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
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
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12-14 June 1980,

National Defense University, Washington, DC

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PRESIDENT'S FOREWORD

As an adjunct to the educational pursuits of the National Defense University, we have endeavored for several years to provide a forum for military and civilian policy-makers to examine and create fresh perspectives on national security issues. One such forum, the 1979 National Security Affairs Conference, surfaced an issue of such complexity that the convened panelists managed only to identify some of the problems in integrating defense planning and arms control.

The potential to develop that study group's findings into policy and organizational suggestions was reinforced when General Lew Allen, Air Force Chief of Staff, noted to me that the 1979 debate in the Senate over ratification of SALT II had also revealed "certain shortcomings in the integration of US arms control efforts and strategic nuclear modernization programs."

The National Security Affairs Institute therefore arranged a special June 1980 conference on "Defense Planning and Arms Control." We invited prominent defense analysts and planners to deliberate with knowledgeable scholars and citizens from the private sector. The participants were divided into two panels which examined "Integrating Defense Planning and Arms Control" and "Problems and Prospects for Arms Control in the 1980s." During the arms control hiatus following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, we had a special opportunity to reexamine some of the fundamental issues of arms control and national security.

The panel participants debated the issues, encouraged by the university's policy of nonattribution of specific views to individuals and stimulated by the diverse perspectives of the papers commissioned to focus discussions. This conference proceedings summarizes those discussions and presents the papers so ably prepared by the authors.

As with our annual conference, we were privileged to have the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as our cosponsor and again express our thanks to Secretary David E. McGiffert and his staff for their splendid cooperation. We also sincerely appreciate the personal participation of Air Force Chief of Staff General Lew Allen which made the deliberations more relevant to future policy choices. The interest and support of Ambassador Ralph Earle II, Director of ACDA, also contributed to the final outcome of this meeting.

Finally, on behalf of all of us at the National Defense University, I must express our gratitude to our distinguished panel chairmen, authors, and participants for making this special National Security Affairs Institute conference a valuable source of ideas for us all.

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R. G. Gard, Jr.

R. G. GARD, JR.
Lieutenant General, USA
President

OVERVIEW

Defense Planning and Arms Control

During the summer of 1979 one of the panels of the Annual National Security Affairs Conference sponsored by the National Defense University (NDU) explored policy issues affected by continuity and change in arms control and defense planning. That panel identified problems in the integration of defense planning and arms control, but provided few suggestions for improvement. Later in the year General Lew Allen, Air Force Chief of Staff, reinforced the panel conclusion in a letter to Lieutenant General Robert G. Gard, Jr., President, National Defense University. General Allen indicated that shortcomings in integrating arms control and defense modernization efforts may be sources of a lack of consensus on fundamental national security issues. General Allen requested that NDU assist in exploring these problems which he encountered firsthand during congressional testimony concerning SALT II ratification.

In response to General Allen's request, and to build upon the conclusions of the 1979 conference, NDU and the Office of the Secretary of Defense cosponsored a special conference June 12-14, 1980, at NDU. Two panels were convened; one focused on current policies and processes for integrating defense planning and force structure development with arms control initiatives and negotiations; the second examined the current status of arms control initiatives and assessed future directions for US policies.

This overview introduces and summarizes the material elaborated upon in the later reports from each panel. We must caution, however, that neither this overview nor the panel reports can fully present the intense creativity and thoughtfulness expressed by the participants during their conference deliberations.

PANEL 1. INTEGRATING DEFENSE PLANNING AND ARMS CONTROL

The panel approached its task by exploring the dimensions of the problem of integrating defense planning and arms control and subsequently discussing possible improvements.

One interesting outcome of the panel's deliberations is the manner in which its views converge and diverge from General Allen's formulation. The panel agrees that the debate over ratification of SALT II "revealed a disturbing lack of consensus on issues fundamental to our military posture." Despite arriving at their conclusions from widely separated philosophies of arms control, few, if any, participants disagreed with the proposition that the outcome of US arms control efforts is at present unsatisfactory. The panel failed, however, to affirm, with General Allen, that "much of the argument" derives from shortcomings in integrating defense concerns and arms control efforts.

The underlying reasons for the absence of consensus on arms control and defense planning were seen as more fundamental. Among the reasons discussed by the panel were: a perceived discrediting of the assumptions which originally supported arms control negotiations, in particular, the idea that limited cooperation with the Soviets is possible; sharp, almost irreconcilable differences among the national security leadership on the Soviet-American strategic relationship; basic misunderstanding of the purposes, objectives, and prospects of arms control negotiations as means for enhancing national security which exaggerate expectations and magnify apparent failures; and finally, most directly relevant to the panel's inquiry, inadequate governmental performance resulting in part from intra- and inter-agency arrangements which need improve-

ment. The panel concluded that the lack of consensus on arms control and defense planning is an outgrowth of a more basic, potentially debilitating problem—an absence of general agreement on the broad outlines of a coherent national strategy to achieve US security objectives.

Due to the more fundamental factors which better explain the polarization of national security positions, the panel viewed arrangements for integration of defense planning and arms control at most a second order issue, particularly in light of the apparently broad consensus among panel members that the present national security apparatus is adequately structured to effect integration of the components of national security policy if the more basic divisions are bridged. Nevertheless, the panel did discuss measures which would improve the integration process.

Considerable support was expressed for enhancing the military input into arms control policy deliberations. Some panelists argued that it would be useful to insure this result by providing that the deputy director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) be a military officer. Several panelists also expressed the view, which was not challenged, that the integration of arms control and foreign policy needs to be improved. One panelist suggested that this might be effected by providing that the ACDA director be a senior State Department official.

There was also support for increasing the influence of arms control considerations in the decisional processes of the Department of Defense—the development of defense policy published as Consolidated Guidance; the weapons system acquisition, review, and decision procedures; and the planning, programming, and budgeting system.

Finally, there was a rather broad consensus that the quality of the military participation in arms control policy formulation and implementation should be improved. The present JCS/Joint Staff/services structure was judged by some to be overly cumbersome. There was discussion of the advisability of implementing the Steadman Report (National Military Command Support Structure Study) recommendations which would give the Chairman of the JCS responsibility for rendering independent military advice in some areas, and at the same time provide for more independent assessments of military issues by the Joint Staff. Although time did not permit full discussion, the panel seemed more concerned with weaknesses within the military structure itself than with external constraints imposed by civilian authorities as the principal source of inadequacies in military performance.

PANEL 2. PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL IN THE 1980s

This panel began with an assessment of the issues, recognizing that prospects for arms control had dimmed between 1970 and 1980, that SALT problems were basically political, and that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had seriously threatened SALT and other arms control initiatives. How should the US proceed with arms control? One suggestion was that the US try to extend negotiations by approaching along a new path. For example, the US could propose an agreement to spare C³ networks from nuclear attack.

Ensuing discussion ranged over such a wide area of problems that panelists could not agree on any single chief dilemma for defense strategists to study. They recognized that younger strategists may not feel the horrifying immediacy of nuclear crisis which anyone close to the Cuban missile experience would have understood. Some felt that the rhetoric surrounding SALT masked substance. There was general agreement that

Congress and the American public felt that Afghanistan reflected a new Soviet adventurism encouraged by a growing American military weakness.

The panel discussion also examined the modest potential of any arms control negotiations, suggesting that SALT spokesmen must make clear their purpose, namely, to diminish the risk that war will occur. The panel agreed that political leaders had made use of arms control talks to appeal to certain constituencies, often touting such negotiations too highly. Some suggested amending the proposed treaty to reduce by an agreed annual percentage the numbers of all weapons allowed, an alternative which supposedly would appeal to both hawks and doves and increase the likelihood of Senate ratification.

An animated discussion stressed the naivete of equating arms control with arms reduction but disagreed whether the Soviets would accept percentage reductions. The panelists did agree that the US should recognize its limited ability to control Soviet actions or shape Soviet policy.

In its final discussions, the panel expressed its hope that defense strategists look beyond standard considerations like control and limitation to such important measures as mutual confidence building among the major powers as a means for reducing tension, improved relations with our allies as a means for strengthening prospects for peace, and retargeting as a valuable strategic tool for keeping adversaries off-balance. The members concluded that prospects for arms control in the 1980s may not be as dim as critics think. They expressed appreciation for this opportunity to consider the issues during a quiet time which permitted a thoughtful reevaluation of arms control and its role in US national security planning.

Panel 1

Integrating Defense Planning and Arms Control

This panel examined the current policies and processes for integrating defense planning and force structure development with arms control initiatives and negotiations. The priorities allocated to defense planning versus arms control were reviewed and the group discussed the ability of current organizational structures to integrate these two important aspects of US national security policy. Recommendations were made about future efforts to integrate defense planning and arms control and about organizational structure and process for achieving these ends.

PANEL 1

Participants

CHAIRMAN

Honorable Brent Scowcroft, Consultant

RAPPORTEUR

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AUTHORS

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Honorable George M. Selignious, General Advisory Committee,
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Dr. John Steinbruner, Brookings Institution

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Mr. Adam Yarmolinsky, Kominers, Fort, Schlefer & Boyer

PANEL 1 SUMMARY

Integrating Defense Planning and Arms Control

Brent Scowcroft
Archie Barrett

The task of Panel 1 was to dissect the integration of defense planning and arms control efforts in order to ascertain whether there is a need for improvement in the manner in which these two aspects of national security policy are developed and related to each other. Cognizant of the many facets of the subject as well as the range of views represented by those present, but at the same time mindful of the constraints imposed by a single day for deliberations, the panel limited itself to focusing on two principal sets of questions:

(1) The nature of the problem. Is there really a problem in relating US arms control and defense efforts; if so, what are the substantive dimensions of the problem? Does it stem, at least in part, from flaws in the processes and procedures by which the two are integrated?

(2) The processes for integrating arms control and defense efforts. How do the Department of Defense (DOD), the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the Department of State (DOS), and the National Security Council (NSC) mesh their various concerns to arrive at the defense and arms control components of national security policy? Would different arrangements which give more weight to one or the other component be better?

Reflective of the disparity of views on the subject of arms control, the panel was unable to arrive at a general consensus on the major points at issue. Nevertheless, its deliberations were useful in clarifying the dimensions of the disagreement. And, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, a number of secondary, but still significant, issues were generally agreed upon.

THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

There was a range of views on whether there is in fact a significant problem in "the integration of US arms control efforts and strategic nuclear modernization programs," as stated by General Allen in the correspondence which prompted this conference. At one pole are those who would agree with Professor Michael Nacht's paper that US emphasis on arms control has not had an adverse effect on the structure of its nuclear arsenal. Other factors, discussed below, have been much more significant. Paralleling this position, somewhat, are those who hold that an unforeseen, unfortunate, and perhaps unavoidable, "accidental" conjunction of historical events—Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, inept US political leadership, Iranian hostage crisis—has untracked the arms control process and resulted in the loss of the opportunity for ratification of SALT II. Neither of these groups agrees with the proposition that integrating arms control efforts and defense planning has been a significant problem in the past.

At the other end of the spectrum are those whose position is closer to that expressed in Lieutenant General Edward Rowny's paper. He contends that the overarching importance of the defense posture overwhelms arms control considerations; consequently, the latter should not be integrated with defense planning but should be assessed after a strong national defense has been assured.

Integrating Defense Planning and Arms Control

In the course of discussing these positions it became clear that the panel agreed with—and reflected in its composition—General Allen's observation that there is a "disturbing lack of consensus on issues fundamental to our future military posture." Because the panel could not agree to place a major portion of the blame for this situation at the door of faulty integration, as did General Allen, it was necessary to explore the nature of the problem more broadly.

Certainly few disagreed that the outcome of US arms control efforts is at present unsatisfactory. Arms control proponents are distressed over the absence, after 10 years of negotiations, of a treaty limiting strategic arms. Opponents of SALT II emphasize that the SALT process has failed to halt the growth of Soviet power, either absolutely or relatively, the net result being that the US has emerged from the decade of arms limitation talks with its strategic arsenal threatened. While obviously not agreeing on each item, and aware of the overlap with the deliberations of Panel 2, Panel 1 discussed the following factors which contribute to the present hiatus.

- Many agreed with Professor Nacht's contention that the assumptions which made arms control negotiations with the Russians possible in the first place have been discredited, if not in fact, at least in the perception of many who now oppose or are undecided on SALT. These "discredited" assumptions include the view that limited cooperation with the Soviets is possible due to a mutual desire to avoid nuclear war; the premise that the number of strategic weapons, after a certain point, no longer matters; and the conviction that military force is of limited value in achieving foreign policy goals. Soviet expansionist activities in Africa, Southern Asia, and elsewhere, backed by an unremitting strategic and conventional buildup, undermine these assumptions and, consequently, the preconditions for arms control agreements.

- Whatever the intellectual genesis, the panel recognized the validity of Professor Nacht's observation that there are sharp, irreconcilable differences in outlook among the national security leadership "on virtually every fundamental question about the Soviet-American strategic relationship." These differences automatically preclude outcomes of arms control negotiations which are satisfactory to the leadership as a whole.

- There was general agreement that the anticipated results of arms control have unfortunately been overblown. Realistically, arms control negotiations can only be expected initially to achieve a "halt in place" as a prelude to eventual reductions. Expectations that they will terminate the "arms race," dramatically decrease resources allocated to defense, and secure strategic stability from the perspective of each side are premature, unrealistic, and ultimately self-defeating.

- A criticism, supported by some panel members, was that the cause of arms control has been damaged from a misguided understanding, especially in the early years, of its basic rationale. Those who advance arms control on moral grounds as a good in itself lose credibility in the eyes of all but the most visionary in the present deteriorating conditions. More to the point, they undermine the efforts of those proponents who correctly see both defense and arms control policies as means serving the end of enhanced national security.

- Some panelists maintained that it is unfortunate that the views of those who would make arms control an end in itself are institutionalized in the bureaucracy, giving added weight to an untenable, harmful position. Other panelists disagreed fundamentally that this is the outlook or consequence of a separately organized arms control and disarmament agency. The relationship of ACDA, State, the NSC, and DOD, became the basis for later discussion of the integration process.

Integrating Defense Planning and Arms Control

- Most panelists agreed that there has been a failure to elaborate clearly to the public, the Congress, and allies, the objectives the US was and is seeking in arms control negotiations. Some panelists felt that encouraging the public to expect increased security (i.e., national interest objectives) from the SAL negotiations would have had a self-fulfilling effect; the hand of US negotiators would have been strengthened and a more equitable treaty would have resulted. In this context, some panelists commented favorably on the manner in which the international trade negotiations (admittedly less complex than SALT) were handled with the chief negotiator carefully and continuously relating developments in the negotiations to domestic interest group and congressional concerns. It was argued that arms control negotiations would benefit from an analogous approach.

As these points were discussed, the opinion of panelists appeared to move toward the view that the underlying problem with which the panel was groping was larger than the question of arms control. The problem is an absence of a general agreement on the broad outlines of a coherent national strategy to achieve national security objectives. Some panelists faulted unsophisticated, weak governmental leadership for this condition. Others, while not completely denying this point, would couch their explanation more broadly, pointing to the inherent difficulty in arriving at an agreed strategy in a period in which the US-Soviet military relationship has moved from superiority to parity, energy problems place unprecedented strains on the international and national economies, and domestic political demands have, at least until recently, received greater political support than national security concerns.

Whatever the causes, the panel recognized the harm to the nation which results from an absence of consensus on at least a broad outline of how to pursue national security objectives. Few believe it possible or desirable to endeavor to set out in one document a clear and concise declaration of national strategy, as was attempted in earlier NSC documents. But, on the other hand, few disagree that the nation suffers when the national security leadership is so divided that the extremes are represented on the one hand by the strident call to arms of the Committee on the Present Danger and on the other, by those who subscribe to the validity of sanguine calculations which purport to demonstrate the sufficiency of one ballistic missile submarine to maintain an adequate strategic balance.

INTEGRATING DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS

Having concluded that the basic problems in achieving an acceptable balance between defense planning and arms control lie beyond the reach of governmental processes and structures for developing and coordinating policy positions, the panel also agreed in general that the present intra- and interagency mechanisms are capable of formulating a coherent strategy if the more fundamental obstacles are overcome. Although the central problem is not integration in the structural sense, the panel did discuss possible improvements in ACDA and DOD.

ACDA. Despite the dissatisfaction with its past performance on the part of some members of the panel, which was noted above, there was broad agreement that ACDA should not be abolished or diminished. Several panelists maintained that ACDA should in fact become more influential. One expressed the view that lack of influence in the past has at times fostered its more extreme initiatives; for example, seeking and obtaining legislative approval for the Arms Control Impact Statement. The latter was uniformly criticized as ineffective and counterproductive by all who addressed the subject. Another panelist, speaking from an NSC perspective, expressed the view that integra-

Integrating Defense Planning and Arms Control

tion of arms control and foreign policy is a much more serious problem than the subject of the panel inquiry. This statement was seconded by a participant who suggested that ACDA should ideally be directed by an additional Deputy Secretary of State.

Sentiment for continuing ACDA as a separate organization was not unanimous, however. One panelist expressed the view that because defense planning and arms control are, properly considered, components of defense policy with the end of achieving national security, both should be handled in DOD. Another panelist suggested that, specifically, the JCS should be responsible for arms control efforts.

These minority views gave point to what appeared to be an underlying consensus that the military should have a more influential voice in the development of arms control policy. Discussion focused on whether the ACDA Director or Deputy Director should be a military officer. It was agreed that the director should be a civilian. Subsequently, strong support was expressed for the proposal that the deputy director be a senior military officer. Several panelists suggested that he be an active duty officer; others thought a retired officer would be less likely to incur conflicts with the JCS and services.

DOD. If there was strong support for increasing the weight of military considerations in ACDA arms control deliberations, there was equally strong sentiment for Philip Odeen's recommendations which would institutionalize arms control considerations as a part of the internal decision processes of DOD. Development of strategic weapons emanates from deep within the services. At present, a great deal of momentum, which is difficult to rechannel, is gained before arms control considerations are brought to bear. Odeen's proposals would insure that the implications for arms control are considered in the development of the DOD Consolidated Guidance at each decision point of the weapons acquisition process, and throughout the planning, programming, and budgeting process.

Although there was insufficient time remaining for more than a brief expression of views, the panel ended by considering the adequacy of the military input to arms control planning. Earlier, it had achieved a rather broad agreement that the military voice should be given more weight, but it had delayed considering General Rowny's point that defense planning has failed; that is, that the quality of the military input may be unsatisfactory. The view was expressed that the military input is not what it should be. The JCS has been extremely defensive and reluctant to participate in arms control activities. It seldom, if ever, initiates arms control proposals. More JCS and Joint Staff participation is needed but it is doubtful that the present cumbersome system will support such a change. It was suggested that the recommendations of the Steadman Report (National Military Command Structures Study) on enhancing the role of the Chairman of the JCS as a source of independent military advice and making the Joint Staff less dependent on service views would tend to improve the quality of military participation in the formulation of defense policy. Despite the limited time devoted to the subject, one conclusion is clear: the panel was more concerned with weaknesses within the military structure itself than with external constraints imposed by civilian authorities as the principal source of inadequacies in military performance.

PANEL 1 Paper:

**The Role of Arms Control in Defense Planning:
Integration, Subordination, or Obliteration?**

Michael Nacht

Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan prompted President Carter to request the Senate to delay consideration of the SALT II Treaty, the role of negotiated arms control as an element of US national security policy has become highly uncertain at best and perhaps, as some claim, is on the brink of extinction. Support in the United States for arms control, particularly in the form of bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union, has been eroding rather steadily throughout the 1970s. From the peak of enthusiasm symbolized by the 88-to-2 Senate vote in favor of ratification of the SALT I agreements, we have now reached a point at the beginning of the 1980s where there is considerable skepticism about the utility of the entire concept. Indeed, many students of defense policy argue forcefully that arms control agreements and the SALT process in particular have been highly detrimental to US national security interests.

Restricting our attention initially to SALT, a summary of the main criticisms would include the following:

- The SALT agreements have failed to arrest the impressive buildup of Soviet nuclear forces that has led to a significant shift in the nuclear balance between the superpowers, permitting a condition of American superiority to be replaced by one of incipient Soviet superiority.
- The SALT process has had a "lulling" effect on American attitudes toward defense which in turn has led to a systematic underestimation of the character of the Soviet military threat and the military forces and budgetary resources that the United States requires to meet this threat.
- SALT agreements have not solved and cannot solve particular military problems, such as the vulnerability of the US land-based missile force.

In general, it is argued that arms control became divorced from defense planning. Negotiations were pursued for the sake of reaching agreements irrespective of their relationship to force posture or foreign policy considerations. And, as a consequence of the high-level political support accorded the SALT process, national force posture decisions that would otherwise have been a natural outcome of defense planning were distorted, delayed or nullified. What is needed to remedy this situation, it is now claimed, is to downplay the significance of arms control negotiations, reduce their scope, lower our expectations about what can be achieved through such agreements, and "integrate" arms control into defense planning.

To define concretely what is meant by "integration" and to assess its feasibility and desirability, it is important to see clearly how arms control and defense planning have fit together in the past and to identify the domestic constraints and the international conditions that work against the promotion of integration.

Arms Control: Objectives, Process, Performance

The intellectual underpinnings of arms control stemmed from the writings of non-government defense intellectuals in the late 1950s and early 1960s who were looking for a constructive middle ground between utopian and dangerous notions of unilateral nuclear disarmament on the one hand and the call by others for the accumulation of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles in an open-ended nuclear

Integrating Defense Planning and Arms Control

arms race with the Soviet Union. "Arms control" as articulated by Schelling, Bull, Brennan and others was to be a part of a national strategy aimed at reducing the likelihood of war, reducing the damage should war occur, and/or reducing the resources needed to prepare for war.

The 1960s witnessed the assumption to power of a number of key officials committed to the search for arms control—President Kennedy, Defense Secretary McNamara, Science Advisor Weisner, and others—and their early efforts produced the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the first truly significant arms control agreement in the post-World War II period. But perhaps more importantly, three significant realizations took hold during this decade among important officials and nongovernment leaders that laid the foundation for the SALT process. The first was the judgment that the US and the Soviet Union were *not* engaged in a global contest for power that was "zero sum" in nature. Americans began to believe, influenced in part by Soviet behavior and by the emerging Sino-Soviet split, that limited cooperation with the Soviets was possible, and surely preferable to unbridled competition, and that the most important shared value was in the desire to avoid nuclear war.

Second, a view took hold, stemming from the early writings of Brodie and others, that numbers no longer mattered or did not matter very much in the nuclear weapon business. Once the leadership was confident that a few thousand warheads could survive even the most well-orchestrated first strike and be delivered as part of a resounding retaliatory attack, it was felt that the conditions for nuclear deterrence would be satisfied. The buildup of forces beyond this point served no discernible military or political purpose.

Third, the Vietnam trauma suggested that military force was of limited value in achieving foreign policy goals, and it became fashionable to believe that economic and other non-military concerns would come to dominate a world of growing interdependence and that traditional definitions of security were becoming passé.

The prevalence of these views, I would argue, laid the basis for domestic support for negotiated arms control with the Soviet Union, although it is highly doubtful that America's foreign policy leaders at the end of the decade, particularly President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, subscribed to them. Instead, Nixon and Kissinger sought to use arms control as part of a strategy to enmesh the Soviet Union into the complexities of the international community, to complicate Soviet decision-making processes, and, ultimately, to reform Soviet behavior and reduce the aggressive and expansionist character of Soviet foreign policy aims.

The SALT I agreements, and the ideas introduced by Senator Jackson during the Senate ratification process, were the first signs that the assumptions which were at the foundation of the domestic support for SALT would not go unchallenged. Indeed, the dispute over the numerical disparities between Soviet and American land-based and sea-based missile launchers contained in the Interim Agreement signalled that numbers (of warheads or launchers) *do* matter at least in the context of the American defense debate. Parity is a fine idea for Americans to subscribe to while enjoying superiority. But once numerical parity is seen as arriving and then rapidly slipping away, it is virtually impossible for this deteriorating condition to be avoided as a subject of political debate, irrespective of the intrinsic merits of the numerical comparisons. And then, with the magnification of the US debate at home and abroad, the numbers *do* take on at least political significance. American leaders *do* become less confident. American allies *do* become more uncertain about the credibility of US support. And the Soviet Union's leadership *does* become more emboldened in its attitudes, pronouncements, and policies. Since the Soviet leadership was unwilling to reach SALT agree-

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ments that would constrain the main dimensions of their nuclear weapons modernization program (they had, after all, no incentive to do so), the strategic nuclear balance not only shifted during the 1970s in numerical terms, but the assumption that numbers do not matter was discredited.

Following the ratification of the SALT I agreements, the character of Soviet nuclear force deployments and the nature of Soviet policy in the developing countries undermined the first assumption cited above concerning the cooperative potentialities of the Soviet-American relationship. The litany of Soviet "transgressions" is by now regrettably familiar: the deployment of high-accuracy ICBMs that pose a serious threat to the US ICBM force and its command, control and communication system; the deployment of high-accuracy IRBMs for use in the European theatre that could deny NATO's ability to maintain escalation control in the event of a conventional war in Europe; the testing of antisatellite weapons; questionable adherence to certain provisions of the ABM Treaty and of other arms control agreements; the development and maintenance of an elaborate civil defense program; the generation of military writings that concentrate on nuclear war fighting; the use of Cuban, Czech, and East German proxy forces in Sub-Saharan Africa; and the most recent invasion of Afghanistan. While honest men can disagree about the significance of any one of these developments, the fact is that their cumulative effect has been to paint a picture for the American people of an adversary that is bent on destroying the West and whose leadership has *nothing* in common with the United States, not even the avoidance of nuclear war.

Moreover, in the aftermath of American disengagement from Vietnam, crises and conflicts have continued to materialize and the nature of American weakness has been accentuated. The avoidance of a Soviet-American confrontation during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war; American inability to counter communist gains in Angola, Mozambique, Yemen and Ethiopia; the humiliating hostage situation in Iran; and the smoldering problems of political instability in Saudi Arabia, South Korea and the Philippines all accentuate the significance of the role of force in the modern world. And this realization has produced a marked shift in congressional and popular attitudes about the need for growth in the defense budget, for rapid deployment forces, for a more potent naval presence to project American power, and even for serious reconsideration of the resumption of conscription.

Two conclusions can be drawn from these developments. First, with the possible exception of the ABM Treaty, neither arms control agreements nor the SALT process *per se* has achieved the classical objectives of arms control set down some 20 years ago: the likelihood of war (even a Soviet-American nuclear war) has not decreased; the damage should war occur has not been reduced; and the resources devoted to the preparation for war have not declined.* Nor has the Nixon/Kissinger objective of seducing the Soviet Union into a less aggressive stance, through arms control, economic assistance and other measures, been satisfied.** Second, the major assumptions which were in place by the late 1960s that provided the basis of American support for arms control with the Soviet Union have been severely shaken. Most Americans in 1980 believe that our relationship with the Soviet Union is fundamentally competitive. They feel that numbers of weapons do matter, and they do not wish to be second in any comparison with the Soviet Union. And they see a dangerous and turbulent world in which military force will play a key role. For these reasons the future of arms

*The ABM Treaty, it can be argued, has reduced the likelihood of war and marginally limited the resources devoted to the preparation for war, while increasing the probability of damage should war occur.

**It should be noted, however, that the Jackson-Vanik Amendment precluded a full test of the Nixon-Kissinger thesis.

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control well into this decade must necessarily be far more limited than the expectations that its advocates held a decade ago.

Relating Arms Control to Force Posture

If it is the case that the support for arms control has declined significantly in the last decade and that the process has failed to live up to its advanced billing, has arms control distorted and proved harmful to American force posture as well? While an extraordinarily detailed analysis would be required to answer this question with high confidence, a preliminary examination of the evidence would lead to a negative conclusion.

Consider briefly the evolution of several major programs that have played key roles in shaping US nuclear force posture in the 1970s: ABM systems; MIRVs; the Trident submarine; the B-1 bomber; the cruise missile; and the M-X missile. The following judgments are offered for the reader's consideration:

• ABM

The willingness to deploy an antiballistic missile system, in whatever form, has been constrained primarily because of serious doubts about technical effectiveness. It was in the late 1960s—and remains today—virtually impossible to make a cogent technical case for an area-wide ABM system that could satisfactorily defend American cities from a sophisticated missile attack because "satisfactorily" requires a perfect system that permits no leakage of attacking reentry vehicles. The ability of the attacker to resort to saturation techniques, decoys, penetration aids and other devices or to strike initially at ABM radars to defeat the brains of the system has made a sound technical case for city defense unsustainable. While the defense of hardened, point targets is easier, it is still very formidable, particularly in the face of a Soviet combined SLBM pindown and ICBM attack. The argument can be made, and with considerable justification, that research and development funding for BMD systems since the ABM Treaty entered into force has been adversely affected to a very serious degree (at least until quite recently) because of congressional "arms control" sentiment. But it would be a simplistic misreading of the historical record to conclude that misguided notions about strategic stability, assured destruction and arms control led Nixon and Kissinger to accept an ABM Treaty that precluded the deployment of a highly-valued strategic defensive system. Rather, Nixon and Kissinger wanted to halt Soviet ABM deployments, wanted a SALT agreement for domestic political purposes and as part of their strategic policy of dealing with the Soviet Union, and were willing to pay the price of sacrificing a defensive system whose probability of effectiveness was marginal at best.

• MIRV

The decision to proceed with MIRV deployment for both the Minuteman III ICBMs and the Poseidon SLBMs has been analyzed at length by Greenwood, York and others and is the subject of considerable discussion in Nixon's and Kissinger's memoirs. MIRVs had and have many military attractions: they increase the attacker's confidence in the ability to penetrate against defended targets; they provide breadth of target coverage; they provide the attacker with serious countersilo kill capability if the yield and accuracy characteristics of the reentry vehicles satisfy certain performance criteria; and for the US in the 1970s, they compensated for launcher numerical inferiority. MIRVs were never seriously on the negotiating table at SALT I despite the fact that from the perspective of desiring to limit countersilo kill capability their deployment on both sides has been singularly detrimental. In short, MIRV deployment is a fine counter example to

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the assertions that confused American notions of strategic stability seriously injured US nuclear force deployments.

• Trident Submarine

The Trident submarine was part of the strategic force modernization package that the Nixon administration pushed forward and sold to gain acceptance of the SALT I agreements. Its low noise level, its capability of operating at deep ocean levels for protracted periods of time, and its capacity to carry larger (and therefore longer-range) SLBMs than its predecessor are attractive features from the perspective of system invulnerability—perhaps the crucial characteristic of the sea-based force. However, in carrying 24 rather than 16 missiles it places "more eggs in fewer baskets" and therefore provides a fewer number of aim points than would a fleet composed of a larger number of boats each carrying fewer SLBMs than the Trident. But the Trident submarine design was dominated by power plant and crew considerations; vulnerability to enemy ASW capabilities *per se*, the principal consideration from an arms control perspective, did not dominate the design criteria. Hence, the case can be made with reasonable persuasiveness that the evolution of the US sea-based deterrent force would have been little different in the absence of SALT than it is today.*

• B-1 Bomber

The Air Force pushed long and hard for a penetrating bomber to replace the aging B-52 fleet, but it is stretching reality to attribute President Carter's cancellation of the program to the nefarious influence of arms control. At least two other considerations appear to have played significant roles in his decision: penetrability and cost. While the advertised warning-to-launch capability of the B-1 was a marked improvement over the most modern B-52, thereby reducing the potential effectiveness of a Soviet depressed-trajectory SLBM attack against US SAC bases, the gains in penetrating Soviet air defenses utilizing the B-1 instead of the B-52 were, at least theoretically, far less dramatic. Admittedly, such judgments are based on a number of assumptions concerned with bomber radar cross section, speed and altitude in attack mode, effectiveness of bomber ECM and SRAM systems, the ability to generate bomber corridors, and the capabilities of the air defense systems. But reasonable projections about the improved effectiveness in the 1980s of Soviet look down-shoot down air defenses and layered defenses reduced significantly the confidence of B-1 penetrability against a variety of target sets. Alternatively, the development of the ALCM made the prospect real that a "stand off" bomber could carry out many of the missions of the penetrating bomber without requiring the multi-billion dollar investment in the B-1 program.** Moreover, there is little doubt that cost considerations played a direct role in the President's decision. President Carter ran for office on the promise of balancing the federal budget by the end of his first term. Given certain anticipated growth in the defense budget calculated in the first months of his administration and the likely budgetary commitment to the M-X, Trident, and ALCM programs, President Carter was persuaded (it has been alleged by several sources and reported in the press) that he could not afford the B-1 program as well and hope to reach his balanced budget goal. The main point, again, is that arms control considerations failed to dominate the force posture decision.

*One possible caveat is that without SALT, and with considerably higher US defense budgets prevailing throughout the 1970s, the Navy might have pushed harder for more rapid development and deployment of the Trident I and Trident II missiles.

**In certain contingencies the B-52 equipped with ALCMs could serve as a penetrating bomber as well.

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• Cruise Missiles

The full story of the tortured development of US cruise missiles—from the large, inaccurate, land-based systems of the early 1960s to the sophisticated air-launched, tercom-guided, intercontinental-range ALCMs of the 1980s—has not yet been told. But what seems clear is that strong service interest in the cruise missile (in ALCMs, SLCMs, and GLCMs) did not materialize until after the Vladivostok summit in November 1974.* And there is an instructive point to be derived from this observation, one that has been made before but deserves repeating. Force posture decisions are influenced not only by available technologies, mission requirements, the politics of executive-congressional relations, congressional logrolling, and interservice rivalry, but quite significantly by *intraservice* politics and tradeoffs. In a military organization whose *raison d'être* and high prestige are symbolized by the ICBM, the intercontinental bomber, and the advanced fighter aircraft, there is little incentive (and indeed powerful disincentives) to wage bloody bureaucratic battles to obtain budgetary support for ALCMs—systems that would undermine the strategic rationale for the organization's bread and butter programs. Similarly an organization dominated by the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and the SSBN has little desire to make a strong case for a SLCM program that would benefit primarily the attack submarine fleet and selected surface ship programs. And a fighting force organized around the soldier and armored warfare has limited interest in GLCMs that would presumably improve the effectiveness of the artillery units but would have only marginal effects on the service's overall ability to wage conventional warfare. It is surely the case that since early 1975 the cruise missile in all its forms has been the subject of intense bargaining and negotiation within the United States government and in the SALT process. (Obviously, from the Soviet defense perspective, neither US ALCMs, nor US SLCMs nor US GLCMs would be seen as a welcome development.) As a consequence, should the SALT II Treaty ever be ratified, the number of ALCMs deployed on heavy bombers will be regulated, and the number of GLCMs deployed in Europe as part of the NATO LRTNF modernization program may well become enmeshed in some elaborate arms control initiative to "regulate" the Eurostrategic balance. But, to date, it is difficult to conclude other than that US interest in the cruise missile was stimulated rather than retarded by the SALT process.

• M-X

The M-X land-based ICBM has had a peculiar and controversial evolution whose outcome is still uncertain. When allegations were first raised publicly in the early 1970s about the impending vulnerability of the US Minuteman force, it was the US Air Force that initially mounted the most vigorous analytical rebuttal, pointing in particular to the fratricide problem as a major obstacle for the attacker to overcome. More recently, and particularly after President Carter terminated the B-1 program, the Air Force pushed the M-X program vigorously and has received strong support from Secretary of Defense Brown and Under Secretary of Defense Perry and the blessing of President Carter as well. The M-X would augment considerably the hard target kill capability of the US land-based missile force, would narrow to some extent the throw-weight disparity between the Soviet and US ICBM forces, perhaps thereby improving "perceptions" of the

*There is some evidence to suggest that members of the Ford Administration who opposed the framework of the Vladivostok agreement sought to link the cruise missile issue to constraints on the Soviet *Backfire* bomber. The alleged rationale was that the Soviets would not accept any constraints on the *Backfire* under SALT II, but desperately wished to forestall US cruise missile deployment; linking the two would effectively stalemate the negotiating process, perhaps leading to the abandonment of the Vladivostok formula.

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strategic balance, and would provide the capability to attack the entire spectrum of Soviet targets. But hard target kill capability runs counter to arms control definitions of strategic stability that urge the avoidance of targeting the adversary's retaliatory forces. And yet President Carter decided in favor of M-X deployment in large measure to gain support from Senate skeptics for ratification of the SALT II Treaty. Thus the missile performance characteristics were in no way retarded by arms control considerations.*

Where SALT-related concerns have played a significant role, however, is in the choice of the basing mode for M-X. By early 1979 members of the Defense Science Board and many other respected defense analysts endorsed a multiple vertical protective shelter system for the M-X, a means of protecting the missile through deceptive basing among a large number of aim points. President Carter, it is widely believed, rejected this basing mode on the grounds that it would be inconsistent with provisions of the SALT II Treaty and would not be verifiable by national technical means. Instead he endorsed a horizontal basing mode that has since been redesigned more than once, but that in all likelihood would be more costly and more vulnerable to attack, though more easily verifiable, than the vertical structure system. This is perhaps the first concrete example of a major nuclear force posture decision that was directly influenced, and perhaps adversely, to accommodate explicit arms control considerations.

Overall, then, it is fair to conclude that the Carter administration and the Nixon and Ford administrations as well can claim with a great deal of credibility that no major nuclear weapons program that the United States sought to deploy was constrained by the SALT I agreements, by the prospect of SALT II entering into force or by the SALT process itself. At a more general level, it is difficult to assess comprehensively and dispassionately the allegation that the public and in turn the Congress was "lulled" into a false sense of security by the rhetoric of SALT and detente and that this exercise in self-delusion undercut needed legislative support for real growth in the defense budget through much of the 1970s.

Even granting the veracity of this observation, three important points are worth making. First, weakened support for defense programs surely resulted at least as much from the "no more Vietnams" attitude that permeated American society through most of the decade as from the arms control euphoria that had begun to wane seriously by 1975. Second, it is difficult to determine with precision the debilitating effect on US defense programs of a chronic American inflationary condition, brought about by the decline in economic productivity and the enormous increase in costs for imported oil since 1973. But surely it was a nonnegligible influence on congressional willingness to support incredibly expensive weapons programs that were competing increasingly with a large number of other budgetary priorities. And third, it is not at all clear that, even had greater defense budgetary support been forthcoming during this period, it would have been reflected in heavier funding for strategic nuclear weapons programs. General purpose forces might well have been the principal beneficiary.

Hence, a perhaps uncomfortable but compelling conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that, irrespective of the deficiencies in the nuclear force deployments that have emanated from the American defense planning process in recent years, it is difficult to lay most of the blame at the doorstep of arms control and its supporters.

Domestic Political and Organizational Constraints

There are important domestic political and organizational constraints that at present severely limit the ability of any administration to develop arms control approaches

*Of course should SALT II enter into force, warhead fractionation limits would be in effect.

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and defense programs that are mutually consistent and reinforcing. In recent years it has become widely acknowledged that inconsistency and incoherence have become the hallmark of American foreign and national security policy. While these characteristics have been attributed to the particular limitations of President Carter and some of his subordinates, the problem may be more endemic.

An experienced student of governmental structure and policy implementation has pointed to a "crisis of competence in government" that he attributes to five major developments: the disintegration of American political parties brought on by the decline of party bosses and machine politics has weakened the party as a unifying force among the President, the House and the Senate; the popularization, through state primaries, of the Presidential selection process has increased the prospect that a President could be chosen with limited experience in or knowledge of national or international affairs; the rejection of Presidential leadership by the Congress has emerged as a consequence of Watergate and other perceived excesses of the "imperial presidency"; severe limitations on congressional leadership have resulted from the breakdown of the seniority system and the large influx of newly elected officials who prefer political individualism to party loyalty; and deterioration of administrative competence has been brought about by the increasing number of political appointees in top management positions who are chosen for reasons (e.g., policy views, constituencies represented, or political services rendered) other than the ability to manage.*

The net result of these developments has been increased *fragmentation of authority* throughout the federal policymaking process. This is not a new characteristic, of course. Fragmented authority has been an inherent feature of the process that all public managers must face, at least in the United States, and Richard Neustadt pointed out two decades ago that Presidential power was primarily in the power to persuade. But the process is significantly more fragmented now than when Neustadt first offered his observations. And in the foreign and defense policy arena, with the collapse of containment and the discrediting of detente, the challenges to policy coordination and integration are especially formidable.

A further impediment to the sensible integration of defense planning and arms control is the sheer *overworked condition of the senior figures* in the national security policy community. Consider these observations by a man who has served in a significant advisory capacity to virtually every Secretary of Defense since McNamara:

The trend has ... been toward increased centralization and more layers of authority in an effort to impose some degree of order and coordination on the many and disparate groups in the national security community. But more often than not, the effort has led to the overburdening of a small number of senior officials with the details of foreign policy, defense planning, arms control, and crisis management.

This overloading has had a number of undesirable effects, among them crisis management as a way of life and reaction to events rather than planning and initiatives; inadequate staffing of positions simply because the principals usually lack the time either to determine what kind of support they need or to absorb the results of the work that is done; the ability to handle only a very small number of issues more or less simultaneously; the tendency of the staffs to coordinate and compromise at the lowest common denominator rather than let issues escalate to their harried principals; the exploitation of this process by the ambitious to make their mark, expand staffs, and attract no-

*See James L. Sundquist, "The Crisis of Competence in Government," in Joseph A. Pechman (ed.), *Setting National Priorities: Agenda for the 1980s* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1980), pp. 531-563.

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tice; and leaks as disaffected staffs become alienated from this interminable process or are unable to make their views heard."

Kaufman suggests that even the defense planning guidance that was introduced in the early 1970s to cope with this problem has been largely ineffectual:

The secretary of defense finds himself still immersed in detailed programmatic issues that he is forced to resolve on narrow grounds. He has no macroscopic model of what various budgets and forces will produce in the way of deterrence and defense; he lacks a basis against which to compare what has been produced by the planning and programming process; he sees a great many trees, but few forests. Thus, to the extent that the Carter defense program (or practically any other for the past decade) meets national needs, it is as much by accident as by design."

And the workload problem is just as severe at the highest levels in the Department of State and in the Office of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs. Indeed, Marshall Shulman, who served as a special assistant to Secretary of State Acheson in the Truman Administration and in a similar capacity to former Secretary of State Vance, has estimated that the workload is 10 times today what it was in 1950. With such back-breaking schedules, it is little wonder that government's top officials fail to produce better integrated arms control policy and defense planning.

But there are significant additional impediments to integration. One of these is that there are fundamental differences in outlook, amounting to essentially *irreconcilable ideologies*, held by key players that influence national security policy. Consider, for example, members of the cast who at one time or another had leading roles in the SALT II drama:

President Carter, Vice President Mondale
NSC: Brzezinski, Aaron, Hyland, Molander
DOD: Brown, Slocombe
State: Vance, Gelb, Shulman
ACDA: Warnke, Earle, Timbie
JCS: Jones, Rowny
CIA: Turner, Bowie
Senate: Jackson/Perle, Nunn
Nongovernment: Kissinger, Nitze

Except for the President, this is an imposing array of professionals who have been concerned with foreign policy, defense and arms control issues for many years. They are graduates of America's leading universities and they collectively represent expertise in a wide range of legal, political, military, and technical issues. But where they differ sharply among themselves is on virtually every fundamental question about the Soviet-American strategic relationship: on the delicacy of the nuclear balance; on the political and military significance of growing US ICBM vulnerability; on the political utility of nuclear weapons; on whether the Soviet Union is motivated primarily by defensive or expansionist aims; on the meaning of strategic stability and the desirability of deploying high-accuracy counterforce weapon systems; on what SALT has accomplished to date and what negotiated arms control with the Soviets can hope to accomplish in political, military and economic terms. These views are deeply rooted and give rise to perceptions and self-perceptions that accentuate polarization within the community: some see themselves as present-day Churchills doing battle against dangerously naive Chamberlains; others see themselves as sophisticated foreign policy centerists at odds with

*William W. Kaufmann, "Defense Policy," in Joseph A. Pechman (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 285.

***Ibid.*, pp. 285-286.

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simplistic, neanderthal-like extremists who only see military solutions to what are most often political problems. As a consequence of the fragmentation of authority and of the incompatibility of many of the prescriptions advanced, the policy process is marked by intense bargaining, most often yielding outcomes that reflect tradeoffs and contradictions rather than consistency of purpose.

Differences in perspective are dramatized by the *conflicting organizational stakes* represented in the process. The Secretary of Defense is confronted by difficult choices in terms of allocation of effort. To what extent should he be a strategist leading the way in developing and articulating new concepts of defense policy? How should he manage to channel the vast resources of his department (staffed by personnel with limited foreign area and political expertise) to produce a sound force structure for the United States, especially given the long weapons system lead-times from research and development till deployment? How can he command the respect and loyalty of the military services? Indeed, what quantitative and judgmental considerations should apply in answering that impossible question, "How Much Is Enough"? How much time should he spend on Capitol Hill, in public forums, with representatives from allied governments, and in consultations with former and potential adversaries? In his highest priority to serve as a personal defense adviser to the President, counselling him on the important defense issues of the day? In sum, the Secretary has many claims on his time, and thinking through the arms control implications of particular weapons systems is unlikely to be high on his priority list except in particular "high politics" circumstances.

The Secretary of State, concerned with charting and implementing foreign policy, oversees a vast array of activities and personnel organized along both regional and functional lines. Diplomacy and negotiation are at the heart of his concerns. He and his colleagues, with limited technical and military expertise, tend to be reactive to and often skeptical about the utility of weapons systems that might be politically damaging to existing negotiations or to relations with other states.*

The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency presides over a small, budgetarily limited and bureaucratically weak organization, conceived in an adversarial fashion to "counter" the influence of the defense community in the making of national security policy. The organization is "product" oriented: promoting and assisting in the achievement of negotiated arms control agreements is its basic business. Too often ACDA personnel see the Defense Department as the principal adversary and project an image of seeking arms control for its own sake, irrespective of military requirements or foreign policy concerns. The generation by ACDA of arms control impact statements for use by the Congress—while in theory an effort to inject an arms control perspective into the weapons acquisition process—has seemingly had the effect of exacerbating the ACDA-DOD adversarial relationship without influencing that process in a constructive fashion.

The President's Assistant for National Security Affairs has enormous power by virtue of his proximity to the President and the personal relationship that tends to develop between them, and by his access to perhaps the broadest array of sensitive information of anyone in the US government. One can debate, as Destler and Szanton have recently, the plusses and minuses of how this office has evolved since Bundy

*A counterexample to this generalization, it should be noted, is the attitude in many State Department regional bureaus toward American conventional arms transfer policies. Seeing security problems from regional and country-specific perspectives, these officials have often been strong advocates of the supply of weapons to particular states. But this is largely outside the defense planning process.

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occupied the position under President Kennedy.* But as presently constructed the burdens of day-to-day events are enormous. Accepting the necessity of an NSC staff of fewer than 50 professionals occupied with every serious national security and international economic problem confronting the United States, it is unreasonable to expect that this apparatus could evaluate on a sustained basis the arms control implications of even a small fraction of the myriad of systems in the weapons research, development, testing and engineering pipeline.

We could add to this list the perspectives of:

- **The Joint Chiefs of Staff, who oversee a vast military establishment that is torn by competing interests, priorities and traditions; that is severely demoralized by the Vietnam experience and, most recently, by the failed rescue attempt in Iran; and that sees itself as unnecessarily and harmfully constrained by civilian leaders who use the military solely for their own selfish political ends.**
- Officials of the Office of Management and Budget, who seek to influence policy through budgetary control over programs whose purpose and substance they appreciate to only a limited extent; and who are forced to make decisions in a highly inflationary and therefore highly unpredictable economic climate.
- Officials of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, who have witnessed the dramatic decline in influence of the "Science Advisor" in national security affairs from the days of Kistiakowsky and Weisner, and who now play at best a marginal role on selected defense issues.
- **The President, whose schizophrenia on arms control and defense policy issues has been demonstrated repeatedly, and whose behavior reflects just as much the contradictory advice of his associates and the indecisive character of contemporary attitudes in the Congress, among the informed elite, and within the general public.**

In addition to these varying and competing perspectives, a major constraint on the integration of arms control and defense planning is what might be termed the "*clean slate phenomenon*." Every new administration seeks to make its mark by evaluating the major policies and programs it has inherited, by dismantling when feasible ineffective practices, and by introducing as many distinctively new initiatives as the system will tolerate. Wiping the slate clean and starting afresh guarantees a certain degree of discontinuity, at least from administration to administration. While substantial economic and organizational investments in long lead-time systems build powerful constituencies, we have seen that Presidents and Secretaries of Defense, when willing to pay the price, can and do terminate programs. Arms control negotiations, lacking in broad-based support (SALT was an exception), are relatively easy to redirect or suspend. Consequently it would be naive to expect the policy process as it presently works to produce mutually consistent arms control initiatives and defense programs on a sustained basis.

International Conditions

Students of public management appreciate that in situations where authority is highly fragmented, officials must build support for policies from a variety of sources within and outside their organization. They must act as "entrepreneurial advocates," mobilizing authority and resources from the external environment for specific policy

*See I.M. Destler, "A Job That Doesn't Work," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1980, pp. 80-88 and Peter Szanton, "Two Jobs, Not One," pp. 89-91 in the same issue.

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choices, programs, and organizational agendas. In the defense and arms control field, general trends and specific events in international affairs can be useful in this respect. Without belaboring the point, it is sufficient to note that the nature of Soviet behavior, alliance relationships, and domestic politics in important developing countries all point to a decade ahead of considerable turbulence, anxiety, and danger. This suggests that international conditions will support the arguments of those who seek to augment US defense programs for the purposes of protecting American national interests. In a world of diffuse military, political, and economic power, the number of states needed to be involved to resolve conflicts or to limit arms will be large. Therefore progress through negotiation will be slow and torturous at best. It is doubtful whether the international environment will be helpful in the years ahead for the entrepreneurial advocate who wishes to see arms control considerations play a leading and even decisive role in defense planning or in foreign policy. Rather, such advocates will have to make the case for arms control *in spite of* a hostile international environment, and this will be a very demanding and possibly futile task.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The preceding discussion has addressed some of the underlying impediments to the integration of arms control and defense planning. The focus has intentionally been at the conceptual level and has avoided detailed assessments of the mechanics of defense planning. The Consolidated Guidance of the Department of Defense has not been evaluated nor has the effectiveness of the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council been examined. The manner in which arms control negotiating positions have been put together and their sensitivity to defense policy and foreign policy considerations has not been reviewed. Rather, the effort has been made to examine the broad features of the policy-making environment in which arms control thinking and defense planning are developed. This effort has led to the following conclusions:

- Arms control has by and large failed to satisfy the objectives articulated by both its intellectual inventors and its policy implementors.
- Neither arms control agreements nor the process of negotiated arms control has directly and decisively influenced US nuclear force posture.
- Formidable domestic political and organizational constraints limit the feasibility for integrating arms control and defense planning. These include:
 - fragmentation of authority
 - overburdened senior officials
 - irreconcilable ideologies
 - conflicting organizational stakes
 - the "clean slate" phenomenon.
- International conditions are likely to work against those who seek to promote arms control considerations in the formulation of defense policy.

To "integrate" is to "incorporate into a larger unit." Because of the formidable obstacles identified above it is highly doubtful that defense planning and arms control will become mutually sensitized to the point that either (1) weapons are only deployed that satisfy arms control definitions of stability and desirability; or (2) arms control agreements are only reached that meet defense community standards of security.

To "obliterate" is to "remove utterly from recognition or memory." As a consequence of the residual bureaucratic forces and nongovernmental groups in place that support arms control, and in light of the permanent American characteristic that hope

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springs eternal, even with potential adversaries in a dangerous world, it is equally unlikely that arms control will disappear as a consideration in defense planning and in national security policy more generally.

To "subordinate" is to "place in a lower class or rank." Until such time as domestic structures change and international conditions become more favorable, this is perhaps the best that arms control can hope for in its relationship to defense planning. Weapons will be procured and foreign policies formulated. Arms control considerations will be aired. When arms control perspectives come in direct conflict with either procurement policies or foreign policies, they will be overruled. If there has been any doubt that this has been the role of arms control in the past, it will be dissipated rapidly in the years ahead.

To provide the fairest possible hearing, however, it might be useful to establish a new interagency group. Let us call it the Defense and Arms Control Integration Panel (DACIP). DACIP would be composed of assistant secretary-level personnel from ISA and PA&E in DOD, from PM in the Department of State, and from high-level representatives from the NSC, JCS, OMB, and ACDA. It would be chaired by the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs. It would consider on a continuing basis the arms control implications of deploying several major new weapon systems (the identification of the systems to be examined would be determined by a subcommittee of DACIP). And it would examine the implications on US defense programs of pending agreements in each major ongoing or prospective arms control negotiation. DACIP would be required to produce assessments twice each year to be forwarded to the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, directors of all other agencies associated with national security policy, and appropriate members of the House and Senate. Such a routinized output might not add rationality to the process, but it might illuminate somewhat what the implications are of the choices that have been or are about to be made.

PANEL 1 Paper:

National Security Policy Integration

Philip Odeen

During the course of this study, I interviewed about 80 senior officials dealing with national security issues, as well as a number of former officials and observers outside of government. There was general agreement that the current decisionmaking system works relatively well and that the President is generally being well served. Moreover, there was broad respect for the qualifications, character, and competence of the principals. Some substantive areas were cited as examples of particularly effective national security decisionmaking, namely SALT and the Middle East peace negotiations.

Despite this generally favorable report, there are a number of organizational and procedural weaknesses that reduce the administration's current effectiveness and could prove to be more serious in the future. These matters deserve careful attention. In most cases, prompt remedies are justified and are available; at a minimum, the changes in structure and processes I recommend should be considered when the NSC system is reviewed at the start of the President's next term. My primary objectives in proposing these remedies are to strengthen decision processes, improve implementation of the President's policies, and better prepare the government to deal with crises.

One result of the weaknesses in current organization and procedures is a widespread perception that the administration lacks coherence in policy and action. For example, the most recent *Strategic Survey* published by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies stated:

"Halfway through its term, the Carter Administration continued to present a complicated and at times inconsistent picture to the world. Jimmy Carter's Presidency continues to appear to be one that often lacks centralized means of translating differences of opinion into cabinet policy."

This perception abroad is often echoed domestically as well. Thus a secondary objective of this study is to suggest ways to ensure that this perception is unwarranted and hopefully to change it.

Different Organizational Approaches

Each President has brought a different approach to the management of national security affairs. Since World War II, the National Security Council has normally served as the top-level decision forum while the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and his staff have served as coordinators of the process as well as personal advisors to the President. The manner in which these institutions have been used has varied widely, however, reflecting each President's personal management style, experience, and to a lesser extent the tenor of the times and the personality of the individual occupying the position of National Security Assistant.

Most Presidents have favored "Cabinet Government" when they initially organized their administrations. President Carter opted for this approach and made a persistent effort to decentralize, giving his Cabinet officers considerable responsibility and author-

Note: This paper was prepared originally in September 1979 as the report of a study requested by President Carter and the office of Management and Budget, under the auspices of the President's Reorganization Project (appendix B). The study examines the adequacy of the interagency structure and processes for integrating the President's national security policies, particularly in the areas of defense, foreign affairs, and arms control (see the Terms of Reference, appendix A).

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ity. This effort stems in part from his view that an excessively centralized system existed in the previous administration and in part from his management approach. However, even in areas where departments have broad authority, President Carter has looked to his own staff for fresh ideas, new policy approaches and, in some cases, independent analysis. This has inevitably led to tensions between the EOP and the departments.

There are, however, certain substantive areas where it is agreed that direction or at least detailed involvement by the President's staff is unquestionable. In the conduct of strategic arms limitation negotiations, for example, interagency coordination is required to resolve issues which often affect several departments. Moreover, the issues are of such political importance that the President and his principal advisers are inevitably involved. In such areas, the EOP must play a strong, leading role.

Need for Regular Structure and Processes

There is no ideal system for integrating national security policy, since it must be tailored to fit the needs and style of the President. However, such individualistic considerations alone are not sufficient. For the reasons noted below, regular structure and processes are essential:

- Some issues demand Presidential decision.** They are simply too important for cabinet officers to decide, or to depend on their being raised to the President's attention in an *ad hoc* manner. Established structure and processes help in surfacing such issues and presenting them to the President for resolution.
- Issues requiring Presidential decisions are inevitably complex.** Regular structure and processes help ensure that a full range of options is developed and that the President addresses them early enough to have a real choice. In addition, they provide opportunity for rigorous independent analysis of options, to help the President reach an informed decision.
- One department has primary responsibility, but others may have legitimate interests.** For example, decisions on overseas deployment of nuclear weapons affect State because of foreign policy implications and ACDA because of arms control implications. Unless some means is provided to ensure these agencies have their say, less satisfactory decisions may result and the level of discord will likely increase.
- Policy execution as well as formulation must be ensured.** The system should include a regular means of hearing the views of lower-level officials who will have to implement policy decisions. Unless they feel involved, they will have little commitment to making policies succeed. Furthermore, clear communication to concerned agencies of decisions and their follow-on responsibilities, as well as the expectation of high-level review of their implementation efforts, will increase the probability of effective execution and reduce the likelihood of dissension and poor discipline.

Constraints on Greater Integration

It is important to recognize the constraints on how far and how fast change can be made in the structure and processes that now integrate national security decision-making. They include:

- The need for confidentiality.** Premature leaks are a major concern of all top officials I interviewed. Sensitive documents are not circulated beyond a select few, meetings are limited to principals, and decisions are held closely. However, these practices inevitably limit input and exclude many potential participants with expe-

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rience and responsibility. Although certain discussions and decisions of top officials must remain confidential, every effort should be made to ensure that concerned agencies and individuals are included.

- Decisions must be made.** Each department and EOP element is subject to a demanding regimen of actions, deadlines, and decisions. There is only so much time for debate, staff work, and review. Rigorous judgment must be made as to what interagency inputs will improve the final product. The system must not be overloaded with participants or review levels.
- Value must be added.** Deeper involvement of the departments and EOP elements in one another's activities will work and be sustained only if it adds value to the decisions being made. Carping and concern with minutiae will undercut the mutual cooperation that is needed for the process to operate. The dialogue will quickly become superficial and the impact negligible.

These constraints do not preclude improving the current system for integrating national security policy; however, they deserve careful attention when change is considered.

Most problems and questions raised during my interviews revolve around three related issues, and these deserve particular attention:

- Roles of the President's Staff.** Is the EOP staff identifying critical issues early, managing the process to enable all significant options to be analyzed, and ensuring that decisions are implemented?
- Foreign Policy and Arms Control Considerations.** Are foreign policy and arms control considerations systematically factored into major defense policy, weapon, and program/budget decisions?
- Planning in Advance of Crises.** Is there an adequate process to plan for crises (with political, economic, and military options) before they happen? Are plans adequately reviewed and tested to evaluate their soundness and our ability to execute them?

These issues, my analysis of them, and my recommendations for change are discussed in some detail in the sections that follow. The final section identifies the major actions to be taken by respective agencies to implement these recommendations.

ROLES OF THE PRESIDENT'S STAFF

Primary responsibility for integrating national security policy and actions lies with the President and his staff. Therefore, this section looks critically at the roles played by the Executive Office of the President. There is little doubt that the EOP is serving the President well, according to his style and desires. The main issue raised here is whether its role should shift now that the administration has largely completed its policy formulation stage and must focus more on putting the President's policies into effect.

ADVISORY VS. INSTITUTIONAL ROLES

The national security elements of the Executive Office of the President—essentially the NSC staff, OMB, and OSTP—have two major roles to play:

- Advising the President.** Staff members must support the President according to his management style and immediate concerns. This role affects the issues they

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address, the detail they provide, and the extent to which they serve as advocates as distinguished from process managers.

- Carrying Out Institutional Functions.** Executive staff members must provide more than personal staff assistance to the President. OMB, for example, must be a watchdog of proposed departmental spending and new programs. The NSC staff must raise critical issues for the President's review and ensure that his policies are executed by the departments. This is their institutional role and must be exercised in addition to the personal advisory role.

The president's staff is by all reports exercising the personal advisory role effectively, providing him the staffing, recommendations and analysis he desires. President Carter has put particular emphasis on this function, requesting independent ideas and analyses from his staff. But, despite this stress on the personal advisory role, the staff's institutional role must not be neglected. The question is whether current structure and processes are adequate for fulfilling the institutional responsibilities of the Executive Office.

INSTITUTIONAL TASKS

The institutional responsibilities that I believe the EOP should give greater priority to can be grouped into four major tasks. They are:

- Developing policies.
- Forcing decisions on major issues.
- Managing the decision process.
- Ensuring decisions are implemented.

The NSC staff has primary responsibility for these functions, although OMB and OSTP also play a part.

Developing Policies

A major effort was made in the early months of the administration to review and revamp existing national security policies. Some 30 PRMs were issued in the first half of 1977, over half of them during the President's first week in office. PRM 10 was a broad review of our security policies and strategic posture. Several others touched on more specific elements of defense policy. The formal policy review process has, as might be expected, slowed after the administration addressed the key problem areas and formulated its policy initiatives. Thus, the current emphasis is more on day-to-day issues, program decisions, and matters that relate largely to implementation.

During my interviews, the administration and the NSC system generally received favorable comment in the area of policy development. Some dissatisfaction was expressed over PRM 10, but the resulting Presidential decisions have been broadly accepted. Follow-on studies could have been pursued sooner (e.g. rapid deployment force) or brought sooner into an interagency forum (e.g. nuclear targeting policy), but are now yielding useful results. There are still significant policy gaps (e.g. naval policy and priorities), but the range of policies developed has been generally adequate.

Despite this general satisfaction with policy development, there is considerable criticism over apparent "incoherence." Such criticism may result from three factors:

- The "open administration" philosophy, while bringing a measure of freshness and vitality, has also led to a perception of policy disarray as conflicting views have spilled over into the public domain.

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- Significant, controversial policy initiatives were made in two areas of particular concern to the President, human rights and arms exports. Not unexpectedly, foreign policy "realities" often lead to compromises which are seen by many as policy "reversals."
- Changing international conditions have led to significant shifts in US/Soviet relations and the US position in the Persian Gulf. These developments understandably have led to change in US policies which some observers see as a lack of consistency.

Continued efforts to refine and articulate administration policies may help dampen this criticism. In addition, efforts to reduce leaks which undercut the policy process as well as pose a security problem should be intensified. Finally, steps to implement more effective procedures for developing national security policy may be helpful in giving the public a sense that coordination and direction are being improved. Such reforms may also reduce criticism within the executive branch by groups who feel they are not adequately consulted in the policy development process.

Forcing Decisions on Major Issues

Clear and consistent policy should enable the departments to make most decisions within their spheres of responsibility. But there will always be cases where the President and his staff must step in, to force attention on issues the departments are ignoring, or to ensure that a decision is made from a Presidential rather than a departmental perspective. My interviews revealed instances where the EOP failed to raise such matters for Presidential or NSC review. Some of the cases cited were:

- The future size and roles of the Navy remain largely unresolved and these issues have not been addressed adequately even within DOD. The problem is widely recognized, and several efforts have been made to bring it into focus. Admittedly it is probably the most difficult and contentious issue facing security planners, but it deserves much greater attention and priority than it has received.
- There are *force structure issues* that affect our ability to execute foreign policy, such as the adequacy of our strategic mobility. Questions of this type deserve greater attention, either within the NSC system or between the EOP and DOD, to ensure that the President's priorities are considered when program choices are made.
- While less immediate, there is growing concern over the long-term implications of procuring relatively few *costly high technology weapons* rather than larger numbers of less sophisticated ones. This emphasis on technology may be desirable from a purely military viewpoint, but could have major foreign policy implications. The inevitable result will be smaller forces and fewer weapons. This will almost certainly increase pressures to reduce overseas deployments and reduce our flexibility to deploy military force to critical areas to protect US interests.
- Perhaps the most fundamental problem facing the military revolves around *compensation* and the cost of maintaining quality and motivated troops. These are issues where the EOP can and should play a role. There is also a close interaction with related civil service compensation issues. While OMB has addressed these issues, they have received no priority from other EOP elements.
- There are other, more routine, examples of the need to bring issues to interagency decision. For example, questions related to major international *conferences*, *foreign leader visits*, and *trips by senior US officials* often require decisions on

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positions to be taken, new aid commitments, etc. These decisions are often not addressed on a timely basis.

Managing the Decision Process

In refining policies or forcing up issues for decision, the EOP must manage the interagency process to ensure that sound decisions are made. This requires: (1) using the appropriate forum—interagency, bilateral, or a single department; (2) ensuring consideration of all realistic alternatives, not just those proposed by the bureaucracy; (3) pressing for good analysis and exposing it to sharp criticism; and (4) presenting the options and analysis to the decisionmakers in a way they can best address them and come to a decision.

This has clearly been done in some instances. The question is whether the process can be managed more consistently. Among the points raised which convince me higher EOP priority should be given to managing the decision process are the following:

- Coordinated interagency papers are seldom available as the basis for PRC/SCC meetings.* When papers are provided, they are usually the product of one department, and little effort is made to integrate other agency views or options. While this is in part the result of a conscious effort to give the agencies more responsibility, the result has often been that the real issues are not clear and the meetings are not as productive as they should be.
- The number of SCC/PRCs is increasing sharply,* from 7 per month in 1977 to 18 per month in the first 7 months of 1979. As a result, attendees don't have adequate time to prepare, and meetings often fail to reach firm conclusions or recommendations.
- The quality of the analysis is uneven,* with agencies especially critical of OMB's analytic products. Regardless of the merits of this criticism, there are few systematic joint analyses or coordinated studies designed to sharpen issues or clarify the assumptions and data that drive the outcome of the analyses.
- The materials developed for the President's review often do not facilitate his decisionmaking.* For example, during his final review of the FY '80 DOD budget, the President had to work from three separate books: DOD's, OMB's, and the NSC staff's. Moreover, the issues were not uniformly presented or even the facts agreed to in some cases. This situation puts an inordinate burden on the President. Given the increased demands of economic, energy, and other non-security issues, he requires more systematic and integrated staff support.

Managing the decision process is a time-consuming task and the reduction in the size of the NSC staff could be a reason this task has received inadequate attention. But inadequate process management may also be a price the President has paid for asking the NSC to devote a major portion of its time to personal staff support.

Ensuring Decisions Are Implemented

The final institutional task is to ensure that the President's policies and decisions are carried out. This involves clearly communicating the decisions (and why they were made) to the rest of the government and then overseeing their execution. This is an area where the executive office is most consistently faulted.

An example of EOP weakness in this area is its failure to force prompt action on the formation of a rapid deployment force that has been a priority goal of the President since the early days of the administration. Another shortcoming cited during my interviews included simply failure to follow-up consistently on meetings with a listing

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of the major conclusions/recommendations, the further work to be done, by whom and when.

The heavy reliance on informal processes (e.g. Presidential breakfasts or Vance/Brown/Brzezinski lunches) may be one reason policy decisions are not systematically translated into action. Follow-up often depends on adequate debriefs by the attendees, which do not always happen. The agencies have not adjusted to this informal approach and the White House has not developed means to ensure decisions are communicated clearly and promptly to the agencies in cases where the debriefs are inadequate or the perceptions of the results by the principals differ.

Another factor is that the NSC staff appears to have been optimized for a policy formulation role. This may have been altogether appropriate in earlier phases of the administration. Now, however, with much of the policy review and debate completed, the White House staff needs to give greater priority to execution and follow-up. The President has recognized this weakness in domestic policy implementation. The same refocus is needed in the national security area.

STRENGTHENING THE INSTITUTIONAL ROLE

Remedies for these institutional weaknesses are easy to prescribe but difficult to apply. Nevertheless, I believe the following steps are important:

First, the Executive Office staff, and in particular the NSC staff, should carefully review the major issues related to our national security posture and develop an agenda of priority issues for systematic study within the NSC system. This agenda should be reviewed by the agencies concerned and the final agenda approved by the President. Addressing the issues will require a series of PRMs or other interagency studies and possibly use of outside consultants and advisory panels. The responsibility for developing the agenda of defense issues should be centralized in a single, senior NSC staff member described more fully below. Among the issues included on this agenda should be naval policy, the adequacy of DOD's multi-year fiscal guidance, long-term trends and impacts of weapon developments, and the adequacy of military manpower policy and compensation. These issues are recognized as important. What is needed is a concerted effort to address and resolve them.

Second, greater attention should be given to preparation for SCC/PRC meetings and other interagency meetings convened by EOP elements. This will require more careful advance staff work to sharpen the issues, more frequent preparation of interagency papers, and greater use of "mini" PRC/SCCs or working groups to narrow and focus the issues to be addressed by principal officials. Working groups have been used effectively in specialized areas (intelligence and arms control) but sparingly in other areas.

Third, the EOP staff should give greater priority to overseeing implementation. This means, first of all, clear direction to the staff that such oversight is a priority matter. It also means better follow-up after interagency meetings and clarification of past policy or program decisions as necessary. To augment the role of the EOP, State and the NSC staff should consider wider use of interdepartmental groups (IGs) to see that routine matters are implemented and to follow up on top-level decisions. There has been little use of IGs in recent years. More systematic efforts to review departmental progress in carrying out Presidential decisions would also be useful. A possible renewed effort in this area would be a PD-18 follow-up study: an interdepartmental effort to assess the adequacy of the implementation of the President's basic security policy. It should highlight gaps as well as problems or conflicts related to the policy.

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Fourth, a number of actions to strengthen the staffing of the EOP are in order:

- The NSC staff should have a single individual with responsibility for defense matters—at present responsibility is spread among at least five individuals. At a minimum, a "defense coordinator" should be named with prime responsibility for identifying major issues to be studied within the NSC system and to work closely with OMB on program and budget matters. A strong and experienced senior coordinator for defense-related matters, such as Henry Owen plays in economic matters, could make a major difference in the effectiveness of the NSC staff. The demands on the time of the Assistant to the President and his deputy are too great for them to play this integrating role.
- The organization of the rest of the NSC staff should also be reviewed. Consideration should be given to designating senior people and aligning other staff members under them. The senior personnel could take some of the load off the Assistant to the President and his deputy. By thus organizing staff resources, the NSC could do a more effective job of managing the interagency process and supporting interagency meetings.
- The EOP needs stronger analytic capabilities. This does not imply building a large analytic staff in OMB or the NSC, although a modest increase of four or five professionals on the NSC staff is warranted. Defense can and should provide the bulk of the analytic talent (aided by State, CIA, or ACDA as appropriate). What the EOP needs are analysts of sufficient experience and ability to manage, monitor, and assure the quality of the interagency process. They must be heavily involved in selecting the assumptions, developing alternatives and reviewing results, but should not do the actual work.
- Greater interchange of personnel within the EOP and with the departments should be encouraged. This not only aids communication and improves the informal processes, but also enhances the skills of the individuals involved and broadens their perspectives.
- As personnel on the EOP staff turn over, care should be given to enriching the mix with people having experience in the departments and a concern and interest in follow-up and overseeing policy execution. Knowledge of the players and how the bureaucracy works is important to effective policy execution; on-the-job training in such matters for EOP staff members is a chancy approach. This does not imply moving away from the concept of a diverse staff, composed of personnel with academic or research experience as well as government experts. Rather, the balance should shift in light of the need for greater emphasis on execution.

Finally, there is a need for clearer formulation of responsibilities and coordination processes among EOP elements as well as among the EOP and the departments. In particular, clarification is needed of overlapping OMB, NSC and OSTP responsibilities in the areas of broad DOD resource allocations, weapon acquisitions, and program and budgets. Their relationships and channels with DOD need to be better coordinated, as well as their presentation of issues of mutual interest for the President's decision.

DEFENSE/FOREIGN POLICY/ARMS CONTROL

The need for closer integration of our defense, foreign, and arms control policies and activities has been recognized by the President and his principal advisers. Various mechanisms apart from the formal NSC system have been established to exchange information and ideas and coordinate approaches on matters of joint interest. These include Friday morning breakfasts with the President, Vance/Brown/Brzezinski lunches,

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and regular Bartholomew/McGiffert meetings. The result is closer State/Defense relations than have existed in the past, a development enhanced by the close personal relationship between Secretaries Brown and Vance. George Seignious' long experience in Defense and close ties there should help build more bridges to DOD, helping to overcome the natural rivalry and suspicion that always exist between ACDA and the Pentagon.

Nonetheless, officials interviewed from all three agencies recognized the desirability of improving the processes for synthesizing foreign policy and arms control considerations with defense decisionmaking. Moreover, even closer integration will be needed in the future for several reasons:

- In the early stages of SALT III, systematic consideration of the interaction between weapon developments and negotiating objectives will be essential. Such consideration early in SALT I might have led us to a strategy other than insistence on protecting our MIRV programs. Failure to limit MIRVs then is now enabling the Soviets to threaten our land-based ICBMs. Yet survivability of our land-based ICBMs was a high-priority objective on the SALT agenda. SALT III will also involve a new level of difficulty and sensitivity as it brings into play the concerns of our NATO allies and the political and technical complexities of "gray area" systems.
- A series of increasingly difficult program/budget choices will face the President and his advisors over the next several years. The growth of Soviet capabilities, coupled with new challenges to US security interests in areas such as the Middle East, argue for increased defense spending. Yet the President is also faced with strong political, economic and monetary pressures to hold down the defense budget. Decisions on the overall level of spending as well as on priorities among costly new programs DOD has under way—strategic missiles, Navy ships, new tactical air and Army weapons, improved C³ and mobility—must be made on the basis of the President's overall national priorities, not just those of DOD.**
- Potential areas of crisis or conflict over the next several years, such as the Middle East, require coordinated attention to political and foreign policy developments. Significant input from a variety of area experts is needed if our capability to preserve US interests is to be appropriate to existing circumstances and constraints.

Regardless of closeness and frequency of contact among top-level officials, systematic exchanges of views among DOD, State, and ACDA staffs will be essential. Moreover, if these relationships are to be effective, timing is important. If decisionmakers learn of a serious foreign policy or arms control problem late in the decision process, the required adjustments are likely to be costly in terms of time, money, or diplomatic ramifications.

Interaction among the agencies involved in national security covers a broad spectrum. I have selected three areas where better integration between Defense and other agencies involved in security matters is needed: *Defense Policy*; *Weapon Acquisitions*; *Defense Program/Budget*. In each area, I suggest actions to remedy the problems identified.

The steps I propose to enhance integration of the administration's national security policies will inevitably involve State and ACDA in areas that DOD now handles relatively independently. However, if State and ACDA expect to obtain more substantive cooperation from DOD, they will have to demonstrate reciprocity on their part. DOD has a legitimate interest in many of the activities of these agencies, and its concerns must be given full consideration. For example, DOD has continuously sought greater State

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understanding and support for DOD's needs and concerns in such areas as foreign training locations, nuclear ship visits, status of forces agreements, base negotiations, foreign force deployments, prepositioning of stocks, and the judicious use of military facilities and equipment for foreign policy purposes. It has also sought relief from the burdensome requirements of Arms Control Impact Statements prepared largely by ACDA. These agencies should give priority to being responsive in these areas where Defense needs their cooperation and continued support. They should also coordinate with DOD any major statements relating to national security, such as the Secretary of State's annual address to the UN, discussions at NATO ministers' meetings, and congressional testimony.

DEFENSE POLICY

Clear and well formulated defense policy is critical to our national security posture. It affects the overall force, weapon and dollar requirements, establishes priorities when hard choices must be made, and provides a basis for justifying the administration's posture, program and budget to the Congress and the American public.

Consolidated Guidance

DOD has a formal process to develop and update its basic policy document, the Consolidated Guidance (CG). This document is an internal compendium of policy, programming, and fiscal guidance issued by the Secretary. The CG serves primarily as the basis for the Services' five-year programs and the policy yardstick for making program and budget decisions. It also provides broad guidance to the JCS and U&S commands for the preparation of operational and contingency plans. While many elements of the policy are only relevant and useful within DOD, both State and ACDA have interests in certain aspects of it, such as the NATO guidance, programming for support of conflicts in sensitive areas, strategic nuclear policy, and various arms control issues. Despite the importance of the CG and its significance for our national security posture, a systematic means to incorporate the views of State, ACDA, and the EOP has not been developed.

Information copies of the CG were sent to the NSC staff, OMB, and the Secretary of State (but not ACDA) in 1978. While not asked to do so, State provided DOD with a number of comments and proposed changes. Since the CG had already been sent to the Services, State's comments had little immediate value, although some were reflected in the 1979 document. In addition, a brief NSC meeting was held on the CG, but there was little advance preparation and the discussion dealt more with the assumptions than the substance of the CG. This year DOD again sent copies to the NSC staff, State, and OMB. A PRC meeting was held to consider the CG, among other items, and to provide the agencies an opportunity to raise major issues. The meeting, however, again did not address the policy aspects of the CG, focusing instead on what DOD saw as the more critical issue, the adequacy of the Presidentially approved five-year fiscal guidance. Thus, opportunity for principal agency officials to raise substantive questions about the policy contained in the guidance or to affect its stated priorities has been limited. In addition, there is no formal process for the agencies to raise minor points or suggested changes with DOD.

State believes that its role as chief advisor on foreign affairs and principal executor of foreign policy necessitates greater consideration of its views in the development of the CG. In particular, State wants to have input on "defense" issues with foreign policy or political ramifications to ensure that the major foreign policy questions are pinpointed and fully considered.

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Senior ACDA officials believe they should have a voice in the preparation of the arms control sections of the guidance as well as the weapons policy sections. The NSC and OMB staffs generally would like to comment on the guidance early in the process and to have an interagency review—preferably before the CG goes to the Services in final form.

Policy Studies

DOD sometimes undertakes major policy studies unilaterally, although policy studies of major national security issues are normally an interagency process. These unilateral studies cause some concern in State and ACDA about the adequacy of the foreign policy and arms control assumptions and analyses. In many cases, these studies eventually are considered within the NSC system, especially if they touch on major issues, but such after-the-fact reviews provide State or ACDA little chance to significantly affect the outcome.

Two recent examples are DOD's nuclear targeting policy study and Persian Gulf contingency planning study. In both cases there was active interest in the substance of the studies at State (and ACDA on the targeting study) and a strong belief that their input on the assumptions used, options considered, and possibly the analysis would have made a needed contribution.

Conclusions

The major issue is the adequacy of the current process for preparing the Consolidated Guidance. A secondary issue is the possible need for more interagency participation in selected DOD policy studies.

In my discussions regarding the CG, it was suggested several times that a formal NSC review of the document be conducted, perhaps culminating in Presidential approval. In my view such a formal process is not needed, given the current general agreement among agencies on much of the substance of the CG. The differences are largely over priorities and nuances, not basic policy. There is also a problem of time—the principals who participate in NSC meetings already have extraordinary demands on their schedules. Therefore, what is needed is a low-key, but systematic process that gives careful consideration to the views of State/ACDA/OMB/NSC. This process should settle as many issues as possible at the sub-cabinet level, keeping to a minimum the number to be addressed by the NSC principals and the President.

I recommend a three-part process, which should not be intrusive to DOD or unnecessarily time-consuming, yet which gives the other agencies an opportunity to have their views considered and to raise major issues of interest to the principals. The three steps of the process are:

1. DOD should informally provide the policy section of the CG to State for comment during the drafting stage (as is done with the Defense Report). DOD should provide it to ACDA also, to review it for arms control implications.
2. After the Secretary of Defense approves the CG (roughly March 1) it should be given to State/ACDA/OMB/NSC for a formal review, much as is done now. Any significant issues should be reviewed by a "mini" PRC chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The key to success in this process is keeping the focus on policy issues rather than second guessing Defense's program planning. Moreover, the objective should be to assist DOD in making the tough choices it faces on priorities, given the real-world limits on spending, and not just to press for more programs and forces.

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3. Any major issues unresolved by the "mini" PRC would be considered at a PRC meeting on the Defense 5-year program, which will be discussed later in this section.

Finally, DOD should be sensitive to the need to incorporate the ideas of State/ACDA into major studies, especially those which could affect policy toward major nations and areas or require use of foreign territory for troops, supplies, or overflight rights. It would be useful to ask in advance for input on the political/foreign policy assumptions, constraints, etc. When appropriate, these agencies should participate in the studies. The lead in this effort should be taken by the Under Secretary for Policy.

WEAPON ACQUISITIONS

DOD uses a separate management process to make milestone decisions on weapons—the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC). In an effort to speed and improve weapon development and production decisions, over the past two years DOD has revamped its internal organization and decisionmaking process. The post of Under Secretary for Research and Engineering was created, merging the various parts of OSD that had responsibility for weapon acquisition, and placing all the critical phases of the multi-year development and production process under a single, high-level official. In addition, the DSARC process has been modified to ensure that all relevant cost, schedule and performance factors are considered when milestone decisions are made. A so-called "zero" DSARC was added to take a careful look at the need for each major weapon and ensure that the proposed mission could not be handled by some other military solution.

Foreign Policy and Arms Control Considerations

Despite these changes, foreign policy and arms control considerations are not a systematic part of the process. ISA participates in DSARCs that relate to NATO issues and figures significantly in selected cases such as the MX. NSC and OSTP staff representatives attend some DSARCs. However, other departments have no regular input to decisions on major weapons, unless the Executive Office of the President gets directly involved such as with the B-1 or MX. In these two cases, OMB and the NSC were major participants. Neither State nor ACDA were involved in the B-1 decision, and they had little involvement in the preliminary DOD studies of MX. They did become actively involved in the final, decisive PRC meetings on MX when major decisions were imminent.

The primary concern to ACDA and State is the lack of an early and systematic opportunity to raise questions regarding such major weapon developments. There is no fear that DOD is "out of control" or making numerous unsound decisions. Nor is there support for a complex interagency process to review large numbers of weapons or to veto DOD decisions. But State and ACDA should have a voice in the deliberations, systematically and in timely fashion, so that changes in direction, if necessary, can be made before great momentum builds for a particular option.

In some instances, a more formal Presidential review will be necessary. Decisions as momentous as the MX will inevitably require Presidential involvement at key stages, and as a result the EOP—NSC, OSTP, and OMB—will be involved. In such cases State and perhaps ACDA will likely participate. But even in these cases, the processes tend to be *ad hoc* and unsystematic, more reactive than anticipatory.

The number of weapon developments of interest to State and ACDA is small. The obvious cases are new strategic or space weapons, theater nuclear forces, selected weapons with unusual political impact such as the neutron bomb, theatre-based cruise

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missiles, and joint US/NATO developments. In a few cases developments might impinge on arms control negotiations (e.g., CW/RW systems or anti-satellite weapons) thus warranting State and ACDA involvement. But of the 80 or 90 weapons under the purview of the DSARC at any one time, probably no more than 10-20 percent would justify some interagency input.

Conclusions

There are several ways to add interagency and EOP thinking to weapon acquisition decisions. There is considerable interest in State and ACDA for formal participation in the DSARC. The obvious drawback of such a notion is that it would further complicate an already complex process. Instead, I recommend an advisory process that provides systematic State/ACDA input but does not further burden the DSARC process.

DOD should establish a committee, chaired by a senior DOD official, to consider systematically the arms control and foreign policy implications of upcoming DSARC decisions. In addition to State and ACDA, the EOP staff would participate. This group might meet quarterly, would have an agenda for each session (e.g., sea-launched systems or theater nuclear options), and would receive staff papers circulated in advance to prepare for the discussions. It would select weapons deserving of further attention and develop issues and recommendations for consideration in the DSARC process. A summary analysis of a weapon system's foreign policy and arms control implications would be included in the Decision Coordinating Papers (DCP) prior to DSARC milestone meetings, and a fuller analysis would be included as an annex to the DCP. The chairman would then present these issues at the DSARC to ensure they are given proper consideration in the decisions.

This approach would incorporate foreign policy and arms control considerations into weapon acquisition decisions, particularly in the early phases. It also would alert the President's personal staff to potential weapon development problems so they can get the President involved early if he wishes.

In addition, a regular PRC review of major weapon developments should be scheduled once or twice a year. The meeting should be based on a thorough advance paper and should be limited to weapon systems having major foreign policy and arms control implications. This would identify major issues early and provide a way to raise major questions to the President. This may reduce the likelihood of major reversals, such as occurred on the "neutron bomb" issue.

Finally, if this process is adopted, ACDA officials should take the lead in seeking congressional relief from the statutory provision requiring preparation of Arms Control Impact Statements for submission to Congress. This requirement has been generally recognized as overly burdensome for the Administration. More significantly, it does not produce the desired effect of active ACDA impact on weapon acquisitions. The changes recommended here would do this far more effectively.

DEFENSE PROGRAM/BUDGET

Development of the five-year defense program has essentially been an internal DOD process. EOP offices, such as OMB, NSC and OSTP, have been only marginally involved, and State and ACDA even less so. DOD is making a greater effort to include OMB in the process this year, and senior OMB officials are taking part. By all reports this involvement has been a success. In the past OMB has tended to focus primarily on the budget phase of the cycle rather than on the planning and programming phases.

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The DOD budget review now includes active OMB involvement with OSD in the review of the proposed Service budgets. Other elements of the Executive Office of the President are only involved to a limited extent. The NSC and OSTP staffs attend the OMB Spring Planning and Fall Budget reviews as well as meetings where key Presidential budget decisions are made—the overall TOA/outlay figures and selected major program issues. But with the exception of a few specialized areas, such as intelligence, they play a passive role. The non-EOP agencies (e.g. State) are not formal participants in any phase of the budget process.

Despite the relative smoothness of the current process, a number of the officials I interviewed question its adequacy. Two basic issues were raised:

- Does the EOP ensure that the President is provided an adequate national security framework within which to make the most critical DOD program/budget decisions each year—the multi-year fiscal guidance and the annual TOA/outlay figures? Do EOP processes enable the President to address adequately other major national security resource allocation and force structure issues?
- What role should State and ACDA play in ensuring that foreign policy and arms control implications of programs/budget issues are adequately included in the process?

Presidential Budget and Resource Allocation Decisions

OMB plays the major role in the President's annual decisions on multi-year fiscal guidance and TOA/outlay ceilings for DOD. DOD officials question the basis for these overall budget level decisions, believing that the analysis focuses too heavily on how much we can afford and too little on how much we need.

Deciding "how much is enough" is a difficult, largely subjective determination that nevertheless must be made. The PRC and NSC addressed the question this year, and the results may affect the President's decisions on the FY 1981 DOD budget and outyear fiscal guidance. However, current coordination procedures within the EOP are inadequate to integrate the two separate efforts: the OMB-managed discussions with the President which lead to budget ceilings, and the NSC review of national security resource needs as presented to the PRC and NSC. These two important EOP elements need to find ways to integrate their processes to assist the President in making decisions on the DOD budget. In particular, the NSC staff should play a stronger role with OMB in Presidential budget decisions.

Concern was also raised over the lack of a Presidential review of major DOD resource allocation and force structure decisions. Is DOD making the best choices regarding: (1) the allocation of resources between NATO forces and forces for other contingencies? (2) the structure of the Navy to support our security policy? and (3) the relative emphasis on high technology weapons as opposed to numbers of weapons and forces? The current EOP review of DOD focuses largely on either broad policy or budget details. Other types of critical issues get little interagency or EOP attention. Unless the NSC and OMB work together, these issues are unlikely to be addressed systematically outside of the DOD.

State and ACDA Role

Some program/budget decisions have clear foreign policy or arms control implications, such as decisions on force levels, overseas deployments and weapon co-production. I encountered considerable concern over the adequacy of the current process to include such considerations. An important FY 1980 budget issue, for exam-

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ple, was the President's NATO commitment to increase the defense budget 3 percent in real terms. The central questions were: How firm was the commitment; and what impact would it have on the NATO allies if it were not fully executed? This issue was actively debated within the EOP and with DOD. It became a major issue in budget meetings with the President. Yet State and the Secretary did not join this debate substantively, despite its unmistakable foreign policy overtones. State's primary input came late in the budget cycle when Secretary Vance wrote a memo to the President expressing his concern over the foreign policy impact of a failure to live up to this commitment.

Conclusions

Two different sets of actions are needed to remedy problems in the DOD program/budget area:

1. To broaden and further coordinate EOP efforts in Presidential budget and resource allocation decisions, three new practices should be established:

- a. A major review of DOD's long-term resource needs should be made no later than early in the President's second term (i.e., January 1981). It should be an inter-agency effort, led by NSC and OMB, to weigh national security needs against domestic priorities and economic policy.
- b. **OMB should participate more actively in DOD's program review. OMB's major program issues should be part of DOD's issue paper process. While not bound to DOD's program choices, OMB should generally accept the Secretary's decisions, unless major program deletions are required later to meet the President's budget limit.**
- c. A major effort should be made to rotate staff between OMB and DOD and within the EOP (e.g., between OMB and NSC). This would give the respective staffs a better understanding of one another's problems and viewpoints as well as broaden their experience.

2. To ensure that foreign policy and arms control issues are identified during the program/budget process, three modest changes should suffice, especially if the policy and weapon development processes are broadened as proposed previously in this section:

- a. At the end of DOD's preliminary program decision phase (roughly August 1) the PRC should review the Secretary of Defense's five-year program and address any major policy issues that were not resolved earlier. Prior to the meeting, DOD should circulate a paper summarizing the forces, weapon systems, and other key elements, as well as the major outstanding issues of concern to State, ACDA, and the NSC staff or OMB.* This would build on the precedent set last year with the President's mid-cycle program review. Any changes to the program resulting from the meeting should be reflected in the final program decisions (APDMs).
- b. **The NSC staff should participate actively in OMB's budget review process (e.g., the spring and fall reviews) to ensure that major foreign policy/arms control issues are identified. NSC staff members should highlight questions**

* For this meeting to be useful, it is important that the issues be selected carefully, focusing on matters of direct interest to State and ACDA. It is also essential that the meeting be used to help DOD and OMB set priorities and make choices among programs competing for scarce resources, and not simply to press for more.

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for which State or ACDA input is needed, such as OMB's proposal to terminate the ROLAND air defense missile program, and ensure this input is provided.

- c. State should be included in major EOP-convened meetings where foreign policy matters are significant. For example, the Secretary of State should participate in Presidential meetings where the NATO commitment to a 3 percent real defense budget increase is a major issue.

PLANNING FOR CRISES

The President's staff and the departments share responsibility for planning to preserve US interests during various types of international crises. The departments must do the detailed work; but the National Security Council staff should ensure that the planning is done, provide guidance on types of crises, US interests, and other factors to be covered, and review the results.

Planning in anticipation of crises is a demanding and often unrewarding effort. It is difficult to anticipate locations or the nature of crises, let alone their sequence of events. As a result, potentially important contributors often underestimate the value of the exercise on the argument that forecasting is futile. But in most cases, the payoff is not the plan but the planning process, the questioning of assumptions, sharpened perceptions of United States' interests and options, and familiarization with other agencies' personnel and resources.

Within DOD, top civilians have little involvement in planning for the actual use of military force in crises as compared with their heavy involvement in policy, programs and budgets. Planning for use of forces is largely restricted to a limited group of military officers.

Within State, the NSC, or other non-defense agencies, planning for potential crises gets little attention. Furthermore, such planning is only rarely done on an interagency basis. This inadequacy has frequently caused major problems when crises have developed. The lack of an array of complementary policy options (political, economic, and military), let alone sound military options, has at times slowed our response to a crisis or led to actions that in retrospect were seriously flawed.

There are understandable reasons for the lack of high-level attention to crisis planning. They go beyond the difficulty of the process and the normal preoccupation of the leadership with the priorities of budget and program decisions, PRMs, and answering the latest cable or memo. Planning for future crises is a sensitive process from which leaks can cause serious political problems or can even trigger the crisis that the planning hoped to avoid or to contain. Therefore, the challenge is to improve and broaden crisis planning by providing a greater and sustained leavening of political/foreign policy/economic considerations and options without compromising the security of the plans or unduly complicating the problems of the military commands.

There are two separate but closely related aspects of crisis planning: (1) providing national and foreign policy guidance for the military's planning effort, and (2) adding political and economic options to military ones through interagency planning. Each is discussed below.

PLANNING WITHIN DEFENSE

Planning for the use of forces in a variety of situations—peacetime, crisis, limited or major war—gets considerable attention within DOD. Such "war planning," not sur-

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prisingly, is the province of the JCS and the Unified and Specified Commands. Civilian leadership in DOD has little involvement, and State and the NSC staff have virtually none. Given the tradition of military responsibility, plus the sensitivity of the documents, the JCS/CINCs vigorously defend their exclusivity.

Background

There has been sharp criticism of the process recently. The Ignatius, Steadman and Brehm (Nifty Nugget) reports all recommend broader civilian participation in military planning, setting policy, and reviewing results. (See Appendix C for excerpts of their recommendations.) These recommendations do not arise from failures on the part of military planners, but rather from the view that end results would be improved if a limited but systematic input of political/foreign policy/economic advice were added. The shortcomings of the present system that are cited include:

- Planning may not cover some of the more likely crisis situations, in terms of US interests, if those situations involve neither countries that face overt military threats nor that are thought of as allied with the United States.
- Scenarios and assumptions may not be accurately defined, the degree or nature of support expected from other nations may be unrealistic, or political constraints (e.g. on overflight rights, use of bases, etc.) may not be fully taken into account.
- The military options presented are too few. Political realities may dictate adding more limited military options, using allied forces, or considering what may be less than optimal actions from a military point of view.

In response to these criticisms, Defense has taken steps to integrate foreign policy considerations into the military planning process, as well as to provide a limited review by responsible senior officials. Secretary Brown directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to initiate such a process. Under Secretary Resor's resignation slowed efforts to get this new responsibility for OSD under way, but Secretary Brown has continued discussions with the Chairman, JCS (CJCS), to establish OSD policy guidance and review procedures.

The concerns of the various studies are shared by the CJCS. He has recently taken steps to set up an internal Crisis Planning and Assessment Group (CPAG) to improve planning, to take political/foreign policy factors into account, and to tap the expertise of the Washington foreign policy/intelligence community.

In addition, Defense's Nifty Nugget exercise in the fall of 1978 was a valuable initiative to test the adequacy of a major war plan—a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict. The exercise brought to light a number of flaws in the plans and planning process as well as weaknesses in our capability to carry out the plans. The result has been beneficial for both planning and program/budgeting.

All three of these Defense military planning initiatives are moves in the right direction and need to be supported and expanded.

Discussion

There are many ways to add broader political and foreign policy considerations to military contingency planning. In my view, the more formal approaches, such as giving State and the NSC a direct role, are neither needed nor wise. At least two, less structured, approaches should be considered:

- Retain prime responsibility in DOD, but include State and NSC views in the process through an OSD-chaired steering committee that would issue contingency plan-

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ning guidance to the JCS, specify areas and assumptions for inclusion in plans, and review selected plans when complete. (The JCS could produce any additional plans they believe are needed.)

- Rely on present attempts within OSD to strengthen civilian participation and to correct problems with the current process. The Under Secretary for Policy would be responsible for ensuring that military planning covers the appropriate areas and uses reasonable assumptions and scenarios, drawing the State/NSC advice as required.

Either or both of these approaches would be compatible with the interagency political/economic crisis planning effort discussed later in this section. If an interagency group were established, its efforts would influence DOD's military planning, but any attempt by such a group to control the military planning process would be most contentious and, in my view, counterproductive.

Conclusions

Effective military crisis planning requires higher government levels to select situations to be planned for, to provide the planners with realistic assumptions and objectives, and to conduct a critical review of the resulting plans.

The current internal DOD effort to provide policy guidance for military crisis planning can meet this need. It should be continued and strengthened. As this initiative matures, adequate political/foreign policy considerations will be provided to the JCS without excessive interagency involvement in largely technical military operational planning. This internal process, coupled with the interagency process discussed below, will provide the President sounder military planning within a range of options including political and economic ones.

Secondly, military plans should be exercised periodically. Nifty Nugget underscored the need for such exercises, with high-level government participation, both to discover shortcomings in planning and to test the capabilities and resources needed to execute existing plans. It would be useful, for example, to test our capability to quickly move major forces to the Middle East.

Finally, serious doubts were raised during my study about the practicality of developing realistic plans away from Washington for highly political locales and by military commands headquartered out of the theater in question. The most obvious situation of this type is military planning for possible Middle East crises. This is currently done by EUCOM, a command whose primary responsibility is NATO. EUCOM cannot be expected to maintain adequate expertise on the Middle East as well as familiarity with changing political/foreign policy developments, which are better understood by Washington-based experts in State, OSD, and the intelligence community. I recommend that the President urge the Secretary of Defense to review this matter, as part of his efforts to improve DOD's crisis planning capabilities.

INTERAGENCY PLANNING

Current crisis planning is largely centered within DOD and is almost exclusively military in nature. The effort over this past year to draw OSD into the process, specifying areas and scenarios to be planned for and to review plans for selected, high-risk situations is a useful forward step. What this innovation fails to do is to add nonmilitary options to the plans, or force State, Treasury, the EOP and other agencies to engage in systematic anticipatory planning. In many areas, such as in the less developed countries of the world, political and economic actions could well prove more useful and call for

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a lesser level of US commitment than military actions. Yet we are giving insufficient attention to these possibilities.

Background

There have been periods when broader interagency planning was undertaken, usually in the aftermath of a crisis for which we were ill-prepared:

- In the mid-1960s, after the Dominican Republic intervention, a State/OSD/JCS planning group was set up to select potential crises for planning attention, to specify scenarios and assumptions, and to ensure that political and economic as well as military options were developed.
- In the wake of the 1969 EC-121 incident with North Korea, the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG)* selected a number of potential crises for joint planning and a high-level JCS/OSD/State group was formed to develop plans. At the same time, Secretary Laird directed the OSD staff to assess selected JCS contingency plans because of his dissatisfaction with the contingency options available when the crisis occurred.
- In 1973, the NSC Contingency Planning Working Group (CPWG), under the Chairmanship of the Department of State and including members from OSD, JCS, and CIA, was established to assess the currency and adequacy of existing plans; identify additional planning which needed to be done; and review other contingency-related studies. The CPWG was active for about 2 years, culling plans that had been overtaken by events. It also oversaw the preparation and updating of plans, guided them through interagency clearance, and submitted them in finished form to the NSC via the WSAG.

Greater attention has recently been given planning for future crises in the wake of the Iranian situation. An *ad hoc* interagency group is looking at possible trouble spots, reviewing US objectives and policies, sorting out options, and taking steps to better prepare for possible crises. This is a much-needed initiative. The question is whether it will be sustained and given continued high-level support.

Conclusions

Sustaining high quality interagency planning for potential crises is a tough challenge. The pattern seen in the past seems inevitable: problem identification, a brief period of high-level but *ad-hoc* attention, loss of interest, and then loss of momentum. To break this cycle, a new, more structured approach should be established.

Over the long term, this planning effort is more likely to be sustained if primary responsibility were given to State and the process managed by a State-chaired PRC. The actual planning would be done by interdepartmental regional groups (IGs), led by an appropriate Assistant Secretary of State. Their charter should include sufficient authority to consider the full range of governmental responsibility and activity as they develop a variety of potential US courses of action. Membership would include NSC, OSD, JCS, CIA, Treasury and other agencies (e.g., OMB or DOE) as appropriate. The PRC would provide these groups with a limited number of critical situations to focus on. It would also periodically (at least annually) review the planning of each group, to ensure its consistency with the views and policies of the principals and to make certain the regional IGs give this process the high priority it deserves.

*NOTE: The WSAG was originally designed to plan for potential crises and conflicts. In practice, it was primarily used to manage them once they developed.

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It might be prudent to test this new structured process by building upon the current *ad hoc* interagency group, and having the SCC or PRC assign it five or six areas to develop plans for (e.g., review a study on the Caribbean which the State Department has under way). The interagency effort should be led by a senior NSC staff member or State. The objective should be to develop a range of options, political and economic as well as military. The process should be monitored closely by the SCC/PRC and, if successful, would serve as the basis for the broader process proposed above.

A critical factor in the success of this effort, especially in drawing the best possible input from concerned agencies, will be continued attention from the White House. It must get support from the Assistant for National Security Affairs, and NSC staff members must be involved on a sustained basis—not just as crises heat up.

IMPLEMENTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS

The preceding four sections include detailed findings and recommendations. This final section summarizes the major actions by agency that should be taken to implement the recommendations.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

The following major actions should be taken with regard to the EOP generally in the areas of jurisdictional responsibilities, coordination procedures and personnel experience:

- Clarify the respective responsibilities of the NSC, OMB and OSTP with respect to policymaking and oversight in the areas of defense policy, weapon acquisitions, program/budgets, and crisis planning. The most critical step would be to develop closer relations between OMB and the NSC Staff.
- Improve coordination procedures among EOP elements, particularly for issues requiring Presidential involvement, to ensure that comprehensive analyses and viewpoints are presented in a manner to facilitate decisionmaking.
- Establish a program for interchanging personnel among EOP elements, as well as among departments and agencies, to broaden their experience and perspectives.

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

The Director of OMB should take the following major actions in the areas of DOD program/budget, defense resource allocation review, and personnel:

DOD Program/Budget

- Develop further OMB's active participation in DOD's program development, incorporating its options and views in issue papers and other documents.
- Identify early the issues it plans to raise in the fall budget review so that joint analysis can be undertaken with the departments or within the EOP, to make the decision process more comprehensive.
- Identify major issues it believes should be addressed in future years so that DOD can include them in its studies program and begin any needed interagency analyses.

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- Solicit full involvement of the OSTP and NSC staffs in preparations for its spring and fall reviews and on major program/budget issues it may forward to the President for decision. Review the issues with these staffs to identify problems on which State or ACDA views should be requested.
- Participate in the various interagency reviews and studies proposed in this report (e.g., "mini" PRC meeting on CG issues and PRC meetings on program and weapon development issues).

Defense Resource Allocation Review

- No later than mid-1980, the Director of OMB, together with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, should formulate plans for a major review of long-term defense resource allocation issues to begin no later than January 1981. The review should consider a range of allocation options and likely consequences, in the context of national priorities and domestic/economic/monetary considerations. Early planning for this major review will enable various agencies to contribute to the work plan and begin longer-term analytic efforts.

Personnel

- Develop programs to interchange personnel with DOD and other EOP offices.
- Strengthen OMB's analytic capability with staff members having experience in the analytic processes at DOD and other agencies, in order to improve its effectiveness in managing and participating in interagency analyses.

ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

The National Security Assistant should take the following major actions in the areas of the NSC staff's institutional role; Defense policy, weapon acquisitions, and program/budget; planning for crises; and the NSC staff organization and personnel:

NSC Staff Institutional Role

- Prepare an agenda of important but still unresolved national security issues and initiate their systematic review within appropriate interagency forums.
- Give greater attention to preparations for interagency meetings, ensuring that discussion papers include adequate inputs from pertinent agencies, a full range of options, and quality analysis.
- Establish high-level priority to implementation oversight, including follow-up to major policy decisions such as PD-18 as well as to more routine interagency deliberations.

Defense Policy, Weapon Acquisitions and Program/Budget

- Convene a DOD-chaired "mini" PRC meeting to review significant issues arising from the CG.
- Convene a regular PRC review of major weapon developments at least annually to focus on key weapon systems with major implications for foreign policy and arms control.
- Convene a DOD-chaired PRC after the initial DOD program decisions (about August 1) to review the Secretary of Defense's five-year program as well as to address any policy issues unresolved at the "mini" PRC meeting on the CG.

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- Participate actively in OMB's budget process (e.g., the spring and fall reviews) to ensure that major foreign policy/arms control issues are identified and that State/ACDA input is included as appropriate.

Planning for Crises

- Establish a pilot interagency crisis planning group, probably under the direction of a State-chaired PRC, to develop a range of options (military, political and economic) to deal with a group of potential crises selected by the SCC or PRC.
- Based on the experience of this initial pilot effort, develop a systematic process for identifying potential crises and developing a range of options to manage them should they occur.**
- Designate a senior member of the NSC staff to support the work of this group and to be responsible for following up its recommendations.

NSC Staff Organization and Personnel

- Organize the staff with senior members responsible for broad areas, to better cover institutional tasks.
- Designate a senior member of the NSC staff as "defense coordinator" with prime responsibility for: identifying critical national security issues to be addressed within the NSC system; managing the interagency analysis and decisionmaking on such issues; and working closely with OMB on defense program/budget issues.
- Establish a program to interchange personnel with OMB, DOD and other national security-related offices.
- As members of the NSC staff depart, shift its composition toward a greater mix of personnel with experience in the departments and interest in overseeing the implementation of national security policies.**
- Increase the size of the staff by about 4 or 5 professional members, to better perform the tasks discussed in this report.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Secretary of Defense should take the following major actions in the areas of Defense policy, weapon acquisitions, program/budget, and planning for crises:

Defense Policy

- During the drafting stage of the Consolidated Guidance, informally solicit input from State and ACDA for the policy section.
- After approval of the CG by the Secretary, provide it to the EOP, State and ACDA for formal review. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should chair a "mini" PRC to review significant issues that arise from this review.**
- Seek inputs and participation from State and ACDA as appropriate on Defense policy studies.

Weapon Acquisitions

- Establish an OSD-chaired committee with senior representatives from State, ACDA and the EOP to consider the foreign policy and arms control implications of weapon developments, and to provide analyses of significant foreign policy and

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arms control implications for inclusion in the Decision Coordinating Papers (DCP) prior to DSARC milestone reviews.

- Chair a regular (at least annual) PRC review of major weapon developments, focusing on foreign policy/arms control implications.

Defense Program/Budget

- Develop further OMB's active participation in DOD's program development.
- After the initial DOD program decisions (about August 1) chair a PRC meeting to review the five-year defense program and address any policy issues not resolved by the "mini" PRC meeting on the Consolidated Guidance.

Planning for Crises

- Strengthen current efforts, focused on the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, to provide better political/foreign policy guidance to military planners, and to review completed military plans.
- Participate in the interagency crisis planning group established by the NSC to develop political and economic options to supplement military crisis planning.**
- Review the adequacy of current military planning responsibilities for politically sensitive areas, especially the Middle East.
- Periodically exercise major war plans, such as was done with Nifty Nugget, to test the planning and the adequacy of our resources to execute the plans.

SECRETARY OF STATE

The Secretary of State should take the following actions in the areas of Defense policy, weapon acquisitions, and program/budget; planning for crises; and support for DOD needs:

Defense Policy, Weapon Acquisitions, and Program/Budget

- Review the policy section of the Consolidated Guidance during the drafting stage.
- Review the CG for foreign policy considerations after it has been tentatively approved by the Secretary of Defense and provide analyses of significant foreign policy problems for the "mini" PRC meeting on the CG.
- Participate in DOD policy studies as appropriate.
- Participate in an OSD-chaired interagency committee to review the foreign policy and arms control implications of selected weapon systems for consideration by the DSARC.**
- Participate in an annual PRC meeting to review DOD's five-year program, as well as major policy issues unresolved from the "mini" PRC meeting on the CG.
- Contribute to EOP meetings on the DOD program and budget where significant foreign policy matters are at issue.

Planning for Crises

- Assign clear responsibility within the Department for coordinating with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in providing political/foreign policy guidance to military planners.

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- Ensure active State leadership and participation in the systematic interagency planning process for crises. This would include a State-chaired PRC to oversee the process as well as State-chaired interagency groups with primary responsibility for preparing political economic plans supplementing military plans

Support for DOD Needs

- Give greater priority to supporting critical DOD needs overseas such as for training areas, overflight rights, port calls, etc.
- Ensure that DOD has an opportunity to review and comment on major foreign policy addresses and statements.

DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

The Director of ACDA should take the following actions related to defense policy and weapon acquisitions:

- Review the policy section of the CG during drafting for arms control considerations.
- Review the CG for arms control considerations after it has been tentatively approved by the Secretary of Defense, and participate in a "mini" PRC meeting to review significant CG issues.
- Participate in DOD policy studies as appropriate.
- Participate in an OSD-chaired interagency committee to review the arms control implications of selected weapon acquisitions, and to provide analyses of these implications for consideration by the DSARC.
- In light of the above increased ACDA role in DOD policy and weapon acquisition decisions, support elimination of or at least relief from the Congressionally-mandated Arms Control Impact Statements.

APPENDIX A. TERMS OF REFERENCE

Review of Organization and Processes

For Integrating Defense Policy and National Priorities (December 11, 1978)

Subject. The study will review Executive Branch organization and processes intended to assure the consistency of national security actions with each other and with national priorities. It will examine current arrangements in terms of their capacity to identify early those issues requiring interagency or Presidential consideration; to bring to bear on decisionmaking a full range of relevant considerations; and to oversee implementation for its consistency with policy.

Agencies Involved. The primary agencies involved will be the Department of Defense, Department of State, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget. Other agencies may be included as appropriate.

Process. The review will be based largely on interviews with a wide range of current and former officials, and on case studies to be conducted by the study staff. Conclusions and recommendations will be reviewed with each of the agencies involved prior to the completion of a final report.

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Product. The review will result in a Report to the President which assesses the performance of current organizational arrangements, and where appropriate, proposes alternatives.

Staffing. A Study Director will be selected in consultation with the agencies involved. One or two staff members will be contributed by each agency.

Timing. The review will begin as soon after January 1, 1979, as the study group can be assembled. It will complete its work within four to six months.

APPENDIX B. PRESIDENT'S REORGANIZATION PROJECT ISSUE SUMMARY

Integrating Defense Policy with National Priorities (August 1977)

Issue: What changes in organization and processes would improve the integration of national policy perspectives into Defense decisionmaking.

Summary of Problems and Opportunities

Defense policy must form part of overall national policy. Yet the integration of defense programs into the larger framework of US priorities has often been uneven or erratic, and on occasion the linkage between US foreign policy and US defense policy has been weak or lacking. In part, the reasons for these shortcomings are structural and organizational.

Numerous studies of our foreign and defense policy machinery concerning weapons development, force posture, or strategic doctrine have shown that decisions made within the Department of Defense without significant input from outside agencies may prove to have significant long term implications for national priorities or US foreign policy. The natural complexity of the defense planning process, the long lead time required in developing weapons systems, and the difficulty of translating "foreign policy" objectives into defense program and budget decisions contribute to the problem.

Nevertheless, the current decisionmaking system, with its emphasis on ad hoc arrangements, has not always contributed to the early identification of defense issues with foreign policy implications nor ensured that broad national goals were considered in the formulation and implementation of defense policy. Many major defense programs—the B-1 bomber, the neutron bomb, MIRV weapon systems, for example—have received appropriately broad analysis and review only when issues have surfaced at the Presidential level. At that point, the momentum behind such programs is often so great as to make it difficult to revise or reverse decisions previously taken. On other defense programs where there exist major trade-offs between military and foreign policy objectives—developing a replacement for the M-60 tank while supporting NATO weapons standardization, for example—guidance to DOD is by nature broad in character and unable by itself to guide DOD in translating national policy into specific program decisions.

In the past, line agencies with foreign and national policy perspectives, such as the State Department, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and even the Office of International Security Affairs (ISA) within DOD have tended to become involved in the defense programming cycle too late to have a significant impact. Additionally, State, ACDA and ISA have been hampered by a lack of specialized staff and of timely access to program information. Those elements within DOD that currently do play an

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important role in program determination have generally not sought broad national or foreign policy guidance. Specifically, three questions exist with regard to our decision-making machinery:

1. How to ensure that key agencies outside of DOD receive early information on defense plans and programs which could have significant foreign and national policy implications?
2. **How to strengthen the analytical and planning competence of entities within and without DOD to enable them to make appropriate policy contributions on defense issues?**
3. How to improve current machinery for the translation of appropriate guidance into specific defense program decisions?

Current Initiatives:

- The newly established Arms Export Control Board will play a coordinating role in the field of arms transfer policy. This is likely to improve coordination among the interested agencies, but will not alter the fact that some of the parties lack the competence or the perspective necessary to enable them to fulfill their proper roles.
- Defense Secretary Brown plans to establish a new Under Secretary for Policy between his office and ISA. He also hopes to redirect ISA toward monitoring defense programs and to bring State and ACDA into the consideration of defense issues with foreign policy implications.**
- The Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs is trying to enhance the analytic abilities of his staff and to bring State into the DOD budget process at an earlier point.

Comment: Under new leadership, both PM and ISA are seeking new cooperative relationships aimed at better coordination of defense and foreign policy and a closer integration of policymaking between the two agencies. It is still too early to judge the long-term effect of these efforts.

Prior Initiatives

Since 1951, there have been at least 65 studies of the US foreign policy machinery. Their recommendations have been many and varied, but several themes recur: suggestions that the Department of State (or perhaps some expanded version of State) should coordinate agency policies and activities with international implications and that the personnel of State should have greater competence in specialized fields with international implications (e.g., military affairs, economics, science). The principal recommendations of two major recent studies were:

Heineman Report (1967)

1. State should be "coordinator" of foreign and national security policy.
2. State should review the entire foreign affairs budget (including DOD and intelligence community).
3. Establish Under Secretary of State for Security Affairs.

Murphy Commission (June 1975)

1. ISA should play an increased role in shaping the defense program and budget.
2. A single senior State Department official for both political-military and national security affairs.

National Security Policy Integration

3. The selection and training of Foreign Service Officers should recognize the need for competent national security analysts.
4. The political-military capability of the regional bureaus in State should be upgraded.

Recommended Action

The President's Reorganization Project should conduct a study to determine how we can improve the current mechanism for assuring the timely and effective integration of national objectives into Defense program planning and implementation. Particular questions to be studied would include: the roles of State's Under Secretary for Security Assistance and Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, the Defense Security Assistance Agency and the Office of International Security Affairs, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; information management, reporting, and assessment capabilities throughout the US Government on political-military issues relating to foreign and defense policies; and the staffing and coordination of overseas diplomatic activities related to defense programs.

Potential Benefits

- Assure an appropriate relationship of defense programs to overall national objectives and goals.
- Assure that all agencies are better informed of defense issues with foreign policy implications and are capable of playing their appropriate roles in the decisionmaking process.

Constraints:

- Jurisdictional conflict among agencies.
- The difficulty in translating foreign policy objectives into defense programs and the long lead time within DOD in weapons acquisition, logistics, personnel, strategic policy, etc.
- The weakness of various non-DOD agencies in terms of knowledge and competence to influence decisions on specialized issues even if they are afforded early opportunities to comment.

Agencies, Groups, and Individuals Concerned

- Agencies:* State, DOD, ACDA, NSC, OMB.
- Groups:* The principal groups interested would be the employees of State and other affected agencies, although many academics and other private groups can be expected to take on interest in any study touching on our foreign or defense policy machinery.

Related Issues

- Defense Top Management
- Defense Resource Management
- National Military Command Structure

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APPENDIX C. RECENT RECOMMENDATIONS ON CRISIS PLANNING

Departmental Headquarters Study by Paul R. Ignatius, June 1, 1978

"Recommendation No. 2. Establish a Planning Office under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, formally linked in liaison to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, with assignments including politico-military long-range planning and contingency planning oriented to the formulation of Defense policy guidance and in mutual support with overall national security policies.

"This proposal takes advantage of the coincidence of an unfulfilled potential in the new Under Secretary's office; the consensus of a need for better integration of military planning with political considerations and overall national security policymaking; and a foreseeable growth in the strategic, force structure, and national security policy issues facing the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It should enhance the military voice by an organizational connection not now existing and bring military planning into concert with political perspectives... Contingency planning concentrating on politico-military matters should strengthen readiness and sharpen insights on the best use of available armed power."

National Military Command Structure Study by Richard C. Steadman, July 1978

"In the area of policy guidance for operational plans there is a need for at least an annual review by the Secretary and selected key assistants of the principal military plans to assure that their political assumptions are consistent with national security policy. Such briefings also would broaden the understanding of key policymakers of military capabilities and options in the event of crisis or conflict.

"The JCS are sensitive to the fact that only the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary are in the operational chain of command and, thus, strictly interpreted, only they have a "need to know" regarding operational plans. While security of operational plans is critical, present arrangements place too great a burden on the Secretary and Deputy Secretary for assuring that there is sufficient continuing policy guidance in these areas. This responsibility should be delegated to the Under Secretary for Policy."

Evaluation of Nifty Nugget Exercise by William Brehm, November 1978

"The DOD should break with tradition and involve certain key civilians in the review of military operation plans. This review need not involve civilians in the details of the military planning process, but should take the form of OJCS information briefings in the depth and scope required to inform selected OSD civilian officials about key operational assumptions concerning: Political judgements including warning, resource availability, dependence on reserve components, force readiness, major unit deployments, and principal contingencies and options addressed. The OSD civilians should also understand the general process by which operation plans are developed so that they can have both a realistic appreciation for military operational flexibility, and sufficient familiarity with military terminology and concepts to function effectively in the crisis or mobilization management role. The principal OSD staff official in this review should be the Under Secretary for Policy, who should coordinate the involvement of other OSD officials...

"The Chairman, JCS, in coordination with the Under Secretary for Policy, should develop a plan for conducting frequent exercises of the Nifty Nugget type. The exercises should continue to emphasize high-level civilian and military involvement in mobilization and deployment management..."

PANEL 1 Paper:

Integrating Defense Planning

Edward Rowny

Let me start right out by disassociating myself [from] the title assigned to this panel. The wording suggests that defense planning should be integrated with arms control. To those who would object to this interpretation, I would still counter that the title implies that arms control should be on an equal footing with defense planning.

Instead, I would like to address myself to the subject of improving defense planning. Arms control should be allowed to enter the process only when and where it does not interfere with the provision of adequate defense for the United States.

My reasons for this are that over the past two decades defense planning has failed to accomplish its purpose. We should not allow anything, including arms control, to aggravate the dangerous situation which has resulted from two decades of fuzzy thinking and inadequate action.

There can be no doubt that the United States has been overtaken by the Soviet Union in military power. To the huge asymmetry already existing between the USSR and United States in conventional and theater nuclear power we are now being overtaken in strategic power. While we have agonized and debated among ourselves over the role of military power, the Soviet Union has displayed that it has no doubt that military power is *the basis*—the *sine qua non*—for carrying out its national objectives and its foreign policy goals.

Our first task, then, should be to look around us and assess the situation. Is there any doubt that the USSR has expanded its hegemony, first with surrogate forces and now with its own forces? Is there any doubt that this has been made possible because the USSR has increased its military strength? Some may argue that the Soviets, too, have had failures and have not been successful everywhere. Others may choose to perpetuate the fictional analogy between Americans in Vietnam and the Soviets in Afghanistan. But any objective observer cannot but answer these two questions, first, that the USSR has been on the move, and second, that military power made the moves possible.

How about the United States? We have a system of government where people enjoy freedom. The dignity of the individual is upheld. And we are governed by the consent of the governed. We have redress to courts when any of these "God-given rights" are violated or even threatened. We enjoy a high degree of material comfort. With fewer people than the Soviets we still have twice their Gross National Product (GNP). Is there any objective reason why we can not provide for our defense? If the Soviets can spend 12-14 percent of their GNP for military forces, can not we afford to spend more than 4.7 cents of our GNP dollar for our defenses? It is not a question of whether or not we can afford it; the question is whether we can afford not to provide the forces we need.

As a matter of highest priority, therefore, we need to recognize what we have been overlooking. Namely, that a state cannot pursue its national objectives—even though they be non-expansionist ones which strive for stability and seek a peaceful world—without military power. Indeed, a state needs military power if it is to deter another which is embarked on expansion and extending its hegemony.

We need as a first call on our brains and our energy to relearn this basic fact of national existence. To enjoy peace a nation must possess military strength. We cannot

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embark on the task of rebuilding our national strength until we acknowledge this basic truth and admit that we have been pursuing a policy which, if continued, threatens our very existence.

You will note that to this point I have had little to say about arms control. I have done this because my six and one-half years with SALT have led me to the conclusion that we have put too much emphasis on the *control* of arms and too little on the *provision* of arms. It has been a profound mistake for the United States to make arms control the centerpiece of its foreign policy. The Soviet Union has not done so and has profited from our folly.

The Soviets have their priorities straight. First, they determine their national objectives and foreign policy goals. Then they develop and deploy the forces needed to carry out these objectives and goals. Finally, and only in third priority, they see where and if controls or limitations of arms can be accepted which fit into this scheme.

In the United States we have tried to stand this pyramid on its head. First we examine what arms might be controlled or limited. Then we plan and tailor our forces accordingly. Finally we look around to see what objectives and goals we might be able to achieve with the forces that are left. It was by following this policy that we postponed the development of the M-X, delayed the Trident submarine (and are still delaying the missile to go into it), abandoned the B-1, stretched out our cruise missile programs, and shortchanged our C³I improvements and ABM research.

Therefore, as lesson number one of the SALT experience I would say: make United States defense posture and not the achievement of a SALT agreement our first priority objective. Only with our strength restored can we pursue our foreign policy objectives. Moreover, we will then be in a position to enter into negotiations on limiting arms from the only basis which has promise of success—a posture of strength.

When I was assigned to the SALT negotiating team as the JCS Representative in Washington in 1973, I read—and in some cases reread—the "classics" of those who had negotiating experience with the Soviets.

As a result of this reading, I drew up a list of "do's" and "don'ts" to guide me during my own negotiating experience. This experience I would divide into four periods: 1) "Great Expectations," up to the Vladivostok accords in 1974; 2) "Great Frustrations," from Vladivostok to the end of the Nixon era; 3) "Hope Rekindled," the first six months of the Carter Administration, and 4) "the Great Disillusion," the final months when we made the major concessions which prevented SALT II from being an equal and verifiable treaty.

I learned from this experience that if we had heeded the lessons of our predecessors we might have been able to arrive at a good agreement. However, we honored most of the rules in the breach. First, we assumed that the Soviets had the same goals and objectives as did we. As a consequence, while we "problem solved" they competed. Second, we mirror-imaged and assumed the Soviets are more like us than unlike us. The opposite is closer to the truth. Finally, we put the aim of achieving an agreement ahead of the terms of that agreement, we put process ahead of substance. We showed too much zeal. We offered proposal after proposal and package upon package to the Soviets. As a result the Soviets picked and chose from the proposals they liked and rejected the remainder. The Soviets took all we offered and asked for more.

The net result was an unequal and unverifiable treaty. It is unequal because it allows the Soviets 308 heavy missile launchers and us none. The 3,000-odd ICBM warheads on these heavy missiles alone are more than those we have on all of our

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ICBMs put together. And each warhead is twice as powerful and has an accuracy comparable to ours. Second, the treaty allows the Soviets not to count 375 intercontinentally-capable Backfire bombers. Third, it permits them greater levels of strategic power; it allows them an asymmetry in ICBM throwweight, for example, which is four times as great as ours.

There are two arguments often used by proponents of this SALT Treaty. First, that the treaty limits both sides to equal numbers of systems. This is true. But it completely neglects the "numbers fallacy," an illusion that numbers are meaningful in an agreement where the potential destructive power of the unit is of so much greater significance. We overlook the sad fact that qualitative limitations were not achieved. In other words, the total resources the Soviets spend for strategic arms has not been affected. They can make qualitative improvements to make the situation even more dangerous for us than if they merely increased their numbers of systems.

The second argument for SALT is that we succeeded in reaching a fractionation limit—the Soviets will be limited to 10 warheads per missile. Again, this is true. However, it neglects the fact that the throwweight, the total destructive power of the SS-18 has not been reduced. Therefore, the Soviets can deploy 20 or more warheads per SS-18 as soon as the treaty, if one is ever ratified, expires.

To the argument that the Soviets could build even more without the treaty than with it—the answer is "why should they?" They already have more than enough. Further, "how much more could they add to the 12-14 percent of the GNP they are now spending for defense?"

The argument is sometimes advanced that the treaty will prevent Soviet interference with our National Technical Means (NTM) of verification. But we have permitted the Soviets to encrypt telemetry on their ICBM tests—the one system that really counts—and hence we have already permitted them to interfere with our NTM.

During the ratification process, as individual Senators studied the provisions of the treaty, a greater number registered their opposition to the agreement as written. Even before Afghanistan there were 44 Senate votes lined up against ratification. After Afghanistan the President took SALT off the calendar, saying the time was not propitious for debating the treaty. He was right. We can only hope that he did indeed learn more about the Soviets in one week than in the preceding three years. He was shocked that Brezhnev had lied to him. His biggest mistake since Afghanistan has been to declare that he will abide by the terms of SALT II. He is thus not only legislating the treaty into existence by executive fiat but has telegraphed to the Soviets that the United States will not do what it should—that is, close the window of vulnerability—as rapidly as possible. We should not tie our hands and thus prevent ourselves from doing whatever we need to do to regain strategic parity as rapidly and as economically as possible. If the provisions of the treaty, or our interpretation of them, prevent us from achieving this goal we should look first to our defenses.

I am here speaking first of all about the vulnerability of our land-based missile force. We should be digging holes in the ground into which we can randomly move our Minutemen. Later we should replace Minuteman with the MX missile. Second, we should be developing and deploying cruise missiles, and especially ground-launched cruise missiles, as rapidly as possible and not be proceeding on our current "business as usual" schedule. Third, we should be preparing to deploy air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles in whatever numbers, and from whatever platforms that are optimal for our defense.

But I have already talked too much about arms control whereas my main object is to focus on defense planning. Let me at this point make my position perfectly clear.

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I was selected to be the JCS Representative to SALT because of my belief in arms control. Despite my illuminating, disillusioning and sobering six and one-half years' experience, I still believe in the objectives of arms control. However, I am no longer a believer in the process of arms control if it is to be a continuation of our past processes.

One cannot get to a good SALT III from a poor SALT II. SALT II is not a step to SALT III because the gulf which separates us is so wide that one cannot take two successive steps—or even leaps—to get to the other side of the chasm. There are two ways, theoretically, that this distance can be shortened. One is for the Soviets to come down in their strength. However, this they will not do. Therefore, the only alternative open to us is to build up. Only after we have built up can we risk taking the step between the two postures which have been brought closer together. Only then can we risk entering into a SALT agreement. Therefore, let us look to our defenses.

Over the past two decades I have served in the Pentagon several times. During Secretary McNamara's regime I worked for the Chairman of the JCS and then for McNamara himself when I headed the task force to strengthen our forces in NATO during the second Berlin crisis. During my tours in the Pentagon, and especially recently, I have seen an erosion in common-sense defense planning. To turn this about I believe we must recognize that military power *does* count. We must rid ourselves, and then our superiors, of the well-intentioned but naive notion that we can carry out our foreign policy from a position of weakness. The United States needs a sound, coherent, and consistent foreign policy. But it is not enough to make this statement. What we must do is look to the philosophy and the mechanism for providing for our defenses. Only then can we carry out such a foreign policy.

To do this we must realize that the patient is gravely ill. No bandages or even medication will do. It's time to face up to the need for surgery.

I would start with the reaffirmation of the responsibility of our military leadership. Title II of the National Security Act of 1947, the law of the land, states that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the principal military advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense.

What has happened is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been primarily advising the Secretary of Defense and only secondarily the President. In the past several years they have been competing with second and third rung political appointees for the ear of the Secretary of Defense.

No responsible person, in or out of uniform, has a quarrel with the concept of civilian control, that is the ultimate control of the military establishment by duly elected civilians. However, this original concept has been broadened to encompass a competitive and, in some cases, a primary method of providing strategic planning and military advice by second and third rung civilians who have not been elected but appointed to their positions.

Let me make my position crystal clear. I am not calling for a General Boulanger—a military man on horseback—to take charge. What I am calling for is the return to the *legitimate and proper role of preferring professional military expertise and advise.*

This system broke down after World War II because of the inability of powerful and strong-willed Service Chiefs to agree upon how much defense was needed and more importantly how the pie was to be cut up. As a result, the Chiefs were subordinated to a powerful Secretary of Defense who could resolve the disputes among the military leaders.

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But over the past two decades, and especially over the past several years, the pendulum has swung too far. A huge civilian bureaucracy has been established which overshadows and overpowers the nation's professional military expertise. An entire set of organizational and procedural changes has come about which presents the appearance that uniformed military men are doing the strategic and logistical planning and giving military advice. However, the reality is that while military leaders are held responsible in the minds of the US public for the defense of the nation, these military leaders do not have the authority, nor the means, for providing for good defense planning or for presenting sound military advice.

This is neither the time nor the place to go into detail into those organizational and procedural changes which would need to be made to restore strategic planning and advice to its proper position. Let me only suggest several features which would be changed. First, the JCS would strengthen their strategic analysis and defense planning capabilities. Second, the manner in which Defense Planning Guidance is rendered needs to revert to its former function. Third, the Chiefs should acknowledge a primary role on the part of their Chairman in making decisions on defense planning, especially in matters affecting strategic forces. Fourth, the JCS should as a matter of procedure send memoranda giving military advice directly to the President and provide information copies to the Secretary of Defense. The current practice, whereby the JCS habitually send memoranda to the President through the Secretary of Defense, has the effect of watering down or tempering military advice.

The above points are only suggestive of the kind of thing that needs to be done and is by no means exhaustive.

The main thrust of what I have to say is that defense planning, as it has evolved over the past several years, has not worked. It has brought us to a position of military inferiority vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. It is time to examine why this has happened and to make the necessary changes to redress the situation.

This brings me back to the question of integrating defense planning and arms control. I have made it clear that attempts within the United States to have arms control go hand in hand with defense planning have only harmed the latter. If there is a case for integrating the two, it is to be increasingly vigilant that we do not make decisions in defense planning in the expectation that some particular limitation or control of arms will result in a verifiable and enforceable agreement with the USSR.

Let us once again focus on the fundamental problem before us. What needs to be emphasized is that the United States is confronted with a serious Soviet challenge. For the first time in our history we are facing military inferiority, in strategic, theater nuclear, and conventional forces. The military balance—what the Soviets call the "correlation of forces"—has changed, and it continues to change in favor of the Soviet Union. The implications of this shift are far-reaching and significant, not only for the United States but for our allies as well.

Any assessment of relative US and Soviet military strategic capabilities must necessarily look at a comparison of US-Soviet defense spending. It has been repeatedly and authoritatively pointed out that in the past decade, while our defense budgets declined in real terms, Soviet spending on defense increased. As Secretary of Defense Brown put it: "Soviet spending has not responded to US restraint. . . . Unless we act . . . to increase our efforts, the difference in current effort would soon be reflected in an unacceptable imbalance."

In 1975 the Central Intelligence Agency was forced, by the weight of incontrovertible evidence, to revise its estimate of Soviet defense spending from 5 to 7 percent of

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GNP to 11 to 13 percent of GNP. Other intelligence estimates have placed Soviet spending at an even higher range of 12 to 14 percent, and some estimates have been even higher. During the 1970s the USSR outspent the United States on military investment by about \$104 billion in equivalent dollars. To appreciate fully the magnitude of this difference, let us look at what the United States could have accomplished had this total been budgeted. It could have covered all of the following: the entire B-1 program; the MX program (missiles and shelters); all of the currently programmed Trident submarines and missiles; the roughly 7,000 XM-1 tanks we now plan to acquire; a matching number of infantry fighting vehicles; the once-planned buy of air transports to provide us with an intra-theater mobility. Having provided for all of these weapons we would still have enough left to buy all of the F-14s, F-15s, F-16s, F-18s, and A-10s now planned for Air Force and Navy tactical air modernization.

In general, Soviet defense expenditures in the decade of the 1970s exceeded US expenditures by some 50 percent. In strategic forces alone the Soviet effort was over three times that of the United States. Unfortunately, SALT has had no appreciable effect on Soviet spending for strategic forces.

The Soviet Union is currently ahead of the United States in 33 of 41 static indices of US and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, such as numbers of ICBMs, MIRVed ICBM throwweight, and total throwweight. If current trends continue, the Soviets could well find themselves superior in all 41 indices in the next several years.

This massive allocation of resources to the defense industry has resulted in a continuous procurement by the Soviet Union of new types of strategic nuclear weapons systems. Presently, the Soviet ICBM deployment program will give the USSR an increasing advantage against US ICBMs. It has been estimated that within two years the Soviet Union will achieve the combination of ICBM numbers, warhead yields and accuracies necessary to destroy 90 percent of our Minuteman force. This development is by far the most pressing strategic problem facing the United States today; it gives the Soviets a formidable first-strike capability. As SALT has had no impact on Soviet defense spending, it has also had little impact on Soviet procurement of strategic offensive weapons systems. As described by Harold Brown, "When we build, they build. When we cut, they build." One thing is clear about the SALT process—it has failed to slow the momentum of the Soviet strategic buildup.

As a result of this change in the strategic balance, the US strategic deterrent has been undermined. A situation in which the United States is strategically inferior and its ICBMs vulnerable can only weaken deterrence and cause Soviet leaders to engage in more aggressive actions than they would otherwise undertake. This could have a dangerously destabilizing effect in a time of crisis. A strategically superior Soviet Union would, in times of crisis, take greater risks, thus contributing to an escalation to situations in which nuclear arms might be employed. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is only the latest example of the willingness of the USSR to take aggressive actions in the knowledge that the United States will not respond.

As I have said earlier, there is no objective reason why the United States cannot keep pace militarily with the Soviet Union. The Soviets cannot compete with us in any other area—not in social well-being nor in economic productivity. In fact, they are only out-doing us in this one field—military strength. But this one field can make all the difference.

The task facing us in the 1980s is, therefore, not how we integrate defense planning and arms control. The task is to determine how to integrate defense planning to provide for the common defense. All of us who have observed what has been

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happening, and especially those of us who are or were exposed at first hand to Soviet thought and action, must be more frank, more explicit, and more courageous at explaining to the American people what has in fact been happening. We need not exaggerate or resort to emotional appeals.

These are the cold sober facts. Our leaders must adopt a strategic, long-range view of our foreign and defense policies. Once this is done we must reexamine what has been wrong with our defense planning and set about quickly to correct the situation. The urgent problem facing us is not to integrate defense planning with arms control. The urgent and vital problem is to integrate our defense planning, period.

Panel 2

Problems and Prospects for Arms Control in the 1980s

Papers and discussion in this panel examined the current status of arms control initiatives/negotiations and assessed future directions for US policies. Arms control issues that were examined included those surrounding SALT, MBFR, NATO's TNF modernization, nuclear test bans and nonproliferation, Indian Ocean forces, and anti-satellite technologies. The group assessed the major problems facing the United States in each of these areas and looked at the prospects for successful arms control initiatives in the near future.

PANEL 2

Participants

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Professor Jack Ruina, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Mr. Leon Sloss, SRI International

Dr. Jeremy J. Stone, Director, Federation of American Scientists

Dr. Richard H. Ullman, Princeton University

Dr. Kenneth N. Waltz, Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institution

PANEL 2 SUMMARY

Problems and Prospects for Arms Control in the 1980s

Richard Burt
Roger F. Pajak

Dr. Dougherty began the deliberations of the panel by summarizing the paper which he had prepared for the conference. The problems of arms control, according to Dr. Dougherty, appeared to be more formidable and the prospects dimmer than they were when the SALT process began a little over a decade ago. Even more significant than the currently applicable technical difficulties, in the author's judgment, was his observation that the present international political-strategic environment was less conducive to reaching arms limitation agreements than it was in the early 1970s. Afghanistan may have been the last straw, rather than the precipitating factor.

Dr. Dougherty maintained that it will be difficult to get SALT II back on track. He noted that the President has stated that the US would abide by the provisions of the SALT II agreement as long as the Soviets do likewise. At the same time, it is conceivable in the eyes of the Soviet leadership that the Pentagon might be in a better position to go forward with SALT II than without it.

Dr. Dougherty felt that the Soviets may now be as concerned with European developments regarding theater nuclear forces as they are with SALT. They certainly are concerned with the possible deployment of the MX missile.

It was somewhat surprising, in Dr. Dougherty's estimation, that US defense planners may be interested in pushing the Soviets toward deployment of a mobile missile system, inasmuch as arms controllers have long held that a mobile system would complicate verification procedures, and as such would be destabilizing. It might be more useful, he felt, in allowing both sides to deploy the systems they wish to deploy.

The panel agreed that the problems concerning SALT were largely political in nature. Some members argued, moreover, that Afghanistan was the catalyst that caused the breakdown of SALT.

The US position basically has been that we can bring the Soviets around to our own thinking on arms control. At the same time, at least some members felt that there was no US consensus on what arms control seems to be about. It was felt that a more precise recognition of Soviet and US differences would enable us to plan our force structure more effectively.

The point was made in discussion that, if the Soviets perceive a deterioration of the US strategic position, a danger exists that they will act with greater boldness in the international arena. They may think they have interdicted or outmaneuvered the US. This could cause a gradual US slide into a position of something less than strategic parity.

New Options Suggested for Arms Control

Several new options for arms control negotiators were suggested by the panel as follows:

- (1) Ride out a temporary hiatus in negotiations;
- (2) Attempt to get negotiations back on their former track; or
- (3) Attempt to get negotiations back on some other track.

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Some sentiment was evinced for the *last option* mentioned. It was felt that arms control could possibly make further progress if SALT was not so much of a centerpiece in US-Soviet relations.

Doubt was expressed that the US can pressure or otherwise co-opt the Soviets into shifting economic resources from one component of their forces to another, e.g., shifting funds from strategic to general purpose forces. It was questionable that the US could influence the Soviet strategic budget or any other facet of Soviet military spending.

Another problem in current arms control activity may be an overemphasis on *reductions* in arms, rather than their limitation. A useful alternative conducive to stability might be more concentration on confidence-building measures.

Also, more attention of late has been paid to countervailing strategy. Perhaps additional emphasis could be placed on strategic targeting in counter-force or counter-communications modes.

One panel member noted that he had seen nothing so far in Soviet doctrinal literature that indicated a Soviet interest in mutual measures to spare existing communications, command, and control (C³) networks in the event of a nuclear exchange. Observing that the preservation of C³ networks would be especially critical for ensuing negotiations, he suggested that measures to spare such facilities from nuclear attack might be an important agenda item for future arms control discussions.

Current Problems for Arms Control

In response to the question of what currently "ails" arms control, the answer might be nothing or everything. One fundamental issue is the determination of strategic parity between the superpowers. No task of determining parity is complicated by the "yardstick approach" which attempts to measure and weigh the disparate strategic systems which comprise the superpowers' arsenals. Another issue concerns the role of SALT in US-Soviet relations. A third would be whether a "war limiting" strategy is destabilizing.

Most of the panel members seemed to feel that the most arms control can do at present is to assist the US in muddling through to a little more security. One member argued that defense strategists may no longer be sufficiently impressed with the horror and calamity of a nuclear war and seem to be more disposed to consider "corrections" in US force posture and strategy that only recently were considered "destabilizing." He thought perhaps another Cuban missile-type crisis might be necessary to bring strategic planners back to reality.

Another member felt that it was important to distinguish between the rhetoric and the substance of SALT. An example of a difference between our declaratory policy and strategic force posture was our *targeting* policy. An objective of arms control was to locate grounds of common interest between the parties.

In returning to the question of "parity," the point was made that some people in the US don't accept it. Many still question what it is. In a similar vein, both sides favor "stability," but have differing interpretations of what it means.

With regard to the problem of accidents and miscalculations, the Soviets have as great an interest in this area as the U.S. The Soviets at times are left confused or suspicious as to US intentions in discussing such issues, and sometimes feel that the US has ulterior motives in making certain proposals. There are concerns on the Soviets' part that US plans for Theater Nuclear Forces are, among other things, contributing to nuclear proliferation among the NATO countries.

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The panel felt that certain perceptions obtained in Congress and the public at large, as follow:

- (1) That the balance of power was eroding over the entire military spectrum;
- (2) That the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan demonstrated that they were beginning to take higher risks in international adventures; and
- (3) That the US was coming off second best in arms control endeavors.

The point was made that the US actually has few types of leverage to use against the Soviets. Moreover, the Soviets face different threats from the US, and many of our allies are located close to Soviet borders.

Blechman Paper

Barry Blechman summarized his paper on the future for negotiated arms limitations. He began by viewing the fall 1980 elections as another opportunity, regardless of the outcome, to formulate arms control policies anew. He argued that much will depend upon the resolution of two basic issues:

- (1) The continuing debate on the desired character of US-Soviet relations, and more particularly, the relationship between arms control issues and "linkage," and
- (2) A largely unstated argument about the role of nuclear weapons in US foreign policy.

At its root, arms control offers a technically-oriented approach to military force limitations with a modest set of objectives. Its theoretical underpinnings accept tension among states as an inevitable component of international politics and view military force as a necessary and legitimate instrument of national policy. Arms control and military forces are seen as flip sides of the same coin, both being means of enhancing the nation's security.

In view of its recognition of the realities of international conflict, the *objectives* of arms control are limited. Three are usually mentioned:

- (1) To diminish the risk of war;
- (2) To minimize the cost of war, should it occur; and
- (3) To reduce the cost of preparing for war.

In all three of these objectives, any successes can come only at the margin. The purpose is *not* to abolish war, but to *diminish* the risk that war will occur.

However, in the process of being transformed from such a modest theoretical construct, of interest to a handful of military specialists, into a national political issue of significant magnitude, the objectives of arms control, Blechman argued, were sharply revised. The nation's political leaders, over the past 20 or so years, found in arms control a convenient means of satisfying popular demands resulting from international circumstances and certain strands of opinion, e.g., antimilitarism and an aversion to power politics, long present in the nation's psyche. American political leaders accordingly found in arms control a pragmatic means of temporarily satisfying the demands of certain constituencies.

Blechman went on to argue that if arms control is to be revived, policymakers should be forthright about the *modest* potential of any arms control negotiations. Agreements that result from arms limitations are not stepping stones to peace. Optimally, they can accomplish specific objectives in the context of international political conflict.

Another point of interest raised by Blechman was the relationship between arms

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control benefits and the overall state of US-Soviet relations. From the Soviet perspective, one might think that arms control should be closely linked with other manifestations of Soviet behavior, i.e., the concept of linkage. Strangely enough, the opposite has been the case. Progress in arms control, especially in the early seventies, occurred apart from other Soviet developments in the international arena. Since the mid-seventies, however, SALT has increasingly become a weather vane in US-Soviet relations.

Blechman also addressed the topic of nuclear weapons in US strategic thinking, referring to the heretofore existing orthodoxy that such weapons can play only a tightly circumscribed role in foreign policy. Basically, nuclear weapons served to deter nuclear attack or coercion on the US and its allies. The other and often unstated side of this argument, however, was that such weapons could translate nuclear strength into political clout in an assertive way. Consequently, the US, in a policy crunch, made use of nuclear threats on numerous occasions, such as the Berlin Blockade, Lebanon, and the Korean War. Blechman felt that as the US moves into the 1980s, it probably would make use of such threats even more frequently than in the past.

At this point in the discussion the chairman posed the question as to which specific actions could be accomplished to get SALT back on track.

One member responded by suggesting the sweetening of SALT. He urged that the administration send the treaty back to the Senate for ratification as a "baseline" agreement, and that all numbers of weapon systems allowed by the treaty be reduced by an agreed percentage each year. The member averred that the "doves" would find such a provision acceptable because of the reductions in arms levels involved, while the "hawks" would find attraction in the reductions on the part of the Soviets. Furthermore, both sides would have the freedom to choose whatever systems they would like to eliminate in their respective reductions.

In response to a point raised about such questions as Backfire, TNF, and other issues that have been on the periphery of the agreement, the originator commented such points were already included in the treaty that had been before the Senate.

This exchange not surprisingly generated some rather animated discussion. A panel member argued that some advocates of arms control equated *progress* with *arms reductions*. He felt that the position of recent administrations was that arms control, on the contrary, had very modest ambitions, and he advocated a very limited approach in working toward reductions. Other members of the panel felt that working toward a 10 per cent force level reduction, for example, by the mid-1980s was not hoping for too much.

The panel generally agreed that it was fallacious to equate arms control with reductions. Members felt that the public could be convinced of the merits of arms control by a concerted campaign by the administration, with cooperation from Congress. Perhaps some form of arms control could be institutionalized, with one example being the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) in the SALT milieu. At the same time, it was probably naive to believe that any administration would be willing to take on this task.

Another aspect of the discussion centered on the multilateralization of arms control discussions. Although SALT remained in a class by itself vis-a-vis the strategic arsenals of the two superpowers, other negotiations might benefit from having additional interested parties participate. For example, in retrospect it seems to have been a mistake for the US to engage only the Soviets in bilateral talks in the Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) negotiations. A multilateral approach, engaging the European arms suppliers as well, might have been more effective. Such an approach, among other

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things, would take the burden off the US and remove some of the international pressure from the two superpowers if participation in the talks could be broadened. The question still remained whether a new administration would want to establish a whole new context for arms control.

Further debate then ensued on the merits of percentage reductions in strategic weapons levels. The panel was divided between those who were dubious that the Soviets would consider percentage reductions as a sweetener and those who felt the Soviets would be interested in preventing detente, or what remained of it, from unravelling too far.

Some of the skeptics on the panel maintained that the Soviets would be extremely reluctant to move toward any reductions. The issue of reductions might even cause the Soviets to attempt to reopen the whole SALT negotiating process. It was also argued that such disarmament proposals evoked memories of the Cold War.

The panel in general felt that the US sometimes thinks it can sway the Soviet Union more than it in fact can. We have tried, on occasion, to formulate their emigration policy, design their force structure, or re-allocate their budget, and have found to our chagrin that we cannot do it.

New Considerations for SALT and US Defense Policy

Colonel Johnson summarized the paper that Commander Norton and he had written for the conference. With the present uncertainty governing the future of the SALT process, defense planning must proceed with SALT as a tenuous variable. Such planning must respond to the realities of the strategic situation which are adverse to the US.

For various reasons, strategic arms control will continue as a basic instrument of national security policy. The paper discusses several issues which are especially important at this juncture, including linkage, the allies' positions, and the probable Soviet outlook.

Three general approaches are considered:

- (1) Ratification of the SALT Treaty, as it now stands (with the question to be considered as to how much longer the Soviets will adhere to the treaty);
- (2) Leapfrogging SALT II and seeking more restrictive quantitative and qualitative constraints; or
- (3) Falling back to a more incremental series of less comprehensive agreements.

Colonel Johnson then called for considerations in defense planning which would optimize US advantages and retain program flexibility while keeping the door open to SALT as an option in defense policy and an element of the strategic relationship between the US and the Soviet Union.

The panel felt that, by mid-1981, the Soviets may decide that a deal cut in 1979 may no longer be valid without formal ratification. They have so far declined to work out any new procedures as outlined under SALT. In another year or so, the Soviets may decide that a SALT II Treaty and Protocol, sans ratification, will no longer be useful to them. Rather than insisting on the protocol's extension, they may be inclined to relinquish it altogether.

The panel raised several questions pursuant to SALT at this point. Are there modifications that might be made to the treaty that would improve chances for US ratification? What would happen if the Soviets decided to increase the size of their strategic

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weapons arsenal in the wake of Afghanistan? Should the US keep its options open to defend its missile force in the 1980s?

A member noted that some US Senators may find modification of the ABM Treaty an attractive alternative to the MX. Other members rejoined to this by expressing alarm at tinkering with the ABM Treaty again, claiming that doing so would violate the tenet of not knowing when you're well off.

Once again, the discussion reverted to looking at arms control prospects in the 1980s. The point was reemphasized that what we need to do is to move away from such standard issues as reductions and look toward other measures, such as confidence-building, relations with our allies, and re-targeting.

It was thought that some measures may not be verifiable, but would be extremely useful just the same. Indeed, a useful element for SALT III might be an extension or broadening of verification procedures.

The panel concluded on the hopeful note that the prospects for arms control in the 1980s may not be as pessimistic or bleak as may have been imagined at the beginning of the conference sessions.

PANEL 2 Paper

Is There a Future for Negotiated Arms Limitations?

Barry Blechman

In the spring of 1980, the future of efforts to limit armaments through international negotiations is very much in doubt. President Carter's decision in January to defer Senate debate on the SALT II Treaty only recognized formally what had long been apparent: In many ways the troubled history of SALT II already had represented a significant, perhaps fatal defeat for negotiated arms limitations—regardless of the specific fate of the treaty itself. Even before the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, enthusiasm for arms limitations had become increasingly restrained within the Administration—to put it mildly—as the SALT agreement's political problems had become increasingly evident. Moreover, the national SALT debate and related developments had occasioned perceptions in the Congress and among the public-at-large of political and substantive liabilities of negotiated arms limitations that seemed likely to give pause to any President taking office in 1981.

Few would have predicted such a state of affairs. Upon taking office, President Carter set ambitious objectives for, and assigned unprecedented priority to arms limitations. The design of the M-X missile system, for example, the most important weapon program backed by the Carter administration, was strongly influenced by projected requirements of verifying future negotiated limitations on strategic weapons. Similarly, early in 1977 the President established tough unilateral policies aimed at reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation and restraining sales of conventional weapons. Most importantly, in March 1977, US objectives in the on-going SALT negotiations were reevaluated and a more ambitious negotiating position adopted. At the same time, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance proposed the creation of new US-Soviet arms limitation working groups. Eight such groups were agreed upon: anti-satellite weapons, chemical weapons, civil defense, comprehensive nuclear test ban, conventional arms transfers, demilitarization of the Indian Ocean, prior notification of missile tests, and radiological weapons and new types of mass destruction weapons.

The results of this ambitious program have been modest. Indeed, in the closing months of the Carter administration, efforts to place limitations on armaments are at a standstill; their prognosis bleak.

Judged strictly on their own criteria, unilateral efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation and to restrain arms sales may have been successful for a time, but in the end seem to have failed. During the second half of 1979, as concern about the substantive and political consequences of Soviet military assertiveness mounted within the Administration, the President reversed himself on a series of arms transfer decisions, authorizing sales of OV-10 aircraft to Morocco and of large quantities of munitions to Saudi Arabia, and making a crucial blanket exception to the arms transfer restraint policy by permitting development of a new aircraft whose only markets would be found overseas.

Similarly, efforts to restrain nuclear proliferation were set back in 1979 by the

NOTE: After being developed for this Special NSAI Conference, this paper was accepted for publication in *Foreign Affairs* in the autumn of 1980. A somewhat revised and edited version was scheduled for public release by *Foreign Affairs* after 15 September 1980.

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disappointing results of the INFCE study,* several international deals involving components of civilian nuclear power systems, an unexplained event near South Africa which could have been a nuclear explosion, and the Administration's reversal of prior decisions not to sell nuclear fuel for the unsafeguarded Indian reactor at Tarapur and not to provide economic or military assistance to Pakistan because of that nation's attempt to develop a nuclear explosive capability. While these individual decisions may be understandable in the light of world events, and although the non-proliferation and arms transfer policies did score some important early successes, at the end of three years both policies clearly were in disarray.

Even greater disappointments occurred in the negotiations. The SALT II negotiations were concluded successfully, but the treaty's fate at best is uncertain. Of the US-Soviet working groups, negotiations on civil defense and prior notification of missile tests were never held;** three negotiations which did begin have since been terminated—in fact, if not formally;*** and two negotiations—for a comprehensive nuclear test ban and a ban on chemical weapons—continue, but with no agreement in sight. Agreement also remains elusive in a negotiation already proceeding when President Carter took office: talks for mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe. Only one negotiation was concluded successfully: that on radiological weapons; elements of an agreement acceptable to both the United States and the Soviet Union have been presented to the Committee on Disarmament for consideration and possible inclusion in a multilateral treaty.

Why was it not possible to accomplish more? To be sure, these activities were pursued in a domestic environment that included the same social, economic, and political factors which in recent years have made virtually any national policy difficult to establish and even harder to sustain over the long term. The absence of national consensus, the dispersion of power within the Congress, the continuing conflict between the executive and legislative branches over appropriate roles in foreign policy decision-making, the legacy of suspicion and distrust of the Presidency inherited by Jimmy Carter, the erosion of the major political parties and the rise of single issue interest groups—all contributed to the difficulties of US foreign policy in general and US arms limitation efforts in particular.

Moreover, the climate for arms limitations had been strongly and adversely affected by the continuing buildup of Soviet military power. Roughly 16 years in duration by 1980, the broad scope and relentless pace of the buildup has had dramatic effects on Western public and elite perceptions of the political and military implications of US-Soviet arms negotiations. Although these Soviet military efforts raise certain specific security concerns, their perhaps more important effects are diffuse and political in character. The Soviet Union's continued willingness to allocate a relatively large percentage of its relatively scarce resources to military forces which already—to a Western eye—appear excessive for defensive purposes, has raised the most serious questions about Soviet ambitions.

Continuing turbulence and frequent military conflicts in the third world have seriously aggravated the situation. These conflicts, which more often than not challenged a status quo favoring the West, posed problems enough. Direct or indirect

*An acronym for International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation; an effort to develop an international consensus on ways to limit the dangers that civilian nuclear power programs pose for nuclear weapons proliferation.

**A requirement for prior notification of certain missile tests was included in the SALT II Treaty.

***The Indian Ocean negotiations were last convened in February 1978, the conventional arms transfer talks were last held in December 1978, and the anti-satellite talks were last convened in June 1979. No future meetings have been scheduled for any of the three.

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Soviet involvement, when it occurred, added another, more threatening dimension to third world turmoil. To be sure, these Soviet military programs and activity in the third world do not violate any arms control agreement.* Moreover, short of war, negotiating mutual limitations on armaments remains the only direct way to constrain Soviet armed forces. Yet, the political logic of the situation even before the occupation of Afghanistan was such that Soviet military decisions clearly made efforts to form and sustain the constituencies necessary to ensure the success of arms limitation initiatives far more difficult.

The US Senate's SALT deliberations are instructive. At the end of the first round of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings in August 1979, prospects for the treaty seemed bright. Criticisms of the specific terms of the treaty aired during the extensive sessions of the committee had been fully discussed and largely discredited. Remaining concerns focused mainly on what commitments to military spending the Carter administration would be willing to make to offset charges that SALT induced a certain euphoria in the US Government. Although passage was far from certain, betting in Washington was that approval by the full Senate would be in hand by Thanksgiving.

The subsequent travails of the treaty are traceable not to the surfacing of any new arguments about the agreement itself, nor to new information about the balance of strategic weapons, but to other types of events. The revelation in September that there was a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba and the subsequent pseudocrisis delayed the committee markup. Once sufficient time had passed for the hoopla to die down, the committee reviewed the treaty line by line, again demonstrating the weaknesses of substantive criticisms of the agreement itself. The treaty was passed by the full committee in November without amendments significant enough to require renegotiation. Then, however, came seizure of the US Embassy in Teheran, which delayed the opening of floor debate, and, finally, the coup de grace administered by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

What now? Obviously, not much will happen in the near-term—at least through the US election. But what of the period after 1980? Should there be continued efforts to limit arms through negotiations? What objectives, if any, are realistic? Much will depend upon the resolution of two fundamental issues: (a) the continuing debate about the desired character of US-Soviet relations; and (b) a largely unstated argument about the role of nuclear weapons in US foreign policy.

LINKAGE

ARMS LIMITATIONS IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS

Permit me, first of all, to express our sincere gratitude to Mr. Karjalainen, Minister of Foreign Affairs, for his warm welcome and wishes for success in our work.

The Government of the USSR attaches great importance to the negotiations on curbing the strategic arms race. *Their positive results should undoubtedly contribute both to improvement in Soviet-American relations and in the consolidation of universal peace.***

*Recent evidence that the Soviets may have been storing (or producing) biological warfare agents in Sverdlovsk stands as a possible exception to this statement.

***New York Times*, 18 November 1969, p. 10 (italics added)

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With these words, Vladimir S. Semyonov began the Soviet presentation at the first session of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, more than 10 years ago. And, thus, at the very outset of the talks, the concept which eventually was to break the back of the SALT process was recognized formally: Linkage, the idea that progress toward arms limitation would lead to progress in other aspects of US-Soviet relations and, conversely, its corollary, that cooperation (or lack of cooperation) in other aspects of US-Soviet relations would facilitate (or hamper) movement in arms negotiations. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have been ambivalent about "linkage." Both have stressed or deemphasized it as they found it to be in their interest. In the end, however, the concept took firm root in the American political system and, as a result, imposed a heavier burden on the talks than they could possibly bear; indeed, the notion emphasized a model of US-Soviet relations which turned out to be more than a significant segment of the American population was prepared to accept.

Given their ideological origins, it would be surprising if Soviet commentators did not stress interrelationships between negotiated arms limitations and broader accommodation between the United States and the Soviet Union. From a Soviet theoretical perspective, the source of all conflict is economic and, by extension, political, stemming fundamentally from the existence of historically antagonistic social systems. To a Soviet theorist, the basic premise of arms control—that weapons in themselves contribute to the risk of war—is sophistry. Conflict results from the necessary clash of opposing social forces. The alleviation of conflict, therefore, can only result from broad political accommodation. By making preexisting settlements specific and legally binding, arms limitation agreements can strengthen political accommodations but they can never force new arrangements; they are the "practical embodiment" of detente, not its cause.

At times, the Soviets have been willing to demonstrate the practical consequences of this relationship. Perhaps the best example occurred in December 1978. At that time, Secretary Vance met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Geneva in what was widely viewed as likely to be the final round of substantive SALT II negotiations. Indeed, the White House had begun media preparations to announce completion of the agreement. Just prior to the round, however, the United States announced its decision to normalize relations with China, a process to be marked by the visit of Deputy Premier Deng Xiaoping to Washington the following month. In response, the Soviets demonstrated their belief that political conditions were not yet right for US-Soviet arms limitations by—as expected—indicating that the few remaining problems could be solved but, at the final session, elevating to new prominence what previously had been perceived as relatively minor issues, thus delaying the US-Soviet summit expected to cap the negotiations.

For the most part, however, the close linkage between movement in broader political relations and progress in arms limitations which would seem to be dictated by Soviet theory has not proved to be important in practice. Most notably, in 1972 the Soviets completed SALT I as scheduled, despite the United States' mining of Haiphong and other North Vietnamese ports on the eve of the summit, an act which trapped or damaged a number of Soviet-flag merchant ships. More recently, the Soviets have vigorously protested US attempts to link progress in arms control to the curtailment of Soviet military activities in Africa, Cuba, and South Asia.

To be sure, Soviet forbearance did not result either from devotion to the cause of arms limitation or to a rejection of their Marxist heritage in favor of historic American pragmatism. What did happen was that the stream of world events was such, to say nothing of the dictates of Soviet internal politics, that the Brezhnev regime found pursuit of SALT very much in its interest, despite continued erosion of the broader

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context of US-Soviet relations. In fact, as US-Soviet relations deteriorated, the Soviets pressed harder across the range of negotiations, adopting increasingly conciliatory positions and raising expectations in several. It is as if they saw in arms limitation negotiations the only remaining evidence of the possibility of US-Soviet cooperation, and clung to them in desperation as Brezhnev's policy of detente otherwise was torn asunder.

In the United States, the experience has been just the opposite. The American theory of arms control, as it were, would isolate such negotiations from politics. In theoretical terms, arms limitation talks should be viewed as technical exercises, directed at constraining the risks which weapons themselves add to existing political conflicts. As those espousing arms control made no pretense of solving political conflicts through the negotiations they proposed, they saw no relationship (other than that artificially instilled by politicians) between progress or lack of progress in settling underlying sources of conflict and progress or lack of progress in arms negotiations. Indeed, they accepted international tensions as inevitable and saw arms limitation talks simply as one way to manage its consequences.

In practice, however, the United States has closely linked movement in arms control with broader political accommodation with the Soviet Union. Specifically, successive US administrations, perhaps reluctantly, have frequently concluded that there could not be movement in arms talks unless, or until, the Soviet Union modified its international behavior so as not to pose military challenges to Western interests. Examples are legion. The start of the talks, for example, planned for 1968, was delayed by the occupation of Czechoslovakia. In 1976, completion of the Vladivostock accord was deferred because of Soviet military involvement in Angola. And, despite its public protestations to the contrary, as early as 1978 the Carter administration's positions in SALT and other arms negotiations were strongly influenced by the deterioration of US-Soviet relations, punctuated by such events as Soviet military involvement in the Horn of Africa and the Shaba incident.

This sensitivity on the part of American administrators should be expected in a democratic political system. Policies—especially innovative policies that run counter to traditional ways of doing business*—cannot be sustained without substantial political constituencies. SALT suffered as much from rising uneasiness among the American populace about Soviet military power and Soviet assertiveness as it did from its own deficiencies. Never mind that SALT was the one policy instrument that conceivably could place limits on Soviet forces. The concept which prevailed in the public's mind extended the basic premise of linkage, i.e., progress in arms control could facilitate progress in broader relations, to an assertion that if arms control was worth pursuing, it would result in broader accommodation. Since there was no evidence of such a broad accommodation, the argument ran, then obviously arms control was at least not serving its purposes and probably, in some mysterious way, was itself contributing to the problem. As this concept took root, first among conservative Republicans and later in a wider body of opinion, both the Ford and Carter Administrations felt compelled to behave as though they accepted it as well.

In effect, the SALT talks became a weather vane of US-Soviet relations, the centerpiece and primary symbol of a certain model of that relationship. As such, the talks were criticized by, indeed contributed to the creation of, a coalition of dedicated opponents who fought both the treaties and the process which led to them, as much for what they implied for US-Soviet relations as for whatever specific limitations they did or did not impose on US and Soviet nuclear weapons.

*One is reminded here of Paul Warnke's characterization of arms control as "an unnatural act."

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The 1972 treaty which placed severe limitations on antiballistic missile systems is the key factor here. By agreeing not to deploy weapons which could create the illusion of a capability to defend against a major nuclear attack, the two nations gave formal recognition to the probability that they each would suffer unprecedented destruction in the event of a major nuclear exchange. As such, they accepted the necessity for a certain degree of cooperation in their relations and implicitly set limits on their competition. This is not to say that they agreed to get along with one another, to end the rivalry, or anything like that, far from it. Still, they did establish a formally recognized mutual need to stop the competition from getting out of hand, to avoid confrontations that could contain a real danger of nuclear war.

The ABM Treaty is thus a central element in the quest for cooperative US-Soviet relations. The continuing SALT process supported the viability of the ABM Treaty; limits on defensive weapons probably cannot be sustained in the presence of a wide-open offensive weapons race. SALT thus came to symbolize America's acceptance of the need to get along with the Soviet Union. Additionally, by linking the United States and the USSR in a cooperative venture reserved for them and no other nations, SALT set the two superpowers apart from all other states—even America's allies. To many audiences, this was particularly distasteful and worrisome.

For reasons of both national security and moral outrage, many Americans believe that the United States must seek to change Soviet society and, to do so, that it must remain in a state of tension with the Soviet government. These people argue that if it is isolated, the Soviet state eventually will crack of its own internal contradictions—nationalities problems, economic failures, corruption, the natural yearnings of individuals for freedom, and so forth. This means that the United States should seek to construct a wall of implacable hostility around the USSR, a political-cum-military alliance among the nations of Western Europe, Japan, China, and others in the third world. Only America can galvanize such an alliance, it is argued, and to do so the United States must avoid bilateral agreements or even bilateral negotiations, as these imply acceptance of the Soviet regime and accord legitimacy to it. The ABM Treaty, the SALT II Treaty, and the SALT process itself—to say nothing of other arms negotiations—thus run directly counter to, and undermine, this long-run objective of causing fundamental change in Soviet society.

Obviously, opponents of arms limitations typically find it in their interest not to articulate this line of reasoning; they prefer to debate technical points in the treaty itself, arguing that they support arms control in the abstract, but that a better deal should have been made. The reasons for this stance are clear: The specter of unfettered and open-ended competition with the Soviet Union, including a relatively high risk of confrontation and nuclear war, is not one likely to find substantial political support over the long term. The fact that the congressional SALT debate concentrated on technical questions, rather than basic issues like the implications of the SALT process for US-Soviet relations, stands in testimony to the treaty's opponent's political skills. The importance of their ability to dictate the terms of the debate is magnified when the second unstated burden of SALT is considered.

There is an orthodoxy in the United States that nuclear weapons can play only a small and tightly circumscribed role in foreign policy. Because of the tremendous risks they imply, the standard argument proceeds, nuclear weapons (meaning nuclear threats) can be utilized only for narrow and quite specific purposes. First and foremost, they serve to deter nuclear attacks on, or coercion of, the United States itself. Additionally, it is believed, the US nuclear umbrella can be extended to a few other nations—primarily the industrialized democracies. And that, more or less, is that. It is

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true that beginning in the early 1970s some officials began to speak of additional purposes of nuclear weapons, as when discussing limited nuclear options, but this was strictly in a reactive context, to offset the presumed political consequences of growth in Soviet nuclear capabilities.

There is a flip side to the argument, however; one which is usually left unstated. Theoretically, at least, one could seek to integrate the threat of nuclear war more centrally in US foreign policy; to seek to translate nuclear strength into political clout in a positive and assertive way. Indeed, some would maintain that this has already occurred, and continues to occur, regardless of our declaratory stance. Ever since World War II, they argue, nuclear weapons in fact have provided the one trump card in the US hand. From the two bombs dropped on Japan, to nuclear threats, implicit or explicit, during the Berlin Blockade, Korean War, Quemoy Crisis, Cuban Missile Crisis, and 1973 Middle East War, as well as during scores of other more uncertain occasions, the United States turned to its nuclear arsenal, when push came to shove, to protect its own security and the security of its friends and allies.

Faced with the impossibility, in a democracy, of sustaining, over the long haul, conventional forces large enough to match those of the Soviet Union, this reasoning continues, the United States will likely face this necessity again. NATO doctrine itself ensures such a probability with its explicit reliance on the threat of first-use of nuclear weapons in the event that conventional conflict goes badly. Moreover, the balance of conventional military power is turning so adversely against the United States that this reliance is more and more likely. Witness the recent tentative turn to nuclear threats to back up President Carter's commitment that the US would defend the Persian Gulf from Soviet aggression.*

To the extent that the United States must rely on nuclear weapons, the argument runs, agreements which seek to enshrine strategic nuclear parity as a permanent condition of US-Soviet relations are misguided; rather, the US must turn its resources and technology to the quest for strategic superiority. Not that success in this goal is seriously contemplated; none but the most naive believe that such an end is attainable. Nonetheless, the argument runs, only when superiority is the stated objective, and possible result if the Soviets falter, can nuclear threats be made credibly, and thus political decisions taken which avoid the necessity for nuclear options to be employed. In short, only in an environment of wide-open US-Soviet nuclear competition can the United States' *necessary reliance* on nuclear weapons to underpin its foreign policy be carried out successfully.

An element uniting these two underlying strands of argumentation against negotiated arms limitation—implications for US-Soviet relations and for the role of nuclear weapons in foreign policy—is that those adhering to these viewpoints cannot be satisfied by any changes in the specific content of agreements. To be sure, agreements can be more or less bad, depending on their content. *But only the absence of agreement—indeed the end of the process of seeking agreement—can fully satisfy the demands of these sources of opposition.* From these perspectives, the adverse implications of SALT for US-Soviet relations and for the potential role of nuclear weapons in US foreign policy can be erased only when the arms negotiation comes to an end, and its meager products dismantled.

*Within 10 days of the President's statement, US defense officials made clear nuclear threats on three separate occasions. Although officials subsequently backtracked, coincidental flights of B-52 bombers directed against Soviet naval vessels in the Arabian Sea reinforced the message.

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APPROACHES AND IMPLICATIONS

Obviously, those who oppose SALT because of its (to them) adverse implications for US-Soviet relations or for the role of nuclear weapons in US foreign policy, can never be counted among the potential supporters of future arms control initiatives. But what of others? Can a new coalition be created with sufficient political power to rejuvenate arms control? Rebuilding such a constituency is complicated by the ambivalence which characterizes American attitudes toward the talks. Even among supporters, the purposes and potential benefits of arms negotiations have reflected sharply divergent perspectives. This is symbolized by the very title of the agency created in 1961 to plan and carry out these negotiations—the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; a title which emerged only after long debate, in a typical congressional compromise that appeared to give each side what it wanted but, in fact, gave neither the benefits of victory. For “arms control” and “disarmament” represent quite different approaches to arms limitations, with very different policy implications. Although obfuscation of the differences between them did help to secure a prominent position for arms limitations on the nation’s agenda for a while, in the end, it contributed to the failure of efforts to negotiate limits on armaments.

The theory of “arms control” is based on the rather modest notion that decisions to develop certain types or quantities of weapons can aggravate political conflicts and, thereby, *in themselves contribute to the risk of war*. This is not to say that weapon decisions are a primary or even secondary cause of conflict; only that such decisions are one factor which influences the relative probabilities that political conflicts are resolved peacefully, remain unsettled, or result in war. It is assumed that one nation’s weapon decisions are perceived and interpreted by other states, and that these judgments influence that latter’s assessments of the potential military threat to their security, the likelihood that their adversaries intend to make use of that potential, and what weapons or military actions in response are necessary on their own part. As such, the initial decision and the decisions which follow affect both the “stability” (a key word) of the military balance and of broader political relations among nations, as well as the risk of war. Conversely, the theory continues, these adverse effects can be reduced, or at least contained, both through unilateral decisions to avoid deployments of “destabilizing” weapons and, more importantly, through international negotiations on agreements to mutually avoid deploying certain types of weapons or to place other types of agreed mutual limitations on weaponry.

Thus, at its root, “arms control” offers a technically-oriented approach to arms limitations with a modest set of objectives. Its theoretical underpinnings accept conflict among nations as an inevitable part of contemporary international politics and view military force as a necessary (and legitimate) instrument of national policy. It views negotiated limitations on armaments solely as a means of containing the risks and costs of political conflict. “Arms control” and military programs are seen as two sides of the same coin, both being means of enhancing the nation’s security.

In view of its recognition of the fundamental political basis of international conflict, and its acceptance that essentially technical discussions about weapons can only reflect, not initiate political accommodation, the objectives of “arms control” are limited. In the usual formulation, three are mentioned: (a) to reduce the risk of war; (b) to reduce the cost of preparing for war; and (c) to reduce the cost of war should it occur. In all three, however, success can come only at the margin. The purpose is not to abolish war, but to diminish the risk that war would occur. The objective is not to turn all swords into plowshares, but to create conditions such that some resources which otherwise might be used to prepare for war can instead be utilized for peaceful purposes.

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In the process of being transformed from this modest theoretical construct of interest to a handful of defense intellectuals and military specialists into a national political issue of significant magnitude, however, these objectives and even the ultimate promise of "arms control" had to be sharply revised. Essentially, the nation's political leaders found in "arms control" a convenient means of satisfying popular demands resulting from international circumstance and certain fundamental strands of opinion long present in the nation's psyche. These latter—among other things, antimilitarism, with its concomitant desire to minimize defense spending, an aversion to power politics, especially a fear of foreign entanglements—had dominated the nation's foreign policies, with the exception of a few short-lived periods, until the Second World War. They remain important determinants of certain basic American perspectives on world affairs, and can become more or less important depending on events. For convenience, I will refer to those whose attitudes on world affairs are dominated by these sorts of concerns as the "disarmament constituency." Readers should be clear, however, that this shorthand refers to a far larger group than that small minority which actively supports true disarmament.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, concerns of the "disarmament constituency" concentrated largely on nuclear weapons. After all, at that time, the tensions of Cold War confrontation in Berlin and elsewhere were very real. The dangers of nuclear holocaust, as yet unassimilated in the mindset of the generations which dominated political life, were manifest through such phenomena as civil defense drills and atmospheric nuclear tests, to say nothing of the surviving victims of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs. Ten years later, in the late 1960s, the concerns of the "disarmament constituency" were far broader, its demands more strident, and its political clout far more impressive. Twenty years later, in the late 1970s, as memories of Vietnam faded, as increasing Soviet assertiveness revitalized old fears of Russian imperialism, and as events in Africa and Southwest Asia demonstrated anew the potential utility of military power, attitudes which motivate the "disarmament constituency" have again been subsumed by other concerns.

For those 20 years, however, American political leaders found in "arms control" a pragmatic means of satisfying the demands of this constituency—at least for a while. Thus, for example, as his administration came increasingly under fire because of the slow pace of disengagement from Southeast Asia, President Nixon found it increasingly in his interest to emphasize SALT. In effect, the Nixon administration said, "Yes, we know you are dissatisfied with what is happening in Southeast Asia and we are doing our best, under difficult circumstances, to speed things up. But, anyway, look over here. We have managed to isolate Vietnam from US-Soviet relations and are making important progress. We are building a 'structure of peace' with the Russians, a structure whose centerpiece is SALT—the control of nuclear weapons. This will be of lasting benefit for your concerns."

This is not to imply that the Nixon administration's SALT policies were cynically motivated or driven solely by a desire to ease the pressures stemming essentially from the war; simply, that because of the war, the effort to control nuclear weapons—independently motivated by solid reasons of international politics and concern for the risk of nuclear war—gained new political significance and therefore greater emphasis. Nor is it being suggested that only the Nixon administration was responsible. At times, Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Ford, and Carter all found political benefits in their support for arms control, and saw in their advocacy of arms control a means of satisfying political demands. Indeed, if anything, Democratic presidents are more susceptible to the pressures of the "disarmament constituency." For example,

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although his personal commitment to arms limitation is beyond question, President Carter obviously saw benefit in a strong pro-arms control stance when competing for the support of the McGovern wing of the party during the early stages of his Presidential campaign.

Regardless of who was President, however, one change, one slight obfuscation in the theory of "arms control," was necessary before it could serve these political purposes. If SALT, for example, were to serve to ease the political demands being made on the Nixon administration, the limited nature of the objectives of arms control could not be fully accepted. The inevitability of conflict, the acceptance of the legitimacy of military power, the very limited reduction in the risk of war even potentially resultant from arms negotiations—none of this would satisfy the "disarmament constituency." Rather, these limitations had to be transformed into gradualism. *Limited objectives could be stated, but only as first steps*; the implicit (and sometimes explicit) promise was that the process would continue—each stage with more and more ambitious purposes. In this way, the "disarmament constituency" could accept tentative and modest early measures; political support was exchanged for the promise of more ambitious undertakings in the future.

It is surprising that this deal survived as long as it did. The emptiness of the promise should have been apparent from the outset. The premises upon which it was based simply could not be fulfilled, and evidence to that effect soon became apparent. After all, the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty did not soon result in a comprehensive end to nuclear testing. Treaties in the 1960s to demilitarize the Antarctic, outer space, and the seabed did not soon result in progress toward demilitarization of regions in which the threat of military conflict was more pertinent. And, most importantly, the SALT I Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons did not quickly lead to more significant constraints on nuclear weapons as had been promised.

It took the SALT II Treaty, however, for the bargain to finally come unstuck. SALT II would place many important restraints on US and Soviet nuclear weapons; restraints which could significantly stabilize the nuclear competition and the balance of strategic forces, thereby contributing to a lower risk of nuclear war. Its features in this regard—limits on the number of warheads on strategic missiles, limits on the introduction of new types of land-based missiles, a special subceiling on the number of land-based missiles with multiple warheads, and others—were readily recognizable to the specialist in "arms control." However, the importance of these things was not nearly so apparent to the general public, nor to the usual politician. What the latter looked for were the obvious—the signs of progress toward "disarmament," toward fulfillment of the promise attributed to arms control 20 years before. And these did not exist. The treaty would cause only slight reductions in Soviet nuclear forces, and in fact, would ratify an increase in US forces. The treaty would not end weapons modernization, and thereby permit budget reductions, far from it. It would allow an acceleration of US strategic programs and thereby larger expenditures on strategic forces. For all these reasons, the treaty disappointed the "disarmament constituency."

The effect of this was not so much to lose votes for ratification explicitly, although there may have been a few senators who could be so identified, as to make it impossible to galvanize a political constituency behind the treaty. For the most part, the Carter administration's efforts to gain support for the treaty were ignored—not so much because of anything deleterious in the treaty itself, as because of its lack of evident positive attributes. Its importance was simply not credible (and certainly not obvious) to a significant political audience. As a result, mass support could not be enlisted and senators, for the most part, had little if any reason to get out in front of the ratification

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process. What could they cite in their home districts as reason for their advocacy? That the treaty would result in "only" 2,250 central strategic nuclear delivery systems on each side? That, like SALT I, the new treaty was important not for itself, but because it would make possible future negotiations. After 10 years of SALT, the promise of significant future gains would no longer wash.

Moreover, this exaggeration of the ultimate promise of negotiated arms limitations had the contradictory effect of stiffening the opposition. As the objectives of arms control were transformed from the modest goals of regulating the nuclear competition, thus reducing the risk of nuclear war to, as President Carter put it in his inaugural address, "the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this earth," the coalition of groups opposing SALT grew and hardened. Some joined the opposition because of their belief concerning the adverse effects of SALT on US-Soviet relations; others, because of their concerns about the necessary roles of nuclear weapons in US foreign policy. Still others opposed SALT because its transfigured objectives directly challenged their personal and institutional interests. Obviously, individuals whose entire professional lives have been devoted to the development or operation of strategic forces are likely to view these weapons in a rather more favorable light than was indicated by the administration's policy. These people, for the most part, sincerely believe that strategic weapons serve vital functions in protecting American security. While they may support negotiations which seek to regulate the nuclear competition, they are unlikely to view a process that aims to abolish nuclear weapons favorably.

Thus, throughout the 1970s SALT increasingly lost the support it previously enjoyed from the armed services, from the aerospace industry and the labor unions which serve it, from the scientific and research community associated with the Defense Department, and from their political representatives. This was a crucial defeat for arms control; without the support of these groups and in the absence of prospective treaties dramatic enough to galvanize decisive political support from the "disarmament constituency," arms limitations can never succeed in a democratic political system.

The regulation of international trade provides an analogy of some relevance.* The strongest supporters of international trade agreements typically are those firms and labor organizations who are most dependent upon imports and exports for their livelihoods. They see in regulation the benefits of stability, which permits effective long-range planning, as well as the avoidance of risks and costs of unfettered competition. Theoretically at least, those most directly concerned with the strategic competition could see similar benefits in arms control. Yet, this has not proven to be the case since 1972; largely, in my view, because of exaggeration of the original goals of arms control and obfuscation of the differences between arms control and disarmament.

If efforts to negotiate limits on arms are to succeed in the future, policymakers will have to choose between two alternatives. They can define, structure, and pursue these efforts along the lines of the original concept of arms control, seeking modest objectives, and enlisting the support of those elements of the government, industry, labor, and the scientific community which are most personally and directly concerned with nuclear weapons; or they can continue to blur the distinction between arms control and disarmament, seeking to reinvigorate that wider political constituency whose roots lie in considerations of religion, morality, and the fundamental American antipathy to military power, in order to overcome vested interests. The latter can only succeed, however, if the products of negotiations are more dramatic than those recently

*I am indebted to Mac Destler for this analogy.

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delivered. If this wider constituency is to be rebuilt, the benefits of agreements will have to be apparent, on their merits, to a large popular audience. There is little basis in either the history of arms negotiations or in more recent developments in US-Soviet relations, to believe that such dramatic results are at all feasible.

REVIVAL OF ARMS CONTROL

Ironically, the failure of the Carter administration's arms control policy, and particularly the failure of SALT II in the Congress, could provide an opportunity to modify and then revitalize the public's appreciation for arms control. This would not be easy; it would take considerable time. It would require the leadership of the administration that takes office in 1981 and the support of those in the Congress who have developed a reputation for expertise on the subject.

Essentially, these political leaders would have to make clear to the public that no matter what happens in arms negotiations, for the foreseeable future the United States will have to take decisive and costly actions to rebuild its military forces sufficiently to offset the growth in Soviet military power over the past 16 years. Given that such a defense buildup is vigorously pursued, however, the extent of the effort required and the dangers implicit in the continuing competition may be moderated through agreements placing mutual restraints on specific types of weapons. If other nations agree to place specific limits on the size of their forces, for example, the US may be in a position to accept comparable restrictions on its own forces. If other nations agree to retard certain weapon modernization programs, the US may be able to slow down some of its programs to a comparable degree. If other nations agree to restrict the operational flexibility of their forces in a certain region in order to avoid suspicions about the possible outbreak of war, then the US may find that it, too, has an interest in limiting the flexibility of its forces in comparable ways.

In short, if arms control is to be revived, policymakers and political opinion leaders should be forthright about the modest potential of even successful negotiations. Arms talks can reduce the risk of war, but not abolish war. Arms talks can reduce the cost of preparing for war, but the burden of military preparations will remain high so long as the international political system remains in its present form. Agreements that result from arms negotiations are not stepping stones to peace; at best, they can accomplish specific things in the context of continuing international political conflict.

In concrete terms, this means that the first step must be to rewrite and substantially narrow the arms control agenda. What is needed most is a clear set of priorities; a firm sense of what is important and what is trivial. Even in its early days, the experience of the Carter administration demonstrates conclusively that neither the American political system nor the contemporary condition of relations among nations is capable of sustaining arms negotiations on a broad front. Some of the Carter administration initiatives conflicted with one another substantively. All competed with one another both for the attention of high-level decisionmakers and for the political capital necessary to move them through a resistant bureaucracy and equally difficult international system.

The new administration must decide what is important and what is feasible and pursue limitations only in those few areas. Policymakers must be ruthless in this regard. There is a tendency to accept new objectives even when their prospects are perceived to be hopeless, as means of pleasing constituents with actions that are considered harmless. In fact, however, the larding of the arms control agenda with foolish initiatives demeans those items which are significant, wasting time and influence, and casting a naive pall over the entire policy, regardless of the intrinsic merits of specific items.

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For convenience, I discuss below the prospective arms control agenda in three parts: arms control in Europe, US-Soviet negotiations on nuclear weapons, and multi-lateral arms control.

Arms Control in Europe

The politico-military situation in Europe comes closest to the conditions necessary for the success of arms negotiations. East-West political and economic relations in Europe are relatively cooperative, and have been that way for more than 10 years. With a few obvious exceptions, political systems on both sides of the demarcation line are stable; most economies are flourishing. Ties between the two halves of Europe continue to deepen and to expand in scope. The fact that, so far at least, detente in Europe has survived the deterioration of US-Soviet relations demonstrates the stability of the situation.

European political leaders in both East and West have considerable incentive to ensure that things do not change. Detente has a tangible economic meaning in Europe which it never gained in the United States. Detente also has a very human dimension for Europeans, as it facilitates exchanges, such as family visits across the boundary between East and West. For East Europeans, detente has meant a relaxation of political and economic restrictions. The threat of war, which would rise quickly if Europe returned to more tense East-West relations, also has a more pointed historic meaning for Europeans than for Americans. And, not insignificantly, West European nations—for the most part—are ruled by individuals and parties which have built their careers, in part, on rapprochement.

Despite all this, the East-West military competition in Europe continues to worsen. Both sides are now substantially expanding their military capabilities on the continent. The Warsaw Pact, particularly in its Soviet component, grew somewhat in size and began to accelerate its equipment modernization more than 10 years ago. NATO responded slowly, but is now taking important steps to expand its combat capabilities, by raising force levels slightly and sharply accelerating its modernization programs, as well as taking other steps to improve the efficiency with which the alliance as a whole makes use of its members' contributions. The nations of NATO now seem resolved to increase their military spending beyond the amount necessary to offset inflation each year. Over time, given NATO's far greater resource base, this would reverse the past trend in relative capabilities between East and West.

These continuing military buildups have an adverse effect on the political situation in Europe. At a minimum, they delay and make more difficult the strengthening of detente. More likely, over time—by contributing to a diffuse sense of unease and apprehension—they can actually erode the progress which has been made in the past, thus contributing to new tensions and a greater risk of war. Should certain contingencies occur, whether civil war in Yugoslavia, turmoil in Poland, or anarchy in Italy, the suspicions and concerns resulting from the continuing momentum of the military competition can make the avoidance of military conflict more difficult. At times, specific decisions can have more pointed and immediate political effects, as in the case of the Soviet deployment of SS-20 mobile intermediate-range missiles and the resultant NATO decision to deploy both a new model ballistic missile and ground-launched cruise missiles capable of striking Soviet territory. Overall, it seems doubtful that political stability and detente can survive indefinitely in the face of unbridled military competition.

This is a classic opportunity for arms control. Theoretically at least, given the relatively benign political situation, it should be possible to negotiate mutual limita-

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tions on the military forces of the two sides which can dampen these adverse consequences of continuing military deployments. These negotiations will not erase the remaining differences between East and West but, potentially, they can confine the degree to which the military competition independently aggravates the political situation. They will not end the need for NATO to respond to the Soviet military buildup but, by confining growth in Soviet capabilities, they could moderate the burden of defense in the West.

There are three potential forums for such negotiations: (a) the now 7-year-old Warsaw Pact talks in Vienna for mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in the NATO guidelines area; (b) the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which previously negotiated and incorporated in the Helsinki Final Act certain measures to increase the confidence with which each side was able to view the other's military activities, and for which a review conference is scheduled in Madrid in November 1980; and (c) the French proposal for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), which has received some support from both the Warsaw Pact and the West Germans.

If these putative negotiations are each pursued separately, they are all virtually guaranteed if not to fail, then at least to produce insignificant results. Progress toward arms control in Europe requires a unified approach with the support of all members of both blocs, as well as the neutral and nonaligned states. What would seem most promising would be a strategy that sought to terminate the MBFR talks with completion of the proposal now on the table, and then moved to assimilate the French CDE proposal within the CSCE context.

MBFR is fatally flawed by its limited geographic scope, its too-long history, its endless debates over data, the refusal of the French to participate, and, most importantly, its emphasis on bloc-to-bloc confrontation. The talks have served some useful purposes—perhaps more in terms of their effects on intra-NATO consultations and procedures than their stated purpose—but have outlived their usefulness. They require some sort of modest agreement to permit a graceful exit for all parties. The proposal put on the table by the West in December would provide an equitable, if essentially symbolic, agreement, and a convenient way to end the talks. It is now up to the Soviet Union to adopt the positions necessary to complete the negotiation.

In the meantime, the preliminary steps necessary to fuse the CSCE and CDE concepts and kick-off the new negotiating forum could be taken at the November Madrid Conference. It may be possible at Madrid, in fact, to make more stringent the confidence-building measures already incorporated in the Helsinki Final Act. Most important, however, would be the creation of a CSCE working group on European security issues. Such a group could incorporate the essence of the French CDE proposal—addressing the broad definition of Europe (from the Urals to the Atlantic) and shifting from bloc-to-bloc to true multinational negotiations; the group might even meet in Paris. As its first order of business it might take up a number of possible, additional confidence-building measures. If these negotiations proved successful, the talks could shift to the more difficult questions of quantitative limitations on conventional forces.

US-Soviet Negotiations on Strategic Weapons

The SALT II Treaty obviously is mortally wounded: It has had such a difficult history, it is associated in a large part of the public's mind with such negative events, its politics are so bad, that any new administration—including a second Carter administration—would be reluctant to enter yet again into the maelstrom of congressional debate on the treaty. Yet, the treaty will not disappear; some action will have to be taken, and the character of that action will have an important impact on US-Soviet

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relations. The test will come early in 1981. The US elections will be past; presumably, US-Soviet relations will have stabilized, even if, as is likely, the relationship features a high level of tension and open political conflict.

Under such conditions, there would be important reasons to seek to preserve the terms of SALT II. It is precisely at the times when US-Soviet confrontation is most acute that the benefits of SALT are most significant. Confrontational politics seem likely to be the watchword for at least the next several years. Reducing the nuclear component of the risks associated with such a situation could be a crucial plus.

Besides, the treaty places significant limitations on Soviet strategic forces. It restricts the number of warheads on Soviet missiles and the number of such missiles themselves. It retards modernization of Soviet land-based missiles. The pace and status of Soviet strategic programs is such that these provisions could be violated rapidly once the Kremlin decides that SALT is either dead or undesirable. Most Americans now agree that the United States must take major steps to improve its own strategic capabilities. These steps will take time, however. The treaty confines Soviet options at precisely the time when the US would be most disadvantaged: the period between now and 1985. In the absence of SALT II's constraints on Soviet programs, the United States may be playing catchup for far longer than is now contemplated, regardless of the size of the step-up in our own defense efforts.

Whether these considerations will be persuasive remains to be seen. The immediate need is for both sides to avoid steps that violate the terms of the treaty. If such a tacit agreement can be maintained until 1981, depending on events, it may be possible to consider resubmitting the treaty to the Congress. Conceivably, the two sides might find it in their mutual interest to make some minor changes to the treaty, changes sufficient to take the political curse off the present document. Alternatively, it could be possible to devise some procedural arrangement such that tacit observance of the treaty is maintained while negotiations are reopened on a new agreement. There will always be a temptation in the United States, particularly if a new administration takes office, to throw away SALT II and begin again. That temptation should be avoided. In one sense, SALT's current problems can be traced to the initial Carter administration decision to discard the Vladivostok Accord in favor of something better.

Beyond SALT II, there will be questions of the future of the ABM Treaty. The key date is 1982—the year of the next scheduled review conference. Unquestionably, pressure will mount to scrap or at least to significantly amend the treaty. These pressures will be greater if SALT II is not preserved, but they will exist regardless in view of new developments in relevant technologies, the ostensible potential of ABMs to facilitate the deployment of survivable land-based offensive missile systems, and the blood already drawn by opponents of SALT—whose real target has always been the ABM Treaty and its implications for US-Soviet relations. Determining one's position on the question of whether the ABM Treaty should or should not be amended requires evaluation of the potential benefits and costs of the new technologies, a comparable survey of alternative methods of accomplishing similar ends, and a political assessment of the consequences of seeking to revise one of the few major accomplishments of arms negotiations, as well as the environment which would attend efforts to verify a treaty permitting larger deployments of more sophisticated, perhaps mobile, ABMs.

If SALT II continues to be observed, formally or informally, and if the ABM Treaty is preserved, even if modified to permit defense of additional ICBM sites, consideration of the style and substance of new negotiations on offensive weapons may again become policy-relevant. Too much must occur between now and then, however, and

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too much ink has already been futilely spilled on the subject of SALT III, to warrant such speculation at present.

In the interim, the US-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission, a confidential body established by the ABM Treaty, could provide a useful forum for continued discussions of the modalities of US and Soviet behavior that could best preserve what progress has been made in the past, as well as options for the future if political relations thaw. These talks could touch on what is necessary to preserve the "objectives and purposes" of SALT II, the beginnings of a dialogue on the question of whether to revise the ABM Treaty and, conceivably, the types of national behavior that could most damage and most support chances for a future agreement to prevent the escalation of US-Soviet military competition in space.

Multilateral Arms Control

There clearly must be a shift in emphasis from bilateral US-Soviet negotiations to multilateral forums. There has been a tendency to seek US-Soviet agreement as a first step, believing that once that nut had been cracked, wider agreement would follow. This not only placed undue burdens on US-Soviet relations, but nurtured the fears of those who saw arms control as an expression of US-Soviet condominium, thereby aggravating the political problems already surrounding the negotiations.

Problems more appropriately tackled in multilateral, rather than bilateral, forums include those of nuclear tests, chemical weapons, and arms sales. These phenomena pose dangers to the security of all, not just the citizens of the United States and the Soviet Union. There is no substantive reason why the United States should place itself in the position of claimant on these matters, as is implied when it takes initiatives for US-Soviet agreements preliminary to multilateral solutions. Indeed, there often are unnecessary problems created when it appears that the superpowers are dictating the terms of agreement to less powerful nations; a problem faced, for example, in the recent talks to restrain arms sales.

The multilateral forum most appropriate for these discussions is the UN's Committee on Disarmament. Recently reorganized, the Committee now includes all the nuclear powers, as China took its seat during the spring 1980 session. The United States can and should play a constructive role within the CD, but its posture should be relatively low-key. Separate US-Soviet discussions might take place, at times, as on the details of additional protocols to aid verification arrangements, but these talks should be viewed as complementary, not substitutes for discussions in the Committee or any working groups that it establishes. Moreover, such separate bilaterals need not take place until it is clear that multilateral agreement is feasible.

Some will criticize this proposal as condemning these negotiations to failure. That may be, but if true, it reflects the objective conditions of the international system, conditions which cannot be either wished away or defeated by procedural sleights-of-hand. If, for example, all five nuclear powers are not prepared to accept a comprehensive test ban, then any US-Soviet agreement, even if possible, would necessarily be short-lived. More likely, US-Soviet agreement will prove impossible to attain, reflecting these objective conditions and adding an additional obstacle to improvements in other forms of US-Soviet cooperation.

Others will fear that greater emphasis on the Committee on Disarmament would place the US in positions where it could not resist pressures to subscribe to agreements that it would otherwise prefer to avoid. That argument, too, is spurious. There is no substantive reason why the United States, like France, could not persist in defense of

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its own perception of proper approaches to, and necessary conditions for arms control, including—wherever appropriate—a firm insistence that any agreements include adequate attention to verification.

TIME FOR ACTION

Judged by the standards of the recent past, this agenda is modest in the extreme. Yet, what is needed now—and badly—are tangible accomplishments. We have had 20 years of grandiose declarations, absolute objectives, ambitious agendas, and inspiring speeches. We need results—pragmatic steps toward the limitation of arms.

If negotiated arms limitations are to have a future, they need to return to the more limited concept which originally characterized arms control. We live in a heterogeneous world of sovereign nations. There are real conflicts among many of these nations—conflicts over land, over economic rights, over religious and political values. And there are real villains in this world as well—individuals dedicated to the aggrandizement of themselves, their friends, their nations, even at the expense of others, and even if it implies grave risks of war. Weapons are not the cause of these conflicts, they are their reflection. Discussions about weapons cannot solve these conflicts, they can only—and even then at certain times—contain their effects.

In another sense, given the rhetoric of confrontation which now characterizes US-Soviet exchanges, even this modest agenda may appear naive. An acceptance of a return to more tense US-Soviet relations, however, need not include the abandonment of efforts to contain the military competition at its most dangerous points. Given the extraordinary uncertainties of nuclear war, the unprecedented potential of nuclear weapons for destruction, containing the effects of political conflict, reducing the risk of war—even if only modestly—could be a crucial accomplishment. The effort deserves our attention, and it also requires our support.

PANEL 2 Paper

Arms Control in the 1980s: Retrospect, Contrast, Prospect

James Dougherty

As the century's eighth decade gets under way, it can be asserted with little fear of contradiction that the problems of arms control appear to be less tractable and the prospects dimmer than they were a decade ago, when the SALT process began. The technical difficulties in several areas are formidable enough, as they have always been. But even more significant is the fact that the international political-strategic environment is today less conducive to the reaching of superpower agreements than it was in the early 1970s. In an age of mass media when the sense of historical continuity has been corroded by the emotional immediacy of the present moment, followed by a rapid forgetting, a calm effort to contrast the beginning of SALT I with what many observers regard as the end of SALT II may be instructive.

The Contrast of a Decade

A decade ago, several factors militated in favor of detente (or at least a facade thereof) and negotiation between Washington and Moscow. The relatively simplistic assumptions concerning international politics in the years of cold war bipolarity had given way to the more subtle, complex requirements of conducting foreign and defense policies in what Nixon and Kissinger were calling (somewhat prematurely, as things turned out) a "multipolar world." The two superpowers had their reasons and motives, not similar or of equal intensity in most respects, for undertaking the SALT process. Each was interested, of course, in reducing as much as possible uncertainty about the other's future weapons deployment plans. Even while the United States still enjoyed a substantial though diminishing margin of strategic superiority, American policymaking elites increasingly questioned the meaning and political utility of such a concept, partly no doubt because of the disillusionment and deep division of the nation over Vietnam. There were probably some planners on both sides for whom it made sense to avoid the economic futility of a mutually cancelling armaments competition, and to permit the diversion of resources from strategic forces to other purposes.

By no means was this motive symmetrical so far as intended results were concerned. During the Vietnam War, both sides considerably expanded their military budgets, but while nearly the entire increase of some \$20 billion per year in US defense expenditures went to support the operations in Vietnam, only a small fraction (probably less than 10 per cent) of the comparable expansion in Soviet military spending was directed toward that conflict. The rest went into the buildup of Soviet strategic and conventional military capabilities, including naval forces. As America's frustration over Southeast Asia approached the political breaking point, the United States experienced internal social disorders arising from urban crises, racial conflicts, minority discontents, the political alienation of a significant segment of the nation's intelligentsia and youth, and the beginnings of a pervasive inflation. All these factors generated a demand that the United States lower its international profile, reduce its global commitment to act as "world policeman," and reorder national priorities from defense and outer space to the inner city, the environment, and social welfare.

The situation of the Soviet Union was quite different. Political and socio-economic discontent has flared recurringly in that country ever since the 1917 revolution. But its leaders, accountable neither to a genuine electorate nor to an effective

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parliamentary body, have always been able to contain dissent within manageable bounds and to stifle antigovernment demonstrations that might seriously constrain choices in the allocation of resources. This is not to suggest that the Soviet leaders were unconcerned about Jewish and liberal dissidents, and about the "countercultural tendencies" of Russian youth. But they were probably fairly confident of their ability to ignore the types of pressures which affect responsible politicians in democratic systems. While doing what they can to exploit the self-paralyzing proclivities characteristic of open societies, they count their own immunity to political pressure from below as a great strategic asset, for it leaves them free to allocate domestic resources to the goal of maximizing Soviet power. Given their smaller economic base, Soviet leaders often find themselves even less able than their harrassed counterparts in democratic countries to do all the things they would like to do. But being guided by a single informing ideology and strategic doctrine, plus the principle of democratic centralism, they have a clearer idea of what they wish to accomplish in the military realm; being much less affected by private lobbies and interest groups below the party level, their ability to carry out their ideas in practice is usually limited primarily by the quality of their planning and their technological efficiency. In any event, the Soviet government was interested in modulating the rate of strategic arms rivalry. But this did not necessarily mean that Moscow wished to reallocate resources from the sector of military technology to that of civilian technology.

Rather it is likely that the Soviet leaders entered the SALT negotiations for the following reasons related to national self-interest: (1) to inhibit the development and deployment of new strategic weapons in the United States, for whose technological prowess and productive capacity they continued to have great respect; (2) to begin acting like a power that had achieved full strategic parity even while still enroute toward that status; (3) to improve Soviet intelligence concerning US deployment intentions and to influence those intentions in ways optimally favorable to themselves; (4) to achieve maximum freedom to be able to allocate their defense resources in ways compatible with the requirements and preferences of their own strategic doctrine, rather than in reaction to the unlimited freedom of choice of an economically and technologically superior United States; and (5) thus, specifically, to build their strategic and conventional forces as they wished and also to obtain Western assistance—not only food to compensate for the perennial deficiencies of an agricultural system dependent upon cumbersome bureaucracy, erratic weather, and the prayers of devout *muzhiks*, but also computer technology that might be of significance in military planning and nonmilitary technology which could bolster the life quality of the Russian people, thereby reducing in the eyes of outsiders the appearance of national backwardness.

The superpowers shared other motives for undertaking SALT. Their behavior was being watched by the rest of the world, and especially those Third World non-nuclear weapons states that had signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Article VI of which pledged the nuclear leaders to pursue disarmament negotiations in good faith. Moscow and Washington had to take this provision seriously, assuming that they were interested in preserving the international nonproliferation regime which they had worked to create. But even beyond this constraint of world public opinion, there was reason to think 10 years ago that the two rival global powers, despite deep ideological-political differences over how society and the international system ought to be organized, recognized an overriding mutual obligation to try their best to limit the danger of an unbridled arms competition, as well as the possibility that local conflicts in which both countries were involved might flare out of control and lead to a disastrous confrontation. The SALT process itself, it was thought, would improve the international climate.

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China constituted another crucial factor, although not one that can be easily formulated. The three military powers were all reassessing their strategic relationships with each other. The People's Republic was approaching a stage of military-technological development at which she posed a more immediate threat to Russia than to America. With Sino-Soviet tensions mounting along the Amur-Ussuri River boundary, so much that some analysts expected a Soviet preventive strike against the Chinese nuclear facility at Lop Nor in late 1969, the leadership in Peking saw no choice but to begin tilting toward the United States for purposes of deterring the USSR. The shock waves of Mao's Cultural Revolution were subsiding; the Lin Piao strategy of "encircling the cities," which had disturbed American policymakers in the mid-1960s, was first played down and then repudiated; as the Nixon administration appeared to disengage from Southeast Asia, Peking began to regard the socialist-imperialist enemy as more dangerous than the capitalist-imperialist foe. The imperial will of the former was waxing while that of the latter was on the wane.

China was suspicious of superpower collusion in SALT. Washington's cautious diplomatic opening was designed in part to allay Chinese suspicions, and in part to give Moscow something to worry about while American forces retreated, hopefully with honor, from Indochina. The USSR, ever apprehensive about enemies on two fronts, was anxious to promote detente with the West through arms and territorial agreements as the dispute with China grew more acrimonious. Thus, both SALT and the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the latter aimed at permanently ratifying Europe's postwar boundaries, fitted in well with the Soviet Union's foreign policy objectives.¹

One must always, it seems, keep multiplying the contrasts between then and now. The air was filled then with talk about "rough strategic parity"—based upon the fluctuating, compensating asymmetries of offensive and defensive weapons systems. These asymmetries involved differences in numbers, types and ranges of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers; total throwweight; numbers of deliverable warheads of varying yields; hardening, dispersal, the degree of alert and other factors affecting vulnerability; firing reliability; ballistic and terminal guidance accuracy; geodetic science and warhead maneuverability; reentry speeds, penetration aids, opposing defenses and warning systems; detonation altitudes; intelligence; strategic doctrines and C³. The list could be extended ad infinitum, and the debate over which factors were the most important went on endlessly. The minds of single-factor theorists were usually more certain than the computers on that score. But most Western analysts are not single-factor theorists because they have been conditioned by Whitehead's warning against the fallacy of the single factor. Most were convinced of the plurality of variables in the strategic equation, and of the strategically stabilizing virtues of uncertainty.

American policymakers were convinced that the international strategic equilibrium existing at the time was highly stable and could not easily be destabilized. They took it for granted that, even if military planners had to worry about the worst case in which deterrence breaks down, the political leaders on neither side could possibly perceive any rational political-military purpose to be served by a deliberate decision for nuclear war. That is what led American policy elites, especially those in the arms control community, to think that they could "cap the volcano," as McGeorge Bundy put it. Somewhat condescendingly, they considered themselves more responsible and sophisticated than their Soviet counterparts when it came to analyzing deterrence and arms control. If they attended at all—which they seldom did—to the difference between the American strategic doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction, worked out by civilian theorists, and the Soviet doctrine of deterrence through the maintenance of a war-

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fighting, war-winning and war-surviving capability, it was usually to smile at Soviet primitivist naivete. One of the purposes of the SALT exercise was to educate the Soviet leaders in these matters, and to bring them around to a more realistic point of view.

The actual strategic balance existing at the start of SALT was not quite as simple as the term "rough strategic parity" implied. American policy elites in the McNamara Pentagon had virtually been marking time on strategic deployments to give the Soviet Union a chance to catch up, so that meaningful negotiations could begin. But the phrase "rough strategic parity" was too static to capture the dynamic reality. The United States was in transition from superiority toward parity; the Soviet Union from inferiority toward parity and—in the thinking of some Soviet planners—toward superiority. The mere fact that Henry Kissinger professed not to know the meaning of superiority ("My God, what does it mean?") and that other Western analysts could not imagine how a numerical military superiority might be translated into political leverage on the world scene did not constrain Soviet theoreticians to exorcize the concept from their minds.

As a matter of fact, American policymakers assured themselves smugly, but not incorrectly, that the United States still enjoyed various modes of quantitative and qualitative superiority over the Soviet Union—in strategic bombers, overseas naval bases, MIRV technology, nuclear submarine and SLBM technology, and missile accuracy. This enabled the Nixon-Kissinger administration to justify a SALT I Agreement which codified for the Soviet Union a potential edge of 40 percent in the number of ICBMs and 34 percent in the number of SLBMs. It also helped to compensate for what was probably the most glaring discrepancy in the SALT I negotiations. Each side was worried primarily about one aspect of the other's deployment plans. The Soviet Union was concerned about our ABM; we were concerned about their heavy missiles. In SALT I, they were more successful in removing the source of their worry than we were, because their negotiating goals meshed much better with our strategic doctrine than our goals did with their doctrine. They simply do not accept the US conceptions of deterrence and arms control based on Mutual Assured Destruction and restraint in the deployment of forces which can degrade the retaliatory and hence the deterrence capability of the adversary.² But that difference in doctrines was less clear a decade ago than it is today.

The New Political-Strategic Climate

By now we are all fairly familiar with the technological and political developments which have made the arms control picture look so much bleaker in 1980. In military technology, the United States has not been standing still by any means. Even while closing down the Minuteman III production line (limiting the number of MIRVed ICBMs to 550 up to 1985), cancelling the B-1 bomber, and slowing the Trident program, the United States has upgraded the accuracy of Minuteman III, has completed the Poseidon conversion program, and has begun to deploy the larger-yield Mark 12A warhead in Minuteman III and also to develop air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) and MX. Nevertheless, most strategic analysts in Europe and the United States are agreed that the Soviet Union has been doing more across the board. It has sustained a larger military budget, while suffering far less from the effects of inflation. It deploys a current generation SLBM (SS-N-8) with a range of 4,800 miles (superior to that of the Trident). It has tested new heavy missiles with MIRVs—the SS-17 with four, the SS-19 with six, and the SS-18 with ten. Given this capability, combined with a reload capability that would enable the USSR to execute its preferred strategy of the preemptive counterforce strike while holding in reserve, for deterrence, a formidable ICBM force, US military planners in recent years have been concerned about the growing vulnerability of the land-based

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ICBM leg of the strategic triad. The implications are spelled out in the following passage:

When fully deployed during the early 1980s, the presently projected Soviet ICBM force will provide a total throwweight of at least 8 million pounds and more than 5,000 one-megaton reentry vehicles. Without the deployment of MX, which is not now scheduled to be available until the late 1980s, the United States would deploy approximately 2 million pounds of throwweight and 2,154 ICBM RVs. Within proposed SALT II limits on MIRVed ICBMs, the Soviet Union will be able to target the entire U.S. fixed-, land-based ICBM force with three warheads against each Minuteman silo with its SS-18 force alone. (Under the terms of the SALT II Treaty, the SS-18 is permitted to carry no more than ten warheads; the Soviet Union is allowed 308 SS-18s; this enables the Soviet Union to target approximately three warheads against each of the 1,000 Minuteman silos.) Hitherto, the Soviet Union has achieved hard-target lethality through large warheads; the United States, by means of accuracy. But the Soviet Union is expected, by the early 1980s, to have attained accuracy levels comparable to those of the United States. Each generation of Soviet ICBMs has cut the circular error probable (CEP) of the previous generation by about half. So long as the Soviet CEP is .2 nautical miles or greater, about a quarter of our Minuteman force would probably survive a disarming first strike. When the CEP drops below that level, a strike that would disable at least 90 percent of our fixed-, land-based force becomes possible. The total residual Soviet throwweight could exceed 4 million pounds and 1,000 RVs in the ICBM force alone.³

Even though not all strategic analysts regard the foregoing statistics as equally ominous—and some would immediately point to the less vulnerable sea-based deterrent—nevertheless those numerical disparities were bound to give pause to many Senators and defense-minded Americans (not all of whom are "hawks"). One could argue that purely on the basis of the mathematics of the strategic balance, the SALT II Agreements did not stand a very good chance of receiving Senate assent at the opening of the ratification debate. In a sense, the cards had been stacked against the administration, primarily by itself. On the first day of the hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee, Defense Secretary Harold Brown, while arguing rather eloquently for the continued effectiveness of the US strategic deterrent through the life of the treaty, nevertheless conceded that under the terms of the Vienna agreement the United States would by 1985 forfeit some of the strategic advantages which it still enjoyed in July 1979. In other words, the United States could increase the number of its warheads from, let us say, 9,000 to 12,000; the Soviet Union from about 4,500 to about 10,000. That is a diminishing margin. Even though Soviet warheads on the average are considerably larger in yield, it is highly probable that the Secretary was correct in saying that the US deterrent would hold, regardless of discrepancies in numbers of warheads and in strategic doctrines—assuming, that is, the prevalence of rational decisionmaking in Moscow.

Up to a point, crude numerical differences may be irrelevant to the military planning of deterrence. But when those differences become glaring enough to worry the military, they must be taken seriously. Long before that, numerical differences become invested with political significance. It is difficult to understand how the administration failed to see that and failed to remedy the problem, both by holding out in the negotiations for a numerically more equitable agreement and by more timely defense planning to parry the Soviet military challenge within the permitted limits of the anticipated agreement. The administration must bear a large share of the responsibility for presenting a SALT Treaty that the Senate did not find at all attractive, and which some Senators had to support without enthusiasm out of party loyalty.

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The numbers do not have to be perfectly equal. That, too, would be inequitable. The SALT II numbers were not extremely bad, not marginally bad, but bad somewhere in between extremely and marginally. They might even have floated if the political climate had been favorable. But that climate was horrible, both domestically and internationally. Never in American history had relations between a President and a Senate dominated by his own party reached a lower point. We need only mention the fact, without examining all the reasons, except to note that the President had irritated several important Senators, not by failing to keep them informed on the SALT negotiations—for he did inform them—but by applying pressure to secure the 1978 ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty (which offended many conservative voters);⁴ by appearing in their eyes to be weakening US defense (e.g., in cancelling the B-1 and deferring the decision to develop the neutron bomb) at a time when Soviet strategic and theater power was growing;⁵ and by making an unveiled threat to bypass the Senate's power to advise and consent by using an executive agreement rather than a treaty.⁶ Since *Pravda* was blaming the Congress for the slow pace of the arms negotiations and warning the Carter administration against trying to use the threat of Senate rejection to obtain concessions from Moscow,⁷ all that can be said by way of summary is that the President was not a model of political prudence in his dealings with the Senate.

The deterioration of the international political climate was even more worrisome. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan cannot be branded as the sole killer of SALT. Rather it was merely the culmination of a long period, stretching back several years, during which there had been a slow disintegration of Soviet-American detente since 1972. Watergate, which began in the spring of 1973, had played an important part in setting in motion a series of internationally destabilizing consequences. We should not forget how, at the critical point of superpower confrontation during the Yom Kippur War, many Europeans skeptically attributed the DEFCON alert of October 25, 1973, to a desperate effort by the Nixon Presidency to mask the fact that it was coming apart at the seams.⁸

Americans were chagrined to learn that Soviet propagandists had been urging the Arabs to use oil flows and prices as political weapons. If the Soviet leaders were subsequently annoyed at being excluded from Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East, they could rub their hands with glee at the sight of an Atlantic Alliance plunged into a new disarray (in a history of ever recurring disarrays) over the energy-financial crisis which the Europeans blamed on Washington's pro-Israeli stance. But Soviet-American detente appeared to be brought back on track, at least temporarily, as a result of Nixon's visit to Moscow in July 1974, at which time the Protocol to the ABM Treaty as well as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Protocol were signed,⁹ and also the Ford-Brezhnev Vladivostok meeting of November 1974, at which agreement was reached on guidelines for parity of strategic numbers (as required by the Jackson Amendment to Senate consent to SALT I) largely by including strategic bombers, not by altering the US-Soviet missile ratio codified in SALT I.¹⁰

After the resignation of Nixon, the international prestige of the United States declined much more rapidly than its actual power ranking warranted. In the wake of Watergate, which involved official subversion of the rule of law, some Americans, now totally distrustful of their government, demanded maximum exposure of public wrong-doing whether real or alleged. The American press, savoring its *Pentagon Papers* triumph, turned its investigative spotlight upon the CIA. A smarting Congress, determined to reassert its diminished prerogatives and to unhinge in its time of troubles what had come to be called the "Imperial Presidency," went for the jugular vein of the Executive's power in foreign affairs—the intelligence capability—on the grounds that it

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had gotten out of control and had developed in ways incompatible with national ideals and values. Congress reflected the sulking neo-isolationism of the American people amidst the ignominious withdrawal of the US military presence from Southeast Asia. There can be little doubt concerning the astuteness of the judgment made next by the Soviet leaders—that the time was ripe for them to step up the pace of their expansionist operations in Africa. They decided to cast in a proxy role the military forces of satellite Cuba, a poor, unhappy little island which suddenly found itself catapulted upon the stage of world power politics, thereby demonstrating that socialist imperialists were not entirely bereft of a sense of humor.

The United States not only took the joke seriously, it showed itself unable to do anything about it. Henry Kissinger, by emphasizing the grave implications of the loss of Angola for the security of the United States before a Congress bent intransigently upon noninvolvement, accomplished little more than to underscore, and perhaps to exaggerate, both the magnitude of that disaster and the international impotence of the United States. American failure to make an adequate response in Angola helped to prepare the way in 1975-76 for the historic transfer of Soviet support from Somalia to Ethiopia, and the communization of the Horn of Africa, while Washington watched transfixed in self-paralysis.¹¹

Other factors intruded adversely upon the Soviet-American detente. The Soviet Union appeared to be frustrated at not being able to obtain all the technology it wanted from the West. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which made the extension of US trade credits contingent upon a specific Soviet pledge concerning Jewish emigration, infuriated the Soviet leaders, who regarded it as intervention in their internal affairs. As the United States approached its bicentennial, liberals in the Congress began to emphasize the human rights theme in the conduct of foreign policy.

Originally, the intention was for the United States to promote the cause of human rights in friendly countries where it could exercise leverage through military and economic aid policies—such as South Korea, Iran, and Chile. Kissinger, whose normal diplomatic style was to subordinate abstract moral principles to the pragmatic interests of national security and international stability, opposed using the human rights issue as a lever against foreign governments, whether adversaries or allies.¹² But when Jimmy Carter took office, he stepped up the human rights campaign, offending and irritating Soviet leaders in a very sensitive area despite the President's assurances that his message was universal and not aimed specifically at the Soviet Union. The dissident trials in the summer of 1978 sent dark clouds through the skies over the superpower relationship. International political rhetoric escalated toward a new high of international hostility.¹³

The tension was exacerbated by Soviet decisions to mete out severe treatment to American journalists, businessmen, and diplomats, and by Carter's decision to retaliate by cancelling the sale of computers and oil-drilling equipment, as well as curtailing the exchange of scientific commissions and high-level governmental officials. Gradually the summer storm subsided, SALT II negotiations returned to normalcy, and the human rights issue was muted almost everywhere—except in Iran, where Islamic and Marxist elements paradoxically made it the basis of a tactical alliance to overthrow the Shah.

Finally, the Soviet leaders had become concerned about Washington's tendency, which had even antedated the signing of SALT I, to "play the China card." The Nixon-Kissinger opening to Peking, traceable to the ping-pong diplomacy of 1971, had not gone down at all well with the leaders in the Kremlin. Originally the China ploy had been handled very deftly by Nixon and Kissinger, who were anxious to give Moscow pause without frightening it unduly. In their hands, the maneuver had a largely symbolic-

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ceremonial character. It introduced a new uncertainty into Soviet calculations, but produced no definable change in the world power balance. Moreover, it was accompanied by an intensification of efforts to advance the Soviet-American detente, culminating in SALT I and the hardly triumphal US military withdrawal from Southeast Asia.

In contrast, the Carter-Brzezinski policy toward the Peking regime took shape at a time of worsening US-Soviet relations. It seemed to be aimed at the technological buildup of China by the West. The United States at first tried to attenuate Soviet fears with assurances that American technology transfers would not include arms. This did not really assuage the paranoid leaders in Moscow, who normally fret over any kind of Chinese technological development, and who criticized the United States for failing to discourage French sales of antitank and antiaircraft missiles and British sales of Harrier jet fighters and diesel engines for coast guard craft. In mid-1978, *Pravda*, in a reference to US-China ties, accused the United States of seeking a "common language with the aggressive anti-Sovietism of the Chinese rulers."¹⁴ Soviet suspicions reached one peak in December 1978, when Carter granted full diplomatic recognition to the PRC, and another in early 1979 when Teng visited Washington and sounded warnings against Moscow's hegemonial ambitions. Later they would mount still higher.

The Ratification Debate

We need do no more than remind ourselves of the four developments of the past year and a half which helped to clinch the ratification stall on SALT II—the ouster of the Shah in early 1979 which made Americans aware of the precariousness of their position in the Persian Gulf region; the revelation concerning the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, which Carter at one point called "unacceptable," two weeks before he retreated by declaring that the United States would take steps to make certain that Soviet troops in Cuba could not threaten American security; the seizure of the hostages at the US Embassy in Tehran, which opened a long period of American frustration and apparent impotence; and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which forced the President to admit that his eyes had been opened to Soviet expansionist objectives and to take retaliatory measures—postponement of SALT II, an embargo on high-grade technology and grain shipments to Russia, and a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. Well before the invasion of Afghanistan, SALT looked unratifiable in the prevailing world climate.

Despite the President's efforts over the course of a year or more to convert the Senate critics of SALT by trying to sound tough on defense (a doubling of civil defense preparations, plans to develop MX, a five percent increase in defense spending after inflation for the force improvements necessary to restore the strategic balance, etc.),¹⁵ there was a growing assumption in Washington during the last few months of 1979 that the time simply was not right for ratification. As early as September, Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd considered delaying the floor debate on SALT II until after the issue of Soviet troops in Cuba had been settled.¹⁶ The target date of October 1 for bringing the treaty to the full Senate passed with no action. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee received a petition signed by 1,678 retired generals and admirals opposing ratification.¹⁷ Senator Sam Nunn insisted that the treaty should not be approved unless the European allies could be reassured by an upgrading of nuclear and conventional capabilities, especially in the NATO area.¹⁸ Senator Henry Jackson cast doubt on the President's sincerity in proposing a larger military budget in order to influence the Senate. He asked: "Is this a quick fix that's going to disappear the moment we vote on SALT?"¹⁹

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 9, 1976, reported the treaty favorably by a vote of 9 to 6. The majority expressed the view that the treaty

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contained useful limitations, was verifiable, and would lead to more positive gains (in the form of arms cuts) in SALT III. A majority of the committee believed that without SALT II the United States would have to spend a great deal more on defense, whereas the treaty if ratified would usher in a more stable power equilibrium.²⁶ The majority sought to avoid linkages except for Cuba: the President was urged to reaffirm his understanding with the USSR that Soviet troops in Cuba would not be used in a combat role to threaten any country in the Caribbean or elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere.²⁷

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee by a vote of 11 to 1 adopted a resolution interpreting the treaty as permitting the MX.²² It voted unanimously that the terms of the treaty could not be extended beyond the 1985 expiration date without approval by two-thirds of the Senate, and that the Protocol restrictions on MX and cruise missiles did not constitute a precedent for future negotiations.²³ It also voted unanimously that it would regard any significant improvements in the range and capability of the Soviet Backfire bomber as justifying US withdrawal from the treaty, but it stopped short of demanding a Soviet promise not to increase the bomber's range or payload, or production beyond the rate of 30 per year.²⁴ These were all reservations, the effect of which was to put the Soviet leaders on notice as to what was in the minds of committee members in favorably reporting SALT II. There were no "killer amendments" that would require formal renegotiation. The Soviet leaders, of course, were perfectly free to entertain their own views on whether MX is compatible with the treaty, whether the Protocol restrictions constitute a precedent, and whether they would improve Backfire or increase its production rate.

A minority report from the Foreign Relations Committee signed by four Republican members (Baker, Hayakawa, Helms and Lugar), called the treaty "detrimental to the security of the United States," because it had been pursued in the absence of a coherent national strategy "and was not being linked to the overall geopolitical relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. The minority objected to the tendency of the administration and some treaty proponents to label as "killer actions" the amendments, reservations and understandings which had been offered to correct inequities in the treaty and salvage it from almost certain rejection in its present form."²⁵

The committee issued its report two weeks after the seizure of the hostages in Iran. That crisis had already begun to have an impact on the national mood, and marked a turning point in the post-Vietnam period toward a tougher US foreign policy. Policymakers on all sides, painfully aware of the limited US ability to project power in the Persian Gulf, and of the country's rapidly deteriorating image as a strategic superpower, began to call for bigger increases in the military budget than the administration had requested—a new Rapid Deployment Force (RDF); a larger Navy; a speedup of the Trident, cruise missile, and MX programs; a new bomber; and a strengthened NATO.

The White House preferred to ignore the drop in the political barometer and to exude confidence that the treaty would soon be ratified. It was scheduled to go to the floor right after Thanksgiving. But nearly everyone in Washington outside the White House, including some of its staunchest supporters on the Hill, knew that the treaty's chances were fading rapidly. Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd concluded that the full floor debate should not begin while the hostages were being held, and should be pushed off until early in 1980, and even then might be too hot to handle in a presidential election year.²⁶ By the time the Senate Armed Services Committee adopted its controversial report calling SALT II "not in the national security interest" of the United States,²⁷ it was obvious that a full-fledged debate over the treaty would have divided the Senate and the American people at a time of a deepening crisis in the nation's foreign policy. Not until January 2, 1980, did President Carter decide to ask the Senate to delay

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
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consideration of the treaty in response to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. The action was not without an appearance of face-saving.

Thus, one can readily conclude that we face an extremely complex international political-strategic mosaic. It is much too simplistic to suggest that the invasion of Afghanistan is what caused detente to collapse and SALT to be postponed, if not permanently shelved.²⁸ Certainly, the movement of 100,000 Soviet troops into Afghanistan altered the strategic map of the world, posed a threat to Iran and Pakistan, and introduced an important new destabilizing factor into an already highly unstable region. But Afghanistan must be viewed against a background which encompasses Soviet arms acquisition policies of the last decade; Soviet behavior of recent years in Angola, Mozambique, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Southeast Asia, and Cuba; Soviet encouragement and support to the Arabs (especially the Syrians, Lybians, Algerians, Iraqis, Yemenites, and PLO) who are most vehemently opposed to Sadat's quest for a settlement with Israel; Soviet military deployments in Europe which have made West Europeans more apprehensive than ever over Finlandization, because the Soviet leaders know how preferable it is to war. (Officials of NATO governments in Europe have publicly called for ratification, while some defense-minded Europeans have expressed dismay over its provisions.²⁹ More will be said later about Europe and arms control.)

The general psychopolitical climate for arms control and the prevalence of rational restraint in making defense policy and conducting foreign policy has not been helped by frequent press reports concerning exotic new weapons technologies which one superpower or the other, or both, would develop—the neutron bomb; look-down, shoot-down missile systems; maneuverable reentry vehicles (MARVs); titanium submarines; binary chemical weapons; antisatellite killers; the space shuttle; laser weapons and charged particle beam weapons—to mention only a few of the better known. On top of that, the burgeoning Middle East crisis has produced daily headlines on the need for airlift and sealift capability, as well as a rapid deployment force, higher defense spending, the dispatch of forces to the Arabian Sea, the search for bases on the Horn of Africa, and even the possibility that the superpowers might be drifting toward a nuclear confrontation more dangerous than that over Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962.³⁰

Not only the United States and its allies have become apprehensive in recent years about the West's being in retreat in the face of a relentless accumulation of Soviet military power, harnessed to a powerful imperialistic urge. Because of mounting misgivings over trends in Soviet capabilities and behavior—misgivings that have been well-founded in external reality and long-delayed in being felt at some governmental levels—the Western nations have decided within the past year that they must take certain steps to improve deterrence and defense preparedness, in an effort to force an expanding Soviet Union to restrain itself. These actions, which are politically unavoidable and overdue, may eventually have their desired effect. Meanwhile, they may also stimulate traditional Russian paranoia, of which we find a residue after discounting the well-known proclivity of Soviet propagandists for fabrication, exaggeration, distortion, invective, and a holier-than-thou projection of all blame outward. In other words, the Soviet leaders probably regard the West's defensive reactions, which they themselves have undoubtedly provoked, as evidence of the resurgence of aggressiveness in a capitalism at bay.

Much more than a US military presence in the Persian Gulf area, the leaders in Moscow fear the proposal for a new NATO IRBM force and Washington's announcement in January 1980 that it was ready to sell military equipment to China, three months after Secretary Vance had reaffirmed administration policy barring arms sales to China.³¹ The issue of NATO missiles will be discussed below. The aim and scope of this

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paper do not allow a discussion of the intricate triangular relationship beyond mentioning the fact that the Soviet leaders appear to be extremely worried about the possibility that the West will contribute significantly to the growth of China's technological base and military power.³² This threat, which the West has serious qualms about ever carrying out, constitutes an important bargaining lever, so long as it is not brandished in such a way as to precipitate a Soviet response characterized by more irrationality than rationality.

Current Status of Some Negotiations

It is not possible to review in detail all the arms control negotiations carried on by the superpowers and other states in recent years. (Worthy of note is the fact that France took her place on the UN Committee on Disarmament in Geneva early in 1979.) The author is constrained by time and space limits to exclude the Conventional Arms and Technology Transfer discussions except to note that the Carter administration was able, thanks largely to Taiwanese and Iranian cancellations, to reduce military sales to the Third World by nearly \$2 billion below what had been projected by the President for FY 1979.³³ Meanwhile, the Soviet Union replaced the United States as the largest supplier to the Third World as a whole, and to Africa and Latin America. The next few years, however, will probably see compelling reasons for arranging increased military transfers to the NATO and Pacific allies of the United States, to Morocco, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, China, and other countries looking to the West to improve their security, and to countries in the Persian Gulf-Horn-Cape Route region that will expect military aid in return for granting access to bases (e.g., to Berbera). But the United States will probably continue to refrain from being first to introduce new advanced weapons into a region unless this becomes absolutely necessary, either for a clear purpose of deterring external aggression or as a preferable alternative to nuclear proliferation. Both motives will be difficult to justify in the public political forum, regardless of intelligence estimates.

In the following pages, the author intends to examine briefly the current status of arms control negotiations in selected areas: (1) killer satellites; (2) Indian Ocean naval arms limitation; (3) biological and chemical weapons; and (4) comprehensive test ban.

Killer Satellites

Both superpowers rely heavily on satellites for a variety of purposes, military (warning, reconnaissance, communications, and navigation), civilian (meteorology, civil communications, and scientific investigation), and to verify compliance with arms control agreements. Because of the importance of satellites for security, the United States has become concerned in recent years over Soviet development and testing of an antisatellite system. While working to develop an ASAT capability of its own, the United States has pursued negotiations toward an ASAT agreement. Talks began in Helsinki in June 1978—the outgrowth of one of the joint US Soviet arms control working groups set up by Vance and Gromyko in March 1977 as part of the salvage operation following the Soviet rejection of the Carter SALT II proposal earlier that month. Additional sessions were held in Bern from January 23 to February 16, 1979, and in Vienna from April 23 to June 17, 1979. The communique from the Vienna SALT II Summit recorded no progress apart from agreement to continue searching actively.³⁴

It has been reported that the United States hoped to get an agreement at least to ban testing while negotiations were in progress. As a first step, aggressive action against either's spacecraft would be banned; a subsequent step two would ban antisatellite hardware.

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American officials were not agreed on the US ability to verify compliance.³⁵ There has been speculation to the effect that the Soviet Union wished to link a ban on killer satellite testing with a discontinuation of the US space shuttle program, presumably on the grounds that the shuttle has an antisatellite capability. But the shuttle program has been slowed by engine troubles and funding problems.³⁶

Although the United States could probably develop a workable antisatellite system, using high-intensity lasers, within 5 to 10 years, apparently the administration would still prefer to obtain an agreement banning such weapons. One could perhaps argue that, in view of the differences between Soviet and American strategic doctrines, the satellite killer is theoretically more important to the Soviet Union, since its use would be an essential ingredient of a preemptive strike. It would also seem logical that an antisatellite killer (sic) would make more sense for the United States, so that the Soviet Union could be prevented from destroying American satellites either at low altitudes, where it now possesses a limited operational capability, or at higher geosynchronous altitudes (where most of our satellites orbit the earth and where the Soviets have not yet developed an ASAT capability). Regardless of which strategic doctrine a nation espouses—war fighting/war winning/war surviving or mutual assured destruction or launch under attack or selective counterforce or whatever—its military leaders will find it crucially important to have a secure reconnaissance and warning system both before and after the initiation of hostilities.

Indian Ocean Naval Arms Limitation

In 1971, the United Nations General Assembly sought to have the Indian Ocean declared a *Zone of Peace*, closed to the military forces of external states. Neither of the superpowers supported that initiative; nothing came of it. A few years later, in 1975-76, Senate opponents of funding for a US-operated facility on Diego Garcia succeeded in delaying the release of construction appropriations pending the quest for a US-Soviet naval arms limitation agreement. The State Department under the Ford administration objected to such a mandate as not compatible with US interests in a period of expanding Soviet strategic influence in Angola, the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere around the Indian Ocean littoral region. The Soviet attitude was ambiguous. Moscow was probably willing to enter talks with a view toward delaying the Diego Garcia construction and possibly prying the United States loose from Bahrain. But the USSR was unwilling at first to admit that it had built a major base at Berbera, and equally unwilling later to have it treated in negotiations as an Indian Ocean base, before switching its support from Somalia to Ethiopia. (Soviet naval units also operated routinely from Umm Qasr, Basrah, Aden, Mogadiscio and Indian ports.)³⁷

The incoming Carter administration seemed eager to enter bilateral talks in 1977 with a view toward fixing ceilings and averting a naval arms race. Apparently little prior analysis went into the US proposal to negotiate. This, too, was part of the SALT salvage operation of March 1977. Actually, the superpower naval force levels in the area were not all that high. Besides, a number of thorny technical problems were encountered—e.g., defining limits in terms of "ship-days" or "ship-ton-days" per year. (In any effort to measure the military and other utilities of ships, it is always difficult to relate quantity to quality.)

American enthusiasm for continuing the talks declined in 1978 as the Soviet Union became increasingly involved in the Horn of Africa, and at the same time lost access to the facilities at Berbera. As doubts about the accessibility of the base at Subic Bay in the Philippines arose, the future potential of Diego Garcia for purposes of supply, reconnaissance, communications, and intelligence became more significant. Moreover, dur-

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ing the last few years the Western allies have become steadily more concerned, in the face of growing political turbulence along the Cape Route, to shore up the sea lanes of communication on which they depend for the flow of oil and other critical raw materials. Even before the acute crisis which set in during the last two months of 1979, the United States, Britain, and France had been working on plans to strengthen their naval presence in that volatile region. Since the seizure of the hostages in Iran and the Soviet move into Afghanistan, which poses security threats to Iran, Pakistan and the oilfields of the Persian Gulf, all the talk has been of "swing strategies," the building up of naval capabilities, the need for a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), and the search for bases in Oman, Kenya and Somalia.³⁸ Of all the arms control negotiations in which the United States has been involved in recent years, this set was among the most ill-considered. There would seem to be no prospect whatsoever for meaningful negotiations in this area, barring a comprehensive global settlement and a genuine subsidence of the threat to Western interests—developments that now appear hardly likely.

Biological and Chemical Weapons

Having decided unilaterally to destroy its existing stockpiles of biological warfare agents and weapons more than a decade ago, and to concentrate research efforts henceforth on defense, such as immunization measures, the United States had no difficulty in co-proposing, negotiating, helping to draft and signing a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction. There had been some disagreement over whether biological and chemical weapons should be linked or separated. The Soviet Union argued for continued linkage, on the grounds that separation might lead to an intensified competition in chemical weapons. The United States and Britain took the position that the two categories were quite different, that chemical weapons (unlike the militarily less useful biological agents) had actually been used in modern warfare, and that a ban on biological weapons could be agreed upon more quickly than one encompassing both classes of weapons. Eventually the USSR accepted this position, and the convention—a purely declaratory one, with no provision for international inspection (only a procedure to lodge a complaint with the UN Security Council in case of suspected violation by a signatory)—was signed in 1972. The convention and the Geneva Protocol were ratified by the United States on January 22, 1975, following an exchange between the Executive and the Senate clarifying a no-first-use policy for riot control agents and herbicides in war. Adherence to the Biological Convention marks the only time the United States has entered an international agreement calling for complete disarmament in a specific weapons sector without requiring an adequate verification capability. Adherence to the protocol marks the only time the United States has formally pledged not to use weapons at its disposal except in retaliation.

For nearly five years (since December 26, 1975) the United States has retained no biological warfare stockpiles. In other words the United States has renounced its intention and its capability to deter biological warfare attacks through the threat of retaliation. When the Soviet Union ratified the convention in 1975, it declared that it possessed no biological weapons. According to Western intelligence based on satellite reconnaissance, however, the Soviet Union has been known at least for the last few years to be engaged in an extensive R&D program aimed at refining and producing more lethal microbes and viruses that cause such diseases as the plague, anthrax, tuberculosis, smallpox, yellow fever and diphtheria, and perhaps lassa, ebola and marburg fever.³⁹

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Most recently, a controversy flared over a 1979 anthrax epidemic in the Soviet Union. Officials in the Carter administration cited evidence that hundreds of persons died from airborne pulmonary anthrax in the vicinity of a plant in Sverdlovsk which had been suspected for several years as a producer of biological weapons.⁴⁰ The Russians confirmed that there had been an epidemic, but claimed that the deaths were attributable to tainted meat, and the United States categorically rejected that explanation.⁴¹ The United States expressed its concern directly to the Soviet Union and raised in Geneva the question whether the USSR was in violation of the Biological Weapons Convention which came into effect in 1975.

Reports of the Sverdlovsk incident noted that the evidence of violation is not unambiguous. But if the accounts turn out to be well-founded, they will have serious implications for the future climate of arms control.

The control of chemical weapons has been a much more complex problem. These weapons have actually been used in modern warfare, especially World War I, although it is generally agreed that their introduction into World War II was deterred by the knowledge that retaliation would follow. The United States employed defoliation agents and tear gas in Vietnam. According to Western intelligence sources, the Soviet Union has supplied chemical weapons since 1976 for use against Laotian tribesmen resisting the Communist rule of the Pathet Lao and Vietnamese forces.⁴² More recently, fleeing Afghani rebels have accused the Soviet Union of using poison gas—probably Soman, a potentially lethal nerve agent—to suppress the rebellion in their country.⁴³

The United States has developed no new chemical warfare weapons since 1969, when President Nixon renounced their first use (except for defoliants and riot control agents). The United States maintains a stockpile, however, for purposes of deterrence. No military analysts now doubt that the Soviet Union holds a wide lead over the United States in chemical warfare potential. It has been reported that the Soviet armed forces count 70,000 to 100,000 CW specialists, with a CW arsenal totalling 350,000 tons; comparable figures for the United States are 2,000 personnel and 42,000 tons. Of all the nations of the world, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies are now by far the best prepared to conduct chemical warfare operations on a large scale—best prepared in terms of funding, training, size of arsenal, numbers of CW troops, and protective and decontamination equipment. What is more, Soviet military theoreticians have fully incorporated CW warfare into their thinking and operational planning. Western defense analysts are convinced that readiness in this area constitutes one of the most glaring and critical asymmetries in US-Soviet and NATO-Warsaw Pact capabilities.⁴⁴ The Soviet Union has steadily modernized its inventory of nerve gas since 1973 and its armed forces are fully equipped to operate on a battlefield where they expect the environment to be chemical from the start, marked by gas attacks using bombs, land mines and missiles.

US and NATO European armies have been worried for several years about Soviet superiority, but only within the last year have they gone public with demands for more vigorous efforts in this weapons sector. The British, who from World War I experience find "gas warfare" particularly repugnant to contemplate, have nevertheless cautiously suggested that it may be necessary to develop chemical weapons for deterrence.⁴⁵ The US Army has been trying for a decade to obtain authorization to develop a new generation of chemical weapons—"binary munitions" in which two relatively harmless chemical substances are combined to produce a highly toxic or lethal effect shortly before striking the target or in the explosion itself.⁴⁶ This past spring, Director of Defense Research William Perry was reported to have instructed the Army and Navy to complete the design of a facility to produce binary weapons.⁴⁷ Army plans now call for more than \$1 billion worth of effort over the next five years to develop a chem-war capability.

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Given the growing danger of CW weapons derived from organophosphorous compounds (the V and G agents) which cause frightful damage to the nervous system, B gas and the hydrogen cyanide agents which break up the blood cells, and the new binary weapon techniques of delivery,⁴⁸ efforts toward CW disarmament have not been lacking. The United States and the Soviet Union began negotiations in 1976 with a view toward producing a joint draft convention to be submitted to the UN Committee on Disarmament for multilateral negotiation. Ten rounds of meetings were held from then through 1979. The very fact that the negotiations were taking place led the House Appropriations Committee in 1975-76 to turn down funds for the construction of a chemical weapons production facility, and led President Carter in 1977 to direct that the US chemical weapons stockpile be "maintained without improvement."⁴⁹ That hold was still on in 1979, pending progress in the talks. But there has been little real progress in the Geneva talks because agreement on the general principle that there should be disarmament in this weapons dimension bogs down on the crucial difficulty of adequately verifying compliance by NTM—a difficulty rendered virtually insoluble by the emergence of binary weapons. The latest ACDA Annual Report is somewhat optimistic and euphemistic in assessing the progress made thus far:

The two sides agreed that parties to a Chemical Weapons Convention should not develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain chemical warfare agents or munitions except for chemicals needed for permitted purposes, such as the development of protective equipment and antidotes. Further, the two nations sides have agreed that the convention must be subject to adequate verification. While some arrangements and procedures have been agreed upon, other important verification issues have not been resolved, such as methods of verifying destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles and disposition of production facilities for chemical munitions and chemicals which would be covered by an agreement.

International interest in negotiations on chemical weapons intensified during 1979 as awareness grew of the possible impact and benefits. Although a CW convention would affect all countries with well-developed chemical industries, it would also, more importantly, move nations beyond the 1925 Geneva Protocol which banned the first use of chemical weapons, to eliminate an entire class of mass destruction weapons which exist today in large quantities.⁵⁰

In view of the fact that the Soviet Union now enjoys such a wide margin of superiority in CW preparedness, especially in Europe, it makes no sense whatever for Moscow to want CW disarmament. Furthermore, to the extent that the United States may be waking up to the CW threat and starting, albeit haltingly, to support Army budget requests, there is no strong strategic incentive on our side to press for negotiations in the absence of any real expectation that the USSR can be parleyed out of a presently held advantage. No one, however, should conclude that negotiations for CW disarmament, regardless of how futile they may be, will collapse. They will not.

Both sides have powerful incentives for keeping them going. The Soviet motives are military; the American motives, political; the two sets of motives complement each other perfectly from the Soviet perspective. The Soviet objective, of course, is to use negotiations to slow down the US effort to improve its CW capability. The objective of the US Government is to placate a public opinion disturbed by the antihumane effects of these weapons, which lend themselves to particularly lurid descriptions; by reports of Soviet use and American development, which the public and a segment of the press erroneously assume to be in flagrant violation of international law; by charges that the use of herbicides by the United States in Vietnam, particularly the defoliant Agent Orange, caused cancer and genetic defects;⁵¹ and the increasingly frequent reports of accidents, whether strictly chemical or not, from Three Mile Island to Love Canal, with many toxic chemical tanker spills, derailments, and crashes in between—reports which

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understandably arouse the fears of normal citizens and make it difficult for the US military to test, store, or transport chemical agents.⁵² To sum up, the two superpowers will probably pursue CW negotiations partly for opposite reasons—strategy versus environment—quite apart from the natural aversion of military personnel to a weapons technology which not only impedes military operations, but also can produce some unlovely effects upon combatants and less protected civilian population. In the final analysis, the humane motive will at least try to keep hope alive.⁵³

Comprehensive Test Ban⁵³

For a long time back in the 1950s, the Eisenhower administration insisted that a nuclear test ban could be seriously considered only in the context of a general plan to control the production of all fissionable material exclusively for peaceful, nonmilitary purposes. The position was a logical one to take, and the French supported it ardently. It was based on the assumption, quite sensible, that so long as the Great Powers reposed their confidence in nuclear weapons technology and nuclear deterrence strategies as the foundations of their national security, it would not be possible to eliminate the possibility of testing and developing new explosive devices in a dynamic, rapidly changing nuclear environment.

Politics and logic, however, are seldom, if ever, happily married in the minds of policymakers. Nuclear testing in the 1950s provoked an adverse reaction, worldwide and domestically, among scientists and other intellectuals, publics and many politicians deeply concerned over radioactive fallout from atmospheric tests. Opponents of tests undoubtedly exaggerated for political purposes the health hazards involved, but even the scientists who advocated nuclear testing admitted that the dangers were not deniable yet had to be borne as a cost of security.

The United States was finally compelled by public opinion to separate the testing issue from effective limitations on nuclear armaments. But five years of negotiations (in which technical experts were prominently involved) failed to produce agreement on how to verify a comprehensive ban through a combination of NTM, a worldwide network of seismic monitoring stations, and annual quotas of on-site inspections in case of detected seismic events which could not be certainly identified as earthquakes or nuclear detonations.⁵⁴ The impasse was resolved by practical compromise in the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963. The treaty eliminated the largest part of the fallout problem, that part attributable to superpower testing, without impairing the experimentation and development needed to maintain effective deterrence in a nuclear-armed world. Testing was renounced in all environments in which a ban could be monitored by NTM, while underground testing could continue. Since the mid-1960s France and China have conducted atomic and thermonuclear tests in the atmosphere without incurring much international political wrath.

Both superpowers have conducted hundreds of underground tests since 1963. According to the Swedish National Defense Research Institute, during the 10-year period from January 1, 1970 to December 31, 1979, a total of 421 nuclear tests had been counted: USSR, 191; United States, 154; France, 55; China, 15; Great Britain, 5; and India, 1.⁵⁵ Most of the Russian tests were at or near the 150-kiloton limit permitted by the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, but one was estimated by the United States at about 200 kilotons. The advocates of disarmament and a segment of the arms control community,⁵⁶ convinced that a CTB would help substantially to discourage further nuclear proliferation and to dampen competition in advanced weapons technology, persisted in their quest for a CTBT.

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Neither superpower has ever been wildly enthusiastic over the prospect of a CTB. Although the United States has steadily improved its NTM for verifying a test ban during the past two decades, defense officials are still far from being completely satisfied on this score. For a number of years the Soviet Union would not even discuss on-site inspection and was reluctant to enter a CTB so long as France and China kept testing and refused to adhere formally to any arms control agreements (even though both have tacitly observed the basic terms of those which serve their national interests, such as the Nonproliferation Treaty). Three years ago, the Soviet Union hinted at a willingness to sign a less than universal CTBT and to discuss on-site inspection. This may have meant that the Soviet leaders wished to hedge their bets against the possibility that SALT II might not reach a successful conclusion, in which case the demand for new Western military programs could become for a time a more urgent threat than that posed by China.

Upon assuming office, the Carter administration assigned a high priority to negotiating a CTBT, regarding it almost as important as SALT itself because of its potential as a brake on the superpower arms race and on proliferation to other states. The United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have been negotiating a CTBT in Geneva since October 1977. The fact that more than 24 weeks of talks were held during 1979 indicates that, next to SALT, this has been the most serious US-Soviet negotiating forum in the arms control spectrum in recent years.

At first the US delegation was sent to Geneva with instructions to seek an absolute ban on all tests. But opposition to a zero-yield test ban surfaced from several quarters—the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger, the Defense Nuclear Agency and the House Armed Services Committee.⁵⁷ Principal concerns were that "the present state of the art does not permit adequate verification of nuclear testing below certain levels;"⁵⁸ that a CTB could, over a period of time, have a destabilizing effect upon the international strategic equilibrium because the nuclear stockpiles on which deterrence rests require periodic proof-testing, and that the Soviet Union (given the nature of its society and its more exact knowledge about which of its tests have been detected by others' NTM) would be in a better position than the United States to maintain stockpile confidence over many years by testing at unobservably low yields;⁵⁹ and that until the SALT process produces tangible and credible evidence that the nuclear arms race has been brought under effective control, quantitatively and qualitatively, it will be necessary for both sides to test recurrently to obtain information needed for the development of new weapons designs, and also to preserve scientific and technological capabilities in the realm of nuclear weapons technology. In view of the fact that modernization of strategic and theater nuclear forces (MX, Trident, Tomahawk GLCMs, etc.) will be much more important to the United States than comparable programs will be to the Soviet Union, a CTBT would weigh more heavily upon the development efforts of the former than of the latter.

During the first year of the negotiations, it looked as though the Carter administration was divided within itself after having entered CTB talks hastily, without having done its homework and without a clear idea of its objectives. For a while the US preference seemed to shift toward a ban which would permit a small number of low-yield tests to be conducted. The Soviet Union, which has never shown any disposition to permit the United States to carry out low-yield tests under a CTB, remained adamantly opposed. The present incomplete draft text prohibits all explosions. The United States sought to limit the liability of a CTBT by pressing for a three-year agreement; the Soviet Union wanted no time limit.⁶⁰ Among the principles agreed upon thus far is that the treaty should be of fixed duration. This would give each party the option of reassessing

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its total security situation upon expiration, and resuming tests, if necessary. But Moscow can be expected—depending upon the exact wording finally incorporated into the draft—to argue as it did in the case of the SALT II Protocol that any agreement once made establishes a firm precedent for all future negotiations, and that any temporary deviation would constitute a reversal of the entire SALT process—unless, of course, the Soviet Union perceives good reasons for resuming its own testing program. A protocol of the same duration as the treaty would establish a moratorium on explosions for peaceful nuclear purposes, unless some agreed method can be found to preclude the acquisition of military benefits from PNEs.⁶¹

Some verification issues still await resolution. The problem of proof-testing stockpiles might be rendered manageable by the three-year term, with a testing interlude prior to another three-year ban. Some strategic analysts are bound to feel uncomfortable at the thought of a permanent CTB between two superpowers that depend so vitally for their security upon an ever-changing nuclear technology. Some will be wary of even a three-year ban if it appears likely to exert a drag effect upon the development of new weapons systems essential to the programs of modernizing the strategic and theater nuclear forces on which, for the last two years, the ability of the United States and its European allies to adhere to SALT II has presumably been based as an irreducible minimum. If US-Soviet relations become any less acrimonious than they have been during the past year, and if the Carter administration decides that it would be a politically hopeful sign in an election year (in which there is virtually no chance of SALT II ratification) to produce a new arms control agreement (the Senate debate over which would have to be postponed until 1981), the CTBT will be the prime candidate.

Random Reflections and Tentative Conclusions

It is the height of presumptuousness to try to survey the arms control panorama in a single paper. The author has drawn some contrasts between then and now, and selected a few specific areas for detailed comments. Apart from a comparison of a few general characteristics of SALT I and SALT II, little of note has been said about SALT II outside the framework of the ratification debate. So much has been said and written on the numbers of SALT II, and their implications for the strategic balance during the next decade, that a full summation is impossible and a superficial one would be useless. We are perhaps becoming increasingly aware that, regardless of how important the bare numbers may be, SALT II is more of a political than a mathematical game between the superpowers. In the final analysis, the only criterion by which to determine whether the situation of strategic parity prevails is whether the two superpowers are politically satisfied that it does prevail. At the present time, the American political system is not so satisfied, regardless of what President Carter thinks. Indeed, there is not a great deal of reassuring evidence that the President understands the operation of the American political system.

Serious asymmetries exist in the strategic postures of the superpowers. These stem from profound differences in the ideologies, philosophies, political values and military strategic doctrines of the two nuclear titans. The formidable discrepancy in throwweight cannot be blamed on SALT. It is rather the result of strategic weapons choices by the two governments which to a certain extent antedate SALT and have been unconstrained by SALT in the past, even though some measures which may be helpful in rectifying the imbalance would be constrained by SALT in the future. Three examples will suffice to illustrate the point: (1) The Soviet Union enjoys a virtual monopoly in air defense; the United States has shown no interest for two decades in air defense and still shows no interest today (despite concern over the Backfire) even though SALT leaves

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it free to acquire all the air defense it might wish to acquire. (2) The United States is permitted under SALT II to deploy a total of 820 MIRVed ICBMs; up to now it has deployed only 550 MIRVed Minutemen III and, rather than deploying a larger number, has closed out the production of its land-based missile. (3) Prior to SALT, the United States was perfectly free to develop and deploy heavy missiles comparable to those developed and deployed by the Soviet Union; it never made a serious move in that direction. Now, while undertaking the development of the heavier mobile MX, the United States will find its freedom constrained psychopolitically by SALT II limitations (if it is ratified) and by strident Soviet charges that MX is incompatible with the treaty. (More will be said about MX subsequently.)

Nothing has been said in this paper about SALT verification, an esoteric subject on which the author cannot pretend to have any expertise. One Senator favored ratification of SALT II if he could be shown that his doubts about verification were unwarranted. Another Senator opposed SALT II on its merits but held that it could be verified—at least he held that up to the time when the Senate Intelligence Committee voted on the question. The average professor-in-the-street is entitled to be a bit confused. But strict verifiability was not as central an issue as the stability of the strategic balance.⁶² Verification, however, became more critical as nervousness over the stability of what appeared to be an adversely tilting balance rose. If the rhetoric of the pessimists occasionally bordered on the apocalyptic, that of the optimists was sometimes sanguine.

One point worth remembering is that the ability of the United States to acquire on a continuing basis reliable intelligence concerning Soviet military capabilities will constitute a serious challenge under a SALT regime, and a serious challenge of a somewhat different kind in the absence of SALT. Since SALT II imposes certain obligations upon both parties in regard to monitoring (e.g., not to interfere with NTM), it is possible that the United States stands to lose more in the realm of verification ability than it does with respect to its ability to restore and maintain a satisfactory strategic balance (if that is the real problem) in the event that SALT II collapses entirely for not being ratified. This might at least constitute a subject of a lively debate: Is SALT II more important for our ability to be *certain* than for our ability to be *equal*? One of the implications of this question is that in the absence of a SALT agreement the Soviet Union might not find it too easy to exceed the treaty ceilings on strategic missiles by 25 per cent. Rather than tailor its force acquisition goals to arms control objectives, the Soviet Union decides first what strategic forces it needs and what it is able to produce over a treaty period. This determines the ceilings to be negotiated. It is not at all clear that the USSR during the next 5 years can simultaneously carry out a large-scale MIRVing program and also expand its strategic missile force from 2,400 to 3,000. We must ponder carefully whether the Soviet Union on the one hand and the United States and its allies on the other will be in a better or worse situation with and without SALT II.

Nonproliferation

First, a word should be said about the implications of SALT II for the problem of nuclear proliferation. The first Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference in 1975 was far from being a howling success.⁶³ Yet India has not conducted a second "peaceful explosive" test, and none of the other countries whose entry into the nuclear club was widely speculated upon at that time—Pakistan, Iran, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and others—has thus far acquired a nuclear capability. Within recent years it has come to be taken for granted that Israel possesses a small arsenal of nuclear weapons. Concern continues to be expressed about the intentions of Pakistan, notwithstanding the suc-

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cess of the United States in dissuading France and Switzerland from selling nuclear equipment to Islamabad, and despite US warnings that if the Zia government insists on proceeding with a nuclear test it will jeopardize American plans to supply military aid to ward off a Soviet threat in the post-Afghanistan situation (an offer, incidentally, which Pakistan characterized as "peanuts"). The United States has also worried in recent years about the possibility of budding cooperative arrangements involving financial deals and/or the supply of nuclear reactors, fuel, materials and reprocessing equipment between West Germany on the one hand and Brazil and Argentina on the other; France and Switzerland with Pakistan; Pakistan and Libya; and France and Italy with Iraq.⁶⁴ Since the mysterious blast near the Antarctic Circle in September 1979, there has also been some speculation—still unverified—regarding atomic weapons cooperation between Israel and South Africa.

No nation has worked as assiduously as the United States for the last 25 years to discourage proliferation. Almost alone, it pressed for the NPT. If other nuclear weapons states perceived an advantage to themselves in the NPT, they nevertheless preferred to allow the United States to bear almost the entire burden of alienating the *non beati possedentes* [nuclear have-nots] in the Third World and elsewhere. At Soviet insistence, the United States was compelled to offend and frighten its principal continental NATO ally by scuttling the ill-conceived Multilateral Force (MLF) in the mid-1960s as the price for the NPT (demonstrating once again that hair-brained schemes in foreign policy invariably come home to roost). Besides fathering the NPT, which India unkindly characterized as an effort by the armed to disarm the unarmed, the United States has also pursued its antiproliferation objective by supporting efforts to strengthen the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); by backing the initiative for the Treaty of Tlatelolco which establishes a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Latin America; by coordinating the development of international controls on the export of nuclear supplies; and by putting together an international study effort involving 66 countries and five international organizations—the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE)—designed to minimize the nuclear weapons proliferation risks associated with widespread commerce in plutonium and highly enriched uranium.⁶⁵

Despite all the criticisms to which the US policy of opposing proliferation has been subject, that policy has been fundamentally correct and prudent. Proliferation is likely to lead in the long run to the decay of global political order and the rise of global anarchy even beyond what we have witnessed in the last few years. Proliferation will increase the risk of accidental or unauthorized use; raise the chance that local wars will escalate to the nuclear level; increase over time the probability of major nuclear war as well as catalytic war; erode the existing "firebreak" against the use of nuclear weapons; compound the difficulty of future arms limitation negotiations; and lead to the eventual acquisition of nuclear weapons by "crazy states," "crazy elites" or "crazy terrorists."⁶⁶ Nevertheless the antiproliferation policy has brought the United States into serious and inescapable dilemmas—e.g., in its relations with India and Pakistan, and also with West Germany and Brazil. What is more, at the upcoming second NPT Review Conference in August 1980, assuming that SALT II will not have been ratified by that time, the United States can expect endless tongue-lashing by many Third World non-weapons signatories as the superpower to be blamed for delaying progress on nuclear arms limitations.

In the final analysis the outcome of SALT II will not be the decisive determinant of whether New Delhi, Islamabad, Praetoria, Seoul or Rio finally chooses to exercise the nuclear option. The final collapse of SALT II would furnish those capitals not so much a reason for acquisition (for the causes lie elsewhere) as a moral-political justification or rationale. The ratification of SALT II would probably shore up the non-proliferation

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regime, at least for a while, depending upon how much the general political climate of the world improves. But if the barometer continues dropping as it has been, that regime will become increasingly fragile and increasingly difficult to preserve. If one country goes nuclear, it will certainly be followed by others. The world will become a more dangerous place in which to live. But the United States alone, no matter how hard it tries, cannot dam the dike against the flood.

New Missiles for NATO

Living with a sense of theater military imbalance tilting ever more adversely is by no means new for Western Europeans. They have felt it for decades. But the formidable conventional imbalance of the 1950s was adequately compensated for by US strategic superiority and in the mid-1960s by the deployment of 7,000 "tactical" nuclear weapons in NATO Europe. Ten years ago, when the SALT process got under way and the "codification of strategic parity" became a household term among arms controllers, it was widely agreed by analysts that the regional military equation would henceforth become more important and more worrisome. Today American strategists more and more frequently are questioning the existence of strategic parity between the superpowers. Aware that the Soviet Union in recent years has been deploying longer-range "Eurostrategic" nuclear systems (including the SS-20 and the Backfire) than NATO has at its disposal, NATO commanders have issued stern warnings about West European security and European observers have become more apprehensive about "Finlandization." The famous Kissinger speech in Brussels last September, in which the former Secretary of State cautioned the Europeans against relying too much on the traditional US nuclear guarantee for their defense, merely climaxed a long period in which the Europeans themselves had agonized over the credibility of the US deterrent pledge.⁶⁷

West European misgivings have been compounded by recurring crises of confidence in American leadership of the alliance ever since the first year of the Carter administration. In 1977 and 1978 the Europeans feared that Carter's shift of ideological gears from the *Realpolitik* of Kissinger to an idealistic human rights campaign might undermine detente in Europe, unravel the frayed fabric of the Helsinki Accords, foment trouble in powderkeg areas, and lead to a heavier Soviet crackdown on dissidents at home and in East Europe. Europeans accused the Carter White House first of underreacting and later of overreacting to Soviet expansionist activity in Africa. They were appalled by the neutron bomb fiasco, and suspicious that the United States in bilateral SALT negotiations might bargain away capabilities—especially the cruise missile—thought crucial to European security and the restoration of theater balance. Most recently, strains in the US-European relationship have been caused by Washington's handling of the crises over Iran and Afghanistan. The reactions of the Europeans themselves have often been far from consistent, but in their own defense they plead that for the last three years they have never been sure where they are being led through the stops and starts, zigs and zags, twists and turns, and initiatives and reversals of what seems to them the highly erratic, incompetent, and self-righteous courses pursued by the Carter administration. They are understandably reluctant to tailgate such a driver.

After six years of MBFR negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact had failed to produce any significant progress—indeed, with the Soviet Union holding adamantly to the line that there is no theater imbalance—the Atlantic Alliance displayed a fair amount of unity and determination (despite domestic political opposition in Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands) by deciding in December to go ahead with the production and deployment in Europe of 108 Pershing 2s and 464 Tomahawk GLCMs capable of reaching targets on Soviet territory. The plan calls for stationing the medium-

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range missiles in Great Britain, West Germany, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands. Belgium said it would have to reexamine its role in the project every six months in the light of developments in future East-West arms negotiations, whether in SALT III or some other forum, over the "gray area nuclear weapons" which have hitherto not been covered either in SALT or MBFR. The Netherlands, preferring to assign priority to the quest for negotiated reductions of all nuclear weapons in Europe, said that it would not make a final decision to deploy the new missiles on its soil until the end of 1981.⁶⁸ In order to demonstrate that the new Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces would not increase NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons or the number of nuclear weapons in the NATO region, it was announced that the United States would withdraw 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe as soon as feasible. (Presumably these would be higher yield warheads from shorter range delivery systems which the West Europeans in any case are not happy to have stationed on their soil.)

The new NATO missiles, which would not be ready for deployment until well after the expiration of the SALT II Protocol at the end of 1981, will each carry a single warhead, and thus will not come close to matching the total lethality of a projected 1,000 or more SS-20s, each armed with three warheads. Nevertheless the 572 missiles, should they actually be deployed, will significantly strengthen deterrence in Europe. By their verbal reactions to the decision, the Soviet leaders have shown that they are quite disturbed by the prospect of NATO's reducing its vulnerability. The mere anticipation of the Brussels decision induced them to make a peace offering in the form of an announced intention to carry out unilateral withdrawals from East Germany in order to enhance detente, combined with propaganda threats that the deployment of a new NATO missile force would wreck detente.⁶⁹ That transparent ploy frightened some faint hearts, but it was not sufficient to stay the NATO foreign and defense ministers from performing their duty to the alliance.

The projected LRTNF for NATO will generate several new problems and questions: (1) How will planned deployments be phased with East-West negotiations? (Some see the projected missile force as a mere bargaining chip for the expected talks on "gray area weapons;" others think that Western Europe has been hoping for the best for such a long time that the strengthening of deterrence is much overdue.) (2) Will the new NATO force blur the distinction between NATO deterrence, which has always depended upon the US strategic deterrent, and the British strategic deterrent forces? (3) Will such a force strengthen or weaken the coupling between the defense of Western Europe and the US strategic deterrent?⁷⁰ (4) Will such a force ever actually be deployed, or will it suffer a mounting domestic political opposition in the host countries comparable to that which the MX has encountered here, and will that opposition in the end prove insuperable? (5) Will the European allies make US ratification of SALT II an essential precondition for their proceeding with the planned deployment? (6) Will it be possible to work out an equitable compromise—a partial NATO deployment for a partial Soviet reduction in theater forces, or will the USSR remain as intransigent as in MBFR, and insist that when NATO calls for "restoring the balance" it really means "destroying the balance?" After withholding the wine which it once offered the West to taste in MBFR, and after beginning to imagine how sweet a Finlandized Europe would taste, the Soviet Union will not find it easy to settle for a stabilizing standoff in the 1980s. Given the extreme delicacy of the present situation, if Jimmy Carter and Helmut Schmidt—two leaders whose personalities, styles and policies do not exactly resonate in harmony—should happen to be reelected this coming fall, the Europeans will probably gravitate toward the latter (especially if Giscard d'Estaing also wins in 1981) to provide deft guidance through the European atomic minefield during the early 1980s. At the present time it seems almost

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certain that a second Carter administration will see the West Europeans strike out more on their own to make the best deal they can with the power to the east.

SALT II and MX

Well before the signing of SALT II—in fact, all through the last year or more of negotiations—it was widely recognized that treaty approval would depend upon the production of MX and the deployment of that system in a survivable basing mode as the preferred means of solving the problem of ICBM vulnerability—a problem that would reach a critical danger point in the early 1980s, as the Soviet Union achieved high missile accuracy. After nearly two years of study and controversy within the Pentagon and the White House, President Carter announced the decision to develop and deploy MX on September 7, 1979.⁷¹ This would be the largest and most accurate missile ever built by the United States. It would enable this country to match the Soviet Union's capability of targeting the other side's land-based missile forces. Although the decision was fraught with profound implications for US strategic doctrine, including a potential shift of emphasis from Mutual Assured Destruction to Counterforce, it appeared to emerge not from any great debate over strategic doctrine (which was long overdue) but rather from a desire on the part of the Carter administration to alter its reputation within the defense community from vacillating to tough in order to enhance the prospects for ratification of SALT II. The opportunity to conduct such a debate was lost while Washington played the most popular game in town—describing the various basing modes being considered, arguing their merits, and trying to guess which one would finally be chosen.

It would be very unfair to infer that the Carter administration had chosen MX purely for the purpose of SALT-selling. The Defense Department under Harold Brown, genuinely concerned about ICBM vulnerability, had developed a solid case for MX. Suggestions that the United States need not worry about its ICBMs because the Soviet Union would be deterred by strategic bombers and SLBMs, or that the United States should phase out land-based missiles and deploy additional ones at sea, were analyzed and dismissed as unsatisfactory solutions. It was concluded that the triad should be preserved with three healthy legs. The American triad compounds uncertainty and resource allocation problems in the minds of Soviet military planners. If they should believe that they possessed an unremedied capability of knocking out 90 per cent of the US land-based missile forces, they would then feel free to concentrate a greater portion of their R&D on ASW and defense against incoming bombers and missiles. MX was seen as necessary for the maintenance of a stable strategic balance. Whereas the emplacement of missiles in submarines would greatly reduce the number of military targets that the Soviet Union would have to kill (assuming an effective ASW capability), MX would greatly increase that number without increasing the number of US missiles. In other words, the USSR could theoretically kill 240 US warheads on a Trident submarine with one or two weapons, but would theoretically be compelled to expend 23 (or 46) accurate, high-yield reentry vehicles to be sure of destroying one MX missile. State of the ASW arts aside, mathematics strongly favors MX.⁷² Moreover, MX would eliminate the necessity of having to contemplate going to a policy that has long been the nightmare of prudent arms controllers—launch on warning—without eliminating the option of being able to launch under attack/assessment in order to improve deterrence by reducing the expectation of benefits which the Soviet leaders might think they could reap from a surprise first strike or preemptive blow.⁷³

Unfortunately, the compelling strategic case for MX has been largely submerged in the intellectual parlor games about basing modes and in the press accounts of rising

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opposition to the new weapons system. There is no need to discuss the dozen proposed basing modes—from the earliest plans to launch from helicopters, transport on highways or railroads, disperse on warning to military or commercial airstrips, or roll on underground tracks—to the more recent schemes for deployment on racetracks and now linear tracks, in vertical or horizontal positions.⁷⁴ Perhaps the only point to be made is that the many changes of direction on basing modes has rendered MX subject to a good deal of ridicule as a "Rube Goldberg" contraption which some of us are old enough to remember from the Sunday comic papers.

Opposition to MX has mounted steadily, as groups across a broad spectrum of views (often incompatible with each other) have coalesced against it. Arguments heard most frequently are these:

(1) Its cost (more than \$30 billion) is too high. Opponents do not call attention to the fact that this is an estimate of cost over nearly 10 years, or just about two per cent of the annual defense budget. They prefer instead to emphasize cost overruns, the impact of the program upon inflation and the diversion of resources from welfare programs. A more interesting economic debate among the *cognoscenti* is whether it will be cheaper for the Soviet Union to produce additional reentry vehicles than for the United States to build additional aim points. Some have urged the deployment of Minuteman in MAP or MPS modes as cheaper than building a new mobile missile.

(2) MX is not needed in an era of nuclear overkill, triadic deterrence, SALT and detente. (The latter part of this argument has been muted of late, but if the international political climate improves during the next year or so it is bound to be resuscitated.) Even after a massive Soviet first strike, in which the Soviet leaders can never be sure of how many ICBMs will survive or be launched before impact, the United States will still be able to inflict an unacceptable amount of damage in retaliation. (Opponents of MX dismiss as far-fetched the scenario in which the USSR, with a relatively small fraction of its total strategic forces, carries out a disarming counterforce strike against USICBMs while reserving a large missile force to deter American retaliation with bombers and SLBMs.)

(3) Since the Carter administration has approved the MX program either as a "sweetener" to obtain ratification consent or as a bargaining chip for SALT III negotiations, the political motives which have driven the MX program thus far will change significantly along with the world political climate if and when SALT II comes into effect.

(4) MX will not remain as invulnerable as its advocates claim. Any deception scheme, no matter how cleverly devised, will undergo degradation over the course of several years. The actual location of the MX in one of its 23 shelters will probably become detectable (by satellite TV, "backpacker spies" or other means) and vulnerable to low trajectory attack from offshore submarines. This would eliminate or greatly reduce the US launch-under-attack capability. Even before Soviet sensors become sufficiently developed to detect the missile's presence in a particular silo, the whole track could be taken out with three SS-18s. (But the whole Soviet heavy missile force, we must remember, could kill only one-half of the MX force.) Few would deny, of course, that any strategic weapons system is bound to be effectiveness-degradable over a long period of time as the other side improves its countering technology.

(5) If SALT II is ever ratified, we can expect to hear MX condemned as a violation of its spirit and an impediment to the success of SALT III. Even if SALT II should not be ratified, the opponents of MX will criticize it as being incompatible with intelligent unilateral arms control. Several lines of attack have already been employed:

(a) MX will heat up the arms race by adding a major new strategic weapons system; it would be better to refrain from placing a mobile system on the strategic

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chessboard. (Arms controllers 20 years ago extolled mobility at sea because it strengthened the invulnerable deterrent.)

(b) MX will produce a shift in strategic doctrine on our side from a second-strike countervalue Mutual Assured Destruction strategy to a first-strike, counterforce selective options strategy.

(c) 200 MXs, each armed with ten 335-kiloton warheads of high accuracy, will usher in a new period of strategic instability, because they will threaten Soviet ICBMs (which carry two-thirds of Soviet megatonnage, whereas our ICBMs carry only one-third of ours) and will therefore increase the Soviet incentive to carry out a preemptive strike in time of international crisis. (Only the United States is cast in the role of destabilizer. The fact that the Soviet Union's military theoreticians have long expounded a preemptive counterforce strike doctrine is often downplayed, glossed over or explained away as understandable in their circumstances.)

(d) The deployment of MX will compound the Soviet verification problem, no matter how we tailor the basing mode to permit counting single missiles without acquiring knowledge of their exact location. Even though the United States has insisted that MX is permissible under the Treaty, the Soviet Union follows a different interpretation. If the Treaty is ratified the USSR is certain to condemn plans for MX as SALT-shakers and wreckers of detente. The deployment of MX will eventually compel the Soviet Union to follow suit, and it will be far less solicitous than the United States in trying to make sure that the other side can verify. (Citing a future hypothetical problem as derivative from a presently contemplated course of action is a favorite way of discouraging imminent steps to solve an urgent, existing problem. To this objection, the opponents of MX respond by citing the history of MIRV and the failure of the United States to press for a MIRV ban in SALT I—despite the fact that the other side was not in the least bit interested because the United States was ahead in MIRV technology, just as it is with MX.)

(e) MX deployment will put the Soviet Union under pressure to increase the number and size of its warheads to target mobile land-based ICBMs, regardless of SALT II limitations.

(f) In the final analysis, the deployment of MX will increase the probability that nuclear war will occur.

(6) Last but not least is the rising chorus of domestic political opposition to MX from a coalition of environmentalists, antimilitarists, disarming pacifists, respected military leaders, politicians, legalistic states' righters, liberal legislators who want to fund their own favorite programs by slicing the military budget, and people in local communities who already feel the impact of the projected MX and who are launching their protests under impact, with the backing of vote-conscious governors. Assuming that enough cement can be found to build the needed linear tracks and silos (without totally disrupting the construction industries of Nevada, Utah, Arizona, New Mexico or wherever), it will not be difficult to show that this vast public works project (greater than the Egyptian pyramids, the Panama Canal or the Alaskan pipeline) will damage the balance of ecological systems, clutter up natural wilderness, increase the danger to local flora and fauna (shades of the snail darter and other jeopardized species), fence off more lands in the public domain than the Air Force now says it will need, produce a boom town economic impact upon small communities, change the social environment of rural towns as a result of population influx (for construction and operation), impinge upon land now available for grazing, mineral exploration and recreation, and siphon off huge quantities of water in water-scarce country.⁷⁵

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There is no doubt that the United States must do something to meet the problem of ICBM vulnerability. Land-based missiles, which are more accurate than those sea-based, should be preserved. Some kind of mobile missile in a MAP or MPS mode would seem to be preferable as a remedy. But it may turn out to be politically unfloatable in the Congress after all the economic, political, military-strategic, environmental, legal, sociological, and arms control aspects of the project have been scrutinized. If it should prove impossible to lift MX off the ground after the 1980 election, there will probably be only one direction left in which the United States can move—and that will be to invoke the national interest provision of the 1972 ABM Treaty (i.e., not to renegotiate but to withdraw) and to deploy ABM to insure the survivability of an adequate proportion of the ICBM force. During the past year, the Pentagon has been giving serious consideration to the ABM requirement.⁷⁶ Many arms controllers (but not all) will cavil at a solution which calls for rolling back the one arms control measure which seemed most clearly at the time to enshrine the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction. A decade later, we are a decade wiser. We now know that we have not been able to educate the Soviet leaders to our strategic way of thinking. They have their own philosophy of deterrence. They are just as much interested in deterring nuclear war as we are. But they go about it very differently, and that requires a fundamental readjustment in our thought, our strategic doctrine and our strategic forces posture. Our national ethic does not require us to be damned fools.

Whither Arms Control in the 1980s?

As we head into the third decade of arms control, many strategic analysts wonder whether it is possible to regulate dynamic advanced military technology by means of formal agreements, arrived at through traditional diplomatic negotiation, the terminology of which is often outflanked by the scientists and engineers before the signatories' ink has even dried on the paper. Certainly the superpowers are each interested in acting intelligently to minimize whatever dangers can be minimized in a dangerous world. But elaborate treaties which take five or six years to negotiate and which become entangled in the domestic political process of one party may not be the best way to modulate competition in strategic armaments between rival powers with very different approaches to deterrence and arms control. There is reason to suspect that the quest for such formal agreements may exacerbate international tensions more than it alleviates them, and may contribute as much to a speeding up as a slowing down of armaments competition between the superpowers. It might be almost better for a few years if the United States and the Soviet Union each carries out the military programs which it deems necessary for its security, while each watches the other and communicates to the other its rationale for doing what it is doing. The results of such a process could hardly turn out to be worse than the SALT II debacle.

In the months ahead many will speculate whether, in the wake of Iran, Afghanistan, and the Olympics boycott, detente can be put back on the track and SALT II can be ratified. According to one school of thought, nothing can be done until next spring, after the US election. Despite the fact that administration spokesmen have said more than once since Afghanistan that the treaty would be taken up again at a more propitious time, it does not appear likely that this will be done prior to the election, because a Senate defeat—which remains a possibility even though the international political climate undergoes some improvement—might show how much President Carter's own political weakness in Washington contributed, along with the adversely tilting strategic balance and Soviet aggressive behavior, to the rough handling accorded the treaty by the Senate. The outcome of the election will undoubtedly have a

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considerable effect upon the prospects for treaty approval, but the consequences are not easy to predict at this time. The reelection of the President would strengthen his hand, but might conceivably not guarantee ratification approval. The election of Reagan would not necessarily doom the treaty to the dustbin, but might lead to the renegotiation of certain provisions. In either case, approval would hinge upon convincing military leaders and defense conservatives on the Hill that the United States will be better off with the treaty than without it. (This is the obverse of the possibility that Soviet leaders may be wondering whether the US military will get more of what it wants from the President and Congress within a SALT II regime than outside of it.)

Majority opinion in Western Europe seems to make the ratification of SALT II a precondition to supporting the deployment of a NATO missile force, because the Europeans want the missiles in order to secure the detente, not to bury it. They will probably adhere to this line as long as they see any chance that the Treaty could be approved. By next spring, the protocol will have less than a year to run before it expires. This may please the Europeans by diminishing the precedent-setting aspect of the protocol, but it will not please the Russians, for whom the restrictions on cruise missiles constituted one of the principal benefits to be derived from SALT II. One year, moreover, will hardly provide sufficient time for East and West to negotiate the complexities of Eurostrategic weapons. But even if events related to weapons developments in the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as to quantitative ceilings, qualitative restraints, and deadlines, overtake the treaty and render some of its provisions perishable, this does not necessarily mean that our European allies will perceive Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces as any less indispensable to their security in the mid- and late 1980s. If anything, they are likely to become more apprehensive over the deployment of SS-20s and Backfires, and more willing to strengthen their own bargaining position. They are certainly not prepared to concede that only the Warsaw Pact may modernize theater nuclear forces. Moreover, the USSR, which often appears to be more worried about missile deployments in Europe than in the CONUS, may be motivated to negotiate a compromise based on partial deployments in the West and partial reductions in the East. We should not underestimate, however, the reluctance of Moscow to surrender any strategic advantage which it has once achieved, and to dismantle any usable modern weapons.

No one can plausibly predict what will happen to SALT II, to arms control in general, and to the unstable political atmospherics known as detente. The fate of the treaty will depend in no small measure on how the two superpowers act between now and early 1981. President Carter has said that the United States will abide by the terms of SALT II so long as the USSR appears to be doing likewise. (Already the Senate Armed Services Committee has authorized adding 100 Minuteman III missiles to the 550 already deployed, a move which, if carried out, could put the United States above the limit of 1,200 MIRVed missiles.⁷⁷) The Soviet leaders might step up construction and other activity at Cienfuegos, begin testing their new generation of land-based ICBMs with more than 10 warheads, increase the production rate of Backfire, and resort to total encryption of missile test data.⁷⁸ On the other hand, they may deem this sort of behavior to be imprudent, and prefer instead to mount a campaign for peace, negotiation, disarmament, the resuscitation of detente, and the multilateral working out of a comprehensive long-range approach to outstanding world problems. Regardless of its prospects for significant results, such a propaganda appeal will exert a powerful attraction to democratic publics.

The bloom is off the cheek of arms control. Because SALT has been oversold in the past, leading to disappointment, it may have to be de-emphasized in the future as the central symbol of superpower prudence and restraint. If the rhetoric could be toned

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down on the part of critics and advocates alike, a more realistic and in the end a more successful US arms control policy—one more likely to promote national security and stable deterrence—will have a chance to emerge.

SALT or no SALT, there are still compelling reasons for both superpowers to pursue some form of arms control. Neither one wants a world of unlimited nuclear proliferation. Neither one really wants weapons configurations and defense policies that raise suspicions and tensions to intolerable levels, thereby increasing the probability that nuclear war will occur. Each would like to see its own brand of deterrence succeed. Each must keep a careful eye on China. (When the PRC conducted two ICBM tests in May 1980, US spokesmen declared that the event posed problems for the Soviet Union, not for the United States. This smug attitude will require revision before the end of the present decade.)

One important prerequisite to the development of a more intelligent arms control policy for the United States in the 1980s is an acknowledgment that this country lacks a unified and coherent strategic doctrine. Such public doctrine as we have is very different from that of the USSR. Profound differences between the doctrines of mutual assured destruction and the war-fighting/war-winning/war-surviving strategy should not be overdrawn as an absolute bar to the reaching of arms control agreements. Such differences, which are related to ideology at least as much as actual military planning, should not be overdrawn. (The United States, after all, has never lacked a counterforce targeting capability.) But in formulating our arms control policy, we must recognize the significance of doctrinal divergence and get our own strategic thought in order. We cannot go on naively believing that we are converting the Soviet Union to our philosophy of deterrence and arms control.

ENDNOTES

1. This introductory section is based largely on the author's earlier writings concerning the motives of the superpowers for entering SALT. See his "SALT and the Future of International Politics," in William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970s* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973), especially pp. 345-353; *How to Think About Arms Control and Disarmament* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1973), pp. 168-171; "Soviet-Western Arms Negotiations: SALT and MBFR," in *R.U.S.I. and Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1974*, edited by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (London: Thornton Cox, 1974), pp. 123-148. On the triangular relationship of the United States, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, which has been likened to the mathematically insoluble "three-body problem" in physics, cf. Michel Tatu, *The Great Power Triangle* (Paris: "The Atlantic Soviet-American Relations," in *Soviet-American Relations and World Order: The Two and the Many*, Adelphi Papers No. 66 (London: IISS, 1970). For speculation on an impending Sino-Soviet war, see three articles by Victor Korza in the *Manchester Guardian Weekly*: "Is Russia Planning War on China?" (October 4, 1969); "Chinese War Buildup Worries Kremlin" (December 13, 1969); and "Spectre of War on Two Fronts" (January 24, 1970).
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6. See Henry L. Trehwhitt, "Executive Accord Weighed for SALT," *Baltimore Sun*, August 26, 1978; Bernard Gwertzman, "Carter's Hill Strategies Weigh End Run to Get SALT Pact Approval," *Washington Star*, August 25, 1978; and Robert G. Kaiser, "Byrd Warns Administration SALT Pact Must Be a Treaty," *Washington Post*, August 26, 1978.
7. *New York Times*, February 12, 1978.
8. "The Moral Authority of the President," *The Sunday Times* (London), October 28, 1973.
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that the Carter administration was working actively to develop a new strategy that would bring the treaty before the Senate regardless of the status of Afghanistan. "I think the two issues are separable," Muskie said. Although Senate leaders saw no possibility of the treaty being approved in the present anti-Soviet atmosphere, there was speculation that the administration might try to use ratification as a campaign issue against Reagan, who is opposed. Bernard Gwertzman, "Muskie Calls Nuclear Arms Treaty and Afghanistan 'Separable'," *New York Times*, June 7, 1980.

Panel 2 Paper

SALT on the Back Burner: Some Considerations for US Defense Policy

**Arthur Johnson
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A POLICY OPTION DEFERRED

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, consideration of the SALT II Treaty by the full Senate has been deferred at the request of the President. In taking this action, President Carter observed that he continued to believe that the SALT II Treaty is in the national security interest of the United States and should be taken up as soon as the more urgent issues surrounding the Afghanistan crisis have been dealt with. In the absence of SALT II ratification, the US Government has sought to establish a tacit, interim regime limiting strategic offensive arms. Pending completion of the ratification process, the United States has declared that it intends to take no action inconsistent with the SALT I Interim Agreement and that it would refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the SALT II Treaty, unless the Soviets do not reciprocate.

Uncertainty about the SALT II Treaty ratification existed prior to the President's action. SALT II is not only delayed, but it faces a skeptical, hostile Senate. It may well be that the opportunity to ratify the treaty as signed at Vienna has vanished, consumed by the passage of time, the politics of a Presidential election year, the Iranian hostage affair, and Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.

United States strategic nuclear force plans and programs for a number of years have been formulated with strategic arms limitations (SAL) as a complement to existing and planned forces. The President's uniformed military advisers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for several years have expressed concern that, because of unilateral US decisions, modernization programs were marginally adequate in the face of the increasing sophistication and quantity of Soviet forces. The Joint Chiefs have also expressed support for seeking equitable, verifiable SAL agreements which would slow Soviet momentum and provide a framework in which US modernization programs necessary to redress the balance could be undertaken.

In the present uncertain situation, a number of considerations exist for policymakers as they reexamine the requirements for maintaining US national security:

1. The military requirements of maintaining deterrence and essential equivalence with or without SALT II;
2. The characteristics, obligations, opportunities, and risks of the SAL regime which the United States has sought to establish by its declaratory policy pending completion of the ratification process;
3. The possible entry into force of the SALT II Treaty or the resumption of active negotiations toward some other SAL agreement based upon similar principles.

This study will discuss these considerations, highlight what appear to be key decisions facing policymakers in the short term, and suggest some policy options for the consideration of those concerned with making these important choices.

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THE CHANGED SITUATION

Over the past decade US Government policy has grown to consider arms control as one of the means available, in combination with other measures, to provide for US national security. As the Secretary of Defense stated in the Fiscal Year 1980 DOD Annual Report, "An adequate and properly balanced defense budget is a necessary way to maintain security, but arms control agreements are an additional and complementary way of dealing with Soviet military efforts."¹ Particular efforts have been made to integrate arms control measures with forces in being and planned to meet defense needs in the area of strategic nuclear forces. As Secretary Brown testified before Congress, although the United States could and would meet its defense needs of deterrence and essential equivalence with or without a SALT II agreement, SALT, while not an alternative to strategic forces, is a major factor along with force modernization in maintaining the military balance and meeting broad US strategic goals.² During the present uncertainty concerning the future of SALT, there is a possibility that a significant factor in US national security planning as it has evolved over the past decade may be cancelled out.

The current situation with regard to the strategic balance and US military programs has been broadly outlined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in their testimony before the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees of the Senate: as a consequence of 15 years of unequal rates of investment in strategic force modernization, the Soviet Union has progressed from a position of clear inferiority to one of at least military equality with the United States. Because of the lead times required to deploy modern weapons, this progressive shift in the military balance will continue, with or without SALT, into the mid-1980s. "Regardless of the outcome of the SALT II ratification process," the JCS testified, "there is an urgent need to proceed resolutely and deliberately with a well thought-out program of force modernization both to avoid the undesirable international consequences of strategic inferiority and to create the necessary incentives for Soviet agreement to significant reductions as the arms control process continues."³

The military necessity for US strategic force modernization is unchanged by the possibility that SALT II will not be a part of the US national security equation. Indeed, there is widespread agreement on the need to do more if not on what specific actions should be taken. The authors will suggest later that the major thrust of the actions to be taken in response to the currently projected threat should be the same with or without SALT. They recognize the many divisive issues making up the debate surrounding specific US defense program requirements. It is not the purpose of this paper to argue these issues. The authors support the view that there is an imperative requirement for aggressive US strategic force modernization.

In contrast to defense program requirements the situation with regard to strategic arms limitations (SAL) has changed considerably, though not to the extent that it no longer merits consideration in US defense planning. A SAL regime presently exists. It consists of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and of the bilateral working group which meets at 6-month intervals to deal with any issues which may arise out of the ABM Treaty's operation, the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). The ABM Treaty has the status of international law and is scheduled for a 5-year, periodic review in 1982. The last review was accomplished in 1979 by the SCC.

A second aspect of the current SAL regime is the US declaratory policy regarding the SALT I and SALT II agreements limiting strategic offensive arms. In September 1977, before the SALT I Interim Agreement expired, the United States stated its intent not to take any action inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and with the goals of the SALT II negotiations provided the Soviet Union exercised similar restraint.

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At that time the USSR issued a similar statement. On January 4, 1980, the US Government declared that the foregoing continued to be US policy and that it expected that this would continue to be the policy of the Soviet Union. A second US Government statement was made that day concerning the status of the SALT II Treaty pending completion of the ratification process:

The United States and the Soviet Union share the view that under international law a State should refrain from taking actions which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty it has signed subject to ratification. We, therefore, expect that both the United States and the Soviet Union will refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the SALT II Treaty before it is ratified and enters into force. Such acts could include, for example, testing of missiles with more warheads than would be permitted under the Treaty, or the testing of new types of missiles which would not be permitted under the Treaty.

The Soviet Government did not make any public response to either of the US declarations of January 4. Subsequently Soviet signals have been ambiguous. On one hand there have been indications of *de facto* compliance with the Interim Agreement and the SALT II Treaty (described later herein under "Soviet Decision Points"). While on the other hand, there have been statements to the effect that the assumption that the Soviet Union will abide by an unratified Treaty is unjustified since the United States does not feel bound and "is doing all it can to upset the strategic balance."⁴

In sum, the SALT process continues. At present it consists of ABM Treaty obligations with the status of international law and a set of obligations to limit strategic offensive arms voluntarily undertaken by the United States on condition of Soviet reciprocity.

The situation set with regard to US strategic forces and to SALT thus contains two major requirements for US policymakers. First there is the necessity to proceed with strategic force modernization programs, as the highest military and civilian officials of the Department of Defense have urged, with or without ratification of the SALT II Treaty. Second, at least so long as US declaratory policy remains unchanged, there is the requirement to proceed with such programs in a manner which complies with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and does not defeat the object and purpose of the SALT II Treaty.

RETHINKING US STRATEGY, PLANS, AND PROGRAMS

The present hiatus in SALT, occurring as it has in the midst of a renewed national attention on defense issues, presents both opportunities and risks. The ingredients for a consensus affirmation of US defense policies, or the inception of new policies, have been brought into broad national focus by the interaction of a volatile set of circumstances—the SALT II Treaty, the discovery of Soviet combat troops in Cuba, the Iranian hostage crisis, the potential denial of access to critical resources, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and widely shared perceptions that the United States lacks conventional and nuclear force equivalence with the Soviet Union.

A major feature of this yet-budding reassessment of US defense policy will be an examination of the elements of deterrence, the policy of essential equivalence and the maintenance of a Triad of strategic nuclear forces which must survive, to an acceptable degree, a preemptive Soviet attack. The emerging review of strategic policies has thus far concentrated to a large degree on hardware. However, one of the hoped for effects of a broader debate would be the development of a consensus which reflects a marriage of declaratory policies, weapon acquisition programs, and targeting objectives. No small amount of criticism has been levied heretofore that the United States has lacked

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such a strategy.⁵ Immensely difficult to quantify, the objectives of parity and essential equivalence may be more negotiating principles which evolved during a decade of SALT negotiations than accurate criteria for deterrence or military capability should deterrence fail. What must be determined is a set of policies, strategies and objectives which is designed to deter the Soviets. The opportunities provided by this current, renewed focus on national security issues lie in the chance to arrive at a better strategy. The risks are that all the ingredients of the potential reassessment of US defense policies will not be taken up; that programs and strategies of a more ambiguous direction may result; and that the debate could become so divisive that the result is immobilization both in strategic programs and SALT. The inescapable difference now is that the priorities seem to be in clearer focus with the emphasis on programs first, with arms control options in a supporting and appropriate role.

The tide of public and elite opinion has turned from lack of attention to the adverse trends in the military balance, to a general awareness of the unfavorable situation, to more willingness to support increased military programs to slow the trend toward Soviet superiority, and then to regain lost ground. In the present atmosphere strategic military programs command greater support than strategic arms control. However, it is no less true now than it was when the obverse obtained that these approaches to our national security can be complementary. Those with defense responsibilities, in the Congress as well as in the executive branch, should endeavor to keep this proposition in the public view.

Attitudes toward SALT demonstrate the conflicting currents which will buffet policymakers. Views held in the United States generally fall between two poles. At one pole is the view that the SALT process is not in the US interest and that the nation has been lulled into strategic nuclear inferiority by SALT itself while Soviet world behavior has become more aggressive and threatening. This view asserts that the country now needs to put SALT behind it and undertake a vigorous expansion of its defense programs with the object of regaining a clear measure of strategic nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. The other polar view is that the SALT process is in the US interest because it can provide security by severely reducing and ultimately eliminating strategic nuclear forces, but that the provisions of the SALT II Treaty were disappointing in this regard and that the political price for its ratification appeared to be a commitment to unwarranted increases in strategic programs. This view asserts that in the present situation the United States should show restraint in its defense programs and that perhaps the provisions of SALT II can be observed tacitly by both sides thus obviating the price of increased defense spending required for ratification. Proponents of this view would take the position that as soon as possible the United States should renew SALT negotiations, this time with a firm commitment to achieve "real" arms control.

Events of the past several years have given a clear picture of what SALT can and cannot accomplish at present. The fact that its accomplishments have been modest should not obscure their usefulness in meeting defense requirements and possible ancillary benefits for other aspects of US foreign policy. We should not close the door on a process which can contribute to this end; at the same time we must understand that keeping the door open does not equate to refraining from necessary defense measures such as those strategic programs which we planned to undertake within the framework of SALT II. In other words we must not fall into the "good-faith restraint trap."

The restraint the United States has shown in modernization programs since the early 1970s has not been reciprocated. Failure to continue with development and deployment plans for MX, Trident, and cruise missiles—all of which the Soviets sought but failed to block by means of SALT restrictions—would be to fall into such a restraint trap.

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Such inaction would not only be militarily self-defeating, but would induce the Soviets not to engage in SAL negotiations. The history of SALT suggests that SAL negotiations with the Soviet Union can contribute to our security only to the extent that there is clear evidence of US readiness to maintain the balance without SAL. One of the reasons that SALT II's contribution toward meeting our defense needs would be no more than modest is that the Soviet Union has not perceived such evidence in recent years.

Misreading of the current strategic balance and trends is another danger. We must examine carefully either assertions that the nonratification of SALT II would open significant avenues to redress the strategic balance closed by the treaty, or that nonratification would render impractical modernization programs which were planned for implementation within the SALT II framework. Observers might pay particular attention to the question of how present circumstances would enhance the utility of options not previously selected or reduce that of current programs.

This misreading of the effects of the suspension of the SALT process is particularly pertinent in the case of MX basing. Perhaps due to the emphasis placed by some SALT II proponents upon the value of ICBM payload fractionation limits, a number of voices have asserted that without such limits the MX program cannot accomplish its objective of increasing the capability and survivability of the US ICBM force. It is said that without SALT II the Soviets are legally free to deploy accurate ICBM RVs without limit and will do so; thus reducing the military utility of Multiple Protective Structure (MPS) basing—no matter how many missiles and shelters are deployed—to the status of an expensive form of running in place. This reasoning assumes that the Soviets are more willing than the United States to engage in such an aimpoint versus RV competition, that they have the resources (such as nuclear material) to do so successfully; and that there is little value to the United States in the time which would be purchased by this process or in the political signals—quite possibly to the enhancement of arms control prospects—which would be sent thereby. Such a view discounts the consideration that shelters can be constructed at a rate of 2,000 per year allowing the United States to completely deploy a 10,000 shelter system by 1989 if a decision to do so were made by 1984.⁶ Obviously, an upward spiral of ICBM reentry vehicle fractionation and shelter construction is not something the United States wishes to incite with the Soviet Union; optimistically, the potential to adjust the number of shelters will deter the Soviets from undertaking increased fractionation, even in the absence of SALT. A further hedge against a massive Soviet departure from SALT II limits which should be considered is an ABM defense of the MX basing area in the Southwest.

There are some aspects of the current mood which encourage change for its own sake. Just as we must avoid the good-faith restraint trap, so also must we avoid the "hardware trap": the commitment of scarce resources to programs which would contribute little to the capabilities of the strategic forces Triad or which are taken without consideration of their limiting consequences for the achievement of long-term US SAL objectives.

The need to move forward with military programs is strong and so also is the need to ensure that those programs are sound. In particular we must ensure that the differences between perceived and military capabilities are recognized and kept in view as decisions are made. It would be self-deception to believe that the perceptions of foreign governments can be significantly influenced by measures which bear little relation to increased military effectiveness of US strategic forces. The renewed production of Minuteman III (if such were feasible) as a substitute for MX in order to allow survivable ICBMs to be deployed somewhat more rapidly exemplifies being caught in the hardware trap. It is this sort of decision which could fail to favorably influence

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perceptions because it would fall far short of providing the increased military capability required to achieve a balance in perceptions of essential equivalence.

The US Government should not lightly or inadvertently undertake new strategic programs which would be fundamentally incompatible with SALT II, some future SAL agreement based upon similar principles, or with the ABM Treaty now in force. Several areas exemplify the need to consider downstream consequences. While it can be demonstrated that designing features for aircraft equipped for air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) to facilitate SALT verification adds somewhat to the program cost, and perhaps to the period required to attain full operational capability, these penalties are modest. Should a proposal to modify these features arise, any saving would need to be balanced against the fact that elimination of these features which resulted in loss of ability to distinguish by national technical means of verification (NTM) between aircraft equipped to launch long range ALCM and those not so equipped would be in direct conflict with a fundamental US SAL objective, adequate verification. Recall that it was the United States that sought such verification enhancements for SALT II and as a precedent for the future. Similar considerations would come into play should questions arise concerning the desirability of continuing to provide for adequate verification of the MX basing mode.⁷

A review of the ABM Treaty is scheduled for 1982 and could occur earlier if sought. This agreement now limits each side to ABM defense of one ICBM field or its national capital area. Recalling the US unilateral statement in May 1972 that the ABM Treaty was linked to a more complete strategic offensive arms limitation, modification of that treaty to permit ABM defense of ICBM fields would deserve careful consideration, particularly as a complement to multiple aim point MX basing, if the Soviets depart from SALT II fractionation limits. At the same time it should be borne in mind that a proliferated ABM environment would be incompatible with reductions in numbers of RVs or missile throw-weight. In the near term the Soviets, with a throw-weight advantage in deployed ICBM forces, are better positioned than is the United States to deploy offensive forces which would be effective in such an environment. Further, because the US technological lead has narrowed,⁸ it is not clear who would hold the initial advantage if the ABM Treaty was abrogated or modified to permit increased deployments.

A striving for balance should be the central proposition of the current rethinking process. We must press forward with much-needed strategic programs to modernize the US Triad which will meet defense needs in a no-SAL environment if necessary and thus give the Soviets an incentive to continue the SALT process. At the same time it would be prudent for the United States to modernize in a manner which preserves the option to seek further SAL agreements.

US RESPONSES TO THE CHANGED SITUATION

In addition to current US declaratory policy, which could change quickly, several other factors in the military and political situation indicate that the active search for a SALT agreement to follow the Interim Agreement of 1972 will be resumed.

Despite recent assertions that arms control has failed, a longer view of the situation could conclude that the concept of strategic arms limitation as a complement to strategic forces remains valid. It seems likely that this concept will retain considerable appeal for Americans and thus will find advocates within the political process. In the abstract it offers the sort of logical solution which Americans have historically found appealing. Further, although the authors would argue that economy is at best a second-order reason for seeking arms control agreements (one possible side effect of an otherwise beneficial agreement), the idea that SALT can save money has had and will continue to

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have appeal. Additional impetus is provided because strategic arms limitations have been included in US national security planning.

This conceptual factor is joined by institutional factors in keeping the door open for a resumption of efforts to negotiate strategic arms control agreements which complement US defense efforts: the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the State Department will discharge their respective responsibilities to keep arms control negotiating possibilities within the view of those who make national security policy. Another impetus is provided by the views of our allies. In the wake of NATO's December 1979 Ministerial meetings and from the cautious responses to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it seems that the nations of NATO Europe wish to avoid burning bridges to the East. In addition, many NATO European countries find arms control efforts a domestic political imperative to gain support for military modernization programs. In NATO an approach to security which includes both new military programs and arms control efforts appears to be a fact of life.

Also there yet remains considerable underlying momentum in the Soviet-American relationship for the continuation of the SALT process. Regardless of the degree to which foreign policy objectives clash and of the apparently different views of the possibility of meaningful victory in a nuclear war, it seems clear that the Soviets, too, wish to achieve their objectives without such a war. Policymakers in both countries see SALT as making some contribution to the reduction of the risk of nuclear war. And from the Soviet point of view, assuming nothing more than *realpolitik*, there would be utility in a revitalization of the SALT process. In the short term the Soviets would probably value such a development as an acknowledgment that the invasion of Afghanistan no longer places the USSR beyond the pale. For the longer term, though any hopes that SALT II would serve as a tranquilizer have been dimmed, there probably remains a Soviet belief that through shrewd negotiating they can restrain some American defense programs of particular concern at an acceptable bargaining cost. And since the United States has tended to deploy new strategic forces in surges, partially in reflection of swings in the public mood, the Soviets may see real value in the predictability which a SALT framework would offer as an upper bound on the next US surge.

There are thus both immediate and enduring factors which call for keeping SALT in view while making decisions on defense programs. The primary policy consideration must be correcting the imbalances caused by disparate rates of modernization in Soviet and American strategic forces over the past 10 to 15 years. This need exists with or without the SALT II Treaty or continuation of the SALT process. But where decisions are choices among programs which meet this need and offer roughly equal security, the question of relative impact upon broad US SAL objectives such as reductions and adequate verification should be among the factors carefully considered.

Such consideration might usefully take place within a conceptual framework which incorporates both the juridical and the practical effects of actions being considered by the United States and of actions observed in the Soviet Union. Consideration of the juridical effect would involve a judgment of consistency with the provisions of Interim Agreement and of relation to the object and purpose of the SALT II Treaty. Consideration of practical effect would involve a judgment as to whether an action which meets the juridical standard has consequences which limit desirable arms control approaches.

A number of policy decisions face US (and Soviet) officials as they consider defense program requirements and the potentials of the SAL process. The US initiative to offer to abide by the tacit SAL regime raises two sets of issues for those responsible for defense planning and funding: how to make US military program decisions which have

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SALT consequences and how to judge Soviet military program actions with such consequences. Clearly, these are not separable considerations. Responses to Soviet actions is a consideration in US decisions and presumably vice versa. For discussion purposes, however, it is useful to deal with them separately employing the juridical/practical framework. Not all conceivable decision points will be addressed; rather, those presently in view and some others which exemplify the types of decisions which may arise.

US Decision Point: SLBM Limits

Military program decisions raise several juridical issues for the United States. One of the most immediate concerns is the provision of the Interim Agreement limiting each country to a maximum number of sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and a maximum number of submarines carrying such launchers. The United States is permitted 710 launchers and 44 submarines (SSBNs). The US presently has 656 launchers deployed aboard 41 SSBNs. The launcher deployment may be increased to 710 provided that an equal number of older (pre-1964) ICBM launchers or SLBM launchers on older submarines are dismantled or destroyed before the submarine carrying the 657th and subsequent launchers first puts to sea. (These provisions apply as well to the Soviets. But under the Interim Agreement they are permitted a larger number of SLBM launchers and submarines, which they attained in the past while dismantling or destroying the necessary ICBM launchers and submarines to remain in compliance.)

When the USS Ohio puts to sea on its first trial, scheduled for fall 1980, it would be the 42d submarine and would carry the 657th through 680th SLBM launchers. To remain in accord with its declared intent to take no action inconsistent with the provisions of the Interim Agreement the United States would dismantle or destroy two older ballistic missile submarines (each carried 16 launchers) prior to the Ohio's initial sea trial and report this to the USSR at the next meeting of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). The planning for this action has been initiated. Should this decision be changed another avenue would be to agree with the Soviets upon some procedure other than dismantling or destruction. Neither nation had expected to be bound by these particular limits in 1980 because they were not carried forward into the SALT II Treaty which provides for equal limits on strategic systems and does not limit numbers of ballistic missile submarines.

Other US Decision Points

If present development and deployment plans are changed, additional issues for US defense planners could arise from the stated policy that we will take no action which would defeat the object and purpose of the SALT II Treaty. Sea- and ground-launched cruise missiles of over 600km range are presently scheduled for deployment in 1982 and 1983 respectively. If such deployments were begun prior to 1982 they would be contrary to the object and purpose of Article III of the SALT II Treaty Protocol which bans such deployments. The MX ICBM is being developed as a light ICBM with up to 10 reentry vehicles (RVs), to be launched from a mobile launcher. If MX became a heavy ICBM or carried more than 10 RVs and was flight tested prior to 1986, or the currently planned MX was flight tested from a mobile launcher prior to 1982, such actions would be contrary to the object and purpose of Article IV of the treaty and Article I of the protocol respectively.

Also to be considered is that set of program actions which, though not contrary to the current SAL regime in a juridical sense, could have the practical effect of rendering provisions of the SALT II Agreement untenable. Such actions could require radical changes in the US strategic force structure in order to comply with SALT II or another

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agreement with similar verification provisions and equal or lower numerical ceilings. Examples include failure to conduct ALCM development and deployment activities in a manner compatible with SALT II provisions or, if ICBM launcher conversion or modernization programs are begun, failure to ensure that launchers of MIRV ICBMs be distinguishable by national technical means from launchers of non-MIRV ICBMs.

The assessment of Soviet actions or inactions in the context of the existing SAL regime, and questions of US response, will challenge the foresight and skill of officials in both the executive and the legislative branches, and of the press as well. An element in selecting US courses of action should be recognition that not all Soviet acts or omissions with regard to maintaining the interim SAL regime would be equally serious either in terms of increased threat to US security or in terms of impact upon US SAL objectives. For example, Soviet failure to reduce their June 1979 level of 2,504 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) to the 2,400 level required initially by the SALT II Treaty (an action which is neither unreasonable or irreversible) would not carry the same impact as an SS-18 flight test where 15 RVs are released. The latter would irreversibly overturn the SALT II limit of 10 RVs on the SS-18.

Soviet Decision Points

The Soviet Union, should its actions continue to reciprocate the US declaratory policy as they have to date, may face a larger set of issues than does the United States.

With respect to the provisions of the Interim Agreement the most immediate issue is that of continued compliance with the ceiling on numbers of SLBM launchers and on numbers of ballistic missile submarines. The Soviets are now deploying new SSBNs and, prior to the first sea trial of each, must dismantle or destroy a compensating submarine and number of launchers and report this to the United States through the SCC. The Soviet Delegation reportedly made one such notification at the March 1980 SCC session.⁹

Soviet policymakers might direct the resumption of past practices which could impede verification of the Interim Agreement. The Soviets once placed a large net over an ICBM silo at the Tyura-tam test range. They later removed it after the United States delegation to the SCC informed the Soviet delegation that the net concealed activities from national technical means and could impede verification, but they did not acknowledge that the US challenge was valid.

Additional issues arise for the Soviets under the Interim Agreement as a result of strategic programs which they have ongoing but which the United States does not. With ICBM production lines open and the deployment of fourth generation ICBMs in progress the Soviets could choose to deploy these missiles not only as replacements but also as additional forces in newly constructed fixed silo launchers in violation of the ban on such construction. One such fourth generation missile is the SS-18 heavy ICBM currently replacing the older SS-9 heavy ICBM. If these were to be deployed in addition to, as well as in replacement of, the SS-9s, such action could violate the ban on additional silo launchers and the ceiling on launchers of heavy ICBMs.

Continued observance of the object and purpose of the SALT II Treaty likewise raises more potential issues for the Soviet Union than for the United States. The first of these is the requirement to reduce SNDVs—significant for its symbolism but without irreversible consequences which could overturn the object and purpose of the treaty. Another, and by contrast a vital issue for SALT II, is the matter of ICBM testing cited in the US declaration as an example of acts which would be defeating. With a number of follow-on ICBMs in the development process, the Soviets may face the decision of

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whether to observe the SALT II Treaty provisions which limit the flight testing of ICBMs to one "new type" (as defined in the treaty) either MIRV or non-MIRV. Further, currently deployed Soviet heavy ICBMs possess throw-weight capacity which could increase their capability if a greater number of warheads than those permitted under the SALT II Treaty were to be installed.

Having agreed in SALT II not to further produce, test, or deploy the SS-16 ICBM, the Soviets could consider whether to observe this prohibition under present circumstances. There may be interest in the deployment of this ICBM, previously tested from a mobile launcher, since the United States is developing a mobile ICBM to begin deployment about 1986. Since the United States assesses the SS-16 ICBM as compatible with the mobile launcher of the currently deployed SS-20 IRBM, resumed SS-16 production and testing could lead to an increased strategic offensive threat to the United States and overturn a number of SALT II provisions. In this event SS-20 IRBM launchers would be accountable as ICBM launchers, and the treaty ban on conversion of IRBM launchers would be broken.

Further, because of the interior location of their test ranges, the Soviets do not at present, and are not required to, report all ICBM test launches pursuant to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea; but now they face a decision regarding the advance notification of certain launches which SALT II would require them to provide. They reportedly provided such notification prior to planned launches in April 1980.¹⁰ Another, potentially more serious, issue could arise from ICBM flight tests. During SALT II negotiations the Soviets on several occasions encrypted ICBM telemetry during flights of a fourth generation ICBM. They were informed that such practices, if extended to a new or modified ICBM, would constitute deliberate concealment which would impede verification of SALT II. The Soviets later agreed at Vienna that there must be no encryption of information involving parameters covered by the treaty. Given the Soviet concern with secrecy of military programs, they may be tempted in present circumstances not to observe this prohibition.

Press reports have stated that the Soviets encrypted SLBM flight test telemetry in January 1980. The missile was said to have failed in flight, preventing a conclusive US assessment of whether the encryption would have violated the terms of the SALT II Treaty. A State Department spokesman stated in mid-February that "at present we have no basis for concluding that there has been any such violation."¹¹

Should questionable Soviet behavior occur, the United States response should be broadly conceived. Primarily it should be a sufficient military offset to any increased Soviet threat resulting from that behavior. However, it should be undertaken with full awareness of the possible downstream consequences for enduring US SAL objectives such as adequate verification and increased strategic stability at reduced force levels. Government officials should be particularly wary of pressures to respond rapidly and symmetrically (mirror imaging). While some such responses may indeed be the best course of action, others might be neither militarily effective nor consistent with US SAL objectives. For example consider the merits of a decision to respond to Soviet "break-out" from the ICBM fractionation limits of SALT II by US deployment of the previously tested seven-RV configuration of the Minuteman ICBM. This would not be an effective military offset to the increased threat to fixed ICBM survivability posed by the Soviet action and indeed would have a questionable effect on the strategic capability of Minuteman.

The SCC continues in operation and offers a forum for questioning the Soviets concerning any ambiguous or questionable actions which may occur. Recourse to this body is not a substitute for those adjustments to US strategic programs which might be

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required, but it should not be ignored when US responses are under consideration. US officials should keep in mind, when considering a possible challenge in the SCC to Soviet actions, that our challenge threshold will help set the precedent for future SCC operation. This is a two-edged sword calling for careful judgment in our policy. We must neither allow the Soviets too much leeway nor conduct a harassing campaign since they could be expected to respond to the latter in kind.

PICKING UP THE PIECES OF THE SALT PROCESS

At some point, perhaps in 1980 but in all likelihood not until some months after the 1981 Presidential inauguration, the administration will undertake, with the Senate and the Soviets, the process of picking up the pieces of SALT. The feasibility and desirability of various approaches will be influenced by broad considerations as yet undetermined, such as the future role assigned to strategic arms control as an instrument of national security policy and the degree to which US strategic policy objectives may be redefined. Even though these broad boundaries have not yet taken shape it is possible to build a framework for strategy decisions aimed at the revitalization of the SALT process. A possible framework follows, beginning with an examination of specific factors which must be considered before choosing a course of action and then proceeding to look at several alternative courses of action, in terms of these factors.

There are a number of variables certain to influence the US approach to resuming the SALT process; but at present they are uncertain in their precise effect. The more significant considerations include the strength and vigor of US defense programs; expectations for a renewed SALT process; an evaluation of the significance of any "bridges burned" for SALT by US or Soviet actions; the degree of linkage of the SALT process to Soviet behavior in other spheres; the importance given to restoration of momentum and credibility to the SALT process by quick agreement; the outlook of the NATO Allies; and the outlook of the Soviet Union.

The Strength and Vigor of US Defense Programs

A fundamental question has to be: How much negotiating collateral in strategic systems will the United States bring to a resumption of the SALT process? The importance of this question of leverage depends on whether or not the SALT II Treaty as it stood in July 1979 can be ratified or, alternatively, whether or not the United States and Soviet Union must in a sense begin from scratch to build a new comprehensive or less ambitious agreement. A balance of leverage has been struck in the treaty; however, if ratification is no longer possible the previous bargains will perish. If this happens a number of factors come into play.

US and Soviet strategic force modernization programs were out of phase during the negotiation of the SALT II Treaty. US programs for the modernization of its ICBM and SLBM forces, as a result of decisions made in the 1960s, came to fruition in the early phases of the SALT II negotiations. While the United States delayed the acquisition of follow-on replacement weapon systems, the Soviets tested and deployed their own first generation of MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs and initiated the development of a follow-on generation of ICBMs and SLBMs. They insisted on a right to continue this course possibly without alteration of their original plans. Likewise the United States sought to preserve its own rights to begin and complete its lagging modernization efforts which were out of step with Soviet programs. Unable to negotiate away the increasing threat to its silo-based ICBM force, the United States protected the option for a survivably based replacement for Minuteman and resisted crippling constraints on the air-launched cruise missile, the announced alternative to replacing the B-52 heavy bomber.

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The result was that for both sides the provisions of the SALT II Treaty largely reflected their perceived modernization requirements.

US strategic force programs established in the latter half of the 1970s became defense imperatives—"bare-bones" programs in a competitive budget environment which were essential to correct deficiencies created by Soviet momentum building for over a decade. Thus, barring an extraordinary application of resources in the context of a national emergency, in which case there would be few compelling concerns about SALT, or barring the emergence of a strategy requiring less than a perception of strategic parity, US strategic force programs will be at the margin of what is required to maintain this perception when the SALT process resumes. It is doubtful that any reasonably plausible outcome of a reassessment of US national security policy would alter this fundamental condition. The United States will not be in a position to bargain away strategic programs planned for deployment in the mid-to-late 1980s because these US strategic forces are necessary to counterbalance Soviet forces which are being deployed now.

Considerations such as the foregoing would seem to dictate modest expectations in resuming the SALT process.

Expectations For a Renewed SALT Process

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee in its November 1979 report on the SALT II Treaty stated that the SALT III negotiations would be a watershed in the SALT process. The committee asserted that unless there was significant future progress, particularly in the areas of reductions and qualitative limits, the concept of arms control was apt to collapse as a policy option.¹² Now the possibility that the SALT II Treaty will not be ratified without modification raises the issue of how the corporate and individually-held opinions of influential Senators and the arms control constituency within the United States would influence a renewed US approach to SALT. Possibly some of the toughest negotiations will take place between the executive and legislative branches in attempting to develop a negotiating strategy with some hope of later ratification. The historical legacy of the SALT process provides some lessons about national attitudes and negotiating precedents. We should anticipate that this legacy will act to bound realistic expectations for subsequent negotiations, either those which will follow a ratified SALT II Treaty or those which may be necessary to reconstruct the SALT process should ratification fail or be deferred indefinitely.

There are significant precedents in the Interim Agreement, the Vladivostok Accords, and the SALT II Treaty—some favorable to the United States and others not—which will affect a resumption of SALT. Earlier problems are not likely to go away in future negotiations.

In retrospect perhaps the two most significant features of the Interim Agreement (IA) in setting the stage for subsequent negotiations were the asymmetrical freeze on the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers (heavy bombers were excluded from the SALT I limitations) and the verification provisions. (The exclusion from SALT I of what became familiarly known as forward-based systems (FBS) will be discussed in the review of SALT II precedents because of the increasingly broader implications of the issue as the SALT II negotiations progressed.)

With regard to the freeze, what has proved to be the most contentious precedent is the unilateral Soviet right to 308 modern large ballistic missiles (heavy ICBMs). This asymmetrical right was carried forward in both the Vladivostok Accords and the SALT II Treaty and has been a principal focus of criticism during the ratification debate.

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During the SALT II negotiations the Soviets resisted a variety of US proposals which were designed to reduce the throw-weight potential of Soviet heavy ICBMs, e.g., aggregate ICBM throw-weight limits and heavy ICBM reductions. The heavy ICBM continues to be a significant part of the Soviet strategic force structure and this factor, coupled with the negotiating precedents which have been established, clearly indicates that the United States should expect tough bargaining about any more stringent limits on heavy ICBMs.

The second significant precedent established in the IA was the principle of verification by NTM and the associated provisions about interference and deliberate concealment. Although a definition of NTM was not part of the IA it was certainly understood by the negotiators that the concept excluded intrusive monitoring such as on-site inspection. As the scope of limitations expanded during the SALT II negotiations, the United States sought to broaden the concept of verification and to define more precisely what measures might constitute deliberate concealment. However Article V of the IA, dealing with verification, was carried forward unmodified in its essentials in both the Vladivostok Accords and the SALT II Treaty. The principles of verification, like the heavy ICBM asymmetry, have a history of negotiation which began in 1969. Both issues have been the focus of agonizing negotiation and much US domestic criticism. Although in concept the United States might seek to wipe the SALT slate clean and begin anew, these precedents and others will be difficult to erase.

At Vladivostok some significant elements of the IA were carried forward as noted earlier. There were other equally important precedents established at Vladivostok. It was agreed that SALT II, like SALT I, would not address the so-called FBS. Americans generally believed that this precedent was in the US interest; however, as the SALT II negotiations continued, questions related to FBS became intertwined with the treaty and with planning for subsequent negotiations. The issue is now partially encompassed in the protocol provisions pertaining to ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles (GLCM and SLCM) and in statements made by NATO and by the Soviets regarding the future negotiation of constraints on long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF). Other precedents from Vladivostok helped shape the SALT II Treaty and will affect any future SALT process: the concept of equal aggregates of central systems, which included heavy bombers, and the duration of the follow-on agreement to the IA. With the exception of the heavy ICBM asymmetry, an equal aggregate of central strategic systems corrected the fundamental deficiency of the IA which froze unequal force levels. One can argue that the subsequent handling of the Backfire bomber issue and the constraining effect of some aggregate sublimits eroded the fundamental advantages of equal aggregates. Nevertheless this precedent is probably the basic arms control gain at Vladivostok and the principle which allowed the later evolution of other desirable provisions, particularly reductions.

The SALT II Treaty duration established at Vladivostok set aside the earlier concept of a permanent agreement to replace the IA and served as a planning guideline, particularly in the United States. With the protracted SALT II negotiations and the deferral of the ratification debate, the SALT II Treaty duration agreed at Vladivostok takes on a new dimension. Indeed, even with immediate ratification of the treaty as signed at Vienna, it will remain in force less than 6 years. More realistically the sides are facing the prospect of a treaty which may expire before it affects the defense policies of either party in the positive way intended.

This precedent, which formed a basis for the SALT II Treaty, needs reexamination. In fact, presuming the protocol were not continued past December 31, 1981, a treaty on the order of SALT II extended through 1990 would be in the US national interest in at

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least three respects: (a) If MX, Trident and cruise missile programs go forward, US strategic capabilities increase throughout the 1980s with a corresponding increase in leverage for any follow-on agreements after 1990; (b) An extended agreement would provide an upper bound on Soviet deployments and moderate near-term concerns about a rapid ICBM fractionation breakout; and (c) A longer duration allows more time for building upon desirable SALT II precedents such as reductions during the treaty period.

The SALT II Treaty itself is obviously the most substantive legacy of the SALT process and embodies a chronicle of the precedents and the give-and-take of years of negotiation. How much of the SALT II Treaty will be salvaged in resuming the process is a complex question which will be addressed in an array of alternatives later in this paper; however, regardless of the treaty's fate in the Senate the SALT II provisions will likely be the starting point. Some of the more important considerations follow.

Protocol. The three-tiered approach (Treaty, Protocol and Principles) sought to accommodate, at least in concept, the scope of the March 1977 Comprehensive Proposal. The protocol addressed a number of constraints and definitions which were too contentious to be resolved as a part of a treaty lasting through 1985. The protocol issues are a particularly significant factor during the hiatus in the SALT process because the agreed protocol period is passing during the delay. Although this circumstance could work to the tactical advantage of the United States in assuring that the protocol limits are not extended beyond December 31, 1981, the Soviets are not likely to forego easily their demonstrated past objectives of blocking US mobile ICBM and cruise missile deployments. Not only does the protocol ban what may be three US defense imperatives—mobile ICBMs, SLCM and GLCM—but it contains potentially troublesome definitions; e.g., defining all SLCMs capable of a range over 600 kilometers as nuclear armed, which could unacceptably constrain important defense program options (depending of course on what if any long-term limits on SLCM are negotiated). The Soviets could press to have extension of the protocol as the precondition in resuming the SALT process, arguing that the delay in ratification calls for rolling the expiration date forward to allow for adequate negotiation time. If the Soviets were successful in this tactic, protocol provisions could well last through 1985. Alternatively, the Soviets might believe they have sufficient negotiating leverage in their own programs to successfully obtain constraints on US programs in follow-on negotiations regardless of the expiration date of the protocol.

Reductions. Like the protocol, the provisions pertaining to reductions in the SALT II Treaty are time-sensitive and affected by the deferral of the ratification. In fact there is the vestige of a linkage between the protocol expiration date and the December 31, 1981, date for completion of reductions to the 2,250 aggregate level. Further the Soviets can be expected, and not unreasonably, to delay beginning dismantling or destruction to reach the 2,400 aggregate level until the treaty enters into force. Thus there is a favorable precedent for an agreed reduction, but an unfavorable complication regarding its affective date. More to the point for expectations of deep reductions in the next round of SALT, the Soviets resoundingly rejected such cuts in SALT II. In fact they were only willing to settle for less than 10 percent reductions in the Vladivostok limits.

Aggregate Limits and Sublimits. The concept of the equal aggregates of central systems was agreed at Vladivostok. Subsequently the sides agreed to sublimits within the aggregate. Inclusion of ALCM-equipped heavy bombers in the 1,320 "MIRV" sub-limit not only limited force structuring options uniquely of importance to the US, but

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flew in the face of earlier US positions that ALCM should not be subject to SALT limitation. The 820 MIRV ICBM sublimit curtailed projected Soviet MIRV ICBM deployments and had its inception in the March 1977 Comprehensive Proposal to limit such ICBMs to 550. Since these sublimits required compromise by each government, both the United States and the Soviet Union can be expected to reexamine the advisability of such limits if the process resumes in an environment where the fundamentals of the SALT II Treaty have come unraveled.

Qualitative Limits on ICBMs. The ICBM fractionation limits contained in the "new-types" provisions of the SALT II Treaty and the 820 limit on MIRVed ICBMs are perhaps the most significant additions beyond the basic Vladivostok formula. These limits, which affect the Soviets more than the US, are among the most fragile given the demonstrated potential of the SS-18 heavy ICBM to be tested and deployed with more than 10 reentry vehicles. The Soviets linked acceptance of ICBM fractionation limits with limits on the numbers of ALCM allowed on heavy bombers—a linkage which they seem unlikely to drop.

Cruise Missile Issues. Besides the limitations on ALCM numbers on individual aircraft and the 1,320 MIRV sublimit, the treaty and protocol contain a number of other cruise missile issues which will influence future negotiations. These include counting rules based on distinguishability between armed (long-range*) cruise missiles and similar aerodynamic vehicles that are not armed; another precedent is a ban on converting armed (long-range) cruise missiles to such unarmed aerodynamic vehicles; also, there are flight-test bans on cruise missiles with multiple independently targetable warheads. The constraints themselves are not the only precedent. Provisions pertaining to the verification of cruise missile range and armament by NTM alone stretch monitoring by this means to its limits. These issues all become inextricably tied into the problem of theater nuclear force (TNF) modernization and arms control.

Backfire. The cruise missile issue was one of the two questions which deadlocked the SALT II negotiations until at least 1977; the other was Backfire. Backfire has a "guarantee" outside the treaty text—a production limit of 30 aircraft a year and a pledge not to take some broadly specified actions with regard to its capability. This treatment of Backfire and the heavy ICBM asymmetry are the two shortcomings of the SALT II Treaty which have probably received the most criticism. The Backfire problem, like heavy ICBMs, will be difficult to set right. Backfire creates a precedent in a broader sense in that a weapon system with a strategic potential undisputed in the United States is excluded from the aggregate limitations, not on the basis of its capabilities, but on an assessment of its apparent intended use. The Soviets sought to impose a similar solution, in principle, on Bear and Bison heavy bombers equipped for ASW, reconnaissance, or refueling, and on the dual capability of the SS-20 mobile launcher; they argued that these systems were not subject to SALT limits because, among other things, they were used for other than strategic offensive missions. Just as there was a Backfire-to-cruise missile linkage in SALT II, there promises to be a similar Backfire-to-TNF linkage when the arms control process resumes.

Verification. The basic origins of the verification issues were the IA and Vladivostok precedents. Although the fundamentals were agreed in 1972 and reaffirmed in 1974, the scope of SALT II, particularly as it evolved after March 1977, made the problems of verification some of the most nagging in the negotiations. These problems

*Capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

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remain. The SALT II Treaty stretched the concept of verification by NTM to its limits. In fact, if the SALT II Treaty comes unraveled, verification could be the most troublesome hurdle in resuming the process beyond the most rudimentary limits. For example, unambiguous verification provisions pertaining to qualitative constraints and limits on ballistic missiles and cruise missiles were sought in SALT II; but they required a precision of mutual understanding and a shading of the difference between SALT-related monitoring and intelligence gathering with which neither the United States nor the Soviets were ready to come fully to grips.

It could be argued if SALT is resumed following a nonratification of SALT II the issue of cooperative measures beyond NTM should be settled before attempting to return to limitations which are difficult to monitor without them. Admittedly this is somewhat of a chicken-and-egg problem. In any event, verification is different from other contentious questions which directly affect strategic force capabilities and perceptions of parity. Verification (in particular, questions of mutual access to unencrypted telemetry) has a political dimension encompassing not only confidence in compliance but long-held predilections related to intelligence and secrecy.

Joint Statement of Principles. The Joint Statement of Principles (JSP) is a broad-ranging agenda for SALT III which can mean as much or as little as it might be advantageous to argue in negotiation. Certainly, the kinds of things included in the JSP—e.g., significant and substantial reductions, qualitative limitations and a broader concept of verification—are an integral part of the legacy of the SALT process.

It is against the above background of step-by-step negotiating and hard bargaining that the expectations of the Senate and others must be viewed. Because of a number of international and domestic political considerations the ratification debate became much more than a debate of the merits of the SALT II Treaty. Even after ratification was formally deferred, questions surrounding the treaty provisions and US strategic force sufficiency continued to be raised in a concert of national security issues incited by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet combat troops in Cuba, events in Iran and a perceived decline in US power throughout the world. As a result a body of opinion formed which had an immediate effect on force planning and programs and which can be expected to have a future impact on any resumption of the SALT process. This impact could be in the form of Senate "guidance" or less specific general expectations that must be reckoned with in the negotiations. Many of these considerations are summarized in the report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and in the hearing record of the Armed Services Committee.¹³

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) categorized the conditions to its advice and consent as: Category I—those that need not be formally communicated to or agreed to by the Soviet Union; Category II—those that would be formally communicated to the Soviets, but not necessarily agreed to by them; and Category III—those that would require explicit Soviet agreement prior to ratification.¹⁴ There were two Category III conditions: One would assure the legal status of the Agreed Statements and Common Understandings associated with the treaty and protocol, and the other would assure the legal status of the Backfire statements made at the Vienna summit.¹⁵ There were 18 Category I and II conditions, some of which could shift in category if a resumption of the SALT process opened the signed treaty to modification. Since the reader can form his own judgments by reviewing the SFRC report, this paper will not list all 18 conditions. However, several major examples of recommendations for subsequent negotiations suggest that SALT should seek: continuous year-by-year reductions in treaty ceilings and subceilings; to reduce the number of MIRVed ICBM launchers; further agreement on qualitative limitations; inclusion of cooperative measures which contribute to the

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effectiveness of NTM; and agreement to permit access to unencrypted telemetry during flight-testing.

Perhaps even more significant than the foregoing SFRC conditions as a portent for picking up the pieces of the SALT process are proposed modifications to the SALT II Treaty which did not receive majority support in the committee. Amendments which did not prevail in the SFRC (often colloquially identified as "killer amendments") would have, for example: (a) counted Backfire as 3/4 of an SNDV and the FB-111 as 1/2 of an SNDV; (b) counted Soviet Golf SLBM launchers (on approximately 20 older diesel submarines equipped with SS-N-4 or SS-N-5 SLBMs which were excluded from the SALT I freeze); (c) given the US equal right to heavy ICBMs; (d) required agreement before 1982 to eliminate heavy ICBMs by 1986; (e) eliminated heavy ICBMs by December, 31 1981; (f) allowed intelligence collection facilities on the territory of each party; and (g) limited to 200 the number of ICBMs produced, stored or maintained above those deployed.

The SASC, in contrast to the conditional consent of SFRC, reportedly concluded that the treaty as transmitted to the Senate was not in the security interests of the United States.¹⁶ The SASC was apparently prepared to recommend that the administration consider major changes to remedy by amendment such issues as Soviet possession of modern large ballistic missiles, exclusion of the Backfire bomber, and US ability to monitor Soviet compliance. As of this writing the SASC has not officially printed its report.¹⁷

How these factors will be dealt with and how much negotiating with its attendant ploys and bluffs will take place between the Senate and the executive branch as the United States develops an arms control strategy for the future is unknown. Clearly the administration should seek to achieve the broad support of Congress in resuming the process.

In addition to specific Senate policy recommendations on individual issues, there is a plethora of grand schemes and recommendations which go beyond tuning the fundamentals of the SALT II Treaty. They represent essentially new approaches in SALT or a near complete rewrite of the treaty's provisions. Characteristic of these ideas are the concept proposed by Dr. Jeremy Stone and others of "percentage annual reductions" (PAR) where agreed ceilings would undergo a percentage reduction each year; Senator George McGovern's and Senator Mark Hatfield's idea of a freeze or moratorium at existing deployment levels; and Senator Jake Garn's alternative SALT II package which amends many of the contentious provisions.¹⁸

Defense Program Decisions Affecting SALT Options

The United States and the Soviet Union may, during the hiatus in the SALT process, burn some bridges—undertake actions which will foreclose some arms control options. In fact prudent force planning, because of what should be rather modest expectations for arms control options in defense policy, must necessarily make provision for adjustment should a worst case—essentially no-SALT—environment evolve. Thus, what are judged to be imperative programmatic options by the Department of Defense or the Congress (which may or may not agree with the defense programs proposed by DOD), may burn SALT bridges and narrow arms control alternatives correspondingly. From the perspective of seeking to maximize the gains of the SALT process this creates a closed and a counterproductive cycle. This situation points up the need for an integrated strategy which keeps both defense programs and arms control approaches in view and assures that decisions in one sphere which close options in the other are deliberate and their implications understood.

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Linkages

The linkage of SALT to other security issues is a fact of life and one where consensus has obviously not always existed between Congress and the executive branch. The SALT negotiations have a history of linkages. They have been operative as both governments have slowed or stopped the process to protest or observe; e.g., during the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, following the US and Chinese rapprochement in late 1978 (where the Soviets tacitly implemented the linkage concept they rhetorically disdained), and the recent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The problem as it affects the SALT process should be thought of as one of managing linkage in a macro sense and not one of hopelessly complicating detailed proposals by tying them to specific actions in other spheres.

As a result of the SALT II experience the United States and the Soviet Union will have reached a greater understanding as to what behaviors are conducive to progress in SALT. As illustrated by events following the disclosure of Soviet combat troops in Cuba, unless there is a broad consensus between the Senate and the executive branch on how to manage the linkage issue, a policy decision to resume the SALT process may not be successful. Linkages could become less of a factor if SALT does not again become the centerpiece of the US/Soviet relationship. One policy which the United States should assuredly avoid is making concessions in SALT in return for Soviet restraint in some other sphere of interest.¹⁹

The Credibility of the Process

Another factor bearing on resuming the SALT process is an assessment of how important it is to revalidate its credibility through a ratified agreement. If SALT II remains unratified and with the IA legally expired, the United States and Soviet Union will have achieved little from years of painstaking negotiations. The Soviets can be expected to distrust the US commitment to the SALT process and the ability of the executive branch to develop sufficient consensus to deliver a ratified treaty. Soviet willingness to resume the SALT process may be an indication of readiness to deal with the realities of the ratification process. If so, such a Soviet inclination could in a backhanded way increase US negotiating leverage. The United States will have uncertainties concerning Soviet readiness to pursue foreign policy objectives in a manner compatible with the conduct of SALT negotiations; e.g., will the Soviets view Afghanistan as too costly or as a pattern to be repeated?

Such mutual uncertainty and lack of certified progress argues the importance of reestablishing some degree of confidence that the SALT process can result in a positive outcome for the participants. The best approach is success—a ratified agreement of mutual advantage. Thus, in selecting a course of action including seeking to ratify the SALT II Treaty, a priority consideration should be whether the seriousness of the sides in the SALT process can be rather quickly confirmed.

The Outlook of the NATO Allies

In December 1979, NATO affirmed its commitment to arms control as an integral part of its defense policy and stated that any future limitations on US theater systems should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theater systems.²⁰ However, attitudes among the Allies were divided with regard to that policy, springing from domestic pressures and centering on the difficult issue of balancing defense programs and arms control options. Subsequent Soviet rejection of the NATO offer to negotiate limitations on LRTNF was not unexpected in the wake of their intense propa-

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ganda campaign against NATO TNF modernization plans. Soviet rejection of the NATO proposal may be posturing as a prelude to theater negotiations; however, this and their invasion of Afghanistan, resulting in the suspension of the SALT II ratification process, did nothing to simplify an already immensely complex issue.

The attitudes and objectives of the Allies should be an important consideration for US policymakers in deciding how to resume the SALT process. In particular the United States must determine how much progress on the arms control track is necessary for Allied support for the TNF modernization and basing agreed upon in December 1979. Is the delicate skein of basing arrangements likely to come unravelled without significant emphasis on TNF arms control? Or, in the wake of Afghanistan and Soviet rejection of the NATO offer of TNF negotiations, will Europeans view TNF arms control as less promising and force modernization as more urgent than they did in December? US priorities will to some extent depend upon how these questions are answered. There is, in addition, the troublesome possibility that the Allies may wish to bargain at TNF negotiations with what the United States might conclude is an essential defense program requirement or with collateral the United States wishes to apply to the negotiation of central strategic systems limitations.

It is too soon to know how much real potential there is for progress in LRTNF negotiations with or without SALT II. The complexities of such negotiations could easily outstrip those of central systems and this is, in itself, daunting.

Soviet Outlook Toward the SALT Process

Soviet attitudes toward SALT which have operational significance are unclear. Prior to the move into Afghanistan the public statements of high Soviet officials such as Brezhnev, Gromyko, and Ustinov reflected readiness to continue SALT negotiations though they voiced sharp opposition to the NATO decision to modernize its long range theater nuclear forces. Since that time the Soviets have rejected at least formally the NATO offer of TNF negotiations while criticizing the United States for putting SALT II on hold and urging that the good things of detente not be lost. Such public statements may give some indication of the Soviet outlook, but perhaps the clearest signs are the actions which they take (or fail to take) in their strategic force programs. Their continued dismantling of SSBNs to remain in compliance with SALT I and the advance notification of an ICBM test launch as would be required by SALT II indicate interest in preserving the process.²¹

One need not conclude that the move into Afghanistan followed a Soviet decision to turn away from SALT. That is one possibility, but the possibility that this was a case of a perceived vital interest taking precedence over a lesser interest seems no less likely at present. Events since the Vienna Summit must have dimmed some Soviet maximum expectations for SALT II and raised anew the question of whether the complex US ratification system will support undertakings agreed by the US executive.

Accentuating such questions are two facts: While the Soviets have a number of ICBM programs which may be restrained, and deployed forces which would necessarily be retired, by the observance of SALT II, the United States does not, and the absence of SALT II restraints is not likely to result in a significant increase in the capability of deployed US forces through the mid-1980s. Such considerations will be balanced against other facts: that arms control, albeit more often rhetorically, has played an enduring role in Soviet foreign policy; and that it is associated with the atmosphere of business as usual, which the Soviets are encouraging to mute criticism of their action in Afghanistan, e.g. the current MBFR round. The Soviets may be expected to weigh the

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military and political benefit from completion of the strategic programs which they alone have in hand (e.g., being able to deploy at least four follow-on ICBM types without consideration of SALT constraints) and the utility of their forces now deployed in numbers greater than SALT II would permit against their interest in maintaining a tacit SAL regime and in preserving SALT II provisions.

Informed selection among various possible approaches to the revitalization of SALT will require a thorough appreciation of the state of play of the issues raised in the preceding discussion, which are in a sense criteria for the evaluation of alternatives, at the time SALT is to be resumed. To reiterate, the issues include: the robustness of US defense programs; SALT expectations; defense options which may have foreclosed SALT alternatives—"bridges burned," linkages; the perceived importance of restoring credibility to the SALT process; and the attitudes of US Allies and the Soviet Union. Evaluation of alternative approaches at present must necessarily be tentative. Nonetheless the general outlines of several courses of action are in view, as are some of their opportunities and risks.

Alternative 1—Ratify the Vienna Treaty

In a sense, the simplest way to resume the SALT process is to take up the treaty as it stands for ratification. Without entering into well-worn arguments pertaining to the treaty provisions, this alternative is examined for feasibility as the one the administration would likely prefer if there were a reasonable probability of success.

Advantages of seeking ratification of the Vienna Treaty as a means of resuming the SALT process:

- a. Ratification would consolidate the gains of the SALT process—agreed definitions, counting rules, aggregate limits on central systems, reductions, fractionation limits, and some degree of planning certainty—into a comprehensive treaty.
- b. **Since renegotiation would not be required, this approach could be a more rapid means toward entry into force than approaches requiring further negotiation. This would revalidate the credibility of the process and provide a basis to move promptly to follow-on negotiations.**
- c. Because of leadtimes for strategic force programs and previous US defense program decisions, the limits of the SALT II Treaty largely reflect US development, acquisition, and deployment capabilities in the next 5 to 6 years (reflecting what the United States is nominally able to do while at least slowing Soviet momentum).
- d. The provisions of the treaty plow familiar ground making the advantages, disadvantages, and tradeoffs reasonably well understood.
- e. Ratification of SALT II as signed at Vienna would preserve the finite protocol expiration date of December 31, 1981; the diminishing time to negotiate the protocol issues operates (or should) to the tactical advantage of the United States, in whose interest it is that the protocol simply expire since deployment of a mobile ICBM and long-range GLCM/SLCM may be defense imperatives for the United States.

Disadvantages of seeking ratification of the Vienna Treaty:

- a. The treaty text could require revision as early as July 1980 if it does not enter into force by then; e.g., the Soviets are to begin dismantling or destruction of arms in excess of 2,250 by January 1, 1981, which presumes they would have

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reached the 2,400 limit by that time. Since 6 months are allowed to dismantle or destroy ICBM launchers to reach 2,400, some adjustment to the reductions schedule is implied if the treaty does not enter into force by July 1, 1980.

- b. The duration of the treaty is shrinking, reducing its utility as a guide to strategic force planning; lead times to bring strategic force programs to fruition exceed the treaty period, giving incentive to technological hedges (in the face of future uncertainty) which may overrun the pace and objectives of subsequent negotiations.
- c. **Ratification would codify those elements of the treaty where the United States would have preferred a different outcome thereby continuing unfavorable precedents; e.g., Backfire and the heavy ICBM asymmetry.**
- d. The prospects for Senate ratification of the Vienna Treaty are uncertain at best; forcing the treaty to a vote risks a repudiation of the President's signature at Vienna which might be more damaging to the SALT process than other alternatives.

It should be noted that continued Soviet support of the Vienna Treaty is not certain. It is probable that they will reassess the value of the SALT process and their own objectives. The protocol is perishing and, from their Soviet viewpoint, eroding an important means of restraining US defense programs (renegotiation of the protocol issues could be their *sine qua non* for resuming the process). A Soviet reassessment of a revised US national security policy could change their perceptions of the "balance" of the agreement.

Alternative 2—Modify and Renegotiate

Other considerations notwithstanding, an inescapable problem with the first alternative is that after June 30, 1980, a problem exists with the reductions schedule unless either the Soviets begin dismantling or destruction of arms in excess of 2,400 in the absence of a ratified treaty, or we presume they have the capability to compress the time for completion of dismantling or destruction. Thus a modification to the Vienna Treaty which would take this into account might be a less fragile approach. Because "modification" is a subjective concept, there is a great deal of flexibility in shaping the substance of the alternative and evaluating it. It could be no more than a mechanical date adjustment process. But beyond such a minimum modification, for example, this alternative provides a possible way to extend the treaty duration perhaps to 1990, again presuming the protocol would not be extended beyond December 31, 1981.

In considering the impact upon future negotiations of keeping the SALT II Treaty in effect longer, time may work in US favor as discussed earlier. Programmed strategic force deployments incrementally increase leverage as the 1980s unfold, allowing the United States to negotiate modifications to the SALT II Treaty; e.g., percentage annual reductions, and post-1990 SALT limitations, from a better position. A treaty lasting through 1990 would accommodate current US programs and defer apprehensions over a Soviet ICBM reentry vehicle fractionation breakout until the United States was in a better position to deal with it militarily and politically.

Extending the treaty duration and not extending the protocol as an entity has only been addressed briefly here as an example of an alternative within an alternative. One should not minimize the problems of negotiating such an approach. Even if the Soviets do not see an extended treaty as disadvantageous to their military plans, they would perceive it as a reduction of their leverage for follow-on negotiations. It is not difficult to imagine the same rhetorical rejection with which the Soviets responded to the March

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1977 Comprehensive Proposal. Further, the Soviets can be expected to press hard for extended protocol provisions regardless of treaty duration. In spite of the apparent problems, a consideration of how to get SALT moving again should address the desirability and plausibility of negotiating an extended SALT II Treaty duration.

In addition to something on the order of an adjusted treaty duration, "modifications" could accommodate SFRC Category III conditions if the Senate chooses to leave its mark on the treaty in a pronounced way. Depending on what arms control "bridges" had been burned during the hiatus in the SALT process, there is also at least the possibility of incorporating some significant changes without redrawing the entire treaty; e.g., a revision increasing the average number of ALCM which may be deployed on heavy bombers. Obviously, at some point the "modifications" are no longer minor and the treaty becomes undone to the point where it no longer provides a workable entity.

Advantages of modification and renegotiation as a means of resuming the SALT process:

- a. This alternative recognizes the possibility of the need for some modification if the treaty does not enter into force by July 1980, which it is unlikely to do.
- b. This approach consolidates historical negotiating gains as in Alternative 1.
- c. If US-proposed modifications are indeed held to a minimum, this alternative conceivably provides an opportunity to make some changes in the treaty text without making it practically inevitable that the Soviets will propose major modifications disadvantageous to the United States.
- d. **Given strategic force program development lead times and preservation of the essential treaty elements, the provisions of a renegotiated agreement could probably be kept consistent with US defense programs and capabilities as in Alternative 1.**
- e. The effects of the provisions are understood.
- f. Minimum modification of the treaty presumably would retain the earlier discussed US tactical advantage with regard to the diminishing time to work the protocol.

Disadvantages of modification and renegotiation:

- a. Once the treaty text is opened to revision, limitations important to the US are placed at risk; e.g., the Soviets might propose a raising of the ICBM fractionation limits as leverage to negotiate an extension of the protocol.
- b. Modification and renegotiation raises the possibility of protracted negotiations when a near term success may be the best thing and while subsequent negotiations, including LRTNF, may have to wait.
- c. Strategic deployments and technology continue to advance during protracted negotiations, constantly altering the technical context within which the original agreement was struck.

As with Alternative 1, continued Soviet support of the SALT II Treaty is not certain.

Alternative 3—Leapfrog SALT II

Leapfrogging SALT II is, in concept, a beginning anew approach to a comprehensive agreement—assuming, of course, that the standing treaty becomes unsalvageable because of its time sensitivity or US/Soviet strategic force program decisions. Even

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though the SALT legacy would be operative, the concept would be the most adaptable of those considered thus far to greater innovation in the integration of defense programs and arms control strategies to counter the Soviet threat. The approach could be implemented in a comprehensive proposal based on that made in March 1977, on the Joint Statement of Principles and/or on the NATO proposal to the Soviet Union in December 1979.

In the view of some critics of SALT II, leapfrogging ahead would be a chance for "real" arms control and could accommodate a wide range of limitations to include LRTNF and air defenses. It would be an opportunity for bold initiatives such as strategic force deployment moratoriums and deep reductions in MIRV ICBMs. Although not a feature exclusive to this alternative, one aspect of a new comprehensive approach could be breaking down the protocol as a package to negotiate the individual issues on their merit. Such an approach would allow the United States to separate negotiable from nonnegotiable programs.

Advantages of leapfrogging SALT II as a means of resuming the SALT process:

- a. It provides an opportunity for a comprehensive agreement at the outset for limiting central strategic systems and LRTNF to substantially reduced levels, building on the SALT I and II experience.
- b. **What would presumably be protracted negotiations could work to US advantage if strategic program momentum is regained and negotiating leverage increases during the 1980s.**
- c. Negotiations from scratch at a deliberate pace would facilitate rebuilding of cooperation in other spheres and observation of Soviet behavior, without an overemphasis on SALT as the determinant of whether detente will work or not.

Disadvantages of leapfrogging SALT II:

- a. The negotiations will be time-consuming and complex, delaying revalidation of the credibility of the process and running the risk of divisive, constant domestic political pressures.
- b. The Soviets will not easily drop precedents of the SALT process which were advantageous to them, and there is the possibility that important gains for the United States will be lost.
- c. **There is a danger of exaggerated expectations and emphasis, giving incentive to unilateral suppression of defense programs (the "good-faith" restraint trap).**
- d. A totally new approach will require careful evaluation of new tradeoffs and negotiating linkages, with the chance of making a mistake during the potentially perilous mid-1980 period in the strategic relationship between the United States and Soviet Union.

Alternative 4—Negotiate on Specific Issues

Resuming a SALT process with objectives less ambitious than a comprehensive agreement is a way of dealing with a SALT II Treaty which cannot be salvaged in its fundamental form; it is also a way of dealing with an environment where the disadvantages of beginning from scratch as discussed in Alternative 3 may outweigh the advantages. Although not dealt with in detail here, an incremental approach would also be an alternative for negotiations following a ratified SALT II of some form.²² The primary focus of this discussion is on the former and not this latter case.

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Conceptually, negotiating on specific issues is a means to maintain the SALT process which reflects a belief that protracted, complex negotiations stand little chance of success in the current environment of the US/Soviet relationship. The approach would accommodate, for example: (a) minimum fixes to facilitate compliance with SALT I numerical limits, perhaps in the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, e.g., how to handle SSBN numbers which exceed SALT I limits but not those of SALT II; (b) negotiations toward quick agreement to an equal aggregate of central systems, with attendant definitions and fundamentals of verification, in another forum, and/or (c) tackling the tougher question of LRTNF, e.g., Backfire, SS-20, and cruise missiles, in yet another negotiation.

If SALT II does collapse, seeking to achieve and ratify agreement to the most rudimentary Vladivostok accords could be a first step, as in the example cited. This concept of parallel, but separate, incremental steps could also apply to other less significant objectives such as confidence builders; e.g., agreement on a data base and prenotification of ICBM test launches.

Advantages of incremental steps as a means of resuming the SALT process:

- a. There is a possibility of a quick success to revalidate the process and to recapture crucial gains.
- b. It is not necessarily tied to a comprehensive approach; therefore, tougher issues need not encumber progress in less contentious areas.
- c. It allows simple, direct application of leverage among related issues.
- d. It is compatible with a deemphasis of arms control in US national security policy and as the central focus of the Soviet-American relationship.
- e. The concept is adaptable enough to "guidance" which may be provided by the Senate without undermining executive branch flexibility to negotiate.

Disadvantages of incremental steps:

- a. The loss of important gains in a comprehensive agreement raises the possibility of an exaggerated, piecemeal focus on one issue or another; e.g., ICBM fractionation limits, with pressure to use an inordinate amount of leverage to resolve it.
- b. An incremental approach, in lieu of a comprehensive agreement, could be criticized on one hand as a step backward in the SALT process or, on the other hand, could form the basis for unrealistic objectives and expectations which even though incremental would doom the process before it began.**
- c. The efficacy of the process would be more vulnerable to technological surprise and change than a comprehensive approach.
- d. There would be new ground to break and new tradeoffs to understand.
- e. Using incremental steps to consolidate gains assumes the Soviets will be forthcoming and interested, as a starter, in progress on relatively neutral issues.
- f. Given the differing strategic concepts and force structures of the US and USSR it could prove to be very difficult to aggregate the issues of SALT in such a way that they could be dealt with in individual increments each of which was, *considered on its own, equitable in the eyes of each government.*

The four alternatives presented are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Apparent from even our brief overview are overlaps in the concepts and their advantages and disadvantages.

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A definite course of action cannot be sorted out until many of the variables examined earlier have more certain parameters. The objective has been to provide a framework which will be flexible enough to accommodate the realities of national security issues as they pertain to a reassessment of US arms control strategy.

SOME CONSIDERATIONS FOR US DEFENSE POLICY

Strategic arms limitation has been an instrument of US national security policy for over a decade. Now this instrument is in question. The current deterioration of US and Soviet relations notwithstanding, there are strong, long term mutual incentives for strategic arms control which would make defense planning without SALT in view imprudent. If the United States and the Soviet Union can be expected in the future to attempt to resume the SALT process, then there is an array of factors and alternatives which should be kept in view.

In conclusion, the authors propose the following considerations for defense planning to optimize US advantages and retain essential defense program flexibility, while keeping the SALT door open as an option in defense policy.

Beware of the good-faith restraint trap. Experience has shown the United States has a propensity to unilaterally suppress defense programs based upon speculation that arms control prospects will be enhanced thereby. Experience has also shown that the Soviets do not reciprocate. Further, the United States has not been able to attain through SALT national security objectives which the nation does not appear willing to attain through its defense programs. Defense programs identified as imperative to carry out US policy should not be tagged as bargaining chips.

Avoid the hardware trap. Perceptions of equivalence will not be significantly enhanced by programs which do not increase the military effectiveness of US strategic forces, or which are not a sufficient military offset to an increased Soviet threat to those forces. At the same time, the United States should not burn SALT bridges lightly or inadvertently. The competitive military environment in which US defense policy will operate leaves small margin for error. A decision to overturn even a seemingly minor SALT II provision; e.g., provision of credible, externally observable differences on B-52s equipped for long-range ALCM, is a matter requiring careful consideration in the context of a consensus on overall strategy. In this regard, a comprehensive review of US defense policy and its supporting strategies is a most desirable objective.

Adopt reasonable expectations for Soviet "compliance" with the present SALT regime. In reacting to any burning of SALT bridges by the Soviets in the absence of *de jure* agreement, we should resist the counsel of indignation urging a tit-for-tat response. Rather, our policy should be informed by a prudent assessment of those US programmatic and arms control options which would respond to the increased threat.

Apply negotiating leverage prudently. In the event the SALT II Treaty comes unraveled because of US or Soviet actions, guard against a misapplication of leverage in new negotiations. For example, do not bargain at the TNF table with ICBM fractionation limits. The form and scope of Allied participation in further SALT negotiations should be planned with due consideration given to the possibility of conflicting views regarding negotiating strategy.

Keep SALT in perspective. There are many facets of the US and Soviet relationship to be considered, not the least of which is strategic equivalence. Further, do not ask SALT to carry the burden of being the centerpiece of US-Soviet relations. Attaining an executive-legislative consensus understanding of the limits of linkage should be an

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administration priority and would be worth every bit of the considerable effort required to reach it.

Expect modest results. Above all, do not raise or encourage expectations for major steps toward more restrictive strategic arms limitations in the near term. Exaggerated expectations are the gravest risk in the SALT process. They give rise to unilateral US restraint in anticipation of possible limitations and, as the commitment to an arms control rather than a programmatic option strengthens, the United States finds Soviet negotiating proposals to up the ante almost irresistible. The SALT process is one strategy option, complementary to strategic force programs, in defense policy. It is not, in the foreseeable future, a solution to the problems of deterrence and defense spending, or a measure of detente. Preparations for further SALT negotiations should include attempts to resolve the clear conflicts between the more ambitious senatorial and public expectations voiced during the 1979 SALT hearings, and the lesser expectations supported by the history of the negotiations. In the initial stages of resuming the process there is no room for bold moves.

There should be no encouragement given to the idea that the next round of SALT is a watershed where arms control either succeeds smashingly or dies. Rather, US policymakers should make a renewed attempt to add another SALT agreement to international law, along with the ABM Treaty, in full recognition of the difficult path in doing so, but with recognition as well that small, incremental successes are gains nonetheless. An accumulation of such small steps in concert with the strategic programs necessary to maintain deterrence and essential equivalence within the SALT framework might eventually lead to an equitable, stable, and less hazardous strategic nuclear balance.

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KEYNOTE ADDRESS

Defense Planning and Arms Control

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I welcome the opportunity to be here this morning to discuss the two major topics of this conference, how we can better integrate our defense planning and arms control activities, and, the problems and prospects we face for arms control in the 1980s.

We are all disappointed at the lack of success of our arms control efforts in which we sought to impose adequate constraints on the continuing Soviet military buildup that threatens our security. The SALT II agreements do, of course, contain some modest but important steps in this regard, but the ultimate fate of these agreements is clearly in doubt.

I have also been disappointed with the arms control process within the US Government, in particular the failure of the military to play the role it can and must in this important area. In my view, we, the uniformed services, have not developed a sufficiently forward-looking view of the nation's security needs and the manner in which our defense programs and policies can be combined with our arms control negotiating efforts to achieve these objectives. Instead, the Pentagon has all too frequently simply reacted in a defensive manner to the initiatives of other elements in the US arms control policymaking community. While the administration has often proclaimed the US commitment to a two-pronged strategy that couples arms limitation efforts and defense programs as a means to meet the Soviet military challenge, it is time to give considerably greater coherence and substance to this declaration.

The process of integration is relatively easy to describe. I recognize, however, that it will be very difficult to do and do well. It will require us to examine and imaginatively integrate several diverse considerations—our own conclusions regarding what constitutes an appropriate US deterrent force posture and weapons employment doctrine; evaluation of the opportunities available in new technologies and their applicability to the force characteristics we seek, and a clear understanding of not only Soviet political and military aspirations but also of their military doctrine, evolving force posture, and arms limitation negotiating style.

In the context of all of these factors, we must figure out and clearly enunciate the future US-Soviet and NATO-Warsaw Pact force configurations that we believe would best serve our deterrence, essential equivalence, and stability objectives. Having established these we should develop combined force development and negotiating strategies that will maximize our ability to channel the Soviets in these directions. Given the long lead times and service lifetimes of major weapons systems and the massive investments they represent, this effort is likely to require us to take a long term view of the security environment we seek to shape. This view should, in turn, have significant impact on our current defense decisions and negotiating strategies.

The present slowdown in US-Soviet arms control negotiations and the deferral of the Senate ratification debate on SALT II are unfortunate. This period provides, however, an excellent opportunity for us not only to review critically our past performance but also to readdress our basic objectives and approaches to the combined arms control and defense planning process. I urge you to try your hand at helping develop a

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comprehensive force development and negotiating strategy along the lines I've just outlined as a potentially fruitful means to achieve our defense policy goals.

We in the Air Force have already begun to do some serious analysis along these lines with regard to our strategic force modernization programs and the SALT negotiations. In our deliberations, we have posed the following broad objectives for our central strategic forces, which, in my view, remain the bedrock of US deterrent policy:

Credible deterrence—In accordance with our evolving countervailing strategy, our strategic nuclear forces must be sufficiently survivable and militarily effective to convince any would-be aggressor that in response to an attack upon us or our allies he will face not only devastating retaliation but also will be denied the prospect of accomplishing his objectives at any level of conflict and under any condition of war initiation. To support this strategy we must maintain a diversified mix of strategic nuclear forces and associated command and control capabilities that allow us to successfully attack the full range of Soviet military, economic and political targets, deliberately and selectively, while holding at risk a sizeable portion of the Soviet urban-industrial base. These forces will also provide the basis for successful war fighting and escalation control, should war occur.

Essential Equivalence—Since perceptions of the strategic nuclear balance, by friend and foe alike, are critical elements of the international political scene, we must maintain forces that are, in fact, and are commonly viewed to be at least as capable as those of the Soviet Union.

Stability—We seek US-Soviet force configurations that are both *crisis stable*, that is, there is no incentive for either side to strike first, even during deep crisis, and *arms race stable*, that is, these force structures are such they do not encourage either side to engage in successive rounds of spiralling weapons deployments.

While I am convinced we should pursue a coupled arms control and force modernization approach to meet these objectives we must recognize, of course, that our attempts to negotiate equitable and verifiable arms limitations may not succeed. Consequently, our defense programs, while designed to accommodate and promote successful arms control, must be sufficiently flexible to permit us to field the necessary forces to meet our deterrence and essential equivalence objectives against a wide range of possible Soviet threats. Nevertheless, we should seek to make our tasks easier by imposing useful constraints on Soviet military programs wherever possible.

Consonant with this coupled approach, it is possible to posit an illustrative US-Soviet strategic force configuration that would support our accomplishment of these security objectives.

- US and Soviet force postures would include diverse, survivable and militarily effective weapons systems on both sides including: survivable ICBMs, a major component of which will be deployed in verifiable, mobile configurations; long range, MIRVed SLBMs on SSBNs; and heavy bombers carrying ALCMs and other weapons.
- These forces would be deployed within an overall ceiling on strategic weapons (not merely the launchers) and subceilings on MIRVs, particularly ICBM MIRVs, at levels at least as low and preferably substantially lower than those agreed to in SALT II.
- These postures would allow confident verification of the numbers of weapons deployed using National Technical Means, supplemented by cooperative measures as required.

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- Both sides would possess flexible, redundant C³I, and attack warning and assessment systems with enduring survivability.
- There would be SALT limits on future force modernization that prevent the testing and deployment of new ICBMs or SLBMs beyond the M-X and the Trident II (D-5) on the US side and their Soviet counterparts. This would have to be accompanied by provisions that allow confident verification of the characteristics of strategic systems during their flight testing phase.
- The ABM Treaty would continue in force. Alternatively, it might be modified to permit defense of ICBM fields with specially designed, local low altitude defense systems.**
- Deployment of atmospheric air defense on both sides would be adequate to cope with moderately sized raids but would be unable to cope with a massive, combined ALCM and penetrating bomber attacks. (The Soviets clearly seek a more comprehensive air defense capability; the US would have to upgrade its air defenses to reach this point). We continue to examine various approaches to strategic air defense limitations, but the pronounced US-Soviet asymmetries in this area and serious difficulties in separating strategic from theater air defense capabilities are among the problems that will make such limitations exceedingly difficult to achieve.

Consistent with the approach I discussed a few moments ago, I believe that our defense programs and arms control strategies can and should be coordinated to help us move toward this configuration. I believe that proceeding with deployment of the M-X ICBM in a Multiple Protective Structures (MPS) basing configuration, for example, will represent an important step within this process. The M-X will serve these objectives for several reasons:

- Its MPS basing mode will restore US ICBM survivability and confront the Soviets with the prospect of a highly unfavorable exchange ratio should they try to attack the system. This will increase US deterrent might and provide a more stable strategic balance.**
- The M-X missile and its basing configuration have been designed both to meet the relevant limitations of the SALT II treaty—the single new, SS-19 class ICBM permitted, carrying no more than 10 MIRVs—and to provide a useful precedent for verifiable, mobile ICBM deployments for the future. To support this objective, we have included several verification related features—controlled and NTM observable missile assembly and introduction, verifiable confinement within identifiable sections of the deployment area, and the potential for NTM inspection within the deployment area—in the basic design of the system.
- The yield and accuracy of the M-X are such that it will provide a powerful incentive for the Soviets to move away from their present reliance upon highly fractionated ICBMs deployed in increasingly vulnerable fixed silos toward more survivable, probably land mobile, configurations. If this occurs, the US M-X/MPS design will provide a useful precedent regarding the principles involved in verifiable land mobile ICBM deployment modes.
- Since the survivability of the M-X is largely a function of the large number of shelters (some 4,600) which house a much smaller number of missiles (200), the system is well suited to support our longer term SALT objectives of meeting US military needs with reduced numbers of weapons systems.**
- Similarly, because M-X survivability is directly linked to the Soviet attack threat facing its protective structures, the size and cost of the M-X/MPS system can be

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favorably affected by the presence of SALT restraints. Yet the system has been explicitly designed with sufficient resilience to permit it to be adjusted to maintain M-X survivability against a wide range of expanded Soviet threats in an environment without SALT limitations. The presence of these credible US response options—adding shelters and possibly missiles, or deploying a high leverage, low altitude ABM system—should help dissuade the Soviets from pursuing such force expansions in the first place.

—With regard to arms limitation, there are a number of initiatives in follow-on SALT negotiations that should be pursued to help us to reach survivable, mobile ICBM force configurations on both sides.

—Mobile ICBMs should be permitted in the context of explicit guidelines regarding the assembly and deployment practices and verification opportunities associated with such systems.

—The SALT II limits on ICBM fractionation should be maintained and the *de facto* ceiling on ICBM weapons maintained and reduced significantly, if possible.

The foregoing discussion of M-X and SALT is intended simply as an example of the kind of future-oriented thinking we need to do to improve our arms control efforts. Our initiatives in SALT or any other arms limitation negotiations must proceed on the basis of two fundamental precepts:

—**First, a clear recognition that such negotiations are not ends in themselves but rather potentially useful dimensions of our overall national security policy, the objective of which is to provide adequately for the nation's defense.**

—Second, we must also recognize that there are basic conflicts of purpose between ourselves and the Soviets that, in my view, will continue to make our relationship a strongly competitive one for the foreseeable future. While significant progress in arms control will require a modicum of US-Soviet cooperation, even if significant arms control agreements are achieved, this will, by no means, signal an end to our fundamental rivalry and sustained political conflict in the world.

As a matter of fact, it is entirely possible, and probably likely, that the Soviets, should they agree to constraints in the central strategic arms competition, would redirect the rubles saved in this sphere to expand their nuclear or conventional forces for theater warfare or for distant power projection. This possibility points out the need for us to pursue our two-tracked arms control negotiation and force modernization approach across the full range of US-Soviet military competition.

Most of my comments this morning, for reasons of time, have focused upon the strategic arms competition and SALT. Clearly the need for improved integration of force planning and arms control extends to all the areas of US-Soviet military competition. In each case, I believe we must clarify our strategic objectives, set forth alternative force configurations that meet these objectives, and attempt to combine our arms and arms control policies in ways that help us achieve these ends. The Soviet military challenge is real and growing ominously. In concert with our allies, we must meet this challenge. I remain convinced that arms control can play a very valuable role in this process and I urge all of you to assist in this process.

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Arms Control and Security in the 1980s

Ambassador Ralph Earle II

Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

(Delivered by Mr. James M. Montgomery, ACDA)

I would, at the outset, like to thank Bob Gard and Dave McGiffert for extending to me the invitation to address this distinguished group, albeit on Friday, the 13th. Actually, the last few months have been a kind of extended Friday the 13th for parts of arms control. What I hope to impress upon you today is the vital importance to our national security of moving the arms control calendar ahead in some areas, lest we find ourselves stalled on a Friday, the 13th, for months, or years, to come.

Let me assure you, first of all, that published accounts notwithstanding, the Arms Control Agency is very much alive.

Though I have heard and read much to the contrary in recent months, arms control is not, and cannot be, separable from all other efforts to maintain and enhance US national security. I start from the premise that arms control is a fundamental element of our national security. Our security is best served when arms control and defense planning are fully integrated. Arms control is not an alternative to defense measures. It is one of many factors that contributes to national security. It does, however, have some unique characteristics. It is the only approach that offers the prospect of directly restraining and reducing the military threat to this country; the only tool available to constrain Soviet military capabilities. As such, its importance is even more apparent in times of heightened tension in US-Soviet relations.

The United States' military and political competition with the Soviet Union is a relatively new phenomenon. The last 15 years have been the only period, since this country became a major international actor after the turn of the century, when we have had to face a potential adversary with sufficient resources to match us weapon for weapon, ruble for dollar. We now share the world with another superpower. This is a fact of international life that will not go away no matter how much we might want it to. It is another fact that neither superpower is able to maintain superiority over the other, in any weapon system, for very long. I need only refer to the case of MIRVs, a short-term US technical advantage that has evolved into a long-term Soviet threat to our ICBMs. I think we all have to ask ourselves: could we have avoided this latter development with more foresight, perhaps a closer look at the arms control alternatives? We can see similar developments in other areas. A full panoply of Soviet cruise missiles, for example, is not beyond the realm of possibility in the not-too-distant future.

Control of this action/reaction cycle, however, requires a joint decision, a parallel exercise of political will in two national capitals, Moscow and Washington. Joint decisions of this type are sometimes difficult to achieve even when the countries are allies, as many of you well know. It is even more difficult when the interlocutors are ideological and political competitors.

One criticism that we often hear is that arms control efforts are constantly overtaken by technological developments. I think this is somewhat overdrawn. SALT in particular has been faulted for falling behind the pace of technology in strategic offensive weapons. SALT does point up that arms control faces something of a dilemma: small steps are more "doable," by and large, but have less of an impact; large steps have

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more potential impact, but they are also more complicated and run the risk of political overload on one or both sides. Every arms control effort is not just a negotiation between two governments (or three or a hundred) but a series of negotiations within governments as well. But in the strategic area itself we do have a demonstration that technology can be contained before it creates irresistible pressures. I am speaking here of the ABM Treaty. Research and development in ABMs continues, but the treaty imposes important restrictions on certain types of R&D; on mobile systems, for example. And it severely restricts ABM deployments. As a result, we have avoided what could have been an extremely expensive, and ultimately futile, offense-defense race with the Soviet Union.

In areas other than strategic weapons, arms control is sometimes in a race with technology, sometimes not. Technological developments are clearly important in ASAT, as we attempt to head off an arms race in space. Other considerations are often of equal or greater weight, such as nonproliferation in the case of a comprehensive test ban, or the conventional force balance in Europe in the case of mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations. But in these areas, as well as in SALT and weapons development generally, it is important to apply a longer-ranged perspective to complement the shorter-range considerations that can dominate defense policymaking. We, the Soviet Union, and other states are all in business for the long haul. The bilateral competition for influence in various parts of the world is likely to continue. We can, in the process, engage in an expensive arms buildup that produces no net gain in security. Or by vigorous integrated planning we can identify opportunities to constrain and in some instances reverse this process through arms control. In so doing, we can make the future more predictable; especially in terms of its military requirements. What we can anticipate reliably, we can plan for in confidence and with greater economy. If nothing else, arms control agreements reduce uncertainty; and less uncertainty we can use more of.

In my view, the approach to security policymaking that makes the most sense is one that considers explicitly not just the potential impact of a given policy on US capabilities and force planning, but the potential impact: on the Soviet Union; on possibilities for restraint; and, in the case of multilateral negotiations, on other participants as well. We have to look at the impact on US interests, and not just over the succeeding year or two, but over the succeeding decade. Because the development cycle of modern weapons is easily a decade or more; security planning, in its fullest sense, can afford to be no less farsighted.

For example, in the area of antisatellite, or ASAT, weaponry, the Soviet Union has taken a temporary lead in modern system testing, although the US can clearly match or exceed that capability if we wish. Negotiations have taken place regarding limitations on these systems, but we have also warned that we will not tolerate any meaningful Soviet advantage in this area. With events moving rapidly, we are thinking through the long-term implications for our security that ASAT activities pose. We are striving to look beyond our ability, in the next few years, to overmatch the present Soviet capability and attain a technological lead that could prove temporary. We are facing the question: are we better off with or without limitations on ASAT activities?

The point I want to stress is that comprehensive and farsighted analysis can be of considerable benefit in deciding how best to develop an overall approach to any specific security problem and that arms control initiatives are as much a part of that approach as defense programs. In this connection, I am encouraged by the President's adoption earlier this year of the recommendations made to the President by Phil Odeen. These allow for a more systematic integration of the potential arms control and foreign policy

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factors into the defense planning process. ACDA has spent considerable effort this year working with DOD, State, the NSC Staff, and OMB in implementing these new procedures. To the extent that we can adopt and refine this more integrated approach to defense policy, I believe that we can move into the 1980s and look toward the 1990s, and beyond, with greater confidence in our ability to maintain the security of this country.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

Distinguished Guest Speakers

GENERAL LEW ALLEN, JR., USAF, Chief of Staff, US Air Force. General Allen commanded the Air Force Systems Command before serving briefly as Air Force Vice Chief of Staff on his way to becoming the Chief. He previously had served as Chief of Staff for Air Force Systems Command, then was appointed as Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community. From there he became Director, National Security Agency, and Chief, Central Security Service. Earlier assignments included some 8 years with the Secretary of the Air Force in space, missile, and satellite programs; a tour in the Space Technology Office of the Secretary of Defense, and several tours in the field dealing with nuclear weapons. A graduate of the US Military Academy, General Allen is a command pilot and wears the Master Missileman Badge. He received master's and doctoral degrees in physics from the University of Illinois.

MR. JAMES M. MONTGOMERY, Counselor, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. A career foreign service officer, Mr. Montgomery has served in the State Department's Office of Soviet Affairs and as special assistant to the Counselor of the Department. He also has served as Director of the Office of Public Programs and as Director of the Office of Internal Security Policy. Foreign assignments include tours in Thailand and Mexico. Mr. Montgomery entered foreign service following his graduation from Juniata College in Pennsylvania.

Participants

DR. JOSEPH W. ANNUNZIATA, Organization and Management Adviser, President's Reorganization Project, Office of Management and Budget. Dr. Annunziata prepares studies, with recommendations to the President, to improve the organization and management of key government agencies affecting national security and defense. He previously was Foreign Affairs Adviser in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and, before that, Congressional Legislative Aide for House Majority Leadership and Senator Edward Kennedy. He served as a media analyst for the Defense Department following a period as a Professor with the Air University, George Washington University, and Troy State College. Author of numerous articles and studies on international political, economic, social, and military affairs, he is a Fairfield University graduate and has a Ph.D. degree from the Sorbonne, University of Paris.

DR. ROBERT J. ART, Dean, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Brandeis University, and Christian A. Herter Associate Professor of International Relations, Brandeis University. Dr. Art also serves as Special Assistant for Academic Resources at Brandeis and as a Member, Council on Foreign Relations. He has served in research and fellowship capacities at Harvard University, The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. A Guggenheim Fellow, he has authored a monograph, three books, and numerous articles dealing with the use of force and American foreign policy. He also has participated in dozens of seminars and study groups dealing with military and political topics. A graduate of Columbia College, he received his Ph.D. degree from Harvard University.

Biographical Notes

MR. GEORGE W. ASHWORTH, Assistant Director of the Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Mr. Ashworth chairs the agency's External Research Council and directs the agency's Policy Planning Staff. Before joining ACDA, Mr. Ashworth was a staff member of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, with primary staff responsibility for arms control and several national security affairs matters. A graduate of Washington and Lee University, Mr. Ashworth was a newspaperman with the Richmond (Va.) Times-Dispatch and the Christian Science Monitor before entering government service.

COLONEL ARCHIE D. BARRETT, USAF, Senior Research Fellow, National Defense University. Colonel Barrett came to the university after serving as the military staff assistant to the Executive Secretary of the Defense Organization Study (the Defense Department portion of the President's Reorganization Project). His experience includes strategic, tactical, and training flying operations in the US, Southeast Asia, and Europe; Associate Professor of Political Science at the Air Force Academy; specialist in NATO general defense, nuclear, and logistics plans and policies at the NATO Weapon Systems School; Air Staff long range planning, concept and doctrine development, and Executive Officer of the Air Staff Directorate of Concepts. Colonel Barrett received his bachelor's degree from the US Military Academy and his master's and doctoral degrees from Harvard University.

MR. WILLIAM BEECHER, Washington Diplomatic Correspondent for the Boston Globe and syndicated columnist for United Features. Mr. Beecher served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, 1973-75, following several years as Washington military correspondent for the New York Times. Previously, he was the Washington correspondent for the Wall Street Journal and Fairchild Publications. Twice winner of Overseas Press Club of America citations for diplomatic analyses, he also has worked as a general assignments reporter for the St. Louis Globe-Democrat. He holds a bachelor's degree from Harvard University and a master's degree from Columbia University.

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Biographical Notes

MR. RICHARD R. BURT, National Security Affairs Correspondent, New York Times Washington Bureau. Before joining the Times in 1977, Mr. Burt was the Assistant Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies, in London. He is the author of various journal articles and Adelphi papers on defense budgeting and new weapons technology and his articles appear regularly in the national press. He is a former Advanced Research Fellow of the Naval War College and Defense Adviser to the Wednesday Group, United States House of Representatives. He received his bachelor's degree from Cornell University and his master's degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

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HONORABLE NATHANIEL DAVIS, State Department Adviser to the Naval War College and holder of the Chester W. Nimitz Chair of National Security and Foreign Affairs. Dr. Davis has held ambassadorships to Switzerland, Chile, and Guatemala, and has served in Bulgaria, Venezuela, the Soviet Union, Italy, and Czechoslovakia. Dr. Davis also has served as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Director General of the Foreign Service, and on the Senior Staff of the National Security Council at the White House. He previously was Deputy Associate Director for Overseas Operations of the Peace Corps in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Dr. Davis has had numerous articles, reviews, and speeches published in magazines and journals. A graduate of Brown University, he holds master's and doctoral degrees from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABM	antiballistic missile
ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ALCM	air-launched cruise missile
APDM	annual program decision memorandum
ASAT	antisatellite weaponry
ASW	antisubmarine warfare
BMD	ballistic missile defense
CAT	conventional arms transfer
CD	Committee on Disarmament (UN)
CDE	Committee on Disarmament in Europe
CEP	circular error probable
CG	consolidated guidance
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINC	commander-in-chief
CPAG	Crisis Planning and Assessment Group
CPWG	Contingency Planning Working Group
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CTB	comprehensive test ban
CTBT	comprehensive test ban treaty
C ³ I	command, control, communications and intelligence
CW	chemical warfare
DACIP	Defense and Arms Control Integration Panel
DCP	Decision Coordinating Papers
DEFCON	defense condition
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DSARC	Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
ECM	electronic countermeasures
EOP	Executive Office of the President
FBS	forward-based system
GLCM	ground-launched cruise missile
GNP	gross national product
IA	interim agreement
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
IG	interdepartmental (interagency) groups
IRBM	intermediate range ballistic missile
ISA	international security affairs
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JSP	joint statement of principles
LRTNF	long-range theater nuclear force
MAP	multiple aim points
MARV	maneuverable reentry vehicle
MBFR	mutual and balanced force reductions
MIRV	multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle
MLF	multilateral force
MPS	multiple protective structures
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	nonproliferation treaty
NSC	National Security Council

Glossary of Abbreviations

NTM	national technical means
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSTP	Office of Science and Technology Policy
PA&E	Program Analysis and Evaluation
PAR	percentage annual reductions
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PM	Politico-Military Affairs
PNE	peaceful nuclear explosion
PRC	program review committee
PRM	program review memorandum
R&D	research and development
RDF	rapid deployment force
RV	reentry vehicle
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SAL	strategic arms limitations
SALT	strategic arms limitation talks
SCC	Standing Consultative Commission
SFRC	Senate Foreign Relations Committee
SLBM	sea-, space-, or submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLCM	sea-launched cruise missile
SNDV	strategic nuclear delivery vehicle
SRAM	short-range attack missile
SSBN	fleet ballistic missile submarine
UN	United Nations
U&S	unified and specified
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WSAG	Washington Special Action Group

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