Review of the Guard and Reserve (ROGAR), A Framework for Action.
Abstract
The US defense posture of the 1980's will emphasize increased reliance on the Reserve Forces (RF). The viability of this posture depends upon the Nation's ability and willingness to support the required number of Reserve Component units and individuals. Reserve units must be manned, equipped and trained properly and be capable of mobilizing and employing rapidly in time of need. Reservists who are not members of units must be trained properly and able to report to the right place at the right time after Mobilization Day (M-Day). The most demanding requirement placed on RF is the ability to participate in a major conventional war in Europe that begins with little or no warning is of such high intensity that many RF must be capable of deployment and employment within the first 30 days. A timely RF mobilization in this situation hopefully would contribute to deterring the Warsaw Pact from launching an attack. Failing this, RF would help stabilize the front and repel the invader. If the Soviets prevail in the opening battle of European conflict, RF would be necessary to continue conventional operations against the aggressor. A nuclear attack against the Continental United States would require employment of RF to maintain order and assist in alleviating the effects of the attack.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 28, 1979
- Accession Number
- ADA082137
Entities
Organizations
- Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs