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
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**CANADA'S FOREIGN POLICY
OBJECTIVES AND CANADIAN SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS IN THE NORTH**

by
Nicholas Tracy



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(6) CANADA'S FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES AND CANADIAN
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE NORTH

by

(10) NICHOLAS TRACY

An Extra-Mural Paper presents the view of its author on a topic of potential interest to DND. Publication by ORAE confirms the interest but does not necessarily imply endorsement of the paper's content or agreement with its conclusions. It is issued for information purposes and to stimulate discussion.

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ABSTRACT

A rationale is presented for a Canadian focus on the security problems of the northern tier of NATO. The main proposition is that cooperation between Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Iceland and Norway at various levels of military effort can achieve a degree of political cohesion that will serve the interests of each of the states involved, and promote the general good of NATO. It is considered that it is now necessary to give consideration to a program which will promote this objective.

RESUME

L'auteur met l'accent sur la nécessité pour le Canada d'orienter ses efforts vers les problèmes de sécurité qui se posent dans la partie septentrionale de la région OTAN. Le principal argument invoqué est celui selon lequel une collaboration entre le Canada, le Danemark/Groënland, l'Islande et la Norvège, dans divers domaines militaires, peut contribuer à assurer une certaine mesure de cohésion politique qui ne pourra que servir les intérêts de chacun des pays en cause et de l'OTAN dans son ensemble. Le temps est venu, estime-t-on, d'envisager la mise sur pied d'un programme favorisant la réalisation de cet objectif.

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CANADA'S FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES AND CANADIAN

SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE NORTH

CHAPTER ONE

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1. Armed forces traditionally have been thought of as the ultimate means of coping with the most dangerous eventualities, and radicals have objected that Canada's forces ought instead to be reformed for the purpose of maximizing their ability to defeat the most probable incursions into Canada's sovereignty. It is evident, however, that, at least in Canada's circumstances the dichotomy has been falsely drawn. It is the contribution Canada makes to the security of her allies which does most to turn aside assaults on Canadian interests.
2. Canadians generally do not think of their country as an actor in the field of military influence; neither, apparently, is that the image held of Canada abroad. Canadians like to think of their armed forces as reluctant concessions to the obscurantist views of Canada's friends, possibly serving some purpose to the extent that a Russian peril is admitted, but generally valued most greatly for their deployment on United Nations missions to bail out the miscreant peoples in less fortunate parts of the world. When in 1969 Trudeau called for a defence policy which complemented Canada's foreign policy the result was a White Paper which emphasized surveillance of Canadian territory, the obvious implication being that Canada's armed forces could have little significance in Canada's relationships with other states.¹ By then even the U.N. role had lost some of its appeal. This modest self-image had the additional

benefit of being an inexpensive one to sustain. Unfortunately for the Treasury Board, however, the premise is wrong, as was shown up clearly when in 1973 Trudeau set out to obtain for Canada a contractual link with the European Economic Community. German Chancellor Willy Brandt then made it clear that the signing of a treaty would depend upon Canada's performance as a European military power, and a few months later Defence Minister Richardson reversed previous indications that there would be major cuts in Canada's armed forces, announcing that the force in Europe would not be diminished.² Canada's military status in Europe was also instrumental in obtaining a seat for Canada at the Helsinki conference on European Security. It has become clear that Canada's armed forces do constitute an instrument of Canada's foreign policy, and the international image of altruism attached to Canadian forces can be regarded as an important factor increasing their effectiveness for that purpose.

3. Perhaps it is not surprising that the influence value of Canada's armed forces is so little understood, for except when armies actually clash in battle it is never easy to establish just what is the effect of military establishments and deployments upon the international political system. If it is difficult to pin down the significance of the armed forces of the super-powers it is far more so with respect to minor military actors, and the puzzle is greatly increased when it is evident that it is the councils of the super-powers themselves which it is the task of Canada's armed forces to influence. The political significance of armed forces can only be judged operationally, by practical observation, for there is no applicable general theory. Politics, and one might say especially international politics, remains an "art of the possible". There are so many variables in political systems that the ability of a statesman

to achieve an objective depends upon the discovery of a formula which, probably for only partially understood reasons, works.

4. The limited capabilities of Canada's armed forces are deceptively obvious. As a military power Canada does not have the ability to intervene unassisted in any foreign dispute, and indeed the Canadian government must call upon foreign support just to patrol her own air-space. But outside of the context of the existing international system, and Canada's real foreign policy objectives, it is meaningless to talk about the utility of Canada's forces as though such institutions had abstract values. A work of art can be admired without reference to any standard, save perhaps the Platonic world of forms. But an institution only acquires value in relation to its environment. It would be little help, however, were a catalogue to be made giving a description of the world in which Canada acts, because the complexity of the environment would prevent any description approaching adequacy. In the end not only is the statesman's judgment necessary for devising a means of promoting national interests, but it is also necessary for determining whether the armed forces have actually contributed positively to the outcome. The question "how great is the influence" can only be answered subjectively.

5. Accordingly, it is usual to concentrate upon the problem of uncovering the mechanism by which armed forces can influence state systems. The efficacy of any mechanism may then be speculated about by considering its relative functional economy: assaulting the walls of a castle may appear to be the most economic way of carrying off a princess, because the objective may be achieved directly once the walls are crossed. In contrast it is much less economic of function to waylay the handsome

prince with the purpose of making an exchange. However, the actual as opposed to the theoretical value of each operation will depend upon the practical problems, such as the height of the walls, as well as the subjective values, such as the valuation put respectively upon the prince and princess. It is virtually impossible to assess in abstract the mutual relation of practical and subjective considerations, so again one is ultimately thrust back upon "the art of the possible".

6. Bearing this limitation in mind, however, it may nonetheless be useful to establish the broad categories within which different mechanisms of influence fall. The principal division lies between supportive intervention, and intervention which is actually or by implication hostile. Practically speaking, Canada is virtually barred from the latter by the small size of her deployable forces, one of the few possible exceptions being Canada's dispute with France over the application of the law of the sea to Ile St. Pierre, which may conceivably be influenced by Canada's ability to intervene with force if need be. If so, the threat has not been made explicitly. But Canada is not evidently a great loser from not having the forces to threaten hostile intervention. As a generalization, it may be said that the supportive mode of military influence is more frequently usable in current conditions.

7. Within the category of supportive influence lie two sub-categories. Armed forces can be used simply to satisfy the need of a friend and so earn the rewards of gratitude. This mode has generally been accepted as the norm, and the question is frequently asked whether there is good evidence that American policies have ever been influenced by respect

for Canada's military effort and fear for its loss. But it may be argued that this is asking quite a lot from a bureaucratic government system in peace-time. Surely it is enough that Canada's military efforts provides her with friends in court whenever Americans are debating policies which could be harmful to Canada. It must be remembered when considering that sort of influence that Canada has only a limited freedom to cease her efforts in support of her allies, if for no other reason than that the implications of doing so could greatly increase her defence budget.

8. Canadian governments have in fact made a practice of avoiding the appearance of relating favours being sought from foreign governments to any Canadian national military effort. Quid pro quo bargaining obviously must favour the stronger state, whereas the unquantifiable benefits to a great state of co-operative neighbours can lead the former to a degree of generosity which a strict calculation of "cost effectiveness" would never encourage. In practice it has been foreign governments, most recently the West German government as has been noted, which have demanded military effort from Canada as a quid pro quo for other benefits.

9. The threat to withdraw support amounts to coercion, and any attempt to coerce ones friends must inevitably have its adverse repercussions. If it is to be attempted for any reason less than one of overwhelming national importance it is desirable to minimize the political signature of the activity by making it look to be a necessary and automatic response to a national need. The demonstration thus becomes ambiguous and it may reasonably be hoped to retain friendly relations with the state being coerced. But to be able to

achieve this tactical ideal it is necessary to possess armed forces which are at once serving an alliance function and are directly applicable to whatever may be the immediate subject of dispute. Obviously, this consideration effectively precludes the coercive use of Canada's alliance commitments to influence wheat sales, or any other such economic arrangement, unless the need is perceived to be great enough to make unambiguous coercion unavoidable. But with respect to Canada's claims to off-shore control around her coasts Canada does enjoy an ability to redeploy naval forces tasked to NATO for the purpose of enforcing Canadian law. The move would be an ambiguous statement of Canada's attitudes to her allies, and hence usable. Some importance may be attached to the fact that the force involved is a naval force. The inherent mobility of naval forces makes them less convincing symbols of support, which weakness has the advantage of making their withdrawal look less threatening. The move need never be in the public view. By contrast it is inconceivable that Canada's ground forces in Germany could be dispatched on any task outside the context of NATO without implying a major change in Canada's policy towards Europe. But even at sea Canada's freedom to manipulate her contribution to NATO's forces is limited by her shared perception of the threat posed by the Russian navy.

10. The other category of supportive influence is really the ultimate perfection of ambiguous coercion. Whereas hitherto one has been considering the instance of a purely supportive military activity which may be used coercively, it is also apparent that all military establishments are inherently coercive whether or not they are used supportively. The coercion may be implicit in the nature of the support offered and so unquestionably "automatic". In an extreme case a

national military capability may pose a danger to an ally, which obliges it to respond to the needs of the first state. The British nuclear force was conceived with this function in mind and actually serves its purpose by putting Britons into American nuclear planning establishments. And it also does more, as Andrew Pierre has written from his experience in the American Embassy in London between 1962 and 1964:

As full nuclear partners they [i.e. the British] acquired a privileged position which no other ally enjoyed in day-to-day discussions of nuclear targeting and war planning. The act of nuclear sharing also created an environment in which American trust in the British government deepened so that American officials discussed a wider range of military and political topics more frankly with their British counterparts than with officials of other friendly nations.³

The creation in 1966 of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group which includes Britain and Germany reduces the importance to Britain of her nuclear forces, but possibly the NPG only exists because it was recognized that Germany could follow the British precedent. Canada has no military capability which can so command American or NATO responses, but Canada does share with all other members of the alliance an ability to coerce by virtue of the affect her forces have on the military structure of NATO. The British nuclear force, besides obliging the Americans in the interest of rational planning to keep Britain in the picture of their own nuclear policy, has the additional function of acting as a trigger to American deterrent forces. The Russians know that they cannot bomb London without retaliation, and accordingly will only do so if prepared to take on NATO as a whole. For her part Canada profoundly influences the structure of NATO by her naval effort which is a major component of the means of linking Europe and North America. The Canadian forces in Germany in their own way have a similar effect. It is the thesis of this paper that Canada should be making more use of this mode of coercive, supportive military influence, which by altering the structure of NATO makes it more responsive to Canadian interests.

11. The modal division of military influence between supportive and hostile is paralleled by a conceptual division of no less importance between the influence of armed forces as actors and as symbols. This division is fundamental to any understanding of the role of Canada's armed forces. As actors, armed forces can perform or threaten to undertake specific actions, allowance for which states must make. So much is obvious. But the symbolic nature of armed forces is equally important. Although the ability of a state to manipulate its military establishment may be greater than is the freedom, certainly of the Canadian government, to manipulate economic or other civil facets of the state to serve foreign policy objectives, the deployment of armed forces nonetheless constitutes a strong political statement and will only be made after careful deliberation. Once made it tends to commit the government which made it, because the reversal of policy always causes loss of prestige. Furthermore the government would not have made its move without belief that the public would support it, and if they do so, then domestic considerations will obstruct any reversal. That being so, a military deployment can be seen as a trigger mechanism which commits a state and may make possible, or even unavoidable, the development of the commitment along strong military or other lines.

12. The precise symbolic significance of a military deployment, however, will differ from state to state and according to circumstances. As symbols, the armed forces of a state reflect the image held of that state abroad. Canada's image as "the helpful fixer", for instance, makes her military less threatening, her deployments more altruistic, and therefore the national commitment less great. Accordingly, there are many circumstances in which Canadian forces can be used to promote NATO's and Canada's interests when American forces, because they symbolize a strong anti-Russian commitment, would be unacceptable or counter-productive. Great national advantages, as well as alliance

gains, can be secured as a result of the relatively unique political signature of each nation's forces. Because Canada can do things the Americans, or Germans, cannot, our willingness to contribute becomes important to our allies.

13. Because in different circumstances military capability will have a somewhat different significance, it is necessary that each state analyse for itself what aspects of its foreign policy need support from its limited military capability. Theoretically the defence policy should then be tailored to match the needs of foreign policy. But in practice the limitations of military forces as instruments of foreign policy impose the need to match possibilities with necessities, to arrive at an arrangement which makes a significant contribution to the solution of national problems.

14. Simply stated, the fundamental objectives of Canadian foreign policy are the avoidance of war, the maintenance of adequate trading connections, and the preservation of Canadian independence. It would, however, be a thankless task to attempt to tailor in abstract a defence policy to support these general aims. It is necessary to adopt a simple line of foreign policy which seems to satisfy basic national interests and which does not demand more military support than can be provided. Accordingly Canadian governments have chosen to support a strong military alliance of the states of western Europe and North America. Canadian diplomatic activity is certainly not confined to the support of NATO - on the contrary NATO is taken somewhat for granted - but it is through support of NATO that Canada's armed forces are able most effectively to promote basic Canadian interests. The NATO alliance serves at once to promote the continuity of a trading area large enough to support the Canadian economy, to maintain an international strategic balance which discourages military adventures, and to reduce Canadian vulnerability to control by the United States.

15. Control of Canada's subordination to the United States is fostered by the extent to which the Americans are dependent upon Canadian volition, by the importance of Canadian and American contacts with third states, and by the reduction of international tensions, last which is of course an important objective in itself. To a large extent the pursuit of these instrumental goals necessarily leads Canada to the reinforcement of her ties with Europe. This direction of policy is determined, in part, by calculation of the most effective employment of Canada's armed forces, while the realization of this policy is, in part, dependent also upon the correct employment of Canada's forces. The close military alliance of the United States and western Europe is of paramount importance to Canada as it removes Canada from the front line of the American defensive perimeter. The existence of a stable Atlantic alliance also serves Canadian interests by discouraging the development of new threats to American security which, besides posing a direct military collateral threat to Canada, could terminate American toleration of the independent policy of Canada. And the alliance of Canada and western Europe, which finds expression in a military form, is also significant in fostering Canadian attitudes of independence by providing a cultural and economic counterweight to the United States. In abstract these advantages could accrue to Canada without her active military participation in the NATO alliance, but in practice Canada's participation is important to the alliance. The United States has sufficient reasons of her own to follow a policy of alliance with western European states, but even the United States is constrained by the limitations of her military capability and by her position in the world. In practice the continued cohesion of the NATO alliance is somewhat dependent upon Canada's military effort. Not only does this mean that Canada's defence policy is an important means of preventing the development of challenges to Canadian sovereignty, but, because the United States would

experience some difficulty in duplicating Canada's military effort, it also means that Canada's relationship with the United States is to some degree altered from one of dependence to one of interdependence. Interdependence, in the present day, is the only sure foundation for independence.

16. The need to control Canada's relationship with the United States was very much a consideration of the Canadians who were instrumental in the creation of the NATO alliance; specifically it was held to be of paramount importance that Britain and the United States be linked in alliance. The primary and explicit reason for the creation of NATO, however, was the determination to prevent an imbalance of military power on the European continent leading to a renewed war in Europe. At the time the fear was that the Soviet Union would exploit the post-war military weakness of Western European states and reduce them one by one to a condition of vassalage. The situation is now considerably altered, for the economic recovery of the states of Europe has created a situation where only the choice by European statesmen of other priorities has prevented the development of a purely European system of defence. Nevertheless, NATO still serves to stabilize the peace: by enabling European statesmen to set priorities other than an indigenous security system, NATO helps to ensure that military competition in Europe does not lead to war. It is not inevitable that the development of the European Common Market countries into a cohesive, nuclear armed, political entity would panic Russia into aggressive moves, but it is evidently a possibility which Europeans take seriously.

17. In promoting the linkages between Europe and North America Canada's armed forces are valued both for their capabilities, base facilities, and for their political characteristics.

The value of Canada's naval forces to NATO lies almost exclusively in their technical ability. By contrast, although their technical value is rated highly, Canada's forces in Germany have been most valued because of the symbiosis of Canada and the United States. The commitment of Canadian forces to a cause provides political support within the United States for that cause. This feature is also valued by American governments, as was demonstrated by the pressure placed on Canada to send forces to Korea, and to Viet Nam. Canadian commitment helped, or was thought to help, defuse domestic opposition to American war policy. There are other political features of Canadian forces which perhaps are not adequately exploited. For one, Canada's character as an arctic state, which gives her forces legitimacy in arctic regions, could enable Canada to play a role in the arctic confrontation between NATO and Russian which would be valuable to the alliance. Canada's position as a lesser power also enhances her ability to play a role of mediator, and her lack of great power or imperial status makes her more acceptable to the other small states of Europe. As yet, however, little capital is made of these assets, for the general good of NATO and the particular good of Canada.

18. Complexities of international relations and military technique require consideration of other factors. Support of the alliance of western Europe and North America, as we have seen, provides the framework within which the Canadian armed forces are capable of supporting primary Canadian interests, but the Defence White Paper of 1970 gave the armed forces the primary task of protecting Canadian "Sovereignty". This priority appears to have been based in part upon a naive assumption that the presence of Canadian forces in and near Canada was the most effective way of protecting Canadian interests, which is not the case. But the rejection of that simplistic judgment does not remove the need for Canada to maintain forces in areas

over which she wishes to have some control. Even within the unusually integrated NATO alliance it is a fact that the provision of forces within a theatre of operations is generally necessary to ensure a national voice in the conduct of particular allied operations, and indeed it is necessary to contribute forces which will actually be involved in the operation before the national government can be sure of full information and a significant voice. Naturally, therefore, all states are concerned to dominate alliance military activity within their own territorial limits. Iceland by contrast, without armed forces of her own, must depend upon American judgments as to what they should be told about allied military activity from bases in Iceland. Understandably Icelanders are unhappy about the situation. Canada clearly must give priority to participation in military activity within Canada. It would be very detrimental to Canadian interests were Canadian forces not adequate to undertake both the domestic and the alliance activity, but given that there is a limitation to Canadian defence spending any decision as to the nature of Canada's alliance roles must be governed by the compatibility of the two. Canadian naval specialization in anti-submarine operations is a good choice of activity which serves both an important domestic and a vital alliance purpose. By contrast Canadian ground forces have to maintain distinct capabilities for operations on the central front in Germany and for domestic purposes. Superficially at any rate the compatibility of northern flank requirements with domestic infantry configurations suggests the value of developing that role, but the absolute importance of the central front must also be kept in mind.

19. The importance of participation in any operation over the conduct of which Canada wants to have some control also suggests the need to let the choice of alliance tasks be influenced by consideration of what operations appear to the

Canadian government most critical to national interests. In effect this means that besides participation in operations which may affect Canadian territory directly it is also desirable to participate in operations through which NATO and Canada could come into danger. Essentially these are alliance operations which are in direct contact with Soviet Union forces. Many factors must be considered. For one, Canadian participation must be on a level to justify Canada having a substantial voice in policy decisions; otherwise, participation may only increase vulnerability without compensating advantages. Another consideration must be whether the circumstances will permit Canada to play a useful role; for instance, in the arctic she may be able to act as a buffer in concert with other arctic states, whereas in the Mediterranean Canadian forces, with little local status, could only play an effective role if their purely military force-level was high. The role Canadian forces are playing in Cyprus must be judged by different criteria because United Nations operations have a unique character in international politico-military operations.

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20. The objective of this paper is to consider whether an effective way of realizing Canadian foreign policy objectives may be found in the development of Canada's role in the northern tier of NATO. It is not enough to accept that the continued existence of the NATO alliance is useful to Canada, and that Canadian support for the alliance will facilitate her relationships with its other members, it is also necessary to calculate what form of Canadian contribution will do most to ensure that NATO serves Canadian interests and do most to support Canada's position within the alliance. The objectives are both direct and instrumental. They are direct in that it is desired to impose upon the strategic environment a form

which, as much as is possible, favours Canadian interests. And they are instrumental for it must be the hope of any government to increase its ability to control the future development of its country. These considerations, however, cannot be used as the point of departure for analysis because of the limitations to the understanding of political systems. Instead, it is necessary to give consideration to some of the salient political and military problems of the alliance, and to postulate hypothetical solutions Canada might provide to at least some of them, and then to test the hypotheses by consideration of the effect such a development would appear likely to have upon Canada's primary interests.

21. The focus of this paper on the arctic regions of the world is one that needs to be defended. It is generally recognized that Canada's arctic territories, with or without a preventive scorched-ice policy, are not in the forefront of East-West conflict. In economic terms there is no sign yet (pace Jacobsen)⁴ that possession of the northern islands would tilt the balance in favour of world communism so decisively that Moscow could be tempted beyond restraint. The military value of the area is also limited. The SSN 8 missile carried in Russian Delta class submarines could be launched from the polar ocean to targets in the United States, but without approaching Canadian shores. The development of over-the-horizon radar and of airborne warning and control aircraft may increase the importance of Canadian arctic territory for defence against bombers, and the possession of the land is valuable in terms of the control it permits NATO to impose on air movement. It must be accepted, therefore, that Canada's security problems in her own arctic territories are secondary to those which could arise out of conflict in Europe, or in the Atlantic, although the Canadian arctic may have some importance in NATO's tactical control of the Atlantic. The Manhattan episode, when in 1969

the experimental voyage of the American supertanker through the north-west passage was seen as an American challenge to Canada's jurisdiction, may be taken as typical of the sort of threat to be expected. How important discouraging economic assessments were in turning aside that threat may be left to conjecture. Suffice it to say that when a super-power challenges Canadian authority the best defence would be to have friends who were interested in the outcome.

22. Having disposed of the false dichotomy between the local defence of Canadian sovereignty and the collective defence of NATO, it is evident that the essential means to the end of protecting Canada's arctic jurisdiction is the preservation of a secure alliance of western Europe and North America. The three main thrusts of alliance security are strategic nuclear stalemate, the NATO forces on the central front of Europe, and reasonably secure lines of communication across the Atlantic. Canada contributes military support to the NATO commanders responsible for each of these tasks. On the central front, Canada maintains a four-battalion brigade-group with indigenous air support. In the Atlantic, Canada maintains a fleet of twelve helicopter-carrying destroyers supported by three submarines, two fleet supply vessels, and long-range maritime patrol aircraft. And in defence of the United States strategic nuclear forces Canada participates in the NORAD air-defence arrangements.

23. Why then should Canada consider the development of her role in the Arctic? The answer lies very much in the art of the possible. Canada already has a commitment to reinforce Norway in the event of a crisis, so the arctic issue won't go away if ignored. And Canada already feels obliged to maintain some ability to deploy forces to her own arctic territories.

The security problems of Canada, Iceland, Norway and Danish Greenland do in fact relate to the central issues of North Atlantic security and the security of the deterrent nuclear forces. And the political signature of Canada's forces is one that has use in the context of the northern flank states of NATO. Without attempting at this point to justify these last two assertions it must at least be admitted that there is enough suggestive evidence to warrant an examination of the image of a closer partnership of Canada with the nordic states of NATO as a means of furthering the interests of each participant state, of NATO as a whole, and indeed of the world in general.

CHAPTER TWO
CANADA AND THE NORTHERN TIER OF NATO

24. In a study of military influence the logical place to begin is with an assessment of the perceptions of danger experienced by the target state. This observation is most pertinent to the concept of influencing through gratification, which as has been shown is only a part of the whole equation. And furthermore, this study is only partially about influencing allies; it is at least as important to influence one's opponents. Still one does have to start somewhere and as good a place as any is to look at the interconnecting problems of the Atlantic sea lines of communication, and the security problems of the states littoral to the Norwegian Sea as seen through their own eyes and those of NATO as a whole.

25. The relative ability of the Soviet Union to use its naval forces to interdict Atlantic communications, compared to the ability of NATO to ensure the movement of adequate tonnage to sustain a defense of western Europe, is a knotty question which cannot be tackled here. The question, however, is one of fundamental importance. Nuclear stalemate virtually ensures that war in Europe would have to be fought in Europe. Even if the war developed to the stage where battlefield nuclear weapons were used the disincentives against strategic nuclear strikes are such as to protract the conflict at lower levels of violence. Should it prove to be impossible to defend Europe by measures short of strategic nuclear attack it might well be that the only sane course would be to negotiate terms of capitulation, using whatever leverage was available to minimize the loss. But a protracted war however fought could only be sustained by NATO in Europe so long as vital supplies continued to arrive, and the bulk of them could only be carried by sea. Hence an ability to move cargoes by sea in the event of a European war

is vital to NATO - but really the issue is greater even than that. The importance of sea communciations is so clearly perceived, the evidence of two world wars being indisputable, that a threat in the Atlantic can be viewed as a threat to the structure of NATO. War at sea having far less potential for collateral damage, it is conceivable that the Russians might confine their action against NATO to the Atlantic, with minor attacks in other oceans to pin down U.S. forces. The fact of conflict would oblige NATO to reinforce the European front, which would increase the targets against which the Russian navy could act. Hence defeat to Russia at sea could by itself destroy NATO, and the defeat could take place without strategic nuclear forces ever being engaged. Even attacks on Russian fleet bases would present too great a risk of escalation to be a likely riposte to defeats at sea.

26. But we need not go so far as to postulate a war at sea. Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of the growth of the Russian navy is the threat that it might be able, by its existence alone, to bring about the disintegration of NATO. Defence leaders in NATO have expressed the fear that, if the safe arrival of the reinforcements needed to sustain a European battle could not be guaranteed, the political pressures upon the American and Canadian governments to anticipate defeat and withdraw their ground forces from Europe might become undeniable. European nations would then have less confidence in their ability to resist illegitimate Russian demands. From the point of view of the Russians the hamstringing of NATO is unquestionably preferable to the most successful of wars, and so they have every incentive to continue the build-up of their fleet.

27. NATO's ability to ensure the use of the Atlantic is open to question. The requirement for defensive forces is primarily a factor of the size of the ocean and the number

of merchant ships needing protection. Nuclear submarines and anti-shipping missiles greatly increase the problems of defence. But the Russian ability to use their great fleet of submarines to defeat NATO is by no means a foregone conclusion. Submarines even today are grossly restricted in their abilities to move, perceive, and communicate. A nuclear submarine can out-run a surface ship, has radar and sonar, and sophisticated radio circuits. But missile firing nuclear submarines are not heavily armed defensively, and must operate quietly, which generally precludes high speeds or extensive use of transmitters. Consequently the defensive forces have all the advantages associated with team-work against individual adversaries. They also enjoy the advantage of controlling the coastlines of the Atlantic. Not only does this facilitate NATO operations within the Atlantic, but it also greatly increases the dangers the Russians must encounter before they can even come close to NATO shipping. The Russian Northern Fleet may be the largest in the world, but it is based at Kola, a thousand miles up a natural fiord the shores of which, Norway, Greenland and Iceland, are NATO states.

28. It is impossible to over-state the importance to NATO of the Norwegian Sea and its littoral. It provided at once a sound-box through which Russian submarines have to make their way, and choke points at which in wartime a proportion of the submarines in transit to and from the Atlantic could be destroyed. Norwegian and Icelandic territory is vital to NATO as terminals of SOSUS, the sea-bottom-mounted acoustic surveillance system, and because of the airfields at Bodø, Andøya, and Keflavik from which maritime patrol aircraft can operate, and from which air support could be given to surface naval forces. The channels between Greenland and Iceland, and between Iceland and Scotland, are the most dangerous points for Russian submarines in transit.

29. Hence it is evident that in order to guarantee Atlantic communications it is as necessary to ensure the continued availability of Norwegian and Icelandic territory as it is to maintain adequate naval forces. But provision for the security of the so-called "northern flank" states of NATO is a complex problem with important political as well as military dimensions. Perhaps largely due to the sparseness of the population of the countries concerned, and to the shared need to find means for the exploitation of the resources of a harsh climate, the indigenous political and economic issues at dispute between Russia and the northern flank states are few. Even the growing tension over the extraction of off-shore oil deposits is to a considerable extent a result of technical military considerations. Consequently there is great concern to prevent defensive arrangements being themselves provocative of conflict. Each state is obliged to arrive at its own compromise. As it has been commented, one of the strengths of NATO is its diversity which permits the tailoring of foreign and defence policy to fit different circumstances, and it is necessary, therefore, to consider the different problems of different countries.

30. Norwegian defence policy must be predicated upon the two considerations, that without allied assistance Norway cannot defend herself from Russian attack and that Norway must avoid doing anything which will make it militarily necessary for Russia to intervene in Norway. This, of course, necessitates a complex equation in practice, for the certainty of allied support in a crisis depends to some extent upon the availability of Norwegian territory as a base of operations against Russia. The Norwegian solution has been to provide SACLANT, the supreme allied commander Atlantic, with a measure of surveillance of the Russian Northern Fleet, but to limit the extent of the surveillance, and to refuse to develop in

peacetime any offensive means which could pose a threat to the Kola bases and so oblige the Russians to consider means of destroying those Norwegian facilities.

31. Norwegian surveillance of the Northern Fleet is undertaken from fixed sensors, from submarines of which they have fifteen small diesel boats of German design, and from maritime patrol aircraft of which they have five P3-Bs. Normally this number of aircraft permits one surveillance flight daily in the Barents sea, which is Norway's responsibility under C-in-C East Atlantic. Allied aircraft sometimes fly into Norwegian bases at Andøya and Bodø to operate with the Norwegians, but on those occasions their Norwegian operational orders limit them to flights west of longitude 24° East. This limitation was established after the Russian shot down a U-2 surveillance aircraft which had been using Norwegian as well as other air bases.

32. Norwegian assurances to Russia that they would not permit their territory to be used to threaten Russian security were explicit before Norway joined the NATO alliance. In 1949, in response to Russian questions, the policy was announced of prohibiting the permanent stationing of foreign forces on Norwegian territory, unless attack were expected.⁵ The care which Norway has taken to preserve the disarmed and neutral status of Svalbard according to the convention of 1920 is another measure which encourages Russian toleration of Norway, and indeed it has prevented Svalbard becoming an important issue between NATO and Russia. In 1976 Knut Frydenland, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, told the Storting:

In a world otherwise full of strife and conflicts, the level of tension in the area around Svalbard has been low. We shall do our utmost to ensure that this will continue to be the case in the years ahead. Since Svalbard is situated in an area which, in terms of security policy, is steadily increasing in importance, this task will become both more difficult and of greater significance.⁶

The Norwegian decision to restrict the exploitation for oil on the Norwegian continental shelf to Norwegian companies has also been motivated, in part, by an understanding of the Russian concern that oil-drilling operations could endanger the egress of the Northern Fleet by providing a cover for surveillance, and by justifying a substantial NATO naval presence to "defend" the rigs. In 1978, however, the Norwegians decided to permit the minority participation of the great international oil companies in the development of the far northern fields. Ostensibly the decision was based on the need for large-scale investment in a high-cost area, but possibly an additional consideration was that allied support is needed for the Norwegian claim to a median-line division of the seabed with Russia, as opposed to Russia's meridian-line claim.

33. At the same time as Norway has controlled the activity of her allies, she has also avoided any military developments of her own which could threaten the security of Russian forces on the Kola. The Orion squadron is small, and although the submarines could be a serious threat, their war-time commitment to the security of Norwegian fiords must be seen as reducing their ability to threaten the egress of the Northern fleet. In this context it should be noted that the Russian marine infantry in Kola can have no other purpose than for an assault on Norway. Norway has a squadron of CF-104G strike aircraft trained for maritime operations, but again they are an important

part of the defences of the fiords. With modern precision-guided ordnance it would be quite possible for Norway to mount a deterrent force, capable of destroying Northern fleet ships in harbour without using nuclear weapons, but this option has not been taken up.

34. It is not possible, however, for Norway to avoid entirely the danger of Russian intervention, despite her careful behaviour. The small extent of ice-free coastline which Russia controls in the Kola peninsula and its proximity to Norway suggests to Norwegian analysts that there are great pressures encouraging Russia to increase the defensive perimeter of the base area. Requirements could begin with the elimination of Norwegian surveillance equipment back at least as far as the beginning of the wide deep-water channel west of the Bear Island to North-Cape channel. Further requirements would seem to be the elimination of Norwegian air bases which command the entire Norwegian Sea and are of fundamental importance in any NATO operation to block the egress of the Russian northern fleet. Their capture by Russia could reverse the situation and not only provide forward defences for the Kola base, but give Russia enhanced air support in a battle for control of the Norwegian Sea. Finally, it may be presumed that Norwegian fiords could be regarded as necessary dispersal harbours for the Russian Northern fleet should war be imminent.

35. It is not surprising that some NATO states consider Norway's policy equivocal, not to say disloyal. The attitude taken depends essentially on whether it is believed that preparations for war, or avoidance of provocation, is the more important means to the preservation of peace. But the situation of the observer also affects the question, for the United States, as the state primarily threatened by Russian SSBN, nuclear-powered submarines armed with ballistic missiles, naturally

feels that the Norwegian policy increases the threat to America. This may well be short-sighted, but the feeling of resentment nonetheless remains.

36. Perhaps it is because of the difficulties Norway has convincing her allies of the validity of her policy that there is some concern that Russia may not be convinced of the continued reality of the NATO guarantee of Norwegian security. Norwegian military authorities are also concerned that it may be difficult in a crisis for the necessary allied support to be received without terminating Russian belief that it remains possible to tolerate Norwegian independence. This is a very complex problem as a Norwegian decision to place the defence of Norway under allied control, which would be a necessary aspect of bringing in allied support, would appear automatically to transform Norway into a base of operations against Russia. If it did not, then it may be expected that NATO would be reluctant to devote forces to Norway when the security crisis would be general. In this respect the time it would take for allied forces to arrive is seen as critical, for the interval between it becoming apparent that Norway was no longer to preserve her semi-neutral character which encouraged Russian co-operation, and the arrival of forces which would provide a military argument against Russian adventures, would possibly encourage the Russians to take precipitate steps to forestall NATO. It is from the Norwegian point of view, and probably from the point of view of NATO as a whole, desirable that the arrival of allied support appear to the Russians as being at once inevitable and not unduly threatening. For this reason it has been suggested that the Canadian army group destined for the support of Norway, the CAST Combat Group, be transformed into a force which can at very short notice be flown at least in part to Norway to bolster Norwegian defences. It would be exercised regularly in Norway, and perhaps it would

have such an organic link with the Norwegian army that Canadian soldiers would be found in various numbers virtually every day in north Norway. The objectives would be at once the demonstration that any Russian aggression in North Norway would inevitably be a general NATO problem, and to significantly raise the degree of military force which the Russians would have to deploy for operations against Norway.

37. The Americans are of course the ultimate recourse of all allied defence planning, and their forces available for Norwegian defence are very important. Two U.S. Marine brigades with heavy air support are committed to Norway, but their expected arrival 30 days after assembly in the U.S. could be rather late. Heavy U.S. support might also be expected from the Strike Fleet Atlantic which could arrive more expeditiously provided it was not engaged elsewhere. But besides the delayed arrival time, U.S. forces could not be sent to reinforce Norway without creating a strong impression of crisis. Unless it were desired to do that it would be preferable for the Norwegians to be able to call upon other states for support. This is available in the ACE Mobile Force North, which consists of three reinforced battalions and three fighter squadrons, available on two to six days notice. But this force is small and is primarily intended to build in a threat of escalation to any attack on Norway, by demonstrating multi-national commitment. Canada provides one battalion and two CF-5 squadrons for ACE Mobile Force North. The German commitment to ACE Mobile Force North has the same political significance as does the American commitments, in that the Germans are so unpopular in Norway, and in Russia, that their arrival would amount to a crisis. The Standing Naval Force Atlantic may also be available for a timely show of allied support. Otherwise Norwegian hopes lie in the UK mobile force, now truncated to one air-portable reinforced brigade group with

three tactical ground-support air squadrons and helicopters, available in ten to twelve days; an amphibious force of two Royal Marine Commandos, one Netherlands Marine Commando, and one U.S. Marine Expeditionary Brigade, available in two weeks; and the Canadian Air and Sea Transportable brigade, available in 30 days.⁷

38. The ACE Mobile Force is obviously at present the most rapidly available reinforcement, but it is only exercised in Norway every second year. The British provide the most extensive ground force support to Norway, and the Royal Marines exercise regularly in Norway. And indeed the NATO allied command north Europe is a post filled by a British general. But only the Canadians are specifically ear-marked for northern Norway, and the Norwegians feel that only the Canadians have the right political image to make their regular appearance in north Norway acceptable at once to the Norwegian public and to the Russians.

39. The Norwegians assess that their most pressing defence problem relates to a possible transitional stage between peace and general war, or to a Russian attempt to snatch the space they want and present NATO with a fait accompli which only war could undo. There does not appear to be any disposition amongst NATO analysts to dispute the Norwegian view on the advantages the acquisition of Norwegian territory would give the Russians. But on the other hand, neither is there any doubt that NATO has substantial military reasons for retaining control of the Norwegian Sea littoral. In a situation of existing war it can hardly be doubted but that the defence of north Norway would be given a high priority. In any case, in a general war context it is problematic that if the Russians felt a need to intervene in Norway they could be deterred by a marginal improvement in the defence arrangements of Norway. If the mobilization of the

Norwegian army reserves, and the reinforcement of Norwegian forces by allied units, raised the requirements for assault forces above a level which could be made available in the prevailing military circumstances the Russians might be obliged to forgo any attempt to occupy the country. But this eventuality would not prevent the use of conventional or nuclear weapons to at least deny allied forces the use of Norwegian bases.

40. The evidence to support a supposition that Russia might be impelled to attempt a localized military intervention against a NATO state is certainly slight. Observation of Russian behaviour since 1945 does indicate that strategic imperatives are the principal motives for expensive state commitments. The most important example of this priority has been the Russian expenditure of large resources in military aid to Egypt and the Arab states in return for the privilege of using Egyptian ports to support Russian naval operations against the United States 6th Fleet. The use made by the Russians, however, of military forces in the pursuit of access to Mediterranean ports has been entirely supportive. Military force has been used by the Russians as an instrument of persuasion in Black Africa, in Guinea where they acquired an air station, and in Somalia where they acquired naval support facilities, and by proxy in Angola where the objectives were more of a political nature. With the exception of Angola, however, and Russian forces were not directly committed in Angola, the Russian use of force has been extremely circumspect. So much so, indeed, that western observers do not know for certain that force was ever more than threatened. It is evident that these histories provide little precedent to suppose Russia might risk the use of force against a NATO state in any but the most extreme circumstances.

41. It is not impossible, however, that the vulnerability of the Northern Fleet from Norwegian territory might impel the Russians to overrule their policy of circumspection in the threatened use of military force outside the context of general war. Certainly Russia has in the past attempted to bully Norway, beginning in 1944 with demands for a joint administration of Svalbard, and continuing with pressure to keep Norway out of NATO. The most recent attempts to use demonstrative force have been the Russian declaration in 1975 and 1976 of missile test areas in the sector of the Barents sea of which ownership of the sea-bed is disputed by Norway and Russia. In the first instance missile firing actually took place at a time when a Norwegian parliamentary delegation was visiting Svalbard, and in the latest the provocation was somewhat the reverse for there was little in the way of firings to justify the protracted exclusion of Norwegian fishermen from a profitable fishing ground. The care which Norway has taken to limit the threat to Russia which is posed by Norwegian membership in NATO may be seen as evidence that the Norwegians are vulnerable to pressure. The Norwegian policy of excluding foreign military establishments unless attack is threatened has the theoretical advantage that it discourages Russia from threatening attack. But conversely it also suggests that the Norwegians might be equally willing to forbid NATO even the use of Norwegian facilities, or perhaps go so far as to permit the Russians to use them, in order to buy off Russian hostility.

42. The means by which the Russian government might hope to bring about this transformation need not involve overt threats. Conceivably the ostentatious display of military strength in a manner to emphasize the inability of NATO to intervene, coupled with a polite request that Norway alter its relationship with NATO because it was exacerbating Russo-Norwegian relations, could lead to immense public pressure to

oblige, and governmental fear not to do so. What is required to counter this scenario is to ensure that both Russia and Norway are convinced that NATO can reinforce Norway in time, and to minimize the danger that a Norwegian determination to resist will be thought to precipitate catastrophe.

43. On both counts the Canadian armed forces are well equipped to bolster the Norwegian ability to resist. Only the certainty that allied assistance could be made available at a very short notice can provide a future Norwegian government with the justification for resisting Russian illegitimate demands backed by the threat of force. Canadian forces by virtue of their arctic capability can most easily be molded to fill this role. But the political character of Canadian forces is at least as important as their military ability. Because of Canada's stature as a small state committed to peace, with a history of support for United Nations peace-keeping, because Canada is not a primary antagonist of Russia in a military or political sense, and because Canada is another arctic state, it may be anticipated that the Norwegians would be less apprehensive in a crisis that a request for reinforcements would break down the restraints on Russian action if the reinforcements were provided by Canada.

44. Crisis decision-making is extremely difficult and anticipation of the difficulties must be an important part of peace-time defence planning. It has been observed that during the Cuban missile crisis President Kennedy made every effort to minimize the importance of individual decisions, making two sequential decisions rather than attempting at once to determine the preferred course of action. It is unlikely that any democratic state, let alone alliance, could be more decisive in dangerous circumstances. Accordingly any reduction in the apparent significance of a decision will tend to facilitate its

conclusion. It is probably true, as a British authority has put it, that actions which can be represented as potentially escalatory are likely to be in fact the surest means of deterring aggression and preserving peace. Another Briton, General Sir John Sharp, C-in-C Allied Forces Northern Europe, has made the same observation,

that the whole concept of reinforcement depends on early and very brave political decisions being taken not only by the nation asking for help but equally by those who are in a position to provide it. I do not think I am being too dramatic in saying that political courage will determine whether we can deter aggression in a crisis situation, or defend NEC should the worst happen.⁸

But this warning, while valid, does not deny that different forms of military response to pressure can have substantially different results. If the only response possible is preparation for dangerous offensive action it may well be better to do that than nothing. But it is better still to be able to rapidly increase the deterrents to action without increasing the military or political need for the opponent to respond. The rapid reinforcement of Norway's defences by the politically innocuous Canadian forces would appear to offer the closest approach to the ideal. If the Canadian forces, by regular peace-time operation with the Norwegian forces, had become accepted as an inevitable part of the Norwegian defences the decision to ask for reinforcements would become even less difficult, for it would have been established as being virtually automatic.

45. If it is accepted that the Norwegian arguments are valid there are nonetheless other questions which must be answered. In the first place must be the question of priorities. The Norwegians are naturally concerned to provide for

their territorial defence, and seek to reinforce the system of deterrents to possible Russian efforts to strengthen the situation of their Northern Fleet. They rightly see the development of the Northern Fleet into a force with the ability to threaten the trade connections of the Atlantic, and to pose a nuclear attack capability, protected by substantial surface and air forces, as one of the most important politico-military developments of the post-war world. The very importance of the Northern Fleet, however, and the fact that any hope of containing it north of the Iceland-Faeroes gap in the event of war depends upon the use of Norwegian territory, must be accepted as insuring that NATO will not permit Norway to fall by default. Consequently the local defence of Norway must not be allowed to assume an appearance of greater military importance than it has. Sight must not be lost of the fact that it is the Northern Fleet itself, and the damage it could possibly do even without crossing the threshold of war, that is one of the fundamental military problems of NATO.

46. If by the devotion of military forces to the defence of Norwegian territory Canada can deter Russian efforts at altering the political and military geography of the arctic it is apparent that she will have played a substantial part in the allied effort to confine the danger from the Northern Fleet. It is extremely difficult, however, to assess whether money spent upon that approach to the containment of the Northern Fleet problem is most effectively spent, or whether military effort more directly related to the defence of the trade connections across the Atlantic is a more effective use of money.

47. Strictly speaking that question cannot be answered, although technical military judgments may be able to reduce the margin of doubt. Several considerations may affect the

decision, however. In the first place, the defence of North Norway is important to NATO as a whole for more than military reasons. The cohesion of NATO depends upon the belief of its members that the alliance is concerned to secure the territorial integrity of all the members. The defence of northern Norway may be important instrumentally in insuring the viability of the Atlantic lines of communication of NATO, but the converse is even more true, that the sea lines of communication are only important instrumentally as a means of insuring the security of the states of NATO, including of course Norway. If the Northern Fleet could demonstrate its ability to dominate the Atlantic the cohesion of NATO would be in danger, but how much greater would be the impact on NATO cohesion if Russia were to be able to isolate and bully Norway, thereby demonstrating that no state could depend upon NATO as a collective security system.

48. A second consideration is that "sea-control" is not an absolute which can be lost forever if not secured entirely. At most only local sea-control is possible, and in connection with trade movement it must generally be a moving zone of control around a convoy. The important issue is not whether an area of the sea is held at all times, but whether control can be established within a short time of its being required. The defence of territory upon which depends the ability to impose control of a sea-area, on the other hand, is a far more time-sensitive problem, for once lost to an enemy who digs himself in it may be irrecoverable.

49. Thirdly, it should be considered that with respect to the territorial defence of Norway Canada possesses the previously mentioned political advantages, but that these are of no significance whatever in a naval battle in the Atlantic. Clearly it is necessary to attack the problem posed by the

Northern Fleet from both ends, and as efficiently as possible. Accordingly, if Canadian forces are best able to fill the deterrent requirement in Norway they ought to be made available. But it may also be possible to tailor the military nature of the deterrent effort so as to minimize the difference between the nature of the forces devoted to Norway and those required for other Canadian and NATO purposes.

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50. Canada's commitment to the security of the northern flank has another perspective. It is necessary for the Canadian statesman to look beyond the general proposition, that NATO is good for Canada and must be supported, and also consider how Canada can influence the structure of NATO so that it more nearly conforms to Canada's perception of the requirements of international security. In this respect it is evident that a Canadian decision to support Norway more effectively than at present would constitute support for the Norwegian policy of confining the threat posed by the west to Russian strategic interests in the Kola peninsula. Without Canadian support the balance of Norway's policy might have to shift either towards closer conformity with that of the United States, maybe even to the extent of permitting permanent bases for American forces in Norway, or more probably, towards greater co-operation with Russia. In 1973 Johan Holst, now an undersecretary of Defence in Oslo, wrote: "Norwegian decision-makers are quite aware of the fact that the reservations with regard to foreign troops are facilitated by the existence of Norwegian 'drawing rights' on the American forces in Germany and Iceland".⁹ Movement towards closer or more distant relations with her allies could be equally destabilizing, and possibly could have

unfortunate effects on super-power attitudes to arctic concerns. It is evident, therefore, that the northern flank commitment is an aspect of Canada's defence policy which has considerable significance to Canada's international objectives: detente, which Canada seeks through arms-control negotiations and international congresses, must also be pursued where possible through unilateral restraint, and support must be provided for those in a position to provide stability. It is in this light, as a means of modifying the polarity of the east-west dispute, that Canada should regard the Norwegian commitment.

51. A related consideration is that not only does Canadian support for Norway help to build into NATO an ability to respect Russian security requirements without unduly reducing its ability to resist aggression but Canada also has greater opportunities in the northern flank to acquire some control over NATO operational policy and NATO's response to crises. Unlike the situation in central Europe, where there are few Canadians and many Europeans, in the arctic Canada is a resident, and if she augmented her contribution to Norwegian security Canada could expect to acquire the position of greatest influence in Norwegian military planning, after Norway herself. In the air and at sea, if Canada made a parallel effort in those environments, she must remain a junior partner to the United States and Great Britain. Nevertheless, because she was operating forces in the area, and because Canada is an arctic state, she must expect to be at least informed of allied naval operations. As the contest between allied and communist nuclear submarines is one out of which it is possible that accidental war could erupt, it is obvious that Canada must have an interest in having some control of this chariot to the wheel of which she is chained.

52. Icelandic geography is if anything more important to NATO than is that of northern Norway, but the security problems of Iceland are quite different from those of Norway. It is impossible to consider Iceland as an entity in the international military spectrum because of the smallness of its population, less than three hundred thousand, which has effectively forbidden the establishment of any military forces of its own. Icelanders do not, in fact, seek to become an armed state and until 1940 relied with Denmark for protection upon a policy of neutrality, made effective, in the case of the Icelanders, by their isolation in the north Atlantic. But the British (including Canadian troops) occupation of Iceland in 1940, to forestall a possible German move following the invasion of Denmark and to support the naval war in the Atlantic, firmly put an end to strategic isolation. American forces were substituted for British in 1941 and except for a brief hiatus before the Korean war they have remained there in considerable force. In 1949 the Icelandic government, now fully independent of Denmark, decided that it could not avoid involvement in European security problems, and accordingly must link Icelandic security with that of her cultural and economic partners. It was decided to join the NATO alliance, and loyalty to NATO remains strong in Iceland. In 1975, only the People's Alliance of left-wing parties, with 18% of the 1974 popular vote, had an anti-NATO policy, and having learnt its lesson by its failed attempt in the preceeding years to alienate Iceland from NATO, not even the People's Alliance makes its anti-NATO stand a condition for participation in government coalitions.¹⁰ But the general agreement that it is necessary to choose sides and stick with the choice does not preclude concern over some of the unfortunate implications of NATO membership. Unable and unwilling to possess indigenous armed forces, Icelanders have accepted the presence of American forces, which by the Defence Agreement of 1951 have been described as "The Icelandic Defence

Force". The name, however, does not affect the situation greatly and the Icelandic government has imposed strict controls to prevent the tiny Icelandic population being submerged in an imported culture. The coalition "Left Alliance" government which ruled until 1974 determined that the American forces should be withdrawn, but with the formation of a new government agreement was reached to allow the continuation of the facilities.

53. The technology of naval and air warfare in the years since the surrender of Nazi Germany has put an increasing importance upon Icelandic geography in the confrontation of NATO and Soviet forces. Icelandic security, as a result, depends upon the continued viability of NATO as a defence system: Iceland cannot hope for adequate defence in isolation from the rest of NATO. The "Icelandic Defence Forces" are engaged in electronic and acoustic surveillance of Russian naval activity, and Keflavik air station would be a vitally important element in any operation to deny the Norwegian sea to Russian forces.

54. It is an unhappy situation for Icelanders, but making what appears to NATO eyes to be the best of a bad job, they have provided NATO with the use of Icelandic territory free of charge. This is their significant contribution to mutual defence. But the continued Icelandic support of NATO is very much an act of faith by a people who are not in a position to judge the validity of NATO assessments. As Bjorn Bjarnason writes:

Internal discussions about Icelandic security is, of course, marked by the fact that the nation has no military tradition and no Icelandic specialists on military matters are to be found. The polemic is therefore based more or less on nationalistic and emotional sentiments.¹¹

Conflict over marine resources with Britain and West Germany has played its part in complicating the Icelandic view of NATO.¹² The Icelandic resort to force to drive off foreign fishermen, using their coast guard gunboats to harass foreign operations, was dictated by extreme concern for a national industry upon which the Icelandic economy depends. It was also symptomatic of what Bjorn calls the irresponsibility of small nations. But it is evident that the Left Alliance dominated government in the period 1971-3 was determined to exploit the issue to bring about a rejection of NATO. Tactics appear to have been aimed more at creating hostility rather than utilizing Iceland's importance to NATO as a means of pressuring Iceland's allies. As has been said, the attempt failed because the highly educated Icelanders were not interested in a break with NATO. An opinion poll taken in early 1974, when the weather prevented reaching all the country voters, collected signatures of 55.5% of the voters as in favour of NATO. From 1974 to 1978 the Icelandic government of Geir Hallgrimsson continued to seek greater Icelandic control of off-shore fisheries, and being a pro-NATO government it was able to gain more effective support and virtually obtained its goals in a treaty signed with Britain in 1976.¹³

55. A new agreement was reached between the Icelandic and the American governments following the fall of the Left Alliance government in 1974. The 1951 Defence Agreement was not, in the end, abrogated. Instead, in an exchange of notes it was agreed that every effort would be made to fill the non-military jobs on the bases with Icelandic personnel. It was hoped to reduce United States personnel by 420. The present situation is amicable, but it nonetheless remains an unhappy one. Considering Iceland's importance to NATO, and NATO's importance to Canada, it is perhaps time for the Canadian government to pay some attention to easing Iceland's problems.

56. Greenland is yet another military/political problem, although the difficulties are more potential than actual ones. Greenland passed in 1953 from the status of a Danish colony to that of a province of Denmark with a provincial council which considers bills relating to Greenland before they are submitted to the Folketing in Copenhagen. In January 1979 the people of Greenland voted for home rule as a semi-autonomous province similar to the Faeroes. With a population of 50,000 in Greenland the independence movement may seem to have little chance of success, but the example of Iceland makes it impossible to discount that possibility. Greenland is potentially an important part of NATO geography should it ever become necessary to relocate the facilities now in Iceland, but otherwise its chief value lies in the fact that Danish sovereignty enables American forces, in Greenland by agreement signed 27 April 1951, to exercise air control, and to prevent Russia seeking to establish naval or air base-facilities in Greenland.

57. The American forces in Greenland do not constitute part of the NATO organization, although they would assume that status in the event of a crisis. They are national forces dedicated to continental North American security, primarily concerned with the defence of American strategic nuclear forces. The NORAD agreement co-ordinating Canadian and American air defences is analogous to the Greenland agreement, but in Greenland there are no Danish forces capable of participating in the air-defence operations. There are two American defence areas in Greenland, at Thule in the north west, and Søndre Strømfjord further south. At Thule is a BMEWS, ballistic missile warning, radar and an air base now largely used for tankers and as an emergency field. Søndre Strømfjord is used to support the four stations of the DEW, or distant early warning, radar line which crosses the south tip of Greenland, and also provides Greenland with an all-weather landing strip

for civilian service.

58. Danish military activity in Greenland is limited, and is primarily directed towards surveillance, partially for the purposes of resources management. The Danish Defence Act states that:

Primarily, the objectives of the Defence, in time of peace, will be to uphold our sovereignty through surveillance of Danish territory, and to repel violations.

The assistant to the Danish defence attaché in London, Commander Sørensen, has amplified this statement:

The aim of Danish Security Policy where Greenland is concerned will be to try to secure a peaceful co-existence for the exploitation of the resources in the area, at the same time maintaining public order by exercising sovereignty over the national area and securing the defence of Greenland within the framework of NATO.

He added however, that:

Denmark is in no position to accept the full responsibility for the defence of Greenland. Such task assumes a magnitude by far exceeding the resources Denmark can possibly make available.¹⁴

There are no Danish army posts on Greenland, Greenlanders are not liable to national service, and Denmark undertakes no army exercise in Greenland. But surveillance is undertaken by the SIRIUS sledge patrol which operates six sledge teams with police authority out of Daneborg in East Greenland. The Danish navy patrols the coast and fjords with at least one ship on station all the time. The ship is equipped with a helicopter and is built for navigation in ice. Three small inspection

craft work in the fjords, and a C130 aircraft based on Søndre Strømfjord provides aerial reconnaissance of the fisheries. It is hoped that new aircraft and helicopters, equipped with improved surveillance and navigational equipment will become available. The Danish naval station in Greenland is at Grønnedal on Arsuk fjord in SW Greenland, and in addition the Danish forces now man year around with a strength of 5 men Station Nord in the far north (82°N 17°W) as an emergency strip and equipment testing centre.

59. The independence movement in Greenland may not be much of a danger to NATO because, as with Icelanders, Greenlanders know they really have no neutral option and can hardly avoid a commitment to American security. Indeed that very argument was used in 1940 by the Danish ambassador to the United States who justified his agreement to the stationing of American forces in Greenland after the German invasion of Denmark on the grounds that it was better to have U.S. forces there by agreement than without one. But Denmark is a very minor military state, with a substantial pacifist element amongst the people. Greenland, therefore, has a security problem not unlike that which Canada has with respect to her own arctic territories. In the event of a crisis the U.S. commander in Greenland is supposed to come under SACLANT, the NATO supreme allied commander Atlantic. But as Denmark has no front-line forces in Greenland the NATO connection can do little to enhance Danish authority. The limited ability of Denmark to police her Greenland territory lays it open at once to Russian clandestine use, and to high-handed American action to prevent such an occurrence. These are not perhaps very great risks. Greenland may be useful to the Russians but hardly enough to risk war. But clearly it is in Greenland's interest to be able to provide surveillance of her own territories. In one respect the Danes have established their

sovereignty in Greenland more effectively than Canada has in her own north for the naval station at Grønnedal finds no parallel in a Canadian arctic base, and is indeed the only naval station in the western Atlantic north of Halifax. Canada's dependence on long-range surveillance equipment is a much less satisfactory expression of sovereignty. That equipment does have its uses, however, and it may be in Greenland's interest to co-operate with Canada in the resolution of their security problems.

60. It is evident that the security problems of Norway, Iceland, Greenland, and Canada all differ greatly in detail, but they do have common elements. Canada is furthest removed from the danger of Russian aggression, but shares with the other small arctic states of NATO the need to control the extent of her dependence upon, and vulnerability to, the United States and the other great allies. They also share to a greater or lesser degree a perception of the Soviet Union which emphasizes an ability to co-exist, and recognizes Russia's strategic problems. Being minor military states there is no question that separately or collectively they could carve a unique path in the international policy. But, largely because of their common connection through the arctic, it is conceivable that co-operation amongst the four can at once modify the relationship of NATO with the Soviet Union while continuing to guard against Russian encroachment, and support the individual members against undue influence by their greater allies.

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61. The Canadian policy-maker must give consideration to the question of whether Canadian military involvement in the Norwegian sea area would unduly expose Canada to peacetime

resentment or wartime danger. These dangers are somewhat different from each other, and of different degrees of importance. At first sight it may be supposed that the danger of vulnerability in wartime is the greater problem, but it is primarily a problem for the Canadian military whereas peacetime resentment is a more all-embracing national concern.

62. Theoretically the danger entailed in a minor military state such as is Canada accepting alliance commitments within the context of a greater alliance organization, is that in the event of a crisis Canada could find that her initiatives in defence of members of the alliance would be disavowed by her great-power allies out of fear of the holocaust. Certainly that is a possibility which cannot be overlooked, especially when nuclear weapons enhance the meaning of the word terror. In the hypothetical scenario of a Russian assault from the Kola peninsula into the Finmark there would be great pressures upon NATO to acquiesce in the annexation rather than attempt to compel Russian withdrawal at the risk of general nuclear war. Canadian support of Norway in the crisis might not be enough to ensure a NATO reaction, although if Canadian support had been forthcoming early enough it might have sufficed to give the Russians second thoughts and so achieve the objective before they were too committed to be able to withdraw. Hypothetically, however, Canada could find herself under attack and unsupported.

63. In practice, however, this is not a risk with a high order of probability. At the worst it could happen that Canadian military forces sent in aid of Norway, or Iceland, were annihilated. Obviously this would be extremely upsetting for the men involved, and it is fear of so being "Hong Konged" that leads the Canadian military to be cautious of the Norwegian commitment. The loss of a Canadian expeditionary force,

however, would have little direct bearing upon the security of Canada. Even if Canadian forces in Norway were to be left unsupported in a crisis, it would not follow that the United States would be able to tolerate Russian attacks upon the Canadian homeland. Nor would the Russians expect to be able to carry the war to Canada without an American reaction.

64. It appears, accordingly, that if the commitment of Canadian forces to the security of the Norwegian sea littoral had a reasonable chance of achieving its purpose of reinforcing the domestic political scene, and deterring Russian attack, that the risks involved in undertaking the commitment are nationally endurable. It is probable, in any case, that the risk of abandonment in wartime would be comparatively small. It is apparent that the collapse of multi-lateral security arrangements in the 1930s was occasioned by the failure of any state to take a military initiative against Hitler. In the Rhineland crisis, for instance, it is evident to historians that France was afraid to act without a British commitment of support, while the British would only move to support France after the French had made the first move. The inability of western states to support Finland against Russia in 1940 is an example of the dangers of exposure. But, in the circumstances of Russian threats to Iceland or arctic Norway, the lesson to learn from the Finnish experience is not to accept aggression, but that it is necessary to react in good time if the opportune moment to turn back invasion, ideally before the enemy has committed his prestige to the adventure, is not to be missed.

65. But if exposure in the unlikely event of war is not an obstacle to Canadian commitment to nordic security, the risk of Russian resentment in peacetime is more real, and certainly appears to be a major consideration governing policy in the Department of External Affairs. It is undoubt-

edly true that the Russians are capable of making trouble for Canada, especially for the government of the day. Despite frequent vociferous calls for Canada to exert her independence Canada has no real tradition of an independent foreign policy and any Canadian government which took action that led to retaliation would be likely to experience extreme criticism domestically. If Russia responded to greater Canadian military involvement in the defence of the nordic peoples by refusing to buy Canadian wheat the Canadian government could expect very heavy criticism indeed, unless, of course, China bought the wheat as an anti-Russian measure. It is probable that there is domestic political support for independent policies only if it is independence from the United States which is in mind.

66. This issue of caution versus independence is extremely complex. In the first place, it is obvious that there is no desire at all to harm relations with Russia. The idea is that by reinforcing the integrity of NATO in the nordic area the chances of a crisis developing are reduced. By Canada's taking an active role in the area it may be possible to prevent legitimate moves to check Russian encroachment from producing a counterproductive sense of insecurity amongst the Russians. The Russian government may actually welcome the introduction of a Canadian voice in the conduct of NATO operations in the Norwegian Sea area. In fact it does not appear that any state stands to lose much from Canada's accepting greater responsibility in the nordic area. A critic of the idea of some sort of linkage of arctic states rejected Canadian involvement as too obviously a tool of American policy, but one cannot reject a demarche which serves Canadian, nordic, and probably Russian interests just because it also serves United States interests. If the Canadian chauvinist can be brought to see that strong ties with Europe are vital to Canadian independence within

North America he may be brought to accept the need to be firm with Russia, although it may be doubted that he will ever accept that an important reason for enhancing Canada's position in NATO is to improve the balance of Canada's relationship with the United States. In any case it is very doubtful whether harmonious relations between Canada and Russia are dependent upon Canadian abasement. The Russians have much to gain from Canadian co-operation on any terms, although naturally they are glad to exploit weakness. It is unlikely that the deployment itself would much affect Russo-Canadian relations, but care would have to be taken to control the political impact of the move, and it would have to be accepted that forward deployment would oblige the Canadian government to acquire the competence to handle armed forces as instruments of crisis control.

CHAPTER THREE

A NORTHERN COMMITMENT AND CANADA'S DOMESTIC SECURITY NEEDS

67. Perhaps the most appealing aspect of a "special relationship" among Canada, Norway, Iceland and Danish Greenland is the effect it might have on Canada's ability to protect her interests in the arctic. The difficulty of distinguishing between the requirements of local Canadian, continental, and NATO defences does not mean that there is not a very real need, when considering Canada's military roles in NATO, to pay attention to their compatibility with military requirements at home. Collective security arrangements, and the blessings of geography, may well stand between Canada and the danger of what may perhaps be termed a "classic" invasion, or investment. The tanks of the Red Army threaten the German frontier, not the borders of Canada, and Canada is less vulnerable to naval blockade than are most industrialized states. Equally, Canada's circumstances mean that she runs little risk of being abandoned to face alone nuclear extortion especially if she continues to contribute effectively to collective security arrangements. But Canada is nonetheless exposed to small-scale assaults upon her sovereign authority, which she is expected to meet out of her own resources. And even were it possible to rely upon collective security to satisfy all domestic defence needs it would not be tolerable to do so. As has been commented previously, only by participating in a military operation can a state ensure it will be aware of what action is taken, and only by providing the preponderant part of the force can a state be confident of controlling its conduct. Naturally any state must seek to control military operations within its borders. Furthermore, even if control is certain, the presence of large numbers of foreign military forces within a state tend to undermine

the exclusivity of national governmental authority.

68. The Canadian armed forces have been cautious about devoting scarce resources to domestic needs for fear that the effect will be to starve the elements which are required to cope with the central military danger from Russia. This cautious attitude has been encouraged by the limited public understanding of the extent to which Canada's armed forces do foster the security of local national interests. The long history of Canada's relationship with the United States has suggested that no military effort is required of Canada. But this assessment fails to take into account the fact that Canada's military weakness until 1939 posed no problem for the United States because of the immunity of North America at the then level of military technique, and because of the neutrality policy of the United States. The ability of Britain to resist Nazi aggression in the 1930s, on the other hand, was seriously undermined by Canada's refusal to contribute to imperial defence. In the 1980s, as in the 1940s, Canada's friends will have pressing military problems and will continue to look to Canada for support. Not only does it mean that Canada is expected to provide her own deterrents to foreign intervention, but it means that Canadian military contribution to joint military problems is an important means of encouraging her friends to respect her interests. Accordingly, while decisions must be made as to the proportion of Canada's armed forces effort which goes to low-intensity operations as opposed to allied military preparedness, there should not be any doubt but that both activities are necessary to enable Canada to prevent non-military damage to her interests. Co-operative arrangements amongst the small arctic states of NATO appear to offer the prospect of pursuing both approaches to security, at an acceptable cost.

69. Surveillance is the *sine qua non* of national defence at any level, but in Canada's circumstances adequate arrangements for surveillance of activities in, and over Canada, and off-shore, also constitute the primary means of deterring or defeating hostile invasions. The armed forces only play a part in these surveillance operations, a large share of the work being done by the civilian police and by other civilian government agencies such as the department of Fisheries and H.M.C. Customs. But some forms of surveillance can only be done by the armed forces, while military equipment often provides efficient means of keeping watch on other aspects of Canadian national interests. The invasion of Canadian air-space by military aircraft and the operation of foreign warships off Canada's coasts are two surveillance targets virtually entirely handled by military forces. The former challenge is met by radar surveillance, and by interception with aircraft. The latter problem is met by fixed acoustic monitors and related electronics, and by air and sea patrols. Radio interception is a partially military and partially civilian intelligence operation. And such problems as supervision of commercial activity in the arctic and on the sea-bed call for some use of military equipment, particularly aircraft and sea-bed sensors.

70. The knowledge that efficient surveillance operations are being conducted will alone suffice to deter most illegal activity. Such invasions of Canada's air-space as are made from time to time by the Russians, for instance, appear to be aimed essentially at testing the quality of Canada's surveillance of air movements. The Russian aircraft promptly withdraw when challenged.

71. Adequate surveillance also is a necessary means of preventing the challenge of Canadian sovereignty by Canada's friends. Specifically, it is only by providing an adequate level of military surveillance that Canada can obviate the need of the United States to undertake the surveillance herself. With respect to Canadian territory the law of nations gives Canada the exclusive right to undertake military activities, but the compulsions of power politics severely limit Canada's ability to let her negligence pose a danger to the United States. It has been commented that Canada agreed to the building of the DEW line of arctic radar stations in order to prevent it being built without her agreement. At sea the problem is greater for international law permits foreign naval operations even within territorial waters, and certainly outside the 12-mile limit. Accordingly, the only way to ensure that Canadian authority in her coastal waters is not undermined by the obtrusive presence of foreign warships on anti-submarine patrols, is for Canada to capitalize on the scarce resources of her allies' navies and exclude their ships by undertaking the surveillance operations herself.

72. If Canadian authority should be challenged despite the vigilance of Canadian forces, however, the next requirement is for the appropriate military equipment to permit the Canadian government to demonstrate its determination to resist the invasion. The demonstrative value of an armed force derives from the domestic inhibitions which militate against their being so employed. Before a government can order its armed forces to undertake semi-belligerent actions it has to be confident that it will receive public and parliamentary support. Since there must always be a measure of doubt about the public reaction, and since the many departments of government may have solid reasons for not challenging the invader, a foreign government may well not be much bothered by protests at its

actions unless it sees that its victim's reaction is sufficiently united to permit a military demonstration of determination. Equally, the victim may well hesitate to make so strong a statement as a military demonstration unless it is convinced that it can count upon strong support for its cause from its own military, economic, or political condition, or from its allies. It follows that the domestic and foreign reactions to the military demonstration are as important as is the initial fact that it was made. But the ability of a government to exploit its advantages by making a military demonstration depends to a considerable degree upon the possession of appropriate forces.

73. The demonstrative use of armed forces is an art form which requires judicious control. The selection of the means of demonstration must be appropriate to the location, nature, and circumstances of the dispute. The military forces which Canada supplies to NATO, for instance, can be used to demonstrate Canada's determination to protect her interests. Their withdrawal from alliance tasks for that purpose, however, will always make a strong threat to Canada's allies, as well as endanger NATO as a whole. The threat may on occasion be necessary to compel allied support, or to dissuade allied interference, but is hardly appropriate for first instances. For an initial reaction to a first encounter, such as a Russian over-flight, it is necessary to be able to make the response with military forces stationed in Canada and retained for that purpose. And the force employed must relate as directly as possible to the threat made, and be capable of a very controlled exercise of force.

74. The difficulty of predicting the possible challenges to a state's sovereignty over the thirty-odd years, which is the life cycle of some military systems, does not, in fact, pose much problem when it comes to ensuring the ability of the state to make appropriate minor demonstrations against incursions. At that level of response, on the whole it is the least sophisticated systems which are required, and it is therefore sufficient for each element of the service to maintain a small strength in its traditional arms. In the air, interceptor aircraft are necessary so long as there continues to be any sort of manned military aircraft. And not only are ground-to-air guided weapons unsuitable for such purposes, but so is an interceptor aircraft armed exclusively with long-range ordnance and with no capability to engage a target which it has brought into visual contact. At sea, it is also necessary to retain ships which are armed with guns. The modern surface-to-surface missile cannot be used for making warning shots, and indeed it is vulnerable to erratic behaviour, perhaps occasioned by the opponents jamming devices, and so poses a danger to neutral shipping in the area.¹⁵ Anti-submarine torpedoes are equally useless for warning submarines, but it is a small matter to equip warships with suitable warning charges. Ashore there is much less need to limit the reaction to military invasion, should it occur, for there are no limits to national territorial sovereignty. Invasion, however, can be accidental, or be the work of civilian commercial firms, and political considerations will in those cases again call for restraint. Accordingly it will also be necessary for Canada to possess some form of light infantry. Civilian police forces can often be used to respond to civilian invasions, as civilian fisheries protection officers respond to foreign violations of fisheries regulations. But entire dependence upon civilian agencies is impossible because, unless they are virtually military forces, they will always be inappropriate

as a response to military incursions. Furthermore, infantry are needed for other purposes including NATO purposes, so that not only is it efficient to maintain infantry, but their dual function also provides the Canadian government with the ability to withdraw forces from NATO for domestic duties, and so make a stronger demonstration of national intention should it be necessary to do so.

75. The ability of an interceptor aircraft to buzz a foreign military aircraft, or of a warship to interpose itself between a trawler and a foreign warship, provides the government with a very precise and limited means of demonstrating its determination. But unfortunately most injurious actions of foreign governments are not such as to allow a direct military demonstration. The only way that military forces can then be used to demonstrate the national determination, for example, in instances such as a foreign embargo on trade, is for a display of force to be made which is not directly connected to the issue but nonetheless threatens the many profitable aspects of the peaceful relationship between the states concerned. That sort of display is necessarily a stronger statement than is the simple interception of an invader, and will therefore, where possible, only be a second step. It follows that it is desirable for any state to maintain appropriate military equipment for challenging a foreign invader in every circumstance that it is technically possible.

76. Whether or not the subject of the dispute is directly vulnerable to a Canadian military response, the purpose of the military demonstration is to warn that the continuation of the dispute puts at risk all the advantages which result from peaceful intercourse with Canada. Accordingly, the foundation of Canadian domestic security is the extent to which her good will is valuable to other states. It is appar-

ent, therefore, that Canada's security depends as much upon her wheat production, and her raw material production, as it does upon her military effort. But again the question is the appropriateness of the response to injury. Canada's military effort is the only national activity over which the Canadian government can exercise virtually complete control without serious opposition from domestic interests. And Canada's right to control her own forces is not circumscribed to the same extent as is her freedom to embargo trade, or make unilateral alterations in her relations with international financial organizations. Canada's contribution to the security of her allies, therefore, provides her with a significant means of deterring incursions from her allies, or of mobilizing their support against other states.

77. Even so, however, there are strong restraints upon Canada's freedom to withdraw her forces from NATO without unfortunate repercussions. As was noted in chapter one, it is probably only in the circumstances where the Canadian force committed to NATO can be used to directly counter an invasion, or to provide support for the unsophisticated forces dealing with the problem, that withdrawal of the forces can be an appropriate measure in anything less than a major crisis. If they can be so used, however, Canada can meet whatever challenge has been made with not only a stronger demonstration on the spot, but also with the more forceful argument of the withdrawal of services from NATO, without explicitly threatening a permanent alteration of Canada's relationship with NATO. It is apparent, therefore, that the selection of Canada's roles in NATO should be influenced by consideration of their suitability for supporting operations in defence of Canada's domestic authority.

78. The domestic military requirements which must influence the selection of NATO roles can, therefore, be broken down into those of surveillance, challenge or demonstration, and reinforcement. Of the three aspects of local defence, in Canada's circumstances, surveillance is potentially the least compatible with NATO because it is a full-time task. It has been possible, however, to organize Canada's surveillance arrangements so as to make them virtually completely compatible with the needs of collective security. At sea the selection of trade defence as a NATO role is perfectly harmonious with maritime surveillance, for both tasks require continuous observation of the seas off Canada's coasts. The only knotty problem which has to be faced in that respect is whether there is a need for effective anti-submarine surveillance in arctic waters. In the air, surveillance of Canada's air-space is an entirely necessary aspect of protecting the security of the United States Air Force nuclear delivery system upon which, together with the United States naval ballistic missile submarines, is based the entire structure of NATO defence. North American air defences may be redundant in the ballistic missile age, but aerial surveillance is still necessary, and in the future it may be necessary to provide defences against long-range cruise missiles by maintaining interceptors far enough north to be able to interdict the mother aircraft before they reach launch point. And the defence of the linkages between the European and North American halves of NATO is of no less importance to the viability of the alliance. It would seem, therefore, that there could be no justification for abandoning either Canada's naval commitment to trade defence, or Canada's contribution to the air defences of North America. The latter might be modified, or Canada could perform the same task without co-ordination with the United States and at greater cost, but that possibility would not affect the basic consideration of the need for Canada to undertake the job.

79. Technical developments invariably affect the compatibility of military systems and the possible introduction of the E-3A, airborne early warning and control aircraft (AWACS), if under Canadian control, could mean that even the equipment used for surveillance of Canadian air-space would be able to play a part in the air-defence of other parts of NATO. Much may depend upon the numbers of aircraft required for control of interceptors operating over Canada, and whether the provisions of enough slack in the Canadian equipment to allow for efficient servicing would also permit the occasional and emergency use of AWACS aircraft for the control of interceptors in, for instance, the Norwegian Sea area. But it may be possible and desirable to go beyond this limited commitment to the air security of NATO interests in the Norwegian Sea area. The control of Canada's air space, and of the sector covering Greenland to Norway, is so intimately connected by distance that the advent of AWACS should possibly be greeted as a major factor/changing alliance strategy. Possibly Canada should capitalize on the diminished need for air defences for North America and develop an interceptor and AWACS force capable of serving both Canadian surveillance needs and performing a major air defence role in the northern flank area where, because they could conceivably come under attack in less than total war circumstances, there remains an air defence requirement even in the age of ballistic missiles.

80. Given the compatibility of the surveillance role with NATO tasks, either because they are identical or because they are co-located, it is not to be expected that the requirement to maintain in Canada forces which can challenge an invader will be difficult to fulfil. It is necessary, however, to ensure that the sophisticated forces needed for surveillance, and for the NATO tasks, include some vessels and aircraft which can without undue risk or waste undertake the specialized tasks

of closing an invader, and warning him, if necessary using limited fire from easily controlled ordnance. But this requirement can be met without great expense. At sea, the development of forces suitable for a range of different reactions with different international implications puts more strain upon the relationship between the navy and the other government maritime agencies than it does upon the organization of the navy itself. Ashore, the task of challenging an invader could be undertaken by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, or by the militia, as well as by the regular infantry.

81. It is the third aspect of local security, the reinforcement of Canadian defences once a challenge has been identified, which must intrude most into the present discussion of Canada's NATO roles. The requirement is for the forces committed to NATO to be suitable for redeployment to Canada, so as both to make a stronger statement of Canada's determination -- as well as to apply pressure upon Canada's allies -- and to strengthen directly Canada's defences against the infringement of her sovereign authority. It is important that Canada have sufficient forces of her own, so that if military operations must be carried out on Canadian soil, or in which Canadian sovereignty is intimately involved, they will be able to ensure the Canadian government a predominant control of the operation. But since invasion of Canada in strength is an unlikely eventuality, provided adequate attention is given to collective security, it is primarily necessary to identify those aspects of local security which are most likely to be considered by an enemy as not fully protected by collective security, and to make special provision for them.

82. Although, by the time Canada declared a 200 mile exclusive fisheries zone in January 1977, that concept had become fairly established--acceptable now even to the great naval powers--the inchoate form of the law of the sea does create a risk of considerable confusion and dispute while the claims of different countries are worked out. It remains a distinct possibility that Canada's ability to enforce her authority will depend upon more than surveillance and protest or even selective boarding and arrest. It is not beyond the realm of probability that it might be necessary for Canada to demonstrate, from her own resources, an ability to make unprofitable the deployment of foreign naval forces to defy Canadian coastal jurisdiction. To do so Canada ought to be able to deploy at sea, or in the air, a significant strike force against a small number of major surface ships. The most effective way of doing this would probably be the maintenance of maritime strike aircraft (possibly no more than air-to-surface missiles carried by maritime patrol aircraft). An alternative might be missile-firing hydrofoils, although aircraft have the advantage of being more easily deployed from one coast to another. It follows that Canada should consider the advisability of finding NATO roles which call for that armament, and indeed there is a maritime strike requirement in the Norwegian Sea and in the Baltic approaches. In any case, modern interceptor aircraft for which Canada has a need can be given equipment so as to allow them to undertake maritime strike operations in an emergency.

83. Ashore Canada's sovereignty is probably most vulnerable to dispute in the arctic. Again the moment of greatest risk appears to have passed now that the companies drilling for oil and gas have acknowledged Canadian authority, but the danger could reoccur, particularly should the arctic ocean be opened to maritime commerce by the development of icebreaking super-

ships which would most likely have to be routed through the thinner ice which is found near the land masses. It is hard to believe that any state would take the trouble to make a military invasion of any part of Canada's arctic real-estate, but for the same reason it is possible to imagine that Canada's NATO allies might not be very eager to support Canada's sovereignty in the high arctic. Accordingly, Canada's forces must be equipped and trained to support by themselves Canada's authority in the arctic, which task calls for air-mobility, light arms, and arctic equipment. These requirements are quite different from those pertaining to the forces dedicated to the defence of the central front of NATO in Germany, where tanks may be used, and where the extensive road system means that forces can, and therefore must, operate with heavy equipment. But they are more nearly like those applicable to NATO's northern flank where, although tanks may be used, the limited transport system gives some freedom to rely upon light arms, and where arctic equipment is needed for part of the year.

84. The possibility that a Canadian commitment to northern flank operations might lead to the growth of a reciprocal responsibility on the part of Norway for the security of Canada's arctic is another aspect of the problem of selecting NATO roles which are compatible with local security problems. It is very desirable that Canada should be able to choose which of her allies would provide support if Canadian sovereignty were to be challenged. The greatest threat to Canadian authority in the arctic may well come from the United States, so that it is unsatisfactory for Canada to be dependent upon the United States supporting Canada's claims. And it might also be unfortunate to have to call upon United States' support in the event of a Russian challenge, for to do so could be to bring about a major crisis in Canadian territory. In either instance it could be of considerable value to Canada to be able to mount

a small Canadian-Norwegian exercise in the area.

85. Canadian forces must be capable of effective action not only in the arctic, for there are other possible needs for military support. Russia, for instance, might take a fancy to a naval base in Newfoundland. Mobile Command must make some provision for such eventualities. But the difference between deploying forces to Newfoundland or the high arctic is less than that between the military requirements for action in Newfoundland or in Germany. The requirements for action in the northern flank, on the other hand, are fairly similar to those for any part of Canada. Less attention, however, has to be given to southern Canadian dangers because Canadian authority there is hardly likely to be questioned by her allies. The primary need in the south is for the Canadian government to be able to use troops in support of the police in emergencies.

86. The value of co-operative arrangements amongst the small arctic states of NATO is not limited by the logistics question of how strong a force can be mobilized for what purpose. Of far more value is the political effect produced by an established pattern of co-operation. The product is intangible and amounts to preventive defence, added to which will be whatever by-products the chosen tokens of co-operation, such as joint scientific projects, may yield. Unfortunately it will rarely be possible to quantify the intangible product of a pattern of co-operation. Political phenomena are not often measurable. It is always difficult even to detect whether a system designed to prevent the occurrence of challenges is functioning, because the absence of challenges can hardly constitute evidence. The amorphous nature of any arctic grouping compounds the difficulty. The diplomacy of arctic interests is a morass in which groupings are never constant, and rarely

firm. Franklyn Griffiths has observed that Russian willingness to support Canadian arctic interests depends upon the current state of Russo-American relations.¹⁶ When relations are poor, as in 1967, approaches may be made to Canada, in the hope of wooing her. Canadian receptiveness to Russia, however, must depend upon the immediacy of the Russian threat to the west. Griffiths also believes that Norwegian willingness to support Canadian interests against the United States varies according to their dependence upon the support of the United States for their own claims against Russia. The outcome of diplomatic negotiations, however, does not always depend directly upon the ability of the different parties to defend their interests by military and non-military force. Other factors are of great importance. One of these is the political power of the collective voice. A community of states, even if militarily weak, has more impact upon international opinion than could a single state. Accordingly, it is useful for Canada to have informal allies who will support her views in a particular range of concerns.

87. It is too simplistic to assume that the dependence of a country such as Norway upon American support for her arctic interests prohibits her opposition to aspects of American policy as they relate to the Canadian arctic. Norway's ability to count upon American support depends upon the general value of Norway to the United States, in a military and an economic and a political sense. What Norway must be concerned about is the ability of the United States to use its position to distort Norwegian policy, and accordingly the Norwegian government is bound to seek allies in its efforts to control its relationship with the United States. With respect to arctic problems Canada is the obvious country for Norway to look to for support of that kind. Agreement between Norway and Canada may in fact be a significant means of promoting

joint interests.

88. It is not always necessary to articulate agreement for a state to benefit from the support of an ally. If two states are closely involved in a wide range of joint activities they will acquire, with respect to those issues, an enhanced stature. Canadian and Norwegian military co-operation in arctic Norway and arctic Canada will automatically support the claims each state makes for its individual sovereign control in the arctic. This authority can be greatly enhanced by joint scientific and commercial ventures in the area. If co-operation is extended to Iceland and Greenland the collective voice would become substantial and would in all likelihood frequently be effective even when not explicitly invoked. The fact that there are differences between the views of the small arctic states, if Canada can be described as small in that respect, will not, therefore, prevent the grouping serving to support the interests of each on many occasions. There will always be a question in the minds of outside powers whether opposition to one of the small arctic states will lead the others to abandon their differences.

89. It is apparent that this sort of community of arctic states can function effectively within an institution of wider membership, especially if the purpose of the institution is not directly related to the areas of greatest controversy. An informal arctic group within NATO, which would ostensibly exist for the co-ordination of defence planning in the arctic, could therefore be a useful way of co-ordinating arctic development by serving as a forum for discussion. The development of an understanding among the smaller states of their mutual problems and their military co-operation, especially as it would be founded upon a more or less common perception of the need to survive in the squeeze between Russia and the United States,

would facilitate their efforts to ensure that their allies did not adopt harmful policies. The same effect could be anticipated with respect to negotiations with Russia even if no institution existed which brought the western arctic states together collectively vis-a-vis Russia. The pattern of co-operation among the small arctic states would enhance the stature of each when it came to bi-lateral discussions.

90. It is not possible to directly relate the importance of Canadian military effort in the northern flank and in the Canadian arctic to the degree of respect given to Canadian interests in those areas. On some particular issues, such as Canadian control of submarine movement in the Canadian archipelago, a Canadian military capability to impose control would obviously reinforce Canadian claims, especially if some way could be found of imposing control without killing foreign naval personnel. If the development of long-range cruise missiles creates a new and critical air-defence need in the arctic, Canada would have to be prepared to undertake a major part of the air-defence operation, especially of those elements which would be based in Canada. But with respect to arctic security arrangements in general it can only be said that the extent of Canadian influence will be determined by the value given to her contribution to international security, which depends as much upon the political relationships between Canada and the several states as it does upon the relative size of Canadian forces, and it would depend upon how Canada employed her position. But what commitment of military forces to the theatre is necessary to reach a working level of local importance is a matter of trial and error; it is very much an instance of the art of the possible.

CHAPTER FOUR

A CANADIAN NORTHERN COMMITMENT AND CANADA'S COMMITMENTS IN EUROPE AND TO THE UNITED NATIONS

The Central Front

91. It is evident that there are substantial political and military reasons suggesting the desirability of Canadian commitment to the defence of the northern flank of NATO, the most compelling of which is the opportunity, which is there, of turning a military obligation into a means of enhancing the security of Canada's arctic territories. But one of the greatest problems of NATO planning is the apportionment of effort to different theatres and it must not be forgotten that Canada is fulfilling an important requirement in central Europe. It has been seen that defence of the northern flank is of considerable importance in securing the Atlantic sea lanes, and the reverse is also true. Accordingly, it is logical to undertake aspects of both tasks, to the extent that Canada is able. Defence of the sea lanes is also pertinent to the problem of stabilizing the political and military situation in central Europe. But, at least under the present configuration of Canadian forces in Germany, Canadian ground forces in Germany have little significance in the problems of either the northern flank or the North Atlantic beyond the fact that stability in central Europe is a factor in discouraging confrontation elsewhere. The competition in roles is therefore greater. Some Norwegians would suggest that, since Canadian forces are particularly suitable for defence roles in the northern flank, the brigade group in Germany should be given a lower priority, or even be withdrawn. But on the other hand there is even stronger pressure, upon the part of those who are particularly sensitive to the political needs of central Europe, to terminate Canada's

commitment to Norway in order to permit the rationalization of the Canadian army for the provision of forces on the central front. It is necessary, therefore, to consider the compatibility of the two commitments in Europe, and whether any alteration in the form of the Canadian effort is desirable.

92. Canadian forces stationed at Lahr in the Black Forest evidently serve a political function which the German government considers to be of great significance. The Secretary General of NATO, Dr. Luns, has described the brigade group as a demonstration of Canada's commitment to NATO, more so than her naval forces or than Canadian-based ground forces, because foreign-based ground forces are the strongest statement of national commitment. This is so because of the practical difficulty of removing them in a crisis, a difficulty compounded by the political impact of such a removal which would constitute an undeniable statement of disassociation with the issue at hand. These forces have been described as hostages, and the families of the Canadian forces are in this respect equally important. It may not be useful to talk of hostages, for the Germans are not interested in revenge after attack, but in deterrence. If the Russians, however, are persuaded that the presence of Canadian forces and their families at Lahr would facilitate or make inevitable a Canadian governmental decision to react strongly in a crisis the effect is the same, whether the emotive word "hostage" is used or avoided. Accordingly, ground forces on station demonstrate a commitment because they commit. Although Canada's present military capability is limited, her economic base, her resources in raw materials, and her substantial military effort in two world wars make her an ally worth courting.

93. More to the point, however, Canada's symbiotic relationship with the United States means that Canada's commitment to the security of Europe is believed to have an impact upon the political support within the United States for a military commitment to Europe. There is a long history of isolationism in the United States, a tendency which persists and has many healthy aspects. A strong anti-military lobby is desirable in a super-power, so long as it does not permit less inhibited governments exploiting, unopposed, their military strength. In any case, for good or bad, it puts a premium on collective action, for if an American administration can point to allies with common cultural values which are also convinced of the need for military action, it can satisfy many of its domestic critics. For this reason Canadian support was sought in both the Korean and the Vietnam wars; it was not forthcoming in the latter and domestic opposition eventually obliged the withdrawal of American forces. In the case of Asian wars the United States placed at least as much value on European support as on Canadian, and since the strength of the Commonwealth Division in Korea was largely British the British naturally had more influence on the conduct of the war. But Canada is the only country, with a cultural heritage similar to that of the United States, whose support could have much significance with respect to American military commitment to Europe, for American public opinion is unlikely to be greatly impressed by obviously self-interested European views on the question. Pressure for the withdrawal of American forces from Germany has long been felt in the United States, notably emanating from Senator Mike Mansfield, and is likely to continue. Accordingly, the German government perceived a great need to ensure the continuation of the Canadian military establishment in Germany, and that perception is shared by the American Defence Department.

94. Canada's attitude to central European security may be of fundamental importance to the continued viability of NATO's strategy of dependence upon the linkages among the three elements of western defence, the triad of conventional, tactical nuclear, and strategic nuclear arms. The Russian achievement of strategic nuclear parity and efforts to surpass parity, has already, to the Russian mind, compelled a western policy of detente. It is necessary that it be demonstrated that strategic nuclear parity has not terminated American nuclear guarantee of European security. As a senior German general remarked, were that impression to be established then with all its imperfections Germany would be obliged to rely upon the force de frappe. What he did not say, but which has long been recognized as a possibility, is that Germany could be obliged to put together her own nuclear weapons, despite the effect such action could have upon stability in Europe. Canadians may think that the withdrawal of Canadian forces from Germany demonstrates a conviction that stability has now been established in Europe, but the German view is that it could more readily be interpreted in Europe as demonstrating that Canada no longer believed in the American strategic deterrent and was leaving the sinking ship in good time.

95. A third political function served by the Canadian military establishment in Germany is its demonstration of Canadian support for the German people and belief in the legitimacy of their purposes. Canada is not one of the occupying powers of Germany, and indeed is the only state which has an army in Germany for no other apparent reason than a belief in the need to provide a deterrent to Russian occupation. It is evident that there lingers in France and Britain a distrust of Germany, and accordingly their armies on the Rhine serve something of a double purpose. The United States retains little hostility towards Germany, but the United

States nevertheless is an occupying power and the Russians at any rate seem to attach some importance to that. The hostile public reaction in Norway in 1975 when a German medical unit exercised with the Norwegian army is indicative of the way Germany is the victim of her history. This more or less veiled distrust is exceedingly unhealthy and poses a danger to the peace of Europe and the integrity of NATO. It has been suggested, for example, that because the only foreseeable means of reuniting Germany would be for the Bonn government to leave NATO and go communist, such a possibility is to be taken seriously. That idea is more indicative of the distrust felt in some states of NATO than of German political realities, and it may be that the suggestion is intended only to frighten Russia. But at any rate it is clear that moral support for German democracy is a continuing need.

96. This point has been particularly emphasized to me in discussions with senior members of the German foreign office. Apparently less importance is now attached to Canada's symbiotic relationship with the United States than was the case in earlier years. Canada's commitment to European security now appears to be valued more because Canada's opinions in world affairs have become ones to respect. This view parallels that heard in Norway, although without the Norwegian element of hostility towards some other states in NATO. Because Canadian views on international security have acquired some measure of respect, the commitment of Canadian forces to NATO is thought to help secure support for NATO in the smaller states of Europe, especially the Benelux and Denmark. An important aspect of this consideration is the effect active Canadian participation in NATO's European affairs has on reducing the appearance that the alliance is becoming a Germano-American hegemony. It is thought that, for these reasons, Canada's participation in NATO

is an important catalyst promoting the vitality of the alliance. At the very least, even if the disinterestedness of Canadian foreign policy is questioned, it appears evident that Canada's symbiotic relationship with the United States has a parallel in Europe.

97. A less complex view of Canada's role in European security, coming from another senior member of the German Foreign Office, was that the issue was essentially one of maintaining in Western Europe an adequate military force to prevent Russia acquiring the evident ability to defeat western ground forces should she choose to do so. The nationality of the western forces was only valued because they represented so many possible sources of reinforcements. This view is perhaps a little unsophisticated but it has the merit of reminding that ultimately it is necessary for NATO to maintain forces capable of sustaining conventional battle long enough so that there is no way the Russians can expect to achieve victory without the risk of escalation to nuclear forces.

98. So greatly does the German government value the Canadian military commitment that it has made Canadian preferential access to Common Market trade dependent upon the continuation of the commitment. There is considerable practical justification for that position, for economics are so much an aspect of security that any state with critical security problems is bound to employ whatever latitude it has in its economic arrangements in order to promote its defensive arrangements. It is fairly crude to use the promise of trade connections as an inducement for military support, but sometimes crude arguments are necessary to obtain political support for policies which are the product of more sophisticated reasoning, and in the long run the German point is correct that trade connections are inseparable from political connections. In the German view

Canada's military commitment in Europe is necessary, inter alia, to ensure the continuation of American support for NATO, without which European political patterns would be bound to change. In an altered European political community it is inevitable that the pattern of European trade with Canada would also change.

99. The dependence of trade connections upon a satisfactory political order is only one facet of the general interdependence of state interests, which as presently constituted provide a powerful incentive for the continuance of Canadian political and military commitment to west European security. It has already been observed that the stability of the European political scene, and the ability of European states to rely upon American support, is of the utmost importance to Canadian security. Efforts on the part of European states to provide for their own military security without American support could pose an unacceptable challenge to Russia and lead to war in Europe. Conversely, European despair could lead to the acceptance of a pax Sovietica in Europe. But even if Europe and Russia could find a modus vivendi while avoiding war, the severance of the political ties across the Atlantic would make Canada, out of concern for security within the narrow perimeter of North America, significantly more vulnerable to American control.

100. Theoretically there is nothing in this reasoning which establishes the size or nature of Canada's military commitment to the central front, except that the realization that its function is primarily symbolic suggests that size is not important provided the force has some visibility, and is able to sustain battle long enough to convince the Russians of the risk of escalation in any attempted coup. However, even symbols do not operate in a vacuum. Any appearance of reduction of Canadian forces in Europe could be catastrophic, and Europeans

have seen far too much of reductions dressed up as "augmentations in real fighting ability" to be easily convinced. Besides, the Canadian battle group is already held to be second to none in quality. Because ground forces are fundamental to the commitment value of Canada's forces, it is tempting to consider the concentration of effort upon ground forces, while economizing on the air element in order to be able to finance more easily an air-interceptor role in the northern flank and arctic Canada. But the history of Canada's recent attempt to have Canadian forces at Lahr restructured into an air-mobile force capable of deployment on United Nations missions, a restructuring which would dispense with air element and tanks, makes those two aspects of military force an essential part of the symbolism. Canada's air effort in Europe is also valued as permitting Canada to intervene with some authority in the planning of allied air tactics as they relate to the central European battle. There really appears to be very little room for any change in Canada's military role in Europe. In effect, the essential military characteristics necessary for Canada's forces to be able to serve their political function are those they now possess. That does not mean there is no room for change, such as the eventual transformation of the European air group into an interceptor force, should it be desirable to operate the same air equipment in Europe, the northern flank, and in Canada. Any change in the nature of Canada's military establishment in Europe, however, must be clearly no reduction and preferably a real increase in fighting capability.

101. Given that the primary function of the Canadian forces at Lahr is the demonstration of allied solidarity, there is some appeal to the idea of abandoning the independent Canadian headquarters and organically linking the brigade to a German division, presumably the 4th Jaeger. It has been a long-standing policy of Canadian governments to keep Canadian soldiers

under Canadian command. In the First World War Canada organized an army corps and took responsibility for a section of the front. It was the intention in 1939 to repeat this arrangement, but circumstances did not permit. The reason for the policy was to ensure that the Canadian government had control of Canadian troops, and the inability to implement the policy in the Second World War certainly did not help the Canadian government to obtain influence over the British and American control of operations. But whether or not the consolidation of the Canadian army in Europe into a single fighting unit in the Second World War would have served to make Mackenzie King a force in the direction of allied policy, the circumstances of Canadian forces presently in Germany are very different. Only a very substantial increase in the size of the Canadian forces stationed in Europe could ever give Canada a substantial voice in European affairs. Even so, Canada would not pull much weight along-side the Americans, and in the end the fact that Canada is not a European state must severely confine her ability to control a European security crisis. Accordingly, it would seem logical to abandon the militarily inefficient policy of a **separate** Canadian brigade headquarters. Instead Canada's forces in central Europe could be tailored to maximize their ability to provide Germany with the political support that is needed.

102. In the view of German military command the relationship is so close between the Canadian brigade and the 4th Jaeger division of the Bundeswehr, with which it operates virtually as a fourth brigade, that there would be little technical difficulty in making the connection formal should it be desirable for political reasons to do so. The German forces, which have no command authority outside the structure of NATO, have always sought the increased internationalization of other NATO forces. The implementation of an organic linkage, however, would necessitate the abandonment of the present Canadian

insistence that the force at Lahr constitutes a "fleet in being" which may only be committed to action on orders from Ottawa. The German Bundeswehr naturally does not want the organic integration of the Canadian force unless it can be depended on as an instantly ready part of their defence.

103. The greatest doubt about the wisdom of such a development came from the German foreign office. Concern was expressed whether Canadian public opinion would tolerate it. Also there was doubt whether it would be an advantage for the alliance to have another sort of integration substituted for the present NATO integration. Instead of inspiring allied effort, it might more likely appear to squeeze out the other small allies. Unfortunately the political problems of Europe are so complex when it comes to the relationship of the Federal German Republic with its allies that the assimilation of Canada's military effort on the central front into the military organization of Germany may have some undesirable political repercussions. Germans are not the only victims of history, and other European states retain long memories of two wars in this century alone against Germany. In consequence they are concerned to ensure that Germany feels secure enough to retain its present associations, but they are also concerned to ensure that the nature of those associations is not altered by Germany acquiring a dominant military position. Both these sentiments support the continued presence of American and Canadian forces in Europe, but it is possible that the close linkage of Canadian and German forces would appear to upset the balance.

104. An alternative suggestion, which might yield the political and military advantages of Canadian integration with the Bundeswehr without the disadvantages, envisaged the enlargement of the Canadian headquarters at Lahr into a cadre divisional headquarters which could, in an emergency, take command of

reinforcements for Canada, Germany, possibly the United States and the Benelux countries. This development might, at very little cost, create a strong impression that the Canadian commitment in Europe was not moribund; indeed that Canada was reacting to the build-up of Russian conventional forces by a parallel development of Canadian conventional preparedness.

105. To those who feel that it is more logical for Canada to concentrate her effort on the defence of the Atlantic and northern flank there is comfort to be gained from the fact that, although no change is possible in Canada's present European commitment, neither is any substantial change sought. The majority of German officers and civil servants appear to agree that the role Canada could play in stabilizing the military and political situation in the northern flank was of importance to Germany. It is realized that soldiers should not be asked to train for more than one contingency area, and that therefore some part of Canada's army should be ear-marked for the northern flank. On the other hand, there is some scepticism in Germany that the Russian threat to the sea lines of communication is credible in peacetime, or relevant in war when a really rapid Russian advance by land would make resupply impossible. In consequence a Russian threat to Norway would be of importance primarily because of its effect upon the political cohesion of NATO. That view would naturally relegate Canada's effort in the northern flank to a lower level of military function which would not require any more substantial a force than is now dedicated to the central front.

106. However, the assessment of the relative significance in Western governmental decision-making of the overbearing strength of the Russian Red Fleet, and the Red Army, is a difficult and highly subjective task. It is true that naval forces in general have far less political significance than do ground forces,

because they operate away from the centres of population, and can rarely of themselves pose a mortal danger to any state. But on the other hand those very limitations make naval forces inherently more useable in a highly volatile situation. Accordingly, while the ground forces in Europe are designed to convince that any land attack will rapidly escalate, the naval forces in the Atlantic have to be designed to secure western interests without uncontrolled escalation, for it is apparent that no western government will ever feel committed to strategic nuclear war as a result of events at sea.

107. Clearly it is necessary to continue to provide against all the different military manifestations of the Soviet challenge to the west. Equally clearly there is at present little room for manoeuvre with respect to the nature of Canada's effort in central Europe. The requirement is for continued and enthusiastic effort in the present form to demonstrate Canada's continuing confidence in NATO. This demonstrative military commitment must also be matched by continued assurance at the diplomatic level when dealing with the Russians over such matters as family reunification. The development of the Canadian headquarters at Lahr into a cadre allied divisional headquarters would appear to be a useful development which would demonstrate Canadian confidence in NATO and determination to support its structure. It would also facilitate the augmentation of the Canadian ground forces in Europe should it be judged that such were necessary to ensure the continued ability of SACEUR to sustain battle, and so preserve the linkages between the nuclear deterrent and European security. But there does not appear to be any strong feeling in Germany that Canada should not develop her natural role in the northern flank.

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING

108. There remains the need to consider the compatibility of a new northern focus of Canada's armed forces with the role Canada has played outside of NATO in support of the United Nations. Canadian forces have seen virtually all their active service "under fire" since 1945 with the United Nations, and even though the purport of Trudeau's revised order of defence priorities in the 1970 defence white paper was to cast doubt about Canada's continued participation in United Nations operations, there does not appear to be any likelihood of Canada being able to avoid such commitments in the future. Not only is there strong public support for United Nations peacekeeping which satisfies the desire to see Canadian forces in action, and strong state reasons for defusing areas of conflict, but peacekeeping is one of the activities which supports Canada abroad and justifies her failure otherwise to do her fair share of collective defence. United Nations peacekeeping is a major element in Canada's international image, and is in fact one of the elements which enables Canadian forces to play an effective role in Norway.

109. Peacekeeping is a major employer of Canadian forces, so it must be taken into consideration when establishing their size and nature. It does not follow, however, that it is useful to attempt to permit the requirements for United Nations operations to determine Canada's roles within NATO. It has been mentioned that there was at one time consideration given to converting Canada's forces in Germany into an air-mobile force suitable for rapid deployment on United Nations operations, but the Germans correctly objected that the two roles could not be played at the same time by the same unit. There is more sense in the idea of concentrating upon light infantry for Canadian domestic needs and for deployment to Norway, with the idea that

such forces would be suitable for United Nations operations. But again they cannot satisfy both needs at once. United Nations operations do not require special equipment; instead, they generally call for a minimum of weapons and for substantial support equipment. Otherwise the requirement is for men with specialized training. Accordingly, the continuing need to be able to field forces for United Nations operations must determine the size of Canada's forces but need have little bearing upon what tasks they undertake within NATO.

110. To date United Nations operations have made limited use of naval forces, if the unique experience of the Korean War is discounted. It does not follow that there will never be a need for Canadian naval forces in United Nations operations; air transport is the most probable need but combat forces could also be called for. If the prospect is entertained of Canada wanting to be able to offer support to a third world friend, or wanting to participate in an international force designed to protect western interests despite local hostilities, or some such need, then it could be argued that Canada should allow such considerations to determine the size of all three of her military forces. But it must be accepted that Canada already falls so short of her NATO military needs that it is hardly realistic to think of maintaining a surplus over those requirements.

111. In passing, it should in any event be observed that by participating in NATO, and especially by supporting the aspects of NATO which lead to greater stability, Canada is in effect promoting her interests outside the NATO area. NATO is an efficient means of containing Russian forces which can cause far less trouble kicking their heels in east Europe and the Kola peninsula than they could if they were free to march into India or blockade Indonesia. Of course, NATO forces are equally

contained by those of Russia, but, because collective security is efficient, western states can spare some forces for roles outside the NATO area, and can afford to be generous givers of foreign aid. At the highest level of military might, the balance of NATO and the Warsaw Pact excludes thermonuclear weapons from the competition for influence in the third world. Accordingly, although Canada will continue to need forces for the deployment on United Nations peacekeeping operations, NATO must always be her first military priority.

CHAPTER FIVE

A PROGRAM FOR DEFENCE CO-OPERATION IN THE ARCTIC

112. In the first part of this paper the rationale was presented for a Canadian focus on the security problems of the northern tier of NATO - Canada, Danish Greenland, Iceland and Norway - while continuing to play her part in the military structure of NATO's forces in Germany. The objectives may be listed as:

1. Continued support for NATO's efforts to guarantee the North Atlantic sea lines of communication.
2. Continued and improved support for Norway's effort to stabilize the security environment in the Norwegian and Barents sea area.
3. Support for the pro-NATO elements in Iceland.
4. Improved ability to control Canada's own arctic territory and air-space.

It is now necessary to give consideration to a program which will promote these objectives.

113. The main line of the argument has already been spelt out: the proposition is that co-operation amongst the four small arctic states of NATO at various levels of military effort can achieve a degree of political cohesion that will serve the interests of each of the states involved, and also promote the general good of NATO. The arctic is the common denominator, partially "because it is there". As Michael Marsden wrote in 1966 it is still difficult to impress upon the public and industry at large that the most essential quality of the arctic is not cold, or gold, or polar bears, but a central

position in the world community.⁴ But the arctic is also important because it finds a common political response amongst three of the states in question, Iceland being a possible exception with its predominantly maritime interest. That is not to say that it is because of this common element that Canada has an interest in, for instance, supporting Norway, but nonetheless the common element of the arctic may well make Canadian support more convincing.

114. The problem that Norway has in living with a defence system which depends upon allied reinforcement is the fear that in a real crisis the allies will be reluctant to risk their men or commit their people. The fact that Canadians as a whole feel little attachment to Norway is, accordingly, a serious danger. What is necessary is to develop a relationship between Canada and Norway which is analogous to the post-imperial relationship Canadians have with Britain. Probably the only way of achieving this instrumental goal is for Norway to demonstrate a parallel commitment to Canada, and the high political profile the arctic has in Canada makes the arctic the obvious area for Norway to make this commitment. An arctic commitment also makes sense because it is by far the nearest area of Canada to Norway, and because the support of other small arctic states may be expected to provide a significant support for Canada's sovereign control in the arctic. This last consideration also suggests the value of Icelandic and Greenlander support in the arctic, in return for which Canada may be able to provide parallel support in Icelandic and Danish Greenlander efforts to preserve their sovereign control.

115. The importance of the central location of the Canadian arctic lies in the relative ease with which forces could be transferred from there to Norway, and from Norway to the Canadian arctic, or between the Canadian arctic and Iceland or

Greenland. From the airfields of Bodø, Andøya, and Bardufoss in the County of Troms in north Norway, the Canadian contingency area, the air distance to all the eastern islands of the Canadian arctic archipelago is less than 2,000 nautical miles, which is easy range for a Hercules transport. Edmonton and Winnipeg are about 1,500 to 1,700 miles from Devon Island, which is half-way between Frobisher Bay and Alert, and Montreal is 2,000 nautical miles. Iceland and Greenland are close neighbours with a distance across Greenland from Devon Island to Keflavik in Iceland of about 1,500 nautical miles. At present Canada does not have any military base in the arctic archipelago, although an aircraft support facility is maintained at Frobisher Bay, and there is a small Canadian forces establishment at Alert in Ellesmere Island. Accordingly, a decision would have to be made whether to restrict the arctic element to minor operations, or to construct a base upon which effective arctic co-operation could pivot. On purely conceptual grounds the latter appears to be the more effective way of resolving the strategic problems.

116. The construction of a Canadian arctic base would have important implications for the strategic environment in north Norway, if it were used as a means of developing a close professional bond between the Norwegian and Canadian armies. The idea which has been put forward - of flying Canadian servicemen to Norway every time the Russians conduct an exercise - is open to the objection that control of Canadian forces is thereby surrendered to Russia; equally there are objections to the permanent basing of Canadians in Norway. But Canadians, an element of the CAST Combat Group, stationed, let us say, on Devon Island, could be so closely involved in the routine of the Norwegian army that the political decision to ask for their support during a crisis would be significantly less difficult. Some Canadians would doubtless have to be seconded to the staff of C-in-C North Norway

at Bodø, but otherwise a weekly Hercules flight between Devon Island and north Norway could bring in Canadians for short periods of training and service, and carry Norwegians back for comparable periods of training and service in the Canadian arctic. Although the men and units would be changing constantly there would always be Canadians in north Norway, with others arriving and departing. An observer would be accustomed to the movement of Canadians into Norway to the point where the flow of Canadian reinforcements into Norway in a crisis would at first be hardly noticed and might never be seen as provocative.

117. A Canadian arctic base would also facilitate the actual movement of the reinforcement brigade into Norway. An element of the force would always be stationed in the arctic, while the remainder back in southern Canada would have to be brought forward by air. But a Canadian arctic base would permit the embodiment of the brigade within short air-ferry of Norway in anticipation of need to deploy, while avoiding the step of sending it out of Canada. This would satisfy both the Norwegian need to know they can be reinforced quickly, and a Canadian desire to put off the decision to commit the men abroad.

118. Because of the importance of establishing the civilian contacts upon which the reality of international commitment depends it might be preferable to establish civilian air connections between the Canadian arctic base and north Norway. There is at present no air link from Canada to Greenland, because Greenlanders are reluctant to see the business monopolized by a Canadian carrier equipped with jets. But it should be possible to jointly finance and operate a route from Canada through Greenland and Iceland to Norway. Armed Forces personnel could use this route, instead of depending upon the already overstretched resources of Armed Forces air transport.

119. The development of a base in the Canadian arctic would not by itself solve the problem of the CAST Combat Group's movement, for there would remain the problem of the brigade's heavy equipment. It would still be necessary to pre-stock some of the heaviest equipment in Norway. This is an expensive proposition, because equipment would have to be duplicated, but it can hardly be avoided. General Sir John Sharp, recently C-in-C Allied Forces Northern Europe, told the Royal United Services Institute in 1976 that with certain reinforcements, which have to come a long way, such as the Canadian Air Sea Transportable Combat Group there is really only one satisfactory solution, and that is to stockpile equipment in peacetime, and fly the personnel in in a period of tension.¹⁸ The British have in fact accepted their own logic and it was announced in January 1978 that arrangements were being completed for the pre-stocking in Norway of the snow vehicles needed for number 45 Marine Commando.¹⁹ The Canadian arctic base would solve one of the problems of pre-stocking which is the maintenance of the equipment. With Canadians moving in and out of Norway every week it would be quite easy for Canadian soldiers to at least supervise the maintenance of their own equipment. And perhaps less of the equipment would have to be stocked in Norway if there were a base in the Canadian arctic where some of it could be kept within 2000 miles of Norway.

120. Cost may well preclude the stocking in Norway of the heavy equipment for the entire brigade, and there are other objections to doing so. Pre-stocking commits the expeditionary force to a single deployment area, which might prove undesirable. The Russians might, for instance, by-pass the Troms district and make an amphibious attack on Trondheim where are located support facilities for the Strike Fleet Atlantic. Accordingly, it would be preferable to retain some measure of flexibility in deployment by only pre-stocking the equipment for one

battalion, which would be exercised to be able to arrive on a few days notice. The rest of the heavy equipment would still have to find sea-lift. Arrangements for sea transport could be improved, perhaps with containerization of equipment, or preferably by the provision of specialized military transports which would be less vulnerable to enemy action. Arrival time could also be reduced by stocking a half-way depot, which might be located in Iceland. The existence of a Canadian Forces depot in Iceland could be the focus for a greater Canadian participation in Icelandic security.

121. It may well be objected that although the regular visits of Canadians to Norway can be justified in terms of training in their designated contingency area, the Norwegians who came to Canada would be training in an environment which is quite unlike their own. The Canadian arctic is colder and dryer than is the county of Troms which is really a sub-arctic area. This objection, however, need not be an overwhelming impediment. For one thing the mountainous regions of Baffin Island have something in common with southern Norway and could become an extremely challenging training area. Nevertheless it is not for ground forces training that Norwegians would be sent to Canada. A small number of Norwegians could well be attached to Canadian ground force units training for military tasks in the Canadian arctic, such would be a natural part of a Norwegian commitment to the security of the Canadian arctic. But in terms of primary military tasks it would be more reasonable to look for Norwegian Air Force participation in the air-control problems of the Canadian arctic.

122. It would be a very major decision to undertake the extension of Canadian air-control to cover the arctic archipelago, but it makes considerable sense to do so. The effective use of interceptor aircraft north of the Distant Early Warning

radar chain would require the acquisition of some form of air-warning radar, and cost would be a major consideration. An answer may, however, be available in Airborne Warning and Control (AWAC) aircraft, over the horizon backscatter radar (OTHRs) or in satellite detection. If the problem of air warning is solvable, the forward deployment of Canadian interceptors to an arctic base would permit the extension of air-identification to the perimeter of Canadian sovereignty, and would also facilitate the participation of Canadian home air-squadrons, as required, in any Norwegian Sea air-superiority battle. Because of the shorter ranges of interceptor aircraft, in-flight refueling would be required if the Canadian aircraft were to operate into the Norwegian Sea area from their own base. But the Canadian air force has an in-flight refuelling capability, or American tankers operating from Thule could be used. An ability to arm the aircraft for maritime strikes against warships in the Norwegian Sea would complement the need for such an ability off Canada's east and west coasts.

123. Given the existing close relationship between the Canadian and Norwegian air forces, with Canada once again providing pilot training for Norway, it should be anticipated that the organic linkage of a Canadian and a Norwegian squadron would be happy and workable. There would be no conflict with Norway's policy against foreign bases because Norwegian air-defence is always under NATO command. Clearly Norway could not accept a net loss of air strength to the Canadian arctic, but the exchange of partial squadrons would present little difficulty. The presence of Royal Norwegian Air Force interceptors acting under Canadian orders in the defence of Canada's arctic sovereignty should be at once a real support for Canada vis à vis the super-powers, and a politically important statement of Norwegian concern for Canadian interests which would stimulate Canadian public interest in Norway.

124. Air force relations need not be confined to interceptor squadrons. In the air-transport, search-and-rescue, and arctic surveillance roles co-operation could also be useful. Norway has Hercules aircraft for air-transport, and coast-guard purposes, and might be able to undertake half the burden of the air link between a Canadian arctic base and North Norway, although for peacetime routine purposes it would be better to make use of a civilian service. In an emergency Norwegian coast-guard aircraft could well assist in flying the CAST Combat Group in from the arctic, while Canadian civilian aircraft ferried the rearward battalions north from Edmonton or elsewhere in southern Canada. International co-operation in surveillance tasks could also be useful, although the primary value of a Canadian arctic base in terms of aerial surveillance is that it would permit the more extensive use of small aircraft which could make more detailed inspections and make better use of the good weather than can the present long-range flights by Argus maritime patrol aircraft flying from the south.

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125. Greenland naturally shares with Canada and Norway an interest in arctic affairs, but more in terms of arctic development than in terms of security. Greenland is a strategic backwater, and the Danish government with responsibility for Greenland's security does not admit to any great discontent with the present dependence upon NATO reinforcement in the event of a violation. Possibly the reason is that, at a time when Greenland's future is still inchoate, the community of Inuit interest in Greenland and in Canada is seen as more of a threat to Danish authority than is any Russian strategic imperative. If so, the point is not admitted in public, and there is interest in co-operation with Canada in northern development. Already there is effective communication at departmental level between the administration of Greenland, the Royal Greenland Trade Department, and the authorities in arctic Canada.

126. The Canadian Armed Forces are hardly in a position to proffer unwanted and unneeded assistance to a neighbouring state. There is one area of Greenlandic security, however, where there is perceived in Greenland to be a need for close co-operation with Canada, and which it is in both Canada's military and civilian interest to satisfy. The problem needing joint handling is that of fisheries regulation in the Davis Strait area. Already there is developing a more effectual measure of co-operation between the Royal Danish Navy, based at Grønnedal in south-west Greenland, and the Canadian Department of Fisheries. In the summer of 1979 the Canadian fisheries inspection ship Cape Roger visited Grønnedal in the course of an inspection of the Davis Strait fishery, and Danish and Canadian fishery inspection officers have exchanged places. Canada, however, also has sound military reasons for developing links with the Royal Danish Navy in that part of the world.

127. There are sound strategic reasons for seeking a greater Canadian naval role in Greenlandic and Icelandic waters. Canada's naval forces have been developed with the primary task of convoying shipping across the North Atlantic. But there is a substantial body of NATO naval opinion which regards the interdiction of Russian submarines as they exit from the Norwegian Sea as the more important means to the end of protecting shipping. The lesson of the Second World War was that, at the state of the art of war then existing, air attacks on U-boat basins, air and sea patrol of transit areas, and "offensive" patrols of battle areas, were substantially less effective than the provision of strong sea and air support to convoys. Not only were fewer losses suffered, but opportunities were created for attacking U-boats at their most vulnerable. German U-boats during most of the war, on the other hand, did not have to make

as dangerous a transit as do Northern Fleet submarines through the Norwegian Sea. And at the same time as technical development has altered the ability to detect submarines in transit, with computer processing of signals from fixed and mobile acoustic sensors somewhat compensating for the inability to detect nuclear submarines by radar, the development of submarine-launched cruise missiles has greatly complicated the problem of convoy defence. Convoy defence remains the politically most acceptable resolution of the problem, for offensive operations on transit areas may be very destabilizing in the event of a limited and undeclared war. It may never be possible to entirely abandon convoy as a defence technique, and even were that to come about it would still be necessary for the Canadian navy to monitor submarine operations off Canada's coasts, but it may nevertheless be desirable for Canada to increase her ability to deploy anti-submarine forces into more distant waters. Indeed, if it may be projected that in a war with Russia convoys would be routed south of the CANLANT area as far from Kola as possible, then C-in-C CANLANT will in any event be primarily engaged in supporting a battle for the Greenland-Iceland-U.K. sea passage; and Canadian forces designed for convoy escort would either be thrown willy-nilly into that battle, or would be placed under the command of other theatre commanders where the convoys were being run. The former possibility seems more probable in the light of nationalist attitudes, and, accordingly, it seems sound to undertake in peacetime tasks one might be called upon to undertake in the event of war.

128. The Davis Strait is an area of particular concern to Canada as it is a terminus of the north-west passage, and is Canadian coastal waters. Only the sparse population of Labrador and Baffin Island diminishes the force of the parallel with the more southerly Canadian coast for which it is deemed politically undesirable to have to depend upon the surveillance abilities

of allied states. Canadian aircraft do patrol the Labrador coast and Davis Strait, but they can only be a partial answer to the most pressing of the military threats, which is the possible use by Russian missile-firing submarines of the ice-strewn Davis Strait for transit and as a launch area. The Canadian Defence Research Board has studied the problem of acoustics under the ice of the area, and the Canadian Coast Guard has an ice-breaking cable-laying ship. The Canadian navy has sent ships in summer-time into the north, but there is not a developed Canadian ability to operate all year round against submarines in the area. Co-operation with the Royal Danish Navy at Grønnedal could be a means to developing that ability, and ending Canada's dependence upon American and British nuclear submarines.

129. The logistic problem of finding ships and men for patrolling and exercising in what is at present undeniably a strategic backwater could be overcome if the objectives of co-operation in fisheries regulation and in anti-submarine surveillance were met by a single Canadian force. The Canadian Armed Forces already provide regular air and surface support for the Department of Fisheries inspectors but it is probably fair to say that the support would be more effective if there were a clear geographic division of responsibility. If the Armed Forces accepted the entire burden of fisheries control for an area, let us say north of the latitude of Goose Bay in Labrador, they would release the Department of Fisheries for a more concentrated effort in the more southerly waters, overcome the problems of accommodating military to civilian procedure, take over the area where the navy's long-range equipment is especially valuable, and be in a position where the same deployment of men and ships could be used for fisheries and anti-submarine surveillance in close co-operation with the Danish Navy. Although there is little more at Grønnedal than

bunker, communications, and housing, the relative freedom of the south-west corner of Greenland from ice would make it a suitable place for ships to shelter and crews to rest. Its great limitation is the lack of a landing field for fixed-wing aircraft.

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130. The concentration of the fisheries regulation effort of the Canadian Armed Forces to the area north of Goose Bay would also facilitate the development of Canadian military contacts with the Icelandic coastguard and government. In contrast to the Davis Strait, the Greenland and Iceland-Faeroes straits are strategically critical areas. No excuses need to be made for greater Canadian naval activity in the area, although it lies outside of the CANLANT NATO area. Canadian naval forces, of course, do already participate in eastern Atlantic operations. Maritime Command's long-range patrol aircraft based in Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island do on occasion reinforce the establishment at Keflavik, and act under the orders of C-in-C EASTLANT. And Canadian destroyers are regularly attached to STANAVFORLANT, the NATO standing naval force which spends much of its time in the north and eastern Atlantic. But more needs to be done with a specifically Icelandic purpose, for Iceland is the strategic linchpin upon which the security of Norway, Greenland and Canada all depend. A Canadian naval effort in the area, if partially directed towards co-operation with Iceland in fisheries intelligence, could be a useful means of reducing the polarity between pro and anti NATO elements in Iceland, by providing professional contacts which could give Icelanders greater confidence when considering military matters.

131. The Icelandic government established in 1979 a Commission on Security and International Affairs within the foreign Office. It is beginning the task of learning from first principles the fundamentals of military, and especially naval technique and strategy. The Icelandic government has also hinted that it would welcome the establishment of a Canadian embassy in Reykjavik. The establishment of a Canadian office would certainly not solve the Icelandic problem of not having an indigenous Icelandic source of military expertise, but an embassy office which housed a Canadian Department of Fisheries liaison staff and a Canadian Armed Forces liaison staff, might provide the context within which professional contacts could be developed. In addition Canada could take the initiative of offering a place at the National Defence College to an Icelandic.

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132. The Norwegian navy may also be brought into the picture, possibly within the context of fisheries regulation around Jan Mayen Island. The advantages of Norwegian participation in Danish and Canadian exercises off Greenland are quite self-explanatory in general terms. But there is an additional contribution that Norway could make. ASW technique in ice-covered waters generally depends upon the use of submarines. If nuclear submarines cannot be paid for, and the chances are they cannot be, then the technique of using conventional submarines under the ice must be developed. Norway has considerable experience in operating small conventional submarines in arctic areas, and indeed has embarked on the development of a new class. Canada could get into the project at the design stage in order to ensure that the craft were suitable to the Davis Strait area.

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133. As well as the military and air force co-operation with Norway, and the naval and fisheries co-operation with Denmark and Iceland, it could be highly desirable for Canada and Denmark to co-operate in the territorial security and surveillance of Greenland and Canada. Denmark has no ground forces stationed in Greenland besides the SIRIUS sledge patrols in East Greenland, and aerial surveillance is limited to the capabilities of a single aircraft based at Søndre Strømfjord. Canada also has no ground forces stationed in Labrador or the arctic archipelago. Neither country expects invasion of its territory, but Canada does exercise forces in her arctic. Denmark does not even do that, having apparently resigned herself to Greenland being indefensible. The logic of that judgment cannot be defended for the same problems would be faced by an invader as by the defender. It would seem to be a useful thing, if only for the support of the self-esteem of the peoples concerned, if they co-operated in this form of self-defence. Greenlanders are not subject to conscription but there is a high level of unemployment. Both Canadian and Greenland Eskimo might be recruited into home defence units which might grow out of the existing Canadian northern rangers, and Canadian militia. Most of the skills required by such home-defence units would relate to supply, movement, communication, and survival in the arctic, which are skills equally required for emergency relief and for survey work. The units could, accordingly, be employed in non-military tasks in the northern communities. It is possible that Iceland too would find it useful to participate in an organization which could be available for such emergencies as occurred when the volcano erupted on Vestmannaeyjar, and the large Icelandic population in Canada, the so-called "West Icelanders", might be a valuable link between the Canadian militia and civilian Iceland.

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
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134. Other military and para-military tasks might be furthered by co-operation amongst the four small arctic states of NATO, and it is equally important that there be co-operation in purely civilian aspects of northern development. Each aspect of co-operation must in itself be of direct value. Such problems as the transport of bulk cargoes in the arctic are shared by three of the four states, and it is in their several interests that they should develop their own technical base so that they need not be dependent upon the economic giants. Equally the states share an interest in reducing their vulnerability to outside market forces for vital products such as the fisheries. The value of co-operation is not only direct, but also instrumental. Co-operation should be looked on as not simply an economic advantage, or disadvantage, but as a necessary means of developing the social and political foundations of the existing military commitments, which are themselves fundamental to national security both in terms of the defence of western values and in terms of minimizing great-power domination within the alliance. In that light the complete absence of direct passenger links connecting arctic Canada, Greenland, Iceland and Norway is more than anomalous, it is detrimental to the security of those states.

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135. In summary then, this program would pursue the objectives listed in the first paragraph of this section by:

- a. Constructing a Canadian arctic base within easy air distance of Norway, so that Canadian soldiers based there could sustain a continual presence in Norway's northern defence system. The expense would be justifiable on purely national grounds as a security for Canada's arctic sovereignty, as well as being an important contribution to NATO.

- b. Pre-stocking at least a part of the CAST Combat Group's heavy equipment in north Norway, so that the force could be flown in from Canada, availing itself of the staging point of the new arctic base.
- c. Basing an air force interceptor element at the new arctic base, so that Canada's air-identification perimeter would more nearly resemble her territorial limits and the aircraft could play a part in any air battle for the Norwegian Sea.
- d. Making arrangements for the exchange of forces with Norway in particular, Greenland (Denmark) and Iceland, for the purpose of developing a sense of common cause amongst those states. In particular, a Norwegian air force element should be exchanged with a Canadian one and based in the arctic, and ground force personnel should be exchanged under national command for arctic patrols. Norway could be asked to accept a formal responsibility within NATO for assisting in the defence of arctic Canada.
- e. The Canadian Armed Forces taking over responsibility for fisheries surveillance in northern waters, and developing their professional contacts with the Royal Danish Navy and the Icelandic Coastguard for the purpose of fisheries regulation and the development of an ability to undertake ASW operations in ice-strewn waters. An aspect of the project could be the joint development of small submarines with the Norwegians for local operations under the ice.
- f. The Canadian government opening an office in Iceland in which embassy, fisheries, defence and other contacts could be established.

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136. It has been my policy in writing this paper to avoid quoting anything but public statements. I would like, however, to express my thanks to those people listed below with whom I have spoken during visits I have made in connection with this work to Britain, Germany, Greenland, Iceland and Norway.

Britain: Colin Humphreys - Ministry of Defence, Assistant Undersecretary of State (Naval Staff)

Michael Quinlan - Ministry of Defence, Deputy Undersecretary of State (Policy and Planning).

Germany: K Adm Bethge - Ministry of Defence, for the Inspektors der Marine

Brig. General von zur Gathen - Stabsabteilungsleiter
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Generalieutnant Hildebrandt - Ministry of Defence,
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Dr. Holik - Foreign Office, Deputy for VLR I,
Dr. Dannenbring, head of Referat 201.

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Dr. Witte - Foreign Office, Assistant to Ministerial
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Herr Wolff - Foreign Office, Direktor Referat
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Greenland: Admiral H.E. Hansen, Island Commander Greenland
Einar Lemche - Ministry for Greenland, Head of Section,
Lawyer.

Iceland: Mar Elisson - Director of Fisheries.
Benedikt Grondal - Foreign Minister and Chairman of
the Social Democratic Party
Einor Agustsson - Chairman of the commission on
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Geir Hallgrimsson, former Prime Minister and Chairman
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Steingrimur Hermansson - Minister of Justice and
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Petur Sigursson, Director Iceland Coast Guard
Norway: Colonel Edland - Deputy Chief of Staff, COMSONOR
Erik Klippenberg - Chief, Norwegian Defence Research
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Lt. General Hambre - COMNONOR
Johan J. Holst - Undersecretary of State for Defence
Major General Huitfeldt - Commander 6th Division.
Commodore Sjarstad - Commander Tromsø Naval District
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