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
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
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⑥ MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT

FOR

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Prepared by
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics)

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T O

I. M. GREENBERG

Mr. Greenberg was responsible for producing the
six previous manpower reports and molding the report
into its present form. He recently retired after nearly
38 years of federal service. The MRA&L staff strove to
match his standard of excellence in preparing the
FY 1981 report.

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FY 1981 DEFENSE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT

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
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PART A - Defense Manpower Requirements

Part A presents a summary of the Department of Defense Manpower Program for Fiscal Year 1981. It describes each of the Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPC), summarizes manpower requirements for each DPPC, and explains the essential elements of U.S. defense policy from which manpower requirements are determined. It also describes the manpower requirements and achievements of each of the individual Services and the defense agencies.

Chapter I	-	Introduction
Chapter II	-	Manpower and U.S. National Security
Chapter III	-	Summary of Requirements
Chapter IV	-	Military Forces and Defense Manpower
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Secretary of Defense hereby submits to the Congress the Defense Manpower Requirements Report for FY 1981 in compliance with Section 138(c)(3) of title 10, United States Code.

This report should be read and used along with the following related Defense Department reports:

- The Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the Congress on the FY 1981 Budget, FY 1982 Authorization Request, and FY 1981 through FY 1985 Defense Programs.
- The FY 1981 Military Manpower Training Report.

This chapter discusses the following general topics:

- Reporting requirement.
- Content and organization of the report.
- Reserve components.
- Manpower strengths.
- The Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC) language used throughout the report.

A. Reporting Requirement

Section 138(c)(3) of title 10, United States Code requires that the Secretary of Defense submit to the Congress a written report, not later than February 15 of each fiscal year, recommending the manpower requirements for the next fiscal year.

This law was amended by Public Law 94-361, The Defense Appropriation Authorization Act For FY 1977, to require a report on the military base structure.

This law was further amended by Public Law 96-107, the Department of Defense Authorization Act 1980, to read as follows:

"(A) The Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a written report, not later than February 15 of each fiscal year, recommending the annual active duty end strength level for each component of the armed forces for the next fiscal year and the annual civilian personnel end strength level for each component of the Department of Defense for the next fiscal year, and shall include in that report justification for the strength levels recommended and an explanation of the relationship

between the personnel strength levels recommended for that fiscal year and the national security policies of the United States in effect at the time. The justification and explanation shall specify in detail for all military forces (including each land force division, carrier and other major combatant vessel, air wing, and other comparable unit) the -

- (i) unit mission and capability;
- (ii) strategy which the unit supports; and
- (iii) area of deployment and illustrative areas of potential deployment, including a description of any United States commitment to defend such areas. (Note: Detailed deployment data are presented in Chapter XIV.)

"(B) The Secretary of Defense shall also include in the report required under subparagraph (A) a detailed discussion of -

- (i) the manpower required for support and overhead functions within the armed forces and the Department of Defense;
- (ii) the relationship of the manpower required for support and overhead functions to the primary combat missions and support policies; and
- (iii) the manpower required to be stationed or assigned to duty in foreign countries and aboard vessels located outside the territorial limits of the United States, its territories, and possessions.

"(C) In such report, the Secretary of Defense shall also identify, define, and group by mission and by region the types of military bases, installations, and facilities and shall provide an explanation and justification of the relationship between this base structure and the proposed military force structure together with a comprehensive identification of base operating support costs and an evaluation of possible alternatives to reduce such costs.

"(D) The Secretary of Defense shall also include in such report with respect to each armed force under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of a military department -

- (i) the estimated requirements in members on active duty during the next fiscal year;
- (ii) The estimated number of commissioned officers in each grade on active duty and to be promoted during the next fiscal year; and
- (iii) an analysis of the distribution by grade of commissioned officers on active duty at the time the report is prepared." (Note: These data are contained in Chapter III.)

B. Content and Organization of the Report

The report includes the Department of Defense manpower requests for active military, Selected Reserve, and civilian strengths incorporated in the President's Budget for FY 1981. To assist Congress in considering authorizing legislation for FY 1982, the report also includes strengths requested by the Department of Defense for that fiscal year.

The report is organized into two major parts plus two annexes which are submitted separately.

Part A. Defense Manpower Requirements (Chapters I through IX). Chapter I provides an introduction to the report. Chapter II is a brief overview of national security policy and its relationship to the defense manpower program. Chapter III is a summary of the FY 1981 manpower program. Chapter IV describes the military forces and associated manpower by DPPC categories; major changes in manpower strengths in each category are explained. Chapters V through IX contain the details on manpower requirements for each of the military services and the defense agencies.

Part B. Special Analyses and Data (Chapters X through XV). This part contains special analyses or data on six subjects related to the Defense manpower program. Chapter X discusses the cost of manpower. Chapter XI discusses the all volunteer force. Chapter XII discusses the role of women in the military. Chapter XIII presents the productivity program within the Department. Chapter XIV presents data on forces and manpower by location. Chapter XV contains an audit trail of the structure changes within the Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPC) that have occurred since the FY 1980 DMRR. These chapters are included because of special interest or request by the Congress.

Base Structure Annex. The Department will submit a Base Structure Annex in compliance with the reporting requirement. This annex will relate our FY 1981 base structure to the force structure for that period and will provide estimates of base operating support costs. The Base Structure Annex is forwarded to Congress, under separate cover, at the same time as this report.

Unit Annex. As requested by the Senate Armed Services Committee, a Unit Annex is provided which describes the planned allocation of manpower to specific types of units within the force. The Unit Annex also is forwarded to Congress, under separate cover, at the same time as this report.

C. Reserve Components

Reserve component manpower is divided into three categories: The Standby Reserve, the Retired Reserve, and the Ready Reserve. The Standby Reserve generally consists of members who have completed their statutory six-year military obligation and have chosen to remain in the Standby Reserve. The Retired Reserve consists of former members of either the

active components or the Ready Reserve who have retired and have transferred to the Retired Reserve. Members of the Standby and Retired Reserves do not generally participate in reserve training or readiness programs. They may be mobilized by authority of Congress.

The Ready Reserve is the major source of manpower augmentation for the active force. It comprises three elements: Selected Reserve units, Pretrained Individual Reservists, and a Training Pipeline. Selected Reserve units are organized, equipped, and trained to perform a wartime mission. Members of Selected Reserve units train throughout the year and participate annually in active duty training.

Pretrained Individual Reservists include Individual Mobilization Augmentees, members of the Inactive National Guard, and Individual Ready Reservists.

The Individual Ready Reserve generally consists of people who have served recently in the active forces or Selected Reserve and have some period of obligated service remaining on their contract. The majority of the members in the Individual Ready Reserve do not participate in organized training.

The reserve component manpower requested by the Department of Defense is limited to that of the Selected Reserve, including full-time support personnel, since that number is authorized by Congress.

D. Manpower Strengths

The manpower figures used in this report reflect strengths as of the end of a fiscal year. This is the number of people on, or expected to be on, departmental rolls or receiving drill pay at that time.

In the manpower authorization request (Chapter III), we show average strengths for the reserve components as required by section 138(b) of title 10, United States Code. Additionally, fiscal year end strengths are also given.

Beginning in FY 1981, personnel employed under the part-time career employment program established by section 3402 of title 5, United States Code are counted as a fraction of full-time based on the number of hours worked, as set out in section 3404 of that title. The FY 1981 civilian end strengths given reflect this accounting change.

E. Time Periods

The time periods used in this report are:

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>End Date</u>	<u>Manpower Data</u>
FY 1979	Sept. 30, 1979	Actual strength
FY 1980	Sept. 30, 1980	Planned strength re-
FY 1981	Sept. 30, 1981	flected in President's
		FY 1981 Budget
FY 1982	Sept. 30, 1982	Planned strength

F. Defense Planning and Programming Categories

The Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPC) are used throughout this report to describe and explain defense manpower requirements.

The DPPC are based on the same program elements as the ten Major Defense Programs, but the elements are aggregated differently. The Major Defense Programs aggregate, for each Program, all the resources which can be reasonably associated with the "output" of that program. For example, the Strategic Program includes not only the bomber squadrons but the base support personnel which sustain these units. The DPPC, on the other hand, aggregate activities performing similar functions. For example, base support is given separate visibility. Each approach has utility for the management of resources; however, the DPPC system is particularly well suited for explaining how manpower resources are used. The DPPC are listed below.

DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES

1. Strategic

Offensive Strategic Forces
 Defensive Strategic Forces
 Strategic Control and Surveillance
 Forces

2. Tactical/Mobility

Land Forces
 Tactical Air Forces
 Naval Forces
 Mobility Forces

3. Auxiliary Activities

Intelligence
 Centrally Managed Communications
 Research and Development
 Geophysical Activities

4. Support Activities

Base Operating Support
 Medical Support
 Personnel Support
 Individual Training
 Force Support Training
 Central Logistics
 Centralized Support Activities
 Management Headquarters
 Federal Agency Support

5. Individuals

Transients
 Patients, Prisoners, and
 Holdees
 Trainees and Students
 Cadets

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CHAPTER II


MANPOWER AND US NATIONAL SECURITY

A. National Security Objectives and Policy

The basic national security objective is to preserve the United States as a free nation with its fundamental institutions and values intact. This involves assuring the physical security of the United States and maintaining an international environment in which US interests are protected. Achieving this objective is dependent upon the ability to influence international affairs from a position of recognized strength, to fight when necessary, and to terminate conflicts on terms compatible with US national security interests. To those ends, strong and capable armed forces are essential. A more detailed and comprehensive statement of the objectives of American foreign policy and the way in which defense policies and strategy support their attainment can be found in the Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to Congress for FY 1981.

B. Force Structure

The Defense manpower program is related to national security policy as shown in the following diagram.



Defense manpower comprises active and reserve military and civilian personnel. The size of the manpower program is based on the forces required to execute our military strategy. The size of the force structure is also affected by fiscal constraints and our capability to mobilize and deploy forces in the event of war.

The force structure for FY 1981 continues to be based on DoD's Total Force Policy which recognizes that all units in the force structure contribute to our success in wartime. In structuring our forces, units are placed in the Selected Reserve whenever feasible to maintain as small a peacetime force as national security policy and our military strategy permit. Selected Reserve units are available upon mobilization to bring the total force to its required combat capability. These reserve units must also be responsive to call-up for limited periods without a declaration of war or national emergency. Active units, on the other hand, are those forces needed for a contingency not involving mobilization; for early deployment in a major war before Selected Reserve units can be deployed; and for forward deployment in peacetime as a deterrent against major conflict.

The table on the following page is a summary of the major force elements planned for FY 1980 and FY 1981 compared to those that existed at the end of FY 1979.

The defense manpower required to support these forces is discussed, by DPPC, in Chapter IV.

Summary of Major Force Elements

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Strategic</u>			
ICBM/SLBM	1,710	1,710	1,622
Bombers (PAA) ^{1/}	376	376	376
Tankers (KC-135) (PAA) ^{1/}			
Active	487	487	487
Guard/Reserve	128	128	128
Interceptor Squadrons			
Active	6	6	6
Guard/Reserve	10	10	10
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>			
Land Forces			
Army Divisions			
Active	16	16	16
Guard	8	8	8
Army Separate Brigade/Regiments			
Active	9	9	9
Guard/Reserve ^{2/}	28	28	28
Marine Corps Divisions			
Active	3	3	3
Reserve	1	1	1
Tactical Air Forces ^{3/}			
Air Force Squadrons			
Active	108	104	104
Guard/Reserve	55	55	55
Navy Squadrons			
Active	82	82	82
Reserve	16	16	16
Marine Corps Squadrons			
Active	30	30	29
Reserve	9	9	7
Naval Forces ^{4/}			
Carriers (active only)	13	13	12
Attack Submarines (active only)	77	80	90
Surface Combatants			
Active	166	178	190
Reserve	24	20	6
Amphibious Assault Ships			
Active	65	63	60
Reserve	2	3	6
Patrol Ships (active only)	1	1	3
ASW Aircraft Squadrons			
Active	52	52	52
Reserve	17	17	13
Mobility Forces			
Airlift Squadrons			
Active	34	34	34
Guard/Reserve ^{5/}	54	54	53
Sealift Ships			
Nucleus Fleet	69	70	72
Commercial Fleet	36	36	36

^{1/} Primary aircraft authorized.

^{2/} Includes four Reserve Component Brigades that roundout active divisions and one infantry brigade for school support upon mobilization.

^{3/} Includes tactical fighter, tactical reconnaissance, special operations, airborne TACS and TACCS, and tanker/cargo (KC-10) squadrons.

^{4/} Excludes ships assigned to Strategic, RDT&E and Support Activities.

^{5/} Includes 17 strategic airlift Reserve Associate squadrons.

C. Force Deployments

1. Forward Deployments

The deployment of US forces outside of the United States is an integral part of US national security policy. Specifically, we maintain forward deployments of our forces in regions most vital to US interests to:

- Deter aggression by demonstrating to potential enemies and to our allies our resolve to honor US commitments;
- Enable the United States to assist our allies in the event they are attacked;
- Provide the President with the flexibility for prompt response to contingencies.

2. Summary of Manpower by Geographic Location

The following tables summarize our present and planned forward deployments.

Military Manpower by Location
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
United States and Territories (Afloat)	1,562.3 (151.1)	1,566.0 (147.6)	1,574.9 (149.5)
Foreign Countries:			
Western and Southern Europe	324.6	335.6	340.7
East Asia and Pacific	127.9	127.5	127.7
Other Countries and Areas	<u>9.6</u>	<u>16.1</u>	<u>15.8</u>
Subtotal Foreign Countries (Afloat)	462.1 <u>(51.2)</u>	479.2 <u>(56.2)</u>	484.2 <u>(56.0)</u>
Total Military Manpower	2,024.4	2,045.2	2,059.1

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

3. European Deployments

The total manpower programmed for Europe continues to increase through FY 1981. The Army increases from FY 1979 reflect higher manning levels, increased artillery, and new intelligence, electronic warfare and chemical defensive units. Air Force increases from FY 1979 include basing of additional aircraft, added tactical air control, and manning to support additional forward operating locations.

In addition to these force improvements, the Department will continue the Prepositioning of Material Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS) during FY 1981. This will increase the capability to rapidly deploy reinforcements to NATO.

The following table displays, by Service, the military manpower deployed to Western and Southern Europe:

Deployed Military Manpower
Western and Southern Europe
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Army	211.6	214.2	217.7
Navy	33.2	37.6	37.7
(Afloat)	(21.2)	(24.8)	(24.8)
Marine Corps	3.0	2.9	2.9
(Afloat)	(1.8)	(1.8)	(1.8)
Air Force	76.8	80.9	82.4
 TOTAL	 324.6	 335.6	 340.7
(Afloat)	(23.0)	(26.6)	(26.6)

4. East Asia and Pacific Deployments

The withdrawal of ground combat forces from Korea has been delayed by Presidential decision. During 1981 an interagency task force will reevaluate the balance of forces on the Korean peninsula. There are no plans to change the deployment of other combat forces in the East Asia and Pacific area.

The following table displays, by Service, the military manpower deployed in the Western Pacific area.

Deployed Military Manpower
East Asia and Pacific
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Army	33.0	31.9	31.7
Navy	36.4	38.5	38.8
(Afloat)	(23.6)	(25.5)	(25.5)
Marine Corps	26.4	25.3	25.3
(Afloat)	(3.0)	(3.0)	(3.0)
Air Force	32.1	31.8	31.9
 TOTAL	 127.9	 127.5	 127.7
(Afloat)	(26.6)	(28.5)	(28.5)

5. Other Deployments

Deployments outside Western and Southern Europe and the East Asia and Pacific Area include naval activities in Bermuda for operation and support of patrol aircraft covering the central Atlantic area, USAF Southern Air Division (TAC) in Panama and naval forces deployed to the Indian Ocean. Most of the remaining deployed manpower is allocated to small Military Assistance Groups and diplomatic missions.

Tables of deployed manpower by country and tables of unit deployments are contained in Chapter XIV.



CHAPTER III

SUMMARY OF REQUIREMENTS

This chapter presents the Department of Defense manpower request, provides an overview of manpower strength trends, and explains the major strength changes from FY 1980 to FY 1981.

A. Manpower Request

As required by Section 138(c) of title 10, United States Code, the Department of Defense submitted to the Congress proposed legislation prescribing for FY 1981 and FY 1982 the authorized end strengths for active duty military personnel, the authorized average strengths for the Selected Reserve, and the authorized end strength for civilian personnel (direct and indirect hire). The strength requests are as follows:

Active Duty Military Personnel (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1981</u>	<u>FY 1982</u>
Army	775.8	781.0
Navy	533.6	544.2
Marine Corps	185.2	185.2
Air Force	564.5	565.8
Total	2,059.1	2,076.2

Note: Detail may not add due to rounding.

The following table reflects the Department of Defense manpower request for the Selected Reserve expressed in average strengths. The table also includes the corresponding end strength and the appropriate wartime manning requirement.

Selected Reserve Manpower
(Thousands)

	<u>Average Strength</u>		<u>End Strength</u>		<u>Wartime Requirement Strength</u>
	<u>FY81</u>	<u>FY82</u>	<u>FY81</u>	<u>FY82</u>	<u>FY81</u>
Army National Guard	371.3	385.8	381.4	390.3	438.3
Army Reserve	204.5	213.2	210.7	218.1	273.0
Naval Reserve	87.4	87.4	87.4	87.4	96.4 ^{1/}
Marine Corps Reserve	33.7	33.7	33.7	33.7	46.8
Air National Guard	94.3	95.6	95.8	96.3	96.8
Air Force Reserve	58.8	59.8	59.3	60.4	66.0
DoD Total	850.0	875.4	868.3	886.3	1017.3

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

^{1/} Under Review by OSD. See the discussion of the Navy Manpower Mobilization System in Chapter VI.

The following table shows the number of reserve personnel on active duty in support of the reserve components. This full-time manpower is included in the Selected Reserve totals throughout this report beginning with FY 1980.

Full-Time Reserve Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>
Army National Guard	10.2
Army Reserve	5.4
Naval Reserve	0.2
Marine Corps Reserve	0.1
Air National Guard	3.2
Air Force Reserve	0.7
DoD Total	19.8

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

The Department requests authorization for total DoD direct and indirect hire civilian employment, military functions, for end FY 1981 and FY 1982 as follows:

Civilian Authorization Request 1/
Direct and Indirect Hires, Military Functions
End Fiscal Year Strength

	<u>FY 1981</u>	<u>FY 1982</u>
Total DoD	990,000 ^{2/}	990,000

1/ Includes 55,326 (FY 1981) and 55,571 (FY 1982) National Guard and Reserve technicians who are also members of the Selected Reserve.

2/ Public Law 95-437, Federal Employee Part-Time Career Employment Act of 1978 requires that, beginning in FY 1981, part-time career employees be counted as a fraction of a full-time employee based on the number of hours worked. The Defense authorization request and, accordingly, the strengths in this report reflect the fractional counting for part-time employees.

Consistent with Section 501(c) of Public Law 94-361, the DoD Appropriation Authorization Act for FY 1977, the requested civilian authorization includes full-time, part-time, intermittent, permanent, and temporary employees; it excludes the following three categories of DoD civilian employees:

1. Special Student and Disadvantaged Youth Programs. Excluded under this category are: Stay-in-School Campaign, Temporary Summer Aid Program, Federal Junior Fellowship Program, and worker trainee opportunity programs. Employment in these categories, based on past experience, will be about 8,500 in FY 1981 and FY 1982.

2. National Security Agency employees are excluded in accordance with Public Law 86-36.

3. Civil Functions. Excluded are employees performing civil functions administered by DoD including Corps of Engineer Civil Works; cemeterial activities; and the Wildlife Conservation Program. Civil functions employment at the end of FY 1981 and FY 1982 is planned to be about 33,000.

The composition of the total DoD civilian request for FY 1981 is shown in the following table by component, direct and indirect hire.

Composition of Civilian Authorization Request for FY 1981

	<u>Direct Hire</u>	<u>Indirect Hire</u>	<u>Total</u>
Army	305,535	53,064	358,599
Navy	299,200	10,900	310,100
Marine Corps <u>1/</u>	(16,213)	(3,009)	(19,222)
Air Force	227,200	13,400	240,600
Defense Agencies	78,765	1,936	80,700
Total DoD	910,700	79,300	990,000

1/ Marine Corps civilians are included in Department of Navy strengths.

B. Manpower Overview

Military and civilian manpower strength trends are shown in the following tables.

Defense Employment (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>Actual</u>				<u>FY 81 Budget</u>	
	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Military						
Active	2,687	3,547	2,061	2,024	2,045 <u>2/</u>	2,059
Selected Reserve	953	922	788	807	832	868
Civilian <u>1/</u>	1,176	1,393	1,017	991	991 <u>3/</u>	990

1/ Direct and indirect hires.

2/ Includes full-time reservists on active duty, beginning in FY 1980.

3/ This end strength is 7,400 greater than that authorized by Public Law 96-107 for FY 1980; i.e. 983,600. The Secretary of Defense is allowed to increase the civilian end strength by as much as 1½% of that authorized if he deems it necessary. The Secretary has provided justification for the increase in civilian end strength to Congress in a separate report.

1. Active Military Strengths. The FY 1981 authorization request for active duty military personnel is 2,059,100. This request is 14,000 greater than the planned FY 1980 end strength. Most of the increases are in combat forces. The following table shows the shift in military manpower to combat forces since FY 1973.

Percent of Active Military Strength

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>FY 81 Budget</u>	
	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Strategic/Tactical/Mobility Forces	45.9	50.2	50.6	51.0
Auxiliary and Support Activities	39.7	34.6	34.5	34.5
Individuals*	14.4	15.2	14.9	14.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

*Includes trainees, students, cadets, transients, patients and prisoners.

Details of the force improvements are in the Service chapters.

Highlights of the active military manpower trends by Service are as follows:

Army

The Army will continue to increase the capabilities of selected forward deployed units in NATO and of CONUS based NATO reinforcing and Rapid Deployment Force units. These improvements include artillery, nuclear, chemical, and biological defense; combat electronic warfare and intelligence; and tactical support enhancements in both Europe and CONUS.

Navy

The Navy's total active fleet will increase from 462 ships in FY 1980 to 477 ships in FY 1981. Major numerical gains are experienced in Navy surface combatant and undersea warfare forces. Carrier levels decline temporarily from 13 to 12 during the period the SARATOGA undergoes Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) modernization. Active fleet gains include the delivery of 23 ships from new construction. In addition to the SARATOGA deactivation, other Active Fleet losses include the transfer of three ships to the Naval Reserve Fleet, one ship to the Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force, and the deactivation of three other ships.

Lesser manpower increases are experienced in various other support and pipeline categories paralleling the growth in Navy's combat manpower. Of these, the principal increase occurs in Navy's training community. Details are in the Navy chapter.

Marine Corps

The Marine Corps continues to integrate manpower management and readiness enhancing initiatives. Unit deployment and computer based assignment models improve uniform readiness and reduce turbulence. Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) units form an integral part of the newly created Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. During FY 1980 and FY 1981 Tactical/Mobility manpower will increase while the Individuals account manpower decreases.

Air Force

The Air Force continues to program for full equipage, modernization, and manning of its 26 active tactical fighter wings. The Air Force is increasing support to space programs, tactical communications, and refueling capabilities (both strategic and tactical). The Air Force active military manpower program increases in the Individuals account due to increased accession requirements. In FY 1981, two more AWACS aircraft will bring the force to 22 PAA and modification of 186 C-141 aircraft to the "stretch" version will be complete.

2. Selected Reserve Strengths. Selected Reserve end strengths for the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force reflect a modest growth for FY 1980. FY 1981 and FY 1982 budget projections are looking forward to continued increases. The programmed increases are in anticipation of improved recruiting and retention.

3. Civilian Manpower. Defense civilian employment has decreased steadily since the peak of the Vietnam War (FY 1968). By 30 September 1978, civilian employment was 159,000 less than in pre-Vietnam peacetime (FY 1964). During FY 1979 civilian employment dropped by an additional 26,000. From September 1979 to September 1981, civilian employment is programmed to remain fairly constant.

C. Summary of Manpower Requirements

The following tables summarizes the FY 1981 Defense manpower programs and compares them to the FY 1979 and FY 1980 programs. The presentation is by DPPC category.

Table 1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1979 Actual	FY 1980 FY 1981 Budget	FY 1981 Budget
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>97.6</u>	<u>96.4</u>	<u>94.9</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	75.2	74.9	73.4
Defensive Strategic Forces	9.6	8.5	8.5
Strategic Control and Surveillance	12.9	13.0	13.1
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>918.0</u>	<u>939.3</u>	<u>954.9</u>
Land Forces	535.7	552.2	558.7
Tactical Air Forces	169.9	172.1	176.9
Naval Forces	174.8	177.6	181.9
Mobility Forces	37.6	37.0	37.3
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>103.2</u>	<u>106.8</u>	<u>103.8</u>
Intelligence	33.7	34.8	31.7
Centrally Managed Communications	31.9	32.4	32.9
Research and Development	27.4	29.6	29.3
Geophysical Activities	10.1	10.0	9.8
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>598.6</u>	<u>600.1</u>	<u>607.8</u>
Base Operating Support	288.9	288.2	289.8
Medical Support	41.0	39.0	39.4
Personnel Support	30.3	30.1	31.1
Individual Training	90.3	92.8	95.0
Force Support Training	41.0	42.7	44.7
Central Logistics	21.4	21.3	21.6
Centralized Support Activities	45.0	45.3	45.3
Management Headquarters	38.2	38.3	38.4
Federal Agency Support	2.6	2.6	2.7
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>1,717.6</u>	<u>1,742.4</u>	<u>1,761.5</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>306.9</u>	<u>302.8</u>	<u>297.5</u>
Transients	80.8	70.1	70.5
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	14.1	13.5	13.2
Students, Trainees	198.7	208.0	202.7
Gadets	13.2	13.1	13.1
<u>Total</u>	<u>2,024.5</u>	<u>2,045.2</u>	<u>2,059.1</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

Table 2

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1979</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 1980</u> <u>FY 1981</u>	<u>FY 1981</u> <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>23.1</u>	<u>23.0</u>	<u>23.1</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	12.6	12.5	12.6
Defensive Strategic Forces	9.7	9.8	9.8
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.7	0.7	0.7
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>631.1</u>	<u>647.7</u>	<u>671.4</u>
Land Forces	472.2	484.7	507.3
Tactical Air Forces	59.4	60.0	62.3
Naval Forces	49.3	52.6	52.2
Mobility Forces	50.3	50.1	49.6
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>20.6</u>	<u>19.5</u>	<u>20.2</u>
Intelligence	5.4	5.6	5.7
Centrally Managed Communications	12.5	11.9	11.9
Research and Development	1.3	0.8	0.8
Geophysical Activities	1.3	1.4	1.9
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>104.3</u>	<u>112.0</u>	<u>121.1</u>
Base Operating Support	26.4	20.6	21.1
Medical Support	10.4	13.0	13.2
Personnel Support	2.1	4.8	5.2
Individual Training	36.1	35.8	37.9
Force Support Training	0.2	0.5	0.5
Central Logistics	5.2	6.6	6.6
Centralized Support Activities	19.5	23.8	28.3
Management Headquarters	3.7	6.5	7.9
Federal Agency Support	0.3	0.5	0.5
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>778.8</u>	<u>802.4</u>	<u>835.9</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>28.9</u>	<u>29.5</u>	<u>32.2</u>
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holders	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	28.9	29.5	32.2
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>807.6</u>	<u>831.8</u>	<u>868.3</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

Table 3

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1979</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 1980</u> <u>FY 1981</u>	<u>FY 1981</u> <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>11.5</u>	<u>11.4</u>	<u>11.3</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	5.8	5.9	6.1
Defensive Strategic Forces	3.7	3.4	3.2
Strategic Control and Surveillance	1.9	2.0	2.0
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>51.2</u>	<u>51.2</u>	<u>50.6</u>
Land Forces	16.2	16.2	14.7
Tactical Air Forces	14.0	14.1	14.6
Naval Forces	0.8	0.9	0.9
Mobility Forces	20.2	20.1	20.4
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>105.1</u>	<u>105.4</u>	<u>105.0</u>
Intelligence	7.4	7.6	7.4
Centrally Managed Communications	11.6	12.1	12.0
Research and Development	76.0	75.3	75.0
Geophysical Activities	10.0	10.3	10.6
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>823.3</u>	<u>822.9</u>	<u>823.0</u>
Base Operating Support	305.1	315.7	312.3
Medical Support	32.0	21.6	22.4
Personnel Support	18.5	21.0	21.5
Individual Training	21.4	21.7	21.9
Force Support Training	4.4	4.4	4.5
Central Logistics	354.1	347.0	349.8
Centralized Support Activities	53.6	55.9	54.7
Management Headquarters	34.2	35.6	35.9
Federal Agency Support	*	*	*
<u>Total</u>	<u>991.0</u>	<u>991.2</u>	<u>990.0</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

* Fewer than 50.

D. Manpower Program Changes by Component

This section lists planned changes in the manpower program of DoD Components from the end of FY 1980 to the end of FY 1981. Manpower figures are in thousands. Details may not add to total due to rounding.

Army

Active Military Strength End FY 1980 774.0

Division Forces	+4.8
Theater Forces	+0.3
Intelligence	-0.1
Research and Development	-0.1
Base Operating Support	+0.6
Medical Support	+0.6
Personnel Support	+0.3
Individual Training	+0.6
Force Support Training	+0.1
Central Logistics	+0.2
Centralized Support Activities	+1.0
Transients	-0.2
Holdees	-0.1
Students and Trainees	-6.3

End-FY 1981 775.8

Army National Guard Strength End FY 1980 358.6

Division Forces	+16.2
Theater Forces	+ 0.7
Base Operating Support	+ 0.3
Personnel Support	+ 0.3
Individual Training	+ 1.1
Centralized Support Activities	+ 4.3

End-FY 1981 381.4

Army Reserve Strength End FY 1980 200.3

Division Forces	+5.2
Theater Forces	+0.6
Base Operating Support	+0.1
Medical Support	+0.2
Individual Training	+1.0
Centralized Support Activities	+0.2
Management Headquarters	+1.1
Students and Trainees	+2.1

End-FY 1981 210.7

<u>Civilian Strength End FY 1980</u>	<u>359.1</u>

Division Forces	-1.5
Mobility Forces	-0.1
Intelligence	-0.2
Research and Development	-0.2
Base Operating Support	+0.4
Medical Support	+0.7
Personnel Support	+0.3
Central Logistics	+1.2
Centralized Support Activities	-1.1

<u>End-FY 1981</u>	<u>358.6</u>

- Navy

<u>Active Military Strength End FY 1980</u>	<u>528.0</u>

Offensive Strategic Forces	-1.5
Strategic Control and Surveillance	+0.1
Tactical Air Forces	-1.1
Naval Forces	+4.3
Intelligence	+0.2
Centrally Managed Communications	+0.5
Research and Development	-0.2
Geophysical Activities	+0.1
Base Operating Support	-0.1
Medical Support	-0.1
Personnel Support	+0.5
Individual Training	+1.7
Force Support Training	-0.2
Central Logistics	+0.1
Centralized Support Activities	+0.1
Management Headquarters	+0.2
Federal Agency Support	+0.1
Transients	+0.8
Students and Trainees	+0.3

<u>End-FY 1981</u>	<u>533.6</u>

<u>Naval Reserve Strength End FY 1980</u>	<u>87.0</u>

Tactical Air Forces	+0.3
Naval Forces	-0.4
Intelligence	+0.1
Management Headquarters	+0.1
Students and Trainees	+0.1

<u>END FY 1981</u>	<u>87.4</u>

<u>Civilian Strength End FY 1980</u>	<u>288.7</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	+0.4
Mobility Forces	+0.5
Research and Development	-0.1
Base Operating Support	-1.7
Personnel Support	+0.1
Force Support Training	+0.1
Central Logistics	+2.6
Management Headquarters	+0.2
<u>END-FY 1981</u>	<u>290.9</u>
<u>- Marine Corps</u>	
<u>Active Military Strength End FY 1980</u>	<u>185.2</u>
Land Forces	+1.4
Tactical Air Forces	+0.4
Base Operating Support	+0.2
Individual Training	-0.1
Force Support Training	+0.1
Management Headquarters	-0.1
Transients	-0.4
Holdees	-0.1
Students and Trainees	-1.6
<u>End-FY 1981</u>	<u>185.2</u>
<u>Marine Corps Reserve Strength End FY 1980</u>	<u>33.7</u>
<u>End-FY 1981</u>	<u>33.7</u>
<u>Civilian Strength End FY 1980</u>	<u>19.6</u>
Base Operating Support	-0.4
<u>End-FY 1981</u>	<u>19.2</u>
<u>- Air Force</u>	
<u>Active Military Strength End FY 1980</u>	<u>558.0</u>
Tactical Air Forces	+5.5
Mobility Forces	+0.3
Intelligence	-3.2
Geophysical Activities	-0.3
Base Operating Support	+1.2
Medical Support	-0.1
Personnel Support	+0.3
Force Support Training	+2.0
Centralized Support Activities	-1.4
Transients	+0.2
Holdees	-0.1
Students and Trainees	+2.0
<u>End-FY 1981</u>	<u>564.5</u>

<u>Air National Guard Strength End FY 1980</u>	<u>94.0</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	+0.1
Tactical Air Forces	+1.5
Mobility Forces	+0.1
Base Operating Support	+0.1
Personnel Support	+0.1
<u>End-FY 1981</u>	<u>95.8</u>
<u>Air Force Reserve Strength End FY 1980</u>	<u>58.2</u>
Tactical Air Forces	+0.5
Mobility Forces	-0.6
Geophysical Activities	+0.5
Management Headquarters	+0.2
Students and Trainees	+0.5
<u>End-FY 1981</u>	<u>59.3</u>
<u>Air Force Civilian Strength End FY 1980</u>	<u>243.9</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	-0.2
Defensive Strategic Forces	-0.2
Tactical Air Forces	+0.5
Mobility Forces	-0.1
Centrally Managed Communications	-0.1
Geophysical Activities	+0.2
Base Operating Support	-1.8
Medical Support	+0.1
Individual Training	+0.1
Central Logistics	-0.9
Centralized Support Activities	-0.7
<u>End-FY 1981</u>	<u>240.6</u>
<u>- Defense Agencies</u>	
<u>Defense Agency Civilian Strength End FY 1980</u>	<u>79.7</u>
Geophysical Activities	+0.1
Personnel Support	+0.1
Individual Training	+0.1
Centralized Support Activities	+0.6
Management Headquarters	+0.1
<u>End-FY 1981</u>	<u>80.7</u>

E. Additional Military Manpower Data

Public Law 96-107, Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1980, amended Section 138(c) of title 10, United States Code to require the Secretary of Defense to submit the following data, by Service, in the annual Defense Manpower Requirements Report: (1) the estimated requirements in numbers on active duty during the next fiscal year; (2) the estimated number of commissioned officers in each grade on active duty and to be promoted during the next fiscal year; and (3) an analysis of the distribution by grades of commissioned officers on active duty at the time the report is prepared. These data are in the following tables.

TABLE I. ESTIMATED NUMBER OF SERVICE MEMBERS IN THE ACTIVE FORCES (FY 1981) 1/
(Programmed End Strength)

<u>MILITARY CATEGORIES</u>	<u>SERVICES</u>				<u>Totals</u>
	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	
Commissioned Officers	85,980	61,380	16,702	97,853	261,915
Warrant Officers	13,960	3,095	1,215	0	18,270
Enlisted Personnel	671,560	464,700	167,283	462,230	1,765,773
Cadets	4,300	4,425		4,417	13,142
Total Military	775,800	533,600	185,200	564,500	2,059,100

1/ Excludes members funded from Reserve, Guard, and Civil Works appropriations.

TABLE II. THE ESTIMATED NUMBER OF COMMISSIONED OFFICERS IN EACH GRADE IN THE ACTIVE FORCES AND THE NUMBERS TO BE PROMOTED DURING THE NEXT FISCAL YEAR (1981)

Grades	SERVICES									
	Army		Navy		Marine Corps		Air Force		Totals	
	End Str	Prom	End Str	Prom	End Str	Prom	End Str	Prom	End Str	Prom
0-7+	414	55	259	45	66	9	354	63	1,093 ^{1/}	172
0-6	4,409	774	3,785	719	580	103	5,158	1,039	13,932	2,635
0-5	11,139	2,106	7,761	1,546	1,493	320	12,746	3,152	33,139	7,124
0-4	15,979	3,404	13,290	2,737	2,870	612	18,190	4,463	50,329	11,216
0-3	27,092	4,277	15,934	4,275	4,493	1,198	29,143	4,277	76,662	14,027
0-2	12,984	7,407	8,962	4,009	3,986	1,458	14,036	8,304	39,968	21,178
0-1	13,963	0	11,389	0	3,214	0	18,226	0	46,792	0
Totals	85,980	18,023	61,380	13,331	16,702	3,700	97,853	21,298	261,915	56,352

^{1/} When the number of general and flag officers paid from Reserve, Guard, and Civil Works appropriations is added to this number, the total is 1119. This does not indicate any intent to exceed the congressional ceiling for end FY 1980 of 1073 general and flag officers, but only that, as of the date of this report, the reduction has not been allocated by Service.

TABLE III. DISTRIBUTION BY GRADE OF COMMISSIONED OFFICERS (30 NOV 1979)

SERVICES

Grades	Army		Navy		Marine Corps		Air Force		Totals	
	Reg	Res	Reg	Res	Reg	Res	Reg	Res	Reg	Res
0-11	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
0-10	10	0	8	0	2	0	13	0	33	0
0-9	31	1	32	0	7	0	38	0	108	1
0-8	166	2	89	1	23	0	121	5	399	8
0-7	210	2	130	2	33	1	179	2	552	7
0-6	4,199	249	3,468	194	534	36	4,929	230	13,130	709
0-5	9,190	1,794	6,856	552	1,467	33	11,614	1,087	29,127	3,466
0-4	9,776	6,265	10,225	1,598	2,529	127	13,917	4,363	36,447	12,353
0-3	11,511	15,522	12,741	4,543	4,096	569	20,146	16,335	48,494	36,968
0-2	4,124	8,223	5,950	3,683	2,521	2,167	2,133	8,070	14,728	22,143
0-1	4,334	7,712	4,530	4,647	899	1,822	1,839	11,244	11,602	25,425
Totals	43,552	39,769	44,029	15,220	12,111	4,755	54,929	41,336	154,621	101,080

Note: Regular (Reg), Reserve (Res)

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CHAPTER IV

MILITARY FORCES AND DEFENSE MANPOWER

This chapter discusses the existing and planned military forces, for the years FY 1979 through FY 1981, and manpower necessary to support these forces. The presentation is by DPPC category. All manpower, active military, reserve military, and civilians in each Service as well as civilians in the Defense Agencies is included.

I. STRATEGIC

A. Introduction

Strategic Forces consist of those nuclear offensive, defensive, and control and surveillance forces that are intended to deter nuclear attack, enhance deterrence of conventional attack and, if necessary, respond to strategic attack. To fulfill these objectives in strategic force planning, we strive to maintain a reliable strategic force, placing emphasis on measures that both enhance survivability and assure our ability to penetrate defenses. In addition, we seek to provide reliable early warning capabilities to minimize the likelihood and consequences of surprise and to provide an effective and reliable command and control system for all strategic forces.

Included in this category are the strategic bomber and tanker aircraft of the Air Force, the ICBM and SLBM missiles and launcher systems of the Air Force and Navy, and the air defense interceptor forces and associated ground environment systems of the Air Force. Also included in this category are the aircraft, airborne command control and communications, and ground environment systems operated by the Air Force to provide a comprehensive warning and command and control capability.

B. Strategic Manpower

The following table displays Strategic manpower.

Strategic Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active			
Offensive Strategic	75.2	74.9	73.4
Defensive Strategic	9.6	8.5	8.5
Strategic Control and Surveillance	12.9	13.0	13.1
Total DoD	97.7	96.4	94.9
Reserve Components			
Offensive Strategic	12.6	12.5	12.6
Defense Strategic	9.7	9.8	9.8
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.7	0.7	0.7
Total DoD	23.1	23.0	23.1
<u>Civilian</u>			
Offensive Strategic	5.8	5.9	6.1
Defensive Strategic	3.7	3.4	3.2
Strategic Control and Surveillance	1.9	2.0	2.0
Total DoD	11.5	11.4	11.3

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

C. Offensive Strategic Forces

To achieve a strong deterrent posture the US maintains a well-diversified mix of offensive strategic forces consisting of land-based ICBMs, sea-based SLBMs, and manned bombers with their supporting communications systems. Offensive Strategic Forces are displayed in the following table:

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Offensive Strategic Forces</u>			
Bombers (PAA) ^{1/} :			
B-52	316	316	316
FB-111	60	60	60
Tankers (PAA):			
KC-135			
Active Force	487	487	487
Air Reserve Components	128	128	128
Missiles (PAA):			
Titan II	54	54	54
Minuteman	1000	1000	1000
Polaris/Poseidon/Trident	656	656	568
Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN)	41	41	35
Submarine Tenders (AS)	5	5	4
FBM Support Ship	1	1	1

^{1/} Primary Aircraft/Aerospace Vehicle Authorized

The following table displays Offensive Strategic Forces manpower.

Offensive Strategic Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	75.2	74.9	73.4
Reserve Components	12.6	12.5	12.6
<u>Civilian</u>	5.8	5.9	6.1

FY 1980 and 1981 active military manpower reductions are associated primarily with changes in the Navy's Fleet Ballistic Missile program. The increase in civilian manpower is due primarily to increased requirements in the TRIDENT program.

D. Defensive Strategic Forces

Defensive Strategic Forces include the aircraft and radars used for surveillance and control of US airspace as well as the civil defense function.

1. Air Defense

The US interceptor force consists of six active and five ANGUS F-106 squadrons, two ANGUS F-101 squadrons and three ANGUS F-4 squadrons. These aircraft operate in the United States during peacetime to perform the airspace control mission. Active Air Force tactical F-4 squadrons in Alaska and Iceland also provide air defense in these areas. In addition, to enhance our air defense capability in crisis situations, the dedicated interceptor force is augmented by F-15s and F-4s from the Tactical/General Purpose forces.

The Joint Surveillance System is being implemented to perform the peacetime airspace control mission. For crisis command and control, the E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) provides surveillance and command, control, communications for employment of the interceptor force.

2. Civil Defense

In FY 1979 the responsibility for civil defense was transferred from the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency to the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Defensive Strategic Forces are displayed in the following table.

Defensive Strategic Forces

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Interceptor Squadrons			
Active (F-106)	6	6	6
ANGUS (F-101, F-106, F-4)	10	10	10
Control Centers	10	10	10
Surveillance Radar Sites <u>1/</u>	63	59	61
DEW Radars <u>2/</u>	31	31	31

1/ Includes FAA joint use radars

2/ Includes 21 non-USAF radars

Manpower required for Defensive Strategic Forces is shown in the following table:

Defensive Strategic Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	9.6	8.5	8.5
Reserve Components	9.7	9.8	9.8
<u>Civilian</u>	3.7	3.4	3.2

The active military reductions in FY 1980 are due primarily to the phased implementation of the Joint Surveillance System (JSS). Civilian reductions are due to the conversion of Air Force Reserve technicians to full time active duty reservists in FY 1981, phase-in of the JSS program in FY 1980, and adjustments to the ANGUS force structure in FY 1981.

E. Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces

Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces provide warning to the United States of impending attacks by enemy bombers and/or ICBMs. These forces also include command and control facilities which support the National Command Authority. Aircraft in this DPPC include SR-71s, EC-135 Post Attack Command and Control System Aircraft and E-4A/B National Emergency Airborne Command Post aircraft. There are also numerous ground environment activities, including the NORAD Combat Operations Center.

1. Ballistic Missile Attack Warning and Space Systems

The Satellite Early Warning System, the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System, and the PAVE PAWS detection radars will continue to be relied on for warning of missile attacks. Surveillance of satellites and orbiting objects will be provided primarily by one dedicated radar sensor and four optical sensors. Additional SPACETRACK coverage is provided by the missile warning radars as a secondary mission.

Information essential to understanding foreign space activity will continue to be provided by the existing USAF SPACETRACK systems and the Navy's SPASUR system, both of which are tied into NORAD and supported by the Space Computational Center for continuous monitoring of foreign and US space activities.

2. Ballistic Missile Defense

We continue research and development on a variety of types of missile defenses at a pace adequate to maintain the technological base and to preserve options to meet potential future requirements.

3. Command and Control

The strategic command and control system assures the President positive control of our nuclear forces. The Advanced Airborne Command Post program, initiated in FY 1973, will be continued. In addition, development will continue on other programs to ensure that our command and control system will be able to perform its mission in the future.

Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces are shown in the following table.

Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Space Surveillance Forces</u>			
Radar Sensors/Systems	11	8	10
Optical Sensors	4	4	4
<u>Strategic Command and Control</u>			
National Level Command Centers	3	3	3
Major Subordinate Level Command Centers	15	15	15
<u>Ballistic Missile Warning</u>			
Missile Warning			
Satellites/Ground Stations	3/3	3/3	3/3
Radars	11	8	8

Manpower associated with Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces is shown below:

Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	12.9	13.0	13.1
Reserve Components	0.7	0.7	0.7
<u>Civilians</u>	1.9	2.0	2.0

The FY 1980 and FY 1981 changes in active military manpower are a result of minor changes in the Navy's control and surveillance programs.

II. TACTICAL/MOBILITY

A. Introduction

Forces in the Tactical/Mobility category are designed and equipped to deter conflicts through a visible capability to resist aggression against any country or area vital to our interests. Inherent in these forces is the capability to conduct military operations at any level of warfare. These forces consist of Land Forces of the Army and Marine Corps, Tactical Air Forces of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps as well as Naval Forces and Mobility Forces.

Included in this category are the Army's combat divisions, separate combat brigades, regiments and tactical support units. Marine units in this category include not only their combat divisions, but also air wings, force service support groups, and ship security detachments. Air Force units in this category include fighter, reconnaissance and special operations squadrons as well as both tactical and strategic airlift forces. The bulk of Navy manpower in this category is devoted to Naval Forces for ship manning requirements, including a significant element for operation of aircraft carriers and associated air wings.

The following table displays Tactical/Mobility manpower by sub-category.

Tactical/Mobility Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active			
Land Forces	535.7	552.2	558.7
Tactical Air Forces	169.9	172.1	176.9
Naval Forces	174.8	177.6	181.9
Mobility Forces	37.6	37.0	37.3
Total DoD	918.0	939.3	954.9
Reserve Components			
Land Forces	472.2	484.7	507.3
Tactical Air Forces	59.4	60.0	62.3
Naval Forces	49.3	52.6	52.2
Mobility Forces	50.3	50.1	49.6
Total DoD	631.1	647.4	671.4
<u>Civilian</u>			
Land Forces	16.2	16.2	14.7
Tactical Air Forces	14.0	14.1	14.6
Naval Forces	0.8	0.9	0.9
Mobility Forces	20.2	20.1	20.4
Total DoD	51.2	51.2	50.6

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

B. Land Forces

1. Summary of Forces and Manpower

The following tables summarize Land Forces and manpower. Reserve component forces provide a significant portion of these manpower intensive forces.

Land Force Levels

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Army</u>			
<u>Divisions (Brigades)</u>			
Active 1/			
Deployed	5(18)	5(18)	5(18)
CONUS/Hawaii	11(28)	11(26)	11(26)
Reserve Components	8(24)	8(24)	8(24)
TOTAL	24(70)	24(68)	24(68)
<u>Separate Brigades</u>			
Active			
Deployed	2	2	2
CONUS/Alaska	3	3	3
Reserve Components 2/	23	23	23
TOTAL	28	28	28
<u>Cavalry Units</u>			
Active			
Deployed	2	2	2
CONUS 3/	2	2	2
Reserve Components	4	4	4
TOTAL	8	8	8
<u>Marine Corps Divisions</u>			
Active			
Deployed	1	1	1
CONUS	2	2	2
Reserve Components	1	1	1
TOTAL	4	4	4

- 1/ In FY 1980 and FY 1981, 12 Army divisions have three active brigades each; four Army divisions have two active and one reserve "round out" brigade each.
- 2/ Includes four reserve brigades that round out active divisions; excludes one infantry brigade provided for school support.
- 3/ Includes the 6th Combat Brigade Air Cavalry

Land Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	535.7	552.2	558.7
Reserve Components	472.2	484.7	507.3
<u>Civilian</u>	16.2	16.2	14.7

The increases in Land Forces active military manpower reflect improvements in the combat capability of forward deployed units in Europe and units with a NATO reinforcement mission. The decrease in civilian manpower reflects plans to convert reserve component technician positions to full-time military status.

2. Capabilities of Land Forces

Land Forces are divided into two subcategories: Division Forces and Theater Forces. Division Forces comprise the combat divisions, brigades, regiments, and the additional combat and tactical support units required in the theater of operations to sustain combat operations of the divisions. Division Forces provide the bulk of land combat power in the potential theaters of major warfare. Theater Forces comprise the combat and support units required in the theater of operations to accomplish missions other than conventional land combat such as air defense and long-range tactical nuclear firepower (surface-to-surface missiles). Theater Forces, as defined above, are unique to the Army for reasons of mission and organization.

a. Army Division Forces

(1) The division is the basic combat organization of the Army. It includes, under a single commander, all combat arms (infantry, armor, artillery, engineer and aviation) and some of the support (signal, intelligence, supply, transportation, maintenance, and administration) required to fight a battle. The Army division includes from nine to eleven maneuver battalions and four artillery battalions. There are several types of Army divisions and each is designed for a particular role on the battlefield. The strength of the division varies according to type as shown in the following table.

Characteristics of Model Army Divisions

<u>Type Division</u>	<u>Objective Mix of Maneuver Battalions</u>				<u>Auth Wartime Strength</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
	<u>Inf</u>	<u>Mech</u>	<u>Tank</u>	<u>Total</u>		
Armored	-	5	6	11	18,900	Mobile defense or attack
Mechanized	-	6	5	11	18,500	Mobile defense or attack
Infantry	8	1	1	10	17,600	All-around capability against light forces
Airborne	9	-	1	10	16,500	Parachute assault; strategic mobility
Air Assault	9	-	-	9	18,400	Battlefield mobility chiefly against light forces

(2) The division cannot operate alone in the theater of war; additional combat units and support units are necessary to allow it to operate at its intended level of combat power.

(a) Non-Divisional Combat Increment. A division is augmented by the following organizations which have substantial combat power.

1 Separate combat brigades. These brigades are similar to divisions, except that they are smaller. A separate brigade includes from three to five maneuver battalions, one artillery battalion, and appropriate support units. Infantry, mechanized, and armored brigades differ by battalion mix. A separate brigade may be attached to a division or employed separately under a corps or theater commander.

2 The cavalry brigade (air combat). This organization includes attack helicopters and "air cavalry". This brigade exploits the capabilities of helicopters in land warfare. It is normally employed as a separate brigade under control of the corps commander.

3 The armored cavalry regiment. This is an organization consisting of infantry, tank, artillery, and reconnaissance elements integrated at squadron (battalion) level. The armored cavalry regiment is designed for such roles as reconnaissance, flank protection, and screening the divisions and brigades.

4 Separate artillery battalions. These battalions comprise about one-half the total artillery of the Division Forces. This non-divisional artillery, which includes missile battalions as well as cannon artillery, normally is part of the corps organization.

(b) Tactical Support Increment. These units provide combat service and/or administrative support; i.e., Ammunition, Civil Affairs, Finance, Logistical HQS, Intelligence.

b. Marine Corps Division Forces

(1) The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, assigns the Marine Corps the mission of providing "... Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign." The Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) is the basic element for the conduct of amphibious operations or land operations ashore. The MAF is an integrated force of combined arms, consisting typically of a Marine division, a Marine aircraft wing, a force service support group, and selected combat support units.

(2) A Marine division is an infantry division configured specially for amphibious operations with about 16,000 members. It includes nine infantry battalions, three to five artillery battalions, plus a tank, assault amphibian, reconnaissance, and combat engineer battalions.

(3) A Marine aircraft wing is integral to the MAF and operates in conjunction with a division. Close integration of land and tactical air capabilities is an essential ingredient of the Marine Corps capability for amphibious operations. The manpower associated with the fixed-wing portion of the Marine air wings is in the Tactical Air Forces category while helicopter resources are designated as Land Forces aviation.

(4) The force service support groups provide combat service support units in support of the entire MAF. Each group includes transportation, supply, maintenance, communications, and administrative units.

c. Army Theater Forces. There are four subcategories of Army Theater Forces:

(1) Theater Missile Forces. These include the surface-to-surface missile units and supporting ammunition supply and maintenance units which provide the theater commander a responsive theater

nuclear capability. (The Division Forces also have a nuclear capability because they include dual-capable units which can wage either conventional or nuclear combat.)

(2) Theater Air Defense Forces. This category includes surface-to-air missile units and supporting supply, maintenance, and command and control units devoted to the theater-wide air defense mission under the control of the theater commander.

(3) Theater Special Operations Forces. These organizations include units devoted to special missions including psychological operations, civil affairs support, and unconventional warfare on a theater-wide basis under control of the theater commander.

(4) Theater Defense Forces. These forces include active and reserve component separate infantry brigades provided for the defense of selected critical areas: Alaska, Berlin, Panama, Iceland, and the Caribbean. Provision of specific units for these essential defense missions achieves economies by tailoring the units for their missions. The following table shows the allocation of these forces.

End FY 81 Theater Defense Forces

<u>Location</u>	<u>Infantry Brigades</u>	
	<u>Active</u>	<u>Reserve Components</u>
Alaska	1	1
Panama	1	1
Berlin	1	-
Iceland	-	1
Caribbean	-	1
TOTAL	3	4

C. Tactical Air Forces

1. Summary of Forces and Manpower

In order to meet the tactical air portion of national strategy goals, the forces shown in the following table are planned for FY 1981. Forces for FY 1979 and FY 1980 are shown for comparison. As shown by the table, all military assets are considered in force planning. For example, the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve tactical aircraft are an integral part of planned deployments. A table showing the corresponding manpower levels is also included.

The basic organizational building block for tactical air forces is the squadron. The number of aircraft in each squadron depends on the type of equipment and the operating environment. Air Force fighter squadrons usually have 18 or 24 primary aircraft authorized (PAA) while

the Navy and Marine Corps fighter squadrons usually have 12. Specialized squadrons or detachments of each Service (e.g., reconnaissance, ECM) usually have fewer aircraft.

The major tactical Air Force operational organization is the wing. Wings are composed of one or more squadrons depending on the mission and size of the support facility. Air Force wings are usually made up of three squadrons with like aircraft. Navy and Marine Corps wings are usually composed of five or more squadrons with dissimilar aircraft because their isolated operating environments (carrier or beachhead) demand mixed capability air units.

Tactical Air Forces 1/

Squadrons 2/

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Active</u>			
Air Force	108	104	104
Navy	82	82	82
Marine Corps 3/	30	30	29
<u>Reserve Components</u>			
Air National Guard	45	45	45
Air Force Reserve	10	10	10
Naval Reserve	16	16	16
Marine Corps Reserve 3/	9	9	7

1/ Includes fighter, attack, reconnaissance, TACS, TACCS, tanker/cargo (KC-10), and special operations squadrons. For further classified detail, see the FY 1981 Report of the Secretary of Defense.

2/ Squadron PAA are variable.

3/ Includes integrated tanker squadrons.

Tactical Air Forces Manpower (End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	169.9	172.1	176.9
Reserve Components	59.4	60.0	62.3
<u>Civilians</u>	14.0	14.1	14.6

The increase in FY 1981 active forces is due primarily to a significant increase in the number of fighter aircraft in the Air Force. The reserve component and civilian manpower increases in FY 1980 and FY 1981 reflect the continued modernization and expansion of the air reserve force tactical fighter force as additional reservists and technicians are added to support increased numbers of aircraft.

2. Capabilities of Tactical Air Forces

Tactical aircraft can carry out a variety of missions in a conflict. These capabilities include close air support, interdiction, counterair (including air defense), reconnaissance, tanker/cargo, and special purpose missions. Tactical air forces contribute to theater nuclear capabilities because some tactical aircraft have both a nuclear and conventional weapon delivery capability.

a. Close Air Support (CAS). Close air support sorties are flown against enemy forces in close proximity to friendly forces. Primary goals of close air support are: to destroy or neutralize enemy forces close to friendly forces; and to attack these enemy forces rapidly after receiving requests for close air support. CAS systems should be able to: deliver accurate, lethal fire; provide fire support responsive to the ground commander; survive in enemy air defense environments; maneuver well enough to employ the tactics required to attack various targets; and carry ordnance in sufficient quantity and variety to be effective against diverse targets.

b. Interdiction. Interdiction sorties are flown by tactical aircraft against a wide range of targets including: enemy forces maneuvering behind their front lines; enemy lines of communication; storage and production facilities in rear areas; enemy surface ships such as surface-to-surface missile launching patrol boats, cruisers, and destroyers; and enemy ports and naval bases.

c. Counterair. Counterair operations are conducted to gain and maintain air superiority by destruction or neutralization of an enemy's air capability. Offensive counterair operations are normally conducted throughout enemy territory to seek out and destroy aircraft in the air or on the ground, missile and anti-aircraft artillery sites, air bases, air control systems, and other elements which constitute or support the enemy air order of battle. Defensive counterair operations are generally reactive to enemy initiative. Air defense sorties are flown to protect friendly air, sea, or ground forces from enemy air attack. The primary objective is to limit the effectiveness of enemy air efforts to a level permitting freedom of action of friendly forces.

d. Reconnaissance. Tactical reconnaissance resources are a vital part of the information collection capability available to commanders engaged in unilateral, joint, or combined operations both in peacetime and in all intensities of warfare. Tactical air reconnaissance operations provide timely intelligence information concerning the enemy's installations, lines of communication, and electronic emissions, as well as the disposition, composition, and movement of enemy forces. Intelligence information is collected, and surveillance of battle areas is carried out day and night and in all kinds of weather.

e. Special Purpose. Special purpose aircraft are used in electronic warfare (detection of and countermeasures against enemy electronic emitters), special operations forces (for example, specifically tailored for unconventional warfare, psychological, and counterinsurgency operations), tactical air control (enroute and terminal control of tactical aircraft), and airborne early warning (airborne search radar).

f. Tanker/Cargo. The KC-10 force provides the unique capability for extended force deployment/support without benefit of enroute basing or destination fuel. The additional air refueling off load capability enables more receiver deployment per tanker to more distant locations than the KC-135 can support. Enhanced air refueling plus simultaneous cargo carriage make the KC-10 a potent addition to US power projection ability. The active force will consist of one KC-10 squadron and the reserve force will consist of one Reserve Associate Squadron using active force aircraft.

D. Naval Forces

1. Summary of Forces and Manpower

The following tables summarize Naval Forces and manpower.

<u>Naval Forces 1/</u>			
	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Ships</u>			
<u>Active Forces</u>			
Carriers 2/	13	13	12
Attack Submarines			
Nuclear	72	75	85
Diesel	5	5	5
Surface Combatants	166	178	190
Amphibious Assault Ships	65	63	60
<u>Support Forces</u>			
Underway Replenishment	37	34	34
Major Fleet Support	20	20	22
Minor Fleet Support	19	16	16
Patrol Ships	1	1	3
Minesweepers	3	3	3
Subtotal	401	408	430
	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Reserve Components Forces</u>			
Surface Combatants	24	20	6
Amphibious Assault Ships	2	3	6
Minesweepers	22	22	22
Minor Fleet Support Ships	5	6	6
Underway Replenishment	-	2	2
Subtotal	53	53	42
Total Ships	454	460	471
<u>ASW Aircraft Squadrons</u>			
<u>Active Forces</u>			
Land-Based	24	24	24
Ship-Based (Fixed/Rotary Wing)	28	28	28
Subtotal	52	52	52
<u>Reserve Components Forces</u>			
Land-Based	13	13	13
Ship-Based (Fixed/Rotary Wing)	4	4	0
Subtotal	17	17	13
Total ASW Aircraft Squadrons	69	69	65

1/ Table excludes active fleet ships assigned to Strategic Forces, RDT&E and Support Activities (57 ships in FY 1979, 54 ships in FY 1980 and 47 in FY 1981).

2/ Associated manpower is reported under Tactical Air Forces.

Naval Forces Manpower ^{1/}
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	174.8	177.6	181.9
Reserve Components	49.3	52.6	52.2
<u>Civilian</u>	0.8	0.9	0.9

1/ Naval forces manpower includes Marines assigned to ships' security detachments and amphibious ships and commands.

The increase in active military manpower between FY 1979 and FY 1981 reflects increased ship manning requirements as a result of growth in the size of the active fleet from 458 ships in FY 1979 to 477 ships in FY 1981. The increase in the reserve strength is due to force level changes.

2. Capabilities of Naval Forces

Naval forces are required to have the capabilities to carry out prompt and sustained combat operations at sea. This includes the ability to exercise sea control and to project power ashore. For sea control operations, the United States maintains sea and land-based aircraft, surface combatants, attack submarines, mines, surveillance systems, and logistics support forces. For the projection of power ashore, the United States provides sea-based aircraft and amphibious forces, together with escorting and supporting forces. Many of these forces have utility in both the sea control and force projection roles and also carry out the naval presence and crisis control missions in peacetime.

Requirements for active US naval forces are derived by the need to maintain those forces which deploy forward in peacetime or which are planned for early use in war. Reserve forces are planned to provide the additional sustaining capability needed during wartime.

In peacetime and wartime, naval forces are organized into task units. The building block for these task units is the individual ship. The following illustrative examples demonstrate the formation of these task units. Actual task unit composition in peacetime and wartime would vary depending on the scenario, location, and force availability.

- Carrier Battle Group (CVBG). A representative CVBG would comprise one or two carriers, surface combatants, and attack submarines (SSN) organized to conduct sea control or power projection operations. Surface combatants in this battle group would be cruisers (CG), guided missile destroyers (DDG), and destroyers (DD). This CVBG could be divided into two single carrier groups to operate in open ocean areas where the air threat is less numerically demanding. Against severe threats, CVBGs would normally be combined to provide additional mutual support.

- Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). An ARG would comprise the amphibious ships necessary to transport a Marine amphibious unit (1/9 of a division/wing team) and the protection forces as necessary. Protection forces would consist of frigates (FF or FFG) and guided missile destroyers (DDG).

- Underway Replenishment Group (URG). URGs provide logistics support (fuel, munitions, food) to other task units at sea. A typical URG would have four underway replenishment ships: two oilers (AO); an ammunition ship (AE); and a combat stores ship (AFS). The URG might be escorted by a mix of guided missile destroyers (DDG), destroyers (DD), and frigates (FFB or FF).

- Convoy. Convoys are groups of cargo ships escorted by naval surface combatants and, possibly, aircraft which are organized to provide protection during passage through potentially dangerous waters. A typical convoy would have 40-60 merchant ships and combatants, composed of a destroyers (DD) and frigates (FFG or FF).

E. Mobility Forces

1. Summary of Forces and Manpower

The following tables display the Mobility Forces and manpower.

Mobility Forces

<u>Airlift Forces (Squadrons/PAA)</u>	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Active</u>			
Strategic	17/304	17/304	17/304
Tactical	14/218	14/218	14/218
<u>Reserve Components</u>			
Strategic <u>1/</u>	17/--	17/--	17/--
Tactical (ANGUS/AFR)	36/368	36/376	35/344
<u>Rescue/Recovery (Squadrons/PAA)</u>			
Active	7/105	7/95	7/96
Reserve (ANGUS/USAFR)	6/56	6/52	6/52
<u>Aeromedical (Squadrons/PAA)</u>			
Active	3/17	3/17	3/17
Reserve (USAFR) <u>1/</u>	1/--	1/--	1/--
<u>Sealift Forces <u>2/</u></u>			
Nucleus Fleet			
Government owned/operated	51	52	54
Contractor Operated <u>3/</u>	18	18	18
Commercial Fleet	36	36	36

- 1/ Air Force Reserve associate squadrons operate and maintain active force aircraft.
- 2/ Only government owned MSC Nucleus Fleet ships are manned by Navy civil service personnel. Manning of all other MSC ships is accomplished by manpower from the private sector.
- 3/ Four of these ships are government owned.

Mobility Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	37.6	37.0	37.3
Reserve Components	50.3	50.1	49.6
<u>Civilian</u>	20.2	20.1	20.4

The changes in Mobility Forces manpower are due primarily to force structure changes.

2. Capabilities of Mobility Forces

Mobility Forces consist of strategic and tactical airlift, sea-lift, and support forces, including air and sea terminals, aerospace rescue and recovery, and aeromedical evacuation units. They are a vital element of our tactical/mobility structure. To deter aggression, we must have a credible capability to bring our forces to bear quickly whenever and wherever necessary. Mobility Forces enable the United States to do this without positioning large numbers of US forces abroad.

Mobility Forces could be used in a variety of situations, ranging from a show of force to support of an all-out conventional war. Present planning for the spectrum of possible deployments involves principally military and US commercial assets. However, in the case of a war in Europe, planning includes NATO allied participation in assisting US deployments.

a. Airlift

(1) Strategic Airlift Strategic airlift provides the capability to deploy forces or critical logistical support rapidly to any part of the world. Our military strategic airlift force consists of both active and Air Force Reserve associate units. The active force includes four C-5 and thirteen C-141 squadrons. For each active force unit there is a collocated Air Force Reserve associate squadron. In addition to the military assets, US commercial airlines have committed 372 long-range aircraft to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program. Of these, 121 are cargo or passenger/cargo convertible aircraft and 251 are passenger-only aircraft.

(2) Tactical Airlift In contrast to strategic airlift which provides deployment capability from CONUS to overseas areas, tactical airlift provides transportation and air logistic support for theater forces. Our active tactical airlift force consists of 14 C-130 squadrons. This active force is augmented by the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve which are currently equipped with 29 C-130, 4 C-123, and 3 C-7 squadrons. In FY 1981, the C-7 squadrons are programmed to receive C-130 aircraft as replacement for the C-7s.

(3) Aerospace Rescue and Recovery. The aerospace rescue and recovery force maintains the capability to deploy worldwide to meet contingency or emergency rescue requirements, primarily for downed air crews. Additionally, this force is manned to furnish regional search and rescue coordination for the CONUS land region and Alaska. The active force is composed of HC-130 fixed wing aircraft and HH-53, HH-3 and UH-1 helicopters. As with airlift, the active force is augmented by reserve forces operating HC-130, HH-3, and H-1 aircraft.

(4) Aeromedical Evacuation. The aeromedical evacuation system provides the capability to move patients as expeditiously as possible to hospitals. The active force consists of one C-9 CONUS squadron, one C-9 squadron in the Pacific, and one in Europe. The CONUS unit is augmented by an Air Force Reserve associate squadron. In addition, strategic airlift aircraft may be used for aeromedical evacuation if necessary.

b. Sealift. We rely heavily on sealift to deploy and sustain our forces. The ships controlled by the Military Sealift Command have only a limited capability. We are reliant on US flag ships, the National Defense Reserve Fleet and the ships of our allies to provide the necessary sealift in a major war and for lesser contingencies.

F. Disposition of Forces

The peacetime disposition of US Tactical/Mobility Forces is a combination of CONUS and forward deployed forces. Forward deployed forces are a symbol of the US commitment to mutual defense of areas critical to US national security. Should deterrence fail, forward deployed forces provide an initial combat capability.

Forces located in the United States provide additional combat and support units capable of deployment to any theater of operations in the event of war. These forces also provide a peacetime base of rotation for units and ships deployed overseas.

Details on the deployment of forces are in Chapter XIV.

III. AUXILIARY ACTIVITIES

A. Introduction

Auxiliary Activities personnel carry out major defense-wide programs under centralized DoD control. These programs include Intelligence, Centrally Managed Communications, Research and Development, and Geophysical Activities. The following table shows the manpower for FY 1979 through FY 1981.

DoD Auxiliary Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active			
Intelligence	33.7	34.8	31.7
Centrally Managed Comm.	31.9	32.4	32.9
Research and Development	27.4	29.6	29.3
Geophysical Activities	10.1	10.0	9.8
Total DoD	103.2	106.8	103.8
Reserve Components			
Intelligence	5.4	5.6	5.7
Centrally Managed Comm.	12.5	11.9	11.9
Research and Development	1.3	0.8	0.8
Geophysical Activities	1.3	1.4	1.9
Total DoD	20.6	19.5	20.2
<u>Civilian</u>			
Intelligence	7.4	7.6	7.5
Centrally Managed Comm.	11.6	12.1	12.0
Research and Development	76.0	75.3	75.0
Geophysical Activities	10.0	10.3	10.6
Total DoD	105.1	105.4	105.0

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

B. Intelligence

Intelligence activities gather, analyze, and disseminate foreign intelligence information to users at the national, departmental, and tactical levels. This information is used for strategic planning as well as supporting force planning, operations, and research and development. These requirements form the basis for budget and manpower allocations.

Functional requirements, engineering standards, and other management criteria provide the principal measures for determining intelligence unit manning. Manpower levels are modified as broad missions of the staffs change; as science and technology impact on the intelligence process; and as actual combat experience may require. Integration of military and civilian expertise is essential to the success of defense intelligence activities. Military personnel provide some of the necessary experience and perspectives required to carry out the different functional activities associated with military intelligence. The balance of the work force is civilian.

The two principal programs which involve the bulk of defense intelligence manpower are discussed below.

1. Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP)

The cryptologic program is managed by the Director, National Security Agency (NSA). The NSA mission is international in scope and involves the performance of highly specialized technical functions in support of the foreign intelligence activities of the United States. Resources included are those authorized and appropriated by the Congress for selected intelligence organizations, the Army, Navy, Air Force and for NSA. For security reasons, NSA civilian manpower is excluded from the DoD civilian authorization request in accordance with PL 86-36.

By National Security Council Directives, the Director, National Security Agency has been assigned three basic cryptologic responsibilities under the Secretary of Defense:

- Organizing, operating, and managing certain activities and facilities for collecting, processing, analyzing, and reporting of foreign intelligence information;
- Organizing and coordinating the research and engineering activities of the US Government which are in support of the cryptologic program; and
- Regulating certain communications in support of agency missions.

2. General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP).

The GDIP covers all military intelligence units and activities in the National Foreign Intelligence Program other than Navy and Air Force special activities and the Consolidated Cryptologic Program. It includes the Defense Intelligence Agency, units from each of the military departments, and special security and communications elements of the Defense Mapping Agency. It also includes intelligence units of the Unified and Specified Commands that have theater-wide responsibilities and significant national and departmental peacetime intelligence missions.

The following table shows Intelligence manpower.

Intelligence Manpower 1/
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	33.7	34.8	31.7
Reserve Components	5.4	5.6	5.7
<u>Civilian</u>	7.4	7.6	7.4

1/ Excludes National Security Agency civilian manpower.

The active military increase in FY 1980 reflects additional support to the National Security Agency. The decrease in active military manpower in FY 1981 is largely due to an accounting change which moves some cryptological manpower to Base Operating Support.

C. Centrally Managed Communications

Centrally Managed Communications (CMC) consist of the key world-wide dedicated and common user communications systems of the Defense Department required to support and implement overall national security policy and objectives. To understand CMC, it is necessary to consider it in the context of the larger communications community, Telecommunications and Command Control Program (T&CCP), of which it is the largest element. T&CCP contains the resources that support the Command, Control, and Communications (C³) Systems of the Department of Defense. The C³ Systems are the means through which National Command Authorities (the President and the Secretary of Defense) and, under their direction, the military commanders control and employ the military strength of the nation. While T&CCP manpower appears in all Defense Planning and Programming Categories, Centrally Managed Communications represents about 45% of the total.

Functions by Defense Planning and Programming Categories in the T&CCP are:

Strategic category includes the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS); automated data processing installations such as those at Strategic Air Command (SAC), North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), and the National Military Command Center (NMCC); WWMCCS facilities such as Airborne Command Posts and the NORAD Combat Operation Center (COC); and communication systems for the National Military Command System (NMCS), Fleet Ballistic Missile Control, and Air Force strategic missile systems.

Tactical/Mobility category includes such telecommunications systems as Joint Tactical Communications, Air Force Tactical Air Control System, and Army signal battalions.

Support Activities include base communications for installations supporting operational commands in both US and overseas locations, communications logistics operations, and communications management headquarters manpower.

Auxiliary Activities include Centrally Managed Communications (CMC) and communications systems supporting intelligence and security, weather service, and satellite control.

Centrally managed communications reduce duplication of effort and improve the responsiveness of these communications systems to our National Command Authorities. In addition to the people associated with the operation and maintenance of these systems, CMC includes the people involved in communications security.

Worldwide communications to facilitate command and control of our forces are provided by the Defense Communications System (DCS) and the communications systems of the military services. The DCS is made up of a number of general purpose sub-systems such as the automatic voice network, the digital transmission network, and the secure voice network. Military service communications systems provide internal networks for the services and interface with DCS systems.

Communications requirements for these systems are based on current and projected deployment of our forces; i.e., the number, type, and location of installations and the distances between locations. The required capacity for each of several modes of communications is determined based on prior experience and the expressed needs of the field commander. Each such operating location is manned based on the number of operating positions to be filled, maintenance manhours required, and the need for administration and support. Therefore, the strength of the CMC is not merely a function of the size of the forces being supported, but also the composition and dispersion of those forces.

The following table reflects the DoD manpower in Centrally Managed Communications (CMC).

Centrally Managed Communications Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	31.9	32.4	32.9
Reserve Components	12.5	11.9	11.9
<u>Civilian</u>	11.6	12.1	12.0

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

The increase in active military and civilian manpower as well as the decrease in reserve manpower between FY 1979 and FY 1980 is due to a number of small changes in the Army and Navy communications programs.

D. Research and Development

The Department of Defense R&D effort has two essential objectives: assure a continuous flow of initiatives and options out of the base of science and advanced technology and into development projects, and develop effective systems to deter war and respond to aggression. *These efforts are paced by the technological improvements which the Soviet Union continues to make in its forces.*

Manpower attributed to the R&D programs conducts the work performed in the 108 laboratories and test and evaluation facilities of the DoD. They also manage defense-related R&D contracted with agencies outside DoD. This work encompasses virtually all aspects of the physical, biomedical, environmental, and behavioral sciences, plus the engineering disciplines.

The DoD R&D organization includes both military and civilian manpower. Military experience and expertise have proven invaluable in making the transition from a statement of military requirements through the design, development, test, and evaluation phases toward the final production of effective weapons systems. Military personnel are largely employed in test activities where their current operational skills and professional backgrounds are fully utilized. Civilian manpower is used to fill billets not absolutely requiring military incumbents. A summary of R&D manpower is shown in the following table.

Research and Development Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	27.4	29.6	29.3
Reserve Components	1.3	0.8	0.8
<u>Civilian</u>	76.0	75.3	75.0

The increase in active military manpower between FY 1979 and FY 1980 is primarily due to accounting changes. The decreases in reserve and civilian manpower reflects the transfer of manpower to higher priority activities.

E. Geophysical Activities

This category consists of manpower associated with meteorological, topographic, oceanographic, and navigational activities. These activities provide common services involving geophysical phenomena to DoD, as well as to other departments and agencies. These services are essential to the effective delivery of ICBMs and cruise missiles; to the safe navigation of ships, submarines and aircraft; and to the successful accomplishment of essentially every other major military mission.

Meteorological activities include Air Force weather reconnaissance units, Navy weather centers, and Air Force base weather detachments. Also included are a small number of administrative personnel needed to control the operations of the Air Weather Service and the Navy Weather Service.

Topographic and oceanographic activities involve the preparation, production, and dissemination of maps and charts, and the investigation and evaluation of topographic and oceanographic phenomena. Also included are a small number of administrative personnel needed to control the operations of the Defense Mapping Agency and the Oceanographer of the Navy.

Navigational activities include units which provide Defense-wide navigational support via the operation of navigation satellite control facilities.

Manpower requirements for Geophysical Activities are predicated upon the services performed at each location and the activity level of all organizations serviced by each location. The manpower needed to provide these services is determined by applying work measurement standards. As in other categories, civilian manpower is used to obtain skills not readily available from military sources and to fill billets not absolutely requiring military incumbents. Included are professional meteorologists and oceanographers who supplement the small military officer community in manning weather facilities; meteorological technicians who observe, collect, record and analyze meteorological and oceanographic data in the development of forecasts and related environmental services; technical specialists who perform diverse functions encompassing ADP operations and maintenance, atmospheric and oceanographic modeling, and environmental data product development and dissemination; and a small staff to perform supervisory clerical and logistics functions.

The manpower devoted to Geophysical Activities for FY 1979 through FY 1981 is shown in the following table.

Geophysical Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	10.1	10.0	9.8
Reserve Components	1.3	1.4	1.9
<u>Civilian</u>	10.0	10.3	10.6

The reduction in active military and the increase in reserve and civilian manpower in FY 1981 is due to transfer of Air Force aircraft from the active force to the reserve force.

IV. SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

A. Introduction

This section discusses the nine subcategories of Support Activities: Base Operating Support, Medical Support, Personnel Support, Individual Training, Force Support Training, Central Logistics, Centralized Support Activities, Management Headquarters, and Federal Agency Support. Support Activities account for approximately 29 percent of active military manpower, 14 percent of Selected Reserve manpower and more than 83 percent of the DoD civilian manpower.

The following table displays the Support Activities manpower by subcategory.

DoD Support Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active			
Base Operating Support	288.9	288.2	289.8
Medical Support	41.0	39.0	39.4
Personnel Support	30.3	30.1	31.1
Individual Training	90.3	92.8	95.0
Force Support Training	41.0	42.7	44.7
Central Logistics	21.4	21.3	21.6
Centralized Support Activities	45.0	45.3	45.3
Management Headquarters	38.2	38.3	38.4
Federal Agency Support	2.6	2.6	2.7
Total DoD	598.6	600.1	607.8
Reserve Components			
Base Operating Support	26.4	20.6	21.1
Medical Support	10.4	13.0	13.2
Personnel Support	2.1	4.8	5.2
Individual Training	36.1	35.8	37.9
Force Support Training	0.2	0.5	0.5
Central Logistics	5.2	6.6	6.6
Centralized Support Activities	19.5	23.8	28.3
Management Headquarters	3.7	6.5	7.9
Federal Agency Support	0.3	0.5	0.5
Total DoD	104.3	112.0	121.1
<u>Civilian</u>			
Base Operating Support	305.1	315.7	312.3
Medical Support	32.0	21.6	22.4
Personnel Support	18.5	21.0	21.5
Individual Training	21.4	21.7	21.9
Force Support Training	4.4	4.4	4.5
Central Logistics	354.1	347.0	349.8
Centralized Support Activities	53.6	55.9	54.7
Management Headquarters	34.2	35.6	35.9
Federal Agency Support	*	*	*
Total DoD	823.3	822.9	823.0

NOTE: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

*Fewer than 50.

B. Base Operating Support

Base Operating Support includes a wide range of diverse services similar to those provided by local government, utility companies, and the "service industry" segment of the civilian economy. Included are: services which directly support forces, active and reserve (e.g., airfield operations, wharf operations, and base supply and transportation activities); services which maintain the installation facilities (e.g., building and road construction and repair, police and fire protection, trash and sewage disposal, and utilities operation); services which directly support operating personnel, military and civilian (e.g., food services, laundries, clothing issue, payroll and administrative activities, and housing); and services which maintain the "quality of life" primarily for servicemen, and to some extent for dependents and retirees (e.g., exchanges, theaters, libraries, religious activities, and sports and entertainment facilities).

The amount of manpower required in Base Operating Support is dependent upon: the number of installations; the size and composition of the force structure; the size and composition of the population supported; and the range and level of services provided. The decision to open or retain an installation generates a workload. Part of this workload is relatively insensitive to the number of people supported by the installation and is considered "fixed" since the mere existence of the installation generates the work. Grounds maintenance is an example.

The remaining or "variable" portion of Base Operating Support is highly dependent upon the size and composition of the tenant population being supported. This population consists of active duty personnel and their dependents, and to a lesser extent, retirees and their dependents, Selected Reserve personnel, civilian DoD employees, members of other uniformed services (e.g., Coast Guard), and Foreign Service personnel and their dependents. Active duty service members assigned to an installation and accompanied by dependents are the largest consumers of Base Operating Support services.

Accounting for Base Operating Support manpower varies among the Services. All the Services include in the Base Operating Support category those people who provide fixed-site services such as housing and real property maintenance. However, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps manpower providing food, transportation, and supply type services to divisions and ships are integral with those units for operational purposes and are counted as mission manpower. The Air Force accounts for this manpower in Base Operating Support and carries only operations and maintenance manpower in its Strategic and Tactical/Mobility categories. These organizational differences preclude making simple "combat to support" comparisons among the Services.

The following table summarizes Base Operating Support manpower.

Base Operating Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	288.9	288.2	289.8
Reserve Components	26.4	20.6	21.0
<u>Civilian</u>	305.1	315.7	312.3

The FY 1980 decrease in Selected Reserve manpower is primarily a result of changing requirements within the Navy. The increase in civilian manpower in FY 1980 is the result of an accounting change that moved some medical support manpower into BOS. The decrease in civilian manpower in FY 1981 is largely due to anticipated conversions to contract.

C. Medical Support

The people in Medical Support are involved in the military direct-care medical system. They, along with support people in Base Operations, provide for the operations of the 161 hospitals and 318 separate outpatient clinics with a total of approximately 20,000 operating beds. These medical people provide a nucleus around which to build our wartime medical force. The medical care demands of the active duty force in peacetime are less than the delivery capability of the medical manpower nucleus. Therefore, use of the direct-care system by retirees, dependents, and other DoD beneficiaries increases peacetime utilization of this nucleus of medical manpower.

Total medical manpower available to the Services is routinely assigned to fixed-site medical activities such as hospitals and clinics, and to operational billets in ships and in field medical units. However, many medical support personnel assigned to operational billets often work in hospitals and other fixed-site facilities during peacetime when not performing their tactical mission.

The Department is currently facing a physician shortage of about ten percent of authorized strength. We anticipate that recent changes in the Armed Forces Health Profession Scholarship Program and physician compensation, along with passage of pay legislation currently before the Congress, will improve recruiting and enhance retention over the next several years.

The population eligible for care in DoD medical facilities has remained relatively constant over the past few years. However, admissions and the average number of beds occupied have been declining for several years. Between 1973 and 1978, admissions declined 10% and beds occupied declined 35%. The national trend towards providing maximum care on an

outpatient basis, especially for minor surgery such as tonsillectomies, and new technology have contributed to this decline in hospitalization. This decline is expected to continue, but at a lesser rate. Outpatient visits to DoD medical facilities have remained relatively stable. The military departments have made a concerted effort to reduce the length of stay, particularly for active duty military, to decrease operating costs.

Approximately seven million people are eligible for the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS). These people are authorized use of CHAMPUS when the inpatient care they need is not available in a uniformed service facility within a 40 mile radius of their residence. For outpatient care they can exercise their own discretion. About one million people annually actually receive health care from civilian sources under the program.

CHAMPUS Costs Since FY 1974

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>CHAMPUS Cost (\$ millions)</u>
1974	482
1975	526
1976	516
1977	136
1978	567
1979	610 ^{1/}
1980	486 ^{2/}
1981	767
	832

1/ Includes amounts transferred to military departments for capitation test. This is a test where CHAMPUS funds are transferred to the Service medical facilities on a per capita basis. This gives the local commander total fiscal responsibility for the health care of the eligible population within a 40 mile radius.

2/ Reduction due to change in time at which funds are obligated for services.

The number of people needed to staff medical activities is based on detailed workload studies and manpower surveys for each facility. Projected CHAMPUS funding is based on the expected average number of claims per person using CHAMPUS, the growth in population using the program, and expected inflation of civilian medical costs.

The following table summarizes Medical Support manpower.

Medical Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	41.0	39.0	39.4
Reserve Components	10.4	13.0	13.2
<u>Civilian</u>	32.0	21.6	22.4

The FY 1980 decreases in active military and civilian manpower is primarily due to the transfer of some medical support to the BOS account. The increase in reserve strength in FY 1980 is due to increased requirements in the Navy. The increase in active military and civilian strength from FY 1980 to FY 1981 reflects, primarily, an increase in medical support personnel.

D. Personnel Support

Personnel Support provides several varied services including recruiting and examining, the overseas dependents education program, reception centers, disciplinary barracks, centrally-funded welfare and morale programs, the Armed Forces Information Program, and civilian career training and intern programs.

1. Recruiting and Examining

Recruiting and examining personnel operate about 6,000 recruiting offices, manage the recruiting program, and operate 67 Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations. In FY 1981, approximately 34,000 military and civilian personnel are associated with recruiting and examining for the active and reserve forces.

2. Overseas Dependent Education Program

The Overseas Dependent Education Program provides the elementary and secondary school systems for the children of military and DoD civilian personnel stationed outside of the United States. In FY 1981 about 10,900 civilians are associated with overseas dependents education and are shown in the Defense Agency strengths rather than in the individual departments.

3. Other Personnel Support

Other Personnel Support activities include the operation of armed forces reception centers, disciplinary barracks (including rehabilitation and retraining activities), centrally funded welfare and morale programs, the Armed Forces Information Program, and other similar programs.

The following table summarizes the strengths in Personnel Support.

Personnel Support Manpower

(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	30.3	30.1	31.1
Reserve Components	2.1	4.8	5.2
<u>Civilian</u>	18.5	21.0	21.5

There are no major active military changes in this category. The FY 1980 increase in reserve strength is for full-time recruiters, principally for the Army reserve components. The FY 1980 increase in civilian manpower is for the assumption of responsibility for dependent education in Panama.

E. Individual Training

This section presents only a short overview of individual training in the Department of Defense. A detailed analysis of individual training conducted by the active training establishment is presented to the Congress in the Military Manpower Training Report for FY 1981.

The personnel included in this category conduct and support centrally managed Service training activities in schools and training centers. This category does not include the people undergoing training -- the trainees, students, cadets, and midshipmen -- who are reported under the Individuals category, discussed later in this chapter. The training addressed in this category imparts required skills and knowledge to individuals so that they are prepared to apply these skills in later assignments as member of operational organizations. This focus on the individual distinguishes Individual Training from Force Support Training, which is training conducted by operational units in order to achieve and maintain combat readiness.

A smoothly functioning, efficient, and ready military establishment must be manned with the right number of properly trained personnel. Producing these trained personnel is the task of the training establishment. The number of personnel who must be trained in a given skill is a function of projected skill requirements versus projected skill inventories. If the inventory of qualified personnel in a skill is forecast to be less than the need, replacements must be trained in advance to fill the vacancies.

Reserve component manpower devoted to Individual Training provides for mobilization augmentation of the active training establishment. Included are both units and individuals. A reserve component training

organization, for example, would activate a training center, and mobilization designees from other reserve components would provide augmentation staffing for existing centers.

The requirement for Individual Training manpower is based, in part, on the total number of personnel to be trained whether assigned to a school or attending in temporary duty status. Both active and reserve component military personnel, as well as personnel from other government agencies (e.g., Coast Guard) and foreign military students, influence Individual Training manpower. The number of personnel required to instruct and support a given student/trainee workload is based on work measurement studies and historical experience, codified into staffing guides and other manning documents. The overall size of the active training establishment is sensitive to the number of new active and reserve accessions and the rate of retention of experienced personnel. It is also strongly influenced by the mix of types of training, methods of instruction, and the amount of training equipment which must be operated and maintained.

In the active training establishment, the personnel associated with Individual Training are subdivided into five categories, each of which is briefly described in the following paragraphs.

1. Recruit Training

Recruit training provides the basic introductory and indoctrination training given to non-prior service enlisted personnel, including reservists, immediately after entrance into a Service.

2. Officer Acquisition Training

This category provides training programs leading to a commission in one of the services. Included are the faculties and staffs of the Service academies, ROTC instructors, and instructors and staffs in officer candidate schools.

3. Specialized Skill Training

Specialized skill training provides individuals with skills needed in military specialties. Participants include graduates from recruit or officer acquisition training who are learning skills at the basic level and, at the more advanced level, officers and enlisted personnel with some operational experience who are being prepared for jobs of greater responsibility or technical complexity. The Army has combined recruit and specialized skill training for many new entrants into one-station unit training, conducted as a single course at one location.

4. Flight Training

Flight training provides undergraduate training of pilots, navigators, and naval flight officers. Such undergraduate training is exclusive of Force Support Training and the training carried out in operational units. Included also are personnel responsible for providing some related advanced flight training, such as Army instructor flight training.

5. Professional Development Education

This category provide educational courses conducted at the higher-level Service schools to broaden the outlook and knowledge of senior military personnel or to impart knowledge in advanced academic disciplines to meet service and joint requirements. Almost all of these people are involved in operating the intermediate and senior Service and joint schools (i.e., command and staff colleges, war colleges, and the National Defense University) and Service graduate schools (i.e., Air Force Institute of Technology and Navy Postgraduate School).

The following table summarizes Individual Training manpower.

Individual Training Manpower 1/
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	90.3	92.8	95.0
Reserve Components	36.1	35.8	37.9
Civilian	21.4	21.7	21.9

1/ Excludes active military and reserve component trainees and students, and Service academy and ROTC cadets (see Section V, Individuals).

The FY 1980 increase in active military strength is due to undermanning of training requirements in FY 1979 by both Navy and Air Force. The increase in FY 1981 active military manpower is a result of increases in the size of the Navy's active fleet. The FY 1981 increase in reserve manpower is largely due to Army initiatives to increase readiness.

F. Force Support Training

Force Support Training consists largely of Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps advanced flight training and Army specialized warfare training activities. It provides specific skills for mission accomplishment and the necessary link between the centrally managed training activities that provide individuals the basic skills to do a job, and the training of the operational units themselves. Advanced training is provided by fleet readiness squadrons (Navy), Marine combat crew readiness training groups, and combat crew training squadrons (Air Force). It is conducted in the specific aircraft to be flown into combat, thus making the transition from the undergraduate training aircraft, where the basic flying skills are learned, to the high performance operational aircraft. When aviators leave advanced flight training, they are ready to join deployed operational units and can fly combat missions.

The Army operates specialized warfare centers (i.e., arctic and jungle warfare), and the Navy operates fleet training groups which provide underway training assistance to ships.

The following table summarizes the manpower in Force Support Training.

Force Support Training
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	41.0	42.7	44.7
Reserve Components	0.2	0.5	0.5
<u>Civilian</u>	4.4	4.4	4.5

The FY 1980 and FY 1981 active military manpower increases are largely due to increases in the Air Force tactical training aircraft, READY TEAM and in-flight refueling training.

G. Central Logistics

An adequate logistics capability is essential to maintaining the operational capability of the Armed Forces. Logistics support occurs at every organizational level in DoD and includes over a million people. The centrally managed supply, maintenance and other logistics activities are classified as Central Logistics.

1. Supply Operations

The people employed in supply operations at the central or wholesale level buy, store, distribute, manage and control the supplies and spare parts needed by the Services. The factors influencing the workloads and manpower required at the central supply activities include:

- the amount of equipment being used;
- the anticipated tempo of operations of the Armed Forces;
- the desired level of combat readiness;
- the maintenance required on the equipment; and
- introduction or phase-out of equipment.

2. Maintenance Operations

Central or depot level maintenance manpower is required to repair, overhaul, and modify equipment and components. Factors influencing the maintenance workloads to be performed and the manpower required at the shipyard or depot level include:

- the size of the equipment inventory;
- the rate of use and conditions under which it is used;
- the desired level of materiel readiness;
- the maintenance, repair, and overhaul policies and standards established for each type of equipment;
- the backlog carried forward from previous years and allowed to be carried over to future years; and
- the amount of central maintenance to be contracted to the private sector. (About 30 percent of the mission essential depot maintenance is now accomplished by private industry on contract.)

3. Logistics Support Operations

This category contains manpower for centralized logistics activities, other than supply and maintenance. Specifically included are: industrial preparedness, second destination transportation, property disposal, production engineering and testing, construction planning and design, operation of printing plants, storage and disposal of inactive equipment (including aircraft), logistics administrative support, and other centrally managed logistic support services. Corresponding reserve component units are also included in this category.

The determination of logistics manpower requirements is accomplished by the military departments and defense agencies through a series of techniques including: engineered and statistical manning standards; manning guides based on past experience; and the projected supply and maintenance needs of the operating and support forces.

In FY 1981, approximately 371,400 men and women will perform central logistics functions. This includes 349,800 civilians and 21,600 active military as shown in the following table.

Central Logistics Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	21.4	21.3	21.6
Reserve Components	5.2	6.6	6.6
<u>Civilian</u>	354.1	347.0	349.8

There is no major change in active military strength. The increase in the reserve strength is due increased manning requirements in the Naval Reserve. The decrease in civilian manpower is largely due to contracting initiatives and some accounting changes. The increase in civilian strength in FY 1981 is due to increased requirements at Navy shipyards and ordnance activities.

H. Centralized Support Activities

The manpower in this category is for centralized support to multiple missions and functions which do not fit other DPPC. Examples include:

1. Combat Developments Activities. These activities are engaged in the development, testing, and evaluation of new concepts, tactics, organizational structure and equipment requirements, policies, usages of equipment, etc.

2. Counterintelligence and Investigative Activities. The people associated with counterintelligence and investigative activities perform investigations of applicants for DoD positions requiring a security clearance and operate various programs designed to prevent the compromise of classified information. Included are the personnel for the Defense Investigative Service. This category also includes people associated with Service counterintelligence and criminal and fraud investigative activities.

3. Civil Air Patrol. The Department of the Air Force has the mission of providing support to the Civil Air Patrol. The requirements for people in this activity are related to the organization of the Civil Air Patrol, currently one wing for each state and also for the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.

4. Criminal Investigation Activities. The people assigned to these organizations investigate crimes committed on DoD property (including leased space) and assist federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in investigations of alleged crimes involving DoD personnel. The manpower requirements are a function of workload and the geographic dispersion of Defense installations.

5. Intelligence Support Activities. Included are people assigned to the Air Force Intelligence Service which provides specialized intelligence services to Headquarters USAF and USAF commanders worldwide.

6. Security Assistance Activities. In support of US national security, the US government provides defense material and services to certain foreign governments. Some is in the form of US funded grant aid under the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and the International Military and Education Training Program (IMET). The current majority of security assistance is fully funded by the foreign governments through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.

Security assistance manpower in the Centralized Support Activities category is limited to people who work full-time on MAP efforts or specific FMS cases. Activities include military assistance advisory groups, mobile training teams, technical assistance field teams, and similar organizations abroad.

The Centralized Support Activities category does not contain all security assistance manpower. In particular, most people supporting FMS spend only part of their time on FMS or perform overall administrative work that cannot be associated with a specific FMS case. Spaces for these people are incorporated in other DPPC which better describe their primary responsibilities.

7. Other Support. Certain support elements of unified commands, international military organizations and the Office of the Secretary of Defense make up this category.

The following table summarizes Centralized Support Activities Manpower.

Centralized Support Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	45.0	45.3	45.3
Reserve Components	19.5	23.8	28.3
<u>Civilian</u>	53.6	55.9	54.7

The increases in the reserve strength in FY 1980 and FY 1981 are due to Army actions to increase the readiness and strength of the reserve forces. The civilian increase in FY 1980 is largely due to this DPPC being under manned in FY 1979. The decrease in civilian strength in FY 1981 results from conversion of civilian technician positions to reserve military in the Army

I. Management Headquarters

Organizational elements or units of all DoD components are designated as Management Headquarters activities when their primary mission requires that they substantially perform the following for organizations or units at a lower echelon:

- policy development and/or guidance;
- long range planning, programming, and budgeting;
- management and distribution of resources; and
- program performance review and evaluation.

Management Headquarters activities also include units whose primary mission is to provide direct professional, technical, administrative or logistics support to a management headquarters.

Department of Defense Management Headquarters are divided into the following categories: Defense Agencies, International Military Organizations, Unified Commands, Service Support-Combat Commands, and Service Support-Support Commands.

1. Defense Agencies. These headquarters are responsible for direction and control of the Defense Agencies. Included are the headquarters of:

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
Defense Audit Service
Defense Audiovisual Agency
Defense Communications Agency
Defense Contract Audit Agency
Defense Intelligence Agency
Defense Investigative Service
Defense Logistics Agency
Defense Mapping Agency
Defense Nuclear Agency
Defense Security Assistance Agency
National Security Agency/Central Security Service*

* Civilian manpower not included in the Defense Manpower Requirements Report.

Also included with this category are the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. International Military Headquarters. These headquarters are responsible for the command and control of operating forces of allied nations in combined military operations. Included are:

NATO Headquarters

NATO Military Committee
Allied Command Atlantic
Allied Command Europe
Allied Command Channel

Allied Forces - Northern Europe
Allied Forces - Central Europe
Allied Forces - Southern Europe

Other International Headquarters

Central Treaty Organization
North American Air Defense Command
United Nations Command (Korea) 1/
ROK/US Combined Forces Command

1/ Consolidated with Eighth Army and U.S. Forces Korea.

3. Unified Command Headquarters. These headquarters are responsible for the command and control of operating forces of all Services in unified and coordinated activities under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included are:

Atlantic Command
US European Command
US Southern Command
US Readiness Command
Pacific Command

4. Service Support - Combat Commands. These headquarters provide Service command and control of deployed (or deployable) forces and forces tasked with the defense of the United States. Also included are corresponding reserve component headquarters. The headquarters elements of the following organizations are included:

Army

US Army, Europe
US Army Forces Command
US Army, Japan
8th Army, Korea
US Army Western Command
Military Traffic Management
Command (and regional
headquarters)

Navy and Marine Corps

US Navy, Atlantic Fleet
US Navy, Pacific Fleet
US Naval Forces, Europe
Numbered Fleets

Navy Type Commands
Fleet Marine Forces
Military Sealift Command

Air Force

Strategic Air Command 1/
Alaskan Air Command
Aerospace Defense Command 1/
Tactical Air Command
Pacific Air Forces
US Air Forces, Europe
Military Airlift Command 1/
Numbered Air Forces

1/ Specified Commands

5. Service Support - Support Commands. These headquarters provide operational and administrative control of the military Service support commands. Also included are corresponding reserve component headquarters. Examples of Service Support-Support Commands include: the Service Secretariats, the Army Staff, Air Staff, and Chief of Naval Operations Staff, Headquarters Marine Corps, training commands such as Army's Training and Doctrine Command, and the Air Force Air Training Command, and the depot-level logistics activities such as the Navy Material Command and the Air Force Logistics Command.

The following table summarizes the manpower in Management Headquarters.

Management Headquarters Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	38.2	38.3	38.4
Reserve Components	3.7	6.5	7.9
<u>Civilian</u>	34.2	35.6	35.9

The increases in the reserve strength in FY 1980 and FY 1981 are due to increased requirements in the Army reserve. The increase in civilian manpower in FY 1980 is largely due to under manning in FY 1979.

J. Federal Agency Support

Federal Agency Support includes military and some civilian individuals assigned to Federal departments and independent agencies. The DoD assigns people to these organizations when it furthers the interests of DoD or when authorized by law. Assignments are reimbursable except in those instances where the mission is specifically given to DoD. A significant amount of effort has been expended to either control or reduce the level of military people assigned in support of various non-DoD

functions. Examples of Federal Agency Support are the 1,300 Marine Corps Embassy guards and the over 700 people assigned to the National Science Foundation (NSF). The NSF draws upon existing DoD (Navy) resources and capabilities to support its Antarctic program rather than forming and training an aviation unit.

The following table summarizes DoD personnel assigned to support other federal agencies.

Federal Agency Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	2.6	2.6	2.7
Reserve Components	0.3	0.5	0.5
<u>Civilian</u>	*	*	*

*Fewer than 50

There are no significant strength changes in this category.

V. INDIVIDUALS

A. Introduction

Military manpower is divided into two broad categories: force structure and individuals. All of the manpower in the previously discussed manpower categories is considered force structure manpower. The force structure is the aggregation of units required for sustained performance of the defense mission. The manpower for each unit is determined on the basis of workload, combat doctrines, or other organizational criteria.

Not included in unit manning documents are military personnel being transferred between units, undergoing certain types of training, receiving medical treatment on a full-time basis, imprisoned, or awaiting separation. These people are accounted for in the Individuals category. For example, the manpower required to staff a recruit training center with instructors and administrators is accounted for in a unit manning document and is part of the force structure, but the recruits in training are accounted for in the Individuals category. Similarly, a hospital's staff is part of the force structure while the patients are considered Individuals.

There is no Individuals category for civilian manpower. Compared to the military system, the civilian system must provide for only a few moves and relatively little training. Sick leave is factored into

a manhour availability used to convert industrial workloads into strength requirements. Civilian trainees jobs are programmed as part of the overall work force at an activity. When civilians are away from their jobs for long-term professional development training, they are not replaced. Their duties are absorbed by temporary reassignment of their work to other employees.

Manpower planning for the Individuals categories is approached differently than for the force structure. This is due to the uncertainty associated with the planning factors. In the training area, lengths of some courses are known in advance; others, however, depend on the rate at which the material is learned. The numbers of people who will attend those courses are based on estimates and are subject, to some extent, to uncontrollable factors. For example, the number of people going through recruit training depends upon the success of the recruiting effort which is not completely controllable. Factors in other areas, such as patient load in hospitals, are unpredictable. These types of estimates are usually projected from historical data.

Individuals serve the entire force structure. Therefore, if manpower allocated for Individuals is insufficient for real needs, shortages of personnel will occur in the force structure. For example, assume we calculate that 70,500 transients are required at end FY 1981. Suppose we attempt to save manpower by programming for only 65,000. Unless we change policies to reduce the number or length of moves, the result will be an unplanned shortage of 5,500 people in force structure units, with commensurate degradation of force readiness.

The following table summarizes Individuals military manpower.

Individuals Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active			
Transients	80.8	70.1	70.5
Patients/Prisoners/Holdees	14.1	13.5	13.2
Trainees/Students	198.7	208.0	202.7
Cadets	<u>13.2</u>	<u>13.1</u>	<u>13.1</u>
Total DoD	306.7	302.8	297.5
Reserve			
Trainees and Students ^{1/}	28.9	29.5	32.2

^{1/} Reservists on initial active duty for training.

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

B. Transients

Transient requirements are largely a function of the Permanent Change of Station (PCS) move program. Transient manpower spaces are provided to account for time consumed during PCS moves and include travel, leave enroute, and temporary duty enroute. Leave enroute allows people time to relocate between assignments. Temporary duty enroute is usually associated with preparing people for their next duty assignment. PCS move requirements are driven by annual accessions and losses, tour length, skill/job matches, number of people in deployed areas, and the total strength in the Armed Forces.

The following table summarizes Transient military manpower by Service.

Transients Manpower
(End Strengths in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active			
Army	26.2	24.0	23.8
Navy	28.0	25.1	25.9
Marine Corps	7.9	7.7	7.3
Air Force	18.7	13.3	13.5
Total	80.8	70.1	70.5

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

Projected Transient strengths for FY 1980 and 1981 are based upon historical experience of the average enroute time per PCS move and the projected PCS move program for the fiscal year. The decrease in transient strength between FY 1979 and FY 1980 reflects actions taken by all Services to cut down the number of station change moves.

C. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees

This account provides manpower to offset losses to units resulting from hospitalization, confinement in a military disciplinary facility, or assignment to a correctional training facility. It also accounts for personnel awaiting reassignment upon termination of medical treatment, awaiting administrative discharge, or in the process of separating from active duty. Patient and prisoner projections are based on historical incidences of noncombat casualties, illnesses, and confinement. Holdees, or personnel awaiting reassignment or separation, are based on average delays and the incidence of these delays.

The following table summarizes Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees military manpower.

Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	14.1	13.5	13.2

The decrease in and strength in FY 1980 and FY 1981 is due to a reduction in the number of people waiting separation. This is caused by increased retention rates.

D. Trainees, Students, and Cadets

The number of trainee and student spaces is a function of enlistment patterns, course lengths, and training plans. The only reserve component spaces in the Individuals account are those for initial active duty for training. A comprehensive discussion of the determination of trainee and student loads is included in the FY 1981 Military Manpower Training Report.

The following table shows active and reserve trainee and student strengths.

Trainees and Students Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active			
Army	77.0	81.6	75.3
Navy	65.9	68.4	68.7
Marine Corps	25.1	23.8	22.2
Air Force	30.7	34.5	36.5
Total	198.7	208.3	202.7
Reserve Components			
Army National Guard	15.1	15.5	15.5
Army Reserve	6.7	6.8	8.9
Naval Reserve	0.8	0.8	0.9
Marine Corps Reserve	3.7	3.4	3.4
Air National Guard	1.8	1.9	1.9
Air Force Reserve	0.8	1.1	1.6
Total	28.9	29.5	32.2

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

The number of active trainees and students will increase in FY 1980 from the FY 1979 level primarily as the result of increased accession requirements for all Services except the Marine Corps. The decrease in FY 1981 in the Army account reflects in a decrease in accession requirements. The FY 1981 increase in the Air Force account reflects increased training requirements in nearly all areas.

The reserve trainees and students manpower remains fairly constant. The increase in the USAR account in FY 1981 is due to expected success from increased recruiting activity.

The following table displays Cadet/Midshipmen strengths.

Cadets/Midshipmen Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Active	13.1	13.1	13.1

Each of the academies is authorized a maximum enrollment of 4,544. The September 30th strength reflects enrollment after summer attrition has occurred.



CHAPTER V

ARMY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

A. Introduction

1. Summary and Highlights

This chapter discusses the active, reserve, and civilian components which constitute the total Army. Their collective effort is designed to field modern, well-trained, and well-equipped forces capable of achieving national objectives by insuring sufficient combat power for an effective and clearly perceived deterrent to war. The active forces are capable of acting in situations not involving mobilization. The reserves must be able to augment and sustain the active forces and provide the capability for rapid partial or full mobilization. The civilian component must provide essential sustaining support in the training, supply, logistics, medical, procurement, and scientific and technical areas as well as managerial expertise. To accomplish these tasks, the Army needs a support base sufficient to:

- Recruit, train, and maintain the total Army in peacetime.
- Provide timely, rapid expansion for mobilization and deployment of the total Army in support of combat operations.
- Surge the training base output to sustain the deployed force and/or expand the force beyond 24 divisions if necessary.

Aggregate military manpower available in the event of mobilization continues to be inadequate. Active and reserve component manning is significantly below required peacetime levels. In FY 1980, the active military component must increase by 16,000 in order to recover from the shortfall in actual strength at the end of FY 1979. The size of this undermanning which occurred in FY 1979 underscores the level of effort needed to procure and retain the required manpower in the active component, the Selected Reserve, and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The civilian program is characterized by a relatively stable level from FY 1979 to FY 1981.

The Army manpower program for FY 1981 is planned to accomplish the following:

- Improve NATO forward deployed force readiness.
- Support the NATO Long-Term Defense Program.
- Increase Rapid Deployment Force capability.
- Enhance deployability.

- Maintain the 24 division total Army force containing 16 active and 8 reserve component divisions.

- Improve the sustainability of these 24 divisions by fielding adequate combat support and combat service support forces.

- Provide our volunteer soldiers essential support programs to improve the quality of life for them and their dependents.

In order to fill these force requirements and retain U.S. forces in Korea while at the same time keeping a level end strength, it has been necessary, because of recruiting problems, to reduce the manning levels in the CONUS divisions and delay some previously programmed unit activations.

The Army military and civilian personnel end strength requests for FY 1981 and FY 1982 are as follows:

Army Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
Active Military	775.8	781.0
Selected Reserve		
Army National Guard	381.4	390.3
Army Reserve	210.7	218.1
Civilian	358.6	358.6

2. Major Force Structure Changes

The focus of force changes is an enhancement of support to NATO and the Rapid Deployment Force while modernizing the force.

a. Active Component

(1) Army will continue to increase the capabilities of selected forward deployed units in NATO and NATO reinforcing and Rapid Deployment Force units in CONUS.

(2) Army will continue to add units in Europe and CONUS to improve electronic and intelligence warfare and chemical defense capabilities.

(3) Army will continue to support the Prepositioning of Materiel Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS) to reduce the time required for units deploying from CONUS to Europe to become operationally ready.

(4) Further withdrawal of U.S. ground combat forces from Korea is being held in abeyance pending the outcome of a scheduled 1981 reassessment of the military balance on the Korean Peninsula. Recruiting shortfalls and the delay of the withdrawal required that the conversion of eight field artillery battalions (from 18 to 24 howitzers) be reprogrammed from FY 1980 to FY 1982 and the activation of one infantry battalion (mechanized) be reprogrammed from FY 1980 to FY 1983. Additionally, the 105 percent manning of selected early deploying units, an initiative in effect through FY 1979, has been cancelled.

b. Reserve Components

(1) Expansion plans of the Army Affiliation Program call for adding, as feasible, D+31 to D+60 RC units to the Affiliation Program during FY 1980 and FY 1981. This expansion should bring the total of RC affiliated units to over 300. This expansion program is closely related to Army CAPSTONE program decisions. Under the CAPSTONE program, CONUS units are aligned into wartime structures to facilitate peacetime training and transition to wartime operations.

(2) As part of the Army's Full Time Support Program, reserve component personnel in full-time military status will continue to be added to RC Roundout units, early deploying mission essential units, and essential early mobilizing units during FY 1981 to improve RC readiness and response time. Active military are also used for this purpose. However, because of recent manning problems in the active force, greater reliance is being placed on reserve personnel.

(3) The Army will continue to convert selected civilian technician positions in the reserve components to full-time military positions to test the reserve's ability to attract and retain qualified personnel in a full-time military status. The USAR will convert 540 positions and the ARNG will convert 2,063 in FY 1980. The conversion program will be evaluated in the fourth quarter of FY 1980. In anticipation of a satisfactory evaluation, 436 USAR and 2,473 ARNG additional positions have been programmed for conversion in FY 1981.

3. Manpower Requirements Determination

a. General. Army manpower requirements are derived from analysis of wartime combat and general support structures and essential requirements peculiar to peacetime support. In meeting these requirements, the manning levels, the mix of units among active and reserve component forces, and the mix of military and civilian personnel are established within the constraints of resource availability.

b. Manpower Requirements Within Units and Organizations. Manpower requirements for Army units are developed through analytical techniques that take into account the nature of the mission. The Table

of Organization and Equipment (TOE) provides manpower and equipment levels for standard unit wartime mission accomplishment. The manpower requirements for a TOE unit are determined as follows:

- The mission and desired capabilities of the unit are determined, and the organizational entities required for mission accomplishment (e.g., firing sections, rifle squads, maintenance teams, mess teams) are identified.

- The number of combat type positions required in a TOE is dictated by tactical and organizational doctrine, the firepower desired, and/or number of weapons included. Each weapon has a set number of operators (e.g., one man per rifle in a rifle squad, ten men per 155 mm field artillery firing section). Rifle squads or firing sections are aggregated into units to produce the optimal combat capability considering span of control and other management and leadership limitations.

- The number of personnel required for TOE service and support activities (mess, maintenance, supply) is determined by application of standard staffing criteria. These criteria are based on engineering data, tests, and experience. They are based on the assumption that in the wartime environment individuals will work up to twelve hours per day, seven days per week. Standard staffing criteria are revised and updated on a three-year cyclic basis.

A TOE prescribes the required structure, manpower, and equipment for five organizational options from full manning to cadre level for a particular type of unit. These options provide a model for fielding the unit at full or reduced capability. The Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) is the authorization document for an active unit. It shows the actual organizational option selected from the TOE, as amended by changes, to fit the unit to a specific geographical or operational environment. It is the authority for the unit to requisition personnel and equipment.

The requirements for organizations developed to accomplish specific local missions are displayed in Tables of Distribution and Allowance (TDA). The manpower requirements for each TDA organization are developed using work load data and mission requirements. For common functions, Army staffing guides are used to structure the unit. Adjustments in manpower requirements are made when changes in mission, function, or work load occur.

Manpower surveys of each TDA organization are conducted at least quadrennially. Survey teams use functional analyses which relate performance to current functions and work load; organizational analyses to eliminate organizations that duplicate functions or interrupt a sequential flow of actions; and position analyses, using engineered standards, to address essentiality of type and number of positions in relation to the job to be accomplished.

c. Force Packaging. Army manpower requirements generally exceed Army manpower authorizations. Therefore, the Army has developed a force packaging methodology which establishes Army priorities for distributing manpower and equipment. Applying this methodology permits priority distribution of authorized manpower to forward deployed and early deploying units.

d. Initiatives in Manpower Requirements Determination. It is difficult, if not impossible, to separate the manpower requirements determination process from other interrelated systems which are grouped under the general function of manpower management. These functions include the development of manpower standards and guidance, requirements determination and justification, resource allocation and documentation, and personnel management and staffing. The size of the Army and sound management principles dictate a decentralized form of management. Headquarters, Department of the Army provides policy and guidance; however, execution of the manpower management system is delegated in whole or in part to the major commands and agencies. The Army has a good manpower management system which, when considered in its totality, is serving the Army adequately. However, as pointed out by the GAO report--"Lack of Control and Feedback Hinders Army Manpower Management Improvements" (October 1979)--and acknowledged by the Army, various subsets of the system are in need of change, and Army leadership is moving to make corrections as appropriate. In many areas change must be accomplished over a long period of time and will require resources. Changes to the manpower management system must interface with and complement other ongoing systems in order to supply management data to the Army, OSD, and Congress. Succeeding paragraphs address ongoing initiatives designed to improve all aspects of the manpower management process. Emphasis, however, is on those areas that relate specifically to the requirements determination process.

(1) Requirements Determination Process. While the Army's requirements determination process has been criticized for lack of credible staffing criteria and standards, the procedures are workable and do provide a systematic approach. Approximately 76,000 Army positions are covered by engineered standards; 223,000 positions, by DA staffing guides and Manpower Authorization Criteria (MACRIT); and 292,000, by a combat development process. This accounts for approximately 77 percent of Army positions. Further, Army plans to include the remaining 23 percent of positions under staffing criteria standards. Ongoing improvements of the current system include the following:

(a) Manpower Management Task Force. The Director of Manpower, Plans and Budget, in the Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER) chartered the Manpower Management Task Force on 20 March 1979 to develop short-range (1-2 years) and long-range (3-5 years) improvements to the current manpower management system and to monitor implementation of system improvements. The Task Force was functionally divided into manpower requirements, policy and procedures, and systems teams to pursue these objectives. Numerous recommendations were made in the areas of manpower surveys; staffing guides; borrowed military manpower; automatic data processing systems; documentation

policies; the planning, programming, and budgeting system; and overall manpower management procedures. Many of the recommendations have either been adopted or are presently being studied.

(b) Manning the Force Task Force. A task force sponsored by ODCSPER was established 28 August 1979 to determine how the Army can better man its total force in peace and under mobilization. Through the task force's examination of the face/space relationship, the study is expected to improve the manpower requirements determination process. The task force's draft report will be published by 31 March 1980.

(c) Adoption of Functional Survey Approach. At present, manpower surveys are conducted on an organizational basis and the results apply only to the organization surveyed. The Army is now testing a functional approach to the survey process. This consists of a vertical review of major administrative and support functions Army-wide. This functional approach lends itself to work measurement techniques and the development of Army-wide staffing standards. A major test of functional surveys is being undertaken in FY 1980, and the technique will be used in FY 1981 if the test proves out.

(d) Improvements in Army Staffing Guides. Department of the Army staffing guides have been criticized for their lack of objective quantitative guidance and because the use of the standards is not mandatory. Functional standards will now be developed using approved work measurement techniques which will be mandatory. They will provide more definitive work center descriptions and will be published in a simplified format for position needs. The directive will include rationale for allowing deviations and hence will insure uniform application of the standard on an Army-wide basis.

(e) Army Productivity Committee. The Army Productivity and Technical Committee (PROCOM) was established on 29 June 1979. It is an Army-wide forum of personnel from the methods and standards (M&S) discipline. A major thrust of the PROCOM is to facilitate the integration of summary level performance standards developed through the M&S program into the manpower requirements determination process. The M&S program is oriented to functional standards development, and the PROCOM serves as an excellent vehicle for coordination of the M&S program with the functional manpower requirements determination process.

(f) Improvements to the Manpower Authorization Criteria (MACRIT) Program. In Table of Organization (TOE) units, manpower requirements are determined by tactics, doctrine, and MACRIT. MACRIT basically addresses those non-supervisory positions subject to work load measurements, e.g., mechanics. Currently, MACRIT employs the following formula to derive the manpower standard.

$$\frac{\text{Annual Manhours Required For Task}}{\text{Annual Manhours Available Per Person}} = \text{Manpower Standard}$$

After extensive reviews by the GAO and Senate Appropriations Committee, it was determined that the portion of the equation involving Annual Manhours Required needed refinement to consider combat stress data, combat damage data, component reliability/failure data, diagnosis/repair/replacement/inspection times, maintenance allocation charts, equipment cannibalization policies, and other scenarios depicting the true wartime environment. Also, that portion of the equation pertaining to Annual Manhours Available was suspect because the non-productive time factors of K.P., guard duty, and detail had not been updated since 1968. A project is now underway to restructure MACRIT to incorporate the above factors.

(g) Quantitative Techniques for Identifying Positions as Military or Civilian. A study effort is under contract to develop quantitative techniques for identifying positions as military or civilian. Objective criteria will also be established to determine whether the military positions should be enlisted, warrant, or commissioned officer. This will result in a systematic rationale for military and civilian staffing.

(h) Borrowed Military Manpower (BMM). BMM relates to military personnel who perform work of a recurring or constant nature in a position, function, or organization other than the one to which assigned. Generally, BMM is associated with the borrowing of individuals from a combat unit. The absence of these military personnel from parent units affects the capability of the individual to retain skills associated with his occupational specialty, the capabilities of the parent unit to conduct realistic training and, ultimately, the readiness of our combat forces. Although BMM is undesirable from a readiness viewpoint, it is a resource which can be used to offset shortages of civilian personnel in garrison support activities and must be considered in the requirements determination process. Currently, the term BMM is loosely defined and this leads to inaccurate reporting of BMM usage to the Department of the Army and subsequently to the Congress. A new definition has been formulated along with an improved reporting procedure which provides a more accurate assessment of the number of soldiers being diverted from combat units to perform garrison support duties and refines the guidelines for the use of individuals in this type of duty. Additionally, restrictions on the use of BMM to offset reduction-in-force actions necessitated by civilian end strength cuts were suspended in March 1979 through FY 1980. Sufficient restrictions were placed on commanders, however, to ensure that job rights of the civilian work force were adequately protected. This action provided commanders needed time to balance the work force through organizational realignments, cost effective contracting out, or the use of host nation support while still performing essential garrison support functions.

(2) Management Information Systems. As pointed out by the GAO report and as acknowledged by the Army, a common data base or systems interface is needed to improve manpower management. Some of the more significant actions in this area are discussed in the following:

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MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS REPORT FOR FY 1981.(U)
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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS 1963-A

(a) Force Development Integrated Management System. The Force Development Integrated Management System (FORDIMS) is a data base management system which integrates three current manpower management systems: Army Force Program - manpower by command program and appropriation; Force Accounting System - manpower categories by unit; The Army Authorization Documents System - manpower by grade, specialty, and unit. This link between the three systems will ultimately enable the Army to determine when and why resources were allocated to a specific program and unit, tell exactly what changed and why within a given period, identify what portion of resource guidance commands have and have not complied with, and insure that commands use manpower as allocated or accounted for in DA systems.

(b) Face/Space/Dollar Interface. This area includes putting proper emphasis on people as well as positions and making better use of manpower assets. A management information system is currently under contract which will permit aligning authorizations with corresponding personnel assets, work load, and financial data. This system will also highlight inconsistencies and provide an excellent management tool for both the manpower and the personnel manager. Some of the specific objectives are:

1 Better Alignment - Actual vs. Allocated Manpower. A problem exists with filling active component manpower spaces with qualified personnel. Generally, the problem stems from several sources: active component recruiting shortfall, overmanning of priority units, and distribution problems. The new system will pinpoint the skills where fill problems exist and suggest where adjustments to active Army recruiting criteria and application of additional recruiting and retention resources may be in order. Similarly, the system can assist in evaluating other solutions such as reduction of existing functions, increased contractual effort, elimination of the overmanning of priority units, and reduction of the force structure.

2 Civilian Hire Lag. Hire lag (difference between authorized civilian strength and assigned strength) results from management decision to divert resources to other priorities, inability to recruit or delay in recruitment, and turbulence in the civilian work force. Better management of hire lag can be achieved through improved management controls and improved management reports via the space/face/dollar interface.

3 Improved Audit. As a longer range objective, the system can be modified to audit intended manpower uses by relating resources requested, provided, and used to accomplishments and costs.

(c) FORECAST. Active Army military manpower is presently programmed at the aggregate officer and enlisted levels using a modeling system called Enlisted Loss Inventory Model - Computation of Manpower Programs Using Linear Programs (ELIM-COMPLIP). Although a highly successful tool, ELIM-COMPLIP is limited in that it actually models only the enlisted force and cannot discriminate by grade or Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). Officer computations are done externally

and are manually entered into the ELIM-COMPLIP system so that they are available for the various reports that the system produces. A five year contractual effort is underway to develop a more comprehensive system called FORECAST - a multi-level (aggregate, MOS, and perhaps unit level), modular, integrated ADP system which will enable projection of active Army military strength (officer and enlisted) in aggregate terms as well as by grade, skill, and unit. The system will provide a common system for improved planning, programming, and budgeting and will enable the Army to test the effects of alternative policies on the force. The system will be capable of operation in peacetime, partial mobilization, and full mobilization modes.

(d) Army Management Structure. The Army Management Structure (AMS) is a standard classification of Army activities and the coding structure for resource allocation. It is used to interrelate the Army programming, budgeting, accounting, and manpower control processes. A six-month contractual effort is now underway to validate manpower information needs, define each need, and develop an improved AMS framework for reporting resource management information.

(3) Training and Development. The Army has structured progressive courses of formalized instruction for entry and mid-level manpower managers. The mid-level course provides intensive training in program planning and budgeting implications. Discussions are currently underway to establish a senior level course for general officer/senior executive service participants. The course will focus on studies of the relationship of resource management to Army goals and objectives.

The Army is the only Service which has formal civilian career programs for both personnel and manpower functions. The annual performance appraisal for manpower managers is being revised so that the technical elements on which careerists are rated relate more closely to requirements for manpower manager positions. On the military side, the Army is investigating the adoption of a new speciality code for manpower management officers. This new designation, if implemented, would enhance career progression and development.

(4) Organization. The Department of the Army Staff reorganization in October 1978 consolidated all Headquarters, Department of the Army manpower management responsibility under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. It specifically restructured the Manpower, Plans and Budget Directorate to assume this responsibility. This new organization was further refined in October 1979 based on one year's experience. At that time, the Manpower Management and Analysis Division was formed to provide an organization with a manpower overview function in order to facilitate coordination of diverse manpower initiatives, requirements determination and justification, programming and budgeting, resources allocation and documentation, and staffing and personnel management.

(5) Other Initiatives. The Army is taking initiatives in other manpower management areas not touched on by the GAO report. Among these are:

(a) Mobilization. Several initiatives are underway which will have a direct impact on the mobilization manpower requirements determination process. These are:

1 The alignment of unit deployment schedules and equipment availability.

2 A time-phased casualty generation and estimation model to assess deployed manpower replacement requirements.

3 A mobilization base requirements model to determine the CONUS base force structure and manpower required to mobilize, train, deploy, and sustain the total Army after mobilization.

These models, in tandem with the Total Army Analysis Model (TAA) which generates the deployed and deploying force requirements for programming, will refine and more precisely quantify the true manpower requirements essential for full mobilization.

(b) Mission Area Analysis (MAA). At present, a major effort is being taken to determine the feasibility of allocating resources by mission area. Of basic concern is an inability to link mission, resources, and capabilities. The MAA for allocating resources, if feasible, could provide a tool to help in understanding capability to accomplish missions.

(c) Force Modernization. Programming manpower for modernization is a complex task and requires a systematic approach. Actions underway in this area include Division 86 (a look at the combat division and the integration of expected new systems), requirements for each Army Systems Acquisition Review Council to address manpower requirements along with the system itself, establishment of the Army Force Modernization Office in the Office of the Army Chief of Staff and affordability teams in various staff agencies who are concerned with manpower impacts of new systems, detailed planning by the Military Personnel Center (determination of skills, training, and lead times required by the new systems), ensuring projected manpower requirements can be entered into other data bases, and special management of battlefield automation systems to ensure appropriate consideration is given to manpower requirements.

(d) Commercial and Industrial-Type Activities (CITA). Pursuit of the CITA program prescribed by OMB Circular A-76 will have an impact on the Army's manpower needs. The Army is reviewing a large number of functions which may be more economical to the government to operate by contract. In the long run, this program should reduce civilian space requirements for reapplication to other support requirements and military space requirements for use in combat and combat service support units. On the other hand, the CITA program also includes reviewing those functions currently being performed under contract. If contracting is shown to be more expensive, these functions would be brought in-house and additional manpower would be required.

B. Significant Trends

1. Added Manning in Europe and Units for Increased Combat Capability

a. Europe. The Army began in late FY 1978 to increase manning of selected forward deployed division/brigade units and non-divisional units to improve combat capability. This effort will continue in FY 1981. The FY 1981 force structure initiatives include:

- An increase of six howitzers per battalion in each of five divisional 155mm field artillery battalions (3x8 artillery).

- An increase in the number of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) NCO's and officers.

- Increased manning in divisions/brigades and tactical support units.

- Increased capability for missile storage, ammunition, and transportation units.

- Activation of two Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI) battalions.

b. CONUS. FY 1981 force structure initiatives include:

- Activation of

- Seven chemical companies (three NBC defense, four smoke generating)

- One CEWI battalion

- Seven tactical support companies.

- Conversion of three 105mm field artillery battalions to 155 mm.

c. While recognizing the need to enhance its combat force, the Army must operate within a constrained resource environment. Accommodation of the manpower costs of modernization, while increasing early combat capability, necessitated some trade-offs of later deploying assets. These trade-offs include:

- Inactivation of

- One light infantry battalion (Ft Lewis)

- One 105 mm field artillery battalion (Ft Sill).

- Reduction of the authorized level of organization (ALO) of three divisions and one brigade in CONUS, one division in Hawaii, one brigade in Alaska, and the Panama Brigade.

2. Force Design. In 1976, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) began what has now evolved into a major effort to redesign the Army's organizations for the 1980's. The initial focus, the Division Restructuring Study (DRS), was on the Army's heavy (armored and mechanized) divisions with a goal of developing the optimum organizational structure for employing the myriad of new systems entering the inventory over the next decade. For over two years, TRADOC conducted field tests and analyses of the DRS candidate concepts. Results indicated a need for a follow-on effort to blend the finer features of both the current and proposed structures. That follow-on, Division 86, also concentrated on the heavy divisions with essentially the same product in mind--to produce the optimum heavy division structure for the 1980's. In addition, Division 86 provides the vehicle to produce and institutionalize a methodology for future force design endeavors. This approach is now being applied to design the conceptual heavy corps (Corps 86) and the light division (the Light Division Study). Most recently, TRADOC has begun a study of Echelons Above Corps. Collectively, these force design initiatives are known as Army 86. The final Division 86 product will be presented to the Chief of Staff for a decision in July 1980. Progress reports on the other Army 86 efforts will also be provided at that time. A Headquarters, Department of Army management plan for follow-on implementation is presently being developed to smooth the transition of approved organizations into the force.

3. Initiatives

a. Training.

Innovations in training technology and concepts have permitted the Army to maximize the efficiency of the training base in recent years. Expansion of self-paced instruction and one-station unit training saves student many years and "pipeline" transit time. The use of subcaliber training devices, laser systems, weapons and equipment simulators, and computer assisted training has reduced training costs.

Officer training is undergoing a detailed and thorough analysis. The ultimate goal is to provide a training and education system which combines individual, unit, and institutional development in a phased program from precommissioning training through career completion. A year-long review of education and training for officers was completed in August 1978. In FY 1980, preliminary test control, training developments, and assessment procedures will be continued. Improving officer training will require resources. Based on the results to date, the Army has programmed an additional 238 military and 54 civilian personnel in FY 1980 and 296 military and 120 civilian personnel in FY 1981 to improve officer training.

Evaluating individual job proficiency was accomplished through continued expansion of the enlisted Skill Qualification Test (SQT) program in FY 1980. The original goals of 90 and 95 percent implementation for FY 1980 and FY 1981 respectively, reported in this section last year, have been modified because of reorganizations in some of the career management fields. In FY 1981, SQT will be fielded for approximately 85 percent of active Army and 80 percent of reserve component soldiers.

Training is the number one peacetime mission of the Army. Primary focus must be on providing the opportunity for maneuver battalions to train as they will fight. However, the space required to create such a battlefield, the stationing of sufficient opposing forces to create a realistic threat, and the instrumentation required for realism are impractical at Army installations where combat units are now stationed. The concept of an Army National Training Center has been developed to provide combat battalions two weeks of advanced combat training following the achievement of readiness standards at home stations.

The National Training Center will provide training in:

- Air deployment of the force.
- Deployment onto the battlefield.
- Realistic time space factors against a properly trained opposing force.
- Applying an instrumented, diagnostic environment for evaluation of unit operational training.
- Operating in a sophisticated electronic warfare environment.
- Integration of artillery, helicopter gunships, and USAF close air support through Army/Air Force joint play in the forward battle area (both Services have stressed the importance of interdependence in battle).
- Redeployment.

Activation of the National Training Center is planned for July 1981 although 106 military and civilian personnel will be on site at the end of FY 1980 and two brigade rotations will be accomplished in FY 1980. In FY 1981, three brigades will rotate through the Center. By the end of FY 1981 the Center will have a complement of 1,240 military and 400 civilians. Of that number, 458 military are in existing TOE units which will relocate to the Center.

b. Reserve Components

(1) Initiatives to Reduce Manpower Shortfall in Units. To increase reserve component unit strength in peacetime, the Army in FY 1980 and FY 1981 is continuing the following programs: increasing the full time recruiter force and recruiting and advertising budgets; continuing the US Army Recruiting Command mission to recruit for the US Army Reserve; maintaining the pilot "split training" program, geared to appeal to students and seasonal workers (This program permits non-prior service personnel to enlist in the Ready Reserve with initial active duty training split into two separate increments up to one year apart); and offering enlistment and reenlistment incentives for reserve component personnel in selected units (Eligible enlistees may select a cash bonus

of \$1,500 or educational assistance of up to \$2,000 for enlisting in certain designated units; reenlistees with nine or fewer years of service can receive a reenlistment bonus of either \$1,800 for a six-year reenlistment or \$900 for a three-year reenlistment in a designated unit.) In FY 1981, those units not now receiving reenlistment bonuses will be authorized to offer the bonus for certain critical skills. Additionally, selected units will receive full-time manning of up to 8 percent of authorized strength. The intent is to provide the resources for improved management, administration, and planning of training, etc., to allow units to make maximum use of unit assemblies.

(2) Initiatives to Increase Manpower in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). To increase the size of the IRR, the Army took the following actions in FY 1979: stopped the automatic transfer of obligated reservists to the Standby Reserve when they complete five years of their Military Service Obligation (MSO), developed a program aimed at increasing voluntary reenlistments in the IRR, and developed a test program to determine the attractiveness of direct enlistment in the IRR. Legislative authority has been requested to permit payment of IRR reenlistment bonuses. The Army will continue these initiatives in FY 1980 and FY 1981.

(3) Initiatives to Improve Management of Manpower Assets. The Army is improving management of its manpower assets through the following actions:

(a) Refining guidance that was in effect and evaluated during exercise NIFTY NUGGET 78 for withdrawing personnel from the CONUS base and late deploying units in order to keep the deployed force at the manning level required for combat effectiveness during the early days of a conflict;

(b) Implementing a mobilization preassignment program to speed the mobilization of both the IRR (to provide unit fillers and casualty replacements) and retired Army personnel (to meet wartime TDA requirements in CONUS Installations);

(c) Revising the US Army Recruiting Command mobilization plan to consolidate recruiting at the District Recruiting Command level, thus "freeing up" manpower resources to fill increased requirements in the post-mobilization Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations.


4. Military Manpower

a. Active Component

(1) General. Since the advent of the All Volunteer Force (AVF) and through FY 1978, the active Army had been able to increase its force structure and strength in the units of that structure while simultaneously decreasing its requests for total military strength. This was possible because numerous policy and program changes reduced the total demand for personnel in the Individuals Accounts. In FY 1979, however, the active Army was unable to attract sufficient volunteers and at year end had an aggregate strength of 758,400, which was 15,400 short of

the Congressional authorization of 773,800. Because of the difficulties experienced in recruiting and the consequent strength shortages, average manning of units in the field was 17,100 below peacetime requirements.

(2) Enlisted Procurement. Before FY 1977, the Army achieved virtually 100 percent of its quantity objectives while increasing the percent of High School Diploma Graduates (HSDG) and Mental Group Categories (MG) I-III A. Congress acted favorably on Army requests for recruiting resources for FY 1974 and FY 1975. Additionally, the economy of the nation was generally recessionary with a high level of teenage unemployment. In 1976, at the time of an expanding national economy, recruiting resources were reduced and reductions continued through FY 1978. The Army, at first, was able to come close to meeting 100 percent of its recruiting requirements through increased recruiting experience and efficiency. By the first quarter of FY 1977, however, an improved economy, the erosion of benefits of military service, and inadequate recruiting resources began to show their effect in a downturn in the numbers of HSDG and MG I-III A enlistees. (See chart below.)



By FY 1979, internal actions and the carry-over effect of earlier resource expenditures were no longer sufficient to overcome the unfavorable trend in resources and environmental factors adversely affecting recruiting. The result was an active component end strength shortfall of 15,400 in FY 1979 and the lowest number of MG I-III A and HSDG accessions in the volunteer era. Active Army recruiting performance is shown in the table below.

	QUANTITY (thousands)				
	<u>FY 1976</u>	<u>FY 1977</u>	<u>FY 1978</u>	<u>FY 1979</u>	<u>FY 1980</u> (Program)
Total Accession	193.0	180.7	134.4	142.2	177.1
% of objective	100.2	99.2	98.1	89.3	
NPS Male	164.3	153.4	106.5	112.1	140.0
% of objective	100.1	100.3	97.4	87.4	
NPS Female	15.9	15.0	17.5	17.2	23.0
% of objective	99.9	100.4	99.5	91.5	
PS	12.8	12.3	10.4	12.9	14.0
% of objective	102.0	86.2	103.0	128.7	

APTITUDE FOR MILITARY TRAINING, PERFORMANCE, AND RETENTION

HSDG	105.5	99.7	91.4	82.8	98.8
% NPS (M+F)	58.6	59.2	73.7	64.1	60.6
MG I-III A	98.8	77.0	63.7	55.2	81.1
% NPS (M+F)	54.8	45.7	51.3	42.6	49.7

For FY 1980 and beyond, the end strength must be achieved and the downward trend in HSDG and MG I-III A accessions reversed. These tasks must be accomplished in a difficult recruiting environment which is characterized by a declining target population, decreasing enlistment propensity, and increasing competition from other services, colleges and universities, and civilian employers.

The probability that a soldier (male or female) who has completed high school will be lost from the Army before completion of his/her first term of enlistment is approximately one-half that of a non-high school graduate (NHSDG). As a group, male HSDG enlistees contribute 1.38 times as many years to the Army's strength as male NHSDG enlistees during the period of the first and second enlistments. This results from the reduced attrition and higher reenlistment rates of HSDGs over NHSDGs. Upper mental group accessions are required to ensure trainability of accessions. This need is especially important in light of increasing technology of new weapons systems anticipated in the 1980's. Therefore, the Army desires the highest HSDG and MG levels achievable.

To attract the required numbers of HSDG and upper MG, the active Army has implemented a Recruiting Action Plan. This plan is specifically designed to target the recruiting effort towards HSDG and upper MG and to provide an efficient, more adequately resourced and therefore more effective recruiting force. This plan includes a systematic high level review of the recruiting process and provides the mechanism to ensure that Army needs for recruiting resources are properly identified and presented. Highlights of this plan include a balanced resource package in terms of recruiters, advertising, enlistment options, and incentives designed to create a resource and incentive environment similar to that attained in FY 1975 and FY 1976, the years the Army achieved its highest numbers of HSDG and MG I-III A accessions. The Army has also developed a plan to ensure total Army support of the recruiting mission and carry the Army's need to the civilian community.

Because of the FY 1980 requirement to make up FY 1979 shortfalls and the impact of late availability of the additional FY 1980 recruiting resources that the Army has requested, additional resources and options necessary to ensure achievement of FY 1981 requirements may be needed. Actions that are considered essential to the Army's long-term success include the two-year enlistment option, an enhanced Veterans Educational Assistance Program (VEAP), an increased enlistment bonus, and additional recruiters. These actions, along with greater involvement at all levels of the Army in the recruiting issue, are the steps required to get back on track in active Army recruiting.

(3) Officer Procurement. Procurement goals for active commissioned and warrant officers are shown below:

Active Officer Procurement Goals

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Programmed	9,529	11,725	12,315
Actual	9,662	-	-

Officer end strength is programmed to reach a level of 99,940 in FY 1981. This represents an increase of 1,600 over the programmed FY 1980 officer end strength of 98,340. This increase is necessary to support force structure initiatives which include active Army full-time manning of early deploying reserve component units; increased aviator training rates, officer intensive management efforts including organizational effectiveness, review of education and training for officers, and initiatives to improve military personnel management and administration. The planned FY 1979 officer end strength was exceeded, primarily due to the Army Medical Department specialties meeting their procurement objectives and having fewer losses than anticipated. The following table provides the sources for active officer accessions.

FY 1981 Active Officer Accessions

<u>Source</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>
USMA	7.6
ROTC	45.9
OCS	6.2
Recall and miscellaneous	6.3
Army Medical Department (less ROTC and OCS)	16.2
Chaplain and Judge Advocate General	2.2
Warrant Officers	15.6
TOTAL	100.0

(4) Enhanced Enlisted Grade Structure. The Army's Enlisted Force Management Plan (EFMP), reviewed and approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, establishes long-range management goals which are designed to meet the requirements of and reduce turbulence in the enlisted force. It focuses on the management of the career force rather than the first-term force. The EFMP is based on an objective force with an enlisted career content of 49 percent. As career content increases, additional grade structure is required in order to accommodate increased experience levels and to maintain promotion opportunity, thereby preventing an adverse impact on retention of career personnel. The increase in grade content requested in the FY 1981 budget is a continuation of our efforts to move toward the objectives in the EFMP previously approved by OSD. The increase requested for FY 1981 is 1,700 in grades E-5 through E-9 and 1,300 in the grade of E-4. This increase in grade structure will assist in reducing a long standing shortfall in noncommissioned officers.

b. Reserve Components.

(1) Strength Trends. For the first time in recent years the USAR troop program units showed increases in strength over the prior years, and the decline in ARNG troop program unit strength appears to have been halted. Both, however, continue to be below desirable strength levels.

Reserve Component Strengths

FY	Congressionally Authorized Average Paid Strength	ARNG	
		Actual Average Paid Strength	Actual End of Year Paid Strength
71	400,000	400,842	402,175
72	400,000	386,528	387,539
73	402,333	388,025	385,600
74	379,144	394,352	403,396
75	400,000	394,119	394,720
76	400,000	380,439	362,330
TQ	400,000	363,779	366,841
77	390,000	358,793	354,706
78	382,000	347,646	340,996
79	362,200	343,677	345,528
80	355,700		
81	371,300 (Requested)		
FY	Congressionally Authorized Average Paid Strength	USAR	
		Actual Average Paid Strength	Actual End of Year Paid Strength
71	260,000	261,521	263,299
72	260,000	249,106	235,192
73	261,300	234,095	235,499
74	232,591	229,997	234,866
75	225,000	224,901	225,057
76	219,000	213,527	194,611
TQ	219,000	193,320	191,919
77	212,400	190,361	189,420
78	211,300	188,880	185,753
79	195,750	186,844	189,990
80	197,400		
81	204,500 (Requested)		

The historic decline in actual strength through FY 1978 was due largely to the Army's inability to replace people who joined in the late 1960's and early 1970's (many of whom were draft motivated) and who have reached the end of the six-year military service obligation.

(a) ARNG. ARNG strength increased from 340,996 at the end of FY 1978 to 345,528 at the end of FY 1979. The average of 343,677 is 56,000 short of the desired average strength of 400,000. Gradual and consistent increases in strength are expected during FY 1980 and FY 1981, provided all planned incentive funding becomes available and other factors remain relatively constant.

The ARNG enlisted 84,850 personnel during FY 1979 of which 42,580 were non-prior service. There were 80,128 extensions of enlistments during this same period. Although the figure for extensions decreased by 18,293 from 98,421 during FY 1978, the extension rate (the

ratio of extensions to eligibles) was higher during FY 1979 (65%) than during FY 1978 (61%). The trend of gradual increases in both the levels of extension and eligibles is expected to continue through FY 1981.

Losses for reasons other than ETS (Expiration Term of Service) continued to be high both in number and as a percent of total losses. During FY 1979 the number of ETS losses declined from 52,491 to 33,191 as total losses from paid strength declined from 101,769 to 83,910. Non-ETS losses decreased from 52,872 to 50,719. Effective 1 September 1979 the Army Directorate, National Guard Bureau formed the NGB/ARNG Attrition Management Work Group to analyze ideas, recommendations, and incentives in order to reverse the current non-ETS attrition rate and improve retention within the ARNG. The initial objective is to reduce the FY 1980 non-ETS loss levels to 42,000 (a reduction of 17 percent from FY 1979). This attrition management effort, the employment of full-time recruiters, and the use of enlistment and retention incentives are expected to contribute substantially to achieving FY 1980 and FY 1981 strength objectives.

(b) USAR. Although the average FY 1979 strength in the USAR dropped by 2,000, the year end paid strength increased by 4,870 over FY 1978. Despite that improvement, the USAR was still 70,000 short of the Army's desired strength of 260,000. Strength is projected to continue to increase in FY 1980 and FY 1981 due to fewer losses and the application of improved enlistment and retention incentives. In FY 1979, the USAR enlisted 54,600 personnel of which 21,400 were NPS. Over 37,000 reservists reenlisted or extended. For the first time in recent history, gains exceeded losses. While ETS losses declined in FY 1979, non-ETS losses rose to 35,900, constituting over 70 percent of total losses. A major effort is underway to determine the cause and find solutions to this high rate of non-ETS losses.

One of our most serious concerns is that, should we have to mobilize today, not nearly enough trained personnel are readily available to meet manpower requirements. The primary source of rapidly available, recently trained assets is the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The strength of the IRR is slightly more than 200,000. The forecast is for the strength to remain essentially stable at approximately 200,000 until the impact of other initiatives is felt during FY 1981 and beyond. These initiatives include a direct enlistment test program, reenlistment bonuses, and transfer to the IRR of some trained and qualified soldiers who fail to complete their Service commitment. A portion of the remaining requirement can be made up through the Standby Reserve and retired personnel. The Standby Reserve enlisted strength is dwindling and soon will be insignificant. Recalled retirees will be of use primarily in CONUS due to their age. Both categories would be hampered by a lack of current training.

(2) Officer Procurement.

(a) The ARNG objective is to achieve an assigned strength of 37,062 by FY 1981: 29,403 officers and 7,659 warrant officers. Officer and warrant officer strengths have shown an upward trend since the first

quarter of FY 1979 and are the highest recorded since 1961. These increases reflect the success of new and expanded officer and warrant officer accession programs. The State OCS program is receiving additional emphasis nationwide, while the ROTC program shows promise of having significant impact on ARNG officer accessions. A new medical program, a women's program, and a soon-to-be-developed chaplains' program are focusing added emphasis on these important professional areas. A new Direct Appointment Program and a new Warrant Officer Professional Development Program are also being developed.

(b) The USAR units must acquire about 7,100 officers annually to maintain current strength levels. The bulk of these officers will come from the IRR. In spite of growing success in assigning ROTC and other basic speciality officers to unit vacancies, USAR units will remain over 4,000 officers short due to the lack of special branch officers to fill professional vacancies. Enrollment shortfalls in the advance ROTC programs (MS III) for the last two years will preclude the Army's achieving its 10,000 production goal by FY 1982.

c. Mobilization Manpower.

In the event of a major conflict, such as a NATO/Warsaw Pact war in Europe, active and reserve component units would require substantial augmentation to achieve full wartime strength. Additional large numbers of pretrained individuals would also be required as casualty replacements until inductees could be trained and transported to the theater of operations.

The individuals would come mainly from three sources whose combined output is presently insufficient to fully meet the time-phased requirements: (1) training base output, which would be at a low level until almost 100 days after the current Selective Service System began to produce inductees; (2) members of the Individual Ready Reserve and the Standby Reserve, the total of which continues its substantial decline in strength in recent years; and (3) personnel drawn from the CONUS base and later deploying units. In addition, the Army is developing plans for the post-mobilization recall of retired personnel for use in CONUS installations to meet the expanding personnel requirements of the Army's mobilization base. An appeal for volunteers from among former soldiers could also provide additional pretrained personnel who would require minimum retraining.

Appeals would be made for non-prior service volunteers in an effort to keep the training base operating at capacity until the Selective Service System produced sufficient inductees. Dependence on this uncertain source will be reduced as the Selective Service System is revitalized.

d. Civilian Manpower.

In the performance of support functions, the Army seeks the best utilization of military and civilian manning and contracted services compatible with effective mission accomplishment. The general

policy is to use civilians (in-house or contract) rather than military personnel, except where prohibited by law, or where military personnel are required for training, discipline, rotation base, or combat effectiveness reasons. Civilians are employed to perform essential tasks in intelligence, communications, research and development, training, administration, medical, logistical, and reserve component support. They perform the bulk of installation operations and do most of the essential depot maintenance and distribution of equipment.

In total, the Army plan for civilian employment between FY 1980 and FY 1981 is relatively stable. However, there are still significant staffing shortfalls in the logistics system, recruiting and retention, soldier support programs, and base support functions, to cite a few, which impair adequate support of near-term readiness. Moreover, there is insufficient staffing to support even the initial phases of mobilization. At mobilization, the 14,000 to 16,000 borrowed military manpower performing essential installation activities would be returned to parent units, leaving installations in an emergency situation to support ensuing mobilization requirements. Also, real growth and near-term readiness will demand more, not fewer civilians. In this budget, recognizing the realities of limited fiscal and ceiling resources, the Army has adjusted internally to address some of its most pressing staffing deficiencies. These are discussed later in the description of the various DPPC changes.

In the development of the FY 1980 request, 6,700 civilian spaces were reduced as an estimate that feasible contracting out could be accomplished by the end of FY 1980. The procedures for deciding in-house versus contract operation are complex and time-consuming. Inevitably, some cost based decisions will slip into FY 1981. The FY 1979 experience was that decisions on less than 20 percent of CITA manpower in reviewed functions were finalized by the end of FY 1979. In FY 1980, manpower savings were estimated against 90 percent of the manpower in the functions planned for review. This may have been too high. If contracting out cannot be accomplished as previously estimated, the Army will require a temporary upward adjustment of the FY 1980 ceiling. This adjustment would be necessary to prevent unwarranted impact on other approved programs.

C. Army Manpower Requirements by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC).

The following tables display Army manpower by DPPC for FY 1979 through FY 1981. Beginning with FY 1980, Selected Reserve numbers throughout this chapter include reservists on full-time active duty for administration and training of the reserves.

ACTIVE ARMY MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1979 Actual</u>	<u>FY 1980 FY 1981 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1981</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.4	0.4	0.4
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>453.8</u>	<u>467.7</u>	<u>472.8</u>
Land Forces	<u>453.3</u>	<u>467.4</u>	<u>472.5</u>
Division Forces	(413.1)	(429.4)	(434.2)
Theater Forces	(40.2)	(38.0)	(38.3)
Mobility Forces	0.4	0.2	0.2
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>23.7</u>	<u>25.9</u>	<u>25.7</u>
Intelligence	8.2	8.3	8.2
Centrally Managed Communications	9.1	9.7	9.7
Research and Development	6.2	7.7	7.6
Geophysical Activities	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>166.1</u>	<u>163.6</u>	<u>167.0</u>
Base Operating Support	56.8	55.9	56.5
Medical Support	17.3	15.7	16.3
Personnel Support	12.5	12.5	12.8
Individual Training	39.4	39.1	39.7
Force Support Training	2.2	2.3	2.4
Central Logistics	8.9	8.4	8.6
Centralized Support Activities	20.1	20.3	21.3
Management Headquarters	8.9	9.3	9.3
Federal Agency Support	0.1	0.1	0.1
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure^{1/}</u>	<u>644.0</u>	<u>657.6</u>	<u>666.0</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>114.4</u>	<u>116.4</u>	<u>109.8</u>
Transients	26.2	24.0	23.8
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdes	6.9	6.5	6.4
Students, Trainees	77.0	81.6	75.3
Cadets	4.3	4.3	4.3
<u>Total</u>	<u>758.4</u>	<u>774.0</u>	<u>775.8</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

^{1/} Manpower totals in the Force Structure reflect the temporary undermanning that occurs on 30 September of a fiscal year. Explanation and distribution of this undermanning is at paragraph C1, this chapter.

ARMY SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS (ARNG)
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1979 Actual</u>	<u>FY 1980 FY 1981 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1981</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	-	-	-
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>308.0</u>	<u>316.4</u>	<u>333.2</u>
Land Forces	308.0	316.4	333.2
Division Forces	(296.5)	(304.7)	(320.9)
Theater Forces	(11.5)	(11.7)	(12.4)
Mobility Forces	-	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	-	-	-
Intelligence	-	-	-
Centrally Managed Communications	-	-	-
Research and Development	-	-	-
Geophysical Activities	-	-	-
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>20.9</u>	<u>26.7</u>	<u>32.5</u>
Base Operating Support	4.6	4.7	5.0
Medical Support	0.2	0.2	0.2
Personnel Support	1.7	1.7	2.0
Individual Training	3.7	3.1	4.2
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	-	-	-
Centralized Support Activities	12.3	16.9	21.2
Management Headquarters	*	*	*
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>330.6</u>	<u>343.1</u>	<u>365.8</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>15.1</u>	<u>15.5</u>	<u>15.5</u>
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	15.1	15.5	15.5
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>345.5</u>	<u>358.6</u>	<u>381.4</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

* Fewer than 50 spaces.

ARMY SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS (USAR)
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1979</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 1980</u> <u>FY 1981 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1981</u> <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	0.2	0.2	0.2
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>140.9</u>	<u>145.8</u>	<u>151.3</u>
Land Forces	<u>140.0</u>	<u>144.5</u>	<u>150.3</u>
Division Forces	(126.1)	(130.0)	(135.2)
Theater Forces	(13.9)	(14.5)	(15.1)
Mobility Forces	0.9	1.0	1.0
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>
Intelligence	0.3	0.3	0.3
Centrally Managed Communications	-	-	-
Research and Development	-	-	-
Geophysical Activities	-	-	-
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>41.9</u>	<u>47.2</u>	<u>50.0</u>
Base Operating Support	2.9	3.0	3.1
Medical Support	6.3	6.5	6.7
Personnel Support	-	1.6	1.6
Individual Training	30.5	31.5	32.5
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	-	-	-
Centralized Support Activities	2.0	2.1	2.3
Management Headquarters	*	2.5	3.6
Federal Agency Support	0.2	0.2	0.2
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>183.3</u>	<u>193.5</u>	<u>201.8</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>6.7</u>	<u>6.8</u>	<u>8.9</u>
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	6.7	6.8	8.9
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>190.0</u>	<u>200.3</u>	<u>210.7</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

* Fewer than 50 spaces.

ARMY CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1979 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1980 <u>FY 1981 Budget</u>	FY 1981 <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	*	*	*
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.2	0.1	0.1
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>18.4</u>	<u>18.3</u>	<u>16.7</u>
Land Forces	<u>16.2</u>	<u>16.2</u>	<u>14.7</u>
Division Forces	(15.3)	(15.0)	(13.5)
Theater Forces	(0.9)	(1.2)	(1.2)
Mobility Forces	2.2	2.1	2.0
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>33.4</u>	<u>33.2</u>	<u>32.8</u>
Intelligence	<u>1.7</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>1.6</u>
Centrally Managed Communications	4.2	4.3	4.3
Research and Development	27.4	27.1	26.9
Geophysical Activities	-	-	-
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>307.1</u>	<u>307.5</u>	<u>309.0</u>
Base Operating Support	<u>130.9</u>	<u>142.9</u>	<u>143.3</u>
Medical Support	24.0	13.3	14.0
Personnel Support	6.7	7.2	7.5
Individual Training	12.2	12.1	12.1
Force Support Training	1.0	0.9	0.9
Central Logistics	87.8	84.9	86.1
Centralized Support Activities	31.3	32.5	31.4
Management Headquarters	13.1	13.7	13.7
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>359.1</u>	<u>359.1</u>	<u>358.6</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

* Fewer than 50 spaces.

1. Determination of Active Military End Strength.

a. Active Army military strength fluctuates periodically, reflecting the seasonality of gains and losses. As discussed earlier, the Army strives to recruit HSDGs. High school graduates are available in the summer months and hence the Army strength declines through the spring in anticipation of the prime recruiting months of June, July, and August. The problem is to develop a manpower program that will adequately man the units of the Army, on average, within the constraint of a reasonable end of year strength. This process includes determination of the flow of gains and losses, unit manning, and end strength for the last day of the fiscal year. The problem is complicated by the fact that not all soldiers are available to man the force. Incoming personnel are delayed from a unit assignment until completion of initial entry training. Additional personnel are between troop unit assignments (e.g., transients). The end strength requested is that at which units of the Army are adequately manned on the average. More precisely, the end strength developed minimizes the total of the weighted absolute values of the monthly over and under strengths. If a value had been chosen to provide full manning at 1981 fiscal year end, additional trained soldiers would have been requested.

b. Year end under/overmanning is not a good basis by which to judge the Army's manpower program. The average manning is a better indicator of how the units of the Army have been or will be manned over time. The FY 1979 year-end undermanning was 30,200; however, the average undermanning was 17,100. For FY 1980, the year-end undermanning is projected to be 15,900 and the average is projected to be 17,300. These two fiscal years have relatively high undermanning (exceeding internal thresholds) because, during FY 1979, the Army did not obtain the number of accessions needed to reach its authorized end strength. The FY 1979 shortage will continue into FY 1980 but is projected to get better later in the year. Accordingly, FY 1981 end year undermanning is projected to be 8,300 and the average to be a 400 overmanning.

c. The projected temporary undermanning for 30 September was computed for and deducted from each DPPC category according to the ratio of that DPPC's programmed manpower to the total programmed for all DPPCs. This acknowledges the undermanning and provides the best estimate of its projected distribution. The following table shows the undermanning by DPPC for budget years FY 1980 and FY 1981.

Active Military Undermanning By DPPC

	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>6</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	11	6
 <u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	 <u>11,322</u>	 <u>5,861</u>
Land Forces	11,316	5,858
Division Forces	(10,395)	(5,382)
Theater Forces	(921)	(476)
Mobility Forces	6	3
 <u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	 <u>626</u>	 <u>318</u>
Intelligence	201	101
Centrally Managed Communications	235	121
Research and Development Activities	187	94
Geophysical Activities	3	2
 <u>Support Activities</u>	 <u>3,961</u>	 <u>2,070</u>
Base Operating Support	1,354	701
Medical Support	380	202
Personnel Support	302	158
Individual Training	947	492
Force Support Training	55	30
Central Logistics	204	107
Centralized Support Activities	493	263
Management Headquarters	223	115
Federal Agency Support	3	2
 <u>Total</u>	 <u>15,920</u>	 <u>8,255</u>

2. Strategic Forces

a. Defensive Strategic Forces

Defensive Strategic Forces Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Reserve Component			
USAR	0.2	0.2	0.2
<u>Civilian</u>	*	*	*

* Fewer than 50 spaces

Manpower supports the Army Ballistic Missile Defense Program.

b. Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces

Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.4	0.4	0.5
<u>Civilian</u>	0.2	0.1	0.1

Manpower supports national level command centers.

The active military increase in FY 1981 reflects a number of small miscellaneous work load related transfers from other categories totaling 61 end strength. These transfers reflect current command plans for utilization and result in an increase when rounded to the nearest hundred.

The civilian program remains stable between FY 1980 and FY 1981. The previous plan to transfer Vint Hill base operations support to Support Installations in FY 1979 did not occur until FY 1980 due to required personnel actions.

3. Tactical/Mobility Forces

a. Land Forces

(1) Division Forces

Division Forces Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	413.1	429.4 ^{1/}	434.2 ^{2/}
Reserve Components			
ARNG	296.5	304.7	320.9
USAR	126.1	130.0	135.2
<u>Civilian</u>	15.3	15.0	13.5

^{1/} Reflects reduction for undermanning of 10.4 as of 30 September 1980.

^{2/} Reflects reduction for undermanning of 5.4 as of 30 September 1981.

Manpower consists of the Army's combat divisions, separate combat brigades, regiments and tactical support units.

The active military increase in FY 1981 results from a manning increase offset by a structure decrease reflecting 800 spaces lost as a result of inactivation of a light infantry brigade, 700 spaces added for combat service support increases to Europe, and 100 spaces lost because of delay in converting a field artillery battalion to the new M198 155mm howitzer.

The reserve component increases are a part of the increased total paid strength to improve readiness.

The 1,500 decrease in civilian end strength during FY 1981 is due to continuing the conversion of reserve component civilian technicians to reserve component military. The FY 1981 technician conversion was planned during the development of the FY 1980 budget. The Army is aware of the Congressional moratorium on technician conversions after July 1980 and realizes that the continuation of this conversion program is contingent upon future decisions. Should the conversion program not proceed in FY 1981, an upward adjustment of end strength would be required.

The following table shows active and reserve combined arms organizations programmed for end FY 1981.

COMBINED ARMS ORGANIZATIONS IN LAND FORCES END FY 1981

	<u>Active Army</u>	<u>Reserve Components</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Divisions (Brigades)</u> ^{1/}			
Armored	4 (12)	2 (6)	6 (18)
Mechanized	6 (16)	1 (3)	7 (19)
Infantry	4 (10)	5 (15)	9 (25)
Air Assault	1 (3)		1 (3)
Airborne	1 (3)		1 (3)
	16 (44)	8 (24)	24 (68)
<u>Separate Combat Brigades</u>			
Armored	1	3	4
Mechanized		9	9
Infantry	4	11	15
	5	23 ^{2/}	28 ^{2/}
<u>Cavalry Brigade</u>			
Air Combat	1	0	1
<u>Cavalry Regiments</u>			
Armored	3	4	7

^{1/} Four reserve component separate brigades round-out two light infantry and two infantry (Mech) divisions in the active component. Three divisions have forward deployed brigades: 1st Cavalry Division, 2d Armored Division, and 1st Infantry Division (Mech).

^{2/} Includes the four reserve brigades that round-out active divisions; excludes the 33rd Infantry Brigade (Illinois National Guard), provided for school support.

(2) Theater Forces

Theater Forces Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	40.2	38.0 ^{1/}	38.3 ^{2/}
Reserve Components			
ARNG	11.5	11.7	12.4
USAR	13.9	14.5	15.1
<u>Civilian</u>	0.9	1.2	1.2

^{1/} Reflects reduction for undermanning of 0.9 as of 30 September 1980.

^{2/} Reflects reduction for undermanning of 0.5 as of 30 September 1981.

Manpower consists of theater-wide and specialized units such as separate infantry brigades; certain supply, maintenance, and security activities in support of NATO; and theater-level psychological warfare and civil affairs units and related support.

The active military increase in FY 1981 results from a manning increase offset by a structure decrease reflecting 700 spaces lost because of a reduction in the authorized level of organization of two light infantry brigades, 200 spaces added for nuclear site security in Europe and 400 spaces added for miscellaneous force structure actions.

USAR and ARNG increases are part of an overall increase in paid drill strength to increase readiness.

b. Mobility Forces

Mobility Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.4	0.2	0.2
Reserve Component			
USAR	0.9	1.0	1.0
<u>Civilian</u>	2.2	2.1	2.0

Manpower included in this category supports CONUS ocean terminal operations, DoD traffic management and engineering services, and accountability and maintenance of the Defense Railway Interchange Fleet.

The FY 1980 USAR increase results from realignments and consolidations affecting the Military Transport Management Command.

The decrease of 100 civilians in FY 1981 is due to anticipated conversions to contract and organizational efficiencies.

4. Auxiliary Activities.

a. Intelligence

Intelligence Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	8.2	8.3 ^{1/}	8.2 ^{2/}
Reserve Component			
USAR	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>Civilian</u>	1.7	1.8	1.6

^{1/} Reflects reduction for undermanning of 0.2 as of 30 September 1980.

^{2/} Reflects reduction for undermanning of 0.1 as of 30 September 1981.

Manpower supports Consolidated Cryptologic Activities, the General Defense Intelligence Program, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency.

b. Centrally Managed Communications

Centrally Managed Communications Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	9.1	9.7 ^{1/}	9.7 ^{2/}
<u>Civilian</u>	4.2	4.3	4.3

^{1/} Reflects reduction for undermanning of 0.2 as of 30 September 1980.
^{2/} Reflects reductions for undermanning of 0.1 as of 30 September 1981.

Manpower supports Defense Consolidated Telecommunications and the Worldwide Command and Control System and excludes support of tactical units (included under Land Forces) and installations (included in Base Operations Support).

Though the active military strength remains level, the force structure decreases reflecting the loss of 200 spaces as a result of the end of the Army's mission in Taiwan and the gain of 100 spaces to increase emergency command and control communications in Europe.

c. Research and Development Activities

Research and Development Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	6.2	7.7 ^{1/}	7.6 ^{2/}
<u>Civilian</u>	27.4	27.1	26.9

^{1/} Reflects reduction for undermanning of 0.2 as of 30 September 1980.
^{2/} Reflects reduction for undermanning of 0.1 as of 30 September 1981.

Manpower is responsible for:

- (1) Directing contractor efforts and carrying on in-house programs in areas of basic and applied research.
- (2) Designing and fabricating experimental prototype articles and systems.
- (3) Conducting tests and evaluation.
- (4) Operating and maintaining Army R&D facilities.
- (5) Command administration of R&D programs.

The FY 1980 military increase of 1,500 is due to restoration of a prior year reduction which had been based upon improper military manpower accountability. The decrease of 100 military personnel in FY 1981 is manning improvements offset by structure changes associated with the restoration of forces in Korea based upon deferral of the programmed withdrawal and the planned completion of reliability, availability, maintainability/logistic testing of the CH-47 helicopter modernization.

The decrease in civilian manpower in FY 1980 is a result of an effort to curtail civilian employment and a transfer of manpower to Central Logistics in support of procurement operations. The decrease in FY 1981 is a result of reductions in anticipation of functions converting to contract operation.

d. Geophysical Activities

Geophysical Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.1	0.1	0.1

Manpower is assigned to the Defense Mapping Agency.

5. Support Activities

a. Base Operations Support

Base Operating Support Manpower
Combat Installations
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	25.7	25.4 ^{1/}	26.2 ^{2/}
<u>Civilian</u>	82.6	83.9	84.4

- ^{1/} Reflects reduction for undermanning of 0.6 as of 30 September 1980.
^{2/} Reflects reduction for undermanning of 0.3 as of 30 September 1981.

Manpower supports the Army's combat mission commands: US Army Europe; US Army Japan; Eighth US Army, Korea; US Army Forces Command; and US Army Western Command.

The active military structure increase in FY 1981 reflects an increase of 100 spaces to support the Army's alcohol and drug abuse prevention control program, 100 spaces to support a restoration of a light infantry brigade to the program, 100 spaces to support the restoration of a special mission brigade in Europe, and 200 spaces restored to functions determined to be more economically conducted in-house than by contract.

The net civilian increase of 500 in FY 1981 is due to an increase of 1,000 for additional facilities and POMCUS support in Europe and for CONUS logistics support. Offsets of about 500 result from anticipation of functions converting to contract operation.

Base Operating Support Manpower
Support Installations
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	31.1	30.5 ^{1/}	30.3 ^{2/}
Reserve Component			
ARNG	4.6	4.7	5.0
USAR	2.9	3.0	3.1
<u>Civilian</u>	48.3	59.0	58.8

^{1/} Reflects reduction for undermanning of 0.7 as of 30 September 1980.
^{2/} Reflects reduction for undermanning of 0.4 as of 30 September 1981.

Manpower is for Army support-oriented commands: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command, US Army Communications Command, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, US Army Military District of Washington, and US Army Health Services Command.

The active military structure decrease in FY 1981 reflects the loss of 400 spaces from military police functions under review for contracting and 100 spaces lost by the transfer of testing measurement and diagnostic equipment calibration and repair activities associated with the Korean withdrawal and restoration.

Increases in reserve component strengths reflect increases in base operations needed to support increased paid drill strength.

The civilian decrease in FY 1981 results from anticipation of functions converting to contract operation.

b. Medical Support Activities

Medical Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	17.3	15.7 ^{1/}	16.3 ^{2/}
Reserve Components			
ARNG	0.2	0.2	0.2
USAR	6.3	6.5	6.7
<u>Civilian</u>	24.0	13.3	14.0

^{1/} Reflects reduction for undermanning of 0.4 as of 30 September 1980.

^{2/} Reflects reduction for undermanning of 0.2 as of 30 September 1981.

Manpower includes all Army non-tactical health care activities.

The active military structure increase in FY 1981 reflects the gain of 100 spaces associated with the transfer of veterinary functions from the Air Force and an increase of 300 medical support spaces to support force structure increases in Europe and CONUS.

Increase in USAR strength reflects part of total increase in paid drill strength to improve readiness.

The FY 1981 increase of 700 civilians considers FY 1980 congressional recognition of medical staffing deficiencies. The FY 1981 program thus corrects staffing deficiencies in military unit medical support, health professionals, ancillary medical support, and soldier support such as drug and alcohol prevention and treatment.

c. Personnel Support Activities

Personnel Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	12.5	12.5 ^{1/}	12.8 ^{2/}
Reserve Components			
ARNG	1.7	1.7	2.0
USAR	-	1.6	1.6
<u>Civilian</u>	6.7	7.2	7.5

1/ Reflects reduction for undermanning of 0.3 as of 30 September 1980.

2/ Reflects reduction for undermanning of 0.2 as of 30 September 1981.

Manpower includes the US Army Recruiting Command, the Army Junior ROTC program, counterintelligence and investigative activities, Army personnel processing activities, and off duty education programs.

Beginning in FY 1980, ARNG full-time recruiting and retention personnel are separately identified in the account. In FY 1981 there is a slight increase to improve the ARNG recruiting and retention program.

The active military structure increase in FY 1981 reflects an increase of over 100 spaces to improve Army efforts in drug suppression which causes an increase of 200 due to rounding.

The USAR increases in FY 1980 reflect an increase of full-time recruiters to the previously approved level.

The FY 1981 civilian increase of 300 is for intern training programs.

d. Individual Training Activities

Individual Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	39.4	39.1 ^{1/}	39.7 ^{2/}
Reserve Components			
ARNG	3.7	3.1	4.2
USAR	30.5	31.5	32.5
<u>Civilian</u>	12.2	12.1	12.1

1/ Reflects reduction for undermanning of 0.9 as of 30 September 1980.

2/ Reflects reduction for undermanning of 0.5 as of 30 September 1981.

Manpower supports the conduct of individual training. Individuals actually undergoing training are carried in the student/trainee account of the Individuals category.

The active military structure increase in FY 1981 reflects an increase of 200 spaces to increase ROTC production.

The ARNG manpower declined slightly in FY 1980 because of reduced requirements but returns to its normal proportion of paid drill strength in FY 1981.

The USAR increases reflect part of the total increase in paid drill strength to improve readiness.

e. Force Support Training Activities

Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	2.2	2.3 ^{1/}	2.4
<u>Civilian</u>	1.0	0.9	0.9

Manpower includes the Army's Jungle Warfare School in Panama, the Northern Warfare Training Command in Alaska, and the Seventh Army Training Center in Germany.

1/ Reflects reduction for undermanning of 0.1 as of 30 September 1980.

The FY 1981 active military increase provides 100 military personnel to increase Training Development and Training Support packages for both the active and reserve components.

f. Central Logistics Activities

Central Logistics Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	8.9	8.4 ^{1/}	8.6 ^{2/}
<u>Civilian</u>	87.8	84.9	86.1

^{1/} Reflects reduction for undermanning of 0.2 as of 30 September 1980.

^{2/} Reflects reduction for undermanning of 0.1 as of 30 September 1981.

Manpower in this category conduct supply, maintenance, and logistics support activities worldwide, with the largest strength concentration in the Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command and United States Army Europe.

The increase in active military manpower from FY 1980 to FY 1981 reflects the consolidation of test measurement diagnostic equipment calibration and repair, with responsibility for this function transferred from other commands to the Materiel Development and Readiness Command.

The increase in civilian manpower between FY 1980 and FY 1981 will support modernization initiatives, to include the fielding of new systems; continue efforts to improve the wholesale logistics posture; and reduce backlogs in equipment maintenance and central procurement.

g. Centralized Support Activities

Centralized Support Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	20.1	20.3 ^{1/}	21.3 ^{2/}
Reserve Components			
ARNG	12.3	16.9	21.2
USAR	2.0	2.1	2.3
<u>Civilian</u>	31.3	32.5	31.4

^{1/} Reflects reduction for undermanning of 0.5 as of 30 September 1980.

^{2/} Reflects reduction for undermanning of 0.3 as of 30 September 1981.

Manpower supports joint and international activities (less Management Headquarters), combat development, counterintelligence, reserve activities, public affairs, personnel administration, criminal investigations, OSD activities, and foreign military sales.

The active military structure increase in FY 1981 reflects the restoration of 100 spaces to institutionalize personnel management functions within the Army's structure, an increase of 200 spaces associated with the realignment of the Army's full-time manning of reserve component units, the addition of 100 spaces to the Army Council of Review Boards, an increase of 100 spaces to increase mobilization personnel management, and the work load related transfer of 300 other miscellaneous spaces from other categories.

The ARNG increase is for full-time personnel to improve readiness in Roundout, early deploying, and early mobilizing units; for the conversion of selected civilian technician positions to full-time military positions; and for part of the overall increase in paid drill strength.

USAR increases support the overall increase in paid drill strength.

The civilian decrease for FY 1981 results from the conversion of selected civilian technician positions to reserve military.

h. Management Headquarters Activities

Management Headquarters Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	8.9	9.3 ^{1/}	9.3 ^{2/}
Reserve Component			
USAR	*	2.5 ^{3/}	3.6 ^{3/}
ARNG	*	*	*
<u>Civilian</u>	13.1	13.7	13.7

*Fewer than 50 spaces

1/ Reflects reduction for undermanning of 0.2 as of 30 September 1980.

2/ Reflects reduction for undermanning of 0.1 as of 30 September 1981.

3/ As a temporary measure, personnel for full-time manning and technician conversions are being carried in this DPPC. Plans are to allocate these resources to the actual DPPC in which they are employed.

Manpower is assigned to defense agencies, international military organizations, unified commands, service support - combat commands, and service support - support commands.

i. Federal Agency Support Activities

Federal Agency Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.1	0.1	0.1
Reserve Component			
USAR	0.2	0.2	0.2

Manpower is assigned to DoD and non-DoD agencies in support of various functions. Assignments are normally on a reimbursable basis unless they support the mission of DoD.

6. Individuals

The Individuals accounts are estimates of manpower required for transients, holdees (patients, prisoners, separatees), trainees, students, and US Military Academy cadets.

a. Transients

Transients Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	26.2	24.0	23.8

Transient strengths are based on the projected levels of non-prior service accessions; separations; retirements; and operational, rotational, and training moves.

The decline in transients from FY 1979 through FY 1981 results from a reduction in the number of individuals in a PCS status at year end. Although there are more total PCS moves programmed for FY 1980 and FY 1981 than experienced in FY 1979, both the accession and PCS move patterns are programmed such that fewer moves occur at year end.

b. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees

Patients, Prisoners and Holdees
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
(Actual)		

Military

Active	6.9	6.5	6.4

The decline in this DPPC from FY 1979 through FY 1981 is in holdees and results from a reduction in the number of individuals scheduled to reach ETS and, hence, a reduction in personnel pending separation.

c. Trainees, Students, Cadets

Trainees, Students, and Cadets
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
(Actual)		

Military

Active			
Trainees/Students	77.0	81.6	75.3
Cadets	4.3	4.3	4.3
Reserve Trainees/Students			
ARNG	15.1	15.5	15.5
USAR	6.7	6.8	8.9

The active military increase in trainees for FY 1980 is caused by the large increase in HSDG enlistees during that year. Being available for recruitment primarily during the summer, these personnel will be in training at the end of the fiscal year. Similarly, the decline in FY 1981 results from the lower FY 1981 accession requirements.

USAR increases reflect expected increases in overall recruiting efforts resulting from increased USAREC activities and incentive programs begun in FY 1979.

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CHAPTER VI

NAVY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

A. Introduction

1. Summary and Highlights

This chapter describes the Navy's Total Force manpower requirements in terms of its active military, reserve, and civilian manpower components for FY 1981 and FY 1982. Navy's manpower requirements derive from the force structure required to accomplish the Navy missions within the national military strategy.

As an aid to understanding Navy's manpower requirements, and to highlight principal elements of Navy's manpower program, this chapter provides:

- a summary of the primary methods used to determine the strength needed to accomplish the assigned missions of the Navy;
- a review of significant manpower trends;
- a discussion of current Navy initiatives to improve its management of manpower; and
- a detailed review of Navy manpower requirements and manning priorities by Defense Planning and Programming Categories including an explanation of substantial changes between fiscal years.

The Navy request for active military, reserve, and civilian manpower for FY 1981 and FY 1982 is as follows:

<u>Navy Manpower Requirements</u> (End Strength in Thousands)		
	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>		
Active	533.6	544.2
Reserve Components	87.4	87.4
<u>Civilian</u>	290.9	289.2

2. Major Force Structure Changes

The number of ships in Navy's Total Ship Operating Force increases from 540 in FY 1980 to 544 in FY 1981. During this period, the size of the Active Fleet increases from 462 ships to 477 ships while the Naval Reserve Fleet declines from 53 ships in FY 1980 to 42 ships in FY 1981. At the same time, the level of civilian manned ships of the Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF) remains constant at 25 ships in both years. The net increase of four ships in Navy's Total Ship Force does not fully reflect the substantial qualitative improvements being made during this period in terms of fleet modernization and improved operational capability since new ships are individually more combat capable than the ships being retired. Specific total ship force changes between FY 1980 and FY 1981 are as follows:

a. Active Fleet

- The number of carriers declines from 13 to 12 during FY 1981 as the SARATOGA undergoes Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) modernization.

- Attack submarine force levels increase by 10 as a result of the commissioning of five new SSN-688 class submarines and the conversion and transfer of five former SSBNs to the attack submarine force.

- The Fleet Ballistic Missile force declines by a net of six submarines as a result of the aforementioned conversion of five SSBNs to attack submarines, the decommissioning of two additional SSBNs, and the scheduled commissioning of Navy's first TRIDENT submarine.

- The number of surface combatant ships increases by 12 following the delivery of eight frigates, one guided missile cruiser, and three guided missile destroyers from new construction.

- Amphibious force ships decline by three as a result of the transfer of two tank landing ships (LSTs) and one amphibious cargo ship (LKA) to the Naval Reserve Fleet.

- Changes in the number of support force ships include the introduction of a destroyer tender, an oiler, and a submarine tender from new construction; the transfer of another tender from the Strategic Forces category; the decommissioning of an older destroyer tender; and the transfer of an ammunition ship to the NFAF.

- The number of patrol ships increases by two following the commissioning of two new guided missile patrol combatants (hydrofoils).

b. Naval Reserve Fleet. Changes in the composition of the Naval Reserve Fleet include the addition of three amphibious force ships from the Active Fleet coupled with the decommissioning of fourteen older destroyers.

c. Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force. The overall size of the NFAF remains constant since the introduction of two fleet ocean tugs from new construction and the transfer of an ammunition ship from the active fleet are numerically offset by the decommissioning of a fleet oiler and two older fleet ocean tugs.

d. Naval Aviation Forces

- The number of active and reserve Navy fighter and attack squadrons will remain level at 70 between FY 1980 and FY 1981.

- Total Navy active and reserve ASW squadrons will decline from 69 in FY 1980 to 65 in FY 1981 with the reduction of four SH-3A/D helicopter squadrons from the reserve forces.

3. Manpower Requirements Determination

a. Operating Forces. The determination of operating force manpower requirements is accomplished by the Navy's Ship and Squadron Manpower Document (SMD/SQMD) programs. Details concerning the techniques and methodology used in both of these programs were provided in previous Defense Manpower Requirements Reports.

The Ship Manpower Document (SMD) program documents the manpower for a specific ship predicated on ship configuration, computed workload, required operational capabilities, and projected operational environment. The level of manpower determined is that which is essential to the operation, maintenance and support of a ship under stated conditions of readiness. The Ship Manpower Document Program covered 91 percent of all ships at the end of FY 1979.

The Squadron Manpower Document (SQMD) program documents manpower requirements for aviation squadrons based on manpower staffing standards which equate workload to the operating tempo defined in the Required Operational Capability and Projected Operational Environment statements. The SQMD program has initial documentation completed for approximately 91 percent of all active duty aviation squadrons. This represents a 3 percent decrease from last year because the Training Command Squadrons have now been added to the program and their documentation has not been completed. The SQMD program schedule provides for annual documentation update of Fleet Readiness Squadrons and certain miscellaneous squadrons and biannual updates for the remainder of the miscellaneous and operational squadrons.

b. Shore Support Establishment. The Shore Requirements, Standards, and Manpower Planning System (SHORSTAMPS) has been developed as a requirements determination system for all manpower (military and civilian) in the

shore support establishment. SHORSTAMPS methodology has been described in previous reports. Major problems associated with SHORSTAMPS program development have included insufficient resources and inadequate training. Navy has taken steps to correct each of these deficiencies. Sufficient resources have been programmed in the FY 1981 budget to maintain a schedule to obtain 70 percent coverage by FY 1987.

The Chief of Naval Operations will annually review growth in manning. However, Navy faces a difficult task in recruiting new, and retaining present, SHORSTAMPS analysts. Navy must compete with other government and private agencies in a field of growing interest and limited skill supply.

Navy has also begun efforts to decentralize this program to gain support and cooperation from field activities. Many of the additional SHORSTAMPS billets will be allocated to field activities.

A training course has been developed and will be required of all officers and middle grade civilians (middle management) assigned to this program. This six-week Navy-operated school is located at the Defense Systems Management College, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. A course for enlisted personnel and junior grade civilians being assigned to SHORSTAMPS billets is being taught at NAVMACLANT and NAVMACPAC.

Other critical improvements are underway and several important corrective actions have been completed. By the end of FY 1981 Navy should have 41 percent coverage of the shore establishment. The plan contains the following goals.

	<u>% of Coverage</u>	<u>Number of Spaces Covered (000s)</u>
FY 82	52%	277.6
FY 83	59%	313.5
FY 84	68%	365.1
FY 85	69%	370.8
FY 86	70%	371.2
FY 87	70%	372.3

A comprehensive report was submitted to the House Armed Services Committee in October 1979 which documented the past problems, corrective actions, present status, and future plans of the SHORSTAMPS program. A detailed plan of action and milestones was contained therein which presented the program's planned objectives through FY 1987. A significant finding of the SHORSTAMPS program to date has been the documentation of substantial additional manpower requirements to accomplish required workloads within appropriate working hours. The accommodation of this additional required manpower will be an issue that must be addressed in future years as SHORSTAMPS coverage grows.

B. Significant Trends

1. Active Military

a. Manpower and Personnel Overview. During the past year, Navy has taken a hard look at the many perceived causes of personnel dissatisfaction. Concerted efforts are being made to better balance the demands made on Navy personnel with the rewards offered in return. Bona fide operational commitments and the need to meet required levels of readiness continue to demand much from our seagoing forces. The Navy expects the tempo of operations to remain at least as strong, if not stronger, in the years immediately ahead, particularly in view of the increased demands for forward deployed Naval forces in the Indian Ocean area. The long working hours and austere life at sea will continue. Prolonged family separations will not be diminished. While Navy's mission will always require extended operations at sea and overseas, it is recognized that many steps may be taken to improve the quality of work and life in the Navy. Navy has reduced the numbers of inspections markedly, begun pilot programs to test alternative manning plans for ships in overhaul, funded a number of initiatives designed to reduce working hours when ships are not deployed, and identified specific areas of pay and compensation which must improve if Navy is to attract and retain a quality fighting force. Each of these will be discussed in the paragraphs to follow. These initiatives are not expected to bear fruit immediately.

Retention. The Navy is experiencing an extreme shortage in highly trained personnel needed to fill all identified skill requirements. Currently there is a deficit of approximately 20,000 skilled petty officers with 6-17 years of service. Junior personnel are being utilized to fill a portion of this experience gap. First and second term net reenlistment rates have decreased from 39.9 percent and 59.1 percent in 1975 to 37.5 percent and 45.3 percent in 1979 resulting in this petty officer deficit. Officer retention is also a matter of concern and statistics indicate continuing serious shortfalls in naval aviators, nuclear trained officers, and medical officers.

Attrition. As in FY 1978, first term attrition continued to decline during FY 1979. It is anticipated that continuing improvements in attrition experience will result from Navy's ongoing counter-attrition program.

Desertion. The desertion rate declined slightly in FY 1979 for the second consecutive year but remains unacceptably high. Although the FY 1979 desertion rate only improved two percent in comparison with the FY 1978 rate, a comparison of the last six months of both fiscal years shows a 9 percent improvement in FY 1979, which may be an indication that recent efforts to correct the problem are starting to take effect.

Recruiting. Navy has fallen short of recruiting goals since end FY 1976. Despite comprehensive recruiting initiatives, including a revised recruiting policy for FY 1980, the high accession goals generated by current retention and attrition rates present an enormous challenge to Navy personnel management. The present All Volunteer Force environment is marked not only by a diminishing manpower availability, but also by a military compensation structure that is becoming less competitive with private sector remuneration.

b. Military Compensation and Entitlement Initiatives. It is generally accepted that military pay was competitive with the civilian sector after the pay raises of 1971 and early 1972. During the intervening years, however, the purchasing power of Regular Military Compensation (RMC) has been eroded due to inflation, pay caps, and reallocations. Navy's recruiting and retention shortfalls provide evidence that Navy is no longer competitive with the civilian sector. For instance, pay for skilled petty officers in grades E-4 to E-7 (25-34 year age group) are well below personnel in the private sector of similar age and education. In 1977, military personnel in this age group made 11.9 percent less than their civilian counterparts. This disparity has directly contributed to Navy's retention problem and has resulted in a shortage of experienced petty officers.

Recent surveys have shown that 84 percent of enlisted personnel separating from the Navy state that pay inadequacy is an important factor in their decision. It is in this area that the understanding and support of the Congress is required. Among the initiatives which have been or will soon be submitted to the Congress are certain items which are critical in nature as addressed below.

Bachelor COLA. The proposed FY 1981 budget includes cost of living funds to be paid to single military members who are stationed overseas and are provided government quarters and government mess. Personnel who live on the economy already receive COLA.

Quarters Allowance for Navy Personnel. The DoD initiative would authorize reimbursement to Navy personnel when they are deprived of their shipboard quarters because of ship repairs or other conditions which make these quarters uninhabitable.

Selective Reenlistment Bonus. The DoD initiative would raise the maximum amounts from \$15,000 to \$20,000 and allow a bonus to be paid for reenlistments between 10 and 14 years of service. Current bonus authority prohibits payments after the tenth year of service.

Military Per Diem. The request increases maximum rate of per diem allowance for military members from \$35 to \$50 and increases maximum reimbursement allowed, when travel expenses exceed the maximum rate of per diem allowance, from \$50 to \$75.

c. Workload Initiatives. While there can be little doubt that marked improvement in the recruiting and retention of trained and dedicated Naval personnel will require enactment of compensation initiatives such as outlined above, the Navy also recognizes that improvements in the conditions of naval service must also be achieved. The following outlines several of the workload initiatives which have been undertaken to minimize the unique demands that a career in the Navy currently imposes on its personnel.

Maintenance. The fleet spends less time underway now than during most of the years since WWII. However, maintenance requirements have actually increased and many people have to accomplish more maintenance and work longer hours while in port. Petty officer manning shortages add to the burden. To relieve the imbalance between work required and manhours available, the Navy has developed a program of maintenance initiatives designed to reduce the maintenance demands.

Organizational Level Maintenance Assistance. Navy is implementing a pilot program in which the Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities will provide certain organizational level maintenance assistance to ships' crews including side painting and bilge cleaning. Navy plans to expand the program in FY 1981 to provide more assistance to the mobility ratings through initiatives such as contracted organizational level maintenance training and contracted equipment repair.

Shipboard Cleaning. The shipboard cleaning equipment program has the potential to significantly reduce working hours. This program employs modern industrial cleaning technology to reduce shipboard cleaning and preservation. The goal is a 20-40 percent reduction in manhours devoted to cleaning. The Navy is accelerating this program to commence installation this year.

Corrosion Control. Implementation of new corrosion control techniques has been accelerated. These processes are a significant improvement and will greatly reduce the hours spent on shipboard preservation programs. New equipment will be installed in over a dozen maintenance facilities and on several ships commencing this year.

Inspections. The demanding post-Vietnam material readiness standards which improved fleet material conditions have been examined to locate overloads which might be imposing undue hardships on Navy personnel. A major effort for the past two years has been a program to reduce and consolidate inspections. The Naval Inspector General has been working closely with the Fleet Commander-in-Chiefs to accomplish this goal. These efforts have effected a reduction of annual or operating cycle inspections from 97 in FY 1977 to 73 in FY 1979. The goal for FY 1980 is to further reduce inspections to 56 without reducing readiness.

Scheduling. Scheduling is one of the most difficult areas in which to make near term improvements. Most of the problems with scheduling stem from the fact that commitments are generated outside the Navy

itself. This characteristic is demonstrated by such events as the deployment of carrier battle groups to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf on short notice, and maintaining them there for extended periods.

Recognizing that periodic perturbations will exist in the area of scheduling, the CNO has nonetheless moved to more equitably balance deployment requirements. Long range employment schedules now exist in both fleets to provide an improved schedule stability which should assist sailors and their families. The FY 1980 schedules show that, international developments permitting, the surface combatant turnaround to deployment ratio will near the goal of 2:1 (two months in port for each month deployed) which is a significant improvement from years past.

Closely associated with Navy efforts in scheduling is the reduction in the number of homeport changes for overhauls and out of homeport repair periods. Navy has initiated a program to match overhaul capability with homeport and is developing a strategy to accomplish this in the FY 1980-86 time frame. The purpose of this effort is to provide more time in homeport for ships' crews and also to reduce costly permanent change of station moves.

d. Officer Procurement Goals. Active officer procurement goals are shown in the following table:

Active Navy Officer Procurement Goals

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Plan	7,258	8,168	7,890
Actual	6,925	-	-

Navy realized 6,925 accessions in FY 1979, which was 333 short of the 7,258 accession goal. Overall losses were 109 less than planned. Adjustments to delete erroneous pre-FY 1979 accessions from the Navy Strength Reporting System resulted in a total end strength deficit of 811. Accession shortfalls reflect Navy's continuing difficulty in recruiting to the engineer/technical programs, as well as problems in attaining the desired pilot training rate. The FY 1979 shortfall creates a requirement for 8,168 accessions to meet the FY 1980 planned end strength of 63,735. A significant improvement in the officer retention area would decrease this accession number.

e. Enlisted Accession Goals. Navy fell short of its FY 1979 "One Navy" accession goal by 5,045. "One Navy" includes all active duty USN and USNR accessions plus a limited number of first enlistments in the Naval Reserve Ready Mariner program. This recruiting shortfall, along with fewer losses than programmed, resulted in an enlisted end strength of 455,041 against an authorized end-strength of 456,125. Earlier reports had shown an enlisted end strength of 457,102. ADP processing subsequent to these initial reports revealed that the actual

FY 1979 strength was 2,061 lower than originally reported. In FY 1979, 76.1 percent of all male non-prior service accessions were high school diploma graduates. In order to obtain a better balance between requirements and manpower supply, Navy implemented a revised recruiting policy on 1 Oct 79. Navy's former policy required 76 percent of male non-prior service accessions to be high school diploma graduates. Under the revised policy 74 percent of male non-prior service accessions must be in Mental Groups I/III Upper. This policy provides a better match between manpower supply and Navy requirements than did the previous policy. It is expected that 72 percent of FY 1980 male non-prior service accessions will be high school diploma graduates. The FY 1980 "One Navy" enlisted accession goal is 16 percent higher than FY 1979 attainment and presents a formidable challenge to Navy's recruiting force. The revised recruiting policy, the planned accession of larger numbers of high quality female accessions and prior service accessions, and other management initiatives will assist Navy in meeting the FY 1980 accession goal. Navy also intends to request continuation of the recruiter reprogramming action which was approved by the Appropriation Committees in FY 1979. Specific "One Navy" accession goals and attainments are:

"One Navy" Enlisted Accession Goals

Quantity

	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Goal	103,325	116,314	94,735	93,390	102,432	102,800
Actual	103,587	111,557	89,009	88,345	-	-

f. Petty Officer Plans. The Enlisted Force Management Plan establishes as a longterm goal a strength of approximately 197,000 for petty officer grades E-5 through E-9 (without officer candidates). The strength in these top five pay grades is anticipated to grow steadily from an end FY 1979 level of 187,641 to about 196,000 by end FY 1984 if the Navy retention goals are achieved.

2. Naval Reserve

a. Manpower Reorganization. During FY 1978, the Navy initiated development of the Navy Manpower Mobilization System (NAMMOS) to provide an ongoing method of refining the alignment of the structure of the Naval Reserve with the Navy's total force requirements. Based on this program, substantial changes occur in the distribution of Selected Reserve manpower requirements within the various Defense Planning and Programming Categories between FY 1979 and FY 1980 in order to reflect overall total force manning priorities. A description of NAMMOS is provided in Paragraph C.3. of this chapter.

Reflected in the size of the Naval Selected Reserve are the manpower changes associated with the items discussed in Section A.2 regarding changes in the Naval Reserve Force.

b. Hardware Modernization. Improved capabilities are programmed for the Naval Reserve in FY 1981 as follows:

(1) Two Maritime Patrol Squadrons (VP) are scheduled to upgrade from P-3A to P-3B aircraft. One squadron is scheduled to commence transition to the P-3B TACNAVMOD aircraft.

(2) The three additional C-9B aircraft procured as a result of FY 1979 and FY 1980 appropriations will be assigned to a Naval Reserve Logistics Support Squadron to replace retiring C-118 aircraft.

3. Civilian Manpower

a. Manpower Overview

The FY 1981 Navy civilian end strength request of 290,878 represents an increase of 2,170 above the FY 1980 level. The FY 1981 estimate reflects new contracting out initiatives which net to a reduction of 1,849, which is partially offset by the addition of 112 for contract administration. The FY 1981 estimate includes an increase of 1,910 for Naval Shipyards to accommodate the ship maintenance program. Much of the shipyard increase (1,130) is specifically related to service life extension work on the carrier SARATOGA. An increase of 549 end strength is reflected for the Military Sealift Command associated with full manning required for fleet support ships undergoing overhaul in FY 1980 and civilian mariners required for additional scientific support ships. Other significant increases include 376 in support of the TRIDENT program, principally attributed to the continuing phased buildup of the refit facility in Bangor, Washington, and an increase of 443 in the ordnance and maintenance area provides for a reduction in the maintenance backlog, reduced repair times, and increased quality control.

b. Contracting Out

Navy's budget assumes economical conversion to commercial contract under the provisions of OMB Circular A-76 of selected functions heretofore performed by in-house personnel. The budget projects the successful contracting out of 4,122 civilian positions by end FY 1980 and a cumulative 5,971 by end FY 1981. The detailed comparative cost studies required in this process are taking longer than anticipated. Additionally, because of delays in implementing the revised guidance contained in OMB Circular A-76 and additional administrative burdens created by the provisions of Section 806 of the FY 1980 Authorization Act, the FY 1980 civilian end strength savings of 4,122 may not be fully realized.

C. Management Initiatives

1. Manpower Management Reorganization. The FY 1980 Defense Manpower Requirements Report provided details of a major Navy headquarters manpower management reorganization which was effected on 1 November 1978. The basic goal of this reorganization was to unify and integrate Total Force (active and reserve military as well as civilian manpower

and contractor support) policy development and integrated planning and programming functions under a single new manpower executive, the DCNO (Manpower, Personnel and Training), OP-01. Additionally, through the integration and realignment of existing resources and organizations, two new manpower commands, the Naval Military Personnel Command (NMPC) and the Naval Civilian Personnel Command (NCPC) were created and placed under the cognizance of the new DCNO(MPT).

The new Total Force manpower management organization has now been in existence for a little over a year. Substantial management improvements are noticeable in the annual manpower programming process, the monitoring of program execution, and the integration of manpower and training management. The planning and programming of civilian personnel has been more tightly integrated into the OPNAV staff. Finally, procedures for the interaction of the OPNAV staff with the military (NMPC) and civilian (NCPC) Personnel Commands have been initiated. Although any reorganization of the scope undertaken by Navy last year will require continuing modification and adjustment for some time, there is little question but that the new organization has permitted Navy to more effectively manage its manpower, personnel, and training resources in the current All Volunteer Force environment.

2. Manpower Requirements vs. Hardware Procurement (HARDMAN)

The HARDMAN project is beginning to provide manpower and hardware planners with the capability to conduct man-machine tradeoffs early in the acquisition process and thus control manpower requirements growth and equipment life cycle costs stemming from the design and acquisition of new weapons systems. Development of analytical capabilities is progressing to support these man-machine tradeoffs and life cycle cost analyses early in new system design. New manpower and training requirements determination and review procedures are being integrated into the weapons system acquisition process. These actions will enable manpower and training resource limitations to be explicitly considered during systems design and will enable the supportability of new hardware to be assessed before acquisition decisions are made. HARDMAN development is proceeding on schedule.

3. Navy Manpower Mobilization System (NAMMOS)

The Navy Manpower Mobilization System (NAMMOS), currently under review by OSD, is a major effort to define and identify full mobilization manpower requirements. Its primary objective is to institute a dynamic system capable of displaying mobilization workload and the resulting qualitative and quantitative manpower requirements for a variety of scenarios. In NAMMOS workload planning factors for aggregated functional areas are used to determine scenario-dependent manpower mobilization requirements. FY 1979 system development addressed the first 60 days of the mobilization scenario. In FY 1980, NAMMOS is programmed to generate manpower mobilization requirements, both military and civilian, for an entire 180-day mobilization scenario. The NAMMOS requirements determination process is compatible with methodology employed in existing

Navy manpower systems, particularly the SHORSTAMPS program described previously. The system will facilitate decision making on structuring and integrating mobilization requirements from all sources (i.e., active military, civilian, Individual Ready Reserve, Selected Reserve, retired military, etc.).

4. Mobilization Manpower Requirements

Currently, mobilization requirements for ships and aircraft are developed under the ship and squadron manpower documentation systems described previously. In determining support mobilization requirements, total manpower authorizations are derived from approved JCS and Navy OPLANS and war plans. This manpower is then identified to the billet level, the relationship within the unit, skill levels of the billet, and time-phasing of the billet requirement from peacetime through the various stages of post-mobilization. NAMMOS will complement this procedure and assist in properly calculating reserve strengths required to support active duty military and civilian mobilization requirements. Augmentation plans will focus on the period following the intensive initial mobilization effort beyond which the initial surge capability of existing manpower resources cannot be sustained. Advantages of this approach include a prioritization of augmentation requirements based on the ability of on-board manpower to assume additional tasking in an expanded workweek; and an orderly spacing of augmentation through the initial phases of mobilization; and a realistic augmentation schedule to facilitate associated accession, training, and transportation planning.

D. Navy Manpower Requirements by Defense Planning and Programming Categories (DPPC).

This section summarizes changes in Navy's manpower totals in terms of force and program changes which dictate year-to-year adjustments in overall Navy strength. The tables on pages 13 through 15 display Navy active military, Selected Reserve, and civilian manpower by DPPC over the period FY 1979 through FY 1981. Following these tables, each sub-category is discussed separately with an explanation provided for all changes amounting to 100 or more between FY 1979 and FY 1980 and between FY 1980 and FY 1981.

NAVY ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1979</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 1980</u> <u>FY 1981 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1981</u> <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>20.7</u>	<u>20.0</u>	<u>18.5</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	19.3	18.5	17.0
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	1.4	1.5	1.6
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>234.8</u>	<u>241.7</u>	<u>244.9</u>
Land Forces	2.7	3.1	3.1
Tactical Air Forces	57.7	61.3	60.2
Naval Forces	174.2	177.0	181.3
Mobility Forces	0.2	0.3	0.3
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>23.0</u>	<u>23.7</u>	<u>24.3</u>
Intelligence	7.8	8.2	8.4
Centrally Managed Communications	7.6	7.5	8.0
Research and Development	5.7	6.2	6.0
Geophysical Activities	1.9	1.8	1.9
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>139.6</u>	<u>139.8</u>	<u>142.1</u>
Base Operating Support	60.3	59.4	59.3
Medical Support	10.8	10.5	10.4
Personnel Support	7.5	7.0	7.5
Individual Training	24.4	25.8	27.5
Force Support Training	13.5	13.6	13.4
Central Logistics	6.6	7.0	7.1
Centralized Support Activities	7.3	7.1	7.2
Management Headquarters	8.1	8.4	8.6
Federal Agency Support	1.1	1.0	1.1
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u> ^{1/}	<u>418.2</u>	<u>425.2</u>	<u>429.8</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>103.5</u>	<u>102.8</u>	<u>103.8</u>
Transients	28.0	25.1	25.9
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	5.1	4.8	4.8
Students, Trainees	65.9	68.4	68.7
Cadets	4.5	4.4	4.4
<u>Total</u>	<u>521.7</u>	<u>528.0</u>	<u>533.6</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

^{1/} Manpower totals in Force Structure categories reflect a temporary undermanning that occurs on 30 September of each fiscal year. An explanation of this undermanning is at paragraph D.1. of this chapter.

NAVAL SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1979</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 1980</u> <u>FY 1981 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1981</u> <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	0.5	0.4	0.4
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>56.4</u>	<u>59.7</u>	<u>59.7</u>
Land Forces	2.6	1.9	1.9
Tactical Air Forces	3.4	4.2	4.5
Naval Forces	49.3	52.6	52.2
Mobility Forces	1.1	1.0	1.0
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>6.9</u>	<u>5.0</u>	<u>5.1</u>
Intelligence	4.0	4.2	4.3
Centrally Managed Communications	2.0	0.4	0.4
Research and Development	0.6	0.1	0.1
Geophysical Activities	0.2	0.3	0.3
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>23.8</u>	<u>21.1</u>	<u>21.3</u>
Base Operating Support	11.5	4.9	4.9
Medical Support	1.2	3.6	3.6
Personnel Support	-	0.8	0.8
Individual Training	0.9	0.5	0.5
Force Support Training	0.2	0.5	0.5
Central Logistics	4.8	6.2	6.2
Centralized Support Activities	2.1	1.4	1.4
Management Headquarters	3.1	3.2	3.3
Federal Agency Support	*	0.1	0.1
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>87.5</u>	<u>86.2</u>	<u>86.5</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>0.9</u>
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	0.8	0.8	0.9
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>88.3</u>	<u>87.0</u>	<u>87.4</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

* Fewer than 50.

NAVY CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1979 Actual</u>	<u>FY 1980 FY 1981 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1981</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>2.9</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	2.0	2.2	2.6
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>5.9</u>	<u>5.9</u>	<u>6.5</u>
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	0.1	0.1	0.1
Naval Forces	0.8	0.9	0.9
Mobility Forces	4.9	5.0	5.5
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>36.8</u>	<u>36.5</u>	<u>36.5</u>
Intelligence	1.5	1.6	1.6
Centrally Managed Communications	2.9	3.1	3.1
Research and Development	31.1	30.5	30.4
Geophysical Activities	1.3	1.3	1.3
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>245.5</u>	<u>243.7</u>	<u>245.0</u>
Base Operating Support	64.5	64.7	63.0
Medical Support	4.8	5.2	5.2
Personnel Support	1.3	1.3	1.4
Individual Training	3.5	3.5	3.5
Force Support Training	1.5	1.6	1.7
Central Logistics	154.8	151.9	154.5
Centralized Support Activities	6.6	6.8	6.8
Management Headquarters	8.5	8.6	8.8
Federal Agency Support	*	*	*
<u>Total</u>	<u>290.4</u>	<u>288.7</u>	<u>290.9</u>

Note: Detail may not add to total due to rounding.

* Fewer than 50.

1. Manning Adjustments

End of Fiscal Year 1979 (30 September 1979) data reflect the actual distribution of personnel by DPPC. New accessions do not join the force in an even flow throughout the year because the pool of potential new recruits is largest in the summer. Further, in order to accommodate the family needs of the career force, a higher proportion of PCS moves occur in the summer months. These factors result in significant seasonal manning imbalances between the force structure and the individuals accounts (where new accession students and transients are reflected).

Adjustments have been made to FY 1980 and FY 1981 manpower requirements displays to reflect them on an end-of-fiscal year basis. This has been done in order to permit a valid comparison between actual FY 1979 totals and programmed FY 1980 and FY 1981 required strengths. The seasonal adjustment is an estimate of the undermanning of the force structure and the overmanning of the individuals accounts (which are programmed on the basis of average student loads and PCS move requirements during the fiscal year) which occurs on 30 September. The adjustments have been spread proportionately across all DPPC categories as outlined in the table below. It should be noted that these seasonal adjustments are offsetting and therefore have no numerical impact on Navy's manpower authorization request in these years.

Active Military Manning Adjustments by DPPC

<u>DPPC</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>-583</u>	<u>-525</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	-541	-480
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-
Strategic Control & Surveillance	-42	-45
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>-7,053</u>	<u>-6,927</u>
Land Forces	-91	-88
Tactical Air Forces	-1,790	-1,702
Naval Forces	-5,165	-5,130
Mobility Forces	-7	-7
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>-693</u>	<u>-692</u>
Intelligence	-241	-238
Centrally Managed Communications	-220	-226
Research and Development	-180	-169
Geophysical Activities	-52	-59
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>-4,081</u>	<u>-4,016</u>
Base Operating Support	-1,734	-1,678
Medical Support	-306	-294
Personnel Support	-205	-213
Individual Training	-753	-777
Force Support Training	-396	-378
Central Logistics	-202	-199
Centralized Support Activities	-208	-203
Management Headquarters	-246	-244
Federal Agency Support	-31	-30
 Total Force Structure Adjustment	 <u>-12,410</u>	 <u>-12,160</u>

2. Strategic

Navy Strategic Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	20.7	20.0	18.5
Reserve Components	0.5	0.4	0.4
<u>Civilian</u>	2.3	2.5	2.9

The Strategic category consists of those nuclear offensive, defensive, and control and surveillance forces which have as their fundamental objective deterrence and defense against nuclear attack upon the United States, our military forces, bases overseas, and our allies. Within Navy, the large majority of manpower in this category comprise ship manpower associated with the Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) System, including both SSBNs and their tenders. The TRIDENT program, strategic operational headquarters, and communications/ADP support are also included.

A slight reduction of Navy Strategic manpower requirements is experienced between FY 1979 and FY 1980. During this period, growth in manpower requirements associated with the TRIDENT program is offset by reductions in Fleet Ballistic Missile submarine manpower. Between FY 1980 and FY 1981, additional TRIDENT precommissioning crew requirements and TRIDENT shore support requirements in Bangor, Washington account for increase of 700. Offsetting this increase, however, is a decrease of approximately 1,000 FBM manpower requirements including the transfer of five SSBNs to the Naval Forces category. An additional reduction of approximately 1,200 occurs as a result of the transfer of the submarine tender, PROTEUS, from the Strategic category to a conventional warfare support role in the Naval Forces category.

The reduction of 100 Selected Reserves from FY 1979 to FY 1980 represents the transfer of one submarine tender augment unit from Strategic forces to Tactical/Mobility forces.

The majority of the increase in civilian manpower in this category is in support of TRIDENT program requirements, principally related to the continuing phased build up of the Refit Facility in Bangor, Washington.

3. Tactical/Mobility

The Tactical/Mobility category is composed of manpower requirements associated with conventional warfare forces and their operational headquarters and supporting units. Within the overall Tactical/Mobility category, Navy manpower is contained in the separate subcategories of Land Forces, Tactical Air Forces, Naval Forces, and Mobility Forces. Each of these subcategories is addressed separately below.

a. Land Forces. Navy Land Forces strength includes doctors, chaplains, hospital corpsmen, and dental technicians assigned to Marine Corps divisions, regiments, and air stations. The following table shows Navy manpower committed to Land Forces.

Navy Land Forces
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	2.7	3.1	3.1
Reserve Components	2.6	1.9	1.9

Active military manpower requirements in support of Marine Corps land forces remains stable during the period, FY 1979 through FY 1980. An apparent increase in requirements between FY 1979 and FY 1980 is the result of undermanning of total Land Force requirements occurring at the end of FY 1979.

The reduction of 700 Selected Reserves from FY 1979 to FY 1980 is the result of decreasing the Selected Reserve support of the Marine forces.

b. Tactical Air Forces. The Tactical Air Forces subcategory includes manpower associated with Navy fighter, attack, reconnaissance, and special operations squadrons; multipurpose aircraft carriers, and tactical air operational headquarters units. The following table reflects Navy manpower associated with Tactical Air Forces.

Navy Tactical Air Forces Manpower^{1/}
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	57.7	61.3	60.2
Reserve Components	3.4	4.2	4.5
<u>Civilian</u>	0.1	0.1	0.1

1/ Includes manpower for multipurpose carriers and associated air wings.

The apparent increase of active Navy Tactical Air Force manpower requirements between FY 1979 and FY 1980 is entirely the result of undermanning in TACAIR units at the end of FY 1979. TACAIR manpower requirements actually decrease by approximately 1,000 during this period as a result of reductions of carrier and reconnaissance manpower requirements. Between FY 1980 and FY 1981, a further reduction of active TACAIR manpower requirements occurs. During this period, manpower savings resulting from the deactivation of the SARATOGA during the period of SLEP

modernization are offset by increased precommissioning crew requirements for the nuclear carrier, VINSON, scheduled to be commissioned in FY 1982. Reductions in overall carrier manpower requirements (800) and other TACAIR adjustments (400) result in an overall decrease in this category of approximately 1,100 end strength.

The increases of 800 Selected Reserves from FY 1979 to FY 1980 is attributed to the first phase of a new requirement to augment aircraft carriers. The increase of 300 from FY 1980 to FY 1981 represents the second phase of this requirement.

c. Naval Forces. This subcategory includes manpower strength related to ASW and Fleet Air Defense Forces, Amphibious Forces, and Naval Support Forces. As the largest subcategory of active military and reserve manpower in the Navy, it includes virtually all ship manpower requirements exclusive of the FBM manpower reflected in the Strategic category and the carrier manpower shown under Tactical Air Forces. The following table depicts total Navy strength contained in the Naval Forces subcategory.

Naval Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	174.2	177.0	181.3
Reserve Components	49.3	52.6	52.2
<u>Civilian</u>	0.8	0.9	0.9

The increase of active Naval Forces manpower requirements between FY 1979 and FY 1980 totals only 800 although the table above suggests a considerably larger increase because of substantial under-manning in this category experienced at the end of FY 1979. This increase parallels the overall growth in active fleet size from a total of 458 ships in FY 1979 to a total of 462 ships in FY 1980.

Between FY 1980 and FY 1981, active Naval Forces manpower requirements increase by approximately 4,300. This increase is primarily attributable to increased ship manning requirements which parallel growth in the size of the active fleet to a total of 477 ships in FY 1981. Manpower in the area of ASW and Fleet Air Defense Forces increases by 4,900 as a result of the increase of 12 major surface combatant ships and ten attack submarines. Of the increase in the attack submarine force, five reflect deliveries from new construction while the remaining five are former POLARIS-type FBM submarines being transferred from the Strategic category. There is a net decrease of approximately 600 in the Amphibious Forces because of the transfer of three amphibious assault ships to the Naval Reserve Forces. This overall

increase in active Naval Forces manpower is offset somewhat by reduced active duty support requirements associated with the scheduled decommissioning of 14 older Naval Reserve Forces destroyers in FY 1981.

The Naval Forces increase of 3,300 Selected Reserve requirements between FY 1979 and FY 1980 is the result of force level changes and the need for priority manning of these Naval forces requirements. The reduction of 400 Selected Reserve requirements from FY 1980 to FY 1981 reflects the decommissioning of 14 destroyers (-800), 2 HAL helicopter light attack squadrons (-100), 4 HS helicopter squadrons (-800), and 1 VR (C118) aircraft squadron (-200). Additions include amphibious assault ships (+200), increased manning of mobile construction battalions (+100), and increased augmentation of destroyer tender forces (+600), support of Navy control of shipping (+500), and operational staffs (+100).

The civilian increase in FY 1980 reflects minor adjustments in the Ship Support Improvement Program and the Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activities.

d. Mobility Forces. Included in this subcategory is Navy strength associated with its required airlift/sealift capability as well as port terminal and traffic management operations. Navy manpower in the Mobility Forces category is shown below.

Navy Mobility Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.2	0.3	0.3
Reserve Components	1.1	1.0	1.0
<u>Civilian</u>	4.9	5.0	5.5

The increase of Navy active military manpower between FY 1979 and FY 1980 results entirely from undermanning of Mobility Forces requirements at the end of FY 1979. Active Navy manpower requirements in this category remain stable over the entire period shown.

The decrease of 100 Selected Reserves from FY 1979 to FY 1980 represents a change necessary to effect priority manning of other Selected Reserve units.

The FY 1981 increase in civilian Mobility Forces manpower reflects restoration of full civilian mariner manning required for fleet support ships which were undergoing overhaul in FY 1980. Increased civilian mariner manning is also required for additional scientific support ships.

4. Auxiliary Activities

Strength included in the category of Auxiliary Activities is associated with Department of the Navy programs which come under centralized DoD control. The various programs include Intelligence, Centrally Managed Communications, Research and Development, and Geophysical Activities. Each of these programs constitutes a separate category of manpower as detailed below.

a. Intelligence. This category contains strength for the centralized intelligence gathering and analytic agencies and activities of the Department of Defense consisting of the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) and the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP), including intelligence communications.

Navy Intelligence Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active ^{1/}	7.8	8.2	8.4
Reserve Components	4.0	4.2	4.3
<u>Civilian</u>	1.5	1.6	1.6

^{1/} Not included in the above totals are military personnel in combat related intelligence units.

Navy active military requirements in the Intelligence category increase by only 100 between FY 1979 and FY 1980 primarily as a result of increased support requirements at the National Security Agency. A larger increase between these years suggested in the table above occurs as a result of seasonal undermanning in this category experienced at the end of FY 1979. The increase of 200 active military between FY 1980 and FY 1981 reflects additional increases in support requirement at the National Security Agency and increased cryptologic efforts at numerous Navy Security Group locations.

The increase of 200 Selected Reserves from FY 1979 to FY 1980 and the increase of 100 from FY 1980 to FY 1981 result from the need to effect priority manning of these Selected Reserve units.

The civilian increase in FY 1980 reflects minor changes in the intelligence community.

b. Centrally Managed Communications. This subcategory reflects strength associated with the Defense Communications System, internal Navy communications requirements, satellite communications systems, communications security and other related communications units. The following table reflects Navy strength associated with these communications requirements.

Navy Centrally Managed Communications
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.6	7.5	8.0
Reserve Components	2.0	0.4	0.4
<u>Civilian</u>	2.9	3.1	3.1

Between FY 1980 and FY 1981, active military requirements in this category increase by approximately 500. This increase is caused by a variety of minor increases at numerous Navy communications sites.

The decrease of 1,600 Selected Reserves from FY 1979 to FY 1980 is the result of changes necessary to man other higher priority Selected Reserve units.

The increase in FY 1980 civilian spaces is attributable to increases at the various major worldwide communications facilities.

c. Research and Development. The Navy's R&D community consists of headquarters, laboratories, RDT&E project ships, test and evaluation activities, and support offices. The largest segment of people are in the R&D laboratories. The Navy's R&D efforts are comprehensive, since they must deal with land, sea, air, and undersea operations. In-house work is performed at 30 Navy RDT&E installations, including seven medical laboratories and 12 industrially-funded facilities such as the Naval Research Laboratory, the David W. Taylor Naval Ship Research and Development Center, and the Naval Air Development Center. The following table depicts Navy's R&D strength.

Navy Research and Development Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	5.7	6.2	6.0
Reserve Components	0.6	0.1	0.1
<u>Civilian</u>	31.1	30.5	30.4

The increase of Navy active manpower in this category in FY 1980 primarily stems from the transfer of various Operational Test and Evaluation units to this category in FY 1980 from the category of Centralized Support Activities (+400) plus an additional amount of undermanning experienced at the end of FY 1979. The reduction of 200 active military in FY 1981 reflects a general decrease of manpower requirements at a variety of industrially-funded R&D laboratories including the Naval Air Test Center, NAS Patuxent River.

The decrease of 500 Selected Reserves from FY 1979 to FY 1980 is the result of the need to effect priority manning of other Selected Reserve units.

The civilian manpower reduction in FY 1980 reflects contracting initiatives and anticipated productivity improvements. The FY 1981 manpower level reflects additional contracting initiatives.

d. Geophysical Activities. The Navy's geophysical effort includes the Naval Observatory and various oceanographic and meteorological activities. These activities employ professional meteorologists, oceanographers, geophysicists, mathematicians, engineers, and technical specialists, as well as a small headquarters staff.

Navy Geophysical Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.9	1.8	1.9
Reserve Components	0.2	0.3	0.3
<u>Civilian</u>	1.3	1.3	1.3

A reduction of approximately 100 active military manpower requirements in this category between FY 1979 and FY 1980 reflects a general decrease in Navy geophysical support units including those associated with navigational aid requirements and air support units. An increase of 100 active military between FY 1980 and FY 1981 occurs as a result of the addition of a surveying ship from the National Defense Reserve Fleet to provide additional required support of mapping, charting, and geodesy efforts.

The increase of 100 Selected Reserves from FY 1979 to FY 1980 reflects the priority manning of Naval Weather Service units.

5. Support Activities

This category includes strength associated with base operating support requirements of both combat and support installations. Also included are centralized organizations, activities, and services consisting of medical and personnel support, individual and force support training, logistics, management headquarters, federal agency support, and other centralized support activities.

a. Base Operating Support. Strength in this subcategory provides for the operation and maintenance of installations for both combat and support forces. Base operating support totals for combat forces provide for strategic, tactical, and airlift and sealift commands, including supporting base communications and air traffic control. Base operating support totals for support forces provide for auxiliary forces, research and development, logistics, training, medical, and administrative commands.

Navy Base Operating Support Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	60.3	59.4	59.3
Reserve Components	11.5	4.9	4.9
<u>Civilian</u>	64.5	64.7	63.0

All Navy manpower totals in the table above reflect substantially increased Navy Base Operating Support over those shown in the FY 1980 DMRR because of the transfer of Medical BOS support units to this category as itemized in the Manpower Data Structure chapter of this report. Changes in active Navy manpower requirements in this category between FY 1979 and FY 1980 largely reflect end-of-year manning variances in these years.

The Active military manpower requirement decrease of approximately 100 between FY 1980 and FY 1981 represents the net of numerous minor changes in this category which encompasses over 1,000 separately identifiable BOS units and components. Overall, BOS requirements at combat installations decline by approximately 300 while requirements at support installations increase by 200.

The decrease of 6,600 Selected Reserves from FY 1979 to FY 1980 is a result of changes required to man other Selected Reserve units.

Civilian increases in FY 1980 for fleet ship repair support, the CHAMPUS program, and commissary operations are offset by contracting initiatives in the training support area and the public works centers. The reduction in FY 1981 is principally due to additional contracting initiatives.

b. Medical Support. Navy manpower requirements included in this category represent that strength required to provide medical care in DOD military medical facilities, including medical centers, hospitals, clinics, dispensaries, infirmaries, and laboratories; and for medical care to qualified individuals in non-DOD facilities. Navy Medical Support requirements are shown in the following table.

Navy Medical Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	10.8	10.5	10.4
Reserve Components	1.2	3.6	3.6
<u>Civilian</u>	4.8	5.2	5.2

As discussed in reference to Navy Base Operating Support totals, Navy manpower requirements in the Navy Medical Support category shown above are substantially lower than comparable totals reflected in the FY 1980 DMRR because of the transfer of medical base support manpower to the BOS category itemized in the Manpower Data Structure chapter later in this report. The active Navy manpower reduction of approximately 100 between FY 1980 and FY 1981 reflects numerous minor reductions at Navy Regional Medical and Dental Centers including the National Navy Medical Center in Bethesda, Md.

The increase of 2,400 Selected Reserve from FY 1979 to FY 1980 is a result of the need to priority man medical support units with Selected Reservists.

The increase in civilian manpower in FY 1980 is principally for improving the CHAMPUS program and occupational/health services.

c. Personnel Support. This strength category includes manpower requirements associated with Navy recruiting and examining, the overseas dependents education program, reception centers, disciplinary barracks, centrally-funded welfare and morale programs, the Armed Forces Information Program, and civilian career training and intern programs. This category also includes research and development manpower requirements for human factors and personnel development research.

Navy Personnel Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.5	7.0	7.5
Reserve Components	-	0.8	0.8
<u>Civilian</u>	1.3	1.3	1.4

The reduction in Navy Personnel Support manpower requirements indicated between FY 1979 and FY 1980 primarily reflects manning imbalances experienced at the end of FY 1979 and the effects of additional recruiter manning authorized by the Congress. Actual Navy manpower requirements in this category remain virtually level between these years. The increase of approximately 500 active military requirements in this category between FY 1980 and FY 1981 comprises approximately 400 associated with expanded recruiting efforts at various districts throughout the U.S., and 100 associated with deserter apprehension efforts.

The increase of 800 Selected Reserves from FY 1979 to FY 1980 is a result of transferring Personnel Mobilization Team augment units from the category of Centralized Support Activities to Personnel Support.

The civilian increase in FY 1981 is principally for expanding the Navy Campus for Achievement Program to cover 85 percent of the Navy population. These personnel provide Navy-wide management, regional administration, and on-site operation of all Navy off-duty education.

d. Individual Training. This category contains the strength required to conduct and support formal military and technical training as well as professional education of military personnel conducted under the centralized control of service training commands. Training activities in this category encompass recruit training, officer acquisition training (including ROTC), general skill training, flight training, professional development education, health care individual training, and training support activities.

Manpower in the Individual Training Category conducts and supports training of students and trainees of the active Navy in both PCS and TAD (temporary duty) status and also Naval Reservists on active duty for training. The students and trainees in PCS status are carried in the Individuals category; those in TAD status are included in the categories of their parent commands.

Navy Individual Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	24.4	25.8	27.5
Reserve Components	0.9	0.5	0.5
<u>Civilian</u>	3.5	3.5	3.5

The increase of active military manpower in this category between FY 1979 and FY 1980 primarily results from undermanning of Navy Individual Training requirements at the end of FY 1979. Manpower requirements in this category remain essentially level between these two years.

The overall increase of approximately 1,700 active military manpower requirements between FY 1980 and FY 1981 is largely the result of the instructor-intensive nature of additional courses required to support the introduction of new and more complex weapons systems into the fleet; expanded training of Navy's first-term personnel as replacement for experienced career personnel losses; an upgrade of the military supervision and instruction provided to trainees; and the correction of long-standing deficiencies in military instructor resources. Additional instructor resources reduce the requirement for student strength by reduction of average instruction time and improved quality of instruction. Naval training is requiring a proportionately greater investment in personnel as more complex systems enter the fleet. As an example, the FFG-7 and DD-963/993 class ships are powered by gas turbines while the GEARING class destroyers which they are replacing are powered with steam propulsion. The length of initial skill training associated with gas turbine technology is 25 weeks as opposed to the 10 weeks of initial skill training required by boiler technicians. An overall increase of approximately 1,900 general skill training instructors is partially offset by a reduction of approximately 200 people in the flight training area. This decrease is associated with the introduction of the T-34C aircraft which is maintained and supported by contractor personnel.

The decrease of 400 Selected Reserves from FY 1979 to FY 1980 is a result of the need to man other high priority Selected Reserve units.

e. Force Support Training. Force Support Training strength is composed of manpower requirements of units which provide training to, or evaluation of, organized crews and units in conjunction with the performance of a specific mission. Navy civilian support in this area consists primarily of maintenance and clerical support of fleet air training units. The student pipeline programmed for Force Support Training is included in the Student and Trainee subcategory of the DPPC category of Individuals.

Navy Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	13.5	13.6	13.4
Reserve Components	0.2	0.5	0.5
<u>Civilian</u>	1.5	1.6	1.7

A small increase in active Navy Force Support Training manpower between FY 1979 and FY 1980 primarily reflects increased instructional and maintenance requirements associated with introduction of new flight simulator equipment at various readiness training locations. The decrease of 200 active military requirements between FY 1980 and FY 1981 results from the deactivation of an F-4 readiness training squadron.

The increase of 300 Selected Reserves from FY 1979 to FY 1980 is a result of priority manning requirements in this area.

The civilian increases represent modest adjustments for readiness squadrons, simulator acquisition, and simulator operation and maintenance.

f. Central Logistics. Manpower requirements reflected in this category represent Navy strength associated with supply operations (supply depots and centers, inventory control points, centralized procurement offices, etc.), maintenance operations (naval air rework facilities, shipyards, naval avionics facility, inactive ship maintenance facilities, etc.), and logistic support operations.

Navy Central Logistics Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	6.6	7.0	7.1
Reserve Components	4.8	6.2	6.2
<u>Civilian</u>	154.8	151.9	154.5

The increase in Navy active military manpower requirements between FY 1979 and FY 1980 results entirely from undermanning of Navy Central Logistics manpower requirements at the end of FY 1979. The active military increase of 100 between FY 1980 and FY 1981 reflects increased requirements associated with procurement of the AEGIS combat weapon system and minor increases at various Navy shipyards.

The increase of 1,400 Selected Reserves from FY 1979 to FY 1980 is a result of the priority manning requirements of Selected Reservists in this area

The following table summarizes Navy manpower by type of logistic operation during the period FY 1979 through FY 1981.

Central Logistics Manpower by Type of Operation
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active			
Supply Operations	1.5	1.7	1.8
Maintenance Operations	3.7	3.7	3.7
Logistic Support Operations	1.3	1.6	1.6
Total	6.6	7.0	7.1
Reserve Components			
Supply Operations	1.7	1.9	1.9
Maintenance Operations	1.7	2.5	2.5
Logistic Support Operations	1.4	1.8	1.8
Total	4.8	6.2	6.2
<u>Civilian</u>			
Supply Operations	23.7	22.4	22.2
Maintenance Operations	116.5	114.7	117.1
Logistic Support Operations	14.6	14.8	15.2
Total	154.8	151.9	154.5

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

(1) Supply Operations - This category includes the Supply Depots, Inventory Control Points and Procurement Activities that provide support to the fleet and contract expertise for the acquisition of ship and aircraft systems. The decline in civilian spaces through FY 1981 is due almost entirely to planned economical contracting efforts at the supply depots and ICPs.

(2) Maintenance Operations

- Naval Air Rework Facilities. The air rework facilities perform depot level maintenance of aircraft and components, manufacture critical nonavailable parts, and provide technical assistance to intermediate maintenance organizations. The total of 22,700 civilian spaces are planned for end FY 1980 and FY 1981 in order to meet funded workload.

- Naval Shipyards. The naval shipyards provide logistics support for assigned ships and service craft; perform authorized work in connection with construction, conversion, overhaul, repair, alteration, drydocking, and outfitting ships and craft; and perform manufacturing research, development and test work.

- The majority of the civilian manpower decrease in the Maintenance Operations for FY 1980 occurs in the shipyards and reflects the orderly workload phasing throughout the year. The FY 1981 civilian workforce is expected to be about 68,600, an increase of 1,900 over FY 1980, including an increase of 1,100 in support of the Carrier SARATOGA Service Life Extension Program (CV-SLEP) scheduled to commence in FY 1981 at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard.

- Ordnance Activities. The Naval Ordnance Activities are responsible for receiving, renovating, maintaining, storing and issuing ammunition, explosives, expendable ordnance items and weapons and ordnance material; providing technical, engineering and logistics support for combat systems, components, and support systems and equipment; proofing, testing, and evaluating underwater weapons and exercising design cognizance of underwater acoustic ranges and range equipment; and providing engineering support for weapon system acquisition, material services and technical support to ensure adequate fleet readiness. Increased civilian employment to about 18,400 at end FY 1981 from an FY 1979/FY 1980 level of 18,000 provides for a reduction in the maintenance backlog, reduced repair times, and increased quality control.

- Maintenance Support Activities. The maintenance support activities plan, design, test and deliver Combat Directional System computer programs for the Operating Forces. They also provide auxiliary computer programs in support of Fleet computer program development and maintenance technical assistance to the shore establishment. The civilian manning at the maintenance support activities is essentially level at approximately 1,300 civilians through FY 1981.

(3) Logistics Support Operations. In addition to supply and maintenance and production activities, logistics support includes 15,200 civilians in FY 1981 in a variety of logistics and technical support activities. Included are the Navy Publications and Printing Service, technical and engineering support activities of the Naval Air, Sea, and Electronics Systems Command and the Navy Regional Data Automation Command (NARDAC). The increases in this category in FY 1980 and FY 1981 are principally to implement the standard organization of the Navy Regional Data Automation Command and for increased technical and engineering support in the Naval Electronics System Command.

g. Centralized Support Activities. This category includes non-management headquarters strength in unified commands, international military organizations, foreign military sales support, counterintelligence, reserve readiness support, public affairs, personnel administration, finance centers, criminal investigations, support of Defense agencies, and other miscellaneous support activities.

Navy Centralized Support Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.3	7.1	7.2
Reserve Components	2.1	1.4	1.4
<u>Civilian</u>	6.6	6.8	6.8

The actual reduction of active Navy manpower requirements in this category between FY 1979 and FY 1980 is substantially greater than suggested in the table above because of undermanning experienced at the end of FY 1979. This reduction includes a decrease of approximately 400 reimbursable FMS billets previously dedicated to Iranian activities. An additional reduction of 400 occurs as a result of the transfer of manpower associated with Operational Test and Evaluation Force units from this category. An increase of approximately 100 between FY 1980 and FY 1981 is associated with increased SHORSTAMPS efforts at several Navy Manpower and Material Analysis Centers.

The decrease of 700 Selected Reserves from FY 1979 to FY 1980 is a result of transferring Personnel Mobilization Team augment units to the category of Personnel Support.

The civilian manpower increase in FY 1980 is for the management of Direct Case Foreign Military Sales reimbursable support.

(3) Logistics Support Operations. In addition to supply and maintenance and production activities, logistics support includes 15,200 civilians in FY 1981 in a variety of logistics and technical support activities. Included are the Navy Publications and Printing Service, technical and engineering support activities of the Naval Air, Sea, and Electronics Systems Command and the Navy Regional Data Automation Command (NARDAC). The increases in this category in FY 1980 and FY 1981 are principally to implement the standard organization of the Navy Regional Data Automation Command and for increased technical and engineering support in the Naval Electronics System Command.

g. Centralized Support Activities. This category includes non-management headquarters strength in unified commands, international military organizations, foreign military sales support, counterintelligence, reserve readiness support, public affairs, personnel administration, finance centers, criminal investigations, support of Defense agencies, and other miscellaneous support activities.

Navy Centralized Support Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.3	7.1	7.2
Reserve Components	2.1	1.4	1.4
<u>Civilian</u>	6.6	6.8	6.8

The actual reduction of active Navy manpower requirements in this category between FY 1979 and FY 1980 is substantially greater than suggested in the table above because of undermanning experienced at the end of FY 1979. This reduction includes a decrease of approximately 400 reimbursable FMS billets previously dedicated to Iranian activities. An additional reduction of 400 occurs as a result of the transfer of manpower associated with Operational Test and Evaluation Force units from this category. An increase of approximately 100 between FY 1980 and FY 1981 is associated with increased SHORSTAMPS efforts at several Navy Manpower and Material Analysis Centers.

The decrease of 700 Selected Reserves from FY 1979 to FY 1980 is a result of transferring Personnel Mobilization Team augment units to the category of Personnel Support.

The civilian manpower increase in FY 1980 is for the management of Direct Case Foreign Military Sales reimbursable support.

h. Management Headquarters. This category reflects management headquarters strength required to support defense agencies, international military organizations, and unified commands as well as combat and service commands.

Management Headquarters Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	8.1	8.4	8.6
Reserve Components	3.1	3.2	3.3
<u>Civilian</u>	8.5	8.6	8.8

The increase of active military manpower between FY 1979 and FY 1980 is caused by undermanning of Management Headquarters requirements experienced at the end of FY 1979. Manpower requirements in this category actually decline by approximately 200 during this period. Between FY 1980 and FY 1981, the 200 increase of manpower requirements is primarily associated with growth in service support command headquarters including fleet and type commander headquarters.

The increase of 100 Selected Reserves from FY 1979 to FY 1980 reflects the undermanning of these units in FY 1979. The increase between FY 1980 and FY 1981 is the result of priority manning in this area.

The increase in civilian end strength for FY 1980 is primarily attributed to new or expanded requirements associated with fleet support, sensitive ordnance, FMS workload, ship and weapon programs, and EEO support. In FY 1981, the increase is for implementation of Shore Requirements, Standards and Manpower Planning System, and new or expanded requirements associated with contract administration, Navy Standard Civilian Payroll System, Senior Executive Service, and the Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force.

i. Federal Agency Support. The Federal Agency Support subcategory includes Navy manpower strength assigned to other federal departments and agencies, normally on a reimbursable basis.

Navy Federal Agency Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.1	1.0	1.1
Reserve Components	*	0.1	0.1
<u>Civilian</u>	*	*	*

* Fewer than 50.

Active military manpower requirements in this category remain level during the entire period shown. The changes of 100 shown in the table reflect rounding of the numbers which result from several minor manpower changes in FY 1980 and FY 1981.

6. Individuals

Up to this point, this chapter has discussed manpower requirements included in the force structure. Requirements for nonstructure manpower are in the Individuals account. Navy has an established set of Individuals accounts so that the units of the force structure, on the average, will be manned at their authorized strengths over the course of the fiscal year. As indicated in previous sections, there are seasonal variations in manning. The end of year numbers reflect these variations. The Individuals account consists of estimates of the numbers of transients, patients, prisoners, holdees, trainees, students, and Naval Academy midshipmen.

a. Transients

Navy Transient Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	28.0	25.1	25.9

Transient requirements are a function of the Permanent Change of Station (PCS) move program. Transient manpower spaces are provided to account for time consumed during PCS travel, which includes travel, leave enroute, and temporary duty enroute. Of these three factors, approximately 75 percent of total transient time represents leave taken en route between duty stations. Navy personnel are encouraged to use accrued leave during PCS moves to reduce non-available time at assigned activities.

Changes in active military manpower in this category, including a decrease of 2,900 from FY 1979 to FY 1980 and an increase of 800 between FY 1980 and FY 1981, are attributable to changes in Navy's PCS move program. The totals shown reflect projected manpower enroute between duty stations at the end of the fiscal year. Transient manpower at this time is normally somewhat higher than the average transient strength throughout the fiscal year as a result of the greater number of PCS moves required to accomodate the training needs of Service members and peak training move requirements.

b. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees

Navy Patients/Prisoners/Holdees Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	5.1	4.8	4.8

Patients manpower spaces are provided to offset lost time in units resulting from hospitalization for extended periods (30 days for members assigned to operating force units, 45 days for all others).

Prisoners manpower spaces are provided to offset lost time in units resulting from confinement in a military disciplinary facility in excess of 30 days.

Holdees manpower spaces are provided to accommodate personnel who are dropped from their assigned units and are awaiting administrative discharge or separation from active duty.

The reduction of 300 active Navy manpower in this category between FY 1979 and FY 1980 reflects a higher than average number of personnel in an awaiting separation or disciplinary status at the end of FY 1979. Manpower requirements in this category are projected to remain virtually level during FY 1980 and FY 1981.

c. Trainees, Students, and Midshipmen

Navy Trainee/Student/Midshipmen Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> (Actual)	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active			
Trainees/Students	65.9	68.4	68.7
Midshipmen	4.5	4.4	4.4
Total	70.4	72.8	73.1
Reserve Components			
Trainees/Students	0.8	0.8	0.9

Trainees, students, and midshipmen manpower spaces represent present investment for future trained individuals. Trainees are individuals undergoing basic military training and initial skill training. Students are individuals undergoing specialized, flight, and professional training. Midshipmen are individuals attending the United States Naval Academy. The number of trainee and student spaces is a function of enlistment patterns, course lengths, and training plans.

The increase of active Navy military manpower in this category between FY 1979 and FY 1980 reflects substantial growth in recruit strength and follow-on general skill training requirements associated with the overall growth in the size of the active Navy between these years. The active military increase of approximately 300 end strength between FY 1980 and FY 1981 results from further increases in specialized skill training requirements which are partially offset by a reduction in recruit trainee strength. A comprehensive discussion of trainee and student loads is included in the separately published Military Manpower Training Report.

The increase of 100 in reserve manpower between FY 1980 and FY 1981 reflects adjustments in the requirement for the Ready Mariner programs.



CHAPTER VII

MARINE CORPS MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

A. Introduction

1. Summary and Highlights

This chapter describes Marine Corps active and reserve military and civilian manpower, justifies the manpower levels programmed for FY 1981 and FY 1982, depicts manpower trends, discusses initiatives, and explains the changes from year to year.

The Marine Corps is unique among the four services because the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, provides that the Marine Corps will consist of "...not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein... organized, trained, and equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms...for service with the fleet...." Further, the Act states that the Marine Corps "...shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform other such duties as the President may direct." In addition, the Marine Corps furnishes guards for U.S. embassies as a result of a memorandum of agreement based on the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended.

Inherent in the statutory missions and functions set forth in the National Security Act of 1947 is the requirement for the Marine Corps to provide rapidly deployable forces for contingency missions in support of the national strategy. To support those missions and functions, the Marine Corps maintains a Fleet Marine Force posture as follows: a Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) built around a division/wing team with combat service support located on the East Coast of the United States with a primary commitment to the defense of NATO; one MAF forward deployed in the Pacific area; and a third MAF stationed on the West Coast of the United States, which is capable of meeting worldwide contingency requirements or reinforcing forward deployed forces, including those committed to NATO.

The Marine Corps Reserve provides the initial and primary source of trained units and individuals for augmentation and reinforcement of the active forces when additional capability beyond that available in the regular component is required.

While the minimum structure of the active Marine Corps is specified by law, the manpower requirement to support that structure is not. The manpower levels requested in FY 1981 and FY 1982 are significantly less than required to fully support all contingency plans. The requested levels are shown in the following table.

Marine Corps Manpower Requirement
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
Active Military	185.2	185.2
Marine Corps Reserve	33.7	33.7
Civilian Personnel	19.2	19.2

The active force structure is selectively manned to maximize combat capability. As a result, manning of the Support Activities is programmed at the absolute minimum necessary to provide acceptable support to the combat forces and to manage the resources of the bases and the training establishment. This level is feasible because Fleet Marine Force units provide augmentation personnel who fulfill a significant portion of the Base Operating Support work load requirements. Additionally, the requirement for Individual Training manpower is reduced through on-the-job and field skill training programs which currently provide approximately 25 percent of Marine Corps initial skill training. Since such programs to reduce total manpower requirements are now used to their maximum potential, further reductions in these categories are not possible if readiness is to be maintained.

The majority of Fleet Marine Force units are authorized manning at less than 100 percent of requirements during peacetime. Selected units are reduced to zero manning. Unmanned units are not eliminated from the total structure requirement because they would be activated and manned by reassigned active duty or mobilized reserve personnel in time of emergency.

2. Major Force Structure Changes

The Marine Corps, while undergoing some organizational restructuring to accommodate available resources, continues to stress the combat capability of its Fleet Marine Forces and reserve forces. Force structure changes for FY 1980 and FY 1981 include: restructuring the infantry battalion, initiated in FY 1979, to take advantage of a smaller but more versatile organization with weapons and employment capabilities more suited to the modern battlefield; reassignment of remaining Force Troops units to Marine divisions or other FMF level commands; and reduction of authorized aircraft in fighter squadrons within Tactical Air Forces during FY 1981.

3. Manpower Requirements Determination

Determination of the requirement for manpower focuses initially on the structure of the infantry battalion. Design of the infantry battalion begins with analysis of the capabilities that are essential to accomplish the missions and functions of the Marine Corps. The analysis involves research on new weapons technology, equipment experiments, war games using manual and computer simulation techniques, field tests, and military judgment.

The infantry battalion structure and the number of such battalions, together with mission requirements, form the basis for determining the type and quantity of other combat and combat support units required to form the Marine division. The objective is to form a ground combat element consisting of infantry, tank, amphibian tractor, artillery, reconnaissance, engineer, command and control units, and to integrate this force with aviation and combat service support elements to provide an amphibious force of combined arms.

Manpower requirements for aviation units of the Marine aircraft wing are established by evaluating the support which must be provided to the ground combat forces. Computer simulated war games, historical data, and military judgment have validated the number of sorties required daily to support an infantry battalion in combat. Each aircraft type has a specific sortie capability which, divided into the sortie requirement, determines the number of each type of aircraft required. The crew ratio (crews per aircraft in wartime) and the direct maintenance and ordnance support factors establish the manpower required to fly and maintain each aircraft. Considerations regarding the necessary span of control, the geographic distribution of supported forces, and the available assets establish the number of aircraft to be assigned to each squadron. The number of aircraft per squadron provides the basis for determining the additional command and control and support manpower required in each squadron. Squadrons are then task organized into Marine aircraft groups and wings according to specific mission requirements.

The Force Service Support Groups (FSSGs) of the Fleet Marine Force are composed of specialized units, such as supply, maintenance, engineer, motor transport, dental, and medical battalions, which are essential to the combat service support of the Marine Amphibious Force.

Determination of the manpower requirement for Support Activities is more complex because of the great variety of activities performed, the many one-of-a-kind situations that exist, and the interdependence of the military, civilian, and contractor portions of the work force. Specific details of the total force manpower requirements for Support Activities are contained in the discussion of the appropriate DPPC in Section C of this chapter.

Total force manpower requirements of all organizations, combat and support, are critically examined on a regular cycle. This assures that the structure and related manpower requirements support the national strategy and that the constrained manpower levels permit the Marine Corps to meet its assigned missions at an acceptable level of risk.

B. Significant Trends

1. Management Initiatives

The Marine Corps continues to integrate military manpower management initiatives with those designed to enhance overall Fleet Marine Force readiness. Two major initiatives - unit deployment and a computer based assignment system - continue to enhance stability for the

individual Marine. These actions, in turn, provide additional leadership and training continuity in units and contribute to improved readiness.

The Marine Corps' unit deployment program, designed to establish uniform operational readiness and reduce organizational and individual turbulence, permits Marines to be homebased in CONUS/Hawaii while deploying for periods of approximately six months to meet a portion of the Western Pacific commitments. The third and fourth phases of this program, scheduled for implementation in FY 1980 and FY 1981, respectively, include ground and aviation unit deployments from CONUS to replace like units in the Western Pacific. Reductions in the requirements for individual replacements in the Western Pacific and in the percentage of Marines on unaccompanied tours have already been realized from the implementation of this program.

To support the unit deployment program, the Marine Corps is proceeding with the development of a computer-based assignment system designed to provide cost effective, equitable allocation of manpower resources among units in the Fleet Marine Force. The inventory projection and tour optimization models will be implemented in FY 1980 to provide uniform readiness through an optimization procedure which reconciles requirements with assets in a manner consistent with approved manning policies.

Additionally, programs to enhance productivity will be coordinated by the Marine Corps Productivity Council at Headquarters Marine Corps. This council integrates ongoing efforts in the areas of work measurement, output standards development, worker motivation, and resource management.

2. Active Military Manpower

a. General. Last year, the Marine Corps requested and was authorized a FY 1980 end strength of 189,000. Subsequent to the request, an affordability assessment in conjunction with initial FY 1981 planning revealed a continuing trend of resource imbalance between manpower, procurement, and operations and maintenance programs. Therefore, to more evenly allocate manpower within total resource demands, the Marine Corps planned to reduce its end strength for FY 1980 and FY 1981. After considering the implications of a projected recruiting shortfall and the renewed interest in readiness for rapid deployment, the Marine Corps recommended a revised FY 1980 end strength of 185,200. The new manpower strength level was approved by the Joint Appropriations Committee in December 1979. The request for FY 1981 is also 185,200. This decrease in end strength from levels projected in last year's report reflects reductions primarily to the manning of the Fleet Marine Forces and fewer requirements for Transient and Trainee overhead manpower.

b. Enlisted. Non-prior service enlisted recruiting attainment and goals are shown in the following table.

Active Marine Corps Enlisted Recruiting Goals

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Plan	41,468	43,884	40,384
Actual	40,230	-	-

The Marine Corps FY 1979 enlisted end strength was 97.3 percent of the authorized level of 171,675. While the Marine Corps failed to meet the established enlisted recruiting goal, recruiting quality was maintained by accessing 75 percent high school graduates. The Marine Corps recruited 40 two-year, 14,192 three-year, 25,874 four-year, and 124 six-year enlistees. For FY 1980 and beyond, all enlistments, except for the small two-year option test, will be for three or more years, with a goal of 70 percent for four or more years.

The Marine Corps continues to emphasize quality enlisted accessions. High school graduates are the best source of manpower quality in terms of retention, trainability, and amenability to discipline. For FY 1980 and FY 1981, the Marine Corps remains committed to a goal of 75 percent high school diploma graduates for non-prior service accessions.

c. Officer. Active officer procurement objectives are shown in the following table.

Active Marine Corps Officer Procurement Goals

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Plan	2,003	1,800	2,018
Actual	2,019	-	-

Officer strength as a result of these procurement plans remains stable at 17,900 in FY 1980 and FY 1981. This structure permits the Marine Corps to retain the most promising officers, maintain a normal promotion flow, provide the necessary leadership for combat forces and training programs, and support the requirement for rapid expansion in time of emergency.

3. Marine Corps Reserve

The Selected Marine Corps Reserve is organized into the 4th Marine Division, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, 4th Force Service Support Group, and appropriate combat support and combat service support elements to make up a division/wing team. The organizational structure of the reserve is designed to complement the active forces.

Upon mobilization, the Selected Marine Corps Reserve will either provide units to reinforce or augment the active force or will provide a balanced air-ground team from brigade to division/wing size for service with the fleet. Because of the limited size of the Selected Reserve, it is not possible to exercise both of these employment concepts simultaneously with the activation of the full division/wing team. The actual employment will depend on the situation existing during mobilization.

The wartime force structure requirement of the 4th Division/Wing team calls for about 47,000 Marines. Assuming no active force augmentation/reinforcement requirements, the force structure will be filled by 30,200 Selected Reservists (excludes 3,400 reservists at Initial Active Duty for Training who would not be available for assignment to units until completion of such training), 4,000 support personnel on active duty, and nearly 12,800 Individual Ready Reservists.

The Marine Corps Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) pool consists of honorably discharged former active duty Marines who have a remaining statutory military obligation or have opted to extend their Ready Reserve contract. Members of the IRR may be recalled to active duty by the President in time of national emergency or when otherwise authorized by law. The end FY 1979 IRR strength was 54,900.

In order to increase the size of the IRR pool and maintain individuals in a rapid recall status, the Marine Corps discontinued the policy of automatically transferring individuals from the IRR to the Standby Reserve at the end of their fifth year of obligation. Transfers are only made upon request, in accordance with Title 10, U.S. Code, 269. Individuals with critical military skills are retained in the IRR for their full period of obligated service. As a result of this policy change, IRR strength is projected to increase to approximately 59,500 by the end of FY 1981.

The policy change discussed above will cause a concomitant reduction in the strength of the Standby Reserve to approximately 2,000 at the end of FY 1981. The Standby Reserve provides additional manpower to augment active and reserve structures in a national emergency declared by the Congress. The majority of personnel in the Marine Corps Standby Reserve are former active duty members in their sixth year of obligated service. If mobilized, Standby Reservists would require refresher training.

The Selected Marine Corps Reserve end strength authorization for FY 1981 is 33,679. This strength supports the peacetime force structure requirements of the 4th Marine Division, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, and 4th Force Service Support Group. The end strength also includes reservists on Initial Active Duty for Training (IADT) and full-time active duty for administration and training of the reserves.

Programmed recruiting goals for the Selected Marine Corps Reserve are as follows:

Marine Corps Reserve Enlisted Recruiting Goals
(Non-Prior Service)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Plan	7,625	7,800	8,000
Actual	7,053	-	-

For FY 1979, the Selected Marine Corps Reserve attained 99.8 percent of the authorized enlisted end strength of 30,875. Although non-prior service recruiting quotas were not achieved, the authorized officer and enlisted end strength of 33,500 was nearly attained. Continuing improvements in the gain to loss ratio, including a 39 percent 1st term reenlistment rate for non-prior service personnel and the introduction of incentive payments for prior service reenlistments, enabled the Selected Marine Corps Reserve to end FY 1979 with a total paid strength of 33,290.

Accession criteria and quality goals for the Selected Marine Corps Reserve are the same as for the active force. Officer input into the Selected Marine Corps Reserve comes from officers who have completed their initial obligated active service of three years or more.

4. Civilian Manpower

The Marine Corps uses civilians to meet the manpower requirements of Support Activities to the maximum practicable extent consistent with the need to use military personnel by reason of law, security, discipline, rotation, and operational readiness. The civilian work force is closely integrated with military manpower to accomplish workload requirements. The FY 1981 Marine Corps civilian end strength request reflects new contracting out initiatives which net to a reduction of 392.

C. Marine Corps Manpower Requirements by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC)

The following tables display, by DPPC, the actual Marine Corps manpower distribution for FY 1979 and manpower requirements for FY 1980 and FY 1981. Beginning in FY 1980, Selected Marine Reserve numbers include reservists on full-time active duty for administration and training of the reserves.

MARINE CORPS ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1979</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 1980</u> <u>FY 1981 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1981</u> <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>*</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	*	*	*
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>106.8</u>	<u>108.4</u>	<u>110.2</u>
Land Forces	79.7	81.7	83.1
Tactical Air Forces	26.5	26.1	26.5
Naval Forces	0.6	0.6	0.6
Mobility Forces	-	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.6</u>
Intelligence	0.7	0.7	0.7
Centrally Managed Communications	*	*	*
Research and Development Activities	0.8	0.9	0.9
Geophysical Activities	*	*	*
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>42.3</u>	<u>42.1</u>	<u>42.3</u>
Base Operating Support	20.9	20.2	20.4
Medical Support	-	-	-
Personnel Support	4.4	4.6	4.6
Individual Training	7.6	7.7	7.6
Force Support Training	2.8	2.8	2.9
Central Logistics	0.8	0.8	0.8
Centralized Support Activities	2.4	2.4	2.4
Management Headquarters	2.3	2.3	2.2
Federal Agency Support	1.2	1.3	1.3
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>150.7</u>	<u>152.2</u>	<u>154.2</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>34.5</u>	<u>33.0</u>	<u>31.0</u>
Transients	7.9	7.7	7.3
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	1.4	1.5	1.4
Students, Trainees	25.1	23.8	22.2
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>185.2</u>	<u>185.2</u>	<u>185.2</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

* Fewer than 50 spaces.

MARINE CORPS SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1979</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 1980</u> <u>FY 1981</u>	<u>FY 1981</u> <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces			
Defensive Strategic Forces			
Strategic Control and Surveillance			
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>29.6</u>	<u>30.2</u>	<u>30.2</u>
Land Forces	21.6	21.9	21.9
Tactical Air Forces	8.0	8.3	8.3
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	-	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Intelligence			
Centrally Managed Communications			
Research and Development Activities			
Geophysical Activities			
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>
Base Operating Support	-	-	-
Medical Support	-	-	-
Personnel Support	-	-	-
Individual Training	-	-	-
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	-	-	-
Centralized Support Activities	-	0.1	0.1
Management Headquarters	-	-	-
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>29.6</u>	<u>30.3</u>	<u>30.3</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>3.7</u>	<u>3.4</u>	<u>3.4</u>
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	3.7	3.4	3.4
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>33.3</u>	<u>33.7</u>	<u>33.7</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

MARINE CORPS CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1979</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 1980</u> <u>FY 1981 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1981</u> <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces			
Defensive Strategic Forces			
Strategic Control and Surveillance			
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Land Forces			
Tactical Air Forces			
Naval Forces			
Mobility Forces			
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Intelligence			
Centrally Managed Communications			
Research and Development Activities			
Geophysical Activities			
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>19.7</u>	<u>19.6</u>	<u>19.2</u>
Base Operating Support	<u>14.7</u>	<u>14.5</u>	<u>14.2</u>
Medical Support	-	-	-
Personnel Support	0.2	0.2	0.2
Individual Training	0.2	0.2	0.2
Force Support Training	0.1	0.1	0.1
Central Logistics	2.7	2.7	2.7
Centralized Support Activities	1.3	1.3	1.3
Management Headquarters	0.6	0.6	0.6
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>19.7</u>	<u>19.6</u>	<u>19.2</u>


Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

1. Tactical/Mobility Forces

Marine Corps Tactical/Mobility Forces include Land Forces, Tactical Air Forces, and Naval Forces. About 110,000 Marines (59 percent of the Corps) will be assigned to this category in FY 1981. Tactical/Mobility units are all rapidly deployable and intended to operate in the combat theater. Only military personnel are included in these units.

The Fleet Marine Force provides the ground, aviation, and combat service support elements of three active combined arms teams called Marine Amphibious Forces (MAFs). Each MAF consists of a Headquarters element, a Marine division, a Marine aircraft wing, a Force Service Support Group, and selected combat support units. At programmed active strength, the Marine Corps has sufficient trained personnel to commit its active Marine Amphibious Forces by whatever strategic mobility means available to major combat operations including amphibious assaults against well-defended positions. Additionally, recent emphasis on the immediate readiness of rapidly deployable conventional forces has resulted in increased mission responsibilities. The establishment of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force as a joint service command in FY 1980 formalizes the traditional Marine Corps emphasis on rapid response. Prior to deployment to combat as an entity, however, the fourth division/wing team from the Selected Marine Corps Reserve would have to be mobilized, brought to wartime planning force strength, and trained before being ready for a major combat operation.

The organization of the Fleet Marine Force is depicted in the following diagram:



1/ COMPOSED OF UNITS FROM 3D MARINE DIVISION, 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, AND 3D FORCE SERVICE SUPPORT GROUP.

The Fleet Marine Force is a ready, versatile organization, capable of conducting amphibious and land combat operations. It is organized into balanced Marine air-ground teams which are especially suited for rapid deployment by sea or airlift. This combined arms integration generates combat power greater than the sum of the individual components. The Fleet Marine Force has the full capability of task organizing separately deployable Marine Air-Ground Task Forces of various sizes below the Marine Amphibious Force level.

With the exception of those reserve personnel undergoing Initial Active Duty for Training and on full-time active duty, the entire Selected Reserve contributes to Tactical/Mobility Forces.

a. Land Forces. Land Forces include the four Marine divisions and supporting Force Service Support Groups. Additionally, this category includes helicopter, observation, and air defense units from the Marine aircraft wings. The following table displays Land Forces for FY 1979 to FY 1981.

Marine Corps Land Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	79.7	81.7	83.1
Reserve Components	21.6	21.9	21.9

Actual strength in FY 1979 reflects the reduced manning of headquarters, logistics, and helicopter units, and the lower manpower demand associated with the restructuring of the infantry battalion. The planned strength in FY 1980 and FY 1981 reflects programmed increases in manning levels. The temporary decreases to Land Force units during FY 1979 and FY 1980 preserve basic firepower and combat capability while reorganizing, to the maximum extent possible, support and headquarters functions. The FY 1981 end strength excludes 85 audiovisual personnel functionally transferred to Base Operating Support.

b. Tactical Air Forces. Tactical Air Forces manpower includes air crews and aircraft organizational and intermediate maintenance personnel who support fixed wing tactical aircraft squadrons. It also includes the manpower associated with Reserve component support, Marine security detachments on aircraft carriers, and various command, control, and support functions.

The manpower requirement for Tactical Air Forces is approximately 27,000 spaces. Of this amount, 9,900 are assigned to tactical aircraft squadrons. The remaining personnel provide direct and indirect support to Marine air wing units in both Land Forces and Tactical Air Forces.

The Tactical Air Forces manpower requirement is as follows:

Marine Corps Tactical Air Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	26.5	26.1	26.5
Reserve Components	8.0	8.3	8.3

The FY 1979 actual strength in Tactical Air Forces reflects reduced output from aviation technical skill training and minor adjustments to squadron tables of organization and associated authorized strengths. The planned change in FY 1980 results from a reduction in the number of A-6 aircraft per squadron and a change in the squadron mix of the various types of attack aircraft. The active manpower program will support 30 fixed wing tactical aircraft squadrons and related support functions for FY 1980, and 29 squadrons for FY 1981. The manpower reduction associated with the deactivation of one squadron is offset by overall higher manning levels in all the squadrons during FY 1981. Personnel performing audio-visual functions have been transferred to Base Operating Support in FY 1981. The reserve manpower program will support six fixed wing tactical aircraft squadrons with appropriate air control, maintenance, and expeditionary support.

c. Naval Forces. The Marine Corps request for Naval Forces includes personnel assigned to ships' detachments (except those assigned to aircraft carriers which are included in Tactical Air Forces), security detachments aboard submarine tenders, and Marine Corps staff billets for naval amphibious commands and ships. The Marine Corps furnishes Naval Forces personnel in accordance with the mission, embodied in law, to provide security on major Navy vessels.

Marine Corps Naval Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.6	0.6	0.6

2. Auxiliary Activities

The Marine Corps program for the Auxiliary Activities category totals approximately 1,600 active military personnel, most of whom are in either Intelligence or Research and Development. The Marine Corps has no reserve or civilian manpower in the Auxiliary Activities category.

a. Intelligence. The manpower in the Intelligence category is used primarily to assist the Navy in manning cryptologic facilities. The manpower program also provides for a small number of personnel (less than 50) who provide Marine Corps representation at Naval intelligence centers. The following table displays Marine Corps Intelligence manpower.

Marine Corps Intelligence Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.7	0.7	0.7

The Marine Corps contribution to the Intelligence function represents an effort to use cryptologic personnel in peacetime in a manner which will allow them to receive valuable training and experience through work in their occupational specialty. Under wartime conditions approximately one-third of these Marines would be returned to duty with the Fleet Marine Forces, remaining in the same type of billet, but contributing directly to the support of a deployed Marine Amphibious Force.

b. Research and Development. Marine Corps participation in research and development activities is small and remains essentially constant throughout the period.

Marine Corps Research and Development Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.8	0.9	0.9

Most of the Marines who perform this function are assigned to the Development Center of the Marine Corps Development and Education Command (MCDEC) located at the Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia. A significant subordinate organization of the Development Center, the Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity, is a tenant activity at the Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California. Marine Corps research and development efforts include the development of the organization, doctrine,

tactics, techniques, equipment, and weapons for employment by the Fleet Marine Force. Primary emphasis is placed on efforts in support of the landing force in amphibious operations. All development activity is closely coordinated with the other services to avoid duplication. Marines assigned to research and development activities conduct studies which identify required operational capabilities, manage materiel development projects designed to satisfy requirements, and conduct and coordinate developmental and operational test and evaluation of all systems intended for procurement and deployment. Additionally, they review and revise Marine Corps doctrinal publications. Some Marines are also assigned in a liaison capacity to developmental activities of the other services. The programmed increase in FY 1980 represents an increase at MCDEC in the areas of operational and armaments testing .

c. Other Auxiliary Forces. In FY 1981, fewer than 50 Marines will be assigned to the remaining Auxiliary Forces categories. The Marines in the Centrally Managed Communications category support the Military Affiliate Radio System and the Defense Communications Agency. The Marines in the Geophysical Activities category are assigned to the Defense Mapping Agency as instructors in schools attended by Marines.

3. Support Activities

a. Base Operating Support

The following table displays the total manpower request for this category and provides detail regarding the sub-categories of Combat Installations and Support Installations.

Marine Corps Base Operating Support
(End Strength in Thousands)

<u>Total of Sub-Categories</u>			
	<u>FY 79</u>		
	<u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	20.9	20.2	20.4
<u>Civilian</u>	14.7	14.5	14.2
<u>Combat Installations</u>			
<u>Military</u>			
Active	16.0	15.5	15.6
<u>Civilian</u>	10.4	10.2	9.9
<u>Support Installations</u>			
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.9	4.6	4.8
<u>Civilian</u>	4.3	4.3	4.3

In the Base Operating Support-Combat Installations sub-category, the active military request remains stable in FY 1980 and FY 1981. The civilian request in this sub-category decreases in FY 1981 as a result of converting certain Civil Service positions to contract services.

The FY 1979 actual strengths include a large number of recruits who entered the initial skill training pipeline during the prime summer recruiting months. A portion of those individuals were assigned to Marine Corps Bases for their training. Such personnel will be used as replacements in base or co-located Fleet Marine Force units upon completion of their training.

The increase in Base Operating Support personnel in FY 1981 highlights the functional shift of all audiovisual personnel to this category.

Base Operating Support manpower constitutes an essential adjunct to Fleet Marine Force readiness by providing the administration, operation, and maintenance of the base structure in which combat forces are housed, supported, supplied, and trained. Manpower in the Base Operating Support-Combat Installations sub-category is assigned to

operate the installations at which Fleet Marine Forces are based. The Support Installations sub-category includes manpower assigned to operate logistic and training bases.

The Marine Corps determines manpower requirements for Base Operating Support-Combat Installations using a fixed/variable support concept. Only the fixed portion is presently included in the Base Operating Support manpower request. The fixed portion consists of the functions and services which are required because of the existence of the base, apart from the Fleet Marine Force units that are located there. Examples of these functions are road maintenance and repair, utilities operations, and sewage disposal. The variable support portion of the manpower requirement results directly from the presence of the tenant units. To the extent feasible, the tenant unit provides augmentation to the base under agreements worked out by local commanders and monitored and approved by Headquarters Marine Corps. Since the augmentation manpower is part of the tenant unit and will train and deploy with that unit, it is counted in the Tactical/Mobility Forces. This system, which enables a percentage of the Marines assigned to augmentation duties to maintain their military skills in a garrison status prior to deployment, significantly reduces the manpower assigned to Base Operating Support-Combat Installations. It does, of course, correspondingly reduce the number of personnel available to Fleet Marine Force units for routine training.

The Base Operating Support-Combat Installations sub-category also includes Marines assigned to security duties with Marine barracks located at major Navy bases throughout the world. Personnel are provided for security guard posts based on the number of hours that each post is required to be manned per week. Supervisory, supply, mess, and administrative personnel are provided based on the number of guards in that unit, and to meet other assigned responsibilities.

The determination of manpower requirements for Base Operating Support-Support Installations is based on an analysis of the functional and workload requirements of bases in this sub-category. Since such bases do not support Fleet Marine Force tenant units, computation of the variable support element is excluded.

The Marine Corps constantly reviews the requirement for Base Operating Support manpower at all combat and support installations. A full-scale, on-site manpower survey is conducted at each installation at least once every three years, and authorized manning levels are reviewed annually. Organizations, functions performed, and services provided are evaluated to ensure that the approved manpower, grade, and skill levels are appropriate. Once the functions to be performed are determined and a work measurement system devised, staffing becomes a matter of deciding the level of support or service that will be furnished. Manpower survey efforts have resulted in a streamlining of support organizations by consolidating duplicative functions, correcting staffing inequities, and eliminating dual staffing requirements, thereby releasing manpower resources for reallocation into areas of more critical need or for satisfaction of directed Base Operating Support reductions.

b. Personnel Support. Manpower requirements in this category are:

Marine Corps Personnel Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.4	4.6	4.6
<u>Civilian</u>	0.2	0.2	0.2

Marine Corps requirements in this category include recruiting and examining services, support to disciplinary commands, and other personnel support. At the end of FY 1979, temporary overstaffing existed at several personnel support activities. The increase for FY 1980 reflects the Congressionally approved assignment of 350 additional recruiters.

c. Individual Training

Marine Corps Individual Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	7.6	7.7	7.6
<u>Civilian</u>	0.2	0.2	0.2

Individual Training manpower is required to conduct the formal military and technical training and the professional education of Marine Corps personnel. To the extent that such training can be conducted at other service schools or through alternative on-the-job and field skill methods, the Individual Training manpower requirement is reduced. During FY 1980, approximately 25 percent of those Marines undergoing initial skill training will be trained through such alternative methods. The percentage will decrease slightly in FY 1981.

In order to correct previously identified deficiencies in the specialized skill training program, the FY 1980 request includes an increase of 395 military spaces. These personnel will provide formal training to approximately 5,200 trainees in infantry, mountain warfare, and amphibian tractor crewman skill areas. This increased requirement is partially offset by reductions in other training categories. The decrease in personnel between FY 1980 and FY 1981 is associated with the functional transfer of audiovisual personnel to Base Operating Support. A detailed justification of training requirements is contained in the FY 1981 Military Manpower Training Report.

d. Force Support Training. Force Support Training units train recently designated aviators and flight officers in combat aircraft prior to their assignment to operational squadrons and provide standardized training to other aviation personnel. In addition, designated units within the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Training Group are tasked with providing wartime interceptor support for the Continental Air Defense Command. The manpower program is based on the projected student load and the necessity to provide instructors, maintain aircraft, and perform the air defense mission.

This category also includes the manpower to support the Marine Corps Institute which provides military skill training to individual Marines through correspondence courses. The following table summarizes the manpower requirement for the Force Support Training mission.

Marine Corps Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	2.8	2.8	2.9
<u>Civilian</u>	.1	.1	.1

The slight growth in FY 1981 results from the increased manning of aviation fleet training squadrons.

e. Central Logistics. The Central Logistics manpower displayed below is required for the conduct of centrally managed supply, maintenance, and logistics support activities. These activities procure materiel, maintain a centralized inventory control, perform depot level maintenance, and provide other logistics support services. A constant military and civilian strength is programmed for FY 1980 and FY 1981.

Marine Corps Central Logistics Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.8	0.8	0.8
<u>Civilian</u>	2.7	2.7	2.7

f. Centralized Support Activities

Marine Corps Centralized Support Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	2.4	2.4	2.4
Reserve Components	-	0.1	0.1
<u>Civilian</u>	1.3	1.3	1.3

The Marines in this category provide centralized support for non-management headquarters activities. They serve in such diversified areas as United Nations truce teams, audit and judiciary activity support, Marine membership on the Naval Council of Review Boards, public affairs activities, family assistance activities, and Marine Corps support to OSD and JCS. Military and civilian personnel in this category also include: the Marine Corps Personnel Support Activity, which administers all active and reserve Marine Corps personnel records; the Marine Corps Automated Services Center, which maintains the automated Marine Corps Manpower Management System; and the Marine Corps Finance Center, which administers the JUMPS system for the Marine Corps. Beginning in FY 1980, reserve personnel on full-time active duty in support of reserve training and administration are accounted for in this category.

g. Management Headquarters. The following table displays the manpower requirement in the Management Headquarters category.

Marine Corps Management Headquarters Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	2.3	2.3	2.2
<u>Civilian</u>	0.6	0.6	0.6

The manpower requirement for this function is associated with four sub-categories of Management Headquarters. Marines serving at NATO, NORAD, and U.S. Forces Korea headquarters activities are categorized under International Military Organizations. Marines assigned to Unified Commands are also so categorized. The Service Support-Combat Commands sub-category includes the Fleet Marine Force and major US Navy operational command headquarters. Manpower requirements for Marine Corps and Navy departmental headquarters and service administrative headquarters are categorized under Service Support-Service Commands.

All of the sub-categories of Management Headquarters include requirements external to the Marine Corps. Marines assigned perform two important functions. First, they provide readily available expertise on amphibious warfare matters. Second, they provide a channel through which the Marine Corps is kept current on contingency planning alternatives and through which external staffs are kept aware of current Fleet Marine Force capabilities and limitations. Management Headquarters personnel strength remains constant except for the small decrease in FY 1981 reflecting the previously discussed reorganized accounting for audiovisual personnel.

h. Federal Agency Support. The following table displays Marine Corps manpower committed to Federal Agency Support.

Marine Corps Federal Agency Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	1.2	1.3	1.3

Federal Agency Support manpower consists almost exclusively of the Marine Corps Security Guard Battalion, which furnishes embassy guards around the world for the Department of State. The lower actual manning level in FY 1979 is due to reduced staffing at several stations.

4. Individuals

The following table displays the Individuals accounts.

Marine Corps Individuals Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u> <u>(Actual)</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active			
Transients	7.9	7.7	7.3
Patients/Prisoners/Holdees	1.4	1.5	1.4
Trainees/Students	<u>25.1</u>	<u>23.8</u>	<u>22.2</u>
Total	34.5	33.0	31.0
Reserve Components			
Trainees/Students	3.7	3.4	3.4

The strengths shown in the Individuals accounts are estimates of the number of personnel who will be in a Transient, Trainee/Student, or Patient/Prisoner/Holdee status at the end of a fiscal year. These estimates are based partly on historical data and partly on current and projected manpower plans and policies. The Individuals accounts are as necessary as the force structure spaces, and shortages in authorizations for these accounts will result in strength reductions in the combat or support forces.

Transient requirements continue to decline as a result of the unit deployment program and other turbulence reduction initiatives. The reductions between FY 1979 and FY 1981 provide a clear indication of the impact of these measures.

The Marine Corps has experienced a decline in its Patient/Prisoner/Holdee population in recent years. A leveling of this trend in FY 1980 and FY 1981 reflects stabilization in the expeditious discharge program initiated in FY 1976 for the early discharge of marginal and sub-standard performers; continued quality in recruiting and the related high discipline, morale, and effectiveness throughout the Marine Corps; and the small number of personnel awaiting separation.

The Trainee/Student request reflects the impact of programmed training efficiencies, principally in recruit and specialized skill training, during FY 1980 and FY 1981.

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
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
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CHAPTER VIII

AIR FORCE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

A. Introduction

1. Summary and Highlights

This chapter describes Air Force military and civilian manpower requirements for both active and reserve forces which are planned for fiscal years 1981 and 1982, as summarized in the following table:

Air Force Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>
<u>Military</u>		
Active	564.5	565.8
Reserve Components		
ANGUS	95.8	96.3
USAFR	59.3	60.4
<u>Civilian</u>	240.6	240.6

The Air Force manpower program for FY 1981 and FY 1982 reflects continued application of the Total Force Policy to accomplish assigned missions. Total active military manpower shows an increase in FY 1981 for the first time since FY 1968. Civilian manpower continues to decline. The Air Force is continuing to search out and implement management initiatives to increase Air Force readiness, improve the utilization of available manpower, and organize and operate its forces for effective, efficient mission accomplishment.

2. Major Force Structure Changes

The mission and associated force structure of the Air Force are the primary indicators of resource requirements. Consequently, the size and composition of the force structure to be supported provide the base for the majority of manpower requirements. From a manpower requirements standpoint, the most important force structure characteristics are the numbers and types of aircraft, missiles, and other systems authorized.

The Air Force continues toward its goal of modernizing and fully equipping its 26 active tactical fighter wings and modernizing the Air Reserve Force tactical fighter force. Increased equipage and force modernization result in 18 additional active tactical fighter aircraft in FY 1981 and 24 more in FY 1982. Concurrently, a net increase of 48 tactical fighters in FY 1981 is added to the Air Reserve Forces, including

42 additional A-10's in the Air Force Reserve, as part of the Air Force's program to modernize and upgrade Air Reserve Force tactical fighter aircraft. The Air Force is also continuing its incremental increase of AWACS aircraft with the addition of two in FY 1981. The modification of C-141A aircraft to C-141B, the "stretch" version, continues in FY 1981. Four KC-10 tanker-cargo aircraft will enter the force in FY 1981. The Air Reserve Forces will continue modernization of their forces from C-123 and C-7 aircraft to C-130 aircraft. Also significant is the continued implementation of the Joint Surveillance System of joint use USAF/FAA radars. Featuring interagency cooperation, the phased implementation of this system will free military and civilian manpower to meet other USAF requirements.

3. Manpower Requirements Determination

One of the most important aspects of manpower management is accurate requirements determination. Overall manpower requirements are not determined independently, but originate from the basic factors which control force levels -- the wartime and peacetime missions the Air Force is expected to perform and the funding levels which determine the resources available for carrying out those missions. Consideration of these factors leads to the decisions which shape the forces that must be deployed, operated, maintained, and updated with advances in technology.

a. Wartime Manpower Requirements. The Air Force annually develops the Total Force manpower required to support the national strategy using its manpower determination process. The procedure begins with the guidance from the Secretary of Defense and identifies the manpower needed to meet the deployed, strategic, and CONUS war-sustaining force requirements. When all requirements have been identified, the Air Force compares the total manning requirement with the authorized manpower to identify any mismatch among functional needs so that appropriate adjustments can be programmed.

The Air Force has made substantial progress in documenting the Total Force wartime manpower required to support the national strategy. Successive iterations have improved the process and have provided useful manpower management data which have identified wartime manpower shortfalls in combat and support activities, influenced decisions concerning manpower resource realignments, and provided information for evaluating potential contract candidates. The Air Force is also using simulation modeling techniques such as the Logistics Composite Model (LCOM), and sortie surge tests of our aircraft units to evaluate and validate wartime manpower requirements. Furthermore, the Air Force is working to develop procedures to provide wartime manpower standards for base operating support functions.

A Wartime Manpower and Personnel Readiness Team has been established to further develop and maintain a demand and supply data base for Air Force and OSD planning and programming. The goal is to improve readiness by insuring an adequate military and civilian manpower resource

mix by skill, the most effective balance between active and reserve components, and the proper balance between combat and combat-sustaining forces.

b. Air Force Management Engineering Program. The Air Force manpower requirements determination effort is centered on the Management Engineering Program (MEP). Using contemporary industrial engineering techniques, objective statements of manpower required to accomplish specific work loads are developed as manpower standards and manpower guides.

Manpower standards are quantitative expressions of manpower required to perform work at varying levels of work load. There are two types of manpower standards--engineered and statistical. The more precise engineered standards are developed through a structured process employing industrial engineering methods such as work sampling and time study to accomplish on-the-spot work measurement. Statistical manpower standards, on the other hand, are customarily derived by using such engineering techniques as on-site, detailed interviews and statistical analyses of existing historical work loads and empirical data.

While over 60 percent of the current Air Force manpower requirements are determined by manpower standards, the remaining Air Force requirements are based on manpower guides. These guides are quantitative expressions of manpower; however, they are less structured than standards and are based on staff estimates, manpower surveys, and contractor estimates rather than on classical work measurement techniques. Guides are preferred where standards development is not practical or feasible; for example, when there is a lack of experience with new systems or when standards would be short-lived because a system or activity is approaching phase-out.

This program has progressively improved and enjoys increased credibility through experience gained over the years and through constant refinement of methodology. Annual application of manpower standards and guides provides an accurate, objective, and consistent basis to forecast future manpower requirements based on projected work loads. When mission or force adjustments cause work load changes, this system assures that manpower will also be revised in accordance with the changed mission or force level and resultant work loads.


B. Significant Trends

As shown in the following chart, the Air Force has absorbed substantial active military and civilian manpower reductions since the peak Southeast Asia years. The reductions from FY 1968 to FY 1973 reflect the Southeast Asia drawdown. However, since FY 1973--when Air Force active military and civilian strengths were already more than 200,000 below pre-Southeast Asia levels--Air Force strengths have continued to decline to the point where active manpower levels are nearly 174,000 below FY 1973 levels. Whereas the active force manpower has been decreasing, the

reserve force manpower levels are gradually rising as the Air Force increases its reliance on the reserve components. Fiscal Year 1981 reverses the recent trend and projects a modest growth in Air Force active manpower.

AIR FORCE MANPOWER

FY 1968 - FY 1981



1/ ARF dual status technicians are included in both civilian and Selective Reserve end strength data.

1. Forces

Significant elements of the Air Force force structure in FY 1981 include:

a. Strategic Offensive Forces. B-52 and FB-111 bomber forces remain at 316 Primary Aerospace Vehicle Authorization (PAA) and 60 PAA respectively. KC-135 aircraft will remain at 615 PAA. Minuteman and Titan II missiles continue at 1,000 PAA and 54 PAA respectively.

b. Strategic Defensive Forces. The force will consist of six active and ten Air National Guard interceptor squadrons. The Air Force began, on a limited basis in FY 1978, the phased replacement of long range radars used in the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) system with joint use USAF/FAA radars. During the period FY 1980 through FY 1982, additional radars are being transferred to the FAA as joint use, and other USAF radars are being eliminated. The E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) augments this surveillance capability.

c. Tactical Air Forces. The active tactical fighter force consists of 26 organizationally structured wings, which the Air Force plans to bring to full equipage by FY 1984. In FY 1981, the Air Force is continuing its tactical fighter force modernization with the addition of four F-16 tactical fighter squadrons and three additional A-10 squadrons. Also, F-15 equipage will increase by 12 PAA in FY 1981.

An eleven wing equivalent Air Reserve Force (ARF) structure composed of 39 fighter squadrons augments the active force. Improvements to ANGUS forces in FY 1981 include conversion of two F-105 units to the F-4 and two units to the OA-37B. Modernization of the ARF continues with the addition of F-4 and A-7 aircraft to the ANGUS and A-10 aircraft to the USAFR in FY 1981. Air Force Reserve associate units provide the ability to more fully use existing bases and aircraft by providing reserve aircrews to active KC-10 units. In FY 1981, the Air Force Reserve will provide 50 percent of the KC-10 aircrews.

Other changes programmed in the tactical aircraft force structure in FY 1981 include an increase in E-3A AWACS aircraft to 22 PAA, providing a significant command and control capability; and an addition of three EC-130H tactical electronic warfare aircraft.

d. Airlift Forces. Although strategic airlift forces remain at 234 PAA C-141 aircraft and 70 PAA C-5 aircraft, the second increment of C-141A aircraft being modified into the "stretched" C-141B enter the inventory in FY 1981, bringing to over 70 percent the number of C-141B aircraft in the force. These modifications will increase C-141 cargo volume capacity by about 30 percent and provide an air refueling capability which will reduce dependence on foreign enroute basing structures.

Air Force Reserve associate units provide the ability to more fully use existing bases and aircraft by providing reserve air

crews and maintenance personnel to active C-141, C-5, and C-9 units. C-5 associate crew ratios will be increasing to allow the Air Force Reserve to assume an increased role in strategic airlift. The ARFs possess the only short takeoff and landing (STOL) capability in the airlift force with C-123 and C-7 aircraft. ARF tactical airlift forces decrease by 32 PAA in FY 1981 for a total of 344 C-130, C-7, and C-123 aircraft.

2. Management Initiatives

Within the stable manpower levels for FY 1980 and FY 1981, the Air Force plans significant improvements in its combat capability through improved utilization of manpower resources.

The Air Force is promoting productivity enhancing initiatives which are discussed in Chapter XIII. The Air Force is also continuing the use of technological initiative to provide manpower economies in FY 1981 such as automated telecommunications programs and replacement of precision approach radars with instrument landing systems.

Increased efficiency through specific management initiatives is a primary means of enhancing the productivity, effectiveness, and readiness of the Air Force combat forces. To enhance overall readiness and mission capability, the Air Force will continue to reallocate resources made available by management initiatives such as those discussed above.

3. Active Military Manpower

The Air Force has revised its FY 1980 active military manpower program to the congressionally authorized ceiling of 558,000. This is a reduction of 1,000 from the budget request. The reduction, as directed by Congress, has been taken primarily in the training area. FY 1981 and FY 1982 requested levels reflect a modest growth compared to the revised FY 1980 program.

Since FY 1973, the Air Force has reduced active military in Base Operating Support by 24 percent, Individual Training by 34 percent, Students and Trainees by 31 percent and Management Headquarters by 35%. During the same period, however, the Air Force increased its Tactical Air Forces active military manpower by 22 percent. The requested manpower program reflects continued emphasis on enhancing combat readiness through management initiatives.

4. Air Reserve Forces Manpower

The Air Reserve Forces play a vital role in our total force posture and must be provided with modern equipment. During the last several years, the Air Force has incrementally equipped them with first line aircraft--A-7s, F-4s, C-130s, KC-135s, F-106s and A-10s. By the end of FY 1981, the Air Reserve Forces will possess approximately 32 percent of the tactical fighter aircraft, 63 percent of the tactical airlift aircraft, 45 percent of the strategic airlift crew capability, 60 percent of aerial ports capability, 21 percent of the strategic tanker aircraft and 60 percent of the strategic defensive interceptor aircraft.

The Air Force has included in the FY 1981 budget the continuation of the congressionally directed test of converting vacant and new civilian positions from Full-Time Unit Support-Military Technician to Full-Time Unit Support-Active Guard/Reserve positions. The FY 1981 program involves the conversion of over 900 positions. The Air Force is closely monitoring this test to insure that the combat readiness of the Air Reserve Forces is not compromised.

Success in overall Air Reserve Forces recruiting and retention will determine, in large measure, the future availability of Air Reserve Forces in the numbers and skills required. The availability of reserve forces manpower will be a key factor in determining the optimum balance between reserve and active forces in the years ahead. The favorable results of Air Reserve Forces recruiting and retention in FY 1979 offer encouragement that, given proper equipment, realistic training, and reasonable monetary incentives, the Total Force Policy as implemented by the Air Force will continue to provide an effective mix of active and reserve capability.

5. Civilian Manpower

In FY 1979, the Air Force employed about 245,100 inservice civilians. Civilian manpower for FY 1981 is nearly 4,500 below this level. In FY 1981, inservice civilians assigned to the vitally important Central Logistics function comprise 93 percent of the total inservice Central Logistics manpower. Other civilian intensive areas include Research and Development (54 percent of total manpower), Base Operating Support (36 percent of total manpower), and Centralized Support Activities (38 percent of total manpower).

The Air Force has long recognized the requirement for a mix of active and reserve military members, inservice civilian employees, and private sector contracts. This highly successful team concept is based on the congressional mandate to use the least costly form of manpower consistent with military requirements and the national policy of relying upon the private sector for commercial/industrial goods and services. Through application of this policy, the Air Force converted over 10,000 military positions to inservice civilian or contract between FY 1973 and FY 1979. The Air Force believes that future military-to-civilian conversion programs can be accommodated only through a regularized function-by-function analysis. To do otherwise could create wartime military skill shortfalls.

Air Force work loads which do not require essential military or inservice civilian incumbency are subjected to comparative OMB Circular A-76 type cost analyses. The Air Force carefully analyzes its military and inservice civilian requirements on a function-by-function basis to insure that proposed potential conversions to contract do not compromise the integrity of our combat readiness posture. Based upon these detailed analyses and as part of a continuing evaluation program, the Air Force, as a budget planning assumption, has programmed the conversion of 2,100

authorizations to contract in FY 1981. This is in addition to the FY 1980 program to convert approximately 6,000.

The Air Force had a very positive experience with its FY 1979 contract conversion program. Studies conducted last year were performed under "interim" procedures using the pre-30 June 1976 OMB Circular A-76, because Congress was not satisfied with the guidance used in FY 1977 and had imposed a moratorium in FY 1978. Fifty-nine cost studies were conducted in FY 1979, resulting in 45 conversions to contract with the balance remaining in-house. The functions converted to contract represent a savings to the government of about one of every five dollars that it has been costing the Air Force. The functions remaining in-house represented a dollar savings to the Government of 11 percent and only required 66 percent of the original manpower authorizations. Strong pressure exerted by the Air Force to insure that the in-house cost calculations were based upon realistic estimates to perform the Statement of Work in the most cost-effective and efficient manner thus resulted in substantial savings. The FY 1979 program kept 19 percent of the functions and 35 percent of the authorizations studied in-house; earlier experience had been 15 percent of the functions and 18 percent of the authorizations remaining in-house.

It is interesting to note that the relative percentages of total FY 1981 Air Force manpower in the three categories -- active military, inservice civilian, and contract manyear equivalents -- have changed very little since FY 1973. As a percent of total manpower, inservice civilian manpower has remained almost constant, while active military has decreased by 2 percent and contract manyear equivalents have increased by 2 percent. The Air Force views this as a very stable internal work force composition despite the decreased overall size and changes in missions.

6. Accession Programs

a. Enlisted. Non-prior service enlisted recruiting goals for FY 1980 through FY 1981, and the number of personnel recruited in FY 1979, are shown below:

Active Air Force Enlisted Accession Goals (Non-Prior Service)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Program	68,000	73,300	79,000
Actual	66,600	-	-

FY 1980 represents the start of the decline in the 18-year-old youth market, which is the major source of Non-Prior Service (NPS) enlistments. This decline is accompanied by increased competition from college campuses to attract quality youth. The OSD Spring 1979 youth survey indicates that the inclination of youth to enlist is 50 percent of the FY 1975 level -- less than 4.2 percent of today's youth state positively they will, or probably will, enlist. The survey also indicates an increase in youth obtaining employment. The net result is a

marked drop in youth availability. Concomitant with this decline in youth availability is the decline in the perception of the Air Force as a viable career option. The Air Force initially entered the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) with adequate resources, an economic climate which facilitated recruiting success, and a competitive enlistment package. That package consisted of wages which were comparable with the private sector, a retirement program and in-service entitlements which enhanced the appeal of a military career, and a strong educational incentive in the GI Bill. Over the past four years this enlistment package has failed to keep pace with the civilian sector in terms of pay increases; the military compensation system is receiving high visibility because of the recommendations of the President's Commission on Military Compensation, the Uniform Services Benefits Act, and other proposed changes, and the Veterans Education Assistance Program (VEAP) educational incentive is not as attractive as the former GI Bill.

During FY 1979, for the first time in All-Volunteer Force history, the Air Force fell short of its enlisted recruiting objective (by about 1,400). The number of male commitments to enlist in the Delayed Enlistment Program (DEP) dropped from a historical average of over 19,000 to less than 8,500. Suggestions have been made to make up the deficit with increased female enlistment. However, female commitments to enlist in the DEP are only approximately 45 percent of requirements versus a historical rate of approximately 65 percent. Additionally, the degradation in the quality of enlistees continues. High school diploma graduate rates were the lowest in the history of the AVF, and the combined Mental Category I and II rates were the lowest since 1958. Continuation of these trends portends increased recruiting costs.

The Air Force must have the requested FY 1981 recruiting resources. These vital resources, combined with a new series of management initiatives, are necessary for the Air Force to better penetrate youth markets to attract enough youth for service in the Air Force.

Air Reserve Force (ARF) non-prior service enlisted recruiting goals for FY 1980 through FY 1981 and the number of personnel recruited in FY 1979 are shown below:

Air Reserve Forces Enlisted Accession Goals
(Non-Prior Service)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Program	8,928	7,569	8,163
Actual	6,231	-	-

Both the ANGUS and the USAFR exceeded their end strength objectives but fell short of their non-prior service objectives by 30 percent. This shortfall, along with fact-of-life problems in manning critical specialties, increases the need for full recruiting resources in FY 1981. The comments regarding the facts of life in today's market place made in the previous section on active force accessions also apply to the Air Reserve Forces.

The Air Reserve Forces will offer an enlistment bonus and educational assistance during FY 1980 for certain hard-to-fill career fields, and will expend every effort to meet all objectives.

b. Officer. The officer procurement program supports established undergraduate flying training rates and officer requirements in the broad range of essential combat sustaining research and development and management functions. During FY 1979, the Air Force continued to encounter increasing difficulties in recruiting officer candidates in the technical and engineering areas, as well as in the health care professions. The market for these skills is highly competitive and, in the volunteer force environment, recruiting is a particularly difficult challenge. In FY 1979, we achieved only 31 percent of our Officer Training School engineering officer requirements and attained only 47 percent of our physician goals. The Air Force is requesting additional recruiters and funding for new recruiting initiative, and will expend every effort to meet the officer force requirements. Officer accession goals and FY 1979 experience are shown below:

Active Air Force Officer Accession Goals

Program	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Actual	10, 298	11,272	10,689
	10, 200	-	-

The Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve, during FY 1979 were successful in their aggressive campaign to procure officers. However, the Air Reserve Forces still have critical manning level problems in some mission essential skill areas, such as weapons systems officers, and in the professional areas, such as doctors. These shortages have direct impact on our combat capabilities.

C. Air Force Manpower Requirements By Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC)

The following tables display Air Force manpower by DPPC for the period FY 1979 through FY 1981. Beginning in FY 1980, Selected Reserve numbers throughout this chapter include reservists on full-time active duty for administration and training of the reserves forces. This section relates Air Force manpower requirements to force levels and describes the significant features of and changes in the FY 1980 through FY 1981 program.

AIR FORCE ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1979</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 1980</u> <u>FY 1981</u>	<u>FY 1981</u> <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>76.5</u>	<u>76.0</u>	<u>76.0</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	55.9	56.4	56.4
Defensive Strategic Forces	9.6	8.5	8.5
Strategic Control and Surveillance	11.1	11.1	11.1
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>122.6</u>	<u>121.2</u>	<u>127.0</u>
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	85.7	84.7	90.2
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	37.0	36.5	36.8
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>55.0</u>	<u>55.6</u>	<u>52.2</u>
Intelligence	17.0	17.6	14.4
Centrally Managed Communications	15.2	15.2	15.2
Research and Development	14.7	14.8	14.8
Geophysical Activities	8.1	8.1	7.8
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>250.6</u>	<u>254.6</u>	<u>256.4</u>
Base Operating Support	150.9	152.7	153.9
Medical Support	12.9	12.8	12.7
Personnel Support	5.9	5.9	6.2
Individual Training	18.9	20.2	20.2
Force Support Training	22.5	24.0	26.0
Central Logistics	5.1	5.1	5.1
Centralized Support Activities	15.2	15.5	14.1
Management Headquarters	18.9	18.3	18.3
Federal Agency Support	0.2	0.2	0.2
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>504.7</u>	<u>507.4</u>	<u>511.5</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>54.5</u>	<u>50.6</u>	<u>52.9</u>
Transients	18.7	13.3	13.5
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	0.7	0.7	0.6
Students, Trainees	30.7	34.5	36.5
Cadets	4.4	4.4	4.4
<u>Total</u>	<u>559.2</u>	<u>558.0</u>	<u>564.5</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

AIR FORCE SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS (ANGUS)
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1979 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1980 <u>FY 1981 Budget</u>	FY 1981 <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	20.4	20.2	20.3
Offensive Strategic Forces	10.3	10.1	10.2
Defensive Strategic Forces	9.3	9.4	9.4
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.7	0.7	0.7
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	57.9	57.3	58.8
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	41.5	41.2	42.7
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	16.4	16.1	16.2
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	11.0	11.9	12.0
Intelligence	-	-	-
Centrally Managed Communications	10.5	11.5	11.5
Research and Development	-	-	-
Geophysical Activities	0.5	0.5	0.5
<u>Support Activities</u>	2.4	2.6	2.7
Base Operating Support	0.4	0.4	0.5
Medical Support	-	-	-
Personnel Support	0.4	0.4	0.5
Individual Training	-	-	-
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	-	-	-
Centralized Support Activities	1.5	1.7	1.7
Management Headquarters	0.0	0.1	0.1
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	91.7	92.1	93.9
<u>Individuals</u>	1.8	1.9	1.9
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	1.8	1.9	1.9
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	93.5	94.0	95.8

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

AIR FORCE SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS (USAFR)
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1979</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 1980</u> <u>FY 1981 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1981</u> <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>2.3</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	1.8	2.0	2.0
Defensive Strategic Forces	0.2	0.2	0.2
Strategic Control and Surveillance	-	-	-
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>38.3</u>	<u>38.3</u>	<u>38.2</u>
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	6.5	6.3	6.8
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	31.9	32.0	31.4
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>2.4</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.8</u>
Intelligence	1.1	1.1	1.1
Centrally Managed Communications	-	-	-
Research and Development	0.7	0.7	0.7
Geophysical Activities	0.6	0.6	1.1
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>13.7</u>	<u>14.3</u>	<u>14.5</u>
Base Operating Support	7.0	7.6	7.6
Medical Support	2.7	2.7	2.7
Personnel Support	0.0	0.3	0.3
Individual Training	1.0	0.7	0.7
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	0.4	0.4	0.4
Centralized Support Activities	1.6	1.6	1.6
Management Headquarters	0.6	0.7	0.9
Federal Agency Support	0.1	0.2	0.2
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>56.2</u>	<u>57.2</u>	<u>57.8</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>0.8</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.6</u>
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	0.8	1.1	1.6
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>57.0</u>	<u>58.2</u>	<u>59.3</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

AIR FORCE CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(Direct and Indirect Fire End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1979</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 1980</u> <u>FY 1981 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1981</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>8.5</u>	<u>8.2</u>	<u>7.7</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	3.8	3.7	3.5
Defensive Strategic Forces	3.7	3.4	3.2
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.9	1.0	1.0
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>26.9</u>	<u>27.0</u>	<u>27.4</u>
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	13.9	14.0	14.5
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	13.1	13.0	12.9
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>23.7</u>	<u>24.3</u>	<u>24.3</u>
Intelligence	1.7	1.7	1.7
Centrally Managed Communications	3.8	4.0	3.9
Research and Development	17.2	17.4	17.4
Geophysical Activities	1.0	1.1	1.3
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>185.9</u>	<u>184.4</u>	<u>181.2</u>
Base Operating Support	89.1	87.8	86.0
Medical Support	3.0	2.9	3.0
Personnel Support	1.2	1.4	1.4
Individual Training	5.1	5.3	5.4
Force Support Training	1.7	1.7	1.7
Central Logistics	68.6	66.9	66.0
Centralized Support Activities	8.7	9.5	8.8
Management Headquarters	8.5	8.9	8.9
Federal Agency Support	*	*	*
<u>Total</u>	<u>245.1</u>	<u>243.9</u>	<u>240.6</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

* Fewer than 50 spaces.

1. Determination of Active Military End Strength

The Air Forces internal manpower management system records authorized strength for force units vice the projected actual strength shown in this report. Authorized strength for a given unit, and hence for a given DPPC, differs from the actual strength because of fluctuations in manning. The DPPC strengths in this report were generated by deducting from the authorized strength for each DPPC a pro rata share of the projected 30 September force undermanning. The strength deducted from each DPPC is shown below.

MILITARY UNDERMANNING BY DPPC

(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1980</u>	<u>FY 1981</u>
<u>Strategic</u>		
Offensive Strategic Forces	0.3	0.3
Defensive Strategic Forces	*	*
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.1	0.1
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>		
Land Forces	-	-
Theater Forces	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	0.4	0.5
Naval Forces	-	-
Mobility Forces	0.2	0.2
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>		
Intelligence	0.1	0.1
Centrally Managed Communications	0.1	0.1
Research and Development	0.1	0.1
Geophysical Activities	*	*
<u>Support Activities</u>		
Base Operating Support	0.8	0.8
Medical Support	0.1	0.1
Personnel Support	*	*
Individual Training	-	-
Force Support Training	0.1	0.1
Central Logistics	*	*
Centralized Support Activities	0.1	0.1
Management Headquarters	0.1	0.1
Federal Agency Support	*	*
<u>Total</u>	2.4	2.5

*Less than 50

Total may not add due to rounding

b. Active Air Force military strength fluctuates continuously as personnel enter and leave the service. High school graduates are available in the summer months, and hence the Air Force strength declines through the spring in anticipation of the prime recruiting months of June, July, and August. Thus, although the Air Force meets overall military end strength levels by the year end, some airmen will still be in the training pipeline vice filling required manpower positions in field units.

2. Strategic. Air Force Strategic Forces are subdivided into Offensive, Defensive, and Control and Surveillance forces.

a. Offensive Strategic Forces. The following tables show Air Force Offensive Strategic Forces.

Air Force Offensive Strategic Forces (PAA)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Active Force</u>			
<u>Bombers</u>			
B-52	316	316	316
FB-111	60	60	60
<u>Tankers</u>			
KC-135	487	487	487
<u>Missiles</u>			
Titan II	54	54	54
Minuteman	1,000	1,000	1,000
<u>Reserve Forces</u>			
<u>Tankers</u>			
ANGUS KC-135	104	104	104
USAFR KC-135	24	24	24

Air Force Offensive Strategic Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	55.9	56.4	56.4
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	10.3	10.1	10.2
USAFR	1.8	2.0	2.0
<u>Civilian</u>	3.8	3.7	3.5

Offensive Strategic Forces consist of combat aircraft and intercontinental ballistic missiles under the control of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). SAC's primary mission is to deter nuclear war by maintaining the ability to deliver nuclear weapons to any part of the world. SAC is also capable of delivering conventional (non-nuclear) weapons with its bomber aircraft. To perform these missions in FY 1981, there are 21 B-52 squadrons, four FB-111 squadrons, 33 active force and 16 reserve force KC-135 tanker squadrons, six Titan missile squadrons, and 20 Minuteman squadrons with the Primary Aircraft/Aerospace Vehicle Authorizations (PAA) shown in the above table.

The FY 1980 active military manpower increase is primarily due to an assigned strength shortfall at the end of FY 1979.

Air Force Reserve manpower increases in FY 1980 reflect full-time active duty personnel included in USAFR strengths. In addition, ANGUS technicians converted to full-time active duty reservists are a primary reason for the decrease in civilians.

b. Defensive Strategic Forces. The following tables show Air Force Defensive Strategic Forces.

Air Force Defensive Strategic Forces

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Interceptor Squadrons</u>			
Active Force	6	6	6
ANGUS	10	10	10

Air Force Defensive Strategic Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	9.6	8.5	8.5
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	9.3	9.4	9.4
USAFR	0.2	0.2	0.2
<u>Civilian</u>	3.7	3.4	3.2

FY 1981 Air Force Defensive Strategic Forces include aircraft and radars of the Tactical Air Command and Air National Guard for surveillance and control of air space. To perform this mission in FY 1981, the Air Force will employ a force of six active Air Force and five Air National Guard F-106 squadrons, two Air National Guard F-101 squadrons and three Air National Guard F-4 squadrons. The ground environment systems include six regional control centers, two manual NORAD control centers, and 60 surveillance radar sites (including USAF/FAA joint use). Thirty-one Distant Early Warning (DEW) stations (10 USAF) are manned primarily by contractor personnel.

FY 1980 active military manpower decreases primarily due to the phased implementation of the Joint Surveillance System (JSS).

ANGUS increases in FY 1980 are the result of including additional full-time active duty personnel in the Selected Reserve strength and an increase in the level of unit manning.

The FY 1980 decrease in civilian manpower is primarily the result of a temporary overage in assigned strength at the end of FY 1979 and the continued implementation of the Joint Surveillance System (JSS). The FY 1981 reductions are primarily the result of the Air Reserve Force technician conversion test and adjustments to the ANGUS force structure program.

c. Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces. Manpower requirements for this category are:

Air Force Strategic Control and Surveillance Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	11.1	11.1	11.1
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	0.7	0.7	0.7
<u>Civilian</u>	0.9	1.0	1.0

Control and Surveillance forces include the following aircraft in FY 1981: one squadron of SR-71s for reconnaissance; 27 EC-135 post attack command and control system aircraft, which are used by the Strategic Air Command for airborne command posts, communications relay, and launch control centers; and four E-4A/B National Emergency Airborne Command Post aircraft. The ground environment activities include the NORAD Combat Operations Center in Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs, which is the nerve center for aerospace defense of the North American continent; three ballistic missile early warning sites; four Submarine Launch Ballistic Missile (SLBM) detection and warning

sites; the Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System facility; six SPACETRACK facilities consisting of radars and ground-based, electro-optical deep space surveillance system sites; the ground data system for the satellite early warning program; three Air National Guard aircraft control and warning sites; and portions of the National Military Command and Control System. Control and Surveillance forces also include communications and command and control support equipment. Finally, some of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System automatic data processing resources are also included in this category.

The apparent increase in civilian manpower in FY 1980 is the result of temporary assigned strength shortfalls at the end of FY 1979.

3. Tactical/Mobility. Air Force Tactical and Mobility forces are discussed in the following sections.

a. Tactical Air Forces. The following tables show Air Force Tactical Air Forces.

Air Force Tactical Air Forces

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Active Force</u>			
Tactical Fighter Wings (TFW)	26	26	26
Tactical Fighter Squadrons	80	79	78
Reconnaissance Squadrons	7	6	6
Special Operations Squadrons	5	5	5
Airborne Warning and Control (AWACS) Squadrons	3	3	3
Airborne TACS Squadrons	11	9	9
Airborne TACCS Squadrons	2	2	2
Tanker/Cargo Squadron (KC-10)	0	0	1
<u>Reserve Forces</u>			
ANGUS Fighter/Attack Squadrons	31	31	31
ANGUS Reconnaissance Squadrons	8	8	8
USAFR Fighter/Attack Squadrons	8	8	8
USAFR Special Operations Squadrons	2	2	2
ANGUS Airborne TACS Squadrons	6	6	6

Air Force Tactical Air Forces Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	85.7	84.7	90.2
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	41.5	41.2	42.7
USAFR	6.5	6.3	6.8
<u>Civilian</u>	13.9	14.0	14.5

Tactical Air Forces consist of the tactical fighter, attack, reconnaissance, special operations, and command and control aircraft for close air support, interdiction, counterair, reconnaissance, tanker/cargo, and special purpose missions. Manpower supporting these forces include air crews, organizational and intermediate aircraft maintenance personnel, and weapon systems security and munitions maintenance personnel. Also included in this category are the forces and manpower for the Air Force's Tactical Air Control Systems, the Air Force Test and Evaluation Center (AFTEC), civil engineering deployable heavy repair (RED HORSE) squadrons, and tactical intelligence squadrons.

FY 1980 active military decreases are due to the Congressionally directed reduction in maintenance of air launched missiles, reductions in the Air Force READY TEAM program, inactivation of one RF-4 squadron and a Tactical Control Group, and potential contract initiatives for tactical range maintenance. These decreases are partially offset by increases for two AWACS aircraft, War Readiness Material (WRM) capabilities to support wartime requirements, tactical fighter force structure increases, and Tactical Air Control System enhancements in Europe. Active military increases in FY 1981 are due principally to increases for four KC-10 aircraft, three EC-130 aircraft, two AWACS aircraft, European Tactical Air Control System enhancements, War Readiness Materiel (WRM) capabilities to support wartime requirements, new tactical fighter range equipment, the initial increment for the Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) system management office, and a structural change from the Intelligence DPPC to the Tactical Air Forces DPPC. These increases are partially offset by savings in maintenance as a result of force modernization.

The ANGUS decrease in FY 1980 is the result of the reduction of two Tactical Control Squadrons, offset by increases to support force conversions. Reserve component increases in FY 1981 reflect the continued modernization and expansion of the Air Reserve Force tactical fighter force. The civilian manpower increase in FY 1980 is due to a temporary end strength shortfall at the end of FY 1979, partially offset by the conversion of Air Reserve Force technicians to active duty reservists. The civilian manpower increase in FY 1981 is the result of continued modernization and expansion of the Air Reserve Force tactical fighter force.

b. Mobility Forces. The following tables show Air Force mobility forces.

Air Force Mobility Forces

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Active Force</u>			
Tactical Airlift Squadrons	14	14	14
Strategic Airlift Squadrons	17	17	17
Aeromed Airlift Squadrons	3	3	3
Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Squadrons	7	7	7

Reserve Forces

Tactical Airlift Squadrons (ANGUS/USAFR)	36	36	35
Strategic Airlift Squadrons (USAFR-Assoc) 1/	17	17	17
Aeromed Airlift Squadrons (USAFR-Assoc) 1/	1	1	1
Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Squadrons (ANGUS/USAFR)	6	6	6

- 1/ Associate squadrons provide aircrews and maintenance personnel for utilization with active USAF squadrons. These include one C-9 aeromedical evaluation squadron, four C-5A squadrons, and 13 C-141 squadrons.

Air Force Mobility Forces Manpower (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	37.0	36.5	36.8
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	16.4	16.1	16.2
USAFR	31.9	32.0	31.4
<u>Civilian</u>	13.1	13.0	12.9

Air Force Mobility Forces consist of the tactical airlift, strategic airlift, aeromedical airlift, and aerospace rescue and recovery aircraft of the Military Airlift Command (MAC), the Air Force Reserve, and the Air National Guard. Manpower supporting these forces include crews, organizational and intermediate aircraft maintenance, and aircraft security personnel. This category also includes manpower for aerial port operations and Air Force special mission forces.

Active military manpower decreases in FY 1980 are due to closure of an air passenger terminal and refinement of aerial port manpower standards, T-39 flying hour reductions, and reduced navigator requirements based on phased installation of Inertial Navigation System (INS) equipment in C-141 aircraft, partially offset by increases in C-130 related manpower as a result of wartime deployment scenarios simulated by the LCOM. FY 1981 increases are due to further increases associated with C-130 wartime deployment requirements simulated by the LCOM.

ANGUS manpower decreases in FY 1980 are due to higher than programmed assigned strength at the end of FY 1979, while increases in FY 1981 reflect C-130 aircraft model changes and the conversion of a C-7 unit to a C-130 unit. USAFR manpower increases in FY 1980 reflect higher unit manning levels to improve readiness. The reduction in FY 1981 USAFR manpower is the result of changes in force structure.

Civilian manpower changes in FY 1980 and FY 1981 are associated with force structure changes in the Air Reserve Forces and conversion of technicians to active duty reservists.

4. Auxiliary Activities. Auxiliary Activities are subdivided into Intelligence, Centrally Managed Communications, Research and Development Activities, and Geophysical Activities.

a. Intelligence.

Air Force Intelligence Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	17.0	17.6	14.4
Reserve Components			
USAFR	1.1	1.1	1.1
<u>Civilian</u>	1.7	1.7	1.7

This category includes manpower for the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, the General Defense Intelligence Program, and Air Force support to the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. The Air Force Intelligence Center and the Air Force Electronic Security Command are the primary Air Force organizations supporting these activities.

In FY 1980, the increase in active military reflects the realignment of cryptologic base operating support manpower from BOS.

FY 1981 active military reductions reflect the realignment of tactical cryptologic activities manpower to the tactical air forces DPPC.

b. Centrally Managed Communications.

Air Force Centrally Managed Communications Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	15.2	15.2	15.2
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	10.5	11.5	11.5
<u>Civilian</u>	3.8	4.0	3.9

This category includes manpower supporting long-haul defense communication systems, Air Force communications systems, satellite communications systems, and the Air Force Communications Command engineering and installation activities.

FY 1980 civilian manpower increases are due to temporary assigned strength shortfalls at the end of FY 1979. FY 1981 civilian decreases are the result of potential contract initiatives.

Increased ANGUS manpower reflects the Air National Guard's efforts to enhance the readiness of its communications units by increasing manpower to required levels.

c. Research and Development

Air Force Research and Development Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	14.7	14.8	14.8
Reserve Components			
USAFR	0.7	0.7	0.7
<u>Civilian</u>	17.2	17.4	17.4

This category includes manpower, primarily in the Air Force Systems Command, which carries out basic and applied research and design, development, test, and evaluation of Air Force systems and subsystems. Manpower in this category also supports various Department of Defense research and development activities and agencies.

The increase in active military and civilian manpower in FY 1980 is due primarily to the MX and Space Transportation System programs. The civilian manpower increase is the result of temporary assigned strength shortfalls at the end of FY 1979.

d. Geophysical Activities

Air Force Geophysical Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	8.1	8.1	7.8
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	0.5	0.5	0.5
USAFR	0.6	0.6	1.1
<u>Civilian</u>	1.0	1.1	1.3

The manpower in this category supports active Air Force and Air Reserve Force weather service activities, meteorological and navigational satellite/space programs, and Defense mapping, charting, and geodesy activities. The FY 1980 civilian increase is the result of temporary assigned strength shortfalls in FY 1979. Active military manpower decreases and Air Force Reserve and civilian increases in FY 1981 reflect a projected force structure adjustment.

5. Support Activities. Support Activities are subdivided into Base Operating Support, Medical Support, Personnel Support, Individual Training, Force Support Training, Central Logistics, Centralized Support Activities, Management Headquarters, and Federal Agency Support.

a. Base Operating Support. Base Operating Support has two subcategories: Combat Installations and Support Installations.

(1) Base Operating Support - Combat Installations.

Air Force Base Operating Support Manpower - Combat Installations
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	113.8	114.2	113.6
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	0.4	0.4	0.4
USAFR	6.7	7.3	7.3
<u>Civilian</u>	51.6	50.0	48.5

This category contains manpower resources essential for the direct support and overall readiness of our combat forces in such vital functions as control tower operations, aircraft dispatch, airfield and combat facilities maintenance and battle damage repair, fire protection and crash rescue, security, base communications, food service, transportation, and supply. Differences among the services in accounting for combat support manpower are discussed in Chapter IV.

Active military manpower increases in FY 1980 are principally due to the application of a USAF-wide base civil engineering manpower standard and an assigned strength shortfall at the end of FY 1979. They are partially offset by base realignment actions at Rickenbacker AFB, the continued implementation of the Joint Surveillance System, and potential inservice to contract conversions. FY 1980 civilian manpower decreases are due primarily to potential inservice to contract conversions, the continued phase-in of the Joint Surveillance System, and base realignment actions at Rickenbacker AFB. They are partially offset by a temporary end strength shortfall at the end of FY 1979.

FY 1981 decreases in active military are due to force structure changes, the phase-out of the Ellington AFB caretaker, and potential inservice to contract initiatives. Partially offsetting increases are associated with phasing into RAF Fairford, United Kingdom. Civilian manpower decreases in FY 1981 are due to potential inservice to contract conversions, implementation of manpower standards, and force structure changes, partially offset by DPPC structure changes bringing Installation audiovisual support from other categories to BOS.

USAFR manpower increases in FY 1980 reflect restructuring of civil engineering PRIME BEEF units and missions.

(2) Base Operating Support - Support Installations

Air Force Base Operating Support Manpower - Support Installations. (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	37.1	38.5	40.3
Reserve Components			
USAFR	0.3	0.3	0.3
<u>Civilian</u>	37.5	37.9	37.5

This category contains manpower resources for the operation and maintenance for auxiliary, logistics, and training installations and other base operating support activities such as base hospitals, clinics, dispensaries, laundries and commissaries.

FY 1980 military and civilian increases are due to the congressionally directed increase in medical support, the realignment of consolidated cryptologic support from Intelligence, application of a USAF-wide base civil engineering manpower standard, and end strength shortfalls at the end of FY 1979, partially offset by potential inservice to contract initiatives and congressionally directed communications center reductions. FY 1981 military increases are the result of a DPPC structure change moving installation audiovisual support into BOS, partially offset by potential inservice to contract initiatives, implementation of manpower standards, and force structure changes.

FY 1981 civilian manpower decreases primarily due to implementation of manpower standards.

b. Medical Support.

Air Force Medical Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	12.9	12.8	12.7
Reserve Components			
USAFR	2.7	2.7	2.7
<u>Civilian</u>	3.0	2.9	3.0

Included in this category is manpower required to provide medical and dental care to eligible individuals in Air Force medical centers and dental facilities. It also includes medical research and development and Air Force Reserve medical service units.

Decreases in FY 1980 military and civilian manpower are due primarily to temporary overages in assigned strength at the end of FY 1979.

c. Personnel Support.

Air Force Personnel Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	5.9	5.9	6.2
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	0.4	0.4	0.5
USAFR	0.0	0.3	0.3
<u>Civilian</u>	1.2	1.4	1.4

The Air Force operates over 1,000 recruiting offices and contributes manpower to 67 Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations (AFEES). Air Force manpower requirements in support of investigative activities, personnel processing, and the Air Force Aerial Demonstration Team are also included in this category.

While active military remains constant in FY 1980, the FY 1981 active military increase is for additional recruiters.

The FY 1981 ANGUS manpower increase provides retention NCOs and an officer minority recruiting team, which will assist the ANGUS in meeting accession goals. The increase in FY 1980 USAFR manpower reflects the accounting for full-time active duty personnel in Selected Reserve strengths.

The FY 1980 increase in civilian manpower is due primarily to an end strength shortfall at the end of FY 1979.

d. Individual Training.

Air Force Individual Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	18.9	20.2	20.2
Reserve Components			
USAFR	1.0	0.7	0.7
<u>Civilian</u>	5.1	5.3	5.4

Manpower required to conduct training is included in this category. Individuals actually undergoing training are carried in the Trainees and Students and Cadets accounts of the Individuals category.

Increases in FY 1980 active military are due primarily to an assigned strength shortfall in FY 1979, increases in officer accession programs (AECF, OTS, ROTC), increased recruit and specialized training, partially offset by a military to civilian conversion in the Air Training Command, and increases in Undergraduate Flight Training (UPT/UNT) requirements. FY 1981 decreases are associated principally with a DPPC structure change moving the Accelerated Copilot Enhancement program to force support training, partially offset by the continued increased UPT requirements and increased instructors associated with increased non-prior service accessions.

In FY 1980, civilian manpower increases due to a planned military to civilian conversion in the Air Training Command. FY 1981 civilian manpower increases are associated with increased non-prior service accessions.

Detailed justification of training requirements is presented in the FY 1981 Military Manpower Training Report.

e. Force Support Training.

Air Force Force Support Training Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	22.5	24.0	26.0
<u>Civilian</u>	1.7	1.7	1.7

Manpower in this category includes Air Force strategic, tactical, and mobility mission support training. Tactical fighter aggressor squadrons and manpower supporting chemical/biological defensive training are also included.

Increased FY 1980 active military requirements are associated with an increase of tactical training aircraft, increased airlift inflight refueling training, and increased C-130 training. FY 1981 increases are due to an increase of tactical training aircraft, increased C-130 training, and a DPPC structure change moving the Accelerated Copilot Enhancement program into this DPPC.

f. Central Logistics.

Air Force Central Logistics Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	5.1	5.1	5.1
Reserve Components			
USAFR	0.4	0.4	0.4
<u>Civilian</u>	68.6	66.9	66.0

Air Force manpower for this category is required for centrally managed supply, procurement, maintenance, and logistics support activities, primarily of the Air Force Logistics Command.

FY 1980 civilian manpower decreases primarily due to planned inservice to contract conversions. Civilian manpower is decreased in FY 1981 due to planned inservice to contract conversions, and productivity and overtime programs, partially offset by force structure support requirements.

g. Centralized Support Activities.

Air Force Centralized Support Activities Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	15.2	15.5	14.1
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	1.5	1.7	1.7
USAFR	1.6	1.6	1.6
<u>Civilian</u>	8.7	9.5	8.8

The manpower in this category is for centralized support to multiple missions and functions which do not fit other DPPCs and includes Air Force support to OSD, JCS, unified commands, and international military organizations. Manpower supporting foreign military sales, counterintelligence activities, readiness support, personnel administration, finance centers, public affairs, and various Air Reserve Force activities is also included.

Active military manpower in FY 1980 increases principally due to a temporary shortfall in assigned strength at the end of FY 1979. In FY 1981, active military decreases are due primarily to a realignment of installation audiovisual support and American Forces Radio and Television Service to BOS.

The FY 1980 increase in ANGUS reflects the accounting for full-time active duty personnel in the Selected Reserve strengths.

FY 1980 civilian manpower increases primarily due to temporary shortfalls in assigned strength at the end of FY 1979. Civilian decreases in FY 1981 are due to the realignment of installation audiovisual support and American Forces Radio and Television Service to BOS and conversions of ARF technicians to full-time military.

h. Management Headquarters.

Air Force Manpower in DoD Management Headquarters
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	18.9	18.3	18.3
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	0.0	0.1	0.1
USAFR	0.6	0.7	0.9
<u>Civilian</u>	8.5	8.9	8.9

The manpower in this category supports Air Force Management Headquarters including the Air Force Secretariat, the Air Staff (including the National Guard Bureau), major command headquarters and their numbered Air Force headquarters, Air Force Reserve headquarters, and Air Force Communications Command area headquarters. Air Force manpower supporting international military headquarters and unified command headquarters is also included in this category.

FY 1980 active military decreases are associated with the congressionally directed reduction in management headquarters and the completion of the planned reorganization of air defense and surveillance warning management responsibilities. Civilian manpower increases in FY 1980 are due to a temporary shortfall in assigned strength at the end of FY 1979, partially offset by the congressionally directed reduction in management headquarters.

Effective FY 1980, the Air Reserve Forces statutory tour officers are accounted for as part of the Selected Reserve strengths.

i. Federal Agency Support.

Air Force Federal Agency Support Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.2	0.2	0.2
Reserve Components			
USAFR	0.1	0.2	0.2
<u>Civilian</u>	*	*	*

*Fewer than 50.

This category includes manpower supporting other federal agencies on either a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis. The manpower in this category remains stable through FY 1981. USAFR manpower increases reflect higher unit manning levels.

6. Individuals. The Individuals accounts contain manpower required for transients; patients, prisoners, and holdees; trainees and students; and Air Force Academy cadets.

a. Transients

Air Force Transient Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	18.7	13.3	13.5

Transient manpower is required to maintain unit manning at authorized levels while military members are in travel and leave-enroute status during PCS moves.

The FY 1980 decrease in transient manpower is a result of updated factors for transient requirements and reduced PCS moves. The increase in FY 1981 is a result of changes in the PCS move program factors.

b. Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees

Air Force Patient, Prisoner, and Holdee Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	0.7	0.7	0.6

Air Force manpower in this category includes patients, prisoners, and personnel assigned to the Correctional and Rehabilitation Squadron for retraining and remains fairly constant through the program.

c. Trainees and Students

Air Force Trainee and Student Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	30.7	34.5	36.5
Reserve Components			
ANGUS	1.8	1.9	1.9
USAFR	0.8	1.1	1.6

This category accounts for people undergoing training. The increases in FY 1980 and FY 1981 are the result of increased recruit training, general skill training, undergraduate flight training (UPT/UNT), health education and training, and tactical training, partially offset by reductions in professional military education.

Reserve component manpower changes in FY 1980 and FY 1981 reflect accession program changes.

d. Cadets

Air Force Cadet Manpower
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
<u>Military</u>			
Active	4.4	4.4	4.4

This category includes only Air Force Academy cadets and remains constant throughout the program.

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CHAPTER IX

DEFENSE AGENCIES MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

A. Introduction

This chapter contains the manpower requirements of the following organizations:

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

- Staff

- Field Activities 1/

Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS)

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)

Defense Audit Service (DAS)

Defense Audiovisual Agency (DAVA)

Defense Communications Agency (DCA)

Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

Defense Investigative Service (DIS)

Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)

Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)

Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)

Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA)

U.S. Court of Military Appeals (USCMA)

Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS).

These organizations, collectively called the defense agencies for the purposes of this report, perform specialized functions supporting the entire Department of Defense. The National Security Agency is excluded from this report for security reasons.

B. Manpower Requirements

The manpower requirements of the combined defense agencies are shown in the following table. All military strengths displayed in the table and throughout this chapter are included in service strengths in the preceding chapters. In all tables in this chapter, detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

1/ Includes personnel assigned to the Washington Headquarters Services, the American Forces Information Service, the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services, the Tri-Service Medical Information System Project Office, the Office of Economic Adjustment, and the Department of Defense Dependents Schools.

Defense Agencies Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Military	7.2	7.7	7.9
Civilian, Direct Hire and Indirect Hire	<u>76.7</u>	<u>79.7</u>	<u>80.7</u>
Total	83.9	87.4	88.6

The FY 1979 data shown throughout this chapter are actual strengths as contrasted to manpower space authorizations in FY 1980 and FY 1981. Actual civilian strengths are typically below authorizations because vacated positions cannot always be immediately refilled. This accounts for all apparent FY 1979 to FY 1980 civilian increases in this chapter unless otherwise indicated.

The mission and associated manpower requirements of each agency are discussed in the following paragraphs. At the end of this chapter, the combined defense agency manpower requirements are displayed by Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPC).

1. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

a. Staff. OSD staff provides the Secretary of Defense with the analytical capability and specialized expertise necessary for him to fulfill his management responsibilities over the vast and complex operations of the Defense Department.

OSD staff manpower requirements are shown in the following table.

OSD Staff Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Military	0.4	0.4	0.4
Civilian	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>1.2</u>
Total	1.6	1.6	1.6

b. Field Activities of OSD. "Field Activities" comprise the Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) and five other organizations which do not directly support the Secretary of Defense but, for reasons of efficiency, draw upon the same administrative resources as OSD rather than set up duplicative operations of their own.

These specialized organizations are described below.

(1) The Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) provides administrative support to the OSD staff and to the other OSD field activities.

(2) The American Forces Information Service (AFIS) is responsible for the DoD Armed Forces Information Program including the dissemination of internal information and the management of materials and resources used in support of such programs.

(3) The Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) manages the payment for medical care in nonmilitary facilities for retired members and for dependents or survivors of active or retired members.

(4) The Tri-Service Medical Management Information System (TRIMIS) Program Office centrally manages the development and application of standardized automated systems to improve the effectiveness and economy of health care in the military services.

(5) The Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) aids communities which have been affected by major program changes such as base closures, contract cutbacks, reductions-in-force, and growth impacts.

(6) The Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DoDDS) administers and operates the primary and secondary schools for the dependents of Defense personnel assigned overseas.

The combined manpower requirements of the field activities of OSD are shown in the following table.

Manpower Requirements
Field Activities of OSD
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Military	0.2	0.2	0.2
Civilian	9.6	11.6	11.7
Total	9.8	11.8	11.9

DoDDS requirements increase in FY 1980 because of the takeover of Panama Canal Zone schools. They increase further in FY 1981 to provide special education programs required by the Education Amendments Act of 1978. The manpower requirements of the other field activities remain stable.

2. Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS)

OJCS provides military expertise and technical and administrative support to the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in discharging their statutory responsibilities as the principal military advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense. OJCS manpower requirements are as follows:

OJCS Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Military	1.0	1.0	1.0
Civilian	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.3</u>
Total	1.3	1.3	1.3

3. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)

DARPA manages high-risk, high-payoff basic research and applied technology programs. Its objective is to select and pursue revolutionary technology developments that minimize the possibility of technological surprise and offer potential for major increases in national defense capability. In the performance of its work, DARPA makes use of the services of the military departments, other government agencies, private industrial and public entities, educational and research institutions, and individuals.

The following table shows DARPA's manpower requirements.

DARPA Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Military	*	*	*
Civilian	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>
Total	0.1	0.1	0.1

*Fewer than 50 spaces.

4. Defense Audit Service (DAS)

DAS plans and conducts audits for OSD, the unified and specified commands, the defense agencies, the Security Assistance Program, and other DoD-wide programs.

DAS manpower requirements are shown below.

DAS Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Civilian Only	0.4	0.4	0.4

5. Defense Audiovisual Agency (DAVA)

DAVA was established by DoD Directive 5040.1 in June 1979. It will provide to all DoD components centrally managed production, acquisition, distribution, and depository support and services for selected

audiovisual aids. The agency's headquarters will be located at Norton Air Force Base in California.

Most of the resources for establishing and operating DAVA will be provided by transferring personnel, funds, and equipment from the military departments.

DAVA's manpower requirements are shown on the following table.

DAVA Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Military		*	0.2
Civilian		<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.5</u>
Total		0.1	0.7

*Fewer than 50 spaces.

The military and civilian increases in FY 1981 are due to the transfer of personnel from the military departments to DAVA.

6. Defense Communications Agency (DCA)

DCA is responsible for:

- System engineering and management of the Defense Communications System;
- System architect functions for current and future Military Satellite Communications Systems;
- System engineering and technical support to the Worldwide Military Command and Control System, the National Military Command System, and the Minimum Essential Communications Network; and
- Procuring leased communications circuits, services, facilities, and equipment for DoD and other government agencies.

DCA's manpower requirements are shown on the following table.

DCA Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Military	1.4	1.5	1.5
Civilian	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.6</u>
Total	3.0	3.1	3.1

7. Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)

DCAA provides the procurement and contract administration activities of the Department with financial information and advice on proposed or existing contracts and contractors. DCAA's services are used in connection with negotiation, administration, and settlement of contract payments and prices. DCAA also provides audit services to other Federal departments and agencies in which the Department of Defense has a continuing audit interest or when this is considered efficient from a government-wide point of view. Primary among these non-DoD agency clients are the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Transportation.

DCAA manpower requirements are as follows:

DCAA Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Civilian Only	3.5	3.6	3.6

8. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

The primary mission of DIA is to produce finished, all-source foreign general military and scientific and technical intelligence and all DoD intelligence estimates and DoD contributions to National Estimates; determine information gaps and validate intelligence collection requirements; provide plans, programs, policies, and procedures for DoD intelligence collection activities; manage the production of general military intelligence by the military services, U&S Commands, and DIA; produce or manage the production of all DoD scientific and technical intelligence; serve as the J-2 of the Joint Staff; and manage and coordinate all DoD intelligence information systems programs and the interface of such systems with the intelligence community and DoD systems.

The DIA supports the intelligence requirements of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, unified and specified commands, military departments, the National Security Council, various other departments of the Executive Branch, and congressional committees.

The table below shows DIA manpower requirements.

DIA Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Military	1.7	1.9	1.9
Civilian	<u>2.5</u>	<u>2.5</u>	<u>2.5</u>
Total	4.2	4.4	4.4

9. Defense Investigative Service (DIS)

DIS performs personnel security investigations for the DoD components to determine the suitability of an individual for employment in a position of trust within the Department or a facility performing under classified contracts. DIS also performs criminal investigations and crime prevention surveys for the Defense Logistics Agency and conducts special investigations as directed by the Secretary of Defense.

The following table shows the manpower requirements of the DIS.

DIS Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Military	0.2	0.2	0.1
Civilian	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.7</u>
Total	1.7	1.7	1.8

A congressional mandate to civilianize DIS leads to a gradual decrease in military manpower and an accompanying increase in civilian manpower.

10. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)

DLA provides common supplies and a broad range of logistic services to the military departments, other defense components, Federal agencies, and authorized foreign governments. Supply management responsibilities include clothing, subsistence and medical goods, industrial and construction material, and petroleum products. Logistic services rendered by DLA include contract administration, surplus personal property disposal, documentation services to the R&D community, and operation of the Federal Cataloging System.

DLA is the largest of the defense agencies, accomplishing its varied missions both in the United States and overseas through 25 major field activities.

The manpower required for DLA's extensive operations is displayed in the following table.

DLA Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Military	1.0	1.1	1.1
Civilian	<u>47.1</u>	<u>47.4</u>	<u>47.4</u>
Total	48.1	48.5	48.5

11. Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)

DMA produces and distributes aeronautical, hydrographic, and topographic products for all DoD components and manages and coordinates all DoD mapping, charting, and geodesy activities. It executes DoD mapping responsibilities under international and interagency agreements. DMA has statutory responsibility for providing nautical charts and marine navigation data for all vessels of the United States and provides cartographic support for the cruise missile program.

DMA manpower requirements are depicted below.

DMA Manpower Requirements (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Military	0.4	0.4	0.4
Civilian	<u>7.8</u>	<u>8.0</u>	<u>8.1</u>
Total	8.2	8.4	8.5

The civilian increase in FY 1980 is necessary to improve force readiness and to support increased mapping requirements created by the formation of the Rapid Deployment Force. Civilians increase further in FY 1981 due to transfer of the terrain analysis function from the Defense Intelligence Agency to DMA.

12. Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)

DNA is the consolidated manager of the DoD nuclear weapons stockpile. The Agency also manages the nuclear weapon effects test and development programs. DNA manpower requirements are shown in the following table.

DNA Manpower Requirements (End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Military	0.5	0.5	0.5
Civilian	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>
Total	1.1	1.1	1.1

13. Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA)

DSAA is responsible for management of the DoD Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Programs. Its manpower requirements are as follows:

DSAA Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Military	*	*	*
Civilian	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>
Total	0.1	0.1	0.1

*Fewer than 50 spaces

14. US Court of Military Appeals (USCMA)

The US Court of Military Appeals serves as the supreme court of the United States system of military justice. It has jurisdiction over every court-martial case involving death, flag or general officers, dismissals, discharges, and confinement for one year or more and over certain military justice cases of lesser penalties.

The manpower requirements of the US Court of Military Appeals are shown below.

USCMA Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Whole Numbers)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Civilian Only	37	49	49

15. Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS)

USUHS was created by PL 92-426 to provide high quality education in health sciences to selected individuals who demonstrate dedication to a career in the health professions of the uniformed services. The University is authorized to grant appropriate advanced academic degrees.

The total manpower requirements -- including staff, faculty, and students -- of the growing University are as follows:

USUHS Manpower Requirements
(End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Military	0.4	0.5	0.6
Civilian	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.7</u>
Total	0.8	1.1	1.3

C. Manpower Requirements By DPPC.

The following tables show the military and civilian requirements of the combined defense agencies, arranged by DPPC.

DEFENSE AGENCIES MILITARY^{1/} MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(End Strength in Thousands)

	FY 1979 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1980 <u>FY 1981 Budget</u>	FY 1981 <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>0.4</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.3	0.4	0.4
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Land Forces	-	-	-
Tactical Air Forces	-	-	-
Naval Forces	-	-	-
Mobility Forces	-	-	-
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>3.2</u>	<u>3.4</u>	<u>3.5</u>
Intelligence	1.7	1.9	1.9
Centrally Managed Communications	0.9	1.0	1.0
Research and Development	0.2	0.2	0.2
Geophysical Activities	0.4	0.4	0.4
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>3.7</u>	<u>3.9</u>	<u>4.0</u>
Base Operating Support	0.1	0.1	0.1
Medical Support	*	*	*
Personnel Support	*	*	*
Individual Training	0.4	0.5	0.6
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	0.9	1.0	1.0
Centralized Support Activities	0.2	0.2	0.3
Management Headquarters	2.0	2.0	2.0
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>7.2</u>	<u>7.7</u>	<u>7.9</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holdees	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	-	-	-
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>7.2</u>	<u>7.7</u>	<u>7.9</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

^{1/} Military strengths in agencies are also included in service tables.
NSA is excluded due to security reasons.

* Fewer than 50.

DEFENSE AGENCIES CIVILIAN^{1/} MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(Direct and Indirect Hire End Strength in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1979</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>FY 1980</u> <u>FY 1981 Budget</u>	<u>FY 1981</u> <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>0.6</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Defensive Strategic Forces	-	-	-
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.5	0.6	0.6
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Land Forces			
Tactical Air Forces			
Naval Forces			
Mobility Forces			
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>11.2</u>	<u>11.4</u>	<u>11.5</u>
Intelligence	2.5	2.5	2.5
Centrally Managed Communications	0.7	0.7	0.7
Research and Development	0.3	0.3	0.3
Geophysical Activities	7.7	7.9	8.0
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>65.0</u>	<u>67.7</u>	<u>68.6</u>
Base Operating Support	6.0	5.8	5.8
Medical Support	0.2	0.2	0.2
Personnel Support	9.1	10.9	11.0
Individual Training	0.4	0.6	0.7
Force Support Training	-	-	-
Central Logistics	40.2	40.6	40.6
Centralized Support Activities	5.7	5.8	6.4
Management Headquarters	3.5	3.8	3.9
Federal Agency Support	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>76.7</u>	<u>79.7</u>	<u>80.7</u>

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

^{1/} NSA manpower is excluded due to security reasons.



PART B - Special Analyses and Data

Part B contains special analyses of five subjects related to the Defense manpower program. It also contains a description of manpower and forces by location.

Chapter X	-	Cost of Manpower
Chapter XI	-	All Volunteer Force
Chapter XII	-	Women in the Military
Chapter XIII	-	Productivity
Chapter XIV	-	Manpower and Forces by Location
Chapter XV	-	Manpower Data Structure

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Chapter X

COST OF MANPOWER

A. Introduction

DoD outlays for manpower costs will be \$77 billion in the President's Budget for FY 1981. This chapter discusses the makeup of those costs.

B. Pay Raise Assumptions

The pay raise assumptions contained in the FY 1981 budget submissions and the previous actual experience are:

	<u>Military/General Schedule</u>	<u>Wage Board</u>
	(%)	(%)
FY 74	4.8	10.2
FY 75	5.5	8.9
FY 76	5.0	9.0
FY 77	4.8	8.3
FY 78	7.1	7.9
FY 79	5.5	5.3
FY 80	7.0	6.4 ^{1/}
FY 81	7.4/6.2 ^{2/}	6.5

1/ Average actual increase since 1 October 1979.

2/ Two numbers in the Military/General Schedule column reflect different military and general schedule pay raises on the assumption that Congress will pass the Civil Service Reform Act, linking military pay raises directly to the private sector. Civilian pay raises will be linked to a wider local sector to include State and local government employees as well as a wider clerical base.

C. Description of Defense Manpower Costs

1. Cost Categories

The manpower cost categories used in this chapter are described below:

a. Military Personnel Appropriations, one for each Service, fund all the active military pay, cash allowances, permanent change of station travel expenses, and the cost of feeding military people (subsistence-in-kind) in military messes or with field rations.

b. Defense Family Housing Appropriation funds the leasing, construction, and maintenance of family housing for military personnel. This appropriation also includes funds for paying civilians. However, the pay for all DoD civilians is counted under another category, civilian costs, in this chapter. Thus, the Defense Family Housing cost category here excludes civilian costs to avoid double counting and should not be compared with the total Defense Family Housing appropriation.

c. Military Retired Pay Appropriation funds the compensation of retired military personnel for previous service. The retired pay appropriation is a single appropriation for DoD and is not normally shown by Service. The amount funded in this appropriation depends on the retired military population and, except in a very long-term context, is independent of the current force. The budget does not reflect future retirement costs for members of the current force.

d. Reserve and Guard Personnel Appropriations, one for each of the six reserve components, fund reserve drills, active duty training, ROTC, full-time reservists for administration and training, and the Health Profession Scholarship Program. These appropriations cover basically the same elements as the Military Personnel appropriations.

e. Civilian Costs. Unlike military personnel costs which are funded through separate appropriations, civilian costs are spread among several appropriations in accordance with the function being performed. The following table shows the percent of the FY 1981 DoD civilian costs contained in each of the functional appropriations.

Table 1

FY 1981 CIVILIAN COSTS BY APPROPRIATION

<u>Appropriations Account</u>	<u>Percent of Civilian Costs</u>
Operations and Maintenance	85.5
RDT&E	8.8
Procurement ^{1/}	3.2
Defense Family Housing	1.4
Military Construction	1.1
Total	100.0

^{1/} No civilians are paid directly from procurement appropriations, but indirectly through the Industrial Funds.

Civilian costs include compensation for both direct and indirect hires. Also included are the DoD contribution to retirement, and health and life insurance.

f Personnel Support Costs. Personnel support costs are defined as the non-pay portions of the costs of the following functions:

- Individual Training
- Medical Support (including CHAMPUS)
- Recruiting and Examining
- Overseas Dependent Education
- Base Operating Support (50 percent of total)
- Other Personnel Support

The direct personnel costs, including pay, are not included in personnel support costs, as they have already been included in the previously defined cost categories. Explanations of the personnel support costs for each of the above listed functions are presented in Section D-1 which follows.

2. Cost Trends

Table 2 shows the trends in manpower costs and the associated strengths for the President's FY 1981 budget and selected historical years including payments to retired military personnel.

Table 2

DEFENSE MANPOWER COSTS WITH MILITARY RETIRED PAY APPROPRIATION 1/
(Outlays, \$ Billion)

	Actual								FY 1981 President's Budget Request	
	FY 64	FY 68	FY 74	FY 75	FY 76	FY 77	FY 78	FY 79	FY 80	FY 81
Defense Outlays	49.5	77.3	77.6	84.9	87.9	95.6	103.0	115.0	127.4	142.7
Manpower Outlays										
Military Personnel Appropriations	12.3	19.0	22.1	23.2	23.3	23.9	25.1	26.3	28.2	30.3
Def. Family Housing Appropriations 2/	.5	.4	.7	.9	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.3
Military Retired Pay Appropriations 3/	1.2	2.1	5.1	6.2	7.3	8.2	9.2	10.3	11.9	13.7
Reserve and Guard Personnel Approps.	.7	.9	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.4	2.7
Civilian Costs 4/	7.5	10.6	14.1	15.3	16.4	17.5	18.9	19.8	21.4	22.7
Personnel Support Costs 5/	1.7	2.8	2.9	3.7	3.8	3.8	4.2	4.8	4.8	6.0
Total Manpower Costs	23.9	35.8	46.6	51.1	53.5	56.3	60.5	64.5	70.0	76.7
End Strengths (000s)										
Regular Employees										
Active Military	2687	3547	2161	2127	2081	2074	2061	2025	2045	2059
Civilians 4/										
Direct Hire	1035	1274	1015	989	960	939	936	916	913	911
Indirect Hire	140	119	94	89	87	83	81	75	78	79
Total	1176	1393	1109	1078	1047	1022	1017	991	991	990
Total	3863	4940	3270	3205	3128	3095	3078	3016	3036	3049
Others										
Selected Reserve 6/	953	922	925	896	823	808	788	807	832	868
Retired Military	435	651	1012	1073	1132	1199	1243	1286	1328	1370

1/ Data exclude civil functions.

2/ Excludes civilian pay portion of this appropriation which is included under civilian costs.

3/ For those already retired. Future retirement costs for current members are not currently reflected in the budget.

4/ The cost of civilians is budgeted under the functional appropriations--e.g., operations and maintenance, family housing, RDT&E. Often indirect hire civilians are excluded from manpower costs and strength data.

5/ Excludes the pay of military and civilian personnel, since they are accounted for separately. Includes costs of individual training, medical support, recruiting and examining, overseas dependent education, half of base operating support, and a miscellaneous category.

6/ Includes National Guard and Reserve technicians who are also counted as civilian employees. Includes all people attending paid drills or receiving initial training. From FY 1980 on, the reserve data also include officers on statutory tours and other reservists on full-time duty for the purpose of organizing administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the reserve forces.

D. Detailed FY 1981 Manpower Costs

The costs in this section are stated in total obligational authority (TOA). The pay raise contingency fund is provided as a separate item for each cost classification.

1. FY 1981 Manpower Costs

Table 3 provides a detailed breakout of FY 1981 manpower costs by DoD Component. Key elements, indexed in the margins of Table 3, are discussed in more detail following the table.

Table 3

FY 1981 MANPOWER COSTS BY COMPONENT
(From FY 1981 President's Budget in TOA-\$M)

Index	COST CATEGORIES	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Defense Agencies	DoD Wide	Total DoD	Index
Military Personnel Appropriations									
a	Basic Pay	7,152	4,944	1,539	5,846			19,481	a
b	Basic Allowances - Quarters (BAQ)	830	622	158	737			2,346	b
c	Subsistence (Cash and In-Kind)	846	603	189	631			2,268	c
d	Bonuses	163	186	43	55			448	d
e	Other Pays	147	190	22	163			521	e
f	Other Allowances	530	261	90	346			1,227	f
g	FICA	462	319	100	378			1,260	g
h	PCS Travel	773	440	127	667			2,006	h
i	Cadet Pay and Allowances	24	25	-	25			74	i
j	Miscellaneous	5	5	2	2			14	j
	Subtotal	10,932	7,594	2,269	8,849			29,644	
- Reimbursables (Pay and Allowances)									
	Direct Obligations	-101	-85	-11	-149			-346	
		10,831	7,509	2,257	8,700			29,298	
k	Pay Raise Contingency	393	277	87	327			1,084	k
	TOTAL MILITARY PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS	11,224	7,786	2,344	9,027	-	-	30,382	
Reserve and Guard Personnel Appropriations									
l	Pay	1,504	204	71	474			2,253	l
m	Allowances	135	13	8	26			183	m
n	Clothing and Travel	159	35	16	56			267	n
o	Other	18	9	-	10			37	o
	Direct Obligations	1,816	261	95	567			2,739	
	Pay Raise Contingency	61	7	3	19			90	
	TOTAL RES/GUARD PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS	1,877	268	98	586	-	-	2,829	

<u>Index</u>	<u>COST CATEGORIES</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Defense Agencies</u>	<u>DoD Wide</u>	<u>Total DoD</u>	<u>Index</u>
P	Defense Family Housing Appropriation (nonpay)	-	-	-	-	-	1,693	1,693	P
q	Military Retired Pay Appropriation	-	-	-	-	-	13,736	13,736	q
r	<u>Civilian Costs 1/ 2/</u>								r
s	Salaries	6,678	6,554		4,919	1,553	277	19,981	s
t	Health and Life Insurance	221	216		162	51	9	659	t
	Retired Pay (DoD Contribution)	440	432		324	102	18	1,316	
	Direct Obligations	7,339	7,202		5,405	1,706	304	21,957	
	Pay Raise Contingency	217	213		160	53	9	650	
	TOTAL CIVILIAN COSTS 1/ 2/	7,556	7,415	-	5,565	1,759	313	22,607	
u	<u>Personnel Support Costs 1/</u>								u
v	Individual Training	520	486		334	8		1,348	v
w	Medical Support	402	196		229	873		1,700	w
x	Recruiting and Examining	167	103		38	0		308	x
y	Overseas Dependents Education	0	0		0	229		229	y
z	Base Operating Support (50%)	1,206	692		1,328	43		3,269	z
	Other Personnel Support	1	97		36	0		134	
	Total Personnel Support Costs 1/	2,296	1,574	-	1,965	1,153	-	6,988	
	TOTAL MANPOWER COSTS 1/	22,953	17,043	2,442	17,143	2,912	15,742	78,235	

NOTE: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

1/ Navy civilian costs and personnel support costs are Department of Navy totals including Marine Corps.
 2/ Defense-wide totals include the costs of civilians employed under the Defense Family Housing, Military Court of Appeals, Civil Defense, and Military Assistance Accounts.

a. Basic Pay (\$19,481 million TOA) is the only element of compensation received in cash by every active duty military member. It ranges in FY 1981 from \$5,386 a year for a new recruit to \$50,112 a year for a four-star officer. The amount of basic pay any member receives is a function of his pay grade and length of military service. For this reason, the total value of basic pay is controlled by the total number of people in uniform and their grade and length of service distribution.

b. Basic Allowance - Quarters (BAQ) (\$2,346 million TOA) is paid to military members who do not occupy government housing, or when the government housing occupied is declared inadequate. Members without dependents who are provided government quarters or who are assigned to field or sea duty receive a partial BAQ payment to offset certain undesirable and unintended effects of pay raise reallocation. In addition to the overall strength, BAQ is a function of the force grade distribution and dependency status and of the numbers and condition of units of government housing. The range of BAQ in FY 1981 is from \$1,109 a year for an E-1 with no dependents to \$5,749 a year for a flag/general officer with dependents. The costs of in-kind housing are not shown in this category but are included in the family housing and base operating support categories.

c. Subsistence (\$2,268 million TOA) represents both the cost of food for military personnel eating in military messes, and cash payments to military members in lieu of food (called Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS)). In FY 1981, all officers are entitled to cash allowances of \$806.52 a year. Enlisted members receive "subsistence-in-kind" in military messes or in the form of field rations. Enlisted members are paid a cash allowance of \$3.62 per day when a mess is not available. They receive \$3.21 per day, or \$1,171.65 annually when on leave or authorized to mess separately, which is the most common form of BAS. When assigned to duty under emergency conditions where no U.S. messing facilities are available, the rate is \$4.79 per day. This BAS rate, however, is rarely used. In addition to varying with strength, subsistence costs vary with the number of people assigned to locations where no mess is available, and with general food prices.

d. Bonuses (\$448 million TOA) include both Enlistment and Reenlistment Bonuses.

(1) Enlistment Bonus (\$70 million TOA) is paid as an incentive for people to enlist in shortage skills. In FY 1981, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps personnel enlisting in combat and some combat support skills will receive this incentive. The maximum enlistment bonus allowed by law is \$3,000, but the actual level is a function of supply and demand in the national youth labor market. For FY 1981, the maximum bonus programmed is \$3,000. This program is under the Armed Forces Enlisted Personnel Bonus Revision Act (PL 93-277), which was extended until 30 September 1980 by the FY 1979 Defense Authorization Bill. Legislation requesting permanent bonus authority and an increase in the maximum bonus to \$5,000 will be submitted by the Department to the second session of the 96th Congress.

(2) Reenlistment Bonus (\$378 million TOA) includes Selective Reenlistment Bonus and Regular Reenlistment Bonus (saved-pay). All personnel who were on active duty on the effective date (June 1, 1974) of PL 93-277, receive the regular bonus up to a cumulative total of \$2000 over a 20-year period. PL 93-277 limited the payment of reenlistment bonuses to critical skills with chronic and sustained shortages. This law replaced the Regular and Variable Reenlistment Bonuses with the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB). The SRB is given only to qualified people reenlisting in a critical and shortage skill during the first ten years of active military service. The current maximum SRB level is \$15,000 for a six year reenlistment in certain nuclear skills, with a \$12,000 maximum for other critical skills. The SRB concept is intended to apply the economic laws of supply and demand to the career manpower requirements of the Services on a skill-by-skill basis. PL 93-277 was extended until September 1980 by the FY 1979 Defense Authorization Bill. Legislation requesting permanent SRB authority, an increase in the eligibility period to 14 years, and an increase in the maximum bonus level will be submitted to the second session of the 96th Congress.

e. Other Pays (\$521 million TOA) include Incentive, Special, and Proficiency Pay.

(1) Incentive Pay (\$245 million TOA) includes payments made to personnel engaged in hazardous duty, such as flying, submarine duty, flight deck duty, and parachute jumping. Payments are influenced by the grade distribution, as well as by the number of qualifying personnel. Although incentive pay varies with the strength of special populations, it does not vary directly with total strength.

(2) Special Pays (\$233 million TOA) are paid to medical and nuclear qualified officers to continue on active duty. Sea and foreign duty pay are paid to enlisted members.

(3) Proficiency Pay (\$44 million TOA) is authorized for enlisted personnel in critical undermanned skill areas and for those in special requirements. These payments are, in effect, additional incentives to attract and retain personnel. In accordance with the intent of Congress, Proficiency Pay has been sharply curtailed in favor of the use of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus.

f. Other Allowances (\$1,227 million TOA) include uniform allowances, separation payments, station allowances, and family separation allowances.

(1) Uniform Allowances (\$347 million TOA) include the cost of providing uniforms to enlisted members entering active duty, and to Reserve officers and ROTC graduates upon commissioning. Also included in these allowances are the costs of uniform maintenance for enlisted personnel with more than six months of active service.

(2) Separation Payments (\$315 million TOA) are paid to four groups of people who are leaving the Services: members with unused leave accrued for which they receive lump sum terminal leave payments; members separated for physical disability reasons; officers separated for reasons of unfitness or failure of promotion; or reserve members involuntarily released from active duty after completing at least five years continuous active duty. The largest component in terms of cost among these four groups is lump sum terminal leave. The value of this component is influenced by the rate of basic pay and the number of days of unused leave. In conjunction with the FY 1976 budget, the President proposed, and Congress enacted, a law (PL 94-212) which limits to 60 days the total terminal leave in a career for which an individual can be paid. The FY 1977 Authorization Bill (PL94-361) prohibits quarters or subsistence payments for any leave accrued after 31 August 1976.

(3) Overseas Station Allowances (\$531 million TOA) are payments made to certain military personnel serving outside the continental United States to reimburse them for increased cost of living in the areas designated. These separate allowances take the form of per diem for cost of living, housing, and temporary lodging. The rates vary by geographical location and by the availability of commissary and post exchange facilities.

(4) Family Separation Allowances (\$34 million TOA) in increments of \$30/month are paid to military members who are serving at duty stations apart from their dependents to reimburse them for added expenses incident to such separation. A member with dependents assigned to a station where dependents are not allowed, on board a ship away from home port for a continuous period of more than 30 days, or ordered to temporary duty away from his permanent station for more than 30 days is entitled to receive the family separation allowance. A member maintaining two homes is entitled to BAQ at the "Without Dependents" rate.

g. FICA Contributions (\$1,260 million TOA) are those payments made for Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (Social Security) by the Defense Department as the employer of military personnel. Payments are influenced by the levels of basic pay and the Social Security tax rates established by law.

h. PCS Travel (\$2,006 million TOA) is the cost of moving people and their households when they enter the Service, move for training, leave the Service, are reassigned to a new duty station, or are part of a unit movement to a new duty location. The following table shows detailed PCS costs by type and Service for FY 1981.

Table 4

**FY 1981 Permanent Change of Station (PCS) Costs
(\$Millions-TOA)**

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>DoD</u>
Accession travel	116	74	26	47	263
Training travel	48	29	5	24	106
Operational travel	42	81	12	88	223
Rotational travel	400	161	60	386	1,007
Separation travel	134	65	20	97	317
Travel of Organized Units	11	20	3	1	35
Non-Temporary Storage	23	8	2	22	55
Total Obligations	773	440	127	667	2,006
Less Reimbursements	-10	-3	-1	-8	-21
Total Direct Obligations	763	437	126	659	1,985

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

i. Cadet Pay and Allowances (\$74 million TOA) includes the pay and allowances of those attending the Military Academy, the Naval Academy, and the Air Force Academy.

j. Miscellaneous Costs (\$14 million TOA) include death gratuities and apprehension of deserters.

(1) Death Gratuities (\$8 million TOA) are paid to beneficiaries of military personnel who die on active duty. The cost of these payments varies with the age distribution of the force and levels of hostilities as well as with overall strength.

(2) Apprehension of Deserters (\$6 million TOA) covers the costs of finding and returning military deserters to military control.

k. Pay Raise Contingency Funds (\$1,847 million TOA total: \$1,084 million for active military; \$23 million for retired military personnel; \$90 million for Reserve/Guard; and \$650 million for civilians) are listed as a proposed supplemental in the President's budget for expected FY 1981 military and civilian pay raises.

1. Reserve Pay (\$2,253 million TOA) includes drill pay and pay for active duty for training of reserve component personnel.

m. Allowances (\$183 million TOA) include subsistence (as described under item 3 in this section), special and incentive pays, and bonuses.

n. Clothing and Travel (\$267 million TOA) include both cash allowances and in-kind clothing issued to recruits, and the cost of travel and transportation of persons in the Reserve Personnel Appropriations.

o. Other Reserve/Guard Military Personnel Costs (\$37 million TOA) include monthly student stipends (ROTC, Armed Forces Health Scholarships, and Platoon Leader Class), educational assistance, Death Gratuities, and Administrative Duty Pay.

p. Defense Family Housing Appropriation (Non-Pay) (\$1,693 million TOA) funds leasing, construction, and maintenance of family housing for military personnel. The total appropriation includes funds for paying civilians, which are counted in this report under civilian costs. To avoid double counting, this civilian pay has been excluded from the Defense Family Housing cost category.

q. Military Retired Pay Appropriation (\$13,736 million TOA) funds the compensation of retired military personnel for previous service. The retired pay appropriation is a single appropriation for DoD and is not normally shown by Service. This appropriation depends on the retired military population, and is independent of the current force.

r. Salaries (\$19,981 million TOA) are the direct monetary compensation paid to civilian employees including basic pay, overtime, incentive and special pays.

s. Health and Life Insurance (\$659 million TOA) includes the government share of the DoD Civilian Health and Life Insurance programs. This currently amounts to about 60 percent of the health program costs and 33 percent of the life insurance program.

t. Retired Pay (DoD Contribution) (\$1,316 million TOA) is the DoD contribution, as employer, to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. This is currently 7 percent of the civilian salaries.

u. Individual Training (\$1,348 million TOA) includes all the non-pay parts of individual training, including recruit training, flight training, professional training, Service academies, and other training of individuals (rather than units).

v. Medical Support (\$1,700 million TOA) includes the non-pay parts of medical support including CHAMPUS (Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services), military hospitals, and some research and development activities.

w. Recruiting and Examining (\$308 million TOA) is the non-pay part of recruiting (including advertising) and examining military personnel.

x. Overseas Dependents Education (\$229 million TOA) includes the non-pay part of this program.

y. Base Operating Support (50%) (\$3,269 million TOA) includes half of the non-pay part of base operating support (BOS) costs. The 50 percent factor is an estimate of the portion of non-pay BOS costs related to the support of people.

z. Other Personnel Support Costs (\$134 million TOA) is a miscellaneous category covering the non-pay part of personnel administration, civilian education and development programs, and other personnel activities.

2. Treatment of FY 1981 Pay Raises. Contingency funds, listed as a proposed supplemental in the President's Budget, are included for expected military and civilian pay raises. In this report, these funds are allocated to the appropriations where they are expected to be spent. The exception to this rule is in Section D-1, above, where the costs are in TOA, and the contingency funds are shown as a separate item to maintain comparability with the detail submitted in support of the President's FY 1981 Budget.

E. Current Civilian and Military Pay Rates

The active military, General Schedule, and Wage Board pay rates are in Tables 5, 6, and 7. Note that the Wage Board pay table is a simple average for 133 areas. Each area has its own distinct pay table. This table is included as a sample only. The pay per training assembly for military reserve personnel is at Table 8. A training assembly is usually a four hour training period. The annual pay for reserves is a function of the number of drills which varies by pay group. Table 9 shows Regular Military Compensation (RMC) for active military personnel. RMC is the total of basic pay; quarters (BAQ) and subsistence (BAS) allowances; and the estimated value of the tax advantage which results because BAQ and BAS are not taxable. RMC figures shown in Table 9 are the averages for each pay grade and longevity step assuming that all military personnel receive the allowances in cash. All of these tables are as of 1 October 1979 and do not include the military and General Schedule pay raises scheduled for October 1980.

Table 5

MILITARY PAY

Monthly Basic Pay Effective 1 October 1979

PAY GRADE	YEARS OF SERVICE													
	UNDER 2	2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	26
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS														
O-10*	3529.80	3654.00	3654.00	3654.00	3654.00	3794.10	3794.10	4084.80	4084.80	4377.00	4377.00	4669.80	4669.80	4961.10
O-9	3128.40	3210.60	3278.70	3278.70	3278.70	3362.40	3362.40	3501.90	3501.90	3794.10	3794.10	4084.80	4084.80	4377.00
O-8	2833.50	2918.40	2987.70	2987.70	2987.70	3210.60	3210.60	3362.40	3362.40	3501.90	3654.00	3794.10	3946.20	3946.20
O-7	2354.40	2514.60	2514.60	2514.60	2627.10	2627.10	2779.80	2779.80	2918.40	3210.60	3431.10	3431.10	3431.10	3431.10
O-6	1745.10	1917.60	2042.70	2042.70	2042.70	2042.70	2042.70	2042.70	2112.00	2446.50	2571.60	2627.10	2779.80	3014.70
O-5	1395.90	1639.20	1752.30	1752.30	1752.30	1752.30	1805.70	1902.30	2029.50	2181.60	2307.00	2376.60	2459.70	2459.70
O-4	1176.60	1432.20	1528.20	1528.20	1556.10	1625.40	1736.10	1833.90	1917.60	2001.30	2057.10	2057.10	2057.10	2057.10
O-3	1093.50	1222.20	1306.50	1445.70	1514.70	1569.60	1653.90	1736.10	1778.70	1778.70	1778.70	1778.70	1778.70	1778.70
O-2	953.10	1041.30	1250.70	1293.00	1319.70	1319.70	1319.70	1319.70	1319.70	1319.70	1319.70	1319.70	1319.70	1319.70
O-1	827.40	861.30	1041.30	1041.30	1041.30	1041.30	1041.30	1041.30	1041.30	1041.30	1041.30	1041.30	1041.30	1041.30
COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WITH OVER 4 YEARS ACTIVE SERVICE AS ENLISTED MEMBERS														
O-3	0.	0.	0.	1445.70	1514.70	1569.60	1653.90	1736.10	1805.70	1805.70	1805.70	1805.70	1805.70	1805.70
O-2	0.	0.	0.	1293.00	1319.70	1361.70	1432.20	1487.40	1528.20	1528.20	1528.20	1528.20	1528.20	1528.20
O-1	0.	0.	0.	1041.30	1112.10	1153.20	1194.90	1236.60	1293.00	1293.00	1293.00	1293.00	1293.00	1293.00
WARRANT OFFICERS														
W-4	1113.90	1194.90	1194.90	1222.20	1278.00	1334.40	1390.20	1487.40	1556.10	1611.30	1653.90	1707.90	1765.20	1902.30
W-3	1012.50	1098.30	1098.30	1112.10	1125.30	1207.50	1278.00	1319.70	1361.70	1402.50	1445.70	1501.50	1556.10	1611.30
W-2	886.80	959.10	959.10	987.00	1041.30	1098.30	1139.70	1181.40	1222.20	1265.10	1306.50	1347.90	1402.50	1402.50
W-1	738.90	847.20	847.20	917.70	959.10	1000.50	1041.30	1084.20	1125.30	1166.70	1207.50	1250.70	1250.70	1250.70
ENLISTED MEMBERS														
E-9**	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	1265.40	1294.20	1323.60	1354.20	1384.20	1411.20	1485.60	1629.60
E-8	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	1061.70	1091.40	1120.50	1149.90	1179.90	1207.20	1236.90	1309.50	1455.60
E-7	741.30	800.10	829.80	858.60	888.30	916.20	945.60	975.00	1019.10	1047.90	1077.60	1091.40	1164.90	1309.50
E-6	640.20	698.10	727.20	757.80	786.00	814.80	844.80	888.30	916.20	945.60	960.00	960.00	960.00	960.00
E-5	562.20	611.70	641.40	669.30	713.10	742.20	771.90	800.10	814.80	814.80	814.80	814.80	814.80	814.80
E-4	540.30	570.60	603.90	651.00	676.80	676.80	676.80	676.80	676.80	676.80	676.80	676.80	676.80	676.80
E-3	519.60	548.10	570.30	592.80	592.80	592.80	592.80	592.80	592.80	592.80	592.80	592.80	592.80	592.80
E-2	500.10	500.10	500.10	500.10	500.10	500.10	500.10	500.10	500.10	500.10	500.10	500.10	500.10	500.10
E-1	448.80	448.80	448.80	448.80	448.80	448.80	448.80	448.80	448.80	448.80	448.80	448.80	448.80	448.80

NOTE: Basic Pay is limited to \$4176.00 by Level V of the Executive Schedule.

* While serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, or Commandant of the Marine Corps, basic pay for this grade is \$5473.80 regardless of cumulative years of service.

** Highest Enlisted Rank. While serving as Sergeant Major of the Army, Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy, Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force, or Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, basic pay for this grade is \$1980.90 regardless of cumulative years of service.

Table 5 - Continued

**MONTHLY
BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR QUARTERS RATES
EFFECTIVE 1 OCTOBER 1979**

PAY GRADE	WITHOUT DEPENDENTS		WITH DEPENDENTS	BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR SUBSISTENCE RATES
	FULL RATE 1/	PARTIAL RATE 2/		
O-10	383.10	50.70	479.10	67.21 per month
O-9	383.10	50.70	479.10	
O-8	383.10	50.70	479.10	
O-7	383.10	50.70	479.10	3.21 per day
O-6	343.80	39.60	419.40	
O-5	316.80	33.00	381.60	
O-4	282.30	26.70	340.50	3.62 per day
O-3	248.10	22.20	306.30	
O-2	215.40	17.70	272.70	
O-1	168.00	13.20	219.00	4.79 per day
W-4	271.80	25.20	328.20	
W-3	242.40	20.70	298.80	
W-2	210.90	15.90	268.20	4.79 per day
W-1	190.50	13.80	246.60	
E-9	205.20	18.60	288.60	
E-8	189.00	15.30	266.70	4.79 per day
E-7	160.80	12.00	248.10	
E-6	146.10	9.90	228.30	
E-5	140.40	8.70	209.70	4.79 per day
E-4	123.90	8.10	184.50	
E-3	110.70	7.80	160.80	
E-2	97.80	7.20	160.80	4.79 per day
E-1	92.40	6.90	160.80	

1/ Payment of the full rate of basic allowance for quarters at these rates for members of the uniformed services to personnel without dependents is authorized by 37 United States Code 403 and Part IV of Executive Order 11157, as amended.

2/ Payment of the partial rate of basic allowance for quarters at these rates to members of the uniformed services without dependents who, under 37 United States Code 403(b) or 403(c), are not entitled to the full rate of basic allowance for quarters, is authorized by 37 United States Code 1009(d) and Part IV of Executive Order 11157, as amended.

Table 6

ANNUAL GENERAL SCHEDULE PAY RATES

FY 1980

As adjusted by Executive Order 12165, October 9, 1979.
Effective on the first day of the first applicable pay period beginning on or after October 1, 1979.

Step	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS-1	\$7,210	\$7,450	\$7,690	\$7,930	\$8,170	\$8,410	\$8,650	\$8,890	\$9,130	\$9,370
2	8,128	8,399	8,670	8,942	9,213	9,484	9,755	10,026	10,297	10,568
3	8,952	9,250	9,548	9,846	10,144	10,442	10,740	11,038	11,336	11,634
4	10,049	10,384	10,719	11,054	11,389	11,724	12,059	12,394	12,729	13,064
5	11,243	11,618	11,993	12,368	12,743	13,118	13,493	13,868	14,243	14,618
6	12,531	12,949	13,367	13,785	14,203	14,621	15,039	15,457	15,875	16,293
7	13,925	14,389	14,853	15,317	15,781	16,245	16,709	17,173	17,637	18,101
8	15,423	15,937	16,451	16,965	17,479	17,993	18,507	19,021	19,535	20,049
9	17,035	17,603	18,171	18,739	19,307	19,875	20,443	21,011	21,579	22,147
10	18,760	19,385	20,010	20,635	21,260	21,885	22,510	23,135	23,760	24,385
11	20,611	21,298	21,985	22,672	23,359	24,046	24,733	25,420	26,107	26,794
12	24,703	25,326	25,949	26,572	27,195	27,818	28,441	29,064	29,687	30,310
13	29,375	30,354	31,333	32,312	33,291	34,270	35,249	36,228	37,207	38,186
14	34,713	35,870	37,027	38,184	39,341	40,498	41,655	42,812	43,969	45,126
15	40,832	42,193	43,554	44,915	46,276	47,637	48,998	50,359	51,720*	53,081*
16	47,889	49,485	51,081*	52,677*	54,273*	55,869*	57,465*	59,061*	60,657*	
17	56,099*	57,969*	59,839*	61,709*	63,579*					
18	65,750*									

* Public Law 96-86, October 12, 1979, limits the rates payable to the rate payable for level V of the Executive Schedule, which is \$50,112.50.

NOTE: On October 1, 1979, the limitation in Schedule 1 of Executive Order No. 12087, October 7, 1978, changed and for the period October 1, 1979, to the start of the first applicable pay period in fiscal 1980 the following rates of pay were payable:

GS-15, Step 9	\$48,336	GS-16, Steps 5 through 9	\$50,100
GS-15, Step 10	49,608	GS-17, Steps 1 through 5	50,100
GS-16, Step 3	47,740	GS-18	50,100
GS-16, Step 4	49,232		

Table 7
FEDERAL WAGE SYSTEM NATIONAL AVERAGE SCHEDULE (APPROPRIATED FUNDS)
CONVERTED TO YEARLY RATES*
(As of 30 September 1979)

Grade/Step	Wage Grade Rates					Wage Leader Rates					Wage Supervisor Rates				
	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
1	10,100	10,500	11,000	11,400	11,800	11,100	11,600	12,100	12,500	13,000	14,900	15,500	16,100	16,800	17,400
2	10,800	11,200	11,700	12,100	12,600	11,800	12,300	12,800	13,300	13,800	15,500	16,200	16,800	17,500	18,100
3	11,400	11,900	12,300	12,800	13,300	12,500	13,000	13,500	14,000	14,500	16,200	16,800	17,500	18,200	18,800
4	12,000	12,500	13,000	13,500	14,000	13,200	13,700	14,200	14,700	15,200	16,800	17,500	18,200	18,900	19,500
5	12,700	13,200	13,700	14,200	14,700	13,900	14,400	14,900	15,400	15,900	17,400	18,100	18,800	19,500	20,100
6	13,300	13,800	14,300	14,800	15,300	14,500	15,000	15,500	16,000	16,500	18,100	18,800	19,500	20,200	21,000
7	14,000	14,500	15,000	15,500	16,000	15,200	15,700	16,200	16,700	17,200	18,700	19,400	20,100	21,000	21,900
8	14,600	15,100	15,600	16,100	16,600	15,800	16,300	16,800	17,300	17,800	19,400	20,100	21,000	21,800	22,600
9	15,200	15,700	16,200	16,700	17,200	16,400	16,900	17,400	17,900	18,400	20,000	20,700	21,600	22,400	23,300
10	15,900	16,400	16,900	17,400	17,900	17,100	17,600	18,100	18,600	19,100	20,700	21,400	22,300	23,100	24,000
11	16,500	17,000	17,500	18,000	18,500	17,700	18,200	18,700	19,200	19,700	21,300	22,000	22,900	23,700	24,600
12	17,200	17,700	18,200	18,700	19,200	18,400	18,900	19,400	19,900	20,400	22,000	22,700	23,600	24,400	25,300
13	17,800	18,300	18,800	19,300	19,800	19,000	19,500	20,000	20,500	21,000	22,600	23,300	24,200	25,000	25,900
14	18,400	18,900	19,400	19,900	20,400	19,600	20,100	20,600	21,100	21,600	23,200	23,900	24,800	25,600	26,500
15	19,100	19,600	20,100	20,600	21,100	20,300	20,800	21,300	21,800	22,300	23,900	24,600	25,500	26,300	27,200
16						20,900	21,400	21,900	22,400	22,900	24,500	25,200	26,100	26,900	27,800
17											26,200	26,900	27,800	28,600	29,500
18											27,700	28,400	29,300	30,100	31,000
19											29,300	30,000	30,900	31,700	32,600
											31,200	32,000	32,900	33,700	34,600

* Rates at Step 2, WG represent a simple average of 133 area wage schedules, Alaska and Puerto Rico excluded. Rates are converted from hourly rates by multiplying by 2,080, representing 52 40-hour weeks.

Table 8

EFFECTIVE 1 OCTOBER 1979

YEARS OF SERVICE

X-18

TABLE 6

[illegible]

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CHAPTER XI

THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

A. Introduction

The All-Volunteer Force (AVF) has been in existence for seven years. The last draft call was made in December 1972 and the statutory authority to draft expired in June 1973. The return to a volunteer force was in keeping with the American tradition of using conscription only in time of war. To a large extent, it was the favorable supply and demand situation with respect to young men of military age, coupled with the perceived inequity of requiring involuntary peacetime service from an increasingly smaller proportion of the eligible young men, that made the AVF possible. From 1954 to 1957, annual active and reserve force accessions were equal to 77 percent of the 18-year-old males estimated to be eligible for military service. From 1974 to 1978, military accession requirements were equal to 26 percent of the eligible 18-year-old males. This proportion will continue through the 1980's even though there will be a declining youth population.

Recent difficulties in recruiting have tended to eclipse our achievements and cause doubts in some quarters about our ability to meet peacetime security requirements through voluntary programs. Since January 1973, three million young men and women have voluntarily entered either the active or reserve forces. Overall manning of the active forces has remained near 99 percent of the authorized level. Manning of the Selected Reserve, particularly the Army, has been a significant problem as the reserves have attempted to replace large numbers of draft motivated volunteers. FY 1979 marked a halt to the downward trend in Selected Reserve manning and improvements in manning levels are expected to continue during FY 1980 and FY 1981. The Army Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) inventory continues to be well below that which is desired for a large-scale, short warning conflict with the Warsaw Pact; however, the manning of the IRR has increased by about 60,000 since January 1978.

The transition to the AVF occurred simultaneously with the drawdown in active strength from Vietnam. Table 1 shows that, since the peak in FY 1968, both active military and civilian strengths have declined to below pre-Vietnam levels. Selected Reserve strengths also declined, principally due to our inability to recruit and retain sufficient people to replace the large losses of draft motivated reservists.

Table 1

Defense Manpower Strengths (000)


	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 79</u>
Active Military	2,687	3,547	2,252	2,074	2,061	2,024
Civilian	1,176	1,393	1,100	1,022	1,017	991
Selected Reserve*	953	922	919	808	788	807

*Includes National Guard and Reserve Technicians who are also counted as civilian employees.

Figure 1 shows that most of the drawdown in active military strength occurred between FY 1969 and FY 1972 (just as the AVF decision was being made) and that the reduction was concentrated in the Army. Unlike the reductions in the reserve forces, the reductions in active duty strength were not the result of inability to recruit and retain but were the result of changes in force structure and weapon systems related to the Vietnam phasedown. In FY 1979, strength was again within 1.5 percent of the authorized level.

Figure 1

TOTAL ACTIVE MILITARY END STRENGTH TRENDS



Since the AVF primarily affected the enlisted force, the remainder of this chapter concentrates on enlisted issues.


B. Active Force

The active force was originally perceived as the most serious potential AVF problem. There were concerns that the active force might not be able to recruit enough young people and that the quality of accessions might drop sharply. Through FY 1979, the AVF has provided sufficient recruits to man the force at nearly 99 percent of authorized strength levels. This has been a function of the Services' efforts in the areas of recruiting, attrition and retention.

1. Recruiting

The trend in annual non-prior service accessions is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2



FY 1978 was an unusual year in that the requirement for accessions was low, reflecting to some extent the move to longer initial enlistments in FY 1976. In FY 1979, the accession requirement increased to a more typical level. For the first time since the advent of the AVF, all Services were unable to meet their enlisted accession objectives. Table 2 compares the Services' actual FY 1979 recruiting experience with their objectives and their FY 1978 achievement.

Table 2

**Enlisted Recruitment (000s)
(All Sources)**

<u>Service</u>	<u>FY 1978 Actual</u>	<u>FY 1979 Objective</u>	<u>FY 1979 Actual</u>	<u>Percent of Objective</u>
Army	134.4	159.2	142.2	89
Navy	87.0	91.6	86.4	94
Marine Corps	41.0	42.9	41.8	98
Air Force	69.3	69.2	67.8	98
DoD Total	331.7	362.9	338.2	93

2. Attrition

As shown in Table 3, the first term attrition rate (defined as the percentage of individuals who are lost to the military during their first three years of service) for enlisted personnel grew markedly from FY 1971 to FY 1974. In the Army, for example, the three-year attrition rate for people who enlisted in FY 1971 was 26 percent while the FY 1974 entry group had a rate of 38 percent. In 1977, the Secretary of Defense directed that efforts be made to decrease first-term attrition. Measures were taken not only to improve the low first-term attrition rates but also to improve our fighting capability. It is undesirable to retain nonproductive people purely to reduce attrition. Therefore, we must not only increase the management attention devoted to this problem but also better screen those who enter the force to exclude high-risk, marginally productive personnel.

Table 3

Attrition Percentage of Active Duty Non-Prior Service Male Enlistees*

<u>Service</u>	<u>Actual</u>						<u>Estimated</u>	
	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
Army	26	28	31	38	37	37	34	30
Navy	28	32	34	38	35	31	33	31
USMC	31	24	32	37	38	35	33	31
USAF	21	26	30	31	30	26	26	27
DoD	26	28	32	37	35	34	32	30

*Percent of those who enlisted for three or more years in fiscal year shown and left the service before completing three years of service.

3. Retention.

The total strength shortfalls in FY 1979 were smaller than the corresponding recruiting shortfalls because of better than anticipated first-term retention. Greater increases in first-term retention and career retention are the keystones of our strategy to reduce the need for new recruiting and to the success of the AVF. Service members who

joined the AVF in the early years are entering the career force at a satisfactory rate. While first-term reenlistment experience has been quite positive, there has been a downturn in the career reenlistment rate. The downward trend is particularly serious in the Navy but it is also evident in the other Services. Table 4 shows the trend in both first-term and career rates since 1973.

Table 4


Reenlistment Rates (%)

	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 79</u>
<u>FIRST TERM</u>							
Army	38	33	39	21	33	36	43
Navy	23	33	40	35	37	40	38
Marine Corps	13	17	20	26	29	29	20
Air Force	20	31	40	37	39	41	38
DoD	24	30	37	30	35	37	37
<u>CAREER</u>							
Army	63	75	75	71	70	69	66
Navy	92	80	81	75	68	64	62
Marine Corps	82	80	73	78	72	69	52
Air Force	93	90	90	82	86	82	82
DoD	83	81	82	76	75	72	68

Table 4 shows the first-term reenlistment rate increasing from 24 percent in 1973 to 37 percent in 1979. Career reenlistments (second and subsequent reenlistments) have declined from 83 percent in 1973 to 68 percent in 1979. The net effect of the increasing first-term rates and declining career rates on the career content of the Services is shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3

ENLISTED CAREER FORCE
(Over 4 Years of Service)



FISCAL YEAR
XI-5

Even with the difficult recruiting year in FY 1979 and the downturn in career reenlistments the active forces are nearly at full strength, as we saw earlier, so we have generally been able to recruit and retain sufficient numbers of people. The second major concern in transitioning to the AVF was whether or not the quality of accessions might drop as compared to the accessions under the draft.

4. Quality

Quality is difficult to measure when dealing with people. Honesty, morality, commitment and loyalty are all terms that could be associated with the quality of individuals. Here the term is used in the more economic sense of probability of completing the enlistment term and successfully completing a training program. The two major tools for measuring the quality of enlisted accessions are educational attainment and mental group ranking.

a. Educational Attainment

It is generally accepted that possession of a high school diploma is the best single measure of a person's potential for adapting to life in the military. High school diploma graduates are more likely to complete their terms of service than are their contemporaries who have dropped out of school. Thus, active forces recruiting programs have concentrated on enlisting high school diploma graduates.

The recruiting of high school diploma graduates has become increasingly difficult for all the Services since 1976. The overall DoD number and percent of high school graduate recruits were lower in FY 1979 than in FY 1978. This decline was most evident in the Army. However, with the exception of FY 1978, the overall high school graduate percent and that for the Army were still above that for any year since FY 1971. Table 5 shows the percentage of non-prior service accessions who were high school diploma graduates for the last six years while Table 6 shows the number of high school diploma graduates.

Table 5
High School Diploma Graduates
Percentage of Non-Prior Service Accessions

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 79</u>
Army	50	58	59	59	74	64
Navy	63	71	77	73	77	77
Marine Corps	50	53	62	70	75	75
Air Force	92	91	89	88	85	83
DoD	61	66	69	69	77	73

Table 6
High School Diploma Graduate
Non-Prior Service Accessions (000s)

	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>	<u>FY 76</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 79</u>
Army	91	107	106	100	91	83
Navy	50	72	71	74	62	62
Marine Corps	24	30	32	32	30	30
Air Force	68	69	65	64	58	55
DoD	233	278	273	269	240	230

Numbers may not add due to rounding.

b. Mental Category

The most significant change in quality of accessions under the AVF has been the decrease in the proportion of accessions in the higher mental categories and in the lowest mental category. In FY 1964, one out of every seven active force accessions ranked in mental category IV, the lowest mental category eligible for enlistment. During the AVF years, this percentage has declined to one in twenty in FY 1979. Mental category IV accessions are easier to recruit but are not eligible for training in many skills because of the likelihood that they would fail the training courses. They are also more likely to require additional time to complete training in skills open to them than are those in category I through III. Figure 4 shows the trends in the mental quality of accessions during the AVF years.

Figure 4
Active Duty, Non-Prior Service Enlisted Accessions
by Mental Category






Figure 4 (con't)
Active Duty, Non-Prior Service Enlisted Accessions
by Mental Category

MENTAL CATEGORY III



MENTAL CATEGORY IV



In terms of general trainability of new recruits, as measured by our enlistment test, the number and the proportion of average and above average enlistees for FY 1979 were about the same as in FY 1978. These recruits accounted for 95 percent of all new accessions in both years. This is well above FY 1964. However, in light of possible test compromise and norming problems, these statistics, old and new, may be somewhat overstated. With the advent of the AVF, service selection and classification procedures were changed. A new test was introduced in 1976 that combined both a measure of general trainability and aptitude for specific occupational training. Introduction of new tests can result in norming problems and the Services have had difficulty in relating, with precision, the current measures of general trainability to those used in the past. Therefore, the current mental group categorization is in doubt for average and below average groups.

The proportion of FY 1979 recruits scoring above average declined compared to FY 1978. Again the decline was most evident in the Army. It is important, however, to note that selection of applicants for enlistment into military service is for job/skill area training based primarily on aptitude area scores obtained on our enlistment test. Every recruit must meet the aptitude area minimum scores required for the training he will receive.

4. Future Prospects

The recruiting task for active forces in FY 1980 represents a serious challenge because the shortfalls of FY 1979 must be made up. The recruiting requirement overall is about 18 percent greater than the FY 1979 accomplishment. The Army must recruit 33 percent more new men and 36 percent more new females in FY 1980 than were recruited in FY 1979. In FY 1981 the requirement falls back to roughly the FY 1977 level. While these goals could be met by a larger infusion of non-high school graduates, that would result in a higher rate of attrition and turbulence in operating units. To avoid this, the Services plan to improve recruiting operations, offer more attractive enlistment options, and increase reenlistment bonuses.

To meet the immediate recruiting challenge and prepare for the rest of the 1980's, we are taking a series of initiatives. We requested increases in recruiting and advertising resources in FY 1980 above the levels originally requested in the President's FY 1980 budget. We are providing better support for our recruiters. We are increasing educational benefits in the Army and testing, on a large scale, the ability of shorter enlistment terms combined with increased educational benefits to attract high quality recruits to the Army and Navy. We are addressing the issue of pay adequacy. We are evaluating different types and levels of educational benefits beyond those presently available. We are attempting to improve the quality of military life. The objective of our efforts in support of recruiting is to enhance our competitiveness in terms of what we offer the prospective enlistee in order to maintain our share of the high quality enlistment market. To be successful, we must recruit, for the active force, one out of every three of all high school diploma graduates who do not go on to college.

The decline in the propensity of our youth to enlist, we believe, is driven by a variety of causes. Youth unemployment, until recently, had been declining. The military offering has become relatively less attractive. The post-service educational benefits available are not as valuable today and must compete with other federal educational assistance programs. Military pay has failed to keep pace with wages for civilian employment alternatives. The image of military service has been influenced by unfavorable publicity. Such things as the discussion of a possible return to conscription, negative feedback from dissatisfied servicemen and women, recruiter malpractice investigations, overseas military living conditions, and military drug abuse have all affected our image negatively. In order to recruit and retain enough Service members, the Armed Forces must offer a more attractive opportunity and

improve the quality and image of military life. We must do so not only to attract sufficient numbers of quality enlistees but also to retain quality people in the career force. We see some problems in the reenlistment of second and third termers. This serves to stress that manning our forces is not simply a recruiting issue. Whether we have an All-Volunteer Force or a draft, we still must provide adequate incentives to retain the career Service members who provide leadership and professionalism to the Armed Forces.

C. Reserve Forces

The DoD depends on several sources of military manpower to meet its wartime requirements. These include the active forces, Selected Reserve components, pretrained individuals, and untrained individuals. Since the active forces were originally perceived as the most serious potential AVF problem and since the active forces provide our initial line of defense in all contingencies, keeping them well manned and ready has been a primary concern of the DoD under the All-Volunteer Force. It continues to have high priority, but increasing attention is now being devoted to the Selected Reserve components and to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).


1. Selected Reserve

The Selected Reserve provides manpower in organized units and individuals to be called to active duty as necessary to augment the active force units during mobilization. Some guard and reserve units also assist active duty units during peacetime. For example, guard and reserve tanker units refuel strategic bombers and other aircraft on their peacetime missions as part of their wartime proficiency training.

a. Selected Reserve Strength

Selected Reserve end strength has declined from 919,000 in FY 1973, the beginning of the AVF, to 807,100 in FY 1979. As shown in Figure 5, almost all of the decline has been in the enlisted force. Unlike those for the active force, Congressional Authorizations for the Selected Reserve have been adjusted downward, due mainly to the inability of Army reserve components to recruit to higher strength levels. In FY 1979, the Army National Guard funded level was about 13 percent below its peacetime requirement and the Army Reserve was funded about 22 percent below its required peacetime level. The other reserve components were funded at their required peacetime levels.

Figure 5



Total Selected Reserve strength in FY 1979 experienced a net gain for the first year since FY 1974. Most of the overall 19,400 strength increase shown in Table 7 was due to improved retention in FY 1979.

Table 7
Selected Reserve Strength
End of September 1979
(000)

	<u>Objective 1/</u>	<u>Assigned 2/</u>	<u>Percent of Objective</u>	<u>Change from Assigned End September 1978 3/</u>
ARNG	345.5	345.5	100	+4.5
USAR	191.7	190.0	99	+4.2
USNR	87.0	88.3	101	+5.5
USMCR	33.5	33.3	99	+6
ANG	92.9	93.4	101	+1.7
USAFR	<u>56.3</u>	<u>56.7</u>	<u>101</u>	<u>+2.8</u>
DoD Total	806.9	807.1	100	+19.4


1/ Objective contained in FY 1980 President's Budget.

2/ Excludes 3,427 members awaiting training without pay (Category L).

3/ September 1978 strength excludes 8,948 members in Category L.

The decline in enlisted strengths, shown in Figure 6, is dominated by the reduction in the Army components. This decline is the result of being unable to retain or recruit sufficient replacements for those people who are completing their obligated service now.

Figure 6



*INCLUDES TRANSITION QUARTER BETWEEN FY 76 & 77.

The composition of today's enlisted Selected Reserve stands in sharp contrast to the pre-AVF reserve forces. Prior to 1973 the vast majority of Selected Reservists were first-termers. The strength decline noted above has occurred in the first-term force. The career force has actually increased and, in the two Army components, is about double that of the draft era. Table 8 shows the change in the composition of the enlisted Selected Reserve force since 1974.

Table 8

**Enlisted First-Term/Career Content
of the Selected Reserve (000s)***

	First-Term (Less than 6 yrs)			Career Force (6 or more yrs)			Total		
	74	79	Change	74	79	Change	74	79	Change
ARNG	266	144	-121	96	162	+ 66	362	307	-55
USAR	139	69	- 70	44	85	+ 41	183	154	-29
USNR	49	24	- 25	48	47	- 1	97	71	-26
USMCR	24	24	-	4	7	+ 2	28	31	+ 3
ANG	48	24	- 23	35	58	+ 22	83	82	- 1
USAFR	19	15	- 4	15	29	+ 14	34	44	+10
DoD	545	301	-244	242	387	+145	787	689	-98

*Numbers may not add due to rounding. Individuals for whom specific categories were not reported by the components are designated "unknowns" and are excluded from this table.

b. Accessions

Under the AVF, we have taken fewer people into the Selected Reserve than during the draft and a greater proportion of our reserve accessions have had prior service. However, Figure 7 shows that both the total number of accessions and the mix of non-prior service and prior service accessions for DoD as a whole have remained relatively constant under the AVF. Experienced prior service personnel are, of course, more productive than untrained recruits, and they are also older, trained and more expensive. Prior service accessions who enlist for one year at a time do, however, add a greater degree of turbulence and uncertainty for reserve force managers.

Figure 7

DOD SELECTED RESERVE ENLISTMENTS




Table 9 shows that the Selected Reserve components achieved 94 percent of their combined recruiting objective in FY 1979 and that actual accessions were 4,000 above FY 1978 levels. The Army and Naval Reserve exceeded 100 percent of program and the Air National Guard exceeded 99 percent of program. Strength increases in the Marine Corps Reserve and both Air Reserve components were due to improved retention, thus reducing their need for accessions.

Table 9
RESERVE COMPONENT ENLISTED ACCESSIONS
(All Sources)

<u>Component</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 79</u>		
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Objective</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Percent of Objective</u>
ARNG	88,600	94,700	84,900	90
USAR	52,900	52,500	54,600	104
USNR	18,600	29,000	29,000	100
USMCR	13,500	12,200	9,600	78
ANG	15,400	15,300	15,200	99
USAFR	11,600	13,200	11,200	85
DoD Total	200,500	216,900	204,500	94

Overall, the Selected Reserve components recruited 8,300 more non-prior service accessions in FY 1979, compared to FY 1978, which more than offset the decrease of 4,300 in prior service accessions. As shown in Table 10, both reserve components of the Army and the Naval Reserve experienced significant improvement as compared to FY 1978 in recruiting non-prior service accessions. The utilization of full-time professional recruiters was a major factor in this achievement, particularly for the Army Reserve, whose recruiters are now managed by the Active Army Recruiting Command.

Table 10
RESERVE NON-PRIOR AND PRIOR SERVICE ENLISTED ACCESSIONS
(Non-Prior Service)

<u>Component</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 79</u>		
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Objective</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Percent of Objective</u>
ARNG	39,500	45,000	42,600	95
USAR	13,500	15,000	21,400	143
USNR	2,400	1,900	3,100	164
USMCR	8,200	7,600	5,000	65
ANG	3,700	5,700	4,000	70
USAFR	2,600	3,200	2,200	69
DoD Total	70,000	78,500	78,300	100

(Prior Service)


Component	FY 78	FY 79		
	Actual	Objective	Actual	Percent of Objective
ARNG	49,000	49,700	42,300	85
USAR	39,200	37,500	33,200	89
USNR	16,200	27,100	25,900	96
USMCR	5,300	4,600	4,600	100
ANG	11,600	9,600	11,200	117
USAFR	9,000	10,000	9,000	90
DoD Total	130,500	138,400	126,200	91

c. Quality of Enlisted Accessions

Quality of non-prior service accessions has changed markedly under the AVF primarily because reserve recruit "quality" during the Vietnam War was swollen by college-trained "recruits" seeking to avoid the draft. Figure 8 shows the decline in educational attainment of Selected Reserve non-prior service accessions since FY 1970. In FY 1970, over 50 percent of the accessions had some college training but only about 6 percent had been to college in FY 1979. However, many of the draft motivated, college trained accessions were overqualified for the positions to which they were assigned. As a result, retention rates beyond the initial enlistment were very low. Approximately one fourth of the non-high school graduates who joined during FY 1979 were attending high school at the time of their enlistment.

Figure 8


EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF SELECTED RESERVE NPS ACCESSIONS



*HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE LINE INCLUDES THOSE WITH SOME COLLEGE AND COLLEGE GRADUATES.

The decline in educational level is correlated with the decline in mental group I and II non-prior service accession as shown in Figure 9. Category IV enlisted hit a peak of 24 percent of the non-prior service accessions in FY 1974, but this has declined to about 10 percent in FY 1979. The reserve force tends to be more "average" today under the AVF than it was under the draft or the early years of the AVF.

Figure 9



The decline in the quality of non-prior service accessions since the beginning of the AVF is partially balanced by the lower percentage of the total accessions they represent. The increase in high quality, experienced prior service accessions has tended, in large measure, to offset the decline in the number and quality of non-prior service accessions.

2. Pretrained Individuals

Pretrained individuals are needed upon mobilization to augment units that are not at full combat strength. They also are used as replacement personnel in the early phases of a conflict until untrained individuals can be called to active duty and properly trained and equipped for combat. Since the end of the Vietnam War the number of


pretrained individuals in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Standby Reserve has declined. Today there are inadequate numbers of pretrained individuals to meet the needs of a high intensity war with short warning. The major problems are centered in meeting the requirement for the Army.

a. Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The major factor in the decline of the IRR was the decrease in the size of the active force that occurred after Vietnam and which reduced the number of people separating and entering the IRR for the remainder of their military service obligation. The dramatic decline is also the result of past management actions to preserve the strength in the active and Selected Reserve forces. These actions include: increasing most active duty enlistments from two to three or more years; enlisting people in the delayed entry pool for up to one year prior to commencement of active duty; and increasing the number of prior service accessions in the Selected Reserve. The high attrition rates under the AVF, coupled with the policy of releasing those who attrite from their six year military service obligations, have also contributed.

As shown in Figure 10, the size of the IRR has declined but is now increasing. This increase is due to the termination of the automatic transfer from the IRR to the Standby Reserve after completion of the first five years of the service obligation; the institution of IRR personnel management programs by each of the Services; the development of IRR reenlistment programs; the testing of a program in which non-prior service personnel may enlist directly in the IRR, receive their basic training, and return home to fulfill the remainder of their obligation in the IRR with two periods of refresher training during that period; and the streamlining of the administrative transfer procedures between the active force and the IRR to insure individuals are actually transferred to the IRR. In addition, several other changes occurred that will affect the size of the IRR in future years. The first is the legislative change that gave all persons the same six-year military service obligation regardless of age. Previously, only those persons under age 26 incurred the six-year obligation. The second was a policy change that deleted the time that active forces enlistees spent in the Delayed Enlistment Program from counting toward fulfillment of the six-year service obligation. In the case of the Army, these initiatives are expected to substantially increase its enlisted IRR force by FY 1984.

Figure 10

STRENGTH TRENDS IN THE INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE



* INCLUDES TRANSITION QUARTER BETWEEN FY 76 & 77.

b. Military Retirees. Personnel retired from the active forces and the Selected Reserve are also mobilization manpower assets. Table 11 shows that there are over half a million retirees who would be available in a major mobilization situation. In time of war, retirees could fill a portion of military support positions making more youthful military personnel in the CONUS base available for deployment. Retirees have been categorized based on the length of time since retirement and their age. Those in Class I have been retired fewer than five years and are under age 60 and would be the primary group recalled if wartime requirements make recall necessary. Those in Class II have been retired between five and ten years and are under age 60. It is doubtful that, except in special cases such as physicians, any person retired more than ten years would be a mobilization asset.

Table 11

Military Retirees by Service and Class (000)

	<u>Class I</u> <u>Retirees</u>	<u>Class II</u> <u>Retirees</u>	<u>Total</u>
Army	69	78	147
Navy	69	51	120
Marine Corps	13	15	28
Air Force	109	110	219
DoD Total	260	254	514

Another factor that makes retirees attractive as mobilization assets is the ease with which retirees can be recalled under current law. In fact, retired regulars of the Army and Air Force can be recalled by the President at any time without any legal restrictions in the interests of national defense. Retired regulars in the Navy and Marine Corps are slightly less available but can be called up without their consent for two years in a national emergency declared by the President.

c. Standby Reserve. At the end of FY 1979, there were approximately 100,000 individuals in the Standby Reserve, of which over 80% were officers. The strength of the Standby Reserve has been decreasing due to policies which retain individuals in the IRR rather than transferring them to the Standby Reserve and by encouraging members to transfer to the IRR. This is because of the legal requirement that the Selected Service System screen and declare Standby Reservists available before DOD can mobilize them. Legislation to relieve the Selective Service of this responsibility has been submitted.

3. Future Prospects

The manning of the reserve forces continues to be a serious problem. The increased attention and resources recently focused on the reserves has reversed the downward trend in manning levels. We are also at the end of the period where we had to replace unusually large losses of draft induced enlistees from earlier years. We have implemented a number of programs to raise the strength of the Selected Reserves to our desired peacetime levels which seem to be having cost-effective and promising results.

The programs include:

- The utilization of full-time professional recruiters. In the case of the Army Reserve, the Active Army Recruiting Command manages the reserve recruiters and provides professional assistance.

- Enlistment bonuses and educational assistance incentives for all DoD Reserve Components, though aimed primarily at the Army.

- An option that allows non-prior service enlistees to split basic training and advanced individual training into consecutive summers or other seasonal cycles.

- A test to recruit individuals with needed technical skills from vocational technical high schools into the Army Reserve.

In the case of the IRR, programs and initiatives for FY 1980 and FY 1981 include screening active and Selected Reserve losses for entry into the IRR so that anyone who shows potential to meet a mobilization requirement is, in fact, transferred to the IRR and only those that have no potential are discharged; the testing of shorter active force enlistments which result in longer periods of time spent in the IRR; the

development of programs to assign members of the IRR to their mobilization positions in peacetime to expedite mobilization; and development of an Individual Mobilization Augmentee program for individual reservists required to report on M-Day. We are also seeking legislative authority to pay an IRR reenlistment bonus. These programs are expected to increase the size of the IRR to about 660,000 by the mid-1980's.



CHAPTER XII

WOMEN IN THE MILITARY


A. Introduction

The Department of Defense has continued its program for increasing both the number of women in the military and the number of career fields open to them. The DoD has revised personnel policies in the areas of assignment, utilization, and promotion.

B. Numbers of Women in the Military


The number of women in the military services has doubled since 1970 and is expected to double again in the next five years. Women represented about one percent of strength until FY 1970. Since then the proportion of women has steadily grown to 7.5 percent of the force in FY 1979, and it is projected to exceed 12.5 percent by FY 1985, as shown on the following figure.

Figure 1



The Secretary of Defense approved the increases discussed above after a careful review of women's role and performance in the military. Not only have the number of women in the military increased, but those increases are concentrated in skills that were not traditionally filled by women. As shown on Figure 2, only 7 percent of enlisted women were in nontraditional skills in 1964 and only 10 percent in 1972; but 46 percent were in nontraditional skills by 1979, and the percentage is estimated to reach 60 percent by 1985. Similarly, nearly all female officers were medical branch officers in 1964, almost exclusively nurses. Thus, only 16 percent of female officers were in the line in 1964. Line officers represented 26 percent of female officers in 1972, rose to 41 percent in 1979, and are projected to reach 64 percent by 1985. These increases in enlisted women in nontraditional skills and female officers other than those in the Nurse Corps represent major changes in the role of women in the military.

Figure 2
ACTIVE DUTY WOMEN



Today, women are an integral part of all of the Army's combat divisions. They receive the same training as men and are expected to serve with their units the same as men in those skills. Two studies conducted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense show that women are performing well in their expanded roles.

The first, entitled "The Use of Women in the Military," published in May 1977 and updated in September 1978, concentrated on enlisted women. Parameters of analysis included promotion, accession prospects, retention, distribution by occupational group, attrition, physical differences, cost comparisons, deployability, and combat restrictions. The study found little difference in the performance of men and women. It concluded that more women were willing to enlist than were being taken and that they could be

used productively. The second study, entitled "American Volunteers," addressed military women in the context of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) and concluded that women are an essential part of the AVF.

In 1977, the Army completed a "MAXWAC" study which concluded that there was no degradation in mission performance in the field for company-level combat support/combat service support units with up to 35 percent of the members being women. Women on sustained field operations in Germany were tested in a study called REFWAC. Results published in May 1978 confirmed the findings of the "MAXWAC" study -- support units on extended exercises which had a female content of up to ten percent were not adversely affected by the presence of women, and women who were properly trained for their jobs did as well as men with the same training.

C. Women in Combat

Section 303 of P.L. 95-79, states:

"For the purpose of promotion equality and expanding job opportunities for the female members of the Armed Forces, the Secretary of Defense shall within six months from the enactment of this section, submit to the Congress a definition of the term 'combat,' together with recommendations on expanding job classifications to which female members of the armed services may be assigned, and recommendations on any changes in law necessary to implement these recommendations."

In a letter dated 14 February 1978, the Deputy Secretary of Defense responded, "the term 'combat' refers to 'engaging an enemy or being engaged by an enemy in armed conflict.' Under current practices, a person is considered to be 'in combat' when he or she is in a geographic area designated as a combat/hostile fire zone by the Secretary of Defense. Members of the armed forces, not in a designated combat/hostile fire zone, may be designated as being 'in combat' by the Secretary of Defense based on specific circumstances and events. These definitions apply to men and women of all the services. A Service member in combat is authorized to receive combat/hostile fire pay and earn combat awards. Women have received hostile fire pay and combat awards in past conflicts. Women have served in combat in many skills during World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. Army nurses have served in combat for over a hundred years, although they and other medical personnel are considered noncombatants. Since the word 'combat' has historically been used to include such a broad range of activities, the Department of Defense does not believe that the term provides a useful basis for expanding the opportunities for women in the service."

What is needed is legislation to repeal both 10 U.S.C. 6015 and 8549. The Secretaries of the military departments should set policy for, monitor, and review the assignment of women within their respective departments. The Secretary of Defense should review and approve the programs of the services and ensure compatibility among the services.

The Administration supported and gained modification to Title 10 U.S.C. Section 6015 to permit the Navy to assign female officers and enlisted personnel to permanent duty on noncombatant vessels and temporary duty aboard combatant vessels. The Administration has now introduced and testified in support of legislation to remove all restrictions on the utilization and career advancement of women in the military. The impact of the legislation would be to provide greater overall military management flexibility and efficiency, while simultaneously expanding the career, education and training opportunities for women.

D. Equality for Military Women

DoD and the individual military departments continue to be concerned about maximum utilization and full integration of women in the military. As more women are recruited and assigned to nontraditional jobs, military policies which adversely impact on women are being reviewed and modified where appropriate. Studies have been requested and are being conducted in such important areas as: field gear, equipment, sizing of clothing for proper fit for women, physical and mental performance requirements, and technical and physical training. The result of these studies will generate programs and policies designed to enhance a woman's ability to experience job satisfaction in the military and successfully compete for promotion and advancement.

In addition to these actions and continued support for repeal of the combat exclusionary laws (10 U.S.C. 6015 and 8549) discussed above, the following actions are being taken to further equality for military women:

- Pursuant to Presidential Memorandum, DoD is cooperating with the Department of Justice Task Force on Sex Discrimination and has conducted a comprehensive review of all laws, programs, policies, and practices which discriminate on the basis of sex. The Task Force is currently reviewing DoD submittals and, upon completion of the review, will report to the President on all substantive matters identified. The President has promised to support necessary corrective legislation.
- The Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS), under the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics), has been actively advising DoD on internal policies which affect women, such as clothing, recruiting, housing, etc.
- All Services will have major increases in the number of women over the next five years; but the Air Force will have the largest increase in women content of all the Services, from present women representation of 55,000 to nearly 98,000 by 1985. Department-wide, women will constitute 12 percent of military personnel in 1985.

- The Army has changed recruiting requirements. Previously, all women were required to have high school diplomas and higher enlistment test scores than men. Now, the requirements for males and females are equal.

- The Army has updated its definition of "combat and combat support" to open many jobs previously reserved for men. This creates opportunities for women to serve in 95 percent of the Army skills, involving over half of all positions, and receive expanded training and advancement opportunities.

- The modification to 10 U.S. Code, 6015, allowed female 1st and 3rd Class Midshipmen from the Naval Academy and NROTC Units to receive summer ship board cruise training comparable to their male counterparts during the summer of 1979.

- Navy enlisted women may now, for the first time, compete with their male counterparts for commissioning in the Limited Duty Officer category and, thereby, proceed directly from the higher enlisted ranks into certain designated commissioned officer specialties.

- Commissions in the Navy's Restricted Line Officer communities, such as Communications, Intelligence and Public Affairs, are now available to women on the same basis as men.

- The Air Force has opened the career enhancing positions of pilot and navigator, in other than aircraft engaged in combat, to women on a permanent basis.

- Air Force women now serve in missile launch crew positions. All occupational specialties in the Air Force, other than four direct combatrelated enlisted specialties, are open to women.

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CHAPTER XIII

PRODUCTIVITY

A. Program Overview

The DoD Productivity Program was established in August 1975. The existing output measurement, work methods and measurement, and Federal Government productivity programs were combined into a single program. In April 1979, the program was revised to include tactical support functions, a focus on labor productivity, incorporation of motivation efforts into the program and establishment of the principal of shared savings to provide an incentive for participation to DoD managers.

The DoD Productivity Program contains the following elements:

1. Integration of productivity enhancement, measurement and evaluation into resource management systems.
2. Establishment of productivity goals as an integral part of planning, programming and budgeting, and the allocation of resources to attain those goals.
3. A planned approach to productivity enhancement.
4. Continuing analysis, performance appraisal and improvement of all operating methods and systems.
5. Effective use of work measurement and statistical techniques to determine work force efficiency, establish a data base for use in operating systems, and provide a basis for planning and budgeting requirements.
6. A comprehensive program to identify opportunities for and provide timely funding of productivity enhancing investments.
7. Analysis and evaluation of productivity improvement alternatives.
8. An aggressive and cohesive program of research and management efforts to improve work force motivation and quality of working life.

The DoD program has been implemented in military departments and defense agencies. The Department has developed a unique productivity enhancing capital investment program which promises to achieve excellent returns in manpower and dollar savings in future years. However, productivity measurement and evaluation efforts have not progressed to the level desired for optimum utility to management.

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
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Recent guidance issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense reemphasizes program priorities and is expected to improve the efficacy of the overall effort. The productivity data and measures contained in this chapter are based on information accumulated for the Federal Government productivity report. To the degree that they match expressed congressional interests, they have been incorporated in this report on Defense productivity.

B. Composition Of The Program

1. Work Measurement and Methods Improvement

Work measurement and methods improvement have been used across a broad range of Defense activities to improve operations and establish a data base for resource management, to develop staffing standards, and for labor performance measurement. The most intensive applications have been in the depot maintenance, arsenal, depot supply, and real property maintenance activities. These applications have resulted in significant productivity increases that have been documented in past work measurement program reports.

A natural evolution of the DoD work measurement program has been the standardization of processes and the times for their accomplishment in the Defense Work Measurement Standard Time Data Program. Data from this program can be applied to increase productivity through installation of standard methods in all activities and to reduce the time needed to analyze processes and establish appropriate time values. This DoD level compilation of standard time data was first published in 1975. The data bank is maintained on a continuing basis and incorporates changes in processes and technology. This program is available to all DoD activities and is provided on request to other government agencies and private industry.

2. Capital Investment

In recognizing that judicious capital-labor substitutions are an effective means to positively affect productivity, current DoD productivity guidance requires that consideration be given to productivity enhancement in capital investment planning and to the impact of potential investments in the establishment of productivity goals. Since 1977, the Department has carried out programs which provide financing for small dollar investments expected to return costs within two years through manpower and dollar savings. These funds are known as Productivity Enhancing Incentive Funds (PEIF). PEIF requires establishment of a level of funding in annual budgets so that investment opportunities can be promptly financed.

Fifteen million dollars in PEIF projects were funded during FY 1977. First year savings of \$16.2 million were estimated from these investments, indicating an excellent internal rate of return from the

projects funded. At the end of FY 1977 there was a backlog of almost \$10 million worth of projects awaiting FY 1978 funding. Due to congressional concern for DoD's management of the program, funding was not authorized in FY 1978.

In authorizing \$13.5 million FY 1979 funds, Congress provided specific guidelines for the use of the money, including a \$40,000 limitation on project cost and the requirement to provide a program plan to ensure that approved projects were adequately evaluated and subjected to post-investment appraisal and evaluation. At the Department's request, the project cost ceiling has since been increased to \$100,000 to compensate for the effects of inflation.

Based on preliminary data for FY 1979, the \$6.5 million in approved PEIF projects will generate \$9.5 million in annual savings. The expected rate of return for the FY 1979 projects approved to date is higher (1.5 to 1 return) than that experienced in FY 1977. Long term savings are expected to be approximately \$10.00 for each dollar invested.

Concurrently with the PEIF, changes were made to regulations governing the use of DoD industrial funds which permitted financing of fast payback investments from operating capital, provided that costs were returned to the funds as operational savings. This program, known as the Industrial Fund Fast Payback Program, was limited to projects costing under \$100,000 with a two year payback. The program has provided benefits in industrially funded activities similar to those achieved in the PEIF and has assisted in counter-balancing the effects of increases in labor and material costs.

In recognition that the public sector processes provide little incentive to seek out opportunities to improve productivity, the DoD policy has been to permit managers to reapply the returns to accomplish valid unfunded or deferred workloads. Through this means, the Department has been able to curb increasing costs and to conserve resources desperately needed to achieve material readiness objectives.

3. Work Force Motivation

DoD has been and will continue to be involved in developing effective means of motivating its personnel. The purpose of motivation efforts is twofold: first, to maintain a more dedicated and stable work force; second, to increase productivity.

Job enrichment techniques have been applied in both the military and civilian functions within DoD. These programs generally have been applied at a command or local level and have been tailored to meet the needs of individual organizations. Programs underway recognize that job enrichment will tend to provide an increased involvement of employees in their work and thereby improve the quality of working life and worker productivity. Although early efforts indicate positive results, it is premature to assess the impact of job enrichment on productivity.

Joint labor management councils which emphasize and institutionalize the joint involvement between labor and management in productivity improvement have been established within DoD. They also identify an area where management and labor can improve the quality of working life. Each council is tailored to the specific activity's desire as seen from both the management and the labor union perspective. This technique has proven to be effective in focusing attention on productivity and has resulted in quantifiable improvements as well as intangible benefits through improved communications.

The development of productivity incentives in the Federal Government environment must consider not only the direct production work but also incentives for management to improve productivity. DoD and the Office of Personnel Management are exploring means within the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 to provide incentives for managers to improve productivity and to recognize this in the performance appraisal process.

4. Measurement and Evaluation

Included within the DoD program are work measurement, productivity indexes, and unit cost comparisons. Work measurement provides an evaluation of labor efficiency by comparing actual application of work force time to an established labor performance standard or norm. Productivity indexes provide an evaluation of the efficiency of an operation over time by comparing the output/input relationship in the current period to an established base period. Resources are most commonly expressed in manpower terms since DoD is labor intensive and manpower statistics are readily available. DoD components are encouraged to develop other measures such as total cost or unit costs which will provide consideration of all resources, i.e., manpower, facilities, material, technology, capital, land, and energy. These evaluation techniques have been used in programming and budgeting, in analyzing investment alternatives, and in determining manpower requirements.

While DoD policy does require establishment of productivity goals and evaluation of performance, this is still a developing aspect of the DoD program. Improvements to this facet of the program are addressed later in this chapter under Program Initiatives.

C. DoD in the Federal Program

DoD's participation in the overall Federal Government productivity program began with involvement in the joint OMB, CSC, GAO task group in 1971. DoD provided information that was used in determining the feasibility of the computation of an overall Federal Government productivity index from its existing management data base, and aided in the analysis of the resultant productivity indexes. In addition, DoD participated in capital investment surveys and accomplished specific projects requested

by the joint task group. Thus, DoD had an experience background to support the Federal Government productivity measurement program when the first data call was issued in 1973.

Thirty-three percent of the civilian and nine percent of the military work force are covered by productivity measures accepted into the Federal Government productivity measurement program. Additional productivity measures, which will require upgrading or revising before they are acceptable for inclusion in the federal program, cover another nineteen percent of the civilian work force and three percent of the military force. Those areas where improved or upgraded measures are to be developed include facilities maintenance, certain areas of depot maintenance, and various personnel activities.

D. Current Program Status

A broader perspective on the potential benefits from Productivity Enhancing Capital Investment (PECI) has been developed in recent revisions to DoD policies and guidance. In addition to the continuation of focus upon small dollar fast payback investments, as provided through the Productivity Enhancing Incentive Funds and the Industrial Fund Fast Payback Program, the Secretary of Defense has taken actions which are intended to ensure that major opportunities to improve productivity through capital-labor substitutions are included in the Defense budget. Beginning in FY 1981, major investment projects with a four year payback will be competitively selected and included in service and agency budgets at OSD direction. In addition, budget guidance has been issued which will provide the needed visibility of overall productivity related investments being carried out throughout the Department. Program guidance will also require more uniform documentation of Peci projects and greater post-investment accountability.

Work force motivation has been a component action under broad DoD guidance. More specific direction to strengthen and guide the program will be issued in FY 1980.


Requirements to consider productivity in program and budget development are a part of OSD's continuing guidance. All components have been directed to develop plans for the establishment and attainment of productivity goals. This direction should result in increased integration of productivity in the DoD management philosophy and provide greater visibility of productivity in future reports.

E. Productivity Trends

Productivity measurement in the DoD is primarily based on an output divided by labor input (employee year) computation. Output/input data, structured by major support functions, are reported by the military services and five defense agencies for the program. The measurement base for FY 1978 totaled 767,000 employee years for work accomplished in 23 major and 18 minor functions. The measured employee years include direct hire civilians, military, and indirect hire foreign nationals. Of the total paid civilian employee years (excluding civil function employees) in both FY 1977 and FY 1978, 49 percent were measured. The measured military employee years represent 14 percent of the military end strength in FY 1977 and 12 percent in FY 1978.


Labor productivity trend data are obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) as a by-product of the Federal Government productivity index computations. The productivity trend data shown in this section covers the FY 1972 to FY 1978 period. While data submitted for the Federal productivity statistics begin in FY 1967, data subsequent to FY 1972 includes a more substantial data base and is being used for this report. The overall DoD labor productivity index, as shown in Figure 1, increased 8.7 percent between FY 1972 and FY 1978. Productivity decreased in FY 1973 as work loads continued to decline at a faster rate than personnel as a result of the post Southeast Asia conflict adjustment. From FY 1975 to FY 1978 inputs continued to decline as economies were achieved and personnel realignments were realized while work loads began to stabilize. As a result, significant productivity increases were achieved in this period.

Figure 1



Labor productivity indexes for five major functional groupings are displayed in Figure 2. These functions represent approximately 73 percent of the total employee years included in the measurement base. The functional areas are equipment maintenance, facilities maintenance, medical services, base services, and supply operations.

Figure 2



The equipment maintenance productivity index includes depot and intermediate level maintenance activities and automotive maintenance. Included in depot level maintenance are the maintenance and repair of ships as well as other equipment. Productivity output measures used in the maintenance of equipment function (other than ships) are the number of items repaired/overhauled or an equivalent. An intensive effort to upgrade the output measures in the ship maintenance area has resulted in an improved system for productivity measurement. The system will be tested with FY 1978 and FY 1979 data and formalized if acceptable. The productivity trend in the equipment maintenance function displays a small long-term gain but a significant upward movement from the downturn in FY 1973. The gains reflect continuing investments in labor savings equipment, realignment of work loads to consolidate similar rework, and other management initiatives. The changing characteristics of the work loads in this area, particularly the move to more complex items, present a measurement problem which was not totally factored out of the data. This could have dampened the level of improvement experienced.

The facilities maintenance function includes those personnel involved in the maintenance and repair of real property. Productivity has increased by 3 percent between FY 1972 and FY 1978, recovering from a sharp downturn in FY 1973. Increases have resulted where staffing levels have been reduced more than the outputs. The existing output measures, however, do not allow for adjustments to reflect changes in level of effort and need to be refined.

The medical services function includes the administration and operation of medical hospitals and clinics. Productivity declined in FY 1973 and FY 1974 as a result of efforts to improve the quality of health care through increasing the staff-per-patient ratio in hospitals. Between FY 1974 and FY 1977, productivity has increased by more than 3 percent as employee-year input was reduced. Improved health care techniques to reduce the length of time patients stay in hospitals and providing more outpatient services were contributing factors. Productivity declined in FY 1978 when work loads declined at a greater rate than the input. Improvement actions such as greater use of automated equipment, increased use of para-professionals, and other management actions were offset by an increase in work efforts related to programs which are not included in the output measures.

The base service function includes food service, laundry and dry cleaning, commissary, and printing activities. Productivity increased by 7 percent between FY 1972 and FY 1978 with an intermediate decrease in FY 1973 and FY 1974. Causal factors contributing to the productivity change were consolidation of facilities, automation of operations, and better alignment of personnel with work loads.

The supply operation function encompasses both depot and local supply operations, inventory control, and property disposal activities. Productivity in these areas increased by 16 percent between FY 1972 and FY 1977. This improvement was achieved through such initiatives as

mechanization of manual operations, capital investments in materiel handling equipment and consolidation of overseas activities. Productivity declined in FY 1978 by almost 4 percent as work loads and personnel related to reorganizations and consolidations of supplies in two areas were out of alignment. The rate of productivity growth in the other elements slowed from prior years and did not offset the declines.

F. Program Initiatives

Productivity improvement is a continuing process. The dynamics of management in the public sector environment dictate a need for continuing program evaluation and refinement to respond to changing needs and challenges. Productivity program initiatives for FY 1980 and FY 1981 will be addressed in this section.

In its Spring Planning Review for FY 1981, the Office of Management and Budget cited the need for DoD to dedicate a part of its annual budget to financing major Productivity Enhancing Capital Investments (PECI). The Department, which had recognized that many significant opportunities to improve productivity have remained unfunded due to the continuing competition for investment funds, took action to establish a Productivity Investment Fund in the FY 1981 program for major PECI projects. These funds were intended to surface major PECI opportunities and ensure that proper consideration was given for their funding in competition with other investment projects.

To ensure that the funds would be used to finance projects which could reasonably be expected to impact labor productivity measures, projects considered for inclusion in the FY 1981 budget were expected to return costs within four years and involve an investment of at least one million dollars, with not less than 50 percent of the savings in manpower costs or reduction in overtime pay. Components were invited to submit candidate projects which were then reviewed, ranked and selected on a competitive basis considering their expected internal rate of return, the long-term return on investment and the magnitude of manpower savings. Of the proposals submitted by the military departments for FY 1981, \$64.3 million were approved for funding. Approximately 2,200 personnel years will be returned from these investments to be reapplied to other urgent requirements.

Additionally, changes have been made to the Industrial Fund Fast Payback Program to raise the project limit from \$100,000 to \$300,000 and extend the payback period to three years. These changes are expected to expand the capability of industrial funds managers to further improve productivity.

Initiatives begun in FY 1980 to integrate productivity considerations into the program and budget cycles were further strengthened and refined for the FY 1981 operating year. As noted earlier, the reissuance of the basic policy document requires the establishment of productivity plans and goals as part of the planning, programming, and budget process. This requirement was incorporated into the OSD program guidance for FY 1981

calling for productivity goals by major function based on improvement potential; programs undertaken to achieve these goals; identification of funds programed for productivity enhancing investments; and the policies for the use of savings.

While these actions represent positive steps initiated to integrate productivity considerations into the programming and budget cycle, it is recognized that changes of this nature take time to plan and implement. The DoD components were thus encouraged to implement this direction to the extent feasible for FY 1980 and to develop a time-phased plan to achieve full implementation.

Another continuing initiative which will impact the FY 1981 program year is the development and issuance of operating instructions which will expand the basic policy guidance, providing more specific direction in the areas of enhancement, measurement and evaluation. Some of the more significant initiatives in these instructions are:

1. Review of internal productivity measures to enhance their utility to managers within the framework of the PPBS and improve the DoD data input to the Federal Government program.
2. The propagation of successful methods improvement, work measurement, and employee motivation efforts in similar functions throughout the Department by improving the visibility of current efforts:
3. Investigation of computer-aided application of the DoD standard time data to optimize labor standards development and increase the ease of cost estimating.
4. Provision of an overall framework for the use of capital investments in improving productivity to include a uniform approach to the management of PEGI which is responsive to congressional perspective of the overall DoD program.

G. Component Programs

1. Department of the Army Productivity Program

a. Overview

(1) Program Description and Responsibilities. The Army is increasingly aware that successful accomplishment of its mission depends largely upon an aggressive effort to increase the efficiency of the work force and decrease the overall cost of accomplishing its mission. In the areas of productivity, this effort has been formalized by Army Regulation 5-4, DA Productivity Improvement Program. At HQDA, the Comptroller of the Army is responsible for providing overall guidance on the Army's productivity improvement effort. Commanders of major Army commands (MACOMs) and separate agencies are responsible for enhancing productivity. To enhance

productivity, MACOMs/Agencies are required to establish formal programs to review and improve work methods, establish labor performance standards, identify fast payback capital investment opportunities, and pursue the procurement and installation of such investments under specialized funding procedures.

(2) Outstanding or Unique Efforts. An additional dimension to the Army's productivity effort is the organized use of value engineering techniques to analyze the functions of Army systems, operations, maintenance, equipment, facilities, procedures, and supplies to identify and eliminate unnecessary functions thereby reducing cost and achieving other collateral benefits that improve productivity. The net result of this effort has been major dollar savings in materiel acquisitions and improvements in logistics, packaging, reliability, maintainability, producibility, weight, parts availability, and production lead time.

b. FY 1981 Initiatives

(1) Establishment of Functional Goals. Army functional proponents have established annual productivity improvement goals for the following functional areas:

<u>Functional Area</u>	<u>FY 1981 Goal (%)</u>
Central Finance & Accounting	2.0
Admin Use Motor Vehicle Maint	2.0
Depot Maint	1.0
Intermediate Maint	1.5
Central Procurement	1.2
Local Supply	1.0
Single Mgr Trans & Tfc Mgmt	1.0
Commissary	1.0
Food Service 1/	-0.75
Laundry and Dry Cleaning 2/	-30.0
Munitions Production	0.73
Weapons Production	0.52

1/ Results from increased services required for multiple choice menus, short order foods and operation of new/improved facilities.

2/ Laundries should be totally contracted out by end FY 1982.

(2) Productivity in Support of the Budget. DA Headquarters currently imposes minimal reporting requirements on its commands to report productivity improvement data and, consequently, a comprehensive statement on the full extent of productivity improvements is not possible.

(3) Impact of Initiatives on FY 1981 and Outyears

(a) Work Methods and Measurement. This program is the keystone of the Army's productivity effort. Major commands have been directed to pursue an aggressive methods and standards improvement effort

and use the data to achieve more efficient management of installation resources, to assist in determining required resources, to justify such resources in the budget, and to provide a basic input of standards to the manpower determination process. Specific emphasis has been placed on the development of statistically reliable higher level standards that can be used to develop new performance factors that provide a rational basis for examining productivity trends in functions being measured and to serve as a basis for development of manpower staffing standards. Additionally, they allow summarization to the desired level in the Army Management Structure Code where dollars and manpower are identifiable to a homogeneous function and where mutually exclusive work units can be correlated to the manhours expended to accomplish the work. Major Army commands have been assigned specific functional areas for the development of summary standards. This effort is designed to be supportive of the Army's manpower requirements determination process. It is expected that additional manpower resources will be required to support this effort in the outyears. The Army guidance specifically asks Army commands to consider this impact in their FY 1982-86 planning.

(b) Productivity Enhancing Capital Investment (PECI).

Productivity improvement involves the timely capital investment in tools and equipment. The Army has been the leader in establishing timely identification of PECI and in establishing special funding procedures to allow rapid installation of the capital improvement and thereby provide rapid enhancement of productivity.

1 Fast Payback - Payback within two years with cost not exceeding \$40K. The Army proved this concept with capital investments totalling \$17.5 million during FY 1973-77 which yielded savings of \$54.7 million during that period with additional savings accruing in future years. Funds of \$9.8 million requested for this program were deleted by the Congress in FY 1978 on the basis that line item detail was not available. The Fast Payback Productivity Enhancing Capital Investment Program was funded for FY 1978. At the end of last September, FY 1979 projects numbered 148 with an investment cost of \$2.8 million. Annual savings of \$3.2 million are expected from these investments. The Army's FY 1980 Budget requested \$3.0 million and the FY 1981 Budget \$3.2 million for fast payback investments.

2 Major - Payback within four years with cost over \$900K. Major PECI projects were provided to OSD to compete for the Productivity Investment Fund set aside for FY 1981. Projects totalling \$25 million in FY 1981 funding were approved with an expected freeing up of 538 equivalent manpower spaces after implementation.

(3) Minor - Payback within five years with cost not exceeding \$900K. The FY 1981 Budget contains numerous minor PECI's in the procurement of Army ammunition totalling \$4.7 million for productivity enhancing equipment and an additional \$6.1 million to improve the productivity of ammunition production facilities. Some examples of other minor PECI's that have produced efficiencies in the Army's FY 1981 Operation & Maintenance budget are as follows:

	<u>Spaces 1/</u>	<u>\$ (000)</u>
Communications Economy and Discipline	-	1,149
Paint Spray Plant (Airless Spray Method)	2	47
Hewlett-Packard Auto Calculating Unit		
Computer W/4 Plotters	1	20
Skin Packaging Machine	-	108
CM 50 Flame Cutter	16	189
Chrome Plating System	4	1,446
Vibratory Finishing Mills	2	48
Ring Laps for Polishing Optics	5	119
Visual Omni-Directional Receiver/Instrument		
Landing System Signal Generator	2	46
Telescriber System for Box & Carton Ordering	2	15

1/ Spaces have either been given up in a manpower reduction program or used to man new programs.

(c) Worker Motivation. The Army's worker motivation and quality of working life programs are not directly linked to the productivity improvement effort. These programs generally have other more specific objectives. Current Army policy requires that each command incorporate into their productivity program timely recognition of individuals, groups, or organizations who contribute in a exceptional manner to improve productivity.

(d) Output Measurement & Productivity Evaluation. This effort is directly linked to the work methods and measurement effort. As statistically reliable higher level standards are developed, new performance factors can be developed so that outputs can be measured more precisely.

2. Department of the Navy Productivity Program.

a. Overview

(1) Program Description and Responsibilities

The primary policy guiding the implementation of the Department of the Navy productivity program is that all managers develop programs for improving performance and cost effectiveness through the establishment of productivity improvement goals. The locally managed programs include a capital investment planning and financing program which ensures timely identification and funding of productivity enhancing opportunities.

The responsibility for Department of the Navy productivity program rests in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps are responsible for developing, implementing, and maintaining productivity guidelines and operating procedures which will encourage efforts to improve labor productivity and cost effectiveness.

(2) The Navy Program

The Navy has many large industrial activities which are engaged in the maintenance and repair of a wide array of unique and complex weapon systems. The primary emphasis in the Navy productivity program is on improving labor productivity at those industrial activities where the potential payoff is significant. The program's major objective is to develop productivity enhancement initiatives as a means to more effectively manage and allocate resources through use of productivity data in program, budget, and performance evaluations.

(3) The Marine Corps Program

The Marine Corps has released an order on productivity to provide guidance to field commands and Headquarters Marine Corps functional managers. The guidance provides specific instructions for the development, implementation, and maintenance of a comprehensive productivity program for use as a management tool by all levels of management. The Marine Corps order provides the structure for commands to identify and accomplish certain productivity improvement plans and actions in the budget process. Functional managers at Headquarters Marine Corps will assist in the planning and identification of productivity improvement actions and will ensure the accomplishment of the goals identified.

Current efforts in the areas of methods analysis/standards development, worker motivation, output measurement and fast payback capital investment, as well as other productivity enhancing efforts, will be coordinated under a comprehensive program. Responsibility will reside with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower.

(4) Outstanding or Unique Efforts

The Naval Material Command (NMC) established a Productivity Management Office in July 1979. The office is presently being staffed to provide guidance, direction, and coordination for the productivity enhancement efforts of the NMC industrial community. A Naval Material Command Instruction on Productivity has been released. The instruction establishes an NMC productivity steering group to define major areas for program development and productivity workshops to be held annually within each SYSCOM. The workshops have been structured to create the framework for field commands to develop a plan of action which focuses on the removal of productivity impediments.

During FY 1979 the naval shipyard community, under the direction of the Naval Sea Systems Command, undertook many unprecedented initiatives to improve productivity. The Naval Shipyard Productivity Action Plan introduced a number of specific management initiatives and target objectives to stimulate productivity growth. Individual shipyard commanders have created and staffed productivity management offices, undertaken "demonstration project" initiatives to improve worker motivation, implemented state-of-the-art production systems, and revitalized a genuine "top-down" commitment for program implementation.

Within the Naval Air Rework Facility (NARF) community, managers are introducing systems at the local field activity level to maximize productivity. The principal thrust of program development involves: a quarterly review of organizational performance involving major work load programs and, where possible, the assignment of productivity incentives to work load norms; the exploration and implementation of advanced systems of production; and projects to improve worker motivation.

Within the Naval Weapons Station and Naval Supply communities, special emphasis is being placed on the development of management programs to improve productivity through productivity enhancing capital investments and through the isolation and elimination of productivity impediments.

The Naval Facilities Command (NAVFAC) continues to play a lead role in the development of engineering standards for plant maintenance/public works functions. These standards are being utilized by all Services to plan, manage, and evaluate performance of work accomplished. Additionally, NAVFAC is pursuing a number of productivity enhancing capital investment opportunities.

Additionally, Navy managers, at all levels, have focused attention on productivity issues involving their own areas of cognizance as they develop personal performance objectives consistent with Civil Service reform.

b. FY 1981 Initiatives

(1) Establishment of Productivity Goals

The Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) established a \$20 million productivity improvement goal for the Naval shipyards for FY 1979. This goal was integrated into the Naval shipyard productivity and action plan for FY 1979. This plan contained ten specific productivity enhancement initiatives applicable to the shipyard community (i.e., fast payback capital investments, methods improvement, improvement in overhead management, etc.). Based upon program success, NAVSEA established a \$40 million productivity improvement goal for FY 1980.

Within the NARF community, productivity goals are established by functional managers and assigned to work load programs under their jurisdiction. The goals reflect a management commitment to improve performance against fixed price norms for specific work load packages. The productivity goals are an integral part of the quarterly fixed price norms negotiations which occur between the NARF and the Naval Aviation Logistics Center. Goals reflect a percentage improvement in performance and result in a decrease in the number of manhours allocated (budgeted) for an aircraft or engine overhaul, repair, or modification.

On a decentralized basis, senior Navy managers are required to address productivity in the establishment of goals and objectives against which performance appraisal decisions are to be measured. The cumulative affect of this persuasive marginal thrust is expected to be significant.

Within the Marine Corps, goals are established by each functional manager. Those functional managers successful in improving productivity will receive priority consideration in the use of realized savings. Budget submissions are reviewed by each functional manager to ensure supporting productivity data is accurate, complete, and achievable. Programmed, identified and realized savings will be reported and redistributed in accordance with guidelines established by higher authority and will become an integral part of budget and Federal productivity report processes.

(2) Productivity in Support of the Budget

The Navy has increasingly sought to stimulate activity awareness of possibilities for obtaining improved military and civilian personnel productivity through expanded capital investment in productivity enhancing equipment. Navy recognition of the need for a meaningful effort in this area is reflected in the proposed FY 1981 Navy procurement budget through an overall increase to such productivity related programs as automated materials handling equipment, shipyard modernization, and operating forces industrial plant equipment. Beyond these measures, the FY 1981 Navy budget will provide \$3.1 million "fast payback" program to fund emergent investment items which can amortize procurement cost within two years after installation.

Navy also intends to continue to seek maximum advantage from the recently established OSD Productivity Investment Fund for major capital investments. Projects approved from these funds for FY 1981 totalled \$30 million and are expected to free up 930 equivalent manpower spaces after implementation.

(3) Impact of Initiatives on FY 1981 and Outyears

(a) Work Methods and Measurement

A system using work measurement and cost and productivity data in support of the development of the Navy military/civilian manpower budget for shore support facilities is being developed with implementation of the complete system projected for FY 1981. A similar system is currently in effect for military personnel assigned to other than the shore support establishment. The Naval Shipyard Productivity Plan emphasizes installing better material control procedures, increasing the use of labor standards, work methods improvements, and other relevant projects. Refinements in all operating areas will continue to be made wherever possible to achieve short-term payoffs. All Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) activities are pressing forward in the areas of improved work methods, new simplified motivational techniques to improve worker output, utilization of improved procedural systems, total work flow process, and increased training at all levels.

(b) Productivity Enhancing Capital Investments (PECI)

Navy places major emphasis on increasing productivity by greater use of investment funds. The Navy has requested productivity enhancing investment funds for FY 1981 for shipyard modernization, shore intermediate maintenance activity upgrade, wholesale supply consolidation, and NIF fast payback.

(c) Worker Motivation

The Navy is pursuing a number of prototype programs to improve worker motivation. Employing the assistance of R&D personnel, outside industrial expertise, and other productivity organizations, these programs are paving the way for managers to address quality of work life issues which affect productivity. Programs involving job redesign, performance contingent award systems, participative employee involvement, and removal of impediments to productivity are among many management initiatives which are being successfully pursued.

(d) Output Measurement and Productivity Evaluation

Work is also proceeding on developing more useful and timely performance measures for managers at all levels in the Navy and the Marine Corps.

3. Department of the Air Force Productivity Program

a. Overview

(1) Program Description and Responsibilities

(a) In Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) is responsible for providing overall guidance for the Air Force Productivity Program, and the Directorate of Manpower and Organization is the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) in the Air Staff.

(b) The Air Force Director of Manpower and Organization has designated the Productivity and Research Office (MPMZ) to serve as the Air Staff focal point for all Air Force productivity issues. In addition, the Air Staff Productivity Committee has been expanded to include all directorates. Both of these actions will ensure that all functional areas participate fully in this dynamic program.

(c) Establishment of Overall Goals

1 The broad goals of the Air Force Productivity Program are to: reduce unit costs of necessary goods and services; reduce the cost to maintain the required level of effectiveness; promote and reinforce the use of accepted disciplines and proven techniques for making productivity improvements at all levels of responsibility in the Air Force; provide appropriate Air Force data for inclusion in productivity reports; and annually prepare command and base-level plans to achieve these goals.

2 As an incentive for greater productivity participation, preference will be given to reinvestment of savings within the performing organization. However, high level visibility of reinvestment of saved resources is necessary to assure that those resources are applied to top priority requirements. Also, reinvestment should not be misconstrued as a commitment to retain the savings through subsequent budget cycles without justification. It will still be necessary to annually justify all resource requirements.

(2) Outstanding or Unique Efforts

(a) The Air Force has a sophisticated and proven methodology to measure labor and determine manpower requirements which is known as the Management Engineering Program (MEP). The MEP uses recognized management and industrial engineering work measurement techniques to develop manpower standards and guides. The standards and guides developed by the MEP incorporate productivity changes including those obtained through reorganizations, technological improvements, improved methods, better working conditions, and other productivity enhancements.

(b) The field commands have developed productivity plans, to be updated annually, in conjunction with the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System and have designated a productivity principal to serve as the command point of contact for all productivity matters. Each command will report the results of their productivity efforts in an annual productivity report.

(c) Specific FY 1981 goals are to: refine the planning process to incorporate the plans and goals developed by the field commands; work toward a better use of measurement procedures and reporting requirements; monitor and control productivity initiatives; and review command plans and publish an Air Force regulation which will provide Air Force goals and outline documentation and reporting procedures.

b. FY 1981 Initiatives

(1) Productivity in Support of the Budget

Resources freed by past or future productivity initiatives will be reinvested within a stable resources level to help pay for the costs of essential improvements in the readiness posture of the Air Force. The impact of several of these specific initiatives can be seen in the paragraphs that follow.

(2) Impact of Initiatives on FY 1981 and Outyears

The Air Force has many continuous programs and specific initiatives with the goal of improving productivity. The purpose of this section is to cite a few examples, both large and small, which affect FY 1981 and future years.

(a) Work Methods and Measurement

Efforts to reduce the time required to develop manpower standards through the Management Engineering Program have been effective. Continued efforts will be made to reduce the time required for standards development and to maintain and update existing standards.

The Air Training Command incorporated the Instrument Flight Simulator (IFS) into the Undergraduate Pilot Training program. As a result of the IFS, flying hours per student will be reduced from 210 to 175 hours. The reduction in flying hours extends the aircraft life without loss in training effectiveness.

C-141/C-5 Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) are being installed. INS provides an aircraft positioning system, for worldwide use, that does not require navigation aids. The total INS cost will be amortized based on logistics support savings and reduced navigator requirements. When INS is fully installed, over 1,000 active duty and reserve navigator manpower authorizations are programmed for reduction.

Functional Management Engineering Teams, working with functional managers to improve productivity in the physiological training area, have saved over 20 manpower authorizations through the elimination of some physiological training units.

Interactive Procession and Display System will enable the Air Force Global Weather Central to maintain its present mission support capability and reduce overall cost and manpower. The system will reduce paperwork and expedite the means by which workers acquire, modify and distribute weather information and products.

(b) Productivity Enhancing Capital Investments (PECI)

(1) To increase emphasis in productivity investment, the Air Force has concentrated and expanded efforts in three primary areas: The Productivity Investment Fund (PIF); the Industrial Fund Fast Payback Program; and the Fast Payback Capital Investment Program (FASCAP).

(2) Submissions to compete for PIF included numerical control machining equipment, intrusion detection systems, companion trainer aircraft, advanced word processing systems, information management systems, scanning systems, and optical mark readers. Projects were approved with \$6 million in FY 1981 funds which are expected to free up 630 equivalent manpower spaces after implementation. With the backlog for capital investment requirements expanding, the Air Force anticipates greater future use of these funds for productivity improvements.

(3) The Industrial Fund Fast Payback Program applies to industrial fund activities and is managed through comptroller channels. Prior to 1979, MAJCOMS could only approve projects with a maximum cost of \$25,000; more expensive projects were approved by OSD to a level of \$100,000. When the \$100,000 approval authority shifted to MAJCOMS in March 1979, the program results increased. The \$100,000 limit has been increased to \$300,000 and the payback period extended from 2 to 3 years. In FY 1977, under the tightest constraints, an investment of only \$210,000 resulted in a \$650,000 2 year savings (3.2:1 rate-of-return). However, as a direct result of the lowered approval authority (OSD to MAJCOM), investments in FY 1979 have increased to \$340,000 with a projected 2 year savings of \$1,683,588. Further growth is anticipated for FY 1980 and beyond.

(4) The Fast Payback Capital Investment Program (FASCAP) is a Congressionally funded program which encourages Air Force personnel to buy equipment that will pay for itself within two years. The "payback" must be in hard O&M dollars or manpower. Although FASCAP has suffered several setbacks -- loss of funding in 1978, delay in reinstating the 1979 program, a \$40,000 ceiling on FY 1979 projects (raised to \$100,000 in Oct 79), and a restriction on lease-to-purchase options -- the program is beginning to show significant progress.

FASCAP RESULTS

<u>FY</u>	<u>Budget (\$ M)</u>	<u>Approved Projects</u>	<u>3080 Funds Investment Cost (\$M)</u>	<u>Two Year Savings(\$M)</u>	<u>Life Cycle Savings(\$M)</u>	<u>2 Yr/Life Cycle Return On Investment</u>
77	6.5	157	6.5	12.8	54.0	1.98/8.38
78	6.5 (requested)		UNFUNDED			
79*	3.6	77	1.2	2.7	11.1	2.07/8.54
80	3.8					

*reflects approximately 6 months of full program operation with the \$40,000 ceiling

The Air Force anticipates that FASCAP will show significant progress if the program is allowed to establish continuity and credibility through continued congressional support.

(c) Worker Motivation

(1) The Air Force plans to continue job enrichment as a management process for redesigning jobs with the goals of making them more interesting and challenging. Potential benefits include higher morale, higher retention, and increased productivity.

(2) The Air Force has various programs designed to assist commanders by improving management practices: management analysis; Management Engineering Teams; and the Leadership Management and Development Center Traveling Teams.

(3) The Air Force encourages voluntary participation in improving efficiency and effectiveness through the very successful Air Force Suggestion Program. Since October 1977, the Presidential Recognition Program provided recognition to 1368 personnel whose suggestions were adopted. Each of their suggestions was valued in excess of \$5,000 with a total of \$88 million accruing to the Air Force.

Air Force Suggestion Program

	<u>Suggestions Received</u>	<u>Suggestions Adopted</u>	<u>Benefits</u>	<u>Awards</u>
FY 78	105,000	21,000	\$44M	\$1.3M
FY 79	93,000	20,000	\$72M	\$1.4M

4. Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) Productivity Program

a. Overview

The Defense Contract Audit Agency is continuing to pursue new measurement methods and productivity goals for its auditors. Regional

Productivity Principals have been designated to serve as focal points with responsibilities for this program in each region. In addition, a formal program of productivity reporting has been established.

In its operations, this agency strives to maintain an optimal balance of productivity, effectiveness, and quality in each audit. The quantification and measurement of these factors are difficult. Research and development efforts toward meaningful measurements continue. At present, the agency has no comprehensive system for measuring the impact of intangible factors influencing much of its work.

b. FY 1981 Initiatives

DCAA had established, as an FY 1981 goal, a productivity increase of 2 percent. However, in line with President Carter's initiative to combat white collar crime, we plan to assess our vulnerability from a functional or program aspect and a contractor reliability viewpoint. We expect to devote more time to assure that contractor internal control systems preclude or detect irregularities resulting from either poor systems design, inefficient application, or intentional manipulation. This effort is consistent with the broad concern taken by Inspector General and internal audit organizations in DoD and elsewhere in Government. As a result, we are programming a productivity increase of only one percent for incurred costs but hope to maintain our full productivity objective of two percent for pricing proposals.

5. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Productivity Program

a. Overview

The DIA productivity enhancement program is the responsibility of the Comptroller of DIA.

b. FY 1981 Initiatives

The FY 1981 initiatives for DIA include the following productivity enhancement goals:

- (1) Optimizing base communications service to DIA and other intelligence components in the National Capital Region while reducing long-term costs.
- (2) Optimizing printing service to DIA and other selected intelligence components while reducing external assistance printing costs.
- (3) Providing the means to improve the intelligence instruction by allowing more flexibility in tailoring course material and curriculum for all students enrolled at the school.

c. Impact of Initiatives on FY 1981 and Outyears

Planned actions to optimize goal #1 include the development of a near-term standard for automation of CINC/Service Defense Special Communication System (DSSCS) requirements; initiation of action to consolidate Special Intelligence and General Services communication facilities and facilitate consolidation of additional DSSCS centers with the DIA DSSCS Center. These productivity improvement projects are designed to absorb the impact on DIA resulting from the closure of additional SI/SAO Communication Centers and a sizeable increase in the amount of message traffic handled without employing additional manpower.

The replacement of assorted major equipment items to provide more in-house printing throughput will accomplish goal #2, utilizing the same manpower resources. Although there will be no manpower savings realized from these actions, the new equipment is necessary to achieve a previously directed manpower reduction and to accommodate increasing requirements.

Planned actions to accomplish goal #3 include a curriculum development program and the expansion of the Defense Intelligence Extended Learning Program which provides intelligence education in exportable self-paced modules. These planned actions will require additional manpower and funding resources. This enhancement program will enable the School to provide programs that will properly prepare students for prospective positions in the intelligence community and further career progression.

6. Defense Investigative Service (DIS) Productivity Program

a. Overview

A Productivity Enhancement Committee was established in June 1978 for the purpose of program oversight. This committee, composed of key staff directors, meets periodically to explore the areas of PEGI and work force motivation. Of particular concern, and an area to be monitored and evaluated, is the impact increases in output will have on the quality of the product being provided the customers.

(1) Work Methods And Measurement

Work method improvement and measurement studies within the investigative organizational elements of DIS are continuing and provide a means by which work load data are translated to manpower requirements. The manning standards resulting from these studies are used in measuring productivity and justifying manpower requirements as well as distributing authorized manpower.

(2) Output Measures and Productivity

A total of 225 investigative elements are dispersed throughout the 50 states, District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. Through use of a detailed Management Information System, DIS is able to monitor the productivity and distribution of work load and make the adjustments, as required, for each element.

b. FY 1981 Initiatives

A goal of 230 investigative leads closed per agent per month has been established for FY 1980 and a goal of 233 leads per agent for FY 1981. Increased productivity for the outyears is anticipated at approximately 0.5 percent per year through FY 1985. We are examining alternative methods and procedures for collecting and analyzing productivity data. In addition, a distributive processing system is undergoing pilot test to determine its potential for increasing productivity in the clerical area.

7. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Productivity Program

a. Overview

The Agency's resource management processes have been tailored to the objective of progressive productivity improvement. Methods improvement, including capital investment for systems automation, performance standards, and productivity measurement techniques are integral elements in a comprehensive DLA resources management system which encompasses: a cost/manhour accounting system to collect basic resource consumption data; a management information system to report operating results; a management engineering program to improve and standardize methods and measure labor efficiency relative to standards; a performance evaluation reporting system for top management assessment of the work load/resource relationship; a formal management review process for executive management performance appraisal; and a programming/budgeting system which translates work loads, production rates, and unit costs into personnel and financial resource requirements. Responsibility for the DLA productivity program is assigned to the Comptroller, DLA.

(1) Work Methods and Measurement

The performance measurement and evaluation components of the DLA resources management system function from the lowest work center level at field installations to the agency headquarters. Major emphasis is placed on the methods improvement phase of the standards-setting process at the lowest level, thereby promoting increased labor efficiency.

(2) Output Measurement and Productivity

In DLA, performance standards are developed for application at the work center level and are progressively aggregated and applied in translating workloads to human resources and related funding requirements. Summary standards are also applied in the performance evaluation system that has been designed to maintain continuous management surveillance over current work load/resource trends and relationships.

b. Outstanding or Unique Efforts

The DLA management system has enabled the agency to cope effectively with changing work loads and expanded mission assignments through timely adjustments to the workforce. During the FY 1973-1979 timeframe, DLA realized an average annual net productivity increase of 5 percent in its prime mission programs, while absorbing several new missions without commensurate growth in total employment. This general improvement resulted largely from capitalizing on systems improvements through mechanization and automation, and a host of methods and procedures refinements generated by aggressive management engineering efforts.

c. FY 1981 Initiatives

(1) Establishment of Productivity Goals

Increases in work load experienced during FY 1979 and continuing into FY 1980, with concurrent reductions in resources, will result in an additional 13.6 percent productivity gain for FY 1980. For FY 1981, we expect to achieve an additional 2.4 percent gain.

(2) Impact of Initiatives on FY 1981 and Outyears

(a) Output Measurement and Productivity

The quantitative output measures used in the DLA Productivity Program provide information on work load volumes in terms of selected mission-oriented end products. Of equal importance, however, are qualitative indicators which reflect program effectiveness in terms of responsiveness and customer satisfaction. The DLA system provides for continuing evaluations of both efficiency and operational effectiveness in the management review process.

(b) Productivity Enhancing Capital Investments

Capital investment savings attained during FY 80 will be addressed in detail in subsequent reports. DLA aggressively seeks the identification and documentation of PECI investment proposals.

8. Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) Productivity Program

a. Overview

(1) Program Description and Responsibilities

DMA productivity improvement efforts are carried out under the DMA Effectiveness/Productivity (E/P) Program, which was begun when the agency became operational in July 1972. The Deputy Director, Management and Technology, is responsible for recommending productivity goals to the Director and for overall direction of efforts to meet

approved goals. The E/P Program is integrated into the management processes and is an identified responsibility at the various echelons of supervision. To a substantial degree, the E/P improvements result from initiatives by individuals and production units. The impetus was, and continues to be, to free up resources in order to reduce the shortfall in meeting the validated requirements of the commands for DMA products and services. This thrust is supported by treating the reinvestment decision as part of the validation process on each productivity improvement action.

(2) Outstanding or Unique Efforts

The more significant E/P actions have occurred in the following areas during FY 1979:

<u>Areas</u>	<u>Total Benefits (\$000)</u>
Productivity Enhancing Capital Investments (PECI)	401.5
Organization & Management Improvements	44.0
Production Techniques/Procedures	871.1
Miscellaneous MC&G Improvements	62.0

b. FY 1981 Initiatives

(1) Establishment of Productivity Goals

Productivity in the function of map and chart development and production, which covers 98 percent of DMA resources, is projected to remain at the same level in FY 1981 as that projected for FY 1980. The normal productivity gains expected from investments in new equipment and technical process improvements will be offset by the impact of introducing new production programs to support expanding DoD requirements, principally the Rapid Deployment Force and transfer of responsibility from DIA for terrain analysis. During FY 1981, approximately 250 new people will be hired and trained for these production programs, and productivity of new people traditionally is low during the training phases of their employment. The remaining 2 percent of DMA resources are devoted to the function of military training. Productivity in this function is largely dependent on the degree to which the Services utilize their requested trainee allocations. No specific productivity improvements have been identified in this functional area for FY 1981.

(2) Impact of Initiatives on FY 1981 and Outyears

Resource investments and other initiatives taken in FY 1981 will enhance DMA productivity in the outyears, permitting available resources to be better used in meeting production shortfalls in validated requirements for DMA products and services. Total productivity gains

during the outyears will continue to be subject to potential offsets due to the intrusion of new programs to support expanding DoD requirements. Investments in productivity enhancing capital investments (PECI) are projected to free-up about 90 manyears and \$2.2 million worth of production capabilities for other production requirements during FY 1981, with equivalent or greater annual savings projected for the outyears. This will be achieved through investment of approximately \$3.5 million in fast payback PECIs over \$100,000 and \$1.1 million in other than fast payback PECIs. Further efficiencies are expected to result from technical process improvements, particularly in the digital production area.

CHAPTER XIV

MANPOWER AND FORCES BY LOCATION

A. U.S. Strategic Forces

With the exception of our sea-based SLEMs, U.S. strategic forces will be primarily located in CONUS by the end of FY 1981. The following display shows their locations.

END FY 81 STRATEGIC FORCES

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MISSION</u>
<u>OFFENSIVE</u>		
<u>AIR FORCE</u>		
<u>Active</u>		
1054 ICBM	CONUS	
25 Bomber Squadrons (B-52/FB-111)	1 Guam 24 CONUS	
34 Tanker Squadrons (KC-135)	1 Japan 1 United Kingdom 32 CONUS	Deter nuclear attack against the US and our allies, our military forces, and bases. If deterrence should fail, support measures aimed at early war termination at the lowest possible level of conflict on terms acceptable to the US and our allies.
<u>ANGUS</u>		
13 Tanker Squadrons (KC-135)	CONUS	
<u>USAFR</u>		
3 Tanker Squadrons (KC-135)	CONUS	
<u>NAVY</u>		
<u>Active</u>		
35 SSBNs ^{1/}	Charleston, S.C.	
4 Submarine Tenders	Holy Loch, Scotland Guam, and Kings Bay, Georgia	
<u>Reserve</u>		
5 Submarine Tender Augmentation Units	CONUS	

^{1/} Includes one TRIDENT SSBN

DEFENSIVE

AIR FORCE

Active

6 Interceptor
Squadrons

CONUS

Airspace Control and
Crisis Air Defense

ANGUS

10 Interceptor
Squadrons (F-4,
F-101, F-106)

CONUS

Airspace Control and
Crisis Air Defense

B. U.S. Tactical/Mobility Forces

Forward deployments of U.S. tactical/mobility forces are shown in the first display below. In addition to location, this display provides the missions of deployed units. The second display shows the locations of units in or near the United States.

FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS

END FY 1981 TACTICAL/MOBILITY FORCES

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Mission</u>
<u>Army Divisions</u>		
1st Armored Division	W. Germany	Force presence. In concert with allied and other US forces, deter Warsaw Pact aggression. Failing that, stop any Warsaw Pact ground attack with a minimum of loss of NATO territory and ensure the prompt restoration of prewar boundaries.
3d Armored Division		
3d Infantry Division (M)		
8th Infantry Division (M)		
Bde, 1st Infantry Division (M)		
Bde, 2d Armored Division		
Bde, 1st Cavalry Division		
2d Infantry Division	S. Korea	Force presence. Provides ground combat and security forces for South Korea.

Special Mission Brigades

Berlin Brigade	W. Germany	Force presence.
193d Infantry Brigade	Panama	Defense of the Panama Canal.

Armored Cavalry Regiments

2d Armored Cavalry Regiment	W. Germany	Force presence. Provides reconnaissance and security forces.
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment		

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Mission</u>
<u>Navy Ships and Aircraft</u>		
<u>Sixth Fleet 1/</u> 2 Multipurpose Carriers 14 Surface Combatants 14 Attack Submarines and Auxiliaries 1 Amphibious Ready Group 2/ 1+ ASW Patrol Squadrons (12 aircraft)	Mediterranean	Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Mediterranean. Provide naval force in Mediterranean in the event of a NATO conflict. Provide crises management or contingency force in Mediterranean.
<u>Middle East Force 1/</u> 1 Flagship (AGF) 2 Surface Combatants	Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean	Provide peacetime naval presence in Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean. Provide limited contingency force in the area.
<u>Seventh Fleet & Western Pacific 1/</u> 2 Multipurpose Carriers 19 Surface Combatants 17 Attack Submarines and Auxiliaries 2 Amphibious Ready Groups 2/ 4 ASW Patrol Squadrons	Western Pacific	Maintain Western Pacific sea lanes in NATO or Asian conflict. Provide tactical air and amphibious "projection" forces in support of Asian conflict. Provide crisis management of contingency force in Western Pacific. Provide peacetime naval presence throughout Western Pacific.

- 1/ Figures shown are approximate averages. Most ships are rotated to distant assignments from US homeports. Mediterranean and Western Pacific forces, however, contain a few units selectively homeported overseas, including one CV homeported in Japan.
- 2/ An Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) is one-ninth of an Amphibious Task Force (ATF). It consists of 4 to 8 amphibious ships with a Marine Battalion Landing Team (BLT) or a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) embarked. In WESTPAC the two ARGs consist of one MAU and one BLT.

Marine Corps Forces

Marine Amphibious Unit (afloat)	Mediterranean	Provide forward afloat force presence in the Eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean.
Battalion Landing Team (afloat)	Atlantic Deployed afloat intermittently	Provide forward afloat force presence in the Western Atlantic and Caribbean.

3d Marine Division (-)	Japan (Okinawa)	Provide forward deployed ground/air combat forces with amphibious forcible entry capability.
1st Marine Aircraft Wing (-)	Japan (incl. Okinawa)	

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Mission</u>
Marine Amphibious Unit (afloat)	Western Pacific	Provide forward afloat force presence in the Western Pacific.
Battalion Landing Team (afloat)		

Air Force Tactical Aircraft Forces 1/

Europe

14 Squadrons	United Kingdom	Provide force presence in forward areas.
16 Squadrons	West Germany	
1 Squadron	Netherlands	Provide close air support, gain air superiority, and provide interdiction and reconnaissance for a NATO conflict.
3 Squadrons	Spain	
1 Squadron	Iceland	
5 Squadrons (Dual-based)	W. Germany,	
40	Italy, U.S.	

Pacific

2 Squadrons	Philippines	Provide force presence. Provide close air support, gain air superiority, and provide interdiction and reconnaissance for an Asian conflict.
5 Squadrons	Japan (Okinawa)	
5 Squadrons	Korea	
12		

1/ Includes fighter, attack, reconnaissance, special operations, TACCS and airborne TACS squadrons.

Air Force Mobility Forces 1/

Europe 2/

2 Squadrons	W. Germany	Provides transportation air logistic support, and aeromedical evacuation capability for theater forces.
1 Squadron	United Kingdom	

Pacific

1 Squadron	Japan
2 Squadrons	Philippines

1/ Includes tactical airlift and aeromedical evacuation aircraft.

2/ Includes rotational squadron.

UNITS IN OR NEAR THE UNITED STATES

END FY 1981 TACTICAL/MOBILITY FORCES

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>Active Army</u>	
<u>Army Divisions</u>	
1st Infantry Division (M) ^{1/}	Fort Riley, Kansas
2d Armored Division ^{1/}	Fort Hood, Texas
4th Infantry Division (M) ^{1/}	Fort Carson, Colorado
1st Cavalry Division ^{1/}	Fort Hood, Texas
9th Infantry Division	Fort Lewis, Washington
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)	Fort Campbell, Kentucky
82d Airborne Division	Fort Bragg, North Carolina
7th Infantry Division ^{2/}	Fort Ord, California
24th Infantry Division (M) ^{2/}	Hunter/Stewart, Georgia
5th Infantry Division (M) ^{2/}	Fort Polk, Louisiana
25th Infantry Division ^{2/}	Hawaii
^{1/} These divisions each have one brigade in Europe.	
^{2/} Composed of two active brigades and one from the reserve components.	

Army Separate Brigades

194th Armored Brigade	Fort Knox, Kentucky
197th Infantry Brigade	Fort Benning, Georgia
6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat)	Fort Hood, Texas
172d Infantry Brigade	Fort Richardson, Alaska

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u>Armored Cavalry Regiment</u>	
3d Armored Cavalry Regiment	Fort Bliss, Texas
<u>Reserve Components</u>	
<u>Army Divisions</u>	
49th Armored Division	Texas
50th Armored Division	New Jersey, Vermont
40th Infantry Division (M)	California
38th Infantry Division	Indiana, Michigan
28th Infantry Division	Pennsylvania
26th Infantry Division	Massachusetts, Connecticut
42d Infantry Division	New York
47th Infantry Division	Minnesota, Illinois, Iowa

Army Separate Brigades 1/

30th Armored Brigade	Tennessee
31st Armored Brigade	Alabama
155th Armored Brigade	Mississippi
48th Mechanized Brigade 2/	Georgia
157th Mechanized Brigade	Pennsylvania (USAR)
218th Mechanized Brigade	South Carolina
256th Mechanized Brigade 2/	Louisiana
69th Mechanized Brigade	Kansas
29th Infantry Brigade 2/	Hawaii
32d Mechanized Brigade	Wisconsin
67th Mechanized Brigade	Nebraska
30th Mechanized Brigade	North Carolina
45th Infantry Brigade	Oklahoma
187th Infantry Brigade	Massachusetts (USAR)
39th Infantry Brigade	Arkansas
81st Mechanized Brigade	Washington
205th Infantry Brigade	Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa (USAR)
41st Infantry Brigade 2/	Oregon
53d Infantry Brigade	Florida
73d Infantry Brigade	Ohio
92d Infantry Brigade	Puerto Rico
58th Infantry Brigade	Maryland
116th Infantry Brigade	Virginia

1/ The 33d Infantry Brigade (Illinois National Guard) is provided for school support and is not included.

2/ Round-out brigade for active Army division.

Unit

Location

Army Armored Cavalry Regiments

107th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Ohio, West Virginia
116th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Idaho, Oregon, Mississippi
163d Armored Cavalry Regiment	Montana, Nevada
278th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-) 1/	Tennessee

1/ Minus one squadron.

Navy Ships and Aircraft

Active

Second Fleet & Western Atlantic

4 Multipurpose Carriers
85 Surface Combatants
139 Attack Submarines, Patrol
Combatants, Mine Warfare
Ships, Amphibious Ships,
and Auxiliaries
10 ASW Patrol Squadrons

U.S. East Coast and Western
Atlantic

Active

Third Fleet and Eastern Pacific

3 Multipurpose Carriers
70 Surface Combatants
106 Attack Submarines, Patrol
Combatants, Amphibious Ships,
and Auxiliaries
8 ASW Patrol Squadrons

U.S. West Coast and Eastern
Pacific

Reserve Components

Second Fleet and Western Atlantic

3 Surface Combatants
13 Mine Warfare Ships/Amphibious
Ships
2 Auxiliaries
7 ASW Patrol Squadrons

U.S. East Coast and Western
Atlantic

Third Fleet and Eastern Pacific

1 Surface Combatant
11 Mine Warfare Ships/Amphibious Ships
3 Auxiliaries
6 ASW Patrol Squadrons

U.S. West Coast and Eastern
Pacific

Unit

Location

Marine Corps Forces

Active

I MAF

(1st Marine Division/3d
Marine Air Wing, 1st Force Service
Support Group, plus supporting
elements).

Camp Pendleton, Calif.; Marine
Corps Air Station (MCAS), El
Toro, Calif.; and Marine Corps
Base, Twenty-Nine Palms, Calif.

II MAF

(2d Marine Division/2d
Marine Air Wing, 2d Force Service
Support Group plus supporting
elements).

Camp Lejeune, N.C.; MCAS,
Cherry Point, N.C.;
MCAS, New River, N.C.; and
MCAS, Beaufort, S.C.

1st MARINE BRIGADE

(Regimental Landing Team 3/Marine
Aircraft Group 24, plus supporting
Brigade Service Support Group).

MCAS, Kaneohe Bay; and
Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii

Reserve Components

DIVISION WING TEAM

(4th Marine Division/4th
Marine Air Wing/4th
Force Service Support
Group).

Headquarters at New Orleans,
Louisiana

Air Force Tactical Aircraft Forces 1/

Active

52 Squadrons 2/
40 CONUS
3 Alaska
1 Hawaii

CONUS, Alaska and
Hawaii

Reserve Components

55 Squadrons
53 CONUS
1 Puerto Rico
1 Hawaii

CONUS, Puerto Rico
and Hawaii

- 1/ Includes fighter, attack, reconnaissance, special operations, tanker/
cargo (KC-10), TACCS, and airborne TACS squadrons.
2/ Excludes dual-based squadrons.

Unit

Location

Air Force Mobility Forces 1/

Active

28 Squadrons 2/
27 CONUS
1 Alaska

CONUS and Alaska

Reserve Components

54 Squadrons 3/
53 CONUS
1 Alaska

CONUS and Alaska

- 1/ Includes strategic and tactical airlift and aeromedical evacuation
aircraft. Does not include rescue or tanker/cargo aircraft.
2/ Excludes rotational squadrons.
3/ Includes C-130 reserve squadrons and C-5, C-141, and C-9 USAFR
Associate Squadrons.

C. Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and
by Country

The following tables show active duty Military personnel strengths
by regional area and country for FY 1979 through FY 1981.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY 1/

SEPTEMBER 30, 1979

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
TOTAL WORLDWIDE	2,027,494	759,892	559,455	523,937 2/	185,250
ASHORE	1,923,920	759,892	559,455	523,937	179,384
Afloat	203,574	-	-	198,108	5,866
U.S. TERRITORY AND SPECIAL LOCATIONS	1,969,070	513,680	452,053	447,917	155,420
CONTINENTAL U.S.	1,250,561	454,180	411,177	251,683	133,521
ALASKA	20,646	8,578	10,416	1,477	174
HAWAII	45,408	17,446	6,003	10,562	11,397
AMERICAN SAMOA	3	1	2	-	-
CANAL ZONE	9,443	7,122	1,885	298	138
GUAM	8,756	13	3,731	4,643	369
JOHNSTON ATOLL	130	119	11	-	-
MIDWAY ISLANDS	472	-	-	472	-
PUERTO RICO	3,532	347	53	2,975	157
TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS	42	-	42	-	-
U.S. MISCELLANEOUS PACIFIC ISLANDS	29	-	-	-	29
VIRGIN ISLANDS OF THE U.S.	9	6	2	1	-
WAKE ISLAND	5	-	5	-	-
TRANSIENTS	76,429	29,867	19,726	23,929	7,907
Afloat	153,605	-	-	151,677	1,728
TOTAL FOREIGN COUNTRIES	456,424	245,172	107,402	76,020	29,830
ASHORE	408,055	245,172	107,402	29,789	25,692
Afloat	50,369	-	-	46,231	4,138
WESTERN & SOUTHERN EUROPE	325,240	211,593	75,447	33,178	5,032
AUSTRIA	35	5	7	1	22
BELGIUM	2,034	1,285	626	100	23
CYPRUS	11	2	-	-	9
DENMARK	43	5	16	12	10
FINLAND	24	6	6	2	10
FRANCE	74	19	18	7	30
GERMANY (FED. REPUBLIC & WEST BERLIN)	239,248	203,893	34,979	275	101
GREECE	3,328	569	2,320	422	17
GREENLAND	291	-	-	-	-
ICELAND	2,859	2	1,125	1,625	107
IRELAND	13	2	5	-	6
ITALY	11,732	3,706	4,332	3,438	254
LUXEMBOURG	7	-	-	-	7
MALTA	2	-	-	-	-
NETHERLANDS	2,220	627	1,568	17	8
NORWAY	212	35	140	29	8
PORTUGAL	1,404	63	1,025	307	8

1/ Includes personnel paid from Civil Works and reserve appropriations who are not included in the other tables of this report as follows: Army - 496, Air Force - 235, Navy - 195, Marine Corps - 63.

2/ Navy end strength in this table is based upon ADP reports which reflect an enlisted strength of 457,102. ADP processing subsequent to these initial reports revealed that the actual FY 1979 strength was 2,061 lower than originally reported. The 2,061 adjustment should be made to the Continental U.S. end strength.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

SEPTEMBER 30, 1979

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
SPAIN	6,714	28	4,631	3,633	222
SWEDEN	15	1	5	2	7
SWITZERLAND	40	3	3	1	33
TURKEY*	4,916	1,200	3,653	46	17
UNITED KINGDOM*	23,015	128	20,497	2,100	290
AFLGAT	25,001	-	-	21,159	3,842
-EUROPEAN NATO	(291,385)	(211,534)	(70,590)	(8,360)	(881)
(2) EAST ASIA & PACIFIC	122,227	35,023	31,185	34,375	23,644
AUSTRALIA	653	6	267	373	7
BURMA	11	3	1	1	6
CHINA	9	2	1	-	6
HAINLAND	1	-	1	-	-
TAIWAN	34	6	-	14	14
HONG KONG	71	21	20	16	14
INDONESIA	46,207	2,498	14,370	6,440	22,499
JAPAN (INCLUDING OKINAWA)	(30,179)	(1,347)	(9,057)	(2,814)	(16,961)
OKINAWA	13	4	2	-	7
MALAYSIA	74	2	15	50	7
NEW ZEALAND	14,101	32	6,170	5,158	741
PHILIPPINES	39,018	30,389	6,315	269	48
REPUBLIC OF KOREA	23	4	1	12	6
SINGAPORE	102	56	22	10	14
THAILAND	21,910	-	-	21,632	278
AFLGAT	3,906	402	312	2,831	363
(3) AFRICA, NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA	11	3	1	-	7
AFGHANISTAN	2	2	-	-	-
ALGERIA	73	3	-	70	-
BAHRAIN	6	2	-	-	4
BANGLADESH	1,053	-	-	1,053	-
BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY	6	-	-	-	-
CAMEROON	3	3	-	-	8
CHAD	6	-	-	-	6
CONGO	136	2	78	29	27
EGYPT	6	-	-	-	6
ETHIOPIA	7	-	-	-	7
GABON	14	3	-	-	11
GHANA	30	3	-	-	18
INDIA	32	7	4	8	13
IRAN					

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY
SEPTEMBER 30, 1979

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
ISRAEL	93	39	22	5	27
IVORY COAST	11	3	-	-	6
JORDAN	21	9	6	-	6
KENYA	30	4	17	-	9
KUWAIT	20	12	1	-	7
LEBANON	20	2	2	-	16
LIBERIA	17	5	2	3	7
MADAGASCAR	6	-	-	1	7
MALAWI	2	2	-	-	-
MALI	6	-	-	-	6
MAURITIUS	6	-	-	-	6
MOROCCO	37	10	6	3	16
NEPAL	10	2	-	-	6
NIGER	6	-	-	-	6
NIGERIA	16	4	2	-	12
PAKISTAN	39	6	10	3	20
ST. HELENA	10	-	10	-	-
SAUDI ARABIA	419	247	132	26	12
SENEGAL	10	-	-	2	6
SEYCHELLES	3	-	3	-	-
SOMALIA	7	2	-	-	5
SOUTH AFRICA	16	1	1	2	12
SRI LANKA	8	-	-	3	5
SUDAN	14	4	2	-	6
SYRIA	11	2	-	-	9
TUNISIA	20	7	1	2	10
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA	7	-	-	-	7
YEMEN (SANA)	15	5	4	-	6
ZAIRE	19	8	4	-	7
ZAMBIA	6	-	-	-	6
AFLGAT	1,614	-	-	1,614	-
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	6,693	96	321	5,560	714
ANTIGUA	111	-	1	-	-
ARGENTINA	31	3	6	4	18
BAHAMAS, THE	162	-	2	155	5
BARBADOS	5	-	-	-	5
BENLUCA	1,296	-	-	1,213	73
BOLIVIA	20	7	4	1	6
BRAZIL	36	12	5	6	15
CANADA	680	6	291	391	10

XI-12

(4)

TABLE P309A
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
CHILE	23	5	2	3	13
COLOMBIA	23	6	3	1	11
COSTA RICA	9	2	-	-	7
CUBA (GUANTANAMO)	2,117	-	3	1,720	394
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	16	2	1	4	9
ECUADOR	23	4	7	3	9
EL SALVADOR	16	3	2	-	13
GUATEMALA	16	4	1	1	9
GUYANA	6	-	-	-	6
HAITI	12	3	1	-	8
HONDURAS	20	4	7	-	9
JAMAICA	10	-	-	-	9
MEXICO	23	9	4	1	9
NICARAGUA	12	2	-	-	10
PANAMA	20	6	2	-	12
PARAGUAY	13	4	1	-	8
PERU	26	5	7	5	9
TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS	109	-	-	109	-
URUGUAY	13	3	1	2	7
VENEZUELA	26	4	10	4	13
AFLTAT	1,844	-	-	1,826	18
ANTARCTICA	71	-	-	71	-
EASTERN EUROPE	173	66	26	5	77
BULGARIA	11	2	2	-	7
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	11	1	3	-	7
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	51	43	-	-	8
HUNGARY	11	4	1	-	6
POLAND	16	3	2	-	10
ROMANIA	16	3	3	-	10
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	41	7	10	4	20
YUGOSLAVIA	17	3	4	1	9
(7) UNDISTRIBUTED	112	-	112	-	-

NOTE: ASHORE INCLUDES TEMPORARILY SHORE-BASED.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY
SEPTEMBER 30, 1980

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
TOTAL WORLDWIDE	2,045,200	774,000	558,000	528,000	185,200
ASHORE	1,841,504	774,000	558,000	330,381	178,123
A FLOAT	203,696	-	-	197,619	6,077
U.S. TERRITORY AND SPECIAL LOCATIONS					
CONTINENTAL U.S. ^{1/}	1,565,893	520,332	444,656	445,304	155,601
ALASKA	1,337,558	493,773	422,585	278,291	142,909
HAWAII	20,871	8,426	10,478	1,774	142,193
AMERICAN SAMOA	44,761	17,626	5,924	10,523	10,688
CANAL ZONE ^{2/}	1	1	-	-	-
GUAM	2,235	-	1,891	344	-
JOHNSTON ATOLL	9,056	13	3,712	4,952	379
MIDWAY ISLANDS	128	119	-	-	-
PUERTO RICO	543	-	-	543	-
TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS	3,082	347	47	2,541	147
VIRGIN ISLANDS OF THE U.S.	52	21	3	28	-
WAKE ISLAND	9	6	1	2	-
A FLOAT	6	-	6	-	-
147,591	-	-	-	146,306	1,285
TOTAL FOREIGN COUNTRIES					
ASHORE	479,307	253,668	113,344	82,696	29,599
A FLOAT	423,202	253,668	113,344	31,383	24,807
56,105	-	-	-	51,313	4,792
(1) WESTERN & SOUTHERN EUROPE					
AUSTRIA	335,627	214,165	80,913	37,625	2,924
BELGIUM	35	5	5	1	24
CYPRUS	2,045	1,285	619	110	31
DENMARK	13	2	-	-	11
FINLAND	44	5	15	13	11
FRANCE	22	6	4	2	10
GERMANY (FED REPUBLIC & WEST BERLIN)	74	19	12	10	33
GREECE	244,381	206,398	37,594	312	77
GREENLAND	3,440	569	2,379	476	16
ICELAND	286	-	286	-	-
Ireland	3,048	2	1,087	1,839	120
IRELAND	15	2	7	-	6
ITALY	12,046	3,760	4,337	3,691	258
LUXEMBOURG	6	-	-	-	6
MALTA	4	2	-	2	-
NETHERLANDS	2,116	634	1,457	18	9
NORWAY	216	46	123	35	12
PORTUGAL	1,580	67	1,035	488	10
SPAIN	8,344	29	4,633	3,498	184
SWEDEN	17	1	5	4	7

^{1/} Includes transients.

^{2/} Area formerly designated as Canal Zone.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

SEPTEMBER 30, 1980

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
SWITZERLAND	39	3	3	-	33
TURKEY	5,071	1,200	3,751	102	16
UNITED KINGDOM- AFLOAT	26,260	130	23,551	2,276	283
	26,523	-	-	24,766	1,755
EUROPEAN NATO	(300,615)	(214,115)	(76,256)	(9,350)	(894)
(2) EAST ASIA & PACIFIC					
AUSTRALIA	127,566	31,902	31,827	36,520	25,337
BURMA	537	6	268	255	6
HONG KONG	12	3	2	1	6
INDONESIA	41	6	5	15	15
JAPAN (INCLUDING OKINAWA)	68	21	16	16	13
	46,829	2,542	15,160	7,635	21,492
MALAYSIA	13	4	2	-	7
NEW ZEALAND	66	2	9	51	6
PHILIPPINES	13,385	32	7,881	4,780	692
REPUBLIC OF KOREA	36,016	29,226	6,456	292	42
SINGAPORE	24	4	2	12	6
THAILAND	104	56	24	11	13
AFLOAT	28,487	-	-	25,450	3,037
(3) AFRICA, NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA					
AFGHANISTAN	3,65	385	246	2,645	376
BAHRAIN	14	5	2	-	7
BANGLADESH	76	3	-	72	1
BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY	8	2	-	-	6
CAPEVERDE	1,345	-	-	1,345	-
	6	-	-	-	6
CHAD	2	2	-	-	-
CONGO	6	-	-	-	6
EGYPT	65	2	6	29	26
ETHIOPIA	7	-	-	-	7
GABON	6	-	-	-	6
GHANA	13	3	-	-	10
INDIA	32	3	4	7	16
IRAN	23	-	4	2	17
ISRAEL	99	39	24	9	27
IVORY COAST	12	3	-	2	7
JORDAN	21	9	5	-	7
KENYA	14	-	1	2	11
KUWAIT	23	12	1	3	7
LEBANON	16	2	-	-	14
LIBERIA	16	5	2	4	7

Strength shown is result of assignment policies predating current crisis and has no validity.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY
SEPTEMBER 30, 1980

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
MADAGASCAR	8	-	-	1	7
MALAWI	2	2	-	-	-
MALI	6	-	-	-	6
MAURITIUS	6	-	-	-	6
MOROCCO	45	10	6	14	15
NEPAL	9	2	-	-	7
NIGER	6	-	-	-	6
NIGERIA	17	4	2	-	11
PAKISTAN	37	6	9	3	19
ST. HELENA	11	-	11	-	-
SAUDI ARABIA	454	247	148	48	13
SENEGAL	10	-	4	1	9
SEYCHELLES	4	-	4	-	-
SIERRA LEONE	6	-	-	-	6
SOUTH AFRICA	24	2	6	4	12
SRI LANKA	9	-	-	3	6
SUDAN	11	-	3	-	8
SYRIA	11	2	-	-	9
TUNISIA	21	7	1	3	10
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA	9	-	-	-	9
UPPER VOLTA	8	-	-	-	8
YEMEN (SANA)	11	5	-	-	6
ZAIRE	20	8	9	-	7
ZAMBIA	6	-	-	-	6
AFLAT	1,095	-	-	1,095	-
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	12,191	7,150	334	3,823	884
ANTIGUA	119	-	-	118	-
ARGENTINA	25	3	6	5	11
BAHAMAS, THE	129	-	1	42	86
BARBADOS	10	-	-	4	6
BERMUDA	1,308	-	-	1,308	-
BOLIVIA	21	7	4	1	9
BRAZIL	57	12	7	16	22
CANADA	735	6	225	486	16
CHILE	30	5	3	7	15
COLOMBIA	25	8	3	1	13
COSTA RICA	11	2	-	-	9
CUBA (GUANTANAMO)	2,201	-	-	1,781	420
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	17	2	1	4	10
ECUADOR	20	4	5	3	8
EL SALVADOR	18	3	1	-	14

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(4)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY
SEPTEMBER 30, 1980

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
GUATEMALA	15	4	1	1	9
GUYANA	6	-	-	-	6
HAITI	14	3	2	-	9
HONDURAS	19	4	7	-	8
JAMAICA	10	-	-	1	9
MEXICO	27	9	4	2	12
NICARAGUA	16	-	3	1	12
PANAMA	7,257	7,060	45	5	147
PARAGUAY	13	4	1	1	7
PERU	27	5	4	6	10
TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS	7	-	-	7	-
URUGUAY	16	3	2	4	7
VENEZUELA	36	4	8	17	9
(5) ANTARCTICA	72	-	-	72	-
(6) EASTERN EUROPE	179	66	24	11	78
BULGARIA	10	2	2	-	6
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	11	1	3	-	7
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	54	43	-	-	11
HUNGARY	13	4	1	1	7
POLAND	17	3	2	1	11
ROMANIA	16	3	3	1	9
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	40	7	9	6	18
YUGOSLAVIA	16	3	4	2	9
(5) ANTARCTICA	-	-	-	-	-
(6) EASTERN EUROPE	179	66	24	11	78
(7) UNDISTRIBUTED	-	-	-	-	-

NOTE: ASHORE INCLUDES TEMPORARILY SHORE-BASED.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

SEPTEMBER 30, 1981

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
TOTAL WORLDWIDE	2,059,100	775,800	564,500	533,600	185,200
ASHORE	1,853,466	775,800	564,500	533,600	179,123
AFLOAT	205,634	-	-	199,557	6,077
U.S. TERRITORY AND SPECIAL LOCATIONS	1,574,943	519,079	449,596	450,667	155,601
CONTINENTAL U.S. ^{1/}	1,346,697	494,121	427,730	281,937	142,909
ALASKA	20,494	8,187	10,359	1,755	193
HAWAII	43,754	16,264	5,959	10,843	10,688
AMERICAN SAMOA	1	1	-	-	-
CANAL ZONE ^{2/}	2,121	-	1,769	352	-
GUAM	8,815	13	3,713	4,710	379
JOHNSTON ATOLL	128	119	9	-	-
MIDWAY ISLANDS	428	-	-	428	-
PUERTO RICO	2,988	347	47	2,447	147
TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS	52	21	3	28	-
VIRGIN ISLANDS OF THE U.S.	9	6	1	2	-
WAKE ISLAND	6	-	6	-	-
AFLOAT	149,450	-	-	148,165	1,285
TOTAL FOREIGN COUNTRIES	484,157	256,721	114,904	82,933	29,599
ASHORE	427,973	256,721	114,904	31,541	24,807
AFLOAT	56,184	-	-	51,392	4,792
(1) WESTERN & SOUTHERN EUROPE	340,660	217,660	82,417	37,659	2,924
AUSTRIA	34	5	4	1	24
BELGIUM	2,048	1,265	619	114	31
CYPRUS	13	2	-	-	11
DENMARK	44	5	15	13	11
FINLAND	21	6	3	2	10
FRANCE	72	19	10	10	33
GERMANY (FED. REPUBLIC & WEST BERLIN)	248,707	209,895	38,424	311	77
GREECE	3,418	569	2,362	471	16
GREENLAND	286	-	286	-	-
ICELAND	3,034	2	1,087	1,825	120
IRELAND	15	2	7	-	6
ITALY	12,166	3,758	4,340	3,610	258
LUXEMBOURG	6	-	-	-	6
MALTA	4	2	-	2	-
NETHERLANDS	2,118	634	1,457	18	9
NORWAY	216	46	124	34	12
PORTUGAL	1,579	67	1,037	465	10
SPAIN	8,227	29	4,647	3,367	184
SWEDEN	16	1	4	4	7

^{1/} Includes transients.

^{2/} Area formerly designated as Canal Zone.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY
SEPTEMBER 30, 1981

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
(2)					
SWITZERLAND	39	3	3	-	33
TURKEY	5,070	1,200	3,750	102	18
UNITED KINGDOM	26,981	130	24,238	2,320	293
AFLOAT	26,945	-	-	24,790	1,755
-EUROPEAN NATO	(305,746)	(217,610)	(77,749)	(9,493)	(894)
EAST ASIA & PACIFIC					
AUSTRALIA	127,852	31,684	31,881	38,750	25,337
BURMA	722	6	268	440	6
HONG KONG	12	3	2	1	6
INDONESIA	42	6	5	16	15
JAPAN (INCLUDING OKINAWA)	60	21	16	10	13
MALAYSIA	46,712	2,542	15,029	7,649	21,492
NEW ZEALAND	13	4	2	-	7
PHILIPPINES	68	2	9	51	6
REPUBLIC OF KOREA	13,369	32	7,889	4,756	692
SINGAPORE	37,983	29,006	8,636	297	42
THAILAND	24	4	2	12	6
AFLOAT	103	56	23	11	13
AFRICA, NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA					
AFGHANISTAN	28,544	-	-	25,507	3,037
BAHRAIN	3,646	385	250	2,635	376
BANGLADESH	14	5	2	-	7
BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY	76	3	-	72	1
CAMBODIA	8	2	-	-	6
CHAD	1,345	-	-	1,345	-
COMO	6	-	-	-	6
CONGO	2	2	-	-	-
EGYPT	6	-	-	-	-
ETHIOPIA	38	2	8	2	26
GABON	7	-	-	-	7
GHANA	6	-	-	-	6
INDIA	13	3	-	-	10
IRAN	32	3	4	7	18
ISRAEL	24	-	5	2	17
IVORY COAST	99	39	24	9	27
JORDAN	12	3	-	2	7
KENYA	21	9	5	-	7
KUWAIT	13	-	-	2	11
LEBANON	23	12	1	3	7
LIBERIA	16	2	-	-	14
	18	5	2	4	7

1/ Strength shown is result of assignment policies predating current crisis and has no validity.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY

SEPTEMBER 30, 1981

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
MADAGASCAR	8	-	-	1	7
MALAWI	2	2	-	-	-
MALI	6	-	-	-	6
MAURITIUS	6	-	-	-	6
MOROCCO	45	10	6	14	15
NEPAL	9	2	-	-	7
NIGER	6	-	-	-	6
NIGERIA	17	4	2	-	11
PAKISTAN	37	6	9	3	19
ST. HELENA	11	-	11	-	-
SAUDI ARABIA	475	247	152	63	13
SENEGAL	10	-	-	1	9
SEYCHELLES	4	-	4	-	-
SOMALIA	6	-	-	-	6
SOUTH AFRICA	24	2	6	4	12
SRI LANKA	9	-	-	3	6
SUDAN	11	-	3	-	8
SYRIA	11	2	-	-	9
TUNISIA	21	7	1	3	10
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA	9	-	-	-	9
UPPER VOLTA	8	-	-	-	8
YEMEN (SANA)	11	5	-	-	6
ZAIRE	20	6	5	-	7
ZAMBIA	6	-	-	-	6
AFLSAT	1,095	-	-	1,095	-
(4) WESTERN HEMISPHERE	6,926	-	-	-	884
ANTIGUA	11,952	-	336	3,806	-
ARGENTINA	120	-	6	119	-
BAHAMAS, THE	25	3	-	5	11
BARBADOS	129	-	1	42	86
BERMUDA	10	-	-	4	6
BOLIVIA	1,327	-	-	1,327	-
BRAZIL	21	7	4	1	9
CANADA	57	12	7	16	22
CHILE	738	8	225	490	16
COLOMBIA	30	5	3	7	15
COSTA RICA	25	6	3	1	13
CUBA (GUANTANAMO)	11	2	-	-	9
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	2,160	-	-	1,740	420
ECUADOR	17	2	1	4	10
EL SALVADOR	20	4	5	3	8
	18	3	1	-	14

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY
SEPTEMBER 30, 1981

REGIONAL AREA/COUNTRY	TOTAL	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY	MARINE CORPS
GUATEMALA	15	4	1	1	9
GUYANA	6	-	-	-	6
HAITI	14	3	2	-	9
HONDURAS	19	4	7	-	6
JAMAICA	10	-	-	1	9
MEXICO	27	9	4	2	12
NICARAGUA	16	-	3	1	12
PANAMA	7,035	6,836	47	5	147
PARAGUAY	13	4	1	1	7
PERU	27	5	4	8	10
TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS	7	-	-	7	-
URUGUAY	16	3	2	4	7
VENEZUELA	38	4	6	17	9
(5) ANTARCTICA	72	-	-	72	-
(6) EASTERN EUROPE	175	66	20	11	78
BULGARIA	10	2	2	-	6
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	11	1	3	-	7
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	54	43	-	-	11
HUNGARY	13	4	1	1	7
POLAND	17	3	2	1	11
ROMANIA	15	3	2	1	9
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	38	7	7	6	18
YUGOSLAVIA	17	3	3	2	9
(5) ANTARCTICA	-	-	-	-	-
(6) EASTERN EUROPE	175	66	20	11	78
(7) UNDISTRIBUTED	-	-	-	-	-

NOTE: ASHORE INCLUDES TEMPORARILY SHORE-BASED.



CHAPTER XV

MANPOWER DATA STRUCTURE

A. Introduction

This chapter provides audit trails of changes to the DPPC structure that have been implemented since publication of the Defense Manpower Requirements Report for FY 1980.

B. Structure Changes

Activity transfers and other management actions result in a number of changes within the DPPC structure. These changes do not affect total manpower but do represent corrections, refinements, and management actions which alter the manner of accounting for this manpower. The changes since the FY 1980 DMRR by component are included in the following table.

AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	MILITARY			CIVILIAN		
			FY 79	FY 80	FY 81	FY 79	FY 80	FY 81
ARMY								
Station Hospitals and Medical Clinics	Medical Support	BOS	15.0	14.8	14.4	10.9	11.7	11.4
Combat Vehicle Maintenance	Logistical Support	Land Forces				0.2	0.2	0.2
Tactical Crypto Activities	Intelligence	Land Forces			0.3			0.3
NAVY								
Navy Photo Center	Force Support Training	BOS				0.2	0.2	0.1
Navy Motion Picture Service	Centralized Support	Personnel Support	*	*	*			
Station Hospitals and Medical Clinics	Medical Support	BOS	11.4	11.6	11.4	4.6	4.8	4.5
Operational Test and Evaluation Units	Centralized Support	R&D	0.4	0.4	0.4		*	*
MARINE CORPS								
Defense Audiovisual Activity	Land Forces	BOS			.1			
	Individual Training	BOS			.1			
Training Support to Units	Individual Training	Force Support Training	.3	.3	.3			
Base Communications	Management Headquarters	BOS	.1	.1	.1			
Base Operations Administration	Centralized Support	BOS	.3	.3	.3			

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AUDIT TRAIL
(End Strength in Thousands)

ACTIVITY

AIR FORCE

Station Hospitals and Medical Clinics
Tactical Crypto Activities
Equal Opportunity and Treatment

American Forces Radio and Television Service
Federal Performance Evaluation and Simulation Center (FEDSIM)
Accelerated Copilot Enhancement Program
Installation Audiovisual Support

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>MILITARY</u>			<u>CIVILIAN</u>		
		<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>
Medical Support	BOS	19.6	19.6	20.3	4.0	4.8	4.8
Intelligence	Tactical Air Force			3.3	*	*	*
Research and Development	Personnel Support	*	*	*	*	*	*
BOS	Personnel Support	0.4	0.4	0.4	*	*	*
Medical Support	Personnel Support	*	*	*	*	*	*
Individual Training	Personnel Support	*	*	*	*	*	*
Force Support Training	Personnel Support	*	*	*	*	*	*
Centralized Support	BOS	-	-	0.4	-	-	0.1
Centralized Support	Federal Agency Support	-	-	-	0.1	0.1	0.1
Individual Training	Force Support Training	-	-	0.5	-	-	*
Research and Development	BOS	-	-	*	-	-	-
Centralized Support	BOS	-	-	1.0	-	-	0.3