The second of the organizational alternatives accepted, relating to "Sub-County Regions," referred to clusters of cities with common disaster interests (e.g., flood-prone cities, coastal cities, etc.).

For almost 20 years, there have existed (on paper, at least) such "clusters of cities," designated by the State Office of Emergency Services as County Operational Areas. Seven in number, they correspond generally to geographic groupings of: coastal, foothill, central, County area, and City of Los Angeles.

(See Appendix 8.)

The history of these designated areas varies, depending on such factors as leadership, funding, political relations, personnel, etc. Nonetheless, the array of cities does have regional logic. There also is some correlation between the area groups and the city manager regional associations in at least three of the cases, which adds a positive dimension.

Area G, composed of 14 south coastal cities, for example, has been recognized by both DCPA and OES as one of the few effective disaster preparedness operations in the Los Angeles area. Most of these cities are inter-related in such organizations as the South Bay Mayors and Managers group and the South Bay City Managers' Association. An important element, too, is the existence in the area of a seven-city joint communication system, created several years ago.

Although "paper" organizations were created in the other areas, these have, for the most part, been relatively ineffective by all measures. Still, there is some degree of cooperation among several of the cities in each area, and attempts are underway in two areas to create multi-city communication networks. In other words, the skeleton of a potential structure still survives in all the remaining disaster service areas of the county.

Initial investigation and interviews substantiated this conclusion (further research is required) and provided the basis for one of the recommendations made to the Public Safety Sub-Committee (i.e., the utilization of the seven operational areas as the sub-county "cluster" regions. More regarding this proposal in the next chapter.)

B. Lead City Designation

In each of the operational areas, there exist several communities which, by virtue of their population size, location, staffing or facilities, could serve as the lead city for that area. Other factors relevant to such a selection could be: existence of a federally-funded Emergency Operations Center, recipient of planning and administration funds (P.& A.), commitment by council and city managers, headquarters city for a joint communication system, etc.

Obviously, a desire to assume this lead role is paramount to the plan's chances of success, but such possibilities do exist. The city manager of Downey, for example, indicated acceptance of such a role (if requested) and also fulfills the other criteria enumerated. Other city officials have also indicated willingness to take such a leadership role when the plan was informally discussed with USC staff. The selection of the lead city would, however, be determined by the area communities.

Area A, though dominated by the City of Los Angeles, which has its own, well-organized resources, is also grouped with five other widely dispersed cities. In this case, therefore, it might be feasible to assign some of the communities elsewhere or have them form another area, whichever the cities prefer.

The County of Los Angeles is the prime member of Area B, associated with three outlying cities. No problem seems to exist with this arrangement. There also appears to be no problem with the situation in Area F, into which the City of Long Beach and its two neighboring cities have been grouped. However, all areas should be studied as part of the JPA process and negotiated by the city members.

C. Joint Powers Agreements

Los Angeles County tried to organize its cities into disaster areas about 20 years ago and designed the legal framework for these organizations. One such

effort is documented for Area D, including a proposed Joint Powers Agreement which was never executed.

Though the reasons for that abortive attempt are not clear, much the same JPA was adopted by all the cities in Area G and a modified form of the agreement (adding sections relating to assessments against members) was adopted by Area E. Most city managers interviewed, however, had not reviewed these JPAs or were unaware of their existence when USC staff referred to the documents.

Examination of the agreements indicates that they are relevant but in need of up-dating and review by each city to make its provisions relevant to current conditions. All of the managers interviewed concurred with the necessity for such a review but felt that the basic document was still useful. Suggestions for revisions were presented to the League Sub-Committee by USC staff.

A more detailed discussion of the joint powers agreement is included in Chapter IV.

#### D. Governing or Coordinating Body

A final element of the recommended option was the creation of an area-wide governing body. Once again, the principle condition of "existing strength" dictated examination of current organizations to ascertain whether they served the desired area.

The formation and history of the Los Angeles County Emergency Preparedness Commission discussed in Chapter I evidences long and thoughtful efforts to deal with the subject of civilian defense by state, federal and regional officials. Staff did not engage in an in-depth analysis of the Commission except with regard to the opinions of the three entities which select its membership (i.e., Los Angeles County, Los Angeles City, and the Board of Directors of the League

of Cities, Los Angeles Division). All urged continuation of the current tri-partite arrangement, although there was no agreement concerning its future funding. For purposes of the current study, therefore, USC staff recommends that the Commission retain the coordinating body under a reorganization of its membership.

The four elements -- sub-county regions--lead cities, joint powers agreements and a coordinating body--constituted the framework of the proposal submitted to the Public Safety Sub-Committee at its February 13, 1979, meeting. (See Appendix 9.)

1) Area Disaster Boards

The existing Joint Powers Agreements require designation of "one representative from each participating agency" to be appointed to the Board by the governing body of that agency. In order to fulfill the requirement of continuity and participation of city managers, it was felt that this office should be assigned to that function. "Recommendation 1 - The agency representative from each participating agency shall be the city manager or assistant city manager of that city."

2) Membership of the County Emergency Preparedness Commission

In order to effect the same degree of commitment to this body, it was felt that legislative officers and city managers must also be represented. If the Commission was to assume county-wide responsibilities, it had to speak with the authority of these officers. "Recommendation 2 - That the current tri-partite representation on the Commission be continued. Each appointing authority shall name one elected officer (or a deputy), one administrative officer (or an assistant), and one

department head (or deputy) to that body."

3) Liaison with Area Disaster Organizations

In order to provide a communication and administrative linkage between all the areas and the Commission, a new committee is proposed. "Recommendation 3 - That an Area Advisory Committee be appointed by the Commission composed of the seven area coordinators (city managers or assistant city managers)." (See Exhibit E.)

4) Joint Powers Agreements with the Commission

The affiliation of the Area Boards and the Commission should be clarified through adoption of a formal agreement.


"Recommendation 4 - Joint Powers Agreements shall be executed between the seven Area Boards and the Emergency Preparedness Commission defining relationships, duties and funding."

At a meeting of the Sub-Committee on February 13, 1979, these proposals and recommendations were reviewed and recommended for adoption by the full Public Safety Committee. Due to the monthly schedule of meetings, the following calendar for routing of the proposal through the League of Cities organization was proposed by League staff:


Review by the Public Safety Committee	March 8, 1979
Review by the Executive Committee	April 5, 1979
Submission to the League Board of Directors or General Membership	April 19, 1979

The remaining steps required in the process are detailed in the next chapter.

CURRENT STRUCTURE



PROPOSED RESTRUCTURE



Where Are We Now?

Following interviews with 50 local government officials, meetings with the mayor/councilmen and city manager associations in the county, discussions with emergency services personnel (current and past) and review of documents relating to the history of disaster organizations since 1950, the complexity of organization in Los Angeles County is again realized. As stated earlier, Los Angeles County defies logical organization in some ways, but its defendants claim that "it still manages to work."

After a reading of the previous attempts at reorganization, it became clear to the current researchers that major emphasis had to be devoted to ascertain what the obstacles to change were and addressing these as part of the instigation for change. This was the prime factor in determining the course of the investigation.

A catalogue of the relevant "actors" within the county which had to be considered was also found necessary. All of these were brought into the process and must continue to be included if final concurrence is to be achieved.

Interviews substantiated that the involvement of city managers and their professional affiliations was critical, that most officials preferred utilization of existing structures to the threat of potential new organizations, and that the demands of home rule prevailed over all considerations.

The researchers also learned the lesson of adaptability and response to new conditions. When planned approaches failed, self-analysis suggested different routes to follow. Constant feedback, through field interviews, was used to keep that input central in all planning.

The most important lesson learned was that any proposals for emergency services reorganization in Los Angeles County has to emanate from the agencies

themselves if there is to be possibility of subsequent "sign off" by these bodies. Finally, by accepting the League of California Cities' resources in the process, such proposals gain credibility with and potential sponsorship by city members.

Work was carried out toward disseminating the recommendations of the League of California Cities. This effort was aimed at making sure that those people who had been involved in the evolution of the ideas were informed and recognized the value of their contributions; and also that people who had a future role in any aspect of the project be made aware of the contents and goals of the study. The need for keeping people informed was considered essential not only for the intrinsic value of the information but, more importantly, because the activity associated with conducting the research had generated considerable interest and expectations. There was a strong belief that something tangible might indeed occur.

Continued work enabled momentum built to continue and also moved the project toward achieving two of the original objectives:

- A) To outline a prototype plan which could be applied (with modifications) to other areas.
- B) To generate a document (agreement) which reflected the interests of the jurisdictions involved and which they would be willing to sign.

The initial effort spent a significant portion of the research time in assessing the climate of opinion surrounding emergency preparedness and the readiness and willingness for action plans. A clear understanding of the impediments to implementation of any suggestions for planning for emergency disaster preparedness, let alone management thereof, needed to be obtained. Accordingly, the research design to the problem was reoriented to take a more pragmatic, political

approach, taking into consideration the reluctance of the jurisdictional entities involved to violate any of the three "sacred" cornerstones of local government in Los Angeles County. These sacrosanct conditions surfaced and were articulated during the course of the original research. They represent crucial criteria for any action-based research implementation plans:

- A) That any proposal must build upon the strengths of existing systems rather than introducing new structures.
- B) That the proposal encompass the traditional home rule concepts, while recognizing the existence of regional obligations.
- C) That consideration must be given to the need for proper funding of any organizational design.

Chapter IV - Continuing Agenda: Toward an Agreement to Agree

League of California Cities Process

As indicated in the previous chapter, a calendar of meetings exists for the League of California membership to be informed of the recommendations of its Public Safety Committee. Conforming to conditions presented at the January 25, 1979, meetings, a proposal was submitted by USC staff which lists the steps toward "creation of the county-wide, multi-jurisdictional network for the planning and coordinating of emergency operations." Part of the process would be signing of Joint Powers Agreements required to validate the new organization.

The Sub-Committee recommendation was presented to the full Public Safety Committee at its March meeting (see Appendix 10) for review and approval. USC staff gave presentations at subsequent meetings to discuss the project in order to assure understanding by all cities in the County. The final step in the League process was the adoption of the recommendations by the Board of Directors at its April 5, 1979, session and by the membership at a general meeting, following which copies were sent to all cities in the division.


(Exhibit F)

Other Association Contacts

Concurrent with these meetings, USC staff met with the Independent Cities and the Contract Cities' Associations in order to bring them up to date on the progress of the League's deliberations and efforts were made to secure parallel approvals on the proposals from these groups.

The question of whether ICLAC's study on mutual aid agreements with the County referred to earlier should be incorporated into the present study should,

PROJECT TIME FRAME



CURRENT PROJECT

CONTINUING AGENDA ITEMS

JULY, 1978

SEPTEMBER

DECEMBER

JANUARY, 1979

FEBRUARY

MARCH

APRIL

JUNE

Exhibit F

therefore, be a matter of consideration by the Disaster Area Boards.

Particular attention must be paid to the three city manager associations of the area since their attitude and support for any such new program is vital at the initiation of the study. Though many city managers have been interviewed, association endorsements of the proposals also should be obtained. Meetings during the next two months will be important in order for the city managers to be acquainted with the purpose of the recommendations which will be sent by the League. Since most of the League correspondence comes to the manager for submission to the city council, the manager's support and understanding is needed. The manager's opinion also will be important to the city council when that body is asked to approve the Joint Powers Agreements for the area.

#### Los Angeles County

As one of the key partners in the system, the County of Los Angeles also must be kept apprised of the proposals. There are several possible approaches and all of them must be utilized in order to assure concurrence by the County.

The first step should be with the Chief Administrator's Office. A current study of the County's emergency services capability is under way by CAO staff. They have been contacted by USC and informed of study progress and plans. An offer was made to share findings so that the studies may be coordinated. Although County research is not dealing with its Emergency Preparedness Commission, comments regarding the League recommendations should be solicited. At meetings with the CAO at the beginning of this project, he indicated a desire to continue close relations with the cities in their deliberations.

Two of the County supervisors have expressed interest in the study and it is, therefore, necessary that their staff members be kept informed. Supervisors Hahn and Schabarum have had staff added to the Advisory Committee (see Chapter III) and thereby will be involved in the future.

Finally, the three County appointees to the Emergency Services Commission should be brought into the process. Two of these appointees are veterans of previous studies and would be important actors in plans for change.

#### Los Angeles City

The remaining partner in the present system is the City of Los Angeles. Here, also, it is vital that inputs and reactions be solicited from councilmembers who were invited to the initial sessions--Council members Stevenson and Picus or their representatives.

Mayor Bradley's office is represented on the Commission by an executive assistant who has attended the League meetings. Another point of contact within Los Angeles City should be the deputy mayor because of his familiarity with League programs and his knowledge of the emergency systems structure. The other two city Commission members have been kept informed by OES staff and should again be contacted for their reaction.

#### Other Area Agencies

The numerous other agencies in the County, such as boards of education, special districts, private associations, etc., are all involved in the system through their dependence upon the County or are currently affiliated through the committee network of the Emergency Preparedness Commission.

Los Angeles County Operational Area Structure

The State Office of Emergency Services had designated seven areas of Los Angeles County into Disaster Boards of Region 1 in the state organization. Although these "clusters" are logical arrays of area interest and geography and appear to have an organizational basis, they are generally "paper organizations" with questionable legal status. (Appendix 8)

Records disclose an attempt made by Los Angeles County from 1956 through 1961 to organize these areas through Joint Powers Agreements, but the only signed document in existence is that for the South Bay Region--Area G. An agreement was prepared for another group of cities (Area E), but no evidence is available that all the cities signed the document needed to make it operational. There is confusion regarding the current membership of the area, although several cities contribute to its funding. Inquiries by USC staff, in fact, resulted in many city managers reading the document for the first time. The area survey disclosed the following:

Area A: City of Los Angeles, Beverly Hills, Culver City, Hidden Hills, San Fernando and Santa Monica.

Apparently, no JPA was ever executed. Beverly Hills, Culver City and Santa Monica may wish to create their own area. The other communities would more logically remain with Los Angeles. Culver City or Santa Monica could serve as the lead city in a separate grouping, if it is feasible to organize one.

Area B: The County of Los Angeles, Cities of Avalon, Lancaster and Palmdale.

Since this is an integrated unit, there appears no reason to change this arrangement.

Area C: Alhambra, Arcadia, Burbank, Glendale, La Canada, Flintridge, Monterey Park, Pasadena, San Gabriel, San Marino, Sierra Madre, and South Pasadena.

These foothill and neighboring cities have no JPA.

There is a "mutual aid" agreement between the cities of Burbank and Glendale, dated July 20, 1950, of limited specificity. Four of the cities have funded emergency operation centers (Burbank, Glendale, Pasadena, South Pasadena), and two of these are also on P & A funding (Glendale and Pasadena). Either of the latter two cities could be the lead community for the area.

Pasadena is currently the lead city in an attempt to establish a four-city joint communication network (with Burbank, Glendale, and South Pasadena).

Area D: Azusa, Baldwin Park, Bradbury, Claremont, Covina, Duarte, El Monte, Glendora, Industry, Irwindale, La Puente, La Verne, Monrovia, Pomona, Rosemead, San Dimas, South El Monte, Temple City, Walnut, and West Covina.

The county attempted to bring these cities under a JPA in 1960. Cities with emergency operating centers are: Azusa, Claremont, Pomona and West Covina. Only Azusa

and West Covina are on P & A funding. The city manager of West Covina is a member of the Los Angeles County Consolidation Study Commission and interested in the creation of intra-county agreements. Since the city also has a new EOC, it would be a choice for the lead-city role.

Area E: Artesia, Bell, Bellflower, Bell Gardens, Carson, Cerritos, Commerce, Compton, Cudahy, Downey, Hawaiian Gardens, Huntington Park, Lakewood, La Mirada, Lynwood, Maywood, Montebello, Norwalk, Paramount, Pico Rivera, Santa Fe Springs, South Gate, Vernon and Whittier.

There appears some confusion as to whether a fully executed agreement exists. The JPA on file in one city shows only nine of the 17 cities having signed. This was the only document located which sets up an assessment table to fund the area's operations, an amount based upon the population of the contributing cities. Approximately half the total amount of the fund is presently contributed by the County. The schedule also sets up amounts for staff salaries and expenses.

The city manager of Downey is currently a member of the Emergency Preparedness Commission. His city also has taken the lead in an attempt to establish a multi-city communication network for Area E communities.

EOCs exist in Bell Gardens, Carson, Cerritos, Downey, Montebello and Norwalk. Carson and Downey are on P & A funding. Downey could serve as the lead city for the area.

Area F: Long Beach and Signal Hill.

Only Long Beach has a federally-funded EOC.

Area G: El Segundo, Gardena, Hawthorne, Hermosa Beach, Inglewood, Lawndale, Lomita, Manhattan Beach, Palos Verdes Estates, Rancho Palos Verdes, Redondo Beach, Rolling Hills, Rolling Hills Estates, and Torrance.

Area G has been described as the only effective operational unit among the large multi-city groupings in the County. All 12 cities have signed a JPA, much similar in form to the documents attempted in Area E and Area D.

Five cities have EOCs in operation: El Segundo, Hermosa Beach, Inglewood, Manhattan Beach, Redondo Beach, and Torrance. This area also has the seven-city joint communication system, under a joint power agreement established several years ago.

Greater attention should be directed to isolate the successful elements of this joint power agreement as a possible guide to other areas.

### Cooperative Agreements

A possible methodological approach to gaining formal cooperation among appropriate governmental organizations in the form of signed agreements was identified. This approach used the "building block" concept, with three "layers" being identified as essential to coping with the problem.

### Cluster-City Agreements

At the micro level, a prototype agreement (Exhibit G) to provide for inter-agency cooperation in civil defense and emergency conditions, using the joint powers law vehicle, was drafted. The applicability of this prototype to Disaster Areas C, D, E and G appeared to be straightforward, although modifications would need to be made for Areas A, B and F to take into consideration their unique politico-geographical configurations.

### Area Boards

A second "block" of the suggested approach focused on the need to provide a formal organization framework for the clusters of cities, i.e., areas, to exchange ideas and concerns. Although this might occur as a result of the city-cluster agreements, there was no apparent vehicle to enable this to take place on a regular and systematic basis. Agreements to create this formal mechanism were not addressed in the study.

### Inter-Area Cooperation: The Los Angeles Emergency Preparedness Commission

The third stage of the building block concept focuses on the macro-environmental concerns, and the need to cooperate at both a planning and implementation level. To facilitate this aspect, a proposal to utilize an already existing Commission was made.

PROTOTYPE AGREEMENT

TO PROVIDE FOR INTER-AGENCY COOPERATION

IN CIVIL DEFENSE AND EMERGENCY CONDITIONS

JOINT POWERS ACT

WHEREAS, there always exists the possibility of natural disaster such as earthquakes, fires, tornadoes, floods, epidemics and other physical manifestations which may affect the peace, comfort, health and security of large numbers of persons and extensive areas; and

WHEREAS, there has existed for some time past a state of world tension, as a result of which it has been necessary for the National and State governments of the United States of America to make provision for Civil Defense; and

WHEREAS, emphasis on preparations made for major natural and man-made emergencies short of war also provides the basis for preparations related to potential war-caused disasters; and

WHEREAS, in order to most effectively accomplish the purposes of such efforts, it is essential that planning at the local level is required; and

WHEREAS, wisdom dictates that preparation should be made before any of such events may occur, in order to minimize so far as possible the adverse affects of such events upon the areas and the public thereof affected; and

WHEREAS, the planning for such events can be most effective if the plans of all sections of the area are coordinated to produce an efficient operation and the elimination of duplication and confusion in time of necessity; and

WHEREAS, such coordination can only be secured by cooperative action through competent agencies prior to need; and

WHEREAS, the parties to this Agreement are all located within Area \_\_\_\_\_ of the Civil Defense Region No. 1 of the State of California, and therefore, have mutual interests and objectives to accomplish with reference to Civil Defense and Disaster Relief measures within said Area; and

WHEREAS, the powers to provide for the common defense; to prepare for defense against natural disaster; and the power to act in case of emergency or disaster, are all powers common to the parties signatory hereto; and

WHEREAS, that in order to economically and adequately exercise the powers hereinabove referred to, it is essential that skilled personnel, charged with the duty of coordinating mutual effort, should be provided in order to obtain maximum benefits. Such contemplated service is more feasibly obtained through joint action than by uncoordinated efforts by the respective agencies severally; and

WHEREAS, that in the opinion of the respective legislative bodies of the respective agencies signatory hereto, the arrangements and provisions provided by this Agreement will best serve the public peace, health, safety, comfort, convenience and general welfare of said respective agencies, and of the area generally; and

NOW THEREFORE,

In consideration of the foregoing premises and of the benefits which will be derived from a thoroughly coordinated plan of action in the event of necessity, the parties hereto do hereby mutually covenant and agree with each other, under the power and authority to do so, granted under the provisions of Chapter 5 of Division 7 of Title I (Section 6500 to 6513, both inclusive) of the Government Code of the State of California (hereinafter called the Joint Powers Law) as follows:

FIRST. That nothing contained in this Agreement shall be construed as releasing any agency signatory hereto from the responsibility or power to protect against the loss of life and property in their respective jurisdictions.

SECOND. That there shall be and there is hereby created the "AREA \_\_\_\_\_ CIVIL DEFENSE AND EMERGENCY SERVICES BOARD," consisting of the chief administrative officer or city manager from each participating agency who shall be appointed to the Board by the governing body of each agency, and who may be removed at any time by such governing body. Each agency may appoint an assistant administrator or assistant city manager who may act in the absence of the designated representative. The Board shall have the duty and responsibility of determining the personnel to be employed under this Agreement; the compensation of such personnel, the location of the Area Headquarters, all matters relating to finance, the overall supervision and direction of the personnel employed, and the determination of overall policy as it relates to Civil Defense and Emergency Services pertaining to "Area \_\_\_\_\_."

A majority of said Board shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business. The Board shall elect one of its own members as Chairman of the Board, who shall also be designated as Area Coordinator. The Board shall provide for the time and place of its own meetings and shall promulgate its own rules and conduct its own business according to Robert's Rules of Order. It shall cause to be kept a record of its proceedings and shall furnish a copy thereof to each of the parties hereto.

THIRD. That the "Area \_\_\_\_\_ Civil Defense and Emergency Preparedness Board" shall perform these primary duties; however, the Board may appoint an Area Executive Officer to perform any or all of these duties under its direction:

- Public information and public relations services, including speeches, press releases, letter and telephone inquiries, etc.;
- Selection and analysis of all data on public and private disasters and civil defense sources and facilities within the Area \_\_\_\_\_ that could be used in the event of an emergency;
- Services to the public schools in preparation of their disaster plans;
- General coordination of volunteer services through the participating agencies;
- Liaison of other Disaster Services offices and organizations;
- Advisory and coordinating services to the operational services; and
- All other duties and responsibilities which are necessary and convenient to carry out the planning and preparation of Civil Defense and Disaster Preparedness.

The Board shall have such powers as are necessary to perform the duties specified in this agreement and such powers are subject to the same restrictions upon the manner of exercising the powers as are the Charter Cities.

FOURTH. The respective parties hereto agree to pay their respective proportionate shares of the costs and expenses incident to the activities, operations, and services covered by this Agreement. Their respective proportionate shares shall be the average of their respective populations and assessed valuations bear to each other, as estimated by the Regional Planning Commission of Los Angeles County, California, and the Los Angeles County Assessor for January 1, of each year this Agreement is in effect.

FIFTH. That the budgets shall be prepared on an annual basis by the "Area \_\_\_\_\_ Civil Defense and Disaster Board" and shall be submitted to the respective parties hereto, on or before the first day of May each year so as to enable the legislative bodies of the respective parties hereto to examine same prior to the beginning of each fiscal year and take such action with reference thereto, as they may desire, on their respective parts.

SIXTH. Annually the Board shall designate a member city to receive and disburse, on order of the "Area \_\_\_\_\_ Civil Defense and Emergency Preparedness Board," all funds of the "Area \_\_\_\_\_ Civil Defense and Emergency Preparedness Board," with a complete accounting of all funds and expenditures to be furnished each member city at the close of each fiscal year.

SEVENTH. No funds may be expended or obligated by the "Area \_\_\_\_\_ Civil Defense and Emergency Preparedness Board" in excess of the total amount received from the participating agencies, plus such grants or gifts as the Board may receive from other sources.

EIGHTH. All encumbered "Area \_\_\_\_\_" funds in the hands of the designated city, pursuant to **the sixth section** above, on June 30 of any fiscal year shall be credited to the participating agencies in proportion to their payments to the fund unless otherwise directed by a vote of at least two-thirds of the members of the Board. Provided further, that in the event of the dissolution of the "Area \_\_\_\_\_ Civil Defense and Disaster Board," all unexpended funds and equipment shall be distributed to the participating agencies in proportion to their respective payments.

NINTH. That this Agreement shall take effect and be in full force as soon as such Agreement shall be duly executed by a majority of the parties hereto.

After this Agreement is in effect, additional jurisdictions may become a party to this Agreement by memorandum endorsement providing such jurisdictions assume their proportionate share of financial responsibility as defined in Section Four.

That the respective parties hereto shall have the right to withdraw from this Agreement at the end of any fiscal year by filing a written notice of intention to so withdraw from said Board on or before the first day of June of such year.

In the event of the withdrawal from this Agreement of one or more of the parties hereto, this Agreement shall continue and remain in full force and effect insofar as the remaining parties are concerned. The cost of the program provided for herein shall be borne by the remaining parties proportionately according to population and assessed valuation as hereinabove set forth.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF each party has caused its corporate name and seal to be hereunto subscribed and affixed by the proper officials thereof, both duly authorized, this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 19 \_\_\_\_.

This shall be followed by a listing of the cities in the Operational Area designation of Region I of the State Office of Emergency Services and the signatures of the Mayor and City Clerk of each city in the Area.

The Los Angeles Emergency Preparedness Commission is a creation of the Board of Supervisors. The study recommends the continuation of the current tripartite representation (three members from each of Los Angeles County, Los Angeles City, and the League of California Cities), but suggests that a more appropriate membership might be attained by having each participating group consist of:

- A) One elected official
- B) One administrative officer (or city manager)
- C) One department head

A second feature of the macro level of cooperation was the proposed creation of an Advisory Committee to the Commission. This would be composed of the coordinators from each of the seven areas in Los Angeles County.

A prototype agreement for the creation of an Emergency Preparedness Commission for the County and Cities of Los Angeles was drafted. (Exhibit H) This document departed from the original Board of Supervisors' generated Commission in two respects:

- 1) It formalized the Commission as an instrument of Los Angeles County and the Cities of Los Angeles rather than allowing the responsibility for this macro level of coordination to rest with Los Angeles County and its Board of Supervisors.
- 2) The role and creation of the Advisory Committee would be legally constituted, thus attempting to provide valuable inputs from each of the seven areas in a systematic manner.

The Commission shall elect a chairperson from among the three elected officials on that body and a vice-chairperson and secretary from the members thereof, each of whom shall serve for one (1) year, and thereafter until a successor is elected.

FOURTH. That the Commission shall: (a) Consult with the County, Area Boards, and other public authorities and coordinate the development of emergency and disaster plans and programs which are County-wide or affect numerous jurisdictions; Support and promote emergency planning improvements, simplification, and standardization; (b) Consider and recommend to the Board and the governing bodies of cities and other operating authorities within the County, programs and policies deemed advisable or necessary to establish and maintain viable emergency and disaster preparedness programs within this County; (c) Consider and recommend emergency and disaster preparedness programs in this County to local non-governmental organizations and to appropriate State and Federal agencies and public and private organizations; (d) Recommend that the proper authority promote training and education programs in all phases of emergency and disaster preparedness within the jurisdictions represented by the Commission or in conjunction with the State or Federal emergency or disaster agencies, or both.

FIFTH. That in the dispatch of its responsibilities, the Commission may conduct meetings, investigations, and hearings, and engage in such related activities as it deems necessary.

SIXTH. That members of the Commission will serve without compensation. The Commission may submit annually to the County Board of Supervisors recommendations as to Commission needs in terms of staff assistance and administrative services.

SEVENTH. There is hereby created an Advisory Committee of the Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Advisory Committee. The Advisory Committee shall consist of the coordinators of the seven (7) Operational Areas designated as Region 1 of the State Office of Emergency Services.

It shall be the duty of the Advisory Committee and it is hereby empowered, within such guidelines as may be established by the Commission, to study, resolve, and recommend on such matters as may be assigned by the Chairperson of the Commission.

EIGHTH. The Area Boards shall be members of the Emergency Preparedness Commission. They shall accept primary responsibility for the development within their areas of disaster plans which shall be compatible with and complimentary to the Area-wide civil defense and emergency planning and organization, formulated pursuant to this agreement and pursuant to the California Disaster and Civil Defense Master Mutual Aid Agreement.

The County shall provide Area-wide civil defense programs in the following areas: (to be enumerated.)

(A funding section may be here included, depending on the operational staffing requirements established by the signators.)

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto do affix their hands:

Unless the areas are created in a formal way, the Advisory Committee cannot be constituted. Therefore, if an Advisory Committee is to serve the function of providing input from the city-area perspective into the county-wide concerns, it must be linked in a formal, legitimate way to the cities and areas themselves.

Methodological Issues in the Selection of a "Test" Area  
For the Implementation Phase

In selecting an appropriate "test" area for implementing the cluster-city prototype agreement, four important criteria were:

1) The number of governmental agencies in the area

It was felt that the selected area should not be so large as to impede group interaction and the discussion of relevant issues.

2) The existence of a signed Joint Powers Agreement

If JPAs were already in existence, the concept and implementation of cooperation would already have been acknowledged. This hopefully could make another JPA easier to achieve.

3) The degree of participation in the area organization

The number of communities actively participating in an area organization was considered to be an indicator of the degree of willingness to think of disaster preparedness as an important issue. If such concerns were not evident, then the process of obtaining any commitment to an agreement would automatically be more difficult.

4) Level of involvement

As indicated in the report, unless an elected official or city manager was directly involved in the process, the probability of adoption of a JPA was considerably diminished. Thus, the history of the number of such people involved to date would act as an indicator of commitment.

Area C vs. Area G

The initial project work isolated Disaster Area G for special attention inso-  
much as these 14 cities in the southwest portion of Los Angeles County have  
had the longest record of cooperation and operation under a signed Joint  
Powers Agreement. It was, therefore, initially felt that Area G should be  
analyzed in order to ascertain its strengths and weaknesses, and that this  
data would thereafter benefit the other areas. Area C was ultimately selected  
for initiation of the implementation study since it represented a more bound-  
able geographic area.

Two other significant factors were influential in the selection of Area C:

1) This is the only area in the County which has never been formal-  
ized through the creation of a Joint Powers Agreement between the cities.

Several reasons have been offered for this lapse, but the consensus is that no  
leadership role has ever been assumed by any of the local officials.

2) The mayor of one of the cities (Sierra Madre) was chairman of the  
League of California Cities' Public Safety Committee and was thoroughly familiar  
with the background of the project, its rationale and recommendations.

A Profile of Area C

Disater Area C falls within the northcentral area of Los Angeles and includes  
the following eleven cities:

Alhambra  
Arcadia  
Burbank  
Glendale  
La Canada/Flintridge  
Monterey Park  
Pasadena  
San Gabriel  
San Marino  
Sierra Madre  
South Pasadena

Disaster Area C consists of 11 cities, including both independent (full service) and contract cities. This area includes, or adjoins, such county and federal agencies as the U. S. Forest Service, two county sheriff substations, and two county fire districts with which they must share emergency operations. This poses integration issues which need to be addressed. This area has undergone a range of disaster situations, from earthquakes to fires to floods.

In the initial report, reference was made to the existence of what are often known as "contract" cities. This term is peculiar to California and is intended to identify those cities which contract out for a significant number of services normally associated with a "full service" city. (See Appendix 11.)

Although all cities contract with the County for some services--ranging from tract mapping to weed abatement--only those which are of a vital nature (e.g., fire, health, police and public works) have implications for emergency preparedness.

The degree and type of contracted services appear to be the criteria upon which a city is designated "contract" or "full service." The focus of control at an operational level for essential or key services will change depending on the contracting agency and thus present pragmatic problems unless specifically addressed prior to any emergency situation.

#### League of California Cities' Sponsorship: A Procedural Necessity

One of the major findings of the initial report was the necessity to involve the appropriate organizations and people in any JPA process. The League of California Cities was identified as an important and legitimate organization recognized by all its members (California cities) as being a responsible representative for their interests and views.

The League had offered its sponsorship to the project and had cooperated in a meaningful way during the study. It had delegated to its Public Safety Committee the responsibility of making recommendations to the League Board concerning the proposals contained in the report. However, as of March, 1979, the final step, i.e., the formal adoption of the Public Safety Committee's report supporting the study's recommendations, had not been formally taken.

On April 5, 1979, the recommendations were approved by the League's Board of Directors, together with a statement urging its implementation through the efforts of the Office of Emergency Services. (Exhibit I)

Toward an Agreement: The Implementation Process for Area C

Ancillary Meetings and Preparation

As the early work emphasized, an important component of the research was securing the involvement of officials of Los Angeles County, the City of Los Angeles, and other major cities and "key actors." Work was devoted to "keeping the emergency pot boiling." The tendency to push emergency preparedness to the back burner unless an emergency occurred was a continual temptation, and the presentation of reports to relevant bodies and people at least partially prevented the back-burner syndrome.

1) Inter-Agency Task Force

Preparatory to the Area C meetings, several other issues had to be dealt with. A major obstacle to regional organization for dealing with disasters, according to city officials contacted, was the lack of geographical logic between the boundaries of the sheriffs' substations, the county fire districts, and the civil defense disaster areas in which they are designated to operate.

Exerpt From  
League of California Cities  
Board of Directors Meeting

April 5, 1979

League Staff Report

Martin Mayer, CJPJ Director, advised that the Los Angeles Division Public Safety Committee dealt with emergency preparedness services in Los Angeles County and made certain recommendations which they would like to bring before the Division; that he would, therefore, turn the mike over to James F. Bale, Chief of Police in Whittier, and current chairman of Los Angeles Regional Criminal Justice Planning Board.

Chief Bale advised that the Executive Committee was approached by USC to find out what cities thought about a plan in terms of developing a new emergency preparedness agreement among local jurisdictions - in November, the Public Safety Committee, with the help of Criminal Justice Unit staff, set up a 1-day workshop which was held in January; a sub-committee was formed to summarize the issues. Chief Bale further advised that the Public Safety Committee approved the recommendations of the sub-committee; that these were contained in the handout that is being distributed; and that it was the wish of the Committee that the Board approve this document so that they could move ahead in formulating an emergency preparedness plan. It was moved, seconded, and carried to approve the recommendations of the Public Safety Committee.

Exhibit I

In order to address the situation, a meeting was held with representatives of the agencies involved which resulted in the creation of an inter-agency task force seeking ways of re-aligning area boundaries to be more compatible with civil defense regions, and to facilitate disaster response during area-wide emergencies.

2) Communications: Progress Reports

Since the intent of the research was to eventually secure agreement between all cities in an area and the County to create a regional network for emergency preparedness, it was necessary that other area organizations be kept informed of the progress of the project.

- o A letter was therefore addressed to officials of the major cities, County staff, and others.

- o The City of Los Angeles was informed through members of the council involved with safety and intergovernmental relations.

- o The Office of the County Chief Administrative Officer was appraised of the developments through monthly meetings with their staff.

- o USC staff spoke at the San Gabriel City Manager's meeting and the Board of Directors of the Independent Cities Association. At each occasion the local officials were supportive of the study goals and methodology and expressed a desire to be kept informed until all areas were reviewed.

Emphasis was made on the importance of keeping the associations of elected officials aware of the process under way. Since they ultimately must make decisions relating to preparedness organization, it was vital that they be supportive of the OES project.

Attendance and presentations at the following meetings kept the project in sight:

- The League of California Cities
- The Independent Cities Association

- The Contract Cities Association of Los Angeles
- An article written for the Newsletter of the Independent Cities Association outlining the purposes of the study and implementation plans to reach a wide audience of County elected officials.

#### Meetings with Area C City Managers

The implementation plan for securing a prototype agreement was based on a two-step approach:

- 1) Individual meetings with city managers to culminate in
- 2) An area-wide city manager's meeting to discuss the prototype agreement and secure approval of its acceptance.

Although this was the basic approach, an intervening series of meetings became necessary to deal with an unanticipated turn of events involving Area D. The adjoining disaster area (Area D) was contemplating a study of its organizational structure with the aim of creating a possible new alignment of its membership. Since staff felt it important that the entire County be studied so as to ascertain the most logical groupings, all such studies had to be interrelated and coordinated with the project objectives. Following meetings with four of the Area D officials, they agreed to postpone their project until Area C study is concluded and its findings integrated into their efforts.

#### 1) Individual Meetings

An important ingredient to area cooperation emphasized in the first report was the commitment of the city managers if any change in organization was to be realized. The fact that they placed emergency preparedness a low priority for their attention resulted in poor attendance at meetings called by previous studies.

Meetings were held with each of the 11 city managers (sometimes accompanied by their police or fire chief) to review the recommendations of the

report, how they evolved, and to answer all questions or doubts regarding the efficacy of the project.

2) Area-Wide Manager's Meeting

Final steps prior to the Area C meeting consisted of conversations with the Pasadena city manager who had agreed to serve as the "lead city" representative and issue the meeting invitations to other city managers. He was briefed on the purpose of the sessions and activities of the Office of Emergency Services and USC in preparation for the meeting.

The "lead city" concept, described on Page 37, was proposed by the Public Safety Committee of the League of California Cities as a means of securing leadership in the project from among the city officials themselves, rather than casting that role to the Office of Emergency Services or USC. The intent was to thereby obtain a "buy-in" by the participants in the process.

The "Area C" meeting, held on September 5, 1979, represented a landmark occasion in that the area city managers were in attendance for an agenda relating specifically to disaster preparedness. The prime purpose of this gathering was to review with the officials the genesis of the project and the importance of an Area C agreement to the creation of a County-wide organization which the federal and state agencies would recognize as a viable entity for funding.

Subsequent steps included deliberations with city department heads and city council members, designation of the area boundaries and the cities to be included, specification of the Joint Powers Agreement elements which they desired, formulation of the area organization desired and, finally, signing of the agreement document. The September 5, 1979, meeting was an important step in that plan since city managers were central to the entire plan.

Minutes of the meeting (Exhibit J) disclose several areas of further study and revision of the planned sequence of events for that area.

A) Area C city managers revealed a reluctance to use the Joint Powers Agreement as an instrument of area-wide organization because it requires official action by the city council. This entails a prolonged and detailed "preparation" of the council at a time of suspicion of newly-created organizational structures.

B) The same concern was not evident with regard to the use of "mutual aid" agreements since many of these documents currently exist and, more importantly, they do not suggest a new bureaucracy.

C) The existence of two spheres of cooperation within the area seems to have surfaced during the interviews. Further attention is, therefore, required as to the feasibility of such a division of the region and the possibility of additional changes in the makeup of the neighboring disaster areas.

AREA C

CITY MANAGERS' MEETING

PASADENA CITY HALL

SEPTEMBER 5, 1979 - 2:00 P.M.

Attending: Don McIntyre, Pasadena; Lloyd deLlamas, Monterey Park; Lyle Alberg, Arcadia; Charles Martin, San Marino and South Pasadena; Clark Smithson, La Canada/Flintridge; Ken Carr, Alhambra; Jim McRea, Sierra Madre; Jim Rez (Asst. City Manager), Glendale; and George Nony (Asst. City Manager), Burbank. Not attending: Bob Clute, San Gabriel. (Clute had a conflicting meeting.)

Jim Haigwood, O.E.S.; Ken Klemm, O.E.S.; and Murray Brown, U.S.C.

Haigwood - Opened the meeting with a presentation regarding the project's aims and background of disaster preparedness in Los Angeles County. He then distributed the attached materials.

Brown - Discussed the reasons for renewed pressure for Area C organization and County-wide organization plan. These included: F.E.M.A., mitigation, liability areas, Proposition 13 economy pressures and internal organization values.

deLlamas - Raised the issue of possibly sharing radio frequencies by different area jurisdictions. Haigwood replied that this is not available under current set up. May be so in the future.

Smithson - Inquired whether other cities can join the new Burbank/Glendale/Pasadena plan. Answer - Too soon.

McIntyre - Do Areas D, E, and G get any federal funds? Answer - Yes.

Alberg - At what stage do you foresee the need for total County response? Aren't we doing that pretty much now--unofficially? Haigwood - Cannot get federal aid; however, unless an organization can be shown to exist which would be capable of dealing with such disasters.

Rez - Police and fire chiefs would agree that there is sufficient County-wide response now. Haigwood - Only with limited response capability, however.

Martin - Are you saying "Get an organization--or else?" Haigwood - No. We're trying to help you form the type of organization you feel you need to handle multi-city disasters.

deLlamas/Smithson - Maybe what we really need is funding for a survey of what currently exists between cities--through mutual aid agreements and then decide what gaps might exist so that we can discuss them. Haigwood - We can look into the funding potential and who can work with you on this.

Martin - Seem to remember that Monterey Park took the lead in getting mutual aid agreements with all the cities in the area--except Burbank and Glendale. Brown - We'll search it out and distribute to all.

AREA C

CITY MANAGERS' MEETING

McIntyre - Can we again see what action the League (Division) took regarding the report? Brown - We'll get copies out to all cities.

Brown - We will contact your offices to obtain mutual aid agreements, record these and get the information back to you. That would obtain the status information you requested. Also keep you informed of what other areas in the County are doing so that the decision can be made with more data.

Haigwood - Purpose of session was to get your input and tell you about O.E.S.'s desire to help in any way we can. Thanks for coming and we will keep you informed of later developments with F.E.M.A. and O.E.S.

Meeting adjourned at 3:20 p.m.

## Chapter V - Recommendations for Future Directions

### Responses and Reactions of Participants

Two issues surfaced during the meetings with city managers which need to be addressed in any future research:

#### 1) Emergency Area Boundaries

The existing boundaries for the areas, in particular Area C, since this was the focus of the beginning of the implementation phase, did not appear to be relevant for operational purposes. There seems to be two distinct segments of the area, each clustered around a different large city, one in the eastern portion and one in the western portion. If emergency preparedness is to be seen in a realistic light, this type of historical information needs to be reexamined in terms of current needs and constraints.

#### 2) Department Head Involvement

The need to involve department heads in the process is crucial. There is often a strong reliance by managers on these key people for the decisions regarding operational cooperation, and any opposition which may be encountered at a significant stage in an emergency situation should be overcome earlier by utilizing the skills and knowledge of department heads during the planning stages.

#### 3) Mutual Aid Agreements vs. Joint Powers Agreements

During the meetings, it became clear that there is some reluctance to establish any new organizational structures, in particular through the use of a Joint Powers Agreement. There was the feeling that such a vehicle tended to formalize the cooperative arrangements to a degree which was not altogether comfortable to all the participants. A second vehicle, the mutual aid agreement, was suggested as being able to achieve the same objectives, without the need to enter into totally new agreements. Further research on the advantages and disadvantages of an expanded mutual aid agreement vs. a joint powers agreement

needs to be done.

One advantage of the mutual aid agreement is that it fulfills the recommendation of the Public Safety Committee of the League of California Cities to "build upon the strengths of existing systems." Many of the cities appear to have existing mutual aid agreements and an expanded version of these might be more acceptable. At the meeting, the Area C cities were agreeable to further study of existing mutual aid agreements. This should be included in any further research.

#### Future Directions

While the research to date indicates the necessity to incorporate key concerns into any future research, other important aspects of the project need to be addressed prior to any further research efforts being undertaken. These are presented below in a general form but should be expanded upon prior to any formal contractual agreement to pursue additional activities in this area.

##### 1) An Obligation to Continue

Despite the reservations mentioned below about the methodological approach or recommendations emanating from either of the two stages of research documented in this report, it is clear from comments received by persons involved with the process to date that there is an implied obligation for the study to continue to some tangible conclusion. The Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Office of Emergency Services need to recognize this obligation to continue the project, at least until those who have been involved feel that their time has not been wasted. The dangers of not continuing the effort already embarked upon might result in resistance in any future efforts to address the issue of emergency preparedness. Many people have given time, effort and energy to the project and have a vested interest in seeing the project reach an acceptable conclusion. It is clear that Los Angeles County and its cities are in need of assistance in coming to some agreement on how to better cope with

disaster situations in an effective manner. To continue to leave this to a crisis-planning mode would be both irresponsible and potentially dangerous.

2) A Conceptual Framework

Although this study has highlighted some of the problems associated with working with a large, multijurisdictional area in an attempt to gain some formal cooperative agreements with regard to emergency preparedness, the lack of a well-defined conceptual framework and research design appear to have allowed some intuitive interpretations and conclusions to creep in. As indicated, the research was based on what is known as "action research," and as such was more concerned with identifying some of the problems and developing ways of working with existing arrangements, people, values, needs, etc., with the idea of causing as little disruption as possible, while at the same time working toward a more effective way of dealing with emergencies.

A major recommendation of this study is that a clearly articulated conceptualization of a framework for understanding and analyzing the complex array of organizations, political interfaces, and geographical aspects to the problem must be formulated. Although a "design" was identified in the study, the lack of a good conceptual framework has meant that the transferability of information to those involved in the process has been difficult and may have led to some misunderstandings and misinterpretations. For future applications, the presence of such a conceptualization would enable the elements of the framework to be transferred to other areas and researchers, providing a working model of the problems which need to be addressed prior to any attempts being made to work toward cooperation.

The conceptual framework seems to be most appropriately divided into two segments:

1. The development of an appropriate policy-making structure.
2. The use of the developed policy structure for planning emergency preparedness.

The action-research approach was used in part because it reflected the strengths of the researchers, rather than being designed to specifically build a conceptual model as the basis for action. The researchers took an inventory of the political entities which seems to have some interest in or influence on some or all aspects of emergency preparedness and attempted to ascertain their attitudes toward the subject and their ideas about how to deal with it. While all of this data provides invaluable inputs into an understanding of the variables, it was done in a vacuum--there was no express intent to design a policy-making vehicle.

In order for this to occur, it must be articulated to the major actors, and to incorporate their input in a systematic manner toward a stated objective. The two-part process would clarify what the intent was and the required inputs from the cities and others involved.

Understanding policy-making processes is not an easy task, and creating a new policy-making network of a formal nature is equally difficult. But that is the challenge which is presented by a multijurisdictional area such as Los Angeles County. It is not a task which should be undertaken lightly if it is to have any chance of success. It needs rigorous research design and follow through, with trained researchers who have both the ability to understand the nature of the task and the imagination to work through and with a diverse set of organizations and personalities.

It must be stressed that such a task should be assigned to professional researchers who are not part of the policy-making structure.

#### 1. Creation of a Policy-Making Structure/Model

Much of the intuitive design of the research was directed toward uncovering the basic elements involved in putting together an acceptable format for cities to agree to work cooperatively. In essence, it was an attempt to begin designing a policy-making system where one did not exist.

If this is explicitly identified, then the probability of succeeding might be greater. Although the literature on policy-making itself

often lacks conceptual or practical clarity, it is usually based on the notion that policy decisions take place in a defined, structural system, e.g., the legislature, a city council. Although any policies which might emerge from utilizing such a formal structure will be influenced by other formal and informal elements of the system, the steps through which a proposed policy must pass in order to become an accepted, legitimate formal policy can then be understood and known by the key actors concerned.

In the case of emergency preparedness in the County of Los Angeles, the formal policy-making machinery or vehicle is non-existent. This meant that much of this research was directed toward creating a mechanism by which policy could be made, be it a loosely-structured system such as that often associated with Joint Powers Agreements.

2. Development of a Policy for Planning for Emergency Preparedness

The second stage of the conceptualization would focus on the policy itself, given a structure designed in the first stage. Although the two aspects of creating a policy-making model and developing operational policy cannot be totally separated, for conceptual neatness, this should be done. If the two are confused, the participants cannot make informed decisions as to what they are attempting to accomplish and what they are participating in.

This confusion seemed to emanate from the September 5, 1979, meeting, where no conclusions could be reached because the people who were responsible for "signing off" on an agreement did not feel that they knew enough of what they were signing off on to engage in such a step.

The actual making of a working policy between a cluster of cities, which was the focus of the second stage of the research, needs considerably more effort than was allowed for in the original contract. Despite the absence of a policy-making machinery, the details of any policy dealing with multiple entities, personalities and phenomena involved in emergency situations call for extended discussions. This involves time--time to think, discuss,

digest, revise and implement. All the concerns of the cooperating entities need to be ironed out before any agreement can be entered into. If such a working policy is to be worth anything in operational terms, a long-term planning and implementation process needs to be embarked upon, addressing the specific needs of those communities relative to each type of disaster situation. This would necessitate some type of responsibility, perhaps vested in an individual hired by the cooperating entities, to plan and manage the emergency preparedness arena, and to keep the cities involved and informed so that when a situation arose where action was needed it would be forthcoming. Obviously, any details associated with this segment of a policy are tentative at this stage, but certainly some of the methodological approaches such as simulation exercises, training key personnel in Critical Path Techniques for optimizing time-lag, etc., would be important ingredients in any policy.

APPENDIX 1

WILL LOCAL GOVERNMENT BE LIABLE  
FOR EARTHQUAKE LOSSES?

Excerpt From  
What Cities and Counties Should Know  
About Earthquake Hazards and  
Local Government Liability

By Terry Margerum

January 1979


Association of  
Bay Area  
Governments

ABAG

## The Basic Question

Could a local government be held liable for injuries or losses in an earthquake which are caused (or made more likely) by its failure to eliminate a known hazard? For example, if people are injured when an old county hospital collapses in an earthquake, could the county be held liable if the injured parties proved the county knew that the old hospital would be unsafe in a foreseeable earthquake and did nothing to reduce the danger?

Not so long ago such questions were never asked. Earthquakes and their effects were considered "acts of God," and governments were protected by so-called "sovereign immunity," a legal doctrine inherited from the English Common Law. Things have changed, and it is now quite possible that a local government could be liable in the situation described above.



## Some Definitions

### Liability

Liability is simply responsibility for an action, event or procedure. If a city is "liable" for something, it can be sued if someone or something is hurt as a result of the mistake or other wrongful act. The official or city employee, or the city can be forced to pay damages if a court or jury agrees with a plaintiff.

Liability results from the commission of a tort or other action governed by civil or criminal law or contract. A "tort" is a legal term derived from the French word meaning "wrong". In the law, an action resulting in some kind of injury which is not governed by civil or criminal law or the terms of a contract is usually classified as a tort. Torts involve all forms of injury — physical, economic, emotional, intangible — and are usually the result of negligence.

Liability arises from several sources. The most familiar are common law, Federal and state constitutions, and statutory law. Common law is what has evolved by judicial precedent in the Anglo/American legal system. Most of the current concepts of tort liability, for example, are rooted in the common law. Constitutions guarantee basic individual rights, and public officials and private citizens bear a liability for any abrogation of these guarantees. Statutory law may spell out other forms of liability or elaborate on common law precedent.

Source: National League of Cities

### Injury


In this report, **injury** means physical injury or death. **Damages** refers to property damage, economic loss, etc.

### Earthquake Hazards

Earthquake hazards can be divided into three categories:

- 1 — **natural hazards** These include active faults, landslide areas, weak soils (e.g., bayfill). These situations become hazardous due to the uses to which the land is put.

## SAN ANDREAS FAULT



... situations become hazardous due to the uses to which the land is put."

Photo courtesy of Wallace C. S. Geographical Survey

- 2 — **structural hazards** These include buildings and other structures that have not been designed to withstand foreseeable earthquakes.
- 3 — **service hazards** These include emergency services such as fire protection, police, medical, and disaster planning personnel which are inadequate for dealing with expected or foreseeable disasters.

## Why Liability for Earthquake Hazards is a Potential Problem

Several factors make it possible that a local government would be held liable for injury or damages caused by its alleged failure to reduce earthquake hazards.

### Legal Facts of Life


- Liability claims are increasing in frequency and visibility, especially against government. A task force of *California's Commission on Government Reform* pointed out that of all the ways government has grown in recent years, none has been more rapid than its growth as a target for claims and lawsuits. Anxious plaintiffs rush to court at the slightest provocation. The *California Citizens' Commission on Tort Reform* found that the number of non-auto tort claims filed is growing 7-15 times as fast as the State's population. In Los Angeles County, for example, the number of claims filed against the County went from 1,853 in 1975 to 2,863 in 1977.
- In recent decades there has been a trend toward making government more liable and less immune. This is evident in both legislative and judicial decisions. Chart 1 chronicles this trend in California. Moreover, some recent court decisions seem more appropriate in a T. V. sit-com than a courtroom. Their consequences, however,
- Increasingly the courts are shifting private losses to the public by going for government's so-called "deep pocket" even where government's involvement in the injury was passive or minimal.

### The Disappearing "Act of God"

An increasing number of courts are holding governmental bodies financially responsible for damages suffered by private individuals in natural disasters. These decisions reflect a growing willingness of the courts to disregard the time-honored agreement that injuries resulting from natural disasters are unavoidable (and liability-free) "acts of God." This change in judicial attitude probably results from several technological changes which reduce the credibility of the "act of

God" defense. Thus, while the earthquake itself remains an act of God, its effects on people and structures are foreseeable — for several reasons:

- **we know how to build** Advances in structural engineering and construction techniques have made it possible to design new structures to be relatively earthquake-resistant, and to modify old buildings so that they don't pose serious hazards to life.
- **we know where not to build** Improved geological information often makes it possible to avoid hazardous areas, e.g., fault zones, landslide areas, poor soil conditions, etc.
- **earthquake prediction** Before the end of the century this developing science may provide practical warnings of impending quakes.



...We know where not to build."

Photo courtesy of Oakland Tribune

Chart 1

## Selected Major Judicial Decisions Affecting California Tort Doctrines, 1960-1977

- 1961 - Abrogation of the doctrine of **sovereign immunity**, i.e., the presumption that public entities could not be sued in tort.
- 1968 - Restriction of the **statutory immunity** of public entities against suits arising from their "discretionary" acts. The restriction provided immunity only for acts of a "planning" rather than an "operational" nature.
- 1970 - Further narrowing of the **statutory immunity** of public entities against suit. A specific case gave immunity for a decision to parole but **not** for a decision whether to **warn** prospective foster parents of a parolee's dangerous tendencies.
- 1971 - Extension of the **liability** of a local government to include hazards entirely contained on adjacent private property.
- 1972 - Further narrowing of the **statutory immunity** of public entities against suits for defective design of public facilities. Liability was imposed for **failure to redesign** in the event of **changed conditions**.
- 1975 - Further narrowing of the **statutory immunity** of public entities against suits arising out of a **licensing decision**.
- 1976 - **Redefinition of statutory immunity** of public entities against suit for **discretionary** actions. A state-employed psychiatrist's decision not to warn a third party of danger from his patient was found **not** to be covered by the immunity.

Source: National League of Cities.

## Public Awareness and Expectations

Both the media and the public are becoming more aware of government's role in reducing the consequences of natural disasters — and expecting government to fulfill that role responsibly. For example, in the 1978 mudslides in Southern California, people asked why the government had allowed developers to build and sell homes in such potentially hazardous areas, places with a clear history of landsliding. As Los Angeles County Supervisor Baxter Ward put it: "The residents of the county are appalled that permits are issued on hillside properties that are unsafe (in severe rainstorms). The public thinks, justifiably or not, that there is some implied guarantee that government knows what it is doing."

## Inherent Vulnerability of Local Governments

In addition to these trends, there is the constant fact that cities and counties are inherently vulnerable to liability because of the many services they provide. They adopt and enforce building codes, land use and zoning ordinances; they prepare disaster and emergency plans; they build and maintain numerous facilities of their own; and they are responsible for keeping public areas — parks, sidewalks, streets, etc. — free and clear of hazards. Local government can shrink neither these duties nor the potential liability which accompanies them.

## Purpose of this report

At the request of its member governments, ABAG spent most of 1978 examining local government's potential liability related to earthquake hazards. The purpose of the study and of this report are:

- 1 - To clarify the nature and extent of local government's potential liability;
- 2 - To advise local government how to cope with that liability;
- 3 - To recommend ways tort law could be changed to encourage local governments to reduce earthquake hazards without increasing their liability.

The study, which was financed by a National Science Foundation grant, was intended for use not only by California but by all earthquake-prone states.

The report is divided into the following major sections:

- I - How Tort Law Works
- II - How Tort Law Affects Local Government Decisions About Earthquake Hazards
- III - Potential Liability: What It Is and How to Minimize It
- IV - Making the Law Work Better

## APPENDIX 2

This historical look at Emergency Services Systems in Los Angeles County was compiled by reviewing all records available at the County of Los Angeles, the City of Los Angeles and, particularly, the files from the Emergency Preparedness Commission, and its preceding organizations--going back to the year 1950.

Emergency Operations Plans of the County and City going back to this era were also reviewed. Personal interviews were conducted with people who were active in Emergency Planning in the 50s and 60s. The majority of useful information has been found in old files.

This report will chronologically address major organizations and the evolution of the program within Los Angeles County.

In 1950, the Los Angeles Countywide policy-forming body was clearly the Civil Defense Committee, which was then composed of:

1. Fletcher Bowron, Mayor, City of Los Angeles
2. William A. Smith, Chairman, Board of Supervisors, Los Angeles County
3. Ernest S. Dixon, Mayor, City of Inglewood

This Civil Defense Committee convened in September of 1950, to elect a chairman and organize the Los Angeles County and Cities Civil Defense Planning Board. The minutes of the initial organization meeting indicate active League of California Cities participation. Mayor Dixon of Inglewood presided at this initial meeting and stated:

**Mayor Dixon:** "It is the purpose of this group to evaluate the problems of possible civil defense disasters that would not recognize boundaries of public jurisdictions. Ours is necessarily a partnership of local governments. The purpose of this meeting is to elect a chairman and to organize the Los Angeles County and Cities Civil Defense Planning Board, consisting of the following:

1. Three (3) members representing Los Angeles County
2. Three (3) members representing Los Angeles City
3. Three (3) city managers representing the other 44 cities of the County

It must be emphasized here that during the preliminary conferences leading up to the appointment of this Board that there has been achieved complete harmony and cooperation among the cities, and with the County. Be assured of the sincerity and desire to cooperate on the part of Los Angeles County, Los Angeles City and the cities represented through the President of the Los Angeles Division of the League of Cities."

Mayor Dixon then showed a chart of a tentative organization for Civil Defense. He noted that the legal staff has been eliminated from the present concept, though shown on the chart. He stated that the Civil Defense Committee had decided that the position of Executive Officer should be left vacant pending decisions by the new Board. He stated further that this organization is expected to tie in completely with individual city and county disaster organizations.

AD-A081 440

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES OFFICE --ETC F/G 13/12  
EMERGENCY DISASTER PREPAREDNESS IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY: A MULTI---ETC(U)  
SEP 79

DCPA01-78-C-0234


NL

UNCLASSIFIED

2 OF 2  
AD  
A081 440



END  
DATE  
FILMED  
4-80  
DDC



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART  
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

Mayor Dixon, in his temporary presiding capacity, then entertained nominations for Chairman of the Board. Dr. Uhl nominated City Manager McMillan of Pasadena. The nomination was seconded by City Manager Vickers. Fire Chief Alderson spoke to the point, suggesting that (1) The chairman should not be either from among the County representatives nor the Los Angeles City representatives; and that (2) Mr. McMillan's study of City-County Relations qualified him particularly for the chairmanship.

Don McMillan was elected Chairman of the Civil Defense Planning Board by a unanimous ballot. Chairman McMillan asked for the election of a secretary, and City Manager Petrie was named as Temporary Secretary.

The Civil Defense Committee later changed its name to the Civil Disaster Council and the basic organization shown in Attachment 1 remained in affect until 1961, when the County Ordinance 8094 created the Los Angeles County and Cities Disaster and Civil Defense Commission.

During the period of 1950 to 1961, certain key events influencing countywide planning occurred:

1950

The State Office of Civil Defense (originally six (6) Regions statewide) reorganized into ten (10) Regions in 1951. The Regional Director of the State Office of Civil Defense, Region 9 (composed of Los Angeles and Orange Counties) divided Region 9 into eight (8) Operational Areas. The Region had a Control Center and Communications Districts for operations. These Districts were then proposed as Regional Operational Areas and were drawn by the Regional Office of the State Civil Defense Organization (Attachment 2). The separate activities of the Los Angeles County and Cities Civil Defense Planning Board and the Regional Office of the State Office of Civil Defense started a continuing clarification process on the topic of operational authority and the definition of an Operational Area.

The then current organizational structures of Los Angeles County and City, shown in Attachments 2A and 2B, were established by Ordinance and a summary of their organizations is indicated below:

Los Angeles County Organization was established by Ordinance 5582 in 1950. Disaster Relief Services were divided into seven (7) functional groups:

1. Law and Communications
2. Fire
3. Public Works
4. Utilities and Transportation
5. Hospital Evacuation and Welfare
6. Welfare and First Aid
7. Property and Procurement, plus Legal Advisor (County Counsel)

For planning and organizing Civil Defense Units. 13 Geographic Districts were set up (13 Sheriff's Station Districts). Commander in each District was the Station Captain. Each District would establish seven (7) functional Subdivisions, similar to the County Functional Groups.

## 1951

Los Angeles City Organization was established by Ordinance 97600 in 1951 and was organized in six (6) functional Divisions:

1. Medical and Welfare
2. Police, including Reserves and Auxiliaries
3. Fire Protection
4. Communications
5. Transportation
6. In addition, two other Divisions: Administration & Supply and Planning & Training

## 1952-1957

In 1952, the State Disaster Office requested the Planning Board to create a Single Operational Area of Los Angeles County. Discussion of the seven (7) Geographic Areas and the County Operational Area Concept continued into the Sixties. The County Disaster and Civil Defense Authority stated in a letter to the Lakewood City Council that the County territory had been divided into seven (7) Mutual Aid Districts with the same boundaries as the State Regional Civil Defense Areas established in 1951. It would be appropriate at this time to consider the original Ordinance 5582, establishing the Los Angeles County Organization in 1950. In 1950, the Sheriffs' Stations were Coordinating Districts for County unincorporated areas.

In 1954, with the beginning of contracted city services being provided by the County, particularly Law Enforcement and Fire Protection, a new element of disaster authority and planning responsibility was added to the discussions on Operational Areas and the coordination of Civil Defense Planning and Operations.

In 1955, the State Civil Defense Agency divided the State into three (3) Regions with each Region divided into Sectors and further into Operational Areas. The boundaries of these Operational Areas were now to be determined by the local governing bodies with the State Office of Civil Defense acting in an advisory capacity. Region I at this time was 12 counties, as shown in Attachment 2C.

Many other topics were addressed in 1956, which were related to countywide planning, authority and role definition. In February, a report by the Chief Administrative Officer, Arthur J. Will, to the Board of Supervisors regarding the role of the County in Civil Defense, and the then County Program, is attached (Attachment 3). In May, a Committee for Coordination and Civil Defense Planning and Operations submitted a Progress Report to the Los Angeles County and Cities Civil Defense Planning Board (Attachment 4). This report recommended essentially that the County Board of Supervisors be informed that the Planning Board would make a study concerning improved coordination of Civil Defense Planning and operations, and also, address the then current Operational Area Structure within the County to achieve both a consolidation of existing areas and closer coordination of jurisdictional activities.

Also in 1956, the Planning Board changed to the "Los Angeles County and Cities Civil Defense and Disaster Planning Board." The Civil Defense Committee then became the Civil Disaster Council with the same three (3) members and the rules and regulations concerning both the Council and the Planning Board are shown in Attachment 5.

There was a movement to establish a legislated Southern California Disaster Authority, separate from any existing organizations. This movement seems to have terminated in 1957, with failure of draft legislation (Assembly Bill 3161) which would create Mutual Aid and Disaster Authority for two (2) or more counties, including municipalities and special districts. The Operational Planning Memo and Letter to Mr. Howard Earl (Attachments 6 and 7) give some reference to this movement to widen the Operational Area Concept to include more than one county. Separate work on the Countywide Operational Structure was also addressed and continued to be addressed for the next decade.

The need for the integration of Civil Defense Planning and Operations countywide was again addressed by the Los Angeles County and Cities Civil Defense Planning Board. The Operational Planning Committee of the Board produced a report in 1956 (Attachment 7A) addressing the subject of a Single Disaster Operational Area for the territory of Los Angeles County.

#### 1958-1961

1. Excerpts from the California Legislature Assembly Interim Committee on Conservation, Planning and Public Works Report in the Fall of 1958, indicated the California Disaster Office with Headquarters in Sacramento, had Regional Offices in Los Angeles, Walnut Creek and Chico. Branch offices were located in Escondido, Salinas, Eureka, Redding and Fresno. The Disaster Office was an arm of the Governor's Office with a budget of \$1,100,000, and a staff of 114 political appointees.
2. Region I of the California Disaster Office requested the Planning Board to study and report on "Development of the Civil Defense Organization having the capability to effectively coordinate and support Disaster Operations within the geographic confines of Los Angeles County."
3. In January of 1958, six (6) recommendations for improving Civil Defense Coordination were submitted to the County Board of Supervisors (See Attachment 8). At almost the same time, a report to the Board of Supervisors on Civil Defense was submitted by the County Chief Administrative Officer (Attachment 8A).
4. A Pilot Program with the County of Los Angeles participating with 14 cities in the San Gabriel and Pomona Valleys in a Joint Powers Agreement was initiated. This was essentially a plan for interagency cooperation in major disasters short of war, based on Master Mutual Aid and Joint Powers Agreements. This Pilot Program was the beginning of the present day Civil Defense Areas. A copy of this Joint Powers Agreement is attached (Attachment 9).
5. In 1959, there was a continuing pressure from the State to set up a Countywide Operational Area with a centralized headquarters. Also, in 1959, a draft of the "Los Angeles County and Cities Plan for a Civil Defense Emergency" was prepared (Attachment 10). An explanation paper of the Plan provided to the State Disaster Office by the Chairman, Don McMillan (See Attachment 11), provided insight into the relationship between the then Planning Board and the State Disaster Office. The role of the Area Coordinator of Area "G" is also set out in Attachment 12.

6. In 1961, the Los Angeles County and Cities Civil Defense and Disaster Planning Board was changed to the "Los Angeles County and Cities Disaster and Civil Defense Commission." The Commission had a staff of four (4) professionals plus clerical support. Don C. McMillan, Chairman of the Planning Board from its inception in 1950, was replaced by Peter J. Pitchess, Sheriff of Los Angeles County, who was elected as Chairman of the newly formed Commission. In County Ordinance 8094 (Attachment 13), the duties of the new Commission were spelled out. It is important to note that the Civil Disaster Council, which had been the recognized policy-making body Countywide was now dissolved and became three (3) separate appointing authorities of the Commission.

#### 1962-1972

1. In 1962, the County then had 73 cities and the unincorporated territory, compared to 56 cities in 1957 and 44 cities in 1950. The Commission Staff was providing Planning Assistance to cities and the State Disaster Office was requested to recognize the Commission's role in Jurisdiction Plan Routing.
  2. In 1963, Don McMillan returned as Chairman of the Los Angeles County and Cities Disaster and Civil Defense Commission. Also in 1963, the Special Study Committee of the Commission had been redesignated the Plans and Programs Committee, and a Countywide Operations Plan began to be developed.
  3. In 1964, Mayor Harper was the Chairman of the Commission and the "Los Angeles County and Cities Disaster Relief Manual" began to develop. There had also been a shift to Natural Disaster Planning over the past few years, for which the Alaskan Earthquake, flooding in California, repeated brush fires and the Baldwin Hills Dam Disaster can be assumed to have provided the incentive.
  4. In 1965, William H. Parker was Chairman of the Commission. Los Angeles County Ordinance 8793 established the Los Angeles County Operational Area (Attachment 14), and the Disaster Relief Manual was completed and distributed.
  5. In 1966, Roy Hoover was Chairman of the Commission.
  6. In 1967, Joe Quinn was Chairman of the Commission. The Commission formed an internal 3-man Executive Committee, composed of one (1) member from each of the officially set authorities appointed by the Chairman of the Commission. The primary duties of the Executive Committee were to:
    - a. Serve as the Official Representative of the Commission for day-to-day administration of Commission activities, including supervision of Commission Staff and Commission Committees.
    - b. Be directly responsible to the Commission Chairman when policy decisions must be made between Commission Meetings.
- In December of 1967, the Commission had requested the Plans and Programs Committee to review and report on Countywide Civil Defense and Disaster Preparedness, structure, functions and activities.

**7. Don McMillan was asked to head a Special Review Subcommittee to:**

- a. Review the documented purposes and objectives of the Commission and the Civil Defense Areas of the County, the organization and staffing requirements, and determine if improvements can be made in efficiency and effectiveness, with emphasis on the Commission Staff and its activities as to whether they might overlap, duplicate, complement or fail to complement the Area Offices; and then
- b. Try to determine the desired level of Countywide activities to accomplish the goals and objectives for which the Commission was established.

The Study, completed in mid-1968, recommended among other things that the Disaster Council be formed again to include the Chairman of the Board of Supervisors, the Mayor of the City of Los Angeles, and the President of the Los Angeles County Division of the League of California Cities. It was recommended that the Los Angeles County and Cities Disaster and Civil Defense Commission be retained and tied over into the County Chief Administrative Office.

In 1968, E. Frederick Bien was Chairman of the Commission.

The Study also recommended updating the County Ordinance so that:

- a. The County Government Civil Defense and Disaster Services staff be enlarged sufficiently to provide secretariat to the Commission and to accept and perform the Countywide planning and other activities, now assigned to the Commission Staff.
- b. Where possible, either at the Civil Defense Area or County Government level, professional and clerical personnel of the Commission Staff be absorbed to avoid loss of their training, knowledge and skills.

An Organization Chart and explanatory material relating to the above recommendation are shown in Attachment 15.

Also in 1968, another subcommittee of the Commission had been tasked with proposing a Countywide Structure for the Operational Area Organization, including the coordination with local jurisdictions and a Basic Operational Plan. The Operational Area Subcommittee Report (Attachment 16) and a further study of the coordination system between the Sheriff as Operational Area Director and the incorporated cities (Attachment 16A) were also completed in 1968. The interim Countywide Emergency Operations Plan for war-caused emergencies was approved. The Executive Committee, as formed in 1967, was reconstituted as an Advisory Committee.

8. In 1969, Commission Chairman was Undersheriff William McCloud. The recommendation to reform the Disaster Council in 1968 was rejected by the Commission's vote in August. The Commission Staff was transferred to County Government under the County Administrative Officer.

9. In 1970, Inspector John H. Kinsling was the Commission Chairman. The subcommittees of the Plans and Programs Committee continued to study the role of the Civil Defense Areas and the Countywide Emergency Organization. The California Emergency Services Act of 1970 required Countywide Operational Areas as communications and coordination links in times of war emergency.
10. In 1971, the Commission Chairman was Councilman James W. Matkins. He was retained as Chairman in 1972 also, to provide continuity to the Commission's projects. The Commission Staff from the Disaster Services Section of the County Administrator's office was reduced.
11. In 1972, the County Ordinance was revised, creating the present-day Los Angeles County Operational Area Organization, the County Disaster Council and the County Disaster Services Office (Attachment 17). Included in the attached Commission Minutes of February, 1972 (Attachment 18), are the review and discussions pertaining to the revision of this Ordinance, the proposed staff to support, the continuing discussion of Countywide Coordination, and the area roles.

#### 1973-1978

1. The Commission Chairman was Evar Peterson for the consecutive years of 1973, 1974 and 1975. Clarification of the role and functions of the Commission was addressed and also amending the Commission Ordinance portion of County Ordinance 8094. A Review Committee was established with the Commission Chairman as one of the three (3) members to study:
  - a. Modernization of County Ordinance 8094
  - b. Revamping Committee Membership
  - c. Restoration of full-time Commission Staff.
2. A summary of the proposed changes is contained in letters to the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County from the Chairman of the Commission (Attachments 19 and 19A). These changes were revised, based on recommendations by the County Administrative Officer to the County Board of Supervisors (Attachment 19B), resulting in the current County Ordinance 4099.

County Ordinance No. 4099, August of 1974, created the current "Emergency Preparedness Commission for the Counties and Cities of Los Angeles" with nine (9) members: three (3) to be appointed by the County Board of Supervisors, three (3) by the Mayor of the City of Los Angeles, and three (3) by the Los Angeles County Division of the League of California Cities. The updated Ordinance is attached (Attachment 20).
3. In 1975, a study of Emergency Preparedness Programs (countywide) was again initiated. A Study Task Force was organized and a report was made to the Commission's Study Committee on May 5, 1976 (Attachment 21). No agreement was reached on any proposed organizational models. The Operational Area Plan was also revised in 1975.
4. In 1976, the Commission Chairman was Sidney S. Barth.

5. In 1977, Stanley E. Barlow was the Commission Chairman.
6. In 1978, the Commission Chairman was Evar P. Peterson, who retired on June 23, 1978, and was replaced by T. H. Von Minden. In 1978, a Federally-funded Contract was given to the State of California, Office of Emergency Services, to determine practical solutions to management and planning requirements, assuring a coordinated Emergency Operations capability and to provide a County-level Multijurisdictional Management and Planning Agreement.

In 1977, the County Ordinance was revised, creating the present-day Los Angeles County Operational Area Organization, the County Disaster Council and the County Disaster Services Office (Attachment 17). Included in the attached Commission Minutes of January, 1977 (Attachment 18), are the review and discussions pertaining to the revision of this Ordinance, the proposed staff to support the continuing disaster preparedness, coordination, and the area rules.

1977-1978

The Commission Chairman was Evar Peterson for the consecutive years of 1977, 1978 and 1979. Evaluation of the role and functions of the Commission was addressed and also included the Commission Ordinance revision of County Ordinance 8094. A Review Committee was established with the Commission Chairman as one of the three (3) members to study:

- a. Modernization of County Ordinance 8094
- b. Governing Committee Membership
- c. Restoration of Full-time Commission Staff

A summary of the proposed changes is contained in letters to the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County from the Chairman of the Commission (Attachments 19 and 20). These changes were based on recommendations by the County Administrative Officer to the County Board of Supervisors (Attachment 21), resulting in the current County Ordinance 8097.

County Ordinance No. 8097, August of 1978, created the current "Emergency Preparedness Commission for the County of Los Angeles" with nine (9) members, three (3) to be appointed by the County Board of Supervisors, three (3) by the Mayor of the City of Los Angeles, and three (3) by the Los Angeles County Division of the League of California Cities. The updated Ordinance is attached (Attachment 20).

In 1977, a study of Emergency Preparedness Programs (Attachments) was again initiated. A study task force was organized and a report was made to the Commission's Study Committee on May 5, 1977 (Attachment 17). No agreement was reached on any proposed organizational models. The Operational Area Plan was also revised in 1977.

In 1978, the Commission Chairman was Sidney S. Smith.

REPORT TO THE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS COMMISSION FOR THE  
COUNTY AND CITIES OF LOS ANGELESBY  
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS STUDY GROUPEMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS STUDY

May 5, 1976

- I. PURPOSE. The purpose of this Study is to report on findings of the three month investigation into the emergency preparedness coordination between the various jurisdictions within Los Angeles County.
- II. SCOPE. The Commission Chairman specifically charged the Study Group to report on the current county-wide preparedness "organization" and readiness posture, and to recommend the most viable organizational concept; to examine and recommend direction and control concepts; to examine the existing Emergency Operations Center concept throughout the County, making recommendations for EOC distribution county-wide.

Specific instructions were given that the Study Group was not to make recommendations which were colored by Federal or State standards, desires, or funding; that vested interests within the emergency preparedness field were not to influence the recommendations; and that the most viable, reasonable, effective, and least complex organization was to be recommended.

- III. BACKGROUND. On 8 September 1975, DCPA representative Jay Lund met with Sheriff, CAO, and OES representatives at the Sheriff's Emergency Operations Bureau to discuss DCPA's concern about the viability of the emergency operations concept within Los Angeles County; about how federal funds were being used in the County. Mr. Lund suggested that this jurisdiction conduct a study and make recommendations for improvement of the system. Mr. Lund also stated that he was not suggesting that current funding was being threatened, nor was he specific as to how the County might be deficient. He suggested that the Emergency Preparedness Commission might sponsor such a study.

On 10 November 1975, Mr. Charles Manfred, Director of OES, and Mr. Lund appeared before the Commission, and Mr. Manfred formally requested the study. The Commission agreed to contact the appointing authorities, and to conduct the study. It was originally proposed that the Commission's Plans and Programs Committee would do the study, but the final decision called for each of the Commission's appointing authorities to select two representatives to serve on the Study Group. This was subsequently reduced to one full-time representative. The County representative has been and is Captain William Alley of the Sheriff's Department, with Sergeant Lee Lanzini an alternate. The League of Cities assigned Mrs. Cleo Janiw for approximately two (2) months, replaced on 1 April by Mr. John Korkis, Emergency Services Coordinator for the City of Glendale. There was no representative from the City of Los Angeles.

The Office of Emergency Services provided Mr. Ken Klemm on a permanent basis to assist the Study Group, and Mr. Larry Snell of the U.S.C. Disaster Institute participated in numerous meetings at the behest of Commissioner Peterson.

May 5, 1976

The first Study Group meeting took place on 9 February in the Long Beach EOC, and subsequent meetings encompassed interviews with the thirty-three (33) persons named in the two progress reports submitted to the Commission on 5 March and 14 April. Since then, we have interviewed the following persons:

Charles Thompson	Downey City Manager	10 April
Michael Dougherty	County Counsel's Office	20 April
James Clark	County Counsel's Office	20 April
Michael Regan	L.A. City C.D. Coordinator	30 April
Gary Penny	L.A. City CAO	30 April
James Pótepan	L.A. City CAO	30 April
Phillip Smith	L.A. City Public Works	30 April
Harry Wharafsky	L.A. City Public Utilities Comm.	30 April
Leon Boudreau	L.A. City Medical Services	30 April
Robert Anderson, Capt.	L.A. City Fire Dept.	30 April
Marsh White, Officer	L.A. Police Department	30 April

Mr. Charles Thompson of Downey assisted the Study Group by contacting several City Managers throughout the County regarding the intent and nature of the Study. Mr. John Dangleis, Azusa City Manager, made a presentation to the San Gabriel Valley City Managers Association on 21 April to inform them of the Study, and to assess their views.

The persons interviewed have covered a wide range of city and county administrators, law enforcement officers, fire personnel, and Civil Defense Area Coordinators. It would require a lengthy presentation to include a synopsis of each interview; therefore, the Study Group has chosen to incorporate the various views and impressions into general statements.

#### IV. STUDY CONSIDERATIONS.

##### A. Organizational Model Criteria

The Study Group has identified a number of features which should be incorporated into any suggested organizational model, and which are essential in a county-wide coordinated planning and response system:

1. There must be an acknowledgement of the necessity for strong, centralized, county-wide coordination during disasters through the Operational Area Emergency Organization.
2. The county-wide emergency "organization" should be called "The Los Angeles County Operational Area Emergency Organization".
3. The Operational Area must provide a central EOC specifically designed to respond to requests for emergency assistance from all jurisdictions during actual or impending disasters. The County must be divided into manageable "districts" to provide adequate coordination and response.

4. The City of Los Angeles should maintain its own response, coordination, resource, and planning system to coordinate with the Operational Area EOC when required.
5. Each jurisdiction must retain operational control of disaster response within that jurisdiction where feasible, and participate in decision making of agencies assisting during emergencies.
6. Each jurisdiction must accept responsibility for the development of realistic disaster plans for that jurisdiction, and coordinate with adjacent cities, county agencies, and public and private resources.
7. Competent on-site pre-disaster planning assistance must be available to all jurisdictions on a permanent basis to facilitate coordination between jurisdictions, and to provide technical guidance during disasters and during the recovery period.
8. An adequately staffed, centralized planning management function should be provided to facilitate some planning uniformity and continuity throughout the Operational Area, develop disaster exercises, plan public information programs and procedures, provide technical advice and recommend improvement of plans and systems.
9. Each level of government should maintain a central coordination center, whether designated an emergency operations center (EOC), city coordination center (CCC), or similar designations. This center should provide an operations, communications, public information, information gathering, and liaison staff to determine needs, coordinate with assisting agencies and adjacent jurisdictions, and provide a channel for requesting mutual aid, up to and including federal assistance.
10. The Emergency Preparedness Commission should provide planning input to the on-site and central planning functions to assure that all jurisdictions have a continued review of and voice in the planning activities affecting those jurisdictions. Composition of the Commission should continue to reflect adequate representation for the County, City, and cities of Los Angeles County.
11. An effective, coordinated organizational "structure" providing a meaningful level of service to the 78 cities and county areas must be adequately funded and staffed.

B. Specific Topics Explored

1. Assessment of the Civil Defense Area Coordinator's function, role, and services rendered.

- a. Findings. Of the seven Areas within the County, four (4) have full-time Area Coordinators, three (3) of which are funded by taxation through Joint Powers Agreements. Many cities in these areas do not participate in this service, and many of those who do primarily utilize the Coordinator to "update" basic plans to conform to State law, access some surplus property, and generally act as an information resource. They have no authority, no operational role, and are not being utilized to best advantage by the cities.
- b. Recommendations. These positions can be better utilized by incorporating them into a coordinated county-wide planning function, as will be illustrated in Section V under "District Coordinators". Salaries should be provided by funds not controlled by individual jurisdictions.

2. Examination of Attitudes of Cities.

- a. Findings. Attitudes vary from desiring full autonomy and direct operational control over all services, to desires for central direction and control at the County level. The most prevalent views call for the cities to operate their own emergency systems until specific assistance is requested, and that city administrators continue operational control over responding assistance unless unable to do so. In all circumstances, the cities rightly insist on participating in all decisions affecting their jurisdictions, and on appropriate liaison being established. Although many eye the County government with some suspicion regarding intrusion in their daily (including planning) activities, and would thoroughly resent being told by some County authority what to do, practically all agree that some form of central coordinating authority is necessary, and acknowledge that County services and resources would be requested and utilized.

A few cities have substantial interest in emergency preparedness, and maintain full or part-time staff for ongoing planning. Others have such an interest, but are unable to employ a staff with specific planning responsibilities, thus rely on the Area Coordinators to provide some planning assistance. Unfortunately, some cities would appear to have less than intense interest in preparedness for a number of reasons: (1) they are beset by the

daily, immediate concerns of routine city operations; (2) in some instances there would appear to be lack of perception as to what is available or what direction to take; (3) an attitude that their problems will be taken care of by the County or State or other jurisdictions when assistance is needed; (4) an unwillingness or inability to commit necessary funds for planning for events which may or may not occur. Viable, well thought-out plans are not the norm.

- b. Recommendations. We believe it is a proper role for the Commission to even more energetically promote understanding and participation at every governmental level for a county-wide coordinated system, and that the Study considerations outlined in IV A. above be stressed. Particular emphasis should be placed on city autonomy and responsibility for pre-disaster planning.

3. County-wide Communications.

- a. Findings. There is no viable coordinated governmental communications system in Los Angeles County. There are a number of sophisticated and efficient systems in some County and Los Angeles City operating Departments; there is a South Bay Regional Communications Project to link nine communities in that area; there is an Inter-City net linking many law enforcement agencies, and a separate Fire net. For links between the various governmental agencies during disasters, the only county-wide system consists of Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES), which are volunteer amateur operators. Under the auspices of the Sheriff, 20 cities have implemented the RACES plan in their cities, and can have direct communication with Sheriff's Stations, the Operational Area EOC, and in some cases, have expanded the system throughout their own cities. The county-furnished radio equipment has been purchased or is on order for all jurisdictions that desire it.

The communications picture is somewhat clouded by a number of Citizens Band radio groups and Amateur Clubs that are not affiliated with RACES, which is the only group authorized and registered by the County to provide services. Some aggressive but well meaning groups have attempted to affiliate with local jurisdictions to provide emergency government communications, and others assume names which give the impression that they are a legitimate and recognized emergency corps. In fact, these groups create many operational problems.

Recent FCC Rules changes have created concern about the continued operational effectiveness of RACES. These matters are being pursued by the Sheriff.

- b. Recommendations. We recommend that serious consideration be given to a governmental radio system with county-wide access, particularly one linking all governmental jurisdictions. Although RACES has and can perform valuable service, an amateur, volunteer organization is no substitute for a dedicated governmental system.

Barring development of such a system, it is recommended that all cities be urged to take advantage of the RACES network. It is also recommended that all jurisdictions discourage participation of untrained, unknowledgeable, unidentified, and uncoordinated amateur or citizen band volunteers.

#### 4. Emergency Operations Center.

- a. Findings. We have not examined this subject in detail, and are not prepared to discuss distribution of EOC's throughout the County. There are 17 hard-site EOC's throughout the County, excepting 4 in Los Angeles City. There was some consideration given to recommending 1 EOC per the to-be-described 17 districts, but it does not seem feasible or reasonable to expect a City which has expended substantial funds and effort to construct an EOC to be prevailed upon to furnish working space and communications to other cities and agencies. There would be insufficient space, and some sort of financial arrangement would need to be worked out.
- b. Recommendations. This matter is a subject for more extensive investigation. Jurisdictions must give careful consideration to the advantages and disadvantages of adopting federal standards and accepting federal money, plus 25 years of federal supervision over the EOC.

#### 5. Mutual Aid

- a. Findings. This is another area which has not received sufficient attention by the Study Group due to lack of time. As we have indicated in our Progress Report of 14 April, we believe there is much work and coordination between city, county, and state governments to clarify some areas of confusion and uncertainty in several specialized areas, i.e., health services, public works, engineering, et al. The very generalized State Plan is not helpful in a definitive sense to local agencies.
- b. Recommendations. This needs study and clarification.

6. Preparedness Programs, Funding and Support

- a. Findings. Local funding for emergency preparedness programs is provided in several ways. The salaries and limited expenses of Area Coordinators are provided through the Joint Powers Agreements. Some jurisdictions maintain full-time planners/coordinators, receiving P & A reimbursement from DCPA for part of their salaries. A few jurisdictions take advantage of the surplus property program, and/or have received partial support through matching funds for EOC construction and maintenance. Other governmental positions are assigned emergency preparedness functions as a collateral duty, and obtain P & A reimbursement for a portion of the salaries. In the latter instance, however, the DCPA reimbursement is usually placed in a General Fund account to offset salaries, and is not used to promote additional programs or to provide additional services. This is particularly true in County government, which has received \$300,000 to \$400,000 of P & A funds yearly. It should be noted, however, that subsequent to the 1971 earthquake, the County established an Earthquake Fund of approximately \$1.6 million to improve the County's preparedness posture. This has not been the general rule. Most of the local monies spent have been to improve daily response capabilities.

It is also true that most jurisdictions have not taken advantage of available P & A funding, and in the case of surplus property only 19 of the 78 cities accessed it at all in 1974-75, and many of those on a very limited scale. There are a number of reasons expressed for that lack of interest, i.e., not wanting to expend the time and money in preparation of program papers and other red tape; not wanting to accept federal standards considered "unrealistic", such as preparation for war caused emergencies; and as previously stated, the weight of real, "now", day-to-day problems of administering governmental affairs. It would be fair to state that coordinated disaster response planning has a low priority with some administrators.

In our two Progress Reports, we commented on local dissatisfaction with federal standards. This dissatisfaction has increased somewhat with the latest policy change which provides support only for development of Nuclear Civil Preparedness (NCP) programs and terminates maintenance of established programs, which OMB and DCPA says was never authorized by law, but has been allowed for many years. In the numerous interviews we have conducted, there was a definite and general rejection of such a concept. Crisis Relocation, Shelter Programs, and similar schemes dear to the hearts of federal Civil Defense planners are viewed with skepticism, amusement and irritation. This is not to say that planners

and administrators are insensitive to the necessity for a viable organization to cope with a possible wartime emergency, but that the federal system has the nuclear disaster cart before the natural disaster horse. Most feel that a viable program for large-scale natural disasters will work reasonably effectively in a nuclear disaster environment. There are some unique problems, of course, such as radiological monitoring, special medical problems, etc., but these should be included in disaster response plan, not provide the framework for it. Since the current federal policy will only support that planning and preparedness effort specifically devoted to NCP development, many are now less interested than in the past.

We have examined with the County Counsel's office various alternatives for obtaining funding for whatever approach to county-wide coordinated planning and response is ultimately adopted:

- 1) Per Capita Taxation. Not legal.
- 2) County Special District. - County Service Area. Within the parameters established by the Study Group, wherein funds were not to be controlled by any one political subdivision, County Counsel stated that these concepts would always be subject to budgetary review by the County. Each must be submitted to the electorate due to the taxing provisions.
- 3) State Legislated Emergency Preparedness District. This method calls for requesting the legislature to create a special Emergency Preparedness District, stating details of appointment of a Board of Directors, specifying a special property tax levy, and other considerations. A county-wide vote is not required. The proposed statute would include the following:

Territory. The legislature hereby forms the Emergency Preparedness District for Los Angeles County.

Purposes of District. Would include planning for emergency preparedness services within the cities in Los Angeles, and public education.

Taxation, method or rate.

Powers. To be delineated. The coordination and supervision of planning for emergency preparedness. Interrelation with the Sheriff in a disaster; action as staff resource to Sheriff; make contracts; employ General Manager; employ Clerk of the Board; employ staff to accomplish above.

District Financing. Establish a budget; give to County auditor who will compute levy to accomplish budget; state that regular assessment in any one year shall not exceed \_\_\_\_\_¢ per \$100 of assessed valuation on land and improvements; the Board of Supervisors then levies these taxes, and they shall determine the rate of assessment; the Board of Supervisors shall contribute monies in the ratio of \_\_\_\_\_% for County and \_\_\_\_\_% for cities in the event of any deficiency.

Annual audit, make provisions for.

Employees, decide benefits, set up a retirement system. Include a section on consolidation of districts. This would state in part that this board and the board of \_\_\_\_\_ districts can consolidate.

- 4) 5-Year Federal Grant. We have not explored this method, but it may be possible to obtain a program grant from FDAA or other federal agency to develop and implement a county-wide planning, coordination, and response system for natural and wartime disasters. This might provide all the stated desirable features we envision. It would be essential, however, that on termination of the grant the appropriate county-wide funding must be provided to maintain the system.

- b. Recommendations. To attempt to establish the Emergency Preparedness District. As an alternate method, and perhaps simultaneously, explore the availability of the federal grant. The only other alternative we can see is to continue in the present restrictive federal matching funds program.

## V. ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS

### A. District Coordinating Model (See Enclosure 1)

This concept addresses the organizational criteria established in IV A. of this Study. It provides a strong centralized coordination role to the Sheriff, who effects disaster response coordination through the Operational Area ECC to Sheriff's Stations to all cities, with the exception of Los Angeles City, which provides the same centralized coordination throughout the City area. Coordination between the two major jurisdictions is provided. A central planning unit is established, coordinating the planning efforts of emergency preparedness coordinators who are specifically assigned to a district to coordinate district plans, and assist cities in their planning efforts. Cities are autonomous and

responsible for their own planning and emergency response efforts. The planners are part of the operating group. No one jurisdiction "controls" the planners, policy, or funding, except through representation on the Emergency Preparedness Commission. The concept of EOC's at every level is addressed.

1. Positions and functions are described below:

a. Director of Emergency Operations (Sheriff).

Participates in pre-disaster planning through the Commission, the Disaster Preparedness Coordinators who provide the central planning management function, and the Sheriff's Station Commanders. Coordinates response efforts of the Operational Area Emergency Organization during disaster and recovery through the Operational Area EOC. Establishes and maintains the RACES organization to establish communications links to all jurisdictions.

b. County Government/Los Angeles City Government

These work autonomously, each with its own resources. Direct communication ties between these agencies is an obvious necessity.

c. Operational Area EOC

Maintained by the Sheriff to coordinate emergency response efforts between the County, cities, governmental and private services or resources. In an emergency, it is staffed with representatives of major County departments, L.A. City/private agencies, and other support agencies with direct communication, landline and radio (where feasible) to their respective headquarters or EOC's. The EOC is a fixed facility. The Field Command Post is also available, is mobile, and can be set up at any convenient location.

d. Emergency Operations Bureau

Maintains its headquarters in the operational area Emergency Operations Center where it continues the ongoing preparedness planning and coordination between the County, city governments, other agencies, and the Sheriff's Department.

e. County Support EOC's

The EOC's or coordination centers of County agencies, where department heads direct and coordinate respective department functions with representatives in the operational area EOC.

f. Emergency Preparedness Commission

A joint advisory body for the County and cities of Los Angeles. Its functions include promotion of county-wide coordination of

May 5, 1976

emergency planning and preparedness programs, sponsoring semi-annual disaster exercises, and annual emergency preparedness seminars. Formulates broad policy guidance through the Disaster Preparedness Coordinators to the Assistant District Coordinator. Pays the Coordinators with funds obtained by the County, which are transferred to the Commission.

g. Disaster Preparedness Coordinator

It is recommended that four to six full-time civilian planners are assigned to this position to effect the coordination between the County, cities, and the Emergency Preparedness Commission. They will work out of the Sheriff's Emergency Operations Bureau to provide the county-wide preparedness planning and coordination policies which will be implemented at the district level. A similar central staff would be assigned to L.A. City. They would be assigned to the County and City ECC as advisory staff. They work with, not for the Sheriff.

h. Assistant District Coordinator

A civilian employee who works under the Disaster Preparedness Coordinator. It is proposed to eliminate the seven civil defense areas and proceed with the district concept. In so doing, the seven civil defense areas would be expanded to twenty-one districts corresponding to the geographical location of each of the 17 Sheriff's Stations and the 4 L.A. City districts. They will foster planning and coordination throughout the assigned districts.

i. District Coordinator

Each Sheriff's Station Commander now would wear a second hat, that of District Coordinator. The present position of Station Coordinator which is P & A funded will be eliminated. The District Coordinator will assist in coordinating the emergency preparedness structure and planning with the district cities in an effort to facilitate expeditious response in the event of a disaster.

j. Los Angeles City Districts

The vast resources of the city should be able to tend the needs of her citizens under all but the most catastrophic conditions. There must be, however, close coordination and cooperation between the city and the county. The City would consist of 4 districts. A central planning unit such as the Disaster Preparedness Coordinators would be established.

k. District Emergency Operations Center

An operations center that can provide coordination of county-wide services for the district cities and the operations area EOC. In most cases, the District EOC will be located in the Sheriff's Station, but it is not inconceivable that in the event a more suitable structure was available, the center could be located there.

1. City

The cities served by a district. The number varies in different districts according to jurisdictional needs. There will be individual city emergency operation centers or coordination centers where city officials can carry out the functions of their respective offices. Communication ties both radio and landline should be readily available between the city EOC's and the district EOC. The cities are autonomous and responsible for their own emergency preparedness plans. Their plans should be integrated with the district and operational area plans. District Coordinators will furnish coordination and cooperation to the cities as needed. The emergency resource services of a city are available to that individual city.

2. Strengths

- a. The planners are co-located with the administrators of the operating system and have an operational role in the EOC's.
- b. Permanently assigned district coordinators provide a continuing and familiar link for district coordination.
- c. Planning uniformity can be enhanced, but unique problems in each district are individually addressed.
- d. The planners are not under the direct authority of any one specific governmental entity allowing flexibility in planning needs. Their prime concern is for the district as a whole.
- e. Provides guidance and technical support to district entities in obtaining available funds, in preparing program papers, project applications, and accessing surplus property.
- f. Existing public safety agency facilities and office space will be used to reduce overhead.
- g. The autonomy of the cities is retained during planning, operations, and recovery phases.

May 5, 1976

- h. Implementation of county-wide planning is simplified, and becomes more manageable, under the district concept.
- i. District Coordinator will have the ability to work closely with his counterparts in other public safety agencies or organizations within the district.

### 3. Weaknesses. Funding

#### B. Joint Planning Group Model (See Enclosure 2)

This concept was proposed by Commissioner Evar Peterson, and is included in this Study for consideration by the Commission.

#### Field Offices

The model contemplates that there would be field offices, possibly in existing Emergency Operations Centers. They would serve several cities and accomplish day-to-day planning and training.

There are EOC's now located in many cities and dispersed geographically throughout the County, i.e., Glendale, Long Beach, Norwalk, Azusa, etc.

No specific number of field offices is designated, but there would be at least as many as we now have that we call Civil Defense areas, a minimum of seven (7).

The EOC's were built with protection designed into the structure, it would seem prudent that these could be used as coordinating points by the Sheriff.

Continuation of matching funds would undoubtedly be contingent on use of protected locations. Except for the County Sheriff's Communication Center, which is centrally located, the sub-stations do not generally meet the criteria for hardened sites.

The headquarters staff should be located at the County EOC or as close as conveniently possible, so that they would have a daily working rapport with their operational counterparts.

#### Staff Specialties

When it is not practical to have certain specialists located within each field office, it would be the type of staff person assigned to the headquarters staff.

#### Number of Jobs

The number of positions available to staff the headquarters, and the field offices, will be determined by the funding of the program. It is

important that the staff be sufficient in size to do an adequate job. The principal is recognized that the Sheriff should have staffing, out of the common matching funds pool, for their day-to-day operational planning and training needs, and this could be as many as one per sub-station.

The City of L.A. and the County of L.A. may select the option of maintaining their own separate staffing and they would provide liaison with the headquarters staff to ensure county-wide coordination. Under the circumstances, the L.A. City and L.A. County staffs could still be paid under the common funding pool.

#### Implementation

Implementation of this model would be phased over a period of time not exceeding 18 months. It may be necessary to receive special considerations during that period of time with regard to DCPA funding. We would assume that staffing would be phased in as various program increments are activated. As staffing needs are clearly developed, obviously some flexibility must be accommodated. It is recognized that there is a point in time at which DCPA will have the right to expect this organizational structure to be fully functional.

#### Autonomy of political subdivisions

This model will accommodate the autonomy of each community choosing to participate. The chief executive in each jurisdiction will remain fully in charge and responsible for his or her City's emergency plan. It will be this chief executive's determination as to when his City requests assistance, or is able to provide assistance to others under the mutual aid agreement. The staff will provide services to the chief executive to include advise and guidance in the development of the plan. This will include all aspects of such a plan, i.e., they will conduct training exercises for the total emergency organization of a city, or for segments of such an organization, e.g., an emergency medical exercise. Administrative costs of printing planning documents, etc., and other personnel administrative expenses will be taken care of out of the common matching funds pool.

#### Post Disaster

The Joint Planning Group of professionals will have assignments given to them by the County Sheriff whenever the Sheriff activates his operational area role. During this period of time, depending on the size and nature of the disaster, it is possible that all day-to-day preparatory planning and training will be suspended. Immediately following the operational phase of a disaster, as many professional and clerical staff members as needed will devote their attention to assisting all affected jurisdictions in the preparation and submission of reimbursement documents required under PL 93-288.

1. Strengths

- a. Professional planning service is available to all cities.
- b. Cities retain autonomy during all three phases; preparatory, operational, and recovery.
- c. Jurisdictions will be assisted with program papers, P & A applications, accessing surplus property.
- d. Planning uniformity enhanced throughout county.
- e. Provides much more efficiency in dealing with state and federal agencies.
- f. Will develop maximum self-help within each community.
- g. Provides better prepared and trained jurisdictions for purposes of mutual aid.
- h. Enlarged centralized staffing will provide specialists in critical program areas that individual cities could not afford if operating independently.
- i. Overhead costs for public information activities, by being centralized, should be greatly reduced, and yet much more effective.
- j. The State Office of Emergency Services will have one set of funding documents for purposes of matching funds.

2. Weaknesses. This model suffers the same weaknesses of the District Model so far as funding is concerned. It also envisions a planning group separated from the operating group, and having no operational role during a disaster, although they would be available for counsel. This we see as the principal weakness.

C. Combined Model

We are not presenting a separate model because there is now a great deal of similarity in the two models that was not apparent or expressed in the 14 April presentation. Size of the two models would seem to vary substantially, but this kind of detail has not been sufficiently addressed. Thus, the most apparent dissimilarity appears to be the separation of the planners and operators. The funding approaches previously addressed appear to be applicable to both models.

D. Existing Organization

The existing structure is essentially the same as the District Model, except that the civilian planners do not exist, and the Assistant District Coordinator's function is partially accomplished by the Sheriff's Station Emergency Preparedness Coordinator. Although not understood at all levels, the same coordination and response channels exist. There is no funding available beyond existing P & A, which will in many instances be eliminated by DCPA under the new policy unless the dual purpose planning concept (nuclear and disaster preparedness) is restored.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS


A. Primary. We believe that with appropriate funding under a State-created Emergency Preparedness District, the District Coordinating Model is most appropriate.


B. Alternate.

1. Lacking the Emergency Preparedness District formation and county-wide taxation for funding, the Commission should pursue a federal grant to establish the District Coordinating Model for a 3-5 year implementation.
2. Should funding not be available, we recommend that the Commission aggressively promote a county-wide information program, familiarizing all jurisdictions and agencies with the existing organization, and encourage their full participation in disaster planning and develop a coordinated response capability.

Study Group


  
\_\_\_\_\_  
William H. Alley, Captain  
Los Angeles County Sheriff

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
John Korkis, Emergency Services  
Coordinator, City of Glendale

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Kenneth Klein, Planner  
State Office of Emergency Services

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Lee Lanzini, Sergeant  
Los Angeles County Sheriff

# DISTRICT COORDINATING CONCEPT




————— DIRECTION  
----- COORDINATION

# JOINT PLANNING GROUP

ENCLOSURE (2)

CONSTITUENCY COMPONENTS  
WITHIN THE COUNTY




ENCLOSURE (2)

APPENDIX 4

Los Angeles Office  
Administration Center Building  
Los Angeles 90017

4934



RESIDENT

Don Yokaitis  
Pasadena

FIRST VICE PRESIDENT

Gilbert Smith  
Carson

SECOND VICE PRESIDENT

Ken Chappell  
West Covina

TREASURER

Dr. Thomas Clark  
Long Beach

RECORDING SECRETARY

Doris Stone  
Pasadena

THE FOLLOWING MATTER IS SUBMITTED FOR YOUR IMMEDIATE ATTENTION WITH A REQUEST THAT EACH CITY RESPOND BY USING THE ATTACHED QUESTIONNAIRE AND RETURN ENVELOPE ON OR BEFORE JUNE 15, 1976

May 28, 1976

Dear Mayor and Council Member:

The Emergency Preparedness Commission for the County and Cities of Los Angeles was asked by the federal government, through the State Office of Emergency Services, to conduct a study and recommend an appropriate course of action to improve civil preparedness throughout the County. This study has now been completed and is summarized in the attached report.

The federal government over the years has provided matching funds to a number of cities within the County as well as to the County to assist in the development of a meaningful emergency response capability. This past year, these matching funds from the federal government amounted to \$750,000. Total program expenditures within the County, therefore, has amounted to approximately \$1,500,000 with the other half coming from the participating local jurisdictions.

The federal government has made the following points with which your Executive Committee concurs:

1. The funding, if spent more effectively, is sufficient to provide an excellent County-wide program.
2. Large-scale disasters do not respect city boundaries.
3. Many cities are not involved and therefore have no meaningful disaster readiness.
4. Some participating cities are merely meeting the paper requirements.
5. The Los Angeles County area is unique because of many factors such as high population density, contiguous boundaries, and seventy-nine jurisdictional governments with a great variance of managerial problems.

6. Within the County, there are tremendous resources, but we need to develop the means by which these resources can be quickly marshalled and deployed where needed when lives and property are in jeopardy.
7. As all cities are subject to disaster, each should pull its own weight.
8. Appropriate standards should apply so that all citizens County-wide have equal protection.

Your Executive Committee has carefully reviewed the two models proposed in the attached report and believes that either one if adopted would provide a major improvement over the present approach wherein each city has been on its own. This has resulted in a piecemeal approach which means that instead of having one County-wide master plan with one set of overhead costs we have a splintered effect with numerous overheads of a duplicating nature.


Both models can operate effectively at the funding level that currently applies, but the source of funding would need to be changed to a County-wide basis. Obviously, before sanctioning the establishment of a special district, the cities and County must have assurance that the funding level will be tightly controlled. Your Executive Committee, therefore, recommends that the management structure have built-in safeguards to assure proper League representation and control before final approval is given.

Model 2 contemplates maintaining the area offices such as presently established and anticipates that the personnel now in the system would continue to be utilized inasmuch as they have already met the federally established civil service criteria. It is expected that these offices would be augmented and also have available specialized expertise from a central office. On the other hand, Model 1 contemplates that the Sheriffs Station Commanders working with Assistant District Coordinators would be responsible for coordinating planning within each district.

It is highly unlikely that implementation of either model could take place during the coming fiscal year. Therefore, city councils should continue their present programs as currently established.


Upon receipt of the response from each city, the League office will determine the consensus and forward it to the Commission as requested. The other jurisdictional components with representation on the Commission will also respond to the Commission prior to the deadline. The Commission will then decide which of the two models to recommend for state and federal consideration. If the state and federal governments concur in the Commission's recommendation, it is contemplated that the selected model will be worked out in detail and submitted once again to the League, the County, and the City of Los Angeles for final approval.

# DISTRICT COORDINATING CONCEPT




———— DIRECTION  
- - - - COORDINATION

# JOINT PLANNING GROUP



Office  
Center Building  
Los Angeles 90017

4



**PRESIDENT**

Don Yokailis  
Pasadena

**FIRST VICE PRESIDENT**

Gilbert Smith  
Carson

**SECOND VICE PRESIDENT**

Ken Chappell  
West Covina

**TREASURER**

Dr. Thomas Clark  
Long Beach

**RECORDING SECRETARY**

Doris Stone  
Pasadena

QUESTIONNAIRE

SUBJECT: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IMPROVEMENT SURVEY

It is respectfully requested that this questionnaire be completed and returned to the League of California Cities Los Angeles office on or before June 15, 1976

\_\_\_\_\_  
Name of City Submitting

This City prefers \_\_\_\_\_ Model 1 \_\_\_\_\_ Model 2.


This City will concur in the establishment of a special County-wide district for funding purposes provided that prior to final approval it is clearly demonstrated that tight control over the funding level will be maintained.

\_\_\_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No

Please return to:

League of California Cities  
900 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 702

Los Angeles Office  
900 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 702  
Los Angeles 90017  
624-4934



**PRESIDENT**

Kenneth I. Chappell  
Council Member  
West Covina

November 20, 1978

**FIRST VICE PRESIDENT**

Dr. Thomas Clark  
Mayor  
Long Beach

**TO:** Members Public Safety Committee

**FROM:** Chairman Nat Trives

**SECOND VICE PRESIDENT**

Betty Wilson  
Council Member  
Sante Fe Springs

**SUBJECT:** Emergency Preparedness Workshop  
Thursday, December 14, 1978  
USC Davidson Center

**TREASURER**

Charles E. Gibb  
Council Member  
Arcadia

You will recall at our meeting of November 7, 1978, a presentation was made by Murray Brown regarding the University of Southern California's contract with the State Office of Emergency Services (OES).

**STATE LEAGUE DIRECTOR**

Richard Nagel  
Council Member  
El Segundo

At that time, staff was instructed to set up an Emergency Preparedness Workshop to assess current emergency preparedness efforts and develop a consensus among cities as to the need for a formalized emergency program.

**RECORDING SECRETARY**

Vangie Schock  
Secretary  
West Covina


Please mark your calendars and plan to attend this very important workshop Thursday, December 14, 1978, 9:00 AM to 3:30 PM at the USC Davidson Center.

Additional material and a detailed agenda will be sent to you as soon as completed.

NT:jb

✓

Los Angeles Office  
D. Shire Blvd., Suite 702  
Los Angeles 90017  
24-4934



PRESIDENT

Kenneth I. Chappell  
Council Member  
West Covina

FIRST VICE PRESIDENT

Dr. Thomas Clark  
Mayor  
Long Beach

SECOND VICE PRESIDENT

Betty Wilson  
Council Member  
Santa Fe Springs

JURER

Charles E. Gilb  
Council Member  
Arcadia

STATE LEAGUE DIRECTOR

Richard Nagel  
Council Member  
El Segundo

RECORDING SECRETARY

Vangie Schock  
Secretary  
West Covina

December 6, 1978

TO: LOS ANGELES DIVISION PUBLIC SAFETY  
COMMITTEE MEMBERS

FROM: Councilman Nat Trives  
Santa Monica, Chairman

SUBJECT: USC EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS WORKSHOP  
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1978

As was indicated in the initial notice recently sent out, regarding the Emergency Preparedness Workshop of November 20, 1978, the Public Safety Committee has been asked by the Executive Committee of the Division's Board of Directors to participate in a study on the emergency services in Los Angeles County. This is part of a project seeking to "prepare a prototype agreement" between cities and Los Angeles County on the handling of natural disasters and other emergency situations which may arise in the area.

Such a study is timely in view of the Carter Administration's recent re-organization plan incorporating agencies dealing with seismic safety, flood insurance, disaster assistance, etc., into a new Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Organization of this new agency will be proposed by the Office of Management and Budget in the near future.

Closer to home for Los Angeles County cities are concerns regarding the adequacy of organizations (and funding) to deal with regional problems caused by natural disaster and/or civil disorders, public service strikes, etc. The recent City of Vernon firemen strike, the land-slides in Laguna and brush-fires in Malibu may suggest areas for re-evaluation of existing structures for area-wide cooperation.

Present at the workshop will be federal and state officials, USC faculty members, area agencies involved in emergency preparedness. For purposes of preparation for the workshop, please find the enclosed materials which provide a historical perspective as to emergency preparedness in Los Angeles County.


Since these subjects have obvious political implications, it is of great import that elected officials and city managers on the committee plan to attend this workshop.

**PLACE:** USC's Davidson Conference Center, located at the southwest corner of Figueroa and Jefferson Boulevards (downtown Los Angeles). Parking will be available at the rear of the Davidson Conference building (entrance on the Jefferson side).

**LUNCH:** A complimentary lunch has been arranged by the League, Los Angeles County Division.

**R.S.V.P.:** In Order that appropriate arrangements can be made for lunch, room space, etc., please notify the League office no later than Monday, December 11th whether or not you will be in attendance. Telephone Number (213) 624-4934.

Los Angeles Office  
900 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 702  
Los Angeles 90017  
624-4934



**PRESIDENT**

Dr. Thomas Clark  
Mayor  
Long Beach

January 12, 1979

MEMO

**FIRST VICE PRESIDENT**

Betty Wilson  
Council Member  
Santa Fe Springs

**TO: PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE  
LOS ANGELES COUNTY DIVISION**

**FROM: MARTIN J. MAYER, DIRECTOR  
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANNING UNIT**

**SECOND VICE PRESIDENT**

Charles E. Gilb  
Council Member  
Arcadia

**SUBJECT: JSC EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS WORKSHOP,  
January 25, 1979 - 9:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.**

**TREASURER**

Wilfred L. Simendinger  
Council Member  
La Mirada

As you will recall, the Public Safety Committee has been asked by the Executive Board of the Los Angeles County Division to participate in a workshop sponsored by the University of Southern California on the problems of emergency services in Los Angeles County. Attached is the Agenda for the program.

**STATE LEAGUE DIRECTOR**

Richard Nagel  
Council Member  
El Segundo

Additional materials are also enclosed which will provide you with information regarding the history of the emergency preparedness program in Los Angeles. These materials are in addition to items previously forwarded.

**RECORDING SECRETARY**

Bernice Cooper  
Secretary to Mayor  
Long Beach

The workshop will be held at the USC Davidson Conference Center located at the southwest corner of Figueroa and Jefferson Boulevards (downtown Los Angeles). Parking will be available at the rear of the Davidson Conference Building (entrance on Jefferson Boulevard).

A complimentary lunch has been arranged by the Los Angeles County Division; in order that appropriate arrangements can be made for the luncheon, please be good enough to notify the League office no later than January 22, 1979, whether or not you will be in attendance. Please phone: (213) 624-4934.

APPENDIX 6

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA  
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS WORKSHOP  
JANUARY 25, 1979

- 9:00 - 9:15 WELCOME AND INTRODUCTIONS - Presiding, Gary Adams, Mayor Pro Tem, Sierra Madre
- 9:15 - 9:45 PROJECT BACKGROUND - Alex Cunningham, Director, California Office of Emergency Services  
Frances Dias, Regional Director, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
- 9:45 - 10:00 WORKSHOP FORMAT - Randy Harrison, Associate Dean, USC/SPA  
AND PLAN Murray Brown, Office of Program Development
- 10:00 - 10:30 RESEARCH BACKGROUND- Dr. Dave Mars, USC/SPA  
Dr. William Petak, USC/SPA  
Dr. Robert Stallings, USC/SPA
- 10:30 - 11:00 AGENCY REPORTS - Gil Smith, Councilman, Carson; Past President, L. A. Division, League of California Cities; Member, Governor's Emergency Council  
Art Jones, City Manager, El Segundo: Member, L. A. Emergency Preparedness Commission  
Fred Bien, City Manager, Carson; former member, L. A. Preparedness Commission
- 11:00 - 11:30 SPECIAL ISSUES - Don Wilson, Councilman, Torrance; Chairman, I.C.L.A.C. Subcommittee on Mutual Aid  
Gary Adams, Mayor Pro Tem, Sierra Madre; Foothill Cities Emergency Planning
- 11:30 - 1:00 LUNCHEON - This will be a working lunch to allow for the discussion of issues and the development of ideas regarding future activities.

ADJOURNMENT BY 1:00 P.M.

January 22, 1979

TO: Members, Public Safety Committee, League of California Cities, Los Angeles County Division

From: U.S.C. Office of Program Development

I. Purpose of the Study The California State Office of Emergency Services has contracted with this office "to determine practical solutions to management and planning requirements to assure a coordinated emergency operations capability for Los Angeles County jurisdictions."

In order to obtain a "sense of the issues involved" a two-fold approach was proposed by the study team: 1) preparation of a detailed history of the disaster preparedness/civil defense activities in Los Angeles County since 1950 and 2) the appointment of an advisory body composed of legislators, city managers and defense preparedness personnel involved in operations.

The historical summary report which was prepared traces the preparedness programs from an original three-jurisdictional organization, to its current designation — the Los Angeles County Defense Preparedness Commission. (See attached.)

At the first meeting of the Advisory Committee, only the technical members turned out in any numbers and only two (of five) representatives of elected officials or managers were in attendance, despite earlier promises to attend. A re-evaluation of this approach by the U.S.C. and O.E.S. staff resulted in new strategy. Since input from legislators was important, and since time constraints made their participation difficult, a schedule of about 40 visitation/inverviews was designed to be undertaken by O.E.S. and U.S.C. personnel. The list of calls included meetings with all major governmental levels and with elected and appointed public personnel. An important element in the design was the decision to obtain support and interest of the various associations of city officials within the county-wide area.

II. Perceived Problem Areas Three weaknesses in the existing structure have surfaced during our interviews with city officials:

- A. Insufficient representation from the diverse area differences in the county. For the purposes of disaster organization there can be identified the following interest groupings -- the county structure, the city of Los Angeles, the other 10 major cities, contract cities, and special Problem communities (such as foothill cities, beach cities or industrial areas) as well as the seven state designated disaster preparedness areas. A total program should provide liaison with each of these constituent groups.
- B. Absence of a clearly defined role assigned to each of the jurisdictions in the planning and responding to a major area-wide emergency. All the other 80 cities of the county are represented on the Commission by appointed division representatives. There is no direct participation or commitment by these cities in the Commission actions or recommendations.
- C. Lack of involvement by most councilpersons or city managers. An important aspect of any proposed strengthening of the process would be the understanding and support of the city managers. Their concern with other priorities, Proposition 13 funding limitations and reduced public interest makes such commitment difficult at this time.

III. Obstacles to the Creation of an Area-Wide System

A wide range of perceptions regarding the subject of emergency preparedness was evidenced in interviews with public officials. Since many of these are undefined and untested, attempts to obtain support for any "agreement" is all the more difficult. Attention should be given toward clarification of these beliefs and possible validation by acceptable sources before any consensus can be achieved.

Some of the more frequently expressed views were the following:

1. The current EP function in the county works effectively due to the uniqueness of the area and a long tradition of cooperation between

functional levels (i.e., police, fire, public works, etc.).

2. Legislators will not and can not be involved in EP planning on a long term basis because of time constraints, disinterest, etc.
3. City Managers are vital for the selling and acceptance of any new organization and have to be involved in the process to make it acceptable to their councils.
4. City Managers and their emergency response personnel differ in their perceptions regarding the effectiveness of the response capability.
5. Cities would resist giving over-all control to Sheriff personnel for operations in their community during an emergency.
6. City personnel can best respond to local emergencies and can always call on the County (or Federal) for aid, if they need it.
7. If the disaster is major, the Feds would come in and run the show, anyway. Therefore, all we can do is to concern ourselves with the reasonable expectations -- the sort of organization we can afford.
8. Planning and operations cannot be separated in any EP organizational effort.

IV. Unresolved Questions In the light of the unsuccessful recent attempt to restructure the Commission (see Section V), the project staff decided to embark upon an attempt to seek commitment from the major decision-making groups in the County. Following meetings with contract cities and independent cities, city manager groups, the larger cities and regional associations, the assistance of the League of Cities was sought. The Board of Directors has asked the Public Safety Committee to consider the issue and assisting a review of the effectiveness of disaster preparedness organizations in the County. By this process, any proposals will have been

examined within the organized structure of the League before it is submitted to the general membership. Similar approaches will be offered to the other associations contacted.

V. History of Commission History of the Emergency Services System in Los Angeles County indicates the changing nature of the organization since 1950. Part of the process has been a continuing series of studies and reports -- seeking to better define functional responsibilities among the County's governmental units and the public officials therein. According to the O.E.S. research document, the current study is the 10th since creation of the Civil Defense Committee in 1950. (This is not necessarily indicative of an uncertainty of purpose -- but rather, a response to the changing public attitude, structural growth in the County, varying budgetary abilities and changing perceptions, among other reasons. Nevertheless, it is important to view the current study as part of this progression and the realization that flexibility and adapting to new circumstances has been the pragmatic test over the years.)

Questioned now is 1) whether the current organization fulfills the requirements of a "coordinated" plan and 2) whether some other configuration is feasible and acceptable by all the involved agencies.

The Los Angeles Countywide Civil Defense Committee, formed in 1950, was composed of the mayor of Los Angeles, the chairman of the Board of Supervisors and the president of the Los Angeles division, League of California Cities. Subsequent re-organizations of the body saw its makeup

changed to include appointed officials and a diffusion of the major officials' interest in its activities. Through the years, for example, the chairman has more often been a county official or city department head than any large city political leader.

As the Commission's functions expanded into operational areas (such as communications, fire, public safety) greater reliance was placed on the technical personnel — further isolating the legislative officers from the organization. Concern with this change was reported by a 1968 study which called for "re-constituting the Disaster Council to again include the chairman of the Board of Supervisors, the mayor of Los Angeles and the president of the League of Cities division". The proposal was not accepted by the Commission and its membership continued to be dominated by non-legislators and emergency operation members.

The most recent study of the Commission and its functions was conducted in 1976 by a staff comprised of two members of the Sheriff's department, a city emergency services coordinator and an O.E.S. staff member. Their alternative organizations were proposed to the cities of Los Angeles County — creation of an Emergency Preparedness District with centralized authority under the Sheriff, and a modified version of the existing cooperative model, retaining local control and autonomy. No plan was adopted due to a lack of response from the cities.


#### Conclusion

The Los Angeles area is a complex and diversified mix of governmental levels, area interests or problems, and intergovernmental history. No unified approach ever has been possible without taking these factors into

account. The task before this committee, therefore, is to bring these representations into any final product.

Several options will be presented today as the basis for discussion and possible recommendation to the Division's Board of Directors. Only through the process of deliberation and review by all the different segments within the County can there be hope for a unified approach.


**OES - OPD PROJECT**  
**Action Research Model**



\*30 Member Committee (Attached List)  
 Plus Ad Hoc Representatives from  
 ICLAC "Mutual Aid" study subcommittee and  
 City Manager Associations

OES - OPD PROJECT

Time Frame Scale



John W. Davis, Retired Past  
Executive Director  
Los Angeles County and  
Cities Disaster Commission

## DISASTER READINESS

Details of preparation for disaster. I think the first thing that should be considered is the threat. What type of disaster is most likely to affect your city. Certainly we should include earthquakes in this category. Seismic sea waves may strike a coastal community but poses no threat to an inland city. Brush fires are a threat for some, but not for others. An airplane may fall anywhere, but certainly the jurisdiction within the flight pattern of a busy airport faces a greater danger than one more remote. We should go down the list - landslides, explosions, train wrecks, chemical accidents, nuclear accidents, air pollution. We should not overlook riots. After all, what happened in New York and Philadelphia not too long ago was certainly in the nature of disaster. The plans and preparations made should be directed to the various dangers that face the city.

### Legislative Preparation

As mentioned previously, the California Disaster Act and the California Master Mutual Aid Agreement provide for assistance between jurisdictions in California. To become fully accredited by the State Disaster Council it is necessary that governing bodies enact a civil defense ordinance and pass three resolutions, of which models are readily available. I might add that the ordinance and one resolution pertain to civil defense, one resolution to Workmen's Compensation and one constitutes agreement to abide by the provisions of the California Master Mutual Aid Agreement. Most jurisdictions in California have accompanied this step. Probably less than 10% have not done so.

Next is a disaster operations plan. I feel that you can cover both natural and war-caused disasters in the same plan. Above all, the plan should be realistic and meaningful. I, for one, feel that great volume is not necessarily indicative of a good plan. But in any case, have a plan. I have often heard it stated that a poor plan well executed will produce better results than a good plan, poorly executed.

Provide for effective use of your existing staff. The same people that carry on day-to-day business must carry the load in a disaster.

Provide clear lines of direction and coordination.

Be sure that key positions are kept filled and that alternates are available.

It may be necessary to notify key people of an emergency quickly. Provide for a telephone fan-out system and also an alternate system of notification if telephones are inoperative.

Have a place from which to operate. Call it an emergency operating center, a disaster headquarters, or whatever you like. Designate or provide for some alternate sites. After all, we cannot predict where disaster will strike.

## DISASTER READINESS, Continued

Provide for staffing and equipping your headquarters. Remember that when disaster strikes, power may be disrupted. If you have not provided for emergency power, at least be able to put your hands on some lanterns, and some mobile communications units.

Disaster operations plans are supplemented by standing operating procedures for your staff and for each emergency service. These go into detail, not practical in a plan. Review these periodically and keep them up to date.

You may have to expand quickly your purchasing and contracting activities. Keep on hand a current commodity price list or index, purchase order forms, requisition forms, etc.

Be prepared to account for non-recurring, unbudgeted disaster and emergency costs.

Pre-stock certain emergency supplies. This should include, but not necessarily be limited to:

- Activity log forms for the staff and services.
- Model disaster proclamation forms.
- Official forms to identify individuals and vehicles.
- Permit forms to pass police lines.
- Special maps to show storm drains, services, water mains, etc.
- Posters and signs to warn or direct the public. ("Danger," "Keep Out," "Detour," etc.)
- Office supplies and map posting materials.

Preplan prompt centralized release to information and instructions to the public and close cooperation with the news media.

Arrange for photographic coverage to document the disaster situation and operations. I would like to mention at this time the very excellent film that Leland Cunn has put together of the Bakersfield earthquake.

Have a current directory of local, State and Federal disaster relief sources and contacts.

Understand, coordinate and preplan emergency rolse of the American Red Cross and other local and private agencies.

Encourage school district to sign agreements with Red Cross authorizing emergency use of school plants as mass care centers.

Finally, I might say that your plans, your standing operating procedures, all your material preparations must not be a one-shot affair. They are not something that can be made and then put aside to collect dust. Keep them up to date, revise them constantly based upon your experience and the experience of others. Keep them alive.

I have restricted my remarks to preparations for disaster, following quite closely the first portion of our "Administrators' Check List" entitled, "Disaster Readiness." We have extended this check list through two following phases, When Disaster Strikes and Recovery and Rehabilitation.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY AND CITIES

DISASTER RELIEF MANUAL

ANNEX 3

ADMINISTRATORS' CHECK LIST

for

Non-War Disasters in Los Angeles County

- Introduction -

The check list has been prepared as a general guide to assist administrative or executive heads of governments within Los Angeles County in preparing for and coping with major disasters not caused by war. Key personnel of public authorities, districts and departments concerned with emergency operations may also find pertinent portions useful. It is divided into three sections:

- A. Disaster Readiness
- B. When Disaster Strikes
- C. Recovery and Rehabilitation

This check list is not all-inclusive, but it points out certain generally applicable and accepted management actions to facilitate disaster planning and efficient operations under varying circumstances. It has been compiled from a study of similar check lists, disaster reports and discussions with individuals experienced in emergency operations. The general basis, authority and guidance for disaster planning and operations are contained in the California Disaster Act, Master Mutual Aid Agreement, and the State Civil Defense and Disaster Plan; the Los Angeles County and Cities Disaster Relief Manual; and legislation and operational plans of the County of Los Angeles and the cities concerned.

Each political jurisdiction should enact the necessary legislation, develop an appropriate emergency organization and have a current operational plan and standard operating procedures to mobilize and employ effectively public and private resources during emergencies. The staff of the Disaster and Civil Defense Commission is prepared to assist jurisdictions in a staff capacity in both pre-disaster planning and during disaster operations.

A. DISASTER READINESS

Check, as  
Applicable

1. Types of Disaster

Determine the types of disaster which could seriously affect your jurisdiction and consider the needs of each in planning and preparations:

- Earthquake
- Seismic sea wave (tsunami)
- Brush or forest fire
- Petroleum or gasoline fire
- Flood
- Land slide
- Aircraft accident
- Train Wreck
- Explosion
- Chemical accident

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

- Nuclear accident
- Air pollution
- Epidemic
- Riot
- Other

Check, as  
Applicable

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

2. Legislative Preparation

As a minimum, the following should be adopted, maintained current and three copies of each furnished to the State (via CDO Region I):

- Ordinance, Civil Defense and Disasters
- Resolution, Civil Defense and Disasters
- Resolution, Workmen's Compensation
- Resolution, Master Mutual Aid Agreement

Adopted      Copies to  
                  Region I

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Check, as  
Applicable

3. Disaster Operations Plan

(Note: May be incorporated in Civil Defense Operations Plan for war-caused emergencies.)

- Basic plan prepared and current
- Appendices and annexes current
- Provides for disasters checked in 1, above
- Reviewed by Disaster and Civil Defense Commission
- Approved by State (CDO)
- Copies furnished (two to Commission, three to CDO Region I)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

4. Disaster Organization

- Plan effective use of existing staff
- Provide clear lines of direction and coordination
- Designate key personnel assignments
- Designate sufficient alternates to key personnel
- Assign emergency duties
- Insure that personnel understand disaster duties
- Properly register volunteer disaster service workers
- Fill vacant key positions

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

5. Emergency Notification System

It will be necessary to reach many people quickly. Normal telephone service may fail, or key personnel may be away from their offices or homes.

- Prescribe a telephone fan-out system
- Base it on a 24-hour office or service
- Include alternate key personnel
- Prescribe alternate system of notification
- Instruct key personnel to report promptly when information of a local disaster is received by radio, TV or other means
- Test and improve the emergency notification system

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

6. Emergency Operating Center (Disaster Control Headquarters)

- Designate Emergency Operating Center site
- Designate alternate EOC sites
- Provide reliable land line communications
- Arrange emergency radio communications
- Designate initial personnel cadre staffing
- Assign headquarters space, by function
- Assign records and reports functions
- Provide situation maps and charts
- Provide EOC equipment, supplies and forms

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

7. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)

- SOPs for each service prepared and current
- SOP or manual for staff and EOC operations prepared and current
- SOPs provide for disasters checked in 1, above

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

8. Emergency Supplies and Assistance

Pre-disaster planning and preparations are necessary to meet the sudden and greatly increased requirements and to facilitate efficient operations.

a. Disaster Procurement and Expenses

Insure that purchasing, contracting and auditing operations can be rapidly expanded and expedited

\_\_\_\_\_

Have on hand:

- Purchase order forms
- Complete, current commodity price list or index
- Requisition forms
- Standard contract forms
- "Plan Bulldozer" contract forms
- Establish system to account for and report non-recurring, unbudgeted disaster and emergency costs as they occur (separate from normal day-to-day expenses)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Check, as  
Applicable

b. Pre-Stock Emergency Supplies

- Activity log forms, for staff and services \_\_\_\_\_
- Model Disaster proclamation forms \_\_\_\_\_
- Official forms to identify individuals and vehicles \_\_\_\_\_
- Permit forms, to pass police lines \_\_\_\_\_
- Special purpose maps showing storm drains, sewers,  
water supply, etc. \_\_\_\_\_
- Office supplies and map-posting materials \_\_\_\_\_
- Posters and signs to warn or direct the public ("Danger,"  
"Keep Out," "Detour," etc.) \_\_\_\_\_

c. Pre-Plan Additional Needs

- Arrange prompt centralized release of information and  
instructions to the public and close cooperation with  
news media (radio, TV and newspapers) \_\_\_\_\_
- Arrange photographic coverage to document the disaster  
situation and operations \_\_\_\_\_
- Have current directory of local, State and Federal  
disaster relief resources and contacts (see Annex 2  
to Los Angeles County and Cities Disaster Relief Manual) \_\_\_\_\_
- Understand, coordinate and pre-plan emergency roles of  
the American Red Cross and other local private and  
public welfare agencies \_\_\_\_\_
- Encourage School Districts to sign agreements with  
Red Cross authorizing emergency use of school  
facilities as mass care centers \_\_\_\_\_
- Pre-plan emergency use of any other appropriate resources \_\_\_\_\_

d. Mutual Aid and Other Assistance

The Los Angeles County and Cities Disaster Relief Manual  
is designed to assist jurisdictions.

Have copies of the following on hand:

- The above manual \_\_\_\_\_
- Local Mutual Aid Agreements \_\_\_\_\_

Insure that key personnel generally understand:

- Roles and functions of agencies concerned \_\_\_\_\_
- Principles of self-help and mutual aid \_\_\_\_\_
- Sources of assistance (Annex 2 to Manual) \_\_\_\_\_
- Mutual Aid to assist other jurisdictions \_\_\_\_\_
- State and Federal assistance generally is requested  
only when local resources are inadequate \_\_\_\_\_

9. Readiness

Disasters strike with little or no warning. Current, thorough preparedness  
and close teamwork are the keys to prompt and efficient disaster operations  
and recovery. Changes occur in personnel, resources and requirements. Periodic  
review and evaluation of readiness are necessary.



Check, as  
Applicable

Orient key personnel and issue initial instructions:

Confirm emergency assignments; stress teamwork

Announce primary tasks and stress government responsibility to:

Save lives and property

Keep the public informed (3, below)

Start and maintain activity logs indicating time and nature of information received, messages received and sent, actions taken, instructions issued, and requests and reports made

Develop the situation and anticipate needs:

Collect and evaluate situation reports

Identify and anticipate critical problem areas

Compare needs to available resources

Determine if assistance may be needed (4, below)

Insure adequate manning of EOC:

Continuously, 24 hours per day, if necessary

Overlap briefings of successive personnel

### 3. Public Information

Public understanding and support are essential. Keep the public informed of the situation, of actions taken and of what they should or should not do.

Promptly establish a central information service to:

Answer public inquiries

Verify data with services concerned

Provide liaison with and facilities for news media

Assist news media in obtaining information

Meet with news media representatives

Establish mutual cooperation in public interest

Stress necessity of authenticating facts before release

In releasing information to the general public:

Present a factual picture of the situation and operations

Stress teamwork among the disaster services

Issue clear, simple instructions for the public, e.g.:

Stay away from disaster area

Monitor local radio or TV for information

Use telephone only for emergency calls

Release names of disaster dead only through the County

Chief Medical Examiner-Coroner

Avoid blanket appeals for volunteers or assistance;

experience shows that such appeals usually backfire

Other information or instructions given the public will depend on the situation, e.g. evacuation of danger areas, location of mass care centers, water supply, use of highways, etc.

### 4. Mutual Aid and Other Assistance

First, use own resources, the Red Cross and other emergency, welfare or contract services to the maximum. As soon as it is clear that available resources are inadequate:

Check, as  
Applicable

\*Alert agencies from whom assistance may be requested  
Coordinate and determine actual assistance needed  
Make specific requests to appropriate sources

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

5. Governing Authority

Issue local disaster proclamation (see Annex 1, Compendium of  
Legislation, for samples)

Request State/Federal disaster proclamations if situation  
warrants

Impose emergency curfew, if necessary

Suspend liquor sales, if advisable

Forbid verbal contracts, authorize use of predrawn standard  
contracts and establish or confirm authority for signing  
contracts

If Federal assistance under Public Law 875 is involved and the  
President has declared a "major disaster," adopt appropriate  
resolutions (see OEP Circular 4000.4, Natural Disaster Manual  
for State and Local Applicants):

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

For Financial assistance, designating the individual  
authorized to act for the jurisdiction (see  
sample, page 19)

For direct assistance, requesting OEP to arrange  
emergency work (see sample, page 39)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

6. Keep Records

Insure that accurate records are maintained to document the disaster  
situation, its effects, actions taken and reasons therefore, including:

Chronological staff and service activity logs

Estimates of damage

Resources employed

Contracts made

Mutual aid or assistance requested/provided

Financial expenditures and obligations

Photographs, motion pictures and news media coverage

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

7. Continuing Direction and Coordination

The situation may change rapidly until it is stabilized. Be alert  
and flexible; expect the unexpected. Utilities may be disrupted  
suddenly, partially or gradually; flood waters may trigger fires or  
explosions; and earthquake after-shocks may be more damaging than  
initial shocks. Incorrect reports may cause panic or diversion of  
needed resources.

\*See Annex 2 to Los Angeles County and Cities Disaster Relief Manual. Do not attempt  
to short cut channels in requesting assistance; such action invariably results in  
confusion and actual delay.

Check, as  
Applicable

- Maintain a firm position of leadership \_\_\_\_\_
- Direct and coordinate inter-service activities \_\_\_\_\_
- Depend on service chiefs and key personnel \_\_\_\_\_
- Delegate tasks and avoid minor details \_\_\_\_\_
- Hold staff conferences, as necessary \_\_\_\_\_
- Insure that objectives are being reached \_\_\_\_\_
- Insure that resources are correctly applied \_\_\_\_\_
- Analyze current and potential problem areas \_\_\_\_\_
- Maintain liaison and coordinate with other jurisdictions involved \_\_\_\_\_
- Verify reports of new or worsened situations \_\_\_\_\_
- Adjust resources to most critical needs \_\_\_\_\_
- Keep disaster services, other agencies and the public informed \_\_\_\_\_

C. RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION

1. Safety and Security

- Continue emergency and relief operations \_\_\_\_\_
- Maintain surveillance of disaster area \_\_\_\_\_
- Maintain controlled access to disaster area \_\_\_\_\_
- Initiate public health and building inspections \_\_\_\_\_
- Permit reoccupation of areas only after safety is verified and  
    other inspections are completed \_\_\_\_\_

2. Public Information and Assistance

- Continue to keep the public informed \_\_\_\_\_
- Establish a center where individuals and business representatives  
    can obtain information on claims, rehabilitation and financial  
    assistance (Red Cross, Small Business Administration, etc.) \_\_\_\_\_

3. Administrative Matters

- Go to bid on project contracts as soon as possible \_\_\_\_\_
- Continue activity logs until disaster is officially declared  
    terminated \_\_\_\_\_
- Maintain complete and factual records (they may be needed for  
    State or Federal assistance) \_\_\_\_\_

4. Return to Normal

- As soon as they become marginal or unnecessary:
  - Release volunteer help and outside assistance \_\_\_\_\_
  - Phase down emergency services \_\_\_\_\_
  - Return equipment and supplies \_\_\_\_\_
  - Withdraw restrictive ordinances and resolutions \_\_\_\_\_
  - Reduce or remove restrictions on disaster area \_\_\_\_\_

5. Reports

- Report, by month, any non-budgeted disaster or emergency costs to:
  - The Disaster and Civil Defense Commission for consolidation  
    and forwarding to Region I \_\_\_\_\_
- Analyze disaster operations objectively and
  - Prepare a summary report for official records \_\_\_\_\_
  - Initiate appropriate measures to improve readiness \_\_\_\_\_

# SUGGESTED DISASTER OPERATIONS CHART FOR THE CITY MANAGER OR THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER

By ROBERT O. BAILEY  
City Manager, Chico



Reprinted from WESTERN CITY MAGAZINE

# SUGGESTED DISASTER OPERATIONS CHART

## FOR THE CITY MANAGER OR THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER

By ROBERT O. BAILEY  
City Manager, Chico

In the United States, since World War II, each special facet of civil defense or natural disaster has been developed in detail and described at length. Carloads of paper, drums of ink have gone into this outpouring of minute instructions to every operational phase of civil defense. The harried city manager or chief administrative officer each year has waded through reams of publications directed to service heads searching for the few grains of information of value to him in his normal role as city director of civil defense. The following Disaster Operations Chart represents an attempt to incorporate administrative gleanings from civil defense literature with actual disaster operations experience at Yuba City.

Used with common sense as a guide, not as a set of rules, it may be useful if you have made your advance preparations for disaster operation as suggested in the first column.

Note the central column closely. The important steps required are set in heavy type. The second chart is a breakdown of the basic assignments or type of assignments which should be worked out with service department heads as disaster preparation for which administrators delegate authority to complete under Part VII.

ADVANCE PREPARATION	WHEN DISASTER STRIKES	PRELIMINARY MOP-UP
<p>I. Plan location and tentative layout of C.D. Headquarters sites. Establish priority list for H.Q. sites so key personnel will know where to report if communications are out.</p> <p>Special needs: 1. Preinstalled telephone trunk lines. 2. Room for bulk C.D. form storage for all services. Keep stocked.</p>	<p>I. Determine what H.Q. sites are available. Choose best available site. Proceed to H.Q. immediately.</p>	<p>I. Move to better site later if necessary and possible.</p>
<p>II. Construct C.D. organization on cadre (key personnel) basis:</p> <p>A. Appoint as many C.D. service heads as possible from your own department heads or other payrolls which will make C.D. disaster preparation part of their normal job responsibility. This includes continuous training of present and new employees. Choose alternates from natural leaders in community (business or labor).</p>	<p>II. Your service heads are working in familiar territory with familiar supervisor and trained organization. Alternates can understudy on job preparatory to relieving service head. Allow 2 hour cushion.</p>	<p>II. Your service head and his trained dept. will be there when the volunteers fade away to normal routine.</p>
<p>III. Prearrange operational relationships with military units, National Guard. Keep current. Personnel changes.</p>	<p>III. Alert on telephone fanout. (See V.). Request they stand by. NOTE! Do not call out National Guard directly. It may cost you \$50,000. Request through C. D. regional office. Exhaust mutual aid first.</p>	<p>III. Deactivate immediately. They become marginal.</p>
<p>IV. Prearrange an expanded purchasing and auditing operation. Supply and service needs are phenomenal in disaster.</p> <p>Special needs:</p> <p>A. Supply of purchase orders and requisition forms. B. Commodity Price Index and list of special supplies immediately necessary.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Flashlights, batteries, candles.</li> <li>2. Paper-toilet, towel and clerical supply.</li> <li>3. Sandbags and sand (check with Public Works).</li> </ol>	<p>IV. Activate on telephone fanout (See V.).</p> <p>A. Use as necessary. B. Use last price shown, if any.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Purchase immediately.</li> <li>2. If indicated.</li> <li>3. Check supply immediately.</li> </ol>	<p>IV. Good records will expedite reimbursement, preserve fiscal control.</p>
<p>V. Establish telephone fanout for key personnel. Keep current.</p>	<p>V. Start telephone fanout from PD giving H. Q. location and type of disaster to key personnel including operational area H.Q. and regional C.D.</p>	<p>V. _____</p>
<p>VI. Procure supply of activity log forms. Write C.D. for sample.</p>	<p>VI. Start your activity log. You may need it for the grand jury. Include time, contents, circumstances, information received or released, orders received, decisions made, actions initiated. Check or verify wherever possible.</p>	<p>VI. Continue activity log.</p>

**SUGGESTED SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS and DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY  
by CITY MANAGER TO SERVICE HEADS IN DISASTER OPERATIONS**

**DELEGATION TO POLICE SERVICE**

ADVANCE PREPARATION	WHEN DISASTER STRIKES	PRELIMINARY MOP-UP
I. Build screened, trained Police Reserve. Make certain your Police Chief has studied the C.D. Law Enforcement Services Operational Plan, understands it, uses it, trains old and new personnel.	I. A. Police Chief stay at H.Q. and: Start P.D. activity log. B. Mobilize regulars and reserves. C. Be alert for panic control and psychos. D. Request mutual aid through manager. E. Set up traffic control including sightseer road-block. F. Establish devastated area security cordon and patrol. G. Freeze all liquor supplies. H. Make daily written report to manager—progress and needs.	I. A. Continue activity log. B. Release reserves promptly. C. _____ D. Rotate mutual aid officers. E. Maintain road-block. F. Maintain cordon. G. Continue liquor freeze.
II. Print security passes.	II. Issue temporary and permanent security passes.	II. Continue pass system
III. Plan with Police Chief the regulation of: A. Disaster outlet stores. B. Unlicensed contractors. C. Unlicensed cleanup services. D. Looters.	III. _____	III. Require business license for all contractors, service trades, damaged merchandise sales. P.D. must cruise and check continuously.
IV. Pinpoint critical installations (in case of attack).	IV. Immediately protect (in case of attack).	IV. Continue protection until relieved by military.

**DELEGATION TO PUBLIC WORKS**

ADVANCE PREPARATION	WHEN DISASTER STRIKES	PRELIMINARY MOP-UP
I. Analyze area potential for natural disaster. Example: flood, earthquake, windstorm, conflagration, explosion.	I. Alert organization: A. Request mutual aid through manager. B. Relay vital information to manager. C. Keep activity log of time, messages, orders, decisions and actions initiated. D. Submit daily report of needs and progress to manager.	I. A. Request additional mutual aid through mgr. as needed. B. Continue. C. Continue. D. Continue.
II. Floods are most common. A. Levee vital utility installations, if necessary. B. Locate sandbag and sand supply. C. Prepare topographic overlay for utility base maps for flood analysis. D. Locate source of portable chemical toilets. E. Have supply of base maps or current negatives to furnish maps to Public Works, Police, U.S. Engineers, others.	II. A. Sandbag vital facilities if levees insufficient. B. Procure sandbag and sand supply. C. Protect utilities, if possible. 1. Sandbag manholes in potential flooded area. 2. Seal off units of water & gas system? (check with Fire Chief). 3. Pull switch on threatened electrical system? D. Order chemical toilets if sewer is out. Check with Health Service. E. Print map supply, if necessary. Deliver supply to Police immediately.	II. A. Restore utilities—fast. 1. Check with health service. 2. Ration water? D. Return promptly, save rental. E. Request progress maps from all mop up services.
III. Plan building condemnation procedure. A. Procure supply of building condemnation posters.	III. _____	III. Request building inspection mutual aid to inspect structural damage and condemn unsafe buildings. Reinspect several times. They continue to deteriorate. Post unsafe buildings.
IV. Keep inventory of portable generators.	IV. Requisition portable generators as necessary for all night work or communication. Keep careful records.	IV. Return generators promptly.
V. Make heavy and special equipment inventory. Keep current including roster of operators. Plan marshalling point.	V. Estimate needs—requisition—do not forget fuel.	V. Deactivate when use becomes marginal.
VI. _____	VI. _____	VI. Restrict traffic to as few inundated streets as possible to allow subgrade to dry.

**DELEGATION TO COMMUNICATIONS**

ADVANCE PREPARATION	WHEN DISASTER STRIKES	PRELIMINARY MOP-UP
I. Plan and install extra telephone trunk lines necessary for disaster plan.	I. _____	I. _____
II. Inventory supplemental telephones necessary to install to service disaster plan. A. Plan C.D. telephone priority.	II. Order telephone installations as needed on pre-installed trunks and elsewhere. A. Arrange C.D. telephone priority.	II. Take out phones as marginal. A. Continue while necessary.
III. Install auxiliary power service adequate for radio and necessity lighting (Have Fire Dept. maintain).	III. Check auxiliary power source. Use if needed.	III. _____
IV. Establish public warning system. (For attack alert only).	IV. Use for attack alert only.	IV. After attack teach public the signal system again. They will pay attention now!
IVa Install teletype in Police Dept.	IVa Use when necessary. Keep copy for log.	IVa Continue.
V. Establish telephone fanout to service heads and key figures. Keep it current!	V. Telephone fanout will be activated from Police Dept.	V. Keep fanout list to date.
VI. Obtain and store ample supply of C.D. Communication Log. Order from C.D.	VI. All communication services used should keep message log.	VI. Continue message logs.
VII. Inventory and keep current all non-commercial radio systems in area. Arrange for use. Examples: C.H.P., Div. of Highways, Div of Forestry, taxis, construction firms, C.A.P. (radio and direct observation).	VII. Alert non-commercial radio systems to stand by: A. Keep Health Service and Welfare off radio until emergency traffic control is complete. B. Transmit only written messages including time. C. Write down all messages received. D. Use C.A.P. for direct observation, if necessary.	VII. Deactivate when marginal. B. Continue procedure. C. Continue procedure.
VIII. Locate walkie-talkie supply. (National Guard military base, large city, regional C.D.).	VIII. Procure and issue walkie-talkies. Record issuance and return.	VIII. Return walkie-talkies promptly (they disappear).
IX. Inventory mobile PA systems. Arrange for use.	IX. Analyze need. Use if radio-TV is out of order or in case of attack.	IX. Use as needed.
X. Plan courier system using: A. Mailmen (excellent). B. Motorcycle clubs. C. Boy Scouts.	X. Alert and use as needed.	X. Release promptly.

**DELEGATION TO TRANSPORTATION SERVICE**

ADVANCE PREPARATION	WHEN DISASTER STRIKES	PRELIMINARY MOP-UP
I. Appoint trained transportation dispatcher as service head or alternate.	I. Alert organization. Estimate needs. Marshal appropriate vehicles at equipment pool.	I. _____
III. Plan equipment pool with Public Works & Evac. and Welfare. It may take more than one type yard. Special need: 1. Supply appropriate forms. 2. Mechanics with tools.	II. A. Operate only on requisition from manager's office. B. Issue on basis of need. C. Supply your own drivers. (Strangers could steal the equipment). D. Keep fuel mileage, repair records.	III. Continue while needed.
III. Inventory transportation supply in area.	III. _____	III. _____

**DELEGATION TO WOMEN'S CIVIL DEFENSE COUNCIL**

ADVANCE PREPARATION	WHEN DISASTER STRIKES	PRELIMINARY MOP-UP
I. Organize and train a women's group consisting of representatives of womens organizations. Keep it active and interested with: A. Programs. B. Work assignments. C. Responsibility.	I. Alert organization. A. Furnish executive, clerical, nursing, cooking, child care, evacuee housing wherever necessary.	I. Release promptly when possible.

APPENDIX 7

(DISCUSSION DRAFT ONLY)

Alternative Organizational Models for  
the Disaster Mitigation Function  
in the Los Angeles area

1. City-County Joint Powers Agreement: to include Los Angeles County, City of Los Angeles, and as many other cities in Los Angeles County as can be persuaded to join. The joint powers agreement would set up a governing or coordinating body, specify its powers and relations to jurisdictions, and specify a funding formula.
2. County District Plan:  
Variant A: district entire county, including territory in the City of Los Angeles, county coordinator within each district.  
Variant B: district entire county, excluding City of Los Angeles, which constitutes a separate district, or is itself divided into districts, county coordinators function only within county districts.
3. Sub-County Regions: divide county into clusters of cities with common disaster interests (e.g., flood-prone cities, coastal cities, etc.), designate lead city within each cluster, county provides technical assistance, evaluations, etc.
4. Metropolitan/Regional Disaster Mitigation District: to cover area larger than Los Angeles County, to be set up by intercounty joint powers agreement.
5. Intergovernmental Cooperation Model: coordinated planning by Los Angeles County, City of Los Angeles, other cities; operations to continue within separate jurisdictions.
6. Local Control: over planning and operations, technical assistance from County.

APPENDIX 8

Legal Basis for  
Civil Defense Areas D, E and G  
of Los Angeles County  
(Civil Defense Area Map Attached)

**Overview:** Because Los Angeles County includes so many jurisdictions, it was divided into seven Areas for civil defense coordination purposes in the 1950's. In Areas D, E and G, the County and Cities later joined in formal joint powers agreements to improve emergency preparedness on a cooperative and economical basis. Participating members contribute annually to Area costs. These Area organizations and their small staffs have essentially the same legal basis, but they have different backgrounds, needs and methods of getting the job done.

Areas A, B, C and F do not have joint powers agreements and the cities in those Areas do not contribute to an Area organization. However, there are designated Area Coordinators for these four unfunded Areas who do some coordinative work with the cities in the unfunded Areas.


**State Law:** The three existing Civil Defense Area's joint powers agreements are established under the joint powers law (California Government Code, Section 6500 et seq.). It permits cities, counties and other public agencies by agreement to jointly exercise any power common to the contracting parties and to provide for the method of accomplishing the purpose. The administering agency is considered a public entity, separate from the parties.

**Area Organization and Functions:** The current Area D, E and G agreements, prepared by Los Angeles County Counsel to meet local needs, recognize the need for civil defense and disaster preparations, coordinated local planning, cooperative action and skilled professional personnel. The member jurisdictions specifically retain their responsibility and power to protect against the loss of life and property. The member cities establish an Area Board representing each participating jurisdiction, with responsibilities for policy, finance and employees. The Area Board elects its chairman. The Board or its appointed Area Executive Officer or Area Coordinator perform such duties as:

- Public information and public relations services
- Data on public and private resources
- Preparation of emergency plans for cities, schools, hospitals and industry
- Coordination of volunteer services
- Liaison with other offices and organizations
- Advice and coordination for operational services
- Other necessary or convenient coordinating services

The agreements also provide for payment of costs by shares according to population (and assessed valuation in Area G), and for the accountability of funds, preparation of annual budgets, and rights of withdrawal. The policy of the County Board of Supervisors is to participate when a majority of the cities in an Area are contributing members.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY CIVIL DEFENSE AREAS



SEE ATTACHED SHEET

AREA "A"

Beverly Hills  
Culver City  
Hidden Hills  
Los Angeles  
San Fernando  
Santa Monica

AREA "B"

All unincorporated area  
Avalon  
Catalina Island  
Palmdale  
Lancaster

AREA "C"

Alhambra  
Arcadia  
Burbank  
La Canada/**Flintridge**  
Glendale  
Monterey Park  
Pasadena  
San Gabriel  
San Marino  
Sierra Madre  
So. Pasadena

AREA "D"

Azusa  
Baldwin Park  
Bradbury  
Claremont  
Covina  
Duarte  
El Monte  
Glendora  
Industry  
Irwindale  
La Puente  
La Verne  
Monrovia  
Pomona  
Rosemead  
San Dimas  
South El Monte  
Temple City  
Walnut  
West Covina

AREA "E"

Artesia  
Bell  
Bellflower  
Bell Gardens  
Carson  
Cerritos  
Commerce  
Compton  
Cudahy  
Downey  
Hawaiian Gardens  
Huntington Park  
Lakewood  
La Habra Heights  
La Mirada  
Lynwood  
Maywood  
Montebello  
Norwalk  
Paramount  
Pico Rivera  
Santa Fe Springs  
South Gate  
Vernon  
Whittier

AREA "F"

Long Beach  
Signal Hill

AREA "G"

El Segundo  
Gardena  
Hawthorne  
Hermosa Beach  
Inglewood  
Lawndale  
Lomita  
Manhattan Beach  
Palos Verdes Estates  
Redondo Beach  
Rolling Hills  
Rolling Hills Estates  
Rancho Palos Verdes  
Torrance

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1967

February 12, 1979

Memo: Notes for Consideration at Public Safety Sub-Committee Meeting,  
February 13, 1979

From: Murray Brown  
University of Southern California, Office of Program Development

The following are some of the items raised at the January 25th meeting of the Public Safety Committee to be considered in any resolution of the OES-related problem:

Conditions:

- 1) Build upon "strengths of existing system" rather than introducing new structures.
- 2) Operate within home rule concepts, recognizing the necessity for regional responsibilities.
- 3) Consideration must be given to the proper funding of any reorganization within the county.

Alternatives (as expressed by January 24th participants):

Consensus appeared on the following of Dr. Mars' six options, basically a mix between:

"Sub-County Regions: Divide the county into clusters of cities with common disaster interests (e.g., flood prone cities, coastal cities, etc.), designate lead city within each cluster, county provides technical assistance, evaluations, etc." AND

"City-County Joint Powers Agreement: To include Los Angeles County, City of Los Angeles, and as many other cities in Los Angeles County as can be persuaded to join. JPA would set up a governing or coordinating body, specify the powers and relations to jurisdictions, and specify a funding formula."

Application of Conditions to Above Proposals

- 1) "Build Upon Current Strengths." Current Los Angeles operational areas organize the cities into seven areas (see History). These are generally the foothill cities, South Bay cities, the Pasadena, Glendale and Burbank grouping, and the central county cities. Los Angeles City and County are in separate areas.

Area G is generally considered to be operational and effective. One of the possible reasons is the existence of a multi-city joint communication system.

Since the groupings by area appear to be logically determined, current concern should be directed toward seeking methods to strengthen the others. Areas have such potential as indicated in conversations with local officials.

- 2) "Lead City Concept." Several such possibilities exist in each of the areas by virtue of size, existence of an EOC and current P & A funding.

Example: Downey could fit all three criteria and also is lead city in the formation of creating a five-city Joint Communication Center. Might be considered for the lead city designation in Area E.

- 3) "Joint Powers Agreement." JPAs now exist in all of the areas (though not all cities have signed and there has been uneven enforcement of its provisions). These documents could serve as the enabling legislation within each area. Attention will have to be given to reacquainting cities with its purpose and provisions.

The JPAs provide for appointment of one representative from each member city to be a member of the Area Disaster Board.


Recommendation 1: The area representative from each city shall be the city manager or assistant city manager.

JPA also provides for the appointment of an Area Executive Officer, if desired, to report to the Board and defines these duties.

- 4) "Governing or Coordinating Body." Los Angeles County Disaster Preparedness Commission has served the purpose of review and coordination for many years. There is a need to: assure the involvement and commitment of the legislative officers and administrators in the process and to improve the coordinating capability of the Commission.


Recommendation 2: That the current tri-partite representation on the Commission be continued. Each jurisdiction shall appoint: 1) A legislative officer (or his deputy); 2) An administrative officer (or deputy); and, 3) A department head (or deputy).

Recommendation 3: Advising the Commission shall be a committee of the seven Area Coordinators.



Recommendation 4: JPAs shall be signed between the areas and the Commission defining relationships, duties and funding.

Los Angeles Office  
 900 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 702  
 Los Angeles 90017  
 624-4934



**PRESIDENT**

Dr. Thomas Clark  
 Mayor  
 Long Beach

**FIRST VICE PRESIDENT**

Betty Wilson  
 Council Member  
 Santa Fe Springs

**SECOND VICE PRESIDENT**

Charles E. Gilb  
 Council Member  
 Arcadia

**TREASURER**

Wilfred L. Simendinger  
 Council Member  
 La Mirada

**STATE LEAGUE DIRECTOR**

Richard Nagel  
 Council Member  
 El Segundo

**RECORDING SECRETARY**

Bernice Cooper  
 Secretary to Mayor  
 Long Beach

February 28, 1979

TO: PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE MEMBERS  
 FROM: Gary Adams, Vice-Chairman  
 RE: USC Emergency Preparedness Grant Recommendations

At the last Public Safety Committee meeting of November 7, 1978, the Committee was informed that the Office of Emergency Services had awarded a Grant to USC for the purpose of developing a prototype Emergency Preparedness Agreement. In an effort to identify the position of cities, as to whether or not such a program is needed or desired by cities in Los Angeles County; CJPU Staff was directed to work with USC in setting a date and developing necessary materials for a work-day workshop.

Public Safety Committee Workshop

The Public Safety Committee held a workshop on January 25, 1979; Committee members, as well as other involved City administrators and League representatives, heard presentations by local, State, and Federal Emergency Preparedness officials as to the current status of Emergency Preparedness in Los Angeles County. These presentations were followed by extensive discussion of the group; the general concerns and issues at the conclusion of that meeting, relative to a new prototype agreement, were captured in the following conditions.

Conditions:

1. Build upon "strengths of existing system" rather than introducing new structures.
2. Operate within home rule concepts, recognizing the necessity for regional responsibilities.
3. Consideration must be given to the proper funding of any re-organization within the County.

Furthermore, several alternative organizational models for Disaster Mitigation Function in Los Angeles County were introduced. Of these proposed models, the Committee, through general consensus, approved the following Proposals:

- Proposal 1 - "Sub-County Regions: divide the county into clusters of cities with common disaster interests (e.g., flood-prone cities, coastal cities, etc), designate lead city within each cluster, county provides technical assistance, evaluations, etc."
- Proposal 2 - "City-County Joint Powers Agreement: to include LA county, city of LA, and as many other cities in LA county as can be persuaded to join. Joint Power Agreements would set up a governing or coordinating body, specify the powers and relations to jurisdictions, and specify a funding formula."

Subsequent to the January 25, 1979 workshop, Public Safety Committee Vice-Chairman Gary Adams, appointed a Sub-Committee (as follows) to work with Staff and USC in developing concise and definitive recommendations upon which the full Public Safety Committee could review and take action.

Sub-Committee

Gary Adams, Councilman	Sierra Madre
Jim Bale, Police Chief	Whittier
Mel Bailey, Public Safety Coordinator	Carson
John Gerard, Fire Chief	Los Angeles City
Carl Calkins, Police Chief	Long Beach
Ed Ferraro, City Manager	Torrance

The Sub-Committee met on February 15, 1979, and with the assistance of USC staff integrated the above conditions and model proposals into the following rationale and recommendations:

RATIONALE

Current LA Operational Areas organize the cities into 7 areas. These are generally the foothill cities, South Bay cities, the Pasadena, Glendale and Burbank grouping, and the central county cities. LA city and county are in separate areas. Since the groupings by area appear to be logically determined, current concern should be directed toward seeking methods to strengthen the others.


"Joint Powers Agreement" JPA's now exist in all of the Areas (though not all cities have signed, and there has been uneven enforcement of its provisions). These documents could serve as the enabling legislation within each Area.

The JPA's provide for appointment of one representative from each member city to be a member of the Area Disaster Board, and provide for the appointment of an Area Executive Officer to report to the Board and defines these duties.


"Governing or Coordinating Body" Los Angeles County Disaster Preparedness Commission has served the purpose of review and coordination for many years. There is a need to: assure the involvement and commitment of the legislative officers and administrators in the process and to improve the coordinating capability of the Commission.

RECOMMENDATIONS


1. RECOMMENDATION: THE AREA REPRESENTATIVE FROM EACH CITY SHALL BE THE CITY MANAGER OR ASSISTANT CITY MANAGER.
2. RECOMMENDATION: THAT THE CURRENT TRI-PARTITE REPRESENTATION ON THE COMMISSION BE CONTINUED. EACH JURISDICTION SHALL APPOINT (1) LEGISLATIVE OFFICER (OR HIS DEPUTY), (2) AN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER (OR DEPUTY), AND (3) A DEPARTMENT HEAD (OR DEPUTY).
3. RECOMMENDATION: ADVISING THE COMMISSION SHALL BE A COMMITTEE OF THE 7 AREA COORDINATORS.
4. RECOMMENDATION: JPA'S SHALL BE SIGNED BETWEEN THE AREAS AND THE COMMISSION DEFINING RELATIONSHIPS, DUTIES AND FUNDING.



CURRENT STRUCTURE



PROPOSED RESTRUCTURE



APPENDIX 11

COUNTY CONTRACT CITIES PROGRAM

Chief Administrative Office  
County of Los Angeles

Introduction and Historical Background

The County of Los Angeles, with its 7,017,500 estimated population as of July 1, 1976, is the most populous county in the United States and exceeds the total population of any one of 42 states in the nation. Of this total population, approximately 6,050,000 (86 percent) are in the 80 municipalities, and approximately 950,000 (14 percent) are in the unincorporated area.

Los Angeles County has an area of 4,083 square miles, of which 1,000 is a desert valley in the north end of the County with a population of 152,202. South of this desert valley is a huge range of mountains reaching a height of 10,000 feet, consisting of 2,000 square miles, and composed primarily of the Angeles National Forest.

South of this mountain range lies the coastal basin of 1,000 square miles wherein we find over 98 percent of the total population and 78 of the 80 incorporated cities ranging in population from 245 in the City of Vernon to the City of Los Angeles with 2,746,234 people. Los Angeles County government is the largest unit of county government in the United States and is governed by a five-man board of supervisors elected from five districts. The Board administers the activities of over 80,000 County employees and a total budget of over \$3.2 billion.

The distinctive feature of Los Angeles County government is that since 1913 it has been a "home rule charter county" with a civil service system; non-partisan elections; a short ballot with only the five members of the Board of Supervisors, the Sheriff, the District Attorney, and the Assessor elected--all of which have produced a well-organized, well-managed, and qualified group of operating units. Los Angeles County is further distinctive from most counties in that it dropped its "farm tools" over 65 years ago and has provided municipal-type services to the unincorporated area on an increasingly expanded scale. As a result, from 1939 to 1954--a period which witnessed the growth of unincorporated population from 445,000 to 1,150,000 (159 percent)--not one city incorporation took place. In other words, the County was geared to provide, and did provide, all basic and necessary municipal

services to this unincorporated "city" of over one million people as well as provide many basic services in welfare, probation, courts, recording of documents, hospitals, etc., throughout the entire County to all its citizens regardless of whether they lived in a municipality or not.

It is also significant to note that since 1954, 35 cities have incorporated and many areas have annexed to cities, yet the population of the unincorporated area of the County is still approximately 950,000. This, combined with the total population of 843,656 in the 31 cities which contract for the County to provide most of their basic municipal services, means that Los Angeles County provides such services to approximately 1,800,000 people. Only four cities in the United States--New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia--provide municipal services to a larger population.

The County of Los Angeles, as a highly organized and urbanized county, has provided contract services covering various municipal-type activities for a period of over 68 years. During this time, many problems of functional overlapping never occurred because each new city upon incorporation automatically looked to the County for assessment and tax collection and health services, and many of them looked to the County for building inspection, library, and personnel services. As a matter of fact, when Lakewood was incorporated in 1954, the first incorporation in 15 years, over 400 service agreements existed with the 45 cities that existed at that time.

#### Incorporation of the City of Lakewood

What was the significance of the Lakewood incorporation in 1954? In the first place, as previously stated, it was the first incorporation in Los Angeles County in 15 years. It was a brand new city that had mushroomed within about a three-year period in an area of seven square miles with approximately 60,000\* people and, upon its incorporation, became the fifteenth largest city in the State of California.

The second item of significance was that the contract cities program was born. When a city incorporates in California, State law requires that the city become responsible for providing certain governmental services. Among the major services which a city must provide are police and fire protection, street maintenance and construction, planning and zoning administration, sewer construction and maintenance, library, street lighting, local parks and recreation and building inspection. Immediately following Lakewood's incorporation, the City Council, rather than establish its own departments, requested that the County continue to provide the bulk of its municipal-type services within the city, while the Council retained the legislative, budgetary, and planning controls. The County Board of Supervisors said, "Yes, provided you pay what the services cost."

\* Approximately 80,000 in 1975

Thus, Lakewood's incorporation brought about a change in the philosophy of offering services by the County to cities in that total municipal services were provided for the first time in one package to a city--some by contract and some by virtue of the City's remaining in a County-administered special district. Since 1954, 35 cities, including Lakewood, have incorporated, totaling over 294 square miles and 1,022,084 people. Five of these cities provide all their own basic municipal services, leaving the County of Los Angeles providing municipal-type services for 31 cities which contain 843,656 people in an area of over 252 square miles. The 31 contract cities receive anywhere from the 20 services furnished to the City of Rolling Hills Estates to the 35 services furnished to the City of Lakewood. A package of services usually includes police, fire, engineering, street construction and maintenance, animal regulation, street lighting, planning and zoning, enforcement of city health ordinances, and emergency ambulance services. In addition, all other cities in the County participate to varying degrees in many services provided by the County.

Inherent in the contract cities program is that local autonomy and control of municipal affairs remain with the locally elected city council. The result is home rule plus economy--a city operation without large capital investments and minimal overhead but retaining grass-roots government. It is decentralized policy with centralized administration.

The plan is one of municipal partnership with County government. It provides for the furnishing of many municipal services by a county at the request of the city through their own free choice, not legal necessity. It is voluntary.

#### The Legal Basis for the Contract Cities Program

It is necessary in setting up a contract cities program to establish the legal basis for the provision of municipal-type services to cities by the County. State laws, County and city charters, and all types of local ordinances, both County and city, must be considered when establishing such a program. In addition to the basic laws governing the powers and duties of public agencies to contract with one another for services, it is also necessary in dealing with specific services such as police, fire, health, animal regulation, and building inspection to identify any state laws or local ordinances which must be met in the rendering of the service.

In California, the basic enabling law for the contract program is contained in the State of California Government Code. Section 51301 of this Code provides that the Board of Supervisors of a County may contract with any city within the County for any municipal-type

service requested by the cities. Section 51302 of this Code states that the term of the contract shall not exceed five years but may continue for successive periods of five years unless either party votes to discontinue the service.

The legal authority for Los Angeles County to provide contract services to cities is contained in the County Charter. Section 56½ states that the County shall have the power and authority to provide for the assumption and discharge of municipal functions when requested to do so by any city in the County.

Another legal requirement in the contract program is the need for cities to adopt or amend city ordinances if their level of service is considered below that required by the County. As a matter of policy, the County will not provide contract services to cities unless those services provided are at least equal to that level provided by the County in the unincorporated areas.

#### The Financing of Contract Services Provided to Cities

The financing of the municipal-type services provided to cities by this program can be divided into three categories:

1. Contract services which are basically self-financing. The performance of services in this category is financed generally by fees collected from the user of the service. An example is the building inspection service program, wherein a building permit fee is charged for the services rendered by the County. If the building permit fees do not cover actual cost of the service, the city is billed for the balance. Excess fees over cost are refunded to a city.
2. Continuance of service through special taxing or assessment districts. These are services provided through the fiscal device of a County-administered special district and include fire, library,\* street lighting, sewer maintenance, and any other service for which the County is authorized to provide by means of a district in unincorporated territory. Cities receive these services either by remaining within the districts which were in existence prior to incorporation or by joining existing County districts.
3. Contract services provided on the basis of a direct billing by the city. The County is reimbursed for all municipal-type services provided to cities, other than those mentioned above, by means of a rate established on the basis of actual costs as determined annually by the

---

\* Not a true special district but rather a special fund.

County Auditor-Controller. Principal services include law enforcement, engineering and planning staff services, prosecution of city misdemeanors, street maintenance and construction, park maintenance, and recreation services.

When computing the costs to be charged to a city for services rendered by the County (i.e., the Department of County Engineer), the County Auditor bases his recommended charges on direct and indirect costs including general County and departmental overhead. Direct labor generally represents the salary costs of the individuals performing these services. To this salary cost, retirement (13.74 percent) and Workmen's Compensation (1.57 percent), Social Security (3.76 percent), and health and life insurance (5.30 percent) are added. Indirect cost includes among other things divisional and sectional supervision in the operational division providing the service (division head, assistant division head, and stenographic staff). Department overhead includes departmental administration and the office of business management, administrative services, equipment, personnel, payroll, etc. In 1976-77, these overhead costs amounted to 37.8 percent for the County Engineer. Indirect costs will, of course, vary from department to department.

General County overhead includes a portion of the costs of all service organizations such as the Personnel Department, County Counsel, Auditor-Controller, etc., and a portion of all central appropriations such as utilities.

Examples of the elements of cost reflected in the hourly rate for a new employee are shown in the following table. (The County has a five-step salary plan in which merit increases are made in each of the first four years of service in a classified position.)

Productive Work Hour Rate (\$17,851* ÷ 1,766 hrs.**)	\$10.11
Retirement (13.74%) Workmen's Compensation Insurance (1.57%) Health and Life Insurance (5.30%) and Social Security (3.76%) = 24.37%	2.46
County-wide, Department, and Divisional Overhead 37.8%	<u>3.82</u>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$16.39</b>

\* Annual salary, 1st step = \$17,851.

\*\* Productive work hours = 1,766 productive hours per year (allows time off for Saturdays and Sundays, an average of 13.87 days vacation, 11 holidays, 13.71 days of sick leave, and 1.67 days miscellaneous paid absences such as military leave, bereavement leave, and jury duty.)

Annually, before adoption of the County Budget, the departments which provide cities with services develop proposed service budgets for the ensuing year. These proposed service budgets take into account past expenditure trends, the desire of the city to adjust levels of service, and the ability of the County departments to provide for such adjustments. According to the California Constitution, all County costs must be recovered from the cities; therefore, there should not be a net County general fund budget appropriation for any city service. The various city budgets for each department are then submitted to the County-City Services Section in the Chief Administrative Office for submission to each city. Total billings in 1977-78 are estimated at \$30 million.

Various types of financial reporting systems have been established in each County department rendering services to cities. Naturally, these various systems must be designed to meet the needs of any particular service or the individual city. It is common, however, for the County departments to report monthly to the cities on the expenditure of funds, the types of jobs completed, and where appropriate the jobs in process.

#### Use of Contracts

We have discussed the various means of financing the services provided by the County to cities. As indicated in the preceding section, many of the municipal services provided by the County to cities are furnished by a County-administered special district, as in the case of the County Fire Protection Districts and the County Library System. However, the notoriety resulting from the Lakewood Plan stems not from the services provided through special districts but from services which are provided specifically through the use of contractual arrangements between the County and the individual cities.

At the present time, there are 13 major standard form agreements in effect between the County and the various cities. These agreements cover the following services:

- General Services (76 cities)
- Emergency Ambulance Program (72 cities)
- Building Inspection (34 cities)
- Industrial Waste (33 cities)
- Tract and/or Parcel Map Checking (66 cities)
- City Health Ordinance Enforcement (28 cities)
- Animal Control or Shelter Services (34 cities)
- Street Maintenance and Construction (28 cities)
- Law Enforcement Services (32 cities)

Basically, the standard form agreements contain the following provisions:

- That the city shall pay to the County the entire cost of performing each function. The cost shall include salaries and wages of all employees engaged in providing the service plus departmental overhead, miscellaneous expenses, County overhead, department costs. The rate for each function is recomputed annually and revised accordingly.
- No County department shall perform for the city any function not coming within the scope of the duties of the department or its employee. (Exception: traffic law enforcement)
- No service shall be performed unless requested in writing by the city or authorized by the city council or such officer as it may designate.
- If city and County agree as to the need for a County department to maintain headquarters in the city, it shall be done at city expense and city shall provide all necessary office space, furniture, etc. However, this does not preclude the County from maintaining a regional office in order to serve an area greater than the city which contracts for services. In this case, the cost of maintaining the County facility is borne exclusively by the County. If special supplies, stationery, etc., must be issued in the name of the city, it shall be supplied at city expense.
- All persons employed in the performance of contract services for the city shall be County employees and no city employee shall be taken over by the County; however, for the purpose of performing any service and for the purpose of giving official status for the performance of such services, every County employee performing such service shall be deemed to be an employee of the city while performing service for the city.
- The city shall not be called upon to assume any liability for the payment of any salary, wage, or other compensation to any County employee.
- Each County department performing contract services shall keep reasonable itemized records covering the cost of all services performed.

Each city council desiring to receive a specific service executes the standard form agreement, which is then approved by the County Board of Supervisors. In each case, the standard form agreement

is used. The agreement is not tailored to meet a specific request of an individual city. The reason for this is obvious, since approval of specific amendments, additions, or deletions to an agreement as suggested by one city would result in each city in turn requesting its own modifications to meet a particular need. This would result in a hodgepodge of agreements with no uniformity and could lead to inequities in the level of service rendered. The policy of the Board of Supervisors is to treat each city equally as to the provisions contained in the service agreements. In the past 15 years, we have had very few requests for special provisions in an agreement, since cities are aware of this policy. This is not to say that amendments to the basic standard form agreements have not been made over the years--to the contrary, such amendments are made--both on recommendation of the cities and our own County Counsel. However, such amendments have been applied equally to all the cities receiving a specific service.

Most of the standard form agreements are written for a five-year term, and we attempt to have them terminate at the end of the fiscal year--June 30. Renewals of agreements are processed routinely by the County-City Services Section to the Board of Supervisors for approval.

From time to time, city councils by resolution have requested that the County provide a service for which no standard form agreement exists. This may involve the specialized services of County departments, some of which are not normally involved in providing municipal-type services to cities. In order to provide a method by which the County could upon request provide such services to cities, a standard form General Services Agreement was adopted and has been executed by 78 of the 80 cities in the County. At the present time, services such as city prosecution by the District Attorney, personnel services by the Department of Personnel, planning and zoning services by the Regional Planning Department, and recreation services by the Department of Parks and Recreation are provided pursuant to the terms and conditions of the General Services Agreement.

Originally, many of the service contracts with cities were written in a way that called for the city to assume all liability and hold the County harmless for the negligent act of County employees while working in a city pursuant to contract. In recent years, however, cities have urged the County to assume this liability, as would any contractor. Accordingly, some contracts were revised by eliminating the hold harmless agreement in favor of the County. In 1963, the State legislation stated that when public entities contract with each other for the providing of public services, if any liability accrues, it shall

be jointly and severally shared in the absence of any specific contract provision to the contrary. The effect of this statute was to place equally upon the County and the cities the potential liability arising out of the services provided under contract. As a result of this law, it was agreed that the County would, by contract, assume all liability arising out of the performance of these contracts. The County agreed to give cities a uniform hold-harmless amendment applicable to all service agreements. The County then purchased insurance to cover all liability arising out of the contract service program, and the full cost of the insurance was passed on to cities in the rates charged for the services.

Insurance companies raised liability insurance rates 300 percent in less than three years and ultimately cancelled the County's policy. A new policy was obtained which insured the County for losses between one million and five million dollars. The County now assumes liability up to one million dollars for each occurrence and includes in the rates charged to cities an amount to cover losses up to one million dollars. The County is presently considering a full self-insurance program for the contract cities program.

What is Required of a County Which Offers a Contract Cities Program?

This is easy--you must have a strong, virile county government with an affirmative attitude, willingness to provide service, and an ability to produce. In the absence of any one of the three considerations, the contract service program is impossible. Los Angeles County has all three--attitude, willingness, and ability.

A second prerequisite for a contract cities program is that the cities will voluntarily request services from the County. This means that the County service must be sufficiently adequate to meet the demand, must be sufficiently economical to meet the cost, and must be sufficiently responsive to warrant its continuance.

The Contract cities program would not exist in Los Angeles County today if the cities had not requested the services--and if they had not continued to use them for over 20 years. Implementation of this type of county program requires continuous and expert attention to policy matters, public relations, and day-to-day coordination of particular functions. It requires the same type of prompt service and good will as is required by any successful retail business. These requirements demand the sympathetic cooperation of top management and elected officials.

### Need for Central Coordination and Control

In Los Angeles County, we have created in the Office of the Chief Administrative Officer a top-level staff position in the Special Services Division. All County contract service business is coordinated through this Division. A Contract Coordinator has also been established in every major department which provides contract services to cities. This person serves as the liaison between his department and the city and between his department and the County-City Coordinator in the Special Services Division. All such positions are basically to serve as channels of communication, advice, and consultation. They expedite operations, anticipate trouble spots, suggest corrective action, and keep emergencies at a minimum and smooth operations at a maximum.

The activities of the County-City Coordinator also include assistance in the preparation of and dissemination of reports prior to incorporation, close work with municipalities in their organizational stages, and coordination of the intergovernmental relations for the County. Copies of preincorporation reports (feasibility studies), while neither recommending for nor against incorporation, show the effect that incorporation will have on the governmental and financial structure of a particular area. Copies are made available to all citizens and show what revenues will be forthcoming to the city and what County costs for contract services will be.

After incorporation, a complete package of materials is submitted to each newly elected city council and city attorney. These include all agreements which may be adopted by the city council, resolutions and ordinances which should be adopted by the city to cover emergency public property and safety regulations. Thus, there is no break in service between the unincorporated area and the new city--everything continues as it was at the minute of incorporation. The city council has no awesome fear of breakdowns in fire protection, police protection, health protection, sewer stoppages, broken boulevard stop signs, etc. These things are being attended to while they are signing the agreements. The city council knows where it is, knows the service it has, does not have to organize departments to provide services, does not have to hire personnel to perform services, does not have to build an operations building, does not have to buy equipment, and simply sits back and decides the direction in which it wants to go.

### Impact of a County-City Contract Program on County Operation

The greatest impact of the program on County operations has been to create an awareness on the part of all departments that they are no longer providing services for a captive clientele--but to an

audience of cities that can stop services at any time. Therefore, they are obligated to keep their services up to date, responsible, economical, and, above all, efficient. This has not only helped the cities but also helped provide more efficient County services.

In any large or small organization we are familiar with the tendency of bureaucracy to slow down to a "lava-like" crawl. Ordinary citizen complaints may not upset a complacent bureaucrat in a jurisdiction which has a monopoly in providing services to the citizen. However, the siren blast of an irate city councilman stating that he can easily obtain his services elsewhere makes County employees most responsive. The review by cities of County services has necessitated that County departments constantly evaluate their operations, which, in turn, results in improved methods and cost reductions. Providing services to municipalities has strengthened the service attitude of the various County departments--even though we have always stimulated our employees to courteous and prompt treatment of the taxpayers.

#### Growth of Contract Services in the Older Cities

Another significant factor has been the growth of contract operations in those cities incorporated prior to Lakewood. Of the 1,226 service agreements and resolutions in effect between the County and the 79 cities in 1976, over 300 were with old line "non-contract cities". During recent years, we have seen a definite growing tendency on the part of such cities to request contract services from the County. This probably has more significant implications for the future than the development of the contract cities program. Many of these older cities have been critically reviewing their service operations each year, and more and more have asked the County to submit proposals for the provision of certain services and subsequently have requested that the County take them over. For example, the Cities of Glendora, which incorporated in 1911, and Signal Hill, which incorporated in 1924, decided to annex to a County fire protection district, thus giving up their own department. The Cities of Monrovia (1887) and Compton (1898) are currently contracting for animal control or animal shelter services. We believe that the following conditions are significant in this change of attitude on the part of the older cities:

- Tight budget squeeze--Demands for higher salaries, increased levels of service and capital improvements have created a need for new tax sources at the city level. This has not been forthcoming in any significant amount from the State Legislature, and the property tax which most cities rely upon is just about as high as it can go. A leveling off

of economic conditions has reduced the rate of increase in sales tax revenues. Transferring a function to the County may help reduce the financial burden on the city, thereby releasing funds for other city functions.

- Increased Labor Union Activity--With almost one out of every six employees employed by some form of governmental agency, labor unions found this to be a fertile area and are becoming increasingly more aggressive, active, and demanding. County salaries have, over the past years, been higher than comparable salaries in small cities. As the result of increased labor demands on cities to raise salaries, this gap is narrowing. Some city officials believe that if they must pay salaries equal to County salaries, they may as well contract with the County and save the capital expenditures for buildings and equipment and also not be required to get involved in time-consuming personnel problems and labor negotiations. This trend is becoming more apparent, especially in the field of fire protection and law enforcement.
  
- Gradual Acceptance of the Contract Philosophy--As the result of the contract plan's continued effectiveness, a healthy dialog has developed between elected city officials and the County. An older city is no longer as hesitant as it had been to request a service agreement with the County. We are finding a gradual elimination of some of the old attitudes and a growing view that many services can be shared or cooperatively provided without affecting the basic independence of the city or the power of the city council to freely exercise the right of decision.

#### Changing Service Patterns in Contract Cities

While some older cities are seeking services from the County, we find the beginnings of what may be a very important development in the 31 contract cities. We have found a definite trend in many of the new cities to revise the level, extent, and degree of service received from the County. Many of these now have come through the initial adjustment stage and have grown in both years and stature. They are now reviewing their entire service operations as provided by contract and are making several changes. Thus, while the initial approach to the provision of services to newer cities was a "package" including all municipal services, we find now a tendency towards selection of the service to be requested by the city from the County, other cities, private contract, or the establishment of their own service organization. This is particularly true in the field of public works and engineering. We feel that this has a decidedly strengthening effect on the system, since many of the services which we continue to provide in these cities are those apparently most conducive to contract operation, while those we lose through cancellation or

revision of service level are those with which we may have been experiencing problems. This further emphasizes the voluntary nature of the program and the fact that the County is not demanding that the cities take these services under any and all conditions but is flexible enough to adjust to individual circumstances.

### Conclusion

As the result of the past 20 years of experience with the Contract cities program, we conclude with the following: The providing of County services to cities on a contract basis--

1. Demands a forward-looking "urbanized" County government willing and able to provide adequate municipal-type services at reasonable costs and with acceptable responsiveness.
2. Has worked successfully and has provided a vehicle for functional consolidation without the need for political consolidation. For example, we now have 49\* police departments serving 80 cities and the County instead of 81 separate departments.
3. Has improved the organization and service of County operations. In the past 20 years, it has been the exception, rather than the rule, for cities to cancel a County contract service. This implies a high-level of efficiency in County operations.
4. Has provided a laboratory in government, which is enabling us to determine those particular elements of governmental activity that can best be provided by each city. Thus, a process almost akin to natural selection in the live sciences is taking place and will result in, we are confident, the establishment of the logical role of both the city and the County in a highly urban area. This is apparent in Los Angeles County, where old and established cities are requesting the County to take over certain services but on a selective basis.
5. Is not the ultimate solution to the complexities of governmental structure in a metropolitan area. It is an intermediate step toward arriving at a solution. The final solution will generally demand a comprehensive and overall review of the governmental structure for area-wide responsibilities.

---

\* City of Cudahy contracts with the City of Bell for police services.

DISTRIBUTION LIST

ORGANIZATION	# COPIES	ORGANIZATION	# COPIES
Federal Emergency Management Agency Mitigation and Research Attn: Administrative Officer Washington, D.C. 20472	60	The Dikewood Corporation University Research Park 1009 Bradbury Drive, S.E. Albuquerque, NM 87106	1
Defense Technical Information Center Cameron Station Alexandria, VA 22314	12	Ohio State University Disaster Research Center 127-129 West 10th Avenue Columbus, OH 43201	1
Civil Defense Research Project Oak Ridge National Laboratory Attn: Librarian P.O. Box X Oak Ridge, TN 37830	1	URS Research Company 155 Bovet Road San Mateo, CA 94402	1
Dr. William W. Chenault Human Sciences Research, Inc. Westgate Research Park 7710 Old Springhouse Road McLean, VA 22101	1	Dr. Gerald Klonglan Dept. of Sociology & Anthropology Iowa State University Ames, IA 50010	1
Dr. Jiri Nehnevajsa Professor of Sociology University of Pittsburgh Pittsburgh, PA 15213		General Leslie Bray The Analytic Sciences Corp 1117 North 19th Street Rosslyn, VA 22209	1
Dr. Conrad Chester ERDA, Holifield Nat'l Laboratory P.O. Box X Oak Ridge, TN 37830	1	Mr. Howard McClennon President Int'l Association of Fire Fighters 1750 New York Avenue, N.W. 3rd Floor Washington, D.C. 20006	1
Mr. Walmer E. Strobe Center for Planning & Research 5600 Columbia Pike Bailey Cross Roads, VA 22041	1	General Manager Int'l Association of Fire Chiefs 1329 - 18th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036	1
Mr. Don Johnston Research Triangle Institute P.O. Box 12194 Research Triangle Park, NC 27709	1	Mr. Bjorn Pedersen Int'l Association of Chiefs of Police 11 Firstfield Road Gaithersburg, MD 20760	1
Mr. Richard K. Laurino Center for Planning and Research, Inc. 2483 East Bayshore Road Palo Alto, CA 94304			

ORGANIZATION	# COPIES	ORGANIZATION	# COPIES
Mr. Ferris Lucas National Sheriff's Association 1250 Connecticut Ave., N.W. #320 Washington, D.C. 20036	1	Mr. Gerald W. Collins Executive Vice President National Defense Transportation Assn. 1612 K Street, N.W., Suite 706 Washington, D.C. 20006	1
National Fire Protection Association Attn: Library 470 Atlantic Avenue Boston, MA 02210	1	Dr. John W. Billheimer SYSTAN, Inc. P.O. Box U Los Altos, CA 94022	1
National Bureau of Standards Disaster Research Coordinator Attn: Mr. C.G. Culver Office of Federal Building Technology Washington, D.C. 20234	1	Mr. Robert Harker SYSTAN, Inc. P.O. Box U Los Altos, CA 94022	1
Command and Control Technical Center The Pentagon - BE 685 Washington, D.C. 20301	1	Ms. Marie Hayman International City Management Association 1140 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036	1
Mr. Louis V. Spencer Radiation Theory Section National Bureau of Standards Building 245, Room C-313 Washington, D.C. 20418	1	Ms. Clara Rubin Academy of Contemporary Problems 1501 Neil Avenue Columbus, Ohio 43201	1
National Academy of Sciences(JH-312) Commission on Sociotechnical Systems Committee on Fire Research 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20418	1		
Governor Leo A. Hoegh Timpa Road Chipita Park, CO 80811	1		
The Council of State Governments Attn: Mr. Hubert A. Gallagher Disaster Assistance Project 1225 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. #300 Washington, D.C. 20036	1		
Dr. Joseph E. Minor Texas Tech University Department of Civil Engineering P.O. Box 4089 Lubbock, TX 79409	1		

EMERGENCY DISASTER PREPAREDNESS IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY:  
A MULTIJURISDICTIONAL DILEMMA

UNCLASSIFIED FEMA, September 30, 1979, 165 pages  
DCPA01-78-C-0234, Work Unit 2614 E

ABSTRACT

This study addresses developing a management and planning system for emergency preparedness in the multijurisdictional setting of Los Angeles County. The study focuses on the management level of participation in the planning process and the development of methodology for a test cluster of cities to address emergency preparedness. Study recommendations address developing appropriate mechanisms for countywide planning, creation of a policy making structure and development of a specific policy for emergency preparedness.

EMERGENCY DISASTER PREPAREDNESS IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY:  
A MULTIJURISDICTIONAL DILEMMA

UNCLASSIFIED FEMA, September 30, 1979, 165 pages  
DCPA01-78-C-0234, Work Unit 2614 E

ABSTRACT

This study addresses developing a management and planning system for emergency preparedness in the multijurisdictional setting of Los Angeles County. The study focuses on the management level of participation in the planning process and the development of methodology for a test cluster of cities to address emergency preparedness. Study recommendations address developing appropriate mechanisms for countywide planning, creation of a policy making structure and development of a specific policy for emergency preparedness.

EMERGENCY DISASTER PREPAREDNESS IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY:  
A MULTIJURISDICTIONAL DILEMMA

UNCLASSIFIED FEMA, September 30, 1979, 165 pages  
DCPA01-78-C-0234, Work Unit 2614 E

ABSTRACT

This study addresses developing a management and planning system for emergency preparedness in the multijurisdictional setting of Los Angeles County. The study focuses on the management level of participation in the planning process and the development of methodology for a test cluster of cities to address emergency preparedness. Study recommendations address developing appropriate mechanisms for countywide planning, creation of a policy making structure and development of a specific policy for emergency preparedness.

EMERGENCY DISASTER PREPAREDNESS IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY:  
A MULTIJURISDICTIONAL DILEMMA

UNCLASSIFIED FEMA, September 30, 1979, 165 pages  
DCPA01-78-C-0234, Work Unit 2614 E

ABSTRACT

This study addresses developing a management and planning system for emergency preparedness in the multijurisdictional setting of Los Angeles County. The study focuses on the management level of participation in the planning process and the development of methodology for a test cluster of cities to address emergency preparedness. Study recommendations address developing appropriate mechanisms for countywide planning, creation of a policy making structure and development of a specific policy for emergency preparedness.

C O N T R A C T S

1. The State of California and the Federal Emergency Management Agency

Number: DCPA01-78-C 0234  
Amount: \$49,849

2. The State of California and the University of Southern California

Number: SA-110  
Amount: \$20,000

Reference: Section 7800, Chapter 23, Division 7, Title I,  
Government Code