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
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SOVIET-NORWEGIAN RELATIONS
NORWEGIAN REACTIONS TO SOVIET PRESSURES

by

Daniel Dale Devlin

December 1979

Thesis Advisor:

J. Valenta

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SOVIET-NORWEGIAN RELATIONS
NORWEGIAN REACTIONS TO SOVIET PRESSURES

by

Daniel Dale Devlin
Captain, United States Army
B.S., North Dakota State University, 1969

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS


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
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
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ABSTRACT

This research provides an analysis of the current security threat to Norway posed by increased Soviet pressures on the northern flank of NATO and Norwegian reactions to Soviet pressure. Nordic regional security is discussed in order to determine the background of Norwegian NATO membership, Nordic unity and the importance of the northern flank. As Soviet pressures have increased in Norwegian territorial waters and airspace, on the Svalbard archipelago, and in the Barents and Norwegian seas, Norwegian support of NATO has been questioned, particularly regarding political trends in Norway in the early 1970's and Norwegian policies concerning NATO. The results of the research determine that Soviet pressure has been counterproductive. Norwegian support for NATO has increased as a result of pressure. Other Norwegian national issues are not directly related to support for NATO, but are a result of regional unity and national interests.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The past decade has provided numerous discussions concerning the erosion of the NATO Alliance and the weakening of individual member's resolve in the alliance. At the same time the term "Finlandization"¹ has gained popularity as a catchword applied to many of the Western European nations.

Norway has not escaped this latest wave of discussion. Norwegian policies and politics are frequently misunderstood and yet, are used as a basis for criticism. Among those most often voiced: 1) Norway's policies barring nuclear weapons and foreign troops from Norwegian soil; 2) Norway's close Nordic ties with non-NATO members; 3) results of the 1972 referendum in Norway, which turned down EEC membership.

In addition to internal political decisions, external pressure exerted on Norway by the Soviet Union has provided the basis for assumptions that Norway must be weakening in its position as a NATO member. In question is whether a nation of 4 million people can withstand the pressures of a neighbor as strong as the Soviet Union.

These arguments and misrepresentations indicated the need for a closer study of the Norwegian position. Therefore, the

¹"Finlandization" is a term often used to describe the relationship between the USSR and Finland. This term is frequently applied to other countries to denote a process of change in the relationships of those countries with the Soviet Union. The term, as used here, does not reflect acceptance of its other applications.




Figure 1: Map of the Nordic Region

thesis of this research is that under increased Soviet pressures, the resolve of the Norwegian people towards support of NATO has not been weakened, but rather strengthened.

Initially, an examination of Nordic Unity is necessary to determine the historical background of Norway's relationship with other non-NATO Nordic countries. This examination will include the background of Norway's entrance in the NATO alliance.

In Chapter III, the increased Soviet threat to Norwegian security will be discussed. This will provide insight into Norway's strategic importance by virtue of physical location, and as the only northern NATO country bordering on the Soviet Union.

Chapter IV will examine recent events in Soviet-Norwegian relations and what their effect has been on the Norwegian policies. Included in this chapter are the recent events concerning Svalbard and the Barents Sea. These issues, still unresolved, are crucial to any discussion of the present attitudes toward the Soviet Union and towards support of NATO.

The Norwegian reaction to national and international politics will be discussed in Chapter V. The Norwegian EEC referendum in 1972, and the Norwegian national election of 1973 are often misunderstood, particularly in their relationship to NATO support. These relationships will be examined utilizing polls conducted before and after the elections. In addition, this chapter will include the results of polls registering support for NATO, indicating changes in public

opinion from initial entrance until the present day.

In Chapter VI the conclusions reached through research will determine the validity of the thesis. The conclusions will take into account the historic background of Nordic unity, the relationship between the Soviet Union and Norway and the reaction of the Norwegian government and people to recent Soviet actions.

In order to solidify a framework for studying this problem and to varify research completed, interviews were conducted with Norwegian citizens in Monterey, CA, Washington, D.C. and finally Oslo, Norway. Interviews were conducted: 1) in Oslo, at the Ministry of Defense and the Foreign Ministry with Norwegian government officials, at the University of Oslo and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs with scholars of Nordic affairs, and in private offices and homes with writers and scholars; 2) in Washington, at the State Department with Norwegian and Scandinavian desk officers, at the Foreign Press Building with the Norwegian U.S. correspondent; 3) in Monterey, with senior Norwegian military officers at the Defense Resources Management Center, and with Norwegian students attending the Naval Postgraduate School. A list of interviewees is provided in the bibliography. Since these interviews were conducted to validate rather than gather research material, no direct quotes will be used; nor should information found in this study be attributed to individuals interviewed.

Finally the area included in this study is not usually covered by maps in a scale providing good detail. However, maps and portions of maps will be provided wherever possible to assist the reader in understanding the area.

II. SECURITY OF THE NORDIC REGION

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Nordic security is dependent upon international environment as is the security of most of the world. The Nordic countries are faced with unique problems in this respect, since they are directly linked to the two opposing superpowers in the world environment while maintaining an extremely close regional relationship.

In the aftermath of World War II, Europe split into two quite distinct camps which are territorially defined and separated by ideology. As pointed out by Egil Ulstein, "In some ways the Nordic countries may be said to straddle the split of Europe."² The interests of these countries are firmly tied to European interests, tied to each other and tied directly to opposing powers and ideologies. The problems faced by the area can be studied by examining the relationships each nation maintains within the Nordic Area and in the international environment.

A brief historical background is necessary for a better understanding of Nordic cooperation. The countries of Finland and Sweden must be studied in order to emphasize the different problems the Nordic countries face and to provide a discussion of the Nordic security problems. Although this

²Egil Ulstein, Nordic Security, Adelphi Papers, no. 81 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, November 1971), p. 16.




Figure 2: Map of NATO's Northern Flank

thesis deals with Norway, it is necessary to discuss Sweden and Finland in order to fully understand regional security as related to the concepts of Nordic unity and the "Nordic Balance."

To avoid confusion, some explanation of terms is necessary. The Nordic Area refers to the five countries of Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Iceland and their territories. The terms Scandinavia and Scandinavian, although not always applicable to Finland because of differences such as language, are generally accepted to refer to the same five countries³ and will be used interchangeably with the Nordic Area.

For purposes of this discussion, Norway, Sweden and Finland are used to examine the problems facing the Nordic Area. Iceland and Denmark are mentioned in discussion of the Scandinavian problems, but are not examined in detail.

The history of Nordic unity and cooperation can be traced to the Napoleonic period and the Congress of Vienna. As compensation resulting from the Russo-Swedish War, Finland was lost by Sweden in 1809. In 1814, Sweden acquired Norway from Denmark as a result of joining the coalition against Napoleon. Except for the Danish war with Prussia in 1864, the Scandinavian countries were able to maintain a peaceful existence until the beginning of World War II.

Norway declared its independence in 1905 and elected a Danish King. Finland proclaimed independence in 1917 after the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. Iceland separated itself

³Donald S. Connery, The Scandinavians (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), p. 11.

from Denmark in 1941 and was established as an independent republic in 1944. From these beginnings, the present governments of the Scandinavian countries have grown: two republics and three constitutional monarchies, all democracies.⁴

The Scandinavian countries were able to maintain their neutrality throughout World War I. Other than restrictions made necessary by the Allied blockade of Germany during the war, neutrality appeared to work well for the Nordic Area and the Nordic countries saw little necessity for defense building following the war. They became active members in the League of Nations and believed firmly in their neutral stance.

In 1939, Norway, Sweden and Finland rejected Germany's offer to sign a mutual non-aggression pact, believing such action a form of commitment unnecessary for neutral states. Denmark alone agreed to the pact. The invasion of Finland by Russia in 1939 and the invasion of Denmark and Norway by Germany in 1940 shocked the Nordic countries. The Scandinavian desire for neutrality was ignored in the struggle for natural resources and geographic location that had great significance to neighbors already involved in war.

The geographic position which had once offered security had become significant in a war which had changed through improved technology. Scandinavia controlled the sea lanes to Northern Europe and also held iron ore necessary for

⁴Franklin D. Scott, Scandinavia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 33-35.

German war industry.⁵ The geographic location important in World War II will be discussed later, as its importance has increased in the post war era.

Following the war, the Scandinavian governments agreed that actions must be taken to insure security for the future. Military alliances meant a clear break with the Nordic tradition of nonalignment or neutrality, but an alliance appeared the only practical way of achieving security.

Negotiations for a Nordic Defense Union proved negative when Norway, Denmark and Sweden could not agree with regard to foreign policy commitments. This pact would have allowed a mutual defense agreement under conditions of nonalignment with East or West. All three governments initially favored the Union, but security could not be insured without outside assistance, particularly in weapons. The United States was unwilling to supply countries other than its immediate allies and Sweden was unwilling to join any alliance outside the Nordic Area.

When agreement could not be reached for a Nordic Defense Union, the Norwegian government became convinced that Norway's security policy could only be defended through a defensive alliance with major western powers. In 1949, Norway became a charter member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.⁶ Denmark followed Norway's lead, and her sovereignty over

⁵Ibid, p. 215.

⁶James A. Storing, Norwegian Democracy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963), pp. 214-215.

Greenland stretched the alliance across the North Atlantic. Iceland's decision to join NATO was based on its need for protection and its location for bases.

Sweden, following the collapse of an attempt at a Nordic alliance, was determined to remain nonaligned in peacetime and neutral in the event of war. The Swedish people considered joining the NATO alliance, but feared doing so would threaten Finland's independence and decided the best course was continued neutrality. Finland had little choice but to sign a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union in order to maintain that independence.

B. THE "NORDIC BALANCE"

The "Nordic Balance" is a widely held Scandinavian belief that a delicate defense balance exists restraining the Soviet Union from occupying Finland or even parts of northern Norway.⁷ The elements of this balance are:

- 1) A desire not to provoke the Soviet Union unnecessarily.
- 2) A Finland that has complicated ties with both Nordic and Soviet interests.
- 3) An assumption that Swedish nonalignment is necessary to keep the Nordic nations delicately poised between East and West.
- 4) A similar assumption concerning the desirability of tenuous links between NATO and the two Scandinavian members, Norway and Denmark.⁸

This belief is the major reason for the "base policy" of Norway and Denmark and its basis was the wish to avoid any

⁷Egil Ulstein, "The Nordic Countries in a Changing Europe," Military Review, September 1972, p. 52.

⁸James J. Robbins, Strengthening NATO's Scandinavian Flank, RM-3282-PR (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, August 1962), p. 10.

policy which could be interpreted as a provocation against the Soviet Union.

The "base policy" is a qualification to NATO membership for both Norway and Denmark. This policy prevents foreign troops from being based on Norwegian or Danish soil in peacetime, except for a limited number of NATO staff officers. The policy also prevents nuclear arms from being stockpiled in either country at any time. These qualifications were made to indicate their membership in the alliance was defensive rather than allowing the alliance to use their territories for offensive purposes.

Denmark and Norway have chosen to restrict the effect of their Alliance membership but retained the freedom to remove these restrictions whenever they consider that the explicitly stated conditions on which they are based no longer apply.⁹

The "base policy" has been emphasized as an important point in the maintenance of the "Nordic Balance." In October 1961, when Khrushchev notified the Finnish government requesting mutual military consultation provided for under their Mutual Assistance Agreement, the Norwegian Foreign Minister quickly responded that Norway's restriction on bases and nuclear weapons were to a large degree conditional on the maintenance of Finnish neutrality. In addition, if the Soviet Union was considering changes in Finland's status, Norway would have to reconsider its "base policy." The consultation demands were dropped by the Soviets and the "base policy" has remained in effect.

⁹Ulstein, Nordic Security, p. 9.

C. FINLAND

Since the "Nordic Balance" is based on Finland's continued independence and relationship with the Soviet Union, it is a good place to begin in describing the Scandinavian countries' very different problems. "Finland is a fiercely independent country, but its independence is compromised by the facts of life in its relationship with the Soviet Union."¹⁰ Sharing a border of almost eight hundred miles with the Soviet Union, Finland is the most prosperous and democratic of all the countries bordering directly on the Soviet Union (excluding Norway, whose border with the Soviet Union was created by border adjustments following World War II). Finland's border is the third longest of the countries bordering the Soviet Union, ranking behind China and Mongolia.

Being a Russian neighbor has never been easy. As Scott points out in the plaint of an anonymous Finn, "Oh, why did our forefathers fall in love with these lakes and woods and settle here? Why didn't they keep on moving west? Then someone else could be Russia's neighbor."¹¹ In all, Finland has fought 42 wars with Russia and lost them all.¹² Although fierce warriors, the Finns have always suffered from a small population (particularly compared with Russia), a location strategic to Russian interests, and a lack of allies in war.

¹⁰Connery, p. 443.

¹¹Scott, p. 17.

¹²Connery, p. 443.

In fact, the only real support ever offered Finland against Russia came from Germany, twice offering assistance while at war with Russia herself, twice being a loser in world wars and if anything, hurting Finland's position in post war negotiations.

Finland lived under Swedish rule for seven centuries. In 1809, Finland became a Russian grand duchy following the Russian-Swedish War of 1808. Although ruled by the Tsar, Finland enjoyed more freedom under Russian domination than most Russian territory. Finnish nationalism grew during the first fifty years of Russian hegemony. Under Nicholas II, a russification period was suffered and when the Russian Revolution took place in 1917, the Finns quickly declared their independence.¹³

A civil war between Reds and Whites ended after three and a half months and determined that the country would have a democratic government. Initially a monarchy was favored, but within a year the parliament voted for a republic with a single house parliament and a president elected by a popularly chosen electoral college.¹⁴

In 1932, Finland declared itself to be neutral and the same year signed a nonaggression treaty with the Soviets. The Soviets, fearing that Finland might ally themselves with Germany, constantly sought evidence from the Finns that they understood the security problem faced by the

¹³Anatole G. Mazour, Finland, Between East and West (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956), p. 5-39.

¹⁴Ibid, pp. 49-55.

Soviet Union. The Soviets asked for base rights in Finnish territory to protect the Gulf of Finland and Leningrad. In addition, constant agitation existed in the Karelian area over what part of Karelia should be Finnish territory. The Finnish government had successfully fought an anti-Communist campaign within Finland during the 1930's and the Soviets were concerned that Finland had anti-Soviet intentions.

In 1939, the Nazi-Soviet secret pact placed Finland in the Soviet's sphere of influence. When new demands for base rights and other concessions were made of the Finnish government and turned down, and after the German invasion of Poland, the Soviets invaded Finland expecting easy victory. The Soviets instead faced intense fighting and finally settled after five difficult months. The Finns had been unable to get support during the war except supplies from Sweden. Germany wouldn't break its treaty with the Soviets and prevented the Italians from assisting. The United States was still attempting to stay out of the European affair, and when Great Britain and France prepared to send help, the Norwegians and Swedes refused to allow crossing rights, claiming breach of neutrality. In the peace negotiations, Finland was forced to give up territory and base rights to the Soviets.¹⁵

The Soviet invasion of Finland resulted in Hitler's belief that the Soviets were weak militarily and he seriously underestimated their capabilities. Strangely enough, had the French and British been successful in assisting Finland, the

¹⁵Connery, pp. 481-485.

later alliance with the Soviets probably could not have occurred. The "Winter War" was not the end of Finnish-Soviet conflict in the Second World War.

The Finns were drawn into the war again on the German side and soon found themselves in a "continuation war" with the Soviets. As the German war effort began to fail, Finland was forced into signing a separate armistice with the Soviets. Not only were the reparations staggering, but the Finns had to drive the remaining Germans out of the country, resulting in a "scorched earth" retreat by the Germans. In addition, Finland had lost the respect of the western world for siding with the Nazis. The result was loss of territory and Soviet domination of Finland in the post war era.¹⁶

The Soviet influence in Finland's foreign policy and internal affairs has resulted in what westerners describe as "Finlandization."

The term "Finlandization"—meaning that process or state of affairs in which, under the cloak of maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet Union, the sovereignty of a country becomes reduced—has entered the political dictionary despite the protests of Helsinki, Helsinki's western well-wishers, the Russians and some American neo-isolationists.¹⁷

Still Finlandization is not the worst of possibilities for Finland. The country remains a democratic republic,¹⁸ independent, with a great deal more freedom than is normally

¹⁶Mazour, pp. 135-177.

¹⁷Walter Laquer, "Europe: The Specter of Finlandization," Commentary, December 1977, p. 37.

¹⁸Jaakko Nousiainen, The Finnish Political System, trans. John H. Hodgson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 146.

recognized. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has a definite grip on Finnish foreign policy and Finnish leaders realize the hostage position in which the country exists.

Juko Paasikivi, prime minister from November 1944 to March 1946 and then president, implemented a policy of improving relations with the Soviet Union, a policy known as the Paasikivi line. Paasikivi stated on Finnish Independence Day, December 6, 1944,

Finnish foreign policy is governed by our relations with our great neighbour in the East, the Soviet Union. This is the real problem in our foreign policy, and we have to find a solution to it, for the future of our nation depends on it. We have just signed a truce with the Soviet Union. . .we are all agreed that the provisions of this truce must be conscientiously fulfilled. But above and beyond this, we must establish a relationship of mutual trust with our great neighbour. Suspicion must be banished, friendship must prevail. I am convinced that it is in the best interests of our nation that Finnish foreign policy should never be led into paths hostile to the Soviet Union.¹⁹

Nordic cooperation has already been discussed and the cooperation that continued immediately after the war was developed at first quite cautiously. This relationship was emphasized by Paasikivi as well.

Our social organization and our outlook on life have been determined by nearly 700 years of association with Sweden. This and the fact that our nation includes a considerable Swedish-speaking population, have led to the establishment of close cultural and economic ties with our western neighbour and with other Scandinavian countries.²⁰

¹⁹Hillar Kallas and Sylvia Nickels, ed., Finland, Creation and Construction (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1968), p. 37.

²⁰Ibid, pp. 37-38, Finnish Independence Day, December 6, 1944.

President Paasikivi was successful in gaining a good deal of trust from the Soviet Union considering that the Soviets withdrew their troops from the Porkkala naval base in 1955 and returned it to the Finns, 42 years before the lease expired as stated in the Finnish Peace Treaty. This strengthened Finland's nonaligned position in terms of international status. President Paasikivi stated on July 31, 1955,

Good relations with Russia are, and always will be of prime importance to Finland. Geography and history have determined this. In foreign policy we must think geographically, as I have said before, but one cannot repeat it too often. Some people so easily forget to look at the map. And what does history teach us? Although it does not always repeat itself, as was once thought, it is true that all the military engagements that we have been involved in with Russia in the past 250 years have ended in disaster for Finland, whereas we have often achieved worthwhile results when we have met the Russians round a table. In the history of our people the pen has repaired what the sword had broken.²¹

Finland and the Soviet Union signed an Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in 1948, subsequently reaffirmed in 1955 and 1970. Unlike the mutual defense alliances that the Soviets have concluded with Eastern European countries, Finland is required only to defend its own territory against aggression or to prevent aggression toward the Soviet Union across Finnish territory. The Soviet Union will assist, "in case of need," when the two nations agree "between themselves."²² This agreement

²¹Ibid, p. 38, interview with Dagen Nyketer.

²²Theodore L. Stoddard et al., Area Handbook for Finland (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 215.

"represented the first international recognition of Finland's neutrality-nonalignment orientation."²³

The policy of neutrality was not emphasized during the Paasikivi era, but his successor President Urko Kekkonen has stressed this policy in the international arena. Finland has taken an active role in international affairs. After joining the United Nations in 1955, Finnish troops have often participated in UN peace-keeping missions and Finnish officers have commanded UN forces. In UN decisions, however, neutrality and Soviet influence are noticeable. Finland has abstained from voting on issues which involve the interests of the great powers, particularly if the Soviet Union is involved. Consequently, the Finnish delegation did not vote on condemnation of Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, or on resolutions concerning the Middle East in 1967 or 1973.

The Soviets occasionally make it clear to Finland that policies not in accordance with Soviet interests will not be tolerated. In 1958, the Soviet Union didn't approve of the new organization of the government. The Soviet ambassador was recalled and trade was curtailed with Finland. After a new State Council was formed, the situation was resolved. The Soviets also watch German participation in NATO very closely and any German involvement in the Nordic area is loudly protested as a threat as defined in the Mutual Assistance Agreement. To date, the Finnish government has been

²³Ibid, p. 154.

able to avoid actions by the Soviets under the agreement, other than protests.²⁴

Because of the unique relationship Finland has with the Soviet Union, detente greatly benefits the Finns' relationships with other nations. As long as tensions are relaxed, the Finns enjoy their independence. During periods of tension, the Finnish government is expected to keep in line with Soviet policies and their freedom of action is restrained.

D. SWEDEN

Sweden is the only Nordic country which has been able to avoid war and alliances for 160 years. Three basic reasons account for this fact: "history, geography and good luck."²⁵ Since the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Sweden has been content as a minor player in the international environment, content in developing economically and industrially. Sweden's geographic location, in the center of Scandinavia, has provided a natural buffer from the great powers. During World War II, Sweden was the only Scandinavian country which escaped occupation.

Swedish foreign policy is based on neutrality, or more precisely, "alliance-free in peace, aimed at a policy of neutrality in case of a major war."²⁶ Sweden was very much

²⁴Connery, pp. 502-504.

²⁵Joseph B. Board, Jr., The Government and Politics of Sweden (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970), p. 188.

²⁶Ibid, p. 189.




Figure 4: Map of Sweden

isolationist until after World War I. Participation in the League of Nations was the beginning of active involvement in world affairs. The policy of neutrality in war was seriously threatened when the Soviets invaded Finland in 1939. Although remaining neutral, Sweden did provide arms and volunteer assistance to Finland. The occupation of Norway and Denmark was an even greater shock to the Swedes and certainly the Germans could have occupied Sweden as well, if they had so decided. Sweden's only direct involvement with foreign troops was a brief transit agreement, requested by the Nazis and Finland, under which German troops were allowed to cross from Norway to Finland.

After World War II and the failure of the Nordic Defense Union attempt, Sweden was determined to remain free of alliances (although NATO membership had been discussed), "Out of a desire to remain neutral in the event of a shooting war, but to keep Sweden out of the cold war at a time when Swedish participation would probably have resulted in the destruction of Finland's independence."²⁷ Sweden was one of a few nations to keep its defense forces in a high state of readiness, aware that the Soviets were much more powerful than ever before.

Although nonaligned, Sweden is definitely pro-Western and would look to the West for assistance if attacked. The likelihood of attack from anywhere is doubtful, but Sweden maintains a high degree of readiness, particularly for a

²⁷ Ibid, p. 192.

country its size. The Swedes are realistic enough to realize that their only hope would be to hold off an attacker long enough for help to arrive. Sweden's deceptive image is much like "a prim lady. . .armed not with a long hat pin. . .but a submachine gun and a dozen hand grenades."²⁸

Sweden's involvement in the United Nations began in 1946. Not a charter member, Sweden's role since entrance has been very active. The Swedish representatives have consistently worked for disarmament, particularly concerning nuclear weapons, and relaxation of East-West tensions. Swedish forces have participated frequently in United Nations peace keeping missions and the Swedish government supports all aid programs for underdeveloped nations.²⁹

Sweden's role in the "Nordic Balance" is that of a wedge or fulcrum. History, geography and ideology place Sweden in the center as the balance point for Scandinavian affairs. The maintenance of Swedish nonalignment is critical to the "Nordic Balance." Sweden has frequently voiced the importance of detente and emphasizes the important role the small nations can play in lessening East-West tensions.

E. NORDIC UNITY

In order to understand the basis for the "Nordic Balance" and the close relationships that exist among the Scandinavian countries, a brief study of Nordic unity is helpful. Long before the European Economic Community or the United Nations

²⁸Connery, pp. 346-347.

²⁹Ibid, p. 345.

were organized, Scandinavian cooperation had begun. The similarity of heritages and cultures provided the beginnings for cooperation socially, politically and economically.

Although the military alliance concept was unsuccessful, the conferences led to the establishment of the Nordic Council. Created in 1952, the Council meets annually to discuss judicial, economic, cultural and social matters. No formal headquarters exists and the meetings take place in a different Scandinavian capital each year. Its membership is elected from each country and cabinet ministers often attend the meetings. Recommendations by the Council on matters of interest are usually acted upon by each of the five countries.

By the mid-fifties the Council was debating the idea of a Nordic Common Market. In 1959, the European Free Trade Area was formed with Great Britain and several other European countries. This arrangement benefited everyone since Great Britain was the principal market for all the Scandinavian countries. By 1961, Finland was allowed an associate membership (in order to satisfy Soviet misgivings) and the Scandinavian countries found increased markets between each other as a result of the association. Great Britain and Denmark dropped out of the association after joining the European Economic Community, but trade between the remaining partners remains active. Norway's attempt at EEC entry was rejected in a national referendum. All the Nordic countries have trade agreements with the EEC that provide favored status of trade.

Nordic Unity exists in other areas as well. The degree to which cooperation exists cannot be fully documented. The daily contact between governmental departments through meetings, messages and phone calls is staggering and impossible to track.

All five countries have a common passport area for their citizens. The labor market was opened in 1954 when the countries signed a convention dispensing with work permits in each other's countries. Education is greatly affected by the cooperation between countries. Entrance examinations as well as scholarships and student loans are available for interchange of students. Nordic Unity can be found in almost every area of life making the Nordic Area the most integrated group of independent countries in the world.

The Scandinavian countries strongly supported international organizations following World War II. They quickly joined the Council of Europe in 1949, actively participating, although the Council's efforts have been limited. Scandinavia was eager to show the importance of small nations in the new international system. As Scott points out, "All had learned that international organization was the only hope for them and the world."³⁰ Norway had participated in the United Nations organization from the beginning. This was possible even during the war, since the Norwegian government spent the war years in London. Denmark joined the United Nations after liberation in 1945, Sweden and Iceland gained admission in 1946 with the first group of nonwarring states.

³⁰Scott, p. 254.

As Scott describes, "Finland

. . . wanted to join, every one professed to want her in, but she was caught in the rivalry of East and West. When the United Nations refused to admit certain of the Russian satellite states, the USSR retaliated by delaying the inclusion of Finland, but she was admitted in 1955.³¹

Scandinavian cooperation has proved effective in international organizations. The Nordic countries actively take part in United Nations peacekeeping efforts and Nordic statesmen are frequently asked to mediate or lead negotiations in troubled areas.

³¹Ibid.

III. STRATEGIC GEOGRAPHICAL IMPORTANCE

A. THE KOLA PENINSULA

The Kola Peninsula is of particular importance to Soviet Naval strategy. The ice free ports of Murmansk and Poliarnyi are located on the peninsula and have historically been used by Russia as major sea ports. Following World War II, the Soviets gained additional territory on the peninsula by annexing territory from Finland. The annexation gained the Petsama region, an additional port and naval base at Pechenga, and formed a common border of 195.7 km (122 miles) between Norway and the USSR.³²

The importance of these ports can easily be seen when considering the organization and location of the Soviet Navy. The Navy is organized into four fleets: The Pacific Fleet, the Northern Fleet (in the Murmansk area), and the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets.³³ The Pacific Fleet has secure access to ports but is not close enough to support operations in the Atlantic area, the scene of the most probable crisis to the Russian Navy. The Baltic and Black Sea Fleets are unable to maneuver from their home ports without passing through straits controlled by NATO member nations. Thus, their

³²Trevor Lloyd, "The Norwegian-Soviet Boundary, A Study in Political Geography," (Dartmouth College, Hanover, February 1954), p. 1.

³³Max B. Scheider, "The Significance of North Norway to NATO Military Strategy," (Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 21 May 1976), pp. 18-19.




Figure 5: Map of NATO's Northern Flank

movements are closely observed and access routes could effectively be blocked by NATO forces in times of crisis. This illustrates the importance of the ports on the Kola Peninsula. A priority has been placed there on construction of harbor defenses and shelters for submarines and other small warships.

The severe climate of the area would seem to be a disadvantage, however, the population of the area has almost tripled since World War II and industrial production is eight times what it was in 1940. Over 20% of the total of Soviet fish products is provided by a fishing fleet of close to 500 vessels that operated from the peninsula. The area is rich in mineral resources, particularly rare metals and other minerals, and will be of greater importance to the Soviet economy as these resources are exploited.³⁴

The military forces stationed on the peninsula include two motorized infantry divisions (24,000 men), members of the Leningrad Military District who are permanently stationed in the area. An additional 2-5 motorized divisions are assigned to the district and could be used to support the local forces. In addition, a naval infantry (marine) brigade of 2,000 men is permanently located on the peninsula. The marines and both motorized divisions are equipped with amphibious tanks and are trained in amphibious operations. Over 40 airfields are located on the peninsula, of which

³⁴Johan Jørgen Holst, ed., Five Roads to Nordic Security, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1973), p. 90.

about 10 can support modern aircraft. Approximately 300 aircraft (including helicopters) of the 500 belonging to the Leningrad Military District are deployed to airfields in the area.³⁵

Of major importance, as previously mentioned, is the Northern Fleet. This fleet is made up of approximately 500 ships and craft and 10,000 men. Because of frequent reassignment among fleets, estimates of this fleet must be constantly updated. Latest estimates have included 30 cruisers and destroyers, 35 ocean going escorts, 25 landing ships, 25 missile carrying patrol boats, 150-200 smaller vessels, and 180-185 submarines of which 70-80 are nuclear powered.³⁶

The concentration of naval power in one area has been explained as availability of port facilities from which to maneuver. This buildup of forces has a definite effect on Norway as the only Northern European NATO country which borders directly on the Soviet Union.³⁷

B. NORTHERN NORWAY

The value of Northern Norway from a strategic point of view is primarily geographical. Control of this area provides a significant vantage point of polar air routes and naval access routes between North America and the Soviet

³⁵Scheider, p. 16.

³⁶Edgar Prina, "A New Look at NATO," Military Review, July 1977, p. 30.

³⁷John H. Roush Jr., "Norway's Significance from a Military Point of View," Military Review, July 1975, p. 25.

Union. In this respect, both NATO and the Soviet Union could benefit from such control.

From a aerial viewpoint, Northern Norway could provide early warning of either intercontinental ballistic missiles or conventional aircraft utilizing the most direct route between the two continents. In addition to early warning surveillance, the area could also provide an excellent location for forward bases for interceptor aircraft and missiles. The airfields in the area would also provide excellent forward strike bases to the south, from a Soviet point of view, and against the growing Soviet threat by NATO forces.³⁸

The Soviet naval force, already mentioned, has adequate port facilities on the Kola Peninsula. However, the Soviet Northern Fleet requires ease of access to the Atlantic Ocean, preferably unobserved, in order to be an effective force. Northern Norway flanks this access route to the Atlantic and provides a strategic vantage point for NATO air and sea reconnaissance and electronic surveillance equipment.³⁹ The rugged Norwegian coastline provides excellent areas from which NATO submarines can operate; and the Norwegian and Barents Seas offer optimum zones for Polaris submarine operations.⁴⁰

Intelligence estimates indicate that control of Northern

³⁸Scheider, p. 24.

³⁹Arthur E. Dewey, "The Nordic Balance," Strategic Review, Fall 1976, p. 52.

⁴⁰Scheider, p. 25.

Norway is considered necessary by the Soviets in order to deploy their Northern Fleet.⁴¹ The Soviets could enjoy the same benefits from the extensive Norwegian coastline as NATO forces. This coast could be used to disperse the Northern Fleet and provide closer positions to interdict Atlantic sea routes. The numerous airfields in the area could provide much better air cover for their fleet, increasing the time on station for aircraft, and reducing the vulnerability of the fleet.

C. SVALBARD

The Svalbard archipelago is located half way between Norway and the North Pole, approximately 400 miles north of Norway's northern coast. Included in the island group is the largest group, Spitsbergen, and Bear Island, a small island half way between northern Norway and Spitsbergen.⁴²

The entire land mass of the archipelago is 24,000 square miles of icy mountains, glaciers and thick permafrost. Named Spitsbergen by the Dutch explorer Barents, who first mapped their location, Svalbard is the Norwegian name referring to the entire group of islands between latitude 74 and 81 N and longitude 10 and 35 E. The names given this remote area describe it very well. The Dutch name Spitsbergen, Land of Pointed Mountains, give an indication of the

⁴¹Drew Middleton, "NATO Voices Concern over Weakness of Northern Defenses," New York Times, 15 December 1971, p. C12.

⁴²R.W. Apple Jr., "Soviet and Norway Spar in Arctic Waters," New York Times, 6 August 1978, p. 2.

rough terrain covering much of the land. The Norwegian name Svalbard, Land with Frozen Shores, better describes a land nearly 60% covered with ice or frozen in areas to a depth of 300 meters.⁴³

The description of the archipelago makes understanding its importance difficult. Considering the Spitsbergen island group is frozen in pack ice for most of the year, international disagreements in the area seem unlikely. Until the beginning of the 19th Century, European whalers fought over the area in the summer time and had been wintering on the islands for 150 years. With the extinction of the Greenland whale, hunters, trappers and fishermen kept the quarrel over the area open until an American company began coal mining operations in 1906. Since then, coal mining has been the major industry on the islands.

The Norwegian government gained sovereignty over the Svalbard archipelago in 1920 under the International Treaty of Paris, signed by over forty nations.⁴⁴ Although Norway maintains sole sovereignty under the terms of the treaty, all signatories retained equal economic rights for development of resources. In addition, all military activity was banned from the island group.

The Soviet Union was not one of the original signatories to the Svalbard Treaty, but recognized Norwegian sovereignty

⁴³Gordon Young, "Norway's Strategic Arctic Islands," National Geographic, August 1978, p. 267.

⁴⁴Roush, p. 21.




Figure 7: Map of Svalbard

in 1924. The Norwegian government ratified the treaty in 1925 and the Soviet Union acceded to the treaty without reservations in 1935. Since 1924, Norway and the Soviet Union have been the only two countries to maintain active business concerns on the island group.⁴⁵

The Norwegians purchased the original coal mining operation from the American company in 1916. Since 1932, when the Soviets bought a coal operation from a Dutch company, the Soviets and Norwegians have been the only two countries of the treaty signatories to take advantage of exploiting Svalbard's natural resources.

Although the Soviets outnumber the Norwegians on the island by more than two to one, each country's annual output of coal is about the same (about 450,000 tons a year).⁴⁶ The productivity of the Soviets is not low when compared with normal production output in the Soviet Donetz basin. However, the quantity of coal produced by the Soviets on Spitsbergen is very small compared with their needs; and the coal they are getting is not particularly good quality. Both facts indicate that the Soviets have other interests than coal mining which keep them on the archipelago. According to some reports, most of the Soviets are actually "military men disguised as civilians."⁴⁷

⁴⁵Holst, Five Roads, p. 110.

⁴⁶"Norway. The Next Richest Nation. A Survey." The Economist, 15 November 1975, pp. 20-22.

⁴⁷"Probing NATO's Northern Flank," Time, 27 June 1977, p. 24.

Lief Eldring, former Governor of Spitsbergen, explains it this way,

I'm sure there is no military activity. Everything I have asked to see in four years they showed me, although I wouldn't pretend to know whether they have a radio listening post or things like that. They don't really need the coal. They use it as an excuse to keep a presence here, to keep an eye on other people.⁴⁸

D. MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE

The geographical location that had helped keep Norway out of European wars in the 19th century became the primary reason for invasion in the 20th century. In World War I, the sea lanes around Norway's northern cape had been used by the Allies to supply Russia by way of Murmansk. Norway had been able to maintain neutrality in World War I, in spite of this fact.

In World War II, this close proximity to the major North Atlantic shipping lanes became of significant military importance. Winston Churchill spoke of Norway's "immense strategic significance",⁴⁹ recognizing the damage the Germans could inflict on British shipping of war material with submarines operating from the Norwegian coast. In addition, the possibility of German air strikes from the Norwegian airstrip threatened British shipping as well as the British coast.

At the same time, the Chief of the German Naval Staff, Raeder, took the view that a British occupation of Norway

⁴⁸Apple, "Soviet and Norway Spar", p. 2.

⁴⁹Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948), p. 531.

would be fatal to Germany, interrupting the supply of Swedish iron ore to Germany, and allowing England to intensify her air war on Germany. The Naval Staff considered "the loss of Norway to England would be synonymous with losing the war."⁵⁰ In discussing the invasion of Norway with General Falkenhorst, Adolf Hitler called the Norwegian coast "a strategic turning point."⁵¹ At this time in the war the strategic significance of the Arctic was still small, since Germany and the Soviet Union were at peace.

Both leader's assessments of Norway's significant location were correct. Hitler, however, surprised both Norway and Great Britain by invading Norway on April 9, 1940. Norway resisted, but was ill prepared for a major invasion, assuming that neutrality was possible as it had been in World War I. The effects of five years of German occupation will never be forgotten by the Norwegians. Their resistance efforts during the war were effective and they resolved never to be unprepared for national defense or suffer occupation again.

After the invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany, the Allied supply convoys to the Soviet ports in Murmansk were constantly hit by German torpedo-bombers, utilizing Norwegian fjords. This harassment accounted for critical losses to Allied convoys and for a time, caused a complete halt in convoy operations.

⁵⁰Great Britain Admiralty, The German Campaign in Norway, (Naval Staff Admiralty, 1948), p. 1-4.

⁵¹Churchill, p. 564.

Military interest in Spitsbergen also increased during World War II. The Allies and Germans fought over control of the islands for communications use with the Norwegians finally gaining control in 1943. In retaliation, the Germans destroyed most of the settlements (as they did across most of northern Norway and Finland), in this case, through the efforts of a naval force. The Norwegians, however, maintained a garrison until after the war, when all the settlements were rebuilt.⁵²

The Soviet Union quickly realized the military significance and attempted to gain more control of the archipelago for the Norwegians or to establish a bilateral Soviet-Norwegian concern, thus circumventing the Svalbard Treaty. At the end of World War II the Soviet government proposed that Norway and the Soviet Union organize a joint defense of Svalbard and that Norway cede Bear Island to the Soviets. The Norwegians countered that any revision of the International Treaty of 1920 concerning defense of the island group should be decided as a part of a universal arrangement by post war world organizations.⁵³

In October 1951, the Soviet government officially protested Norway's participation in NATO's joint command arrangement, claiming that the Atlantic command was authorized to take such military measures in the areas around the

⁵²Earl F. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940-1945, (Washington: Department of the Army, 1959), pp. 235-268.

⁵³Ronald G. Popperwell, Norway, (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1972), p. 181.

archipelago as would constitute a violation of Article 9 of the Svalbard Treaty. The Norwegian government rejected the protest, emphasizing that no military fortifications would be permitted on Spitsbergen or Bear Island. A more recent press report in The New York Times in 1974 indicated that the Soviets were again pressuring the Norwegian government for a bilateral arrangement in control of the Svalbard group.⁵⁴

⁵⁴"Oslo Expects Soviets to Ask Joint Spitsbergen Rule," The New York Times, 6 October 1974, p. 10.

IV. SECURITY PROBLEMS AND ISSUES IN THE 1970's

A. SVALBARD

Although relations between the Norwegians and Soviets on Svalbard have always been peaceable, the Soviet government uses every possible excuse to protest Norwegian actions or challenge Norwegian authority. No local government existed on Svalbard until 1971. Since it was established, new attempts have been made to control administrative details locally and provide more services that had previously been provided by the Norwegian coal company. The local governor frequently has to remind the Soviets that he alone is responsible for administering the islands. Although the Soviets on Svalbard are subject to the same income tax as the Norwegians, they refuse to supply a list of residents eligible to be taxed, paying the tax for the entire group in one lump sum.⁵⁵

The Norwegian government has frequently reminded the Soviet government that Norway has complete sovereignty over Svalbard and will administer it as properly authorized by the treaty. The Soviets have resented even the minimal steps insisted on by the Norwegians as incidental to sovereignty including:

Regular safety inspections of the mines, which the Norwegians are specifically required to undertake by the treaty, and of oil-drilling operations.

⁵⁵ Apple, "Soviet and Norway Spar," p. 2.

Action against illegal hunting.
Measure to protect the environment.
Air traffic control.
Control of the use of radio transmitters.⁵⁶

The longest lasting dispute continued for almost twenty years concerning the building of an airport for year round transportation from Norway. As early as 1956, plans were discussed by the government in Oslo to build a civilian airstrip. The Soviets protested that the airfield would be yet another link in the chain of NATO airfields. These protests delayed the project for fifteen years. Finally in 1973, the Norwegian government approved construction of an airfield, informing all parties of the treaty concerning the decision to build.⁵⁷ Demands by the Soviet Union for a major representation in the administration and operations of the airfield were rejected by the Norwegian government. In March 1974, the two countries finally reached an agreement "permitting Norway to build an all-year airport on West Spitsbergen (for civil use only). . . The agreement also enables Soviet aircraft to utilize the Norwegian state-owned airport."⁵⁸

The permanent airport was opened in August 1975 as part of a celebration emphasizing the 50th anniversary of "full and unlimited sovereignty" over the archipelago.

⁵⁶"Norway. The Next Richest Nation.", p. 22.

⁵⁷Holst, Five Roads, pp. 110-111.

⁵⁸"Soviet-Norwegian Spitsbergen Agreement," Norway, Deadline Data on World Affairs, 7 March 1974, p. 29.

The opening of the airport began a new area of conflict with the Soviets. The new airport allowed a monthly landing from Aeroflot, the Soviet airline. Although there was only one Aeroflot flight a month, the Soviets insisted on a significant staff, permanently settled at the airport site. When a planeload of "wives of the staff" arrived (along with a load of twin beds), the governor of Svalbard objected, finally compromising on a total staff of six to handle the monthly Aeroflot flight.⁵⁹ Thus the apparent Soviet attempt at increased airport control was ended.

In November 1976, the Oslo Arbeiderbladet ran an interview with Svalbard District Governor Leif Eldering which discussed the Soviet helicopter base at Cape Heer on Spitsbergen. Eldering stated that after several inspections he could determine that it was not a military base, but questioned the need for the extremely large helicopters the Soviets had stationed on the base. In addition, the Russians had not requested licenses for the new helicopters, permission to build a landing site, or flight clearance for the helicopters. All of these requirements were clearly laid down in the 1973 air traffic regulations. The Soviets had licensed and requested clearance for the original smaller helicopters, which had been replaced.⁶⁰

⁵⁹"Keeping the Cold War on Ice," Manchester Guardian, 28 May 1978, p. 9.

⁶⁰"Svalbard Official: No Military Base at Cape Heer," Arbeiderbladet (Oslo), 9 November 1976, p. 13, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Western Europe, 11 November 1976, p. P1.

Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund has commented on Norwegian policy on Svalbard and Norwegian-Soviet disagreements on several occasions. In an address to the Norwegian parliament he said, "On Svalbard, clear, correct and effective exercise of sovereignty on the basis of the treaty is the main feature of the government's policy."⁶¹

In a new year interview for the Norwegian Telegraph Bureau, Foreign Minister Frydenlund described Norwegian-Soviet relations on Svalbard, "The unresolved problems on Svalbard in relation to the Soviet Union apply to administrative questions.... The Russians disagree with us on issues concerning conservation, safety while drilling for oil, air traffic and other regulations."⁶²

In September 1977, Foreign Minister Frydenlund formally protested Soviet actions on Svalbard to Soviet Ambassador to Oslo, Kirichenko. One of the five large helicopters (capable of carrying 30 passengers) crashed on the south point of Spitsbergen. It was first sighted by the Norwegians when a research surveying team spotted the wreckage. The cabin section was intact, but the main rotor had been torn loose and the tail was destroyed. The Norwegians were initially irritated since the flight had not been coordinated

⁶¹"Frydenlund Presents Foreign Policy Review," Arbeiderbladet (Oslo), 14 December 1976, p. 17, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Western Europe, 11 November 1976, p. Pl.

⁶²"Foreign Minister Hits 'Stagnant' Detente," Aftenposten (Oslo), 4 January 1977, p. 4, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Western Europe, 10 January 1977, p. Pl-2.

with air traffic controllers, and the crash was not reported to the district governor as required by air traffic law. The crash had occurred one or two weeks before it was discovered, and the crash site had been cleaned up, also illegal under the air traffic law. The diplomatic protest was made after the Soviets removed the wreckage from the crash site, before civil aviation inspectors could inspect it. This action violated both Norwegian and international laws.

The Soviets claimed that no one was killed in the crash and that it was a forced landing, not a crash. The announced mission of the aircraft was to survey glaciers with a group of Soviet scientists on board.⁶³

In April 1978, the Soviets again violated Norwegian regulations with their helicopters. Two Soviet helicopters flew into the southern Spitsbergen National Park and removed a jeep from an abandoned research station. No permission had been granted to fly into the national park, and the removal of equipment from the park was also illegal. An editorial in the Oslo Aftenposten stated, "It looks as if the Soviet Union is deliberately trying to undermine Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard. It is obvious that this is a stance which is not liable to create a better relationship between two neighbors."⁶⁴

⁶³"Soviet Helicopter Wreckage Found on Spitsbergen," Aftenposten (Oslo), 18 August 1977, p. 4, translated in FBIS, Western Europe, 23 August 1977, p. P1.

⁶⁴"Russians Remove Downed Helicopter Wreckage on Svalbard," Arbeiderbladet (Oslo), 7 September 1977, p. 6, translated in FBIS, Western Europe, 16 September 1977, p. P2.

In August 1978, the Norwegians discovered that the Soviets had set up a radar with a range in excess of 100 kilometers for monitoring aircraft flights. The Soviets claimed they needed the radar for use with their helicopters to provide instrument flying capabilities. Once again the law was broken. Permission to set up the radar station had not been requested as required by law. The Norwegian authorities increased their surveillance to determine if military activities were being conducted on Svalbard, in clear violation of international treaty and Norwegian sovereignty.⁶⁵

On the 4th of September 1978, another Soviet aircraft crash was reported. This time a military plane crashed on Svalbard (on the small island of Hopen) killing all seven Soviet passengers. The crash site was found first by Norwegians; therefore, all the necessary regulations were followed. A Soviet ship in the area arrived near the crash site after a Norwegian Navy ship, consequently the scene was investigated carefully before the Soviets could remove the wreckage. The Soviet Union then sent an investigator to observe the investigation and all diplomatic courtesies were exchanged. If the Norwegians had not found the wreckage, no doubt the Soviet ship would have cleaned up the site of the crash without notifying Norwegian authorities, once again violating international laws.⁶⁶

⁶⁵Sovjet Har Satt Opp Radar Pa Svalbard, Ukens Nytt, 1 September 1978, p. 7.

⁶⁶Ukens Nytt, 4 September 1978, p. 1 and Nytt Fra Norge, 5 September 1978, p. 1.

The controversy over the crash continued through September and October 1978. The Norwegians claimed the right to investigate and took the flight recorder (Black box) for examination to determine the cause of the crash. The Soviets were extremely disturbed since the aircraft was military and the tape contained its flight information for at least one days missions. The Norwegian officials stood fast and even requested assistance from outside aircraft accident investigation agencies for assistance. They also offered the Soviets the right to send a representative to observe the investigation. The Soviet Ambassador responded with another protest and by cancelling several planned Soviet governmental visits.

The Soviet Union has also protested Norwegian activities claiming that military actions had taken place on Svalbard, violating the 1920 treaty. In 1965, when a space telemetry station for the European Space Research Organization (ESRO) was erected on Spitsbergen, the Soviets immediately protested, stating that Svalbard would be exploited for military uses, threatening security of the Soviets on the Kola Peninsula. The Norwegians disagreed with this interpretation, ignored the protest and completed the ESRO station.⁶⁷

More recently, the Soviets have protested military ships from Norway making annual visits to Spitsbergen. In answering these charges, Defense Undersecretary Johan Jørgen Holst stated in the Aftenposten,

⁶⁷Holst, Five Roads, pp. 110-111.

The annual naval cruise is part of the normal exercise of sovereignty and does not conflict with the Svalbard Treaty. It is correct that we have had an annual cruise--so-called cadet cruises--with one Norwegian ship which calls at Svalbard as part of the normal exercise of sovereignty which Norway has carried out on Svalbard throughout the period of the treaty.

Holst went on to explain that the cadet cruises were not in violation of the treaty's ninth article which prohibits the fortification of Svalbard in case of war.⁶⁸

The Soviet actions on the Svalbard archipelago are clearly an effort to gain more control over the island group and/or to undermine the authority of the Norwegians. Through a constant process of shouldering the Norwegians, the Soviets hope to eventually push and find no resistance. The Norwegian government must be constantly alert for Soviet violations in order to maintain the sovereignty given them under the 1920 Treaty of Paris.

B. OIL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Political pressures between the Soviet Union and Norway have not been limited to the Svalbard archipelago. Discovery of oil and gas in the North Sea promoted interest all along the Norwegian coast. Studies of the ocean floor resulted in predictions of tremendous fields of oil and natural gas in the Norwegian and Barents Seas. These predictions raised questions as to the sovereignty of the continental shelf.

⁶⁸"Officials Reject Soviet Criticism of Use of Svalbard," Aftenposten (Oslo), 8 August 1977, p. 4, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Western Europe, 12 August 1977, p. P1-3.

The Norwegian position is based on the argument that the Svalbard archipelago doesn't have its own continental shelf, but rather that the whole area is an extension of the continental shelf off northern Norway. They therefore claim sovereignty over the entire ocean floor between the north coast and the northern limit of Svalbard's territorial limits.

The rights over territorial waters and ocean floors was not determined in the 1920 Treaty of Paris. In fact, a universal definition of undersea territorial sovereignty has not been agreed upon throughout the world.⁶⁹ This situation leaves the territorial waters surrounding Svalbard in question. The rights to the economic exploitation of natural resources on the archipelago is guaranteed to all signatories who obey the Norwegian laws. If the shelf in the area of the islands is considered sovereign to the islands, then the signatories would also have the right to exploitation of the ocean floor's resources. If, as the Norwegians claim, the ocean floor is an extension of their coastal shelf and continuous to a point North of Spitsbergen, then the Norwegians have economic rights to the entire shelf.

In order to determine the boundary between them, the Soviet Union and Norway began talks in 1974 to delimit the continental shelf in the Barents Sea. The Norwegians have proposed that a median line be determined, similar to the agreements reached in the North Sea. This argument is

⁶⁹Loran W. Gierhart, "Offshore Oil and Northern Europe: A Troubled Mix," (Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, April 1976), pp. 63-64.




Figure 8: Map of Disputed Area

supported by the provisions of the 1958 Geneva Convention on law of the sea and has precedence in the case of the North Sea. Interestingly enough, the Norwegians did not sign the 1958 Geneva Convention, but by Royal Decree in 1970, established baselines to be used in the demarcation of the territorial sea for a major portion of Svalbard.⁷⁰

The Soviet proposal is based on the division of Antarctica and calls for delimitation of Arctic sectors running south from the North Pole. The disputed area between the two methods of delimitation amounts to nearly 60,000 square miles. Formal negotiations between the two nations began in November 1974, but little has been accomplished in reaching any type of settlement.

The present status of Law of the Sea conferences greatly affects the outcome of any decision regarding the delimitation and continental shelf right in the Barents Sea. Although anxious to reach a delimitation agreement with the Soviet Union, Norway has not reached a final decision with respect to the continental shelf extending north from Finnmark, all the way to the northern extent of the shelf in the Svalbard area. Formally establishing a firm policy before the negotiations have been concluded at the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference would result in the adoption of a policy that would be unfavorable with respect to conference decisions. Of extreme importance is the agreement by an

⁷⁰Finn Sollie, "New Territories and New Problems in Norwegian Foreign and Security Policy," Cooperation and Conflict 2/3, 1974, p. 148.

international body of definitions for the terms "continental shelf" and the "Exclusive Economic Zone."

The continental shelf, for example, could be determined to be that portion of the shelf of a fixed depth of less than 300 meters. Norway has troughs both in the Norwegian and North Seas and in the Barents Sea which would be of a greater depth and result in the loss of area presently claimed. If a fixed distance (width) were adopted as the method of determination, 200 nautical miles would be likely, and part of the present Norwegian claim would be beyond the set criteria.

Ongoing Law of the Sea Conferences have done little to clear this situation. Presently, the Law of the Sea, the Geneva Convention of 1958, is the only method of determining claims, and it has been broken already. Since 1967, attempts have been made to work out new agreements, but nothing concrete has resulted. The long sessions at the Caracas Law of the Sea Conference in 1974 and Geneva Conference in 1975, resulted in little agreement among participants.

In examining this situation it is clear that either of the possibilities mentioned would be unacceptable to Norwegian desires. In either case, the claim to Svalbard's continental shelf as an extension of the Northern Norwegian continental shelf would be seriously weakened.⁷¹

⁷¹For a more thorough examination of Law of the Sea matters, several references are recommended: Christopher Bertram and Johan Jørgen Holst, eds., New Strategic Factors in the North Atlantic, Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1977; William E. Butler, The Soviet Union and the Law of the Sea, Baltimore, the John Hopkins Press, 1971; S. Houston Lay, Robin Churchill and Myron Nordquist, eds., New Directions in the Law of the Sea, Documents--Vol. 1, Dobbs Ferry, New York, Oceana Publications Inc., 1973.

From a Soviet viewpoint, the delimitation of the Barents Sea and the continental shelf could present a threat to freedom of movement if not to security of the Kola Peninsula. The importance of the bases on the Kola Peninsula has already been mentioned, but the importance of the Barents Sea deserves a more detailed discussion.

The Barents Sea is the Soviet Union's route to the North Atlantic: the major route for the world's largest concentration of submarines and the only route for the surface vessels of the Soviet Northern Fleet. Further restricted by winter ice, the normal passage during the cold months of the year is decreased to a width of 215 nautical miles or approximately the gap between Finnmark and Bear Island.

Clearly, the Soviets are in no hurry to decide the issue of delimitation. At the present time, they do not need the oil believed to be beneath the continental shelf. In fact, they probably do not possess the necessary equipment or technology necessary to take advantage of the oil in the area. More important to the Soviet Union is the possibility of oil companies setting up offshore oil rigs in the Barents Sea between Finnmark and Bear Island and further limiting the access of the Soviet Navy to the Atlantic.⁷²

The Soviets fear that foreign countries may use the offshore rigs as a means of monitoring the location and movement of Soviet naval forces including submarines operating submerged. In spite of the Norwegian caution of allowing

⁷²Gierhart, p. 64.

foreigners in the Finnmark area, and the slim chance that any foreign firm would be allowed to drill for oil in the area, the Soviets distrust the Norwegians just as much and would fear NATO's use of offshore rigs as monitoring stations for Soviet Naval Forces. Meanwhile, until the rights to the ocean floor are settled, the Norwegians have prohibited all drilling activity north of the 62 parallel. Only on Spitsbergen have test wells been drilled, so far without success. Both the Norwegians and the Soviets have conducted drilling tests on Svalbard.

C. SOVIET MILITARY EXERCISES

In 1974, the first talks began between the Soviet Union and the Norwegians over possible delimitation of the continental shelf. Within a year, the Soviets were involved in a new method of gaining the attention of the Norwegians and NATO. The Soviets decided to test several missiles and the target they announced was the disputed area in the delimitation talks.⁷³

On 11 September 1975, the Soviet Union announced the missile tests which would take place from 16 September until 27 September 1975. The missile tests were the latest in a series of military demonstrations designed to impress the Norwegians with Soviet military might.

Beyond this military demonstration lies the possible political pressure the tests will exert on Norway.

⁷³"Soviet Missile Tests Set for Barents Sea," New York Times, 12 September 1975, p. 4.

The Soviet Union is about to negotiate with Norway over national boundaries on the continental shelf in the Barents Sea south of Spitsbergen.⁷⁴

NATO intelligence analysts considered the tests important for several reasons. The missile tests will provide excellent information about the type and reliability of missiles surrounding the huge naval base on the Kola Peninsula. These tests also marked the first time that Soviet missiles were fired in a major test outside the Pacific area. In addition, these tests were obviously designed to announce to the world a new capability for the Soviet Union. The official Soviet explanation was that the tests were only a method of clearing silos in Siberia.⁷⁵

The missile tests followed the largest of semi-annual Soviet Navy exercises in which all four fleets took part in one giant operation. OKEAN 1975, as the exercise was called, was obviously planned to demonstrate the Soviet Navy's ability to operate on a worldwide basis. OKEAN 1975 marked the first exercise in which convoys of merchantmen were used. In addition, much more attention was paid to antisubmarine operations. Secretary of the Navy J. William Middendorf noted the "disturbing fact" that the Soviet Navy today, "has twice the number of major surface combatants and submarines as the United States Navy."⁷⁶

⁷⁴Drew Middleton, "Soviet Testing Missiles in Barents Sea," New York Times, 17 September 1975, p. 4.

⁷⁵Drew Middleton, "Military Strategy of New Importance in North Norway Near Soviet," New York Times, 20 June 1977, p. 14.

⁷⁶"Vast Soviet Naval Exercise Raises Urgent Questions for West," New York Times, 28 April 1975, p. 6.

Other Soviet naval exercises have increased in size and scope in recent years. One of the most significant took place in April 1977, when the Soviets sent 89 submarines into the Atlantic at one time. (The Soviets normally keep seven or eight submarines in the Atlantic.) This submarine exercise was accompanied by "a large force of surface warships including the new aircraft carrier Kiev."⁷⁷ This exercise was also accompanied at times by the newest Soviet supersonic bombers, "Backfires", which flew over the maneuvers, operating out of the Murmansk area.

In the most recent exercises the Soviets have also practiced amphibious landings on the Kola Peninsula, utilizing troops that are based there. These exercises greatly concern the Norwegians since most scenarios for a Soviet invasion of Norway call for a combination land attack and amphibious assault with airborne assistance.

Perhaps the most disturbing exercise for the Norwegians took place in June of 1968, when the Norwegian border guards and border workers woke to find a Soviet division deployed right next to the border in northern Norway. This display of force occurred just before the invasion of Czechoslovakia and is thought to have been connected to it. The totally unexpected action by the Soviets triggered a change in Norwegian public opinion which will be discussed in the next chapter.

⁷⁷"Soviet Sent 89 Subs Into Atlantic," New York Times, 29 July 1977, p. A4.

D. THE "GRAY ZONE"

Although no agreement has been reached in the delimitation talks between the Soviet Union and Norway, separate talks concerning fishing in the Barents Sea finally produced results in May 1977. A proposal by the Norwegian Law of the Sea Minister Jens Evensen was accepted by the Soviets and temporarily solved the fishing limit negotiations. Mr. Evensen's proposal consisted of drawing a line around the fishing banks without using a sector line or a median line.⁷⁸

On 2 July 1977, the protocol signed by the Norwegians and Soviets concerning fishing rights was released to the press. Provisions were made to allow both countries to fish in the "gray zone" without interfering with each other. The protocol was temporary, but provided the break needed to allow both countries fishing industries to take advantage of the Barents Sea. The protocol also provided for the licensing of other countries by both the Soviets and the Norwegians.⁷⁹

However, in August 1978, the Soviets turned two British fishing trawlers away from the "gray zone." Both trawlers had been licensed by the Norwegians under the agreement of 1977.⁸⁰ New talks concerning the "gray zone" were scheduled

⁷⁸"Minister Proposes New Fishing Demarkation to Soviets," Arbeiderbladet (Oslo) 18 May 1977, p. 2, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Western Europe, 24 May 1977, p. P1.

⁷⁹"Fisheries Agreement Protocol with Soviets Published," Aftenposten (Oslo) 2 July 1977, p. 4, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Western Europe, 12 July 1977.

⁸⁰"British Trawlers Turned Back by Soviets," Aftenposten (Oslo) 24 August 1978, p. 4, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Western Europe, 6 September 1978, p. P3-4.




Figure 9: Map of Arctic Claims

in the near future and this incident appeared to be another example of muscle flexing by the Soviets.

E. TERRITORIAL WATERS

Other recent actions by the Soviets in the Barents Sea have the Norwegians concerned and confused. International law allows the Soviet merchant ships to pass through Norwegian territorial waters but does not allow them to stop. In the thirty-three years since the end of World War II, seven incidents had taken place in violation of this law—until 27 June 1978. Between 27 June and 4 August 1978, eight violations occurred on the Norwegian northern cape causing alarm among the Norwegian people.⁸¹

Several excuses were given by the Soviets for these actions. In one case, a tugboat and three smaller vessels anchored off the Nordhyn Peninsula claiming they were seeking shelter from bad weather. The Seas were calm at the time and when gunboats were dispatched, the four boats left.

An oceanographic vessel requested permission to enter territorial waters complaining of engine problems and a leak. Norwegian naval personnel went onboard and found no water or difficulty, but a large amount of electrical equipment. Once out of territorial waters the boat turned on the speed and disappeared. Other similar incidents began occurring repeatedly. Finally one ship's captain was fined before being released.⁸²

⁸¹R.W. Apple, Jr., "Mysterious Soviet Ship Movements Worry and Puzzle Norwegians," New York Times, 4 August 1978, p. A2.

⁸²"Nautical Cat and Mouse," Time, 7 August 1978, p. 48.

All of these incidents add up to some type of surveillance of the Norwegian coastline, but the Norwegians couldn't understand the sudden increase in an area where such incidents have never been a problem before. Fishermen who observed one of the boats described some type of pod device that hung off the bow into the sea. The vessel was also flying flags indicating a message to "keep away, I am carrying out an exercise."⁸³

Several theories exist to explain the sudden number of violations. The Soviets could have been attempting to improve their eavesdropping capability or repairing what they already had. Another theory indicated that this series of incidents could have been aimed at improving the air defense weakness that allowed the Korean Airliner to penetrate Soviet airspace for almost 30 minutes before being challenged.

This particular incident took place when a South Korean passenger airliner crossing the polar cap suddenly made a wrong turn and violated Soviet airspace in the Murmansk region. NATO air defense personnel could not understand at the time what had happened, or why the Soviets were so slow to respond. The Korean airliner was finally shot at and hit by Soviet interceptors, forcing it to land on a frozen lake bed.

In another related note, Norwegian defense chief General

⁸³"More Reports, Reaction on USSR Ship Movements, Violations," Aftenposten (Oslo), 25 July 1978, p. 4, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Western Europe, 31 July 1978, p. P1-2.

Sverre Hamre told the Oslo Aftenposten, "We noticed particularly that the Soviet Russians have replaced one entire air force wing with more modern hardware. . .with approximately three times the range of previous planes."⁸⁴ He went on to mention that the change was perhaps an increase in readiness following the South Korean passenger plane incident.

⁸⁴"Soviet Union Replacing Air Forces on Kola," Aftenposten (Oslo), 25 July 1978, p. 4, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Western Europe, 15 June 1978, p. P-2

V. NORWEGIAN PUBLIC OPINION AND POLITICAL REACTION

The previous discussion has provided the background of Norwegian Nordic ties and the history of increasing Soviet pressure on Norway. In order to show their effect on Norwegian public opinion and politics, three areas will be discussed. The EEC referendum of 1972 has often been misinterpreted as an indication that Norway is withdrawing from European alliances. Therefore, this referendum is discussed in detail to clearly indicate that the results were not related to public support of NATO. The national election of 1973 is discussed relating its results to the EEC referendum and not to NATO. Finally, the results of polls indicating support for NATO are provided to demonstrate Norway's increasing public support which should not be linked to other issues.

A. THE EEC REFERENDUM OF 1972

The Norwegian constitution does not provide for public referendums on controversial issues, but occasionally such issues are handled by public referendum. The EEC debate was one such issue.

Norway's entry into the Common Market had been debated since 1962, increasing each year and finally dominating Norwegian politics in 1972, just prior to the referendum. Norwegians were not voting on whether or not to remain isolated from the European Economic Community, since few supported such a position. The referendum was a "yes" or

"no" vote to membership in the Common Market.⁸⁵

The individual issues debated throughout the country fell into major categories, which were of changing importance during the period 1967-72. These categories were:

1. The international considerations of the EEC, particularly those arguments pertaining to the need for world cooperation.
2. The internal structure of the EEC and the possibilities of it becoming a political union, also questions concerning its governing body.
3. The effect of membership on Norwegian foreign policy and possible influence Norway would have in the decisions of the EEC.
4. The effect on Norwegian internal policies relating to Socialism or social and welfare policies.
5. The possibility of EEC membership reducing Norwegian sovereignty.
6. The degree to which the Norwegian national economy, particularly individual sectors such as fishing and agriculture, could be changed by EEC membership.
7. The effect on Norwegian cultural characteristics from a closer relationship with other, predominantly Catholic, European nations.
8. The question of legality of joining the EEC under the present Norwegian constitution.

⁸⁵In May 1973, a free-trade agreement was subsequently negotiated with the EEC, providing economic benefits without membership.

9. The thoroughness of the government study of the entire EEC membership issue.

The entire question was complicated by the problems of party affiliation, occupation, region, age and urban environment. The issue cut so strongly through party lines that the parties remained fragmented until after the next national election in 1973. The polls indicated that after January, 1972 public opinion remained fairly constant.




Figure 1. Intend to Vote No, Percentage of Those Who Took a Position.

Sources: FAKTA's and Gallup's polls for the period September 1971–December 1972. The question asked has not been identical over the whole period, but has always referred to a dichotomous choice between yes and no to full membership. The size of the 'uncertain' category (including refusals, those who do not intend to vote, and those who have not yet made up their mind) has varied considerably, partly due to slight changes in interviewing technique. For FAKTA the percentages of uncertain respondents were: 41, 41, 39, 39, 34, 37, 34, 36, 17, 20, 15, 15, 13, 14. For Gallup: 27, 24, 27, 28, 21, 23, 27, 27, 24, 19, 21, 21, 12, 8, 5, 8. The January 1972 Gallup result may have been influenced by a biased (pro-EEC) question preceding it in the interview schedule. The April 1972 FAKTA figure is the arithmetic mean of two questions biased in opposite directions.

Figure 10

Source: Scandinavian Political Studies, vol, 8/73, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1973), p. 227

Figure 10, however, does not reflect the percentage of those who took no position. The government believed that membership would be accepted by a slight margin.

The results of the referendum showed 46.5% voting "Yes" and 53.5% voting "No." The polls were obviously quite accurate; voter turnout for the referendum was light by Norwegian standards, 79.3%, compared with 83.8% in the 1969 national election. The results indicate that those with no opinion in the polls reflected their position by not voting. In order to show voting preferences in relation to other categories a number of tables are presented.

Table 1. Percentage of Votes Cast in Favor of Full EEC Membership by Region

Oslofjord area	Interior East	South and West	Middle (Trøndelag)	North
59.4	44.6	41.8	38.9	28.3

Source: Public electoral statistics of the 1972 referendum.

Table 1

Source: Henry Valen, "Norway: 'No' to EEC." Scandinavian Political Studies, vol. 8/73, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1973), p. 216.

The heaviest opposition came from sparsely populated fishing and agricultural communities along the coast. The largest "Yes" vote was from urbanized communities as indicated in Tables 1 and 2.

Table II. Percentage of Votes Cast in Favor of EEC Membership by Region and Urbanization

Type of commune	Region			Diff. (1 - 3)
	1 East	2 South and West	3 Central and North	
1. Densely populated*	52.7	51.6	40.7	12
2. Sparsely populated	39.8	29.3	25.7	14.1
Diff. (1 - 2)	12.9	22.3	15.0	

* At least half of the population living in agglomerations.

Source: Public electoral statistics 1972.

Table 2

Source: Valen, p. 216

Table III. EEC Vote and Occupation
(Entries indicate percent voting 'yes.'* Figures in parentheses indicate the total number of voters in each category)

Occupation			
Manual workers	Salaried employees	Independents in business, including independent professionals	Farmers and fishermen
40 (592)	59 (601)	58 (147)	17 (128)

* Non-voters (8 percent of the sample) are excluded.

Table 3

Source: Valen, p. 217.

Tables 3-7 were constructed utilizing polls, figures in parenthesis indicate the number of voters questioned. The rural occupations along the coast are clearly reflected as the heavies opposition to EEC membership, as reflected in Table 3. Although the majority of manual laborers opposed membership, their "Yes" vote was significantly higher and placed them directly between the business men and rural voters. Similarly in Table 4, the rural community providing

products or those supporting the position of the farmers and fishermen, were more likely to oppose membership than those who disagreed with the statement, "To secure equality between different branches of the economy, farmers and fishermen ought to get far higher prices for their products."⁸⁶

Table IV. EEC Vote and Urban-Rural Position ('Prices ought to be higher'). (Percentage voting 'yes.' Non-voters excluded. Figures in parentheses indicate total number of voters in each category)

Absolutely disagree						100 % agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
72 (191)	66 (112)	66 (108)	52 (330)	47 (172)	28 (146)	25 (264)
Urban						Rural

Table 4

Source: Valen, p. 218.

Table V. EEC Vote and Left-Right Position (Percentage voting 'yes.' Non-voters excluded)

Left					Right
1	2	3	4	5	6
37 (266)	34 (267)	42 (219)	53 (249)	66 (163)	78 (116)

Table 5

Source: Valen, p. 218.

When asked questions determining liberal-conservative political attitudes and placed on a scale of 1-6, the voters comparative EEC stance is not as varied as expected. The

⁸⁶Henry Valen, "Norway: 'No' to EEC," Scandinavian Political Studies, vol. 8/73, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1973), p. 226.

placement, however, was defined more in terms of government control of business than in support of political party.

Table VI. EEC Vote and Background in Cultural Movements (Percentage voting 'yes.' Non-voters excluded. Figures in parentheses indicate total number of voters in each category)

Religious lay movement:

Members	Non-members
38 (127)	48 (1333)

Temperance attitude:

Teetotaler, active	Teetotaler, inactive	Non-teetotaler, inactive	Non-teetotaler active
31 (160)	47 (55)	43 (783)	60 (449)

Language preference:

Nynorsk, active	Nynorsk, inactive	Riksmål, inactive	Riksmål, active
21 (86)	36 (94)	45 (706)	55 (575)

Table 6

Source: Valen, p. 219.

Table 6 reflects EEC voting in comparison with cultural movements. The table reflects that membership in cultural movements tends to increase the likelihood of opposition to EEC membership. The religious movement members do not show as strong a relationship, but 10% difference in voting preference is still significant.

Norwegian society is strictly divided on policies concerning alcohol. Penalties for breaking laws concerning alcohol (example: driving while intoxicated) are severe, and the relationship shown here reflects not only personal

drinking habits, but attitudes towards alcohol policies (i.e. active/inactive). Strict non-drinkers were decidedly opposed to EEC membership, while active drinkers were twice as likely to vote in favor.

The language preference concerns the use of the more colloquial nynorsk as opposed to the literary riksmål. Again, the rural-urban differences show since nynorsk is more popular in the rural and coastal areas, the relationship between nynorsk and EEC opposition is not surprising.

The relationship of EEC support to political party requires explanation of the parties. Important to remember is the fact that the parties were not particularly active in the referendum since national and local elections were not involved. This lack of involvement perhaps allowed for the change of attitudes of many party members following the referendum.

Parties existing during the EEC debate included:

1. Labor (A)—moderate since the 1920's, advocating gradual reforms leading to a socialist state; formed all governments between 1935 and 1965 except for a brief period in 1963.
2. Conservative (H)—supports free enterprise and close ties with the west.
3. Liberal (V)—against socialism but supporting the welfare state through gradual reforms.
4. Christian People's (KrF)—supports Christian principles and social legislation; supports NATO.

5. Center (S)—formerly Agrarian party, represents rural interests; strongly supports NATO.
6. Socialist People's (SF)—neutralist, formed after expulsion from Labor party as an extreme leftist group in 1961; oppose NATO and advocate nonalignment.
7. Norwegian Communist (NKP)—ideology along party line from Moscow; unable to gain any popular support

Party preference is indicated in Table 7, with the parties arranged from left to right as they are considered in the political spectrum. The relationship of support for EEC membership to party preference does not fall in line with party expectations. The factor of deviation has been determined as 18% of party members who deviated from their party's position, i.e. felt that another party's view came closer to their personal preference in the referendum.

Table VII. EEC Vote and Party Preference. (Percentage voting 'yes.' Non-voters excluded. Figures in parentheses indicate total number of voters in each category)*

Party preference								
Communist	Socialist People's	Labor	Liberal	Christian People's	Center	Conservative	No party indicated	Total
6 (17)	2 (94)	65 (485)	42 (88)	18 (91)	5 (198)	90 (264)	33 (231)	47 (1468)

* Question on party preference: 'Let us assume elections should be arranged tomorrow. Which party would you vote for?'

Table 7

Source: Valen, p. 221.

Other factors are involved in the government's failure to predict the outcome of the referendum: 1) In polls of Parliament members, 75% supported membership, accurately

reflecting the urban, business vote, but not necessarily their regions. 2) A clearly defined choice in an election with important consequences, usually produces a very high voter turnout. In the EEC referendum, the urban area voter turnout percentage was only 3.2% better than rural areas compared with a normal gap of 9.5%. 3) Interest in the outcome of the referendum appeared to be higher in the rural areas.

Finally, in post-referendum polls, the majority in all polls favored entry. Excluding the undecided, the results in October 1972 were 55/45 in favor and by June 1973 were 57/43.⁸⁷ As a result of the referendum, the Premier and his Cabinet announced they would resign and did on 6 October 1972. As previously mentioned, the confusion in political party affiliation lasted until the following national election.

B. THE NATIONAL ELECTION OF 1973

The election of 1973 provided very interesting results and the formation of two new parties as well as a new alliance:

1. New People's (DNF)—the Liberal split over the referendum results, with the pro-EEC members forming a new party and claiming the true Liberal (Venstre) tradition.
2. Ander Lange's (ALP)—voters frustrated by the government's inability to reduce taxes supported an old nationalist conservative who founded his own party against taxes, levies and government intervention.

⁸⁷Holst, Five Roads, p. 216.

3. The 'No' front from the liberal party broke off, formed a movement, the Worker's Information Committee (AIK), then merged with the Socialist People's (SF) and the Communist (NKP), forming the Socialist Electoral Alliance (SV); the first time a united left front had been formed in Norwegian politics.

Votes and Seats in the Storting Elections of 1969 and 1973

Party		Votes In Percent of All Cast			Seats		
1969	1973	1969	1973	Diff.	1969	1973	Diff.
	Marxists-Leninists	-	0.43	+0.43		-	
CP		1.04			-		
SF		3.50			-		
	SV	-	11.23	(+ 6.69)		16	(+ 16)
	LAB	46.53	35.29	- 11.24	74	62	- 12
V		9.38	(6.92)	(- 2.46)	13	(3)	(- 10)
	V	-	3.49			2	
	DNF	-	3.43			1	
	CHR	9.40	12.24	+ 2.84	14	20	+ 6
	AGR	10.53	11.03	+ 0.50	20	21	+ 1
	CONS	19.57	17.38	- 2.19	29	29	0
	ALP	-	5.01	+ 5.01	-	4	+ 4
	Other	0.05	0.47	+ 0.42			
Total Votes		2,162,596	2,152,204				
Turnout		83.8%	80.2%				
Seats					150	155	+ 5

Note: All votes for *joint lists* have been distributed among the parties in proportion to earlier results on separate lists.

Table 8

Source: Henry Valen and Stein Rokkan, "Norway: The Election to the Storting in September 1973," Scandinavian Political Studies, vol. 9/74, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1974), p. 207.

As a result of the election, the New People's Party won 1 seat, Anders Lange's Party (originally considered a joke) won 4 seats and the new alliance, the Socialist Electoral Alliance, won 16 seats. The major losses occurred in the Liberal Party which lost 11 seats (the DNF, split from the

Liberal, won only a single seat) and in the Labor Party, which lost 12 seats. Although the Labor Party suffered a major setback, together with the Socialist Electoral Alliance, it was able to gain a one seat majority in the Parliament and form a minority government.

SHIFTS IN PARTY SUPPORT, 1969-73, BY STAND ON EEC AT THE REFERENDUM
(in percentages of respondents)

1969	1973								Total	N
	Left-socialists	Labor party	Liberal party	New People's party	Christian party	Center party	Conservative party	Anders Lange's party		
1972 EEC Supporters										
Left-socialists										(9) ^a
Labor	3	92	b	1	b	0	2	2	100	(238)
Liberal	4	17	4	48	2	2	21	2	100	(48)
Christian	0	6	6	0	69	0	19	0	100	(16)
Center										(13) ^a
Conservative	2	4	0	2	2	1	82	7	100	(114)
1972 EEC Opponents										
Left-socialists	96	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	100	(26)
Labor	25	59	1	0	9	3	1	2	100	(193)
Liberal	3	5	40	5	15	22	8	2	100	(40)
Christian	0	0	0	3	90	7	0	0	100	(60)
Center	0	1	1	0	8	88	1	1	100	(128)
Conservative	7	4	4	2	4	32	39	7	100	(44)

^a Too few cases for computation of percentages.

^b Less than .05 percent.

Source: See footnote 4.

Table 9

Source: Karl H. Cerny, ed., Scandinavia at the Polls, (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977), p. 65.

Three major issues dominated the 1973 election:

1) taxation, 2) abortion and 3) the continuing question of Norway's relationship to the EEC. The taxation question allowed Anders Lange's Party to win 4 seats, but created minor losses in other parties. The abortion issue was a

moral-religious issue calling for the right to self-determined abortion. The opponents of this issue tended to be opponents of EEC membership from the rural community, resulting in losses to the Labor Party. The EEC issue created the major changes, since opponents of EEC tended to change parties, creating the major losses in the Labor and Liberal Parties and gains in the new alliance, and in the Christian and center parties. Table 9 indicates the shift in party support of EEC supporters and opponents.

The changes which occurred in the election of 1973 were interpreted by many as another example of the growing European shift towards the new Socialism (or even Eurocommunism). In the case of Norway, this simply was not true. In the 1977 national election, the Labor Party gained 14 seats, 2 more than it had lost in 1973; the Conservative Party gained 13 seats (remained the same in 1973) and the Christian People's Party gained 2 (gained 6 in 1973). The Center Party, which had gained 2 seats in 1973, lost 9 seats; the Socialist Electoral Alliance lost 15 of the 16 seats it had won in 1973; and the New People's Party and Anders Lange Party disappeared. The Labor Party again formed a minority government (with the coalition of the 2 Liberal Party seats they again controlled the Parliament by 1 seat). It is therefore possible to point out that, with the disappearance of the EEC issue, the political process in Norway returned to normal.

C. NATO SUPPORT

The results of the EEC referendum and the 1973 national election results were interpreted by many as indicating a change of national interests in Norway. Consequently, the question of continued support for NATO arose. The concern was unnecessary.

Polls conducted since Norway's entry into NATO have not always shown the strongest of support. In June 1949 public opinion polls indicated that 54% of Norwegians felt that membership in NATO increased Norway's security, with that segment of the population believing Norway's security to be decreased in the alliance, numbering 17%. A slightly different poll has been taken annually since 1965. In 1967, 49% thought NATO membership contributed to Norwegian security, while those who saw it as increasing the danger of attack numbered 12%, a peak in this poll. The mean figures between 1965 and 1973 were 58% and 9% respectively. By the end of 1972, the number supporting NATO membership had risen to 64%, 17% thought it made no difference, 13% didn't know, and only 6% saw membership in NATO as increasing the danger of attack.

This change in poll figures can be explained by actions in the world and in Europe which affected Norway either directly or indirectly. The involvement of the United States in Viet Nam was unpopular in Norway in the mid-1960's, just as it was in other parts of Europe and in the United States. This and a general drift toward relaxed military

readiness in Norway is reflected in the public opinion polls of 1967.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, together with actions on the Norwegian-Soviet border contributed greatly to the growth of Norwegian wariness towards their neighbor.

The Norwegians realize that the major objective of the Russian buildup is connected with its global strategy rather than being directed specifically against Norway, but they received a salutary shock during the Czechoslovakian crisis in 1968 when Soviet tanks took up positions within yards of the Norwegian border.⁸⁸

Perhaps this feeling is better reflected in a poll taken by the Institute of Social Research in Norway. The Institute asks whether Norway should remain a member of NATO. Eliminating those with no opinion, the 1965 poll showed 76% in favor of remaining and 24% for withdrawing. The figures for 1969 and 1972 were 81%/19% and 85%/15% respectively. The latest polls have found support percentage figures reaching the 90's. Norwegian Vice Admiral Oddmund P. Ahenes recently stated, "Public polls show that the Norwegian people look more favorably on defense and defense spending than they have in a very long time. There is great support for the government's defense policy."⁸⁹

In direct comparison with the issues of the EEC referendum and the 1973 election, Norwegian support for NATO never fell below 80%. One area of Norway which registered the strongest opposition to EEC membership, the coastal area, shows strong

.. "The Next Richest Nation," p. 23.

support for NATO membership. In the political arena, the Conservative Party provides the strongest support for NATO, and in the 1977 national election, won 12 new seats for a total of 41; this was the same election that saw the strongest anti-NATO parties lose every seat but two (a loss of 14). The Labor Party regained its previous seats, but still did not gain a majority, and a coalition government was necessary. The results show a shift away from the left, where gains in 1973 reflected national issues other than NATO support.

Party Representation in the Storting			
Party	1969	1973	1977
Labor	74	62	76
Socialist Left	0	16	2
Conservative	29	29	41
Center	20	21	12
Christian People's	14	20	22
Anders Lange	0	4	0
(Progressives in 1977)			
Liberal	13	2	2
New People's	0	1	0

TABLE 10

The question of Norwegian support for NATO is clearly a separate issue in national polls and elections, decided on its own merits and not tied to other national issues. No evidence exists that Norwegian support for NATO has declined, is declining or will show any decline in the future, particularly as long as the Soviets continue increasing pressure.

VI. CONCLUSION

An examination of Norway's position in the "Nordic Balance" has determined that all the reasons for Norway's initial entry into the alliance are still valid. The Norwegian experience of the Nazi occupation during World War II has instilled in the people of Norway a fierce determination never again to be occupied or dominated. As the neighbor of a powerful and, in recent years, aggressive nation founded on an opposing ideology, the Norwegians fully realize they are unable to defend their position without the assistance of strong, determined allies. An alliance of Nordic neighbors could not be satisfactorily organized, nor could it provide the necessary defense capability. Realizing the need for stronger Western allies, Norway entered the NATO alliance with qualifications in the form of policies designed to protect herself and her Nordic neighbors.

The "base policy" prevents foreign troops or nuclear arms from being stationed on Norwegian soil. This policy helps insure the independence of Finland from Soviet occupation and provides for the continued armed neutrality of Sweden. This "Nordic Balance" is a method for the Scandinavian countries to hold the Soviet Union from active aggression. In fact, the "base policy" allows Norway the opportunity for immediate political action in the event of Soviet aggression. For the same reason Norway prevents allied troops from

maneuvering, overflying or landing military ships east of the 24° line in northern Norway. To provide support for her allies, Norway annually trains NATO forces in Arctic warfare as well as amphibious landings on the jagged Norwegian coastline.

The close cooperation between Norway and the other Nordic nations should not be misunderstood. Norway's cultural and historical ties to the rest of Scandinavia allow Scandinavia to be the most integrated region of independent states in the world. Norway takes part in this "Nordic Unity" with the same cooperation and enthusiasm that is shown toward all international organizations promoting cooperation and peace on the earth.

In the post World War II era and, in particular, the last ten years, the Soviet Union has begun to exhibit more aggression towards Norway. As Anders C. Sjaastad, research associate of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs stated: "The Soviets have changed their stance; from a defensive to an offensive posture."⁹⁰ Although the major attention of NATO is directed to the central front of western Europe, increasing Soviet actions, centered around their naval build-up in the Kola Peninsula, have begun to attract greater attention. The (former) Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General Alexander M. Haig warns, "If you look at the current situation of strategic parity, it is evident that we are not going to be faced in the short term with a major onslaught across the eastern frontiers. We are going to be plagued by those ambiguous situations on the flanks."⁹¹ This perception

⁹⁰"Probing NATO's Northern Flank," Time, 27 June 1977, p. 24.

⁹¹Ibid.

emphasizes the Norwegian precarious position.

Perhaps the Soviets misinterpreted the recent political scene in Norway that has also been misunderstood by many Westerners. The results of the EEC referendum could have been seen as a refusal of further western alliances, rather than the strong nationalist reaction of rural and liberal groups who wanted self-determination in Norway's economic future. In addition, a misinterpretation of the 1973 national election results could have indicated a shift towards socialism (or Eurocommunism). However, close examination of the Norwegian political scene and in particular, the results of the 1977 national election, indicate that the 1972-73 political scene simply reflected a temporary dissatisfaction with individual political parties.

In the past ten years, the Soviets have maintained a constant stream of events, all designed to test Norway's determination and will. The continual challenging of Norwegian sovereignty on Svalbard, the military exercises growing in size and scope, the repetitive violation of Norwegian air space and four mile territorial waters, the refusal to negotiate a settlement on issues involving the continental shelf and the neverending protests over NATO participation, all clearly indicate a desire to test the resolve of the Norwegian people. By failing to understand Norwegian resolve, Soviet actions have been counterproductive, angering Norwegian citizens and resulting in a marked increase in national determination and an equal increase in dislike and distrust

of the Soviets. This national feeling has triggered new and stronger support for defense policies and spending as well as NATO membership.

A review of Norwegian national polls indicates continuing strong public support for NATO. Since the Soviet border demonstration in 1968, the Norwegian people have steadily increased support for NATO and for strong defense programs. Soviet activities on Svalbard, in the Barents Sea and on the Norwegian coast, have resulted in increased public awareness of the Soviet threat, and public support allows the Norwegian government to make use of a strong link with NATO as a signal to the Soviets of Norwegian independence.

Clearly, the increased Soviet pressure on Norway has been counterproductive. Norwegians have viewed Soviet actions toward Norway as a threat to Norway's security. The result is an increase in public support for continuing Norwegian NATO membership.

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