The Westpac Broadcast Realignment-History Evolution and Concept,
Abstract
From 1965 to 1967, fleet broadcasts serving the Western Pacific (WestPac) experienced a rapid, unanticipated growth in traffic volumes as a result of the increased tempo of operations in the South China Sea. Large investments in equipment and personnel, and major procedural changes, such as the de-netting of the broadcasts keyed from Guam and Japan and transfer of the broadcast keying responsibilities from NCS Guam to NCS Phillippines, eventually enabled WestPac communications stations to handle the demand without resorting to 'pigeon post' and other nonelectrical means of delivery. Despite these measures, when traffic volumes stabilized in mid-1967, the load still could not be handled without frequent backlogs. One factor recognized as degrading the WestPac broadcast capabilities was the inordinate number of service requests (requests for retransmission of messages missed on the first run). Late in 1967 and early in 1968, such requests were being received in numbers approximating 50 percent of the first-run volume, with the number of service requests for messages appearing on some channels running as high as 110 percent of the first-run volume. The rebroadcasting of these messages was consuming about 10 percent of the total broadcast capacity, or about 2 hours of broadcast time each day. Because all these requests had to be screened and processed, replies to service requests were being delayed as much as 36 hours. In response to this situation, the Operations Evaluaton Group (OEG) of the Center for Naval Analyses was requested to analyze the WestPac broadcast to isolate the causes for the high service request rate
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 1971
- Accession Number
- ADA084117
Entities
People
- William C. Hardy
Organizations
- Center for Naval Analyses