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
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The Future of Jerusalem

LORD CARADON



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**THE FUTURE OF JERUSALEM:
A Review of Proposals for the
Future of the City,**

15: Hugh Mackintosh/Foot
by

Lord/Caradon (Sir Hugh Foot)

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FOREWORD

As an important corollary to its instructional mission, the National Defense University provides a forum for dialogue on national and international security issues.

It was in the spirit of such open dialogue that Lord Caradon, as a Senior Research Fellow at the National Defense University, wrote this monograph. Lord Caradon has had a long association with the peoples and issues involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. His experiences range from those gathered as a junior British colonial official in Palestine to those developed as the United Kingdom representative to the United Nations.

The publication of this study is in consonance with the diversity of views fostered by the University policy of encouraging free inquiry into the complexities of international security issues. However, as in the case of other University publications, the opinions and conclusions presented in this monograph do not claim to represent the views or policies of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any other United States Government agency.

It has been a rare pleasure and an honor for the National Defense University to have had Lord Caradon in residence as an associate and as its first international senior fellow.



R. G. GARD, JR.
Lieutenant General, USA
President

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

LORD CARADON, HUGH MACKINTOSH FOOT. Lord Caradon has had a long and distinguished career as a British overseas administrator and as a British representative with the United Nations. He was Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Permanent United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations after serving in the United Nations as Ambassador and Permanent United Kingdom Representative on the Trusteeship Council, as consultant to the Special Fund of the United Nations, and as a member, United Nations Expert Group on South Africa. Lord Caradon was the author and sponsor of UN Resolution 242. He was Captain-General and Governor-in-Chief of Jamaica, and Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Cyprus. In 1951, King George VI knighted Lord Caradon and in 1964 Queen Elizabeth made him a life peer, Baron Caradon of St. Cleer. He was educated at Leighton Park School, Reading, and St. Johns College, Cambridge.

PREFACE

I should declare my own interest. It goes back for 50 years, since I first arrived in Jerusalem as the most junior cadet in the British Mandatory Government of Palestine.

In the week of my arrival I witnessed the bloody Wailing Wall riots of 1929; subsequently I served in Palestine during the Arab rebellion of the late 1930's in days of violent demonstrations, ambushes, and assassinations.

Later on, for nearly a decade, I was much concerned with Middle East problems at the United Nations through protracted debates and negotiations, and I have often since been back to Jerusalem.

I shall not forget the dramatic moment in the Security Council when I turned to my right and saw, to my astonishment and delight, Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov of the Soviet Union with his finger raised voting for the British Resolution 242, thus making it unanimous.

I have written and spoken in recent years about the concept that there should be in Jerusalem two sister cities, one Arab and one Israeli, with no barriers between them—with Jerusalem not divided by domination and enmity but united in equality and peace. (Some of the articles I have written on this theme are at Appendix A.)

I realize it may be contended that, having long stated my own opinion, I am disqualified from understanding other attitudes and from examining other possible solutions. But I have set myself the task of reading as much as I can about the whole question, discussing possible courses with those of different ideas who care as much as I do, and examining every possible alternative.

I hope I will be believed when I claim that my own preconception has made me not less but more ready and anxious to consider carefully and fairly all the varied propositions advocated by others.

INTRODUCTION: THE FEAR AND THE HOPE

Jerusalem means the City of Peace. And in all the surrounding uncertainties one thing cannot be disputed. There will be no peace in the Holy Land without peace in Jerusalem.

Yet the question how peace can be achieved in Jerusalem is postponed, avoided, or neglected. In the Camp David concluding document Jerusalem was not even mentioned.

No problem amongst the many disputes of the Middle East raises more difficulties, excites more deep emotions, or commands more intense loyalties than the question of the future of Jerusalem, and no other danger is treated with such an ominous silence.

Everything else could be agreed but without a settlement in Jerusalem all other agreements would be in vain.

Can Jerusalem be transformed from a barrier into a Gateway to Peace?

That is the question which cries out for an answer. The answer is not made any easier, to say the least, by continued deliberate procrastination.

The question of how peace can be achieved in Jerusalem is not only of top importance but also dreadfully urgent.

The fear is that intense feeling over the future of Jerusalem will increase animosities and stand in the way of a peaceful settlement, eventually bringing about bloodshed and destruction on a scale not so far imagined, not only to the Holy City but to all those engaged in the conflict.

The Israelis on one side and the Palestinians on the other can never abandon their devotion and allegiance to Jerusalem. The domination of the whole city by one or the other would surely create a hopeless and disastrous confrontation, preventing all endeavors to find a peaceful settlement in the Holy Land.

What a tragedy it would be if Jerusalem thus became itself the impediment to peace, the central cause of continuing conflict.

The hope is an inspiring contrast to the fear.

It is not difficult to picture the glorious alternative to confrontation—a city of freedom and friendship with free movement throughout the city and free access to the Holy Sites of the three religions of Jerusalem for everyone in the world.

Thus Jerusalem would give the lead, showing the way to reconciliation in which Moslems, Jews, and Christians would have an equal incentive, an equal interest, and an equal investment in a relationship of equality and mutual respect, ending half a century of animosity and opening the way to a blessed and lasting peace.

THE SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES

It is, of course, impossible to consider the future of Jerusalem in isolation from the general situation in the Middle East.

The main factors are sufficiently well known. On the Arab side, there is a demand for a restoration of all the territories occupied in the 1967 war by Israel and for self-determination for the Palestinian people in those territories. The present Israeli Government, however, maintains that the West Bank and Gaza and East Jerusalem are rightly part of Israel, and also contends that the "full autonomy" for Palestinians promised at Camp David may be applicable to individuals but never to territory, and that self-determination for the Palestinian people is in any event not to be contemplated.

Consequently, there is at present a head-on confrontation, and what amounts to a complete deadlock.

There may be shifts as a result of the negotiations between Egypt and Israel, but on the basis of the stated positions of both Egypt and Israel it is impossible to see how the opposite contentions of the two sides can be resolved in agreement.

One possibility is that the main fundamental dispute might be left over, and that, following an earlier suggestion of President Sadat, an attempt might be made to reach agreement on some system of autonomy in the Gaza area alone, as a guide to what later might be attempted for the West Bank. But this might be no more than a device to divide and delay.

Accordingly, no assessment of the present situation on the basis of the public declarations of all concerned could be other than extremely pessimistic—to the point of hopelessness. The Arabs

cannot fail to demand what the Israeli Government has refused to relinquish.

The prospect is consequently one of mounting Arab anger and frustration accompanied by a buildup in Arab military strength and an increase in Palestinian violence, with fierce Israeli retaliation and possible Israeli preemptive strikes against Arab neighbors, and with Egypt temporarily helpless to intervene.

In these most dangerous circumstances and without a comprehensive settlement on other issues, there can be no hope at all of any agreement between Arabs and Israelis over Jerusalem. The likelihood is that Jerusalem will continue as a cause of deep-seated enmity with passionate feelings, inflamed by nationalist and religious extremists, leading on to a vast, destructive conflict.

Fortunately, however, the future of the Middle East is not solely in the hands of those who now face each other in such utter opposition. For peace in the Middle East is not only a matter for the immediate contestants. There is an overwhelming international interest, an obligation, a necessity to prevent a clash which could involve one superpower supporting one side and the other superpower supporting the other side, thus leading to a worldwide confrontation.

It has to be admitted that the international interest has been poorly served and sometimes altogether neglected. The record of the main powers has been pathetically inadequate. It is not that the principles of a Middle East peace settlement have not been realized and acknowledged, but that there has been no sufficient will to give them practical effect. When Ambassador Jarring of Sweden, in accordance with his mandate from the Security Council, put forward positive proposals, they were immediately and contemptuously rejected, and the principal powers did nothing to support his endeavors to initiate new efforts along the lines to which all had previously agreed.

We must, however, assume that the lip service constantly paid to the principles unanimously approved in November 1967 in Security Council Resolution 242 will not be proved to be dishonest and worthless, and it is worth recalling that even at Camp David the concluding document stated that "the agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 in all its parts." (See

Appendix B for text of Resolution 242.)

Consequently, for the purposes of the present review of policies regarding the future of Jerusalem I shall assume that the principles set out in Resolution 242 are not to be abandoned. I shall assume, in spite of all the gloomy evidence to the contrary, that an eventual settlement will respect the principle of "the inadmissibility of acquisition of territories by war" and require a "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" and confirm the right of every state in the area "to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats and acts of force."

Since I proposed Resolution 242 in the Security Council I wish to point out one factor often overlooked which may have an important effect regarding the "secure and recognized boundaries." Criticism has been sometimes directed to the fact that the resolution, while emphasizing in the preamble "the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war," did not require a restoration of the boundaries existing between Israel and Jordan before the 1967 war. This was deliberate, because the 1967 boundaries were unsuitable as permanent frontiers. They were, in fact, no more than the cease-fire boundaries of two decades earlier. In many respects they were quite unjustifiable as a permanent frontier—for instance, the fact that the Arab Legion was across the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road on the night of the cease-fire meant that up to 1967 there had to be an awkward detour of the main road at Latrun.

So when the frontier between Israel and the Palestinians comes to be drawn (I have proposed a Boundary Commission to hear both sides and recommend a suitable final frontier), it may be that important variations and rectifications can be made. In some cases Arab lands could be returned to villages on the Arab side of the new frontier and, most important in Jerusalem, a strong case could be made for the Western Wall and the Jewish quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem being incorporated in the Israeli side of the line.

I like to subscribe to the doctrine of the independent international initiative. Often when there is an intractable dispute and where there is little or no prospect of the parties to the dispute agreeing between themselves, the hope is that a proposition can be put forward by independent international initiative which neither side could propose but which both in the end can accept.

We must not give up such a hope in the Middle East or in Jerusalem. One depends on the other. Both disputes call for independent international initiative.

THE ESSENCE OF THE DISPUTE

Before we go further it will be well to try to realize the strength of feeling which Jerusalem excites. A good way of attempting to convey the intensity of conviction on both sides will be to quote from two outstanding commentators: first, Teddy Kollek, the famous and devoted Mayor of Jerusalem since 1965, and second, Professor Walid Khalidi, of the American University of Beirut and Harvard University, who was born in Jerusalem and is now widely respected as a worthy champion of Palestinian rights.

This is what Teddy Kollek said in an article in *Foreign Affairs* of July 1977:

There are some Israelis who would give up the Golan, some Israelis who would give up the Sinai, and some who would give up the West Bank. But I do not think you can find any Israelis who are willing to give up Jerusalem. They cannot and will not. This beautiful golden city is the heart and the soul of the Jewish people. You cannot live without a heart and soul. If you want one simple word to symbolize all of Jewish history, that would be Jerusalem.

Abba Eban describes Jerusalem as "a link more ancient, more potent and more passionate than any other link between any people and any place."

This is what Walid Khalidi said, also in *Foreign Affairs*, in July 1978:

Without East Jerusalem there would be no West Bank. It is the navel, the pivotal link between Nablus to the north and Hebron to the south. Together with its Arab suburbs, it is the largest Arab urban concentration on the West Bank. It is the former capital of the *sanjak* [district] of Jerusalem under the Ottomans, as well as of mandatory Palestine. The highest proportion of the Palestinian professional elite under occupation resides in it. It is the site of the holiest Muslim shrines on Palestinian soil.

Muslims first turned to it in prayer before they turned to Mecca. Toward it the Prophet Muhammed journeyed on his mystical nocturnal flight and from it he ascended to within "two bow-lengths" of the Throne of God. It is the fountainhead and focus of Sufism—the deepest spiritual tradition of Islam. Within its precincts are buried countless generations of Muslim saints and scholars, warriors and leaders. It evokes the proudest Palestinian and Arab historical memories. It contains the oldest religious endowments of the Palestinians, their most prestigious secular institutions—the cumulative and priceless patrimony of a millennium and a quarter of residence. Architecturally it is distinctively Arab. In ownership and property, it is overwhelmingly so. It is the natural capital of Arab Palestine.

King Hussein has said that "there can be no peace so long as the Israelis are in control of the whole of Jerusalem" and he has added:

In the framework of peace, if sovereignty over the Arab part of the City is returned, I see no reason why it should be a divided City: Jerusalem must be a City of all believers.

THE FAILURES OF THE FORTIES

The fate of Jerusalem and of all Palestine was at stake in the confused and crowded years from 1947 to 1950.

Early in 1947 Britain declared its intention to abandon its task and to end the British Mandate over Palestine. On *the 14th of May 1948* the British withdrew leaving Palestine in chaos, with mounting conflict between the neighbouring Arab States and the forces of the newly declared State of Israel.

It is not the purpose of this paper, which is devoted to the future of Jerusalem, to go back to tell the story of those years in which the United Nations was absorbed in hectic and futile debate while fighting dominated the scene and force decided the outcome. Sufficient to say that it provides a most striking example of the futility of stating international purposes without the means or the will to take action to carry them out on the ground. But the various proposals made in those years regarding the future of Palestine with particular reference to Jerusalem have some bearing on future possibilities.

Therefore, it will be useful to look back at the confused discussions and complicated propositions which emerged in the protracted deliberations of the United Nations in those critical years.

The main international aim was the division of Palestine into two areas, one Arab and one Israeli, with Jerusalem an international enclave under some kind of international control. From 1947 to 1950, United Nations proposals were directed to that international object.

It is, consequently, to the various proposals of that time regarding Jerusalem that I now wish to direct attention.

As far back as 1937, in the days of the Mandate, the Peel Commission had recommended a sovereign Jewish State and a sovereign Arab State with a permanent British mandatory zone including Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and a narrow corridor to the sea at Jaffa.

A subsequent British Commission (in 1938) proposed a larger Jerusalem enclave to include Ramallah and a wider corridor to the coast.

Later, in 1945, the British Chief Justice recommended that the Walled City be placed under a British administrative council with the rest of Jerusalem divided into two autonomous boroughs, one Arab and one Jewish.

In April 1947, following the reference of the Palestine question to the United Nations by Britain, the General Assembly established the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). The Committee (which was specially charged "to give most careful consideration to the religious interests in Palestine of Islam, Judaism, and Christianity") submitted two reports. The majority report recommended an Arab State and a Jewish State, with Jerusalem under international trusteeship.

The city of Jerusalem was to include the "present Municipality of Jerusalem together with the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which to be Abu Dis, the most southern Bethlehem, the most western Ein Karim, and the most northern Shu'fat."

The minority report recommended a federal state with Jerusalem as its capital. For purposes of local administration, Jerusalem should consist of two separate municipalities, one Arab

(including "that part of the city within the walls") and one Jewish. The two municipalities would jointly provide for such common public services as sewage, fire protection, telephones, and water supply.

The majority report further recommended that Jerusalem should be demilitarized. "Its neutrality shall be declared and preserved, and no paramilitary formations, exercises, and activities . . . permitted within its borders."

On the 29th of November 1947 the General Assembly, by a vote of 33 to 10, with ten abstentions, made recommendations on the lines proposed in the majority UNSCOP report providing for two independent states and "the City of Jerusalem shall be established as a *corpus separatum* under a special international regime and shall be administered by the United Nations." This purpose in regard to Jerusalem was repeatedly restated (for example, in General Assembly Resolution 303 of the 9th of December 1949).

The General Assembly also called for "a Statute of Jerusalem to be designed, in part, to protect and preserve the unique spiritual and religious interest located in the city of the three great monotheistic faiths throughout the world." This statute was drafted on the 21st of April 1948 (and somewhat amended in April 1950), and I shall turn to its detailed provisions presently.

I shall also refer to a Swedish proposal for a statute providing for what has been called "functional internationalisation."

It is of interest to note that at this stage the Arabs opposed both the partition of Palestine and the internationalisation of Jerusalem, but the Jewish community of Palestine was reluctantly prepared to accept internationalisation of Jerusalem as the price for obtaining an independent Jewish State under the partition resolution.

These, then, were the proposals, involving a widely supported call for partition of Palestine with an international Jerusalem, which were occupying the United Nations up to the time that the withdrawal of the British led to the Arab-Israeli war of 1948.

As the last hour for the end of the mandate approached, the proceedings at the United Nations reached depths of hectic unreality.

While futile debate in the General Assembly of the United Nations proceeded right up to and past the last minute, a vote for a

temporary international administration for Jerusalem was defeated. The fate of Jerusalem, and Palestine too, was left to be decided not by resolutions or principles or justice but by force of arms.

As a final act of impotence, Mr. Harold Evans, a Philadelphia Quaker, was appointed as Municipal Commissioner of Jerusalem. His appointment had been agreed to by both Jews and Arabs, but no provision was made for the Commissioner to be either protected or supported, and he was in any event not prepared to take up his duties until fighting ceased (and his Quaker principles would not allow him to accept the protection of a military escort).

In the absence of Mr. Evans, Pablo de Azcarte, a Spanish UN official already in Jerusalem, was appointed as temporary Commissioner for Jerusalem in Mr. Evans' place. He could proceed from his office to the Jewish headquarters in Jerusalem only by running a sniper gauntlet, and to the Arab headquarters he had to proceed by foot at dusk on a goat track with a donkey to carry his papers.

No wonder he described his task as United Nations Commissioner in Jerusalem as "a cruel farce."

The fierce fighting did not stop the talking.

Count Bernadotte was appointed as UN Mediator for Palestine and he reported, shortly before he was assassinated, in favor of "special and separate treatment" of Jerusalem. It was his view that Jerusalem should be placed under effective UN control with maximum feasible local autonomy for its Arab and Jewish communities, with full safeguards for the protection of the Holy Places and Sites and free access to them, and for religious freedom.

While Israel and Jordan strengthened their armed hold on their separate areas of Jerusalem, the United Nations continued to debate and advocate the internationalisation of the City.

It is interesting to see how the main participants in the debate changed their positions. The Soviet Union, for instance, first advocated internationalisation of Jerusalem but later opposed it. The Government of Israel by 1950 declared itself strongly opposed to the establishment of an international regime for the city of Jerusalem "but was prepared to accept without reservation an international regime for, or the international control of, the Holy Places of the City."

The Arab States, with the notable exception of Jordan, also altered their previous position and eventually adopted a resolution in favor of the internationalisation of Jerusalem.

With Israel declaring West Jerusalem as its capital and Jordan saying "it could not discuss any plan for internationalisation of Jerusalem," the United Nations still continued discussions of its aims for Jerusalem. A last-minute plan of the President of the Trusteeship Council for an Israeli zone, a Jordanian zone, and an International City under the United Nations was discussed without result, but proposals put forward by Belgium and Sweden were dropped and by the end of 1950 the United Nations had no more to say.

For the next 17 years Jerusalem was divided; the international endeavors had at last ceased.

Adlai Stevenson used to say, "Never blame the United Nations, lest we blame ourselves."

We look back with regret at the pathetic failure of the United Nations to save Jerusalem and Palestine from a conflict which has brought so much bloodshed and suffering and threatens so much more. It was not the United Nations organization that failed: it was the principal world powers which shamefully failed to back their proposals with working agreement and effective support, and failed so miserably to use in time the international instrument for peace.

Now, three decades later it is not violence and force and intimidation which can bring lasting peace, but only a concerted and sustained international initiative.

INTERNATIONAL RETREAT FROM INTERNATIONALISATION

On the 4th of June 1950, the UN Trusteeship Council approved a Statute for the City of Jerusalem (based on an earlier draft prepared by the Council in 1948). The statute was a detailed and elaborate document designed to establish a separate and independent international administration for the City (with its own Governor, flag, seal, and coat of arms).

By the time the 1950 document had been presented, however, Palestine and Jerusalem were already partitioned by conflict, so the statute was of no avail (and on the 23d of January 1950, Israel had proclaimed West Jerusalem as its capital).

Subsequent events, not the least of which being the 1967 war, have made the statute now seem even further from reality; but it may be well to look back at the main features of the statute, since an international regime over the whole or part of Jerusalem must remain amongst the conceivable solutions.

Under the trusteeship statute the boundaries of the city would be the same as those previously proposed by the General Assembly in Resolution 303 of the 9th of December 1949 (see map at Appendix C).

The plan was for a United Nations Governor of the City with full executive authority responsible to the Trusteeship Council. (The original draft provided that the Governor "shall not be a citizen of the City, the Arab State or the Jewish State.") In addition to his other duties of administration, the Governor would exercise supervision over religious and charitable bodies of all faiths in the City "in conformity with existing rights and traditions."

The Governor would have a Chief Secretary, also to be appointed by the Trusteeship Council, and an elected Legislative Council (with four electoral colleges—Christian, Jewish, Moslem, and one other). And there would be a Supreme Court appointed by, and responsible to, the Trusteeship Council.

Three provisions of the statute are of special interest.

Under Article 7 the City was to be demilitarized. (Under Article 15 the Governor would organize and direct a police force for the maintenance of internal law and order, and specially for the protection of the Holy Places.)

Under Article 43 a plan was to be prepared for dividing the City into local autonomous units.

Under Article 42 it was provided that at the expiration of a period of 10 years the residents of the City would be "free to express by means of a referendum their wishes as to possible modifications of the regime of the City."

The strange provision for self-determination for the people of Jerusalem after 10 years drew this comment from the British representative at the United Nations in 1949: "If the people of Jerusalem were given normal democratic liberties their first action would be to vote the international regime out of existence."

Before commenting further on the proposals for internationalisation, we should look at the alternative draft statute prepared by Sweden at the United Nations in December 1950, although the Swedish proposal did not reach the vote before partition by conflict took over.

The Swedish plan was for the appointment of a Commissioner to represent the United Nations and to deal with the states concerned (the assumption presumably then being that the UN proposal for a Jewish State and an Arab State would take effect or that the City would remain divided between Israel and Jordan). The purpose of the plan was to ensure the protection of the Holy Sites and freedom of access to them (and would also apply to Holy Sites elsewhere in the Holy Land outside the Jerusalem area).

A list of Holy Sites would be prepared, a panel of advisers would be appointed, and the UN Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner would be selected by a Committee of the General Assembly (neither Commissioner being a national of Israel nor of any Arab State nor from among the residents of the Jerusalem area).

The governments of the states administering the Jerusalem area would agree to demilitarize the City, and elaborate provisions were proposed for settling any disputes between the Commissioner and the administering states.

This is the kind of plan called "fundamental internationalisation." In a much simpler form I made a somewhat similar proposal several years ago in the following draft:

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Eager to ensure that the Holy City of Jerusalem shall forever be a centre and symbol of peace and freedom;

Anxious moreover that the tranquility and security of the Holy City shall not only be protected by the responsible civil and religious authorities, but shall also be recognized and respected by all mankind;

Wishing to assist in maintaining the permanent freedom of the Holy City from dispute and strife, and the peaceful preservation of the Holy Places, and the

scrupulous protection of religious rights, privileges and immunities;

***Wishing** also to assist in ensuring for all the inhabitants of the Holy City respect for human rights and, in particular, freedom of religion, and for everyone free access to the Holy Places;*

***Calls** for the complete demilitarization of the Holy City, leaving civilian police to keep public order;*

***Decides** to request the Secretary General to appoint a High Commissioner (and Deputy Commissioner) to be stationed in Jerusalem, to represent the United Nations and to work with all concerned to secure and ensure the purposes of this resolution, and to report regularly to the Secretary General for the information of the General Assembly and the Security Council.*

The arguments for an international regime in Jerusalem which dominated international debate 30 years ago and which then carried such wide international support seem now more a matter of history than practical politics. What may have been possible before or during or soon after the Arab-Israeli war of three decades ago is now of mainly academic interest. I shall come presently to examine a number of other proposals, but to imagine that Israel should withdraw from West Jerusalem seems to be beyond the realms of present reality. Nor, it seems to me, should any such demand be further pressed or considered. If both security for the Israeli people and freedom for the Palestinian people are to be achieved, then it seems clear that the arguments for Jerusalem, Israeli Jerusalem, being the capital of the Israeli States are overwhelming. And I maintain that the arguments for Arab sovereignty in Arab Jerusalem are equally compelling if security and peace on a just and lasting basis are to be achieved.

But to reject the old plan for a fully international Jerusalem is not to eliminate the possibilities of an international regime over the Old City which includes most of the Holy Places (provision might be made to include some of the neighboring Holy Sites such as the Mount of Olives and Mount Zion). Nor does the abandonment of the original plan preclude international action as proposed by the Swedish resolution for the protection and guarantee of access to the Holy Places.

To take the second proposal (the Swedish proposal) first, it can surely be fairly represented that it is right for the international community to provide for the protection of the Holy Places and ensure access to them for everyone. It may be that the original Swedish draft resolution was somewhat complicated (and in taking in Holy Places away from Jerusalem may have attempted too much), but the international interest, it can be effectively maintained, is not in governing Jerusalem but in doing everything possible otherwise to ensure its peace and protection and accessibility.

The Vatican and other Christian authorities were early enthusiasts for full internationalisation, but would now probably be mainly concerned to achieve international protection of the Holy Places.

The other proposal, for an international regime in the Old City, has much to commend it, and is supported by a number of able advocates.

This is the proposition put forward in 1970 by Evan Wilson in his book, *Jerusalem Key to Peace*, and his long service and deep concern for Jerusalem command respect:

Partial Territorial Internationalization of an area smaller than the corpus separatum of the 1947 plan, with Israel and Jordan, respectively, controlling the remainder.

This appears to be the most promising of the different alternatives, although manifestly it involves serious problems. It should, however, prove possible to identify an area, such as the Walled City and the area immediately surrounding it, which would contain the most important Holy Places but which would be sufficiently compact, as to be manageable in terms of international administration.

Such a solution would make it possible to meet the requirements of the international interest and the question of access. The smaller the area to be internationalized and the greater the area left under Israeli or Jordanian administration, the less would be the problem of providing for Israeli or Jordanian interests in the international area for those of its Jewish and Arab population.

If such a proposition would gain acceptance from both sides it would obviously have great advantages. The internationalisation of the Old City would, however, be subject to strong criticism and opposition from Arabs and Moslems. It is true that at one point many years ago most Arab States expressed readiness to acquiesce in internationalisation, but that was for the whole City; and for Arabs or Moslems in general or Palestinians in particular to accept now an Israeli Jerusalem on one side and an international regime over their most treasured areas on the other is almost certainly unacceptable, and could not justly be imposed. Moreover, we can assume that such a proposal would excite opposition from Israel as well as from the Arabs. It is worth saying that while we should not abandon any particular plan because it is opposed by one side, it is difficult to justify pursuing any proposal which would certainly be opposed by both.

My conclusion is that the old ideas of international administration of Jerusalem cannot and should not be revived. But that should not preclude action to ensure that the international interest in the Holy City is met by a United Nations presence in a demilitarized City (with headquarters in the old Government House), a presence not to govern the City but to work with all concerned to protect the Holy Places which are the heritage of the whole world, and to ensure free and peaceful access to them for everyone. This should be the function and the purpose and the obligation of the international community.

THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF EAST JERUSALEM

After the capture of East Jerusalem by Israel from Jordan in the 1967 war, the United Nations General Assembly passed a Resolution (No. 2253) on the 14th of July with the following wording:

The General Assembly

Deeply concerned at the situation prevailing in Jerusalem as a result of the measures taken by Israel to change the status of the City:

- 1. Considers the measures invalid.*
- 2. Calls upon Israel to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem.*

This resolution has repeatedly been emphasized and endorsed, often unanimously, in subsequent years both in the Assembly and the Council (the most recent Council Resolution being No. 446 of the 22nd of March 1979).

But these resolutions have been ignored or rejected by the Israeli Government which first extended the Jerusalem Municipal Area and has since the 1967 war administered Jerusalem, East and West, under its Law of Unification, as if it were one City under Israeli sovereignty.

The outstanding figure in the era of Israeli administration has been Mayor Teddy Kollek, who is energetic, able, devoted, uninhibited, and articulate.

He makes a strong defense of Israeli administration and passionately and effectively pleads against the return of "barbed wire fences, mine fields, and concrete barriers."

He opposes internationalisation, adding that the "Muslims too exclude internationalisation because they reject the idea that the Temple Mount, the Haram, should be ruled by infidels: from that point of view Dr. Waldheim is as much an infidel as I am."

Teddy Kollek goes on to recognize that "all Jerusalemites of every persuasion demand that, under whatever political solution, the City will remain accessible to all and the rights of every religion to its Holy Places will be preserved."

He can proudly point to many admirable achievements. The Jewish quarter of the Old City has been rebuilt in excellent conformity with the architectural characteristics of the rest of the Old City. Many parks and open spaces around the city have been provided or extended; indeed the Old City as it stands today is a fine tribute to his devotion and his determination. Moreover, the Muslims and the Christians have been given a good measure of administrative control over their religious Holy Places. For the future he has also proposed a special Jerusalem law giving the City greater autonomy and greater rights, together with the system of boroughs, modeled on the boroughs of London, to give the Palestinians authority in municipal affairs in their own areas. He states his aim that "by making our efforts permanent, by assuring their administration of the Temple Mount and by increasing their local autonomy, we hope to diminish any feeling among Jerusalem Arabs that their way of life is threatened by Israeli

sovereignty: we want to create a secure future for Arabs within the capital of Israel."

Another imaginative innovation which Teddy Kollek introduced was the formation of the Jerusalem Committee, composed of leading personalities from many countries, including city planners, architects, philosophers, and artists, to gather in Jerusalem periodically to see "what we are planning and what we are doing" (though I think he gives way to overstatement when he claims that "we carry out practically all their recommendations" since I understand that they have by no means approved the concrete ring of high-rise apartments which is surrounding the City).

Within the range of his authority as Mayor there can be no doubt that Teddy Kollek has an enviable record of generous and imaginative administration. Everyone who loves Jerusalem has cause to be deeply grateful to him.

Outside the range of Teddy Kollek's authority, a very different picture must be given. We can only imagine that he himself strongly opposed the high-rise buildings which now dominate the hills overlooking the Old City and are rapidly surrounding all Jerusalem, as well as the high-rise buildings in the new City which mar the lovely panorama of the whole.

There is a much more serious danger. It is that the continuation of Israeli domination over the Palestinians of East Jerusalem and the West Bank will justify and intensify Arab resistance. It will be a pity if Teddy Kollek becomes a paternalist, maintaining, as he does, "that the fundamental goal of the Palestinians in Jerusalem is to remain in Jerusalem and to preserve the Arab character of their part of the City." He must know that the desire for national self-respect, for political self-determination, for freedom, goes much deeper than that.

Meron Benvenisti, until recently the Deputy Mayor, in his moving and compassionate book recognizes "the focal point of the problem" which is a "deep-seated national and political conflict and a head-on collision between two legitimate but conflicting attachments."

"For the Arabs," he says, "Jerusalem was simply home, the city where they had been born, like their ancestors for 1,300 years."

Teddy Kollek is not given to understatement but he says, "Despite all our efforts, it is obvious that the Arabs in Jerusalem still

do not accept being included within Israel's frontiers."

It is not possible to persuade Palestinians any more than any other people that it is tolerable to be a subject people.

Teddy Kollek boasts that Jerusalem has a free press, but in fact the Arab papers are subjected to severe daily censorship. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees cannot return to their homes. Hundreds of Palestinians are exiled. Hundreds more are imprisoned without trial. Houses of suspects are blown up. Curfews are often imposed. The Arab universities are harassed or closed. Political activity and organizations amongst Palestinians are restricted or forbidden. Protesting Palestinian students are shot.

Having myself been a colonial official in Palestine, I can respectfully say to Teddy Kollek that a condescending colonialism will not last, however considerate the administrator.

Jerusalem will never achieve the peace we all long for if one part of the population is to remain a subject people.

In this central issue of Jerusalem the Palestinians are supported by representatives of the Arab world and the Moslem world. The strongest statements have come from Saudi Arabia, but on this all the Arab Governments are in agreement.

It is well to remember the wording of the letter which President Sadat sent to President Carter on the 17th of September 1978, after Camp David:

I am writing you to reaffirm the position of the Arab Republic of Egypt with respect to Jerusalem:

1. Arab Jerusalem is an integral part of the West Bank. Legal and historical Arab rights in the city must be respected and restored.
2. Arab Jerusalem should be under Arab sovereignty.
3. The Palestinian inhabitants of Arab Jerusalem are entitled to exercise their legitimate national rights, being part of the Palestinian people in the West Bank.

4. Relevant Security Council resolutions, particularly resolutions 242 and 267, must be applied with regard to Jerusalem. All the measures taken by Israel to alter the status of the city are null and void and should be rescinded.

5. All peoples must have free access to the city and enjoy the free exercise of worship and the right to visit and transit to the holy places without distinction or discrimination.

6. The holy places of each faith may be placed under the administration and control of their representatives.

7. Essential functions in the city should be undivided and a joint municipal council composed of an equal number of Arab and Israeli members can supervise the carrying out of these functions. In this way the city shall be undivided.

The Sadat declaration carries wide general Arab agreement. On these principles and requirements there is no Arab doubt or discord. On the contrary, it can be confidently stated that no Arab, and indeed no Moslem, would ask for less.

THE WAY TO PEACE

Everywhere we look there is readiness to avoid dealing with the future of Jerusalem. At Camp David, as I have said, the word Jerusalem was not even mentioned. The subject is regarded as too difficult, too dangerous. Leave it to the end, is the advice of diplomacy—attempting to forget that disagreement at the end on such a vital issue would bring the whole edifice of negotiation down in ruins.

A few endeavors to face the central issue of the future of Jerusalem have been made. In a draft resolution recently presented to the Israeli Knesset under the heading *The Way to Peace*, this was the brave proposition:

Reconfirming that Jerusalem will remain Israel's eternal capital, the Knesset states that, in the future, as part of the overall peace process, Arab sovereignty may

encompass East Jerusalem, but the municipal unity of the City will be maintained.

But the Knesset was no more ready than anyone else to consider such a proposition.

Even Meron Benvenisti, who knows the whole subject so well and has written such a searching and sympathetic and sincere book, *Jerusalem: The Torn City*, ends his book not with a solution or even a proposal, but with a long list of various suggestions made by others, and with the baffled sentence, "Sixty years after it was first raised as an international political problem, and after thirty-six plans for its solution, the Jerusalem Problem still awaits a settlement."

And in Eugene Bovis' book, *The Jerusalem Question, 1917-1968* (together with Richard Pfaff's book, *Jerusalem: Keystone of an Arab-Israeli Settlement*, the most thorough and complete studies of the whole question), he, too, finishes by referring to the abundant separate proposals (he lists 26) and the gloomy reflection that "the Jerusalem question could become a stumbling block to any comprehensive Near East settlement."

The Brookings report of 1975 in a comprehensive and constructive study did at least set out "minimum criteria." Here is the section of the Brookings report dealing with Jerusalem:

The issue of Jerusalem is especially hard to resolve because it involves intense emotions on the part of both Israelis and Arabs. It embraces sites that are among the most holy for Muslims, Jews, and Christians. It has been the focus of Jewish messianic yearning and has had special significance in Muslim history. The city was bitterly contested in the wars of 1948 and 1967, and its division in the interwar years left a heritage of deep mutual recrimination. Finally, it is the capital of Israel and might also be sought as the capital of a Palestine state.

For all these reasons the issue is highly symbolic for both sides. Consequently, it may prove wise to leave its resolution to a late stage of the negotiation. Whatever that resolution may be, it should meet as a minimum the following criteria:

(a) There should be unimpeded access to all the holy places and each should be under the custodianship of its own faith.

(b) There should be no barriers dividing the city which would prevent free circulation throughout it.

(c) Each national group within the city should, if it so desires, have substantial political autonomy within the area where it predominates.

All these criteria could be met within a city (1) under Israeli sovereign jurisdiction with free access to the holy places, (2) under divided sovereign jurisdiction between Israel and an Arab state with assured free circulation, or (3) under either of these arrangements with an international authority in an agreed area, such as the old walled city, with free access to it from both Israel and the Arab state. These or any other possible solutions should incorporate all three of the criteria set forth above.

No solution will be able to satisfy fully the demands of either side. Yet the issue must be resolved if there is to be a stable peace. We are convinced that ingenuity and patience should be able to find a compromise which will be fair and ultimately acceptable, even though not ideal from the point of view of any party.*

It is with these wise words that we seek to move towards a conclusion, and as I read what others have said, and take into account all the passionate feelings and the forbidding factors, it seems to me that we must not be mesmerized by the conspiracy of international silence. The problem will not be settled by procrastination. Peace will not come from running away. Yet, it may be that the fate of Jerusalem cannot be settled in advance of the other outstanding problems of the Middle East, but it is essential that the difficulties and dangers must be considered and assessed in good time if they are to be overcome.

It seems to me, too, that with all the complications there are firm foundations on which a secure and lasting peace must be built. The choice is basically between three courses of action:

(a) Internationalisation

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(b) Continued Israeli domination of the whole city

(c) An Israeli Jerusalem and an Arab Jerusalem with no barriers between them

I have already stated the objections to the first two possibilities. Neither, I am convinced, can bring the peace which Israelis and Arabs and the Holy City so dearly need.

The third course—the course of unity by equality to take the place of division by domination—would fully satisfy the Brookings criteria.

To give effect to it I propose an expansion of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution which I suggested earlier.

This is the revised draft resolution:

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

EAGER TO ENSURE THAT THE HOLY CITY OF JERUSALEM SHALL FOREVER BE A CENTRE AND SYMBOL OF PEACE AND FREEDOM;

ANXIOUS MOREOVER THAT THE TRANQUILITY AND SECURITY OF THE HOLY CITY SHALL NOT ONLY BE PROTECTED BY THE RESPONSIBLE CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS AUTHORITIES, BUT SHALL ALSO BE RECOGNIZED AND RESPECTED BY ALL MANKIND;

WISHING TO ASSIST IN MAINTAINING THE PERMANENT FREEDOM OF THE HOLY CITY FROM DISPUTE AND STRIFE, AND THE PEACEFUL PRESERVATION OF THE HOLY PLACES, AND THE SCRUPULOUS PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES;

(1) DECIDES THAT THERE SHALL BE AN ISRAELI JERUSALEM AND AN ARAB JERUSALEM EACH EXERCISING FULL SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN THEIR OWN TERRITORY BUT WITH NO BARRIERS BETWEEN THEM AND NO IMPEDIMENT TO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT BETWEEN THEM;

(2) **REQUESTS** THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO APPOINT AN IMPARTIAL BOUNDARY COMMISSION TO HEAR REPRESENTATIONS FROM THOSE CONCERNED AND TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS TO THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE ISRAELI JERUSALEM AND THE ARAB JERUSALEM;

(3) **CALLS** FOR THE COMPLETE DEMILITARIZATION OF THE HOLY CITY;

(4) **REQUESTS** THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN CONSULTATION WITH THOSE CONCERNED TO APPOINT A COMMISSION OF COOPERATION TO WORK OUT AND PUT INTO EFFECT PRACTICAL PLANS FOR ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL COOPERATION;

(5) **DECIDES** TO REQUEST THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO APPOINT A HIGH COMMISSIONER (AND DEPUTY COMMISSIONER) TO BE STATIONED IN JERUSALEM, TO REPRESENT THE UNITED NATIONS AND TO WORK WITH ALL CONCERNED TO SECURE AND ENSURE THE PURPOSES OF THIS RESOLUTION, AND TO REPORT REGULARLY TO THE SECRETARY FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

The Boundary Commission would be instructed to make two main changes in the 1967 line—first that the Jewish Quarter of the Old City and the Western Wall should be included on the Israeli side of the line, and second that an area of Mount Scopus including the Hebrew University should be Israeli territory connected with Israel by an open bridge.

I maintain that these proposals are severely practical because I am convinced that there is no possibility of peace until the division of domination and enmity is replaced by the unity of equality and mutual confidence.

The alternative is growing hate and violence leading on to an eventual conflict of terrible bloodshed and destruction but *it is not too late to save Jerusalem and make the Holy City the Gateway to Peace.*

APPENDIX A. NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

WHY THE PALESTINIANS SEE THE HOLY CITY AS A GATEWAY TO PEACE

By Lord Caradon

THE TIMES (LONDON)
7 January 1977

Of all the crowded impressions from weeks of discussions in the Middle East one main conclusion is clearest of all. The Palestinians want a state of their own on the West Bank of Jordan. They long for a homeland in which they make their own decisions and shape their own destiny and regain their self-respect by practical, constructive endeavour.

On this there is surprising unanimity—I say surprising because in the past there have been so many disputes and divisions in the Arab world. But now—and this is in striking contrast to a year ago when I last toured in the Middle East—I found among the Palestinians no dissenting voice.

The new state should be established on the territories to be recovered from the Israeli occupation on the West Bank and Gaza, and East Jerusalem. This, as I say, is now the firm and clear claim of all the Palestinians I met.

It was reiterated in every West Bank town and village I visited. And the aim is accepted by the Palestine Liberation Organization. Yasser Arafat in a recent interview confirmed the earlier PLO policy: "We are prepared to establish an independent regime in any territory we liberate or from which Israel withdraws."

And when I saw Khaled [sic] Fahum, President of the PLO Council, in Damascus he fully endorsed the Palestinian demand.

So out of the delays and divisions of the past nine years there has emerged among the Palestinians a clear and positive and urgent purpose.

Two factors in this new situation should be specially emphasized.

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First, Arab Jerusalem must be included in the new state of Palestine. Saudi Arabia has always given top importance to the Jerusalem issue, and when I saw President Sadat he was particularly emphatic that no Arab could accept that Arab Jerusalem should not be under Arab administration. Without Arab sovereignty over Arab Jerusalem there can never be peace.

So the concept gains ground that there should be twin cities, an Arab Jerusalem and an Israeli Jerusalem—I trust with no barriers between them—with a new relationship of equality and mutual respect and cooperative understanding. The noble conception is that the Holy City should become not a barrier but a gateway to peace.

There is a second factor of the greatest importance arising from the aim of an independent Palestine state.

It is that the Palestinians of the West Bank increasingly realize that the new Palestine state can emerge and thrive only if those who form and lead it work in the closest and friendliest cooperation with their neighbours and specially with Jordan.

In meeting after meeting in the towns of the West Bank the Palestinians emphasized that the small state of Palestine must depend on the economic and political assistance of the Arab world, including particularly their Arab brothers on the other side of the river. Palestine, they begin to believe, can become not a cause of dispute but a proud centre of Arab unity and cooperation.

So now that the Palestinians agree on what they want, what support can they expect from the Arab governments? President Sadat puts an independent Palestine state as one of the main objects to be pursued at the Geneva Conference. Both in Damascus and Beirut I was told in the foreign ministries in the clearest terms that they are equally in support.

King Husain long ago made his position plain when he said: "Israel has stated that it will not tolerate an independent state in Palestine or the West Bank. Israel has no right to make such a decision. Neither have I. No one has a right to take that decision save the Palestinians themselves."

When I saw the King in Amman he fully confirmed the magnanimous attitude he had taken. The Palestinians know very well they

need Jordan's continuing generous assistance. They are assured that they will get it.

Moreover, international backing for the object of a Palestine state is overwhelming. Nine members of the European Community have declared that an end of Israel's territorial occupation following the 1967 war is an essential element in a settlement, and recently nearly a hundred nations in the United Nations General Assembly have supported the call for an independent Palestine state.

What of the attitude of the Israelis? As usual I was courteously received in the Israeli Foreign Ministry but I certainly did not expect any new statement of policy. I have always understood, and respected, the Israeli attitude that they will give nothing away until they see in negotiation what they are to get in terms of recognition and security.

But the importance of the new Palestinian purpose is, I am sure, not lost on the Israeli Government. They have become determined supporters of the terms of Security Council Resolution 242, and the Palestinian initiative is clearly in conformity with the two basic principles of that resolution, "the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war" and the right of every state in the area "to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats and acts of force"

Moreover, I met again some of the brave and outspoken Israelis who have been openly advocating the necessity of understanding and agreement with the Palestinians, and they tell me that their ideas make good progress in Israeli public opinion. It was good too to talk again with Teddy Kollek, the indefatigable Mayor of Jerusalem, who takes special pride in working for better relations with the Arabs.

It is no longer looked upon as a wildly idealistic conception that the security of Israel and the peace of the whole Middle East must depend not on arms or on territory or on the domination of one side over the other but on agreement, and on peaceful coexistence, with Palestinians too having a right to self-determination and security in their own homeland.

I like to quote what Abba Eban, then Foreign Secretary of Israel, said at the Geneva Conference in 1973: "The ultimate guarantee in a peace agreement lies in the creation of common regional interests in such degree of intensity, in such multiplicity of inter-action, in such entanglement of reciprocal advantage, in such accessibility of human

contact, as to put the possibility of future war beyond national contingency."

The immediate obstacle is the question of how the Palestinians should be represented at the Geneva Conference. There are half a dozen ways of getting over this procedural difficulty, several of them under discussion now, but it is increasingly recognized that to have a Middle East conference and to exclude the Palestinians would be the height of arrogant absurdity. Moreover Kheled Fahum of the PLO in Damascus told me that the PLO is now directing its efforts to making the Palestine National Council as widely representative of all Palestinians as possible.

So if the new purpose is supported by the Palestinians and the Arab governments directly concerned and most of the nations of the world, and if Israel could from this enterprise obtain the security and peace which it needs at least as badly as the Arabs, what hope is there that the Geneva Conference will soon convene and get down to the hard detailed work—on boundaries and guarantees and demilitarized zones and return of refugees and Jerusalem, among other difficult but negotiable questions to be settled?

In spite of all the favourable factors, with the Lebanese civil war ended, Arab governments in accord, a new President in the United States and such wide support for convening the Geneva Conference, I am bound to say that I feel no easy optimism.

The policies of divide and delay which have dominated the past nine years are still more powerful, I fear, than the urge for positive action. And while the drift continues the situation on the ground grows rapidly much worse. The seizure of land and the concrete encirclement of Jerusalem proceed apace. Scarcely a month passes without an announcement about compulsory land acquisition and new Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. They stand right across the path of peace.

My intention was to look for new hopes for the future and not to pursue complaints about the past, but it was impossible to avoid the harsh facts and the bitter reactions of the occupation. When I was in Nablus it was under military curfew. When I was in Hebron the town was in protest strike. Demonstrations by schoolchildren are followed by arrests and heavy fines (as much as ten thousand Israeli pounds in some cases) on the parents.

In the streets as well as in the meeting places I was met with complaints about imprisonment, exiling, house arrests and refusal to allow freedom of political organization.

The occupation of Arab lands by force has gone on much too long. Now there is a prospect and a real hope that this occupation could be ended in a lasting peace.

If this opportunity is lost I believe that all concerned will face maybe a generation of violence and bloodshed and devastation and human suffering too vast to imagine.

We must pray that 1977 will be the year of the peace, a peace internationally achieved and guaranteed, with Europe playing its full part in a concerted and urgent international endeavour and, so I would greatly hope, the United Kingdom again taking the lead.

JERUSALEM, GATEWAY TO PEACE

By Hugh Caradon

THE WASHINGTON POST
12 DECEMBER 1977

Lord Caradon, who recently returned from a visit to the Middle East, served in Palestine and Trans-Jordan in the days of the British Mandate. In 1967, as minister representing the United Kingdom in the United Nations, he proposed Resolution 242 providing a basis for a Middle East settlement, the resolution being unanimously adopted in the Security Council.

In the Middle East there is one fundamental factor often avoided but never to be forgotten. It is that Jerusalem must be at peace.

If there is no settlement in Jerusalem, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's brave expedition will turn sour as a forlorn failure; Secretary of State Cyrus Vance need fly no more; President Carter's hope of the Palestinian homeland can be put away in the files; and Israel must prepare for decades of precarious and expensive defense, an island in a great sea of threatening animosity.

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The plain fact is that no Arab and no Moslem will accept the attempted annexation under Israeli sovereignty of Arab Jerusalem. If anyone doubts that let him ask any Arab, any Moslem, anywhere.

What is more, nearly every country in the world, including the United States, has called on Israel not to proceed with the attempt to annex East Jerusalem.

So much for the negative fact.

It's best to turn to the positive opportunity, the noble conception that Jerusalem should become not a barrier but an opening, an opportunity, an invitation to a new era of freedom, equality, understanding and cooperation in a lasting peace.

For some years now the new idea has been gaining ground. It can be simply stated:

There should be sister cities in an undivided Jerusalem, an Arab Jerusalem under Arab administration and sovereignty on one side, and an Israeli administration and sovereignty on the other, with freedom of movement and communication between the two—a settlement based on mutual respect and peaceful coexistence, creating a new relationship of trust and cooperation between the Israelis and the Arabs, a new Jerusalem to bring about a lasting peace.

A free Jerusalem bringing people together instead of holding them apart, enabling them to cooperate in matters of joint concern—what a prize that would be! What a blessing for everyone! Jerusalem as the center of peace and freedom—that would be the greatest triumph.

I give my own confident testimony from many visits to Jerusalem, and to both sides of the Jordan. Everyone I met, both Arab and Israeli, is agreed that whatever else happens, there should never again be barriers in Jerusalem. There is no intention on either side to go back to the old armed confrontation. That is what makes the proposal for equality in an undivided city both possible and practical.

I have often said while speaking in the Arab towns and villages of the West Bank that if anyone tries to erect barriers again in Jerusalem I should like to come with my own hands to help tear them down. But, as I say, I find on both sides agreement at least on this: a deep desire to keep an undivided city.

What is the international interest?

It was long ago proposed in the United Nations that Jerusalem should be an internationally governed city. That might have been possible at one time. It is not now. Neither the Arabs nor the Israelis would accept it. And anyhow, it will be far better, I am sure, for the Arabs to administer the Arab area and Arab population, and the Israelis their own. The international interest should be directed to freedom of religion and freedom of access to the Holy Places for everyone.

I have proposed a Statute of Jerusalem "to ensure that the Holy City of Jerusalem shall forever be a center and symbol of peace and freedom." The Statute, I have good reason to believe, would be welcomed by the Christian churches as well as Moslems and Jews. It would provide for an international high commissioner, not to administer the sister cities, but to ensure, with the responsible authorities on both sides, freedom of movement between them and freedom of access for everyone to the Holy Places. And it should be agreed on both sides that the open city would be demilitarized.

Is all this an idealist dream? On the contrary, the proposals are practical and possible. The plan for an Arab and an Israeli Jerusalem, undivided and free of barriers, has the inestimable advantage of being the only solution that has any prospect or hope of restoring peace at last to the Middle East.

Now let us look at this proposal in the new light of recent developments. A month ago we all might have agreed that the question of the future of Jerusalem would have to be discussed at the Geneva Conference.

Why should we wait now?

There are many difficult questions later to be resolved by negotiation—questions of Palestinian rights, refugees, boundaries, demilitarized zones, guarantees. But why not now deal with Jerusalem not last but first? By an assurance now that Arab Jerusalem will be free, everything else would be made easier.

I was in Israel when President Sadat came to Jerusalem. He convinced all Israel, I am sure, that he genuinely seeks a permanent peace and recognizes the right of Israel to live in peace and security "free from force and threat of force."

How about a worthy response from Israel on the other central issue? Here is an opportunity for a response that would, I have no doubt at all, give joy to every Arab and every Moslem in the world. Leave all the other issues to be promptly dealt with at Geneva or elsewhere in the transformed atmosphere that an Israeli gesture on Jerusalem would create.

Let Israel's response to Egypt be an assurance now that Arab sovereignty over East Jerusalem is accepted, that the aim must be equality in the Holy City with no barriers.

I do not underestimate the strength of feeling in Israel on the subject of Jerusalem. But I believe that the future security of Israel and Palestinian self-determination and the craving for real peace everywhere in the Middle East are of paramount importance. "Magnanimity in politics is not seldom the truest wisdom."

Israel must be secure; Palestinians must be free. One is not possible without the other. Both are now attainable. Jerusalem could show the way.

What a wonderful thing it would be if we could look back on 1977 as the Year of Peace—with Jerusalem not the impediment but the site, the means, the ensurance, the pride of lasting peace.

**APPENDIX B: UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 242 (1967)**

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter.

1. *Affirms* that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. *Affirms further* the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and main-

tain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution:

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.


On November 23, the Secretary-General, U Thant, designated Gunnar Jarring, Ambassador from Sweden to the Soviet Union, as the Special Representative who would proceed to the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) adopted on November 22.

APPENDIX C. MAPS


**UNITED NATIONS BOUNDARIES PROPOSED FOR
AN INTERNATIONAL CITY**

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 303

9 December 1949



JERUSALEM'S LEVANTINE SETTING



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- 77-6 *U.S. Security Interests in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland,* Daniel M. Duffield, December 1977. (AD No. A050814)
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