Use of the Award Fee in Air Force System and Subsystem Acquisition

Abstract

This study had three objectives: to clarify the conceptual basis of award fee contracting methods; to describe empirically their application in Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) programs; and to identify lessons which could be learned about the award fee method from these applications. From previous research and existing literature, a 'theory' of the award fee approach to acquisition was formulated which presents it as a distinctive management tool for planning and controlling performance in contracted system acquisition. Fifteen applications of the award fee contracting method in the AFSC were selected as cases from which to derive empirical descriptions of patterns of award fee application. These were analyzed for their consistency with award fee theory. Interviews with government and contractor personnel explored their experiences with the award fee and their judgments about it. Thus, an 'input evaluation' of the award fee approach to acquisition was accomplished to provide a basis for identifying policy and technical recommendations for its more effective future use, and for identifying award fee-related research needs.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Mar 01, 1980
Accession Number
ADA091152

Entities

People

  • Raymond G. Hunt

Organizations

  • University at Buffalo

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Human Systems
  • Space
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Force
  • Air Force Personnel
  • Business Administration
  • Commerce
  • Contractors
  • Contracts
  • Costs
  • Government Procurement
  • Governments
  • Management Personnel
  • Market Economy
  • Organizational Structure
  • Personnel Management
  • Procurement
  • Program Management
  • Psychology
  • Systems Management

Readers

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Government Contracting/Procurement.