


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A United Front Against Hegemonism

Chinese Foreign Policy
Into The 1980's

WILLIAM R. HEATON, JR.

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**A UNITED FRONT AGAINST HEGEMONISM:
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY
INTO THE 1980's**

by

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FOREWORD

It is a pleasure to add this analysis of Chinese foreign policy to our growing list of National Security Affairs Monographs.

In 1972, the United States and China issued the Shanghai Communiqué which inaugurated a new era in Chinese foreign policy. The People's Republic of China began to emerge from its isolation and move toward a new role as an activist in international diplomacy. China increased economic and cultural contacts with the West and developed improved relations with former adversaries. Are there suitable explanations for this apparently momentous reversal of policy?

In this monograph, William Heaton suggests that there are three basic determinants of Chinese foreign policy: ideology, bureaucratic politics, and perceptions. The complex interaction of these factors is described as instrumental in the formulation of the Chinese concept of a "united front against hegemonism." This more flexible and pragmatic approach was designed to promote Chinese interests in the modern world and led to China's most dramatic foreign policy change: the normalization of relations with the United States.

The author cautions policymakers against over-optimism about the future of US-Chinese relations. Instead, he suggests a judicious assessment of the variable elements which determine Chinese policy—for such an assessment is essential, he argues, in understanding China's foreign policy as it evolves in the 1980's.



R. G. GARD, JR.
Lieutenant General, USA
President

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Captain William R. Heaton, Jr., USAF, wrote this monograph while a Senior Research Fellow concentrating on Chinese affairs at the Research Directorate, National Defense University. A specialist in the area of East Asian politics, Captain Heaton has served as an Associate Professor of Political Science, USAF Academy, from 1973 to 1978, and as an intelligence officer in Vietnam and Thailand from 1972 to 1973. His publications on East Asian affairs include "The Minorities of the Military in China," *Armed Forces and Society*, "The Thai Counterinsurgency," *American Defense Policy*, and (as co-author) *The Politics of East Asia*. Captain Heaton holds bachelor of arts and master of arts degrees in political science and Asian studies from Brigham Young University and a doctoral degree in political science from the University of California, Berkeley.

A UNITED FRONT AGAINST HEGEMONISM: CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY INTO THE 1980's

... we proceed from the establishment of a united front against hegemonism and for the defense of world peace, security and stability, and this united front includes the US.

Deng Xiaoping¹

Following the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and the purge of the so-called "gang of four," the new leaders of China revitalized the long dormant program of modernization. Designed to overtake the advanced industrialized countries of the West by the year 2000, this program envisioned increased contacts and arrangements with Western countries, to include hitherto unacceptable trade and financial agreements. During the same period China's relations with former allies such as Albania and Vietnam had deteriorated and China's relations with former adversaries such as Japan and the United States had normalized. Thus, by the late 1970's the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China had undergone apparently fundamental changes and a new Chinese foreign policy had ostensibly emerged.

What factors underlie China's new foreign policy and how does the new policy affect the United States? A variety of answers have been offered to both questions. One view is that the new policy is only a duplicitous scheme to mask Beijing's (Peking) true intention of world domination, and thus, is ultimately a threat to the security of the United States.² Another view is that China has an almost paranoid fear of the Soviet Union and will do almost anything to counterbalance the "polar bear." An alternate view is that China is playing an "American card" as a prelude to improving relations with the Soviet Union,³ while still another view is that Chinese policy is the practical result of modernization politics—that is, China needs the advanced technological capabilities of the capitalist countries and has altered its policies to achieve the goal of modernization.⁴ These views, along with several variations, are not mutually exclusive and offer a confusing variety of explanations. Each has limitations in explaining Chinese foreign policy. Deeper and more useful insight may be obtained by re-examining the determinants of Chinese policy, by

discussing more fully the policy decisions themselves, and by proceeding to assess the policies in the light of stated US policy interests.

DETERMINANTS OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

There are three primary determinants of Chinese foreign policy: the role of ideology or doctrine in policymaking, the role of bureaucratic politics in decisionmaking, and the perceptions of the Chinese of the international environment and their role in that environment. Each of these factors is related to the others, but for purposes of analytical clarity each will be considered separately.

Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy

In his classic work, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, Franz Schurman characterized ideology in China, specifically the thought of Mao Zedong, as a new value system which attempted to link the theoretical aspects of Marxism-Leninism with the practical task of building a socialist China.⁵ Other scholars have indicated that Maoist ideology has constituted the "civil religion" of China in that ideology serves as both a guide to, and a justification of, policy.⁶ Consequently, it is instructive to examine the role of ideology in Chinese foreign policy.

Mao Zedong said and wrote many different things at many different times. Quoting Mao is somewhat like quoting the Bible; any number of sects and denominations can cite authoritative passages supporting a particular position. Since the death of Mao, his successors have been able to alter radically a number of policies without seeming to violate Mao's ideological stance. On the contrary, they have freely quoted him to support their actions. In his essay, *On Practice*, now very popular with Chinese leaders, Mao argues that theory does not arise in a vacuum, that it can only be born through experience.⁷ Ideology, then, must be flexible, and must take into account changing reality. In utilizing Maoist ideology, Mao's successors have demonstrated the central tenet of his thinking—the constancy of change.

The concept of change permeates Chinese ideology, and thus influences Chinese foreign policy. Change is also manifest in another cardinal principle of Maoist ideology, that of contradictions. According to Mao, dialectical materialism is characterized by a series of

contradictions, or *mao dum*.⁸ As contradictions are resolved, new contradictions arise in an ongoing historical process that continues even after the achievement of socialism. There are two types of contradictions, nonantagonistic and antagonistic: Nonantagonistic contradictions are less serious and may be managed, although they may some day evolve into antagonistic contradictions. Antagonistic contradictions are more serious and are a matter of life and death struggle; these contradictions must be reconciled by forming a broad united front with all unitable forces. A brief, simplified, historical overview illustrates this principle.

From 1927-36 the Kuomintang, or Chinese Nationalist Party, was identified as the antagonistic contradiction to the Chinese Communist movement. From 1937-45 Japan was identified as the antagonistic contradiction following the Japanese invasion of China. After the Nationalists and Chinese Communists formed a united front, at least in theory, against Japan, the Kuomintang assumed the role of nonantagonistic contradiction. Following the defeat of Japan, the Kuomintang and its ally, the United States, became the antagonistic contradiction.

More recently, the fundamental contradiction, according to the Chinese, is between imperialism and proletarian revolution. They argue that the imperialist powers have brought about the division of the world into oppressor and oppressed nations. To counter the imperialists the international proletariat must form a broad united front with the oppressed nations:

In waging the struggle in the international arena, the proletariat must unite with all those who can be united in the light of what is imperative and feasible in different historical periods, so as to develop the progressive forces, win over the middle forces and isolate the diehards. Therefore, we can never lay down any hard and fast formula for differentiating the world's political forces (i.e. differentiating ourselves, our friends and our enemies in the international class struggle).⁹

Related to this concept of forming a united front against imperialism is the concept of the "Three Worlds." In February 1974 Mao stated:

In my view, the United States and the Soviet Union form the first world. Japan, Europe and Canada, the middle section, belong to the second world. We are the third world. The third world has a huge population. With the exception of Japan, Asia belongs to the third world. The whole of Africa belongs to the third world, and Latin America too.¹⁰

Since that time, the Three Worlds concept has continued to dominate Chinese foreign policy pronouncements. In November 1977, a year after Mao's death, the Editorial Department of *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily) published a restatement of this thesis. The article, entitled "Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism," explained that the Three Worlds concept was a scientific Marxist assessment of present reality.

The First World consists of the two hegemonistic powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Because of their imperialistic nature, these two countries are the greatest exploiters of the peoples of the world and will inevitably go to war with each other. However, the Soviet Union is the most dangerous source of war, because of its expansionist policy, while the United States is defending its world position.

The Second World includes the industrialized countries of Eastern and Western Europe, Canada, Japan, and others. In the Chinese view, these countries have been dominated by the superpowers in the past, but are beginning to assert their independence and constitute a force that can be formed into a united front to oppose hegemonism. Western Europe is crucial to the united front since Soviet expansionism is directly aimed toward this area.

The article notes that since the countries and peoples of the Third World are the most exploited, they will be the most resolute in resisting imperialism, colonialism, and hegemonism. And, that while uniting with other Third World countries in overcoming the divisions engineered by the imperialists is an important Chinese objective, China must never become a superpower or hegemonist.

The article concludes with China's prescription for the situation. First, the people must be warned of the growing danger of war. Second, China must exert all effort in the struggle against hegemonism. Third, China must redouble its efforts to oppose the policy of appeasement, because appeasement can only hasten war. By adhering to these precepts, the defense capabilities of the peoples of all countries can be strengthened, and the outbreak of war can thereby be delayed. In sum, the broadest possible united front against hegemonism must be established.¹¹

The Chinese continued to expound the Three Worlds hypothesis, without significant modification, for about a year. On 26 February

1978, Hua Guofeng delivered his *Report on the Work of the Government* before the first session of the Fifth National People's Congress. In his section on foreign policy Hua again stated the Three Worlds hypothesis and called for the formation of a united front against the hegemonism of the superpowers. He also expressed the desire to establish and develop relations with all countries "on the basis of the Five Principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence."¹² In June, in a speech before the UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament, Foreign Minister Huang Hua further stated the need to develop a broad united front against the United States and the Soviet Union in order to "frustrate the superpowers' policies of aggression and war and uphold world peace."¹³ However, Huang also noted that the *peoples* of the United States and the Soviet Union could be involved in the alliance.

By the fall of 1978, however, there were hints of change in China's definition of the united front. In a speech before the UN General Assembly on 28 September, Huang Hua reiterated the danger of hegemonism, the need for a united front, and China's three prescriptions for dealing with superpower aggression. At the same time he noted Hua Guofeng's successful visit to Romania, Yugoslavia, and Iran, and the conclusion of the peace and friendship treaty with Japan. Speaking of the treaty, Huang observed: "It includes the explicit stipulation that neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony. This is the first time that such a stipulation is included in an international treaty." Huang also observed that "the Chinese people ardently love peace and are opposed to a new world war. Moreover, we need an enduring peaceful international environment in which to build up our country."¹⁴

China's successful diplomacy in Eastern Europe and Japan seemed to suggest that united front diplomacy against hegemonism was effective. While the peoples of the world continued to be aware of the dangers of war, there seemed to be greater hope that war could be forestalled. The view that war among the superpowers was inevitable and fairly imminent gave signs of yielding to a view that united front diplomacy might prevent a major war.

An even greater modification of the united front definition came with the normalization of relations with the United States. Deng Xiaoping, in his speeches and interviews, called on the United States to become part of the united front against the Soviet Union. According to this recent doctrinal modification, one of the hitherto hegemonistic superpowers suddenly was entitled to become part of the united front against the other hegemonist superpower. Thus, it is no longer the hegemonistic tendency of both superpowers that is to be united against, but the hegemonistic tendency of one. The Soviet Union has clearly emerged as the antagonistic contradiction. In his speech before the US Foreign Policy Association, Deng, discussing the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and Cuba, stated: "The zealous pushing of a global strategy for world domination by the hegemonists cannot but increase the danger of a new world war. It has become an urgent task of all countries and people who cherish independence and peace to combat hegemonism."¹⁵

Perhaps the change in doctrine can be explained by the willingness of the United States to join with China, as did Japan, in an official expression of opposition to hegemonism. In the official communiqué establishing diplomatic relations, both sides stated that "neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region of the world and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony." Similar wording was used in the official press communiqué issued by President Carter and Deng during Deng's visit to the United States.¹⁶ However, the United States had pledged its opposition to hegemonism as early as the Shanghai Communiqué; the more recent statements were thus a reiteration rather than a new position for the United States.

A better explanation for the change in doctrine may be found in the concept of the united front envisioned by the Chinese. Maoist doctrine specifically emphasized the formation of the broadest possible coalition, albeit temporary, in the pursuit of a specific goal. It is the duty of Communist Party leaders not to succumb to left or right deviation but to manage the united front carefully until the goal is achieved.¹⁷ The United States, even though it remains a hegemonistic power, may be utilized as part of the broad coalition against the more aggressive hegemonistic superpower, the Soviet Union.

In his report on normalization of relations with the United States before the fifth session of the Fifth National People's Congress Standing Committee, Foreign Minister Huang Hua outlined the development of US-China relations over a long period and stated that

because of changes in the balance of global power, the United States was forced to consider changes in its policy toward China. Huang credited Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou with perceptively seeking to involve the United States in the international struggle against hegemonism and making a strategic policy decision to facilitate normalization of Sino-US relations. This decision led to the visit of President Nixon in 1972 and the issuance of the Shanghai Communiqué. Huang further discussed the development of US-China relations between 1972 and the achievement of normalization in 1979; this development represented "a tremendous victory for the revolutionary line on foreign affairs formulated by Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou during their lifetime, and another important achievement of our country's foreign policy."¹⁸ He said:

[Normalization] will also play a positive role in safeguarding peace and stability in Asia and in the world as a whole, in opposing expansionist and aggressive activities of hegemonism, and in pushing the international situation to continue developing in a direction favorable to the people.¹⁹

Similarly, the January 1979 issue of *Red Flag* traced the history of relations between China and the United States and hailed normalization as a diplomatic victory. It was noted that while normalization should not be considered the formation of an "alliance" or an "axis," it would be favorable to the containment of the Soviet Union. According to *Red Flag*:

The reaffirmation of the principle of opposing hegemony in the joint communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States is undoubtedly favorable to the struggle of the people of various countries against hegemonism.

And further:

The normalization of relations between China and the United States and the conclusion of a treaty of peace and friendship between China and Japan will help hold any war plotter in check, delay the outbreak of a world war and maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the whole world.²⁰

It is important to emphasize that the Chinese do not view their new relationship with the United States as an alliance. When Deng was asked about the Soviet charge that China, Japan, and the United States were forming a triple alliance, he responded:

There is no question of alliance. I think it is true of China, the United States and Japan that each approaches various international issues in the light of its own national interests. For instance, before the normalization of relations between China and the United States, we made it clear on many occasions that while our systems are different and we have differences on many fundamental principles, there is much in common between us on matters of global strategy and on political questions.

You will recall that in the Shanghai Communiqué issued between China and the United States in 1972, in the China-Japan treaty of peace and friendship, and in the recent joint communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States, the anti-hegemonic principle has been specially included. *This is our greatest point politically.* What is there for the Russians to complain about? All they have to do is to stop practicing hegemonism.²¹

From the above statements, it can be seen that ideology is an important component of Chinese foreign policy. Ideology has served as both a guide to, and a justification for, action. The concepts of the Three Worlds and the united front have permitted China considerable flexibility in adjusting its relations with former allies and former adversaries. The most salient ideological aspects of Chinese foreign policy may be summarized as follows:

- According to the concepts of "contradictions" and "practice," the world is divided into three categories; the principle danger of war is brought about by the hegemony seeking first world, the superpowers.**
- War may be postponed and the cause of proletarian revolution advanced by forming the broadest possible united front against hegemonism.**
- The primary force in the united front will be the peoples and nations of the Third World, of which China is a part; however, all other people and nations that can be united must be united.**
- Because there are fundamental contradictions between the United States and the Soviet Union, and because the Soviet Union is an aggressive hegemonist power, the United States may also become part of the united front. This is not an**

alliance but an expedient policy seeking to unite all forces that can be united in opposition to a common enemy.

These ideological aspects of Chinese foreign policy are closely related to Chinese perceptions, a point that will be demonstrated more clearly in a later section.

Bureaucratic Politics and Chinese Foreign Policy

An important element of foreign policy decisionmaking involves the attitudes, beliefs, and values of the decisionmakers.²² The most intimate details of Chinese policymaking are, of course, not well-known. However, the public statements and comments of Chinese officials have provided a rich source of information concerning the internal debates on foreign policy. Inasmuch as the Chinese political system is authoritarian and highly centralized, it is especially meaningful to scrutinize as closely as possible the formation of factions or informal groups at the highest levels of the system. Changing leadership coalitions in China have a pronounced bearing on foreign policy decisions; this has been borne out by the record of past policy decisions.²³

Since the Cultural Revolution, observers of China have been able to demonstrate the existence of clashing interests in China. These observers differ on the nature and composition of these factions or informal groups. The Chinese themselves speak of factions as being either revolutionary or counterrevolutionary in a two-line dichotomy. Lin Piao and the "gang of four" were members of counter-revolutionary anti-Party cliques; the movement to eradicate the followers and influence of Lin and the "gang of four" was ended in the December 1978 plenum of the 11th Central Committee after several years of "struggle."²⁴ The Western press, and even some scholars have usually borrowed from the "two-line" concept to identify the so-called "pragmatics" and "radicals." Radicals are those who adhere rigidly to the ideological precepts of Mao, and pragmatics are those who are willing to bend the rules to achieve modernization.²⁵

A recent example of the two-line approach pits Hua Guofeng against Deng Xiaoping. In this analysis Hua is supported by those whose careers were enhanced by the Cultural Revolution. This group supposedly adheres more closely to Mao's teachings and policies. The group led by Deng suffered during the Cultural Revolution and is now returning to prominence. It is willing to pay lip homage to Mao while discarding his policies in favor of those which will modernize

China more rapidly, even at the cost of social equality. Reports from China say that a showdown between the two groups occurred during the third plenum of the 11th Central Committee. Hua made a self-criticism and several of his supporters lost key positions, while supporters of Deng were said to have made significant gains.²⁶ Deng and his supporters are now said to be firmly in the ascendancy.

While the two-line analysis does indeed reveal much about the formation of informal groups in China, it also obscures much. The groups have never been static, and the evidence suggests that different coalitions develop under differing circumstances. Occasionally, identifiable cliques such as the "gang of four" develop in China, but since the purge of this group, it appears that coalition formation has been more fluid. The formation of these groups involves four variables.

—**The first variable has to do with personality.** Personality is often overlooked by Western social scientists in their analysis of factional cleavage, yet it is the most important variable in the view of many analysts in Taiwan and Hong Kong. For example, Deng Xiaoping is said to have inherited that charismatic mantle of Zhou Enlai, while Hua is more reticent and more uncomfortable in public. Some of the criticism of Wang Dongxing, Mao's bodyguard and now a Party Vice-Chairman, in the recent Central Committee is said to have been based on personal animosity. Other examples could be cited. The point is, personality influences the formation of informal groups in Chinese politics.

—**The second variable has to do with ideological persuasion.** Different leaders are likely to interpret ideology somewhat differently. Even since the purge of the "gang of four," there has been a strong ideological debate at the highest levels. For example, one group was said to have taken the "whatever" line. That is, they took the position that "we are determined to support whatever policy decisions were made by Chairman Mao and we will unswervingly follow whatever instructions were given by Chairman Mao in defending Maoist ideology."²⁷ The "whatever" group has been challenged by the "practice" group which argues that Maoist ideology must be tested and altered through experience or practice.²⁸

—**A third variable has to do with career patterns.** Deng is a veteran of the Long March and has close ties with the military

and the central bureaucracy. Hua is the classic Party organization man, having risen through the ranks of local, then provincial, and finally national leadership. Hua's selection as Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman and Premier was based on reported endorsement by Mao, but also, primarily, because he was a compromise candidate among the various groups. Of great significance in China's decision-making process is the role of the military. About one-third of the voting positions in the Politburo are held by career military officers, to include the commanders of China's key military regions and the commanders of the Air Force and the Navy. Since views on various policies are shaped in part by career experience, the Agriculture Minister, for example, may well have a different view of foreign trade than does the Defense Minister. In addition to bureaucratic experience, the protégé system which is common to authoritarian regimes prevails in China. Deng is said to be a protégé of Zhou Enlai. In recent national and provincial Party organizational shakeups, Deng's protégés are said to have advanced, usually at the expense of other groups.

—**The final variable has to do with the nature of the policy under consideration.** Because of the above mentioned variables, different individuals have different policy interests and specializations, which are not necessarily oriented strictly according to career background. Recent policy debates were on strategies for modernization, foreign trade, foreign policy, and agricultural policy, among others.²⁹

When all of these variables are considered, it is not surprising that a variety of coalitions can and do occur. Thomas Gottlieb has pointed out that during the Cultural Revolution three distinct positions concerning foreign policy emerged.³⁰ Kenneth Lieberthal believes that one of the positions was removed with the "gang of four," at least as far as Sino-Soviet relations are concerned.³¹ In fact, a careful reading of the Chinese press suggests that different spokesmen have taken several different views on foreign policy issues at different times and places. In part, this demonstrates a victory for the advocates of flexibility. At the same time it illustrates the shifting of coalitions and groups that have articulated foreign policy positions.³²

The present dominant coalition has eagerly sought a consensus on foreign policy as well as on domestic policy issues. That consensus has been difficult to achieve is amply demonstrated by the

repeated shakeups in the highest levels of the Party. The most recent of these came with the removal of Wu De, Wang Dongxing, and other prominent members of the Politburo from some of their positions (though they retained Politburo membership). These changes have strengthened the position of Deng Xiaoping and his supporters. Hua Guofeng, in a diminution of his own position, announced before the third plenum that collective leadership in the Party should be emphasized and that no one individual should receive considerable publicity in the media.³³ Emphasis on collective leadership strengthens the position of the dominant coalition, headed by Deng, with the support and titular leadership of Hua, and lends legitimacy to recent decisions taken concerning modernization and foreign policy.³⁴

Since the past history of bureaucratic politics at the highest levels suggests change and instability rather than stability, the present dominant coalition probably will not endure unaltered. Deng is 74 years old and many of his chief supporters are also fairly advanced in age. Furthermore, some of the policies being attempted by the present coalition are likely to fail, thus influencing the stability of the coalition. It can be predicted with reasonable certainty that as the coalition changes, so will China's policies; what is less certain is just how great the changes will be.

In summing up the variable of bureaucratic politics, the following points can be made:

- Chinese foreign policy is in part a result of a struggle for power and influence among China's top leaders.
- Leading coalitions in China are the result of several variables, notably, personality, ideology, official position and policy preference; these coalitions are fluid and changing.
- The present dominant coalition headed by Deng Xiaoping, with the support and titular leadership of Hua Guofeng, has been trying to achieve consensus on policy, but the future is by no means certain; as the coalitions change, so are the policies likely to change.

Chinese Perceptions and Foreign Policy

Chinese perceptions of the international environment and Chi-

na's role in that environment are shaped by ideology and by bureaucratic politics.³⁵ The present ruling coalition has outlined its perceptions in a series of pronouncements dealing primarily with the issue of modernization. Perhaps the best statement of this perception is to be found in the joint editorial celebrating the opening of the Fifth National People's Congress, "A Major Move in Continuing the Long March," which said:

To accomplish the comprehensive modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology by the end of this century so as to make China's national economy advance in the front ranks of the world—this is the behest of Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou, the long-cherished wish of the Chinese people and the sacred mission which history has entrusted to us. *In the present day world, being backward economically and technologically means being easily kicked around. For a whole century following the Opium War, China was kicked around and beaten. Unequal treaties humiliating the nation and forfeiting its sovereignty shackled our beloved country. Why was our country subjected to such humiliation? Why was she trampled underfoot? The corrupt social system was one factor and economic and technological backwardness was another.* From Hung Hsiu-chuan to Sun Yat-sen, Chinese progressives waged indomitable struggles successively to resist the aggression of the big powers and tried to build a prosperous and powerful China. But it was not until our great Chairman Mao Zedong integrated the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, led us in overthrowing the three big mountains—imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism— which lay like a dead weight on the Chinese people and founded the People's Republic of China that the Chinese people stood up.³⁶

The editorial goes on to say that during the period of the People's Republic, there has been some progress in advancing China's science and technology; however, because of the obstruction of various counter-revolutionaries in many areas, the gap between China and the advanced countries has widened. By eliminating the obstacles and achieving comprehensive modernization, China will become a modern, powerful nation.

There are several themes in this editorial that provide the key for understanding Chinese perceptions. The first theme is China's sensitivity over being a backward nation, after having had a long history of technological superiority to the West. Thus, the desire to regain a

position of prominence in technology is important for China's prestige. A related theme is the relationship between technology and power.

China believes that it suffered a hundred years of humiliation because of political, economic, and military weakness imposed by social and technological backwardness. Nearly all Chinese revolutionaries, regardless of ideological persuasion, could agree on the goal of achieving territorial unification, sovereignty by repudiating the unequal treaties, social change, and economic reform. The Chinese nationalist movement, of which the Chinese Communists are a derivative, strongly articulated these goals. The Chinese Communists ultimately came to power because they were more effective in mobilizing popular support around these goals than were the other political movements in China.

There have been differences over the strategy to be employed in achieving comprehensive modernization. Some leaders have demanded a program of total self-reliance: China must shun the outside world and find its own unique path to modernization. Others have argued that modernization must be based on social transformation. In this view China's peasantry must be ideologically motivated to transform consciousness; they will then sacrifice more and work harder to improve production. Still others believe in a more classic Marxist approach—that is, changing society by advancing the material base of society; hence, modernization can be achieved through incentives such as social status and economic benefits—for example, better pay and bonuses. The debate over which is the best way to catch up with the West has gone on for a long time—it is likely to continue.³⁷

The present leaders of China believe that economic modernization will constitute the basis for social transformation. Consequently, they have embarked on a program of development that will permit, even encourage, the continuation of social classes until a time in that far distant future when Communism will be achieved and social classes abolished. Specifically, the developmental program has been termed the "four modernizations": the modernization of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense.

Chinese foreign policy is to be directed toward supporting the four modernizations. Specifically, China wants to avoid a major war which would interfere with investment in developmental programs. Moreover, China hopes to acquire foreign assistance and technology.

During the latter part of 1978, a series of articles on the acquisition of foreign technology appeared in *Kwangming Daily*. The "gang of four" was accused of having hindered economic development by blind opposition to foreign technology. Now, foreign technology is to be utilized according to Chinese needs. In citing Hua's admonition that China must be "good at absorbing whatever is good in foreign things, take them over and turn them to our account, and combine our learning from foreign countries with our own inventiveness so that we can catch up with and surpass advanced world levels as soon as possible," one article listed five methods that Lenin advocated. These included: (1) acquire foreign capital; (2) use foreign capital to import large quantities of machines and equipment; (3) accept technical assistance; (4) organize joint companies; and (5) practice the lease and concession system.

The Chinese have already begun to utilize most of these methods for acquiring foreign technology. China is seeking loans from international agencies such as the United Nations, and has been willing to sign long-term trade agreements with several countries, notably France and Japan, which provide financing for Chinese projects. China has signed contracts with Japanese firms which amount to over \$20 billion, with French firms which amount to over \$10 billion, and with a variety of other countries which account for more billions. Estimates of Chinese trade agreements indicate that China now has foreign commitments of about \$60 billion, and the amount is increasing.³⁸

Under the terms of these agreements, foreign countries will provide nuclear reactors, steel plants, fertilizer plants, coal mines, harbors, and a variety of other industrial projects. Foreign technical advisors will assist in constructing and training Chinese to run the facilities. China has agreed to joint ventures with Hong Kong industrialists in textile's, electronics, and machinery plants. It has signed an agreement with Inter-Continental Hotels to build, staff, and manage several hotels in China; this contract is estimated to be over \$500 million. While foreign companies have not yet been granted concessions in China, several oil companies have been approached about developing China's oil resources. China hopes to export oil to pay for some of the massive purchases of foreign technology.

Another approach to be utilized by the Chinese is that of sending students abroad for advanced graduate education in science and technology. In the long run this is less expensive than some of the

other methods of acquiring technology. China has approached several countries, including the United States, about sending students, and it is anticipated that the small numbers now studying abroad will be rapidly expanded. Some of these students may eventually choose not to return to China; however, the Chinese Government has accepted this eventuality as part of the cost inherent in this method of technological acquisition.

Chinese leaders anticipate that there will be dangers involved in the rapid expansion of foreign exchange and foreign trade. Not the least of these concerns is related to ideology and society. More than a decade ago, the Chinese Communists launched the Cultural Revolution in response to tendencies deemed revisionist, tendencies which are now acceptable, but only to a degree. The clear desire is that foreign things be made to serve China, and not *vice versa*. This idea was clearly stated by Wang Yaoding, Chairman of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade:

Self-reliance and importing advanced equipment and technology do not stand in opposition to one another. No country in the world can produce all the things man needs. Ours is a big country with 800 million people. We could first rely on ourselves for things—from food and clothing up to items for the country's modernization. But at the same time we must learn from the good points of other countries and develop trade with them on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and supplying each other's needs. We must view importing foreign equipment and technology as an effective way to strengthen our ability to be self-reliant in socialist construction so long as it does not infringe on our sovereignty and economic independence or violate Chairman Mao's line in foreign affairs.³⁹

The theme of self-reliance was also echoed in the meetings of the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress in June 1979. In his *Report on the Work of the Government*, Hua insisted that China would continue to adhere to Mao's advice on self-reliance. At the same time, Hua indicated that China would be willing to form joint companies with other countries in developing China. The meetings of the Congress produced China's first real statistics in almost 20 years and indicated that economic growth had surged dramatically since the purge of the "gang of four." Nevertheless, Yu Qiuli, Deputy Premier of the State Council, reported that there were imbalances and announced that there would be cutbacks in investment in heavy industry and more funds put into the development of agriculture, light

industry, energy, and transportation which were seen as weak sectors.

Besides the perception that modernization is the key to national power, and that contacts with foreign countries are the key to modernization, another important perception, suggested by the quotation at the beginning of this section, is the importance of sovereignty. In the Chinese view, the century of humiliation can be absolved only when China claims its rightful place among the family of nations.

Evidence for this proposition can be found in the types of disputes in which the Chinese have become involved, disputes in which they have been willing to employ military force (an employment which often suggests that a nation's vital interests are at stake). The Chinese have resorted to military force in areas near China's borders, usually in connection with territorial disputes.

Chinese intervention in the Korean War, though it did not directly involve the territorial issue, was perceived by the Chinese to be necessary to prevent the expansion of US imperialism in North Korea; the Chinese perceived their intervention to be defensive. In the wars with India and Vietnam and in the border dispute with the Soviet Union, questions of territory were directly involved. In these cases the opposing countries all made territorial claims on the basis of unequal treaties. However, China refused to negotiate on the basis of the unequal treaties, and demanded that they be scrapped before negotiations could proceed. Inability to reach an agreement on procedures led to the employment of military force.

It should also be noted that China has surrendered territory in boundary negotiations with other countries; these countries have been willing to proceed from a basis of mutual sovereignty—that is, to agree that the unequal treaties are no longer in force while using them as a basis for a settlement. China is thereby not put in the untenable position of being dictated to on the basis of the unequal treaties.⁴⁰

Territory, of itself, is not so important to the Chinese as what it symbolizes. The Chinese must be able to negotiate on the basis of mutual sovereignty. Only when they can do this have they "stood up." As the record demonstrates, when they have not been able to do this they have sometimes resorted to military force, even though it may have embarrassed other political goals, as was the case in the war with India and in the subsequent war with Vietnam.

A final factor is the geopolitical realities of Asia which influence Chinese perceptions. Historically, China has been influential in Asia because of its size, location, and population. Chinese culture has had a marked impact on Japan and Southeast Asia. Overseas Chinese are influential in the economic life of Southeast Asia. Beyond Asia, China has had little influence, until comparatively recently. Even now, China tends to be preoccupied with domestic problems and, in spite of pronouncements about global problems, is chiefly concerned with the Asia-Pacific region.⁴¹

Chinese Communist leaders, recognizing China's military and economic weakness, have opted for policies which primarily strengthen China's regional position. While the Chinese eschew any desire of becoming a superpower, they may eventually achieve greater global status; this does not appear, however, to be an immediate objective. This restraint is demonstrated in a number of ways. In military strategy, China has developed only a minimum nuclear weapons deterrent and has declared a no first-strike policy. Further, China has proceeded slowly on ICBM development.⁴² In the United Nations China has remained aloof from the contentions of the superpowers, being almost entirely content in issuing self-righteous platitudes of support for the just struggles of the peoples of the world; China avoids direct involvement in the negotiations of many serious global problems. Nevertheless, Chinese diplomats have recently shown substantially greater interest in world affairs and an increasing number of high-level delegations have traversed the globe in an effort to expand China's influence.

China's limited global involvement is, in part, a reflection of capabilities. If the current modernization drive is successful, China may be expected to become more influential globally. At the same time, limited involvement is also a result of the perception of China's historic geopolitical role in Asia. In the Chinese view, China must demonstrate its regional influence, then China will be in a more favorable position to influence global events.

In essence, the following are the main points about Chinese perceptions:

- Chinese perceptions are based on factors arising from Chinese nationalism as well as Marxist-Leninist doctrine**
- China believes that it must become a strong power, if it does not want to suffer exploitation and humiliation**

- China believes that the best method of becoming powerful is through modernization
- China hopes to achieve modernization through fostering foreign trade and exchange; these will be made to serve China in a spirit of self-reliance
- China will not avoid conflict at the price of humiliation
- China believes that it must strengthen its regional position as the basis for expanding its global influence⁴³

A re-examination of the basic propositions asserted in this section of the paper sheds greater light on recent Chinese foreign policy decisions. It must be remembered that these decisions reflect the bureaucratic politics of the ruling coalition of China, its perceptions, and the Marxist-Leninist ideological basis from which perceptions both arise and justify. On this basis some recent Chinese foreign policy decisions will be considered.

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS

In order to demonstrate the interrelationship of doctrine, politics, and perceptions, it is useful to examine some recent Chinese foreign policy decisions. Among the most notable are the decisions to normalize relations with the United States, continue a policy of confrontation with the Soviet Union, conclude a treaty of peace and friendship with Japan, and finally, invade Vietnam. Each of these decisions reflects a unique blend of the previously enumerated factors of ideology, perceptions, and bureaucratic politics.

Relations with the United States

According to Chinese doctrine, the United States is an imperialist superpower. Because of the nature of its capitalist system, the United States is invariably bound to seek hegemony over other countries. However, US military power is on the decline compared with Soviet military power and the United States is in global retreat while the USSR is in an expansionist mode. The hegemonism of the United States is a *status quo* hegemonism since the United States seeks mainly to preserve its power, not to expand it. The desire of the United States to preserve its power, the Chinese contend, will inevitably lead to conflict with the Soviet Union which seeks global hegemonism; ultimately, this conflict may result in war.⁴⁴

Inasmuch as the United States is on the retreat, it is a suitable candidate for partnership in the united front. Opposition to Soviet imperialism is a common goal of China and the United States, even though the two countries have different motivations for such opposition. China opposes the Soviet Union because China stands on the side of liberation of oppressed peoples, while China views the United States as only wanting to avoid a challenge to its power. According to Chinese commentary, "although common goals can be fulfilled by implementing two parallel policies, we must not be confused over the basic differences between the two policies."⁴⁵

This position has not essentially changed in the period since the normalization of relations between China and the United States. While normalization was warmly welcomed by the Chinese, they believe it was dictated by events and was not merely a spontaneous act of good will by the United States. Several news reports and articles published in China following normalization have made this point. For example, an article by Zeng Quing in *Shijie Zhishi* (World Knowledge) argued that the United States was forced into normalization by businessmen who were afraid the nation would fall behind other countries in competition for the China market. Nevertheless, for China, getting the United States to agree to oppose hegemony in the joint communiqué establishing diplomatic relations was an achievement of great significance.⁴⁶ It seemed to bear out the Chinese perception that the United States could play a role in the anti-hegemonic united front. In the Chinese view it also symbolized the changed strategy of the United States in Asia.

During the 1950's the United States was China's main enemy. The United States fought China during the Korean War, opposed China's entrance into the United Nations, built a system of alliances to contain Chinese influence, and erected an economic embargo intended to hinder China's economic development. In the early 1960's the United States justified its involvement in Vietnam, in part, as an effort to contain Chinese "expansionism." The crowning issue was Taiwan. The United States prevented the Chinese from liberating Taiwan, recognized the Chiang K'ai-shek government in Taipei as the Government of China, and formed a military alliance with Taiwan in 1954. In essence, the United States prevented the conclusion of the Chinese civil war. Moreover, Taiwan continued as a prominent visible symbol of China's century of humiliation.

During the late 1960's and early 1970's, China's perception of the United States changed. With the conclusion of US participation in

the war in Vietnam, the drawdown of US military forces in other Southeast Asian countries, the announcement of the Nixon doctrine, and the overtures of the Nixon administration to China, the Chinese leaders perceived that the United States no longer constituted a hostile threat to Chinese influence. At the same time, the escalating Sino-Soviet dispute, including the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the fighting along the Sino-Soviet border in 1969, indicated that China faced a serious new threat.

The Shanghai Communiqué, issued by President Nixon and the Chinese authorities in 1972, symbolized the new Chinese perception. The United States symbolically acknowledged China's importance by pledging to pursue full normalization of relations. Shortly thereafter, the Beijing authorities replaced Taiwan's representatives in the United Nations, including the permanent seat in the UN Security Council. The dropping of trade barriers permitted an increase in trade with the United States and more importantly with Japan. The changing US position permitted ties between Japan and China to expand much more rapidly. But a major issue which continued to separate China and the United States was Taiwan, at least as far as the Chinese were concerned.⁴⁷

The resolution of the Taiwan issue persisted in being of paramount importance to the Chinese. China's conditions for normalization required that the United States should sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan, repudiate the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan, and withdraw all US forces from Taiwan. The resolution of the Taiwan question was to be left to the Chinese themselves. In negotiations with the Chinese during the fall of 1978, the United States substantially met these conditions, while establishing conditions of its own.

For its part the United States stipulated that it expected the Taiwan issue to be settled peacefully; that the United States would maintain unofficial commercial, cultural, and other appropriate relations with the people of Taiwan; that Taiwan would continue to have access to the purchase of military equipment; and that the treaty would be terminated according to its provisions which required one year's notice of abrogation. Although not agreeing explicitly to all these stipulations, the Chinese did agree that the stipulations need not be an obstacle to normalization of relations.⁴⁸

Inasmuch as the United States was willing to make important concessions on the Taiwan issue and was willing to express publicly its opposition to hegemony in official statements, the United States

could readily be perceived as a nation having many common interests with China. As far as Chinese propaganda was concerned, the 30 years of hostility between the two countries vanished almost overnight. Suddenly, the past years became a temporary aberration in the long history of Sino-American friendship. During the visit of Deng to the United States, Chinese television crews relayed a stream of favorable information about the high level of technology, high standard of living, and friendliness of the American people. The United States had become a nation to be emulated, with, of course, certain qualifications.⁴⁹

Another Chinese perception relevant to relations between China and the United States has to do with the balance of power. In some respects, the united front concept contributes to the idea of balancing power, since a hegemonist force is to be resisted by a coalition of anti-hegemonist forces. China perceives the United States as a factor in the balance of power in Asia, particularly as Soviet influence increases. Hence, China has reversed its earlier position and declared support for the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. The Chinese have also expressed opposition to a precipitous US withdrawal of military forces from various bases in Asia, fearing the Soviet Union might move to "fill the vacuum."

Two major exceptions to the Chinese perception that the United States must maintain a role in Asia to counteract Soviet power are the cases of Taiwan and Korea. Paradoxically, the US decision to abandon its relationship with Taiwan could present to China the image of a vacillating or unreliable balancer. In the case of Korea, China's desire to prevent North Korea from gravitating toward the Soviet Union has seemingly required an endorsement for the policy of reunification of North and South Korea under Kim Il-sung in opposition to the contrary aims of Seoul, which is supported by the United States. China has endorsed Kim's demand for a withdrawal of all US forces from South Korea. In the case of Taiwan, China apparently decided that the symbolic issue of territorial unification outweighed the image of US credibility. In the case of Korea, China apparently has concluded that a Sino-North Korean alliance is a more formidable barrier to Soviet expansion than a US-South Korean alliance.⁵⁰

A final Chinese perception which should be considered is that the United States is a ready source of technology which can be utilized for China's modernization. The Chinese have made no secret of their desire to acquire technology from the United States in a variety of areas. They have also concluded an agreement with the

United States to send students to the United States to study, mainly in the scientific and technical fields. The Chinese view is that the sharing of technology is mutually beneficial to both countries.

Besides the doctrinal and perceptual aspects of Chinese relations with the United States there is the aspect of bureaucratic politics. The decision of Mao and Zhou to reverse course and pursue a policy of reconciliation with the United States in the late 1960's was not welcomed by all Chinese leaders. Opposition to "ping pong diplomacy" may have been a factor in the downfall of Lin Biao. Similarly, the "gang of four" is said to have opposed policies that would have permitted greater ties between China and the United States. Between the issuing of the Shanghai Communiqué and the announcement of normalization, there were periods of greater coolness in US-China relations, brought on by differences within the Chinese leadership.⁵¹

After the death of Mao, the Chinese leadership continued to insist on several conditions, particularly the conditions affecting Taiwan, before full normalization could be achieved. United States compromise proposals, including several made by Secretary Vance in his visit to China in 1977, were rejected. As Deng began to consolidate his position within the Chinese leadership, the Chinese position began to change. During the 11th Party Congress the Politburo was expanded to include a number of persons with technical expertise. During the third plenum, the politburo was expanded again with more technical experts being added. What had been occurring during 1978 was the legitimization of the modernization course advocated by Deng. Party structures at the national and provincial levels were also significantly altered as this legitimization process occurred.

The decision to normalize relations with the United States must thus be considered against a background of the changing dominant coalition at the Party center. After meetings between President Carter and the head of the Chinese Liaison Office in Washington in September, movement toward normalization became rapid. The Chinese were now willing to accept some American conditions pertaining to the future of Taiwan. Specifically, the Chinese agreed that their opposition to arms sales to Taiwan, and to a US statement of expectation that the Taiwan issue should be resolved peacefully, need not obstruct normalization. This, in essence, was a softening of China's three conditions on Taiwan which would not have been likely without the changing political situation in China.

Consequently, it can be seen that China's position vis-a-vis the United States results from the combined influence of ideology, perception, and bureaucratic politics. From the standpoint of ideology, the United States qualifies for membership in a united front against hegemony. This results from the Chinese perception that the United States is no longer an obstacle to China's prestige and influence in Asia; rather, the United States may actually contribute to China's modernization and thereby enhance China's influence. The ideological and perceptual elements of Chinese policy reflect changes in the Chinese leadership, the third element in this analysis. Still unresolved, however, is the question of how these factors will affect *future* Sino-US relations. But to address this issue, it will first be necessary to consider the other superpower, the Soviet Union, in relation to China.

Relations with the Soviet Union

In many respects, China's relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union have been to a large measure reversed since the early 1950's. During the Korean War the Soviet Union was an "eternal ally" of China and the United States was the bitter enemy. Now, the United States is seen as a balancer while the USSR has become the principal contradiction. The changes in Chinese policy toward the Soviet Union, as in the case of the United States, are rooted in doctrinal, perceptual, and political factors.

The ideological dispute between the Russians and the Chinese is too complex to discuss fully here. It will be sufficient to outline some of the key distinctions which are relevant to Chinese policy toward the Soviet Union. One basic difference has developed over the question of how to use Marxism-Leninism to mobilize society in the pursuit of revolutionary goals. To oversimplify, it can be stated that the Chinese, at least as long as Mao was alive, were less enthusiastic than the Russians about investing authority in the bureaucratic party and the bureaucratic state.⁵² During the early polemics of the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute the Chinese charged that the Soviet Union was experiencing a restoration of capitalism. By 1968 this "revisionism" was manifesting itself as "social imperialism" as evidenced by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

According to the Chinese:

The Soviet bureaucrat-monopoly capitalist group has transformed a highly centralized socialist state-owned economy

into a state-monopoly capitalist economy without its equal in any other imperialist country and has transformed a state under the dictatorship of the proletariat into a state under fascist dictatorship. It is therefore easier for Soviet socialist-imperialism to put the entire economy on a military footing and militarize the whole state apparatus.⁵³

As an imperialist power, the Soviet Union "came late to the table" and is, therefore, according to the Chinese more vicious, rapacious, and predatory than other capitalist states. The USSR is more deceptive than other imperialists because it "flaunts the banner of Leninism" in order to undermine the oppressed peoples of various countries. Moreover, the Soviet Union relies primarily on military force because its economic strength is considerably behind that of the United States. For this reason, Soviet hegemonism must be singled out as the greatest enemy of all people.

The ideological dispute between China and the Soviet Union is more than propagandistic rhetoric. There are very real differences over a variety of issues, such as the manner in which society should be transformed, the nature of Party leadership, and the achievement of egalitarianism. The ideological dispute has extended to open competition between China and the Soviet Union for influence in the Communist parties of various countries, with the result that many of these parties have split into factions.

Now that China is committed to a program of modernization, a number of concessions permitting the construction of a large, bureaucratic state are being implemented. Does this then mean that China's ideological stance could become more akin to that of the Soviet Union? The answer is not necessarily yes. In a significant departure from past practice the Chinese are considering a form of Yugoslav "market socialism" for future development.⁵⁴ The modernization of China does not inexorably imply an ideological accommodation with the USSR. In fact, the opposite could be true. Chinese modernization may well lead to an even greater departure from the Soviet position on the relationship between ideology and social development.

In sum, the Chinese argue that the Soviet Union has become the number one enemy because it is an imperialistic, hegemonistic power. It is hegemonistic because of the nature of its political system, which is dominated by the forces of bureaucratic capitalism. This analysis assumes that the USSR must continue on an expansionist

path, unless it is contained by the united front and experiences some significant changes in leadership.

As is the case with the United States, China's ideological stance toward the USSR is in part a reflection of China's perceptions of Soviet policy. These perceptions stem from several sources. First, like Yugoslavia, China did not achieve revolution via Soviet occupation.⁵⁵ Thus, the Chinese do not feel any significant debt or obligation to the Soviet Union. In fact, there is considerable evidence of tension and personal animosity between Soviet and Chinese leaders. During the early years of the Chinese Communist movement, the Russians usually backed Mao's opponents. Mao did respect Stalin as a leader, though Stalin reportedly retained his connections with some of Mao's opponents even after the triumph of 1949. Also, when Khrushchev denounced Stalin in 1956 it set off shock waves in China and Mao found his own leadership called into question. This became a factor in the personal animosity between Mao and Khrushchev and contributed to the Sino-Soviet rift.

Similarly, Chinese experience with Soviet aid and assistance during the first decade of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule was not entirely satisfactory. The Chinese concluded that the Soviet model was not appropriate for China, and began policy changes which led to the withdrawal of Soviet advisors and the cancellation of Soviet aid in the early 1960's. The Sino-Soviet alliance was never a very comfortable relationship for China, and it is not surprising that China began to assert its independence.

Another problem is related to the territorial question. It is China's position that the Soviet Union possesses large amounts of Chinese territory taken by the Tsarist governments through unequal treaties. Although Lenin repudiated the unequal treaties, no territories were returned to China. According to China, the Soviet Union should acknowledge "the rights and wrongs of history" by withdrawing its forces from Mongolia and the border areas, repudiating the unequal treaties, and then sitting down with the Chinese as sovereign equals to negotiate a new boundary. The Chinese feel the unequal treaties should be used as a basis for discussion, and only minor territorial adjustments need be made.⁵⁶ For the Chinese the fundamental principle is not territory, but whether the Soviet Union can dictate terms based on the unequal treaties.

Since 1969 the Soviets have sent several delegations to China to discuss the border issue, but no progress on this issue has been

achieved. The Soviets argue that there can be no troop pullback until a border agreement has been reached, and they are unwilling to renounce the unequal treaties, fearing that the Chinese will up the ante once this has been done. Also, the USSR has other outstanding internal and external territorial questions and border problems that could be embarrassed by a settlement on Beijing's terms. The Soviet Union thus continues a policy which reminds China of the century of humiliation.

Another Chinese perception views the Soviet Union as an expansionist power bent on encircling China and eventually controlling the world. The Chinese view of Soviet strategy has been spelled out in a number of articles. One such article in the authoritative Party journal, *Red Flag*, asserted that the major focus of contention would be Europe. This account declared that the Soviet Union hoped to outflank and encircle Europe by seizing control of strategic countries and resources in the Middle East and Africa. By such means the Kremlin would gain control over the strategic routes from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean, and from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic Ocean. The article pointed to Soviet activities in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and South Yemen as evidence of the strategy. Similarly, the Soviet Union was seen to be supporting its expansionist program by using "lesser hegemonists" such as Vietnam and Cuba in its plans. In Asia, the Soviet Union was expected to continue to press for a collective security system designed to threaten China.⁵⁷

Chinese propaganda charges that the USSR has achieved conventional military superiority, and will soon gain nuclear superiority, in Europe. This superiority, the Chinese contend, will be used by the USSR to pressure Europe for political concessions, and note that the Soviets already hold regularly military exercises to demonstrate their offensive posture toward Western Europe.⁵⁸ This, combined with the outflanking maneuvers to gain strategic control of key resource areas in the Middle East and Africa, are seen as allowing the USSR to achieve domination.

The Soviet threat must be met by strength, not vacillation, the Chinese believe; they express concern that the United States and some of its allies may follow a Munich-like course of appeasement, which will never satiate the "polar bear." Consequently, the Chinese endorse strengthening the NATO alliance and pursuing other policies which can counteract Soviet pressure. It is believed that China can attain its rightful place in Asia and in the world only if the expansionist thrust of the USSR is somehow contained or controlled.

Debates over relations with the Soviet Union have been a prominent aspect of bureaucratic politics in China. Research by Pillsbury, Gottlieb, and Lieberthal has amply demonstrated the factionalism generated in Beijing over the issue of how to approach the USSR.⁵⁹ The statements of Deng Xiaoping do not hold immediate prospects for an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. The recent Chinese invasion of Vietnam seems to have hardened the position of both the USSR and China. The Chinese charge that Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia was instigated shortly after the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and mutual aid between Hanoi and Moscow, thereby implicating Moscow.

An examination of the Chinese press in the past year indicates a greater degree of unanimity among Chinese leaders in the approach to be taken toward the USSR than may have existed previously. This does not mean that the ruling coalition is not without so called "soft-line" and "hard-line" diversity. What it does suggest is that the pressure of events has brought forth a kind of consensus coalition position that is presented in the media. A flurry of activity in mid-1979 prior to initiation of new negotiations with the USSR in late September suggests that Chinese relations with the Soviet Union will continue to be a matter of debate.

One of the chief issues in the debate has to do with whether or not a particular individual or group might be willing to accept support from the USSR. Liu Xiaoqi, once described as "China's Khrushchev," and Lin Biao, killed while purportedly trying to flee to the USSR, and other former leaders have been accused of collaborating with the Soviets. Whether true or not, these accusations demonstrate genuine concern within the Chinese leadership about Soviet political intervention in support of persons or groups at the highest levels. There is uncertainty whether the USSR could or would try to exercise the option of cooperation; nevertheless, the mere possibility adds intrigue to the already complex political situation in China.

In conclusion, we can say that relations between China and the Soviet Union are hostile and are likely to remain so. The two sides remain at ideological loggerheads, with China taking the position that the Soviet Union is the most aggressive, imperialistic, hegemonistic country in the world. Chinese perceptions of the Soviet Union include the belief that the USSR wants to contain China, to prevent China's modernization, and eventually to dominate China. In the Chinese view, not only is the USSR unwilling to negotiate the territorial issues but is also the major obstacle to China's achievement of

regional power. Finally, the issue of Sino-Soviet relations has long plagued the unity of the Chinese leadership. The present coalition which governs China takes the view that a course of opposition to the USSR is more realistic than a course of accommodation. But what about China's relations with other neighbors?

China in Asia: Relations with Japan and Vietnam

One of China's main goals as we have seen is to achieve a position of regional prominence. In this light, it is useful to consider China's approach to relations with two prominent countries in Asia. Japan must be considered because of its highly influential economic position in Asia, and especially because of its recent agreements with China. Also, Sino-Japanese policy is closely related to Sino-US policy. Vietnam is of interest because of China's invasion of that country, and because of the obvious linkage between Sino-Vietnamese relations and Sino-Soviet relations. Once again, the factors of ideology, perceptions, and bureaucratic politics will be used to assess the Chinese approach.

According to Chinese Communist ideology, Japan is part of the second world, a country which is dominated by the United States but is, nevertheless, gradually becoming more independent. Japan is an exploiter of Third World countries, but has been forced to make political and economic concessions. As with other second world countries, Japan does not constitute the main force in dominating and oppressing other countries, and can be included as part of the united front against hegemonism.⁶⁰

Chinese perceptions of Japan go far beyond the mentioned ideological perception. Japan not only has extensive historical and cultural ties with China, but also has a global and regional economic position which offers both opportunities and challenges for China. Furthermore, during the period of the rise of the Chinese Communists, and up until the past few years, Japan has been a principal adversary. It is not surprising that Chinese perceptions of Japan have fluctuated dramatically over time.⁶¹

In the early 1970's, Japan moved to normalize relations with China following the Nixon lead in that direction. Since that time, relations have been gradually expanded, though there have been halts and shifts over various issues. For several years, both sides haggled over the conclusion of a treaty of peace and friendship, primarily because China insisted that a clause opposing hegemony

be included. Japan hesitated because of its desire to remain equidistant between Moscow and Beijing, and because the USSR insisted that for Japan to conclude a treaty with China which included an anti-hegemony clause would be considered an unfriendly act. In 1978, China scored a major diplomatic victory when Japan agreed to the treaty which included an anti-hegemony clause. Japan argued that this clause was not aimed specifically at the Soviet Union, but the USSR and its allies refused to accept Japan's explanation.⁶²

The conclusion of this treaty with the anti-hegemony clause was said by the Chinese to have made contributions not only to relations between the two countries but "also as regards to the peace, security, and stability of the Asian-Pacific region."⁶³ In the Chinese view, the conclusion of the treaty constituted a slight tilt by Japan toward China in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute, and thereby enhanced Beijing's prestige in Asia.

Furthermore, trade between China and Japan, already growing at a rapid pace, was spurred even more by the agreement. China has concluded contracts with various Japanese firms which will amount to more than \$20 billion over the next few years. Some of these contracts have been subsequently cancelled, subject to renegotiation; however, the commitment to expanding trade between the two countries seems firm. Judging from statements made by Deng during his visit to Japan shortly after the conclusion of the treaty, China pins most of its hopes for developmental assistance on Japan. Because of geographic and cultural proximity and Japan's unique economic position, Japan will probably play the leading role in providing foreign assistance to China.

China wants Japan to continue to rely on the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, but to develop its own conventional military forces. Since China believes that an economically strong Japan is useful to China's own development, but continues to be wary of what might happen if Japan were to achieve substantial rearmament, including nuclear weapons, China has played down any military threat China itself might pose to Japan. The sensitive territorial issue of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyutai) has been deferred by the Chinese. The Chinese essentially want Japan to build its own conventional forces for self-defense, rely on US guarantees for protection against the USSR, and feel that China poses no significant threat. Nevertheless, Deng and other leaders have rejected the idea of a military alliance with Japan.⁶⁴

There are, of course, some outstanding unresolved issues between China and Japan. Japan, in spite of the treaty of peace and friendship with China, wants to continue a policy of equidistance between Moscow and Beijing. Japan is concerned about China's support for North Korea; Japan has never renounced the Nixon-Sato statement of 1969, which stated that Korea was essential to Japan's security. Furthermore, there is the issue of the Senkakus noted above and some unresolved problems over territorial waters. In spite of these differences, China perceives that Japan can make important contributions to Beijing's policy of modernization and achievement of status in Asia. Furthermore, Japan will constitute an important part of China's resistance to Soviet containment.

In understanding China's approach to Japan, the bureaucratic politics factor is no less important, but is somewhat more difficult to discern. Doak Barnett suggests that some older "Japan hands" in China have been influential in shifting Chinese policy to one of greater accommodation. He also believes that Chinese policy has been finely tuned to the intricacies of Japan's party politics, and notes that Japan is the most blatant case wherein China has used trade as a political weapon.⁶⁵ The shifts in Chinese policy toward Japan do seem to reflect changes in the composition of the Chinese leadership.

More recently, there have been nuances of difference in official Chinese pronouncements on Japan. For example, on the issue of US-Japanese relations, Deng told Japanese reporters that the US-Japan relationship was more important for Japan than Japanese-Chinese relations. In both the United States and Japan, Deng called for a further strengthening of US-Japanese ties, advocating that Japan should rely on the US nuclear umbrella and not develop its own nuclear weapons.⁶⁶ Yet just a short time later, Liao Zhengzhi, Chairman of the China-Japan Friendship Association, and one of the "old Japan hands," told a visiting Japanese delegation:

Anyone who thinks we approve or hail the Japan-US Security Treaty with open arms is mistaken. Nevertheless, given the current world situation, this treaty serves some useful purposes. Since we regard the Soviet Union as the foremost potential source of another world war, we understand the usefulness of the Security Treaty.⁶⁷

While these remarks are not directly contradictory and were made to different audiences at different times, they do reveal areas of potential divergence in Chinese thinking. On the one hand, the

Security Treaty can be seen as a positive guarantee that Japan will not build nuclear weapons, while contributing to stability in Asia; on the other, it can be seen as a necessary evil as long as the Soviet Union is a threat. Under certain conditions, for example, should China at some future time decide to ameliorate relations with the USSR, the different approaches could assume great significance.

Bureaucratic politics will influence other aspects of Chinese policy. In economic relations it has already been demonstrated that China initially signed numerous contracts with Japanese firms, then retrenched. Undoubtedly, some fiscal conservatives among the Chinese leadership were able to prevail over the views of those who wanted to "go all out." Inasmuch as debates on economic and development strategy were at the heart of the CCP's third plenum in late 1978, and China appeared to be taking a more cautious stance in its economic relations in early 1979, it would appear that the "go slower" voices will have a greater influence on Japan-China relations.

In conclusion it has been shown that China's relations with Japan reflect the intricate mixture of doctrine, perceptions, and politics, just as do China's relations with other countries. In one respect, the Chinese approach to Japan is influenced by China's relations with the United States; in another, it is influenced by the unique geographic and cultural relationship between China and Japan. The main point is, however, that an understanding of China's approach must take all of these factors into account.

Perhaps even more complex than Sino-Japanese relations are Sino-Vietnamese relations. During the period of US involvement in Vietnam, the Chinese characterized their support of Vietnam as full and eternal, yet even prior to the unification of Vietnam, rifts in the relationship were evident. When China staged its "defensive counter-attack" of Vietnam in February 1979, the fundamental forces working to alter Chinese policy became more clear.

In doctrinal terms, Vietnam had been considered to be both part of the Third World and part of the socialist camp. Yet, the leaders of Vietnam were viewed as choosing to betray the Vietnamese people in joining in the expansionism of the hegemonists in the Kremlin—the immediate goal of the Vietnamese leaders being the creation of an Indochina federation, including Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, to be dominated by Vietnam. Shortly after concluding a 25-year treaty of peace and friendship with the USSR on 3 November 1978, Vietnam

launched a massive invasion of Cambodia and established a puppet government in Phnom Penh. Thus, as *Beijing Review* put it, "Viet Nam has become the source of war in Southeast Asia and the Kremlin's main bridgehead for aggression and expansionist pursuits in the continent."⁶⁸

The Chinese case as to the social basis of the Vietnamese change seems flimsy. There is no full explanation as to how the leaders of Vietnam could go from being good socialists to war-mongering hegemonists in the short space of 3 or 4 years. The most frequently stated theme is that somehow the regional hegemonists in Hanoi have been subverted and "bought off" by the Kremlin. In any event, Vietnam has become the "Trojan horse" of Soviet intervention in Southeast Asia.

A better clue can be found in China's changing perceptions of Vietnam. There are three major areas of disagreement between China and Vietnam which were submerged during the war against the United States, but which quickly came to the surface after 1975. The first had to do with the status of Chinese or Hoa people in Vietnam. No final agreement had been reached as to the status of the Chinese in Vietnam, prior to liberation. Since much of the property-owning, managerial class were Chinese, particularly in South Vietnam, a number of Communist-directed changes fell particularly heavy on the Chinese. In one sense, this did not surprise the Chinese Communists, since they had conducted similar reforms during their own revolution. Yet, in another sense, the reforms appeared to be especially discriminatory against the Chinese. Some traditional Chinese-Vietnamese ethnic hostility erupted when about 170,000 Chinese tried to leave Vietnam, or were expelled, and incidents along the Vietnamese-Chinese border increased. It was particularly humiliating and galling to China to have persons of Chinese nationality persecuted by the Vietnamese authorities.⁶⁹

Another issue was the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. China had been the only country to extend full political, economic, and military support to Cambodia, since the Communist victory. Though embarrassed by the dismal human rights record of the Pol Pot regime, China continued to support the Cambodian Government. Historically, China has been opposed to a strong, Hanoi-dominated Indochinese federation, and since the early 1950's has tried to avoid Vietnamese control over Cambodia. Therefore, the formation of the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance not only threatened Beijing's prestige and influence in the region, but enabled the Vietnamese to invade China's

closest ally. Consequently, China perceived that Vietnam was mounting a serious challenge to China's regional status.

Finally, the issue of territory continued to embarrass the Chinese. The Vietnamese continued to claim territory on the basis of unequal treaties made by the French. Although China and Vietnam had arrived at a border agreement, some areas still remained in dispute. The movement of Chinese residents in the frontier areas once again raised the border question. Li Xiannian stated that there were actually only about 60 square kilometers of disputed territory along the border; however, he claimed that after the unification of Vietnam, the Vietnamese authorities began to escalate their territorial demands. Li also claimed that Pham Van Dong had reneged on earlier understandings reached between him and Zhou Enlai about islands in the South China Sea.⁷⁰

In essence, the Chinese perception of the Vietnamese was that they had become part of Moscow's scheme to encircle China in return for Moscow's political and military support for an Indochina federation under Hanoi's domination. The Vietnamese also sought to humiliate China by the mistreatment and expulsion of Chinese residents and by activities along the border. In the Chinese view, this challenge seriously impinged on China's vital interests of regional credibility and territorial integrity. Consequently, the Chinese decided that Vietnam must be "punished."

On 17 February 1979, Chinese forces undertook what the Chinese termed a "defensive counterattack" into Vietnam. An accompanying statement by the official New China News Agency indicated that the action would be limited in terms of time and area. Although battle reports were vague, the Chinese forces apparently penetrated at several points up to a distance of 25 miles. After the capture of Lang Son on 2 March, China announced that its forces would withdraw and called on Hanoi to negotiate. About 2 weeks later, China claimed that its forces had been withdrawn. Both sides claimed a major victory. Vietnam claimed that more than 45,000 Chinese soldiers had been killed and wounded. Chinese sources put their losses at about 3,000 soldiers killed and 100 tanks destroyed. According to Chinese spokesmen, there were about an equal number of casualties on both sides.⁷¹

The Chinese forces failed to gain a substantial military victory, but made a political point. First, by taking action the Chinese Government could say to the Chinese people that China would not suffer

humiliations at the hand of Vietnam. Second, by capturing Lang Son, the apparent target of the invasion, China served notice on Vietnam that Chinese warnings should not be taken lightly. It should be recalled that Lang Son was the point at which a Chinese invasion force was defeated by the Vietnamese during the Ming Dynasty, thus, its capture by Chinese forces in 1979 was an important symbolic act. Furthermore, China demonstrated to the nations of Southeast Asia that it was not afraid to take on an ally of the Soviet Union if China's prestige was at stake. Interestingly, reports from various capitals in Southeast Asia indicate that Hanoi initially may have anticipated greater Soviet support and involvement in the conflict. The conspicuous failure of the USSR to take more direct action against China may have been a source of embarrassment to Vietnamese diplomats and could be a source of future Soviet-Vietnamese discord.⁷²

That China intended its invasion of Vietnam to be a rebuke to the Soviet Union is certain. In his interview with *Yomiuri Shimbun*, Li Xiannian stated:

The counterattack for self-defense we launched is not only a matter of China and Vietnam but a matter of Southeast Asia -- and even the whole world in a sense. It was aimed at crushing the strategic intention of the Soviet Union.

It is not unreasonable that some views in world public opinion say that our strike against Vietnam is one against the Soviet Union. When someone beats a child, the child's mother is also bound to feel the pain. We are insisting that Japan, China, Europe and the Third World should work hand in hand and oppose Soviet hegemonism. Soviet strategic deployments must be destroyed before they are completed. To that end, we must expose the dark designs of the USSR. We must not be deceived by its propaganda about detente, peace and disarmament.⁷³

This statement, conspicuously made to a prominent Japanese newspaper, was a direct challenge to the Soviet Union and was designed to promote China's credibility in Asia.

Chinese leaders apparently calculated correctly that the Soviet Union would not become directly involved in the conflict. They did anticipate a tremendous propaganda barrage, to which Deng Xiaoping reportedly said China "could stuff its ears with cotton." China apparently had contingency plans for three possible Soviet responses, large, medium, and small, but was not required to use any of them.⁷⁴ Quite a few diplomats and analysts believed the USSR

would respond more directly to China's challenge; most of them breathed much easier when the USSR did not become directly involved. China's ability to "punish" Vietnam in spite of Vietnam's treaty with the USSR was generally considered to have enhanced China's prestige in Southeast Asia.⁷⁵

The role of bureaucratic politics in the decision to invade Vietnam is somewhat obscure. China had been considering action since the conclusion of the treaty of friendship and assistance between Vietnam and the USSR and the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Although no public pronouncements were made, the question was probably debated during the third plenum in late 1978. The strongest indication that China was contemplating military action came in remarks Deng made during a stopover in Japan, enroute home from the United States, when he asserted that Vietnam must be "punished" for its conduct. However, a buildup of Chinese forces along the Vietnamese border was in process for several months preceding the invasion.

Chinese statements were usually brief, vague, and consistent, giving no evidence of the political squabbles present in other foreign policy debates. After the first few days of fighting, when Chinese forces were meeting unexpectedly strong resistance, some shifts were made in the command structure with Xu Xuyi taking overall command of the campaign. Perhaps the seriousness of the risk in committing military forces placed a premium on minimizing internal dissent. There were wall posters in various Chinese cities criticizing the invasion, and it is probable that there was considerable debate among the Chinese leadership about the effectiveness of the military action. However, these differences were not publicly apparent.

In sum, the Chinese invasion of Vietnam reflects the doctrinal assertion that Vietnam had become an extension of Soviet hegemonism, the perceptual understanding that Vietnam was seeking to humiliate China and undermine Beijing's prestige in Asia, and the political decision that some action must be taken, in spite of risks, to counteract Vietnam's actions. The actual military achievements appear to have been inconsequential, but China appears to have achieved a measure of political success.

Chinese Foreign Policy: Some Conclusions

In the previous two sections of this paper the doctrinal, perceptual, and political bases of Chinese foreign policy were examined and

case studies were used to demonstrate how, operating together, these variables explain Chinese foreign policy decisions. It should now be possible to make some overall conclusions about Chinese foreign policy in the late 1970's and into the 1980's.

The first conclusion to be drawn is that China wants to achieve an international status which will enable it to deal with the superpowers on the basis of equality. In order to do this, China believes it is necessary to confront the power of the Soviet Union. While an accommodation with the Soviet Union might prove beneficial to China's modernization drive, the Chinese presently believe that ultimately the goals of the USSR and China are in conflict and it is better to form a united front and oppose the USSR now than to follow a policy of appeasement which might court defeat later.

A corollary to this conclusion is that as long as the USSR remains the principal threat, China wants the support of all countries in opposing Soviet "hegemonism," even if the support is temporary and vacillating. Even former (and still deemed potential) adversaries such as Japan and the United States are necessary to this strategy.

Another conclusion that can be made is that China values its credibility, particularly in Asia, and is willing to take risks to maintain credibility, as it did in the invasion of Vietnam. The Chinese recognize that they will not be respected globally until their position in Asia is secure.

A final conclusion is that Chinese policy is highly flexible and expedient. Changes can be made to accommodate a situation. For example, issues such as the disputed islands can be deferred if they are an obstacle to a peace and friendship treaty and economic agreements with Japan, but they can also be brought to the forefront again if the situation seems to so warrant (as in the case of the disputed territories with Vietnam). This last point is especially significant in considering US interests in Asia and their relationship to Chinese foreign policy and will be addressed in the final section of this paper which considers foreign policy in the light of stated US interests.

The foregoing discussion has demonstrated through examples that Chinese foreign policy decisions reflect a combination of doctrine, perceptions, and bureaucratic politics. The last variable is usually one for which it is more difficult to acquire evidence, but its significance cannot be overlooked. Manifestly, China is only one actor in a maze of interactions; the doctrines, perceptions and politics

of the countries with which China interacts must also be understood before a full view of foreign policy unfolds. The pages which follow will compare the US approach with the Chinese approach to gain a better understanding of how Chinese policies relate to the security interests of the United States.

CHINESE POLICY AND US INTERESTS

United States policy in Asia has undergone considerable change during the 1970's. The Shanghai Communiqué, disengagement from Vietnam, and the Nixon and Ford doctrines were significant milestones in this change. As in the case of China, US interests are a product of doctrine, perceptions, and bureaucratic politics. The debates over US policy in Asia are far too rich and extensive to relate in detail here. It will be sufficient to review US policy objectives as stated by administration officials in an effort to examine the relationship of US policy to Chinese policy. An assessment of how well US goals are being achieved must remain for other commentators.

The stated interests of the United States in Asia greatly reflect the influence of Henry Kissinger. In one of a series of Bicentennial speeches, Secretary Kissinger discussed the major US concerns and policies in Asia. According to his interpretation, US foreign policy is based on four propositions:

- American strength is essential to the peace of the world and to the success of our diplomacy**
- United States alliances with the great democracies of North America, Western Europe, and Asia are the bedrock and the top priority of our foreign policy**
- The United States has a political and moral obligation to seek a secure peace, in an age of thermonuclear weapons and strategic balance**
- Security and peace are necessary for the establishment of positive aspirations such as prosperity, human rights, economic development, and other goals. In the case of Asia where the United States has fought three major wars since the 1930's, the nation has important economic concerns and significant cultural contact and influence⁷⁶**

Kissinger further declared that the major challenge to the Uni-

ted States in Asia was in achieving peace and security, in resolving conflicts and easing tensions, and in shaping new patterns of international cooperation. In order to achieve peace and security, the United States must hold firm its commitments to Japan and Korea, encourage strong and independent nations in Southeast Asia, and encourage economic cooperation and other forms of cooperation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In order to resolve conflict, the United States should proceed to improve and normalize relations with China and try to encourage a negotiated settlement of the Korean question. Kissinger indicated that in the case of Southeast Asia, the United States must "bolster the independence of our friends, encourage the restraint of former foes, and help chart a more constructive pattern of relations within the region." As to the third goal of shaping new patterns of international cooperation, Kissinger was concerned primarily with economic development and improved trading patterns.⁷⁷

In the Kissinger view, there was a triangular relationship among China, the Soviet Union, and the United States in the Pacific; Japan also played an important role because of its economic influence. By reason of the growth of Soviet power, it was important for the United States to maintain a credible military force. In the words of Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco, "American power makes us a credible partner for the Chinese in the multipolar world."⁷⁸ Further, others have argued that the United States should maintain a closer relationship with both China and the Soviet Union than they have with each other. The United States should seek to prevent either a re-establishment of the Sino-Soviet alliance or a Sino-Soviet war by trying to improve relations with both countries.⁷⁹

The stated objectives of the Carter administration in Asia have not been significantly different from those of the previous administrations. In an address before the Asia Society in 1977, Secretary of State Vance outlined five goals of US policy in Asia:

- The United States is, and will remain, an Asian and Pacific power
- The United States will continue its key role in contributing to peace and stability in Asia and the Pacific
- The United States seeks normal and friendly relations with the countries in the area on the basis of reciprocity and mutual respect

—The United States will pursue mutual expansion of trade and investment across the Pacific, recognizing the growing interdependence of the economies of the United States and the region

—The United States will use its influence to improve the human condition of the peoples of Asia⁸⁰

After normalization of relations between China and the United States, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski outlined seven fundamental objectives of US foreign policy.⁸¹ Within these objectives he declared that normalization of relations with China was recognition of China's growing military capability and influence in Asia, and that it was important for the United States to have a constructive relationship with China. He welcomed the increasing involvement of China in world affairs:

We consider China as a key force for global peace simply by being China: an independent and strong nation reaching for increased contact with the rest of the world while remaining basically self-reliant and resistant of any efforts by others to dominate it.⁸²

Brzezinski further stated that the United States should retain a strong military presence in Asia, promote the economic well-being and security of the nations of Asia, and continue to foster the development of friendly relations. He added:

For the first time in decades, we can enjoy simultaneously good relations with both China and Japan. It is difficult to overstress the importance of this fact. Normalization consolidates a favorable balance of power in the Far East and enhances the security of our friends.

The Carter administration, however, has given a greater emphasis to issues such as human rights, and has had to come to grips with new developments such as the new war in Indochina. But, since the early 1970's, there have been no significant changes in the stated interests of the United States pertaining to Asia. They may be briefly summarized:

—The United States will remain a power in Asia, because we have vital interests there

—The United States will maintain its commitments to its friends

and will try to reach new accommodations with former adversaries

—The United States will encourage trade and economic development in Asia

—The United States will try to strengthen the security of individual states while promoting regional cooperation among some Asian countries (e.g. ASEAN)

—The United States will encourage the well-being of the people of Asia in areas such as human rights

With this review of US interests, Chinese policy can now be considered. It was noted that Chinese doctrine defines the Soviet Union as China's principal antagonist and the United States as a superpower and hegemonist, but one which can be involved in a united front against hegemonism. Yet, this united front is one of expedience, and policy must be prepared to adjust if conditions change. While the United States is said to be in a period of decline, it will not give in or yield to Soviet hegemonism.⁸³ Therefore, United States power is necessary to prevent Soviet expansionism.

There is sharp disagreement between Beijing and Washington on the manner of approaching the Soviet Union: China believes the policy should be essentially one of confrontation, that is formation of an anti-Soviet united front, and the United States prefers to think in terms of cooperation in some areas, particularly in the area of strategic arms limitation. Both sides accept the principle of the balance of power, but differ on the strategy and tactics for achieving that balance. Perhaps this difference was best put by a Japanese newspaper which stated that the summit meeting between Vice Premier Deng and President Carter ended as a "dosho imu" (sharing the same bed, but having different dreams).⁸⁴ This basic difference in approach may become a thorny issue between the two parties in the foreseeable future.

China's role in Asia is another divergent interest. While China wishes to become the principal power in Asia, the United States wishes to achieve a system of strong, independent nations. These goals are not completely incompatible, yet there are potential difficulties, notably over Korea and Taiwan. A principal concern for the United States is the security of Korea, yet China is closely committed to North Korea, and the United States has strong obligations to South

Korea. On the Taiwan question, the United States believes that its own credibility is related to the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, while China insists that China must retain all options for solving the question of Taiwan.

Another issue has to do with China's economic development. The United States expects to play a significant role in China's modernization, yet, as China develops economic power it could enter into competition with some of the other trading partners of the United States in Asia. China must ultimately turn from the export of raw materials to the export of industrial products, the most likely of which being textiles, electronics, plastics, and other goods now exported by Southeast Asian countries. Unless the US market for these products is unlimited, there are liable to be problems for US economic policy in Asia.

Account must also be taken of other considerations. Since the leadership of China is changing, and given the nature of bureaucratic politics in China, there could be rapid and dramatic shifts in policy. Dr. Brzezinski noted that one of the main reasons for achieving full normalization of relations with China at this time was to help solidify the status of the present leadership and its policies. Unquestionably, those persons in China who are committed to the present modernization policies can point with pride to the achievement of normalization; it does strengthen their position. However, since other factors are also at work, normalization does not guarantee that they will retain power.

Finally, there is the more vague, yet no less vital, issue of China's ultimate goal of achieving socialism. Hence, though China claims that it will never be a superpower or seek hegemony, as it acquires power through modernization there will almost certainly be a much greater temptation to influence other states, particularly those on China's periphery. China has not renounced its support for insurgency in Southeast Asia, but, rather, has reaffirmed its ties to the Communist-controlled guerrillas while promoting good state-to-state relations. Ultimate Chinese objectives do not seem to be in complete harmony with the US objective of achieving a series of strong independent states in Asia.

None of this is to say that the United States should not seek to improve relations with China. The stated objectives of several administrations to improve US-China relations are well-reasoned and well-founded. While knowledgeable persons may disagree over timing or

tactics, the overall objectives of finding areas of agreement and accommodation are laudable. It is precisely because it is important to find these areas of compatibility that the Chinese approach must be thoroughly understood.

Chinese policy is essentially one of expediency. It is a combination of the doctrinal, perceptual, and political factors explained in the context of this paper. The concept of a "united front against hegemony" is a flexible one designed to promote Chinese interests in a changing world. Given the complex situation that exists both globally and in Asia, can the United States be any less flexible in its approach to China? The exuberant optimism which generally has been exhibited in most quarters on the achievement of normalization of relations between the United States and China, must be balanced by a realistic assessment of the elements of Chinese policy. This assessment brings recognition that there are areas for conflict as well as cooperation between China and the United States.

EPILOGUE

In late August and early September 1979, Vice President Mondale visited China and announced new agreements on trade, energy, and bank credit between the United States and China. Even more significantly, in a speech at Beijing University he declared that "a strong, secure and modernizing China is in the American interest in the decade ahead" and that "... any nation which seeks to weaken or isolate you in world affairs assumes a stance counter to American interests. That is why the United States normalized relations with your country, and that is why we must work to broaden and strengthen our new friendship."⁸⁵ In a subsequent press conference Mr. Mondale again observed that "it is surely in our interest that there be a strong and independent China."⁸⁶

That the United States intends to pursue closer ties with China was further demonstrated by the announcement that Defense Secretary Brown would also visit China. The timing of this announcement, coinciding with the uproar over alleged Soviet combat troops in Cuba, caused politicians, columnists, and pundits to once again raise the issue of the "China card." Meanwhile, a Federal court decision raising questions about the legality of the cancellation of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan murkyed the waters. Clearly, the relationship between China and the United States will be a prominent, if controversial, feature of the political landscape.

For its part, China renewed negotiations with the Soviet Union in September. Just at the time the talks were opening in Moscow, Deng Xiaoping told former Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau that he expected no concrete results from the negotiations, thus casting a shadow on any possibility that substantive breakthroughs might be achieved. Hua Guofeng, during a visit to several Western European countries in October, continued to warn against the threat of hegemonism. In France Hua stated that China must "stand together with other countries," in opposing the hegemonists, thereby delaying the outbreak of war and securing a fairly long period of peace.⁸⁷ At a press conference in conjunction with Hua's visit, Foreign Minister Huang Hua, in reference to SALT and other negotiations affecting the Soviet Union, Western Europe, and the United States, stated, "We do not oppose such talks or the conclusion of certain agreements and treaties; these agreements and treaties might serve some purpose, but in our view, more important is to take effective actions and to wage a tit-for-tat struggle against the acts of expansion and aggression. To this end, all the forces loving peace and opposing aggression and expansion must strengthen their unity and coordinate their actions better."⁸⁸

As China enters the decade of the 1980's and continues its "new long march" to modernization in the year 2,000, its strategy of developing a united front against hegemonism does appear to be meeting with some success. In his address celebrating the 30th anniversary of the People's Republic of China, Ye Jianying stated:

We have defeated the successive attempts of foreign forces of aggression to isolate and blockade China, frustrated their interference in our internal affairs and their provocations against us, and consolidated our independence. Standing firm and proud among the nations of the world, our great motherland has become an even stronger force which nobody can ignore.

... From the beginning of the 1970's, acting according to Comrade Mao Zedong's strategic theory of the differentiation of the three worlds, we have united all those forces that can be united in joint opposition to superpower hegemonism and war threats. New prospects for the international struggle have been opened up, and the international situation is developing in a direction favorable to the people of the world.⁸⁹

The confident optimism exuded by the Chinese leaders is matched by a continuing activism in international diplomacy. The visit of Chairman Hua to Europe in the fall of 1979 and announced

reciprocal visits between Hua and President Carter demonstrate the vitality of Chinese diplomacy. As has been explained in the foregoing sections, whether this will continue depends on the relative continuity or change of the many variables which give rise to foreign policy decisions. As for now, the concept of forming a united front against hegemonism is the cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy.

ENDNOTES

1. As interviewed in *Time*, 5 February 1979, p. 34.
2. This is particularly the view in Taiwan. For example, see the report from the *China News Agency* (Taipei), 26 January 1979; Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Reports* (East Asia & Pacific—EAP), 29 January 1979.
3. For an example of this view see Victor Zorza, "China Plays its America Card," *Washington Post*, 28 January 1979.
4. V. H. Krulak, "The China Card," *Strategic Review* 6 (Fall 1978): 5-6. This is also a common view in Japan; for example see *The Asahi Evening News* (Tokyo), 30 January 1979.
5. One of the most thorough discussions of what the Thought of Mao Zedong is and what role it plays in Chinese Society is to be found in Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, 2nd rev. ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 17-104 and *passim*.
6. John B. Starr, *Ideology and Culture* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 32-4.
7. Mao Zedong, *On Practice* (1937), (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1971).
8. The concept of *mao dun* is based on rich historical allegory. The *mao* is a spear and the *dun* is the shield. Pitted against each other they become contradictions.
9. Editorial Department of *Renmin Ribao*, [*People's Daily*] "Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism Leninism," *Peking Review*, 4 November 1977, p. 12.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 11. Here two of Mao's statements were joined by the editors.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 37. For an analysis of the Three Worlds concept see O. Edmund Clubb, "China and the Three Worlds," *Current History*, September 1978, pp. 53-56, 88-89.

12. Hua Guofeng, "Unite and Strive to Build a Modern, Powerful Socialist Country," *Peking Review*, 10 March 1978, p. 36.

13. Huang Hua, "Superpower Disarmament Fraud Exposed," *Peking Review*, 2 June 1978, p.13.

14. Huang Hua, "The International Situation and China's Foreign Policies," *Peking Review*, 6 October 1978, p. 35. This theme was also articulated by Hua Guofeng in his "Report on the Work of the Government," before the 2d session of the Fifth National People's Congress, 18 June 1979; FBIS, 2 July 1979. Hua said: "We believe it is possible to put off the outbreak of war so long as all the peace-loving countries and peoples close ranks and coordinate their efforts."

15. Remarks made before a meeting of the US Foreign Policy Association, 31 January 1979; FBIS (People's Republic of China-PRC), 31 January 1978.

16. The exact wording is:

"They reaffirm that they are opposed to efforts by any country or group of countries to establish domination over others, and that they are determined to make a contribution to the maintenance of international peace, security and national independence."

17. In the case of the united front, left deviationism would be failing to unite with all countries that are potential allies, albeit temporary; right deviationism would be uniting with countries that are not potential allies under any circumstances and surrendering important ideology commitments to do so.

18. *Xinhua* (New China News Agency-NCNA), 26 December 1978; FBIS/PRC, 27 December 1978.

19. Ibid.

20. "A Major Event Favorable to World Peace," *Huang Qi [Red Flag]*, 1 January 1979; FBIS/PRC, 29 January 1979.

21. The question was asked by Fox Butterfield of the *New York Times* (NYT), FBIS/PRC, 5 January 1979.

22. The classic work on bureaucratic politics as a model of decisionmaking in foreign policy is Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little Brown, 1971).

23. Three Rand studies point the significant role of bureaucratic politics in Chinese foreign policy decisions. See Michael Pillsbury, *SALT on the Dragon: Chinese Views of the Soviet-American Strategic Balance*, P-5457 (April 1975); Thomas M. Gottlieb, *Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism and the Origins of the Strategic Triangle*, R-1902-NA (November 1977); Kenneth G. Lieberthal,

Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970's: Its Evolution and Implications for the Strategic Triangle, R-2342-NA (July 1978). While this author does not accept all of the assertions in these studies, they are a valuable contribution in understanding the debates among China's leadership concerning key foreign policy issues.

24. See the Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (adopted 22 December 1978); FBIS/PRC, 26 December 1978.

25. For an example of the "two-line" analysis see A. Doak Barnett, *Uncertain Passage: China's Transition to the Post Mao Era* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974).

26. *Kyodo* (Japanese News Agency), reports, 2-3 February 1979; FBIS/PRC, 5 February 1979. Also see Luo Bing, "The Fall of the 'Whatever Faction' " *Zheng Ming* (Hong Kong) 16 (February 1979): 5-8; FBIS/PRC, 30 January 1979.

27. According to the article in *Zheng Ming* cited above, the "whatever faction" stated its position in a 7 February 1977 article in the newspapers and magazines of the Central Committee stating:

"We are determined to support whatever policy decisions were made by Chairman Mao and we will unswervingly follow whatever instructions were given by Chairman Mao."

28. In the same article noted above, the position of the "practice" group was stated in an editorial in *Guangming Daily* on 11 May 1978: "According to the spirit of the article, Mao Zedong's words and theories must be tested by practice. This is in fact universally correct and is very much in line with fundamental Marxist-Leninist viewpoints. However, this angered the 'whatever faction' very much and made them fly into a rage."

As of early April 1979, it appeared that some of the members of the "whatever faction," which included Wang Dongxing, Ji Dengkui, Chen Yonggui, Wu De, and Chen Xilian were under severe criticism and might be purged from the Politburo. Wang, Ji, and Wu have already been officially demoted, though they retained their Politburo membership.

29. The range of discussions is indicated by the official communiqué of the Third Plenum, cited above.

30. Gottlieb, *Chinese Foreign Policy Formulation*.

31. Lieberthal, *Sino-Soviet Conflict*.

32. Another example of different emphasis is to be seen in the divergent

comments of Chinese leaders in mid-1978. In an interview with the Mexican newspaper *Excelsior*, Geng Biao took the position that war between the superpowers was inevitable. At the same time Huang Hua was emphasizing the position that conflict could be delayed. Part of the difference could be explained by the difference in assignment of the two men. Huang is Foreign Minister, while Geng is in charge of liaison with Communist parties. Still another example occurred in the visit of Vice Premier Chen Shuihua to Australia. Madame Chen, in remarks before the National Press Club said, "We are for detente," but added, "this must be a genuine detente which really curbs the threat of war and safeguards the security of all nations." This was taken by Australians as "giving the nod" to American attempts to reach detente with the USSR. FBIS/PRC, 6 March 1979. Chen's position seems considerably different from the denunciations of detente made by other Chinese leaders.

33. NCNA, 23 December 1978; FBIS, 27 December 1978.

34. It is worthwhile noting that Deng told Japanese reporters there would be no major purges during the meetings of the third plenum. *Kyodo*, 29 November 1978; FBIS 29 November 1978.

35. The three variables, ideology, perceptions, and bureaucratic politics are closely interrelated. The essential difference between ideology and perceptions is that perceptions involve historical experience. For example, Chinese perceptions reflect the influence of Chinese nationalism as well as ideological concepts such as the "three worlds." On the role of perceptions see John G. Stoessinger, *Nations in Darkness: China, Russia and America* (New York: Random House, 1971).

36. My emphasis. "A Major Move in Continuing the Long March," *Peking Review*, 3 March 1978, p. 11.

37. On the relationship between the desire to "catch up" with the West and political fragmentation in China, see Michel Oksenberg and Steven Goldstein, "The Chinese Political Spectrum," *Problems of Communism* 23 (March-April 1974).

38. For a review of China's agreements see Fox Butterfield, "Chinese Seem to Ease Reins on Economy," *NYT*, 7 November 1978. For a discussion of the prospects for US-China trade see Gary R. Teske, Hedija H. Kravalis and Allen J. Lenz, "US Trade With China: Prospects Through 1985," *Business America* 2 (12 February 1979): 3-7.

39. Wang Yaoding, "China's Foreign Trade," *China Reconstructs* 28:1 (January 1979): 26-7.

40. For an example of the Chinese positions see Neville Maxwell, *India's China War* (New York: Doubleday, 1972), pp. 218-26.

41. The lengthy communiqué of the third plenum of the 11th Central Committee had only one paragraph on foreign policy. This related primarily to normalization of relations with the United States and the situation in Asia.
42. Michael S. Minor, "China's Nuclear Development Program," *Asian Survey* 16 (June 1976): 571-9.
43. Illustrative of the importance attached to regional status are to be seen in the significance the Chinese attached to Deng's visit to Southeast Asia in 1978, the conclusion of the treaty with Japan, and the war with Vietnam. The latter two events are discussed in greater detail in the text.
44. See the article in *Wen Wei Pao* (Hong Kong), 22 June 1978; *United States Joint Publication Research Service* (USJPRS) No. 439, pp. 1-2.
45. Ibid.
46. Zeng Quig, "A New State in Sino-American Relations," *Shijie Zhishi* [World Knowledge] 1 (January 1979): 16-18; FBIS/PRC, 7 February 1979. For another interesting historical view see Wang Xi, "A Brief Talk on Several Questions Regarding the History of Sino-US Relations," *Shijie Lishi* [World History] (June 1979), pp. 12-19, FBIS/PRC, 26 June 1979.
47. This was certainly the view of Deng before normalization. See his remarks to a Komeito delegation as reported by *Kyodo*, 29 November 1978; FBIS/EAPR, 29 November 1978.
48. *China*. Background Report by Office of Media Liaison, the White House Press Office, 4 January 1979, p. 6.
49. The Chinese received a very mixed view of the United States. During the visit of Vice Premier Deng, Chinese television taped a short interview with an IBM executive with an income of almost \$40,000 annually and portrayed him as a "typical American worker." Descriptions of the United States said little about problems, but played on such positive themes as technological advancement, standard of living, and so on. Yet, shortly before this portrayal, an article in *People's Daily* discussed the "People's Temple Tragedy" and blamed it on the social system. The article said:

"Many Americans have lost confidence in the US social system and doubt established values. As a result, American society has been affected by nihilistic thinking. To some people, there is no objective truth in the world. Traditional morals and values have collapsed. People live for nothing and life is painful. Consequently, they want to 'die' and regard suicide as a 'sacred death' " (*People's Daily*, 2 December 1978; FBIS/PRC, 14 December 1978).

50. It is clear that the Chinese do not wish North Korea to attack the South. On the Chinese view of the Korean situation see Deng's interview with Japanese reporters which appeared in *Asahi Shimbun* and *Mainichi Shimbun* on 7 September 1978.

51. For a review of developments in Sino-American relations see Robert A. Scalapino, *Asia and the Road Ahead* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 74-80 and *passim*. Also see A. Doak Barnett, *China and the Major Powers in East Asia* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1977), pp. 153-208.

52. On the development of the Chinese view see Stuart Schram, "Origins of the Chinese Road: New Perspective in the Light of Volume V," *The China Quarterly* 74 (June 1978): 401-406.

53. "Chairman Mao's Theory," p. 23. On the change in China's perceptions of the two superpowers see Linda D. Dillon, Bruce Burton, and Walter C. Soderlund, "Who Was the Principal Enemy? Shifts in Official Chinese Perceptions of the Superpowers, 1968-9," *Asian Survey* 17 (May 1977): 456-73. For a Soviet view of Chinese policy see A. Kruchinin, "Peking's Foreign Policy—A Policy of Complicity with Imperialism and Reaction," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, 1 July 1978, pp. 78-83; United States Joint Publications Research Service 71827, 7 September 1978, pp. 21-24.

54. The Chinese press has contained a number of articles favorable toward Yugoslavia's economic system. See NCNA, 4 November 1978; FBIS/PRC, 6 November 1978. On how a market system affects China's foreign trade see the dispatch from *Tanyug* (Official Yugoslav News Agency), 30 November 1978; FBIS/PRC, 1 December 1978.

55. This is a central thesis of Chalmers Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962). Johnson argues that much of the reason for the Sino-Soviet dispute is because the Chinese Communists came to power independently.

56. The Chinese position was stated very clearly in the December 1974 issue of *Lixi Yinjiu* [Historical Research]; FBIS/PRC, 6 January 1975; the same position was reiterated by Hua in his report before the 5th National People's Congress.

57. "The Soviet Strategy Design as Seen From the Anti-China Stand of the Vietnamese Authorities," *Hongqi* [Red Flag], August 1, 1978. Also see "Kremlin Pushes Southward in 1978," NCNA, 29 December 1978; FBIS/PRC, 3 January 1979. Also see "History Has a Lesson to Teach, On the 10th Anniversary of Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia," *Peking Review*, August 1978, pp. 21-22. The repeated references to Soviet expansionism and hegemonism are far too numerous to be repeated here. It was a constant theme in our discussions with Chinese leaders during the National Defense University delegation visit to China in April-May 1979.

58. *Radio Beijing*, 14 December 1978; FBIS/PRC, 18 December 1978.
59. Compare, Rand reports cited in endnote 23.
60. "Chairman Mao's Theory," p. 30.
61. Barnett, *Uncertain Passage*, pp. 88-152.
62. For the text of the treaty see *Peking Review*, 18 August 1978, pp. 7-8.
63. Deng's interview with Japanese reporters, 7 September 1978.
64. Ibid. This view was also stated by Defense Minister Xu Xiangquien in his discussions with our delegation from the National Defense University in May 1979.
65. Barnett, *Uncertain Passage*, pp. 103-6, 126.
66. Deng's interview with *Time*, p. 34; Interview with Japanese reporters, 7 September 1978.
67. As reported in *Asahi Shimbun*, 22 November 1978.
68. "Social-Imperialist Strategy in Asia," *Beijing Review* (formerly Peking Review), 19 January 1979, pp. 13-16.
69. During the Fifth National People's Congress new approaches were made to the Overseas Chinese and a series of new policies announced. The treatment of Chinese residents in Vietnam was repeatedly protested by the Chinese Government. In a sense the alleged Vietnamese persecutions were a direct challenge to Beijing's new policy.
70. Li's interview is reported in *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 5 March 1979.
71. *Agence France Presse* (AFP), Hong Kong, 5 March 1979; FBIS/PRC, 6 March 1979.
72. For examples of Vietnamese statements about anticipated Soviet support see AFP, 20 February 1979; FBIS/EAPR, 23 February 1979; AFP, 27 February 1979; FBIS/EAPR, 28 February 1979.
73. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 5 March 1979.
74. *Ming Pao* (Hong Kong), 4 March 1979; FBIS/PRC, 5 March 1979. Also see the statements made by Deng to US reporters, AFP, 27 February 1979; FBIS/PRC, 27 February 1979. In a subsequent statement made to Thai Ambassador Kasem Dasemsri, Deng reportedly used one of Chairman Mao's favorite images to describe the aim of the Chinese military operation: "You

can't know the reaction of the tiger if you don't touch his arse," AFP, 11 March 1979; FBIS/PRC, 12 March 1979. Similar comments were made to our delegation by senior Chinese leaders in May 1979.

75. Lee Lescaze, "Chinese Invasion Seen Enhancing Peking Prestige in Southeast Asia," *Washington Post*, 8 March 1979.

76. Henry Kissinger, "America and Asia: Security, Easing Tensions and Cooperation," speech in Seattle, Washington, 22 July 1976, *Vital Speeches of the Day* 42 (15 August 1976): 651-6.

77. *Ibid.*, pp. 652-5.

78. Joseph Sisco, Testimony before the Senate Budget Committee, *Department of State Bulletin* 24 (29 March 1976): 422.

79. Winston Lord, "The Triangular Relationship of the United States, the USSR and the People's Republic of China," *Department of State Bulletin* 12 (19 April 1976): 514-18.

80. Cyrus Vance, "America's Role in Consolidating a Peaceful Balance and Promoting Economic Growth in Asia," speech before the Asia Society at New York, NY, 29 June 1977, *Department of State Bulletin* 127 (1 August 1977): 141-5.

81. Remarks of Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to members of the National Council for US/China Trade and the USA/ROC Economic Council, Department of State, Washington, DC, 15 January 1979. Text released by White House Press Office.

82. *Ibid.*

83. Statement by Deng to Japanese reporters, 7 September 1978. Just two months after Deng's statement that the United States would not adopt an appeasement policy, an article in *People's Daily* attacked the United States for following a policy of appeasement. Mei Bing, "Self-Intoxicating Views," *People's Daily*, 19 November 1978; FBIS/PRC, 27 November 1978. Clearly, the Chinese leadership was debating United States foreign policy during this period, since different views were being articulated.

84. *Daily Yomiuri* (English version of *Yomiuri Shimbun*), 1 February 1979.

85. *Xinhua*, 27 August 1979; FBIS, 28 August 1979.

86. *Xinhua*, 28 August 1979; FBIS, 29 August 1979.

87. *Xinhua*, 15 October 1979; FBIS, 16 October 1979.

88. *Xinhua*, 18 October 1979; FBIS, 19 October 1979.

89. *Xinhua*, 29 September 1979; FBIS, 1 October 1979.

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