


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THESIS

**THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLE'S ARMY:
ITS MILITARY AND POLITICAL MISSION**

BY

RICHARD CLINTON HERRICK

SEPTEMBER, 1980

Thesis Advisor:

Jiri Valenta

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The army leadership recognizes that their most important task is the preservation of the Yugoslav state and they have made a commitment to support the post-Tito efforts to maintain a stable government.

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The Yugoslav People's Army:
Its Military and Political Mission

by

Richard Clinton Herrick
Captain, United States Army
B.S., University of Maryland, 1970

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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Author

Richard Clinton Herrick

Approved by:

Jim Tally

Thesis Advisor

Richard F. Starr

Second Reader

Sherran W. Blandin

Chairman

Department of National Security Affairs

W. M. Woods

Dean of Information and Policy Sciences

ABSTRACT

The Yugoslav People's Army is a function of the defense needs of a medium size state and the political needs of a communist regime attempting to unite a multiethnic society.

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
I. INTRODUCTION

The Yugoslav People's Army is a function of the defense needs of a medium size state and the political needs of a communist regime attempting to unite a multiethnic society. Yugoslavia has been a dividing line between the Soviet and Western blocs since 1948 and has had to struggle to defend its position as an independent state in the world community. This struggle has been both external, in the country's efforts to resist superpower pressure, and internal, to blend the particular and often divergent needs of its member republics. The physical security requirements to defend Yugoslavia have had to adjust to the limited resources of a medium size state. The Party's efforts to balance regional-ethnic autonomy with centralized nation-building has coopted the army into the political decision-making process. An outgrowth of these conditions has been the present organization of the Yugoslav People's Army.

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MINISTER OF DEFENSE GENERAL NIKOLA LJUBICIC
WITH MARSHAL JOSIP BROZ TITO





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Yugoslavia is roughly the size of Wyoming, but its strategic location on the Balkan Peninsula has increased its importance in the world geopolitical arena. World events in the late 1940s forced Yugoslavia to adopt a foreign policy of nonalignment, a position it was not particularly prepared to assume. As Yugoslav pragmatism adjusted to the new arrangement, however, Yugoslavia became a spokesman for independent underdeveloped countries in a bipolar international system. These are contributing reasons for Yugoslavia's importance today; had it remained under the Soviet sphere of influence it would probably be no more important than Bulgaria or Romania.

The ability of Yugoslavia to remain nonaligned in its political affiliations, now that President Tito is dead, depends a great deal upon the succession of power and the ability of the new government to maintain internal stability. The succession of power is being handled by rotating the leadership every year among the members of the Presidency of Yugoslavia (a system introduced in 1971 and modified in the 1974 constitution). The constantly changing leadership, however, may fail to provide consistent, cohesive

direction for internal policies and the strength of Yugoslavia's foreign policy role may wane without the continuity of proven and known leadership. While Yugoslavia's reputation and influence as an international spokesman may suffer if it fails to maintain its image among the developing countries, its survival as an independent communist state may cease if instability resulting from internal bitter disputes occurs.

The state of mind in Yugoslavia varies between the nationalities which make up each of the eight regions in the country. In efforts to avoid repeating the policies of the pre-Second World War government which exacerbated the ethnic differences, the communist regime established a federation which provided considerable autonomy to the ethnic groups while supporting a movement toward a strong central government and dissolution of ethnic, religious, and cultural differences. Once realized that this approach was basically unacceptable to the republics, Yugoslav leaders began emphasizing decentralization in domestic, political and economic affairs. The expectation is that the unity of Yugoslavia can best be secured through governmental respect for ethnic diversity. A proportional representation can be observed within the government, army, and the League of Communists and the principles of ethnic equality can be observed in the policies of the federal government.

Major regional inequalities, however, still exist in Yugoslavia and there is no agreed-upon program to improve conditions in the underdeveloped regions of the country. Conflicting federal policies continue to divide the Yugoslav peoples and confound governmental planners attempting to achieve both optimal growth and inter-regional equality. The one integrating force stressing the ethic of "inter-national" cooperation is the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

In the event of post-Tito difficulties, the League of Communists will be the main force capable of holding the federation together. A major power behind this force is the Yugoslav People's Army. The army supports the goals of the Party and its continuing attempts to develop the country. It is unlikely, therefore, that the leaders of the army and security apparatus, which essentially has a tendency to favor patriotism and order, will permit others to deviate from Party policy. It is within this framework, the army subordinate to the Party, that the army is a cohesive force in the country.

The Communist Party of Yugoslav changed its name to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1952 during the 6th Party Congress. The role of the Party was redefined to be the "conscience" of progressive change rather than the "vanguard,"¹

¹Edvard Kardelj, cited in Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 75.

and the name was changed to symbolize the new role. I have used the "League of Communists of Yugoslavia" and the "Party" interchangeably throughout this study.

The Yugoslav People's Army consists of three components: the land army, the air and air defense forces, and the navy. I have used the "army" in its generic sense in this study and have used it interchangeably with "operational army," as distinct from the territorial defense units.

II. TOTAL NATIONAL DEFENSE

Historically, the survival of a nation-state has depended upon the country's ability to defend itself. The desire alone to maintain its form of government has not proven sufficient when countries have been faced with an invading force from abroad or a dissident group from within. All forms of national government have taken measures, therefore, to provide for their defense, and there are few countries where the ties between the defense establishment and the political structure are as strong as they are in Yugoslavia. The geopolitical location of Yugoslavia has played a major role in developing these ties, as has the form of communism which has evolved in the country since the end of the Second World War. In an effort to create a socialist government that met the particular demands of a multinational state, the Yugoslav leadership has developed a defense structure that allows for the national character of each of its republics and provinces to participate in Yugoslavia's defense. At the same time, the government maintains a centrally controlled defensive arm which insures national unity. This chapter will trace and discuss the reasons for the development of the Yugoslav concept of *opstenarodna odbrana* or what is known as "total national defense."

Defense preparations in Yugoslavia proceed from the premise that small and medium-size states must be self-reliant in defense, if they are to maintain their sovereignty. Provided they have suitable military institutions and the national will to support them, such states can successfully resist and quite possibly prevent external attack, even by a superpower.² Following self-reliance and independence, to secure its defense, Yugoslav military policy is derived from four basic principles.³ Yugoslavia insists upon national sovereignty, it has refused to join any political-military bloc, it espouses international political non-alignment, and it has assumed a nonaggressive, nonprovocatory military stance.

To demonstrate its purely defensive nonprovocatory intentions, Yugoslavia emphasizes a territorial defense force in its invasion-deterrent structure. The organizational premise of self-reliance is that all able-bodied citizens mobilize to defend the country and transform the country into a veritable hornets' nest for any enemy force.

²Dusan Dozet, "The influence of International Relations on the Concept of General People's Defense," The Yugoslav Concept of General People's Defense (Belgrade: Medjunarodna Politika, 1970), p. 126.

³Horst Mendershausen, Territorial Defense in NATO and Non-NATO Europe (Santa Monica, CA.: The Rand Corporation, February 1973), p. 27.

The territorial defense concept is nonaggressive, in that the force is latent, relatively lightly armed, and locally assigned. The force is bound to the geography of its own country and, being weak in offensive armament, it is unsuitable for intervention abroad.⁴ Such a force cannot strike at the enemy's homeland and, therefore, does not pose an offensive threat to its neighbors. Territorial defense forces are principally infantry in their tactical and support forces, designed to frustrate a mobile enemy force and deny the enemy access to key terrain.

A territorial defense force is unable to destroy an invading force by itself. Yugoslavia's defense thinking, therefore, is strongly influenced by the presence of superpower military blocs on either side of it. The Yugoslavs do not believe that a state of 22 million people could successfully resist an unlimited attack by a superpower entirely on its own. But they assert that by placing a primary emphasis on self-defense efforts, it can benefit from the superpowers balancing each other off without Yugoslavia being forced into an unwanted military alliance.⁵ Yugoslavia, therefore, feels

⁴Jon L. Lellenberg, Overview of the Citizen-Army Concept (Menlo Park, CA.: Stanford Research Institute, October, 1972), p. 30.

⁵Mendershausen, Territorial Defense in NATO and Non-NATO Europe, p. 85.

free to emphasize territorial defense under the assumption that an aggressor on its territory will have to reckon with the aggressor's opposing bloc's forces. An invader would have to guard against intervention by the other superpower. Yugoslavia, then, relies on an inoffensive deterrent by way of territorial defense. In a speech at Belgrade during the Soviet-Yugoslav rift in 1951, Tito expressed this view of superpowers balancing each other:

In the West there are voices which say that Yugoslavia is in danger and that an attack against Yugoslavia would imply the grave threat of a wider conflict. This does us no harm; on the contrary; since it is a question of our security and since it diminishes the possibility of anyone's deciding to attack.⁶

A consideration that has played as important a role in the Yugoslav decision to place a heavy reliance upon the territorial defense concept is the fact that the peacetime budgetary cost of a largely latent logistics support of a territorial unit is lower than that of an operating or combat-ready logistics support of a standing force of the same wartime strength.⁷ Among the political and economic pressures placed on defense structures is their high cost,

⁶Josip Broz Tito speaking on 16 February 1951, Documents on International Affairs 1951 (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 379.

⁷Savo Drljevic, "The Role of Geo-Political, Socio-Economic, and Military-Strategic Factors," The Yugoslav Concept of General People's Defense (Belgrade: Mejunarodna Politika, 1970), p. 216.

and territorial forces recommend themselves as being relatively inexpensive. The peacetime budgetary cost of a short-term military-trained individual who requires supplemental training each year is considerably less than that of a full-time professional soldier. Therefore, any defense program which can keep the level of professional soldiers at a minimum and still provide adequate national defense is more suitable to a small country with a small national budget.

The overall peacetime cost between a force that is largely of the territorial type can be dramatically compared with that of a largely standing field army type by the following examples. Switzerland supports a wartime force of about 640,000 men which is capable of being mobilized in approximately 48 hours with an annual peacetime budget of \$1.6 billion.⁸ The Federal Republic of Germany supports a wartime force of about 1,250,000 men with an annual budget of \$17.3 billion.⁹ That comes to \$2,500 per year per Swiss soldier and \$14,000 per year per West German soldier. This shows a 1 to 6 cost comparison which demonstrates the economic advantage of a largely territorial defense-oriented

⁸The Military Balance 1978-1979 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1978), p. 22.

⁹Ibid., p. 24.

force. While the force capabilities or defensive requirements of these two armies are not comparable, both are providing sufficient defense for their respective countries. Given the circumstances of Yugoslavia and the understanding that the defense budget competes with other budgets for resources, Yugoslavia is able to take advantage of its geopolitical position and the less expensive form of defense - the reliance on territorial defense forces.

The Yugoslav defense doctrine has included the use of partisan-type territorial defense since the success Yugoslavia achieved from its use in the Second World War.¹⁰ After 1948 however, the thought on military problems was that the territorial forces and the partisan method of waging war were more or less considered as auxiliary forms of the armed forces and reduced, in substantial part, to their tactical values. By the end of 1951, in view of the threat of a Soviet invasion, following the rift in relations between the two countries, Yugoslavia had increased its army to 42 divisions and had about half a million men under arms; the army was fully operational at this time, not a guerrilla organization.¹¹

¹⁰ Josip Broz Tito speech, Yugoslav Facts and Views (New York: Yugoslav Information Center, No. 108, February 1977).

¹¹ The New York Times (December 22, 1951).

Tito stressed Yugoslavia's determination to defend its borders and not to retreat to the mountains. Additionally, because of the army's ability to defend the country, it was insulting, Tito claimed, to say that the Yugoslav army was only suited for guerrilla fighting.¹²

It was recognized, however, that partisan units might be required in the event of an attack, so plans were prepared for their deployment.¹³ The concept of partisan units remained in the defense doctrine and was demonstrated in the 1953 mass military maneuvers, when partisan units were incorporated into the operations.¹⁴ The period 1958-1959 saw a significant turning point in the development of the concept of national defense, after the principles and advantages of guerrilla warfare were re-innovated and the doctrine of combined open and partisan warfare were adopted. At this stage of development, however, the partisan units were formed within the Yugoslav People's Army and were not scheduled to be brought to full wartime strength

¹²The New York Time (December 22, 1951).

¹³Milojica Pantelic, "The System and Organization of National Defense," Yugoslav Survey, Belgrade, Vol. X, No. 2 (May 1969), p. 1.

¹⁴Robert B. Asprey, "Tito's Army," Marine Corps Gazette, Quantico, Vol. 41, No. 7 (July 1957), p. 48.

and mobilization until after a conflict had begun. It was not until later that work organizations and socio-political communities were given a defensive role in the country, beyond that of civil defense.¹⁵

Concurrent with the recognized role of partisan units, however, was a reduction in defense capabilities which followed from the 1955 beginning of improved Soviet-Yugoslav relations. By 1968 the Yugoslav People's Army was down to some 200,000 men, and defense expenditures had fallen from a high of 22 percent of the national income to less than six percent.¹⁶

The Yugoslav constitution of 1946 established a federal state on the Soviet model and the USSR Constitution of 1936. After the 1948 break with the Soviet Union, however, Yugoslav leaders presented principles of self-management and the subsequent decentralization to justify Yugoslavia's existence outside of the socialist model it had tried so hard to live with.¹⁷ Basing self-management on the principles of

¹⁵Milojica Pantelic, "The Role of the Armed Forces in the System of National Defense," Yugoslav Survey, Belgrade, Vol. X, No. 4 (November 1969).

¹⁶A. Ross Johnson, Total National Defense in Yugoslavia (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, December 1971), p. 2.

¹⁷Vladimir Dedijer, The Battle Stalin Lost (New York: The Viking Press, 1971), p. 293.

gave socialist justification for their actions, but it was only after the announcement of workers' self-management in 1950 that federalism was actually implemented. The break with Moscow opened the eyes of the Yugoslav leaders to what Edvard Kardelj termed "the danger of bureaucratic centralism."¹⁸

The main outline of the self-management system evolved during the period 1950-1954, which began a period of extreme decentralization in many respects. In the economy, where most of the changes were taking place, the elimination of direct federal controls plus the wide autonomy for local governments, went so far as to produce an abundance of autonomous economic units and what would later be viewed as extreme forms of localism.

With the implementation of the self-management system, the first major steps toward decentralization of economic decision-making began with the 1957-1961 five year plan.¹⁹ The transfer of authority that occurred in the late 1950's was primarily from the federal authorities to republic and local government organs in relation to major economic policy decisions. These regarded the location of new industries

¹⁸ George W. Hoffman and Fred W. Neal, Yugoslavia and the New Communism (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962) p. 211.

¹⁹ Fred B. Singleton, Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 150.

and production methods, marketing, and production planning in enterprises. The five-year economic plans were actually planning guides for the economy, because the federal government frequently interfered in the operation of the market by subsidizing unprofitable enterprises, directing investment resources according to social and political rather than economic criteria, establishing some commodity prices, and so on.

The contradictions of decentralization arose partly from the struggle between reformers and the more conservative elements, who saw their positions threatened by the abandonment of the old policies within the decision-making bodies. To control the rate of decentralization in the economy, the conservatives were able to control, at least indirectly, the allocation of investments by restricting the accumulation of capital and restricting the use of investment funds.

After the first decade of workers' self-management, the gain in experience led in the early 1960's to the widening of the concept to include all aspects of public life.²⁰ The term "social self-management" was used to indicate that workers in publicly-owned enterprises, as in

²⁰ Singleton, Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia, p. 270.

the past, and participants in all other forms of social activity, cultural, political, or recreational, had the right to govern themselves. A new constitution was drafted in 1959 to incorporate this concept into society, and was adopted in 1963.

Enterprises were given more decision-making authority at the expense of republic and federal government agencies, and the republics were given more authority at the expense of the federal government.²¹ The unified market, however, along with other basic unifying principles, remained. Republics were not permitted to erect barriers between themselves to impede or hinder the free flow of capital, goods, and labor. Common laws regarding foreign trade, customs, duties, etc., were also retained along with a common currency. The basic principles of self-management and of the socialist economic and political systems remained unchanged, and they also were held in common by all republics. The federal government was charged with responsibility for the economically backward regions of the country, and held the power to raise taxes to pay for these services. A complicated system of checks and balances was established,

²¹ Singleton, Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia, p. 271.

which required the agreement of the republics to any extension of federal powers.

The 1963 constitution restructured the Federal Assembly and gave increasing power to various economic and social interests by giving them representation in newly established, indirectly elected chambers.²² The principle of rotation of incumbents in office was introduced, and the separation of the party and the state was advanced by a rule that prohibited the simultaneous holding by one individual of high state and party office. This applied to everyone, except Tito.

Even though decentralization had been formally promulgated and reform was being implemented, there was no immediate success with the programs nor was the concept accepted by everyone. Unemployment was growing and the standard of living, particularly for the least well paid, was falling.²³ The role of the state in the redistribution of national income was reduced, and prices were permitted to respond to supply and demand. Certain economic sectors had been unfairly penalized by altered price ratios or other reform measures.

²² Singleton, Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia, p. 271.

²³ Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948-1974, p. 196.

Those in leading or middle-level positions in the party, state, and economic apparatuses, who had felt deep-seated reservations before the new reforms were adopted, were not willing to wait for the reforms to fail completely to be proven right.²⁴ Those in positions who were opposed to the new reforms sought surreptitiously to undermine the efforts to change. It was evident that the reforms would never really be implemented, unless those in opposition could be disciplined or removed from the positions which enabled them to block the reforms. The group opposed favored strong centralized government with a communist bent for economic development stressing conspicuous and expensive investment projects.

Tito had refrained for a time from speaking out against the anti-reform group by name but only referred to its members as "bureaucratic and etatist forces" and "class enemies."²⁵ In July 1966, however, Tito decided that an end had to come to the anti-reform movement and he forced the resignation of Aleksandar Rankovic, Vice-President of Yugoslavia, for being part of a factional group engaged in

²⁴Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948-1974, p. 180.

²⁵Ibid, p. 184.

in a struggle for power, against economic reforms, and opposed to the programs of decentralization.

The ousting of Rankovic signified a beginning of the liberalization trend. The State Security Service, which had been an extension of Rankovic's power, underwent a reorganization and a new director was appointed. But the sentiment against the State Security Service as a strong central government agency began to affect other centralized agencies. The Army began to fall under scrutiny as well, even though it had helped in the removal of Rankovic.

A year earlier, when major reforms were being implemented, the federal budget was supposed to have been reduced to include a cut in defense expenditures.²⁶ In fact, however, the cut in defense spending was never made, and the 1966 budget called for an increase in defense spending. Six months after the dismissal of Rankovic, in December 1966, parliamentary discussion on the defense budget for 1967 was particularly critical.²⁷ The deputies eventually agreed to pass the defense budget, but with a recommendation that the Defense Ministry take into

²⁶ Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948-19744, p. 117.

²⁷ "Yugoslavia to Reform its Armed Forces," The Times (December 29, 1966), p. 6; London.

consideration all the objections voiced by the National Assembly committees on excessive spending by the military.

Up until that time, the defense budget usually had been approved without discussion. Since then, matters not adversely affecting the security of the army or the state have been subject to public discussion and parliamentary control. The army had had its way for over 20 years, and now it was being told to adjust to the country's economic needs and to do with less than what it wanted. Discussions about the army, an institution which before then had been closed to public control, gave further evidence that the reforms, though mainly economic, had political implications. This amounted in effect to a public confrontation between the military point of view and that of the reformists.

Under growing pressure from younger industrial managers and administrative technocrats, the army leaders were compelled to decrease defense expenditures while still meeting the defense requirements of the country. To comply with contemporary defense requirements, the army announced plans to reorganize to an operational force capable of resisting the first strike and a territorial force of people's army under the scheme of a "total national defense system."

The State Secretariat for National Defense proposed to the Federal Assembly in 1966 that a new Law on National Defense be passed to incorporate the new concept of a

"general-popular" defense war.²⁸ The concept required the organization and preparation not only of the military, but also the civil organs and organizations, as well as every citizen, for the defense of the country. The reorganization of the army was to be carried out in 1967 and was to cut back on the size of the regular army to a small operational force remaining under the unified federal command. Each republic then would have its own territorial army under local command, and with a distinctly local character.

The regular armed forces provided a solid core around which the irregular partisan forces could form. The Yugoslav People's Army maintains its integral place in strategic planning which allowed military planners to think in terms of a mixed forces, combining elements of both traditional and guerrilla strategies.

The operational army continues to be regarded as the backbone, the principle component of national defense. It alone is capable, in terms of its weapons, technical equipment, power, mobility, organization, and trained cadres, to wage regular²⁹ frontal battles - in all forms of operations.

²⁸The Times (December 29, 1966); London.

²⁹Jovan Radovanovic, "The Operational Army," The Yugoslav Concept of General People's Defense (Belgrade: Medjunarodna Politika, 1970), p. 271.

The Yugoslav military planners were cognizant of three particular lessons which came out of the experiences of the Second World War.³⁰ While the amount of manpower which the aggressor can devote is more or less fixed, the defense can draw upon the greater resources of the entire country. While the aggressor may enjoy marked superiority in material factors, the resultant advantages can be neutralized by various forms of unconventional opposition. And while the aggressor may have an advantage in speed, in terms of time and space, these will nevertheless be insufficient to exert control over the occupied territory and population.

Territorial defense units were acknowledged as more economical than massive conventional military buildups. This was a major consideration because of the questionable success of the 1965 economic reforms, the extensive demand on Yugoslav resources, and the political undesirability of outside assistance. The extensive decentralization of the mid-1960's had also added a domestic political limitation, in the form of unwillingness of the non-Serbian republics to see a reconcentration of power in Belgrade. This was understandable, considering that 67 percent

³⁰ Andro Gabelic, "The Universal Substance of General People's Defense," The Yugoslav Concept of General People's Defense (Belgrade: Medjunarodna Politika, 1970), p. 136.

of all positions in the federal organs of administration were held by Serbs, who made up roughly 40 percent of the total population.³¹ In the military, the Serbs made up 60 percent of the officers corps and 47 percent of all general officers.³²

While several ranking military men began to recognize the greater need for a total national defense, there were among them those who still advocated strong central control. The military claimed that the 1967 budget was below the real needs of the services, but it was still scrutinized and approved only begrudgingly by the federal assembly. After the purging of Rankovic, many of these military men began to be replaced. In May 1967 General Ivan Gosnjak lost his post as Secretary of National Defense³³ and by the end of the 1967 the new Secretary, General Nikola Ljubicic, had committed himself to a significant change of emphasis in defense policy. To replace the 1965 National Defense Law, General Ljubicic announced:

³¹Izborni Sistem u Uslovima Samoupravljanja (Belgrade: Institut Društvenih Nauka, 1969), p. 104.

³²Zdenko Antic, "National Structure of the Yugoslav Army Leadership," Radio Free Europe Research, No. 1373 (April 12, 1972), p. 3.

³³Adam Roberts, Nations In Arms (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 158.

The present law does not fully reflect our concept of national defense, the concept of conducting a 'general-popular' defense war, which requires the organization and preparation, not only of the military but also of the civil organs and organizations as well as the citizens, for the defense of the country. The basic thing is to tell, in a more specific way, every citizen, every work organization or socio-political community, where its place is and what is its duty. The new law will elaborate more specifically certain basic constitutional provisions.³⁴

Since 1967 the regular military establishment has undergone an "opening to society." Military affairs came to be discussed in public media as well as by the parliament. The changing character of the party and the proposal to create republican military forces alongside the federal army was paralleled by the evolution of Yugoslav constitutional law. The constitution adopted in 1963, as amended in 1967 and 1968, brought about a reorganization of the central government, accompanied by an expansion of the rights and responsibilities of the republics. The latter possessed their own state prosecutors and shared with Belgrade control over a much reduced security police. Together with the federal government, the republics were responsible for civil defense, and each republic was to have under the proposed

³⁴ Nikola Ljubicic, "Yugoslav National Defense," Survival, Vol. X, No. 2 (February 1968), p. 48.

military reorganization a territorial defense unit of its own.³⁵

Despite the conflict between reformists and centralists over the new role of the army, however, there were no immediate changes made. The exact definition of roles had to be worked out between the operational army and the territorial units, and there was no sense of danger or crisis to justify a major shake-up of the army.³⁶ The political implications of the reorganization of the army and the relations among the nationalities and national groups in Yugoslavia delayed the introduction and passage of the new defense bill until after the unexpected Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.

Yugoslavia had traditionally tried to play off one bloc against the other in an attempt to secure sufficient latitude for its own particular brand of ideology and political system. The alternating movements had been relatively easy to identify, lasting a period of several years in each of the superpowers' direction.

³⁵R. V. Burks, The National Problem and the Future of Yugoslavia (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, October 1971), p. 24.

³⁶Roberts, Nations in Arms, p. 160.

In the period immediately preceding the invasion of Czechoslovakia there was little concern among Yugoslav leaders about Soviet intentions. Tito and his aides were warning about the threat posed by "Western imperialism."³⁷ The Yugoslav military establishment conducted war games oriented toward defense against an attack from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, while the Yugoslav press was writing about the U.S. conduct in Vietnam and the possibility of another Middle East crisis. While Tito was concerned about the posture of "Western imperialism," he showed no alarm at the Warsaw Pact maneuvering on Czechoslovakia's borders, seen only as a measure to put new pressure on the Prague government. Yugoslavia thus misread the political situation in a surprisingly inept manner.

The Czech invasion was particularly shocking to Yugoslavia, because it undermined some assumptions the Yugoslavs had made about the balance of forces in the world. Belgrade felt that there had been a worldwide swing to the right with U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and the possibility of Soviet military involvement in another socialist country, a repeat of 1956 in Hungary, had never been considered. The

³⁷ Andrew Borowiec, Yugoslavia After Tito (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), p. 93.

Yugoslav leaders saw a Soviet foreign policy based on the old principles of power politics and spheres of influence.

It was not inconceivable to the Yugoslavs that if the Soviets were willing to pay the cost of their operation in Czechoslovakia they might also invade Yugoslavia. By doing so the Soviets could achieve three objectives: eliminate a dangerous rival model of socialism as practiced by the Yugoslavs, provide bases for the rapidly expanding Soviet Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea, and outflank NATO from the southeast.³⁸

Other indications that the Soviet Union might invade came from a briefing by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to U.S. congressional leaders two days after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.³⁹ The information given to the press which emerged from the briefing concerned Soviet troop movements, suggesting a "harassment or possible invasion of Yugoslavia." Such a report had to be given credibility, particularly since it was known that the man who had been in charge of Czechoslovakia's military liaison with the Warsaw Treaty Organization, Major General Jan Sejna,

³⁸ Peter Nichols, "Fears of Russian Drive South," The Times (October 9, 1968); London.

³⁹ Louis Heren, "Soviet Troops Heading for Yugoslav Border," The Times (August 26, 1968), p. 1.

had defected to the West earlier that year and would have known about such plans.⁴⁰

Additionally contributing to the Yugoslav leaders' fear that their country's independence and territorial sovereignty was threatened were articles such as the one in Pravda which appeared one month after the Czech invasion:

It has got to be emphasized that when a socialist country seeks to adopt a 'non-affiliated' stand it, in actual fact, retains its national independence precisely thanks to the might of the socialist community, and above all the Soviet Union as its central force, which also includes the might of its armed forces. The weakening of any of the links in the world socialist system directly affects all the socialist countries, which cannot look indifferently upon this.⁴¹

Upon mobilization after the Czech invasion, however, the Yugoslavs found that they were unable to defend their country. It was discovered that there were only two Yugoslav customs officers and a few national policemen standing in the way of the Soviet army. Vladimir Bakaric, the communist party leader of Croatia, stated that the Soviet Army could have punched through the Yugoslav

⁴⁰ Jeffrey Hart, "Soviet Plans for Balkans," The San Francisco Examiner (April 8, 1974), p. 31.

⁴¹ Sergei Kovalyov, "Sovereignty and International Duties," Pravda (September 26, 1968), as translated in Survival, Vol. X, No. 11 (November 1968), p. 375.

defenses to Zagreb in six hours and to the Adriatic coast in 12 hours.⁴²

An outcome of the detailed inspection of the country's defenses resulted in the acceptance of the new strategic concept of total national defense, which was unsuccessfully opposed by some circles in the professional army. Another outcome of faulty strategic planning was the purge of nine top generals on orders of President Tito. The purged officers, including the deputy chairman of the National Defense Council, General Ivan Goshnjak, who had been relieved as Secretary of National Defense two years earlier, and the chief of the general staff, General Rade Hamovic, were accused of "having made inadequate defense preparations and having a faulty strategic concept".⁴³

Hurriedly, the general staff of the army began drawing up plans to counter a possible Soviet invasion, where previous planning and officer training had completely ignored this possibility.⁴⁴ By November 7, 1968, the new defense

⁴²Reported by David Binder, "Yugoslavs Purge Army Generals," The New York Times (April 15, 1969), p. 1.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴David Binder, "Yugoslavia Turning Increasingly Toward West as Result of Soviet Policy," The New York Times (April 18, 1969), p. 12.

bill was finally passed by the federal government and sent to the Federal Assembly for adoption; it was approved by the Federal Assembly on 19 February 1969. Again the delays were caused by the necessity to balance a modernized defense force with greater republican autonomy. The desire for the limitation of central government controls by those wanting more decentralization had to be balanced with the desires of the traditionalists who saw greater independence of the republic governments as being detrimental to the federal government.

After the Soviet invasion, the Yugoslav leaders realized that their military capabilities were inadequate to defend the country and that developing an even larger conventional standing army was not a feasible solution. The economic difficulties the federal budget was experiencing did not permit massive military expenditures. The internal political system that had begun in the middle to late 1960's, that decentralized the role from a strong federal government to the constituted republic governments, did not permit a concentration of power back to the federal government - which would have been the case with a large-scale army. And, had these not been obstacles, the Yugoslavs realized that their army could not match the highly mobile army of a major power, and it would have been futile to resist.

The intent of the 1969 law, then, was to face the Soviet with the probability of extended guerrilla resistance, even

if the Warsaw Pact troops managed to destroy the Yugoslav People's Army in a single blow. But the reformers also wanted to provide each republic with an armed force of its own, in the hope of deterring elements in the People's Army from intervening at some point in the process of decentralization and forcibly reversing it.⁴⁵

The most significant military and political implications of the February 1969 law extended to every "social and political unit" the obligation and responsibility "to organize total national defense and to command the battle directly." The most important feature of the new doctrine was that it provided for the population to be integrated into the active defense of the country under the control of a hierarchy, independent of the regular forces' chain of command.⁴⁶ Moreover, the makeup of Yugoslavia suggested that the new force be organized on the pattern of the existing political structure.

By permitting local communities to participate directly in the defense of the country it was reasoned that the

⁴⁵Burks, The National Problem and the Future of Yugoslavia, p. 22.

⁴⁶Axel Horhager, "Yugoslavia's Defense," Military Review, Vol. LVII, No. 6 (June 1977), p. 59.

concept of self-management, implemented elsewhere in Yugoslav society, represented the interests of the working-class and each of the republics as nationality groups.⁴⁷ Total national defense incorporates a defense in depth throughout the country by every able bodied person and poses a deterrent to possible invaders facing such a broad based resistance. An attack against Yugoslavia then is an attack against the Yugoslav road to socialism, of decentralized socialism. The federal leadership hoped that each republic would realize, if the system of government falls to invasion, each republic will suffer; this being the impetus for them to defend the country against an enemy.

By transferring responsibility for defense to society as a whole, and not only to a number of specialized organizations and agencies we have manifoldly increased our defense capability and at the same time made a significant step towards the realization of the idea of Marxist classics of an armed people. Now in our self-management society there are real conditions for concern for our defense to become the right and duty of all people. This has already become a component part of life and work in factories and socio-political communities and organizations, in schools, and at universities. Needless to say, defense matters must to a still greater extent become the subject of study and concern in all environments.⁴⁸

⁴⁷Josip Broz Tito, "Basic Factors of Strength in Total National Defense," Yugoslav Survey, Vol. XVIII, No. 4 (November 1977), p. 14.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 15.

By giving the republics more independence and responsibility for national defense, the army was forced to relinquish its previous seclusion from local politics and isolation from the socio-political community. If there had been political ambitions among the military elite on a federal level, the opportunities to implement them in the future began to be checked by those forces in the country favoring a confederative organization of government. At the same time, however, that the army came out of socio-political isolation where it had not previously played a political role beyond that of national defense from external threats, the door opened for the regular army to become the guarantor of Yugoslavia's unity and defender of its revolutionary achievements.

Under the National Defense Law, the Yugoslav People's Army provided the operational force of the nation's defense tasked with meeting the first strike of the enemy force, preventing the enemy's penetration into the country, and allowing the rest of the country time to undertake total mobilization. The territorial units under the republics were organized in all enterprises, communes, provinces, and republics and tasked with defending the entire country in depth and from all sides rather than just from a frontal battle line.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Zdenko Antic, "Yugoslavia Prepared to Wage All-Out People's War in Case of an Attack," Radio Free Europe Research (November 26, 1968), p. 4.

The law provided for the territorial defense units to have their own headquarters and to be completely decentralized both in logistics and command. They became an integral part of the armed forces, which closely cooperates with the regular army and under certain conditions under the command of the operational forces. Being under the control of the republic governments fully incorporated the territorial defense units into the socio-political community, as the financial and logistical support for the territorial units began to be borne by the local governments.⁵⁰

The third facet of the defense law provided for civil defense units organized in urban and rural areas by households, enterprises, and communes tasked with protecting the population and the material goods of the community.⁵¹

The total national defense concept, with territorial defense units made up of the Yugoslav population, also provided international legal protection for those citizens involved in the defense of the country.⁵² As Yugoslavs

⁵⁰ Milojica Pantelic, "The System and Organization of National Defense," Yugoslav Survey, Belgrade, Vol. X, No. 2 (May 1969), p. 6.

⁵¹ Antic, "Yugoslavia Prepared to Wage All-Out People's War in Case of an Attack," p. 5.

⁵² Gavro Perazic, "The Yugoslav National Defense Law From the Standpoint of International Law," The Yugoslav Concept of General People's Defense (Belgrade: Medjunarodna Politika, 1970), p. 155.

were now bound by law to fight, the formation of territorial defense units qualified them as legal organized fighters protected under international law. The new military concept involving all able bodied men and women was also based on unifying the citizenry and the military when facing an enemy. General Ljubicic expressed the view that

there is not a hierarchy of elements in the system of nation-wide defense, but a combination of reactions in which any success by one expands the radius for action by others; partial failures are therefore easier to bear and their negative consequences may be more rapidly eliminated.⁵³

Difficulties with the 1969 law, which directed the local authorities to establish their own territorial units and direct resistance against the enemy in an attack, created a chain of command problem when regular army units operated in the territory of a given local command. In the presence of the regular army, the territorial defense units were subordinated to the command of the Yugoslav People's Army unit with which they cooperate in the defense. If the territory became overrun by the enemy, however, the role of directing resistance reverted back to the control of the

⁵³Nikola Ljubicic, "General People's Defense - The Guarantee of Independence for Socialist Yugoslavia," The Yugoslav Concept of General People's Defense (Belgrade: Medjunarodna Politika, 1970), p. 37.

republic.⁵⁴ The National Defense Law of 1974 corrected this by making the president of each republic the supreme commander of the armed forces in each republic during war to ensure a unified direction and control of the military effort.

The new defense law of 1974 which superseded the 1969 version was designed to standardize organizational practices and hierarchical relations in the national defense. As in the previous defense law, the principles of workers' self-management were used as the basis for territorial defense. There was a shift of control, however, and the federal government began to provide more direction for the total defense system, though local initiative still controls the territorial forces during peacetime and all forces during war. The new 1974 law was seen as an improvement in the balance between local autonomy and federal control of national defense.

⁵⁴Yugoslavia, The National Defense Law (1969), article 26.

III. YUGOSLAV PEOPLE'S ARMY AND TERRITORIAL DEFENSE

It is almost a rule that aggressions are not tried against those countries and people who are expected to demonstrate strong resistance and where the outcome of war would be uncertain for the aggressor.⁵⁵

The relationship between the Yugoslav People's Army and the Territorial Defense Force has changed as the defensive role of each has been redefined. The Territorial Defense Force was created along republican lines at the height of decentralization in the 1960's at what the centralists (those wanting a strong central government) felt, was the expense of the Yugoslav People's Army. Until the 1969 National Defense Law established the Territorial Defense Force, the Yugoslav People's Army was the sole defender of the country. It was forced to share that power by decentralist forces within Yugoslavia who felt the autonomy of the republics was threatened by the autonomy they saw the army achieving at the federal level.

Sharing the task of defending the nation did not alter the fact that the Yugoslav People's Army was still the ultimate guardian of Yugoslavia's territory. The first line

⁵⁵ Josip Broz Tito, quoted by Dzemil Sarac, Vjesnik (21 April 1979); Zagreb.

of defense remained the operational army which was tasked through its strength and equipment to defend along the frontiers and frustrate infiltration in the interior of the country. The Territorial Defense Force was placed in the position of supporting the operation army's efforts as the second line of defense.

The Yugoslav defense strategy is to make the country an armed fortress capable of resisting an attacking force by using both the army and the Territorial Defense Force. Yugoslav military leaders recognize that the country cannot withstand aggression by a superpower (which they consider to be the worst situation they might face) but they believe that a total national defense can successfully counteract such aggression until assistance from another power could help them repulse the aggressor.⁵⁶ This strategy assumes that the Warsaw Pact will not tolerate a Western intervention of Yugoslavia, nor will NATO stand idle and permit a Soviet invasion.⁵⁷

To achieve the defense structure that Yugoslavia needs the armed forces have undergone a profound reorganization, not only in the philosophy of how to defend the country,

⁵⁶Savo Drljevic, "The Role of Geo-Political, Socio-Economic, and Military-Strategic Factors," p. 210.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 210.


but also in the strength of the military and the size of participation. In 1978, the operational army, which is also the cadre for training the territorial forces, consisted of 200,000, 65 percent of which were conscripts. The air force had 40,000 (7,000 conscripts), and the navy (including marines) had 27,000 (8,000 conscripts).⁵⁸ The Territorial Defense Force in peacetime consists of 3,000 instructors; theoretically it can be expanded to 1.5 million men in 48 hours. The eventual target is 3 million men in territorial defense units. With the operational army and the civil defense workers this would amount to 5 million men and women, or 25 percent of the population.⁵⁹

The Territorial Defense Force units are subordinated to local and republican defense commands but fall under the command of the Yugoslav People's Army. Since 1972, when certain rights of the republics were curtailed, the General Staff of the Yugoslav People's Army was inserted into the Territorial Defense Force chain of command to emphasize the role of the Territorial Defense Force as part of a unified system. Apart from the political curtailments the redefinition of the chain of command was necessary from a military

⁵⁸ The Military Balance, 1978-1979, p. 32-33.

⁵⁹ Andrew Borowiec, Yugoslavia After Tito (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), p. 95.


THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TERRITORIAL DEFENSE FORCE
AND THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLE'S ARMY GENERAL STAFF



point of view to avoid confusion or conflict between the operation army and the territorial units.⁶⁰

The Party gave greater influence to the Yugoslav People's Army over the Territorial Defense Force, but the Territorial Defense Force units remain politically responsive to their local and republican political organizations. The local and republican governments continue to organize and finance

**THE COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
THE REGIONAL CIVIL GOVERNMENTS AND
THE TERRITORIAL DEFENSE COMMANDS**



⁶⁰ Adam Roberts, Nations In Arms, p. 178.

their subordinate defense units as directed by the Yugoslav constitution and they continued to nominate candidates for Territorial Defense Force command posts.⁶¹

Once the relationship between the Yugoslav People's Army and the Territorial Defense Force began to jell the role of the citizen-soldier became accepted. The major features of Yugoslavia's new approach to national defense, based on the recognition that Yugoslavia needs to be self-reliant in defense if it is to maintain its sovereignty,⁶² became set. As a single state Yugoslavia has an institution involving the entire citizenry in national defense.

The responsibilities of citizenship have been formalized in the constitution, which states that it is the right and duty of every citizen to participate in national defense and that no one has the right to acknowledge or sign an act of capitulation, nor accept or recognize the occupation of Yugoslavia.⁶³ This theme as part of Yugoslavia's national defense policy has been incorporated with its foreign

⁶¹Lazar Djurovski, "National Defense," Yugoslav Survey, Vol. XV, No. 3 (August 1974), p. 77.

⁶²Dusan Dozet, "The Influence of International Relations on the Conception of General People's Defense," p. 126.

⁶³Lazar Djurovski, "National Defense," p. 75.

policy of non-alignment to develop a Gaullist-like *defense a tous azimuts*.

The philosophy behind *defense a tous azimuts* has been expressed very clearly by Lt. General Dzemil Sarac, until recently Secretary of the Conference of the League of Communists of the Yugoslav People's Army and undersecretary in the country's defense ministry.

Every country has the right to defend itself against aggression, regardless of which side it might come from... . Aggression remains aggression, and occupants remain occupants, regardless of what flag they wave or what slogans they try to justify their plans for conquest. Armed resistance against any military intervention or aggression is the natural right of every people and every country.⁶⁴

Yugoslav military leaders believe that the operational army is capable of halting an attack by a neighboring country that does not have full support from a superpower. They recognize that such aggression, though, might require progressive reinforcement of the operational army by the territorial army. In this situation, territorial units would operate together with the operational units within the span of a front under a unified command of the Yugoslav People's Army. "In this variant the territorial army or

⁶⁴Dzemil Sarac, Vjesnik (21 April 1979), Zagreb, Yugoslavia.

rather its main force would largely perform the function of an unending source of manpower and means of reinforcing the ranks and supplies of the operational army."⁶⁵ Yugoslavia has neither the means nor the intention to compete with the world military superpowers. But it does have the intention to take all necessary measures to equal other European armies in equipment and capabilities in order to defend the country.⁶⁶

General Sarac's comments came in response to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the Chinese invasion of Vietnam. Yugoslavia deplored the fact that nonaligned socialist countries were involved in wars against each other. Yugoslavia took this position because it realizes its own vulnerability. Relations with Bulgaria, for example, have been cool for some time, and Yugoslavia has had to continually remind its socialist neighbors of its right to defend itself. While no one in Yugoslavia publically states a belief that the Soviet Union would invade the country, an invasion by a superpower hasn't been completely ruled out, either.

Prior to the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia thought that Western imperialism was the

⁶⁵Savo Drljevic, "The Role of Geo-Political, Socio-Economic, and Military-Strategic Factors," p. 212.

⁶⁶Rajko Tanaskovic, "Kako Cemo Se Braniti" [How We Will Defend Ourselves] Nedeljne Informativne Novine, Vol. 1468 (15 February 1979), p. 11.

threat which the military would have to defend against. The defense doctrine was reoriented, however, to a defense from all points when evidence showed the possibility of Yugoslavia being attacked from the east. The Yugoslavs now consider a blitzkrieg attack by either superpower as the major threat to their defense, and it is against just such an attack that Yugoslavia has prepared.

The military believes aggression would begin by an air attack to the most important targets in the depth of the country, quickly followed by an assault of armored and mechanized forces in selected directions, combined with airborne troops attacks, and air support.⁶⁷ Such an attack could take place in conjunction with a major power maneuver and an aggression could be launched in a matter of hours. An air attack would precede, to neutralize as many counter-force targets as possible, achieve air superiority, and assist the ground attack. This would prepare the way for a joint armor assault against the forwardly deployed Yugoslav People's Army. Airborne and airmobile troops would assault the major cities after the cities had been fired upon from the air and by artillery. The outer limits to the size of such an attacking force, well-equipped with

⁶⁷ Nikola Ljubovic, Total National Defense - Strategy of Peace (Belgrade: NIRO "Komunist," 1977) p. 162.

modern technical means, would be approximately 8 soldiers per square kilometer. This would require a force of at least two million men, which is over two-thirds of the total peacetime armed forces now at the disposal of even the greatest military powers.⁶⁸

Under such an attack the operational army of the Yugoslav armed forces would offer maximum resistance to provide the rest of the country time to mobilize. It would then gradually transform itself into smaller units at the front and the rear to conduct a largely partisan-type war. Certain units in the Territorial Defense Force are prepared to mobilize and receive a combat task within hours of notification.⁶⁹ The distinction between the operational and the territorial army would largely be eliminated and the operational army would merge with the territorial units and other elements of the resistance.

The main part of the territorial units would be transformed into a new operational formation, while a considerable section would remain as part of minor territorial units for local defense. The new operational army would operate within

⁶⁸Nikola Ljubovic, Total National Defense - Strategy of Peace, p. 135.

⁶⁹Rajko Tanaskovic, "Kako Cemo Se Braniti" [How We Will Defend Ourselves], p. 11.

the republican framework or be used according to strategic needs throughout the country. This form of deployment would provide for an operational army and scattered territorial units, the goal being to preserve the main part of the operational army. Nationwide resistance, however, would be permanent even if total partisan warfare had to be resorted to.⁷⁰

Yugoslavia, however, cannot muster an army large enough to oppose a major bloc invasion. The strategy then is to create a territorial defense comprised of various territorial units which would carry operations against the enemy. These operations would influence the opposition provided by units of the operational army at the front, long enough to permit another major political bloc comes to assist in the defense.⁷¹

To provide the manpower for total national defense, compulsory military service is part of the military obligation of all Yugoslav male citizens; women are not presently subject to military service. Men are subject to being called to serve when they reach the age of nineteen and the

⁷⁰Jovan Radovanovic, "The Operational Army," The Yugoslav Concept of General People's Defense, p. 274-275.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 275.

obligation lasts until they reach the age of twenty-seven. Military service can be deferred for students in certain justified cases. Compulsory military service lasts for fifteen months in the Yugoslav People's Army and eighteen months in the navy and air force. Students who have completed the Defense and Protection courses in college only serve for twelve months in the army. After the compulsory term of service, Yugoslav citizens are required to serve in the Reserve Force or the Territorial Defense Force until the age of fifty-five.⁷²

A proposed law on compulsory military service presently before the Federal Assembly would modify the present law somewhat.⁷³ The new law would shorten the required active service obligation in the navy and air force to that of fifteen months as it is in the army. This change has been recommended because the Committee for National Defense, which proposes the new law, cannot justify the differences in lengths of service and feels that fifteen months is sufficient. Another aspect of the law would allow the recruitment of women into the operational army, "first

⁷²Milan Jovanovic, "Service in the Yugoslav Armed Forces," Yugoslav Survey, Vol. XX, No. 1 (February 1979), p. 27.

⁷³"Colonel General Branislav Joksovic, Member of the Committee of National Defense of the Federal Chamber of the Assembly of the SFRY," BORBA, 22 December 1979.

probably in service units and then in fighting units." It has been stressed that there are presently sufficient numbers of men for assignments in the armed forces, there has also been a recognition that women will play a needed role during wartime when there will not be sufficient numbers of men, therefore, women require military training. The third major proposal is the requirement that young people serve their military service after completing secondary school and before going on to studies at the universities. This would do away with student deferments and ease the training difficulties which has been experienced when training 19-year old men and 27-year old men.

The officer corps is comprised of men who have completed a military academy for the branch of service they are entering. Enrollment is based on public competition and is open to everyone who meets the general conditions for admission to active military service. In some cases active noncommissioned officers and warrant officers may receive active officer commissions. The military academic courses last three to five years, and a graduate must serve two years in the Yugoslavia People's Army for each year of schooling, but not less than six years. If an officer has completed pilot training he must serve at least

fifteen years.⁷⁴ After the Croatian crisis in 1971 and the attempt to pass a national defense law by the Croatian National Assembly for the republic of Croatia,⁷⁵ an effort was made to establish proportional representation in the officer corps. In June 1974, it was reported that an adequate national representation of students had been achieved in nearly all officers' schools.⁷⁶

The nationality composition of the Yugoslav People's Army showed a disproportionate number of Serbs in the officer

Nationality	Population (%)	Officer	Generals	High Commanders
Serbs	41.7	60.5	46.0	33.0
Croats	23.0	14.0	19.0	38.0
Slovenes	8.5	5.0	6.0	8.3
Montenegrins	3.0	8.0	19.0	8.3
Macedonians	7.0	6.0	5.0	8.3
Moslems	6.5	3.5	4.0	4.1
Albanians	6.0	2.0	0.5	---
Other	4.3	1.0	0.5	---

⁷⁴Milan Jovanovic, "Service in the Yugoslav Armed Forces," p. 27.

⁷⁵Slobodan Stankovic, "Croatian National Assembly to Adopt Own Defense Law," Radio Free Europe Research, No. 0838 Yugoslavia (21 January 1971), p. 1.

⁷⁶Robert W. Dean, "Civil-Military Relations in Yugoslavia, 1971-1975," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Fall 1976), p. 38.

ranks in general and in the general ranks in specific as of the latest figures available.⁷⁷ In the last decade Yugoslavia has attempted to balance the ethnic proportions within the officer corps of the operational army in order to alleviate potential ethnic discrimination problems.

The operational army consist of ground, naval, air, and air defense forces. The ground force is estimated to have 9 infantry divisions, 21 independent brigades, and 30 independent combat regiments.⁷⁸ The capability of the ground force to defend against an invasion, affording sufficient time for the country to mobilize the territorial defense force, is dependent upon the attacking force. While the ground force might successfully hold a defensive line against a Bulgarian attack into Macedonia or Serbia, it would be hard pressed to delay a Soviet led, multi-pronged advance across the central Hungarian plain.

The navy is organized to provide protection along the Adriatic littoral, among its many islands, and as feasible along the inland waterways. Its force includes 5 coastal submarines, 63 coastal patrol boats (including missile and

⁷⁷ Zdenko Antic, "National Structure of the Yugoslav Army Leadership," Radio Free Europe Research, p. 3.

⁷⁸ The Military Balance, 1978-1979, p. 33.

torpedo boats), amphibious warfare craft, and mine warfare craft.⁷⁹ The air elements of the Yugoslav Air and Air Defense Force include combat aircraft, transports, helicopters, and trainers. The Soviet-built MiG-21 (FISHBED) is the primary air defense aircraft while Yugoslav-built aircraft comprise the bulk of the close air ground support capability.⁸⁰ The capability for all-weather or night air support is poor as it is during night operations.

With the overall limitations of the operational army, the importance of the territorial defense units is dramatized as they may well determine the defense of the country. The main emphasis on building the Territorial Defense Force has been on company-size units at the local level. The size of the unit, however, is determined by the size of the political community on which it is based. Small rural communes provide squads and platoons; intermediate ones, companies and battalions; and large communities provide brigade-size units.

The primary role of the territorial units is the defense of their respective republics. Beyond this role, the territorial units may be used throughout the country if

⁷⁹The Military Balance, 1978-1979, p. 33.

⁸⁰Ibid, p. 33.

the situation requires it. The units comprise both ground and air defense. Units organized by factories are assigned to protect plants. Larger units such as battalions, brigades, and divisions have been given missions to initially defend the republics and therefore require greater mobility than the small local company-size units.⁸¹

The composition and distribution of the officer corps throughout the territorial units is based on equal representation of nations and nationalities in individual republics. Territorial Defense Force officers are trained as reserve officers in schools for reserve officers. Upon graduation they are commissioned and their training continues with their units, where they undergo their annual training. Annual training normally lasts less than a total of 60 days and training on weekends is limited to 60 hours in the course of a year. The number of persons commissioned as reserve officers depends on the number of personnel needed by the war table of organization of the Armed Forces.⁸²

Territorial Defense Force units are primarily armed with light antipersonnel weapons and antitank weapons

⁸¹Lazar Djurovski, "National Defense," p. 78.

⁸²Milan Jovanovic, "Service in the Yugoslav Armed Forces," p. 34.

produced in Yugoslavia. There are still some small arms which were captured during the Second World War, but for the most part, they have been copied or improved upon for present use. Heavier mobile antitank and antiaircraft weapons are found in battalion-size or larger units. Training is provided by the operational army and it includes weapon systems used by foreign armies which could conceivably be captured in the event of war. In a recent interview, Colonel-General Rajko Tanaskovic, Commandant of the Territorial Defense Force of the Federal Republic of Serbia, asserts that even though Yugoslavia doesn't have all of the most modern weapons in its military inventory, there are people in Yugoslavia who know how to use them and how to train others in their use.⁸³ To shorten the mobilization time, personal military equipment is stored at home, and weapons and unit equipment are stored in unit armories. The augmentation of sophisticated weaponry such as night vision devices, laser-target devices, sensors, and mobile communication equipment, for the territorial units is being stressed because the enemy is expected to be prepared for counterinsurgency operations.⁸⁴

⁸³ Rajko Tanaskovic, "Kako Cemo Se Braniti" [How We Will Defend Ourselves], p. 11.

⁸⁴ Aleksandar Tijanic, "How We Are Armed," Nedeljne Informativne Novine, Vol. 1511 (23 December 1979), pp. 18-19.

Joint military exercises involving the Yugoslav People's Army and the Territorial Defense Force began in October 1971. The maneuvers, called Freedom '71, were extended over the northern half of the country and were conducted to test the new concept of "total national defense." The major change in the concept that came out of Freedom '71 was a reorganized command structure for the Territorial Defense Force. It was determined that joint operations required that the General Staff of the Yugoslav People's Army be incorporated into the chain of command. The following year, maneuvers were conducted in the southern region of the country and along the Adriatic Coast. Major maneuvers have been conducted on the average of every two years, with smaller exercises being conducted continuously. Major maneuvers have involved all branches of the military, the territorial units, civil defense, and the entire population living in the maneuver area.⁸⁵ In some cases, families have participated on maneuvers with the men in the territorial units, performing combat support duties while freeing the men for combat roles.

Profound changes in the role of the Yugoslav People's Army resulted in the adoption of "total national defense."

⁸⁵ Axel Horhager, "Yugoslavia's Defense: The Logic of Politics," Military Review, p. 62-63.

Although there has been tension in the acceptance of the defense concept, particularly at the beginning, the senior officer corps has adapted to the new system of national defense. This adaptation was credited to the overriding loyalty of the army to the League of Communists and to President Tito.

With the buildup of the Territorial Defense Force, the Yugoslav People's Army lost its role as the only military institution. The buildup of the territorial units has also sharply lowered the size of the reserve arm of the Yugoslav People's Army. At present, 80% of the conscripts are assigned to the Territorial Defense Force after active military duty. Twenty percent are assigned to the reserves or remain on active duty.⁸⁶ Additionally, some combat support duties have been taken up by the territorial units, for example medical services,⁸⁷ which relieves the operational army of certain responsibilities, but also of authority and control.

⁸⁶ A. Ross Johnson, Yugoslavia in the Twilight of Tito (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1974), p. 49.

⁸⁷ Josip Broz Tito, "President Tito on Total National Defense," Yugoslav Survey, Vol. XVIII, No. 4 (November 1977), p. 13.

IV. THE ARMY IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

On election day, November 11, 1945, columns of soldiers marched to the polls chanting 'armija glasa partiju' [the army votes for the party]. Some of the columns marched right from one polling place to another, stopping long enough to vote at each.⁸⁸

The military has played an important role in the development of Yugoslavia since its founding by the Communist Party after 1941. The army leadership elite was made up of the leadership of the Communist party and the two organizations became synonymous throughout the Second World War. After the war, a brief civilian coalition government was formed until the Communist Party, supported by the Army, won the election in November 1945. This symbiotic relationship has continued throughout the development of the country and the Yugoslav military has come to occupy a position of major importance for the country's political future. This chapter examines the pattern of political involvement by the Yugoslav military establishment.

The relationship between the Army and the Communist Party is centered on a common base stemming from the partisan

⁸⁸ Hal Lehrman, Russia's Europe (New York: Appleton, 1947), p. 147.

struggle. This sense of identify has mitigated institutional differences and has prevented institutional rivalry. This does not mean that there has not been conflict or competition, but the institutional boundaries have been open because the military and political elite emerged from the same beginning. The military has a stake in the preservation of the Yugoslav political system as its leadership plays a role in the present political process. Any attempt to explain the political relevance of the military, therefore must take into account its active involvement in the Party and other civilian organizations.

The Army has been subordinate to the Party since its creation, but the overall control has changed in nature as the organization and values of the Party has changed. As opposed to assigning political commissars to every unit in the Army, for example, where political indoctrination and tactical training were conducted separately, political controls have been exercised through the chain of command since 1953. Seen in perspective, the political involvement of the Yugoslav military has progressed in three stages, which can more or less be identified with shifts in the government. These shifts have paralleled the shifts from centralized to decentralized controls in the political and economic arenas and the perceived Soviet threat to Yugoslavia.

The first stage of the military participation as a political actor in the Yugoslav system can be seen beginning in the postwar period when a strong symbiotic relationship existed between the Party and the Army. This continued throughout the late 1950's, a period of generally centralized controls throughout society, reinforced by fluctuating years of perceived Soviet threat. The second stage lasted until the late 1960's and was characterized by a period of decentralized controls, greater autonomy to the republics, little perception of a threat from the Soviet Union, and a period of declining status and resources for the Yugoslav military. Robin Remington has described the Army during this period as a "bureaucratic interest group under siege."⁸⁹ The final stage began in the 1960's with a greater military involvement in the domestic political life of the Party and the country.

The 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia shocked the Yugoslav leading elite, and military improvements which had been discussed for years began to be implemented. And, as the invasion of Czechoslovakia showed the Yugoslavs how susceptible they were to external attack, the domestic

⁸⁹Robin Alison Remington, "The Military As An Interest Group in Yugoslav Politics," in Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems, ed. Dale R. Hersping and Ivan Volgyes (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978), p. 195.

turmoil of 1971-1972 in Croatia identified to the leadership a need for greater military participation in domestic affairs. Military political involvement which precipitated from these events came not at the initiative of the Army but at the insistence of Party leaders and President Tito. In December 1971, Tito stated that the Army played an internal political role, in Yugoslavia, as well as one of external security and would be utilized to suppress a challenge to the integrity of the Yugoslav state if events dictated it.⁹⁰ The Party newspaper, Socijalizam, later agreed that it was perfectly normal and consistent that during the transition from a class to a classless society the armed forces have both an internal and external function.⁹¹ This was formally recognized in the 1974 Yugoslav constitution several months after President Tito stated that it was no longer sufficient for the Army to be familiar solely with military affairs but that it must also be familiar with and participate in the social, economic, and political affairs of the country.⁹²

⁹⁰Josip Broz Tito, Borba, December 24, 1971.

⁹¹Socijalizam 1(1973): p. 41-53.

⁹²Josip Broz Tito, Speech of 8 January 1974, broadcasted by Radio Belgrade, cited by A. Ross Johnson, The Role of the Military in Communist Yugoslavia (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1978), p. 14.

Active military participation in the political process, which has existed to a limited extent prior to the third stage of involvement, increased both in the Party organization and in the federal government in the first half of the 1970's.⁹³ Recently, Slovenian General Ivan Dolnicar, previously deputy secretary for national defense, was appointed general secretary of the State Presidency, with the rank of federal secretary. In addition to Dolnicar, who also remains a member of the General Council for National Defense, there are five other generals on the 11-member council: General Matic, head of the Commission for National Defense; General Sarac of the Federal Department for National Defense; General Daljevic, president of a commission in the Party Presidium; General Cuic, party secretary in the army; and General Vujatovic, military economist. Members of the Council for the Defense of Constitutional Order include General Nikola Ljubicic, Federal Secretary for National Defense and General Franjo Herljevic, Federal Secretary for Internal Affairs. General Ivan Miskovic has been appointed president of the Council for Civil Defense. Colonel General Ivan Kukoc was appointed one of the Party Executive Committee

⁹³Viktor Meier, "The Marshal's Generals: Tito Installs More and More Generals in Political Offices," Frankfurter Allgemeine (15 October 1979), P. 10.

Secretaries, Major General Vuko Gozze-Gucetic is Public Prosecutor, and Lieutenant-Colonel General Ljubison Curgus is head of the Directorate of Civilian Aviation. The Defense Minister Ljubicic is also a member of the twenty-three member LCY Presidium.

The expanded presence of military officials in Party and state executive organizations is the most visible sign of the enhanced political role of the military. This reflects both the growth in military influence and the conscious premise that the military institution imparts a measure of stability and strength to government institutions and processes. In addition, these generals were personally appointed to their positions by President Tito which reflected on their loyalty to him without ties to particular republics. They also attained their rank by way of the political administration of the Army rather than command posts,⁹⁴ which recalls the practice from earlier years when the leadership generation was a direct outgrowth of the partisan struggle when political and military functions frequently replaced one another or were even combined.

The status of the Army within the Party organization is somewhat akin to that of an autonomous province, a position which is singularly different from any other institution in

⁹⁴Meier, "The Marshal's General", p. 20.

the country. The twenty-three member LCY Presidium is composed of three members from each of the six republican Party, two from the two autonomous provinces, and, as noted, one from the army. In addition to the fifteen seats which are allocated to the military on the LCY Central Committee, (each republic was allocated twenty seats and each province allocated fifteen), two additional army representatives have been included in the republican delegations. Total military representation on the 1974 and 1978 Central Committees was 17 members, or approximately 10 percent of the Central Committee membership. The table below shows the military representation in the LCY Central Committee since 1948 and the increase in representation since the 1970's.

MILITARY REPRESENTATION IN LCY CENTRAL COMMITTEE⁹⁵

<u>Date</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage of Total CC Membership</u>
1978 (Eleventh Party Congress)	17	10
1974 (Tenth Party Congress)	17	10
1969 (Nineth Party Congress)	3	6
1964 (Eighth Party Congress)	9	6
1958 (Seventh Party Congress)	4	3
1952 (Sixth Party Congress)	6	6
1948 (Fifth Party Congress)	3	3

⁹⁵Official proceedings of each Party Congress, cited by A. Ross Johnson, The Role of the Military in Communist Yugoslavia, p. 16.

Military positions on the Central Committee integrated the most important military leaders into the policy-making process of the Party and gave them a role in the established political process. Political leadership remains a function of the League of Communists and those outside of the Party do not make key decisions. As the decisions which determine Yugoslav domestic and foreign policy are made within the League of Communists, the composition of the League of Communists serves as a rough index of who decides the allocation of power and resources in Yugoslav society. The military is a source of conservative pressure and has taken an essentially loyalty position tending toward the preservation of existing institutions. With its sizable representation in the government and the Party it has the opportunity to influence its interests.

The relative power the military appears to have in the Party and the government has arisen through general Party adjustments and the growing independence of the republican parties. Since the Tenth Party Congress in May 1974, new party statutes free the Party organization in the Army from supervision by the republican Parties; establishing the Party organization in the Army as a coequal. In addition to providing the Army Party organization with coequal status the League of Communists also made the Army Party organization

responsible for defining and implementing the views and policy line of the Central League of Communists.⁹⁶ Given this greater responsiveness to central direction, the Army Party organization comes under greater Party control since it represents centrally formulated policies and views. Party reformers began their efforts in the mid-1960's to open the Army to society from fear that an isolated military might present a threat to the economic and political reforms of decentralization. As well as discussion of military matters in the the media for the first time and the Federal Assembly debating the previously "rubber stamped" defense budget, the Party organization of the Army was reorganized to limit the authority of the field commanders by permitting greater participation by the military rank-and-file. This was done in an attempt to effect "the real and not formal acceptance in the Army of the democratic and self-management achievements of society."⁹⁷

⁹⁶Dzemil Sarac, "Communists in the Army in Developing and Implementing the Policy of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia," in Total National Defense in Theory and Practice, ed. Mensur Seferovic (Belgrade: Narodna Armija, 1975), p. 114.

⁹⁷Sveto Kovacevic, "Conceptualization of the Role of Communists in the Post-War Development of the Yugoslav People's Army," Zbornik Radova, (Belgrade: Politicka Skola JNA, 1968), p. 33.

The Army's expanded political involvement evolved over a period of time and after changes were made within the Army organization to insure its subordination to Party control and adherence to civilian institutions. Changes have been implemented in the defense policies, the system of Party control, the Army's ethnic composition, and in renewed emphasis on ideology in military training.

Emphasis was placed on reorganizing the suborganizations or basic units of the League of Communists in the Army. Certain models were abandoned in early 1972 such as large basic units which were formed on a garrison or intergarrison basis, 40% of which had 200 or more members. These basic units are now established on battalion levels, increasing the total number of basic organizations and decreasing the size to an average of 40 to 45 members.⁹⁸ Additionally, there has also been an increased effort placed on recruiting new members to the League of Communists. In the period between the Ninth and Tenth Party Congress, 45,000 new members were admitted to the League of Communists in the Army, and across the country almost every sixth person admitted to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia became a member while in the army.⁹⁹

⁹⁸ Sarac, Total National Defense in Theory and Practice, p. 127.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 127.

Currently, approximately 99 percent of the officers, 95 percent of the senior enlisted men, 65 percent of the civilians employed by the military, and a considerable number of the junior enlisted men are members of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. There are 2,524 basic organizations in the Army Party organization which admit twenty to twenty-two thousand members a year.¹⁰⁰

A strategic task of the League of Communists in the Army is to establish greater "moral-political" cohesion among the various nationalities in the Army for the economic, social, and political stability of the country. The aim is to increase an interest in and sense of responsibility for the continuation of the goals of the Communist Party. The demands on the Army Party organization, as formulated by President Tito, are that "the League of Communists strive for human inter-personal relations, for developing all the moral standards to which the officers and men of the army should adhere. Further efforts must be invested in fostering brotherhood and unity, Yugoslav socialist patriotism, high moral-political consciousness on the part of members of our armed forces."¹⁰¹

¹⁰⁰ Borba, 18 December 1979.

¹⁰¹ Josip Broz Tito, Interview to the journal Vojno Delo, No. 6/73, p. 13.

For many people in Yugoslavia, particularly the decentralists from the northern republics of Croatia and Slovenia who viewed the military as a bastion of Serbian hegemony, there had to be a national balance in the officer corps if the Army was going to represent the views of the Party. The Army's ability to play an important and decisive role in conformity to the national interest requires a national balance of officer corps to preserve the Army's stability and reliability. Vladimir Bakaric admitted after the Croatian Crisis of 1971 that there was a potential danger during that crisis which emanated from the officer corps being 70 percent Serbs. He also said that any socio-political crisis could be reflected in the Army.¹⁰²

The military has made efforts to recruit a balance of officers from throughout the national groups in Yugoslavia and there have been some accelerated promotions to establish a proportional representation in the officer corps not only in total numbers but also distributed throughout the rank structure as much as feasible. The plan, however, has not been completely satisfactory because of the Army's lack of appeal in certain sections of the country.¹⁰³ Ethnicity, as

¹⁰²Vladimir Bakaric, as interviewed in Frankfurter Rundschau, 17 December 1971.

¹⁰³Sarac, Total National Defense in Theory and Practice, p. 118.

reflected in Yugoslav political culture, is an important cause and consequence of the imbalance. Serbs and Montenegrins have traditionally seen the military as a guarantor of influence and military men from these nationalities remained in the postwar army to a disproportionate number compared to other nationalities. The Croats and Albanians, in particular, have viewed the Army as a Serbian-dominated institution and have avoided voluntary military service. The Croats and Slovenes have also had economic and career alternatives in their more industrialized republics and have not been attracted to the military as a profession. Promotion quotas in the Army have lessened the Serb-Montenegrin dominance, there is an effort to recruit more men from the working class from across the country, in 1974 an adequate national representation of students in all officer's schools was reported, and the national composition of the reserve officer corps and the territorial defense units now correspond to the population structure.¹⁰⁴ To a large extent the army's ability to act as an effective guarantor of internal stability depends upon the success of these measures to achieve a more equitable ethnic balance within it.

¹⁰⁴Tanjug Domestic Service, 19 November 1973.

While the army's political role has grown significantly in the last decade, the League of Communists is still the dominant political force in Yugoslavia and is likely to remain so. By incorporating the army as a member of the decision-making process and establishing controls within the Army the League of Communists has sought to preserve its dominance. "The Party," Tito said at the 21th session of the Presidency of the League of Communists," is the one factor which does have the right to undertake ideological-political action in all-Yugoslav framework."¹⁰⁵

All this suggests that the Army has been coopted into the political process in an effort to narrow the differences which might exist between the Army and the Party. This has been done by the Party leadership to strengthen its position vis-a-vis the republics and their desire for more autonomy. There has been a weakening of the central political authority over the past few years as ethnic and regional identity problems surfaced, though by the nature of the Party as a political coalition of Yugoslav nationalities there are inherent weaknesses in the system. By strengthening the

¹⁰⁵ Josip Broz Tito, speech of 21st Session of the Presidency of the League of Communist of Yugoslavia, quoted in Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 309.

position of the Army in the Party, the Party leadership has been able to countervail increased demands for republican autonomy.

The 1963 Constitution and economic reforms in 1965 gave each republic the right to shape its economic policy. These reforms provided economic decentralization and a withdrawal of the central, federal government from economic decision-making, though not to the extent that developed republics of Croatia and Slovenia would have desired. The 9th Party Congress in 1969 gave increased powers to the republican Party organizations which led to the devolution of political power of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. In essence, there became not one but six Yugoslav parties which resulted in the inability of the State and Party organizations to reach a consensus on national issues.

The desire for even greater republican power came to a head when nationalism inspired the student strikes in Zagreb in November and December, 1971, dramatizing fundamental problems in the Yugoslav system. The nationality tensions which were expressed not only posed economic and political problems in the country but they also posed a serious threat to Yugoslav security.

The Party leadership in Croatia, Tito said, had pandered to nationalists and separatists. And while he conceded that many of their complaints were justified it was unacceptable that they should be posed as national

(Croatian) questions, demonstrations should not have been encouraged since there were constitutional mechanisms to solve such problems. Tito also pointed out that the primary fault for events in Croatia did not lie in the intentions of the Croatian leaders but rather in an ideological crisis in the Party and that the crisis existed in most other republics as well. While exerting pressure, Tito said that it was up to the Croatian Central Committee to put their own house in order and to re-establish unity in conformity with the line of the Party.

Tito elaborated on his reasons for taking forceful action to the Council of the Trade Union Federation in mid-December 1971 by explaining that events in Zagreb had been moving "little by little towards a separatist line" and "that if we had not gone into battle now and stopped (the demonstrations), perhaps in six months it would have come to shooting, to a civil war."¹⁰⁶

Shortly afterwards, there was a purge of the Party leadership in Croatia and there was a weakening in the influence held by liberal leaders in other republics. By the end of the year Krsto Crvenkovski of Macedonia came under pressure for his liberal views on nationalism and in

¹⁰⁶Tito, Politika, 19 December 1971.

January, 1972, while still de facto Vice-President of Yugoslavia, was dropped from the Party Executive Bureau on the pretext that no one should be a member of both bodies. Stane Kavcic, President of the Slovenian government came under pressure by Edvard Kardelj at this same time, as did everyone who opposed Tito's decision to publicly denounce the Croatian leaders and force their resignation.

In January, 1972, the 2d Conference of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia reorganized the Party Executive Bureau and reduced it in size from fourteen to eight. Stane Dolanc of Slovenia, who was in the Bureau's Secretary during the Croatian Crisis, was named the first Secretary of the new Bureau, a position which was to rotate annually but which Dolanc retained for eight years. All persons with reputations as advocates of republican Party autonomy were eliminated from the new Executive Bureau.

The contradictions denounced by the conference led to strengthening of Party control and the Party center, and strengthening of self-management.¹⁰⁷ It was argued during the conference that a strong Party was a prerequisite to self-management in order to protect the workers from those who would seek to usurp power for their own personal or class

¹⁰⁷ Druga Konferenija Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije
(Belgrade, 1972), pp. 40-54.

ambition.¹⁰⁸ These themes continued throughout Yugoslav politics until the new Constitution was adopted at the 1974 10th Party Congress, at which time compromises were introduced.

The compromises, however, were in favor of a stronger central Party which called for a newly reunited, recentralized, redisciplined, and therefore thoroughly purged LCY which would reassert effective control over the country's political and economic life.

The 'federalization' of the Party which had emerged out of liberalizing and decentralizing reforms of 1965-68 had enabled certain people, concentrated at the republican level, to frustrate implementation of accepted Party principles and programs. More purges took place in the Party throughout the country prior to the 10th Party Congress, which cleared the decks for reform.

Changes to the 1974 Constitution, the fourth in less than thirty years, redefined the role and responsibility of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and defined who controls the economic power materialized in public property and social capital. Workers' organizations

¹⁰⁸Ibid., pp. 21-39.

became the central legal entity of the economic system and prohibited the election of managers or technical staff to the workers' councils. There was a reforming of the banking system which excluded bank employees from the bank's credit committees. More profoundly, however, it established a political system in which delegations elected delegates who filled public office, all of whom need to be approved by the Party, meaning a return to a direct political role for the Party.

While the self-management system did not apply to the Army, the Army's basic organizations (some 2,500) did participate in the political process of electing a delegation, who would elect delegates to represent the Army in the communal, province, republic, and federal political chambers, provided for under the 1974 constitution.

Since the events of the Croatian crisis there has been a continuous military input into the political system of Yugoslavia. And, the statutes of the constitution make the Party organization in the Army responsible for the establishment and implementation of the views and policy line of the League of Communist; not subject to the political pressures of local or republic Party organizations. Nikola Ljubicic elaborated this further by stating the Army has a debt

to preserve the revolutionary achievements the country has made and that the Army is a "powerful factor of social stability and cohesion in the nation."¹⁰⁹

While it is clear, however, that the Army considers itself to be one of the prime guardians of public order, and that domestic stability is a requirement for a successful defense policy, the army professes that it does not wish to interfere in the internal life of the country. It wishes to cooperate in society within the lines of the Party tenets and not in its status as an armed force.¹¹⁰

Yugoslavia is a country brought together by control, but just as importantly, by compromise. The social and political stability of the multinational state depends upon federal power respecting particular republican interests. While the Army has achieved a measure of political influence over this last decade, it has received it for the purpose of bolstering the central government's position in the Yugoslav coalition. The Yugoslav military recognizes that it serves the Party but cannot be a substitute for it.

¹⁰⁹Ljubicic, Borba, 23 December 1971.

¹¹⁰"The Strengthening of Defense," Politika, 22 October 1972.

V. ARMS TRANSFERS

The investment of financial funds in the production of armament and military equipment is socially and economically justified only in countries upon which that production has been imposed by someone's threat, so that they are compelled to produce military materiel in order to defend themselves.¹¹¹

Yugoslavia's goal of being as self-reliant as possible in national defense and non-aligned in foreign affairs is reflected in the approach it has taken to its arms industry in efforts to equip the military. The country's leaders also realize that there is an inverse relationship between arms dependency on another country and freedom to establish one's foreign policy, both in the political and economic arenas. Yugoslavia, therefore, made the decision to develop its own domestic capabilities to produce arms.¹¹² To this end, the country has placed a good deal of emphasis on the domestic production of arms and the diversification of outside sources for those arms it cannot produce.

¹¹¹Nikola Ljubicic, Total National Defense-Strategy of Peace (Belgrade: Niro "Komunist," 1977), p. 162.

¹¹²Josip Broz Tito, reported by M.S. Handler, "Tito May End Trade With Soviet Bloc," New York Times (28 December 1948), p. 3.

After the Second World War, the Yugoslav army was primarily armed with captured German weapons, some weapons provided by the Western Allies, and those that the Soviet Union gave them. Additional military hardware became available from the Soviet Union upon the conclusion of the fighting and as Yugoslavia's allegiance turned to Moscow. At this time Yugoslavia made considerable strides toward the standard use of Soviet weapons. These arms were required to support the 500,000-man army that Tito maintained after the war - needed for both internal and external security. The June 1948 split with Cominform, however, halted further assistance from the Soviet Union, which cut off shipments of both war materials and machinery for Yugoslavia's armament industry.

By the fall of 1949 Tito increased the size of his army to 800,000 with an additional 700,000 guerilla fighters in reserve. This situation forced Yugoslavia to increase what arms production capabilities it had as Western governments had also refused to sell it military equipment.¹¹³ Yugoslavia had the ability to produce small arms and light aircraft which it could expand somewhat, and it began plans to provide its army with heavy artillery.

¹¹³ General Ivan Goshnjak, cited in "Russians Cut Off Arms to Belgrade," New York Times (3 July 1949), p. 3.

Though its primary objective was to industrialize the country and to recover from the economic devastation caused by the war, the few resources available began to be channeled to the military industry.

Before the break in relations, the Soviet Union was the sole external supplier of arms to Yugoslavia. Their interests coincided to the extent that both countries sought the advancement of world communism and were adamant in their opposition to Western democracies. The Soviet Union therefore, was content with contributing arms to Yugoslavia as long as Yugoslavia was prepared to subjugate its economic interests to those of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia's demand for arms was not such that it would have eventually permitted a state of independence. Yugoslavia, likewise, had held the Soviet model of Marxism-Leninism up for emulation, there had been a historical closeness between brother Slavs, and the Yugoslav military establishment had turned to the Soviet military for training and guidance. In short, except for the limited domestic production of light weapons, the Yugoslav leadership was satisfied with receiving arms from the Soviet Union and expending its resources for the domestic production of capital goods in its own heavy industry.

The Soviet Union had planned to exploit the resources of Yugoslavia, as it was doing to the other Eastern European countries, and had exacted economic conditions

from Yugoslavia which had prevented industrial development from taking place there. When Yugoslavia challenged the Soviet plan to subjugate Yugoslavia, Tito was branded as a Marxist revisionist by the Moscow leadership, Yugoslavia was ousted from Cominform, all assistance was stopped, and the likelihood of an invasion of Yugoslavia by the Soviet Union became real.¹¹⁴ Yugoslavia during this time had also denounced Western imperialism, had territorial claims against Austria and Italy and had committed repeated border violations, had provided aid to the Greek communist movement, and had shot down two US military planes; for ideological reasons it had no desire to turn to a western arms supplier nor did the west offer immediate assistance. The demands of the Soviet Union, therefore, appeared to be supported by a monopoly position.

Yugoslavia's dilemma was once again finding the means to provide itself with arms for defense and to develop an industrial base, in addition to producing food and other material necessities. The world political environment left Yugoslavia with limited possibilities for turning to

¹¹⁴For a complete description of the relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union between 1947 and 1953 See Vladimir Dedijer, The Battle Stalin Lost (New York: Viking Press, 1971), and Robert Bass and Elizabeth Marbury, ed., The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-58 (New York: The East Europe Institute, Inc., 1959).

another arms supplier because of the sharp division which has arisen between the Soviet Union and the United States and Yugoslavia's previous ties with the Soviet Union. To amass funds for domestic industries Tito decided, however, to sell strategic raw materials to Western buyers, since Yugoslavia could no longer depend on trade agreements with the Cominform states for equipment and raw materials essential to the country. The capital requirement even for these industries, however, exceeded Yugoslavia's resources so it requested and received a loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction to develop copper, lead, and zinc mines to obtain hard currency from the export of these products.¹¹⁵ By turning to the West for economic and commercial assistance and easing the pressure on industrial development Yugoslavia was in a position to further develop its domestic defense production.

Relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia continued to worsen after Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform. Yugoslavia began to fear that the Soviet Union and the other Cominform states might resort to armed intervention to bring it back in line with Soviet

¹¹⁵C.L. Sulzberger, "Further Tito Shift to West is Seen Hinged on Moscow," The New York Times (8 September 1949), p. 13.

policy. Coupled with this, the massive droughts in Yugoslavia during 1950 destroyed the year's crops and placed a financial burden on all government programs. To help alleviate the problems it faced Yugoslavia accepted US provided famine relief, of which part went to support the army.¹¹⁶ Domestic affairs, however, constrained the allocation of resources to Yugoslavia's arms production which left Yugoslavia short of needed supplies.

Yugoslavia had one of the best trained guerilla armies in the world, though it was weak in air, armor, and artillery. Additionally, a great deal of the equipment on hand was obsolete and under a Soviet attack there would be no spare parts available for the Soviet equipment Yugoslavia owned. In response to this disquieting situation, Tito explicitly stated:

I can say this, we won't care what anyone says. If the opportunity comes to obtain arms to defend this country - material which we cannot manufacture at home - we will accept it. In an emergency, we'll ask for (military equipment) wherever we can get it."¹¹⁷

In an effort to bolster the defenses of Yugoslavia and modernize the army against the eventuality of a Soviet

¹¹⁶M.S. Handler, "US Offers Aid to Yugoslav Troops," New York Times (21 November 1950), p. 20.

¹¹⁷The New York Times (21 August 1949), p. 1.

invasion, Marshal Tito signed a military assistance agreement in November, 1951, with the United States.

The agreement did not, however, bind the two countries militarily in the form of a defense pact or alliance. The US agreed to grant military assistance on the basis of individual requests by the Yugoslav government with a clause which reserved the right to suspend assistance at any time Yugoslavia used the equipment for other than defensive purposes.¹¹⁸

The factors that influenced Yugoslavia to acquire weapons from the West, and from the United States in particular, were based on several requirements. World War II and the resulting change in government placed a heavy strain on the internal stability of the country. There had been a history of conflict among the ethnic nationalities of Yugoslavia which came to a peak during the war, with a large percentage of the war dead caused by fellow Yugoslavs. Tito's new government quickly found that the attachments to national cultures, traditions, and interests were not easily dissolved and Yugoslavia remained a mosaic on the verge of falling apart. Tito had maintained his

¹¹⁸"Military Assistance Agreement with Yugoslavia,"
The Department of State Bulletin, vol. XXV, no. 648
(26 November 1951), p. 863.

army basically intact, therefore, to insure domestic order while trying to bring the country together by stressing the ideology factor. When the rift with the Soviet Union came about, the communist doctrine in Yugoslavia came under pressure, but the possibility of an external conflict quickly drew national attention and provoked the call for independence, sovereignty, and nationalism.

Up until the 1948 split, the Soviet Union had met the Yugoslav demand for arms in order to impose political influence and extract natural resources from Yugoslavia to support Soviet industrial development. After the economic and ideological break between the two countries, the Soviet Union felt that an arms and trade embargo would force Yugoslavia to meet Soviet demands.

To retain national support and direct attention from domestic problems, Tito increased the size of the army and cautioned the country to be aware of an invasion. Since reliance was being placed on the military to insure the viability of the government and the state, the demand for arms was great.

Yugoslavia continued to stress its independence though the United States had hoped that aid to Yugoslavia would inevitably draw Yugoslavia toward the West. Relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union improved, however, after the death of Stalin. To meet its security needs, Yugoslavia expanded its domestic defense industries and

began accepting military assistance from the Soviet Union in an effort to diversify the outside sources of arms. As assistance increased from the Soviet Union the United States cut back its assistance and as Soviet assistance decreased the United States increased military assistance. After this pattern of relations occurred again Tito asked that the US military aid program be terminated, as it was disruptive to Yugoslav affairs. In March, 1958, the US aid program stopped, though Yugoslavia was permitted to purchase arms from the United States on a case by case basis.

This arrangement has been maintained since, though the United States and its Western allies have assured the world community that Yugoslav defense efforts would receive all the material assistance they required, short of troops, should events warrant such assistance.¹¹⁹

The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 reminded the Yugoslavs once again of the importance of being self-reliant in arms production; this realization prompted the expansion of the domestic arms industry in Yugoslavia. The reason for domestic production was stated

¹¹⁹The Times (28 November 1968); London.

more explicitly by Deputy Secretary for National Defense, General Dusan Vujatovic, at an arms exhibition outside Belgrade in 1973.

The supply of armaments on the world market has always been uncertain: political conditions, demands for political concessions, even blackmail, have always been possible. Therefore, we decided to build our own war industry.... We didn't want to have to depend on anybody else.¹²⁰

Most of the weapons produced by Yugoslavia have been small arms as the infantry makes up most of the defense force, and it has been reported that Yugoslavia is able to produce 80 percent of the country's combat needs.¹²¹ Yugoslavia also produces or co-produces combat aircraft, armored personnel carriers, and a wide range of naval craft, to include medium-sized submarines, with varying degrees of success. None of the major pieces of equipment, however, are solely produced by Yugoslavia.

The most recent armored personnel carrier (M980), for example, uses the same engine and some other components as the French-built carrier, AMX-10P. The submarines rely heavily on Soviet electronic equipment and armament; the most recent fast attack boat is based on a Swedish

¹²⁰Politika (27 June 1973); Belgrade, cited in Adam Roberts, Nations in Arms, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975) p. 195.

¹²¹Rajko Tonaskovic, "Kako Cemo Se Braniti" [How We Will Defend Ourselves], p. 11.

design, carries Soviet missiles, and is powered by Rolls-Royce engines. Yugoslavia's two earlier jet aircraft ("Galeb" and "Jastreb") are powered by Rolls-Royce, engines, and its newest jet ("Orao") is currently powered by Rolls-Royce, though the military has been shopping for another powerplant.¹²² The problem that presents itself is that although Yugoslavia produces these weapon systems, it is still dependent upon the world market to make them operational.

Yugoslavia has found that licensed production of its domestic models is extremely expensive because production runs are too short to be cost-effective. It has also taken longer to develop efficient models than would have been required to acquire an already existing model abroad,¹²³ and empirical data shows that supplying countries tend to charge higher prices for parts than they do for complete weapons. The expense to the Yugoslav defense components from abroad and foreign dependence on the availability of components.

¹²²Jane's Weapons Systems, 1979-80; Jane's Fighting Ships, 1979-80; and Jane's All The World's Aircraft, 1978-79 (London: Jane's Yearbooks).

¹²³"Yugoslavia and Romania Are Believed to Have Problems With a Project for Joint Production of Jet Fighters," The New York Times (26 September 1976), p. 19.

Yugoslavia has offset the cost of production and has improved its balance of payments somewhat by selling arms to other non-aligned countries. It began series production of the "Glaeb" jet aircraft for Zambia and Libya in the early 1970's, along with the "Jastreb" jet aircraft to Zambia at the same time. The "Orao" jet aircraft was co-produced with Romania and is still in the production stage. The earlier armored personnel carrier (M60) has been exported to Cyprus, and artillery pieces and small naval vessels have been supplied to Algeria, Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, India, Burma, and Indonesia.¹²⁴ The Chief of the Center of All Advanced Military Schools in Yugoslavia, General Rahmia Kadenic, stated in a recent speech:

The export of arms and military equipment has greatly increased since 1974. A very significant aspect of co-operation in military-economic relations between our country and the non-aligned states is reflected in a rapid expansion of investment contracts in the field of military and military industrial projects, which we have been constructing in some non-aligned countries.¹²⁵

General Ljubicic reported in December, 1979, that the export of arms and military equipment to non-aligned and other developing countries covers 72 percent of Yugoslavia costs of the import of military technology. This amounts

¹²⁴Jane's Weapons System, 1979-80.

¹²⁵Borba (12 April 1979).

to 3.6 percent of Yugoslavia's overall annual export, and goes up to the 16.6 percent of exports to non-aligned and developing countries.¹²⁶

Yugoslavia has limited its dependence on arms suppliers to some extent by buying what it can from a number of supplying countries, but has relied heavily upon the Soviet Union since the early 1960's.

For example, Yugoslavia does not produce enough heavy armor to be self-reliant; it is still dependent upon the Soviet Union for this type of weaponry. In the past it has also looked to the Soviet Union for anti-tank weapons. In the last five years, however, Yugoslavia has turned to the United States for the purchase of advanced weapons and combat support equipment, to include precision guided munitions.

As the transition of leadership in Yugoslavia takes place there is no doubt that a reevaluation of some of Yugoslavia's defense procurement policies is underway. One conclusion might be that it is not very likely that a country which might use an armor invasion against Yugoslavia would continue to supply anti-tank weapons to

¹²⁶Borba (19 December 1979).

Yugoslavia when it needs them most. While it may not seem likely to some that the Soviet Union will be tempted to invade Yugoslavia now that Tito has left the scene, Yugoslav military planners have contingency plans for just such a scenario, and they again turned back to the West as a source for equipment.

The reasons for Yugoslavia's desire to acquire arms abroad have not changed since it broke from the Soviet Union in 1948. Its domestic industries cannot provide for the country's needs, and the factors influencing those needs still exist. The potential for external and internal conflict varies from time to time, but the potential for both still exists. The role of the military in Yugoslav politics has increased over the last decade and the demands for a modernized military along with it. The demand for weapons has also increased to meet the requirements of the recently organized territorial defense force.

The pressure from the superpowers has not made the situation any more bearable. With the increased presence of the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean and its loss of port facilities at Vlore, Albania in 1960 and Alexandria, Egypt in 1972, there has been an increased Soviet desire for a warm water port in Yugoslavia. The desire that Yugoslavia remain independent and non-aligned has spurred American willingness to arm Yugoslavia.

An inflation rate of 30 percent has badly hurt Yugoslavia's economy. Increased prices of foodstuffs, semi-manufactured goods, and building materials, along with imported oil, has added to a \$6.5 billion foreign payment deficit. The Army is a major consumer of these goods and inflation has diminished the purchasing power of the Army's budget which, in the proposed 1980 Federal Budget, is less than 6 percent of the national income.¹²⁷ Yugoslavia is able to offset part of the defense spending by producing 80 percent of its armament needs, returning a large part of the funds back to the Yugoslav economy. Yugoslavia additionally limits its defense spending by cooperating with many non-aligned and developing countries in the production of military equipment. The hardship is particularly felt, however, when Yugoslavia attempts to purchase sophisticated, high-technology military equipment from the West, at a time when the price of that equipment is influenced by inflation in Western economies. Yugoslavia is least able to afford additional hard currency deficits incurred by military spending at a crucial political period when a strong military could prevent a possible foreign military threat.

¹²⁷"The SFRY Assembly: Debate on Draft of the Federal Budget for 1980," Front (1 December 1979); Belgrade.

Tito said on numerous occasions that the military would be the principal force for stability and unity in the country after he was gone. The ability of the Yugoslav armed forces to maintain the sovereignty of the country depends a great deal on its acceptance by the populace and its being adequately armed.

VI. CONCLUSION

The present military system in Yugoslavia has been designed and modified over the years to meet the defense needs of the country and the political needs of the state. The recognition that national consciousness is far more developed regionally than federally has been a major factor leading to political and economic decentralization. Once this program began, however, it was impossible not to include decentralization of the defense system. The political system in Yugoslavia has tried to take into account the vast differences existing between the nationalities and work these into a true federation.

The Yugoslav leadership recognized that as a socialist state Yugoslavia would have to break away from Soviet dominance in order to maintain the country's sovereignty. Otherwise, they felt the country would be forced to relinquish all independence. Yugoslavia assumed an international position of non-alignment and developed its army as a defensive force against outside aggression. When the Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, giving meaning to the concept of limited sovereignty, the Yugoslav defense authorities realized the inadequacy of their existing defense structure. The army which had remained immured against reforms associated with self-management, federalization,

and decentralization found itself subjected to pressure for republic control and internal reforms. Total national defense was introduced to alter the organization of the Yugoslav People's Army in order to meet the defense demands of a self-reliant middle-size state and to conform to the socio-political structure of the rest of the country.

The army has been described as the cohesive force binding the republics of Yugoslavia into a state, but this characterization is suspect because the army is not the legitimate power for this role. The legal authority of the government comes from the doctrines of Yugoslav socialism and is represented by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The army derives its power, therefore, through the acceptance by the people of the role it plays in supporting the Party and its doctrines. The military leaders are cognizant of the defense role and the supranational position the army has in Yugoslav society. This does not mean, however, that the army could act as a political power without the order or cooperation of the Party leadership.

The cooperation and compromise required to hold the nationalities of Yugoslavia in a federated state runs counter to the nature of discipline, hierarchy, and responsiveness to command that is required to run an army. The social and political stability of Yugoslavia depends upon the central government respecting the desires of the republics for autonomy. The decentralization of the 1960s came about

through compromise on the part of the republics as well as the central government. The army acquiesced to decentralization only after it was forced to do so by the federal assembly. The army has acted as an interest group to influence the allocation of power and resources in its behalf, and this in part was found unacceptable to the republics. The army has not, on its own, balanced its requirements with those of the republics and it has only been within the last decade that the army has acknowledged a mutual dependence between nationwide defense and social and economic requirements. The relationship between defense and the economy as expressed by Tito has influenced military thinking:

The strengthening of the material capability of society is especially important to our defense capability.... The faster we develop our society's productive forces and resolve the question of the standard of living and the social security of our working people, the more ready and capable¹²⁸ they will also be to defend the country.

If the defense of the country depends upon the economic viability of society, then the military establishment must be prepared to subjugate their needs to the general warfare

¹²⁸Josip Broz Tito, "Significance of Society's Material Capability to Defense," cited in Milko Cupara, "Nationwide Defense and Social Reproduction," Vojnoekonomski Pregled, No. 5 (Sep-Oct 1979), pp. 97-114.

and hence, ethnic inequalities in the goods and services produced and consumed by the different peoples. The inequalities basically result from an economically backward and struggling south in competition with a relatively advanced and prosperous north. Yugoslav leaders have contended that these inequalities must be lessened in the construction of socialism and communism,¹²⁹ but the gaps have in fact widened over the three decades of Yugoslav socialism.

Now that Tito is dead, the ability of Yugoslavia to maintain its present foreign policy, economic and political growth and control the reins of state depends a great deal upon the succession of power and the ability of the new government to maintain internal stability in a multinational society. The regime recognizes the need for popular support and is continuing decentralization and regional autonomy among its ethnic groups, while making use of recentralizing mechanisms that work toward assuring needed country-wide cooperation. In the past, the communist regime has been generally successful in handling this contradiction and keeping regional conflicts within

¹²⁹Edvard Kardelj, "For a Dynamic and Continual Socialism," Socialist Thought and Practice (Belgrade: Niro Komunist, Vol. XVIII (1978), pp. 13-22.

limits. Within a complex setting where multiple political cultures exist, however, an abrupt change in the balance of controls established by the federal government could result in domestic unrest.

The League of Communist of Yugoslavia is the main force capable of preventing the federation's dissolution. Political stability and instability are ultimately dependent on the state of mind of society, and it is through the League of Communists that the various ethnic groups are best able to voice their basic needs and expectations.

The Yugoslav People's Army has been designed over the years to support the League of Communists. The army is subordinate to the party as shown by the reorganization it has undergone throughout its history to satisfy the needs of the Party. During the last decade Party control of the army has been refined under the guidance of President Tito in order to balance greater political autonomy given the republics.

The positions that the army has been given in the government are those dealing with defense and security, roles for which they are well suited. The army is not particularly well suited to handle foreign or domestic affairs or economics and while it has a contributing voice in these areas, it does not dominate them. In the post-Tito era the officer corps recognizes that their most important

task is the preservation of the Yugoslav state and they have made a commitment toward this goal.

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