

AD-A084 904


NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA
CONFLICT AND COMMITMENT: THE CASE OF THE YEMENS, (U)
MAR 80 W F BARNS


F/0 5/4

UNCLASSIFIED

NL

1 of 2
AD
A084 904





MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS 1963-A

ADA 084904

LEVEL

(2) 54

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California



THESIS

CONFLICT & COMMITMENT: THE CASE OF THE YEMENS,

by

WILLIAM FLEMMING BARNES

March 1980

Thesis Advisor:

E. J. Laurance

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

DDC FILE COPY

251450
80 5 30 084

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
	AD A084904	
4. TITLE (and Subtitle)		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED
Conflict & Commitment: The Case of the Yemens		Master's Thesis; / March 1980
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s)		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
William Flemming Barns		
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS		12. REPORT DATE
Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		March 1980 /
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES
		170
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)
Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)		
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
Yemen Arab Republic (YAR); People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY); Political Relations; Soviet Arms Transfers; Security Assistance; Soviet/PRC/ US Presence in the Middle East		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
This thesis examines the relationship between the USSR and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen from a systemic aspect; the intent, to gauge the potential for the South Yemenis to undertake specific tactical operations in a Soviet-surrogate manner. This work analyzes the Soviet-Yemeni military export relationship. In making this assessment, the internal political dynamics with the effects of a colonial legacy and a repressive imamate-turned-		

DD FORM 1 JAN 73 1473
(Page 1)

EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE
S/N 0102-014-6601

1

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

republic in South and North Yemen respectively have been explored; the results of these predicated the Soviet involvement. This effort includes an assessment of Sino-Soviet competition there. Additionally, the United States' counter-commitment and arms transfers to the YAR (with the deployment of a naval carrier task force to the Arabian Sea in light of the March 1979 PDRY-YAR border war specifically) are analyzed.

A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE, DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

CONFLICT & COMMITMENT: THE CASE OF THE YEMENS

by

William Flemming Barns
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.A., University of Louisville, 1975


Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the


NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 1980

Author


William Flemming Barns

Approved by:


Prof. E.J. Laurance, Thesis Advisor


Prof. K.T. Said, Thesis Co-Advisor


Prof. P.J. Parker, Chairman,
Department of National Security
Affairs


Dean of Information and Policy Sciences

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the relationship between the USSR and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen from a systemic aspect; the intent, to gauge the potential for the South Yemenis to undertake specific tactical operations in a Soviet-surrogate manner. This work analyzes the Soviet-Yemeni military export relationship. In making this assessment, the internal political dynamics with the effects of a colonial legacy and a repressive imamate-turned-republic in South and North Yemen respectively have been explored; the results of these predicated the Soviet involvement. This effort includes an assessment of Sino-Soviet competition there. Additionally, the United States' counter-commitment and arms transfers to the YAR (with the deployment of a naval carrier task force to the Arabian Sea in light of the March 1979 PDRY-YAR border war specifically) are analyzed.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	8
II.	ARABIA FELIX--ARABIA DIVISUS	14
	A. THE BACKDROP	15
	B. THE BRITISH PRESENCE	18
	C. CHALLENGE TO TURKISH RULE	22
	D. THE REVOLUTION OF 1962	30
	E. THE PDRY & THE YAR: THE INDEPENDENT DECADE	42
	F. A COLONIAL LEGACY AND THE FORCE OF ISLAM: TWO CROSS-CUTTING FACTORS	49
III.	THE SOVIET PRESENCE	52
	A. ADEN & SANAA: MOSCOW'S LINK WITH THE HORN ..	52
	B. SOVIET ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE YEMEN	58
	C. MOSCOW & ADEN: RAPPORT THROUGH MILITARY EXPORTS	70
IV.	SINO-SOVIET "ONE-UPSMANSHIP" IN THE YEMENS	94
	A. THE PARAMETERS OF COMPETITION	94
	B. ORIGINS & EXTENT OF CHINESE INVOLVEMENT	96
	C. PRESENT AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF COMPETITION	103
V.	THE US AND THE YAR	107
	A. BACKGROUND	107
	B. THE SANAA-RIYADH-WASHINGTON TRIAD	109
	C. THE ARMS TRANSFER AFFILIATION	116
	D. THE FEBRUARY-MARCH 1979 BORDER WAR: US RESPONSE	123

VI.	CONCLUSION	130
A.	PROSPECTS FOR A UNIFIED YEMEN	131
	FOOTNOTES FOR SECTION II	140
	FOOTNOTES FOR SECTION III	145
	FOOTNOTES FOR SECTION IV	151
	FOOTNOTES FOR SECTION V	154
	FOOTNOTES FOR SECTION VI	157
	APPENDICES	158
	APPENDIX A	158
	APPENDIX B	159
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	162
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	169

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Although the bibliography catalogues the primary and secondary sources which have been used throughout the course of my research, credit must also be given to those personal "sources" that have made a significant contribution to this effort.

Chiefly among these resources is my thesis advisor, Edward J. Laurance, Ph.D., who provided me with a generous scope of freedom while offering his discretionary guidance. Professor Kamil T. Said was a significant motivating force. His wisdom furnished me with a new insight into the Arab world. The Minister of the Embassy of the Yemen Arab Republic, Dr. Abduljalil Homarah, was of invaluable assistance. Our interview supplied a credible assessment of US-Yemeni relations. Finally, CAPT Paul S. McCarthey, USN, deserves special recognition for his personal role in representing the US commitment as commanding officer of USS CONSTELLATION (CV-64).

To these gentlemen, I offer my sincere appreciation for their personal and professional efforts, making this a true learning progression.

I. INTRODUCTION

The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PRDY) and the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) together (South and North Yemen respectively), form a theatre of engagement between two rival ideologies. It is to South Yemen, the Marxist regime of Aden, that the Soviet Union has devoted massive amounts of economic and military aid, equipment, advisors, and technicians. In a similar manner, the United States has effected selected arms transfers to North Yemen. To demonstrate this commitment and underscore the US interest, in March of 1979, the Carter administration dispatched USS CONSTELLATION to the area; the intention, a "global signal." The underpinning of this situation remains the fact that due to the conflicting strategic, economic, and ideological goals of the USSR and the US that are at stake, both have the potential to be drawn into a crisis, with them, the super-powers, assuming the major roles.

The strategies and tactics that the US and the USSR are using have familiar themes: the US goal of maintaining the credibility of its client (in this case North Yemen) and the USSR providing fraternal assistance--through a surrogate force--to a liberation front (South Yemen). Indeed, the tone may sound analogous to US-Vietnamese and US-Iranian relations, but in this case, unlike Vietnam, the potential for rapid escalation and involvement is unusually great. The reason is that a vital national interest of both

superpowers is involved: oil. Neither the YAR nor the PDRY is petroleum-rich; however, their strategic proximity to the vast reserves in the region upgrades these two nations as critical actors in the overall strategic calculus (ultimately the Arabian Peninsula, the Red Sea Basin, the Horn of Africa, and the Persian Gulf). In fact, recent events make this point all the more important given Soviet setbacks in Afghanistan (the Karmal regime requiring increased Soviet security assistance to establish its legitimacy) and in the province of Eritrea Ethiopia (where Eritrean guerillas are combatting Soviet-backed Ethiopian troops and are having successful results).

The significance of the recent conflict between North and South Yemen is unquestionable and justifies an accurate assessment of the present situation. This thesis will examine the geopolitical/strategic significance of the two nations, their internal political dynamics, and the relationships that exist with the superpowers, Washington-Sanaa and Moscow-Aden. Included in this analysis are these primary variables/components: the strategic locale, the political instability, and the increasing military exports. Additionally, this effort will attempt to establish the link between Soviet activities in Aden and on the Horn of Africa. This assessment will hopefully generate hypotheses which may be applicable to other cases.

The following hypothesis will be tested: "Soviet support of the PDRY is a phase of a long range, calculated strategy

to groom allies and potential surrogates in the region in order to undertake specific military, tactical operations; US support of the YAR represents a desire to maintain area stability and counter Soviet advances."

In the process of testing this hypothesis, it would be most helpful, if one had access to the Soviet (and PDRY) decision-making process information. By examining the components of the governmental machinery inside the "black boxes" this task would be infinitely more simple. As this is not the case, a more pragmatic tack must be employed, i.e., one of output analysis. In this regard, it is necessary to construct a framework which defines the components and parameters of the system; (see figs. 1 and 2). The arguments will be developed largely in a chronological sequence. Chapter II, "Arabia Felix--Arabia Divisus," will focus on the significant political developments in the Yemens, emphasizing the 1839-1979 period. This will establish the great power interests, and the colonial legacy, scrutinizing the Yemeni methods of dealing with these. Against this background grew the Soviet involvement, as examined in Chapter III, "The Soviet Presence." This section discusses the Yemeni-Soviet military relationship and the potential for Soviet employment of the South Yemenis in a surrogate manner. One of the nuances of the Yemeni national development is a formula for competition between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, covered in Chapter IV, "Sino-Soviet 'One-Upsmanship'." As the Soviet rapport with the PDRY has grown, a roughly parallel YAR-Saudi-US




Fig. 1
Systemic View of Soviet-PDRY
Relationship




Fig. 2

Systemic View of US-YAR
Counter-commitment

relationship has developed. Chapter V, "The US in the YAR," will examine this connection, particularly the range of US-Saudi responses to the threat from the South. The conclusion will focus on the prospects for a unified Yemen and formulate other hypotheses for the Soviet-YAR/PDRY future.

A systemic "conceptual lens" will be employed for purposes of this examination to view the events and the actions among players. The dependent variables in this instance are the commitments by the US and the USSR; these are in turn affected by national interests, coupled with political and economic goals and objectives. The military exports that have been arranged between sponsor and client represent a key portion of this estimation. These indicators will be used to gauge the degree of support provided, allowing conclusions to be drawn about future involvement by the superpowers, particularly in response to crises developing between North and South Yemen (or in the event that unification efforts succeed).

II. ARABIA FELIX -- ARABIA DIVISUS

SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

(1839-1979)

"I have lived my faith and my love
as an internationalist, my direction
and my way are Arab,
The beat of my heart will remain Yemeni,
The universe will never see a guard over
my land."

Yemeni popular song

Fragmentation and dynamic interactions tend to characterize Arab political history and the two Yemens are no exception. The intent of this section is not to recount the political chronology and goings-on in South Arabia; rather to take a somewhat disinterested look at the more historically significant developments will better integrate the actors and their actions into a systemic perspective.

Power politics, as practiced by Great Britain, the Ottomans, the Soviet Union, et al, have shaped the history of the two Yemens. This analysis will attempt to gauge the results of Ottoman evacuation from Yemen (then replaced by a series of repressive imams) and the similar British egress from Aden Protectorate, with particular attention paid to how these created a vacuum only to be respectively filled by a republic and one of the most radical Marxist regimes extant. The resulting understanding of the effects of the Zaydi rule from Sanaa and the colonial legacy in Aden are essential to comprehending the present arrangement.

A. THE BACKDROP

The histories of Aden, the Hadramaut (the Eastern portion of Yemen from Aden) and Yemen are all largely intertwined and any historical analysis, no matter how cursory, must take this into account. In pre-Islamic times, the area that encompasses both present-day states (North and South Yemen) was called Arabia Felix, Happy or prosperous Arabia, by the foreigners envious of such riches as frankincense, myrrh, pearls, silks, and spices that seemed to pour forth from its lands; even then, its history contained the conflict theme of tribes constantly battling for supremacy.¹ This, the age of Ignorance (the Islamic concept: Jahiliya), ended in the seventh century with the introduction of Islam into this area; however, what survived from this previous epoch were many of the factions and allegiances, some although religious in nature, were later transformed into viable political forces. There were large pockets of Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, et als, still flourishing in the Yemen each with definite political goals. When coupled with the traditional bedouin cleavages and with Islamic expansion factored in, the result was the potential for serious instabilities. The situation was only exacerbated as a result of the events surrounding the death of Ali and the establishment of the Umayyad Caliphate. What resulted was the significant Shi'a (the Partisans of Ali) - Sunni (the Muawiyah supporters) schism which is to date reflected in the Yemens (and would contribute to a chronic state of unrest among the peoples of once Arabia Felix).²

During the ninth century, the East African coast became a collection point for members of the Zaydi sect of Islam. (Its people are followers of Zayd, grandson of al-Husayn, who was killed about 740 in an uprising against the Umayyads.) Though an offshoot of the Shi'a, the Zaydis do not emphasize Shi'ite tenets and come close to being Sunnites.³ As a result of the effects of the geographic closeness, Yemen's political history was altered:

The year 893 A.D. witnessed a significant event in the history of Yemen. During that year, A-Hadi Yahya Ibn Hussein-El-Haq, a first descendant of the Caliph Ali, founded the Rassite dynasty which based its rule on the Zaydi sect of Islam. Since then, the system of government in Yemen has been basically dependent upon the teachings of the Quran. Accordingly, . . . the Imam should observe the principles of justice and equity.⁴

The rule of the Imams, and for the most part under the Rassid dynasty, was virtually unchallenged from this point until the fifteenth century. It was then, that Portuguese explorers developed designs on Aden (one of the earliest hints of its strategic locale's importance) although these were unsuccessful for the most part. With the Ottoman desire for expansion (c. 1520) and subsequent defeat of the Mamlukes in Egypt, came efforts to consolidate their gain and deny the Portuguese entrance to the Red Sea. Later, Ottoman campaigns in Yemen and attempts to impose Sunni Islam on the populace were answered with very stiff resistance from the Yemenites. The Arabs of Yemen did not acquiesce in the Turkish occupation of a part of their

country, and several revolts ensued: the rebellions of 1547-51 and 1556-70 were indications of the Yemenites determination to free their country. Thus, it has been correctly stated that the Ottoman "hold on Yemen proved to be precarious."⁵

Out of the Turko-Yemeni conflict came a truce which allowed for the Imam to retain provincial control and Turkish management of foreign affairs; what followed during the first year of the truce (1609) was the initial British visit to the area: a ship of the British East India company called at both Mocha and Aden to explore commercial possibilities.⁶ This incident marked both the increased flow of British merchant traffic to these cities and commerce. Congruently, the Ottoman evacuation (in 1636) as a result of the successful resistance movement marked the beginning of the Rassid dynasty, the independent succession of Lahej and fragmentation of politico-religious allegiances. This division was only made worse by the Imam entering into a very comfortable and profitable economic arrangement with the British and Dutch. At this point, European influence in Yemen (Aden and the Hadramaut) was firmly entrenched as evidenced by a munition works in Sanaa, and a naval hospital erected at Mocha.⁷ It was not until 1798 that this influence was tested, when the French ousted the Mamlukes and threatened to move into Aden; the British countered this move by themselves establishing a formal presence there.

B. THE BRITISH PRESENCE

A not so surprising sequence of events surrounded the British occupation of Aden, based on three components: coal, politics, and seapower (rewording the modern combination Oil, Politics, and Seapower, Adie). The commercial ties that Great Britain developed with India were essential to the growth of the empire and any threat to these communication/economic links by a regional power was clearly intolerable. Being a fore-runner in the use of steam navigation, Britain was forced to rely on certain strategically situated coaling stations along her trade routes. In order to secure these stations for British use, it was necessary to conclude treaties with the indigenous occupants. The first such in Aden was "signed on 6 September, 1802 providing for a 'commercial union' between the East India Company and the Sultan of Aden: "opening the port for British goods, charging only miniscule duties, and no charge for anchoring or customhouse, and moreover, 'granting lavish extra-territorial privileges and immunities to British subjects.'"⁸ Finally, the French-Egyptian campaign had to be checked, as did Russian ventures into the Mediterranean. Egyptian operations in Arabia had disturbed the British who judged that preponderant influence of a single strong power in the Red Sea as well as the Persian Gulf represented an unacceptable threat to their communications with India.⁹ Evidently, the thinking in London was in favor of a military action to eliminate this threat, which is precisely what followed: an exercise of British seapower.

The convenient justification for Britain's intervention came when in 1837, the Indian vessel "Deria Dowlut" (which, by the way, was under British colors) shipwrecked off the Aden coast and was subsequently plundered. (Accounts differ regarding the details, but most place the onus on "irresponsible Adenese," acting without the Sultan's sanction).¹⁰ Captain S. B. Haines, Royal Indian Navy, acting with the authority of the government commenced an investigation of the occurrence and generated talks concerning the purchase of Aden. For nearly two years, this process continued as did negotiations over the Sultan's jurisdiction. At one point, when the agreement seemed about to be realized, the Sultan wrote to Haines in Bombay: "Let the body be burnt, but do not let the native country be pierced, it is better to sell ones mother than do this."¹¹

With the principle of the negotiations violated, Aden was captured by force in 1839. Henceforth, British efforts to ensure a stable hinterland for this foothold on the Peninsula by cultivating relations with the rulers of the inland principalities constituted a challenge to both the Yemeni state and the Ottoman government.¹²

From the outset, British involvement in Aden has been described (for the most part by British historians) as limited to those measures necessary to protect their base; the security of the outpost rather than the hinterland was in the scope of British design:

There was no need to conquer the hinterland to make Aden safe. The deep belt of independent Shafi'i tribes formed a cordon sanitaire and although Haines at first had difficulty with his immediate neighbors and former ruler of Aden, the Sultan of Lahej, their leaders were brought into a special relationship with British Aden.¹³

(Although technically, the Central Government of Yemen was the Imam of Sanaa, the actual authority that he carried to Aden and the other coastal regions is difficult to gauge. As has been mentioned, the Zaydi Imam was of the Shi'ite sect; the tribes surrounding this area were Shafi'is: Sunnis; in nearly constant conflict. Ergo: the degree of authority that the Sultan enjoyed as well as a responsibility to Sanaa is unclear. This factor is of prime importance in building the relationship with Great Britain's agents; at least legalistically.)

Perhaps the best amplification of this "special relationship" lies in the points of this "bond" (as the treaties have been labeled) extended to some sixteen tribes.¹⁴ Though somewhat less than specific, the general salience of the treaty, or agreement, may be described in these four points:

1. The British Government undertakes to extend to the chief's territory and its dependencies the gracious favor and protection of His Majesty, the King-Emperor.
2. The Chief agrees and promises on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors and the whole of his tribe under his jurisdiction, to refrain from entering into any correspondence, agreement, or treaty with any foreign nation or power and further promises to give immediate notice to the Resident at Aden, or other British Officer, of the attempt by any other power to interfere with his territory and its dependencies.

3. The chief binds himself, his heirs and successors forever that they will not cede, sell, mortgage, lease, hire or give, or otherwise dispose of his territory under his jurisdiction or any part of the same, at any time, to any power other than the British Government.
4. In consideration thereof, the British Government agrees to pay the said chief and his successors or successor a specified sum of Maria Theresa dollars--every month--on condition that the chief would keep open the roads in his country and under his authority and jurisdiction, and that he would protect all persons who may be going in the direction of Aden for the purposes of trade, or returning therefrom.¹⁵

This special relationship has also been translated as having brought the Yemeni tribes "('in friendly relations') and their country under the British sphere of influence. Between a sphere of influence and a protectorate there was only a step and between the evolution of a British protectorate and involvement there was only another: in time both were taken" (although the manner and circumstances unique).¹⁶

Of course the question arises "why did the British agents and the members of local tribes enter into these negotiated agreements?" The answer is not exactly clear-cut, but depending on ones' perspective can be explained. It should be noted that South Arabia was still under Ottoman "tactical command" (i.e. save Aden) throughout the nineteenth century, although there was much indigenous open resistance to the occupation. The Turkish presence continued to bring tribes to Aden eager to make alliances of some sort with the British;¹⁷ when one compares the results of a British "protectorate" treaty to the imposition of Ottoman administration and all that entailed (witness the chaos resulting

from the Sublime Porte's representatives Ahmad Mukktan Pasha and Ahmad Feizi Pasha) the British desires to acquire "friendly relations" appear quite noble. If any tangible benefit can be derived from this harsh rule by the Ottomans it was the unintentional support that the Imam enjoyed. It was on the opposition to Ottoman rule that most factions of Yemeni society could unite: a new line of Qasimi Imams, the Hamid Al-Din became after 1879 credible leaders of a national liberation movement; mobilization of wealth and manpower dramatically enhanced.¹⁸

C. CHALLENGE TO THE TURKISH RULE

After the turn of the century Imam Al-Mutawakkil Yahya emerged as a national hero and there was wide-scale support for his advocacy of military actions against the Turks. This revolt was so forceful and drastic that all Turkish garrisons were subdued and surrendered.¹⁹ (Their actual defensive readiness is in question, though according to Stookey, p. 160.) The short range benefits of the victory began to dissipate as the traditional contentions began to emerge: rival claims to the Imamate; conflict between the Shafii and Zaydi; and negotiations with the hated Turks. As the negotiations were drawn out and these conflicts intensified, Yahya's support was being sapped and the way was being paved for a long-standing joint British-Ottoman objective: clear demarcations of respective spheres of influence. The Anglo-Turkish Commission produced the end result responsible for

this "blue and violet deliniation", (the present YAR-PDRY border) the Treaty of Du'an (Daan) and was ratified by the Sublime Porte in 1913.

(Between Jan 1903 and May 1905, the frontier line was drawn from Perim, a point at the extreme southwest corner of Arabian Peninsula, to a point as far northeast as the Bana river, leaving the town of Dhala on the British side and Qa'taba on the Turkish side of the line. Beyond the Bana, the line was not delimited. Thus, in theory, Southern Arabia was divided into spheres of Ottoman and British influence; in fact, neither had much control beyond the garrison posts and the tribes under their immediate control.")²⁰ This event signified abandonment of the unifying principle; for the Imam, it was a blow politically--resigning that office to the status of leader of the Zaydi community rather than of a Yemeni nation.²¹

Above all, it must be emphasized that these frontiers were delimited by two occupying powers, without legal/sovereign sanction, for the purpose of military and strategic gain; largely without real consideration for the long-term effects on the indigenous population.

Certainly it would be an incorrect assertion to portent that any nation (such as Yemen) which had both Turkish and British soldiers in-country during the outbreak of international conflict (WWI) would remain unscathed. However, due to its alignment in the war, Yemen did fare rather well: other than skirmishes centering around Aden

and Hodeida, the nation was very little affected (i.e. no wide-scale destruction as in Europe). During this war, the Yemeni were to remain nominally loyal to the Turks, "notwithstanding their hatred of them, the British aided the Idrisi Arabs to capture Asir (in the North) and in 1917, the British took Hodeida, which they ceded to the Idrisi in 1921,"²² later, this area was to be annexed by Yemen. Throughout this time, the British continued to acquire territory: the Lighthouse Islands and Kamran Island (in addition to Perim Island) in keeping with their original desires to maintain a secure coaling station. The acid test of Britain's security forces occurred during this time and the credibility of the protectorate doctrine was jeopardized: "a protectorate where there was no British presence and was protected only by a British scarecrow in Aden was a bluff and could only survive until the bluff was called."²³ The Ottomans called that bluff during the war; Imam Yahya also called it after the War. Trevaskis mentions that "the significance . . . was lost during the immense commotion of global warfare." Perhaps this was true in a relative, or comparative sense only, especially for Britain, but to the Imam, the tribal chieftains, et als., the significance of the "protector unable to protect" was far from lost.

An important outcome of World War I was the erosion of the Ottoman empire and for Yemen and the Aden protectorate particularly, the Mudros Armistice, which (although the Imam was not a signatory) marked the Turkish exit from Yemen and

left Imam Yahya as sovereign of the independent nation. This exit was survived, though by several important facets of the Ottoman legacy: 'the Turkish movement toward administrative modernization, Westernization and concepts of government; . . . attempts at organization of an infrastructure, replete with communications systems, social and medical facilities; and the idea of a professional army and militia under the command of a corps of officers whose status and role were fully differentiated.'²⁴ It is this latter point that has current relevance because the Yemeni military, largely under instruction of Turkish expatriates, has transformed as a medium for social and political change.

Unfortunately, Imam Yahya's good intentions were later partially responsible for his downfall. By sponsoring the education of his officer cadre in Iraq, Syria, and later Egypt, the seeds of revolution were in effect implanted in his country. When analyzed in conjunction with his pre-occupation with his succession and desire to carry out a Jihad against the British, it is evident that the imam's legitimacy began to fade.

This was indeed unfortunate, for Yahya's were the first real attempts at transcending the problems inherent in the traditional popular groupings and organize these under a workable form of government, albeit, a kingdom. In fact, Yahya's own son, Ahmad, was to admit: ". . . he succeeded in unifying Yemen under his absolute authority; this was an enormous accomplishment (given) the rise of no less than a

hundred amirates, shaikhdoms, and sultanates."²⁵ A brief analysis of the components of Yemeni society will provide a degree of explanation:

(a) Conflict was endemic to Yemeni society; as has been mentioned there was a history of struggle between the warring tribes and social groupings. This may be explained partially (not written off, though) as a result of environmental phenomena leading to determinism; i.e., given the rough geography and terrain (a good number of Yemenis were mountain people) a degree of "rugged individualism: and independence resulted. Factored in with a suspicion of outsiders, Islamic precepts and fundamentalism ingrained into the adherents, the conflict theme was logically exacerbated vis-a-vis relations with foreigners. The very pinnacle of government, the imamate, was no exception, particularly, in his relations with the British in Aden; he focused on that external threat.

(b) There were a number of differing perceptions of the role of government in society. It was the notion of many segments that providing for the security of the trade routes, tax collection, etc., was the responsibility of the central government; public administration, adjudication, and other functions were to be carried out by the local ulama, thereby decentralizing control.

(c) The Imam's relationship with his subjects helped to alienate his strongest power base, and those who saw him into office, the ulama. Of particular importance was the

Zaydi ulama, who centered in the urban areas, held numerous positions and effectively formed the intelligentsia. The Shafi'i counterpart was also present, although these were subordinate to the Zaydis (i.e. excluded from government/administrative posts).

(d) Industrial labor, in the modern sense, appeared only toward the close of Ahmad's reign. There were unskilled wage-earners; stevedores in the port towns, and tanners, oil-pressers, potters, spinners and weavers, etc. These laborers were not totally dependent upon wages for their livelihood; "they brought with them the political ties and orientations from their villages."²⁶

(e) Communication, education, medical facilities, etc. were definitely lacking or in undeveloped stages; there was no complete feedback system to the office of the imam, especially when criticism was involved; these conditions grew progressively worse under Yahya's successor.

In sum, "disintegration of the authority pattern was a symptom of decline of the regime's legitimacy among the peasants, from whom its resources were mainly derived; among the bourgeoisie, upon whom it depended for technical functions, but whom it excluded from a voice in policy; among the sayyid aristocracy; finally; Imam Ahmad fatally weakened the moral basis of his rule in the eyes of Zaidi tribes, which were its ultimate mainstay."²⁷

Such was the scenario: an independent kingdom in Yemen created, almost by default in essence, by the Turkish

evacuation; Aden Protectorate established along with the adjacent Eastern Protectorate, under British suzerainty. Yemen, when compared to Aden, was much more advanced: the standard of living much higher; a sense of order and organization (though containing the highlighted drawbacks); and developing a sense of common orientation. Conversely, Aden and Hadramaut presented a somewhat different picture.

Legally and technically, there was only one protectorate; however, the terms Eastern (the Hadramaut) and Western (including Aden) were applied to facilitate administration. The first concern of the British was to bring order to the Western protectorate because of its proximity to Aden,²⁸ but this was attempted with no real concern for modernization or advancement. Two sources were employed to meet this end: the internal security forces, and air power. The Tribal guards and the Government guards and later the Aden Protectorate Levies all drew from the surrounding tribes for their regulars with British and Arab officers filling the necessary posts. The establishment of these forces allowed Britain's planners to turn their attentions to establishing and developing the Royal Air Force (RAF) base at Aden. For communications, security, and an upper hand in conflict, the RAF spoke for itself, proven in combat with Yahya's forces and holding any ideas of Italian expansion at bay. The RAF was able to impose its rough and ready peace very rapidly, as the Imam of Yemen discovered almost at once.²⁹

Next in order of British priorities was to establish some sense of order in the Eastern protectorate, the most populous and economically beneficial region. This was no simple undertaking; in 1933, the major effort commenced, and it was calculated that some two thousand separate governments existed in this region: Great Britain recognized but two.³⁰ The socio-religious complexion of this area was extremely diverse and commonalities other than the bedouin attributes were all but nonexistent, unlike in Yemen. The old British colonial tactic of imposing 'indirect rule' was chosen to achieve this goal, modified as primarily an advisory post.

If one man can be identified as important in this capacity, it would be Harold Ingrams, "the first resident advisor to the Eastern protectorate."³¹ Ingrams laboriously waged a peace initiative among the tribes in effort to establish a workable truce that would be satisfactory for both. His efforts were hampered though, due to an extremely small, literate labor force. Perhaps the most successful of his ventures was establishment of the Hadrami Bedouin legion and the Aden Protectorate College for Sons of Chiefs; these were attempts to fulfill the needs of developing an infrastructure and providing for a means of internal security by intertwining the attributes of a police, religious, educational, fraternal and civil-service organization.

The only drawback of "Ingrams' Peace" was that it was antithetical to the tribal system that continually replaced, by election, weak or ineffective rulers. By signing the agreements, the British effectively froze those rulers then in power--and their heirs-- which was the principal cause for the discontent that would find an effective outlet in the nationalistic organizations forming in Aden Colony.³²

D. THE REVOLUTION OF 1962

Yemen's transformation from an independent Zaydi imamate into a republic was a long process with two important power struggles occurring prior to the 1962 Revolution. The al-Wazir coup of 1948 and the abortive attempt in 1955 were attempts to "effect changes in the personnel ruling Yemen and to revise priorities among received political values without destroying the bases of existing political order. (In contrast) the leaders of the 1962 revolt were revolutionaries in that they aspired to a significant reorganization of Yemeni society, to the assertion of aims innovative in Yemeni politics and to a permanent shift in the locus of legitimate authority."³³ In 1948, al-Wazir, along with members of the Free Yemeni Party and various other conspirators attempted to install al-Wazir in the imam's office. The resulting assassination of Yahya only alienated the majority of the tribesmen and too: "it became rapidly apparent, that once Imam Yahya was removed, no common goals united the conspirators."³⁴ The inability to reach a

consensus caused the coup to fail. Similar conditions existed in 1955 although the details were less carefully planned. Additionally, the conspirators, including members of the ulama and army general staff were unable to muster mass participation; there was no effort to rally popular support beyond demanding the obedience of the citizenry.³⁵

A republic, in Middle East usage, is a state with a non-dynastic head. The term has no reference to the process by which the head attains his office, nor to the manner in which he discharges it. Republicanism meant the end of monarchy, and much of it--though not all--that was connected with it. It had nothing to do with representative government, or liberal democracy.³⁶

It was the development of a republic that the loose coalition of army officers, Shafi'is, young intellectuals, laborers and dissidents who authored the revolution were working to achieve. The military officers as a group were a key factor in bringing the revolution to fruition. For these, the Egyptians (in Yemen on liaison and vice versa) served as mentors, particularly given the Egyptian masses' support to Nasir. One can imagine the Anti-Ahmad sentiment upon his terminating the concept of the United Arab States and speaking out with rhetoric in the "Nasir v. Islam vein."

The Shafi'i merchants were an important element in the planning, contribution of funds, and arranging the smuggling and stockpiling of arms and ammunition.³⁷ As they were reinvesting huge sums into Yemen's economy and were being deprived of many of the benefits of their wealth, this sector of the population had a vested interest. Finally,

the intelligentsia formed a diverse group with equally diverse interests; although these were effectively mobilized into a bloc of support.

If one fundamental reason for the revolution can be identified, it would be the rising unmet expectations resulting from external contact. Between 1955 and 1962, these politically changed Yemenis became convinced that their progress could be protected and further advances made, only if the monarchy were done away with; moreover, they were convinced that by their own efforts they could bring this about. These were and generally are, the necessary conditions for a revolution.³⁸ (Long before the appearance of the republican regime, Cairo had served as a haven for political refugees from the Yemen, as well as from many other Arab lands; the Free Yemeni movement enjoyed the blessings of Abd al-Nasir's government. Whether or not advance joint planning between the UAR and Yemeni conspirators actually took place was not publicly disclosed.)³⁹

The development of the Yemen republic was done at Ahmad's expense for as opposition to his rule grew, he became less just and more brutal. Imam Badr succeeded his father in October, 1961 (a gross violation of a principal Islamic tenet) and proved to be incapable of establishing effective control over the rapidly developing situation. Although Badr had attended school in Egypt and espoused a foreign policy all-too-familiar to that of Nasir's own, factionalism within his government was so pervasive and

the revolutionary movement so great that change was inevitable. A tactical alliance between Zaydi officers and the Shafi'i merchants made it certain.

Badr was left with a divided nation; his pro-Egyptian policies had lost him the support of tribal leaders without gaining him the support of the radicals who despised the Mutawakilite dynasty. On 26 September, 1962, eighteen days after Ahmad's death, one of the radicals, Col. Abdullah al Sallal, whom Ahmad had kept chained to a wall for several years until his rescue by Badr, led the army and six tanks against Al Bashayn Palace and shelled it thoroughly. He occupied the palace and declared Badr's death. Sallal proceeded to execute members of the royal family and Badr's friends who had not escaped and proclaimed himself leader of the revolution with the title of Prime Minister.⁴⁰

(See Fig. 3 for factions among the participants.)

And so, the revolution began which marked the inception of the succession from monarchy; logically, a long civil war broke out and served as a forum to settle the dispute.

It is at this point that the histories of both the newborn Yemen republic and that of the Aden Protectorate markedly changed due to the interferences of foreign governments, Saudi Arabia, Britain, the United States and the United Arab Republic (Egypt) particularly. (The Soviet Union also played a definite role in this scenario; however, this will be dealt with at a later point in Chapter III, "The Soviet Presence.") This may be explained by the various interests each had at stake in the area; e.g.: Britain had a long-standing commitment in Aden

Fig. 3 FACTIONS and PARTICIPANTS in the 1962 REVOLUTION*

Right wing	The Zaidi tribes, both those such as the Khawlan which drifted in and out of the republican orbit during the civil war, and those which consistently supported the YAR against the royalists such as some Hashid tribes. The moderate reformers--Nu'man, Zubairi, Iryani, etc., --with considerable influence in the urban centers as well as in the countryside. The large Shafi'i merchants, aspiring to an effective voice in government decisions in the interest of security, freedom, and commerce. Nasserists, whether by conviction or by opportunism during the Egyptian presence; prominent in, but not confined to, the Yemeni officers. Ba'athists, numerous, young officers and civilian intellectuals. Communists; among the Soviet-trained armed forces, civilians educated in USSR & E. Europe. Also among detribalized repatriates.
Left wing	National Liberation Front (NLF); the radical revolutionary movement which succeeded to British rule in S. Yemen and established the PDRY; considerable influence among laborers returning from Yemen, and some adherents in the armed forces.

* Source, Stookey, Yemen, p. 237.

and feared the cross-border flow effects; Saudi Arabia's own internal security may have been effected should there be inaction by the House of Saud. It was Egypt, though, with the greatest potential gain by providing support to Yemen; Nasir could once again assert his "unquestioned" leadership role among the Arab nations by modernizing--clearing the established monarchies from the path of nationalism--perhaps gain back prestige long lost (in relations with Syria and Iraq specifically).⁴¹ Hence, the situation was multi-tiered: the attentions of the world's major powers had been captured, each one aligning itself with the respective faction that it favored. (As for Britain and the US: Britain refused to recognize the republicans and the US did so in December 1962, providing that Egypt reduce its presence there.)

The protracted and to some degree inconclusive civil war which resulted from the revolution was to last over the course of the next five years, with bloody military campaigns ravaging the Yemen.⁴² The eventual outcomes were nonetheless significant as derived results (all "combat tested") explain:

(a) The Egyptian commitment to the republican (Sallal regime) government may be measured in terms of the

military support and equipment provided. The actual numbers vary, but most sources will agree that President Abd al-Nasir committed in excess of 60,000 troops at one point (one estimate claims 85,000+); regardless, the military support to Yemen was tremendous to the point of Egyptian regulars actually conducting operations. (judging by the operational reports this may have been the safest course of action, as the Egyptians were just as likely to be shot by republicans as royalists.) The new republican army as distinct from the tribal levies, was slow in building, and as late as the spring of 1967, still numbered fewer than 10,000, three-fourths of them trained in Egypt. In the circumstances, Egypt had to assume nearly full responsibility for the major campaigns.⁴³

Evidently, with such great benefits to be realized from his association with the Yemen clients, Nasir made the decision for full commitment; to have a complete and total victory over the royalists and thereby effectively establish a true hegemony over the Yemenis. Nasir made his first visit to Yemen in April, 1964, and drew up a new constitution with a President, prime minister, consultative and defense councils, judiciary, and municipality groups. Sallal was sent on trips to Cairo, Moscow, and Peiking to gain time for the new institutions to consolidate.⁴⁴ The direction in which the Yemen republic was to be steered was most clear.

(The Egyptian commitment worked as a double-edged sword; for although it did demonstrate Nasir's resolve, his desire to gain leverage over the Yemenis through assistance merely exacerbated the traditional Yemen resentment of foreigners.)

(b) Through the Egyptian association, the way was essentially paved for direct Soviet and other communist support.

Signals for help were being sent to the socialist countries and the Egyptian inability to reach a decisive victory over the royalist (and "imperialist-backed") forces provided the justification (i.e., the link to Soviet prestige also being put to the test via Nasir was implicit). Following the UAR withdrawal from Yemen, this would be particularly emphasized.

(c) The civil war tested the administrative and governing abilities of the republicans and simultaneously challenged their nation-building skills. The republican coup was rife with factionalism and could not seem to reach a common ground. Of these, the most important division was between the 'pro-Egypt' and 'progressive' groups. The transition from a military to civilian government was made, but then reverted to the military; the civilian experiment deemed a failure by Egypt. The in-fighting that was rampant within the republican ranks merely reinforced the socio-political divisions--Zaydi-Shafi'i--proving the highest levels of government were not exempt from this legacy. On occasion, the by-product of this conflict proved to be the 'habitual xenophobia focused on the Egyptians.'⁴⁵

(d) Relations between the royal houses of Saud and Hamid al-Din had never been particularly close; they were divided on the grounds of religious sectarianism and territorial disputes had been responsible for a full-scale war in 1933-34.⁴⁶ Their differences notwithstanding, the Saudis did provide support to the royalists (due to a "repugnance for the overthrow of kings."), both militarily and financially. The Saudi desire to see an end to the conflict and UAR forces out of the Arabian Peninsula was responsible for the Saudi-sponsored cease-fire talks (Jidda, Harad, etc.). Finally, at the Arab League Summit, (the post-1967 Arab-Israeli War Arab League Summit Meeting), the UAR withdrew.

The summitters also created a mission consisting of Iraq, Morocco, and Sudan to mediate the dispute over Yemen between the UAR and Saudi Arabia. Such was the price that Abd al-Nasir had to pay for Saudi participation in the consortium of the oil-rich members of the Arab League which helped Egypt and Jordan balance their budgets after the defeat in June.⁴⁷

The moderating force by the Saudis in the interest of intra-Arab conflict resolution was established and would emerge many more times in future instances.

1. Revolution in Yemen, Fallout in Aden

It must be re-emphasized that the histories of Yemen and Aden were very much inter-connected; the events surrounding the Yemen Revolution on the Aden side of the border bear this out. In and around Aden, the vestiges of British rule and imperialism/colonialism were obvious everywhere.

Moreover, the epitome of this concept--British India--was thoroughly reflected in Aden society. Until Aden reached colonial status, it was administered as part of India and due to the communications/trade link with India, there were an abundance of Indian-nationals present. These enjoyed a relatively high status in the social structure (second only to British) and were employed in the government administration extensively; the typical British colonial tactic of indirect rule.

As Aden grew in population, industrial complexity and economic importance, so grew the political awareness of the indigenous population. Although there was little organized political opinion that was (recognizably) hostile to the British until the Mid-1950's,⁴⁸ the social and working conditions certainly bred that hostility. Voice in government and administration was for the most part non-existent to the average Adenese citizen. The first identifiable organization that would provide a means of conveying popular demands was the Aden Association. This group was a collective of merchant-men who campaigned for more power in the administration and recognition of foreign nationals as citizens.⁴⁹ Almost simultaneously, two anti-British Arab groups formed: the United National Front and the South Arabia League; the former demanding Britain's exit and the union among the Peninsular states (save Saudi Arabia); the latter, a desire by the Sultan of Lahej to group the tribes in the region under his jurisdiction.

The events of 1952-53, the Egyptian coup d'etat and revolution, had a dramatic and long-lasting effect throughout the Arab world in general, and Aden Colony, particularly. This produced shockwaves of Arab nationalism throughout the Middle East which served to encourage the anti-British/nationalist sentiments. With Nasir's demand that the British evacuate the Suez Canal Zone and his initiation of relations with the USSR, the concept of socialism in an Arab sense was born; furthermore, it appeared as a viable alternative to British domination. In Aden, the tempo of Free Yemeni activities increased; their actions took the form of propaganda campaigns, formation of the Trade Union Congress (responsible for a number of strikes which became increasingly more violent) and general calls for independence.

This violently developing situation did not go unnoticed by the British, for at this point, the decision was made to grant South Arabia a degree of autonomy. Six states of the Arabian Peninsula formed the Arab emirates of the South, only later to be renamed the Federation of South Arabia. The primordial ties and allegiances of the bedouin society were quite strong and even a loose amalgamation of these was difficult to achieve. Efforts to bring Aden into this association were undertaken in 1963; "Simultaneously, a National Liberation Front (NLF) motivated by socialist ideology was established in Aden, dedicated from its inception to armed rebellion against the British and their 'lackeys' (the ruling class).⁵⁰

To say the least, there were fundamentals present for sustained conflict; the ingredients were there and the conditions right. The ordinary citizen of Aden feared that any form of association with the protectorate states would make him subject to the 'feudal' sheikhs who would be supported by the British and able to enforce their rule by a well-equipped and trained army formed of their tribesmen--for that in effect was how he viewed the transfer of levies and guards to the federation.⁵¹ The NLF general command was able to muster enough popular support to synthesize the efforts of sporadic tribal conflict into an effective campaign and ultimately a war of national liberation. The support received from Egypt and the newly-formed Yemeni republic caused this rebellion to spread into all of the British protectorates, in spite of efforts by the South Arabian federal government to halt it.

The goals of self-determination and suffrage were nearly unobtainable due to the degree of repression the popular movement received under the British. Arrests, detentions, even tortures were the means used to stop the liberation movement. In fact, at one point, Britain suspended the constitution and briefly substituted a direct rule policy. Perhaps the key to eventual freedom--due largely to the inability of the British to quash the movements--was the formation of a "tactical marriage" of numerous groups; e.g.: the Organization for the Liberation of the Occupied South (OLOS) together with the NLF created

the Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (FLOSY); a more militant cadre formed under the Popular Organization of Revolutionary Forces (PORF) et als. Terrorist activities and incredible violence were rampant at this time: the federation was decaying; the British had decided to leave the area in 1966, effective 1968 and desired some semblance of order prior to leaving. Amidst these events and somewhat ahead of schedule, the British handed over the government of South Arabia to the NLF and on 30 November, 1967 an independent unitary state was proclaimed under the name of the Peoples Republic of South Yemen (PRSY).⁵²

Eager to welcome the new-born nation into the Marxist-Socialist camp, the USSR made recognition of this republic, developing a rapport that exists even today, with intermittent punctuation by the Peoples Republic of China.

E. THE PDRY & YAR: THE INDEPENDENT AND POST-REVOLUTION DECADE

1. The Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen

The PDRY recently marked its twelfth anniversary of independence and end of British colonial rule. Over the course of the past twelve years, a major transformation has occurred--the internal political structure has developed a true Marxist orientation through an effective, but not always peaceful process. When the NLF came to power in 1967, it inherited from British colonialism an extreme case of divided economy; in Aden, home for 250,000 people, there was a service-based economy tied to the international shipping trade.⁵³

The pervading sense of anti-colonialism coupled with NLF aims for immediate transformation resulted in factional power struggles and national chaos. During the pre-independence struggles, many of the citizens best suited for positions in the government (i.e., those with administrative skills) were killed, or immigrated and consequently, present government functionaries were trained abroad. In essence, the NLF was faced with a grass-roots organizational process.

"In October, 1978, after a fifteen year process, the NLF became the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP). This process involved a "double radicalization:" in the first phase, from its establishment in October, 1963-June, 1969, it was radicalized within the parameters of the Arab nationalist movement; the Marxist-Leninist faction came indisputably to power in June, 1969."⁵⁴ The second phase began in 1972 with the establishment of a Central Committee, followed by a Politburo (incorporating the Ba'athist and communist groups"), an ideological school in Aden, a huge trade union; additionally, "student and young pioneer-type groups" were formed. In May, 1973, Popular Defense Committees--peasant organizations--modelled on the Cuban system, were set up in the urban areas, but this project is believed to have not been successful: popular enthusiasm was low and the security functions of the committee came to predominate.⁵⁵ Throughout this phase, the components were assembled to formulate a cohesive sense of national-direction that would be received with eventual

popular support. Free elections conducted nation-wide, including women voting, worked together to increase the legitimacy of the regime. The similarity between the political organization and other nations (e.g.: USSR, Angola, Mozambique, Cuba, etc.) is not coincidental.

2. The Yemen Arab Republic

The YAR of the post-revolution and civil war days has itself undergone significant political change. Following the Egyptian exit (and with them went a good deal of military hardware) in 1967, the civil war reached a stalemate with waning royalist pressure finally ceasing. A bloodless coup replaced Sallal and a republican governing council was instated, to prohibit a dictatorship from ever attaining power. Furthermore, a constitution was established:

The Yemeni Constitution, placed in effect on 28 December, 1970 patently embodied the thinking of the older generation of Free Yemenis. It sought to establish political procedures that would respect and preserve the hold of Islam over the great majority of the population while erecting effective barriers to autocracy. It declares Yemen to be an Islamic as well as Arab nation, and the Shari'a to be the source of all its laws. ... a bill of rights implies that the state treats with each citizen as an individual. ... the national goals are modest, conservative and mainly instrumental: unity, social and economic development.⁵⁶

Unfortunately, these rather ideal goals were short-lived (1974) as was the constitution, for a number of reasons, not the least of which was subversion from the PDRY and the two nations' inability to reach a common ground. The

constitution and Consultative council were suspended, with a junta taking charge. Fortunately, it was restored.

At this point, the Republican Government is headed by a seven-member Command council: it is the council that functions as the policymaking body and appoints a Prime Minister, who functions essentially as an administrative official; the cabinet, appointed by the Prime Minister, varies in size (both responsible to the Command Council).⁵⁷ Despite the seemingly grandiose goals, the Yemeni factionalism has not been overcome and was partially responsible for the events of June, 1978.⁵⁸

Presently, the National Democratic Front (NDF) is enjoying a growing popularity, forming a collective for anti-Sanaa sentiments. Charging North Yemen with incredible repression of its citizens, the Aden-headquartered NDF is provoking destabilizing actions aimed at the YAR. (Unhappy with the pro-West/Saudi stance Sanaa has adopted, the NDF is demanding: "revival of the long-neglected investigation into the assassination of Ibrahim al-Hamdi; renunciation of the policy of "exclusive alliance" with Saudi Arabia, and resumption of talks with South Yemen.)⁵⁹

Fig. 4

Shifts of Power in the Yemens

SOUTHERN YEMEN: *The Sultanates of the Federation of South Arabia were overthrown by the NLF in Nov. 1967; the rulers were deposed or fled.
The successors:

Qahtan al-Shaabi; 30 Nov., 1967-22 June, 1969; resigned; later, placed under detention by the new three-man council, where he remains today.

Salem Rubae Ali; 22 June, 1969-26 June, 1978: executed after military coup.

Abdul Fatah Ismail; 26 June, 1978-Present.

YEMEN: Imam Ahmad; 14 March, 1948-18 Sept., 1962; died of chronic ailments and old wounds.
His successors:

Col. Abdullah al-Salal; 28 Sept., 1962-5 Nov., 1967 deposed in a military coup led by dissident republicans released from detention in Egypt.

Abdul Rahman al-Iryani; 5 Nov., 1967-13 June, 1974: deposed in a bloodless coup, then deported to Syria.

Col. Ibrahim al-Hamdi; 13 June, 1974-10 Oct., 1977; killed when his car was machine-gunned.

Ahmed al-Ghasmi; 10 Oct., 1977-24 June, 1978; killed when a bomb contained in a briefcase carried by a visiting diplomat from S. Yemen exploded.

Major Abdallal Saleh; 24 June, 1978-Present.

* Source: New York Times, 2 July, 1978

3. June, 1978: A Crucial Time for the Two Yemens

June, 1978 was a tumultuous month for both the YAR and the PDRY. Two violent events, an assassination and a coup d'etat focused the attentions of the world on these two countries once again.

The first act in the new violence that embroiled the area was the assassination of North Yemen's President al-Gashmi by a bomb planted in the briefcase of an envoy from Pres. Salim Robae Ali of South Yemen. The murder was blamed on President Ali and was cited as a factor in his overthrow and execution two days later by colleagues in South Yemen's pro-Soviet National Front.⁶⁰

These two tragic events stemmed from problems that Ali was having internally--problems of nation-building (i.e., economic, social, etc.) in his attempts to set a course for the PDRY. 'Salem Robae Ali's death marked, above all, the violent denouement of that second, post 1969 radicalization through which the ill-defined leftism of the late 1960's was further transformed and given institutional form. With him fell not only a group opposed to the trend of this second radicalism, but also the main exponents of an alternative and less orthodox pattern of development.⁶¹

Criticism of Ali began approximately a year previous to the coup; he was attacked for his administrative abilities, "undermining relations with the USSR," and (perhaps) leaning too close to the Saudi camp. The Central Committee and Politburo voted to reduce the scope of his powers.

He seemed to have realized by June 1978 that the only way out of his increasingly restricted position in the South was to provoke a crisis in which he could re-establish his own authority by receiving support from sympathetic nationalistic forces in the North, i.e. forces hostile to al-Ghashmi, but also independent of the NLF organization in the South. ... The evidence tends to confirm, though not prove, the impression that it was indeed the Southern President who in an act of desperation, precipitated the crisis.⁶²

The Central Committee went into an emergency session after the assassination; two days later, Ali and two other cohorts were executed. The present Abdul Fatah Ismail & Ali Nasser Mohammed regime took up the reins of South Yemeni government. In the North, Major Abdallal Saleh did likewise and became president.⁶³

The first identifiable conflictual fall-out from the Iranian revolution was the February-March 1979 war between the Yemens. It was the Soviet-sponsored security assistance to PDRY that predicated the border warfare; consequently, the US rushed arms and technicians to the North.) Though only sporadic conflict occurred, this short campaign tested the resolve of the superpowers in support of their respective allies.

The flurry of Arab League activity which led to the surprising turn of the tide in the Southwestern tip of the Arabian Peninsula during the month of March seemed to be very promising indeed. As a result of a rather rare combination of interests on the part of a number of Arab states--all desirous of a cessation of hostilities between the two Yemens--the two parties had at first reached an agreement on a number of crucial points. ... When the leaders of the two Yemens met in Kuwait

for three days late in March, their deliberations produced an agreement on no less than the establishment of a union between their two states. The agreement stipulated a union would be set up within a year following elaborate preparations.⁶⁴

The prospects of a unified Yemen are questionable as unification would translate to a hegemony in effect, i.e. either PDRY over YAR or vice versa. Successful unification would mean removal of the factionalism that is so much a part of the political reality of both nations. If history serves as any judge of this possibility, then history speaks for itself.

F. A COLONIAL LEGACY AND THE FORCE OF ISLAM: TWO CROSS-CUTTING FACTORS

The histories of the two Yemen have been marred by violent conflict from the outset. From the earliest points in the history of this region external powers have been either directly or indirectly involved in the functions of government which in turn has directly effected its citizens. The great powers of the world have had strategic/economic designs on the Yemens and in the process of fulfilling these, have attempted various models of political and colonial administration, many times with no regard for the indigenous population, their religion, mores, or values. The undesirable side-effects--violence and political instability--are readily apparent now. Furthermore, these have developed deep cleavages among the members of both Yemeni societies, not soon to be smoothed over, or joined together.

Equally unfortunate is the likelihood of a cessation of super power interests/involvement/intervention. Even now (as will be demonstrated in the following chapters) the Soviet Union is working for a union between YAR and PDRY; the impetus is not altruism, rather to reap tangible benefits of the strategic, economic, and political sort. The Soviet investment in armaments in PDRY is staggering and leads many analysts to conclude that their motives are concerned with developing a surrogate force in the South Yemenis: "Cubans of the Middle East."⁶⁵ And just how could this be possible? The answer lies somewhere in the saga of Aden's development. "The revolution of the PDRY since independence illustrates, in an extreme form, the fate of revolutions in this century. It has taken place in an extremely impoverished country where, precisely because of the weakness of the local ruling class and the intense impact of British colonialism, it was more possible for a movement that was both nationalist and socially revolutionary to come to power. (as in Cuba, Vietnam, and Angola, the Soviet assistance to a new and struggling regime has been of immense significance.)"⁶⁶

Behind the scenes of the power politics played out by the superpowers lies the backdrop of Islam. A combination of the reaction to great power presence and the tremendous potential force of this value system are volatile ingredients for revolution in the Yemens. For instance, "The revolution in Iran is pushing the West to do what it should have done

long ago--to pay sensitive attention to Islam. Unfamiliarity with a religion seen as exotic and irrelevant has figured in what has turned out to be inadequate reporting, mistaken interpretation of events and undiplomatic diplomacy."⁶⁷ As the apparent revival of Islam is occurring throughout much of the world, it would indeed behoove the adherents of other faiths to try to comprehend the striving of millions of fellow human beings. A British correspondent reports on one encounter with a Pakistani mullah:

You in the West have an understandably hostile attitude to Islamic revival. ... You see it as a backward step, a process of uncivilizing a country, of brutalizing it with a code of conduct that is applicable only to a primitive desert people. We look upon it as a divinely directed form of socialism. We create in an Islamic society a system in which there is no need to steal or kill--respect . . . is born out of the equality that Islam dictates. You do not focus on (the fact) that Islam is an ideal non-Communist social system for the poor masses.⁶⁸

As to what place in the international political system this nascent force demands:

Islam, we are all beginning to realize only now, is the coming political force in the Third World--a religion, a sense of discipline that dominates a third of the world's people from the African Atlantic coast to the Java Sea. We have to reckon with it precisely as we have to reckon with the other global ideologies, and to do so involves understanding, sympathy, and at least attempts at genuine friendship.⁶⁹

III. THE SOVIET PRESENCE

The Soviet experiment in Yemen is indicative of certain generalities which pertain to their Middle East strategy. Therefore, one may conclude that this was a seemingly logical progression. Recognizing (a) the importance of the region in general, (b) this importance in terms of the Soviet perception (both historically and presently), and (c) the potential benefits associated with a presence there, the development of their Yemeni policy comes as so surprise. This analysis will proceed from these assumption.

A. ADEN & SANAA: MOSCOW'S LINK WITH THE HORN

There is not a shade of doubt that the present events in the Horn of Africa are directly due to the collusion of the imperialist powers, primarily the US with reactionary Arab regimes. This pursues the purpose of dealing a blow at the progressive forces in the Red Sea Basin. It is not for nothing that the Horn has been assigned an exceptionally important place . . .; the presence of top class ports in the Gulf of Aden and in the Indian Ocean, and what is most important, the fact that SLOCS link the oil-producing countries in the region with the US. (Tass Dateline.)¹

The strategic importance of the Arabian Peninsula, by virtue of its geographic location cannot be over-emphasized. Bordering on three continents and containing essential waterways both natural and man-made, this has historically been an area of vital interest for the great powers of the world and has become more valuable, as technology,

communications and weapons systems have evolved; this strategic potential has long been recognized by the Soviet Union, too. A presence here would mean a shortened line of communication between Moscow and forces in the area; a solution to numerous logistical problems; and an opportunity to locally base naval forces--a goal that is still extremely high on the Soviet global priority list. Hence, the obvious attractiveness of Aden coupled with Hodeida and the network of nearby islands, as a potential Soviet-regarded linchpin for coordination of regional operations.

The importance of the Middle East is one of the common-places of writings on international politics, a function of oil, strategy and regional stability.² This importance was not lost on Moscow's strategic planners at all:

Soviet interest in the Indian Ocean (and the Middle East) is an extension of an old Czarist thrust for an outlet to the South, dating from the time of Peter the Great. That interest is overlaid with the ideological desire for a worldwide Soviet hegemony. Increasing Soviet military power and decline of the European powers impel the present Soviet drives to replace Britain as the dominant power in the littoral states . . . Soviet dominance seems both to protect its own interests in the area and to threaten the vital oil supplies of Europe and the United States.³

Most Sovietologists and Kremlinologists will attest to the veracity of this statement's theme; however, with the emergence of Arab nationalism and the desire on the parts of many area regimes to become independent actors, Arabologists would be inclined to add certain caveats. For example, the Soviet desires notwithstanding, relations

with the USSR provided a vehicle for national development. A significant facet of this process included "modernizing" the military forces for the struggle against Israel. (By no means should the USSR's involvement be misread as taking precedence over the wave of nationalism; for although the Russian assistance was needed, even the radical regimes at the time did not particularly desire to be placed in great dependency.) Regardless, since 1955, the USSR has made some very important advances, as well as suffered major setbacks in this region.

It has been asserted that because of three basic factors, the Soviet Union was able to make certain significant advances:

- (1) Circumstances in the Middle East itself were more favorable for Soviet penetration, (e.g.: emergence of Arab revolutionary regimes);
- (2) Western policies in the Middle East were uneven, inconsistent, hesitating, contradictory, etc.;
- (3) Soviet policies themselves were flexible and skillfully geared to maximize advantages derived from local circumstances and Western errors. Soviet policies here fused two elements: Soviet national interests and Communist ideological concepts.⁴

These three factors work together to explain what appeared to be a general receptivity to Soviet involvement in the Arab world on behalf of these developing nations. Moreover, they also serve as indicators of the resulting Soviet foreign policy quests. Perhaps the single-most

successful means of attaining these foreign policy goals was through the arms transfer process. There were definite Arab security needs to be filled and the Soviet Union was more than willing to undertake this task. (The US proved to be in a dilemma due to the commitment to Israel.) Syria, Iraq, North Yemen, and (the UAR) later Egypt all received Soviet armaments and are by now familiar sagas in meeting their perceived security needs. Of further significance are the benefits the Soviets reaped: the enhanced prestige and economic plussage (i.e., the hard-currency exchange)--both in the Soviet national interest--and the successful test-case for the USSR to effect arms transfers (ideologically sanctioned and in keeping with the "fraternal assistance" and "wars of national liberation" commitments).⁵ Thus, the challenge to the West and the effect on the regional balance of power had been accomplished.

Although a complete understanding of the motives behind this involvement is constrained by lack of access to the appropriate Soviet sources, certain assumptions may be made given the historical indicators that are available for examination. That the Soviet Union has had a lengthy involvement in this region is evident by naval deployments and expeditions commissioned under Tsarist regimes. Later, Stalin had ambitions in this area as borne out in the 1940 Four Power Pact, which more than provided for Soviet-Nazi non-aggression, in effect targeted Soviet interests "South of the national territory of the Soviet Union, in the

direction of the Indian Ocean" (or as the Soviet counter-draft referred ". . . in the direction of the Persian Gulf).⁶ In 1978, several significant events occurred in this region that further develop the case for the Russian involvement: Soviet security assistance to Ethiopia (in the war in Ogaden); a coup d'etat in Afghanistan which installed a pro-Soviet regime (i.e., that of Nur Muhammad Taraki); and the assassination in North Yemen followed by the coup d'etat in South Yemen; the after-shocks of these and other events are still being felt.

The theory of Soviet behavior as determined by a "grand design" is founded upon the notion that foreign policy is evolutionary and historical.⁷ This theory, in its absolute sense, identifies Moscow as employing strategy and tactics to promote Soviet communism, eroding Western and Chinese presence, and using this region as a springboard for later achievements.⁸ By establishing a series of regional pro-Soviet regimes, certain advantages are gained for Moscow. (This concept may be contrasted to the "muddled theory" that argues Soviet exploitation of selected targets of opportunity.)

From all available indicators, it is apparent that the "grand design" rationale most probably impels Soviet regional policy. Consider this sequence of events:

They set out to establish footholds in the Indian Ocean in a fashion reminiscent of nineteenth century Great Britain: first came the fleet, then the flag, the merchant marine, the traders, the (now secular Marxist) missionary, the political, military, and technical advisors. To consolidate this hold, economic assistance and bilateral accords followed.⁹

The Soviet track record in the Middle East has shown certain negative results, too, particularly when considering the ousting of their advisors from Egypt and severing of diplomatic relations. The "Ugly Russian" syndrome seemed to predominate relations in the post-1973 War timeframe, due to a number of factors, not the least of which was the Soviet desire to pursue short term benefits resulting from their tactical pursuit of targets of opportunity (for indeed at times they have done just that). However, to deny the existence of the long range strategy involved would be to underestimate the Soviet planners. For example, the Soviets have demonstrated a longstanding interest in Africa, since Khrushchev's time:¹⁰ recent activities on the Horn bear this out. "From a global, strategic viewpoint, the Horn of Africa has become, during 1978, an integral part of a Soviet design for the entire region: Afghanistan, Iran, PDRY, Northern Chad, the Sahara--all seem to fit a "pattern." The Horn is perceived today as an important new Soviet foothold, even though the French remain in Djibouti, a US fleet remains in the Indian Ocean and the Soviets have established a foothold in Somalia--now forsaken for Ethiopia--a decade ago."¹¹ In fact, a recent treaty concluded with the Mengistu regime points to the increased joint Ethiopian-USSR collaboration. "Increased military cooperation, multilateral resistance to aggression, etc.;" although somewhat typical of the Soviet style, the nuances and implications for the Soviets are definitely beneficial, (e.g.: "the provisions lend

legitimization to existing USSR aid to Ethiopia as well as for future Soviet activities . . .; interpreted by the USSR as justification for demanding base rights on the Eritrean Red Sea coast; lead to further Ethiopian involvement as a base for subversion or as a proxy force in regional strategic projects).¹² Through their exports of military aid and by generating the psychological support for the radical Mengistu regime, the USSR may now also be trying to cultivate this same type of relationship with the PDRY; ergo: the identifiable linkage between Soviet efforts on the Horn and in South Yemen.

The course of analysis will now focus on the origin of Soviet peninsular interests, the campaign in Yemen. In this regard, Soviet activity here, when viewed as a component in a larger system may be seen not as one unique case study, rather as a logical follow-on to previous and future objectives.

B. SOVIET ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE YEMEN

Although Imam al-Mutawakkil Yahya did sign a treaty of friendship with the USSR in 1928, thus marking the initial Soviet overture to Yemen, this relationship did not fully develop until the reaffirmation of that treaty in 1955.¹³ (It was during that year that the Soviets intensified their Middle East policy.)

Over the next few years, this relationship grew both in commitment and complexity: Yemen received increasing amounts of Soviet hardware; simultaneously, Yemeni-UAR relations were approaching a new dimension. A brief examination of

the supply and demand rationales of the Soviet Union and the Yemen is necessary to comprehend the parameters of this affiliation (as these have relevance to the current PDRY-USSR commitment).

1. Soviet Supply v. Yemeni Demand Rationale

There are certain factors, when considered together, that serve as a motivating force for the Soviets to become involved with a repressive imamate such as Ahmad's, (a gamble with his government from the outset), which include:

(a) The realization of geo-strategic gain. Establishing a presence in Yemen would (when combined with the presence in Egypt) effectively anchor both entrances to the Red Sea--via Suez and through the Arabian Sea. A physical closeness to the petroleum supplies and transportation routes would also be established. Additionally, a presence in Yemen would facilitate logistic support of African recipients, in keeping with those strategic interests.

(b) The chance to counter/challenge Western advances. The USSR regarded the area as a sphere of Western influence which the Western powers had no intention of leaving.¹⁴ By harnessing and eventually exploiting the surfacing anti-British sentiments, the Soviets would logically gain in this competition. An ideal means for ideological advancement might be provided through the Yemeni anti-imperialism/colonialism stance (which transcended the fact that Yemen was a monarchy).

(c) The support for the United Arab Republic (Egypt). By maintaining the existing support for the UAR, encouraging UAR-Yemeni ties, and providing direct support to Yemen, the USSR would establish itself as a credible supplier which was true to its clients. Hence, the obvious benefits from association with the Soviet Union would be recognized by Yemen and the other Arab states. ("The shipments of arms to Yemen undoubtedly increased the Russian prestige in the eyes of the Yemeni government; however, there was an uncomfortable aspect for the Yemenis, for unless Russian or Russian-sponsored mercenaries could have been employed to operate the weapons, they would have had little or no effect when used, and unless used at that time, would quickly have become unserviceable."¹⁵ Here lies the implicit importance of Egyptian operators and technicians.)

The collective motivation from these and other factors provided the necessary justification for the inclusion of Yemen among Soviet foreign policy targets in the Middle East. Thus, by heralding the Yemeni struggle against imperialism/colonialism, the Soviets were able to attain their own goals indirectly, through the Yemenis.

Just as the Soviet Union had a component justification for its involvement, so the Yemen had a number of demands that could be met through an association with the Russians: the resultant of the interaction of these two concepts spawned the bilateral relations. Components of the Yemeni demand scheme included:

(a) The desire to end colonial oppression. Historically, Yemen had been under Ottoman suzerainty; Aden and the Protectorate--to which the imam had territorial claim--was under British rule. The desires of Yahya and later Ahmad were to see a sovereign and independent Yemen, free from colonial presence, and fulfill the claims on the southwest. Russian military equipment might animate this dream.

(b) The desire to consolidate internal security. Imam Ahmad's position was something less than secure, witness the al-Wazir coup aftermath and the abortive attempt of 1955. Perhaps one means for the imam to shore up his leadership claim was through a strong, well-equipped military, regardless of the source of supplies. (Ahmad was basically mistrustful of outsiders, and was reluctant to become involved with the Russians; however, Badr persuaded him to do so. King Saud gave him three million dollars to buy arms.)¹⁶ The improvement to Ahmad's legitimacy would also be realized through emphasis on the "threat" to Yemen posed by Aden; (concentrating on the outside threat would win him dual rewards: a strong military and popular support) coincidentally a series of border clashes resulted.

(c) Improvement of Yemen's economic posture. Receiving Russian armaments naturally held the possibility of further trade with the Soviet Union and improvement of the economic infrastructure; improvement of the standard of living through industrialization might quiet dissident rumblings.

2. Yemeni Receipt of Soviet Arms: A Chronology

The policy of arms transfers from the Soviet Union to Yemen is inseparably linked to the Soviet policy in the UAR; therefore, it is appropriate to digress briefly and examine this point. The Soviet-Egyptian sponsor-client experience serves as a model with utility for Yemen.¹⁷

Starting with 1955, Egypt and the Soviet Union concluded arms agreements roughly every two years: the first, announced on 27 September, 1955, was officially concluded between Egypt and Czechoslovakia, the latter serving largely as a formal substitute for the Soviet Union and only partly as supplier of her own arms. Later, this disguise was abandoned altogether, and the Soviet Union concluded its arms deals directly, occasionally supplemented with East European arms . . . The 1955 agreement provided for four broad categories of arms: aircraft, tanks, other land weapons, including artillery, and warships; aircraft (replacements for those lost in 1956) dominated the 1957-59 period; in 1961, East German military personnel were introduced; from 1962-67, deliveries paralleled Egypt's growing involvement in the Yemen war (a low estimate: \$220 million worth of various armaments).¹⁸

The Egyptian market for Soviet armaments proved a priori, to be an important one, for by effecting these transfers, Soviet foreign policy goals were being fulfilled; further, the returns on the Soviet investment would later be realized. However, this same arms market, rather the Egyptian machinery behind it, formed somewhat of a buffer that inhibited direct Soviet-Yemeni dealings.

Soviet
Foreign Policy
Objectives

Yemeni Demand
Factors

	Influence	Counter West. Presence	Break West. Monopoly	Expand Soviet Military Power	Internal Security of Client	Support Wars of National Liberation	Encourage Communist Movement	Counter PRC	Improve Balance of Payments	Support Arab Cause
Authoritarian gov't	-			-	+	+				
Low level of econ dev.									+	
Undermilitarized	+	+		+	+	+	+			
Strategic Location	+		+	+				+		
Raw Mat'ls/Nat. Res.										
History of colonialism	-	+								
Intractable conflicts						+				+
Lack of Arab unity										
Metropole links										
Fear of Imperialism										
Sanctity of borders						+				
Arabs/Islam	-					+				+

Fig. 5 Interaction of Soviet Foreign Policy Objectives wity Yemeni Demand Factors

*Source: Laurance, E.J., "Soviet Arms Transfers to Sub-Saharan Africa," Unpublished Paper; adapted to fit YAR and PDRY demand schemes. (A + or - indicates that the interaction was favorable or negative.)

Soviet
Foreign Policy
Objectives

Yemeni Demand
Factors

	Influence	Counter West. Presence	Break West. Monopoly	Expand Soviet Military Power	Internal Security of Client	Support Wars of National Liberation	Encourage Communists Movement	Counter PRC	Improve Balance of Payments	Support Arab Cause	
Authoritarian gov't	+										
Low level of econ. dev.											UAR OVERLAY
Undermilitarized	+			+		+	+				Anti- Imperialism
Strategic Location											
Raw Mat'ls/Nat. Res.										+	Promote Arab unity
History of colonialism											
Intractable conflicts											
Lack of Arab unity											
Metropole links											
Fear of Imperialism											Egypt as a regional power
Sanctity of borders											
Arabs / Islam	-	+					-				Nasir's personal ambitions

Fig. 6 Interaction of Soviet Foreign Policy Objectives
with Yemeni Demand Factors/UAR Overlay

Nevertheless, the USSR and the Yemen did conduct relations; Badr was the medium by which these were largely accomplished, resulting from his visits to several Communist countries. In 1956, when the drama of Suez was at its height, a Russian ship arrived at a small Yemeni port with a cargo of arms, the first of many.¹⁹ The 1956 trade agreement with the USSR negotiated by Badr provided (under the label of "machinery") for the sale of five million pounds sterling worth of small arms, anti-air guns, and tanks; these were, for the most part, obsolete Soviet weapons. Accordingly, the small arms were passed out among Yemeni regulars and royalist tribesmen,²⁰ for use against Aden.

The Soviet relationship with Yemen during these years, however, remained on a commercial basis, and it was not their concern if the imam wished to hide his arms in a cave. The USSR offered Yemen a line of credit of 100-million rubles in 1957, but the imam accepted only 60-million (\$15-million). The loan had a grace period of five years, with annual interest of 2 1/2%, and was utilized largely for the construction of a port at Hodeida.²¹

The coup d'etat and resulting Civil War of 1962 increased the flow of Soviet arms into Yemen both via Egypt and more directly. Although it is not apparent what the fine points of the Soviet-Sallal relationship were, the fact that Russian efforts were now "ideologically sanctioned" (i.e., through 'republicanism') was not at all lost on the Soviets; hence these improved as Sallal became the recipient of much-needed aid, both economic and military.

(It is hardly conceivable that al-Badr, in arranging the technical assistance from the USSR, could have believed that his own military resources would be able to put the armaments to good account. It is even more remarkable that Nasir and Khrushchev did not come earlier to realize the incongruities of the situation; . . . it took them until the end of 1962 to put Sallal into action, and until later still to send him substantial reinforcements. The Cairo-Moscow axis made a serious misjudgement. Instead of being able to unite Yemen's military strength with that of Egypt and set it on the road to the southwest, all of its attention had been turned inwards with the aim of establishing itself for the first effective thrust against the British.)²²

The Civil War intensified the UAR-Yemeni commitment; a defense pact was signed on 10 November, 1962, and Egyptian support (in the way of personnel and equipment) began to materialize. What is of greatest significance though, is the signal of a Soviet strategic offensive through direct relations with the Sallal regime. As a result of a Yemeni delegation's visit to Moscow, the Soviets expanded their "Egyptian dealings" through some public praise of Sallal's efforts: the Russians decided to build a complete airport near Sanaa, big enough to handle the Egyptian TU-16 bombers; construction of Hodeida's port facilities was pushed forward, with a reported presence of 1,000 Soviet technicians and instructors in Yemen.²³

"Additionally, there was a possible causal relationship between the present Soviet military (naval) build-up, the diplomatic interest in the entire area 'East of Suez', and the unsuccessful attempt by the Soviets to install nuclear missiles in Cuba."²⁴ It is of coincidental note that one of the primary Soviet military goals during this period

was to counter the US strategic strike threat (namely POLARIS A-3 followed by POSEIDON); what resulted was the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) "surge" in the USSR's naval policy and construction.

By having the ability to operate long-range reconnaissance aircraft from Hanad (possible, as long as the Egyptians were in-country) the US submarine fleet could be contended with over the long run; for the short run, Egyptian troops and equipment could be ferried directly into Yemen more easily. To help make this offensive more attractive to Yemen, "Soviet non-military aid increased at the same time, with the donation of 125,000 doses of polio vaccine, a shipload of flour, fat and sugar. Khrushchev and Brezhnev sent the message: the Soviet people highly appreciate the contribution of the YAR to the cause of protecting peace and the struggle against colonialism. . . The Yemeni people are on the right road."²⁵

As long as the UAR was embroiled in the war, as well as the administration of the Yemen republic, Sallal's popularity diminished and he was no doubt pleased with the withdrawal of UAR and Saudi forces from his country. The war dragged on, though, for another few years, and the Soviet commitment moved into a new dimension:

The USSR now furnished weapons directly and with it more technicians. At the start, Soviet pilots flew planes as air cover for the republican troops that were defending Sanaa against royalist encirclement in December, 1967. When one of the planes was shot down, the

USSR became more cautious. Volunteer pilots were recruited from Syria to constitute the republican air force, while other volunteers from Algeria and from South Yemen reinforced the officer corps of the ground troops.²⁶

As a result of the arrival of the MiG-17/19's and other Soviet equipment, a new republican offensive began. In February, 1968, new shipments of Soviet arms arrived at Hodeida (including about fifty tanks) and further deliveries were carried out by airlift: "Soviet transport planes from Egypt carried large quantities of small arms, mortars, artillery, tanks, and components for fighter and bomber aircraft."²⁷

The factionalism that had traditionally been among both ranks worked to the royalist disadvantage. The republican regime survived, but not without a new orientation towards the USSR. The damage to Egyptian prestige as a result of their defeat in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, vis-a-vis Yemen may be difficult to quantify, but there was also damage done to the credibility of the USSR. From that point, the relationship between Sanaa and Moscow was fractured and the Saudi emergence as a "moderating actor" enticed the republic into closer Saudi-Yemeni affiliation, which also included Yemeni security needs. For Moscow, the departure of the Egyptians meant a change of Soviet Yemeni foreign policy was in order. The USSR was in a dilemma: the survival of the republic was at stake; yet, with their proxies having departed, the Soviet Union lacked the capacity to project its power and thereby influence the outcome of the Civil War.²⁸

The new links with the Yemeni republicans could not be of the same calibre as relations with states professedly 'building socialism' such as Guinea, Syria, et als. The valuable role of the UAR in the pre-1967 era was clear, for the missing intermediary had been an inalienable link. It had been acceptable to aid the Yemenis in their struggle, that was all right. The only justification available for the Soviet aid to the Yemenis directly, however, was the Yemeni role in the anti-imperialist struggle.²⁹

The Soviets, then, opted for minimal involvement; by transferring small arms and many obsolete weapons, they made a policy choice that ideally would mesh with pursuit of their strategic interests. A cautious Soviet Union, therefore conducted its dual policy of support for reconciliation among the partners to the Civil War, while providing limited military aid to the republicans.³⁰ It was their reticence to fully involve themselves with a regime as unstable as the one that Col. Sallal had established--a policy still in formulation--combined with the risk to Soviet prestige, and the commitment to Cairo (for the Alexandria facilities) that resulted in the focus of Soviet attention elsewhere. Conveniently, Republican Yemen's neighbor, recently independent and struggling to develop a Marxist-Leninist republic, attracted these attentions and interest. Accordingly, the Soviets merely stepped up their supply tempo to the People's Republic of South Yemen (PDY after 1970).

C. MOSCOW AND ADEN: RAPPORT THROUGH MILITARY EXPORTS

Strong alliance with the USSR and other countries of the socialist community is the decisive factor of victory of the national-liberation movement of peoples. It is particularly necessary now in order to oppose the forces of Zionism and reaction, which are teaming up in the Middle East (promoting) their incessant hostile designs.³¹

Broadcast from Aden and certified by Tass, these words from the Prime Minister of the PDRY, Ali Nasir Muhammad, were surely well received in Moscow, for it has been the achievement of this end that has prompted the Soviets to devote massive amounts of aid, both economic and military, equipment and technicians to the Marxist regime of Aden.

1. Setting the Stage: The Economic Prelude

Strategically, the importance of the PDRY's location cannot be disputed and the port facilities of Aden in relation to the Strait of Bab al-Mandab, the narrow body of water which is the Southern entrance to the Red Sea, form a valuable "choke point". In the broader scope of analysis, the PDRY holds territorial claims to some very valuable real estate: "The importance of Socotra and the Gulf of Aden lies in their control of one entrance to the Indian Ocean, while the significance of the adjoining Arabian Sea lies in its proximity to Soviet targets for submarine launched missiles."³² It appears that this strategic factor is a point of salvation, for the country is plagued with extreme poverty and has only recently begun the long journey on the road to development. In conjunction with the Soviet desire

to further world Communism, (or more correctly, to promulgate the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty for socialist states) the economic chaos in PDRY also played a role. Though political and geostrategic gain served as primary determinants, South Yemen's economic devastation after a cessation of 130 years of British rule and its potential for restructuring along Marxist-Leninist lines was also factored into the Soviet decision.

The oppression of the people of Yemen under British occupation was particularly severe. The economy was tied to the British economy and made entirely subservient to its needs in both production and exports. A particular feature of British colonial rule in Yemen was the failure to encourage the development of all levels of agriculture in order to make up for the country's industrial backwardness unless this happened to coincide with British requirements for cash crops or foodstuffs. The Yemen was essentially a service economy with no agricultural or industrial base, and the inheritance of the colonial past was a major burden for the revolutionary government when it faced the task of drawing up a new economic policy.³³

As previously demonstrated, political instability in South Yemen was a function of economic problems in that country. Relative deprivation, a growing trade union movement, and loss of revenue from closure of the Suez Canal placed the newly formed republic in economic dire straits. Soviet economic planners could offer relief as well as develop a market for Soviet goods, the fishing fleet and the merchant marine. The favorable terms offered by the Communist countries coupled with a seeming lack of interest on the part of the West, made it inevitable that the Aden Government

should turn to the Eastern Bloc.³⁴ (In fact, the Great Corrective Move of 22 June, 1969, the Three Year Plan of 1971-74, and the Five Year Development Plan of 1974-75 were drawn up with Soviet assistance.) Not to belabor a point, but merely to stress the economic importance as a determinant for Soviet involvement, some definitive statistics are provided.

Although the PDRY has been running a consistent balance of payments deficit since 1969, this has been offset to some degree by the huge amounts of Soviet economic aid that has been provided. (Table 1 refers.)

TABLE 1 SUMMARY BALANCE OF PAYMENTS					
(\$ Million)	<u>1969</u>	<u>73</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>76</u>	<u>77</u>
Domestic Exports	8	14	8	26	29
Retained Imports	-87	-120	-165	-267	-324
<u>Trade Deficit</u>	<u>-79</u>	<u>-106</u>	<u>-157</u>	<u>-241</u>	<u>-295</u>
Invisibles, net	<u>80</u>	<u>54</u>	<u>76</u>	<u>-145</u>	<u>-205</u>
Workers remitts.	57	33	56	115	180
Others, net	23	21	20	30	25
<u>Balance on Goods & Svcs.</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>-52</u>	<u>-81</u>	<u>-95</u>	<u>-90</u>
<u>Official Transfers</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>..</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>55</u>
<u>Official M & LT Capital</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>58</u>	<u>68</u>
Gross Disbursement	5	25	32	60	69
Repayment	..	..	-1	-2	-1
<u>Misc. Capital, net</u>	<u>-13</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>-21</u>	<u>7</u>
Overall Balance	-6	-4	-24	-13	40

SOURCE:

World Bank Country Study: PDRY
(Washington: World Bank, 1979)

Total disbursed assistance to PDRY in the period 1969-77 is estimated cumulatively at about \$250 million in long-term loans (2/3 from socialist countries) and \$113 million in grants. The latter are a comparatively new feature of PDRY's external finance, begun in 1975 and originate from Arab countries (Libya, Iraq, etc.). The bulk of official developmental assistance made available to PDRY in earlier years originated from socialist countries and UN aid agencies. The USSR was principally involved in the agricultural sector (irrigation works, establishment of state farms) and fisheries (particularly processing) . . . The heavy inflow of foreign resources has inevitably led to a rapid accumulation of PDRY's external public debt even through part of the aid was given in grant form. At the end of 1977, the total external debt amounted to \$432 million.³⁵

Military expenditures have remained relatively high (fluctuating around 10% of GNP since 1969-70). It should be noted that in PDRY, the armed forces participate when required in certain areas of economic activity, including public works, harvesting of crops, and the imparting of educational and technical skills.

TABLE 2 DEFENSE EXPENDITURES (Yemeni Denari/Millions*)

	Total Public Expend.	Defense Expend.	Develop. Expend.	Defense as % tot.	Develop. as % of tot.
FY 1969/70	16.8	8.2	7.6	48.8	9.5
FY 1973/74	35.0	10.4	12.1	29.7	34.6
FY 1976	78.4	17.1	39.2	21.9	50.1
FY 1977	101.4	18.9	57.0	18.6	56.2

*(YD1 = US \$2.90)

SOURCE:

World Bank Country Study: PDRY

The 1977 GNP was \$470 million. The PDRY's major trade partners include: North Yemen, East African states, imports from various Communist states, the Persian Gulf states, and there are refined petroleum exports to the United Kingdom and Japan. The major industry is petroleum refinement, but the majority of the population is engaged in subsistence agriculture and fishing. This grim economic picture, then, serves as one of the determinants for the course of political events particularly in the foreign policy arena, and moreover as a precursor for Soviet involvement. For instance, South Yemeni political ambitions have been assessed as, "the single discordant (Peninsular) political note, but to date, the most notable achievements of the South Yemenis have been their overthrow of the traditional hierarchy and attempts to assist rebels in the Dhofar Province of Oman. More significantly, they continue to flirt with the Soviets and thus to raise Saudi concerns as a potential Communist foothold on the Arabian Peninsula."³⁶

The brief history of South Yemen is highlighted by an increasingly radical policy-line accompanied by endemic financial crises and a ruthless power struggle in the NLF.³⁷ Zealous Marxist ideals abounded from the NLF leadership; they were overconfident from their recent combat successes and there were a number of young radicals in the country desiring immediate political, socio-economic reform, (in other words, total) at any risk. Fortunately, a more moderate, rather pragmatic tack was followed, based on the

realization that too rapid a change could produce devastating results.

As soon as the PRSY was formed, the USSR established diplomatic relations; however, early on, there was little aid in the form of money and hardware to accompany the verbal support. There are speculations that the Soviets were somewhat reticent to initially provide complete support to this young movement, perhaps recalling the difficulties with their investment in the UAR and being skeptical of an avowedly (i.e., truly) Marxist regime. It is likely that they were awaiting the precise opportunity. The Soviets also desired to maintain a degree of leverage over their clients as demonstrated through commitments to others: boosting the morale of the recipient, but leaving certain strings attached (as may be seen upon receipt of various types of equipment) until the nation had been properly assuaged, groomed and tested, ready to be brought up to operational status.

In 1969, desperately needing foreign assistance, PDRY President Ash-Sha'Abi visited the USSR. "During the visit, agreements on economic and technical cooperation and air communications were signed."³⁸ This point was of great significance to the Soviets as it afforded them landing possibilities enroute to the Indian Ocean and its littorals. What pervaded this relationship was Soviet apprehension of the "pragmatic" president (espousing "scientific socialism"), in conjunction with the PRC opening of an embassy in Aden.

What may not have been readily apparent to the Soviets was that the PDRY was sending signals of invitation to the USSR to straighten out the internal chaos; an ideal opportunity for the Soviets to obtain the coveted political influence. "Devoted to Marxist-Leninist ideology and hypnotized by dogmatic interpretations, the NLF radicals completely ignored South Yemen's economic realities and were determined to transform their country's backward capitalist (and to a great extent pre-capitalist) economy into a socialist one in the shortest possible time. Foreign assets and several branches of the PRSY economy were nationalized immediately; and in 1970, agrarian reform was implemented."³⁹ Unfortunately, the synthesis resulting from this leadership produced anarchy which saw rampant unemployment and was pointing in the ultimate direction of bankruptcy. Essentially, the Soviets were needed to bail out the South Yemenis.⁴⁰

When presented with the long-term yields that an association with the PDRY offered--furtherment of Marxist-Leninist ideology, entrenchment in this area of the globe, and enhancement of Soviet prestige, not to mention the economic benefits that would eventually be realized--how could they refuse? The War of Ramadan (or Yom Kippur, considering one's perspective) and the energy crisis that followed as a consequence emphasized two points for the Russians: a) Aden's strategic worth, and b) the value of the PDRY to undertake tasks that would benefit the USSR, (i.e., in the joint-security interests of the USSR and PDRY),

merely serving to reinforce the decision. For example, during the 1973 war, elements of the PDRY Navy helped to block the Bab al-Mandab to Israeli navigation. Arab use of oil as a weapon during the aftermath made relations with South Yemen very important--considering its routes to the oil resources. Because of the Soviet physical presence in the Middle East during this war, (Syria, Iraq, PDRY), a deterrent effect to Western escalation resulted. The USSR's position in the PDRY, then, became a strong one because Soviet expertise and assistance was needed to withstand heavy pressure from its neighbors (encouraged by the US and the growing Iranian forces active in Dhofar).⁴¹

The Saudis, in an effort to counter this situation, began a campaign to bring the PDRY regime back into the Arab camp by "bankrolling" the economy, but provided little military equipment. The Arab summit in Rabat in 1974 also produced some Gulf state monies for the PDRY--earmarked for the "moderation" campaign. For a short while, this was well received in Aden, (i.e., as long as remaining in the moderate camp directed South Yemeni ire towards Israel or the West) and proved to be in the regime's best interest. (Further, the Saudis realized that easing tensions within PDRY would also mean less Yemeni support for the Dhofar rebels.) The Marxist-Leninist ideology of the Ruba'i Ali government was not easily altered, as the Saudi Royal family discovered when fraternal assistance was also provided to the Eritrean rebels, later on; this was due primarily to ideological convictions vice military/strategic reasons.

2. A South Yemeni Chronological Receipt of Soviet Arms

Information on Soviet military aid to (Yemen and)

South Yemen has been fragmentary, partly because of the civil war in the 1960's, the strife produced by the transition of the Federation to independence and the severance of normal relations with the West.⁴² Perhaps the first identifiable quantities of Soviet military equipment arrived during the civil war when Soviet-made combat aircraft were detected; some as outright gifts and some on loan. When the Civil War was settled, the chance for direct Soviet involvement with Aden improved immensely. As relations improved between these two nations, Moscow commenced the arms transfer process with 27 July, 1968 being the arrival date of the first Soviet weapons in Aden. Later that year, the shipments included a number of T-34 tanks, and in addition, about 50 South Yemenis were granted scholarships in the Soviet Union.⁴³ This relationship continued to improve as the new radical regime was lured closer to the communist camp.

In 1969, the Soviet Union delivered twelve MiG-17's to Southern Yemen. By January, 1970, these planes were being operated from the ex-RAF base at Khormasaka in Aden. Reportedly, they were maintained by East European technicians. It was estimated that 100 Soviet experts, mostly military were in the country by the end of 1969. It was also announced that the Soviet Union had granted 150 scholarships including 70 in military affairs.⁴⁴

Improving the armed forces and building the national infrastructure were possible through an alliance with the USSR; "e.g.: Soviet assistance was far more diversified and sophisticated than Chinese and included large quantities of relatively modern arms, either given or sold at a great discount on long-term credit. South Yemeni officers, technicians and pilots, were trained in the USSR and Soviet experts built military installations in the PDRY and trained its military forces."⁴⁵

By the end of May, 1972, PDRY had received, in addition to various artillery pieces, over 50 T-34 tanks, 20 MiG-17/19's, fighter interceptors, several transport bombers, helicopters and a small number of patrol boats. Unconfirmed reports claimed that PDRY was given a squadron of MiG-21's and more sophisticated weapons. According to an exiled South Yemeni Prime Minister, more than 600 Soviet experts went to Aden after their services in Egypt were terminated in July, 1972, and were still there in 1973.⁴⁶

Perhaps further justification for the increasing amounts of aid which flowed into the PDRY was provided after reports of "British-Saudi-CIA" plots against the government manifested in the Soviet press, border pressures, and the opportunity for Moscow to make certain strides (to obvious military ends) in the situation. What the Soviets expected to gain in return for the economic and military aid was base rights, transforming a "toe-hold" in the area into a genuine foot-hold, and the development of a client-state,

potentially to be employed in a surrogate manner. (The closing of Bab al-Mandab has already been cited, but also of significance was the Soviet airlift and major re-supply operation to Ethiopia during the height of the Ethiopian-Somali war in 1977; Aden and Al Mukulla were two centers of staging operations.)⁴⁷

Over time, one observes the continual growth of the PDRY armed forces and most notably, the steady influx of Soviet equipment. (Refer to Table 3) There still exists continued fragmentation of specific information regarding the terms of trade, and other mechanics of Soviet-PDRY transactions, but nevertheless certain indicators are apparent to assist in drawing conclusions.

Placing these arms transfer statistics into perspective with Soviet global aims requires some further data, (recently made available through the CIA), demonstrating and re-emphasizing that "Moscow once again focused on military aid as its most effective means of building up influence in the Third World."⁴⁸ At the same time, the USSR expanded economic and technological cooperation with lesser developed countries in order to consolidate political gains and to assure markets and raw material supplies for various branches of Soviet industry,⁴⁹ (witness the PDRY's recently received technical/agricultural assistance). In attempting to gauge what motivating factors are driving the Moscow-Aden arms transfer relationship, the empirical evidence of military advisors/technicians partially provides this basis.

Table 3 Armed Forces of the PDRY	1973-74	1974-75	1975-76	1976-77	1977-78	1978-79	1979-80
Population Armed For. tot Est. GNP Def. Expendts.	1,560,000 9,500 \$140 mill. 15.5 "	1,610,000 14,000 \$500 mill. 26 "	1,660,000 18,000 \$500 mill. 26 "	1,740,000 21,000 \$500 mill. 41 "	1,790,000 21,300 \$500 mill. 43.7 "	1,830,000 20,900 \$240 mill. 56 "	1,870,000 20,800 \$500 mill. 56 "
ARMY 6 inf. brigs. 1 arm. btn. 1 arty. brig. 1 sig. unit. 1 trng. btn. 50 T-34/54 + various APC	8,800	11,300 + var. howitzers; 57 & 85 mm AA gn.	11,300	15,200 9 inf. brigs. 2 arm. bns. + SAM-7's	19,000 10 inf. brigs. 200 T-34/54 + Saladin & Ferret APC	19,000	20,800 105/122/130 mm howitzers; 120 mm mor; 122mm RCL; 37/57/85 mm towed; ZSU- 23/4 SP AA gun SAM-7/9
NAVY (subordinate to army) 2 sub chasers ex-Sov. SO-1 2 Minesweepers 3 landing cft.	200			300 2 MBT ex-Sov. P-6; 2 SV. land craft, Polnochny		600 15 small ptl. craft	500 2 ex-Sov. ZHUK FAC; 1 ex-Sov. Podgorny sml. ptl. craft; 3 Spear cst. ptl
AIR FORCE abt. 30 combat aircraft 1 ftr/bmr.sqn 15 MiG-17 1 Coin. sqn. 1 ftr & helo sqn.	2,500 39 a/c 1 ftr. sqn.w/ MiG-21 3 Mi 8 helos			27 combat a/c; others in storage	+3 MiG-15 UTI's; +3 AN- 24 AA.	1,300 34 combat a/c 7 IL-28 4 IL-14 Atoll AAM	1,300 109 combat a/c 3 FGA sqns. MiG-17F; 10 SU-20/22 3 Intercept sqns. 50 MiG21 tpt. sqn. 4 IL 14; 3 An-24 15,000
Para-military: People's Milit. Pub. Security							
Source: The Military Balance	IIS, (various years.)						

TABLE 4 COMMUNIST MILITARY TECHNICIANS IN LDC's, 1977*

	<u>Total</u>	<u>USSR & E. EURO.</u>	<u>CUBA</u>	<u>PRC</u>
Middle East	4,380	3,380	500	0
YAR	100	100	0	0
PDRY	700	350	350	0

Persons

TABLE 5 MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM LDC's TRAINED IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES*: 1956-77

	<u>Total</u>	<u>USSR & E. EURO.</u>	<u>PRC</u>
Middle East	24,275	21,675	2,220
YAR	1,175	1,175	0
PDRY	875	850	25

Persons

* Number present for 1 month or more, rounded to nearest five.

SOURCE:

Communist Aid to LDC's of the Free World, 1977;
CIA Research Paper, November, 1978

Additionally, the number of academic students being trained in Communist countries as of December, 1977 for North and South Yemen was 850 and 555, respectively, (take from the same source). A consistently accurate number of foreign national military advisors present in PDRY is not readily discernable:

About 10,000 foreigners were in South Yemen--4,000 Russians, 3,500 Cubans who trained and controlled the militia, and 1,100 E. Germans who controlled the security forces--a South Yemeni officer who fled to Oman told the daily Times of Oman on 22 February 79. Hatred of these foreigners, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, and conscription of adults between 16 and 55 has caused about 80,000 people to flee the country.⁵⁰

TABLE 6

Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports by Country by Year

YEAR	Arms IMP Mill. \$*	Arms XPT MILL. \$*	Total IMP Mill. \$*	Total XPT Mill. \$*	Arms %tot. IMP	XPT
ADEN						
1967	---	---	---	---	-	-
1968	2	0	205	110	1	0
1969	6	0	218	144	3	0
1970	4	0	201	146	2	0
1971	5	0	157	105	3	0
1972	20	0	149	108	13	0
1973	42	0	171	113	25	0
1974	43	0	406	242	11	0
1975	36	0	312	187	12	0
1976	38	1	NA	NA	NA	NA
SANAA						
1967	10	0	35	4	28	0
1968	5	0	35	4	14	0
1969	1	0	36	4	3	0
1970	2	0	32	3	6	0
1971	0	0	34	4	0	0
1972	9	0	80	4	11	0
1973	3	0	125	8	2	0
1974	14	0	190	13	7	0
1975	15	0	294	11	5	0
1976	17	0	NA	NA	NA	NA

*Current \$. Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1967-1976, USACDA Pub. \$98, July 1978, p. 155.

TABLE 7

VALUE OF ARMS TRANSFERS CUMULATIVE 1973-77 (Mill. \$**)

Recipient	Total	US	USSR	FRANCE	UK	PRC	FRG	OTHER
ADEN	170	--	160	--	1	-	-	10
SANAA	86	16	30	10	-	-	-	20

Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1968-1971, USACDA Pub. #100, October 1979, p. 156.

** Million \$ current.

The February-March 1979 war between the Yemens was a good opportunity for the Soviets to step up the tempo of their weapons transfers, to "combat test" their commitments and conduct a "live fire" exercise, perhaps grading the PDRY's performance as prospective surrogates. (The timeliness of the attack may have been related to South Yemen's desire to exploit its current superiority in military equipment.)⁵¹ At any rate, the Soviets attached a great deal of significance to this conflict, (as to what degree international timing played in the decision to commence hostilities is not readily apparent, but this action took place shortly after the Soviet-backed Vietnamese felt the brunt of the PRC retaliatory campaign: January 1979), as evidenced here:

Diplomatic sources in London have confirmed reports of a massive Soviet arms lift to South Yemen in the month preceeding the outbreak of the Yemeni war, the Times of Oman reported on 22 March 79.

According to the report, Soviet military equipment including tanks, armored cars and heavy vehicles "poured" into Aden in January. The Soviet naval presence increased and 17 warships and 3 submarines reportedly remain in the Bab al-Mandeb. A large air base has recently been completed at Makasar, near Mukalla, and Soviet-piloted MiG-23/25/27's are operating from it.⁵²

"That the USSR was aiding and abetting a military buildup in South Yemen far in excess of that country's normal needs was evident to US strategists. Equipment such as heavy rocket launchers, to which the YAR had no reply, was being shipped to Aden flown to old RAF bases in

the north of the former British protectorate, and then transferred by helicopter to the border."⁵³ There were also reports of pinpoint artillery shelling and highly coordinated attacks pointing to the Soviet advisory role. The deliveries evidently resulted from the 15-year military agreement signed by Moscow and Aden of June 1978. Among its terms was the construction of a naval base offering the Soviets repairs, storage, and communication facilities.⁵⁴ This agreement was one that was a long time in materializing, but was certainly welcomed in Moscow as well as Aden: "in addition the Soviet Union is reported to construct an air-base for the South Yemeni air force, also providing facilities for the Soviet air force; . . . to supply 30 MiG aircraft of an unspecified type, five patrol boats, and a major radar network to cover parts of the Gulf and Southern Arabia."⁵⁵ It is apparent that the Soviet logic involves providing weapons systems to the South Yemenis that would fulfill not only PDRY's, but also the Soviet's own needs.

At Soviet behest, the German Democratic Republic sent a military mission to Aden (November 1977) to instigate a major buildup in the PDRY armed forces, including reorganization and the task of running three training camps for terrorists and guerillas.⁵⁶ The Cairo press attempted to link the terrorist activities, Soviet involvement, and the patterns of hostilities according to the Middle East News Agency (MENA) in translation of the magazine Akher Saa;

the article was said to emanate from an Arab diplomat who had recently returned from Aden:

The magazine said that two months before the start of the recent fighting the Soviet Union supplied the government of Aden with squadrons of MiG-21 aircraft flown by Cuban pilots and with missile batteries which were positioned on the border. Specific numbers were not given.

The report also said that groups of militia men had returned from Moscow after completing their training on modern T-52 and T-62 Soviet tanks. These tanks had been used in the battles. Akher Saa said that the Soviet Union had chosen a moment for the Aden government to start its border operations against the Sanaa government when Arab and world attention was busy with the events in Iran and the war between Vietnam and China. Soviet experts were administering and operating the airfields and missile bases established along PDRY's border with Saudi Arabia.

The magazine also said that groups of the Palestinian rejection front had arrived in Aden to train infiltrators in sabotage operations and guerilla warfare in special camps under the supervision of Muhsen Sharjabi, head of the intelligence service in Aden, before going across the border to Sanaa. Special groups had also been formed to carry out assassination operations against a number of people who opposed the pro-Soviet regime in South Yemen.⁵⁷

Again, from a global perspective, "the establishment of naval and airbases on or near the principal oil routes is more important in the global balance than military support for client states."⁵⁸ In this respect, seapower and subsequent power-projection-ashore is quite important, as recently demonstrated to the South Yemenis:

A Soviet carrier task force recently went through its paces for the Marxist government of Southern Yemen, Pentagon sources reported. The sources said that the carrier MINSK plus an amphibious assault ship and a 'Kara' class cruiser anchored in the Southern Yemeni capital of Aden on 26 May 79 . . . Then the ships staged a short cruise where the MINSK demonstrated the capabilities of her V/STOL aircraft and the amphib opened the clamshell doors on her bow.⁵⁹

and as perhaps another gauge:

A Soviet missile-carrying nuclear submarine accompanied by a tender has entered Aden, the Southern Yemen port dominating Middle East tanker routes, Navy (i.e., USN) intelligence sources said.

A spokesman for the commander-in-chief in the Pacific, ADM M. Weisner, confirmed the report. The sources said it was not known whether the warship was at Aden on a temporary assignment, or was the vanguard of other Soviet vessels preparing to establish a new Soviet naval base on the tip of the Arabian Peninsula.

The spokesman identified the submarine as a "cruise missile-carrying Echo II class boat" comparable in size and firepower to American submarines of the Ethen Allen type, one of the Navy's biggest and fastest submarines.⁶⁰

And still:

The Soviet Union has completed the construction of a military base on the Red Sea island of Socotra, according to the Cairo daily Al-Ahram, 17 May 79. The base has a sophisticated electronic surveillance system and a communications center for tracking satellites, as well as long-range missile sites and facilities for submarines and warships, the paper said. The base has been built to replace lost facilities in Somalia.⁶¹

The Soviet-South Yemeni joint security interests are further enhanced through the establishment of a

40,000-man multinational paratroop force based in PDRY. Basing this unit here is in keeping with the Soviet doctrine of "correlation of forces" in a region prior to conflict. The airborne, quick-reaction force with its Soviet/East German/Cuban advisors reportedly has its own military supply depot which is essential for staging and conduct of strike operations in the Persian Gulf, the Horn, or on the Arabian Peninsula.⁶²

3. Soviet Use of Proxies: The Cubans of the Middle East?

The philosophy of surrogate warfare is a concept with which the Russians are intimately familiar; from their early experiences in the UAR until the present, they have developed a proficiency in translating this doctrine into action. For the Soviets, this has been profitable both politically, through enhancement of Russian prestige and ideological furtherment, as well as economically, first through arms transfer-related profits and then as a stimulus for Soviet commercial ventures. However, in the case of Yemen (as in Ethiopia), the Soviets have established a presence in a strategic sector of the Middle East. By cultivating the relationship between Aden and Moscow a dependency has been created with an awesome potential.

A graphic representation of Soviet foreign policy goals and structural factors with the interaction of PDRY's demand rationale summarizes this relationship. (See figs. 7 & 8) Soviet arms transfers to the PDRY are an essential

Soviet Structural Factors	PDRY Demand Factors									
	Production/Surplus of Conventional Weapons	Military oriented economy	Debt	Growth of Soviet Navy	Supply lines in support of client	Centralized logistics procedures	Inexperience in overseas logistics	Surrogate Operators of Soviet Equipment	Experience in Internal Security Operations	Ugly Russian Syndrome
Authoritarian gov't		+			+				+	
Low level of econ. dev.		+	-							
Undermilitarized	+			+	+			+		
Strategic Location	+			+	+	+	+	+		
Raw Mat'ls/Nat. Res.			-							
History of colonialism										-
Intractable conflicts										-
Lack of Arab unity										
Metropole links										
Fear of neo-Imperialism				-	-					-
Sanctity of borders										
Arabs/Islam										-

Fig. 7 Interaction of Soviet Structural Factors
With PDRY Demand Factors

Soviet Foreign Policy Objectives	Influence	Counter West. Presence	Break West. Monopoly	Expand Soviet Military Power	Internal Security of Client	Support Wars of National Liberation	Encourage Communist Movement	Counter PRC	Improve Balance of Payments	Support Arab Cause
PDRY Demand Factors										
Authoritarian gov't	+	+		+	+		+			
Low level of econ. dev.									-	
Undermilitarized	+			+						
Strategic location			+	+	+					
Raw Mat's/Nat. Res.										
History of colonialism										+
Intractable conflicts	+			+	+	+				
Lack of Arab unity	+			+						
Metropole links										
Fear of Imperialism	-	+								
Sanctity of borders										
Arabs/Islam							-	-		+

Fig. 8 Interaction of Soviet Foreign Policy Objectives with PDRY Demand Factors

consideration when forecasting South Yemen's Middle East theatre role. Beginning with this premise, there is evidence to construct this analogy: South Yemen--the Cuba of the Middle East.

The South Yemenis, by virtue of their Peninsular discordance, have become somewhat isolated. They are unpopular with the traditional regional powers and present a potentially destabilizing threat; "the South Yemenis are not held in high esteem in the Arab world because of their Soviet dealings."⁶³ Therefore, close relations with the USSR offers not only an attractiveness, but also certain "redeeming" aspects (for PDRY) and ease the negative effects of isolation. This is underscored through the signing of a PDRY-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on 25 October, 1979. A side effect of this treaty was the Soviet and Cuban decision to increase the number of their advisors in-country to 15,000.⁶⁴

The further role of the Soviet and Cuban advisors, then, is merely speculative. Given the proven intimacy between the Soviet Union and Cuba, adding the PDRY to this existing power structure may indicate Moscow's desire to have the South Yemenis also perform essentially Russian-engineered military operations.

The sociology of the arms transfer process may be seen working to Soviet advantage, for by providing modern weapons systems to an essentially developing people, a dependency of sorts is created--on spare parts, repairmen,

instructors, etc. The technology transfer also serves as a vehicle for ideological and cultural exchange, as has been shown; not to mention the accompanying hard currency benefits.

From this estimation, one may conclude that the present relationship between Moscow and Aden is more than a quick-fix target of opportunity for the Soviets; it is a complex arrangement with many of its fine points only implied or left to the deduction of the individual analyst. Additionally, there are a myriad of ultimate objectives involved; both from the standpoint of one of the super-powers and an emerging Marxist republic, few of which are obvious. Exactly what these Middle Eastern "Cubans" may undertake, be it furthering subversion, mustering pro-Soviet sentiments, assisting other liberation movements, or performing any number of tactical assignments is integrally linked to Soviet arms transfers and the PDRY acquisition, as the actual conduct of operations is a function of the possession of the necessary capabilities.⁶⁵

With this hypothetical situation in mind, a recent event may serve as yet another indicator of this affiliation as an eventuality. In November, 1979, the most holy site in Islam, the Grand Mosque in Mecca, was the target of a carefully planned military assault. Intelligence reports of the incident uncovered that the plot was inspired by South Yemen and Libya:⁶⁶ an attempt at kidnapping the Saudi King, Khalid, and instituting fundamental Islamic

reforms, the apparent motive. The attack was mounted by a self-proclaimed mahdi (messiah) and his 500 followers.⁶⁷ The arms for this group were brought into Mecca in containers from Libya and PDRY via Beirut. This incident, aimed at the Saudi monarchy, (though probably not engineered by the Soviets), most probably took place with KGB foreknowledge. Moscow might exploit this sort of occurrence to its advantage, via South Yemen and other nations in the area friendly to the Soviet Union.

On an explicitly military basis, the Soviet and Cuban advisors in Aden illustrate the possibility of regional Angola-style campaigns. That the PDRY has the Soviet-provided capacity to offer assistance external to the Arabian Peninsula is demonstrated by this discovery:

Egypt's influential daily, Al Ahram, has reported that two South Yemeni infantry regiments were dispatched to Afghanistan to fight alongside the Afghan regular army and Soviet troops. In a story dated Aden, Al Ahram said Yemeni troops were "part of an operation to replace Soviet troops." The South Yemeni troops are to play the role of Soviet surrogates, the same role played by Cubans in Africa in recent months. The Yemenis, being Muslims, are likely to raise less of a political story than the Cubans in a predominantly Muslim Afghanistan.⁶⁸

Based on the available evidence, it appears that the PDRY not only has both the potential and the demonstrated capabilities of yet another effective Soviet surrogate force.

IV. SINO-SOVIET "ONE-UPMANSHIP" IN THE YEMENS

"What kind of spirit is this that makes a foreigner selflessly adopt the cause of the Chinese people's liberation as his own? It is the spirit of internationalism."

Chairman Mao Tse-Tung

A. THE PARAMETERS OF COMPETITION

A significant phase of Yemeni history was the period in which both the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union vied for influence in the YAR and the PDRY. For nearly twenty years, from the late 1950's through the mid-1970's, these two Communist giants provided developmental assistance in a competitive manner to the two Arab states; the results of their efforts were as divergent as their motives. The intent of this chapter is to demonstrate how the competition between the PRC and the USSR reflected their respective foreign policies in this period, and how Moscow achieved a relative advantage over Peking.

The availability of unclassified, hard data to empirically quantify the level of Sino-Soviet rivalry in the Middle East in general and in the Yemens particularly, is limited. Therefore, in making this appraisal, the output analysis technique (of Soviet and Chinese foreign policies) has been employed. In this regard, the Chinese experience in the Arab world has been punctuated by shifting national objectives. The PRC's experiment in the PDRY and in the YAR reflects these policy shifts; the broader implications relate to Chinese superpower

aspirations and attempts to counter Soviet advances, first through ideological exports, then followed by the wave of current pragmatism.

When the PRC was born in 1949, it emerged from a long and decimating civil war. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) enjoyed significant popularity and shared an ideological common ground with the Soviet Union, namely an adherence to Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The two entered into a relationship that produced mutual goals and, what appeared to many Westerners, a monolithic Communist threat.¹

Stalin's succession by Nikita Khrushchev added a strain to this association, for with his premiership, difficulties began to surface concerning the character of the epoch (i.e., the international balance of power), the path to socialism, and the concept of peaceful coexistence;² moreover, the PRC began to emerge as a more independent actor in their relationship. These difficulties manifested themselves in the form of clashes between Russian and Chinese personalities, Khrushchev's and Mao Tse-Tung's. The combined result of these differences formed the basis for angry Chinese polemics aimed at the Moscow "revisionist renegade clique" of "social imperialism," the betrayers of world revolution.³ (Soviet counter-charges against the "Maoist cult of personality" were the typical rebuttal.) Indeed this dispute had a fragmentary effect on world Communism, as the USSR could not maintain hegemony over the PRC; "this internationalist aspect increased especially after the PRC refused satellite status and demanded

F/8 5/4


NL

2 of 2
00
NO 04 90-3

DATE _____

6 of 6

0-0-0



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

parity with the USSR. The disagreement's ideological dimension escalated into open and bitter conflict."⁴ The severity of this conflict was demonstrated during the 1969 border clashes on the Ussuri River, where the aftermath of this limited engagement threatened to produce a nuclear exchange.⁵ As neither the USSR nor the PRC could afford the consequences of global war, alternate means of expression were necessary. The Third World provided the ideal "battle-ground."

There is voluminous literature devoted to the subject of the Sino-Soviet rift, as well as numerous speculations about the probable determinants. Beginning with the premise that this dispute translated into competitive foreign policies, to examine the case of Yemen and the split in terms of the following hypothesis would be fitting: "Perhaps the PRC's efforts were fostered by an ideological cleavage with the Soviet Union, with an overlay of resurgent Chinese nationalism." (The assumption is made that a degree of Russian imperialism exists on the part of the USSR.) This would explain the separate approaches in their relations with selected "promising" regimes (i.e., those potentially receptive to Marxist-Leninist social order restructuring) and the assistance the two were both willing and able to provide. The YAR and the PDRY function as a suitable test case.

B. ORIGINS AND EXTENT OF CHINESE INVOLVEMENT

"As Sino-Soviet friction mounted in the late 1950's, Peking placed growing emphasis on China's affinity with those

areas of the Third World where Moscow had serious historical and contemporary stakes. During 1955-57, China's relations with most Arab states were a function of direct Chinese-Egyptian relations,"⁶ which at this point were their most cordial. For instance, China provided the UAR with a good deal of assistance during the Suez crisis: rolled steel, a \$4.7 million grant, volunteers for the fight against Israel, and a market for Egyptian cotton.⁷ As Egypt attempted to pursue nonaligned foreign relations, China emphasized the two countries' "Afro-Asianness" and pushed an anti-Soviet line in the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization. The Yemen (Imamate) and the PRC established diplomatic relations in 1956 and in so doing followed in the footsteps of Egypt and Syria⁸ (the UAR ties being the most likely impetus).

The growing troubles between the PRC and the USSR forced Egypt to sever relations with China, leaning in effect, to the Soviet side, which was not surprising given the Russian investments in that country. However, when Sino-Egyptian relations ended, the ties that China had forged in Yemen remained (recalling the Soviet hesitancy to establish strong bilateral relations with Yemen and the Egyptian "buffer"); the door was opened for an improved Sino-Yemeni rapport. Crown Prince Badr paid a month-long visit to Peking in which a treaty of friendship and commerce, and an agreement on scientific, technical and cultural cooperation between the two nations were concluded. Additionally, the PRC affirmed its support of the Yemeni claim to territories under British

protection and new premises were completed with financial assistance for the Institute of Islamic Theology.⁹

The 1962 Revolution, from which the Republic sprang into existence, marked the possibility of fertile political exchanges for Peking . . .

. . . the radical outlook of many Yemeni revolutionaries after 1962 found a sympathetic response in Peking. If (the PRC) sought its "Albania" in the Arab world, Yemen for some years was a leading candidate. The magnitude of the Chinese threat to Soviet policies, however, should not be exaggerated. Chinese aid and technical assistance were small compared to Russian and trade remained negligible; meanwhile, arms, the principal commodity of interest to Sanaa during the long struggle with the royalists, were provided by Moscow, not Peking.¹⁰

Considering the limited physical ability of the PRC to project itself in the Third World, the Yemen experience is noteworthy. The primary vehicle for this effort was through friendly diplomatic and political relations, combined with labor-intensive projects, designed to impress, and benefit the burgeoning Republic. For example, when President Sallal visited the PRC in 1964, he received a "tumultuous" welcome, attributed to "Peking's continuing effort to develop closer ties with African states and represent itself to them as a more appealing ally than the Soviet Union."¹¹ Evidently, a popularity for the Chinese in Yemen resulted. Remaining somewhat aloof from politics (e.g.: no evidence of Chinese subversion as compared to Soviet complicity in anti-government conspiracies), they were very professional in constructing roads, a textile mill, and a technical high school; Chinese

foremen worked side by side with Yemeni laborers.¹² (One further comparison to the Soviet efforts: they embarked on projects with long-term Soviet benefits--development of the Hodeida port facilities, expansion of the Sanaa airport and building of telecommunications facilities with East German help.)¹³

In 1966, China changed the course of her foreign policy and turned inward; the Cultural Revolution heralded two years of Chinese isolation and essentially her withdrawal from the international scene. The routine management of this event prevented PRC leaders from involving themselves in such things as the 1967 Arab-Israeli War (save for token wheat offerings to Egypt); however, in 1968, when China emerged from this introspection, there were changes in her Middle East foreign policy and in the international state system.¹⁴ The PRC's foreign policy, though still "radical", was tempered with pragmatism hereafter. In the case of Yemen, this meant lending implicit approval to North Yemen's shifting alignment, (i.e., away from the USSR and towards Saudi Arabia and the West), and increasing trade.¹⁵

Concomitantly in 1968, the PRC established diplomatic relations with South Yemen. At first, China's involvement was indirect and mainly within the framework of its revolutionary anti-colonialist policy;¹⁶ however, as the PRC perceived the threat from the USSR to be more to China's own strategic/national interests, practicality refined ideology. While providing assistance to the YAR, "the

Chinese credit extended to the PDRY was the first from a socialist country, and progress on a number of Chinese-supported projects was reported. Meanwhile, Peking found many supporters among the wide spectrum of radicals in Southern Yemen, both in and out of the NLF (certainly there were more Maoists in Southern Yemen relative to its size than in any other Arab state).¹⁷ In fact, the Ash-Shabi regime, although critical of the extreme leftists, allowed the PRC to establish its largest diplomatic mission in the Middle East in Aden and to conduct an extensive economic survey of the country.¹⁸ Relations improved considerably once Salem Rubai Ali came to power; he followed the Chinese model of agrarian reform, forced collectivization, and nationalization of industry. As the success of these policies was limited, Chinese credibility was placed in jeopardy.

In keeping with the commitment of helping bring about world revolution, China provided tacit support to the "progressive" forces in the region. Since 1967, the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (later PFLO)¹⁹, along with insignificant other groups received Chinese lip-service and varying degrees of hardware. However, the economic and logistic constraints involved in providing meaningful support to these movements were entirely too taxing on the PRC. Additionally, this region (save for the PDRY) was not particularly receptive to the liberation concept; the majority of the emirates and sheikhdoms had

legitimacy among their subjects resulting in loyalty to the government. Finally, the post-Cultural Revolution view of the world, the decision to respond to a possible Sino-American rapprochement and the insecurity resulting from the Czechoslovakian invasion coupled with the Chenpao/Ussuri River border conflicts, brought about a fundamental shift in dealings with the Yemens.

For the Soviets, the Chinese presence in PDRY presented problems as previously experienced in the North--this was not at all unlike the similar rivalry in Africa (an ideological "one-upsmanship" series of maneuvers) which had to be held in check. The PRC exploitation of the Arab-Chinese racial identification and socio-economic likeness would be beneficial and could probably offset any Soviet gains. (The corollary to this possibility is that through Peking's "software" approach, China was able to ensure that Soviet hardware was used to its advantage in Dhofar. The USSR then, "assisted in destabilizing efforts of the Gulf rebels, contrary to its interest in maintaining good relations with Iran, Iraq and in securing Gulf oil for Eastern Europe and itself.)"²⁰

The Ali regime realized the limitations of China's ability to assist the PDRY as the tempo of Soviet aid increased. The PRC could provide Little Red Books and revolutionary slogans, but little else.²¹ That fact notwithstanding, the Ismail-Ali rivalry in PDRY forced Ali to maintain his ties with the PRC and thereby offset Soviet advances. As Ali was pro-Peking in his orientation and

represented an even more militant Yemeni faction, it seemed natural to structure the People's militia on the Chinese model and with Chinese aid. (Chinese arms and a military delegation had already reached Aden at the beginning of 1971.)²² With the collapse of the Dhofar Rebellion in 1976, China was no longer a credible military actor; "the subsequent role of the military mission remained a matter of conjecture."²³

Chinese achievements in South Yemen, other than those defense-related, include establishment of a Yemeni medical facility with ten Chinese physicians; increased assistance to the Yemeni fishing industry, including several fishing vessels built in the PRC and a fish-canning factory; construction of a textile mill with a production capacity of seven million yards of cotton per year.²⁴ Again, as in the YAR, the assistance provided by the PRC was essentially labor-intensive, non-military when compared to the USSR's military orientation. In this connection, China could compete with the Soviet Union and still hope to gain the coveted political influence. By modifying foreign policy goals and subsequent interpretation of Marxist-Leninist tenet (i.e., the evolution of 'scientific socialism') the PRC could conduct diplomatic and economic relations with such states as Kuwait and Iran, while at the same time, pursue the strategic objective of countering, or at least contending with the Soviet Union, who was at this point perceived as Peking's primary adversary.

C. PRESENT AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF COMPETITION

With the death of Mao Tse-Tung, the fall of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four and Teng Tiao-ping's installation as Vice Premier, the wave of pragmatism in Chinese foreign relations has grown. In the Middle East, this means that Chinese and Soviet presence is a formula for competition.

China is accelerating its insistent wooing of Arab states as part of its effort to stymie Soviet advances. A low-key diplomatic approach, common interests in oil and burgeoning trade links smoothe the courtship. But China's efforts remain too weak to protect Peking's major strategic interests in the region and China still wields no real influence in the Middle East, remaining at the mercy of events such as the Shah's fall and the unexpected dramatic resurgence of Islam as a political force.

The diplomatic push by Peking is concentrated particularly around the favorite Soviet hunting ground, the Red Sea and the Gulf. (Vice premiers and chairmen of the PRC parliament have recently completed lengthy missions there.)²⁵

The PRC, at a relative military disadvantage, (i.e., to provide protracted security assistance) and with a xenophobic Middle Kingdom legacy, has incorporated the Confucian concept "Li" into its foreign relations with the Arab world. Perhaps it is a means of better relating to the adherents of Islam; "Li" embodies conservatism, realism, politeness, and a constant quest for harmony. It does not, however, include altruism (meaning that the motive for this stance is the pursuit of China's strategic and national interests).²⁶ With ideological metaphors and Maoist rhetoric having set

the tone of previous endeavors, adopting this new tactic is not surprising. Paralleling the shift in diplomacy has been the on-going construction phase of the PRC relations with both Yemens. The Chinese can compete with the Soviets in this respect, in an effort to sway Yemeni allegiances.

For example:

Aid to Aden includes some finely engineered highways, including the Ain-Mukalla link with its 70 bridges and 600 tunnels, a fishery co-operative and a farm tool and hardware factory. Chinese completed staff training for this plant in December (1978) and handed it over. ("This factor typifies the Chinese approach in the Middle East. They are not making the same mistakes the Russians are, they tend to go in, build something, train the technicians and walk away; the Soviets stick around and get involved," a Western diplomat commented.)

In North Yemen, China is building the Sanaa-Sada highway and has signed an agreement on construction of an international conference center.²⁷

These efforts are essential components of Chinese regional strategy, for they have cooled relations with Ethiopia. They are making overtures to Somalia and stand ready to aid that nation with industrial development; this coincides with Somalia's expulsion of Soviet advisors and closure of Berbera.

The CCP still has a fundamental role in pursuit of these Middle East objectives by delivering scorching polemics regarding Soviet adventures. Soviet hegemonism

and "Third World domination" have been targeted by The People's Daily and Red Flag (the CCP theoretical digest):

The USSR is rolling up the whole of Africa from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, revealing its ugly and social imperialist essence.

. . . By establishing itself there, it would regain lost prestige and move into Southern African and the Arabian Peninsula as well . . . Facts show that the side that receives Soviet assistance as well as the side that opposes it are both victims of social imperialist aggression and objects of the Soviet Union's colonial enslavement . . .²⁸

Since the assassination in the North and the coup d'etat in the South (June 1978), the criticism has increased in frequency and severity. As the Soviets effectively struck a blow at Maoism when Ali was executed, (a victory of Soviet over Chinese socialism), the attacks in the media did not begin immediately after his death, rather proceeded with a graduated response, carrying the stories of Soviet complicity from other nations' presses.²⁹

As to the future shape of Chinese policy in the Yemens, one may only speculate based on recent developments. The coup in PDRY resulting in increased Soviet entrenchment, and the Iranian revolution (specifically the ouster of their former ally, the Shah) have been humiliating events for the PRC. China and Pakistan share certain security interests and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has posed a potential threat to these. In order to counter that threat, the PRC Foreign Minister, Hung Hua, paid a visit to Pakistan

discussing security assistance (and probably the re-transfer of military equipment to Muslim partisans in Afghanistan).³⁰ Additionally, the normalization of Sino-American relations and the mounting concern over the apparent Soviet containment attempts would indicate that China may increase her dealings with the YAR. A mutual defense, or any other Sino-Yemeni military agreement remains at this point, a function of the PRC logistic and resupply capability. Accordingly, the two Yemens will remain barometers that reflect indirectly, but accurately, the reading of the continuing Sino-Soviet dispute.

V. THE US AND THE YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

The time is going to come when we need to do some fundamental rethinking about arming everybody in the world and to this extent, particularly in a region like that (the Arabian Peninsula).

We talk about justifying it in terms of our security needs. For a long time, we thought we were talking about Iran's security needs with all the weaponry and things we put into that country.

--Rep. Gerry E. Studds
(to House Subcommittee on
Europe and the Middle East;
96th Congress, first session:
hearing on aid request to
YAR)

A. BACKGROUND

In the years since World War II, the United States policy towards the Middle East in general and the Arabian Peninsula in particular has been characterized by a desire to bolster the existing traditional governments there. By assuring a stable set of political relationships, US interests--primarily an uninterrupted oil supply--would best be protected. Often, this policy has required that Soviet presence and advances be countered. The rationale for this American policy can be found in spirit, if not always in the letter, of the 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine.¹ This doctrine, an integral component of the Cold War and an extension of the Truman-Kennan containment theory, proved to be reactive and geared towards a series of crisis-management responses to the dynamic events in this region. Although a precursor to the Nixon and "Carter" Doctrines (1969 and 1980 respectively), the general tone is

one of stability in light of local events potentially jeopardizing US vital interests.

In the Middle East there is a confluence of US as well as Soviet interests; the process of protecting these has produced contention:

Rivalry and competition between the US and the USSR are the consequences of three factors: (1) they are superpowers in a world which has no others; (2) they have fundamental differences in ideology; and (3) they share the belief that a significant gain for one (in military power, control of territory or expanded influence) constitutes a corresponding loss and a danger for the other. Geography and oil make it almost inevitable that (they) will pursue active and competing policies in this region.²

There are two points which account for a sharp differentiation between US and Soviet policies: a) the apparent methodical, long-range, calculated, global goals of Soviet power projection as contrasted to those of the US which change regularly on a four-year cycle; and b) the inertial effects of a Soviet military (especially the naval) bureaucracy in motion working to achieve a desired end.

In this context, attention must be paid to emerging Soviet perceptions regarding the possibility of a Western reaction to their involvement in the area. The seriousness with which the Russians take certain press accounts relating to mounting US concern about their role and Western needs to challenge it is difficult to gauge. One may speculate that they are seriously concerned, and if this is correct, it follows that Moscow (though desirous of filling power vacuums or posing as the defender of "progressive forces" in the

area) remains worried about escalations which threaten confrontations with the US.³ Rather than attempting to counter each Soviet foray with a counter-demonstration. . .

. . . (Nevertheless) in as critical an area as this one, at least as perceived by both sides, it would be useful to decompress the tension by as clear cut a delimitation of military presence, without at the same time destabilizing the local situation to our disadvantage, is, of course,⁴ the perennial challenge for (US) policy-makers.

The principle means of carrying out this mission has been through cultivating relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran, "the two-pillar policy." However, certain events have necessitated a reordering of priorities in this corner of the globe and a change in the direction and approach of American foreign policy. The Iranian revolution, the subsequent shockwaves of Islamic revival, the February-March 1979 border war between the YAR and the PDRY, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan emphasize the need for this change.

B. THE SANAA-RIYAH-WASHINGTON TRIAD

The delicate relationship between the Sanaa government, the Saudi monarchy and the United States is growing every more inter-dependent, as the national interests of each are challenged by the Soviet Union and their proxy force, the South Yemenis. A tactical (and in some instances a more formal) alliance is required if these three actors are to conduct a concerted response to this challenge. This unstable tri-lateral relationship is dependent on the preservation of the security interests of each. For the YAR and Saudi Arabia,

territorial and internal security is at stake, while for the United States, there are definite foreign policy objectives (i.e., specific regional goals) to be achieved. The concerns of each of these actors will be identified here.

Conceptually, one may view this relationship as a triangle with each leg representing a country; a security triangle, of sorts. Forming the bond which holds the nations together is a combination of labor (Yemeni-Saudi), security assistance (US-Saudi-Yemeni) and petroleum (Saudi-US); a more nebulous security bond links the YAR and the US.

1. Sanaa. The Yemen Arab Republic is indeed in a state of transition, as apparent from the account of political events.

A major goal of the government through (its developmental) programs is to increase the sense of nationalism among Yemenis, with the resultant loyalty to the central government. Yemenis possess a strong sense of identity, but this identity is still closely tied to tribal, village, regional, or religious affiliations. The concept of national identity could transcend these other loyalties, but the lack of stability in the central government and the perceived weakness of the government, even in matters of security, not only hinders national cohesiveness, but private and foreign investment as well.⁵

It has been said that were the Yemmn to achieve true internal security this cohesiveness would offset any external threat, particularly from South Yemen.⁶ The YAR is determined to achieve this security: it is imperative that Yemen become strong and build up its internal structure, not only politically, but militarily (regardless of the source; the line of thinking is that the ultimate goal of national security will

be strong enough to resist any "political strings" attached to the aid provided). This goal is applicable to all states of the Arabian Peninsula, the emirates, sheikhdoms, etc.

2. Riyadh. Since the time of Abd al-Aziz al Saud (Ibn Saud) the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's first monarch, the Royal family ruled consistently and unchallenged, with peaceful succession remaining "in house." King Faisal ruled Saudi Arabia until his assasssination by a nephew in 1975. He guided the nation through the momentous few years of the country's growth, especially in the two years after the October 1973 war, which led to major price increases in Saudi (and other Arab states') oil.⁷ He was instrumental in swaying the allegiances of the republican regime in Sanaa away from the USSR and towards the West. A similar campaign was attempted in PDRY, but was unsuccessful. What emerged from this period and remains so today is a here-to-fore incomprehensible "international power and stature."

King Faisal's successors, King Khalid and Crown Prince Fahd continued the policy of modernization begun by Faisal, but they expanded the task and began preparing an activist, conservative foreign policy on a scale not considered before.⁸ The basis for this foreign policy is a Saudi hegemony of sorts that will ensure the aims of the Royal family--the unquestioned national goals--are met. In concrete terms, this means maintenance of the balance of power in the region, especially resisting the Soviet incursions in the PDRY, the

Horn of Africa, and on the Iraqi border. Although, for the YAR, these closer ties are resented somewhat as an impediment to Yemen's freedom of action.⁹ Saudi Arabia, naturally, is also very concerned with this situation and, not wanting to see a radical regime on her Southern borders, has strengthened her ties and military aid to Yemen.¹⁰ The Saudis wish to ameliorate this situation, perhaps for fear of a threat to their monarchy.

The question has been asked if Saudi Arabia will feel the spillover effects of events in Iran and be faced with a similar revolution, via the Yemens, but the answer is not exactly clear. To be sure, there are numerous similarities in the domestic structures, but there are more significant differences that may indicate resistance to Yemeni, or other destabilizing efforts. For example, the average Saudi Arabian receives a greater share of revenues from petro-dollars than his Iranian contemporary; there are the Islamic religious differences, Sunni and Shi'a (Saudi Arabia and Iran, respectively); and in Saudi Arabia, the Saud king is approachable to any member of society--a striking difference to the Pahlavi dynasty. Conversely, statistics show that there is a growing middle class emerging and this frustrated class consciousness could prove fruitful for revolutionary reform. In fact, "when and if a revolution comes, it will probably not be one under the aegis of Islam--which makes it all the more probable that a Marxist tone will predominate. . . It is quite conceivable that when violent change comes about, it will

take place at a moment when the frustrations of the Bedouin population have progressed to such a point that the Bedouin army will be prepared to make common cause with the regulars."¹¹

There has been a good deal of speculation of late as to what the ultimate direction of Saudi foreign policy will take; this is inseparably linked to the question of succession. Foreign Minister Saud would no doubt prefer to pursue a policy of close cooperation with all Arab states, and he can justifiably maintain that even the Kingdom's Arab opponents would be willing to engage in such a policy of official "friendship." (That Saud places a premium on 'intra-Arab conflict resolution' may be borne out through the results of the March 1979 Yemen crisis.)¹² However, there have also been murmurings on a large scale of dissension within the Royal family, ranging from questions of Prince Fahd's succession as Crown Prince to how to support the Egypt-Israeli peace treaty. The nuances of the Saudi dissensions and disagreements are many, some less subtle than others. Basically, the older generation of Abdul-Aziz's sons is inclined to rely on the old, and in some respects proven alliance with the United States, based on some mutual confidence rather than any written documents. But today, confidence in the Americans is somewhat shaken. The fall of the US ally, the Shah of Iran and the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty diminish this confidence. The Saudi leaders, however, feel that giving their blanket approval to this effort would be the "start of suicide, exposing themselves

to the broadsides of Arab nationalist propaganda." (The more mistrustful of them ask: Is this the beginning of Washington's attempt to destabilize our dynasty?)¹³ For instance, just after the Shah's exit from Teheran, the US sent a squadron of unarmed F-15's to Saudi Arabia.¹⁴ This demonstration was so wrought with international bureaucratic requirements (e.g.: airspace clearances, fueling stops, etc.) that it proved to be more of an exercise in frustration rather than accomplishing its purpose as a viable show of force. Displays such as these do not exactly enhance the US image as a superpower.

Despite these difficulties and the subsequent Saudi feelings of isolation, "the reigning sons of Abdul-Aziz will probably continue to work with the US in security policy, avoid direct attacks against Washington's peace efforts, and exert a certain moderating influence on OPEC's oil pricing. How long this informal collaboration will continue will depend in part on American tact;"¹⁵ and in part on the outcome of the 1980 Presidential election. Maintenance of Peninsular security and regional stability, primary US foreign policy objectives, may be accomplished with the help of the Saudis, provided US demands are not overpowering and that the "special relationship" with Riyadh is nurtured.

Finally, the Saudis and Yemenis are partners in a labor-oriented reciprocity; Saudi Arabia has embarked on a developmental program in need of a large number of workers. This is due to the fact that Saudi Arabia is enjoying a booming

affluence and many Saudis decline menial, or semi-skilled work: the YAR is the closest and most adaptable source of labor supply.¹⁶ The YAR is clearly benefitting from this Saudi affluence as no less than one-million (estimates range from five-hundred-thousand to two-million) Yemeni workers are engaged in projects in Saudi Arabia and other Arab states. Estimated worker repatriation of funds for 1977 exceeded \$1.5 billion.¹⁷ This influx was desperately needed by the Yemen, in undertaking its own developmental projects. (This reciprocity will surface again in unification considerations.)

3. Washington. There are a number of concerns which pervade the US-Yemeni relationship; these are listed in priority importance here:

(a) Despite major US commitments to the continued existence of the YAR as a strong, independent state, most Yemenis are concerned about US priorities in the area, the strength of US commitments after Iran, and reactions to US peace efforts in the Middle East;

(b) The Government of Yemen must have foreign experts and programs to meet the goals it has set for the country's economic development. Yemen receives considerable aid each year from a number of countries, including the US, plus remittances from Yemenis working abroad. Americans are presently considered by most Yemenis as having the best expertise to assist them in their development, but we are in continuing competition with Bloc and oil-rich nations to maintain this position of influence;

(c) Many Yemenis have great misconceptions concerning US society, its traditions and values, and some even consider it the antithesis of traditional Islamic practices, despite their admiration for US technology and education;

(d) Even in the highest level of government, US political processes are not understood, particularly the role of the media in US foreign policy.¹⁸

In a comparative sense the US forte is in diplomacy and scientific and technological exchange. Efforts here can succeed where Soviet and East European missions have failed. A potential strain in relations between the US and the YAR (based on Yemeni demands), may emerge should the US be perceived as "less than forthcoming" in these areas. Military and developmental assistance is the key to US policy formulation; all other issues, both regional and bilateral, which affect the Yemeni-American dialogue are peripheral.¹⁹

C. THE ARMS TRANSFER AFFILIATION

"Overall, our policy towards North Yemen reflects our concern for the security and the integrity of the Arabian Peninsula and our desire to encourage cooperation among moderate Peninsula states, to assure security and orderly development of the region, and to develop a strong bi-lateral rapport with the YAR."²⁰ It has been this "orderly development" tactic which has translated into encouraging economic development and advancing Yemeni social progress; together these form the first tier of US-Yemeni relations. Building on this theme, US economic aid to Yemen would ideally spark similar assistance from Yemen's neighbor. This in fact has been the case, for since 1972, the US has furnished in excess of \$75 million in developmental assistance, while Saudi Arabia and other nations have supplied over \$1 billion to the YAR.²¹ After a rather lengthy involvement with the USSR, the Yemeni receptivity towards an improved stance vis-a-vis the West and Saudi

Arabia was a dramatic--and rewarding--policy shift; (e.g.: On 6 August, 1975, King Khalid made a gift of 810 million Saudi riyals, approximately 110 million British pounds, to North Yemen's budget and development projects paralleling Washington's decision to sell the YAR weapons and provide training.)²²

The second tier of the US policy has been concerned with fulfilling Yemeni security needs; the tempo of military aid being a function of the threat perception from the South (i.e., Soviet arms transfers to PDRY). The present military program is tri-lateral: Yemeni-Saudi-American, although the Yemenis would like direct bilateral relations.²³ The fact that the Saudis are such key actors in this arrangement is merely reflective of the broader perspective of the US arms transfer policy.

The US, in 1976, agreed to its first sale of military equipment to North Yemen--some \$140 million in essential infantry equipment, financed by Saudi Arabia--and began training members of the Yemen armed forces under our International Military Education and Training Program (IMET). . . . In the spring of 1978, the US agreed to a Saudi transfer of 4 F-5B trainer aircraft to North Yemen in anticipation of developing an F-5 squadron as the YAR air force.²⁴

Table 8 is a list of all US equipment transferred to the Yemen Arab Republic; note the timing and actions in the PDRY; a graphic representation of the interaction between US foreign policy objectives (with a Saudi Royal Family overlay) and Yemeni Demand factors follows in Fig. 9 .

TABLE 8

LIST OF EQUIPMENT TRANSFERRED TO THE YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

<u>Item</u>	<u>Comment</u>	<u>PDRY Timeline</u>
81 81 mm mortars	Congress notified '76 All delivered	(1973 - 1976)
127 50 cal. machine guns	Congress notified '76 50 delivered	Continuing border clashes; various territorial violations.
18,015 light anti- tank weaps (IAW)	Congress notified '76 6,975 dlvr'd.	Unification attempts.
74 Vulcan air defense guns	Congress notified '76 36 dlvr'd.	1976
Vulcan ammunition	Congress notified '76 2.3 mill. rounds dlvr.	Diplomatic relations established with Saudi Arabia;
64 105mm towed howtzers.	Congress notified '76 12 dlvr'd.	Unsuccessful coup attempted YAR.
105mm ammunition	all dlvr'd.	End of Dhofar Rebellion supported by PDRY.
200 M79 grenade launch. and ammunition	Cong. notification not req'd. all dlvr'd.	
50 M113A1 APC's	Cong. review waived; all dlvr'd.	1978
50 APC (x-ferred from SAG	Cong. review waived; all dlvr'd.	Assassination in YAR, Coup d'etat in PDRY
2 BAK-12 runway barriers	Cong. not. n/r. all dlvr'd.	1979
24 Dragon trackers and 1524 missiles	Cong. not. n/r. all dlvr'd.	Conflict; continued accusations of territorial violations.
Air munitions for 12 F-5E (including ordnance)	Pres. waiver; some a/c dlvr'd.	FEB-MAR '79
12 TOW launchers & missile	Cong. not. n/r. all dlvr'd.	Border warfare.
TOW adaptor kits	all dlvr'd.	

TABLE 8 Continued

<u>Item</u>	<u>Comment</u>	<u>PDRY Timeline</u>
12 F-5E aircraft	Pres. waiver; 4 a/c in Sanaa	
4 F-5B a/c (x-fer from SAG)	Cong. not. '77; trng. ongoing in Saudi Arabia.	
2 C-310H transports	Approved; commercial sale.	
2800 vehicles	Cong. not. '76; all dlvr'd.	
64 M60A1 tanks	Cong. not. n/r. some x-fered by SAG.	
32 M60A1 tanks (SAG to YARG x-fer)	Pres. waiver; all dlvr'd.	
9,000 rounds 105mm tank ammo. (SAG-YARG)	Cong. not. '79; dlvr'd.	
Jordanian Vulcan trng team	Cong. not. '79.	
Jordanian M113/M60 trng team	Cong. not. '79.	
106mm rifles (SAG-YARG)	Cong. not. '78.	
12 155mm towed hotzers.	Cong. not. n/r.	

*Source: Statement of Hon. L.W. Benson, to House Subcomm. on Appropriations, 96th Congress, First Session, 3 May 1979, pp. 688-690.

Yemeni Demand Factors

Saudi Overlay

Arabs/Islam					+/-	Arabs/Islam
Fear of neocolonialism (diversify dependence)		-				
Authoritarian govt.					-	"Strong" YAR
Upgrade defense posture		+		-	+/-	
Cross border x-fer						Buffer State
Resist PDRY Incursions			+	+		
National Security	+					Regional Stability
	Regional Stability (Arab. Penin.)	Integrity of A.P.	Counter USSR	Commitment to Allies (Middle East)	Improved bilateral relationships	

American
Foreign
Policy
Objectives
(Middle
East)

Fig. 9

Interaction of Yemeni Demand Factors/
Saudi Arabian Overlay and American
Middle East Foreign Policy Objectives

There are, naturally, complicating factors to the US-YAR hardware equation, which stem from historical precepts. Those directly affecting this policy appear below.

There is a good deal of Soviet equipment in North Yemen's inventory; maintaining, advising, and training duties are carried out by Russian advisors. There are still an estimated 150 Soviet advisors remaining in-country, performing these functions;²⁵ they presumably are performing collateral duties such as intelligence gathering and corresponding with the Soviet MAAG in Aden, or the naval facility there.

"In September, 1979, the YAR received a new shipment of Soviet-delivered equipment. Included in the delivery were tons of rockets and ammunition;" meanwhile, other sources identified a North Yemen deal for 100 Polish-built T-55 tanks."²⁶ The problems of such a renewed Yemeni security dialogue with the Soviet Union (although in keeping with YAR's development strategy) vis-a-vis US policy are implicit. Recent reports, though, assert that as a result of Prime Minister-level Washington talks, a tentative agreement has been reached with North Yemen which could limit, or at least slow the growing Soviet influence there; effecting a transition from Soviet/E. bloc military equipment. ("Yemen has agreed to leave their new Russian toys in the crates.")²⁷

(Not that the YAR is a fruitful market for US armaments, by any means, but . . .) There is a definite absorption factor that prohibits the proliferation of sophisticated weapons systems. In this respect, there is a demonstrated limit to

to the degree of assimilation in North Yemen by the delivery of F-5's; pilots had to be recruited from Taiwan.²⁸

Finally, a Saudi ambivalence exists which tends to limit the growth of the Yemeni armed forces. The Royal Family would like to see Yemen remain a buffer state; they are particularly cautious concerning any arms deliveries. The Yemeni development theme is a point of contention for the Saudis. Indeed a strong Yemen (i.e., strong enough to defend itself against aggression or ward off incursions), is in the Yemeni and Saudi interest. Conversely, a YAR that is too strong--one that possesses capabilities beyond these shared interests--is clearly not in keeping with Saudi foreign policy. In fact, there have been speculations (throughout the recent crisis especially) that the Royal family has controlled the influx of military equipment to North Yemen, been less than punctual in paying for US equipment transferred there, and has generally limited its defense aspirations.²⁹

As to the future of the US affiliation, based on these (and certainly other) considerations and hidden variables, unless another crisis ensues which would require US security assistance, there will probably not be another large US delivery in the near term. (It was particularly disconcerting in Washington to provide the YAR with \$500+ million in equipment and have them exclaim--in effect--"that's not all we wanted," by turning to the Soviets.)³⁰ It is appropriate to examine this commitment under the recent "test of fire": the 1979 border war.

D. THE FEBRUARY-MARCH 1979 BORDER WAR: US RESPONSE

Although both the YAR and the PDRY have each blamed the other for initiating the conflict, it is clear that South Yemen had a military superiority (see Table). The hostilities began on 23 February, 1979 and proved to be more serious than those skirmishes of the past: "it was a carefully planned, coordinated, and amply supported campaign with apparent intent of seizing and occupying North Yemen territory and destabilizing the North Yemen government."³¹

As soon as the fighting began, Aden Radio claimed to be making rapid territorial gains in the North, with the support of the local population and troops who had deserted from the North Yemeni armed forces. . . (and) Sanaa Radio said that South Yemen had begun shelling Qaataba and Moryes on 20 February in preparation for an infantry attack which had begun on 23 February backed by MiG-21's, Soviet-built T-55 and T-62 tanks and 160 mm. field guns. Several border towns had been destroyed in the fighting according to Sanaa reports.³² One curious aspect of the war was that both armies had Soviet military advisors; their presence helped to undermine the YAR armed forces' efforts and arrange a PDRY victory. The US moved quickly to assist the YAR with this series of responses:

- 1) Increased the intensity of diplomatic efforts with the Saudis and North Yemenis to assure a peaceful "intra-Arab resolution" to the conflict; North Yemen informed the Secretary General of the United Nations of the attack indicating it was the object of aggression and was acting in legitimate self-defense under Article 51 of the UN charter.

2) State Department spokesman Hodding Carter released this message to news correspondents: "In response to requests by the YAR government, we will accelerate the delivery of arms previously agreed for that country. We support the Saudi Arabian appeal to end the fighting. It is in the interests of the international community that hostilities in the area cease, that occupying forces withdraw, and that all parties involved support the principle of nonaggression."³³

3) Expressed concern to the Soviets, urging restraint on both parties; stated that the security of the Arabian Peninsula was among the US vital interests and that the US was prepared to take appropriate actions to defend those.

4) Under the provisions of the Arms Control Export Act, the President certified the emergency which waived Congressional review of items of equipment already before Congress (the value of the equipment to be transferred to YAR fell below limits specified by this act). Requests were processed by Jordan and Saudi Arabia to transfer US-origin equipment to the YAR.

5) The Saudis were informed of US intention to deploy a squadron of F-15's and two Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to Saudi Arabia to bolster the security of Saudi airspace. (Saudi Arabia placed its 60,000 man armed forces on alert and planned to move 1,200 troops from the Lebanon Arab Deterrent Force.)

6) President Carter ordered a carrier task force headed by the USS CONSTELLATION from the Seventh Fleet into the Western Indian Ocean to demonstrate US concern.³⁴

As is evident from the range of these actions (i.e., from application of diplomatic pressure to insertion of a carrier task force) the Carter administration was in effect "drawing the line" for the Soviets; explicitly signaling that their involvement in the Middle East had begun to encroach on American vital interests and was to be held in check. In this connection, the two Yemens made up a symbolic

testing-ground for Soviet versus US resolve. That a sovereign nation, North Yemen, had been subjected to Soviet-sponsored aggression provided the ideological (and legal, due to the Yemeni and Saudi requests) sanction for a US rejoinder. This was essentially done in two phases: a) by expediting the delivery of equipment already enroute prior to the hostilities commencement, and b) the Presidential waiver under article 36(b) to speed delivery of armored vehicles and aircraft.³⁵

1. "Aircraft Carrier Diplomacy:" Analysis of This Policy Option

Official Washington reaction to the latest events on the Arabian Peninsula is original to say the least. An American aircraft carrier, CONSTELLATION, and ships accompanying it have been ordered to sail from the Philippines to the area of the Arabian Peninsula. According to a Washington announcement, this move is being taken in concern over clashes between North and South Yemen. Several days earlier under the same pretext, the US sent North Yemen 7000 anti-tank missiles and guns. . . The appearance of armed conflict anywhere in the world must cause serious concern, but it is unlikely that a peaceful settlement of the conflict can be prompted by the demonstration of American military strength.

Such a policy, known as "gunboat diplomacy," has long been regarded in the world as a means of intimidation (as a weapon of influence). The US resorted to such tactics during the Indochina conflict, during the oil embargo, and during the events in Iran.³⁶

On 27 December 1978, the USS CONSTELLATION (CV-64) was ordered to get underway from Subic Bay Naval Station in the Philippines. At the time, the ship was undergoing some much needed maintenance and crew rest while nearing the end of a six month Western Pacific deployment. The intended destination

was the Indian Ocean. As international tension built (Vietnam was conducting military operations in Cambodia, the PRC was organizing for the Vietnam campaign, the Soviet Navy had a presence in the South China Sea, and Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi had just left Iran), the US was being placed in a position where it needed to assert itself, largely for the reassurance of its allies. While the task force was enroute (in the Straits of Malacca), CONSTELLATION and her escorts were order to stop; not to proceed further into the Indian Ocean, rather to return to Subic Bay. "It appeared that the (Carter) administration was not exactly sure what CONSTELLATION's role would be near the mouth of the Persian Gulf."³⁷ The task force operated in the vicinity of Singapore for nearly one month before returning to Subic Bay. During this timeframe, January 1979, these international tensions increased significantly (the PRC invaded Vietnam, the Soviet naval presence grew, and the Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran).

On 6 March, 1979, one day before the end of CONSTELLATION's scheduled deployment, orders were received for the carrier, the cruiser STERRETT, the destroyer WADDELL, and the fast combat stores ship KANSAS CITY, to get underway and proceed to the Gulf of Aden (the South Yemenis had invaded North Yemen). Three Atlantic Fleet destroyers, BERRY, PAGE, and DAVIS arrived to augment the carrier task force, as did the submarine TUNNY.

If the January voyage of the CONSTELLATION battle group was altered due to vacillation and indecision, then these

executive waverings were less apparent in March. In January, the administration did not know what it would do if CONSTELLATION arrived in the Persian Gulf; for instance, when one puts a carrier task force in an area such as this, that represents a major power play. If American citizens are slaughtered, for example, the next question is "What will the US do about it?" There is a force in being, on station, with the ability to go into a country, or do certain things to it; policy-makers are then forced to make a hard core decision as to what the objectives are. Perhaps the Carter administration did not want to be placed in that position in the Persian Gulf. The Gulf of Aden represents a different situation with overriding circumstances. The preservation of Washington's "special relationship" with Saudi Arabia and the US dependence on Saudi oil represent these concerns. Saudi Arabia's own stability is inseparably linked with that of the YAR; in an effort to stave-off any further Saudi suspicions that the US would not really commit itself over the Arabian Peninsula, the Carter administration shored-up the commitment through the dispatch of CONSTELLATION to the Indian Ocean, through sending AWACS and F-15's to the Saudis, and effecting other arms transfers to North Yemen (directly, and through re-transfers from Jordan and Saudi Arabia).

In regard to contingencies, it was not precisely clear what CONSTELLATION's task was. The carrier's commanding officer, CAPT P.S. McCarthey, USN provided these two plausible reasons: a) this area was one in which few units had

previously operated, and b) everyone at different levels (of the decision-making process) was doing the same thing, namely, learning as the crisis progressed.³⁸ (This lack of specific direction was aided by the moderating actions of Iraq; as the carrier task force arrived on station, a temporary cease-fire was arranged through the Arab League with Iraq working diligently towards this end.) Upon arrival, CONSTELLATION did conduct reconnaissance flights primarily to assess the electronic, naval, etc., orders of battle of the potential adversaries. The Soviet naval presence was formidable and complicated this problem of "specifics;" for example, Soviet forces in the area included Kresta II and Kara cruisers, Kotlin destroyers, Foxtrot submarines and a number of Bear and May aircraft. There were several AGI's (intelligence gathering ships) and merchants: the latter of these units played significant roles in that the INDRON (acronym for Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron) flagship was a merchant laden with electronic equipment; roll on/roll off vessels transported mobile radar tracking vans for use in the region. Ideally, an engagement with these forces would be avoided and that if elements of the carrier task force were drawn into conflict, it would be with indigenous forces rather than with Soviet units, a much "cleaner" operation.

As there were no incidents at sea reported between the US and USSR navies (save for minor "shouldering operations--insertion of a Soviet merchant or AGI between units of the

task force)³⁹ the carrier's presence accomplished its purpose as a highly visible and publicized US image. The Pentagon reported that there was no intention for US pilots to "fly in or over North Yemen, or for US personnel sent there to become involved in combat with South Yemeni forces. From one to two-hundred Americans were to operate only in the rear areas, not positioned near fighting fronts."⁴⁰ The Soviets were present presumably to aid their clients; judging from Soviet naval doctrine and surveying their force structure, they were prepared to conduct SLOC interdiction (sea denial, or rather "sea control by default") and ASW operations. Conversely, the US carrier task force was poised for pro-SLOC operations and ready to undertake whatever assignment provided by Washington. Given the US foreign policy objectives in this crisis, having as capable a force as this one on station was a logical move.

VI. CONCLUSION

It is simply not apparent from the available evidence, to emphatically conclude that the Soviet Union is following a "grand design" to take over the territories on its Southern borders in general, or the Middle East in particular. This same lack of evidence also precludes adopting the notion that the Soviets are merely following a "happenstance" policy of exploiting selected targets of opportunity. What is clear is that the USSR is pursuing a benevolent foreign policy towards the PDRY, in consonance with its general Third World campaign, and at the same time, providing security assistance. This policy is long range, consistent and contains the necessary political, economic, and defense components to be successful. There is a connection between these elements, although admittedly difficult to quantify. The empirical evidence presented herein does function to shore up the assertion that there have been instances when the PDRY, in concert with other actors, has undertaken military operations designed to ultimately assist the USSR in attainment of its national interests. Whether this will continue, or is only tactical is ancillary to Yemeni national interests and capacity.

The Soviet approach in dealing with their clients is in contrast to that of the US. Where the USSR's policy is essentially long range, in that the recruitment efforts have

taken a number of years and pledged formally, those of the US are relatively short range, changing on a cyclic basis. Where the Soviet policy emphasizes placement of large numbers of advisors/technicians in-country, proliferates arms and equipment and has seemingly few restrictions on providing security assistance, the American policy provides for a limited number of personnel in-country, and constrains the proliferation of military equipment. Where the Soviets have a "correlation of forces", the US relies on rapid deployment; as their relationship with PDRY is bilateral, our relationship with the YAR is at least tri-lateral. These fundamental foreign policy orientations are markedly different (witness the matrices in figs. 7 and 9, indicative of resulting different capabilities, intentions, and actions) and account for the subsequent dissimilar manifestations of these policies vis-a-vis the Yemens (e.g.: when the Soviets attempt to train a surrogate force, the US responds to aggression by that force with a naval task force off the coast to "show the flag"). The divergent US and Soviet Yemen policies predetermine their respective stances on the question of unity.

A. PROSPECTS FOR A UNIFIED YEMEN

Relations between the two governments in North and South Yemen are hardly comparable to typical relations between two states. Yemen was until very recently one country for all intents and purposes. It was only twelve years ago that an independent state was created in the Southern part against the background of a socially and economically integrated nation.¹

Unification of the PDRY and the YAR was the consensus reached by the Arab League in March, 1979 after the fighting during the border war ceased. Under these proposed terms, at least three points must be identified, as they relate to Yemen in the international system: 1) the effect that such a merger would have on the Yemen Arab Republic; 2) the South Yemen-Soviet link; and 3) the Saudi/Western reaction. (The idea of a unified Yemen is not new, and the current situation is all too reminiscent of events in 1972 when in the wake of similar fighting between the two states and under very similar intra-Arab pressure, an agreement was signed for the unification of the two Yemens. At that time, too, joint committees were set up. . . and to this day have never been officially dissolved.)²

An agreement was reached on 30 March, 1979 which called for the drafting of a constitution as well as meetings between the respective heads of state, to arrange a timetable for union, ameliorating any obstacles along the way. Among the "promising" results of these meetings was an agreement on the name of the unified nation--"The People's Republic of Yemen;" its capital in Sanaa. What is curious about this attempt is that South Yemen appears anxious to unify (rather to legally annex the YAR) while North Yemen is evidently pursuing a more cautious path.³

1. The Effect On The Yemen Arab Republic

The transition to union between the two states, dominated by the South Yemenis, could prove to be at the very

least, difficult, the worst case, a civil war (i.e., Republican, tribal, PDRY) could erupt. The precise form the conflict will assume is not easy to measure. The tenuous legitimacy which President Salleh enjoys now would certainly be exacerbated under the circumstances of unity. However, the primary concern in the North is over South Yemeni socialism. Although government officials in the YAR recognize the tactical logic behind "their brothers in the South" choosing this form, it is not particularly pleasing. In fact, there is a pervasive hope in the YAR that they will soon abandon this Marxist-Leninist means of social organization, due primarily to its incompatibility with Islam and the long-term ill-effects of association with the Soviets ("godless Russians").⁴ The fundamental objective in the YAR is internal development; a union of the two Yemens could possibly play a significant (but difficult) role in this process for both countries. There is noticeable optimism about union in the North; this goal may be attained through emphasis of commonalities and reconciliation of differences. Islam serves as an important vehicle to bring this about.

2. The South Yemeni-Soviet Link

It has not been publicly discerned yet as to what role the USSR will play in the Yemeni unification efforts, but there are components present which would indicate potential benefits for the Soviets if this materialized. One commonality between the two nations of which the Soviet Union has been particularly laudatory is the Yemeni Socialist Party.

Hailed as an "important result of the country's political development and formed by the vanguard of the working people," this party may well play a key role for Soviet penetration of the North.

One salient feature of the current transformations in the PDRY is the broad participation of the masses; playing a decisive factor at a crucial moment in the country's history. The importance of the experience of the two-million strong people of Democratic Yemen transcends the boundaries of that country: having a positive effect on the rest of the Arabian Peninsula.⁵

The Arab press contains numerous accounts of large-scale migrations between the YAR and the PDRY. Given the Yemeni ex-patriate situation, the potential danger lies in the fact that a "union of the two Yemens would create a bloc of seven-million people controlled by a Communist South Yemen, the largest bloc in the Arabian Peninsula. Such a relationship could spell serious social danger for Saudi Arabia."⁶ Considering the fluidity of Communist ideology and the championing of the PDRY socialists, successful unification under a Marxist regime, and the possibility of fulfillment of Soviet geopolitical goals, this worst-case analysis could prove destabilizing for the traditional Peninsular balance. The dangers are not so much due to direct great power interference, but the other way around. "If the big powers are too strong to fight, the small ones are, by their very weaknesses, (and) lack of cohesion, likely to be the cause or the scene of all kinds of "destabilizing" violence, ranging from delinquency, organized crime, piracy, riots, guerilla

warfare, and fullscale replays of World War II tank battles and air raids."⁷

The Soviet arms transfer policy may very well prove to be the catalyst to develop these loosely amalgamated components into an integrated whole. In fact, the October 1979 shipment of Soviet weapons would indicate a renewed Soviet emphasis geared to sway the YAR away from the Saudi, S. African, Israeli "sub-imperialist" stance. By proliferation of military hardware to these nations, the USSR may be attempting to bring both Aden and Hodeida into its sights for possible military use.

3. The Saudi/Western Reaction

Foremost in the minds of policymakers in the Saudi Royal family and in the West is the potential threat that such a union of the two Yemens would create. Destabilization of the Peninsular moderate powers is a very real possibility, particularly in light of the labor reciprocity. Given the basic anti-Communist orientation of the Saudi monarchy, a socialist union would be disconcerting: a serious challenge issued to Saudi Arabi'a leadership role in intra-Arab affairs. Hence the Saudi ambivalence to Yemeni development surfaces once more. Likewise, a socialist bloc (i.e., a unified North and South) on the Southern border with a comparatively capable military posture would not be in the Saudi best interest.

As for the United States, in the event of union, a shift in the regional foreign policy would be required,

particularly vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia. The Washington-Riyadh "special relationship" would need to be formalized and more consistently articulated. Responses to future aggression would have to be more forceful than 'flag showing.' For the moment, the "tactical" union serves the US intention of conflict avoidance; long range policy formulation is much more intricate. Unification under socialist auspices would strain any hopes for an improved Yemeni-American dialogue to the breaking point. "It would be very difficult to have the same relationship with Sanaa if Yemen was united under a Marxist regime."⁸

Perhaps the primary threat posed by a Yemen unified under socialism is the Soviet-client link. Whereas PDRY has exhibited a willingness to join the Soviets in intra-extra regional military operations, there is the potential for the YAR to do likewise under given conditions.

There are countless specific operations the PDRY security forces (singularly or in conjunction with Cuban/E. German/Ethiopian contingents) could perform which would benefit Moscow; some of these have been identified in fig. 1. By employing the South Yemenis as Soviet proxies, Moscow could orchestrate regional conflict, produce a devastating rippling effect, and essentially remain out of a superpower engagement. Providing PDRY security assistance to other liberation fronts in the area could effectively temper the political climate to the Soviet Union's favor (or more correctly, to Washington's disadvantage), while pursuing its

vital interests; by manipulating the political actors here, the entire set of allegiances could be altered completely through a symbolic commitment (direct Soviet interference could occur later on). In this respect, there are four plausible hypotheses which could generate from the present state.

(1) The PDRY could initiate another border war with the YAR; due to its questionable legitimacy, the Salleh regime could collapse and be unable to deter the aggression; the stage would be set for liberation of the North by the South and for socialism to be the means of governing the two states. (Of course, there is the possibility that the same effects may be achieved through unity other than by conflict.) Politically mobilized Yemeni-expatriates, alone or in conjunction with dissidents in other nations (i.e., the moderate Arab countries), then would become a threatening force.

(2) The spillover effects of the new revolution might be felt in Oman and a resurgence of the Dhofar Rebellion may result. Should Sultan Qaboos be ousted and a Marxist-Leninist coalition assume power, SLOC-interdiction via Hormuz, to which Oman has territorial claim, as a means of political expression may become more likely.

(3) Soviet and Yemeni efforts to create a Red Sea Basin federation of progressive forces may be increased. The same spillover effects towards Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa may be felt which would establish a solid pro-Soviet bloc there and serve as a Red Sea/Suez SLOC interdiction staging point and operating area.

(4) The potential for continued internal destabilizing efforts in Saudi Arabia, coupled with the possibility of direct military attacks on that kingdom as a result of Soviet-Yemeni (et al) collusion would be compounded. If these attempts were successful, the threat to Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Turkey, etc., is implicit.

Recognizing that these hypotheses are worst case and would require the support of regional radical groups to supply the momentum, they are nonetheless possible and probable, should Soviet supply of the necessary means continue. Forecasting or predicting where and when such events may take place is the inherent difficulty for decision-makers and intelligence analysts; monitoring Soviet arms transfers and diplomatic gestures while remaining alert to Yemeni internal developments will facilitate this task.

As to the challenge to United States policy in the Red Sea Basin, continued favorable Yemeni (YAR)-Saudi-American relations are prerequisite. Yet this course must be tangential to the US Arab-African total policy, addressed in a consistent manner. Certainly in a crisis such as the March 1979 war, US arms transfers and carrier task force presence represent an adequate near-term response. However, over the long run, the policy must fuse security, economic (developmental) and diplomatic (i.e., the moral commitment to democratic ideals) elements. Response to the Kenyan, Omani, and Somali invitation to use naval facilities in these countries represents an ideal premise to inaugurate this policy. In

fact, the rapprochement between the United States and the People's Republic of China (given these two nations' foreign policy objectives) may offer a collateral opportunity. In the final analysis, the vital national interests that the US has in this portion of the world are tied to the commitment to the Yemen Arab Republic; similarly, those of the Soviet Union are linked to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen: the respective superpower affiliation with these actors is a prime determinant of whether their interests here will be pursued, or restricted.

FOOTNOTES FOR SECTION II

¹Nyrop, R.F., Area Handbook for the Yemens (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 7.

²Nyrop, p. 18.

³Hitti, P.K., History of the Arabs (New York: St. Martin's, 1979), p. 738.

⁴Khatib, M.F., British Imperialism in Southern Arabia (New York: Arab Information Center, 1958), p. 5.

⁵Khatib, p. 6.

⁶Nyrop, p. 20.

⁷Nyrop, p. 21.

⁸This treaty was concluded arbitrarily and between unequal parties. It was a fait accompli, imposed on the "Sultan" without giving him the opportunity to express his free will. Although he was unauthorized by the rightful ruler, the Imam of Yemen, to conclude such treaties, the "Sultan" none the less fell under the pressure of the British forceful occupation. Last but not least, the Imam at Sanaa was not consulted nor did he give his consent. Khatib, p. 9.

⁹Stookey, R.W., Yemen: The Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic (Boulder: Westview, 1978), p. 157.

¹⁰Khatib, p. 9.

¹¹Nyrop. p. 23.

¹²Stookey, p. 157.

¹³Trevaskis, Sir K., Shades of Amber (London: Hutchinson, 1968), p. 10.

¹⁴"Protectorate treaties" of this kind were imposed on the following tribes: Soqotra and Qishin, 23 April, 1886; Mahri, 2 May, 1888; Jemadar of Shihr and Mukall, 1 May, 1888; Wahidi

of Bir Ali, 30 April, 1888 & 1 June, 1896; Wahidi of Balahaf, 30 April, 1888 & 15 March, 1895; Alawi, 16 July, 1895; Haushabi, 6 August, 1895; Atifi, 17 September, 1889; Baarhiami, 21 September, 1889; Fadhli, 4 August, 1888; Agrabi, 15 July, 1888; Lower Alaqi, 2 June, 1888; Irqa, 27 April, 1888 & 7 January, 1902; Lower Yafa'i, 1 August, 1895; and Adhali, 19 September, 1914. Khatlib cites Atchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sands, Vol XI (Dheli, 1933), pp. 53-56 as the applicable reference.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Trevaskis, p. 11.

¹⁷Nyrop, p. 25. Another source of conflict was the attempt by the Ottoman administration to establish the civil canon, Qanun; this was contradictory to Zaydi religious laws.

¹⁸Stookey, p. 161.

¹⁹Khatib, p. 15.

²⁰Seton-Williams, Britain and the Arab States (London: Huzac and Company, 1948), p. 196; as quoted in Khatib, p. 15.

²¹Stookey, p. 164.

²²Nyrop, p. 25.

²³Trevaskis, p. 11.

²⁴Stookey, p. 165.

²⁵Stookey, p. 167.

²⁶Stookey, p. 183.

²⁷Stookey, p. 205.

²⁸Nyrop, p. 31.

²⁹Little, T., South Arabia: Arena of Conflict (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 71. For all parties concerned, this was a significant event. Britain's employment of the RAF against the Yemeni forces served as a clear signal of just what was

considered enough of the Iman's claims over the South. Although Yemen was recognized in the "treaty of Amity and Commerce" with Italy in 1919 as fully independent and with territorial integrity, Britain's strategic claims over the Aden Protectorate were meant to be enforced, by whatever means necessary.

³⁰Nyrop. p. 32.

³¹Nyrop, p. 31.

³²Nyrop, p. 34.

³³Stookey, p. 213.

³⁴Stookey, p. 224.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Lewis, B., The Middle East and the West (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 62.

³⁷Stookey, p. 226.

³⁸Stookey, p. 228.

³⁹Hurewitz, J.C., Middle East Politics: the Military Dimension (New York: Octagon, 1974), p. 256.

⁴⁰Nyrop, p. 42.

⁴¹Of the most grandiose of Nasir's ambitions for the Yemen was the desire to "mold a new Yemeni society in the Egyptian image at negligible effort or cost. This judgment was reached through wishful thinking and corresponded to no Yemeni reality." Stookey, p. 232.

⁴²The subject of the War in Yemen has been masterfully treated in Schmidt's Yemen: the Unknown War; this effort will not attempt to duplicate this.

⁴³Hurewitz, p. 257.

⁴⁴Nyrop, p. 47.

- ⁴⁵Nyrop, p. 46.
- ⁴⁶Stookey, p. 246.
- ⁴⁷Hurewitz, p. 260.
- ⁴⁸Nyrop, p. 34.
- ⁴⁹Ibid.
- ⁵⁰Yodfat, A. and Abir, M., In the Direction of the Gulf (London: Frank Cass and Co., 1977), p. 101.
- ⁵¹Little, p. 71.
- ⁵²Yodfat, p. 103.
- ⁵³Halliday, Yemen's Unfinished Revolution: Socialism in the South, Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP) (Washington, 1979), no. 81, p. 5.
- ⁵⁴Halliday, p. 12.
- ⁵⁵Ibid.
- ⁵⁶Stookey, p. 259.
- ⁵⁷Klaum, G.A., "The YAR: From Behind the Veil," The Link, vol. 11, no. 3, Summer 1978, p. 4.
- ⁵⁸For example, in October, 1977, President Ibrahim al-Hamdi was assassinated and his successor, Col. al-Ghashmi, pursued a policy of repression here-to-fore unknown. This was directly responsible for forcing the growth of the National Democratic Front.
- ⁵⁹Gueyras, J., "North Yemen Faces Embryonic Civil War," MERIP, no. 81, p. 21.
- ⁶⁰"Yemens Imparting Red Sea Troubles," New York Times, 2 July, 1978, p. 1.
- ⁶¹Halliday, p. 16.

⁶²Halliday, p. 18.

⁶³The accession to power in Sanaa of a "fighter" according to widespread opinion, little qualified to fulfill the presidential duties, only widened the gulf between the central government and the civilian and military opposition. He (Saleh) is particularly unpopular with the army and is wholly committed to a 'pro-Saudi' policy line. Gueyras, p. 22.

⁶⁴"Tentative Plans for a Tactical Marriage," Middle East Intelligence Survey, April, 1979, p. 7.

⁶⁵Yodfat, p. 103.

⁶⁶Halliday, p. 20.

⁶⁷Christian Science Monitor (CSM), 9 February, 1979, p. 28.

⁶⁸Winchester, S., "An Invitation to a Hanging," Harpers, May, 197, p. 100.

⁶⁹Winchester, p. 102.

FOOTNOTES FOR SECTION III

¹FBIS (Soviet), 8 February, 1979, p. H-1.

²Mangold, P., Superpower Intervention in the Middle East (London: St. Martin's, 1978), p. 14.

³Cottrell, A. and Bray, F., Military Forces in the Persian Gulf (Georgetown: Center for International and Strategic Studies, 1978), p. 25.

⁴Lenczowski, G., Soviet Advances in the Middle East (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1971), p. 2.

⁵Prof. Lenczowski devotes a thorough chapter to Soviet arms transfers to radical Arab states with particular emphasis on the UAR.

⁶Price, D.L., "Moscow and the Persian Gulf," Problems of Communism, May-April, 1979, vol. XXVII, p. 1.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Graham, A., "Soviet Strategy and Policy in the Indian Ocean," Naval Power in Soviet Policy, ed. Murphy, P., (Washington: USGPO, 1978), p. 298.

¹⁰Nakita Khrushchev's memoirs, (Khrushchev Remembers, New York: Bantam, 1971), p. 487, contains a persuasive case for the Soviet-UAR relationship; the long-term effects were to be felt by all of the Third World nations, "especially in Africa." Robert Legvold in "The Soviet Union's Strategic Stake in Africa," Africa & the US, ed. Whitaker (NY: NYU Press, 1978), pp. 153-186, offers a contemporary assessment of the USSR's policy objective in this region that may be a foreshadowing.

¹¹"The Horn of Africa: Soviet-Ethiopian Progress Report," Middle East Intelligence Survey, March, 1979, p. 152.

¹²"Coming shortly after a similar treaty with Vietnam (and about to be followed by one with Afghanistan) and in view of the unrest in Iran and the newly fortified Soviet

powerbase in PDRY, the treaty appeared to be part of a dynamic initiative by the USSR to stabilize its influence on its Southern flank, and to expand its presence all around the oil-rich Arabian Peninsula." Middle East Intel. Survey, March, 1979, p. 143.

¹³"A ten year treaty of Commerce and Friendship was signed on 1 November, 1928 in Sanaa. Under its provisions, the Yemen was recognized as an independent kingdom and a Russian representative was to reside permanently in Sanaa. Due to declining interest by the staff, lengthy, and personal intervention by the imam, the mission failed and was recalled to Moscow in 1918. Macro, E., Yemen and the Western World, p. 112. A Treaty of Friendship between the USSR and Yemen was signed in Cairo on 31 October, 1955. It renewed the old treaty of 1928, and stipulated the intention of both sides to increase trade exchanges and to establish diplomatic relations; a commercial treaty was signed on 8 March, 1956; arms supplies were also arranged at that time. Yodfat, p. 38.

¹⁴Yodfat, p. 39.

¹⁵Macro, p. 118.

¹⁶Ingrams, p. 93.

¹⁷The relationship between the Soviet Union and Egypt from a military aspect reflects the fine points of the Soviet Middle Eastern foreign policy. This relationship serves as a testament to the Soviet tactic of exploiting Egyptian goals to meet Russian strategic ends. Of the literature that is available on the subject, these cited have particular relevance: Sadat, A., In Search of Identity; Heikel, M., The Sphinx and the Commissar.

¹⁸Lenczowski, p. 147/8.

¹⁹Ingrams, p. 98.

²⁰The fate of the arms after being landed reflected one of the splits in pre-revolutionary Yemen. . . Badr trusted the Soviet Union . . . his father trusted no one and rapidly packed the anti-aircraft guns and tanks into royal caves to rust, for he feared their use by his son or a brother against him. Bissell, R.E., "The Soviet Use of Proxies in the Third World: The Case of Yemen," Soviet Studies, vol. XXX, No. 1, January, 1978, pp. 87-106.

²¹Bissell (p. 91) cites el Attar, M.S., Le Sous-Developement Economique et Social de Yemen: Perspectives de la Revolution Yemenits, (Algiers, 1964), p. 215, as the appropriate source.

²²Macro, p. 120.

²³New York Times, 30 July, 1963, and 16 July, 1964, as quoted by Bissell, p. 92.

²⁴Graham, p. 276.

²⁵Radio Sanaa (Domestic Service, 25 Sept., 1963, as quoted by Bissell, p. 92. Note the absence of the "road to socialism" phrase.

²⁶Hurewitz, p. 261.

²⁷Almquist and Wiksell, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), The Arms Trade with the Third World (NY: Humanities Press, 1971), p. 568.

²⁸Novik, N., On the Shores of Bab al-Mandab (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1979), p. 4.

²⁹Bissell, p. 104.

³⁰Novik, p. 5.

³¹FBIS (Middle East), 14 December, 1978, p. F-16.

³²Adie, W.A.C., Oil, Politics, & Seapower (NY: Crane, Rusack & Co., 1975), p. 41.

³³Economic Achievements of Democratic Yemen (London: PDRY Ministry of Information, 1977), p. 28.

³⁴World Bank Country Study: PDRY (Washington, World Bank, 1979), p. 23.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Crowe, W.J., VADM, USN, "The Persian Gulf: Central or Peripheral to US Strategy?", United States Naval Institute Proceedings (USNIP), May, 1978, p. 191.

³⁷Yodfat, p. 103.

³⁸Yodfat, p. 106.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰The hesitancy and the prevailing view of Third World Military governments can be derived from this contemporary passage by G. Mirsky, a Soviet expert on problems of revolutionary strategy in the developing world: "It is not . . . the question of military regimes as such, but rather of revolutionary administration, which has a strong backing of the popular masses builds up a popular political organization and promotes socialist ideology. The revolutionary democrats in power in the UAR, Algeria, Syria (and the PDRY) and other countries have renounced capitalism and shifted to non-capitalist lines conforming to the natural needs of their countries." Mirsky, G., "The Army and the Revolution," Soviet Military Review, August, 1967, p. 54-5.

⁴¹Yodfat, p. 114.

⁴²Lenczowski, p. 154.

⁴³SIPRI, p. 569.

⁴⁴SIPRI, p. 570.

⁴⁵Yodfat, p. 111, cited the Daily Telegraph, 9 May, 1972.

⁴⁶Yodfat, p. 152.

⁴⁷Mondesir, S., "Yemen: Pawns and the Superpowers," Arab Report and Record (ARR), 1-15 October, 1978, p. 735.

⁴⁸"Communist Aid to LDC's in the Free World, 1977," CIA Research Paper, November, 1978.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Middle East Economic Digest, Arab Report (MEED, AR), 14 March, 1979, p. 33.

⁵¹U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, June, 1979, p. 40.

⁵²MEED, AR, 14 March, 1979, p. 33.

⁵³MEED, AR, 28 March, 1979, p. 3, and "That Not So Trivial Yemen Crisis," CSM., 30 March, 1979, p. 21.

⁵⁴AR&R, 16-30 June, 1978, p. 457.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Def. & F.A. Hb., p. 622. "E. Germans Said Important in Supporting Regime," Beirut EVENTS, in English 28 July, 1978 p. 22. "Everyone seems content to believe that the Cubans, with Soviet backing are bolstering. . . S. Yemen and helped to stage the coup. The ones who were active and are still playing a key role in Aden are the E. Germans, working with the Russians. According to an informed diplomatic source in Beirut, it was an E. German agent who carried the case containing explosives which killed N. Yemen Pres. Ahmed Al-Ghashmi." The tone of the article functions as a testament to GDR activities, but provides few specifics. Joint Publications Research Service, 22 August, 1978, p. 85.

⁵⁷MEED, AR, 28 March, 1979, p. 15.

⁵⁸M.E. Intel. Survey, April, 1979, p. 7.

⁵⁹USNIP, August, 1979, p. 124.

⁶⁰Action & Reaction, 13 August, 1979, vol. X, No. 28, p. 8.

⁶¹MEED, AR, 20 May, 1979, p. 23.

⁶²USNIP, November, 1979, p. 124.

⁶³Interview with Michael Arietti, Country Desk Officer for the Yemens, US Dept. of State, 29 January, 1980.

⁶⁴The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XXXI, No. 43, 21 November, 1979, p. 12, provides the text of the treaty and covers the Ismail visit to Moscow extensively.

⁶⁵Kemp, G., "US Strategic Interests and Military Options in Sub-Saharan Africa," Whitaker, p. 128. "SLOC 1: from the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal, Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait into the Arabian Sea. SLOC 1 is the shortest distance but the most vulnerable in terms of physical and political constraints. The Bab al-Mandab Strait at the mouth of the Red

Sea is also very vulnerable and has been the site of several confrontations between Israel and the Arabs regarding shipping access. Hostile forces, including the Soviet Union, based in the PDRY, or on the Horn of Africa, could close this strait to US warships."

⁶⁶de Borchgrave, A., "The Soviet Equation," Newsweek, 25 December, 1979, p. 26.

⁶⁷According to de Borchgrave, a colonel in the Saudi National Guard was paid the equivalent of \$6,000 for his part. Three hundred "soldiers" assisted in the actual attack, with another 200 helpers outside.

⁶⁸"South Yemeni Troops Assist Soviets in Kabul," International Defense, DMS Intelligence, vol. 2, No. 10, March, 180, p. 3.

FOOTNOTES FOR SECTION IV

¹"For most of the following decade, the keystone of China's foreign policy was its alliance with the Soviet Union. Not only did the two countries sign a military pact that linked their basic security interests; they also developed far-reaching relations in economic, scientific, educational and other fields." Barnett, A.D., China and the Major Powers in East Asia (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1977), p. 26.

²These concepts and others which were subject to different interpretation are discussed in W.E. Griffith's, "The November 1960 Moscow Meeting: A Preliminary Reconstruction," China Quarterly, No. 11, 1962.

³See A.D. Low's The Sino-Soviet Dispute: An Analysis of the Polemics (London: Associated University Press, 1976), p. 279.

⁴Yodfat, p. 59.

⁵These incidents are treated expertly in: R.G. Brown's "Chinese Politics and American Policy," Foreign Policy, No. 23, Summer, 1976; H.C. Hinton's "Conflict on the Ussuri: A Clash of Nationalisms," Problems of Communism, January-April, 1971, K. Tolley, RADM, USN, "Bearclaws and Dragon Teeth," USNIP, December, 197.

⁶A Sino-Soviet Perspective in the Middle East, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Near East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: USGPO, 1972), 26 April, 1972, p. 2. (Hereafter cited as Sino-Soviet Perspective.)

⁷Ibid.

⁸"Yemen Sets Peking Tie," New York Times (NTY), 22 August, 1956, p. 3.

⁹"Red China In Pact Backs Yemen Claim," NYT 13 January, 1962.

¹⁰ McClean, C.B., Soviet-Middle East Relations (London: Central Asian Research Center, 1973), p. 118.

¹¹"Peking Gives Sallal Tumultuous Welcome," NYT, 2 June, 1964.

¹²"Aid From Chinese Popular in Yemen," NYT, 2 January, 1972; see also "West Trails Reds in Yemen Aid," NYT, 1 May, 1966, and "A Race to Hold Yemen's Hand," NYT, 13 January, 1969, p. 70.

¹³Creekman, C.T., LCDR, USN, "Sino-Soviet Competition in the Yemens," Naval War College Review, June-July, 1979, p. 75.

¹⁴Sino-Soviet Perspective, p. 4.

¹⁵Creekman, p. 75.

¹⁶Yodfat, p. 106. China has had a historical interest in this area as evidenced by the Ming dynasty naval deployments to Aden (c. 1517).

¹⁷McClellan, p. 82.

¹⁸NYT, 25 June, 1969.

¹⁹For a comprehensive account of the Dhofar Rebellion and the PDRY role in this campaign, see J.D. Anthony's "Isurrection and Intervention," essay contained in The Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean in International Politics, ed. Abbas Amirie (Tehran: Institute for International Political and Economic Studies, 1976).

²⁰"A recent study observes: The amount and dispersal of a PRC loan to Aden suggests that China may well play in South Yemen the economic role played by the USSR in the North. It would be naive not to regard the 300-mi. road (towards Oman) as a strategic path to revolution in the same sense as the 227-km. road of North Yemen in 1962. Soviet military aid to both Yemens predominates: The Soviet Radio "Peace and Progress" commented that Peking bragged about friendship with the Yemeni Republic, "but when we seek for concrete expressions of this friendship, Peking has nothing to offer but Mao Tse-Tung's thoughts." This latter point seems to be fitting; for although there have been several short-term victories, little has lasted over the long run." Adie, p. 42.

²¹Yodfat, p. 111.

²²Yodfat, p. 110. PRC regulars visited the PDRY and established a number of guerilla training centers.

²³Nyrop, p. 156.

²⁴Nyrop. pp. 116-128.

²⁵Breeze, R., "The Arabs and China: Peking Moves to Block Soviet Advances," MEED, AR, 28 February, 1979, p. 4.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Creekman, p. 77. This article contains a thorough survey of verbal exchanges between the PRC and the USSR over their respective Middle East policies.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰"China and Pakistan Appear to be Moving Toward Joint Strategy Against Soviets," LA Times, 22 January, 1980, p. 5.

FOOTNOTES FOR SECTION V

¹Mangold, p. 100.

²Campbell, J.C., "The Superpowers in the Persian Gulf Region," in Amirie, p. 39.

³Letter received from Dr. Eric Willenz, Chairman Europe and Global Research Group, Office of External Research, US Department of State, 5 September 1979.

⁴Ibid.

⁵International Communications Agency, Country Plan for Yemen Arab Republic (Washington: USGPO, 1979), p. 1. (Hereafter cited as Country Plan.)

⁶The following remarks were obtained through the courtesy of a highly placed Yemeni diplomatic source in an interview granted to the author, 28 January, 1980.

⁷Def. & F.A. H-B., p. 448.

⁸Def. & F.A. H-B., p. 449.

⁹Country Plan, p. 1.

¹⁰Country Plan, p. 2.

¹¹Hottinger, A., "Does Saudi Arabia Face Revolution?," New York Review of Books, 28 June, 1979, p. 16.

¹²Hottinger, p. 17.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴New York Times, 11 January, 1979, p. 1.

¹⁵Hottinger, p. 17.

¹⁶Klaum, p. 8.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Country Plan, p. 3.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Crawford, W.R., US Department of State Bulletin, June, 1979, p. 39.

²¹Ibid.

²²Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 16 April, 1976, p. 27682.

²³Country Plan, p. 3.

²⁴Crawford, p. 40. FY 1980 IMET proposed for the YAR: \$600,000 and 33 students; FMS agreements were \$100 million; Overseas Military Program Management personnel strengths include 6 military, 2 civilians and 2 locals. House Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Relations Programs, Appropriations for 1980, pp. 632-665.

²⁵Benson, L.W., House Subcommittee on Appropriations, 3 May 1979, p. 692.

²⁶New York Times, 13 September 1979.

²⁷Taylor, W., "North Yemen Reported Easing Ties to Soviets," Washington Star, 17 January, 1980, p. 1.

²⁸Arietti interview.

²⁹Ibid. See also "North Yemen Between East and West," Newsweek, 24 March, 1980, p. 45.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Crawford, p. 40. There were additional reports in the YAR of invading soldiers who were speaking languages other than Arabic; Spanish and German lend credence to the accusation that Cuban and East Germans forces were assisting the South Yemenis. MEED, A.R., 14 March, 1979, p. 33.

³²The PDRY levelled charges at the YAR, alleging that the North Yemeni regime was responsible for the attack as a means of displacing its own internal troubles. MEED, A.R., 14 March, 1979, p. 33.

³³Bulletin, April, 1979, p. 41.

³⁴Bulletin, June, 1979, p. 40.

³⁵Details of this response may be found in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, FY 1980 International Security Authorization, 96th Congress, p. 697.

³⁶FBIS (Soviet), 8 March, 1979, p. F-6. It should be noted that translations of the Soviet press contained numerous polemics in this vein (e.g.: Current Digest of the Soviet Press: vol. XXX, no. 9, p. 16, "Gunboat Diplomacy in the Red Sea," during the 1978 Ogaden war). Conspicuously absent was any reference to Soviet or East European communist armaments transferred to the PDRY.

³⁷The details of CONSTELLATION's role in the Yemen crisis were obtained through the courtesy of the ship's commanding officer, CAPT P.S. McCarthey, USN in an interview with the author, 17 October, 1979.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹However, when CONSTELLATION was relieved by MIDWAY, there was one incident. "Reportedly, the Russians flew two IL-38 Mays (recon. and ASW planes) out of Aden on 15 May, 1979 and on reaching MIDWAY flew through the carrier's landing pattern . . . as an F-4 and an A-6 were preparing to land. The pilots put the planes through quick maneuvers to avoid collision." Baltimore Sun, as reported in USNIP, August 1979, p. 123.

⁴⁰CSM, 5 March, 1979, p. 2.

FOOTNOTES FOR SECTION VI

¹Mubarez, A., Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the YAR to the UN, letter to the author, 17 January, 1980.

²Middle East Intelligence Survey, April, 1979, p. 7.

³In a report on this subject, the publication Action (28 January, 1980, p. 2), claimed that a North-South constitutional committee approved several articles which were a major stumbling block in the talks; the total number of articles approved by the two is now 143.

⁴These remarks were obtained through an interview with a YAR diplomatic official, conducted on 28 January, 1980.

⁵FBIS (Middle East), 3 November, 1978, F-8.

⁶Herzog, C., "Moscow's Midwest Threats and Blunders," CSM, 7 May, 1979, p. 23.

⁷Adie, p. 77.

⁸Arietti interview.

APPENDIX A

NOTE ON ISLAMIC CONCEPTS

To facilitate the reader's understanding of the Islamic concepts in the text, the following translations are provided:

- Imam: "Religious leader." According to Sunnite beliefs, an imam leads Muslims in congregational prayers. According to the Shi'ites, he is both the religious and political leader of the Islamic community.*
- Jahiliya: The Age of Ignorance; refers to pre-Islamic times; the birth of Islam set an end to this period.
- Jihad: . . . al-asghar: the lesser holy war, i.e., the external holy war against infidels;
. . . al-akbar: the greater holy war, i.e., the inward holy war against passion and ignorance. Jihad is incumbent upon Muslims as a pillar of faith.*
- Mahdi: Refers to a messianic figure, or one claiming this stature; (Arabic mahdiy: he who is guided aright).
- Shi'ites: A major sect in Islam which contends that Ali (Shi'a) (Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law) was the rightful successor of the Prophet and therefore his descendants should have been leaders of the Islamic states.*
- Sunnites: "Traditionalists." They represent the orthodox Muslim population which did not align itself with any particular sect. Founded on Sunna, or the traditions of the Prophet.*
- Ulama: A council or college of learned officials including priests, judges, scholars; they are trained in religion and offer interpretations of the Quran.

*Source: Bishai, W., Islamic History of the Middle East, (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, Inc., 1968).

APPENDIX B

THE NAVAL INDICES

Naval and merchant marine activity is not only a primary instrument of Soviet foreign policy, but also provides a reading with political utility. There is a certain correlation between shipdays/port visits and political rapport, as evident here.

SOVIET, BLOC AND CUBAN INDIAN OCEAN MERCHANT SHIP PORT CALLS 1977-1979

COUNTRY	JAN-MAR	APR-JUN	JUL-SEP	OCT-DEC	TOTAL
Djibouti					
1977	5	8	2	4	19
1978	5	8	7	12	32
1979	12	6	12	12	42
Ethiopia					
1977	15	16	29	30	90
1978	57	21	26	15	119
1979	21	18	21	26	86
North Yemen					
1977	62	73	75	66	276
1978	84	54	56	43	237
1979	79	67	69	75	290
Somalia					
1977	28	27	25	14	94
1978	2	3	0	3	8
1979	3	4	2	1	10
South Yemen					
1977	6	13	7	7	33
1978	4	10	5	3	23
1979	14	16	13	10	53
TOTALS ALL PORTS		1977	512		
		1978	419		
		1979	480		

CHINESE INDIAN OCEAN MERCHANT SHIP PORT CALLS
1977-1979

COUNTRY	JAN-MAR	APR-JUN	JUL-SEP	OCT-DEC	TOTAL
Djibouti					
1977	1	1	1	0	3
1978	5	8	7	12	32
1979	12	6	12	12	42
Ethiopia					
1977	1	0	0	0	1
1978	3	2	0	0	5
1979	0	0	0	0	0
North Yemen					
1977	17	12	14	6	49
1978	6	4	8	10	28
1979	14	16	7	9	46
Somalia					
1977	1	1	3	1	6
1978	2	1	1	1	5
1979	2	1	0	1	4
South Yemen					
1977	6	3	0	0	9
1978	1	2	3	4	10
1979	4	7	5	2	18
TOTAL ALL PORTS		1977	68		
		1978	80		
		1979	110		

SOVIET INDIAN OCEAN NAVAL/NAVAL ASSOCIATED SHIP DAYS
1977-1979

SHIP TYPE	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
SS/SSG	400	450	300	1150
SSN/SSGN	150	0	150	300
Maj. COMBATANTS	1400	1450	1800	4650
Min. COMBATANTS	1050	1550	900	3500
AUXILIARIES	3500	4150	3400	11050
AGI	100	150	300	550
NAV. ASSOC. MER.	450	700	700	1850
TOTALS	7050			

(There have been no known deployments by BLOC Naval units to the Indian Ocean.)

SOVIET INDIAN OCEAN NAVAL/NAVAL ASSOCIATED PORT VISITS
1977-1979*

COUNTRY	JAN-MAR	APR-JUN	JUL-SEP	OCT-DEC	TOTAL
Djibouti					
1977	0	0	0	0	0
1978	0	0	1	0	1
1979	0	0	0	0	0
Ethiopia					
1977	0	0	0	1	1
1978	17	34	20	16	87
1979	30	23	20	24	89
North Yemen					
1977	2	1	0	0	3
1978	0	1	0	0	1
1979	0	0	1	3	4
Somalia					
1977	33	34	13	11	91
1978	0	0	0	0	0
1979	0	0	0	0	0
South Yemen					
1977	3	6	12	23	44
1978	31	27	23	19	100
1979	15	25	12	15	67
TOTALS ALL PORTS		1977	139		
		1978	189		
		1979	160		

* The port visit figures listed here represent the number of Soviet Units present in each country during the quarter noted, including permanent/semi-permanent presence.

All port call figures listed herein are based only on information reported to the NAVAL OCEAN SURVEILLANCE INFORMATION CENTER and processed by the Sea Watch System.

Source: Director, Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center, letter to Superintendent, NAVPGSCOL, 7 February, 1980: Ship Activity Support to USNPGS Student Research; NOSIC Ser 212/025.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books & Monographs:

- Adie, W.A.C., Oil, Politics, & Seapower: The Indian Ocean Vortex, (New York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1975).
- Allison, G., Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1971).
- Almqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Arms Trade With The Third World, (New York: Humanities Press, 1971).
- Amirie, A., (ed.), The Persian Gulf & the Indian Ocean in International Politics, (Tehran: Institute for International Political and Economic Studies, 1975).
- Barnett, A.D., China and the Major Powers in East Asia, (Washington: Brookings, 1977).
- Bray, F., & Cottrell, A., Military Forces in the Persian Gulf, (Georgetown: Center for Int'l & Strat. Studies, 1978).
- Copley, G.R., et als., Defense & Foreign Affairs Handbook, (Washington: Copley & Associates, 1978).
- Dismukes, B., & McConnell, J., (ed.), Soviet Naval Diplomacy, (Elmsford: Pergamon, 1979).
- Fraser, R., (ed.), Keessing's Contemporary Archives, (Edinburgh: Longman Group, Ltd., 1973-1978).
- Garrin, R.J., Aden Under British Rule, (1839-1967), (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1975).
- Hitti, P.K., History of the Arabs, (New York: St. Martin's, 1970).
- Holt, P.M. (ed.), et als., The Cambridge History of Islam, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
- Hudson, M.C., Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).
- Hurewitz, J.C., Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension, (New York: Octagon, 1974).

- Ingrams, H., The Yemen: Imams, Rulers & Revolutions, (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1964).
- Kazziha, W., Revolutionary Transformation in the Arab World, Habash and His Comrades from Nationalism to Marxism, (New York: St. Martin's, 1975).
- Kerr, M., The Arab Cold War, 3rd edition, (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).
- Khatib, M.F., British Imperialism in Southern Arabia, (New York: Arab Information Center, 1958).
- King, G., Imperial Outpost Aden: Its Place in British Strategic Policy, (Plymouth: Oxford University Press, 1964).
- Lackner, H., A House Built on Sand: A Political Economy of Saudi Arabia, (London: Ithaca Press, 1978).
- Lewis, B., et als., (ed.), The Middle East & the West, (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1964).
- _____, et als., (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Islam, (London: Luzac & Co., 1960).
- Lenczowski, G., Soviet Advances in the Middle East, (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972).
- Little, T., South Arabia, Arena of Conflict, (London: F.A. Praeger, 1968).
- Lowe, A.D., Sino-Soviet Dispute: An Analysis of the Polemics, (London: Associated University Press, 1976).
- Macro, E., Yemen and the Western World Since 1571, (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1968).
- Mangold, P., Superpower Intervention in the Middle East, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978).
- McLane, C.B., Soviet-Middle East Relations, (London: Central Asian Research Center, 1973).
- Military Balance, (London: Adlard & Sons, 1967-1979), International Institute for Strategic Studies.
- Murphy, P.J., (ed.), Naval Power in Soviet Policy, vol. 2, (Washington: USGPO, 1978); Studies in Communist Affairs.
- Novik, N., On the Shores of Bab al-Mandab: Soviet Diplomacy and Regional Dynamics, (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1979).

- Nyrop, T., et als., (ed.), Area Handbook for the Yemens, (Washington: USGPO, 1977).
- O'Ballance, E., The War in the Yemen, (Hamden: Archon, 1971).
- Quandt, W.B., The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, (Berkeley: UCLA Press, 1974).
- Schmidt, D., Yemen: The Unknown War, (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1968).
- Scott, H., In the High Yemen, (London: John Murray, 1942).
- Solomon, R., (ed.), Asian Security in the 1980's: Problems and Policies for a Time of Transition, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1979).
- Somerville-Large, P., Tribes and Tribulations, (London: Robert Hale, 1967).
- Stark, F., The Southern Gates of Arabia, (London: John Murray, 1936; tenth edition, 1978).
- Stookey, R.W., Yemen: The Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic, (Boulder: Westview, 1978).
- Talbott, S., Khrushchev Remembers, (New York: Bantam Books, 1971).
- Thompson, W.S., (ed.), The Third World: Premises of US Policy, (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1978).
- Trevaskis, Sr. K., Shades of Amber: A South Arabian Episode, (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1968).
- Triton, A.S., The Imams of Sanaa, (Bombay: Diocesan Press, 1925).
- Waterfield, G., Sultans of Aden, (London: John Murray, 1968).
- Whitaker, J., (ed.), Africa and the United States: Vital Interests, (New York: New York University Press, 1978).
- A World Bank Country Study, PDRY: A Review of Economic and Social Development, (Washington: The World Bank, 1979).
- _____, YAR: Development of a Traditional Economy, (Washington: The World Bank, 1979).

World Military Expenditures & Arms Transfers: 1968-77,
USACDA Publication #100, (Washington: USGPO, 1979).

Yodfat, A., & Abir, M., In the Direction of the Gulf,
(London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1977).

Articles:

Bissell, R.E., "Soviet Use of Proxies in the Third World:
The Case of Yemen," Soviet Studies, vol. XXX, no. 1,
January, 1978, pp. 87-106.

Breeze, R., "The Arabs & the Chinese: Peking Moves to
Block Soviet Advances," Middle East Economic Digest,
Arab Report, 28 February, 1979, pp. 407.

Campbell, J.C., "The Soviet Union in the Middle East,"
Middle East Journal, vol. 32, no. 1, Winter, 1978,
pp. 1-12.

Creekman, C.T., LCDR, USN, "Sino-Soviet Competition in the
Yemens," Naval War College Review, June-July, 1979,
pp. 73-82.

Crowe, W.J., VADM, USN, "The Persian Gulf: Central or
Peripheral to US Strategy," United States Naval Institute
Proceedings, May, 1978, pp. 184-211.

Gueyras, J., "N. Yemen Faces Embryonic Civil War," Middle
East Research and Information Project, vol. 9, no. 8,
October, 1979, pp. 21-22.

Halliday, F., "Yemen's Unfinished Revolution: Socialism in
the South," Middle East Research and Information Project,
vol. 9, no. 8, October, 1979, pp. 3-20.

Hottinger, A., "Does Saudi Arabia Face Revolution?," New
York Review of Books, 28 June, 1979, pp. 14-17.

Klare, M.T., "The Arms Overstock," Harpers, November, 1979,
p. 24.

Klaum, G.A., "The YAR: From Behind the Veil," The Link,
vol. 11, no. 3, Summer, 1978, pp. 1-14.

Laurance, E.J., "Soviet Arms Transfers to Sub-Saharan
Africa: Patterns, Purposes & Effects," Research Paper
Prepared for the NPS Conference 'The Communist States
in Africa,' July, 1979; Used by permission.

Lennon, F., "Soviets Advising Both Sides in the Yemen War,"
Arab Report, 14 March, 1979, p. 1.

McLean, Niel, LTCOL, D.S.O., "The War in the Yemen," Royal United Service Institute Journal, February, 1966, pp. 14-29.

Mondesir, S., "Yemen: Pawns & Superpowers," Arab Report & Record, 1-15 October, 1978, pp. 735-736.

Price, D.L., "Moscow & the Persian Gulf," Problems of Communism, March-April, 1979, vol. XXVIII, pp. 1-13.

Priest, M., "The Yemens: US Will Hold the Line," Middle East Economic Digest, Arab Report, 28 March, 1979, p. 3.

Tyler, R., "Soviet Policy in the Middle East," Middle East Economic Digest, Arab Report, 14 March, 1979, pp. 8-10.

Winchester, S., "Invitation to a Hanging," Harpers, May, 1979, pp. 97-102.

Congressional Hearings:

US Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs, A Sino-Soviet Perspective in the Middle East, Hearing Before The Subcommittee on the Near East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 92nd Congress, 2nd session, 1972.

US Congress. House. Committee on International Relations, Review of Recent Developments in the Middle East, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Europe & the Middle East of the Committee on International Relations, 95th Congress, 1st session, June, 1977.

US Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance & Related Programs Appropriations for 1980, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 96th Congress, 1st session, 1979, (Parts I & II).

US Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, Fiscal Year 1980 International Security Assistance Authorization, Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate on S. 584 (To Amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Arms Export Control Act, and for other purposes), 96th Congress, 1st session, 1979.

Yemeni Government Publications Consulted:

Achievements of Economic Development in Democratic Yemen, (London: Ministry of Information PDRY, 1977).

Achievements of Social Development in Democratic Yemen,
(London: Ministry of Information PDRY, 1977).

Democratic Yemen in the United Nations, (Aden: 14th October Corp., 1977), Dist. by PDRY Min. of Info.

Government Programmes, 1977, (Aden: 14th October Corp., 1977), Dist. by PDRY Min. of Info.

The Constitution of the Unified Political Organization,
The National Front, (UNFPO), (London: Russell Press, 1977).

The PDRY Government Programmes for 1976 & 1977, Presented
by Prime Minister Ali Nasir Muhammad (London: Russell, 1977).

The Present & Future of the PDRY, Statement by Abdel Fattah
Ismail, (London: Russell, 1977).

Programmes of the UNFPO, for the National Democratic Phase
of the Revolution, The Unification Congress, 11-13
October, 1975, (London: Russell, 1977).

Resolutions & Recommendations of the Unification Congress
of the UNFPO, (Aden: 14th October Corp., 1975).

Periodicals & Newspapers Used:

Action & Reaction
Arab Report & Record
Bulletin (US Dept. of State)
China Quarterly
Christian Science Monitor
Current Digest of the Soviet Press
Daily Telegraph
DMS Intelligence
FBIS (Middle East & Soviet)
Harpers
Los Angeles Times
The Link
Middle East Econ. Digest
Middle East Intelligence Survey
Middle East Journal
New York Review of Books
New York Times
Newsweek
Problems of Communism
Soviet Analyst
Soviet Military Review
Soviet Studies
Soviet World Outlook
Strategic Review

The Times
US Naval Institute Proceedings
Washington Post
Washington Star

Personal Letters:

Croan, Melvin, Chrm. Russian Area Studies Program, University
of Wisconsin, letter to the author, 17 August, 1979. .

Kader, A.A., First Secretary, Embassy of the PDRY (UK),
letter to the author, 22 January, 1980.

Mubarez, Abduldayem, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the
YAR to the UN, letter to the author, 17 January, 1980.

Willenz, Eric, Chrm. Europe and Global Research Group,
Office of External Research, US Dept. of State, letter
to the author, 5 September, 1979.

Interviews:

Mr. Michael Arietti, Country Desk Officer for the Yemens,
US Dept. of State, 29 January, 1980.

Mr. Don Hamilton, Country Desk Officer for the Yemens,
US International Communications Agency, 28 January, 1980.

Dr. Abduljalil Homarah, Minister, Embassy of the Yemen Arab
Republic, 28 January, 1980.

CAPT Paul S. McCarthey, USN, Commanding Officer,
USS CONSTELLATION (CV-64), 17 October, 1979.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

	No. Copies
1. Defense Technical Information Center Cameron Station Alexandria, VA 22314	2
2. Library, Code 0142 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93940	2
3. Department Chairman, Code 56 Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93940	1
4. Prof. Edward J. Laurance, Code 56Lk Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93940	1
5. Prof. Kamil T. Said, Code 56Si Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93940	1
6. LT William F. Barns, USN c/o 2411 Ashwood Drive Louisville, KY 40205	1
7. Prof. Jiri Valenta, Code 56Va Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93940	1
8. Prof. John Amos, Code 56Am Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93940	1
9. CAPT Paul S. McCarthey, USN Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-50W) The Pentagon Washington, DC 20350	1
10. CAPT John L. Beck, USN Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-60B) The Pentagon Washington, DC 20350	1

11. Mr. Alex Button 1
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-009F)
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20350
12. Mr. Eric Willenz 1
Chrm. Europe and Global Research Group
Office of External Research
U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC 20520
13. Dr. Melvin Croan 1
Chrm. Russian Area Studies Program
The University of Wisconsin
Madison, WI 53706