

LEVEL II

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THE MODERN MAJOR GENERAL: PATTERNS IN THE CAREERS OF THE BRITISH ARMY
MAJOR GENERALS ON ACTIVE DUTY AT THE TIME OF THE SARAJEVO ASSASSINATIONS

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FINAL REPORT, 11 May 1980

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A thesis submitted to the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
North Carolina in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in the Department of History.

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80 6 16 266

ADA 087580

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. <i>AD-A087580</i>	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) THE MODERN MAJOR GENERAL: PATTERNS IN THE CAREERS OF THE BRITISH ARMY MAJOR GENERALS ON ACTIVE DUTY AT THE TIME OF THE SARAJEVO ASSASSINATIONS		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED FINAL: MASTERS THESIS MAY 78 to MAY 80 (11 May 80 date approved)
7. AUTHOR(s) GREGORY FONTENOT CAPTAIN, UNITED STATES ARMY		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Student, HQDA, MILPERCEN (DAPC-OPP-E), 200 Stovall street, Alexandria, VA 22332		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS HQDA, MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-OPP-E, 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332		12. REPORT DATE 11 May 1980
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 172 pages
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report) SAME AS ABOVE		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES MASTERS THESIS IN ENGLISH HISTORY COMPLETED AT UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, CHAPEL HILL, NORTH CAROLINA		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) SOCIAL AND STATISTICAL STUDY OF BRITISH MAJOR GENERALS ON ACTIVE DUTY IN ~~JUNE~~ 1914. <i>July</i>		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This study describes patterns discernible in the careers of the 108 Bri- tish Major Generals on the active list as of July 28, 1914. Commissioned after the abolition of purchase in 1870 and promoted to Major General between the Boer War and the final crisis leading to World War I, they form the last peace- time generation of general officers. The product of this analysis is a de- scription of who they were, where they came from and by what means they reached the pinnacle of their profession. They merit particular attention as a measure		

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9 Final rept. May 78 - May 80

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A thesis submitted to the faculty of
The University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in the Department of
History.

Chapel Hill

1980

12 174

11 May 80

Accession For	
NTIS G4441	☒
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Justification	
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Distribution	
Available to	
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Approved by:

Samuel Williams
Advisor

James P. Phelan
Reader

Richard Salovey
Reader

ABSTRACT

GREGORY FONTENOT. The Modern Major General: Patterns in the Careers of the British Army Major Generals on Active Duty at the Time of the Sarajevo Assassinations. (Under the direction of DR. SAMUEL R. WILLIAMSON).

This study describes patterns discernible in the careers of the 108 British Major Generals on the active list as of July 28, 1914. Commissioned after the abolition of purchase in 1870 and promoted to Major General between the Boer War and the final crisis leading to World War I, they form the last peace-time generation of general officers. The product of this analysis is a description of who they were, where they came from and by what means they reached the pinnacle of their profession. They merit particular attention as a measure of the effect the abolition of purchase had on the British General officer corps and because of their influence in British military affairs in the years before and during World War I. Finally they also provide a comparison to the prevalent post-War stereotypes of the British War-time Generals. Thus, the study provides a basis for continued discussion on the nature of British generalship.

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FREQUENTLY USED ABBREVIATIONS

A.D.C.	Aide-de-Camp
A.G.	Adjutant General
B.E.F.	British Expeditionary Force
C.B.	Companion of the Order of the Bath
C.B.E.	Companion of the Order of the British Empire
C.G.S.	Chief of the General Staff
C.I.D.	Committee of Imperial Defence
C.I.E.	Companion of the Order of the Indian Empire
C.I.G.S.	Chief of the Imperial General Staff
C-in-C	Commander in Chief
C.M.G.	Companion of the Order of St. Michael and St. George
D.S.O.	Distinguished Service Order
FM	Field Marshal
G.C.B.	Grand Commander of the Order of the Bath
G.C.M.G.	Grand Commander of the Order of St. Michael and St. George
G.C.V.O.	Grand Commander of the Royal Victorian Order
GEN	General
K.B.E.	Knight Commander of the British Empire
K.C.B.	Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath
K.C.I.E.	Knight Commander of the Order of the Indian Empire
K.C.M.G.	Knight Commander of the Order of St. Michael and St. George
K.C.V.O.	Knight Commander of the Royal Victorian Order
LTG	Lieutenant General
MG	Major General
p.s.c.	passed staff college

OFFICERS SERVING IN THE RANK OF MAJOR GENERAL
AT THE TIME OF THE SARAJEVO ASSASSINATIONS

<u>Name</u>	<u>Highest Rank</u>	<u>Birth-Death</u>
Adye, John	MG	1857-1930
Alderson, Edwin A. H.	LTG	1859-1927
Allenby, Edmund H. H.	FM	1861-1936
Altham, Edward A.	LTG	1856-1943
Aylmer, Fenton J.	LTG	1862-1935
Baldock, Thomas S.	MG	1854-1937
Bannatine-Allason, Richard	MG	1855-1940
Barker, John S. S.	MG	1853-1918
Barter, Charles St. L.	LTG	1856-1931
Bell, James A.	MG	1856-1926
Birdwood, William R.	FM	1865-1951
Birkbeck, William H.	MG	1863-1929
Blewett, William E.	MG	1854-1939
Blomfield, Charles J.	MG	1956-1928
Broome, Ralph C.	MG	1860-1915
Brunker, James M. S.	MG	1854-1942
Bunbury, William E.	MG	1858-1922
Burton, Benjamin	MG	1855-1921
Byng, Julian H. G.	GEN	1862-1935
Campbell, Frederick	GEN	1860-1943
Capper, Thompson	MG	1863-1916
Carnegy, Phillip M	MG	1858-1927
Clayton, Frederick T.	LTG	1855-1933
Cookson, George A.	MG	1860-1929
Cowans, John S.	GEN	1862-1921
Crutchley, Charles	MG	1856-1920
Davies, Francis J.	GEN	1864-1948
Davison, Kenneth S.	MG	1856-1934
Donald, Colin G.	MG	1854-1939
Douglas, William	MG	1858-1920
Drummond, Francis H. R.	MG	1857-1919
Drummond, Laurence G.	MG	1861-1946
Egerton, Granville G. A.	MG	1859-1951
Fanshawe, Hew D.	LTG	1860-1957
Fergusson, Charles	GEN	1865-1951
Ferrier, James A.	MG	1854-1934
Forster, John B.	MG	1855-1938
Friend, Lovick B.	MG	1856-1944
Fry, Charles I.	MG	1858-1931
Fry, William	MG	1858-1934
Gorringer, George F.	LTG	1868-1945
Graham, Edward R. C.	MG	1858-1951
Gordon, Alexander H.	LTG	1859-1939
Hadden, Charles F.	MG	1854-1924
Hamilton, Hubert I. W.	MG	1861-1914
Hammersley, Frederick	MG	1858-1924
Hanbury-Williams, John	MG	1859-1946

<u>Name</u>	<u>Highest Rank</u>	<u>Birth-Death</u>
Hastings, Edward S.	MG	1856-1932
Heath, Charles E.	MG	1854-1936
Heath, Henry N. C.	MG	1860-1915
Hickman, Hugh P.	MG	1856-1930
Hunter-Blair, Walter C.	MG	1860-1938
Inglefield, Francis S.	MG	1855-1930
Johnston, James T.	MG	1860-1938
Keary, Henry D'U	LTG	1857-1937
Keir, John L.	LTG	1856-1937
Kelly, Francis H.	MG	1859-1937
Kemball, George V.	MG	1859-1941
Kitson, Gerald C.	MG	1856-1950
Landon, Frederick W. B.	MG	1860-1937
Lawson, Henry M	LTG	1859-1933
Lindley, John E.	MG	1860-1925
Lindsay, Walter F. L.	MG	1855-1930
Lloyd, Francis	LTG	1853-1926
Lomax, Samuel H.	MG	1855-1915
Macbean, Forbes	MG	1857-1919
Mackenzie, Colin J.	MG	1861-1956
Mackenzie-Kennedy, Edward C. W.	MG	1860-1932
Macready, Cecil F.	GEN	1862-1946
Maxwell, Ronald C.	LTG	1852-1924
May, Edward S.	MG	1856-1936
Mellis, Charles J.	MG	1862-1936
Monro, Charles J.	GEN	1860-1929
Morland, Thomas L. N.	GEN	1865-1925
Mullaly, Herbert	MG	1860-1932
Murray, Archibald J.	GEN	1860-1945
O'Donnel, Hugh	MG	1858-1917
Payne, Richard L.	MG	1854-1921
Penton, Arthur P.	MG	1854-1920
Phayre, Arthur	LTG	1856-1940
Pilcher, Thomas D.	MG	1858-1928
Pirie, Charles P. W.	MG	1859-1933
Powell, Charles H.	MG	1857-1943
Pulteney, William P.	LTG	1861-1941
Raitt, Herbert A.	MG	1858-1935
Rawlinson, Henry S.	GEN	1864-1925
Reade, Raymond N. R.	MG	1861-1943
Rimington, Michael F.	LTG	1858-1928
Robb, Frederick S.	MG	1858-1948
Robertson, William R.	FM	1860-1933
Rochfort, Alexander N.	MG	1850-1916
Scott-Moncrieff, George K.	MG	1855-1924
Shaw, David G. L.	MG	1860-1930
Simpson, Charles R.	MG	1856-1948
Snow, Thomas D'O	LTG	1858-1940
Spens, James	MG	1853-1934
Stephenson, Theodore E.	MG	1856-1928
Stuart-Wortley, James E. Montagu	MG	1857-1934

<u>Name</u>	<u>Highest Rank</u>	<u>Birth-Death</u>
Townshend, Charles V. F.	MG	1861-1924
Turner, James G.	MG	1859-1950
Wallace, Alexander	MG	1858-1922
Watkis, Henry B. B.	GEN	1860-1931
Wilkinson, Percival S.	MG	1865-1953
Wilson, Alexander	MG	1858-1937
Wilson, Henry H.	FM	1864-1922
Young, Charles F. G.	MG	1859-1957
Young, James C.	MG	1858-1926
Younghusband, George J.	MG	1859-1944

PREFACE

Most historians of Britain's role in World War I have concentrated on the military, diplomatic, and political history of the conflict. Only recently have there been efforts to address the social history of the War, including the home front and the lot of the individual soldier. But no one has attempted to study--in a collective fashion--those general officers who led the British Army into the old Empire's greatest military engagement. This essay seeks to fill part of this gap by investigating the lives of the 108 Major Generals of the British Army on active duty at the time of the Sarajevo assassinations in June 1914.

This group has been chosen for three reasons. First, these generals occupied positions of responsibility prior to and during the War. Additionally, they represent the first generation of British officers commissioned after the Cardwell reforms of 1870. Finally, they were the last generation of officers promoted to the rank of general officer before the War's impact altered promotion patterns; consequently, they represent the normal progression in the pre-War British Army.

This statistical study attempts to describe patterns in the events and experiences of the careers of these successful officers. Their origins, education, training, and service fostered a unity of thought and similarity in their lives and experiences. The chief sources used are the official and unofficial Army lists, public school registers, The Times, memoirs, biographies, standard biographical references such as the Dictionary of National Biography and genealogical references such as Burke's Landed Gentry. Computer programs in the Statistical Package

for the Social Sciences (SPSS) have been used to generate tables, but the paper only uses statistics which are readily understandable to the general reader.

The belief that there were patterns in the lives of these officers is the central contention throughout this essay. This central issue unites the five chapters. The first chapter sets the thesis, defines the group, and describes the conditions in the Army in 1914. The second chapter discusses the social origins, including parentage and religious affiliation, of the officers. Their education, training and the commissioning process are chief topics in the third chapter. The fourth chapter examines their career patterns, combat records, training, sports, recreation and marriage. The final chapter contains a description of the group's War-time and post-War activities, as well as conclusions.

CHAPTER 1

THE OLD CONTEMPTIBLES

"There are no honest men but Soldiers and Sailors."
General Charles Carmichael Monro

The British Expeditionary Force (B.E.F.) arrived in France in August 1914, only days after Britain declared war. Composed of five divisions from the British Army, the B.E.F. deployed on the left flank of the French Army. Despite the Kaiser's alleged description of them as a "contemptible little army," the B.E.F. saved the day in desperate fighting from Mons to the Marne. Indeed they made a mockery of him by taking for themselves the sobriquet "Old Contemptibles." But the slender strength of the "Old Contemptibles" was not equal to the tasks demanded by the War. In the end, the War was won by Kitchener's new army, the reserve armies of France, and finally the United States. This essay tells the story of the 108 Major Generals of the old British Army who led the "Old Contemptibles" into battle in 1914.¹

These 108 officers played a significant part in the conduct of the War in France and in the other major theaters of the War. Thirty-three of them were eventually promoted to Lieutenant General, fourteen to General and five--Edmund H. H. Allenby, William R. Birdwood, Julian H. G. Byng, William R. Robertson and Henry H. Wilson--to the rank of Field Marshal. During the War sixteen commanded brigades, fifty-eight commanded divisions, eighteen commanded corps, four commanded armies and three

commanded secondary theaters. Many of those who had no commands in the War, nevertheless, served in important staff positions. John Cowans, who ended the War in the rank of General, was Quartermaster-General throughout the War. Robertson, who had never held a combat command, was Chief of the Imperial General Staff from 1915 to 1918. Still others served as governors in the possessions or held posts in India during the War. There can be no doubt that the members of this group had a significant impact on the conduct of the War.

The officers in this study also played important roles in British affairs after the War, both in and out of the Army. Birdwood, for example, commanded the Army in India from 1925 to 1930 and in retirement was Master of Peterhouse, Cambridge. Others, like Edward S. May, retired to the country where they participated in local administration. May, who retired as a Major General in 1919, served as a Justice of the Peace and a Deputy Lord Lieutenant in Devonshire. In the best tradition of the Victorian era, these men served their country during long military careers and continued to do their duty in retirement.²

But there are other reasons for the study as well, not the least of which is to test the validity of preconceptions about the attitudes and backgrounds of the wartime British generals. Historians and novelists of the World War I era have rendered a generally negative picture of them. In The General, now in its seventh printing since 1936, C. S. Forester has produced a well-received caricature of the World War I British general in his chief character, General Herbert Curzon. General Wyaland-Leigh, Curzon's mentor, was modeled after Field Marshal Allenby.³ Both were portrayed as hidebound, stodgy, cold, and oblivious to the horrible toll their methods exacted from the private soldier. In fact Forester observed ironically:

[In 1914] it might have been...more advantageous for England if the British Army had not been quite so full of men of high rank who were so ready for responsibility, so unflinchingly devoted to their duty, so unmoved in the face of difficulties, of such unfaltering courage.⁴

F. M. L. Thompson, Gwyn Harries-Jenkins and P. E. Razzell have all explored the question of where Britian found men having the qualities Forester described. All three investigated the social origins of the British officer corps of the late Victorian and the Edwardian periods. Thompson and Harries-Jenkins used an anecdotal approach concluding much from modest samples. P. E. Razzell has done an exhaustive census of the British officer corps without singling out generals for particular attention. This study brings together the use of these two methods with the entire population of a given segment of the British officer corps. As such this paper takes a fresh approach to an old problem.

The group includes officers of both the British and the Indian Armies.⁵ They share a particular chronological unity that distinguishes them both from their seniors and those that follow. As a group they are the first commissioned after the abolition of purchase to reach the rank of Major General. They are also the only officers to reach that rank after the Boer War and prior to World War I. Moreover, though they achieved the pinnacle of their profession after the Victorian era, they are nonetheless examples of the late Victorian, not the twentieth century, officer corps.

Alexander N. Rochfort, the oldest, was born in 1850 and commissioned in 1871 and George F. Gorringe, the youngest, was born in 1868 and commissioned in 1888. Only three of the 108 Major Generals in this study were killed in action or died of wounds. Hubert I. W. Hamilton was the first to die at age fifty-three. He was killed while on reconnaissance of his division's front in October 1914. Otherwise this group was quite

long-lived with seventy-five as the average age at death. Nine lived to be ninety or older. Charles F. Young, who died at age ninety-eight in 1957, was the last to die.

Just before these officers joined, the "Old Army" underwent substantial organizational changes. Commissioned between 1871-1888, they entered the Army after the reforms introduced by Edward Cardwell, Secretary of State for War in Gladstone's first cabinet. The Cardwell reforms abolished the purchase of commissions and created the linked battalion system which provided two battalions per regiment--one for overseas duty and one at home to provide drafts for the overseas battalion. The Cardwell reforms did not involve enlarging the Army to meet its expanding missions; but were designed with an eye to enabling the Army to make do with what it had. Cardwell, then, reorganized the Army as much as he reformed it. During the late Victorian period the Army was small, numbering approximately 150,000 officers and men. Though its size remained reasonably stable, the Army's responsibility grew with the Empire in the last thirty years of the nineteenth century.⁶

In the 1870s, when the 108 Major Generals under study joined their regiments, Britons generally professed opposition to imperialism, claiming events forced them into empire often against their will. In 1876 Parliament created Victoria Empress of India and the mood of the country began to change. The British mood shifted to ready acceptance and pride in empire. By the time of Victoria's Diamond Jubilee in 1897, patriotism and imperialism were interchangeable terms in Britian. The Jubilee celebrated both Victoria's sixtieth year as Monarch and Britian's pride as the leading imperialist power. The officers in this study matured with

the imperialist movement. They won their spurs in sixty imperial campaigns during the thirty years after Victoria became Empress of India.⁷

British Imperialism stemmed from strategic as well as patriotic considerations. The defense of the lifeline to India, a strategic requirement, led Britain to join the scramble for African possessions. The British found it necessary to control Egypt in order to protect the Suez, the Sudan to protect Egypt, Aden to protect the southern terminus of the Suez and so on. Accordingly the Army saw action in all of these areas. The needs of the Empire kept the Army in action in every year between the Crimean War and the Boer War. During this period Britain fought against native "armies," except for the first Boer War in 1880-1881. Even though British tactics remained relatively unchanged from Wellington's day, the Army generally defeated natives armed with assegais or ancient flintlocks.⁸

After decades of tension punctuated by the Boer insurrection in 1880-1881 and the Jameson raid in 1895, the Boers and the British went to war in October 1899. The Boer War was the first real test of Britain's ability to maintain her Empire by means of a system which depended on the pre-eminence of the Royal Navy and a small professional army. For the Army the war was its first significant test since the Crimea and the Great Mutiny. In fact, few special preparations for war had been made. The government and the public believed that the extemporized corps dispatched to South Africa under Sir Redvers Buller, one of Garnet Wolseley's proteges, would quickly subdue the Boers.⁹

Aside from the querulous voices of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and the radicals, the reaction of the British public to the war was at once righteous and joyous.¹⁰ Public enthusiasm was expressed in every possible

way. Volunteer units were raised overnight and paid for by public subscription. Women and girls knitted thousands of cardigans and packed tons of food parcels for the soldiers of the Empire. The war was an expression of British patriotism, imperialism and the inherent rightness of British institutions, the Army included.¹¹

The Burghers of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State quashed that exuberant confidence at Stormberg, Magersfontein and Colenso during Black Week, December 11-16, 1899. The British were shocked, and that sense of shock deepened as the final commitment to the war grew to 450,000 troops. Garrisons all over the Empire were decimated to meet the needs of the Army in South Africa. Yet, over half of the troops used were raised by mobilizing militia units and by accepting the services of thousands of volunteers from Britain and the dominions. The tremendous drain on Army manpower exposed the inability of the Army to meet adequately the defense requirements of the Empire.¹²

More shocking still was the reaction in Europe. Public opinion in the European capitals was almost universally hostile. This hostility produced concern in Britain that France, Russia, Germany, or some combination of them, might attack some part of the Empire.¹³ While there were no overt military actions by France, Russia or Germany, they were all eager to take advantage of the situation and to see Britain further embarrassed. The Germans, for example, continued in their role as chief arms supplier to the Boers. Moreover, the Kaiser's second naval bill, introduced in December 1899 to provide for a German fleet of thirty-eight battleships, portended great danger for Britain. Despite his efforts to ingratiate himself with the British, it is plain that Wilhelm used the Boer War as both the occasion and justification for embarking on a

naval program which could only be aimed at Britain.¹⁴ The Boer War discredited not only Britain's Army but the policy termed by Lord Salisbury as "Splendid Isolation." In 1900 Britain's isolation was complete and not the least splendid.

The Boer War accelerated change in British foreign policy that dramatically altered Britain's strategic posture. In 1902 the Asian flank was strengthened by the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese naval alliance. The destruction of the Russian fleet at Tsu-Shima in 1905 further eased British fears of possible Russian adventures in the Far East. Closer to home the Balfour government signed the Entente Cordiale with France in 1904. Though the Entente was merely a promise to recognize the spheres of interest each country had carved out for itself, it reduced the fear of confrontation with France to an acceptable level. German saber rattling during the Moroccan Crisis of 1905-1906, the Agadir Crisis in 1911, and Britain's vigorous diplomatic efforts reduced her likely enemies from most of Europe to one. That enemy was Wilhelm's Germany. The British position remained difficult in view of Germany's avowed intention to challenge Britain's most prized possession--command of the sea.¹⁵

If the Boer War stimulated a radical change in British foreign policy, it caused a no less radical change in the British Army. Prior to the Boer War the British Army had been an imperial peace force with the mission of maintaining defense and stability. Indeed the Stanhope memorandum, the principal statement on the Army's mission after 1891, asserted that the likelihood of British involvement in a European war was "sufficiently improbable to make it the primary duty of the military authorities to organize our forces for the defences of this country."¹⁶

The dangers made evident by the Boer War demanded a broader mission than Secretary of War Edward Stanhope had envisaged in 1891. The British public, outraged by the Army's less than distinguished performance, insisted on it.

Fueled by the debacle in South Africa, reformers in and out of government clamored for an overhaul of the Army. The louder voices included Charles a Court Repington of the Times, Spenser Wilkinson of the Morning Post, Sir Charles Dilke, a member of Parliament, and H. O. Arnold-Forster, a member of Parliament and later Secretary of State for War in 1904-1905. Besides a reconstruction of the War Office, they demanded the formation of a general staff. The monthly reviews were filled with similar pleas. In 1902 L. S. Amery, also well known as a War Office critic, published the first three volumes of The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902. Amery's work was a caustic criticism of the defense system that echoed the pleas of earlier reformers. Amery's arguments and those of other War Office critics stimulated public demands for reform.¹⁷

The Balfour government responded decisively. In 1902 Balfour organized a defense committee responsible for determining the country's defense requirements. He also convened the Elgin Commission to ascertain what had gone wrong in South Africa and to study how a recurrence of such disasters could be prevented. After gathering volumes of evidence, the commission assigned blame for the failure while avoiding any recommendations. Still, the Elgin Commission did uncover the major problems in the civil-military defense structure which included poor preparation, obsolete tactics and the lack of an efficient staff system.¹⁸

Immediately on the heels of the Elgin report, Balfour organized the War Office Reconstitution Committee with a charter to propose changes in the organization of the Army hierarchy. Viscount Esher, a courtier and able government insider, chaired the committee which included Admiral Sir John Fisher, future father of the Dreadnought navy, and Sir George S. Clarke, a former Army officer, colonial administrator and advocate of Army reform. The Triumvirate, as the committee came to be called, wasted no time completing its task.

Convened in the fall of 1903, the Esher Committee reported its recommendations in three parts. The first was delivered in January 1904, the last in May of the same year.¹⁹ One part of the report devised an organization and charter for what became the Committee of Imperial Defence. The remaining two parts dealt exclusively with the Army. First the committee submitted a plan for reorganizing the Army along the lines of the British Admiralty, a model they believed "absolutely sound in principle."²⁰ They further proposed the creation of a general staff similar to the German general staff which, since 1870, British reformers had considered the ideal prototype. Balfour took the unprecedented step of implementing the committee's proposals as they were received without consulting the Commons. By the end of the year the War Office reorganization and the General Staff were facts.²¹

Concurrent with the reappraisal of the Army by the Elgin Commission and reorganization of the War Office by the Esher Committee, the Conservative government attempted two reform schemes. Two successive war ministers, St. John Brodrick 1900 to 1903 and H. O. Arnold-Forster 1903 to 1905, attempted to anticipate the reports of the Elgin Commission and the Esher Committee. Both attempts failed, the first because of the

expense of Brodrick's proposed six army corps and the second because Arnold-Forster would have created two forces, one for overseas duty and one for home defense. The Army leadership stoutly opposed the Arnold-Forster scheme and the Commons was unconvinced as well. When the Balfour government fell in December 1905, the old Cardwellian system remained in effect and despite the Esher report, the General Staff had not been fully organized.²²

The task of completing the work begun by the Esher Committee was left to the Liberal government of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and that most unlikely of war ministers, Richard Burdon Haldane. Haldane, a lawyer of great ability, had a reputation for being incisive and possessing a keen analytical mind. Though better known for his interest in the law, educational reform and the maintenance of a good table than for any passion in Army reform, Haldane brought a penchant for efficiency, patience and a willingness to learn to his task as war minister that served his country and the Army well. Under no illusions about his expertise in military affairs, he told his generals in an early meeting that he was "as a young and blushing virgin just united to a bronzed warrior, and that it was not expected by the public that any result of the union should appear until at least nine months had passed."²³ The results of his work in fact appeared in the years 1906 and 1908.

In December 1905, while Haldane and the new Liberal government were campaigning to secure their position in the elections brought on by the fall of the Balfour government, talks began between Major General Grierson, Director of Military Operations, and Major Huguet, the French attache. In January after six weeks of informal (and in the beginning unauthorized) talks, the British and French reached general agreement on a deployment

plan for a British force in France in the event of a German attack. Grierson in fact reconnoitered ports, railheads, and potential cantonment areas. By the end of May the British had the nucleus of a war plan calling for intervention on the continent. What began as a shift from the traditional Army assumption that invasion was the threat they must face became an increasingly enthusiastic commitment to a continental strategy.²⁴

Haldane realized that implicit in these talks was a requirement for a large and readily deployable force, not then extant in the British Army. Moreover any such force must be developed within the constraints of the Army estimates the Liberals would accept. That is, the force must be found within the assets the Army had at hand. The British Expeditionary Force, the first of the Haldane Reforms, emerged as a result of Anglo-French staff talks.²⁵

In 1907 the B.E.F., a force of six infantry divisions and one cavalry division, was created out of the regular Army formations in Britain. No new forces were raised but those on hand were better organized for deployment. To meet the need for an efficient reserve, both to provide drafts for the Army and to garrison the home islands in the event the expeditionary force was deployed, Haldane put forth a plan to amalgamate the old militia and volunteer forces into what he called the Territorial Force. Though bitterly opposed by conservative soldiers and the old, crusty gentlemen who ran the militia, the Territorial Force as Haldane designed it was implemented by law in 1908. Like the Army it was organized into divisions with organic supporting elements.²⁶

Concurrent with the external reforms begun as a result of the Boer War, there was a wave of internal army reform. Haldane himself sensed this movement noting, "A new school of officers has arisen since the

South African War, a thinking school of officers who desire to see the full efficiency which comes from new organization and no surplus energy running to waste."²⁷ The Staff College, which would train such officers, prospered under the vigorous leadership of Henry S. Rawlinson (Commandant 1903-1906), Henry H. Wilson (Commandant 1907-1910), and William R. Robertson (Commandant 1910-1913). The Army also developed the tactic of rapid aimed fire to compensate for the lack of machine guns organic to the rifle battalion. Military journals and organizations, such as The Royal United Service Institution, enjoyed healthy growth as well. The entire period from the Boer War constituted an organizational and intellectual renaissance of the British Army.²⁸

Though all of these developments were important in rejuvenating the Home Army, they had comparatively little effect on the Indian Army. India was no longer the center of attention. As the Russians grew weaker and the British shift to the continental strategy accelerated, interest in the defense of India declined. As C-in-C, India, Herbert Kitchener was energetic in executing such reforms as he could, forming an Indian Staff College at Quetta in 1906. Conditions in India thwarted most of his other reforms. The Indian Army and the British Army in India spent most of its time patrolling the northwest frontier and skirmishing with hostile tribesmen. Much of the year it was simply too hot to train and the difficulties of assembling the far-flung units for large scale training was prohibitive. As a consequence, soldiering in India changed very little during this time.²⁹

By 1910 Haldane had not only executed the formation of the General Staff, he had also formed the B.E.F. and the Territorial Force. No longer merely a colonial police force, the Army was vastly different from its

Boer War predecessor. It had acquired a continental mission and an intense interest in the possibility of war on the continent. Despite the Army's increased world commitments since the Boer War, its numbers had not increased. France, on the other hand, could expect 4,000,000 men in arms in the event of war, of which 1,500,000 were in first line units. Germany's initial war strength roughly equalled that of France, though her reserve potential was far greater. In contrast, at the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, the British Army numbered only 250,000 officers and men with another 400,000 in the Territorial Force. The B.E.F. itself numbered only 160,000 men. Thus, it was through reorganization alone that Haldane prepared the old army for its new mission. In Liddell Hart's words, the British Army was "a rapier among scythes."³⁰

The 108 Major Generals under study were intimately involved in the preparations for the war and expected a major share in the task of wielding the British "rapier." Robertson, Wilson, Nevil Macready and Archibald Murray were the chief staff officers of the B.E.F. Members of this generation of officers commanded one of the B.E.F.'s three corps and all seven of the divisions. They were not only aware of the possibility of a European mission, but interested as well. Many of them visited Europe to see the battlefields of the Franco-Prussian War and discussed the application of the lessons of that war in their own time.³¹ Despite their interest in European warfare, the experience of the Major Generals was limited to bush wars and the Boer War, all of which they had eventually won. This study recounts the story of these 108 officers. It seeks to determine whether they were an identifiable set of men and whether there was a socialization process which made them what they became. This is not then a military history, but a social and statistical study of military elite.

NOTES

¹The original B.E.F. contained seven divisions, but two remained at home in case of invasion. However, by October 1914, two new divisions, two Indian divisions, and the two which had remained at home were sent to France.

For a graphic account of the price the old contemptibles paid, see Tim Carew, The Vanished Army (London: William Kimber, 1964). See B. H. Liddell Hart, The Real War, 1914-1918 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1964 ed.) for the military history of the period. The 108 officers are taken from the official Army list, see Great Britain, War Office, The Quarterly Army List, June 30, 1914 (London: H.M.S.O., 1914), pp. 20-41.

²Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, The Army in Victorian Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977) shows that the retirement activities of these officers followed a pattern typical of the nineteenth century. Serving officers in the nineteenth century usually retired to the country where they participated in local administration, see p. 35.

³General Sir Archibald Wavell, Allenby (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 158.

⁴C. S. Forester, The General (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1936), pp. 29-30. The General had been published in at least six languages before World War II. The Times gave it favorable treatment on its publication and at Forester's death asserted that it was "among the best novels inspired by the first world war."

⁵This sample does not include six Royal Marine officers who appear on the same list.

⁶In practice Cardwell's system involved linking single battalion regiments and rearranging the assignments of multiple battalion regiments. On the Cardwell reforms, see Correlli Barnett, Britain and Her Army 1509-1970, (New York: William Morrow & co., 1970), 2:299-310.

⁷The transition from the "Little England" to glorying in the Empire was swift and by the nineties complete. James Morris, Pax Britannica (London: Faber & Faber, 1968) is an excellent account of British Imperialism as a national patriotic movement. See pp. 19-35 on the Jubilee and the size of the British Empire.

⁸For the Army's successes in the nineteenth century, see Barnett, Britain and Her Army, vol. 2; also Brian Bond, Victorian Military Campaigns (London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 1967), and Byron Farwell, Queen Victoria's Little Wars (New York: Harper & Row, 1972) for excellent accounts of selected campaigns. For an overview of the nature and rationale of British Imperialism, see Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, The Official Mind of Imperialism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967). On the last decade of the great imperialist era, see William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902, vol. 1 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1935).

⁹On the preparation for war, or rather the lack of it, see Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War (New York: Random House, 1979).

¹⁰Campbell-Bannerman, in any event, closed ranks with the government. See Pakenham, The Boer War, pp. 79-80, 258-259.

¹¹Patriotic fervor and confidence was the order of the day in the fall of 1899. See The Times, October-November 1899, for excellent accounts of sewing circles, book collections and general patriotic hysteria.

¹²Pakenham's The Boer War is a very good and even-handed account on the physical difficulties of prosecuting the War and its onerous cost. See Barnett, Britain and Her Army, 2:346-349 for a concise description of the costs and problems the British encountered.

¹³The British public was amazed at the European reaction to her difficulties. Letters to The Times express shock, fear and anger. The assessment of the danger of Sir Edmund Munson, Ambassador to France, is particularly interesting. For his comments, see G. P. Gooch and H. Temperly (eds.), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, vol. I (London: H.M.S.O.), 1927-1938), p. 233. See also p. 288 re: Italy; and p. 239 re: Russian attempts to encourage joint Franco-Russian policy hostile to England. Wilhelm II, despite outward evidence to the contrary, claimed to be a great friend of England. He claimed, in fact, to have kept France and Russia from intervention, see *ibid.*, 2: 253-254.

¹⁴Langer, Diplomacy, 2: 654-656. Langer shows there was little immediate response to the Naval Laws in Britain. Indeed, relations between Britain and Germany were good. What is important is that the Boer War made the Naval Laws possible. Since the German public was ardently pro-Boer and anti-British, passage of the Naval Laws were assured in the fervor over the war. By 1902 the British had become afraid, see Arthur J. Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905 (New York: Knopf, 1940).

¹⁵For an overview of the diplomatic and military events of 1904-1906, see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904-1914 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Press, 1969). Chapter three is especially useful on the initial Anglo-French talks. See Marder, Anatomy, on the strategic difficulties Britain encountered as well as for the British reaction to the German Naval Laws. John Gooch, The Plans of War (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974) is good on the machinations surrounding the Anglo-Japanese naval treaty and the Russian threat to India.

¹⁶Quoted in Barnett, Britain and Her Army, 2: 353-354.

¹⁷Spenser Wilkinson's views were already well known. His book, The Brain of An Army (London: Constable & Co., Ltd., 1890) was widely read in England and in Europe. His criticism of the Boer War efforts can be seen in Spenser Wilkinson, "The War in South Africa and the American Civil War," The Contemporary Review, (June 1900), pp. 793-804. Repington, an ex-Army officer, was military correspondent to The Times. He published

often and kept his views to the fore. During this period both he and Lord Roberts were active in keeping the invasion issue alive and in working for conscription. Dilke was also well known for his interest in Army reform, though his prominence had faded by this time. Arnold-Forster enjoyed a wide reputation as a reformer. On his appointment to the War Office the service paper, The Broad Arrow, proclaimed him as "the statesman the country has waited for," The Broad Arrow, 30 January 1904, p. 123. L.S. Amery was an enthusiastic imperialist. The first volumes of his history of the war are an expose on the Army's failings and his solutions.

¹⁸ See Great Britain, Elgin Commission, Report of His Majesty's Commissioners appointed to inquire into the military preparation and other matters connected with the war in South Africa, Cd. 1789, 1904, XL (London: H.M.S.O.), 1904).

¹⁹ See Great Britain, Report of the War Office (Reconstitution) Committee: Part I - III, Cd. 1932, Cd. 1968, Cd. 2002 (London: H.M.S.O., 1904).

²⁰ Ibid., part I, sec. 2, p. 7.

²¹ Wilkinson's The Brain of An Army started the love affair with the Prussian system. Indeed, in 1891, the Hartington Commission proposed a general staff along German lines. For an overview of the reorganization of the War Office, see W. S. Hamer, The British Army: Civil-Military Relations, 1885-1905 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1970), pp. 223-263. The Army establishment was more than a little ruffled as was the Liberal opposition. For example, see Campbell-Bannerman's remarks in the Hansard, series 4, vol. 130, col. 1224 (29 February 1904), col. 1367 (1 March 1904), and vol. 136, cols. 1502-1503, 1513 (28 June 1904). There was work still to be done on the general staff, see Barnett, Britain and Her Army, 2: 353-359.

²² Barnett, Britain and Her Army, 2: 353-359. See also Hamer, Civil-Military Relations, pp. 218, 223-263. The story of Arnold-Forster's problems was inextricably tied to the ongoing reorganization of the War Office.

²³ Barnett, Britain and Her Army, 2: 362. See also Viscount Haldane, Before the War (New York: Funk & Wagnall's Co., 1920). On Haldane's ties to the national efficiency movement, see G. R. Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).

²⁴ On the shift to the continental strategy, see J. E. Tyler, The British Army and the Continent: 1904-1914 (London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1938). On the debates between the Army and Navy regarding the appropriate European strategy, see Gooch, The Plans of War, pp. 278-295. For a thorough account of the staff conversations themselves, see Williamson, Ch. 3, "The Military Conversations Begin, 1905-1906" in Grand Strategy. Staff planning remained in abeyance from May 1906 until August 1910. The Staff talks heated up again as a result of deteriorating relations with Germany and the enthusiasm of Henry Wilson who became Director of Military Operations in August 1910.

²⁵Williamson, Grand Strategy, pp. 89-91. See also Barnett, Britain and Her Army, 2:364.

²⁶At the start of the War the Territorial Force had fourteen divisions. On the Territorial Force, see Barnett, Britain and Her Army, 2:364-367.

²⁷Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 363.

²⁸Brian Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, 1854-1914 (London: Eyre Methuen, 1972) is very good on the impact of new thinking within the Staff College and the influence exerted by its graduates. See Jay Luvaas, The Education of An Army (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964) on the influence of military thinkers of the time including G. F. R. Henderson and Sir F. Maurice, both Staff College instructors. The best available on what the Staff College was like during the resurgent period is A. R. Godwin-Austen, The Staff and the Staff College (London: Constable & Co., Ltd. 1927). The standards achieved in rapid aimed rifle fire are described in numerous sources including the memoirs of these officers. The Germans often mistook rifle fire for machine gun-fire because it was so rapid. Rawlinson, Wilson and Robertson are members of the group under observation.

²⁹Philip Mason, A Matter of Honour (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974) is an account of the Indian Army and its difficulties in this period.

³⁰Liddell Hart, The Real War. p. 42. On the strength of Germany and France, see pp. 39-40. The Indian Army had 150,000 men at the start of the Great War, see Mason, Honour, p. 405.

³¹Tours of the European battlefields were a regular feature at the Staff College. Additionally, most of these officers made tours on their own as well.

CHAPTER II

OFFICERS AND GENTLEMEN: SOCIAL ORIGINS

"The persistence of family names in the gunners and sappers is a very marked feature of these two corps and . . . my own family may almost constitute a record."

Major General Sir John Adye
5th generation Royal Artillery

The social origins of the 108 Major Generals is a prime concern in this study. This chapter examines their origins--the social status of their parents, their region of origin, and their religious affiliations --to discern whether their backgrounds may have influenced their careers. Historians, such as F. M. L. Thompson, Gwyn Harries-Jenkins and others have demonstrated that the landed interests controlled the Army by constitutional devices and by providing its officers. This study also examines the means of control and evaluates the success of the landed interests in protecting their position. Though the size of this sample of officers is small (108 officers of 12,378 on duty when the War started), the results reflect something of the backgrounds of the officer corps as a whole; and a great deal about the social origins of the officers at the top of the Army hierarchy.¹

From the time of the English Revolution in 1688 the aristocracy and the gentry controlled the government and the military. Specifically with the passage of the First Mutiny Act of 1689, the landed interests gained control of the military; and the practice of purchasing commissions, es-

established in 1683, perpetuated their control. The purchase system insured that only gentlemen could take commissions and was defended as a means of assuring an independent officer corps. The landed interests also held that purchase prevented the development of an Army tied to the state, like Cromwell's Army had been, and therefore one which could be used against the civil sector.²

In the years between the English Revolution and the beginning of the nineteenth century, the landed interests continued to increase and consolidate their power at the expense of the Monarch. However, the Industrial Revolution and the first great nationalist movement in Europe (the French Revolution) unleashed forces in opposition to both the Monarchy and the landed interests. Challenged by a vocal middle class and the increasingly restive lower classes, the landed interests clung to their position, yielding on rare occasions when no other option appeared to be feasible. Under the provisions of the Reform Act of 1832, they admitted part of the middle class to the fraternity of power and, partly as a result of the Chartist movement, they repealed the Corn Laws in 1846. But, by dint of their vigilance and slow economic improvement, the landed interests survived with their powers bent, but not broken. In the mid-nineteenth century, Britain remained a deferential society ruled by the aristocracy and the gentry.³

W. J. Reader, Professional Men, asserts that in Britain, even in the nineteenth century, "The Natural occupations of the gentry . . . were government and war."⁴ By controlling who could accede to positions in the government and the military, the landed interests effectively controlled the nation. The members of this class, its sons and relatives in government and in the military, considered providing for the defense of the country among their prerogatives.

Perhaps no social group is more highly-structured, or more marked by conformity than the military. The soldier's achievements, his occupational specialty, even his relative rank among his colleagues are displayed on his uniform. In 1914, a British civilian encountering an Army officer would probably have recognized his branch, his regiment, his rank, his combat experience and, to some degree, his wealth merely by the cut of his uniform, his regimental insignia and the ribbons on his breast. Such things distinguish soldiers from their civilian counterparts as dramatically and as surely as the caste system separates Hindus.

But, since the landed interests determined the standards for service in the Army, officers were an integral part of the society rather than a separate military caste. The landed interests considered social rank and a public school education sufficient attainments for officer candidates and they stubbornly defended these criteria. As late as 1904, an officer of the old school and a member of a landed family argued that, "It is not necessary for the good of the Army that the officers should be men of means, but it is absolutely essential that they should be born gentlemen."⁵ By law, gentlemen were men who required no occupation. More specifically, gentlemen earned their income from renting or managing the husbandry of their own land. F. M. L. Thompson defines gentlemen as those men who annually earned at least £ 1,000 from their holdings (all succeeding income figures for land holdings are expressed in annual amounts).⁶ Given these conditions gentlemen, by birth, could only be found on the estates of the aristocracy or the country seats of the gentry.

Prior to 1870 the purchase system insured that only gentlemen could take commissions. The government established official rates for the purchase of commissions which varied by the type of regiment. At £ 1,260,

a commission as a Cornet (subaltern) in the Life Guards was the most expensive. A commission as an Ensign (subaltern) in a line infantry regiment could be purchased at £ 450.⁷ There were some exceptions; the Engineers, for example, awarded commissions on merit, but anyone rich enough could become a general merely by purchasing the preceding ranks. Inevitably enterprising people abused the system and commissions came to be viewed as investments for sons not in the direct succession to estates and so on. In practice this meant that commissions became very much more valuable than the official government prices. Perhaps the best-known example of the abuse of the purchase system was Lord Brudenell's purchase, in 1836, of the Lieutenant Colonelcy of the 11th Light Dragoons for a price thought to exceed £ 40,000, or almost seven times the legal purchase price. Brudenell, not known for his competence, had previously been dismissed from the service. However, political influence and the existence of the purchase system enabled him to return to command the 11th. As the seventh Earl of Cardigan, Brudenell led the Light Brigade, his regiment included, on their fool-hardy charge at Balaclava.⁸ Abuse of the purchase system was so widespread that in 1869 Cardwell offered to pay up to £ 14,000 to owners of cavalry regiments instead of the legal £ 6,175 in order to buy up commissions in preparation for the abolition of purchase.⁹ Obviously the middle class could not hope to see their sons taking the Queen's commission under those conditions.

Though the purchase barrier came down in 1870, there were other means of excluding unsuitable candidates. Expenses for officers continued to be high, even excessive. The cost of education formed another part of that barrier. A public school education followed by Sandhurst or Woolwich

amounted to several hundred pounds. On top of this, buying an officer's kit (uniforms and accessories) could cost as much as £ 200 or more. Finally, once on duty a subaltern required as much as £ 600, depending on his regiment, above his pay of £ 120 per annum.¹⁰ These costs were not perceived as unusual or onerous. As late as 1901 conditions had changed so little that one British officer observed that, "It is needless to remark that for the first five to seven or eight years, or sometimes longer, it [the Army] is not a self-supporting profession, but what profession is?"¹¹

These financial barriers were not only borne willingly, but absolutely defended. The expense of Army life was useful as a means of keeping out "men of a class unsuited for the Army."¹² The great expense of the cavalry was deemed appropriate as "the best means that has yet been devised for deciding into what branch of the service an officer should go."¹³ The expense of the elite regiment also protected its officers from having contact "day after day with a man whose habits and conversation continually jar on them, and with whom they have nothing in common."¹⁴

Others defended this monopoly of the aristocracy and gentry on "practical" grounds. A. W. A. Pollack, a soldier of the old school and editor of the United Service Magazine, argued that:

The boy who has spent much of his holiday with his father's gamekeeper and ridden his pony with hounds, is more likely to make a common sense leader in the field than any man, be he ever so poor or rich, who has had a different sort of bringing up.¹⁵

Captain William E. Cairnes claimed that:

No one is quicker than Tommy Atkins at spotting the 'gentleman', it may sound snobbish, I daresay it is snobbish to say so, but the fact remains that men will follow a 'gentleman' much more readily than they will an officer whose social position is not so well assured.¹⁶

The landed interests, determined to preserve the Army as their own, not only maintained barriers against intrusion, but contended that their candidates were the most suitable in any case.

The landed interests included the aristocracy and the families of untitled men who met F. M. L. Thompson's financial definition. Some members of the aristocracy, in fact, would not have qualified by the Thompson standard; but, by virtue of their high birth, shared the views and social status of the landed interests. Cadet branches and families connected by marriage to the landed interests also qualified.

Thirty-one, or 32%, of the 108 Major Generals were born to the landed families (all percentages are derived from the ninety-eight cases where the father's occupation is known, see Table 1). Though none of these officers succeeded to titles, six were in the male line of aristocratic families. Four others were the sons of country gentlemen who married the daughters of noblemen. Julian H. G. Byng came from a wealthy and rising aristocratic family with a tradition of military service. Byng's father the second Earl of Strafford, served in the 42nd Foot (later the Rifle Brigade). The elder Byng strengthened the family ties to the military by marrying into the Paget family. Both the Pagets and the Byngs had representatives who served as generals at Waterloo. Julian, who eventually became a Field Marshal, was the seventh and youngest son of this alliance. In 1876 the second Earl of Strafford earned £ 13,611 on holdings of 7,347 acres.¹⁷ Byng had no cause to be concerned with money.

Charles V. F. Townshend was considerably less fortunate than Byng. Though heir presumptive to the fifth Marquis of Townshend, his father worked as a minor railroad official to earn a living. Despite employment and an allowance from the Marquis, the Townshends lived in genteel poverty. In 1876 the Marquisate earned £ 22,572 on 19,679 acres. How-

TABLE 1
FATHER'S OCCUPATION

Occupation	Number	% of Known Cases
LANDOWNER	<u>31</u>	<u>32%</u>
TOTAL FOR CLASS	31	32%
PROFESSIONAL MIDDLE CLASS		
Army	38	39%
Navy	3	3%
Indian Civil Service	5	5%
Clergy	12	12%
Legal Services	<u>3</u>	<u>3%</u>
TOTAL FOR CLASS	61	62%
NON-PROFESSIONAL MIDDLE CLASS		
Actor	1	1%
Banker	1	1%
Shipowner	1	1%
Engineer	1	1%
Merchant	<u>1</u>	<u>1%</u>
TOTAL FOR CLASS	5	5%
WORKING CLASS		
Tailor	<u>1</u>	<u>1%</u>
TOTAL FOR CLASS	1	1%

Valid cases - 98, missing - 10

Data complete for 91% of sample

ever, the family fortunes declined throughout Charles Townshend's life. In later years Charles became heir presumptive as well and he struggled to stave off the financial collapse of the Marquisate. Townshend's social status was by no means diminished by his unfortunate lack of money since his family was an old and distinguished one which had long participated in government and the military.¹⁸

The twenty-five gentry families represented in this group of officers were no less distinguished. The wealthiest of them lived and probably held attitudes indistinguishable from the greatest peers in the land and some were as old as the oldest noble families. Like the noble families they often had ties to the military service. The family of Major General Walter C. Hunter-Blair held 27,672 acres in Scotland valued at £ 12,892. Hunter-Blair's father, the fourth Baronet of Blariquhan, served in the 93rd Highlanders and traced his title to 1786.¹⁹ Perhaps the oldest of the represented gentry families was that of Major General James Spens. The Spens were a cadet branch of the Spens of Lathallan. Their lineage was as old as Henry de Spens who, as Alexander III, was briefly King of Scotland in 1266.²⁰

The largest source of these 108 Major Generals was military families. Forty-one, or 42%, were the sons of soldiers or sailors. But seventeen, or 41%, of the military families had verifiable ties to either the aristocracy or gentry. The military parents in this group were often younger sons of titled or untitled landed families. For example, Lieutenant General Alexander Hamilton Gordon was the son of General the Honourable Sir Alexander Hamilton Gordon who was the second son of the fourth Earl of Aberdeen, Prime Minister when the Crimean War began.²¹ Some were the heads of landed families in their

own right. Major General Charles Crutchley's father, who retired as a General, owned 3,717 acres in England which earned £ 5,803.²² Lieutenant General Francis Lloyd's father, who retired as a Colonel had also done well in marriage. Lloyd's mother was the daughter of the tenth Earl of Kinnoul whose estate boasted 12,657 acres at £ 15,413.²³ Major General James F. Ferrier's father who retired as an Indian Army Major came from a family which traced its line to 1680 and had been in possession of the same seat since 1735.²⁴

The ranks of the military parents of the officers in the group further demonstrate the strength of the military's ties to the landed interests. Only twelve of the military parents held ranks less than colonel or its naval equivalent. In fact twenty-two of the forty-one military parents were generals or admirals. Since all of the fathers participated in the purchase system, their ability to purchase higher than colonel signifies substantial wealth. Those who retired at ranks of less than colonel appear to have done so to claim inheritances. While landed links can only be verified for seventeen of the military families, retirement at relatively low rank suggests that most of them had landed connections since the military had no worthwhile pension or retirement system.

There were also families in which military careers had become an exclusive family tradition. Most of these families apparently owned little or no land which encouraged long careers in the service. Major General John Adye, eldest son of General Sir John Adye, was born to a family which had an unbroken line of father to son military careers since 1795. Even Adye's mother supported the tradition. She was the daughter of an admiral. On Adye's death in 1930 the family had accumu-

lated 135 years of unbroken service which was carried on by his son. Ralph D. Broome followed his father into the Army where each retired as a Major General. Francis J. Davies, who retired as a General, joined his father's regiment, the Grenadier Guards. Davies' grandfather had also preceded him.²⁵

Twenty, or 21%, of the 108 Major Generals came from the families of professional men. However, six of the twenty, or 30%, of the professional families had verifiable links to the landed interests. Hew D. Fanshawe's father, an Anglican clergyman, came from a gentry family founded by Rear Admiral Charles Fanshawe, who was born in 1695. All four of the Reverend Fanshawe's sons served in the Army. One was promoted to Major General and two, including Hew, advanced to Lieutenant General.²⁶ Links to both the landed interests and the military were common among the professional families. Edward S. May, the son of the Lord Chief Justice of Ireland, had three uncles who were serving officers, including one who was a Vice Admiral in the Royal Navy.²⁷

Only five of these officers: William H. Birkbeck, John Cowans, Francis H. Kelly, Cecil F. Macready and Alexander Wallace were sons of non-professional middle class families. Birkbeck's father was a Yorkshire banker. Kelly's father owned and operated a merchant ship while Wallace's father was a merchant in Calcutta. Macready's father was a renowned and wealthy actor. Cowans' father founded the engineering firm of Cowans, Sheldon and Company. The elder Cowans eventually purchased a country house near Carlisle. At his death, his estate was valued at £ 66,000. Using the standard formula described by F. M. L. Thompson, the Cowans family was well on its way to joining the ranks of the gentry.²⁸

Some real social mobility is apparent in these cases since the vocations of the fathers enabled them to buy their way into the socially prominent ranks of the landed interests.

William R. Robertson, whose career culminated with a baronetcy and a Field Marshal's baton, came from a very modest background. The son of a Lincolnshire tailor, he was the only one of the 108 officers in the study who clearly came from the working class. At thirteen he began his career as a footman to the widow of Lord Cardigan, famed for the Charge of the Light Brigade. In November 1877, at the age of seventeen, Robertson took the "Queen's Shilling" in Worcester. Eleven years later, as a result of hard work on his own time, he earned a commission as a second lieutenant in the 3rd Dragoon Guards, then in India. A year earlier he had refused a commission in his own regiment, the 16th Lancers, in order to wait for a vacancy in India, where a subaltern might reasonably expect to live on his pay.²⁹

The links between the different segments of the recruiting pool and the more traditional vertical ties within each segment are demonstrated by the marriage patterns of the parents of the Major Generals. In Victorian England, as in other periods of English history, marriage was by no means a personal matter. It was a vehicle for social mobility or for the preservation of social standing. A union usually occurred as a result of careful planning by the families involved. Estates often rose or fell depending upon the success or failure of the marriage strategy planned by the families. A family successful in industry allied to a family with sound social credentials gave new money old respectability. By the same token, an old gentry family could avoid financial ruin by such an alliance.³⁰ Marriages of the parents of these officers closely mirrored these conditions.

The marriage of General Henry Seymour Rawlinson's parents demonstrates how the financial condition of a family could be improved by marriage. Major General Henry Rawlinson, first Baronet of Trent, was not a wealthy man. In 1862 he married Louisa Seymour, heiress to her father's estates in Wiltshire, Somerset and Dorsetshire. A nephew of the eighth Duke of Somerset, Mr. Henry Seymour, owned 5,360 acres which earned £ 8,139 in 1876.³¹ Both the elder Rawlinson and Seymour benefited from the alliance. Rawlinson gained eventual access to a substantial income and with the birth of Rawlinson's first son, Henry Seymour, avoided the eventual dissolution of his family's estate. The younger Rawlinson's name proclaims not only his father's admiration for Henry Seymour, but immediately calls forth the fact that he would eventually inherit Mr. Seymour's property. But no one in English society would have faulted old General Rawlinson for reminding his father-in-law that he had a grandson and heir. The younger Rawlinson eventually reached the rank of general and commanded the army which made the first day's assault at the Somme.³²

Rawlinson's family typified similar situations. Benjamin Burton, who retired as a Major General, was the son of an Anglican clergyman who made a successful marriage. The Reverend Burton married Anne, daughter of Colonel Henry Bruen of Oak Park, Carlow. In 1876 her family's estate, then in the hands of her brother, was worth £ 17,492 earned on 23,657 acres.³³ Raymond N. R. Reade's father, John Page Reade of Crowe Hall, Suffolk, married Lady Mary, daughter of the second Earl of Ranfurly, whose two Irish estates earned £ 11,237.³⁴ Such marriages enhanced a family's social credentials and increased their wealth which, in turn,

helped insure a comfortable life for their sons. More importantly, these unions established or reinforced ties with the landed interests.

Male sibling rank was all important because British inheritance laws were based on primogeniture. Hence, eldest sons of wealthy landed families generally remained on the land while younger sons pursued other careers. The male sibling rank of these 108 officers reflects this fact (Table 2). Data for the landed families represented in the group suggest that eldest sons were less likely to pursue a career in the Army than their younger brothers. The male sibling rank of twenty-two of the thirty-one officers born to landed families is known. Only eight, or 36%, of them were eldest sons. Of those eight, one of them, Lovick B. Friend, was illegitimate. Only two of them came from families on Bateman's list of great landowners. One of the two, Charles V. F. Townshend, was not in direct succession for the Marquisate of Townshend.

TABLE 2
ELDEST SONS CHOOSING AN ARMY CAREER
BY FATHER'S OCCUPATION

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Eldest Sons/Known Cases</u>			<u>Percentage</u>
Landowner	8	/	22	36%
Army/Navy	14	/	27	52%
Professionals	7	/	16	44%
Non-Professionals	2	/	3	66%
Working Class	1	/	1	100%

Fourteen, or 52%, of the twenty-seven officers born to military families whose sibling rank is known were eldest sons. More than anything else, this suggests that sons of soldiers and sailors were likely

to follow their fathers regardless of their sibling rank. The sibling rank of sixteen of the twenty sons of non-military professionals is known. Seven, or 44%, of them were first-born which suggests that the military was acceptable as a profession among other professions, but tells us little about general trends in professional families. That is, data on these twenty families will not permit the conclusion that the sons of non-military professionals were likely to choose the Army as a career. Two of the three sons of non-professional middle-class families, whose sibling rank is known, were eldest sons which suggests that the Army was a desirable career for them. Robertson, also an eldest son, was the only working class representative in the study which precludes conclusions for the class; but, it is well-known that Robertson's family did not consider Army service in the ranks as suitable. On hearing that her "Willy" proposed to enlist, Mrs. Robertson wrote to him saying, "What cause have you for such a Low Life . . . I would rather Bury you than see you in a red coat."³⁵

The data for the group as a whole suggests that while a substantial number of these officers, fifty-three of them, were born to families with landed connections, few of them were likely to accede to the family holdings. The Army, then, was a convenient means of finding a place for sons who would not inherit land, but for whom respectable work and a reasonable allowance had to be found. The Army was socially acceptable even if it did not immediately provide adequate financial compensation.

Given the occupations and social connections of their parents, it is not surprising to discover that few of these officers were raised near cities. Indeed none grew up in London though Dublin, Glasgow and Edinburgh were home to five of them. Some of these officers were born

overseas or near garrison towns because their fathers were soldiers or civil servants. Major General Thompson Capper was born in Lucknow, India, for example. But in most cases, even if born overseas, they were sent home to be raised and educated. Birdwood, was born in Kirkee in Poona, India, and raised from the age of three in the home of his grandfather, General Christopher Birdwood, at Bideford in Devon.³⁶ The two officers who are listed as being from India apparently spent most of their childhood there, but they returned to attend public school in England.³⁷

Statistics on the region of origin of these officers produce two interesting results (Table 3). In 1870, a year prior to the commissioning of the first members of this group, the United Kingdom had a population of 31.2 millions of which seventy-one percent were in England and Wales. Ireland had seventeen percent of that total and Scotland eleven

TABLE 3
FAMILIAL HOME OR PLACE OF BIRTH

<u>Country</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>% of Known Cases</u>
England	56	63%
Scotland	17	19%
Ireland	12	13%
Wales	1	1%
Canada	1	1%
India	2	3%

Valid cases - 89, missing - 19
Data complete for 83% of sample


percent.³⁸ Yet nineteen percent of the officers whose region of origin is known were Scottish. At first glance this seems a disproportionate percentage; however, since ten of the Army's seventy-four regiments of

the line in this period were Scottish regiments as was one of the four Guards regiments, the percentage among these officers is not inconsistent with Scottish participation in the Army overall.

The English officers in this study came from generally agrarian counties where estates of 1,000 acres might reasonably earn £ 1,000.³⁹ Accordingly, few came from the counties where the industrial sprawl of cities such as Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester and Leeds was in process, nor did many come from the coal mining regions. Only one of these officers came from London County and he was from Harrow. Most, in fact, came from counties south of a line drawn from the mouth of the Severn in Gloucestershire east to the mouth of the Thames in Essex (See Map, p. 34). Thirty-two, or 60%, of the fifty-four English officers whose county of origin can be determined were from south of that line. Devonshire provided six of them, Hampshire five, Kent and Dorsetshire four each. North of the line only Suffolk provided as many as four while Shropshire and Norfolk each provided three.⁴⁰

If the landed interest considered the Army its own, its relation with the Church of England was at least as strong. The gentry and aristocracy were Anglican to the bone. These 108 Major Generals were no less so. The religious preference of sixty-three can be determined with certainty--sixty, or 95%, were Anglican. Furthermore, the nature of the available sources (obituaries, etc.) suggest that the percentage of Anglicans among the remainder was at least as high. The Army chaplaincy of the period was three-fourths Anglican with the remaining fourth split between the Roman Catholic faith and the Scots Presbyterians.⁴¹ In the Army religion was part of the training schedule. The weekly church parade was a special event in the regiment.

COUNTY OF ORIGIN



The three officers who were not Anglican include Alexander Wallace, a Unitarian, and Charles I. Fry and William Fry who were both Roman Catholic. Even in these three cases there is little surprise. Wallace's father was a merchant and the Frys were Dublin Catholics, though not related. Still these three officers, at only five percent of the known cases, do not constitute a significant part of the whole. Clearly the generals, as a group, held to their landed connections and accepted the established church.

The presence of seventeen Scotsmen among the 108 officers in this study suggests that there ought to have been a large number who would claim the Scottish church for their own. Presumably on entering the service, each soldier declared his religious denomination and was given the opportunity to practice his faith. Church on Sunday was in fact mandatory.⁴² However, there are no verifiable Scots Presbyterians among either the seventeen Scotsmen or the remainder of these 108 officers. Eight of the seventeen Scotsmen were Anglican while the religion of nine of them cannot be determined from the available sources. The English church clearly dominated the Army. Regardless of traditional regional religious loyalties, those destined for commissions apparently accepted the Anglican faith.

There were two unusual ripples in the religious affiliations among these officers in their later years. John Cowans converted to the Roman Catholic faith just before his death. Major General George K. Scott-Moncrieff's obituary described him as an evangelical Anglican as indeed he was. A Scotsman from Kinross, he spent his years after retirement, from 1918 until his death in 1924, doing missionary work among the Polish Jews.⁴³

The analysis of the social origins of the 108 Major Generals shows that they did not come from "all walks of life." Clearly the occupational backgrounds of their parents reflect a narrow segment of the total British population. The generals were the sons of landowners, military officers, and professionals. Only five of them were the sons of non-professional middle class men and just one was the son of a working class man. Since fifty-three, or 49%, of them came from families with verifiable connections to the landed interests, the narrow breadth of their backgrounds is even greater than it appears at first. Often, as in the case of Henry S. Rawlinson, military families might just as well have been listed as land-owning families. The 108 families in this study were not clawing their way up from the lower classes. Robertson is the only clear case of upward mobility among these 108 Major Generals; but, then he was the first British soldier ever to rise from private to field marshal.

The strength shown by the landed interests was not restricted to the military. Very much the same level of participation by the landed interests occurred in the Foreign Office. Zara Steiner has shown that the gentry and aristocracy's contribution to the ranks of the Foreign Office was even higher than in the Army during this period.⁴⁴ Though there are no detailed studies for the Victorian period, the landed interests also manned many of the Navy's officer positions.⁴⁵ A similar phenomenon existed in the United States. Landowners and the American upper class which included bankers, lawyers, clergymen and government officials provided 36.9% of the officer candidates for the United States Navy during the period 1847 to 1900. Morris Janowitz demonstrates that the upper classes provided the bulk of the American Army officers who were contemporaries of the 108 officers in this group.⁴⁶ In Germany, though the middle class was making dramatic progress in gaining access

to the army, the nobility (Junkers included) still held thirty-three percent of the commissions in the German Army in 1914.⁴⁷

The social origins of the 108 Major Generals reflect the landed interests' influence and control over the Army, though the evidence does not suggest a concerted effort in this endeavor. The marriage patterns and occupations of the fathers, however, demonstrate their continued ability to determine who received commissions in the Army. Custom and expense insured that the middle class was largely unrepresented in the group. The influence of their social background can be seen in the religious affiliations of the Major Generals. The church of the gentry was the church of the Army and an official part of Army life. At least half of the Scotsmen in this group were moved by training, conviction or the customs of the service to accept the Anglican faith. The data on the social origins of these officers therefore support F. M. L. Thompson's assertion that, "The power of the aristocracy disappeared no sooner than the last anachronistic cavalry charges of the first world war."⁴⁷

In general, Army officers were either members of the landed interests, or connected to them by marriage or descent. As such, the officer corps was an integral part of society and not a distinct class or a military caste. Practitioners of what W. J. Reader has called "the most ancient function of the aristocracy," Army officers belonged to a respectable profession which enjoyed higher social status than medicine or law.⁴⁹ Implicit in the idea of professionalism is the existence of a process by which the novitiate passes into the profession. In the case of the British Army that process began, as demonstrated here, with the elimination of unsuitable candidates in accordance with the criteria established by the customs and ideas of the landed interests.

NOTES

¹Great Britain, War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War (London: H.M.S.O., 1922), p. 234.

²On the constitutional roots of the purchase system, see Cecil Woodham-Smith, The Reason Why (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1953), pp. 30-35.

³W. L. Burn, The Age of Equipoise (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1964) demonstrates that the landed interests survived the 1830s and 1840s intact and that the 1850s and 1860s were indeed an "age of equipoise." On the earlier period, see Llewellyn Woodward, The Age of Reform, 1815-1870 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938). See also F. M. L. Thompson, English Landed Society in the Nineteenth Century (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963). Thompson's work is concerned with the phenomenon of the landed interests retaining power past the period in which they held the "material sinews of power."

⁴W. J. Reader, Professional Men (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1966), p. 7. According to Reader the most aristocratic employment in Britain was "service as an army officer . . . directly derived from the most ancient function of the aristocracy: to lead the rest of the people in war." see pp. 7 and 78.

⁵Colonel M. J. King-Harmon, "The Education of Army Officers," The United Service Magazine 29 (April 1904): 64-65.

⁶Thompson, Landed Society, pp. 110-112. There is confusion among historians over precisely what a gentleman was. An eighteenth century law defined a gentleman of land as one who earned at least £ 100 from the land. Thompson cites that law and spells out upper and lower limits on land holding as typical of country gentry. Burn, Equipoise, has still another view. He includes certain professionals such as army officers. In his view, the meaning of the term is not clear, see pp. 253-256. In this study the term "gentleman" is meant to describe a style of life and some link to the land, either directly or by family.

⁷W. L. Guttsman, The English Ruling Class (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969) includes a collection of contemporary views on the purchase system, see pp. 268-280. See pp. 274-275 for the official price list which endured with few changes from 1776 to 1870.

⁸The fact that a man of Cardigan's character who having once been relieved of a regiment could then buy his way back in says a great deal about the purchase system. See Woodham-Smith, The Reason Why, on the machinations surrounding the purchase of the 11th Light Dragoons, see especially pp. 52-59. By the time of the now famous charge, the 11th Light Dragoons had been redesignated the 11th Hussars.

⁹Correlli Barnett, Britain and Her Army, 1509-1970, (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1970), 2:308.

¹⁰William Elliot Cairnes, Social Life in the British Army (London: John Long, 1900), p. xii. See also Captain J. L. Jeffreys, "Extravagance of Army Life," The United Service Magazine 23 (June 1901): 290; and The Broad Arrow 29 (January 1900): 101. For more on the cost of kit, see Dudley Seagrim, The Officer's Guide to Campaigning Equipment (London: Gale & Poldon, Ltd., 1896), p. 49. Among the necessities for a campaign were port, champagne and whiskey. See also Thresher and Glenney, Guide to Expenditure on Kit and Equipment (London: private, 1916). Thresher and Glenney were among the leading military outfitters. On expenses in the Indian Army, see Philip Mason, A Matter of Honour (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974), pp. 272-273. For pay scales see A Lieutenant Colonel, The British Army (London: Sampson, Low, Marston & Co., 1899), pp. 223-225. For costs in immediate preparation and while at Sandhurst or Woolwich, see Lieut.-General Sir William Bellairs, The Military Career (London: W. H. Allen & Co., 1889). The topic of cost of particular phases of training and military life are explored in greater detail in Ch. 3.

¹¹Jeffreys, "Extravagance," p. 291.

¹²R. Duke, "The Expense of Officers," The United Service Magazine 25 (September 1902): 637. This view was by no means new. See also Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, The Army in Victorian Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977) pp. 59-102. Harries-Jenkins notes that circa 1870 an Army captain was paid less, by as much as half, than a civil service clerk, see p. 87. The effect of expenses even after the abolition of purchase was to exclude the middle class. On this matter Harries-Jenkins and W. J. Reader both agree.

¹³Duke, "Expenses," p. 637.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 638. Duke's article was one of several in a debate on reducing expense to officers that occupied The United Service Magazine for nearly three years.

¹⁵A. W. A. Pollack, "Editor's Note," The United Service Magazine 24 (September 1900): 292. Pollack went on to add that, "If every British officer were the son of a country gentleman and if all our N.C.O.s and men had been gamekeepers or poachers we should approximate to the natural aptitude of Boers, and beat any European Army of twice our own strength."

¹⁶Cairnes, Social Life, p. xvi.

¹⁷Harries-Jenkins, The Army, p. 40. See also John Bateman, The Great Landowners of Great Britain and Ireland (London: Harrison & Sons, 1978), p. 397; and Dictionary of National Biography, 1931-1940, pp. 132-136.

¹⁸Who Was Who, 1916-1928, p. 1049. Bateman, Great Landowners, p. 415. On the financial difficulties of Townshend and the marquise, see Errol Sherson, Townshend of Chitral and Kut (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1928).

¹⁹Who Was Who, 1929-1940, p. 682; and Bateman, Great Landowners, p. 32.

²⁰Sir Bernard Burke, Burke's Genealogical and Heraldic History of the Landed Gentry (London: Burke's Peerage, Ltd., 1939), 1939 ed., pp. 2104-2106.

²¹Who Was Who, 1929-1940, p. 531.

²²Who Was Who, 1916-1928, p. 252; and Bateman, Great Landowners, p. 101.

²³Sir Bernard Burke, A Genealogical and Heraldic History of the Landed Gentry of Great Britain and Ireland, (London: Harrison, 1871), 2:798. See also Bateman, Great Landowners, p. 233, 253.

²⁴Burke, Burke's Landed Gentry (1939 ed.), pp. 774-775.

²⁵Sir John Adye, Soldiers and Others I Have Known (London: Herbert Jenkins, Ltd., 1925), p. 14. See also Edmund Lodge, Lodge's Peerage and Baronetage (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1876), pp. 149-150. On Broome, see Who Was Who, 1941-1950, pp. 292-294.

²⁶Burke's Landed Gentry (1939 ed.), pp. 744-745.

²⁷Sir Edward S. May, Changes and Chances of a Soldier's Life (London: Philip Allan & Co., 1925), pp. 1-18; and Who Was Who, 1929-1940, p. 921.

²⁸On Birkbeck, see Who Was Who, 1929-1940, p. 115. On Cowans, see Major Desmond Chapman-Huston and Major Owen Rutter, General Sir John Cowans, (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1924), 1:44-46, 52, 59. On Kelly, see Who Was Who, 1929-1940, p. 739; on Wallace, see Who Was Who, 1916-1928, p. 1083. See also Thompson, Landed Society, pp. 35-43. On Macready, see Sir Nevil Macready, Annals of An Active Life (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1924), 1:20-25.

²⁹William R. Robertson, From Private to Field Marshal (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1921), pp. 1. 30-53.

³⁰See Harries-Jenkins, The Army. Much of his work is devoted to describing alliances involving Army officers. On marriage and the gentry, see Thompson, Landed Society.

³¹Bateman, Great Landowners, p. 373.

³²Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, The Life of General Lord Rawlinson of Trent (London: Cassell & Co., Ltd., 1928), pp. 24-25.

³³Burke, Burke's Landed Gentry (1939 ed.), p. 295; and Bateman, Great Landowners, p. 54.

³⁴Burke, Burke's Landed Gentry (1929 ed.), p. 1902; and Bateman, Great Landowners, p. 345.

³⁵Victor Bonham-Carter, Soldier True (London: Frederick Muller Limited, 1963), p. 5.

³⁶Field Marshal Lord Birdwood, Khaki and Gown (London: Ward, Lock & Co., Ltd., 1941), pp. 25-26.

³⁷The two officers who grew up in India are Thompson Capper and Alexander Wallace.

³⁸B. R. Marshall, Abstract of British Historical Statistics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 10.

³⁹This figure comes from the Thompson definition.

⁴⁰Mor. s Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: The Free Press, 1960) has compared the regional origins of American and British officers. He found that the southern and what he termed "rural" tradition held true for English officers as late as 1950. In that year every top British general, born in England, was from the south, see p. 95.

⁴¹Lieut.-General W. H. Goodenough, The Army Book for the British Empire (London: H.M.S.O., 1893), p. 29. The exact figures in 1893 were: sixty-three Anglican chaplains, fifteen Catholic chaplains and five Scots Presbyterian chaplains. Standard biographical sources generally note religion only when it is unusual--not Anglican. The same is true of obituaries. Aside from biographies, the most accurate means of determining religious affiliations is to ascertain either the clergyman's name who officiated at the funeral or the cite of the funeral. From this information religion can be determined by the use of registers such as Crockford's Clerical Directory. There was a tendency for officers to be buried in the same cemeteries and attended by the same men. For example, an Anglican prebend, named Gough, buried four of these officers between 1924 and 1930.

⁴²Ibid., p. 293.

⁴³Chapman-Huston and Rutter, Cowans 2:297. See also The Times, 7 June 1924, pp. 12, 15.

⁴⁴Zara S. Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969). In the Foreign Office, as in the Army, candidates were presumed to have private means. Eton and landed families provided the bulk of successful candidates for the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service, see pp. 16-17, 217-221.

⁴⁵There is some background information by way of comparison with the United States navy in Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy, The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of American Navalism (New York: The Free Press, 1972), pp. 12-15.

⁴⁶Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, pp. 90-91.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 94. See also Ulrich, Trumpener, "Junkers and Others, The Rise of Commoners in the Prussian Army, 1871-1914," Canadian Journal of History/Annales Canadiennes D'Histoire, Vol. XIV, no. 1, April 1979. Trumpener perhaps overstates the case, but he provides more details than Janowitz.

⁴⁸Thompson, Landed Society, p. 1.

⁴⁹Reader, Professional Men, pp. 74, 150.

CHAPTER III

THE PLAYING FIELDS: CAREER PREPARATION

The British officer "is the product of Eton, Winchester, or Clifton, Marlborough or Cheltenham, a perfectly ordinary Public School boy but he has in him the finest qualities such as can be equalled by no other nation."

Major General Sir George Younghusband

In May 1885 William R. Birdwood passed out of Sandhurst and like most new graduates had his picture made. He arrived at the photography session after completing five years at Clifton, almost three years as a teenage Lieutenant of Militia, and a year at Sandhurst. He donned the uniform of his new regiment, the 12th Lancers, and stood in a large dimly lit room with his back to a tall window framed by a colonade. The faint light and high ceiling of the room made a soft background against which young Birdwood stood out in bold relief. With a walking cane under his left arm and his lancer's pill box worn at a rakish angle, Birdwood stared at some point past the camera. In his face one can see pride and youth (he was nineteen), but there is little to suggest that he would command an army in World War I, become a field marshal and serve as C-in-C, India. For Birdwood, like most of the officers in this study, that first picture as a commissioned officer marked his successful completion of a Victorian rite of passage which began in the public schools and culminated in joining his regiment as an officer and gentlemen.¹

The passage from boyhood to officer in the lancers was an expensive one since Victorian Britain made "a shibboleth of economy in the public service."² Army officers were not only poorly paid, but were expected to bear the cost of both their civil and military education. The pre-commissioning process normally began with a stint of three to five years at a public school. Expenses at school could amount to £ 150 or so per year from about age thirteen to age eighteen.³ Most officer candidates then spent a year or more with a crammer at £ 200 per annum.⁴ If the aspirant was admitted to one of the military schools his family paid £ 150 for the one-year course of instruction, and another £ 50 was required for pocket money. Once commissioned an officer invested up to £ 200 in his kit. If he was a cavalry officer he also had to buy two chargers out of pocket. It was not uncommon for the purchase of good horseflesh to run over £ 200. After these initial investments and expenses of £ 1,000 or more, the subaltern required anywhere from £ 100 to £ 600 above his pay per year. Choosing a career in the Army was therefore a serious matter.⁵

A review of the 108 Major Generals' career preparation demonstrates that they met the landed interests' criteria that officers have a public school education. The nature of their educational background reveals a great deal about the values these men held because the British public schooling process involved socialization as well as education. The commissioning process shows that patterns existed in both the paths to a commission and the selection of a regiment. Thus, this chapter sees the Major Generals through the public school years, the commissioning process and their introduction to the regiment.

Though he never claimed that Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton, the Duke of Wellington would have agreed with the sentiment.

The public schools produced leaders in government, the professions and even in industry. Since the fourteenth century they had provided young gentlemen of means the opportunity to have social contact with their peers. Vivian Ogilvie, The English Public School, argues that attending a public school was "almost a vocational necessity in the higher walks of life."⁶ Bonds formed at school endured and preserved a sense of unity among men whose later lives often proceeded on widely divergent paths. The public schools also inculcated in their denizens the British world view. In Boaters and Blazers the public school boys learned the classics and that:

Upon the ladder of progress, nations and races seemed to stand higher or lower according to the proved capacity of each for freedom and enterpri. The British at the top, followed a few rungs below by the Americans and other 'striving, go ahead' Anglo-Saxons.

These 108 officers attended the public schools in the 1860s and 1870s. The public schools were, according to the old saw; English, because they taught Greek and Latin; public, because they were private; and schools, because they were devoted to the cult of athletics. Though Thomas Arnold, headmaster at Rugby from 1828 to 1842, initiated what were for the day radical reforms, the public schools still offered little more than the classics, some computation, and mandatory participation in athletic events. The Clarendon Commission Report of 1864 described the course of study at the seven "great public schools" as "sound and valuable in its main elements but wanting in breadth and flexibility."⁸

The Commission's findings may have been too kind as the curriculum was very narrow. Ogilvie reports that in the 1860s the map used to teach geography at Eton did not include countries outside the Greco-Roman world, such as Scotland and India. This in a country which by this time

had ruled Scotland for two hundred years, India for a century, and owned possessions in all four quarters of the globe.⁹ Public schools offered little in the way of practical education on contemporary subjects or the sciences.

Reformers, in and out of the Army, were unhappy with the education potential officers received at the public schools. Not only were they dissatisfied with the general curriculum, but with the extreme emphasis on athletics. In the words of one officer:

We sorely need the voices of good men and true, to brave 'the booing of the gallery', and to tell us plainly that an officer's esprit-de-corps must not be measured by his power to excel in games of ball, but that his first, and again his second, if not his whole duty¹⁰ is to lead his men, and to train himself to be able to do so.

Despite these shortcomings public school boys who became officers did obtain some benefits other than useful contacts and friendships. Athletics were important in the Army. Conventional wisdom asserted that athletics produced, besides healthy bodies, good leaders and high spirits. The public school graduate did learn some leadership and management skills while at school since discipline was administered by the older boys. Finally the experience of coping in a hierarchical system, starting at the bottom, had some favorable aspects. But, the overall result of the public school experience is probably best described by Vivian Ogilvie. In The English Public School, he writes that the public schools produced:

Men who were sure of themselves and ready to assume responsibility, but devoid of imagination, sensibility and the capacity to criticize what they had been taught to accept, could conquer backwards countries--giving their lives if need be--and administer them conscientiously.¹¹

The public school experiences of the officers in this group confirm these general descriptions. Though none of these officers seems to have

been particularly challenged by his studies, each remembered his school fondly. Birdwood, who notes that Haig was at Clifton with him, remembers his time at school as "happy years."¹² Nevil Macready recalls that while at Cheltenham he did "practically no work, shot all summer, and played football in the winter, with mild rackets and fives thrown in."¹³ About his alma mater Edward S. May records that, "We learnt little but classics thoroughly at Rugby, as at most other public schools in those days: French as she is taught in England, some German, a little mathematics and some science."¹⁴

Eighty-one, or 89%, of the ninety-one officers whose educational background can be determined attended public schools (the remaining ten claimed private education). Of these eighty-one men, thirty percent attended the "great public schools", defined by the Clarendon Commission and the Endowed Schools Acts of 1869 as Eton, Harrow, Charterhouse, Rugby, Shrewsbury, Winchester and Westminster (See Table 4). Cheltenham, along with Marlborough and Wellington, formed the second rank among the public schools. Though fairly new (all three were founded between 1841 and 1843), they had achieved such stature by the time of the Clarendon Commission that the commissioners also took evidence from them.¹⁵ The schools of the second rank produced twenty-nine percent of the officers studied in this work. Eton was the alma mater of twelve of these 108 officers, followed by Cheltenham with eleven. Wellington, which developed a tradition of supplying officers to the Army, was third with ten.

The remaining schools attended were not without distinction. During the headmastership of Edward Thring, a leader in the internal reform of the public schools following the Clarendon Commission, three of these

TABLE 4
PUBLIC SCHOOLS ATTENDED BY THE MAJOR GENERALS

<u>School</u>	<u>Number Attended</u>	<u>% of Known Cases</u>
Aberdeen (Old Gymn)	1	1
St. Andrews	1	1
Bath	1	1
Canterbury	1	1
Charterhouse*	2	2
Cheltenham	11	13
Clifton	5	6
St. Columbia	2	2
Cranleigh	1	1
Edinburgh	2	2
Eton*	12	14
Framlingham	1	1
Haileybury	2	2
Harrow*	7	8
Highgate	1	1
St. James, Jersey	1	1
Lancing	1	1
Marlborough	5	6
Private Education	10	11
Rugby*	1	1
Sherborne	1	1
Shrewsbury*	1	1
Uppingham	3	3
Wellington	10	11
Wimbledon	3	3
Winchester*	4	4

Valid cases - 91, missing - 17

Data complete for 84% of sample

*indicates Clarendon Commission schools--Only Westminster, among the "big seven," has no representative in this group.

officers attended Uppingham. Framlingham, founded in 1865 to provide a broad practical curriculum at less expense than the old schools, was represented as was Lancing, established in 1845 in an effort to bring the middle and upper class together. The Old Gymn in Aberdeen and Edinburgh were also represented. These two schools enjoyed good reputations for sound practical education as did most of the Scottish schools.¹⁶

After graduating from public school most officer candidates proceeded down the most preferred path to a commission in the Queen's Army and entered either the Royal Military College (RMC) at Sandhurst, or the Royal Military Academy (RMA) at Woolwich; but this was only one of the five paths to a commission.¹⁷ It was possible to be commissioned from the ranks. This was not a frequent occurrence and William R. Robertson is the only officer in the group under study promoted from the ranks. A handful of commissions were reserved for candidates from the colonies. For example, each year the RMC at Kingston in Canada was allocated seven places for its graduates. Men who earned university degrees could earn a commission by taking a competitive examination. In this group of 108 Major Generals only Michael F. Rimington, who later won notoriety as a commander of irregular cavalry and commanded a corps during World War I, graduated from a university. After leaving Highgate, Rimington took a degree at Oxford and received a commission as a university candidate in 1881.¹⁸ Militia candidates comprised the second largest number of officers entering the Army. Militia officers with at least fifteen months of service could attain a commission in the Army by passing a competitive examination. Sixteen, or 15%, of the 108 officers in this study were militia candidates. (See Table 5A).

The militia candidates were most often men who had failed to enter one of the military schools. In this group it also meant they had no

TABLE 5A
SOURCE OF COMMISSION

<u>Source</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>% of Known Cases</u>
RMC	59	55
RMA	29	27
Militia	16	15
University	1	.5
Royal Marines	2	2
Ranks	1	.5

Valid cases - 108, missing - 0
Data complete for 100% of sample

TABLE 5B
HIGHER EDUCATION

<u>Institution</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>% of Known Cases</u>
No higher education	18	17
RMC only	53	50
RMA only	29	27
Oxford	1	.5
RMC/Oxford	2	2
RMC/Cambridge	3	3
RMC/Trinity, Dublin	1	.5

Valid cases - 107, missing - 1
Data complete for 99% of sample

higher education, though in the Army at large there were university graduates who elected to follow the militia route to a commission. Henry Wilson typified the militia candidate. In two attempts for the RMA and three for the RMC, Wilson was unsuccessful. After a stint in an Irish militia unit he finally succeeded in obtaining a commission.¹⁹

For militia officers training was limited to a short period of recruit training with a regular regiment, occasional drills and summer encampments. Birdwood, who served in the militia prior to attending Sandhurst, recalled his days in the Prince Regent's Royal Ayr and Wigtown Militia as happy and, in his words, "perhaps a little wild."²⁰ It is hard to see how summer encampments on the Ayr racetrack under the tutelage of the Regimental Adjutant, a bearded veteran of the Crimea, could have prepared Birdwood for the Army. Certainly, the Adjutant's reminiscences must have been interesting, but it is difficult to see how any cavalry unit could have done much that was useful on the paddock and infield of a racetrack. The militia seems to have been more of a club than a useful military unit. The officers of a given militia unit were just as likely to meet to hunt as they were to drill. Many militia officers were determined to win a commission in the regular Army; so they marked time in the militia by preparing with a crammer for the commissioning examination.

The two military schools provided roughly two-thirds of all the officers the Army required (Table 5A and 5B). Many officers' memories of Sandhurst and Woolwich bear a marked resemblance to their recollections of their public school days, but most applicants were not well-prepared for the entrance examination required for admission to the military schools. Most officer candidates discovered that additional preparation

was needed to pass the entrance examination and availed themselves of the services of a "crammer." Crammers were an enterprising breed of men who thoroughly understood what was required to succeed on the examinations and for a fee of about £ 200 per annum would undertake to spoon feed the aspirant with sufficient facts to pass the test. Birdwood passed the examination without the benefit of a crammer, but finished quite near the bottom of the list.²¹ Though Allenby had studied at Haileybury, the traditional incubator of the Indian civil service, he failed the civil service examination. In later years he declared that having failed this examination he then went to "cram for the service [Army] because he was too big a fool for anything else."²² Edward S. May, the son of the Chief Justice of Ireland, found a crammer necessary after leaving Rugby, as did Winston Churchill, a contemporary of these officers.²³ Lieutenant General Sir William Bellairs, The Military Career, considered good cram-mers important enough to include them in his chapter devoted to preparation for an Army career.²⁴ Crammers were so effective that in the period 1887 to 1899, two-thirds of the annual Sandhurst cadetships were won by candidates who prepared with a crammer.²⁵

Aside from the deficiencies in public school education, there were two other reasons for the difficulty encountered in gaining admission to the military schools. Competition was stiff because there were more candidates than places available and scores attained on the examination placed new candidates on a very important order of merit list. Branch cadetships were awarded on a quota system. Candidates who scored highest on the entrance examination had first choice and those at the bottom of the merit list settled for what remained. Choice of branch was based on personal preference, but in many cases the most compelling reason was

money. Candidates had to plan ahead to the day when they would be commissioned. A man of modest means sought to pass high on the merit list in order to procure an infantry cadetship. Those on the bottom of the list settled for the cavalry and the consequent expense. Future Field Marshal William R. Birdwood's low standing on the merit list earned him a cavalry cadetship at Sandhurst. Churchill termed the results of his third attempt at the entrance examination as a "modified success":

I qualified for a cavalry cadetship at Sandhurst. The competition for the infantry was keener, as life in the cavalry was so much more expensive, those who were at the bottom of the list were accordingly offered the easier entry into the cavalry.²⁶

Whether the officers of the group under study who attended one of the military schools passed their time any more profitably than those who did not is debatable. The curriculum of study at the military schools was primarily an extension of their public school experiences. The fare at Woolwich, though more technical, was basically the same as at Sandhurst where the major topics of instruction were mathematics (algebraic functions and geometry), English (included literature, history and geography of the Empire), and modern languages (cadets took at least two). Military subjects included drill, horsemanship, tactics, sketching, military engineering and some military history.²⁷

The quality of life was much the same as at the public schools. Once again the elder boys, as cadet officers, were responsible for discipline. As in the public schools, there was the nightly lock-up though it was a little more thorough in the military schools. Edward S. May recalled that "to prevent getting out, the windows were filled with lancet-work screens of iron."²⁸ The food was so dismal that in 1862 the cadets at Sandhurst mutinied over the vile state of the menu.²⁹ The usual public

school pranks continued in the cadet barracks. Turning out, that grand joke in which the occupant of a bunk is literally rolled up in his mattress, was practiced with great elan. George J. Younghusband and a number of his fellow zealots perpetrated what he remembered as a great joke on the town of Camberley. In the dead of night, shortly before commissioning, a number of them set out to dig up gas lamp posts in the town of Camberley. After great efforts Younghusband and crew accomplished the task. As he described it, "Finally six lamp-posts lay moribund, and from six pipe ends was escaping, in large quantities, the precious gas of the citizens."³⁰ Younghusband also witnessed a duel which only one of the duelists knew was feigned. At the resulting confrontation the hapless cadet who had been challenged was made to believe that he had killed his opponent. Eventually the panic-stricken victim was made aware of the joke and the happy band repaired to the mess for drinks.³¹

In 1884 Birdwood won fame and fleeting recognition from the Duke of Cambridge, then C-in-C, for his own special Sandhurst stunt. It seems that gentleman cadet Birdwood was able to "run at and climb a mast stretching to a high skylight, and then come down head first with his feet holding the mast."³² The Duke who witnessed this feat was sufficiently impressed that he was moved to remark, "I wish I could do that."³³ Apparently at least some foolishness at Sandhurst was quite acceptable in the highest quarters of the Army.

The cadets were well prepared by their public school experience for such antics and for the discipline. Apparently these antics paid dividends for they continued in the Army as an integral part of regimental life. As a subaltern Birdwood, in feminine attire, presided over a mock tournament held in Bangalore, India, as the "Queen of Beauty."³⁴ Young-

husband, who apparently delighted in such affairs, reported that sub-latern's court martials, a kind of kangaroo court, were convened frequently. He recounted one occasion when a brother officer was tried on the grounds that his face was "calculated to spread alarm and despondency amongst her majesty's forces." That officer was, of course, found guilty and sentenced to "be painted blue and yellow in alternate stripes with a view to distracting the attention of her majesty's forces from the more alarming features of his personality."³⁵

Despite the predilection of gentlemen cadets for other activities, some training did occur at the military schools, but it was theoretical rather than practical in nature. Aside from horsemanship, parade and athletics, little outdoor training occurred. The cadets themselves viewed their education as dull, impractical and narrow. On the subject of the quality of education at Woolwich, Edward S. May observed that:

After we had entered Woolwich our general education ceased entirely. We did mathematics, in most cases with little zest. We studied gunnery, which was interesting, but not very deep. We spent hours drawing plans of Vauban's and other systems of fortifications, colouring them, and printing designations on them with meticulous care. We did chemistry to which we paid small attention, and towards the end of our stay military history.³⁶

Even Younghusband, who was quite proud of Sandhurst, found his training disappointing. Of his tactical training at Sandhurst he wrote:

... during the whole year of our training, we never once left the parade ground, a level space, some 300 yards long by 150 yards broad. On this restricted terrain, twice a day, we learnt in progressive stages how to win the battle of Waterloo over again.³⁷

Thus equipped, Younghusband and his peers waged war for the Queen. The military schools continued with little change until the Committee on Military Education, convened as a result of the Boer War debacles, delivered their report in 1902. The committee boasted two members of

Parliament, the headmaster at Eton, the headmaster at St. Paul's and three Army officers. Major General Jelf, who left the committee before it had completed its deliberations, was the senior military member. Captain W. E. Cairnes (author of Social Life in the Army in 1900) was the secretary. Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Hammersly, a member of the group under study in this work, was the other military member. These gentlemen, who were by no means radical, delivered a scathing indictment of both the military and public schools.

Among other things, the Committee observed that officer training had received a decreasing share of the Army budget, especially in the last decade before the Boer War. They laconically concluded that, "Economy appears to have been sought without sufficient regard to efficiency."³⁸ They also observed that "it is no uncommon thing to find officers unable to write a good letter or draw up an intelligible report."³⁹ They concluded that such training as occurred at the two military schools was "far from satisfactory", though they gave Woolwich slightly better marks than Sandhurst.⁴⁰ On the Sandhurst system they pointed out that:

Cadets are required to pipe clay their own buff waist-belts, but that their rifles are cleaned for them. This is remarkable for while a cadet might acquire a familiarity with the mechanism of the rifle from being required to clean it, the educational value of pipe-claying a belt is extremely slight.⁴¹

The committee proposed specific changes to remedy the observed deficiencies, but what they saw in 1902 was very much like what these 108 officers experienced in the late 1870s and early 1880s.

After becoming more or less competent in the fundamentals of their profession, new officers were ready to select a regiment. This was a crucial decision on which much depended since an officer could expect to spend the bulk of his career in and of his regiment. There were occasional outside assignments, but officers remained with their regiment unless they were promoted out of it or exchanged places, usually for a price, with an officer in another regiment. Furthermore, substantive promotions occurred within the regiment up to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Social considerations and money were also important factors in selecting a regiment. The regiment was therefore more than a military unit. It was, at once, an officer's home, career and club.⁴²

A British regiment was not a tactical unit, but a recruiting establishment with an assigned territory. More importantly, the British regiment was an exclusive social club and not unlike a fraternal order. It had its own uniforms, customs and traditions, and in its officers kindled an intense loyalty and a determination to maintain its standards. Sir Garnet Wolseley spoke for a large part of the Army when he said to would-be reformers, "Keep your hands off the regiment, ye iconoclastic civilian officials who meddle and muddle in Army matters."⁴³ A regiment's branch, lineage, regional affiliations and special affiliations with members of the royal family determined its social status.

The regimental choices of the officers in this study reflect their concern with money, social status, regional loyalties and familial traditions (Tables 6A and 6B). The wealthy officers joined "good" regiments. The Guards regiments, both cavalry and infantry, were Britain's most elite. They had long traditions and strong ties to the aristocracy. Life in the Guards was attractive as they were located in London and

TABLE 6A
BRANCH OF SERVICE

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>% of Known Cases</u>
Cavalry	14	13
Infantry	66	61
Artillery	19	18
Engineers	9	8

Valid cases - 108, missing - 0
Data complete for 100% of sample

TABLE 6B
REGIMENTAL TYPES

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>% of Known Cases</u>
Guards Cavalry	0	0
Line Cavalry	7	6
Indian Cavalry	7	6
Guards Infantry	6	6
Line Infantry	43	40
Indian Infantry	17	16
Artillery/Engineers	28	26

Valid cases - 108, missing - 0
Data complete for 100% of sample

rarely sent overseas. Cairnes notes that subalterns in the Guards could expect four months leave each year and captains could take six or more months.⁴⁴ Six of the 108 Major Generals in this study joined Guards regiments. General Charles Fergusson, seventh Baronet of Kilcarran, and Major General Laurence G. Drummond, related to the Viscount of Strathallan, both wealthy and graduates of Eton and Sandhurst, joined the Grenadier and Scots Guards respectively.⁴⁵

Among the "line" regiments the cavalry stood highest in social prestige. Seven officers in the group under study joined line cavalry regiments. The 10th Hussars was one of the most elite of the line cavalry regiments and as expensive to join as the Guards infantry regiments. Cairnes reported that while it was possible to live in the 10th on £ 500 a year above pay, officers who attempted to do so "rarely lasted long."⁴⁶ Field Marshal Julian H. G. Byng, an Eton graduate and former militia officer, joined the 10th.⁴⁷ Birdwood, forced to choose a cavalry regiment by his low standing on the merit list, gazetted to the 12th Lancers. At the end of the required year of service, he transferred to the Indian Army in the 11th Bengal Lancers because the 12th was "an expensive regiment, with many rich men in it, while I was entirely dependent, apart from any pay, on such allowance as my father could make me."⁴⁸

Forty-three of the officers in this study belonged to infantry regiments which ranked just below the line cavalry regiments. The Rifle Brigade and the King's Royal Rifle Corps were the most elite and unique of the line infantry regiments. Recruited nationally, both basked in the radiance of sparkling combat records. In fact the King's Royal Rifle Corps, chosen by four of the officers in this study, was the lineal

descendent of the Royal Americans, raised in the American colonies in 1756 to fight the French and the Indians. Two of the Major Generals joined the Rifle Brigade. Scottish and Irish line infantry regiments held the strongest territorial affiliations. Moreover, the Scottish regiments enjoyed a special status due to their great fighting reputation and Scottish national pride. For example, at Waterloo, the Gordons charged with "Scotland Forever" as their battle cry.⁴⁹ Among the line infantry regiments the "county" regiments were less expensive and less prestigious; however, as a result of their strong regional affiliations, they had many loyal adherents. Accordingly, the Northumberland Fusiliers, the Somerset Light Infantry, the Lancashire Fusiliers, the South Staffords and the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry each claimed two of the officers in this study.⁵⁰

The Indian Army was a native army officered by European and native officers. Spawned from the private army of the East India Company, the regiments of the Indian Army had long, colorful traditions and equally long combat records. The Indian Army ranked beneath the Home Army in the social order; but a young officer could live well on his pay and he had good prospects for combat, both of which attracted certain young men.⁵¹ Again, as in the Home Army, the cavalry enjoyed the highest status, though particular infantry regiments also stood high on the social ladder. There were unique regiments, such as the Guides, which had both infantry and cavalry units. Indian officers composed about one quarter of the officer corps.⁵² Twenty-four, or 22%, of the 108 officers in this study chose to transfer to the Indian Army after serving the required year with a unit in the Home Army. They represented regiments from all the branches and all the regions of India.⁵³

The social status of the Royal Artillery and Engineer regiments was generally lower than the Guards or line regiments. As career choices, the Artillery or Engineers were not as attractive for two reasons. Since these arms were normally grouped no higher than company or battery level, the camaraderie of the regimental mess was lost. Secondly, their missions required practical skills and practice in a time when keenness was out of style. Still, due either to money considerations or personal preferences, twenty-six percent of the Major Generals in this work chose a life in one of these "practical" regiments. Of the twenty-eight who joined artillery or engineer regiments, seventeen came from military or professional middle class families.⁵⁴

Despite the discomforts of occasional campaigning, life in the regiment was good. In fact, life continued for these officers much as it had before their commissioning. They attended parties, hunted, shot wild game, and played polo much as they might have done had they remained at home or inherited an estate in their own right. Younghusband captures the club atmosphere exactly in his memoirs. Arriving after an arduous journey on that peculiar Indian conveyance, the Dak Gharrie, he was greeted quite kindly by his new regiment. He joined the 17th Foot just before they went up into the Khyber Pass in 1878 for another round with the Afghans. Of his welcome he wrote, "It was indeed a warm and happy feeling to be taken straight, a poor dishevelled stranger, into the heart of that gallant regiment three hundred years old."⁵⁵ The next day Younghusband saw action with his regiment, but before the fight the officers of the regiment enjoyed a pleasant luncheon. At the conclusion of their meal Younghusband claims that the lunch party broke up "gay as gay. True Knights and British officers, walking brave and debonair,

maybe towards glory, and maybe towards the pleasant fields of Heaven, where Warriors rest."⁵⁶

Having survived the initiation and the enthusiasm of their welcome, these officers settled down to the routine of drill, sport and mess nights which were the standard fare of British regiments wherever they were found. Young officers could usually get three or more months of leave when not on combat service which gave them time to travel, hunt or otherwise amuse themselves. May observed that garrison life at Woolwich was delightful, in fact, in his opinion, the only thing which could not be done was "train troops."⁵⁷ Allenby, who had a gift for the sardonic, remarked that at the Brighton Garrison, "Life would be tolerable if it were not for its amusements."⁵⁸

Regimental and branch affiliation did have an apparent relationship to success, at least among these 108 officers, though it was not the only determinant. The cavalry and infantry regiments are over-represented in the higher ranks at the expense of the artillery and engineers (Table 7). The cavalry officers in this group, whether in the Indian Cavalry, or the Cavalry of the line in the Home Army, reached higher ranks in greater relative numbers than their colleagues in the infantry and engineer regiments. For example, four of the five officers in this group who were promoted to Field Marshal were cavalry officers. Henry Wilson, the sole infantry officer of the group promoted Field Marshal, came from an elite regiment. Officers of the Guards fared better than those in line infantry regiments. Not surprisingly the artillery and engineers had the worst success rate in terms of promotion to Lieutenant General or higher (Table 8).

TABLE 7
RELATIVE PROMOTION SUCCESS BY REGIMENTAL TYPE

# of MG promoted	Line Cav	Ind Cav	Gds Inf	Line Inf	Ind Inf	Arty/Eng
	# of tot/%	# of tot/%	# of tot/%	# of tot/%	# of tot/%	# of tot/%
to LTG	5 of 7 71%	2 of 7 29%	4 of 6 33%	13 of 43 30%	3 of 17 18%	6 of 28 21%
GEN	3 of 7 43%	1 of 7 14%	2 of 6 33%	7 of 43 16%	2 of 17 12%	-----
FM	3 of 7 43%	1 of 7 14%	-----	1 of 43 2%	-----	-----

TABLE 8
PROMOTION RATES BY REGIMENTAL TYPE*

RANK	Line Cav	Gds Inf	Line Inf	Arty/Eng	Ind Army
TIS to CPT	7	11	8	10	11
TIS to MAJ	16	17	17	17	19
TIS to LTC	19	19	21	23	22
TIS to COL	21	23	25	27	27
TIS to MG	29	31	32	35	33
**TIS to LTG	35	35	36	39	36
TIS to GEN	35	38	36	--	37
TIS to FM	37	--	35	--	40

*The rank of Brigadier General is not included since it was not an integrated, paid rank; but only temporary rank during the time these 108 officers were on active duty. Time in Service (TIS) is stated in years.

**TIS to LTG and above was clearly compressed by the effects of the War.

Valid cases (both tables) - 108, missing - 0

Data complete for 100% of sample.

Regimental and branch affiliations also affected an officer's promotion rate. Members of this group assigned to line cavalry regiments proceeded faster along the entire promotion ladder (See Table 8). Cavalry officers enjoyed the fastest promotion rates to every rank except Lieutenant Colonel. Officers of the Guards, after a slow start, progressed nearly as rapidly as their colleagues in the cavalry regiments. Officers of the artillery, engineers and Indian Army fell behind at the Lieutenant Colonel mark and remained three or more years behind the line cavalry and Guards officers throughout their careers.

The patterns that emerge in regimental selection and relative promotion rates in the regiment suggest that social status was important not only in choosing a regiment, but in later success as well. The cavalry regiments, the Guards, and the better infantry regiments were good places to begin a career despite the inconvenience of higher expenses. Finally, the record of the technical branches suggests that they were neither high in social prestige, nor good platforms for careers.

Money, tradition and social status were important factors in the commissioning process and in the career prospects of the officers in this study. The statistics for these 108 officers demonstrate these assertions clearly. These officers attended the better public schools, went to Sandhurst and Woolwich and finally chose regiments with the three factors of money, tradition, and social status in mind. The promotion rates and relative promotion success for the various regimental alternatives support the conclusion that regiments with good social status in fact offered career advantages as well. The careers of the Indian Army officers under observation suggest that while their regiments had little to recommend them from the point of view of social

status, they offered greater opportunities for combat service and therefore were reasonably good, if more arduous, places to begin a career.

The socialization process began by limiting access to commissions in the first place and was reinforced by the experiences the typical officer in this study encountered in his public school, his military school, and his regiment. Those few men without the proper social credentials who survived the selection process now faced the rigors of the regimental mess. Life in the regiment continued to weed out unsuitable characteristics still present in some newly commissioned young officers. Cairnes was sanguine about the prospects of men who had "bounded" above their class into the Army. He noted that ". . . even now a number of very undesirable men find their way into the army . . . but we can safely leave these young men to the tender mercies of their brother officers."⁵⁴

NOTES

¹Field-Marshal Lord Birdwood, Khaki and Gown (London: Ward, Lock & Co., 1941), pp. 25-29. Birdwood's commissioning photograph faces p. 32.

²W. L. Burn, The Age of Equipoise (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1964), p. 262. On the rationale of low pay and the "duty" of gentlemen to serve, see pp. 261-264.

³Cyril Norwood and Arthur H. Hope, The Higher Education of Boys in England (London: John Murray, 1909), p. 29. Though tuition at Eton during this period was £ 150 per year, a handful of Kings scholars enjoyed lower tuition. But they still needed as much as £ 80 per year. Lower tuition could also be found at schools like Cranleigh and Framlingham that were specifically designed for those who could not afford the "Public School." These were called county schools. See Vivian Ogilvie, The English Public School (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1957), pp. 157-158.

⁴Lieut.-General Sir William Bellairs, The Military Career (London: W. H. Allen & Co., 1889), pp. 52-53. See The Broad Arrow (London), almost any week, for crammers' ads. Advertisements for crammers took a full page in most weeks; see, for example, The Broad Arrow (London), 13 January 1900, p. 63.

⁵Expenses at Sandhurst were determined in three ways. The son of a civilian paid a flat tuition of £ 150. A Queen's cadet, usually a reward for the services of the parent, went tuition free. Henry Rawlinson was a Queen's cadet. The sons of military officers paid on a sliding scale according to the rank the father held. The same scale was used at both Sandhurst and Woolwich. See Great Britain, War Office, Standing Orders of the Royal Military College, Sandhurst (London: H.M.S.O., 1908), p. 5. On the cost of good horseflesh see William Elliot Cairnes, Social Life in the British Army (London: John Long, 1900), pp. 15-16. County regiments cost about £ 100 above pay while an elite regiment like the 60th King's Royal Rifle Corps, Rawlinson's regiment, cost £ 500 above pay; see Philip Mason, A Matter of Honour (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974), p. 372.

⁶Ogilvie, School, p. 180.

⁷Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, The Official Mind of Imperialism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1962), p. 2.

⁸Quoted in Ogilvie, School, p. 170.

⁹Ibid., p. 174. On the whole issue of curriculum in the 1860s and 1870s see Chapter XI - Internal Reforms.

¹⁰Skene Dhub, "How to Begin," The United Service Magazine 25 (August 1902): 533. Compulsory athletics were a key feature of the public schools. For an idealized account of the role of athletics see Various Authors, Great Public Schools (London: Edward Arnold, 1893). For a less favorable account see Our Public Schools (London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1881), especially pp. 32-36.

¹¹Ogilvie, School, p. 189. The work of Cyril Norwood and A. H. Hope, distinguished schoolmasters of the late nineteenth century, was also critical of the public schools.

¹²Birdwood, Khaki and Gown, pp. 26-28.

¹³Sir Nevil Macready, Annals of An Active Life (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1925), 1:35.

¹⁴Major-General Sir Edward S. May, Changes & Chances of a Soldier's Life (London: Philip Allan & Co., 1925), p. 16.

¹⁵Ogilvie, School, pp. 4-5. These are not precise definitions, but Englishmen knew "the Seven" great public schools. On life at school see Charles E. Pascoe, Everyday Life at Eton, Harrow, Rugby and other Great Public Schools (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1882).

¹⁶Ogilvie, School, pp. 169-174, 157.

¹⁷On the five basic paths to commissions see Great Britain, War Office, A Short Guide to the Various Ways of Obtaining A Commission in His Majesty's Regular Army (London: H.M.S.O., 1912); and Bellairs, Military Career. Two officers in this study, Charles H. Powell and Charles V. F. Townshend, transferred from the Royal Marines, which was a variation on the militia route.

¹⁸Who Was Who, 1916-1928, p. 892. See also Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 185.

¹⁹C. E. Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson (London: Cassell & Co., Ltd., 1927), 1:2-4.

²⁰Birdwood, Khaki and Gown, p. 28.

²¹Ibid.

²²Raymond Savage, Allenby of Armageddon (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1926), p. 25.

²³May, Changes, p. 18; and Winston S. Churchill, My Early Life: A Roving Commission (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941), pp. 28-29.

²⁴Bellairs, Military Career, pp. 52-53.

²⁵Ibid., Appendix B. See also Hugh Thomas, The Story of Sandhurst (London: Hutchinson, 1961), p. 150.

²⁶Churchill, My Early Life, p. 35.

²⁷Great Britain, Committee on Military Education, Report of the Committee appointed to consider the Education and Training of Officers of the Army, Cd. 982 (London: H.M.S.O., 1902), Appendixes XXII and XXXI. See also Captain F. G. Guiggesberg, R.E., The Shop (London: Cassell & Co., Ltd., 1900), p. 233, for the RMA syllabus of 1868 compared to the later system in use in 1899.

²⁸May, Changes, p. 21.

²⁹A. F. Mockler-Ferryman, Annals of Sandhurst (London: William Heinemann, 1900), pp. 59-60.

³⁰Sir George Younghusband, A Soldier's Memories (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1917), pp. 24-27.

³¹Ibid., pp. 19-23.

³²Thomas, Sandhurst, p. 147.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Birdwood, Khaki and Gown, p. 31. Birdwood also had to fend off the attentions of a "particularly amorous colonel of native infantry" while in his guise.

³⁵Younghusband, Memories, pp. 33-34.

³⁶May, Changes, p. 19.

³⁷Sir George Younghusband, Forty Years a Soldier (London: Herbert Jenkins, Ltd., 1923), p. 306.

³⁸Committee on Military Education, Education and Training of Officers, p. 2.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 20.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 21.

⁴²The promotion and rank structure during the active careers of these officers was complex. In addition to regimental rank there were also brevet and temporary promotions. Brevet promotions were usually for distinguished service and conferred the rank and authority of the promoted rank on the Army list, but not the pay. Temporary or local promotions were just that. Brigadier was a temporary rank until 1945. An officer could be a paid captain of his regiment, a brevet lieutenant colonel and a brigadier all at once. In the Indian Army there was yet another twist. Officers of the Indian Army joined the Indian Staff

Corps and appeared on a general list. In 1903 the system was changed again so that all officers were of the Indian Army. On how this system worked in practice, see Byron Farwell, Queen Victoria's Little Wars (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), pp. 259-360.

⁴³Farwell, Little Wars, p. 362. Wolseley also observed that the regiment was, to the "uneducated soldier," "mother, sister and mistress." On the regimental concept see Farwell, Little Wars, pp. 354-363. The regiment usually had two battalions, one at home at the regimental depot and one at an overseas station. Each battalion was commanded by a lieutenant colonel. The regiment had no commander, but it did have a colonel-in-chief who could technically reject an officer as unsuitable for the regiment. Colonel-in-chief was largely an honorary post. The Kaiser, for example, was Colonel of the First Dragoons from 5 May 1894 until at least the outbreak of World War I.

⁴⁴Cairnes, Social Life, p. 28.

⁴⁵On Fergusson see Who Was Who, 1951-1960, pp. 370-371. On Drummond see Who Was Who, 1941-1950, pp. 330-331.

⁴⁶Cairnes, Social Life, p. 36.

⁴⁷Dictionary of National Biography, 1931-1940, pp. 132-136.

⁴⁸Birdwood, Khaki and Gown, p. 36.

⁴⁹Vezio Melegari, The World's Great Regiments (London: Spring Books, 1968), p. 78.

⁵⁰There is no study on the regiments and relative social status among them. Cairnes, Social Life in the Army concentrates on the elites. On the matter of precedence Byron Farwell's Queen Victoria's Little Wars is sound, if brief. Any of the Army lists, such as Hart's or the official War Office Lists, will include rank-ordered listings of the regiments according to official Army precedence.

⁵¹Cairnes, Social Life, p. 83. Not only was India cheaper, but pay was about 20% higher in the Indian Army. See Mason, Honour, pp. 371-373.

⁵²Mason shows that, if anything, Indian regiments were even more diverse than the British regiments; see Mason, Honour, pp. 377-383.

⁵³An officer's original branch of commissioning often had little to do with his service in the Indian Army. For example, James C. Turner, though commissioned in the Royal Artillery, transferred to the Indian Army where he served in the cavalry the rest of his career. It is evident he considered himself a cavalryman as did the Second Royal Lancers. Turner was Colonel of that regiment from 1917-1938.

⁵⁴John Adye, for example, came from a line of sappers and artillerymen which went back to the eighteenth century. See Major-General Sir John Ayde, Soldiers and Others I Have Known (London: Herbert Jenkins, Ltd., 1925), p. 14. Two of the five artillery or engineer officers were the sons of judges. One was the son of a clergyman, another the son of a shipowner and the last the son of a civil servant of the East India Company.

⁵⁵Younghusband, Memories, p. 42.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, p. 44.

⁵⁷May, Changes, p. 139.

⁵⁸Savage, Allenby, p. 48.

⁵⁹Cairnes, Social Life, pp. xviii-xiv.

CHAPTER IV

ON H. M. SERVICE: CAREER PATTERNS

"He ought to have lived 500 years ago and dressed in chain mail, and led out his lancers to plunder and foray."

An appreciation of Lieutenant General Sir Michael F. Rimington on his death in 1928.

This chapter delineates patterns discernible in the careers of the 108 officers during their rise to the rank of Major General. The period under consideration begins with their first regimental assignments in the late 1870s and ends with their promotions to Major General between May 14, 1906 and May 12, 1914.¹ Their rise to professional prominence is marked by a distinct similarity in the routes to success resulting in identifiable patterns in their military and social activities. The discussion is topical beginning with military experiences: garrison life, patronage, training, staff duty, and combat service followed by an analysis of overlapping personal matters and social experiences including participation in athletics, club affiliations, political activity, marriage and family size. This chapter, then, is an analysis and description of how the 108 Major Generals achieved professional success.

Despite alarms and excursions around the Empire, duty in the last part of the nineteenth century was not always as exciting as chasing the Dervishes or avoiding Afghan ambushes. Depending on his station, a late Victorian officer spent most of his career in garrison on a more

or less peace-time footing. These 108 officers spent a great deal of their career at Aldershot, Brighton, or one of the Scottish or Irish garrisons. Among the overseas stations were Gibraltar, Malta or Egypt in the Mediterranean; the West Indies and Canada; Natal, Nigeria and the Cape Colony in Africa and various Asian stations. Officers from this group served in all of these locations, but the region which claimed the largest share of Britain's attention, and thus these officers, was India.

India was the largest possession of the Empire and the most threatened. The Indian government, or more accurately the British government in India, not only faced the specter of Russian invasion, but had hostile tribes along the whole of its northern frontier. Consequently throughout this period the Indian Army averaged 125,000 officers and men. In addition to the native army, there was a contingent of about sixty thousand troops in India from the British Army.² Since the British Army, in the nineteenth century, never rose above 250,000 officers and men, a contingent of sixty thousand represented a sizeable share of its troops. The British Army in India maintained its presence on a rotational system. A battalion could expect to spend several years stationed in India before it would be relieved by a battalion from its own or another regiment. As a consequence of this system, sixty-nine, or 64%, of these officers, including the twenty-four who were members of the Indian Army, served in India during their careers.

Even though life in India was cheap and shooting was excellent, duty there was considered undesirable due to the climate and comparative isolation. In fact, many officers transferred to other regiments to avoid deployment to India or other undesirable tours. May recounted the

advantages of Indian duty in his autobiography, but noted that he attempted to buy an exchange into another unit to avoid a second tour.³ It is easy to understand how an officer might be reluctant to spend years in a battalion-sized garrison in the lowlands of India where, according to Cairnes, in the summer "the day is given up to an endeavor to get cool, to sleep and to pass away the time till it is possible to venture forth."⁴ During the summer many officers escaped to the north-western hills where the weather was tolerable and the shooting good. Yet these months could be employed to some use. For example, William R. Robertson and William R. Birdwood pursued their studies of the various Indian languages. Birdwood learned Hindustani (Hindu and Urdu). Besides Hindustani, Robertson learned Pushtu though his pronunciation was considered "indifferent."⁵

The Guards regiments were the only ones who remained in England, or perhaps Ireland, for most of their years of service.⁶ All the other regiments spent many years overseas and the officers in this study logged long tours beyond Britain's shores. Robertson, who belonged to a British line regiment--the 3rd Dragoon Guards, served in India from 1888 to 1896. Edmund H. H. Allenby joined the 6th Inniskilling Dragoons in South Africa in 1882 and did not return until the regiment moved to Brighton in 1890.⁷ The situation was no different in the infantry regiments. Forbes Macbean, of the Gordon Highlanders, served almost continually overseas with his regiment from 1879-1900. During those years the Gordons served in India, Afghanistan and South Africa (during the first and second Boer Wars).⁸

Regardless of their location, army life revolved around the regiment. The last chapter illustrated the social, professional and financial im-

portance of the regiment. It was also their training ground in the social graces and the fundamentals of Army life. A never-ending cycle of guard mounts, parades, drill and inspection supplied tedium in abundance. This routine combined with the mess and the customs of the regiment created what George Younghusband called that "particular brand of esprit de corps," which made the British Army the cohesive force which "extended the British Empire to its present size."⁹

The success with which the nineteenth century British regiment inspired elan in its officers and men was amply proved in the battles at Balaclava, on the Northwest Frontier, and in countless other places around the Empire. The quality of training in the British Army during this period is, however, the subject of considerable debate. Few of these officers expressed satisfaction with their training at Sandhurst and Woolwich and their experiences in their regiments were not always satisfactory either. Edward S. May, a gunner, recalled that his first battery dry fired often and enthusiastically. but did almost no live fire training. Musketry training was worse. Typically, May's battery fired the allotted rounds and then routinely forged scores.¹⁰ Birdwood, who soldiered in India most of his career, found his training somewhat more useful. In the fall of 1888, Birdwood's regiment, the 11th Bengal Lancers, redeployed from Nowgong in central India to Rawalpindi in northern Punjab. The regiment moved 800 miles by march, rather than rail, for the specific purpose of conducting annual maneuvers en route. Along the way they practiced route reconnaissance and maneuvered as part of a training exercise involving in excess of two divisions. Birdwood was enthusiastic about the experience and asserted, "I wish most devoutly that every young officer . . . could have such marching experience."¹¹

The quality of training, then, in the British Army during the last half of the nineteenth century varied greatly from regiment to regiment. Still, Army training improved under the impetus of the Prussian example and with the sincere efforts of reform-minded officers such as Sir Garnet Wolseley, the victor of Tel-el-Kebir whose numerous successes brought him fame and the popular nickname "our only general."¹² Frederick Sleigh Roberts, who first won fame in the Indian Mutiny, and Herbert Kitchener, the hero of Khartoum and the Reconquest of the Sudan in 1897, also stimulated improvements in the level of training in the British and Indian armies.¹³ Their efforts and the quickly expanding Empire made soldiering an exciting and dynamic career.

But, professional zeal alone did not insure promotion. The careers of the officers in this study suggest that a combination of patronage, particular kinds of assignments and good fortune were necessary ingredients in a successful career. Patronage, a long-established tool of the landed classes, was as common a feature of Army life as the sovereign's toast at mess. An officer might enjoy patronage as a result of birth or he might earn it by close association with a general officer. It is sometimes difficult to determine whether an officer enjoyed a successful career because of patronage or if he enjoyed patronage as a result of a successful career. In any event, patronage was a fact of life in the British Army throughout the careers of the officers in this study. The development of good connections enabled an officer to pick and choose assignments which facilitated promotion.

The early career of John Adye illustrates how connections could further a career. Adye used the offices of his father, a full General, to good effect on several occasions. In the autumn of 1878, a crisis

in Afghanistan heated up. It was evident fighting would result. Adye, then a subaltern in England, did the obvious: "I accordingly got my father to make interest with the Deputy Adjutant General, Royal Artillery, at the War Office, to get me sent to India, with a view to active service in Afghanistan."¹⁴ Adye saw action in the second Afghan War as a result. In 1882, Adye joined Wolseley as an aide-de-camp thanks to his father's efforts. In order to join Wolseley, Adye left a temporary post as private secretary to the Secretary of State for War, also a gift from his father.¹⁵ Adye's association with Wolseley boosted his career since he had access to several choice staff assignments early in his career.

Whatever the method of obtaining the job, service as an aide-de-camp brought close association with a general which often paid dividends later. An aide served as a combination personal, press and social secretary who insured that his general was prepared for any eventuality from having the facts he needed at his fingertips to having his greatcoat handy. Thirty of these officers served as aides prior to the start of the Great War. Edwin A. H. Alderson spent the years 1900 to 1906 as a working aide to the King, as did Birdwood from 1906 to 1911. Rawlinson first attracted the attention of Lord Roberts when he was his aide in India. John Hanbury-Williams practically made a career of being an aide. During the 1882 campaign in Egypt, he was an aide to Sir Edward B. Hamley, famed as an author on tactics. From 1884 to 1885 he was aide to Sir. M. E. Grant-Duff, Governor of Madras, and then to Lieutenant General Sir H. Macpherson, General Officer Commanding, Burma, from 1885 to 1886. Later he graduated to the post of Military Secretary, first to Milne in South Africa, then to Brodrick when he was at the War Office, next to the

Royal Governor of Canada from 1904 to 1909, and he capped his career as attache to Tsar Nicolas II from 1914 to the revolution.¹⁶

Brian Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, correctly argues that patronage and networking were necessary because the Army had no formal staff system.¹⁷ Essentially Army patronage was in the hands of two major networks of soldiers. Wolseley and Roberts each reigned over a ring of like-minded officers which dominated the Army during the careers of these Major Generals. Wolseley's ring, known as the "Ashanti Ring" or the "Africans," included Adye, May and others in this group as a second generation. The first generation included Evelyn Wood and Redvers Buller. Roberts, who made his reputation in India, led "Roberts' Ring" or the "Indians." The first generation included men such as Sir George White, later the commander of the besieged garrison in Ladysmith, and Kitchener, later the Secretary of State for War during the early years of World War I. Rawlinson, Wilson and Robertson, members of the group under study, were second generation Indians.

Differing viewpoints on the role of the Army divided the two rings and relations between them were often acrimonious. Wolseley believed the Navy must be the first line of defense, while Roberts believed a large army maintained by conscription was the chief ingredient of a sound defense. At the start of the Boer War, the Ashanti Ring controlled the Army. As C-in-C, Wolseley directed the initial efforts. Buller and Methuen, Wolseley's proteges, commanded the British forces at the disastrous battles of Colenso and Magerfontein. Roberts and Kitchener arrived in South Africa in January 1899. Roberts superseded Buller and thus got the credit for the final victory. Wolseley, Buller and Wood (Quartermaster General) took the blame for the early failures.

Even so, the ascendant Roberts' Ring did not have effective control of the Army until the last years before the War.¹⁸

Acceptance in a ring might come about as a result of outside influence, as in John Ayde's case, or a young officer might earn his place by his own efforts. The experience of Edward S. May is an excellent example of how this worked. In 1893 May published a history of the use of field artillery that impressed Sir Evelyn Wood, the General Officer Commanding, Aldershot. Later that summer, Wood invited the Lieutenant May to join his summer maneuvers staff. The position offered no compensation, but May accepted with alacrity, happy to "be out of pocket for the sake of experience."¹⁹ It is, of course, an assumption to suggest there was any other reason; but, the experience gained aside, Wood was one of the top men in the Army and pleasing him could not have hurt.

The case of William R. Robertson was similar. Robertson first made himself notable on the staff of the Chitral Relief Force in 1895. Sir George White, who succeeded Roberts as C-in-C, India, appointed Robertson to the intelligence section. Robertson's efforts pleased White immensely. As a result, the following summer when Robertson failed to win one of the competitive vacancies to the Staff College, Sir George secured a selective vacancy for him. As a student there Robertson enhanced his position in the Roberts' Ring by favorably impressing G. F. R. Henderson, an instructor who was well known as an historian and widely respected for his knowledge of tactics. Consequently, when Henderson joined Roberts' staff in South Africa he chose Robertson as his assistant.²⁰

The association of Rawlinson, Robertson and Wilson is the best example of networking among the Major Generals. Rawlinson and Wilson be-

longed to the two rival rifle regiments (the King's Royal Rifle Corps and the Rifle Brigade, respectively). Robertson was not only a cavalryman but a ranker from the lower class. Their association crossed regimental boundaries and, to some extent, class lines. They formed ties which would not have been likely except for their mutual links to Roberts. Rawlinson became a member of the ring in 1885 when he joined Roberts' staff in Simla, India. Robertson gained acceptance in 1895 for his work during the relief of Chitral and sealed his membership as Henderson's assistant in South Africa. Wilson, who was Rawlinson's closest friend since the Burma campaign in 1886, became associated with Roberts when Rawlinson introduced them in 1893.²¹

Though none of the three served together until just before World War I, their general agreement on issues of mutual interest and their membership in the Roberts' Ring advanced their careers on converging lines. All three commanded the Staff College in succession. In 1914 Robertson joined the Imperial General Staff as Director of Military Training and began a close working relationship with Wilson, Director of Military Operations. Then both served on the B.E.F. staff and later Wilson succeeded Robertson as C.I.G.S. in 1917. Rawlinson served on Kitchener's staff at the start of the War and later commanded at corps and army level. As a measure of their respect and closeness to their mentor, all served as Roberts' pall-bearers in November 1914.²²

Besides the case of Rawlinson, Roberts and Wilson, there are other cases of networking among the officers under study. Kitchener, though allied to the Roberts' Ring, developed his own circle of followers which included several officers in this study. Hubert I. W. Hamilton of the Queen's (a British line regiment) and Birdwood of the

11th Bengal Lancers became acquaintances through Kitchener's network of officers. Hamilton, a long-time friend of Kitchener's, served on his personal staff from 1897 until 1902. Birdwood joined Kitchener in 1900 in South Africa where he and Hamilton became good friends. In 1902 Hamilton left Kitchener's staff to serve as A.D.C. to the King and on the War Office Staff. Birdwood succeeded Hamilton as military secretary to Kitchener and went with him to India, continuing on his staff until 1909 when Kitchener returned home. Though the two remained friends, Hamilton's death in action during October 1914 prevented a renewal of their old working relationship.²³

Still, the value of their individual and mutual associations with Kitchener are obvious. Hamilton eventually commanded one of the first divisions in France, while Kitchener named Birdwood to command the Australia and New Zealand Corps (ANZAC) in November 1914. Winston Churchill aptly described Birdwood's service with Kitchener as the "turning point in [his] career."²⁴ Networking not only boosted the careers of its members, it stimulated cohesiveness among officers from disparate backgrounds and encouraged a sense of unity and commonality of viewpoint. Ultimately networks provided another link in the chain of the melding process begun in the home, fostered in the educational system and continued in the regiment.

Attending the Staff College at Camberley also aided the careers of the officers under study. In the late 1880s and 1890s the Staff College gained prestige. The result of this increased prestige assured that a Staff College certificate and the addition of p.s.c. (passed staff college) to one's name would enhance career opportunities. Wolseley and Roberts were both enthusiastic about Camberley and encouraged their

favorites to attend. Wolseley advised his aide, John Adye, to attend because the Staff College was the "surest route to professional advancement."²⁵ Rawlinson received his encouragement to attend from his friend and mentor, Roberts.²⁶

The Staff College, however, did not enjoy the universal confidence of the Army. Its history was colored by insufficient funding and outright hostility from much of the Army. Founded in 1857 as a direct result of the catastrophic failures in staff work during the Crimean War, the Staff College had its roots in the old Senior Department of the Royal Military College, High Wycombe founded in 1799.²⁷ The rejuvenated and reorganized successor to the Senior Department was designed to provide practical education in staff work, but for the first thirty years the Staff College got few takers.²⁸

The British Army had a traditional distrust of well-educated officers. Officers dubbed their colleagues who studied with enthusiasm as "mugs." Mugs typically "drank water at mess, went to bed early and swotted at algebra, fortifications or French."²⁹ Philip Mason, A Matter of Honour, asserts that to earn the reputation of being a mug could be fatal. In his words: "You must not be a slacker: you must get through your work and it must be thorough . . . But you must not be seen to work hard."³⁰ When Edward Lord Gleichen (just junior to the officers under study) announced his intention to try for the Staff College, his friends were hostile to the idea. A brother Guardsman advised Gleichen "to say nothing about it [Staff College] to your brother officers or you will get yourself jolly well disliked."³¹ Some regiments held stronger views. Ian Hamilton (just senior to the officers under study) recalled that in

the 1870s the Gordons boasted that "none of their officers had ever entered the staff college or ever would."³¹

The general hostility of the officer corps to Camberley received indirect encouragement from the highest quarter. The Duke of Cambridge, C-in-C of the Army from 1857 to 1895, was neither impressed by the Staff College or its products. At one point the Duke remarked that Staff College officers were "very ugly officers and very dirty officers."³³ Nonetheless, the Staff College grew in size and prestige during the careers of the 108 Major Generals because of the Prussian example and the enthusiastic support of Wolseley and, to a lesser extent, Roberts.³⁴

The enhanced image of the Staff College resulted in intense competition for vacancies. Once an officer determined to try for the Staff College, he repeated the process required for Sandhurst or Woolwich. He spent months studying for the competitive examination required for admission. Once more crammers came into prominence to prepare the candidate in military history, tactics and at least one foreign language. Besides the expense of crammers, bachelor captains needed £ 250 - 300 above their pay to meet expenses at the school and married officers needed even more. Additionally, some corps like the Engineers stopped an officer's pay during his tenure at Camberley on what Brian Bond rightly describes as the "curious grounds that he [the student] was not employed on corps works."³⁵ Finally, earning the p.s.c. did not guarantee service on the staff. Any officer willing to bear these burdens demonstrated considerable professional motivation.

The course of instruction included military history, in addition to more esoteric lectures on how to compute timetables and arrange the feeding of large military units. In the period these officers attended

the Staff College (the 1880s and 1890s) military history was taught by Sir Frederick Maurice, late of the Ashanti Ring and a competent historian; and the incomparable Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, best known for his brilliant biography of Stonewall Jackson.³⁶ They added battlefield tours to the school curriculum as a means of teaching the practical application of military history. Both strived to teach their students how to digest history for themselves rather than to cram them with facts as had been the standard practice at the public schools and military academies.

In spite of the efforts of Maurice and Henderson, the training at the Staff College was not all it might have been, partly because the continued unwillingness of British officers to be seen as "mugs." The Staff College hunt and athletic activities received the greatest attention of most students and the course itself was not as challenging as it might have been. Adye, who graduated in 1887 with honors, had little difficulty with the required work. Of his two years at Camberley he observed that, "Although I took care to keep my term work well up to date I cannot say I found it necessary to work particularly hard."³⁸ Generally Adye found the course useful, but believed that the first year was spent reviewing topics of little use, and that too much of the training was theoretical rather than practical. He noted that a great deal of time was spent learning to use the theodolite, "an instrument I had never seen before and have never had occasion to use since."³⁹

The forty-five officers in this study who earned their Staff College certificates were amply rewarded for their efforts. Attendance at the school paid direct dividends in terms of experience, connections (as in the case of Wilson) and in promotion opportunities since the p.s.c.

could open doors to important staff jobs. The officers in this group who had the p.s.c. did far better than those who did not. Sixty-four percent of those who were p.s.c. earned promotions above the rank of Major General, while only thirty-seven percent of those without advanced past that rank. Nineteen of the thirty-three who made Lieutenant General and six of the fourteen promoted to General were Staff College graduates as well as four of the five who reached the rank of Field Marshal.

Some measure of the impact the Staff College had on the Army can be seen in looking at the Staff College class of 1897. There were thirty-two graduates, five of whom were killed in action before World War I and one who died very early in the War. Of the remaining twenty-six, two became Field Marshals (Haig and Allenby) and fifteen became Generals. Six members of the class of 1897 were in the group of officers under study: Edmund Allenby, later Field Marshal Viscount Allenby of Megiddo and Felixtowe; Thompson Capper, who died of wounds received while leading the 7th division in France; William Birkbeck, who was Director of Remounts in Britain during the War; Henry N. C. Heath, who commanded a division during the War; William Douglas, commander of the East Lancashire Division from 1913 to 1920 in England and Europe; and James T. Johnston who commanded the Royal Artillery, Malta, throughout World War I.⁴⁰

Staff assignments were important rungs on the ladder to success. In the regiment itself the adjutancy carried the most prestige and was usually the first staff assignment to which a young lieutenant or captain might aspire. The adjutant, the third in command of the battalion or regiment, planned and conducted the training of the unit. In short, he was the chief of staff at that level. The job of brigade major (the same task as adjutant only at the next highest level) was

also desirable and considered a "plum" for a young officer.⁴¹ Fifty, or 46%, of these officers served either as adjutant or brigade major; another five, or 5%, served in an unidentifiable capacity on the regimental staff for a total of fifty-five, or 51%, of the group. Since the artillery and engineer officers had no equivalent opportunity, the real percentage among eligible officers was sixty-eight percent. On the average this group served three years on a regimental or brigade staff.

Service on staff at this level was a necessary step in a successful career. Lieutenants or captains who for one reason or another did not serve as an adjutant usually served on a non-regimental staff. For example, Robertson made his career on the strength of his staff work, but never served as an adjutant or brigade major. He began his career on the staff as a captain in the Intelligence section during the Chitral Relief in 1895. If the officers who served in non-regimental staff are added to those who served as an adjutant or brigade major, the total who served in staff assignments at this level was seventy-one, or 66%.

Service on the staff of a general was the next level up. Until the creation of the Imperial General Staff in 1904, the expression general staff was a generic term which included everything from assignments at the War Office to instructor positions at the various military schools. All but four of these 108 officers served in such staff assignments and many spent the majority of their careers there. With the exception of three years as a brigade major, Cowans served in non-regimental staff assignments from 1892 until his retirement in 1919. Eighteen of the group served fifteen or more years at this level. With twenty-seven years on staffs, Charles F. Hadden accumulated more service at this level than any one else in the group.⁴²

Service on the Imperial General Staff, created in accordance with the recommendations of the Esher Committee in 1904, gave an officer the opportunity to influence planning, training and administration at the highest levels and the chance to further his career. The General Staff was organized in three tiers beginning with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (C.I.G.S.) who presided over the entire staff. The second tier was divided into three administrative sections under the Adjutant General, the Quartermaster General and the Master General of Ordnance. Three separate directorates--Military Operations, Military Training and Staff Duties--comprised the third tier. Each of the administrative sections and the directorates had various subordinate agencies responsible for the gamut of staff activities from personnel management to the maintenance of remount depots.⁴³ The access to power and the opportunity to influence the course of the Army made General Staff assignments very desirable. Forty, or 37%, of these 108 officers served on the General Staff prior to World War I. Another twenty-one served in equivalent positions in India or elsewhere. Thus, a total of sixty-one, or 57%, of the group served in these key positions.

The actions of Henry Wilson, as Director of Military Operations from 1910 to 1914 demonstrate what a relatively junior Brigadier could accomplish on the General Staff. An Anglo-Irish officer with a modest combat record and an admitted Francophile, he was convinced that the Army should play a key role in a continental war. Wilson, a veteran of high-level intrigue, laid the groundwork for British involvement on a grand-scale in the event of a continental war. Despite a 1909 directive from the Committee of Imperial Defence (C.I.D.) expressly limiting the Army's role in such a confrontation, he recast British mobilization planning to

deploy the entire B.E.F. to France. Then, in July 1911, he signed a memorandum with the Chief of the French General Staff which anticipated the deployment of the B.E.F. On August 23, 1911 the 114th meeting of the C.I.D., convened during the Agadir Crisis to consider options in the event of war, fortuitously provided Wilson the chance to present his plan. His brilliant presentation carried the day in the face of opposition from the Navy and Winston Churchill. The August meeting was not the last word in British planning, but it is fair to say that Wilson's virtuoso performance played a pivotal role in British strategic planning in the last years before the War.⁴⁴

Other officers in the study also wielded considerable influence on the General Staff. Cowans' work as Quartermaster General in the two years before the War--though less glamorous--was essential to the rapid deployment of the B.E.F. at the outset of hostilities in 1914. At a still more esoteric task, George K. Scott-Moncrieff saved considerable time and facilitated the rapid growth of the Army by conducting a pre-War reconnaissance of possible cantonment areas. Beyond the influence these men gained as a result of their work, service on the General Staff enhanced their careers. Of the sixty-one who served on the General Staff, twenty-four, or 40%, advanced past the rank of Major General while only nine, or 19% of the forty-seven officers, who had no experience advanced beyond that level.

Patronage, networking, service on a staff, and the p.s.c. were all recognized factors in making a successful career, but combat experience was the one facet that was nearly indispensable for success. Not surprisingly the officers under study sought the opportunity to see combat service. John Adye used his father's influence to get to India

so that he might find a way to see action in the second Afghan War. He achieved his goal by falsely claiming knowledge of gatling guns and thereby won command of a gatling gun section with the Kuram Valley Field Force.⁴⁵ George Younghusband, an Indian officer, participated in five campaigns officially: the second Afghan War in 1878-1880, the Sudan in 1885, the Northwest Frontier in 1886, the Chitral Relief in 1895 and the Boer War. But he also wangled a place in the Malakand Pass campaign in 1890 as a correspondent; and he paid his own way to observe the Spanish-American War from the vantage point of Dewey's Fleet in Manila Bay.⁴⁶ Adye's and Younghusband's efforts were very common. A commander had only to be designated for a given expedition to find officers of every description begging to accompany him.

Commissioned between 1871 and 1888, the 108 officers in this study enjoyed boundless opportunities for combat service. For example, in the last three decades of Victoria's reign, there were ninety-four incidents, expeditions or wars where soldiers could distinguish themselves. The British Army's involvement in all of these clashes stemmed from its unwritten mission as a kind of imperial police force. The wars it fought were ones normally pitting small British forces against native armies. Though Wolseley employed an entire army corps at Tel-el-Kebir in 1882, and Britain required 450,000 troops to overwhelm the Boers in 1899-1902, most actions during this period could be described accurately as, using C. E. Callwell's term, "small wars."⁴⁷

Campaigns usually involved less than 10,000 men as in the Manipur campaign of April 1891. Manipur was a small, hill state on the northwest frontier of India. The local Raj, a British client, was overthrown by the commander of his army. Initially the British responded by send-

ing a force of four hundred Gurka soldiers. On their arrival the British Lieutenant Colonel commanding the Gurkas, the Commissioner of Assam and the British political agent for Manipur arranged a parley with the rebels. All three were seized and killed when they entered the palace at Imphal. The Gurkas then retreated under the leadership of the slain political agent's wife, Ethel Grimmond. Upon receipt of Mrs. Grimmond's report, the Indian government dispatched a force of four thousand men which duly marched up to Imphal and routed out the chief perpetrator, who was tried and hung. Phillip M. Carnegie and Gerald C. Kitson, two officers in this group, saw action in the Manipur expedition.⁴⁸

Of the officers under study, 103 gained experience in at least one of sixty different "small wars" from the Gaika War in 1878 to the Bazan Valley expedition in 1908. They participated in an average of 2.6 campaigns. Seventy-nine, or 73%, saw action in at least two campaigns; twenty-six, or 24%, fought in at least four; and one Indian Army officer participated in eight campaigns.⁴⁹ India was the scene of more colonial campaigns than any other part of the world; thus, the twenty-four Indian Army Officers averaged 3.6 campaigns. The five who did not see action were Ralph C. Broome, John Cowans, Charles F. Hadden, Charles D. Heath and Frederick Robb. Indeed, since all five were staff officers during World War I, they probably never heard a shot fired in anger. Of the five, only John Cowans advanced past the rank of Major General.⁵⁰

The officers in this study actively participated in the major campaigns of the period. Twelve were with Wolseley at Tel-el-Kebir in the Egyptian campaign of 1882; sixteen saw action in the Gordon Relief Expedition of 1884; ten served in the Reconquest of Sudan in 1896-1898;

fifteen fought in Tirah against the Afridi and Orakzai tribesmen from 1897 to 1898; and sixty-five, or 60%, of the 108 saw action during the course of the Boer War.

The Boer War was the big event in the history of the British Army between the Crimea and World War I. It had a far-reaching impact not only on the Army as a whole, but on the lives of these officers as well. All of those who got to South Africa held commands or important staff jobs. Twenty-four commanded battalion or larger size units. Allenby, in South Africa from 1899 to 1902, commanded a squadron of the 6th Inniskilling Dragoons and later a column. He was mentioned in dispatches, promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, breveted to Colonel and created Companion of the Bath by War's end.⁵¹ Birdwood, out from India, commanded a column of mounted infantry as a Major and was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in 1902. Thompson Capper commanded a column from 1901 to 1902, received mention in dispatches four times and earned the Distinguished Service Order for his services.⁵² May spent much of the war with the beleaguered garrison at Ladysmith.⁵³

In addition to experience these officers acquired, they earned honors for their excellent performances in the colonial wars. The rewards they could earn included mention in dispatches, brevet promotions, decorations and the award of honors. All of the group who participated in a colonial campaign received mention in dispatches. Eighty-eight won brevet promotions of which sixty-three, or 72%, were awarded during a campaign. Twenty-five, or 23%, received decorations for gallantry with twenty-three earning the Distinguished Service Order, Britain's second highest award for gallantry. Two were awarded Britain's highest, and usually posthumous, decoration--the Victoria Cross.⁵⁴ Ninety-six, or 88%, also achieved recognition by the award of honors such as Companion

of the Order of the Bath, the fourth highest order of the British Empire; or Companion of the Order of the Indian Empire, the eighth highest order (See Tables 9 and 10). These tangible rewards promoted the careers of these officers and enhanced their social prestige as well.⁵⁵

TABLE 9
PRE-WORLD WAR ONE HONORS*

<u>Honor</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>% of Known Cases</u>
K.C.M.G.**	1	.5
K.C.B.	6	6
C.B.	84	78
K.C.V.O.	4	4
C.I.E.	1	.5
No honors	12	11

Valid Cases - 108, missing - 0

Data complete for 100% of sample

*Only the highest honor for each officer is included.

**Honors are listed in order of precedence.

TABLE 10
PRE-WORLD WAR ONE DECORATIONS*

<u>Decoration</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>% of Known Cases</u>
V.C.**	2	2
D.S.O.	23	21
No decorations	83	77

Valid cases - 108, missing - 0

Data complete for 100% of sample

*Only the highest decoration for each officer is included.

Mention in dispatches is not included in any case.

**Decorations are listed in order of precedence.

No clear dividing line existed between the personal and professional lives of the Major Generals. Their personal interests and activities were as much a part of their professional lives as campaigning or parading. Athletics, in particular, played an essential role in Army life. Regimental competitions provided recreation and what most officers perceived as a necessary ingredient of their training. A reputation as a sportsman was a decided asset to an officer throughout his career. Cairnes asserted that "the lad who joins his regiment with a school reputation of being a fine crickateer or racket player is assured of a welcome which would probably be denied to the lad who had passed out at the top of the list into the service."⁵⁶

The mounted sports, which were the most popular, demanded good judgment, courage and coordination between horse and rider. The Army justified time and effort spent in their practice as useful to military preparedness. While stationed in India, officers enjoyed pig sticking which featured pursuit of a wild boar with a lance. Besides its benefit to military prowess, it allegedly had other redeeming qualities such as ridding remote Indian villages of wild boars which ravaged local crops.⁵⁷ Introduced to the Army in the 1870s, polo, another Indian sport, quickly became very popular. Expensive and dangerous, the Army officially discouraged it for some time, but to no avail. It swept the Army, claiming enthusiasts from all branches.⁵⁸ Fox hunting, either with a live fox or a dummy called "the Drag," was the most popular sport in the Army. At the Staff College it assumed great importance where one day a week students and faculty turned out to canter after the Drag across the Surrey countryside. The great social coup at the Staff College was

election to the position of Master of the Drag. Allenby, not otherwise distinguished during his two years at Camberley, won that honor over his rival, Douglas Haig.⁵⁹

All the mounted sports were dangerous and that seemed to be part of their attraction. In 1895 May broke two ribs, damaged a knee and suffered a concussion in pursuit of the Drag; yet, he remained faithful to the sport. Of a friend's death in later years, May observed that his friend, "A good man to the hounds . . . was lucky enough to be killed hunting."⁶⁰ People also regularly lost their lives or were seriously injured playing polo or pig sticking, but remained attracted to the danger. Birdwood claimed he knew of few delights compared with "meeting a great, strong, heavy fighting boar coming at you for all he is worth."⁶¹

All of these officers claimed to be practitioners of one or more of the standard sports practiced in the Army. They pursued their sporting activities with zest, often cataloging their accomplishments or the accomplishments of this or that regiment at various tournaments, hunts or races. Colin J. Mackenzie, an avid cricketer, held the Indian record for the highest score on the first wicket.⁶² Allenby hunted, shot, sailed, and in Africa enjoyed confronting and killing poisonous snakes.⁶³ Birdwood, an avid polo player, also delighted in pig sticking. It was at a polo tournament in India that he met Winston Churchill who played for the Fourth Hussars.⁶⁴ Monro, never accused of being a good rider, was an enthusiastic hunter, as was Rawlinson, who was also an excellent polo player.⁶⁵ The redoubtable May loved shooting as well as hunting. On one trip, to Kashmir in 1877, he reported enthusiastically that he killed a deer and five bears.⁶⁶ Nor was participation in

sports confined to their younger years. Arthur Phayre competed in his last point-to-point race at age sixty-three.⁶⁷

Their avid interest in sports does not distinguish these 108 officers from their civilian contemporaries. Polo, hunting, point-to-point racing, cricket and rackets were also the sports of country gentlemen. The chief difference between the British officers and their civilian counterparts was not only that Army officers enjoyed more opportunities to practice their hobbies, but they could justify the time spent on polo and blood sports on the basis of the supposed military value inherent in riding or facing a wild animal. In Pink and Scarlet, Edwin A. H. Alderson, a member of this group, made the case for hunting as a training device for soldiers.⁶⁸ Furthermore, regimental athletics were an important feature of Army life. Regiments kept the statistics of their accomplishments on the sporting field as fastidiously as they chronicled their combat record. The playing field and the challenge of the hunt encouraged the development of the sportsman's values and strengthened contacts between officers. Sports, then, enhanced the socialization process ongoing in this group since birth.

Athletics were the pastime of British officers and, to a lesser degree their civilian contemporaries; but, the club was their mutual bastion where women and other outsiders were kept at bay. As selective institutions, clubs brought together gentlemen who shared mutual interests in professional, recreational or political areas. Eighty-four, or 78%, of the Major Generals belonged to at least one club and ten, or 9%, belonged to four or more. Thirty-two, or 38%, joined civilian clubs either instead of or in addition to service clubs (See Table 11). Mili-

TABLE 11
CLUB AFFILIATIONS

Club	Memberships
Military	
Army and Navy	13
British Legion	1
Cavalry	5
East India United Service	1
Guards	5
Junior United Service	6
Naval and Military	24
T. F. Association (post WWI club)	1
United Service	28
Total	84
Sports	
Bath (swimming)	1
Canoe	1
Hurlingham (polo & social)	1
M.C.C. (cricket)	3
Nairn Golf	1
Nautical	1
North Surrey Golf	1
Ranelagh (polo, golf, croquet, rackets)	4
Royal Auto	1
Royal Norfolk and Suffolk Yacht	1
Royal Yacht Squadron	1
Total	16
Political	
Carlton	2
Total	2
Social	
Arthurs	2
Athenaeum, Devon	1
Athenaeum, Dublin	1
Ayr County	1
Beefsteak	2
Boodles	2
Brooks	1
Cowes	1
Marlborough	2
New (Edinburgh)	3
Overseas United University	1
Travellers	6
Turf	5
Union	1
Union of Paris	1
White's	2
Total	32
Religious	
National (Protestant)	1
British and Foreign Unitarian Association	1
Total	2

Valid cases - 84, missing - 24
Data complete for 78% of sample

tary clubs, by far the most popular, were an extension of professional social activities and a forum for professional discussions. The United Service Club, for example, published a monthly which addressed military issues of the day. Only majors and above were eligible for nomination which was followed by four years of probation before full memberships were granted. Twenty-eight, or 25%, of these officers eventually joined the United Service Club.

Serious business often found its way into the reading rooms of London clubs. Their proximity to the government and the Army's headquarters made them ideal spots to pass rumors, foment intrigue or settle important matters at an unofficial level. Certainly the Major Generals understood this. Membership in a club then was a serious affair with possible ramifications on one's career. May, a long-time member of the Naval and Military Club noted that "the fate of many a candidate for appointment to it [in this case the Royal Horse Artillery] was settled in that [Naval and Military Club] smoking-room."⁶⁹

Though two of the officers in this study joined the Carlton, the club of the Conservative Party, and one joined White's, a dinner club with Conservative leanings, the club affiliations of the group reflect a generally apolitical stance.⁷⁰ Custom dictated that soldiers remain aloof from politics and most did so. Nevil Macready spoke for most of the group when he asserted that "so long as a soldier continues to serve on the active list it is no business of his to mix himself up in any way with the political views of whatever Government may be in power at the time." He also believed that "if you must resist, resign."⁷¹ Hence, Admiral Beresford resigned before he attacked the government on the issue of naval readiness in 1907; and Lord Roberts left the service in order to air his views on the merits of conscription.⁷²

That is not to say that soldiers did not have political views, or that they always kept their opinions to themselves. The so called Curragh Mutiny in March 1914 is clear proof that they did not. Brigadier Gough, an Anglo-Irishman, and all of the officers in his brigade resigned rather than face the possibility of receiving orders to deploy against the private armies of pro-union Protestant Ulstermen. In contrast, Charles Fergusson, an officer in this study, who commanded the 5th division also in the Curragh area, accepted that it was his duty to obey any such order and convinced most of his officers to do the same.⁷³ Robertson, Director of Military Training and responsible for handling the affair, pursued the task of issuing the appropriate instructions without questioning the principle. Like most officers he was sympathetic to Gough, but could not bring himself to defy the government.⁷⁴

The Royal United Service Institute is also of interest though it was not a club and is therefore not included in Table 11. As Sir William Bellairs, The Military Career, put it, a British officer could "scarcely do amiss in becoming a member" of the Institute because it furnished "a means for instruction in professional matters."⁷⁵ Indeed, it did as Spenser Wilkinson, Charles Dilke, George Chesney, Frederick Maurice and many lesser lights gave talks on subjects of interest to professional soldiers. Moreover, the Institute published a quarterly journal and offered a bi-annual prize for essays on specified military subjects.⁷⁶ Henry Wilson, an active participant in the Institute's activities and Commandant of the Staff College, took Ferdinand Foch to the Institute during Foch's visit to Camberley in 1910.⁷⁷

The interest of the Major Generals in the activities of the Institute, their club affiliations, and even their participation in athletics

show that their professional and personal activities were often intertwined. This phenomenon is evident in their marriages as well. There are identifiable patterns in their marriages which stemmed from the customs and conditions of Army life. Wives were considered an asset to the regiment and could be of real service to an officer's career, but only at the proper time. Veronica Bomfield, herself an Army wife, addressed the matter of army marriages in the late nineteenth century in a well-researched little book entitled On the Strength. She argues that officers were not permitted to marry until age of thirty.⁷⁸ No official regulation prohibited early marriage, but there were rock-hard customs and the permission of the battalion commander to overcome before officers or enlisted men could marry. Moreover, low pay, frequent moves and the peculiarities of regimental life discouraged early marriage.

In a section of The Military Career, entitled "Early Marriage Objectionable," Lieutenant General Sir William Bellairs outlines the reasons officers ought not marry before maturity, which he says was reached between the ages of twenty-five and thirty. The cost of supporting a wife was prohibitive for young officers. Bellairs calculated that a wife cost £ 600 a year to support and each child an additional £ 50 a year. Therefore, a subaltern in even a modest regiment would require an income of £ 900 above pay merely to support a wife.⁷⁹

Bellairs had another equally interesting reason. He noted that:

If you come across any couple who, having married at about the same ages, have reached forty years, you will often notice that while the husband is then at his best, the wife is by no means his equal in the same respect. It augurs better for a happy married life when the wife, through being younger in years, can carry her good looks well into the period of her husband's grey hairs. In order to comply with the foregoing requirements, a man then, should not think of marrying before he is about thirty-five years old.⁸⁰

According to Bellair's reckoning, the bride ought to be about twenty-three to twenty-five years old.⁸¹ Cairnes expressed another view:

The feeling about matrimony may be summed up as follows: the colonel should be married, a bachelor colonel in the mess is not always a joy forever; majors, especially if grumpy and livery in the mornings, may be married; captains should not be married; and subalterns must be bachelors.⁸²

On the matter of married lieutenants, Cairnes observed that "the married subaltern is not likely to find himself popular, and, unless a very good chap, may receive a strong hint to remove himself and his bride to some other regiment."⁸³ In some regiments the feeling against marriage was so strong that according to Cairnes "would-be benedicts have to pay a fine of £ 100 to the funds of the mess as a compensation for their intended desertions."⁸⁴

If these obstacles were not enough to impress or depress "would-be benedicts," there was the spectacle of married life at a remote post where sometimes the only accommodations for married officers were tents. There were generally no government quarters for junior officers anywhere the British Army was stationed. Junior officers and their wives sometimes set up housekeeping in the troopers' barracks behind the doubtful privacy of a partition.⁸⁵ Field grade officers did have a wider range of choices since small bungalows existed at many stations for their use. Finally, quarters were usually provided for Colonel and above. Senior Generals often enjoyed splendid quarters; for example, the C-in-C's house in Simla, India, was a spacious mansion.⁸⁶

In accordance with custom the average age of marriage for the ninety-nine married officers in the group was 32.9 years as compared to 27 for the country as a whole (See Table 12).⁸⁷ The 1911 census, which analysed fertility and marriage patterns by occupation, found the

pattern of late marriage held true for all of the professions (including the military, law, medicine and the clergy). Though the commissioners provided no tables of comparison, they concluded that "early marriage is specially [sic] improvident in the case of the professional classes."⁸⁸

TABLE 12
AGE AT MARRIAGE IN 5 YEAR PERIODS

<u>Age Group</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>% of Known Cases</u>
20-25	11	12
26-30	29	32
31-35	25	28
36-40	14	16
41-45	5	6
46-50	1	1
51-55	4	4
56-60	1	1

Valid cases - 90, missing - 9

Data complete for 91% of sample (99 of the 108 officers were married)

Despite the strong attitudes against early marriage, eleven of these men defied military custom and married between the ages of twenty-two and twenty-five. The youngest to marry was John Cowans who married at age twenty-two, but he had money and was therefore in a position to disdain the dictum against early marriage. Francis Kelly married at age twenty-three. His father was a ship owner and probably could provide a good allowance for his son. Laurence G. Drummond of the Scots Guards, was the son of an admiral and came from a noble family well-able to provide a suitable allowance. Edward A. Altham, Thomas L. N. Morland and Nevil Macready also came from well-to-do families. The remaining five officers had no readily apparent wealth.⁸⁹

In addition to asserting that officers married late, Bomfield further argues that Army officers like the members of most professions "were inclined to intermarriage."⁹⁰ That is, they tended to marry the daughters of other soldiers. In the case of the officers in this group, this assertion is close to the mark. The father's occupation is known for seventy-two of the ninety-nine brides of these officers. Thirty-three, or 45%, of them were the daughters of military men. Twenty-nine, or 42%, of them were the daughters of landed gentlemen (See Table 13). If the landed connections of the military parents of the brides were as high as among the military parents of the officers they married, then the evidence points to marriage within the class of origin as well as within the military profession.

A good marriage was important since a wife could be useful in furthering an officer's career or aiding his financial condition. An attractive woman who understood the service and had money and connections was a real find. Charles V. F. Townshend, heir presumptive to the Marquis of Townshend, made such a marriage. In 1898 he married Alice, daughter of the Comte D'Anvers. The marriage allied a flourishing French family to an English family possessing a large, but nevertheless, declining estate.⁹¹ Townshend used D'Anvers' money more than once in generally fruitless efforts to bolster the marquise. Lady Townshend also assisted her husband in his efforts to manipulate his superiors to further his career. Accomplished and unabashed in her efforts, she often displayed better judgment than Townshend.⁹² Perhaps the best-known and most successful match was made by Douglas Haig. Just senior to the Major Generals, Haig married Dorothy Williams, a maid of honor

to Queen Alexandra. Already close to the King, Haig's marriage kept him in the royal circle.⁹³

TABLE 13
OCCUPATION OF WIFE'S FATHER

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>% of Known Cases</u>
Landowner*	30	42
Total for class	<u>30</u>	<u>42</u>
Professional Middle Class		
Army**	31	44
Navy	2	3
Indian Civil Service	4	6
Doctor	1	.5
Solicitor	1	.5
Clergy	3	4
TOTAL for class	<u>42</u>	<u>58</u>

Valid cases - 72, missing - 27

Data complete for 73% of sample

*Seven noble families represented - six British and one French

**Includes one Royal Marine officer. Royal Marines were on the Army list, thus this case is not listed separately.

Small family size also characterized the marriages of the officers under study. In 1911, when all but five of the married officers in this group had been married for at least five years, the average British family produced 2.33 children.⁹⁴ The average for the professional class, was 1.87 children per couple. Army officers, as a whole, produced 1.52 children, placing them among the least fertile occupational groups of the country. Only Navy officers, bankers, actors, indoor domestics and scientists produced fewer children.⁹⁵ Barristers, doctors and clergymen all had higher rates of fertility. By comparison, the ninety-

nine married couples in this group averaged only 1.49 children. Thirty-three of the married officers had no children at all; and the modal number of offspring for the ninety-nine married couples in the group was one child (See Table 14).

TABLE 14
FERTILITY OF MARRIED COUPLES

<u># of Couples</u>	<u># of Children/Couple</u>	<u>% of Known Cases</u>
33	0	33.3
23	1	23.2
16	2	16.2
18	3	18.2
7	4	7.1
1	5	1
1	6	1

Valid cases - 99, missing - 0

Data complete for 100% of sample

Total fertility, including officers who married more than once, is 1.51 children/couple. First marriages of the 99 married officers in the group produced 148 children. Counting second marriages, the 99 married officers produced 150 children.

The commissioners of the 1911 census, concerned over eugenics issues, observed that, "It is no pleasure to find that amongst the very lowest fertilities in the table [Total Fertility Table] are those officers of the army and navy."⁹⁶ The report concluded that the low fertility of the Army and Naval officers was due to "the conditions of their service, which involves constant movement, and frequently the maintenance of two establishments or their equivalent where the climate of service is unhealthy."⁹⁷ Bomfield notes that, "The great dread of the army wife of all ranks was unwanted pregnancy which fre-

quently seemed to occur at the mere mention of a move or posting overseas."⁹⁸ She also asserts that an army wife would go to "considerable lengths to terminate" an unwanted pregnancy.⁹⁹ Among the more common cures were "repeated doses of hot gin and quinine . . . crawling upstairs backwards, jumping off a chair, riding hard."¹⁰⁰ More drastic methods were also employed. Bomfield interviewed one woman who "had no fewer than six pregnancies terminated in an Indian bazaar."¹⁰¹ Though the method of limiting family size may not be determined for certainty, the low fertility rates among these officers is a testament to the success of their efforts.

Analysis of the careers of this generation of Major Generals reveals a striking similarity in their careers from combat service to family size. They achieved the pinnacle of their profession by similar routes. They unhesitatingly sought out combat service and seized the opportunity to further their careers by attending the Staff College. They served as aides and accumulated staff experience at both regimental and general staff levels. Many of them earned places in one of the two major rings of the Army and unabashedly availed themselves of the good offices of those networks. Patterns are also evident in their social lives. They enhanced their reputations as sportsmen and consequently as officers by virtue of their skill in the manly sports. Their club memberships reflect their similar professional and personal interests as well as their tendency to remain aloof from partisan political activities. According

to custom they married late and, like their fathers, married the daughters of soldiers or the gentry.

The shared experiences of three decades in the mess, service in the field and the commonality in their life styles made these 108 officers members of a recognizable elite with identifiable social and professional customs. The honors and decorations bestowed on them attested to their military prowess, the gratitude of their government and the respect of their countrymen. In the summer of 1914 they occupied positions of great influence in the Army and society. The victors of many small wars, and untainted by the failure of an earlier generation of generals during the Boer War, they were sanguine about their prospects and their preparations for the increasingly likely confrontation with Germany.

NOTES

¹Great Britain, War Office, The Quarterly Army List, 30th June 1914 (London: H.M.S.O., 1914), pp. 20-41.

²Philip Mason, A Matter of Honour (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974), pp. 317-319, 405. The Indian Army reorganization of 1863, conducted as a result of the mutiny, set the figure for the native army at 125,000 officers and men; and for the British Army in India at 62,000 officers and men. Generally these figures were maintained or exceeded as the danger to India appeared to grow. By 1914 the native army was maintained at 150,000 officers and men.

³Major-General Sir Edward S. May, Changes and Chances of a Soldier's Life (London: Philip Allan & Co., 1925), pp. 111-112. Henry Wilson also found returning to India disagreeable. Unlike May he was successful, with the apparent help of the Duke of Connaught, Colonel-in-Chief of Wilson's regiment--the Rifle Brigade, see Major General Sir C. E. Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson (London: Cassell & Co., Ltd. 1927) 1:15-17. "Wire pulling" was tolerated, even expected. Perhaps the best-known Army wire-puller was Winston Churchill who became notorious for his efforts which always landed him where the action was.

⁴William Elliot Cairnes, Social Life in the British Army (London: John Long, 1900), p. 80.

⁵Field-Marshal Lord Birdwood, Khaki and Gown (London: Ward, Lock & Co., Limited, 1941). Birdwood held the view that a British officer must be able to speak the language of his men and eventually was able to communicate in several dialects though he took only the Hindustani interpreters examination. Birdwood claims to have urged Robertson in the latter's studies and it was Birdwood who pronounced Robertson's pronunciation "indifferent," pp. 33, 42, 56. Field Marshal Sir William Robertson, From Private to Field-Marshal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1922). Robertson was quite proud of his linguistic abilities and claimed to know five Indian languages. It is doubtful that he would have agreed with Birdwood's evaluation of his pronunciation, pp. 36, 44, 49.

⁶Guards units did participate in the fighting at Tel-el-Kebir and in the Boer War, but generally they remained in London or Ireland. On deployment records of the Guards, see Henry Manner Chichester and George Burges-Stuart, Records and Badges of the British Army (London: Gale & Polden Ltd., 1900).

⁷Victor Bonham-Carter, Soldier True (London: Frederick Muller Limited, 1963), pp. 33, 40. On Allenby, see Sir Archibald Wavell, Allenby (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941).

⁸Who Was Who, 1916-1928, p. 657.

⁹Sir George Younghusband, Forty Years a Soldier (London: Herbert Jenkins, Ltd., 1923).

¹⁰May, Changes, pp. 68-69.

¹¹Birdwood, Khaki and Gown, pp. 51-62.

¹²On Wolseley's general impact on the Army and the Staff College in particular, see Brian Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, 1854-1914 (London: Eyre Methuen, 1972), pp. 127-131.

¹³See David James, Lord Roberts (London: Hollis & Carter, 1954) and George H. Cassar, Kitchener: Architect of Victory (London: William Kimber, 1977). Roberts and Kitchener were the chief influences in India from the time of the second Afghan War until Kitchener left India in 1910. Their influence at home was not substantial until after the Boer War.

¹⁴Major-General Sir John Adye, Soldiers and Others I Have Known (London: Herbert Jenkins Limited, 1925), p. 27.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.

¹⁶On Alderson, see Dictionary of National Biography, 1922-1930, pp. 10-11; and on Rawlinson, see pp. 709-712. On Birdwood, see Dictionary of National Biography, 1957-1960, pp. 112-144. On Hanbury-Williams, see Who Was Who, 1941-1950. See also Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War (New York: Random House, 1979). Pakenham argues that Kitchener had a "hungry eye for talent" and pushed ahead Rawlinson's career during the Boer War. Kitchener also favored Allenby and Byng in this group, see p. 526. Sir Frederick Maurice made a point of showing that Roberts had this same "hungry eye" and aided his proteges, see Major General Sir Frederick Maurice, The Life of General Lord Rawlinson of Trent (London: Cassell & Co., Ltd., 1928), pp. 12-24. Rawlinson returned Roberts' favor by introducing his other good friend to Roberts. Rawlinson arranged for Kitchener and Roberts to meet at Curragh in August 1899. Supposedly at this meeting, Kitchener agreed to serve as Roberts' Chief of Staff in India which is how it came to pass that Kitchener went to South Africa with Roberts, see James, Lord Roberts, pp. 260-261.

¹⁷Bond, The Staff College, p. 130.

¹⁸Kitchener in fact was a partner with the "Indians" rather than a member of the ring. He had his own small clique. Pakenham argues the feud between the "Indians" and the "Africans" was the "root cause" of many of the disasters during the Boer War, see Pakenham, The Boer War, pp. 252-264, in particular p. 261. It may be inaccurate, strictly speaking, to assert that Methuen was an "African", but Wolseley claimed him as a friend, though he was not one of the old Ashanti crowd.

¹⁹May, Changes, p. 171. May earned Wood's attention by his publication of The Achievements of Field Artillery in 1891. May's little book was a well-received history on the use of artillery as well as a treatise on artillery tactics. On Wood's reaction to the book see p. 162.

²⁰Robertson, From Private, pp. 79, 95, 103.

²¹It would be stretching the point to argue that Robertson and Wilson were great friends because they were not. What is important is they were both "Indians" and knew each other well by reputation and through Rawlinson, who was friends with both, see Maurice, Rawlinson, pp. 15, 25, 26, 85, 86, 107; see also Callwell, Henry Wilson, 1:16.

²²Dictionary of National Biography, 1922-1930, pp. 709-712, 912-916; and Dictionary of National Biography, 1931-1940, pp. 738-743.

²³Birdwood, Khaki and Gown, pp. 117, 132, 138-139, 165. On Hamilton's career, see also Who Was Who, 1897-1914, p. 309 and The Times, 18 October 1914, pp. 3-4.

²⁴Birdwood, Khaki and Gown, p. 7.

²⁵A dye, Soldiers and Others, p. 136.

²⁶Maurice, Rawlinson, pp. 16-17.

²⁷On the general history of the college, see Bond, The Staff College.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 95, 134-138.

²⁹Major-General Sir George Younghusband, A Soldier's Memories (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1917), p. 115.

³⁰Mason, A Matter of Honour, p. 364.

³¹Gleichen is not one of the 108 officers in this study, see Major-General Lord Edwin Gleichen, A Guardsman's Memories (Edinburgh: Blackwood & Sons, 1932), p. 110.

³²Quoted in Bond, The Staff College, p. 97.

³³A. R. Godwin-Austen, The Staff and the Staff College (London: Constable & Co., Ltd., 1927), p. 241. Godwin-Austen is also a good source on life at the Staff College.

³⁴On Wolseley and the Staff College, see Bond, The Staff College, Ch. 4. Roberts supported the school by recommending it to his associates.

³⁵Ibid., p. 160.

³⁶On Maurice and Henderson as military intellectuals and as instructors, see Jay Luvaas, The Education of An Army (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 173-249.

³⁷Ibid. Though Hamley started the first tours, Maurice and Henderson made them an integral part of training, see also Bond, The Staff College, pp. 153-159.

³⁸Adye, Soldiers and Others, p. 145.

³⁹Ibid., p. 148.

⁴⁰Bond, The Staff College, pp. 160-163. See also Who Was Who, 1929-1940, p. 115 on Birkbeck and p. 719 on Johnston; and Who Was Who, 1916-1928 on Douglas.

⁴¹Maurice, Rawlinson, p. 29. Maurice's appraisal of the importance of the post of brigade major can be taken as a contemporary evaluation as he was only a few years younger than the officers in this study.

⁴²Dictionary of National Biography, 1912-1921 pp. 128-130; and Who Was Who, 1916-1928, p. 448.

⁴³On the organization of the General Staff, see Correlli Barnett, Britain and Her Army, 1509-1970, vol. 2 (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1970).

⁴⁴Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904-1914 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 167-186. On the 23 August 1911 C.I.D. meeting, see pp. 187-194. On Henry Wilson's recollections of his first two years as Director of Military Operations, see Callwell, Henry Wilson, 2:87-108; on the August C.I.D. meeting, see 2:99-101.

⁴⁵Adye, Soldiers and Others, p. 29.

⁴⁶Younghusband, Memories, p. 147; and Who Was Who, 1941-1950, p. 1276.

⁴⁷For some general examples of typical small wars, see Byron Farwell, Queen Victoria's Little Wars (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).

⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 295-297. Mrs. Grimmond was a remarkable woman and quite a sensation at the time. For her troubles she was awarded the Royal Red Cross and a pension for life. Both Carnegie and Kitson retired as Major Generals. Oddly neither saw action during World War I. Carnegie commanded a brigade in India until 1915 while Kitson spent the whole of the War training Indian troops. On Carnegie, see Who Was Who, 1916-1928, p. 175; on Kitson, see Who Was Who, 1941-1950, p. 646.

⁴⁹Depending on how they are counted, Alexander Wallace served in eight campaigns. He claimed service on the northwest frontier from 1892-1898 as one campaign and Chilas in 1892 as another. Neither are listed in either Farwell's list in Queen Victoria's Little Wars or on Brian Bond's list in Victorian Military Campaigns (London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 1967). However, since he was wounded twice in 1892, one or both should count. For Wallace's list, see Who Was Who, 1916-1928, p. 1083.

⁵⁰Major Desmond Chapman-Huston and Major Owen Rutter, General Sir John Cowans, vol. 1 (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1924). Broome served as Director of Remounts, India, from 1908 until he retired in 1915. Hadden was President of the Ordinance Board from 1913 to 1915. He retired in 1916. During the War Heath served first as Director of Quarters, then as Deputy Quarter-Master General to the Forces. Robb was military secretary to Kitchener from 1914 to 1916 and continued on the War Office staff after Kitchener's death.

⁵¹Dictionary of National Biography, 1931-1940, pp. 7-12. A column was a rather special command designed to run the Boer Commandos to earth during the latter stages of the war. Composed primarily of mounted riflemen and supporting artillery, column's could be quite large. In 1901 Allenby's column had over 1,500 men, see Raymond Savage, Allenby of Armageddon (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1926), pp. 62-63; and Pakenham, The Boer War, p. 527.

⁵²Who Was Who, 1951-1960, p. 104.

⁵³May, Changes, pp. 208-236.

⁵⁴Fenton Aylmer won his V.C. in December 1891, during an assault on an enemy fort during the Hazara Campaign. He was also wounded twice during the same incident, see The Times 5 September 1935; p. 35. Charles J. Mellis earned his V.C. in 1900, during the 3rd Ashanti War, see The Times, 8 June 1936, p. 19.

⁵⁵Decorations elevated the soldier and made him acceptable in circles where he was otherwise unwelcome. Forester shows this by Herbert Curzon's acceptance into the circle of ducal House of Bude.

⁵⁶Cairnes, Social Life, p. 38.

⁵⁷Birdwood, Khaki and Gown, p. 60.

⁵⁸Polo was introduced to the Home Army largely through the efforts of Colonel Western, riding master at Sandhurst, see Hugh Thomas, The Story of Sandhurst (London: Hutchinson, 1961), p. 138.

⁵⁹Brian Gardner, Allenby of Arabia (London: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1965), p. 16.

⁶⁰May, who was dedicated to all of the mounted sports, was also badly hurt playing polo, see May, Changes, pp. 56-58, 92, 182.

⁶¹Birdwood, Khaki and Gown, p. 60.

⁶²Who Was Who, 1951-1960, p. 706.

⁶³Savage, Allenby of Armageddon, pp. 29-33.

⁶⁴Birdwood, Khaki and Gown, p. 35, 70-61.

⁶⁵General Sir George Barrow, The Life of General Sir Charles Carmichael Monro (London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 1931), esp. p. 236. Also Maurice, Rawlinson, pp. 8, 12. Rawlinson also enjoyed pig sticking, see p. 24.

⁶⁶May, Changes, pp. 37-54.

⁶⁷Who Was Who, 1929-1940, p. 1071; and The Times, 14 December 1940, p. 7.

⁶⁸See Edwin Alfred Hervey Alderson, Pink and Scarlet: or hunting as a school for soldiers (London: Heineman, 1900),

⁶⁹May, Changes, pp. 62-63.

⁷⁰John Timbs, Clubs and Club Life in London (London: Chatto Winders, Publishers, 1872), p. 103.

⁷¹Sir Nevil Macready, Annals of An Active Life (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1924), 2:171-172.

⁷²Tension over whether soldiers had the right or duty to object to civilian policy continued. In 1918 Lloyd George relieved Robertson as C.I.G.S. for his outspoken opposition, see Edward M. Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy, 4th ed. (New York: Atheneum, 1969), pp. 259-301.

⁷³Bonham-Carter, Soldier True, pp. 80-81.

⁷⁴Ibid., pp. 78-80, 83.

⁷⁵Lieut.-General Sir William Bellairs, The Military Career (London: W. H. Allen & Co., 1889), p. 159.

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷Callwell, Henry Wilson, 1:79.

⁷⁸Veronica Bomfield, On the Strength: The Story of the British Army Wife (London: Charles Knight & Co., Ltd., 1974), p. 16.

⁷⁹Bellairs, The Military Career, pp. 135-137.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 134.

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸²Cairnes, Social Life, p. 42.

⁸³Ibid., pp. 41-42.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 43.

⁸⁵Bellairs, The Military Career, pp. 135-136.

⁸⁶For a picture of "Snowden," the C-in-C's house at Simla, see Birdwood, Khaki and Gown, photograph facing p. 148. There was no concerted effort to provide housing, so it varied from post to post.

⁸⁷Great Britain, Census of England and Wales, Summary Tables Vol. 81, 1914-16, cd. 7929 (London: H.M.S.O., 1915). The average age of twenty-seven is a modal age determined from aggregate tables, see especially table 29, pp. 90-91.

⁸⁸Great Britain, Census of England and Wales, Fertility of Marriage, part 2, Vol. 13, 1923 (London: H.M.S.O., 1923), p. lxxxvi.

⁸⁹Who Was Who, 1916-1928, p. 236; and Who Was Who, 1929-1940, pp. 739, 981. Laurance G. Drummond who retired as Major General, having commanded a brigade in the B.E.F. and a reserve center during the War, was the son of Admiral James R. Drummond. As the second son of the eighth Viscount Strathallan, it is likely that Admiral Drummond could give his own son a generous allowance, see Who Was Who, 1941-1950, pp. 330-331. Nevil Macready's father was a well-known and apparently well-to-do actor, William Charles Macready, see Macready, Annals, 1:1-20. T. L. N. Morland, who commanded two different army corps during the War, was the son of Thomas Morland, an English engineer who made his career in Canada, see Who Was Who, 1916-1924, p. 748. The other five were: Edward A. Altham, son of an Army major who was probably a landowner as well; Charles J. Blomfield, the son of a clergyman; Frederick W. G. Landon whose father was also a clergyman; James A. Bell, the son of an Indian Army Colonel and Alexander Wilson whose father's occupation can not be determined from the available sources.

⁹⁰Bomfield, On the Strength, p. 15.

⁹¹The Comte D'Anvers was more than willing to assist Townshend with cash, see, for example, Errol Sherson, Townshend of Chitral and Kut (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1928), p. 205.

⁹²Ibid., pp. 220, 241-244. Lady Townshend really came into her own as an intriguer at the start of World War I, see Ch. V in this study.

⁹³Duff Cooper, Haig (London: Faber & Faber Limited, 1935) 1:103-104.

⁹⁴Fertility of Marriage, p. cvii, see table XLVIII. All figures cited in this paper are standardized for surviving children. The actual number produced for the country was 2.82 with 2.33 surviving children per couple.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. cv, see table XLVIII.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. cvx.

⁹⁷Ibid.

⁹⁸Bomfield, On the Strength, p. 26.

⁹⁹Ibid.

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

¹⁰¹Ibid.

CHAPTER V

THE WAR AND BEYOND

"But--can I ever hope to see the whole Regiment again?
Alas, I fear not, and that never again shall I know the
joy of lines of Lancers galloping behind me."

Field Marshal Lord Birdwood of Anzac and
Totnes on leaving the Army and his regiment.

In April 1914 Charles V. F. Townshend assumed command of the Rawal Pindi Brigade of the 2nd division, Indian Army. To attain that command Townshend gave up a Territorial Force division and arranged a transfer to a brigade in India and then finally to the Rawal Pindi Brigade because he believed he would shortly accede to the divisional command. Townshend considered command of an active Indian brigade with the opportunity to accede to divisional command as more beneficial to his career than command of a Territorial Force division. But, for once, the consummate puller of wires had miscalculated. Not four months later Britain declared war and he found himself in the wrong place at the right time.¹

Appalled by the prospect of missing the War, Townshend fired off barrages of telegrams to French, commander of B.E.F., Kitchener at the War Office, and even to Repington at The Times. Unwilling to leave any stone unturned, he even sent an open telegram to the military secretary at the War Office which read simply, "Re: New Divisions beg my name considered."² Lady Townshend, who had remained in England, followed up Townshend's efforts with personal visits to Kitchener and French.³

Townshend's frenzied attempts to return home met with no success. But, he was not alone in his frustration, nor was he alone in his concern that he might miss the War. It was by no means evident that the War would be a long one. I. S. Bloch's argument that any European war would result in a stalemate with the opposing armies burrowing underground to avoid the effects of modern weaponry convinced few people. In any event, the accuracy of Bloch's prediction insured that few of these 108 officers were disappointed for long.⁴

This concluding chapter examines the activities of Townshend and his contemporaries at war, with a glance at their post-War careers and patterns in retirement. The caricature of War-time generals, drawn by C. S. Forester in The General, is compared to one of his models for the novel, Edmund H. H. Allenby, as well as to other officers in this study. In light of that comparison, the careers of two officers are reviewed as an illustration of the major patterns asserted for the group as a whole. Finally, the chapter seeks to reveal the perceptions the Major Generals had about their profession and how they functioned in the Army system.

In August 1914 the B.E.F. with four of its six infantry divisions and its one of cavalry, went into battle on the left flank of the French army near the Belgian town of Mons. By October's end five more British and two Indian divisions had joined in the desperate fighting. With only twelve divisions immediately available and no means of rapidly expanding her Army or of mobilizing her eligible male population, Britain was at a distinct disadvantage as compared to the continental powers. In contrast to the mass armies of France, Germany and Russia, the B.E.F., even when augmented by Indian troops, was indeed a "contemptible little army."⁵

To a large extent members of the group under study controlled the British forces employed in 1914. Field Marshal Sir John French, a Boer War general, commanded the B.E.F. and two of his original corps commanders, Douglas Haig and James M. Grierson, were senior to the 108 Major Generals. But, the remaining corps and all of the original B.E.F. divisions were commanded by officers in this generation of major generals. William P. Pultney commanded III Corps and Allenby led the cavalry division. Samuel H. Lomax, killed in action in April 1915, led the 1st division. Charles C. Monro--who later commanded an army, the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, and served as C-in-C, India--commanded the 2nd division. Hubert I. W. Hamilton served as commanding general of the 3rd division until killed in action in October 1914. He was then succeeded by Colin J. Mackenzie, also one of the officers under study. The 4th division was commanded by Thomas D'O Snow, later commander of VII Corps at the Somme. Charles Fergusson, who rose to the rank of General, commanded the 5th division until October 1914 when he was succeeded by another of the 108, Thomas L. N. Morland. John L. Keir led the 6th division.⁶

The IV Corps, under the command of Henry S. Rawlinson, arrived in October 1914 with its 7th and 8th divisions commanded by Thompson Capper, who died of wounds in September 1916, and Francis J. Davies, who rose to the rank of Lieutenant General during the War. The IV Corps also included the newly-formed 3rd cavalry division under the command of Julian H. G. Byng.⁷ Members of this generation of major generals also dominated the Indian Corps which landed at Marseilles in late September 1914. Phillip M. Carnegie, James M. S. Brunner, Henry D'U Keary and Forbes Macbean commanded four of the six infantry brigades sent out from India.⁸

During the course of the War officers in the group continued to hold important field commands at home and in active theaters. Seventeen commanded brigades, fifty-nine commanded divisions, eighteen commanded corps and five commanded armies.⁹ Three of them commanded separate theaters of the War. Charles C. Monro commanded the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (M.E.F.) from October 1915 to January 1916. Archibald J. Murray commanded the Egypt Expeditionary Force (E.E.F.) from December 1915 until June 1917 when Allenby succeeded him. Allenby commanded the E.E.F. until March 1919 and won a tremendous victory at Megiddo in 1918, capturing most of the Turkish 7th Army.¹⁰

The Major Generals also commanded dominion forces employed during the War. Edwin A. H. Alderson commanded a Canadian division and eventually the Canadian Corps. Byng commanded a division, an army and four different corps, including the Canadian Corps from May 1916 to June 1917. James Spens commanded the Australian training depot in Egypt in 1915 and Birdwood commanded the Australia and New Zeland Army Corps (ANZAC) from December 1914 to June 1918.¹¹

In addition to wielding command over many of the troops in the field, they influenced the conduct of the War as senior staff officers. The four chief staff officers of the B.E.F. were all members of this group. The Chief of the General Staff (C.G.S.) was Archibald J. Murray, and Henry Wilson served as his assistant. Murray served as C.G.S. until 1915 when he returned home to be C.I.G.S. Robertson, Quartermaster General (Q.M.G.) at this time, succeeded Murray as C.G.S. and later in the same year succeeded him as C.I.G.S. as well. Wilson left the B.E.F. staff in 1915 to act as liaison to the French army. Later he commanded a corps and in 1917 succeeded Robertson as C.I.G.S. Nevil Macready

served as Adjutant General (A.G.) of the B.E.F. until 1916 when he moved up to the Army Council as A.G. to the Forces.¹⁷

The "old contemptibles," mostly under the leadership of the 108 Major Generals in this study, conducted the retreat from Mons, turned and fought at Le Cateau and helped to stop the Germans on the Marne. Moreover, the efforts of Townshend in Mesopotamia, Younghusband in the Sinai and others throughout the several theaters of the War were of utmost importance to the British war effort, but, despite their best efforts, the armies in Belgium and France went underground. Just as Bloch had argued, the killing power of modern weaponry gave the advantage to the defender. Stalemated, the armies in France eyed each other across no man's land in a trench system which wound its way nearly four hundred miles from the Franco-German border to the sea.

On July 1, 1916 the British began their first great effort to end the trench warfare. At 7:30 a.m. that morning in the Department of the Somme, near the town of Montauban, Captain W. P. Neville of the 8th East Surrey's kicked a football toward the German lines which he and his company then followed into no man's land. So began the first day of the Somme which cost the British over 60,000 casualties, including Neville. The casualties on the first day of the 140-day battle exceeded the combined British losses sustained in the Crimean War, the Boer War and the Korean War.¹³

During this bloodiest of British battles, the officers in this study were still very much in control of the troops in the field. Rawlinson's 4th Army conducted the main attack towards Bapaume. Pultney, still in command of III Corps, and Morland, commanding X Corps, led two of Rawlinson's five corps. Major General Thomas D. Pilcher commanded one of Rawlinson's fifteen infantry divisions. Allenby, in command of

3rd Army, directed the supporting attack. Snow, commanding VII Corps as part of Allenby's force, had the responsibility of conducting the attack against Gommecourt. Major General Edward H. Montague-Stuart-Wortley commanded one of Snow's two assault divisions.¹⁴

The Somme offensive was conspicuous for its lack of success and infamous for its terrible cost in human lives. Still, the senior commanders, Rawlinson and Allenby, escaped real criticism. Haig even lauded Rawlinson's efforts. The troops and divisional commanders were not as fortunate. The Somme consumed lives and careers alike. Allenby "degommed" Stuart-Wortley for failing to renew his attack against the Germans near Gommecourt on the afternoon of 1 July. Stuart-Wortley declined to renew the attack because he had lost half of his assault troops in the initial attack and saw no prospect of success in a second attempt.¹⁵ A few days later Lieutenant General H. S. Horne, who was only a Brigadier in August 1914, fired Pilcher for the same reason. Pilcher, a Major General since 1907 and in command of his division since January 1915, remarked of Horne that, "It is very easy to sit a few miles in the rear and get credit for allowing men to be killed in an undertaking foredoomed to failure, but the part did not appeal to me and my protests against these useless attacks were not well received."¹⁶ Relieved for their reticence in continuing attacks they believed futile, Stuart-Wortley and Pilcher were banished to assignments in Great Britain. Both retired, still Major Generals, in 1919 and neither received decorations or honors for their services. By comparison, Horne, a relative newcomer, was promoted to full General before the end of the year.¹⁷

John L. Keir, another of the 108 Major Generals, also lost his job in the aftermath of the Somme. Openly critical of Allenby and his

methods, Keir threatened to "stir up trouble in London."¹⁸ Consequently, with Haig's support, Allenby sent Keir packing in August 1916. Created K.C.B. in 1915 and promoted to Lieutenant General in 1916, Keir suddenly found himself in the backwaters, never to return to active command. Indeed, it seems he remained unemployed until his retirement in 1918.¹⁹

A comparison of the British order of battle in the fall of 1914 to the order of battle of troops employed on the first day of the Somme shows that the relative number of the Major Generals in field commands had declined in the interim. Comprising sixty-four percent of all generals in June 1914, the officers in this group enjoyed a virtual monopoly, both in command and staff billets of the B.E.F. In January 1915, they comprised fifty-eight percent of the active Major Generals and twenty-eight percent of active Lieutenant Generals; and still dominated field commands. For example, they commanded six of the eight army corps in the field in February 1915. Their dominance continued through Neuve-Chapelle and the first two battles of Ypres, but their numbers were declining at division level. By the time of the Somme they still had the majority of commands at corps and army level, but were in the minority at division level. Indeed, they only comprised forty-two percent of all active generals at the end of the year.²⁰ There were several reasons for their relative decline. As the Army expanded their numbers were diluted. Moreover, the number of essential staff positions grew with the Army and, as senior officers, many of the pre-War Major Generals were assigned to these posts. Finally, training commands also required their service. (See Table 15 for assignment status in October 1914 compared to November 1918).

TABLE 15

ASSIGNMENTS FOR THE OFFICERS UNDER STUDY
IN OCTOBER 1914 AND NOVEMBER 1918

Assignment	October 1914	% of Known Cases	November 1918	% of Known Cases
Combat Command	50*	49	7	7
Non-combat Command	32	30	30	29
Staff, War Office	6	6	5	5
Staff, Combat Area	7	7	3	3
Staff, Non Combat Area	8	8	15	15
Prisoner of War	0	0	2	2
Retired	0	0	25	24
Dead	0	0	8	8
Unemployed	0	0	7	7

Valid cases (1914) - 103, missing - 5

Data Complete for 95% of sample

Valid cases (1918) - 102, missing - 6

Data complete for 94% of sample

*Thirty of these officers were in command of units in various stages of deployment to combat theaters.

Age was another important reason for the declining numbers of the 108 Major Generals in field commands. The youngest of them was forty-six when the War started and most were in their middle or late fifties. As a result, they fared poorly in the strenuous work of leading divisions or doing the required staff work in combat theaters. Archibald Murray, fifty-four when the War began, collapsed from exhaustion during the early weeks of the War and had to return home to less strenuous work as C.I.G.S.²¹ Henry N. C. Heath, "worn out by trying to knock into shape during the severe winter of 1914-1915 a Territorial division which he brought to France," died in 1915 at the age of fifty-five.²² Edward C. W. Mackenzie-Kennedy, commander of the 26th division in Salonika, returned from a rest at home to find someone else commanding his division. To no avail Mackenzie-Kennedy appealed to his commander, Lieutenant General G. F. Milne who was six years his junior and promoted to Major General in 1915 (seven years after Mackenzie-Kennedy). Of the disgruntled Mackenzie-Kennedy, Milne remarked that he was "a man of some age and has been suffering from mental strain. Personally I should prefer a younger man."²³

By the end of 1916, five of the 108 were dead and eleven more had retired. Mellis and Townshend were prisoners of war and some, such as Keir, Pilcher and Stuart-Wortley, had been sent home. Even so, members of the group continued to hold field commands throughout the War. On Armistice Day, seven of them held combat commands and thirty commanded units in non-combat areas (See Table 15). Birdwood, Byng and Rawlinson commanded three of the five armies on the Western Front while Allenby held the army-level command in Egypt, Palestine and Syria. Fergusson and Morland commanded two of the nineteen army corps in the west, and

Gorringe (the youngest of these officers) was in command of one of the sixty-four divisions.²⁴

The influence this generation of generals had on the British war effort while serving on staffs was as large as their active efforts on the battlefield. Though Robertson, Wilson and Murray served in the limelight at the highest levels, the more mundane efforts of men such as John Cowans deserve mention. Cowans served as Q.M.G. to the Forces during the whole of the War. The speed and efficiency with which he arranged the deployment of the B.E.F. to France demonstrated his considerable ability. Cowans advanced to the rank of General and was created G.C.M.G. and G.C.B. in recognition of his services.²⁵ William H. Birkbeck, Director of Remounts from 1912 to 1920, ably managed the British reserve of horses. His task was extremely important to an army that depended on the horse for mobility. Birkbeck, whom Kitchener described as "imperturable," kept pace with events in a department which grew from 351 people and 25,000 animals to nearly 21,000 people and 869,931 animals.²⁶ Staff assignments included the important business of running the Empire and officers in this study played an important part here as well. Alexander N. Rochfort, for example, served as Lieutenant Governor of Jersey until illness forced his retirement in 1916.²⁷ Throughout the course of the War, thirty-eight of the Major Generals served on staff assignments in the field or in non-combat areas. At the end of the War, twenty-three of them were serving various staff assignments.²⁸

Whether they served in field commands or staff assignments, it is clear that the needs of the British Empire were not the only determinants in the War-time assignments of the officers in this study. Networking continued to play a role in their affairs as indeed it had

throughout their pre-War careers. At the start of the War, the ascendancy of the Roberts' Ring was complete. The fate of officers associated with Wolseley and the Africans amply illustrates how completely the Indians controlled the Army. Adye, a junior member of the Wolseley Ring, was shunted from one staff job to another and remained a Major General until he retired. Edward S. May, whose book on the use of artillery caught Evelyn Wood's attention in 1893, spent the War years in India and, like Adye, received no promotions. Townshend, an associate and relative of Redvers Buller, never got to France. Furthermore, though created K.C.B. for his defense of Kut, he was not promoted nor was he offered employment in the post-War Army.²⁹ On the other hand, members of Roberts' Ring did quite well. Kitchener, Roberts' ally in South Africa, acceded to the War Office at the start of the War. French, also an associate of Roberts, commanded the B.E.F. Wilson, Robertson and Rawlinson, long-time members, were all destined for high places, as were Allenby and Birdwood, proteges of Kitchener.

But, power in the Army shifted to Douglas Haig after Kitchener's death in 1916. Consequently, officers who had not enjoyed good relations with him found themselves adrift. Allenby, who already had enemies in plentiful quantities and had never gotten along with Haig, was particularly vulnerable. From the start of his tenure as commander of the B.E.F., Haig continually snubbed Allenby and relations between them steadily deteriorated.³⁰ Finally, before the Battle of Arras in April 1917, Haig dismissed Allenby's novel proposals for increased use of tanks, aircraft and short preparatory bombardments. Allenby's attack nonetheless made good initial gains; but, like so many British attacks petered out. In the aftermath of the battle Allenby, under criticism,

occupied an untenable position. In June 1917, when Robertson, the C.I.G.S., was pressed by the government to name a new commander in Egypt he saw a solution to two problems. Aware of the conflict between the two men, he suggested Allenby for the post in Egypt and Haig readily agreed. Robertson and Haig clearly viewed Egypt as a side show as did Allenby who was distraught and considered the assignment a demotion.³¹

Allenby more than recouped his fall from grace with his dramatic rout of the Turks at Megiddo in 1918. With Allenby's victory at Megiddo and the British advance in the closing campaign in the west, the War ended on an upbeat note for Britain. The government was generous in its rewards to the victorious generals including the 108 pre-War Major Generals. Seventy-three, or 68%, of them received honors for service (See Table 16). No less than thirty-seven of them were created Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath. Four were raised to the Peerage: Rawlinson and Byng were created Barons with a grant of £ 30,000 each; Birdwood was created Baron of Anzac and Totnes with a grant of £ 10,000; Allenby, created Viscount Allenby of Megiddo and Felixstowe, received £ 50,000; and Macready, Monro, Robertson and Wilson were all created Baronets. Forty-eight were named Colonel of the Regiment, a high honor reserved to old and distinguished soldiers. Several served in more than one regiment. Birdwood, for example, was the Colonel of eight different regiments.

The influence of the officers under study did not end with the Armistice. Forty-four were on active duty in November 1919 and seven were still in the Army in 1925. Two of the nine active Field Marshals in 1919 were members of the group as were eight of the twenty-one full Generals, eleven of the fifty eight Lieutenant Generals and twenty-three of the

TABLE 16
POST-WAR HONORS*

Honor	Number	% of Known Cases
G. C. B.**	4	4
K. C. B.	37	34
C. B.	4	4
G. C. M. G.	2	2
K. C. M. G.	12	11
C. M. G.	7	6
K. C. I. E.	1	1
G. C. V. O.	1	1
K. C. V. O.	1	1
K. B. E.	1	1
C. B. E.	3	3
No Honors***	35	32

Valid cases - 108, missing - 0

Data Complete for 100% of sample

* Only the highest honor for each officer is included

** Honors are listed in order of precedence.

*** Of the thirty-five officers who were not awarded honors, two were men who were killed early in the War, and twelve were officers who retired early on and saw no active service.

234 Major Generals.³² They represented only one eighth of the total number of general officers, but they continued to serve in important posts. Robertson, though relieved of his duties as C.I.G.S. in 1918, commanded the British Army of the Rhine from April 1919 to March 1920 when he was promoted to Field Marshal and retired.³³ Henry Wilson continued as C.I.G.S. in succession to Robertson until 1922 when he left to take a seat in the House of Commons.³⁴ Gorringe commanded a division in Egypt from 1919 to 1921 when he was promoted to Lieutenant General and took command of the Tigris Corps.³⁵ Monro served as Governor General of Malta from 1923 until his death in 1928.³⁶ Rawlinson preceeded Birdwood as C-in-C, India, and held that post until his death in 1925.³⁷ Allenby served a six-year tour as Special High Commissioner in Egypt until his retirement in 1926. Birdwood, the last to leave the Army, retired in 1930 after serving five years as C-in-C, India.³⁹

After an average of forty years of active service the surviving Major Generals retired. As a result of thrift and well-managed investments most were able to enjoy their retirement in a manner befitting gentlemen. Though Army pay in the lower grades had been inadequate, their financial circumstances improved considerably as they advanced in rank. In 1914 a Major General earned £ 1,300 per annum, a Lieutenant General £ 2,600, and a General £ 3,900; and assignment to certain posts, such as the War Office, included additional pay.⁴⁰ Moreover, the Army provided generals with soldier servants and inexpensive, or even gratis, housing. Indeed, half of the officers in this study retired to country homes or respectable residences in London, Edinburgh or Dublin which suggests they had sufficient income to meet F. M. L. Thompson's criteria for identification as a gentleman.

Like other country gentlemen they became involved in local administration. Thirteen served as Justices of the Peace, Deputy Lord Lieutenants, or in other posts in county administration.⁴¹ Still others served in semi-official positions that were really sinecures. Allenby and Birdwood both served as Captains of Deal Castle (curator), and Birdwood also served as Master of Peterhouse, Cambridge. Younghusband was resident in the Tower of London from 1917 to 1944.⁴² Others became involved in public works. Francis H. Kelly, who retired as a Major General in 1918, was prominent in the Boy Scout movement in Surrey.⁴³ Francis Lloyd, also a Major General, served as Commissioner of the Duke of York's Royal Military School.⁴⁴ A handful of these officers were still active during World War II. Birdwood, for example, was on the selection committee which determined who would receive commissions in the Home Guard.⁴⁵

A few of the generals were appointed or elected to government positions. Nevil Macready, for example, served as Commandant to the Special Constabulary in 1926 where he demonstrated expertise in maintaining order during the major strikes of that year. On the other hand, Wilson, Townshend and Pilcher all served in the House of Commons. Wilson became a Unionist member for North Down, Ireland, in an uncontested bye election in February 1922; but, he never had the opportunity to do much since he was assassinated by the Sinn Fein in London on June 22, 1922. Townshend, elected as an Independent in 1922, later accepted the Tory Whip. He was active on military questions and something of a nuisance in foreign affairs until his death in 1924. Pilcher, who retired as a Major General in 1919, served in Parliament in the 1920s as a member of

the National Party.⁴⁶ But despite these three examples, overt political activity remained uncharacteristic of the group as a whole.

This analysis of the 108 pre-War Major Generals illustrates their careers and represents them as a group, but it does not characterize them as individuals. Though an exploration of individual personalities is not a central issue in this study, a comparison of well-known post-War stereotypes to officers in this study will test the validity of these caricatures as well as illuminate unique qualities of individuals within the group. Sydney Low's Colonel Blimp is perhaps the best-known caricature on the World War I British General. His image as a pompous, old fool, prattering about the All-India Cup with a "pip, pip" and a "cheerio" is practically an institution.⁴⁷ Lieutenant General Sydney T. B. Lawford--promoted to Major General during the War and who later immigrated to Hollywood so that his son, Peter, could pursue an acting career--portrayed a Blimp-type general in a B-grade movie entitled "Rogue's March."⁴⁸ Certainly the Blimp image comes to mind when recalling Birdwood's views on pig-sticking or May's on fox hunting. However, the Blimp image is too pat and superficial.

C. S. Forester's characters, Generals Curzon and Wayland Leigh, are more complete models of the War-time generals. In The General, Forester recounts the life of Herbert Curzon, an uncompromising cavalry officer who rises from Major to Lieutenant General during the War. Forester's appreciation of the army in the late nineteenth century is quite good. Life in the regiment, the importance of good social connections and a good marriage are amply illustrated, as is the value of networking. It is in the network of Wayland-Leigh (an Allenby-like character) that Curzon makes his way, ably assisted by his marriage to the daughter of the influential Duke of Bude. His own intrigues and those of the Bude

House combine to make him a powerful and influential officer on the Western Front.

Though Forester is fair and even sympathetic, the picture that emerges of Curzon and Wayland-Leigh is distinctly one-sided. They are cold, insensitive men quite willing to fight to the last private. Perhaps most damning in Forester's view is that they can not see what to him was quite obvious two decades after the War. Forester sees the British generals of the First World War as single-minded and unimaginative. He described the planning process and exchange of ideas between Wayland-Leigh and G.H.Q. as:

. . . like the debate of a group of savages as to how to extract a screw from a piece of wood. Accustomed only to nails, they had made one effort to pull out the screw by main force, and now that it had failed were devising methods of applying more force still, of obtaining more efficient pincers, of using levers and fulcrums so that more men could bring their strength to bear. They could hardly be blamed for not guessing that by rotating the screw it would come out after the exertion of far less effort; it would be a notion so different from anything they had ever encountered that they would laugh at the man who suggested it.⁴⁹

Allenby had many of the traits C. S. Forester attributed to Wayland-Leigh. He was mercurial and his temper had long before earned him the nickname "Bull." During the Somme, he lived in a splendid chateau and his dinner parties were well-known for their ostentation. Not only did Allenby fire Stuart-Wortley for balking at continuing murderous frontal assaults, he also fired Keir for having the temerity to disagree with his methods.⁵⁰

Rawlinson shared many of these same qualities. On the eve of the Somme, he found time to attend a dinner of the Old Etonians. Like Allenby, he also took a dim view of criticism. Responding to objections by subordinates on his plan of attack for July 1, 1916, he announced

that, "All criticism by subordinates . . . of orders received from superior authority will in the end recoil on the heads of the critics."⁵¹

Still, it was Allenby who routed the Turkish 7th Army at Megiddo, using his own methods. And, it was Rawlinson who observed that the true cause of the British failure at Neuve-Chapelle was that "our tactics [were] faulty, and that we . . . misconceived the strength and resisting power of the enemy."⁵² Allenby and Rawlinson were not the only officers capable of displaying un-Blimpish qualities. In Mesopotamia, Townshend utilized everything from pirogue-like boats, camels and aircraft to move and coordinate the British advance towards Baghdad in 1915. Monro faced Kitchener without blanching in urging the initially unpopular view that the Dardanelles must be evacuated.⁵³

Unlike Forester's characters, these officers exhibited compassion for their troops and were not unappreciative of their efforts. Rawlinson confided in his diary on August 16, 1916, that, "The most noticeable feature so far, in the battle of the Somme has been the fighting spirit and extreme gallantry . . . exhibited by the New Armies."⁵⁴ The example of Pilcher and Stuart-Wortley, who sacrificed their careers to prevent what they perceived as the useless slaughter of their troops, commands attention as well. Walter F. Lindsay, who witnessed the piecemeal destruction of brigades detached from his division at 2nd Ypres "was so deeply affected . . . that he broke down."⁵⁵ William Fry, who commanded a division in France, scandalized the martinets in the Army with his clemency in court martial sentences.⁵⁶ Monro, well-known as a sympathetic commander and a strong believer in providing for the morale of his men, was one of the first to urge home leave for troops in France. He was also active in the Soldier's and Sailor's Families Association and insured that church services and bands (playing popular tunes) were

available to his combat troops.⁵⁷ Moreover, Younghusband's Story of the Guides shows that he had a genuine, even paternalistic, affection for his Indian soldiers.

Unlike their stereotypes, the officers in this group were not cold, stodgy men who cared little about the consequences of their decisions. Yet, in other ways, they do bear a strong resemblance to Forester's picture of the War-time British general. The worth of these caricatures does not lay in assigning all of the qualities of Curzon and Wayland-Leigh to the officers in this study. Their importance rests on recognizing that like the savages with the screw, these men were confronted with something beyond their experience. Forester had the benefit of two decades of hindsight not available to these generals who had to make on-the-spot decisions. Allenby, Rawlinson and others in this generation of generals, well-versed in the dictates of duty exemplified by Nelson's message to the fleet at Trafalgar that "England expects that every man will do his duty," marched, like Napoleon's marshals, "to the sound of the guns." It is to their credit that they did so in the face of such unfamiliar and awesome surroundings.

Even so, while denying a blanket censure of the Major Generals, it is not possible to deny that there are truths in the Forester stereotype. As shown the careers of these 108 men are not dissimilar to that of General Curzon. Using the data in this study, it is possible to construct an archetype for this group of Major Generals. Rather than relying on such an archetype or Forester's caricature, for an understanding of these officers, it is more useful to trace the career of a "typical" member of the group with the understanding that examples, unlike stereotypes, do not reflect every quality of a group. But, unlike either stereotypes or statistics alone, an example conveys the uniqueness of individuals within a group.

Raymond N. R. Reade, born February 16, 1861, the second son of John Page Reade of Crowe Hall, Suffolk, is representative of this group. His father served as Justice of the Peace and Deputy Lord Lieutenant of the county. His mother was the daughter of the second Earl of Ranfurly, whose estate totaled over 10,000 acres in 1876. Educated at Eton and Sandhurst, Reade joined the 85th Foot, The Kings Own Light Infantry. He saw action in four campaigns prior to World War I: the Second Afghan War, 1880; the Ashanti Expedition, 1895; the Nigerian campaign in 1898; and the Boer War. During his forty-year career he held a number of staff assignments from Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, Egypt (as a captain from 1889 to 1893), to Representative to the Inter-Allied Mission, Greece, 1918 to 1920. A Staff College graduate, Reade also served as the aide to the General Officer Commanding, Aldershot from 1899 to 1901. He commanded the Royal Military College, Kingston in Canada from 1901 to 1905. Later he was the General Officer Commanding, Troops, Straits Settlements from 1914 to 1915. During the War itself, frail health prevented his commanding a unit in an active theater, but he did command the 59th and 68th divisions in England. He was created C.B. in 1908, and C.M.G. in 1918. He retired from the Army in 1920 as a Major General.⁵⁸

Reade followed army custom when in 1894 at the age of thirty-three he married the daughter of Colonel Almeric Spencer. They had one child. In London he had access to the Army and Navy and the Travelers Clubs. After retirement Reade moved to a country house named Sutton Manor, near Ipswich, Suffolk, and served as a Justice of the Peace. He was also Colonel of his second regiment, the King's Shropshire Light Infantry, from 1921 to 1931. Reade died in October 1943.⁵⁹

Hubert I. W. Hamilton reflects the central characteristic of these generals. Born in Kent in June 1861, he was the third son of Lieutenant General Henry Hamilton. His mother was the daughter of an Anglican clergyman. Hamilton left Sandhurst in 1880 and was gazetted to the Queen's Regiment. In his early career he saw action in Burma (1885-1887) and served as the regimental adjutant from 1886 to 1890. In 1892, he attended the Staff College where he became close friends with Wilson, Rawlinson and Snow. He participated in the Reconquest of the Sudan in 1897 and the Boer War from 1899-1902. During both of these actions he served on Kitchener's staff. Hamilton continued in various staff billets, including A.D.C. to King Edward VII in 1902, until January 1906 when he began a two-year stint in command of the 7th Infantry Brigade (as a temporary Brigadier General). In 1908, as a brevet Major General, he joined the staff in Malta. During these years, Hamilton won several honors: D.S.O. in 1898, created C.B. in 1906 and C.V.O. in 1909.⁶⁰

After promotion to Major General in June 1909, Hamilton commanded a Territorial Force division and then the 3rd Infantry division, B.E.F. He saw action with his division at Mons, Le Cateau, the Marne, Aisne Crossing and was killed by enemy shellfire during the Battle of La Bassée in October 1914. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, his corps commander and good friend, buried him in the nearby churchyard at Lacouture. Smith-Dorrien described the funeral, conducted under fire, as "quite the most impressive funeral I have seen or am ever likely to see--and quite the most appropriate to the gallant soldier and fine leader we were laying in his last resting place."⁶¹ The Major Generals in this study were touched by the loss of one of their own so early. Widely known as "Handsome Harry," Hamilton, a bachelor, was a popular officer. A solid soldier whose

only club was the the Army and Navy Club, Birdwood described him as a "typical Queen's officer--which is a grand testimonial in itself for surely no other regiment can claim to have produced so many first-class men."⁶²

The careers of these two officers highlight individual differences, yet amply illustrate the similar patterns repeated in each. Seventy-four percent of these men came from the families of landowners or soldiers and another twenty-one percent came from professional families (Indian civil service, clergy or legal services). Clearly the upper and upper-middle classes accounted for ninety-five percent of these officers. From these similar origins the officers in this study embarked on common educational experiences. Eighty-nine percent attended one of the British public schools, with twenty-two percent choosing one of the big seven (as specified by the Clarendon Commission). Ninety-seven percent of them continued their education at Sandhurst or Woolwich. The public and military schools, not noted for providing a broad education, emphasized participation in athletics. Finally, they chose regiments giving consideration to opportunity for combat service, family tradition, regional loyalty, social status, and finances.

The socialization process inaugurated in the public schools and reinforced by the military academies persisted throughout the pre-War careers of the generals. They eagerly availed themselves of the opportunity to see combat during the heyday of British imperialism; and ninety-five percent of them gained such combat experience in colonial campaigns. For their services seventy-eight percent were created C.B. and twenty-three percent won awards for gallantry. Despite Army-wide skepticism on the merits of the Staff College, forty-two percent of the

officers in this study endured the harrassment of their peers and financial hardship to attend and were later rewarded for their efforts. Sixty-four percent of those who attended were eventually promoted above Major General (only thirty-seven percent of non-graduates in the group made it past this rank), and four of the five Field Marshals promoted in this group were graduates as well.

Roberts and Wolseley dominated the Army during the careers of the 108 Major Generals. Many officers in this group allied themselves with one of their rings. The patronage that networks fostered, along with the possession of the Staff College certificate, opened avenues to assignment on a general's staff. These jobs advanced careers because they broadened an officer's knowledge and strengthened bonds within networks. As a group the Major Generals served an average of nine years on the staffs of various generals. The events of the Boer War resulted in the ascendancy of Roberts' Ring and the officers in his ring often received the choice assignments. In fact, all five officers in this group promoted to Field Marshal were allied to the Roberts' Ring in one way or another.

Patterns are evident, too, in the recreational habits of the pre-War Major Generals. Interest in athletics, inculcated during their school days, received reinforcement in the regiment. Virtually all of these officers participated in some sport. The mounted sports claimed the most adherents throughout the Army. Membership in gentlemen's clubs provided another social outlet. Seventy-eight percent belonged to at least one club. Military clubs were the most popular, perhaps because they provided a forum for professional discussions. A striking feature of their club membership was the generally non-political nature of their affiliations. Only two of the 108 joined political clubs which re-

flected the military attitude that politics and military service did not mix.

The generals also led very similar private lives. Service customs and low pay for junior officers compelled most officers to postpone marriage. The average age at marriage for these officers was 32.9 years as compared to an average age of 27 for British society as a whole. Among the known cases, these officers chose wives from the upper and upper-middle classes--forty-two percent married the daughters of landowners, forty-seven percent the daughters of soldiers and eleven percent the daughters of professional men. Furthermore, the peculiarities of military life tended to inhibit family size. According to the 1911 census, British families, in general, averaged 2.33 children per couple with the professional class averaging 1.87. The families of the men in this study averaged 1.49 children per couple.

World War I presented opportunities far broader in scope than the colonial campaigns in which the 108 Major Generals had participated. In the first two years they dominated the Army in both command and staff billets. The remaining members of the Wolseley Ring were relegated to non-combat assignments or assignments in secondary theaters, compelling the conclusion that networking played a definite role in the careers of these officers during the War. Advancing age had an impact on their opportunities as well. By the time of the Battle of the Somme their numbers in field commands had declined. Their numbers continued to decline, but the survivors served in high posts throughout the War and even after the Armistice.

After leaving the Army these generals assumed the traditional roles of retired gentlemen just as Harries-Jenkins showed that their predecessors in the nineteenth century had done.⁶³ Half of them settled down on

country estates and became involved in local administration. Others received minor appointive positions with the government or became involved in public service projects. Several served as Colonels of regiments which gave them the opportunity to occasionally don their old uniforms displaying the honors won in forty years of service to their country.

The patterns evident in the careers of this group of Major Generals resulted from the similarity of their origins and from a socialization process which began in the public school and continued throughout their army careers. The desired traits included loyalty, devotion to duty, athletic prowess and courage. A man--such as Edward S. May--who thrived on the danger of the hunt or combat and showed an eagerness to do his part, was the ideal product of this system. During this same time this socialization process also produced men such as Winston Churchill.

While the existence of patterns and a socialization process have been proven in this study, they are not new assumptions. This particular approach of studying an entire generation of generals is new and verifies the assertions of historians such as Gwyn Harries-Jenkins and F. M. L. Thompson who examined links between the military and nineteenth century British society. This study has also added dimension to P.E. Razzell's strictly statistical study of the social origins of the British Army officer. Razzell's conclusion that the gentry provided thirty-two percent of the whole officer corps in this period was borne out by the findings in this analysis. Additionally, the career patterns of these 108 officers were similar to those suggested for the officer corps as a whole by Philip Mason. In his study of the Indian Army he relied on a much smaller sample and an anecdotal approach. This analysis has also

brought post-War stereotypes into perspective by comparing these men with Forester's caricatures.

This study has gone further than merely fortifying previous assumptions. By examining career patterns in their totality, it has shown how and why these patterns developed. The evidence suggests that the officers in this study shared a sense of belonging to an elite, and that they understood how to operate within it to achieve professional success. Certain questions remain to be answered. How far did that awareness extend, who did it include and when did it begin? What perceptions did these men have about their fellow officers and the Army? Also, did they view themselves as professionals?

This generation of generals, shared a sense of racial pride that formed the basis of their understanding of each other and their world view. They believed they possessed what one of them termed "the best fighting blood and the best ruling blood that the world has produced."⁶⁴ They took heart in the knowledge they were the product of blood lines "mixed and matured over a period of some two thousand years," which resulted in the blending of "the ancient Briton," with "the full fighting blood of the Romans, the Norsemen, the Danes, the Saxons, the Scots and the Normans."⁶⁵ Soldierly qualities, then, were a product of good breeding and the British soldier was particularly well-bred. Could Allenby, in whose veins Cromwell's blood flowed, have doubted the existence of inherent talent?⁶⁶

Confidence in their heritage was buoyed up by another important trait common to all of them--loyalty. Loyalty to peers, sovereign and

country, taught in public schools and cultivated by Sandhurst and Woolwich, flowered in the regiment. Loyalty to the regiment was exacting. Celibacy until age thirty and sublimation of self, encouraged devotion to the regiment. These 108 officers accepted their vows to the regiment with equanimity. In 1884 as a new lieutenant in the Kings Royal Rifle Corps, stationed in India's lowlands, Henry S. Rawlinson demonstrated the meaning of regimental loyalty. Though bowled over by the heat and racked by fever, Rawlinson refused to allow his father to use influence to transfer him to the healthier climate of the northern hills. Young Rawlinson did not want to inconvenience his brother officers by leaving them short-handed. He advised his father that he wished to remain with the regiment to "make a good name with my Colonel and my brother officers."⁶⁷ Born to a family with money and influence, Rawlinson did not require the good opinion of either his Colonel or regiment. He could have left the regiment with no penalty but chose the more difficult course to demonstrate his loyalty and to win the loyalty of the regiment in return.

Regimental loyalty ran deep. John Adye was proud to note that his family boasted "five successive generations who have served in the Royal Artillery."⁶⁸ These men believed the regimental system was the basis of the strength of the British Army and would have contended that the esprit engendered by the regiment made the Empire what it was in their time. George Younghusband asserted that the typical regimental mess "was a happy band of comrades, mostly with good private means who travelled about the world in company, and fought the Queen's battles, where and when required."⁶⁹

This sense of loyalty also existed between officers and men. Forester recognized the mechanism of this up and down loyalty, noting that Herbert Curzon lived by the old cavalry axiom which admonished the good commander to, "Feed the horses before the men, and the men before the officers, and the officers before yourself."⁷⁰ By their own example and consideration for their men, the officers in this group won the loyalty and confidence of the British private soldier. They were equally successful with the sepoys of the Indian Army. On bivouac in northern India, Birdwood awoke in a pouring rain to find that his troops had used their own cloaks to shelter and warm him. When he protested one of his soldiers replied, "You are our Sahib, it is our duty to look after you."⁷¹ Thirty years after leaving the Bengal Lancers, Birdwood continued to receive cards and letters from the soldiers he led as a young lieutenant.⁷²

The officers in this study never forgot the importance of setting the right example or caring for their troops. Many of them were conspicuous for their continued efforts to inspire soldiers even when elevated to lofty posts far removed from the troops. Thompson Capper died making a gesture typical of the British officer. He sought to steady his troops during an artillery barrage by riding forward and trooping their lines.⁷³ The sacrifices at the Somme, though no tribute to the methods of the generals, were a tribute to "tommy's" faith in their leadership. Members of this generation even won a grudging tribute from so irreverent a publication as the "Wipers Times" which published the following riddle in 1917:

Little Willie: "When will our heaven-protected troops thrust
back the hordes that seek to enter our sacred
Vaterland, Papa?"

Big Willie: "When the Rawlies cease from Goughing, and their
Plumers Byng no more."⁷⁴

After three years of war, the front line troops retained confidence in Henry Rawlinson and Julian H. G. Byng as well as Plumer and Gough (not members of the group under study).

Strong as it was, esprit-de-corps does not completely account for the obvious commonality of viewpoint and method commented on by Forester and historians of the Great War. Regimental loyalty was the building block which formed the basis of a wider loyalty and sense of belonging that pervaded the British Army. Common origins, education, networking and bonds formed on the athletic field or on campaigns resulted in a sense of belonging to a broader band of officers outside the regiment. Moreover, since the officer corps was small (about 12,000 officers in August 1914) and recruited from a limited sector of society, it was possible for an officer to know a large percentage of his brother officers.

During the War, officers in this study took comfort in knowing their brother officers and, for the most part, felt comfortable working together in the greatest event of their lives. Birdwood, for example, worked closely with Kitchener on the planning for Gallipoli because they had known each other for years. Later, when he served under Haig in France, he noted that he and Haig had first met as school mates at Clifton. He had even closer association with Robertson whom he met in 1888. They were subalterns together and eventually became in-laws as well.⁷⁵ Senior officers, such as Lord Roberts, were well aware of the

importance of this sense of belonging. Roberts made a habit of meeting the junior officers in his command. As Younghusband observed, Roberts always asked after new officers and "he [Roberts] never forgot a face, . . . still more wonderful, a name."⁷⁶

There is little reason to doubt that these men considered the Army a profession and themselves professionals. British society certainly considered the Army a profession above even medicine and law.⁷⁷ Still, Army custom preserved a certain guise of amateur status inherited from the days of purchase when many officers were, in fact, playing at being soldiers. The officers in this study reflected the old prejudice by coating a sincere professional interest in their vocation with a professed indifference to study. In his memoirs, Younghusband asserted that he missed the good old days when sport and dancing were the chief activities of the mess. He suggests it was a simple time when there were "no beastly examinations."⁷⁸ But that same man criticized his training at Sandhurst and can be seen looking both severe and resplendent in the uniform of the Guides in the class photograph of the Staff College class of 1890. John Cowans, also in that Staff College picture, was a well-known bon vivant whose demeanor in no way indicated any great ability or enthusiasm. One of his commanders described him as charming, but not possessed with any "great ardour or genius."⁷⁹ But, Cowans was an industrious student and his staff work was one of the bright spots during the long war in France and Belgium.

The Major Generals under study demonstrated that they were professionals in other ways than attending the Staff College. They joined military clubs which gave them a forum for their views. Still others wrote articles for the monthlies or served as military correspondents

for London papers. Younghusband and Scott-Moncrieff were both prolific contributors to monthly journals. Adye, like others, served as military correspondent several times during his career.⁸⁰ Fifteen of them published books on military subjects, such as John L. Keir's A Soldier's Eye-View of our Armies, published in 1919. Keir offered several radical reforms including ending the resident course of instruction at Sandhurst and Woolwich. Edwin A. H. Alderson's With the Mounted Infantry and the Mashonaland Field Force, 1895 is typical of seven pre-World War I works attempted by officers in this study.⁸¹

It is clear from their own record that these officers perceived themselves as part of a profession which enjoyed a long tradition, well-linked to what they considered a rich national heritage. Their own perceptions further compel the conclusion that they were well aware of the socialization system in the Army. They understood how that system worked and what it required. From the perspective of their own time, there is little doubt survivors of the 108 officers in this study could look on their past with pride even as they bore their old messmates to churchyards in the quiet country towns of Devon, Sussex or Perthshire. Looking back on his forty years of service (1878 to 1918), George Younghusband aptly summed up the accomplishments of his generation, observing:

. . . that in forty years the British Empire has doubled itself in extent of territory, and in population . . . increased by several millions. The sun never sets on the dominions of the King and in righteousness and justice does he reign over half the world.⁸²

NOTES

¹Errol Sherson, Townshend of Chitral and Kut (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1928), pp. 236-240.

²Ibid., pp. 241-242.

³Ibid., p. 241.

⁴Bloch, a Polish banker, published his arguments in the 1890s. The first English translation was available in 1899 under the title Is War Impossible. Bloch also argued modern war would be financially ruinous to participants. Though Nicholas II was sufficiently impressed to call the first Hague Peace Conference, there was little other reaction to Bloch's arguments, see Quincy Wright, A Study of War, abridged by Louise Leonard Wright (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1965).

⁵On the general outline of Franco-British planning, see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969). See also B. H. Liddell Hart, The Real War 1914-1918 (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1964), pp. 36-53.

⁶This information is drawn from various sources. For the order of battle of the B.E.F. on mobilization, see Great Britain, War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War, 1914-1920 (London: H.M.S.O., 1922), p. 12. On command tenures, see A. F. Becke (ed.), Order of Battle 1914-1918, part 1 (London: H.M.S.O., 1945), pp. 1096. See also Brian Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, 1954-1914 (London: Eyre Methuen Ltd., 1972), pp. 338-340.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Lt.-Colonel J. W. B. Merewether and the Rt. Hon. Sir Frederick Smith, The Indian Corps in France (London: John Murray, 1917), pp. 10-12.

⁹These figures include command of formations in all of the combatant theaters as well as the United Kingdom and India. On tenures, see Becke, Order of Battle, parts 1-4.

¹⁰Dictionary of National Biography, 1922-1930, pp. 605-607; Dictionary of National Biography, 1941-1950, pp. 611-613; and Dictionary of National Biography, 1931-1940, pp. 7-12.

¹¹Dictionary of National Biography, 1922-1930, pp. 10-11; and Dictionary of National Biography, 1931-1940, pp. 132-136. See also Who Was Who, 1929-1940, pp. 1271-1272; and Who Was Who, 1951-1960, p. 104.

¹²See Bond, The Staff College, p. 238. On tenures in various assignments, see Becke, Order of Battle, part 4.

¹³Martin Middlebrook, The First Day on the Somme, 1 July 1916 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc. 1972), pp. 105, 244.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 298-305.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 188-240.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 240. Horne fired another general on the same day (July 11, 1916). Horne became an army commander in 1916.

¹⁷Horne rose rapidly during the War from substantive Colonel to Major General (October 1914) to temporary Lieutenant General in January 1916 and temporary General in September 1916. Horne, who had no pre-War honors was invested with four orders, a Baronetcy and a £ 30,000 gratuity for War Services, see Dictionary of National Biography, 1922-1930, pp. 429-431.

¹⁸Brian Gardner, Allenby of Arabia (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1965).

¹⁹Who Was Who, 1929-1940, p. 738.

²⁰Percentages were determined from the Quarterly Army Lists for June 30, 1914; December 31, 1915; December 31, 1916; and December 31, 1917. On the Order of Battle for January 1915, see Brigadier-General Sir J. E. Edmonds (ed.), Military Operations in France and Belgium, 1915 (London: H.M.S.O., 1927), pp. 363-365.

²¹Murray, whose health was a definite factor in his assignment to the post of C.I.G.S., proved incapable of bearing the strain of working with Kitchener, see George H. Cassar, Kitchener: Architect of Victory (London: William Kimber, 1977), pp. 263-297.

²²Brigadier J. E. Edmonds as quoted in Bond, The Staff College, p. 163.

²³Graham Nicol, Uncle George: Field Marshal Lord Milne of Salonika and Rubislaw (London: Reedminster Publications, 1976), pp. 111-112.

²⁴Great Britain, War Office, Statistics, pp. 12-24.

²⁵See Major Desmond Chapman-Huston and Major Owen Rutter, General Sir John Cowans (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1924). See especially Field Marshal Robertson's introduction in volume 2. See the appreciation by Lieutenant-General Edward Altham, a member of the group under study, at Appendix 1, pp. 327-341. Appendix 2, p. 342, shows that Cowans maintained control of supply for an army that increased from about 154,000 regulars to over five million troops in combat theaters in 1918.

²⁶The Times, 18 April 1929, pp. 16, 21.

²⁷Who Was Who, 1916-1928, p. 1136.

²⁸See Table 15 above.

²⁹Who Was Who, 1929-1940, pp. 10, 921; and Sherson, Townshend, pp. 252-258. Townshend's K.C.B., awarded during the War, was the only honor he received for War services. Sherson asserts that Churchill, whom Townshend had known since Omdurman in 1898, attempted to find employment for him to no avail. Townshend and Buller were related by the marriage of Buller to Townshend's second cousin, see Sherson, p. 49.

³⁰General Sir Archibald Wavell, Allenby, A Study in Greatness (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941) pp. 170, 183, 184.

³¹It is worth recalling here that Sir John French favored Wilson over Robertson for the Job of C.G.S., B.E.F., which was Robertson's first step towards become C.I.G.S. Haig's efforts on Robertson's behalf appear to have been instrumental in Robertson's succession to C.G.S., B.E.F., see Bond, The Staff College, p. 316. On Allenby's reaction to his assignment to Egypt, see Gardner, Allenby of Arabia, p. 113.

³²Great Britain, War Office, The Monthly Army List for November, 1919 (London: H.M.S.O., 1919), pp. 121-144. These figures do not include Royal Marines or celebrities who had honorary ranks. For example, Ferdinand Foch was on the list for November 1919, as a British Field Marshal.

³³Dictionary of National Biography, 1931-1940, pp. 738-743.

³⁴Dictionary of National Biography, 1916-1928, pp. 912-916.

³⁵Who Was Who, 1941-1950, p. 450.

³⁶Dictionary of National Biography, 1922-1930, pp. 605-607.

³⁷Ibid., pp. 709-712.

³⁸Dictionary of National Biography, 1931-1940, pp. 7-12.

³⁹Dictionary of National Biography, 1951-1960, pp. 112-114.

⁴⁰Commander Russell Grenfell, The Men Who Defend Us (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1938), p. 63.

⁴¹This information comes exclusively from Who Was Who or the Dictionary of National Biography. Since Who Was Who articles are prepared from information the subject submitted for Who's Who, it is possible more of these officers participated in local administration than shown here.

⁴²William R. Birdwood, Khaki and Gown (London: Ward, Lock & Co., Limited, 1941), pp. 409-411. On Younghusband see Who Was Who, 1941-1950, p. 1276.

⁴³Who Was Who, 1929-1940, p. 739.

⁴⁴Who Was Who, 1916-1928, p. 637.

⁴⁵Birdwood, Khaki and Gown, p. 439.

⁴⁶Who Was Who, 1916-1928, p. 840; Who Was Who, 1941-1950, p. 708. See also Sherson, Townshend, pp. 359-368; and C. E. Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson (London: Cassel & Co., Ltd. 1927) 2:323-326. 328-344.

⁴⁷David Low's "Colonel Blimp" first appeared in 1934 and soon became an institution, albeit one on which few could agree. Low himself was amazed by the intense controversy over the character. He later wondered whether he had "invented this buffoon or did he really exist." By the end of the thirties a feature length film entitled "The Life and Death of Colonel Blimp" further helped institutionalize the stereotype, see David Low, Low's Autobiography (New York: Simon Schuster, 1958), pp. 264-276.

⁴⁸The Times, 20 February 1953, p. 8. General Lawford died in Los Angeles where he made his home in the 1930s.

⁴⁹C. S. Forester, The General (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1936), p. 226.

⁵⁰Gardner, Allenby of Arabia, pp. 93-94; see also Middlebrook, Somme, pp. 238-239.

⁵¹Middlebrook, Somme, p. 80.

⁵²Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, The Life of General Lord Rawlinson of Trent (London: Cassell & Co., Ltd., 1928), p. 132. Nothing in Maurice's work suggests Rawlinson had a solution, but he understood the problem and was flexible enough to experiment. Two weeks after the Somme began he conducted a local attack at night with only five minutes bombardment.

⁵³See Sherson, Townshend, pp. 249-296. Townshend's force had to operate as much as 250 miles inland from their base at Basra, a port on the Tigris-Euphrates estuary on the Persian Gulf. Operating against a force four times the strength of his own, Townshend's advance petered out at Cestiphon about thirty miles south of Baghdad. He then withdrew to Kut, to shorten his supply lines, where he was ordered to remain. The result was that Kut was invested by the Turks. Townshend gets high marks from Liddell Hart, see The Real War, pp. 140-141. On Monro, see Cassar, Kitchener, pp. 414-415.

⁵⁴Maurice, Rawlinson, p. 168.

⁵⁵The Times, 10 May 1930, p. 19.

⁵⁶Ibid., 21 May 1934, p. 9.

⁵⁷General Sir George Barrow, The Life of General Sir Charles Carmichael Monro (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1931), pp. 45, 50, 113-114, and 259.

⁵⁸Who Was Who, 1941-1950, p. 959; see also The Times, 20 October 1943, p. 4.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Who Was Who, 1897-1914, p. 309; see also The Times, 18 October 1914, pp. 3, 4; and 20 October 1914, p. 10.

⁶¹Smithers, A. J., The Man Who Disobeyed (London: Lee Cooper, 1970), pp. 236-237.

⁶²Birdwood, Khaki and Gown, p. 165.

⁶³Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, The Army in Victorian Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 35.

⁶⁴Major-General Sir George Younghusband, Forty Years a Soldier (London: Herbert Jenkins Limited, 1977), p. 35.

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Wavell, Allenby, p. 24.

⁶⁷Maurice, Rawlinson, p. 65.

⁶⁸Major-General Sir John Ayde, Soldiers and Others I Have Known (London: Herbert Jenkins Limited, 1925), p. 15.

⁶⁹Younghusband, Forty Years, p. 8.

⁷⁰Forester, The General, p. 35.

⁷¹Philip Mason, A Matter of Honour (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974), p. 388.

⁷²Birdwood, Khaki and Gown, pp. 90-91.

⁷³Bond, The Staff College, p. 211n. Capper had a reputation for incisiveness, flexibility and above all courage. He believed that officers must be well forward to be able to influence the action. He is reputed to have announced in the Division Staff's mess on one occasion, "What! Nobody on the Staff wounded today; that won't do!" He then promptly sent them all up to the line, see Bond, p. 318.

⁷⁴Patrick Beaver (compiler), The Wipers Times (London: Peter Davies, 1973), p. 230. From the B.E.F. Times (nee Wipers Times), 8 September 1917.

⁷⁵Birdwood, Khaki and Gown, pp. 55-56. Robertson and Birdwood's elder brother, Christopher, married the two daughters of Lieutenant General T. C. Palin, Indian Army.

⁷⁶Younghusband, Forty Years, p. 27.

⁷⁷W. J. Reader, Professional Men (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1966), pp. 78, 150. The Army's prestige rested on the fact that it was "the most aristocratic profession."

⁷⁸Younghusband, Forty Years, p. 8.

⁷⁹Chapman-Huston and Rutter, Cowans, 1:63-64.

⁸⁰Adye, Soldiers, p. 151.

⁸¹Alderson had three other publications. Two on exclusively military topics and Pink and Scarlet which asserted the benefits of hunting for soldiers.

⁸²Younghusband, Forty Years, p. 320.

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