Reflexive Launch Strategies.
Abstract
Given the impending vulnerability of U.S. ICBMs, this thesis assesses the viability of countervailing reflexive launch strategies. Arguments are based on logical analysis of capabilities within the context of political realities. This thesis establishes the relative utility of reflexive launch strategies as part of the total strategic deterrent posture. Presentation of evidence (logical; historical; quantitative) supports a case for specific reflexive launch options. The central thesis is that regardless of technical capabilities (e.g., warning systems or C3(Command, Control and Communications) reflexive strategies are not substantial enough to act as a doctrinal shield for inherently vulnerable land-based forces. Alternatively, it will be shown that within the context of existing/projected U.S. weapon systems (e.g., MX, ALCM), as well as Soviet forces and perceptions, the capability for rapid retaliation prior to impact or immediately following an attack will remain an essential element of a credible deterrent. It is argued that survivable weapons simply shift vulnerability to the centers of political and economic power and do not obviate the requirement for deterring reflexive launch options.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 1980
- Accession Number
- ADA092300
Entities
People
- Kurt Allan Strauss
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School