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EAST EUROPEAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS: THE WARSAW PACT NORTHERN--ETC(U)

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
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East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier

A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean, Alexander Alexiev

Prepared for
**THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE and
THE FORD FOUNDATION**

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Commonly accepted scenarios of Warsaw Pact warfare against NATO assume that over half of initial Pact offensive forces would consist of Czechoslovak, East German, and Polish units. These Northern Tier military institutions and their roles domestically and within the Warsaw Pact are examined in this study. The officer corps of all three military establishments are outwardly committed to a Soviet-defined "lightning war" strategy. This strategy may constitute the principal Soviet lever for ensuring Northern Tier participation in a Warsaw Pact offensive, but how reliably the conscript armies would in fact fulfill that intended role is another question. In any case, Pact preparations for "coalition warfare" imply weaknesses and vulnerabilities that deserve careful attention in light of the distinctive individual characteristics of the respective Northern Tier military establishments. 205 pp. (Author)

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PREFACE

This report provides an in-depth examination of the Czechoslovak, East German, and Polish military establishments, as well as an overview of the development of Soviet-Northern Tier military relations generally. It draws conclusions about opportunities for and constraints on Soviet use of Northern Tier military forces as a supplement to Soviet military power in Europe. It focuses not on the size, armaments, or operational principles of the armed forces under discussion, but rather on the respective national military institutions themselves and their functions both domestic and within the Soviet military alliance system. It is the first comprehensive examination of the Northern Tier military establishments.

The report is a collective product. Section III, the Polish case study, was written principally by A. Ross Johnson, the project leader. Section IV, the East German case study, was written principally by Robert Dean, formerly a Rand staff member. Section V, the Czechoslovak case study, was written principally by Alex Alexiev (utilizing in part material contributed by J. F. Brown, a Rand Consultant). Alexiev provided the material in Section I on standard U.S. Government assumptions concerning the Northern Tier, and Appendix E on the Romanian military deviation in the Warsaw Pact. Dean and Johnson jointly drafted the conclusions in Section VI. Research assistance was provided throughout by Barbara Kliszewski, Marie Hoepfner, and Ewa Chciuk-Celt. The Rand Library and the Hoover Institution were very helpful in obtaining rare East European source materials.

The research for this study was conducted under the National Security Strategies program of Project AIR FORCE; final results were conveyed to the Air Force in November 1979. Preparation of the present revised report was supported by a grant from The Ford Foundation (see below).

Final revisions of the report were made in November 1980, as the current Polish crisis unfolded. The analysis of the role of the Polish military in earlier crises, in Section III, should help in appraising its role in the 1980 crisis.

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In late 1978, The Ford Foundation provided grants to The Rand Corporation and several university centers for research and training in international security and arms control. At Rand, the grant is supporting a diverse program. In The Rand Graduate Institute, which offers a doctorate in policy analysis, the grant is contributing to student fellowships for dissertation preparation, curriculum development, workshops and tutorials, and a series of visiting lecturers. In Rand's National Security Research Division, the Ford-sponsored projects are designed to extend beyond the immediate needs of government sponsors of research by investigating long-term or emerging problems and by developing and assessing new research methodologies. The grant also is being used to fund the publication of relevant sponsored research that would otherwise not be disseminated to the general public.

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SUMMARY

Commonly accepted scenarios of Warsaw Pact warfare against NATO assume unreinforced attack and predicate the launching of such an offensive on the prompt, substantial, and reliable participation by non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Northern Tier forces--Czechoslovak, East German, and Polish. Such scenarios, which postulate that over half of the Warsaw Pact's initial offensive force would consist of East Europeans, rest on a set of generally unexamined assumptions about the respective Northern Tier military establishments. Explication and analysis of these assumptions is a prerequisite to judging the plausibility of standard scenarios, to considering other roles that East European forces might play in international and domestic crises, and to discerning Warsaw Pact vulnerabilities that could improve NATO's defensive posture.

This report is intended to serve that function. It focuses not on order-of-battle or operational issues, but rather provides an in-depth examination of the respective Northern Tier national military institutions themselves. Summary conclusions about the role and reliability of the Polish, East German, and Czechoslovak armed forces will be found at the end of Sections III, IV, and V, respectively. Comparative conclusions concerning the Northern Tier as a whole will be found in Section VI.

Although developed under conditions of Soviet hegemony, each Northern Tier military establishment has evolved differently. The Polish military has partially revived its traditional ethos as the guardian of national Polish interests and has achieved a degree of institutional integrity that violates Leninist conceptions of Party control of the armed forces. Seeking national stability and acting as a moderate force domestically, it nonetheless takes seriously its alliance obligations. The Polish military leadership, closely linked professionally with the Soviet military, has accepted the offensive role envisaged for Polish forces by the USSR and has improved Polish military capabilities accordingly. The operational army is programmed for a massive, rapid offensive onto NATO territory in a nuclear environment.

The commitment of Polish military professionals to this mission, and the corresponding design of Polish forces to serve this end, is generally underestimated.

The East German military, in contrast to the Polish, lacks a national tradition to embrace. It thus lacks an alternative to ideology as a basis for military loyalties. Perhaps for this reason the GDR regime has evidently had more success than its Polish or Czechoslovak counterparts in meeting the challenge to total Party domination of the armed forces posed by professionalization and modernization. The military has not played a significant domestic political role. Developed under especially close Soviet tutelage later than the other Northern Tier armies, and still the smallest of these, the GDR armed forces are intended to participate fully, in conjunction with much larger Soviet contingents, in a Warsaw Pact offensive. While the continuing preoccupation in the GDR with a West German "threat" indicates fundamental national insecurities, the officer corps appears to be loyal to East German state interests as defined by the Communist Party.

The profile of the Czechoslovak armed forces is still different. Its image as pliant and reliable was proved false between 1966 and 1968, when national military sentiments prevailed among important segments of the officer corps. These tendencies, if unchecked, could have resulted in a Romanian-like decoupling of Czechoslovak from Soviet defense concepts and significant autonomy for the military institution vis-à-vis the Communist Party. The Soviet-led invasion of 1968 shattered the morale of the Czechoslovak armed forces, resulting in a demoralization and disintegration of the officer corps on a scale comparable to that in post-1956 Hungary. After 1968 the Soviets reestablished firm and direct control over the Czechoslovak armed forces and resubordinated them to Soviet-defined Warsaw Pact offensive doctrine. Yet the capabilities of the Czechoslovak army are questionable. It has not regained its pre-1968 size, cohesion, or quality, nor has it recovered from the trauma of 1968.

Together, the three Northern Tier officer corps are outwardly committed to the military mission defined for them by the USSR: significant participation in a massive Warsaw Pact offensive against Western

Europe in the event of a war in Europe. How reliably the Northern Tier forces would fulfill that role is another question. Conscripts in these forces represent a cross-section of their respective societies; as such, however good their military training and discipline, they lack commitment to Soviet interests and, particularly in Poland and Czechoslovakia, oppose Soviet values. In a war of attrition their morale probably would crumble. Nor do the security interests of the Northern Tier countries, as defined by the respective Communist leaderships, coincide completely with those of the USSR. Today the divergence is greatest in Poland; its national rationale for fidelity to the USSR has declined with détente in Europe and the fading of German irredentism.

Yet Poland's geopolitical position locks it into central involvement in any variant of European war envisaged in Soviet strategy. And this inexorability--which applies to a lesser extent to the entire Northern Tier--may explain how the USSR can place the weight it evidently does in its military planning for European contingencies on the reliable participation of client states that continue to resist the Soviet model. The greater role envisaged for the Northern Tier forces and the "lightning war" strategy have developed hand-in-hand in Soviet military planning since the early 1960s. The strategy of "lightning war" may even constitute a primary Soviet lever for ensuring substantial Northern Tier military participation in a Warsaw Pact offensive. Given inevitable Soviet concerns about the reliability of the East Europeans, it would be to Soviet advantage to minimize consultation and preparation time and achieve quick multinational involvement of forces and early battlefield success. In such circumstances, the Soviets may realistically calculate that the motivation and opportunities for national political or military leaders to "opt out" would be very limited.

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GLOSSARY

AL	Armia Ludowa (People's Army--Wartime Communist Underground-Poland)
CC	Central Committee
C ³ I	Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CPA	Czechoslovak People's Army
CSSR	Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
DAO	Defense Attache Office
FDJ	Freie Deutsche Jugend (Youth Organization - GDR)
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)
GDR	German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
GSFG	Group of Soviet Forces in Germany
GST	Gesellschaft fuer Sport und Technik (Society for Sport and Technology - GDR)
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
KGA	Klement Gottwald Military-Political Academy
KBW	Korpus Bezpieczenstwa Wewnetrznego (Internal Security Corps - Poland)
MND	Ministry for National Defense
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MPA	Main Political Administration
NPA	National People's Army - GDR
NSWP	Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
OTK	Obrona Terytorium Kraju (Defense of National Territory - Poland)
PCC	Political Consultative Committee

PM	People's Militia - Czechoslovakia
PUWP	Polish United Workers Party
PVO	Protivovozdushnaia Oborona (Air Defense Forces - USSR)
SSD	Staatssicherheitsdienst (State Security Service - GDR)
SUAZARM	Association for Cooperation with the Army (Czechoslovakia)
TO	Terytorialna Obrona (Territorial Defense Forces - Poland)
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
USG	United States Government
USIB	United States Intelligence Board
WOP	Wojska Ochrony Pogranicza (Border Security Forces - Poland)
WOPK	Wojska Obrony Powietrznej Kraju (Air Defense Forces - Poland)
WOW	Wojska Obrony Wewnetrznej (Internal Security Forces - Poland)
WP	Warsaw Pact
WSW	Wojska Sluzby Wewnetrznej (Military Security Service - Poland)
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization
ZBOWID	Zwiazek Bojownikow o Wolnosc i Demokracje (Veterans' Organization - Poland)

I. INTRODUCTION

THE THREAT TO CENTRAL EUROPE AND NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT FORCES: STANDARD ASSUMPTIONS

American perceptions of the nature of the military threat posed by the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe have undergone considerable change in recent years. Most significant has been the change from a scenario envisaging a massive Warsaw Pact attack with prior reinforcement and considerable warning time to one postulating an unreinforced, forces-in-being attack with very little warning, as the likely scenario of Warsaw Pact-initiated war against NATO.

The unreinforced Warsaw Pact attack has subsequently become widely accepted as the likely contingency facing U.S. and NATO defense planners. It has been reflected in numerous official USG defense pronouncements. For example, the posture statement of the Secretary of Defense for fiscal year 1978 states that,

The [NATO] conventional posture in Europe must be based on the assumption that (a) an attack with little or no warning by in-place Warsaw Pact forces is possible; (b) an attacking force could amount to 500,000 or more men,¹

while the 1979 statement points out

the possibilities that the powerful Pact forces already positioned in Eastern Europe would attack without reinforcement, and with little tactical warning.²

The 1979 JCS posture statement stresses that,

The Warsaw Pact can attack in Europe without waiting for reinforcements from the USSR. Such an attack would offer NATO only brief warning,³

and the Army posture statement asserts,

The Warsaw Pact forces deployed in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland can attack NATO's Central Region without

reinforcement and they can do so in a relatively short time after the decision is made.⁴

The 1980 posture statement of the Secretary of Defense emphasizes: "After a short period of preparation the Pact could launch an attack made up of two Fronts from its forward deployed forces,"⁵ while the 1981 statement addresses Soviet capabilities that might be used in "sudden and massive attacks" on Central Europe and reiterates that such attacks could be launched with "relatively little advance preparation and warning."⁶

The unreinforced Warsaw Pact attack scenario assumes major participation by non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces, although this fact is often glossed over. Of the 58 Warsaw Pact in-place divisions most often mentioned in attack scenarios, 31 are non-Soviet (including 15 Polish, 10 Czechoslovak, and 6 East German divisions).

In brief, commonly accepted scenarios of Warsaw Pact attack in Central Europe predicate the launching of such an offensive on the prompt, substantial, and effective participation by non-Soviet Northern Tier forces--Polish, Czechoslovak, and East German. Yet most Western analyses of the Warsaw Pact threat to Central Europe pass too quickly over this fact. Scenarios postulating that over half of the Warsaw Pact's initial offensive force will consist of East Europeans rest on a set of generally unexamined assumptions about the respective Northern Tier military establishments. Explication and analysis of these assumptions about the East European forces is a prerequisite to judging the plausibility of the standard scenarios, to considering other roles that the East European forces might play in international and domestic crises, and to discerning Warsaw Pact vulnerabilities that could improve NATO's defense posture.

Key issues that must be addressed in judging the role of the Northern Tier military forces include the following:

Availability. It is generally assumed that the Northern Tier forces will automatically be at the disposal of the USSR in the case of European conflict. Although this may seem certain, it is useful to ask why this should be the case and whether there might be

circumstances that would lead national military or political leaders in Eastern Europe to attempt to "opt out" of a European war.

Capability. The military capabilities of the Northern Tier armed forces understandably receive the greatest attention in analyses of the respective Warsaw Pact countries. Perhaps more attention should be given, particularly in aggregate analyses, to differences between Soviet and non-Soviet military units in terms of organizational structure, equipment, training, readiness, and related factors. It is not self-evident that Polish, East German, or Czechoslovak divisions, for example, should be considered as equivalent to Soviet divisions in terms of capability.

Reliability. The reliability of East European forces is frequently raised as an issue in USG and other Western analyses but seldom defined, let alone examined. The issue is whether Northern Tier forces, if entrusted with important military tasks by the USSR, will carry out those tasks in an effective and disciplined manner and thus contribute importantly to the Soviet campaign.

Surprise. Achievement of surprise is imperative to the success of the standard unreinforced attack scenario. Since it is assumed that East European forces would participate from the outset, attention must be paid to the national East European political and military decision processes that would be involved following a Soviet decision to go to war, what prepositioning of East European forces would be required, and how compatible these processes are with usual time assumptions about surprise.

Operational Coordination. The success of a military operation of the magnitude envisaged in a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe would require a high degree of coordination of a multinational military force and an effective command, control, communications, and intelligence (C³I) system. The likelihood of the various national Pact units functioning efficiently under these conditions should be assessed.

Logistics. The standard unreinforced attack scenario implies an important East European role in maintaining major Warsaw Pact lines of communication and logistics. Research is therefore needed regarding

the degree of integration of Pact logistics and the efficiency of national logistic systems.

Circumstances. Effective participation of the Northern Tier forces in Soviet-initiated military operations in Europe may depend importantly on the nature of Soviet objectives and the specific circumstances of war initiation. Analysis is needed of the respective national interests, as defined by the Communist Party elites, and how these might be threatened or furthered in various ways by a range of specific circumstances.

Soviet Perceptions. The projected role of the Northern Tier armed forces in a European war depends ultimately on the Soviet judgment about the political-military and operational issues just discussed. That judgment, particularly on such matters as the reliability of the East European armed forces, may differ from Western appraisals. Although definitive answers cannot be expected, analyses of the western role of the Northern Tier forces should be conscious of the prism through which the Soviet military and political leadership views the East European states generally, and the East European military establishments in particular.

FOCUS OF THE PRESENT STUDY

Underlying the kinds of issues listed above is a prior set of questions concerning the military *institutions* of the individual East European countries. Analysis of the East European contribution to Soviet military strength in Europe cannot be limited to the forces themselves ("15 Polish divisions will . . ."), or to political abstractions ("the Czechs would not . . ."). Such analysis must focus first of all on the military institutions deploying forces in response to political directives. Although developed under conditions of Soviet hegemony, each East European military establishment has evolved differently, and each must be understood on its own terms, not on the basis of generalizations about the "Warsaw Pact."

To put the East European contribution to Soviet military power in Europe in perspective, operational and political analysts need answers to such questions as the following, for the individual East European states:

- o Under what conditions were the armed forces established?
- o What roles do they play in the national Communist political system?
- o What has been their organizational and doctrinal evolution?
- o How do national military theorists describe the "threat" and resulting mission of the armed forces?
- o How effectively, and with what instruments, does the Communist Party control the military?
- o How has the officer corps evolved? What are its loyalties and professional skills?
- o Has there been tension between the national military elite and the USSR, and, if so, over what issues?
- o How have the armed forces reacted to domestic and international crisis situations?

These issues have been woefully neglected. Apart from a few West German books on the East German military and Dale R. Herspring's specialized study, *East German Civil-Military Relations: The Impact of Technology 1949-72* (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1973), there is not a single Western book devoted to an East European military establishment. This study is intended as a contribution to filling that gap.

Section II presents an overview of the postwar development of the Soviet-East European military relationship and the evolution of the Warsaw Pact as a multilateral institution. Detailed analyses of the Polish, East German, and Czechoslovak military establishments follow in Sections III, IV, and V, respectively. These country analyses are not fully coordinate, in part because of the uneven availability of source material and in part because different issues have been important in the development of the respective national military establishments. Thus the Polish case study emphasizes the doctrinal evolution of the Polish armed forces and their unique (for the three Northern Tier countries) degree of autonomy within the political system. The East German (GDR) case study devotes greatest attention to direct Soviet domination of the National People's Army and the NPA's approach to the "Red-Expert" dilemma within its ranks. The Czechoslovak case

study is focused on the trauma of the 1968 Soviet-led invasion and the resulting disintegration and attempted reconstruction of the Czechoslovak armed forces. Section VI presents conclusions, drawn from the preceding analyses, about the national military establishments, individually and jointly, that should permit a better appraisal of their role in supplementing Soviet military power in Europe.

NOTES TO SECTION I

1. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Annual Defense Department Report for Fiscal Year 1978*, DoD press release.
2. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, *Annual Defense Department Report for Fiscal Year 1979*, DoD press release, p. 6.
3. General George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *United States Military Posture for Fiscal Year 1979*, DoD press release, p. 13.
4. Clifford L. Alexander, Jr., Secretary of the Army, and Bernard W. Rogers, United States Army Chief of Staff, *The Posture of the Army: Department of the Army Budget Estimates for Fiscal Year 1979*, DoD press release, p. 3.
5. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, *Annual Defense Department Report for Fiscal Year 1980*, DoD press release, p. 119.
6. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, *Annual Defense Department Report for Fiscal Year 1981*, DoD press release, pp. 45, 108.

II. THE WARSAW PACT AND THE EVOLVING ROLE OF EAST EUROPEAN FORCES IN SOVIET STRATEGY

This report is intended primarily to provide a detailed examination of the national military establishments of Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. However, such an analysis assumes an understanding of the general evolution of Soviet-East European military relations in the postwar period. This section will summarize major developments in the post-World War II Soviet-East European military relationship.¹

The East European military establishments first became important to Moscow as international tension mounted at the turn of the 1950s. The post-1949 expansion of the Soviet armed forces was soon extended to the fledgling East European Communist military establishments as well. Conscription was introduced in all the East European armed forces (in the GDR this occurred only in 1962), and by 1953 the resulting military buildup had brought some million and a half men under arms and created some 65 East European divisions. Soviet equipment flowed in to replace obsolete World War II armaments.

Harnessed to Stalin's foreign policy in the early 1950s, the East European military establishments were internally "Stalinized" as well. Military command positions were filled with Communist and pro-Communist officers, usually of "low" social origin and with little or no prior military experience, but with postwar training in Communist military institutions. The internal organization, training patterns, military doctrine, tactics, and even uniforms of the East European armed forces were modified to conform to the Soviet model. Each Communist Party established triple channels of political control over the national armed forces; the command channel secured through the replacement of prewar officers by Party loyalists was complemented by extending the networks of the Central Committee-directed Political Administration and the security service, each with its own chain of command, to the regimental level or below.

Dependency of the East European Communist Parties on Moscow notwithstanding, consolidation of national Party control over the respective East European armed forces was for Stalin an inadequate guarantee

that they would be fully responsive to Soviet directives. Direct Soviet channels of control were required. The newly appointed, Communist-trained East European commanders were subordinated to Soviet officers of respective national origins who had served, sometimes for years, in the Red Army as Soviet citizens and who now formally resumed their original citizenship. This was most evident in Poland, but the practice was almost as widespread in the Hungarian Army and was followed to a lesser extent in the other East European armed forces. Equally important, thousands of Soviet "advisers" were placed within the East European armies, constituting a separate chain of command. By means of the senior Soviet officers and the Soviet "advisers" in each East European army, the Soviet high command was, in practice, able to dispose of the East European armed forces as branches of the Red Army. In the Stalinist period, then, an informal but effective unified Soviet command and control system over "integrated" East European armed forces was established, setting a standard to which latter-day Soviet leaders would aspire.

Following Stalin's death and with a partial easing of tensions in Europe, the Soviet leadership sought to relax the most extreme forms of forced mobilization and subservience to Soviet control in Eastern Europe--essentials of the Stalinist interstate system that became Soviet liabilities with the removal of the system's personal linchpin. Economic considerations were cardinal in the Soviet effort to rationalize what was now viewed as Stalin's misallocation of military-related resources in Eastern Europe. Because it so overstretched the East European economies, the military burden in Eastern Europe had serious destabilizing political ramifications. So defense spending was reduced and military manpower cut in Eastern Europe, just as in the USSR, and the Stalinist approach to military mobilization was condemned by East European leaders as primitive and wasteful. As Soviet military thought was freed from Stalin's emphasis on traditional "permanent operating factors of war," East European military doctrine was affected in turn. Stalin had resisted doctrinal implications of the technical possibilities for greater mechanization and concentration of ground forces; these were now accepted, and motorized divisions replaced infantry

divisions in the East European armed forces. Soviet military doctrine now embraced the realities of the nuclear age; a decade before they acquired systems capable of delivering nuclear warheads, the East European armed forces, too, received instruction from the Soviet mentors on nuclear warfare.

The founding in 1955 of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), as the formal multilateral security alliance of the states within the Soviet orbit, was not principally a consequence of this process of rationalizing the Soviet and East European military establishments. Instead, creation of the Warsaw Pact (WP) was to be explained in political terms. Externally, it was a political response to the incorporation of West Germany in NATO. In internal Soviet bloc terms, it was an effort to establish a multilateral political organization that, together with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and other specialized bloc organizations, could provide an institutionalized substitute for the personalized Stalinist system of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.

Article 5 of the Warsaw Treaty did provide for a joint military command, which was formally established in Moscow in early 1956. Yet in military terms, the WTO remained a paper organization until the 1960s.* At the outset, it served one concrete Soviet military purpose: it provided an alternate source of legitimization for deployment of forces in Hungary and Romania after ratification of the Austrian State Treaty in 1955. It also provided the Soviets with a mechanism to contain the renationalization of the East European military establishments that began after Stalin's death. A multilateral alliance framework, no matter how devoid of substance, served to formally recognize an East European voice in alliance matters and thus help to defuse potentially explosive national feelings and to legitimize Soviet control.

* In common Western usage, "Warsaw Pact" is used to describe any military entities or activities of the USSR and its East European client-states. Here and elsewhere throughout this report, discussion of the Warsaw Pact as an institution or organization pertains to the formal structure of the Pact, embracing a number of multinational bodies.

The crises of 1956 in Eastern Europe indicated the importance of this last consideration. The resulting unrest led to Soviet military pressure in Poland and Soviet military suppression of the Hungarian Revolution. As a consequence, East European leaderships became more sensitive to the *forms* of national sovereignty, in the military as in other realms. Formal renationalization of the East European armed forces, begun in 1953, was completed after 1956. Many of the former Soviet officers who had commanded the East European military establishments were recalled to the USSR. National military uniforms were rehabilitated. More important, the Soviet Government declaration of October 1956 on more equitable relations between the USSR and the East European countries (issued just prior to Hungary's renunciation of the Warsaw Pact and the ensuing Soviet military suppression of the Hungarian Revolution) professed a Soviet willingness to review the issue of Soviet troops stationed in Eastern Europe. Despite Soviet military suppression of the Hungarian Revolution, in December 1956 the USSR concluded a status-of-forces agreement with Poland specifying the terms of the stationing of Soviet forces on Polish territory and pledging their noninterference in Polish affairs. Status-of-forces agreements were also concluded with Hungary, Romania, and East Germany early in 1957. In what might be interpreted as a final Soviet gesture to East European national sentiments, perhaps as a specific result of Romanian economic concessions and Chinese support, Moscow acceded to a Romanian request, advanced even before 1956, and withdrew all Soviet forces from Romania early in 1958.

After 1956, Khrushchev sought to construct a viable "socialist commonwealth" that would ensure Soviet control over the broad outlines of domestic and foreign policies of the East European states. On the one hand, the USSR dismantled or mitigated the more onerous forms of direct Soviet control and (in contrast to the Stalinist period) permitted room for some domestic autonomy. On the other hand, the USSR sought to utilize the Warsaw Pact and COMECON as institutional mechanisms for ensuring the stability of Soviet hegemony in the region. But little headway was made in translating wish into policy. Indeed, initially after 1956, Khrushchev's presumptive effort to use the Warsaw

Pact as an organization for Soviet-dominated institution-building in Eastern Europe was not pursued vigorously. Until 1961, the Warsaw Pact as such lacked political and especially military substance. The supreme Warsaw Pact organ, the Political Consultative Committee (PCC), met only four times between 1955 and the spring of 1961, even though its statutes called for two meetings per year. The fact that the PCC failed to meet at all between January 1956 and May 1958 (the most turbulent period in postwar East European history) testifies that the Warsaw Pact was not invested with crisis-management prerogatives. On the military side, there was no visible attempt to promote military integration in a Warsaw Pact framework.

Beginning in 1960, Khrushchev sought to initiate a revolution in Soviet military organization and doctrine by emphasizing nuclear missile forces at the expense of the traditional Soviet military strength, ground forces in Europe, and by recasting ground forces doctrine to emphasize *blitzkrieg* offensives of mobile forces at the expense of Soviet mobilization capabilities. Khrushchev's conception evidently postulated that Soviet ground forces could be further reduced if East European armed forces were to assume a more substantial role in Soviet military planning for Europe. A part of the Khrushchevian vision was implemented: The Strategic Rocket Forces were organized in 1960 and the goal of strategic equality with the United States was vigorously pursued. But while overall Soviet military forces for conventional conflicts were reduced after 1960, the combination of heightened East-West tension in Europe associated with the Berlin crisis of 1961 and traditionalist institutional opposition within the Soviet military establishment resulted in a practically undiminished level of Soviet ground forces in Eastern Europe.

Nonetheless, apparently as a direct consequence of the original Khrushchev vision, the USSR began to place more emphasis on an East European military contribution to Soviet power. The post-1956 quiescence in Eastern Europe made this possible; heightened East-West tensions and the emerging Soviet security problem portended by the worsening Sino-Soviet split made it more urgent. The Warsaw Pact provided a multilateral framework for this purpose.

A decision to strengthen the military as well as the political functions of the Warsaw Pact first became visible at the March 1961 meeting of the PCC, where the member-states evidently agreed on regular consultative meetings of national defense ministers, joint multinational military maneuvers, and Soviet-assisted modernization of East European forces. The first of these multilateral exercises, "Brotherhood in Arms," was held in the fall of 1961 in connection with the Berlin crisis of that year. Symptomatic of Soviet priorities in building up the East European military establishments in the 1960s, it involved the USSR, on the one hand, and the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia--the "Northern Tier"--on the other. While the initial exercises of the early 1960s could be interpreted as largely political demonstrations intended to display Soviet-East European military fraternity, by the mid-1960s they had become serious combat training activities. Moreover, the East European armed forces were now supplied by the USSR with modern T54 and T55 tanks, MiG 21 and SU-7 aircraft, and other weapons. By the mid-1960s, some East European armed forces were being supplied with nuclear-capable delivery vehicles (first of all, surface-to-surface missiles)--although the warheads themselves presumably remained under sole Soviet control--and were being trained in their use. Standardization of armaments within the Warsaw Pact was enhanced as East European states abandoned some indigenous arms production capabilities; a nascent East German military aircraft industry was abandoned in 1961, while Poland renounced further development of advanced combat aircraft in 1969. These joint combat training, modernization, and specialization programs suggested that the USSR had come to view the East European armed forces as an important contribution to Soviet military power. Not only did the East European forces extend the Soviet air defense system and constitute a buffer (as they had since Stalin's day), but they were now earmarked for an active mechanized ground-and-air-combat role in military operations in Europe.

Yet for all the improvements in the military capabilities of the East European military establishments in the 1960s achieved in the framework of the Warsaw Pact, there was little indication of progress

toward military integration through military institutions of the Warsaw Pact itself. The only integrated armed forces branch in the Soviet bloc was air defense, and that was created not under Warsaw Pact auspices but by incorporating East European air defense systems in the Soviet *PVO Strany*. Despite its elaborate formal structure, the WTO lacked functional military organs. It lacked integrated command and control and logistics systems such as NATO had created. Even the Joint Command's staff lacked continuity. In the 1960s, as Malcolm Macintosh suggested,² the Warsaw Pact seemed to function as a multinational analogue of a traditional European war office, with administrative duties for mobilization, training, and equipment, but without direct responsibility for the conduct of military operations.

There is clear evidence from the 1960s that in a European war, East European armed forces, just as the groups of Soviet forces stationed in Eastern Europe, would not be subordinated to the Warsaw Pact Joint Command but would be incorporated in Fronts commanded by the Soviet General Staff via theater or field headquarters. This was the command arrangement the USSR used at the end of World War II. It was the Soviet military planning assumption reflected in the 1968 edition of the authoritative Soviet military handbook, Sokolovskii's *On Military Strategy*. It was the pattern followed in the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. In that operation, the Warsaw Pact military organization command by Marshal Yakubovskii was responsible for the Warsaw Pact maneuvers in and around Czechoslovakia through June. But the Soviet, Polish, Hungarian, East German, and Bulgarian units that constituted the invasion force were mobilized and deployed by various Soviet commands, without reference to Warsaw Pact institutions, while the military intervention itself was directed by the commander of the Soviet ground forces, General Pavlovskii, operating from a forward headquarters of the Soviet high command. Knowledgeable former East European military officers have since confirmed this absence of an independent Warsaw Pact command and operational capability in the late 1960s.³

In the 1960s, the Warsaw Pact military institutions served mobilization, training, and control functions rather than wartime military-operational ones. As such they came under attack from some quarters

in Eastern Europe as excessively Soviet-dominated. Such criticism emanated primarily from Romania, which under Ceausescu had launched an autonomous national course that brought it--within clear limits--into conflict with Soviet interests on a broad range of issues. In late 1964 Romania, alone, reduced its term of military conscription from 24 to 16 months; this resulted in a cut of 40,000 men in the Romanian armed forces. Romania sought to reduce what it viewed as an excessive contribution to the collective military strength of the Warsaw Pact and to turn to a smaller, more domestically oriented military establishment. Simultaneously, however, Romania sought to increase its national voice in WP military affairs and hence reduce the degree of Soviet control over Romanian defense. In 1966, Ceausescu obliquely called for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe. Bucharest evidently subsequently proposed that the position of WP commander in chief (always occupied by a Marshal of the Soviet Armed Forces) rotate--and may have succeeded thereby in forcing a delay in the naming of Ivan Yakubovskii to replace Grechko as WP commander in chief in 1967. Further, arguing that East European military expenditures in general were excessive, Romania brought about a dramatic reduction in the size of the Soviet military liaison mission in Bucharest, claimed at least a consultative voice in matters related to nuclear weapons in the Warsaw Pact, expressed concerns about the Non-Proliferation Treaty derived from these sensitivities, refused to permit WP troop maneuvers on Romanian soil, and generally abstained from joint maneuvers involving combat forces in other countries as well.

Unambiguous as it was, the Romanian deviation alone (outlined in Appendix E) does not account satisfactorily for the evident lack of progress after 1965 toward the Soviet goal of creating a permanent political coordination mechanism within the Warsaw Pact or for the lack of progress in upgrading WP military institutions in a manner strengthening Soviet control. That lack of progress would seem to indicate, additionally, uncertainty or division in Moscow and neutrality or support for the Romanian position in other East European states. The controversy over the role of the Warsaw Pact evidently precipitated previously unarticulated aspirations on the part of other East European

countries for a more equal position in WP military affairs as well. Czechoslovak support for some of the Romanian grievances can be documented as early as 1966, when the Czech press voiced concern about Czechoslovakia's limited participation in Warsaw Pact military organs and its desire for a consultative voice in WP nuclear affairs. In 1968, as the reformist political movement headed by Alexander Dubcek gained ground in Czechoslovakia, dissatisfaction with Soviet domination of the Czechoslovak armed forces and WP military institutions was voiced more openly (as will be described in Section V). These military grievances, and especially the bluntness with which they were expressed, were one factor in the Soviet decision to intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 (with Polish, Hungarian, GDR, and Bulgarian units joining the Soviet invasion force).

The occupation of Czechoslovakia was a watershed in the development of bilateral and multilateral military relationships in the Soviet bloc. The Soviets demonstrated that they were able to mobilize their loyalist allies (Romania abstained) to use military force for imposing loyalty on a deviant client-state. But as will be documented later in this study, in doing so they paid a high price, involving the complete demoralization of the Czechoslovak armed forces and considerable soul-searching in the Polish and East German military establishments as well. One consequence was more *relative* emphasis on Soviet, as opposed to East European, forces in the area. Five Soviet divisions remained in Czechoslovakia after the 1968 invasion (none had been stationed there previously). Additionally, a general buildup and modernization of Soviet forces elsewhere in East Europe occurred. This increase in Soviet military strength is all the more significant because it occurred in a period when the main emphasis in Soviet general purpose forces development was the buildup on the Chinese border.

Notwithstanding presumptive Soviet doubts about the loyalty of the Czechoslovak armed forces, in particular since 1968, the USSR has by no means written off the military contribution of the East European armed forces. East European manpower levels have remained roughly constant since 1966, totaling over one million regular military personnel. Significant increases in defense spending devoted primarily to

modernization have occurred. Participation of East European armed forces in joint Warsaw Pact exercises has continued, as has their modernization with Soviet-supplied weapons, including T-62 tanks, advanced MiG and Sukhoi aircraft, and SA-4, SA-6, and SA-7 surface-to-air missiles. These efforts have been concentrated in the Northern Tier to such an extent* that "Northern Tier" is almost synonymous with "Warsaw Pact"; the armed forces of loyalist Hungary and Bulgaria constitute at best a marginal increment to Soviet military capabilities, while for some purposes Romanian forces constitute a (minor) subtraction.

Six months after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the WTO Political Consultative Committee met in Budapest to ratify organizational changes in the WTO's military institutions. Details of these changes remain sparse. But enough information has been disclosed in Soviet bloc sources to make it clear that they were not the result of a crash Soviet effort after Czechoslovakia to enhance Soviet direction of WP military affairs through creation of new, Soviet-dominated supranational organs. Rather, the 1969 institutional reforms in the Warsaw Pact were the slightly belated consequence of the post-1965 East European pressure to improve access to and gain at least a consultative voice in WP military affairs. As noted, that drive was spearheaded by Romania but was probably supported on some issues by other East European states. The pending changes in WP military organs had been broached as early as 1966; detailed planning was evidently carried out in the fall of 1968.

The formal structure of the WP military organization incorporating the Budapest institutional changes is outlined in Appendix A. Highlights of these changes were formal establishment of a Committee of Defense Ministers and a Military Council; restructuring of the Joint Command so that East European deputy defense ministers, rather than the defense ministers, serve as deputy WP commanders; establishment of a permanent Joint Command staff; and adoption of a new statute of the Joint Armed Forces. The 1969 changes were evidently intended to give

* For example, 41 of 50 joint WTO field exercises prior to 1976 were held in the Northern Tier.

the Warsaw Pact more of a semblance of a multinational military alliance and to grant the East European military establishments a greater consultative voice in WP decisionmaking, while streamlining decision channels affecting such matters as training and weapons standardization in a manner serving Soviet interests. Whether the reforms also prepared the way for the WP Joint Command as such to assume an operational wartime role remains an open question. On balance, the evidence is negative; the Warsaw Pact as such evidently remains a peacetime entity, with functions that would revert to the Soviet General Staff in wartime.* This direct subordination of the East European armed forces to Soviet command in wartime is reflected even in peacetime in the organization of air defense (the elements of the East European armed forces most crucial to Soviet defense): the East European air defense systems are subordinated to the Soviet commander of the *PVO Strany*, whose "second hat" as WP commander of Air Defense Forces seems to be a formal designation only. Similarly, the Polish and East German Baltic fleets are subordinated (at least in certain aspects) to the Joint Fleet Command, headed by the commander of the Soviet Baltic Fleet.

These various WP military institutions appeared to function in the 1970s; the Committee of Defense Ministers, Military Council, and specialized consultations (such as meetings of Main Political Administration (MPA) heads) were convened regularly. Multilateral command-staff and field maneuvers were held. But the continued existence of internal tensions within the Pact was demonstrated at the November 1978 PCC session. On that occasion, Romania refused to accept Soviet demands for greater military spending, and Ceausescu reiterated the Romanian insistence on national control of national armed forces in a manner implying renewed Soviet efforts to expand WP military integration at

* One item of evidence supporting the contrary hypothesis is a statement by the Polish chief of staff in 1974:

In peacetime, command of the armed forces assigned by individual states to the Joint Armed Forces is exercised by the defense ministers of those states. In wartime those forces are subordinated in operational-strategic terms to the Supreme Commander of the Joint Armed Forces.⁴

the expense of national control. Perhaps more important, support for the Romanian position against increased military spending was reportedly forthcoming at the PCC session from other East European states.

NOTES TO SECTION II

1. This section summarizes and updates materials contained in A. Ross Johnson, *Soviet-East European Military Relations: An Overview*, The Rand Corporation, P-5383-1, August 1977. Material on the Romanian "military deviation" is taken from Alex Alexiev, *Romania and the Warsaw Pact: The Defense Policy of a Reluctant Ally*, The Rand Corporation, P-6270, January 1979. Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe: The Evolution of a Political-Military Posture, 1945-1964*, The Rand Corporation, RM-5838-PR, November 1968, and *Soviet Power and Europe: 1965-1969*, The Rand Corporation, RM-5991-PR, July 1979, provide a comprehensive analysis from the Soviet perspective. Extensive documentation is contained in these studies. See also Dale R. Herspring, "The Warsaw Pact at 25," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1980.
2. Malcolm Mackintosh, *The Evolution of the Warsaw Pact*, Adelphi Papers, No. 58, June 1969, pp. 11-15.
3. Interviews by the authors with former East German, Polish, and Czechoslovak officers, who wish to remain anonymous.
4. Boleslaw Chocha, *Obrona terytorium kraju*, Warsaw, MON, 1974.

III. THE POLISH MILITARY

THE NATIONAL SETTING¹

Poland occupies a pivotal position in the Soviet bloc. It is the largest and most populous of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states. Its Communist system, established under Soviet tutelage at the end of World War II, has always been less repressive than the Soviet system; even at the height of Stalinism, for example, there were no "show trials" and executions of purged Communist leaders in Poland. With the end of the Stalinist era, a domestic crisis resulted in the return to power of Party leader Wladyslaw Gomulka (purged in 1948 for "nationalism"). Although Gomulka quickly betrayed the hopes of the liberal and national forces that had backed him in 1956, reimposing stricter Party controls at home and stressing fidelity to the USSR, Poland continued to depart from Soviet preferences in key matters: the private character of its agriculture, the uniquely strong national as well as religious role of the Roman Catholic Church (so clearly demonstrated during the visit to Poland of the "Polish Pope" in June 1979), and the Western outlook of a Polish nation largely uncommitted to Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Domestic economic and social problems throughout the 1960s culminated in strikes and riots of industrial workers in the coastal cities (Gdansk, Gdynia, Szczecin, and Sopot) in December 1970. This crisis caused the fall of Gomulka and his replacement as Party leader by Edward Gierek. One of Gomulka's last acts had been to conclude a treaty with West Germany normalizing relations and embodying formal West German acceptance of Poland's postwar territorial boundaries. This normalization has had the major consequence--still underestimated in the West--of reducing Polish concern with a West German threat to Polish security interests and undermining the contention of the Polish Communist leadership that only complete loyalty to the USSR could safeguard Poland's national existence.

Gomulka's rule thus ended with a fading perception of a West German threat; the Gierek era began with an economic strategy of satisfying consumer demands that involved a quantum increase in Poland's

economic ties with the West. This economic strategy proved unsuccessful. In 1976 the announcement of pending foodstuff price rises again provoked worker strikes and unrest. This time, having drawn lessons from the December 1970 riots, Gierek backed off and rescinded the price increases, and Soviet loans were granted to help revive the economy. But economic conditions worsened, leading to increased popular dissatisfaction. Dissident intellectuals became active, organizing in such groups as the "Committee for the Defense of the Workers." The Church became more assertive. In early 1977, the Party leadership bowed to popular pressure and abandoned its efforts to make explicit reference to Party rule and alliance with the USSR in a revised state constitution.²

In mid-1980, socioeconomic tensions reached crisis proportions when yet another attempt by the government to precipitately increase foodstuff prices led to an outbreak of strikes that assumed massive proportions, especially on the Baltic coast. In contrast to the situations in 1970 and 1976, violence was avoided, the workers stuck to their demands, and the government was forced to agree to far-reaching economic and political concessions.

These developments are indicative of the depth of national tradition, the implicit anti-Sovietism, the extent of popular resistance to a truly Soviet-style political system, and the pro-Western orientation that exist today in Poland. Yet, under Soviet tutelage, Poland's armed forces have been developed over the past twenty years to a point where its 15 divisions are evidently intended to play a key role in the offensive operations against Western Europe envisaged by Soviet strategy in the event of military conflict in Europe. This wartime role postulates the effectiveness and reliability of the armed forces of what is doubtless correctly viewed by Soviet leaders as perhaps the most troublesome and least "reliable" country in the Soviet orbit. This evident paradox has been generally ignored both in political analyses of Poland's role in the Soviet bloc and in military appraisals of the Warsaw Pact threat to NATO Europe. Neither type of analysis has heretofore attempted to examine, in a political and military context, the postwar development of the Polish armed forces. This section will review key developments in the Polish military in the post-1956 period, with the aim of enhancing Western understanding of the evident paradox of a key Polish military role in Soviet strategy.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

The origins of the "Polish People's Army" created in 1945 are traced principally to the First and Second Polish Armies organized by Moscow on Soviet territory in 1943. Made up of Poles who had fled from Poland to the USSR in the face of Nazi occupation, the two Polish armies were not only organized by Moscow but dominated by Soviet officers; by the end of the war, one-third of their officers were Soviets.³ These strong Soviet roots influenced much of the subsequent development of the Polish armed forces.

A second but much smaller precursor of the new Polish army was the "People's Army," made up of Communist partisans (some with military experience in the Spanish Civil War) who waged underground resistance in Poland. This People's Army was, however, very small; in the Polish resistance movement it was insignificant in comparison with the non-Communist Home Army.

The Polish army created in 1945 out of these two wartime organizations was the largest regular military force in Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, it was largely neglected by the Communist Party until 1948. Prior to that year, the Party concentrated on developing strong and reliable internal security forces; it was these forces (especially the Internal Security Corps, KBW) rather than the regular military that were used to suppress non-Communist resistance in conflict that assumed the proportions of civil war in Poland through 1947.⁴

With the Communist consolidation of power in 1948, the Party began to emphasize the strengthening and political consolidation of the armed forces. But this process was immediately affected by Stalinization in both its domestic and international ramifications. The purge of Party leader Gomulka at Stalin's directive in 1948 was followed by the ouster (and in some cases imprisonment) of many of his fellow "native" Communists (i.e., Communists who fought in Poland rather than the USSR during World War II) who had assumed important posts in the postwar army. With these ousters underway (in the context of the rising East-West tensions that culminated in the outbreak of the Korean War), Moscow began a massive military buildup of its own army and extended this effort to include Polish as well as other East European forces. Following introduction of conscription in 1949, the Polish armed forces

were built up to a force of nearly 400,000 men. Soviet equipment flowed in to replace obsolete World War II armaments. The USSR also decreed organizational changes in the Polish army; military organization, training patterns, doctrine, tactics, and even uniforms were modified to conform to the Soviet model. To carry out this buildup and to ensure that the Polish army was fully responsive to Soviet direction, Soviet officers (in many cases the same officers who had served in the wartime First and Second Polish Armies) were reintroduced into the Polish army. Soviet Marshal Rokossowski became Defense Minister and Commander in Chief in 1949; subsequently the posts of chief of the general staff, commander of the ground forces, heads of all service branches, and commanders of all the military districts were filled by Soviet officers.⁵ At lower levels, hundreds of Soviet "advisers" were introduced. The result was the transformation of the Polish army into an essentially extra-national force, in practice as directly subordinated to the Soviet High Command as was a Soviet military district. Marshal Rokossowski took his orders from Moscow; although a member of the Polish Party Politburo, he was only formally responsive to that body in military matters.⁶

In the Stalinist period, then, in Poland just as in other East European countries, an informal but effective unified Soviet command and control system over "integrated" East European armed forces was established. From the Polish Communists' point of view, this practice constituted a blatant denial of national sovereignty--one they would roundly condemn after 1956.

As direct as this Soviet control was and as real as the Soviet-ordered military buildup of the early 1950s was, however, the offensive capabilities of the Polish army (and doubtless other East European armies) were often overestimated in the West at the time. The Polish Army was structured for mobile defense; moreover, its poor state of organization, inadequate weaponry, and limited combat capability are ubiquitous themes in the many frank critiques of the 1949-1955 period contained in post-1956 Polish military writings.⁷

Following Stalin's death, the Soviet leadership sought to mitigate the most extreme forms of forced mobilization and subservience to Soviet control in Eastern Europe. In Poland, Stalin's approach to

military mobilization was condemned as primitive and wasteful. Defense spending was cut, and the first of several waves of demobilization of enlisted men and officers was initiated. In the midst of this process of partial demobilization, the Polish armed forces were caught up in the political developments that culminated in the removal of Polish Stalinists and the return to power of Gomulka in October 1956. The catalyst of the Polish "October" was rioting by industrial workers in Poznan in June 1956. On that occasion local KBW forces proved insufficient to handle the demonstrations; regular army units disobeyed orders to fire on striking workers, and an elite KBW brigade from Warsaw used force to restore order, with hundreds of casualties. This led to a national outpouring of revulsion against both the KBW and the Party leadership that had ordered the use of force in Poznan; in August 1956 command of the KBW was assumed by General Wacław Komar, who had been purged along with Gomulka and subsequently imprisoned.⁸

This change in the KBW command was to prove crucial in October 1956, when Gomulka returned to power. As Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership arrived uninvited and unannounced in Warsaw to deal with the Polish leadership, Soviet divisions in Poland moved from their garrisons toward Warsaw. The Polish army was internally divided between the Soviet generals, headed by Rokossowski, and lower-ranking Polish officers sympathetic to Gomulka; as a result it was largely neutralized and remained in its barracks. Soviet or pro-Soviet elements in Poland evidently did prepare to arrest Gomulka and his supporters, but they were stopped by reform-minded elements supported by actions of the KBW under General Komar. A Committee for the Defense of Warsaw was organized, and the KBW took up defensive positions around Warsaw and prepared to resist the approaching Soviet forces. A few key regular unit commanders, including Admiral Jan Wisniewski (commander of coastal defense units) and General Jan Frey-Bielecki, an Air Force unit commander, also prepared their units for armed resistance.⁹ This threat of armed resistance is widely regarded in Poland as a critical element in Khrushchev's decision to back down and accept Gomulka; in so doing, Khrushchev gambled, successfully, that Poland's deviation from the Soviet model would be held within acceptable bounds.

Gomulka's return to power led to a renewed emphasis on national *Polish* characteristics, as opposed to imposed Soviet forms, throughout the political system. In this situation the Soviet-dominated Polish army was an anachronism that inflamed Polish national feelings. The obvious threat that the Polish army posed to Gomulka's personal position made more urgent the need to "de-Sovietize" the armed forces. The Polish army was thus "renationalized": many of the Soviet forms imposed on it after 1949 were discarded, and the army reverted to the status quo ante 1950. Marshal Rokossowski and almost all of his fellow Soviet officers were recalled to the USSR. They were replaced in many cases by "native" Communists with experience in the People's Army who had been purged with Gomulka (and sometimes imprisoned) in the Stalinist era. The most prominent were General Marian Spychalski, who had been deputy defense minister until 1948 and who now succeeded Rokossowski as defense minister, and General Janusz Zarzycki, who assumed leadership of the Main Political Administration. National military uniforms and songs were reintroduced. In December 1956 Poland concluded a status-of-forces agreement with the USSR that specified the terms of the stationing of Soviet forces on Polish territory, including their "noninterference" in Polish domestic affairs.

This simultaneous "renationalization" and "Gomulka-ization" of the armed forces brought with it a diminution of the powers of the political apparatus vis-à-vis the professional officer corps and thus a weakening of Party control. This latter development was a reflection of the broader current of liberalization that affected the political system at the time. The Communist youth organization (ZMP) was abolished in 1956; since few enlisted men and only half of the officers were Party members (but had been organized in ZMP cells within the military), its abolition meant the end of a mass Communist organization within the military. The activity of political officers was reduced, and the lowest-level position of political officer, at the company level, was abolished.

The focus of political activity in the armed forces shifted from the political apparatus, discredited in the Stalinist era, to Party

organizations* which reformist elements often initially dominated. The result was to reduce Party influence in the military establishment, because only a minority of soldiers and half the officer corps were subject to Party discipline, and because Party organizations in the military had less impact on activities of the professional commanders than did the military's political apparatus.¹⁰ The professional military leadership consequently began to reassert its prerogatives. An early indication of this was the establishment in February 1957 of a Military Council in the Ministry of National Defense as a formal advisory body bringing together, under the chairmanship of the Minister, the heads of the major departments and services.¹¹ Military councils were also established at lower levels; unlike corresponding Soviet organs, the Polish military councils were strictly military bodies and did not include non-military Party representatives.

These changes occurred in the context of a general discrediting of the military establishment in the eyes of the population--a consequence, above all, of the total domination of the Polish army by the USSR prior to 1956. The low social prestige of the military was indicated by public opinion polls instituted in Poland at the time. The military profession had been a prestigious one in interwar Poland, but a 1958 survey of Warsaw secondary school youth indicated it had dropped to 21st place in social prestige, below office workers.¹² This caused serious difficulties in recruiting new officers. For example, the Artillery Officers School was able to fill only 40 percent of the places in its first year class for the 1957-1958 school year.¹³

In the wake of the October 1956 political upheaval in Poland, then, the Polish army reverted from an extra-national entity to a military institution again under direct control of the Polish Communist leadership, but considerably discredited in the eyes of the Polish population. The instruments of political control within the military establishment had been weakened. But from this weakened state, the Polish armed forces were very quickly caught up in "the revolution in Soviet

* In the Stalinist era, the political apparatus had been emphasized; basic Party organizations had been introduced in the military only in 1951 and only down to the regimental level.

military science" and assumed a new and important role in Soviet military planning for European hostilities. The evident speed of this process suggests that a consequence of the period of direct Soviet domination of the Polish army in the early 1950s was the creation of a cadre of Polish officers trained by and in many ways attuned to the thinking of the Soviet military and unwilling or unable to divorce Polish national security considerations from Soviet military imperatives.

DOCTRINAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL EVOLUTION

The end of the 1950s brought the "revolution in Soviet military science" which freed Soviet military thought from Stalin's static concepts; a restructuring of the Soviet armed forces for offensive *blitzkrieg* operations resulted.¹⁴ Polish military doctrine and organization were similarly recast. Poland's emulation of Soviet military doctrinal and organizational change was fundamentally a consequence of her inclusion in the Soviet bloc and Gomulka's commitment to Moscow that Poland would remain a firm ally. But the reorientation of the Soviet military was extended to the Polish military through a specific system of professional relationships that bound the Polish military elite to the Soviet military establishment--more so than analogous relationships linking other Polish elite groups with their Soviet counterparts--and ensured even in the first years after 1956 that on fundamental issues the Polish military remained attuned to Soviet developments. This system of military relationships developed from Poland's participation in the emerging military institutions of the Warsaw Pact and bilateral Soviet-Polish military agreements, including the December 1956 status-of-forces agreement. But the system extended well beyond these formal ties. It included training of senior Polish officers at Voroshilov Academy, translation of Soviet military literature in Polish military publications, joint conferences and seminars of military leaders and experts, joint command-staff exercises, and countless exchanges of military visits at lower levels.¹⁵

Attuned to the rethinking of Soviet strategy then underway, in the late 1950s Polish military specialists elaborated, in a series of


military journal articles and books,¹⁶ a doctrine of coalition warfare which reflected Poland's military participation in the Warsaw Pact and was thus largely Soviet-derived, but which embodied a Polish component. This coalition doctrine, it should be noted, took shape in the late 1950s and as such *preceded* (and provided the doctrinal justification for) multilateral Warsaw Pact field exercises formally initiated in 1961. As such, the doctrine suggests an earlier Soviet decision to place greater reliance on East European forces in military planning for European contingencies than is usually assumed. Polish coalition warfare doctrine assumed rapid offensive operations onto NATO territory by Warsaw Pact forces; the doctrine explicitly stipulated that it was the mission of regular Polish military forces to fight on this "external front."

Parallel to the development of coalition warfare doctrine, Polish military theorists elaborated a concept of "defense of national territory" that had a distinctly national Polish flavor. This concept stressed the threat that modern nuclear weapons posed to Poland's national existence, postulating that Poland's geopolitical position--between the "first echelon" and the "rear" of the Warsaw Pact--made it a likely target for massive NATO nuclear strikes.¹⁷ In the mid-1960s the doctrine led to the formal exclusion from Warsaw Pact operations of a segment of Polish armed forces, which were earmarked for action on the "internal front" (see Fig. 1). This doctrine of "defense of national territory" anticipated in part the later Soviet approach to civil defense.

The following pages describe in greater detail this doctrinal and organizational evolution of the Polish military since the late 1950s.

Preparation for Coalition Warfare

At the heart of Polish military doctrine as developed since the late 1950s is the proposition that national defense is illusory for a small Communist state and that only the Soviet military coalition--the Warsaw Pact--can provide military security. In Polish doctrine, the postulated "threat" is from NATO; until the normalization of Polish-West German relations in 1970, Polish military writers dwelt



*In peacetime subordinated to Interior Ministry.

Fig. 1--Organization of the Polish armed forces (key components)

principally on the threat to Poland from the West German Bundeswehr, given its major role in NATO after the mid-1950s. This military doctrine was a reflection of the political syllogism of Polish Communism until 1970: only alliance with the USSR could guarantee Poland's national integrity in the face of the German threat to Poland's territorial integrity. In the Polish Communist interpretation, in the military just as in the political realm, only by fulfilling "internationalist" (meaning Soviet-imposed) alliance obligations could national security desiderata be met. According to this logic, defense "must be viewed in coalition dimensions. Today, defense cannot be organized in narrow, domestic-national dimensions."¹⁸

It followed that Polish forces must fight in the interest of, and as required by, the Warsaw Pact as a whole:

The problem of the defense of the Polish People's Republic is today principally the problem of our operational function in the defensive system of the Warsaw Pact. . . [with the creation of the Warsaw Pact] the defensive borders of our armed forces became the borders of the countries of the socialist camp.¹⁹

This is the core assumption of Polish military thought; there is no evidence that it has been questioned within the military elite in the past 20 years--even by officers ousted in the 1960s for "nationalism"--along the lines current in Czech military thought from 1966 to 1968 emphasizing national defense. This core assumption shapes the Polish military structure, as Polish military writers freely note:

the coalition approach to defense does not only have important political and practical implications. It has many organizational and doctrinal implications. [One of these is] the obligation to subordinate the national defense system to the fundamentals and strategic assumptions of the [Soviet] camp as a whole.²⁰

Coalition defense postulates an "external front," outside Poland, to which Polish forces are dedicated. A principal assumption of Polish doctrine is that a European conflict on this "external front" would

be nuclear. Elaboration of the conditions and requirements of nuclear warfare is a major theme in Polish military writings; the point is buttressed by repeated criticism of Polish (and Soviet) military thought in the 1950s for failing to come to terms early enough with the realities of nuclear warfare, and to understand that

the number, kind, power, and nature of the use of nuclear weapons conditions the character of action of other kinds of forces, including infantry, tanks, and conventional artillery--and not vice versa.²¹

In the 1960s it was the consistent assumption of Polish military doctrine that a European conflict would be nuclear; some writers granted only the possibility of "a short conventional phase" at the outset of nuclear conflict.²² In the 1970s, in line with the shift in Soviet pronouncements, Polish military leaders and writers have placed slightly more emphasis on the possibility of a conventional phase; the dominant theme is still, however, that conventional warfare would very likely escalate.²³

The central assumption of nuclear warfare has influenced many other aspects of the post-1956 reorientation of Polish military thought. It has led to a preoccupation with sudden attack and corresponding attention to the initial period of conflict.²⁴ This assumption also underlies the reorientation of operational doctrine from mobile defense to a doctrine of rapid offensive operations onto NATO territory. In the words of the former chief of staff:

The end goal [of military operations of the Polish operational army and the Soviet army] will not be liberation of an occupied country, as was the case in the last war, but destruction of the enemy's forces and thwarting their invasion of the territory of the socialist countries.²⁵

Some Polish sources assert that the "superiority" of conventional Warsaw Pact forces over NATO forces in Europe ensures that a war will not be fought on Pact territory.²⁶ Polish military strategists have produced a considerable literature on operational doctrine keyed to these

assumptions, emphasizing such themes as surprise, deception, rapid offensive operations, and maneuverability.²⁷

The Polish military doctrine developed since the late 1950s is explicitly "coalition doctrine," and the Poles make no pretense that it is not Soviet-generated. At the same time, Polish military spokesmen argue that they are not just "consumers" of Soviet-generated coalition doctrine, but "actively participate in its development" as well.²⁸ The most important *Polish* component of Polish military thought is said to be the separate doctrine of "defense of national territory" discussed below.²⁹ But Polish spokesmen contend that they have made contributions to the formulation of common Warsaw Pact doctrine as well. These contributions, as listed by the chief of the general staff, include doctrine on such operational matters as tactics of river crossings and battle control information systems.³⁰ Some of these innovations were reportedly tested in the 1966 "Jesien" Polish maneuvers and subsequently accepted by the USSR and other Warsaw Pact states.³¹

In accordance with Warsaw Pact coalition doctrine, regular units of the Polish army are intended to fight on the "external front," outside Poland, "with the purpose, together with the allied [Warsaw Pact] armies, of preventing the aggression of the opponent and of carrying military operations to his territory."³² In the mid-1960s, the regular forces were designated the "operational army." It is clear from Polish military writings that the *entire* operational army, the 15 ground force divisions, the Air Force, and the Navy, and not certain of its components,³³ are earmarked for the "external front" and are thus included in the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact.

This external mission of the operational army apparently has never been challenged within the Polish officer corps; so far as one can judge, it is accepted by the military leadership and the officer corps as the proper (or at least the necessary) role of Polish forces ensuing from Poland's participation in the Warsaw Pact military institutions and the Soviet alliance. Putting this doctrinal postulate into operation, however, evidently gave rise to some specifically Polish initiatives. As described by informed former Polish officers now in the West,³⁴ in a European war Polish divisions would be organized

in three armies and, as such, would undertake offensive military operations along with Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces. In the early 1960s, the Polish military proposed that in wartime these armies be organized in a separate Polish Front and, as such, fight directly under a Polish Front commander (responsive to overall direction of the war effort from Moscow). The concept of a Polish Front was reportedly developed by General Zygmunt Duszynski, in 1959 appointed chief of the newly established Chief Inspectorate of Training, and deputy defense minister. Since Duszynski was later transferred for "nationalist" leanings, the notion of a Polish Front can be viewed as an effort by a group within the Polish military to establish a basis for retaining direct command of Polish forces in wartime, given an unchallengeable Soviet requirement that these forces henceforth be prepared for offensive operations alongside Soviet forces against Western Europe. The proponents of the concept evidently sought to link it with a stronger domestic defense industry and more intensive national military-scientific and theoretical work.³⁵

According to the testimony of former Polish officers, at a session of the Military Council convened to consider the "Polish Front," General Duszynski was the chief advocate, while General Bordzilowski--the remaining high-ranking Soviet officer, who served as chief of staff until 1965--led the opposition. Duszynski's view triumphed. More important, according to the same testimony, this Polish initiative was formally accepted by the USSR and served as the dominant scenario in joint, Soviet-Polish command-staff exercises at least until the late 1960s.

The concept of the Polish Front provided that two of the Polish armies would have the task of advancing across the North German Plain to the Low Countries; the third army would occupy Denmark. Organizationally, the Chief Inspectorate for Training served as the peacetime nucleus of a wartime Polish Front; the Chief Inspectorate contained cadre operational departments for this purpose.*

* This description of the Inspectorate for Training, based on interviews with former Polish military officers, is plausible; this intended wartime role of the Inspectorate would explain its otherwise

It must be questioned, however, whether the USSR in fact placed much credence in the Polish Front's role in its own war plans; perhaps its evident acceptance was token and seen in Moscow as a necessary bow to Polish national sensitivities. In any case, while the concept of a Polish Front was reportedly the dominant scenario in command-staff exercises in the 1960s, other variants also existed. These involved incorporating the Polish armies in various Soviet fronts. The reported existence of these alternate variants would seem to indicate, as suggested by the emigre Polish military informants, that the USSR indeed had reservations about the notion of a Polish Front, on operational and political grounds. From the Soviet point of view, it was uncertain that the three Polish armies could be concentrated in one direction or that Polish divisions could maintain the offensive pace of Soviet divisions. Also uncertain, from Moscow's perspective, was the reliability of the Polish forces, left entirely to themselves in a Polish Front.

"Defense of National Territory"

As noted, Warsaw Pact "coalition doctrine" as interpreted by the Polish military assumes that ground warfare in Europe would take place outside Polish national territory. But in the late 1950s Polish military thought also emphasized Poland's vulnerability to nuclear air attack (along with other, ancillary threats to national territory). This threat perception led to the development by Polish military strategists of the "defense of national territory" (*obrona terytorium kraju*, OTK) as a genuinely Polish element in Polish military doctrine. The OTK concept first emerged at the end of the 1950s, parallel to coalition doctrine for the operational army. According to the testimony of former Polish officers, a key role in its formulation was played by General Boleslaw Chocha, who subsequently became chief of staff. Much of OTK doctrine is set forth in Chocha's book, *Defense*

unusual prominence in Polish military organization: It exists outside the General Staff, its head is a deputy defense minister, and since 1969 only he (no other deputy defense minister) has served as Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces deputy commander in chief.

of National Territory, first issued in 1965 and reissued in 1967 and 1974.³⁶

The principal tenet of OTK doctrine is the need to prepare Poland against massive nuclear air attack. Hence the need for a strong air defense force and a civil defense system including shelters and evacuation of major target areas. Internal security and territorial units have the mission, according to the OTK concept, of resisting selected enemy penetration (airborne and diversionary forces); these units also have a second explicit function of quelling internal unrest.

OTK doctrine was evidently created at Polish initiative and was not, as was true of "coalition doctrine," a Polish version of a basically Soviet concept. OTK doctrine was developed prior to much of Soviet civil defense doctrine, and it still has no counterpart in other East European states. There is no evidence that the OTK provoked Soviet dissatisfaction; apart from the fact that it was an autonomous Polish development, there is no reason that it should have. It was, after all, a by-product of plans that dedicated Poland's operational army to the "external front" in the ranks of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces. Moreover, an explicit, albeit secondary purpose of OTK doctrine was to facilitate the transit of Soviet reserve forces and supplies across Poland.

Organizationally, OTK doctrine was implemented gradually over a decade beginning in the early 1960s. In 1962, the Air Defense Forces (WOPK) were organized as a separate service, along the lines of the Soviet Air Defense Forces (PVO). (A component of the OTK system, the Air Defense Forces are nonetheless a part of the unified Warsaw Pact air defense system.) The same year, military staffs were established at the wojewodship (provincial) level. In 1965 the "Forces for the Defense of National Territory" were formally separated from the regular forces (designated the "operational army") and subordinated to the Chief Inspectorate for the Defense of National Territory, a new body created parallel to the General Staff and headed by a deputy defense minister (see Fig. 1). As part of this reorganization, the KBW was renamed the Internal Defense Forces (WOW) and was transferred from the jurisdiction of the Interior Ministry to the Defense Ministry and

subordinated to the Chief Inspectorate for OTK; likewise, the Border Security Forces (WOP) were transferred to the OTK Inspectorate. This change in supervision of the internal security forces also had a political dimension, to be discussed below. Separate from the WOP, but likewise subordinated to the OTK Inspectorate, territorial units (TO) were established in the mid-1960s. Together, the ground forces subordinated to the OTK Chief Inspectorate were dedicated to operations on the "internal front" related both to external attack and internal unrest. Beginning with extensive exercises in the Silesian military district in 1970, these internal forces have engaged in regular exercises.³⁷

Formal establishment of the OTK system in 1965 was followed by a new national defense law in 1967 intended to institutionalize the defense system and stress mass involvement in defense matters. OTK doctrine and the 1967 law set the stage for a civil defense program, but in fact civil defense preparations were neglected until the early 1970s. A government regulation of 1973 gave new impetus to civil defense efforts, which were then emphasized, parallel to expansion of the Soviet civil defense program. As documented in *Przegląd obrony cywilnej* [Civil Defense Review] and other military publications, there has been considerable discussion of and some practical attention to such matters as shelters and especially evacuation plans. Civil defense exercises have been held involving ministries, factories, and local territorial units.³⁸

As in other East European countries, a variety of premilitary and paramilitary organizations and activities exist in Poland. These are incorporated in the OTK system; they also serve to create a better manpower pool for the operational army.

The OTK concept envisions mass citizen involvement in national defense in a country deemed to be a likely target of nuclear attack and whose operational forces are dedicated to Warsaw Pact operations outside its frontiers. From its inception, this doctrine implied extensive civil defense preparations; as such, Polish doctrine preceded (and perhaps influenced the development of) Soviet civil defense

doctrine. Yet in practice, the OTK concept has proceeded slowly, and only in the mid-1970s was any significant attention paid to civil defense preparations. These efforts continue, but their proportions should not be exaggerated. There is a large gap between theory and practice in Polish preparations for "defense of national territory." Mass involvement in defense preparations has not been achieved in Poland (as opposed, for example, to the practice of Yugoslavia or Switzerland).³⁹ This situation is acknowledged--and openly resented--by Polish military leaders. Polish military writings contain numerous polemics against "skeptics" of civil defense efforts. The former chief of staff, most notably, took strong issue with such views:

The opinion of the "skeptics" would not be dangerous if it were not linked with the assertion that any efforts for defense against weapons of mass destruction are a financial and material waste and a squandering of human energy and work.⁴⁰

Such remarks must be understood as directed at elements of the Polish Communist establishment--and perhaps of its leadership. They represent a clear-cut case of advocacy of a military program by the professional military. It is important to understand why that advocacy has not been more successful.

The doctrine of "defense of national territory" was developed by Polish military professionals. It did not represent a symbiosis of political and military thought (as did, for example, the post-1968 Yugoslav doctrine of "total national defense.") As such, it can be viewed as a *Polish* current in Polish military thought, a logical expression of national interests given unquestionable Soviet-defined criteria regarding the mission of regular Polish forces in Warsaw Pact operations against NATO territory. Yet the OTK concept has not been implemented comprehensively. Formulated and advocated by the military, it was evidently not accepted fully by either the Gomulka or Gierek leaderships. This is doubtless in part the consequence of economic constraints. It is probably also the consequence of a (surely correct) view by the political leadership that the Polish population

cannot be mobilized for a mass defensive effort against a Western "threat," especially in an international environment characterized by a fading of the German bogeyman and the establishment of greater economic and other contacts between Eastern and Western Europe. These economic and social constraints on Polish military strength will be discussed below.

Military Modernization

In accordance with the doctrinal and organizational changes just outlined, the Polish armed forces have been transformed since the 1950s into what is today not only the largest but in many respects the most modern of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact military establishments--a far cry from the "Polish cavalry" of 1939.* Ground force divisions were restructured after 1960 on the Soviet model.[†] Today they are nearly identical to Soviet divisions. The operational army has 15 divisions, organized in three military regions. Two of these divisions are unique (for NSWP countries), elite, special-purpose divisions: a sea-landing division, evidently intended for use in the framework of Warsaw Pact offensive operations, and an airborne assault division.⁴¹ The ground forces have some 3800 tanks, including T-54/55/62 and T-34. The Navy includes a naval aviation regiment with 60 combat aircraft. The Air Force has some 725 combat aircraft, mostly MiG 21 and 17, but including 28 SU-20 modern fighter-bombers.⁴²

It has been argued that the development of modern armed forces in Poland in the 1960s with Soviet assistance is a source of considerable professional satisfaction for the Polish military officer and as such constitutes a source of solidarity with the Soviet military. Yet there is clear evidence that in the mid-1960s considerable dissatisfaction existed within the Polish officer corps concerning the

* For example, as indicated in Appendix B, only Poland has SU-20 aircraft and SA-9 missiles.

[†] According to former Polish military officers, at the first joint Warsaw Pact exercise in 1960 Marshal Grechko complained about the lack of uniformity between Soviet and NSWP divisions; subsequently East European divisions were restructured.

pace of modernization. This dissatisfaction arose from the fact that the Polish military still lagged well behind the Soviet army in modernization and, especially, that Soviet client-states in the Middle East received new weapon systems before they were made available to Poland. The issue came to a head in 1967, when there was considerable admiration in the Polish military establishment (centered in the Air Defense Forces, but present elsewhere as well) for Israeli equipment and tactics in the Six-Day War and disparagement of Soviet equipment and tactics.⁴³ Officers who openly expressed such sentiments were quickly ousted, as will be described, and in the past decade there has been no evidence of renewed expression of such dissatisfactions. Still, for all the progress in modernization, the Polish armed forces continue to lag well behind the USSR.⁴⁴ One may speculate that this disparity continues to engender dissatisfaction within the Polish officer corps.

Constraints on modernization of the Polish forces cannot, however, be ascribed solely to Moscow. In retrospect it is clear that the modernization effort of the 1960s added a substantial burden to the already strained Polish economy. It would seem that this enhanced military burden was one factor contributing to the faltering of the Polish economy at the end of the 1960s that led in turn to the worker riots in December 1970 and the change of Party leadership. Figure 2 presents official Polish data on defense spending; while these figures clearly understate the total burden, they would seem to give some indication of relative changes over time. The data indicate a peaking of the military burden (as a percentage of national income) in 1970 and a subsequent relative decline (but continued increase in absolute terms).^{*} Such a development is certainly consistent with Polish economic policy after 1970 under Party leader Gierek. Rejecting structural economic change, that economic policy emphasized greater

^{*}This relative decline is exaggerated by the fact that since 1970 Western credits have constituted a significant component of Polish national income.




Fig. 2--Defense expenditure: Poland

(SOURCE: See Appendix C)

consumer satisfaction based in large part on greatly expanded ties with the West. Polish military writings provide indirect confirmation of post-1970 constraints on military spending:

in the past five years [i.e., 1970 to 1975] the defense system has developed maintaining a balance between the level of development of production forces and current defense needs; all the indices in this area are defined by the general development of the country, resulting from the strategy of the enhanced development of Poland [the term for the Gierek economic policy].⁴⁵

Moreover, early in 1971, as the Gierek leadership was recasting Polish economic policy, statements by military leaders appeared that can only be interpreted as pleas for maintaining existing proportions of defense

spending.⁴⁶ Along with the pointed defense of the OTK system and civil defense noted earlier, such arguments constitute additional evidence of advocacy of military programs, on professional and institutional grounds, by the Polish military.

Presumably any change in the pattern of Polish defense spending can occur only with Soviet blessing. It may be, as one observer has argued, that the Polish military "lobbies" for new weapon systems and higher defense spending principally via the Soviet military and Moscow.⁴⁷ But even if this is the case, decisions are reached through political channels and involve the Politburos of the two countries. Occurring at the time of the buildup of Warsaw Pact forces in Eastern Europe and evidently of greater Soviet reliance on NSWP forces for European conflict, any relative slackening of the Polish defense effort in the early 1970s would obviously have been unwelcome in Moscow. Yet the prospect of civil unrest was even less satisfactory from the viewpoint of the Soviet leadership, as demonstrated in 1976 and--dramatically--in 1980 when renewed worker unrest led the Soviets to grant new hard-currency loans to Poland to help bail out the economy. Under these circumstances, Soviet acceptance of some constraints on enhanced Polish defense spending is understandable. Even on the key issue of defense capabilities, then, just as on other important economic and political issues, the Soviet leadership has evidently accepted, as the price of internal stability, developments in Poland that would be quite unacceptable in the USSR itself or in other East European countries. This is additional testimony as to just how much Soviet preferences have become hostage to domestic problems and the ever-present prospect of severe internal instability in Poland.

In the context of these new constraints on defense spending, Polish military industry was selectively reemphasized in the 1970s. In the 1960s Poland participated in the developing standardization of weapons (and division of labor in producing them) among Warsaw Pact countries; for example, 80 percent of the *Polnocy*-class landing ships produced in the Gdansk shipyards was exported to the USSR, and Poland undertook modernization of the T-54.⁴⁸ In 1969, a COMECON decision ended the production of fighter aircraft in Poland (MiGs produced


under license), apparently with adverse economic consequences for Poland.⁴⁹ Under Gierek, and in view of the economic constraints, Poland evidently attempted to recast its participation in Warsaw Pact weapons production so as to increase the benefits to (or at least reduce the burden on) the civilian economy. As one example, in 1971 Poland began to produce AN-28 transport aircraft, which have both military and civilian uses.⁵⁰

PARTY CONTROL OF THE MILITARY

Firm control of the armed forces has always been a *sine quo non* for every Communist Party. Poland is no exception to this general rule. The Polish Party achieves its "leading role in the military" (in the words of the chief military sociologist) through "the constitutionally guaranteed subordination of the army to the state authorities; the work of the political apparatus in the army; the activity of Party organizations in the army; and the actions of commanders based on exact execution of tasks formulated by the Party."⁵¹

Party control of the armed forces in Poland is exercised through a number of instrumentalities, all modeled on Soviet practice (Fig. 3).

1. A politically reliable commander in chief. The post of defense minister has always been entrusted to a military leader who himself counts as a member of the Party leadership. Except for the 1968 to 1971 period, the Polish defense minister has been a member of the Party Politburo.
2. Close Central Committee supervision of military affairs. As with all other sectors of public life, military affairs fall under the purview of a Party Central Committee Secretary and Department; in Poland this has been the responsibility of the Central Committee Administrative Department.
3. The Main Political Administration (MPA). As in the Soviet case, the Main Political Administration is directly responsible for political matters within the armed forces. Although formally an organizational subdivision of the defense ministry headed by a deputy minister of defense, the MPA in



*The MPA has dual status as a division of the Ministry of National Defense with the status of a Party Central Committee Department.

**"Unified Party-political Organs" headed by the respective deputy commander for political questions.

Fig. 3--The structure of political control in the Polish armed forces

fact, according to the Party statutes, functions "with the powers of a Central Committee department" (as does the Soviet and other Communist-country MPAs) and is directly responsible to the PUWP Secretariat and Politburo.⁵² While it is responsible for political indoctrination and reliability generally, in terms of Party control the MPA has traditionally also played an important role in determining personnel policy in the military.

4. Political officers. Subordinate to the MPA is a political officer corps; from this pool "deputy commanders for political affairs" are posted throughout the military. The political officer is responsible for Party-political, indoctrination, and personnel matters. Obligated to respect the decisions and prerogatives of his "professional" superior on command matters, the political officer in fact qualifies and limits the prerogatives of one-man command. On many issues, the political officer is directly accessible to lower-level officers and conscripts, and he reports through his own channels on political matters. His status is codified in the internal army regulations, which provide that "respect for the chain of command is not obligatory in cases of turning to political officers in ideological, Party, political, cultural, and personal matters."⁵³
5. Party organizations. A network of basic Party organizations throughout the military serves as a forum for political discussions and indoctrination and as an additional organizational base for controlling the command echelon.
6. Party membership as a prerequisite for professional advancement. While Poland still lags behind East Germany and Czechoslovakia in this regard, 85 percent of the officer corps as a whole, and all of the senior officers, are Party members.
7. Communist youth organization in the military. The Communist military youth organization recruits conscripts (only 10 percent of whom are Party members); the purpose is to indoctrinate them and prepare them for future Party membership.

8. The military security service. Along with other counterintelligence and disciplinary functions, the military security service provides an additional important channel through which supervisory Party bodies can maintain control of the professional officer corps.

The nature and use of these instrumentalities of Party control over the Polish military have fluctuated over the postwar period. In 1956, in reaction both to overt Soviet domination of the Polish army under Stalin and as a consequence of general "liberalization," Party control instruments in the armed forces weakened (and in some cases disappeared altogether). The Communist youth organization (ZMP) was abolished in 1956, as was "Military Information," the Stalinist military security service. Political education and Party influence in the armed forces were challenged both from within the military and in the country at large. But after 1956, as the Gomulka leadership consolidated Party control in Poland generally, Party control in the armed forces was strengthened. The "gradual elimination of incorrect tendencies and their exponents"⁵⁴ was accompanied after 1956 by the proliferation and strengthening of Party control instruments in the armed forces.

The first organizational steps in this process were establishment of a new Military Security Service (WSW) in 1957 and the reintroduction in 1958 of a Communist youth organization in the form of Military Youth Circles. In 1973, when a national youth organization was re-established, the Military Youth Circles were transformed into the Socialist Union of Military Youth. This organization embraces roughly half the conscripts.⁵⁵

Until 1961, the political apparatus in the armed forces staffed by political officers on the one hand, and the chain of basic Party organizations on the other, remained organizationally distinct. Party organizations at a given level were headed by a Party secretary who reported to commissions at the next highest level. These distinct organizational channels--political apparatus and Party--merged only at the apex of the military establishment. A reorganization in 1961

established, for the first time, unified Party-political organs on the Soviet model. At each level within the armed forces, the political officer now served as the superior of the Party secretary of the basic Party organization; he in turn was responsible to his superior political officer, not to a Party commission, for Party work at his level. The result was to concentrate and institutionalize Party control of the armed forces in the political apparatus of the military, subordinate to the Main Political Administration. This channel was also extended deeper into the military structure. Previously, basic Party organizations had existed only down to the regimental level. In 1961 Party organizations were established at the battalion level, where they were supervised by the battalion political officer. (Informal groupings of Communist members, but not formal organizations, existed at the company level.)⁵⁶ Simultaneously, a greater percentage of the officer corps became Party members. As indicated by Appendix D, this percentage was only 53 in 1955 but increased to 67 by 1963; today 85 percent of officers are Party members.

The 1961 reorganization strengthening Party control over the armed forces enhanced the importance of the political officer as a primary instrument of that control. But this occurred as the political officer corps itself was undergoing a profound transformation as a result of the post-1956 modernization of the Polish armed forces. Modernization dictated a profile of the political officer different from the politically reliable but often militarily incompetent "commissar" of the Stalinist years. In 1956 and 1957 political officers were widely criticized for ignorance of even the rudiments of military science.⁵⁷ Major changes in the system of training political officers followed. The political officer school was abolished and, as part of a general restructuring of military education in 1957, future political officers now enrolled in the regular military schools, where they took the same course of study as regular officers (albeit with more political courses). Upon graduation with military engineering degrees, they gained command experience in nonpolitical positions and only then (typically after they had attained the rank of major) entered the Political-Military Academy. Upon graduation from the Academy, most

were assigned as battalion political officers (the lowest level at which "deputy commanders for political affairs" existed).⁵⁸

This new training system for political officers evidently succeeded in the 1960s in producing a cadre of political officers who were much closer to their professional counterparts in terms of military skills. At the same time, new functional specializations, including economics, psychology, and other social sciences were introduced in the political officer corps. All this occurred at the cost of deemphasizing the political training of the future political officer. In attempting to adapt to the circumstances of a modernizing professional officer corps, the political officer began to resemble his professional counterpart. Such a development called into question the utility of the political officer structure as a principal means of Party control of the military.

This danger was evidently perceived, and in 1970 the pendulum began to swing back. A further reorganization of political officer training was undertaken in 1970 to reverse creeping "professionalization." Now specific programs were established within the regular military schools for political officers, leading not to the engineering degree granted to professional officers but to a social science degree. The curriculum devoted roughly half-time to military subjects and half-time to political ones. In 1975 a further change was made. Upon graduation, the political officer immediately assumed responsibility for political work; posted to command a platoon, he simultaneously functioned as informal (non-TOE) deputy commander for political affairs at the company level.⁵⁹ Discussions in *Wojsko Ludowe* (the military's "political" monthly) indicate that for the moment Party authorities in the military appear to be satisfied with this mix of professional and political training. Yet it is doubtful that the present balance is stable. As will be described, the officer corps is undergoing ever-greater professional education and specialization. The political officer who must spend most of his training and career on nonprofessional matters will find it increasingly difficult to relate to and exercise control over his professional counterparts. Nor can the political officer in present-day Poland be considered an

ideologically motivated "commissar". Differentiation has occurred within the political officer corps with the introduction at higher levels of such specializations as economists, sociologists, and pedagogues.

The process of strengthened Party control of the military described in the previous pages can be traced to a number of sources. Party influence in and control over the military were weakened during the 1956 period of "liberalization." After 1956, as Gomulka reemphasized the principle of Party control throughout Polish society, the military was naturally a first priority. But there was additional cause for establishing new mechanisms of Party control in the army. In the Stalinist period, control over the military had been exercised directly by Moscow and implemented through the multiple networks of Soviet officers in key command positions, Soviet "advisers" at lower levels, and a military security service responsive to Moscow. The political apparatus and Party organs played a secondary role during this period, as indicated by the failure to establish unified Party-political organs, to extend Party organizations below the regimental level, or to force the "Communization" of the officer corps. With the abolishment of direct Soviet control and blatant secret police supervision after 1956, the Polish Party leadership looked to new political mechanisms for institutionalizing its control over the armed forces. Consolidation of Party control over the armed forces after 1956 also served the purpose of preempting or satisfying Soviet concerns about Party control of the military in Poland.

Modernization of the Polish army provided an additional impetus for renewed attention to Party control. The 1957 military education reform and the subsequent premium placed on military skills within the Polish armed forces raised the prospect of an officer corps increasingly concerned with professional military affairs and deemphasizing ideological commitment and political criteria. This could portend professional autonomy and even "bonapartism"--the concern of every Communist Party leadership that the military might become an independent source of power and authority within a Communist system. Firmer institutionalization of political influence in the armed forces was intended to preclude such a possibility, according to the principle,

the more our army is equipped with modern technology and organization, the more it must be armed with deep Marxist knowledge and ideological commitment.⁶⁰

Party control of the armed forces did increase in Poland after 1956, in reaction both to the specific developments of the mid-1950s and the challenge of a modernizing military establishment. But despite the proliferation and strengthening of control instruments, the Party leadership (and the USSR) can hardly be satisfied with progress to date. The process of strengthening political control over the armed forces was to some extent disrupted in the 1960s by turmoil at the top of the military establishment. It was then further affected by the military's "crisis of conscience" resulting from its role in the December 1970 worker demonstrations.

THE OFFICER CORPS AND MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

Emergence of a Homogeneous Professional Military Elite

The development of the Polish military after 1956 was affected importantly by the conflict within the middle and upper levels of the Communist Party. To understand this development, a brief synopsis of political background is required.⁶¹

Polish Communism has traditionally been characterized by factionalism, and this intra-elite conflict continued after 1956. Following his return to power, Gomulka used his authority as the most prominent Party victim of Stalinism and the defender of Polish sovereignty in 1956 to manipulate and initially to dominate opposed factional groupings and individuals in the Party leadership. He made no attempt to purge these elements, however, and hence a high level of intergroup and interpersonal tension existed in the Party leadership throughout the 1960s.

The dynamic group in this political constellation was the so-called Partisans, led by Mieczyslaw Moczar (then interior minister), which began to challenge Gomulka's power. The hard core of the Partisan group was made up of "native Communist" security officers. These were "old soldiers" who had led the Communist underground during

the war, had subsequently manned the internal security apparatus, and had then been sidetracked or imprisoned during the Stalinist era and replaced by "Moscovite Communists" (many of Jewish origin) who had been in the USSR during World War II and had fought in the Soviet-sponsored Polish armies. After 1958, the Partisans coalesced into a faction and attempted to take over positions in the Party and state apparatus, using as a major weapon an antisemitic whisper campaign. They achieved control of the secret police apparatus and the veterans' organization (ZBOWiD); they also made inroads in the mass media and in the armed forces.

Following his return to power in 1956, Gomulka sought to consolidate national and personal control over the armed forces. As a replacement for Marshal Rokossowski, Gomulka turned to General Marian Spychalski, a wartime confidant who had been postwar deputy defense minister until he had been purged, with Gomulka, in 1948. Following Spychalski's appointment, key military positions were filled by individuals who had either been associated with Gomulka in the Communist underground and purged with him under Stalin or who had been ready to resist Soviet invasion in October 1956. General Zygmunt Duszynski was appointed deputy chief of staff and, in 1959, was named the first incumbent of the key post of Chief Inspectorate of Training. Duszynski had been suspended from Voroshilov Academy in 1950 and retired in 1954. General Janusz Zarzycki became head of the MPA; General Adam Uziemblo, chief of the Military-Political Academy; and General Jerzy Fonkowicz, head of the Defense Ministry personnel department. All had fought in the People's Army (AL) and were sidetracked under Stalinism. General Aleksander Kokoszyn assumed the post of chief of military counterintelligence; he had occupied a lower post in that organization prior to 1948. Generals Jan Frey-Bielecki and Wacław Komar and Admiral Jan Wisniewski were named to head the Air Force, the Internal Forces (overseeing the KBW), and the Navy respectively; all three had commanded units that had mobilized to resist Soviet encroachments in October 1956. General Józef Kurobieska, who had been imprisoned under Stalinism, assumed the politically sensitive post of commander of the Warsaw Military Region. General Grzegorz Korczyński, one of the

organizers of the wartime Communist resistance and a key internal security figure in the postwar consolidation of Communist power, became head of military intelligence.⁶²

Very shortly after 1956, however, this elite group that had been moved into key command positions by Gomulka began to split. One group of reform-minded "national Communists" who had viewed the events of 1956 as the beginning, rather than the end, of a process of achieving greater Polish autonomy from Moscow was gradually sidetracked or removed from the military entirely. A second group, the Partisans, with internal security backgrounds, began to advance in the armed forces as they moved ahead in the Party itself; their most important representative within the military was General Korczynski. As in the Party at large, a major instrument in the Partisan campaign within the armed forces was anti-Semitism; the Partisans were able to utilize this instrument more successfully in the wake of the defection to the West around 1960 of several Polish intelligence officers who were of Jewish origin (e.g., Colonels Monat and Tykocinski).

The Partisans' campaign contributed to a series of top-level personnel shifts and purges in the military in the 1960s. But there were other reasons for these ousters, and it is difficult to judge which was most important. A second factor was Gomulka's interest, as he backtracked from 1956, to remove from the military as from other institutions individuals who continued to espouse excessively "liberal" or "national" ideas.

A third factor was Soviet involvement. The removal of Soviet officers from leading positions in the Polish military and their replacement by individuals who had supported the 1956 changes and in some cases, been prepared to lead military resistance against the USSR, were obvious sources of concern to Moscow. As the Polish armed forces assumed a more prominent role at the end of the 1950s in Soviet military planning, these concerns were reinforced. Politically, Moscow can never have been comfortable with the Partisan group in Poland, for the Partisans themselves played *sub rosa* on nationalism, as well as anti-Semitism, in the form of a "patriotism" campaign that was

occasionally explicitly anti-Soviet.* Nonetheless, in the early and mid-1960s Moscow's interests appeared to coalesce with those of the Partisans in terms of ousting from the Polish military individuals who were suspect because they had demonstrated an intolerable degree of "nationalism" (especially, preparing for armed resistance against Soviet forces in 1956), because they had otherwise aroused Soviet displeasure, even during the Stalinist period, or simply because they were of Jewish origin.†

Thus, three distinct currents--Gomulka's own backtracking from the spirit of the Polish October, the Partisans' factional struggle for power, and Soviet interests--combined to force a series of ousters from key military positions in the 1960s. In retrospect, the entire period until 1973 was marked by instability within the Polish military elite of such proportions that it can only have detracted from the combat effectiveness of the Polish armed forces. A brief overview of these personnel shifts follows.‡

In 1962, General Frey-Bielecki and key deputies were removed from the Air Force command. According to former Polish military officers, they were ousted for excessive "nationalism" at direct Soviet

* In the March 1968 crisis Moczar was so incautious as to publicly criticize "the arrival in our country [from the USSR in 1944] of politicians dressed in officers' uniforms who later felt that, for this reason alone, they . . . had a right to leadership. . . ."63

† Note should be made of the interpretation of a former Polish counterintelligence and political officer, himself a victim of this campaign in 1967, who argues that Moscow instigated all major personnel changes in the Polish armed forces in the 1960s, acting through its "instrument," the military counterintelligence service.64 This interpretation would seem to the present authors to overstate the degree of direct Soviet involvement.

‡ Within a few months after October 1956, some of the individuals who occupied key military posts during the "Polish October" were removed. In 1957, Admiral Wisniewski was removed as Navy Commander for excessive "nationalism." In 1960 General Zarzycki was removed as head of the MPA (allegedly for raising the sensitive Katyn issue); in an unusual appointment, he was replaced by General Jaruzelski (a line officer); General Uziemblo was simultaneously replaced at the Military Political Academy by General Jozef Urbanowicz, a Soviet-Pole.65

instigation, following a visit to Poland of Soviet Air Marshal Birluzov.* Somewhat earlier, officers of Jewish origin had reportedly been transferred from key artillery positions at Soviet insistence before Poland received its first surface-to-air missiles from the USSR.

In 1965 General Duszynski was removed from the key post of head of the Chief Inspectorate of Training and sidetracked to the Studies Department of the General Staff.[†] Duszynski and other generals sidetracked at the time were, again, reportedly removed for an excessively national outlook. That this attitude overtly or implicitly called into question Party control of the military was suggested by Politburo member Zenon Kliszko's warning at the time of "bonapartist" sentiments in the military.⁶⁷

Creation of the OTK system and establishment of the Chief Inspectorate of Territorial Defense in 1965, described previously, was caught up in these political currents within the military. General Korczynski was appointed chief of OTK, which was staffed with many of his fellow Partisans; at the same time, the internal security forces, in which the Partisans were strongly represented, were transferred from the Interior Ministry to the Defense Ministry and placed under Korczynski's control. This reorganization had the effect of increasing the numbers of Partisans in the military, but this was a mixed blessing for the faction and probably resulted from a compromise decision by the Party leadership. For transferring the internal security forces to the Defense Ministry from the Interior Ministry meant removing them from the organizational control of Partisan leader Moczar and making them responsible ultimately to Gomulka's confidant Spsychalski, as defense

* This explanation is indirectly confirmed by Jaruzelski's subsequent sharp critique (at the 13th Party Plenum of 1963) of nationalist tendencies within the officer corps.⁶⁶ In 1956, Frey-Bielecki and several other generals had reportedly called for the removal of Soviet forces from Poland.

[†] Duszynski was replaced by General Bordzilowski (the last high-ranking Soviet officer still serving in the Polish army); General Tadeusz Kufel, a former AL member who was deputy head of military counterintelligence, reportedly was involved. General Fronkowicz was ousted at the same time from the Personnel Department of the Defense Ministry, while General Skibinski was removed from the General Staff.

minister. Parallel with the concentration of Partisans in the OTK, the faction gained strong influence in the MPA, where informal "Moczar clubs" were established (as they were in cultural and other non-military institutions). In the mid-1960s, the MPA was a principal institutional locus (and publisher) of the "patriotic" campaign spearheaded by the Partisans.⁶⁸

The next (and most extensive) wave of military ousters occurred in 1967, when the Six-Day War led to a political crisis in Poland. Many "establishment" Poles expressed open satisfaction with Israel's success and the defeat of the USSR's Arab allies. Reservations about the Soviet military doctrine and equipment were expressed by various elements within the armed forces, most strongly in the Air Defense Forces. The consequence was the ouster from their command positions and the Party of the entire leadership of the Air Defense Command.* But these dismissals were the tip of an iceberg. Reaction to the Six-Day War in Poland created an opportunity for the Partisans to escalate their antisemitic campaign; this was now legitimized by Gomulka himself, who publicly ascribed sympathy for Israel to a "fifth column" of Polish Zionists. The Air Defense Command itself was criticized for a "pro-Israel stance masked by nationalism."⁷⁰ The roughly 200 military officers of Jewish origin still active as of 1967 were required to sign declarations of condemnation of Israel, ". . . those who refused were dismissed immediately; while those who signed were dismissed six months later."⁷¹ The ouster from military and Party posts of 14 generals and 200 colonels (most but by no means all of Jewish origin) followed. This wave of dismissals was a boost to the Partisan cause in the military.⁷²

Nine months later, student demonstrations at Warsaw University provided the Partisans with another opportunity to step up their campaign--and now they sought to topple Gomulka from the Party leadership. In this objective they failed; Gomulka was able to maintain himself in power for the time being. During and after the March 1968

*General Czeslaw Mankiewicz, commander; General T. Dabkowski, deputy commander for political affairs; and General J. Stamieszkin, chief of staff.⁶⁹

crisis, the Partisan faction was successful in initiating a widespread purge and forcing the ouster of its opponents from state and Party positions. But it was on balance unsuccessful in securing the replacement of ousted officials by its own supporters; other individuals, generally younger and less involved in factional politics, advanced instead. This was the pattern in the military as well.* The extent to which the events of the spring of 1968 caused a political crisis in the military is indicated by the fact that major Party meetings were held almost continuously in the armed forces. These meetings failed to express the only slightly veiled criticism of Gomulka that characterized other Party meetings, indicating that Gomulka remained in control of the military.⁷⁴

On April 17, 1968, General Spychalski resigned the post of defense minister. He was not replaced by the Partisan "candidate" General Korczynski, but by General Jaruzelski.⁷⁵ Unlike Spychalski, Jaruzelski was a professional soldier; unlike Korczynski, he had previously not been involved in factional politics within the armed forces.[†] Following Jaruzelski's appointment, a related series of personnel shifts moved some of his former subordinates into more important military positions; in no case did Partisans make significant advances within the military establishment.

The next round of major personnel changes occurred early in 1971, following the worker riots of December 1970 which involved the army and led to the replacement of Gomulka by Edward Gierek, formerly head of the Silesian regional Party organization. In March 1971, General Korczynski and several other Partisans were removed from the OTK. For

*On April 2, two key commanders--commander of the Warsaw Military Region and commander of the 6th Pomeranian Airborne Division (the latter of Jewish origin)--were removed, but they were not replaced by Partisans.⁷³

[†]A young general (born in 1923 and promoted to major general at age 33), Jaruzelski fought as a junior officer in the Soviet-sponsored Second Polish Army during World War II. His subsequent military career consisted exclusively of line positions until his unusual promotion in 1960 from division commander to MPA chief; by virtue of the latter position he became a Party Central Committee member in 1964. In 1965 he left the MPA to become chief of the general staff.

Gierek this politically desirable transfer was eased by Korczynski's unpopularity in the country as a result of his command role over military units utilized to end the coastal unrest. Korczynski was replaced by a Jaruzelski confidant, and in 1972 other key commanders were replaced by Jaruzelski associates.*

In contrast to this protracted instability in the 1960s and early 1970s, since 1973 the military elite has exhibited personnel stability. As a consequence of the waves of dismissals and transfers, in turn groups of Soviet officers, "native" Communists who supported Polish national autonomy, the older generation of "Moscovite" Communists (many political officers and many of Jewish origin), and the "Partisan" native-Communist security officers have, one after the other, been removed from significant positions in the Polish military elite. They have been replaced by a new military group of which Defense Minister Jaruzelski is archetypical. These are younger generals without prewar Communist experience, who fought as soldiers or junior officers in the Polish army formed in the USSR during World War II. They have generally followed professional rather than political career paths. They have almost universally received advanced military training in the USSR. In the 1960s they were responsible for carrying through modernization of the Polish armed forces in the division and military region commands and second-level general staff positions they occupied prior to assuming their present posts.

A Modern Officer Corps

The Polish military elite of the 1970s is in many ways representative of the professional officer corps as a whole, as it has evolved since the late 1950s. The profile of this officer corps is one of

*Korczynski was replaced by General Tadeusz Tuczapski. "Partisan" General Jan Czapla did advance to head the MPA; whatever the explanation for his advance, it lasted only a year; then Czapla was replaced by another Jaruzelski associate, General Wlodzimierz Sawczuk, and a shakeup of the MPA occurred. In further personnel shifts in 1972, General Zygmunt Huszcza and General Jan Rackowski, Air Force commander, were sidetracked to civilian positions and replaced by generals previously close to Jaruzelski.

"Polishness," upward social mobility, Communist Party membership, higher education, and professional specialization.

The officer corps has become almost entirely "Polish." Only a handful of Russian-Poles remain, and Poles of Jewish origin have been eliminated entirely. In 1972, 81 percent of all officers came from worker and peasant families.⁷⁶ Only 2 percent (as of 1973) had had prewar military experience.⁷⁷ As noted earlier, Party membership of the officer corps has increased to 85 percent; all general officers are Party members.

The education of the average Polish officer has increased dramatically since the late 1950s. As indicated by Appendix D, the percentage of officers with academic degrees increased from 17 percent in 1958 to 40 percent in 1974; by that year half of the officer corps had engineering or military technology degrees. New Polish officers pass through one of seven military schools; as reorganized in the late 1950s, these are degree-granting institutions in which the percentage of the curriculum devoted to military, as opposed to political, subjects has steadily increased. In the 1970s there has been renewed attention to postgraduate, refresher training; political courses are deemphasized in this work.⁷⁸

Since the early 1970s and in line with the Gierek leadership's efforts to regularize personnel policy throughout the political system, increased attention has been given to the development of a modern officer corps. In the early 1970s, military theoreticians and personnel specialists devoted themselves to "creating the theoretical bases of an individual description (profile) of the officer of a modern army as well as a model of his career experience."⁷⁹ Practical conclusions were drawn from this model. The principle of obligatory refresher education every four to five years was instituted, and the evaluation and promotion systems were regularized. While "political" qualifications are still important, the evident import of the changes is an institutionalized officer promotion system which places a premium on military skills and limits the arbitrary application of political criteria. Additionally, a special career track for officers viewed early in their careers as candidates for rapid advancement to military leadership

positions was established in the form of a "Pool for the Faster Development of the Officer Cadre."⁸⁰

The Party continues to stress the "ideological commitment" of officers. It insists that "the commander can only speak in the language of the Party."⁸¹ But the development of a modern officer corps has meant more emphasis on professional military criteria and relatively less on political preparation. This has raised the specter of professional military autonomy, and that potential danger has led the Party, as noted, to reemphasize the importance of the political officer as an instrument of control. At the same time, the Party leadership has increased material incentives for and attempted to enhance the social prestige of the officer corps and thus ensure its loyalty.* But it is doubtful that the present balance between fostering a "modern officer corps" and renewed emphasis on political instruments of control--especially the political officer--is a stable one. Modernization has fostered professional autonomy. Tendencies favoring such autonomy were reinforced by the "crisis of conscience" that the Polish military experienced as a result of its involvement in the December 1970 worker riots.

CRISIS BEHAVIOR

The Polish Army has not seen combat in the postwar period, so the extent to which the processes of modernization and professionalism have created an efficient and responsive military instrument has not been put to the test. The Polish Army has played a significant role in several Polish crises in the postwar period. A better understanding of its role in these crises will permit more informed estimates about the opportunities for and the constraints on its use in crisis situations in the future. This "crisis history" will be reviewed briefly in the following pages.

* As noted earlier, in the 1950s the social standing of military officers was low. At the beginning of the Gierek period, renewed efforts were made to improve the position of the officer corps; pay and benefits were increased, and efforts were made to present to society at large the profession of officer as an attractive one.⁸²

Consolidation of Communist Power. The regular armed forces were not utilized directly in the process of the Communist consolidation of power in the late 1940s. Armed resistance continued in Poland (to an extent still not appreciated in the West) in 1946 and 1947; this was suppressed with force by the internal security forces, especially the KBW, then subordinated to the interior ministry (and commanded by many of the latter-day Partisans of the 1960s).⁸³

The Poznan Riots, June 1956. The immediate catalyst of the October 1956 political change in Poland was strikes and riots by industrial workers in Poznan. Local KBW units proved unable to quell the disturbances, regular army units disobeyed orders to fire on striking workers, and an elite KBW brigade used force to restore order, with hundreds of casualties. This bloodshed precipitated the end of the Stalinist system in Poland. Following shifts in the Party leadership, the bloodshed was condemned as unnecessary--an important precedent for the future--and command of the KBW passed into the hand of General Komar, an ally of Gomulka.⁸⁴

Gomulka's Return to Power, October 1956. It is generally believed, inside as well as outside Poland, that a major factor explaining the Soviet leadership's acceptance of Gomulka's return to power in 1956 was the threat of armed Polish resistance to Soviet efforts to use military forces to influence the Polish political situation. At the time, Soviet divisions stationed in Poland moved from their garrisons toward Warsaw. The KBW, under General Komar, took up defensive positions. Most of the regular army was neutralized by its Soviet officers and "advisers," but key commanders, including Admiral Wisniewski and General Frey-Bielecki, prepared their units for armed resistance. In this atmosphere of confrontation, a political solution to the Polish leadership crisis was achieved.⁸⁵

The Invasion of Czechoslovakia, August 1968. Substantial Polish units participated in the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. This action, while Soviet initiated, was undertaken in response to a decision of the Polish Party leadership and in accordance with its interests; Party leader Gomulka had been one of the East European leaders most concerned about the liberalization movement in Czechoslovakia.⁸⁶

Despite traditional national animosities between Poles and Czechs, the invasion was not popular in Poland. Polish units were withdrawn along with other non-Soviet units in late 1968, and subsequently there was considerable criticism of "passivity" and lack of commitment to the goals of the invasion within the armed forces.⁸⁷ The number of applicants to officer schools dropped off sharply as a consequence of the invasion (and the army's later involvement in the December 1970 riots).^{*} Participation in the invasion of Czechoslovakia remains a sensitive issue within the armed forces. This event is a glaring omission in official military histories and chronologies (which cite Poland's participation in the multilateral Warsaw Pact maneuvers in and around Czechoslovakia in mid-1968 but omit all mention of the actual invasion).⁸⁹

The Coastal Cities' Riots, December 1970. Worker strikes, demonstrations, and riots in Poland's coastal cities in December 1970 forced on the regular Polish armed forces a new role: internal repression. This was the first attempt in postwar Eastern Europe to use regular forces on any scale to suppress internal unrest. That this was attempted in Poland indicated just how far Gomulka had divorced himself from Polish reality by 1970; the action ensured his ouster. The military performed its directed internal repressive function only partly and reluctantly, and with profound repercussions for its domestic role as an institution and for the position of its leadership in the political system.

The brunt of the repression in December 1970 was carried out by the militia (police), but it was backed up by the military. When the internal security forces of the coastal region proved insufficient for this task, regular units of the Gdansk garrison were called in and they inflicted some casualties.[†] But in a situation of leadership

^{*}Taking the number of candidates to the relatively prestigious Air Force Academy in 1967 as 100, in 1968 the index number was 94; in 1969, 87; in 1970, 47; in 1971, 51; and in 1972, 60.⁸⁸

[†]It remains a puzzle why elite internal security units stationed in Warsaw were not utilized on this occasion.

crisis in Warsaw and subjected to what Defense Minister Jaruzelski later called "uncoordinated orders," the military leadership refused to act on orders from Gomulka's chief lieutenant in the coastal area, Politburo member Zenon Kliszko, to use immediate and overwhelming force to crush the worker demonstrations.⁹⁰ These events set two crucial precedents.

First, the armed forces stood partly aside in a situation of localized internal unrest and national leadership crisis. The military command was subjected to conflicting instructions from the political level; it judged the legitimacy of conflicting commands and resisted instructions to use overwhelming force. This course of action doubtless derived from a conviction by the military elite that the regular forces could not be used for mass repression of their fellow countrymen. It evidently also resulted from the fact that the orders to use overwhelming force were connected to factional infighting from which Jaruzelski sought to distance both himself and the military institution. But by opting for noninvolvement, the military played something of the role of silent kingmaker. The precedent was that a Party leader challenged by Party opponents in a domestic crisis cannot count on the army to save his position.

Second, the involvement of the regular armed forces in December 1970, limited as it was, had a profoundly demoralizing effect on the military--above all, on the officer corps. Jaruzelski stressed the seriousness of this problem to the Eighth Party Plenum (convened early in February 1971 to deal with the crisis), noting that "difficult morale problems have arisen . . . public opinion has turned against the military."⁹¹ An extraordinary effort on the part of the officer corps to defend its image in the society (and its self-image) resulted. In February 1971, reflecting the national mood, a prominent Party journalist published an article describing the events of December 1970 and stressing the Army's repressive role. The military daily responded with a "Letter from the Officers of the Gdansk Garrison," which attempted to minimize and excuse the military's actions. Despite great pressures and the loss of heavy equipment the officers wrote, "On no occasion was an order given to fire directly at the

crowd." The journalist "should have shown objectively the image of the young soldier and his commander in a role which had never been foreseen in any politico-military training." "We are aware," the letter concluded, "that the coastal events were painful for the entire community, and probably most painful for ourselves. . . ."92

The Gomulka leadership's effort to use the military for mass internal repression was formally condemned by the Eighth Plenum.⁹³ A month later, Gierek himself confronted the issue of the armed forces, role in repressing internal opposition. Affirming the necessity of such a role, he nonetheless qualified it in an unprecedented way for a Communist country:

the Party will always remember that such action can only result from an extraordinary situation, jeopardizing . . . the foundations of the socialist system, a situation where *all the paths of political action have been exhausted*, where an *obvious enemy* has raised his hand against the achievements of the working people. . . .⁹⁴

The precedent was that the military could not be used for internal repression in another situation anything like that of 1970.

The Second Price Increase Crisis, June 1976. The validity of this second precedent is strongly suggested by the events of June 1976 when, in a partial replay of the December 1970 crisis, the announcement of increases in foodstuff prices led to work stoppages by industrial workers outside of Warsaw. On this occasion Gierek quickly backed down and rescinded the price rise before worker dissatisfaction could spread. The military leadership is reported to have played a moderating role, cautioning Gierek (in words attributed to Jaruzelski) that "Polish soldiers will not fire on Polish workers."⁹⁵

The preceding review of the role of the Polish military in Polish crisis situations reveals a strong negative track record, in terms of the utility of the military in suppressing dissent. Internal security forces were used successfully for this purpose in the past. No attempt was made in December 1970 to bring in the elite internal security brigades stationed near Warsaw; while these forces can presumably still be used to put down internal disturbances in some circumstances, they

are under the command of the defense ministry and subject to some of the same constraints that apply to regular forces.

Regular units disobeyed orders to fire on workers in Poznan in 1956. Such units were used on a limited scale in December 1970, but at the cost of effectively precluding their use in an analogous future situation. The military leadership has refused to allow the armed forces to be used as the solution to economic or political mismanagement. This constitutes a degree of autonomous self-definition of the military role that is a significant departure from traditional Communist norms of Party control of the armed forces. It casts the Polish military in the role--albeit potential more than actual--of the guardian of *national* values. The military would not consciously oppose national values to Party ideology, but it might well seek to defend the Party's mission against what it would view as mistakes of a Party leadership during domestic crisis. In emphasizing the primacy of its external security function, in recognizing that it does not command a viable instrument of mass internal repression, and in wishing to remain as uninvolved as possible in controversies within the Party elite, the Polish military leadership has become a significant factor in Polish Communist politics.

The 1980 Crisis. The role played by the Polish military in the Polish crisis of 1980 was conditioned by this history. A full analysis must await the outcome of the crisis. As of November 1980, three key developments could be noted. First, as in 1970 and 1976, Defense Minister Jaruzelski reportedly again played a major role in the change of Party leadership.⁹⁶ Second, all elements in the Polish Communist leadership seemed to have ruled out the use of force in dealing with the August 1980 strike movement. Politburo member Stanislaw Kania, addressing the regional Party organization in Gdansk prior to succeeding Gierek as First Party Secretary, said that "everything must be done to solve the crisis with political means, because no other means are available." Addressing the same meeting, navy commander Admiral Janczyszyn reported that soldiers were asking "increasingly difficult questions" and said "the army will do nothing to sever its ties with society and the workers."⁹⁷ Addressing the Sixth Party Plenum, Jaruzelski subsequently noted that "the Polish Army came out

in favor of a political settlement of the conflict."⁹⁸ Third, military leaders and the military press kept a low public profile. In contrast to past practice, Jaruzelski attended but did not speak at the October 10 Army Day celebrations. *Zolnierz Wolnosci*, the military daily, was generally restrained; its key commentary of September 1980--misinterpreted in both East and West--in effect emphasized the Party's duty to correct its past failings.⁹⁹

International Crises. The Polish military's track record in international crises is far more limited; there are in fact only two data points. In 1956 Moscow was able to largely neutralize the military as an instrument of national resistance to Soviet pressure, yet it did this less successfully than in Hungary in 1956 (where the threat to national interests was much greater and the system of direct Soviet domination of the military establishment weaker). Today the Soviets lack the same direct instruments of control over the Polish army. In a crisis with Moscow the Polish military could be expected to remain united and take its orders from the Polish leadership.

Polish military operations abroad (apart from UN peacekeeping activities) have been limited to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. That event showed that the USSR could mobilize the military forces of its loyalist allies for political purposes, but it told little about the ability of the USSR to use NSWP forces in military action against a deviant member-state (e.g., Romania), and even less about the Soviets' ability to use NSWP forces against NATO.*

CONCLUSIONS: THE ROLE AND RELIABILITY OF THE POLISH ARMED FORCES

To recapitulate, since the late 1950s the Polish military has developed into a modern army--not only the largest but in some respects the best equipped non-Soviet Warsaw Pact military force. It has been resubordinated to national, Polish command. At the same time it has

* Occasional Western media reports of Polish (or other East European) forces on duty on the Soviet-Chinese border lack credibility. Such reports may have resulted from a misreading of training exercises of Polish Air Defense units on Soviet territory.¹⁰⁰

been "integrated" into Soviet strategy for European military operations and earmarked for an offensive role against NATO forces in Northern Europe. This principal mission explains the formal separation of the "operational army" (included in its entirety in the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces) from OTK forces (intended for "defense of national territory") in 1965. The structure, weapons, and training of the Polish armed forces are such as to prepare them for rapid offensives into NATO territory under nuclear conditions.

The human resources of the Polish armed forces have been "modernized" since 1956 in parallel with the equipment. The Poles have emphasized (evidently successfully) the development of a "modern officer corps" with highly developed military skills and specialization--inevitably at the expense of ideology. Sensitive to this development, the Party has taken steps to counter professionalization, increasing the role of political officers, albeit with questionable results. The military elite has been consolidated after major disruptions in the 1960s. A homogeneous military leadership has emerged, comprising a group of generals of which Defense Minister Jaruzelski is the archetype: relatively young; Polish; products, as young officers, of the Polish army organized on Soviet territory during World War II; well-educated in Polish and Soviet military academies; products of line as opposed to political career tracks. They and the military institutions they command are at once participants in a Soviet-dominated system of Warsaw Pact-wide military arrangements and in the Polish Communist system. Appraisals of the Polish armed forces that disregard either of these characteristics risk serious error.

Gomulka's misguided effort to use the Polish Army for internal repression in 1970 reinforced the proclivity of this military elite to remain aloof from the endemic internal conflict of the Polish Communist leadership. This relative "neutrality" is itself an important political factor. It implies institutional detachment and autonomy and reinforces a sense of professional distinctiveness and even elitism--all anathema to the traditional Communist conception of Party-military relations. This detachment is manifested in the military's low representation on the Party Central Committee; it occupies only

three seats, or less than 3 percent; this is less than half the representation of the mid-1960s.¹⁰¹ Institutional autonomy has also been displayed in the advocacy of such programs as civil defense. In all these respects the military elite has acted not as an alien, Soviet-inspired body but as a national institution with the self-avowed mission of protecting national interests and the Communist system in Poland--perhaps even from distortions of the Party leadership. As such it acts as a moderating influence in domestic political terms; it can be expected to endorse policies promoting social stability, to urge political concessions in the case of internal unrest, and to act to suppress internal violence only in circumstances so severe that the viability of the military institution for this purpose is questionable. The elite internal security units apart, the utility and reliability of the military institution as an instrument of domestic repression appears to be quite low.

Seeking national stability at home, the Polish military leadership takes seriously its alliance obligations. These are ultimately political, deriving from Poland's inclusion in the Soviet bloc, and are part of the price Gomulka and Poland had to pay after 1956 to retain a degree of autonomy in domestic affairs. The very real Polish fears of West German military power in the late 1950s and 1960s constituted a national rationale for Poland's military posture within the Warsaw Pact just as for its arms control initiatives, beginning with the Rapacki Plan. This rationale has weakened in the 1970s. The exigencies of modern warfare itself also provided a national rationale for Poland's military posture. Given the Soviet-induced shift in Warsaw Pact strategy around 1960, a prudent Polish military planner concerned with national survival would embrace a role for Polish forces implying combat on German territory and contributing to a quick Pact victory that would preempt or minimize NATO nuclear strikes on Poland. Closely linked professionally with the Soviet military, the Polish military leadership has accepted the role envisaged for Polish forces in Warsaw Pact terms and has improved Polish military capabilities correspondingly. The operational army is programmed for massive and rapid offensive operations onto NATO territory in a nuclear environment. Under

some circumstances the Polish armed forces could make a major contribution to Soviet military operations against Western Europe. The commitment of Polish military professionals to this mission, and the corresponding design of Polish forces to serve it, is generally underestimated.

Effective and reliable employment of Polish forces to this end would depend on circumstances. It would require a corresponding decision by Polish Party leadership which becomes the more problematic in political terms the more the "German threat" fades in Poland. In the absence of a clear and direct threat to Poland's national existence, the effectiveness and reliability of the Polish armed forces in any extended military campaign must be questioned. In such circumstances, the Polish armed forces are likely to be seriously weakened by demoralization of its conscripts, which constitute a cross-section of the Polish nation at large--a nation which may still have residual fears of a national threat from West Germany but which shares little else of the Soviet military concern with NATO. Yet the very posture of the Polish forces today tends to give Moscow influence over Polish decisionmaking that it lacked even in the 1950s. Given a Soviet decision to launch an attack on Western Europe that was perceived as contrary to Polish interests by the Polish Communist leadership, political leaders and military planners in Poland might well view the costs of full-fledged participation as less than the costs of attempting to "opt out." That could result in a major NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict on Polish territory. Depending again on the circumstances, in such a situation the Polish armed forces, as an effective and disciplined military institution, might contribute effectively and reliably to at least the initial phases of a Soviet offensive against Western Europe.

Accepting its alliance obligations, the Polish military could today be expected to favor implementing some of them through such national forms as the Polish Front concept put forward in the early 1960s.* They would expect Soviet acceptance of such forms. Above all,

* Suggestively, General Duszynski's death in 1974 was commemorated in military circles with no allusions to his disgrace in the 1960s.¹⁰² In the 1970s, the NPA has continued to stress "patriotic education"--a theme with national overtones.¹⁰³

they would expect the Soviet military to treat them as professionals and, as such, at least as junior partners. However great the Soviet reliance on Polish forces in Warsaw Pact planning, there are indications that such a Soviet attitude has yet to be adequately displayed. As one example, Polish military theorists extol the Polish contribution to Warsaw Pact coalition doctrine, but acknowledgment of such a non-Soviet role has yet to be found in Soviet sources. Another example is in the continued delay experienced by Poland in receiving even token quantities of the most advanced Soviet weapon systems. Modernization of the Polish armed forces and greater professionalization of the Polish military elite create rising professional expectations vis-à-vis the Soviet military. Should these not be satisfied--and the odds are that they will not be--then professional dissatisfactions would quickly combine with national resentments and pose a stronger challenge to solidarity with the USSR within the Polish military than that of the early 1960s.

The Soviets evidently believe--not without cause--that however great the antipathies toward the USSR on the part of the Polish nation, the Polish armed forces can be utilized effectively and reliably in some circumstances in at least the initial phase of a European war and that, as such, they constitute a significant increment to Soviet military power in Europe. Sensitive to the national impulses that have affected the Polish military establishment in the past, the Soviets can be expected to resist the aspirations for greater military autonomy on the part of Polish military professionals. From Moscow's perspective, in the event of a European conflict, the more Polish forces can be deployed quickly in conjunction with Soviet forces, and against the Germans, the greater the Soviet confidence in their effectiveness and reliability.

NOTES TO SECTION III

1. This study is the product of research that has used the following sources: (1) an extensive review of Polish military books and journals; (2) interviews with former Polish officers and unpublished papers written by them.
2. For a review of these events see A. Ross Johnson, *Eastern Europe Looks West*, P-6032, The Rand Corporation, November 1977.
3. *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, July 1974, p. 63.
4. This period is described in Marian Spychalski, "Dwadzieścia lat budownictwa ludowej obronności," *Nowe Drogi*, October 1963, pp. 3-24.
5. B. H. Liddell Hart, *The Soviet Army*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1956.
6. Interview with Seweryn Bialer, a former Party official, as broadcast by Radio Free Europe, July 9, 1956.
7. E.g., Zdzisław Stapor and Julian Kaczmarek, "Wezłowe problemy sztuki wojennej ludowego Wojska Polskiego w latach 1942-1975," *Wojskowy Przegląd Historyczny*, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1975.
8. A good account is Flora Lewis, *A Case History of Hope*, Garden City, New York, Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1958.
9. Jan Nowak, "Factionalism in the Polish United Workers' Party," unpublished paper, 1963.
10. See the retrospective discussion in Eugeniusz Miszczuk and Marian Zielinski, "Pierwsza próba komentarza," *Wojsko Ludowe*, August 1961, pp. 3-7.
11. *W służbie Polski socjalistycznej*, Warsaw, MON, 1975, p. 480.
12. Adam Sarapata and Włodzimierz Wesolowski, "The Evaluation of Occupations by Warsaw Inhabitants," *American Journal of Sociology*, May 1961, pp. 581-591; Michał Chęciński, "'Ludowe Wojsko Polskie' przed i po marcu 1968," *Zeszyty Historyczne*, Paris, No. 44, 1978, pp. 14-31.
13. Ryszard Majewski, *Wysza Szkoła Oficerska Wojsk Zmechanizowanych im. Tadeusza Kościuszki. Zarys historii 1943-1968*, Warsaw, MON, 1973.
14. See Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970*, Baltimore, Maryland, Johns Hopkins Press, 1970.

15. Interviews with former Polish military officers, 1978.
16. This literature is reviewed in Stapor.
17. Wacław Stankiewicz, *Socjalistyczna myśl wojenno-ekonomiczna*, Warsaw, MON, 1972, p. 332.
18. Józef Graczyk, *Problemy socjologiczne Ludowego Wojska Polskiego*, Warsaw, MON, 1972, p. 49.
19. *Ludowe Wojsko Polskie 1943-1973, materiały z międzynarodowej konferencji naukowej z okazji XXX-lecia Ludowego Wojska Polskiego, 5-6 września 1973 R*, Warsaw, MON, 1975, p. 282.
20. Marian Dowda and Maciej Janisławski, *Obrona kraju obowiązek każdego obywatela*, Warsaw, MON, 1970, p. 37.
21. Stapor, p. 45; see also Henryk Michalski, "Polska socjalistyczna myśl wojskowa 1942-1973 (II)", *Wojsko Ludowe*, No. 10, 1973, pp. 28-34. As early as May 1957, the Training Inspectorate organized instruction on small-unit operations under nuclear conditions, *Mała kronika Ludowego Wojska Polskiego 1943-1973*, Warsaw, MON, 1975, p. 327.
22. Stapor, p. 48.
23. E.g., Stapor; Bolesław Chocha, Interview, *Polityka*, May 5, 1973.
24. Examples are Henryk Michalski, *Pierwsze 100 godzin wojny nuklearnej*, Warsaw, MON, 1967; and Zdzisław Gołaś, *Początkowy okres wojny*, Warsaw, MON, 1972.
25. Bolesław Chocha, *Obrona terytorium kraju*, Warsaw, MON, 1974, pp. 52-53.
26. Albrecht Charisius, Tibor Dobias, and Władysław Kozaczuk, *NATO: strategia i siły zbrojne 1949-1975*, Warsaw, MON, 1977, p. 346.
27. E.g., Kazimierz Nozko, *Zagadnienia współczesnej sztuki wojennej*, Warsaw, MON, 1973; Gołaś; Jan Cwierzdzinski, *Taktyka na współczesnym polu walki*, Warsaw, MON, 1970. These are familiar themes of Soviet operational doctrine. Detailed comparison of Polish with Soviet operational doctrine would indicate to what extent Polish doctrine contains unique elements and to what extent it illuminates Soviet concepts that are expressed less directly in the open Soviet literature. Such a comparison of operational doctrine exceeds the scope of this study.
28. General Molczyk, deputy minister of defense and chief of the Training Inspectorate, as quoted in *W służbie Polski socjalistycznej*, p. 222.

29. *Wojsko ludowe*, June 1968, p. 16.
30. As quoted in Marian Jurek and Edward Skrzypkowski, *Tarcza pokroju, XX-lecie Zbrodni Warszawskiego*, Warsaw, MON, 1975, p. 15.
31. *Materiały do studiowania wojska i sztuki wojennej*, Warsaw, MON, 1967.
32. Nozko, p. 85.
33. E.g., Richard F. Starr, *Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe*, Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 3rd ed., 1971, p. 227.
34. Interviews with former Polish military officers, 1978.
35. Checinski.
36. Chocha, 1974.
37. *Mala kronika . . .*, p. 419.
38. One civil defense exercise was described in *Przegląd obrony cywilnej*, December 1977.
39. For the Yugoslav experience, see A. Ross Johnson, "Yugoslav Total National Defense," *Survival*, March-April 1973.
40. Chocha, 1974, p. 142.
41. Data from *The Military Balance 1978-1979*: London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1978.
42. Ibid.
43. The issues of "nationalist" attitudes and criticism of Soviet equipment were alluded to by Defense Minister Spychalski in a series of meetings in June 1967. See coverage in the Polish Situation Reports of that month, *Radio Free Europe Research*.
44. *The Military Balance*, 1979.
45. Stapor, p. 47. [Emphasis added.]
46. See the article by chief-of-staff Chocha in *Trybuna Ludu*, April 6, 1971.
47. As argued in Dale Herspring, "The Polish Military and the Policy Process," in Maurice D. Simon and Roger E. Kanet, eds., *Background to Crisis: Policy and Politics in Poland*, Boulder, Westview, 1980.

48. Herspring, 1978; interviews with former Polish military officers, 1978.

49. *Wehr und Wirtschaft*, June 1971.

50. *Trybuna Ludu*, No. 43, 1978.

51. Graczyk, p. 161.

52. *Mala kronika...*, p. 308.

53. Graczyk, p. 163.

54. *W sluzbie Polski socjalistycznej*, p. 196.

55. Polish Situation Report/10, *Radio Free Europe Research*, March 9, 1973.

56. See Miszczuk and Zielinski, pp. 3-7; *Mala encyklopedia wojskowa*, Warsaw, MON, 1970, pp. 570, 663; Dale Roy Herspring, "Technology and the Changing Political Officer in the Armed Forces: The Polish and East German Cases," *Comparative Studies in Communism*, Winter 1977, pp. 370-393; and Dale Herspring, "Technology and Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems: The Polish and East German Cases," paper prepared for the Conference on The Role of the Military in Communist Societies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, November 20, 1975.

57. See Herspring, 1977, p. 378.

58. Ibid.

59. Andrzej Wojdyla, "Oficer polityczny - zawod i powolanie," *Zolnierz Polski*, August 6, 1978.

60. Ibid.

61. For details, see A. Ross Johnson, "Poland: End of An Era?", *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1970, pp. 28-39, and A. Ross Johnson, "Polish Perspectives: Past and Present," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1971, pp. 59-72.

62. Nowak.

63. *Trybuna Ludu*, April 13, 1968.

64. Checinski.

65. Nowak.

66. As cited in Joachim Georg Goerlich, "Polens Volksarmee," *Wehrkunde*, May 1966, p. 256. Komar and Frey-Bielecki reportedly asked Gomulka in late 1956 to attempt to secure the removal of all Soviet forces from Poland (Checinski, p. 8).

67. *Zolnierz Polski*, November 18, 1964.
68. Johnson, 1970.
69. See note 43.
70. Ibid.
71. Interview with former Polish military officers, 1978.
72. See note 43.
73. See Polish Situation Report/30, *Radio Free Europe Research*, April 4, 1968.
74. See Johnson, 1970.
75. See Polish Situation Report/33, *Radio Free Europe Research*, April 17, 1968.
76. Eugeniusz Walczuk, "Oficerowie," *Polityka*, April 29, 1972.
77. *Ludowe Wojsko Polskie* . . . , p. 423.
78. Stefan Nogala, "Problems Pertaining to the Organization of Post-Graduate Training for Career Officers," *Przegląd Wojsk Lądowych*, March 1967, translation.
79. *Ludowe Wojsko Polskie* . . . , p. 420.
80. Ibid., pp. 420ff.
81. General Tuczapski, *Zolnierz Wolności*, July 30, 1970.
82. Walczuk's article was intended to serve this purpose.
83. See note 4.
84. See note 8.
85. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1960, pp. 236-268.
86. See Edwin Weit, *Ostblock intern*, Paris, Opera Mundi, 1970, pp. 237-270. Weit was Gomulka's interpreter in the 1960s.
87. General Urbanowicz, as quoted in *Soldat und Technik*, October 1969.
88. *Ludowe Wojsko Polskie* . . . , 1975, p. 470.
89. E.g., *Ludowe Wojsko Polskie* . . . ; *Mala kronika*

90. See Johnson, 1971, and Michael Costello, "The Party and the Military in Poland," *Radio Free Europe Research*, April 26, 1971.

91. *Nowe Drogi*, special issue, May 1971, as translated in JPRS 54071, September 17, 1971.

92. *Zolnierz Wolnosci*, March 4, 1971.

93. *Nowe Drogi*, 1971.

94. Speech to a Silesian Military District Party meeting, *Trybuna Ludu*, March 20, 1971. [Emphasis added.]

95. As quoted in Herspring, 1978.

96. Dispatch from Warsaw by R. W. Apple, *The New York Times*, September 14, 1980; Walter Gunzel, "Armee wird nicht auf Arbeiter schiessen," *Die Welt*, October 16, 1980.

97. Fragments of the discussion were published in *Kultura* (Paris), No. 10/397, 1980.

98. *Zolnierz Wolnosci*, October 6, 1980.

99. "[A Sense of Responsibility]," *Zolnierz Wolnosci*, September 4, 1980. The point was sharpened, in response to misinterpretations by Western news agencies and *Neues Deutschland*, in a second commentary, "A Sense of Responsibility," in the issue of September 9.

100. See the account of one such training exercise in *Zolnierz Wolnosci*, June 9-10, 1973.

101. Herspring, 1978.

102. Checinski, note 7.

103. E.g., in an MPA document, "Patriotic and Internationalist Education--The Main Task of Ideological Educational Work in the Armed Forces," as published in *Wojsko Ludowe*, No. 8, 1978. The document criticizes attempts within the armed forces to denigrate Polish national traditions.

IV. THE GDR MILITARY¹

THE NATIONAL SETTING: THE NPA AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY

The National People's Army (NPA) of the German Democratic Republic is unique among the military institutions of the Warsaw Pact. It is an army without a nation. Originally an artifice of Soviet power, the East German state has had to wage a continuous domestic and international struggle to establish its nationhood. This permanent problem of legitimation has directly influenced the development, character, and functions of the East German military. The NPA cannot be understood, nor can its reliability and effectiveness as a fighting force be assessed, without reference to the political vulnerabilities of the system which it would defend.

The clarity and simplicity of traditional feelings of patriotism and loyalty to the nation, which are the cement of military organizations and which underwrite the authority of the political leadership, have been absent in the case of the GDR because of the state's anomalous status. The synthetic character of the GDR has meant that the "nation" cannot provide the same focus of attachment for military loyalties as in the Polish or other East European armies. This has a number of important consequences for the military. It means that the function of ideology and indoctrination within the NPA is of the utmost importance in providing an *ersatz* source of cohesion, discipline, and morale. The very concept of political authority and legitimacy in the GDR is rooted in and identified with the Party's ideological claim to power. In the military, the state ideology much more than the state itself is the "spiritual" basis of the institution, substantiating its cohesion, ensuring its reliability and subordination to Party authority, and countering possible ambiguities in the attitudes of servicemen associated with the lack of political legitimacy. This explains the singlemindedness with which indoctrination is pursued in the NPA.

Because national loyalties that conflict with Party loyalties are improbable, and because the army has no separate source of national cohesion and no separate sense of purpose beyond its defense of state

interests as defined by the Party, peacetime Party control may be facilitated. In other words, the uncertain political legitimacy in the GDR tends to reinforce military loyalty to the Party. This strong identity of interests would logically tend to generate an urge toward subordination in the officer corps. Because national stewardship cannot serve as a convincing justification or platform for political intervention, there is less potential for the officer corps and its leadership to develop into a potential counter-elite (a judgment one could make with less certainty about other Warsaw Pact states where the military may see itself as the repository of national values). During the 1970 political crisis in Poland, as discussed in the previous section, just such a dilemma for the military was evident in the Party's attempted employment of the regular army against rebellious workers.

In the GDR, in contrast, autonomous initiatives are not to be expected from the military. Indeed, threats to the conservative policies of the Party would likely be perceived as threats to the military as well. The collapse of the Party leadership, or a situation of internecine factional struggle which resulted in a weakened leadership, would create a vacuum into which the military would be unlikely to step despite the opportunity for intervention, for the very continuity of the state would be called into question. This institutional symbiosis suggests an officer corps whose independence is severely circumscribed, and whose reliability in domestic (and possibly foreign) contingencies is enhanced by considerations of institutional self-interest. These considerations reduce the margin for disagreement between Party and army, and augur well for the stability of the military institution in peacetime. In wartime the absence of a military tradition coterminous with the national entity may undermine the NPA's institutional identity and ultimately its reliability.

None of this is to suggest that specifically institutional interests are not articulated and pressed by the military leadership vis-à-vis the East German Party leadership or the USSR, although there is no evidence of either. Military efforts to exercise political influence in matters relating directly to military policy would not necessarily

be inconsistent with Party supremacy. The fact that Defense Minister Heinz Hoffmann sits on the Politburo ensures access and representation. It also ensures that professional military expertise is brought to bear in the nonmilitary deliberations of the Party's highest body. Furthermore, on issues of military policy where the military would logically seek to influence the Party (equipment modernization, military expenditures, recruitment and manpower policies, pay and emoluments, and training), Party and military interests appear to have coincided. The status and pay of officers are high and a great deal of prestige is systematically accorded them. In sum, the East German Party has given the highest priority and support to developing the NPA as an advanced, professional fighting force, and also to assigning it a central domestic role as an instrument of socialization and control.

The military institution is not an island in East German society. The insecurities associated with the lack of legitimacy have prompted the Party leadership to rely heavily on the military as an instrument of political integration. The military's role as an agent of external coercion has been supplemented by other nonmilitary, political, and social functions. The objective is to get the broadest strata of citizens to identify with the state's defense in some participatory sense. Among the military's most important domestic functions is the political socialization of its members. Virtually all males between the ages of 18 and 26 pass through the NPA's ranks, and the process continues for the majority of them in the reserves or in associated paramilitary organizations. For each 10,000 GDR citizens, 433 are members of regular military or paramilitary units, as compared with 210 per 10,000 in Czechoslovakia, 115 per 10,000 in Poland (and 185 per 10,000 in the USSR).^{*} An extensive system of premilitary education and civil defense involves many more citizens in military activities. A comparatively broad spectrum of society is in one way or another under the tutelage of the NPA. The "party school of the nation," as the NPA is commonly known, teaches important technical, pedagogic, and administrative skills

^{*}Based on *The Military Balance: 1978-1979*, London, IISS. Figures do not include reserves. The GDR also leads its East European allies in the relative level of military spending. See Appendixes B and C.

and provides a manpower pool of retired officers from which a reliable administrative elite is recruited. All of these are viewed as system-stabilizing measures that seek to give each citizen a personal relationship to national defense.² To some extent noncoercive functions are characteristic of all Communist military institutions. It is nevertheless safe to conclude that the extent and intensity of participation in military activity is greater in the GDR than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The influence of the NPA on the GDR's social and political character, and its role as an instrument of political integration and as a vehicle for social mobility, are considerable.

This diffusion of the military throughout the society has another important consequence: it blurs institutional boundaries. It is often difficult to identify distinct lines of separation between civil and military responsibilities and functions of the NPA. In serving as an instrument of political integration, the NPA has become more integrated itself. Because of its broad involvement in society, the NPA is physically and psychologically tied to the rest of society; its self-awareness and separate identity are therefore muted--a situation which serves to check any autonomous urges. Thus, these non-military responsibilities assigned to the NPA have important consequences for its relationship to the Party. It begs the question of the military's role and influence in East German society to speak of two separate and distinct institutions, Party and Army.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Because of the legitimacy concerns of the East German Communist leadership, the significance of the NPA to GDR foreign policy has extended beyond an immediate concern with national defense. The development of a strong military institution since the early 1960s served as a vehicle for achieving the GDR's full acceptance within the Warsaw Pact alliance. It has obliged recognition of the GDR as an equal military, and therefore political, partner. Rearmament, emulation of the Soviet military model, and achievement of military excellence all have served as a means for state assertion and international credibility. The NPA's demonstrative efforts to achieve high

performance and its apparent dependability, as well as its acknowledged importance for the defense of the Soviet alliance, have diminished reservations toward the GDR held by its Communist allies and have contributed to the clarification of its sovereignty within the Communist coalition.

The determined emphasis evident since the early 1960s to develop a modern and highly competent military force was the result of a number of factors. Perhaps the most important was that the permanence of the GDR had gradually become a tenet of Soviet policy in Central Europe. In view of East Germany's uncertain political future in the early 1950s, indigenous military capabilities had been supported only hesitantly by the Soviets. Following the anti-regime demonstrations which shook the state in June 1953, initial Soviet sponsorship for the development of the GDR military appears to have been withdrawn. A small fleet of modern MiG-15s which was to serve as the core of a newly constituted East German air force was recalled, and other training and organizational development in process was curtailed.³ Soviet restrictions on GDR military development apparently continued well beyond the formal establishment of the NPA in 1956. Gradually, however, Soviet confidence in the East German Party leadership and in the political and social stability of the "second German state" grew, and was evidently sufficient by the early 1960s to warrant full support of a separate GDR military establishment.

The development of the NPA since the early 1960s and the increased importance attributed to it by the USSR were also due in large measure to the changes in Soviet strategy at that time (discussed in Section II), which elevated the importance of East European military forces in Soviet planning for European contingencies.⁴ Improved economic conditions in the GDR also played a role. The GDR was confronted with extreme economic difficulties between 1956 and 1963, a situation which must have severely restricted the state's rearmament capabilities, especially since there was no domestic arms industry. Furthermore, the flight to the West of large numbers of service-eligible men could only have been increased by a policy of obligatory military service. Until the conscription law of 1962 recruitment was on a voluntary

basis. With construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 sealing off the main route of flight to the West, the universal conscription law was enacted in 1962 without fear of increasing the exodus.

Beginning in 1962 and 1963, as indicated, development of the armed forces began in earnest. Soviet backing was evident in the inclusion of NPA officers for the first time in the Warsaw Pact planning system, and in the transfer of command over the Soviet sector of Berlin to the NPA. In 1965 the NPA was designated, along with the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG), as the Warsaw Pact's "first strategic echelon"⁵--a declaration that apparently signaled the full acceptance of the NPA into the Warsaw Pact and to which NPA official publications and statements continue to make reference. Overt defense spending increased sharply thereafter (see Fig. 4). The NPA's full participation in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, and GDR Defense Minister Hoffmann's command of the 1970 Warsaw Pact maneuvers, "Comrades-in-Arms," in which all Warsaw Pact armies or staffs participated, were also evidence of the NPA's full partnership.

DOCTRINAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL EVOLUTION: THE NPA IN THE WARSAW PACT

Doctrine

In the event of a Central European war, it must be a fundamental strategic objective of the East German Communist leadership to preclude any chance for a separate peace between the USSR and the Western powers at the expense of the GDR, or any chance that the course of the war could undermine or weaken the Soviet political commitment to the East German state. The NPA's integration into the Warsaw Pact and in particular its interdependent relationship with the GSFG therefore serve a very basic purpose for the GDR leadership.

GDR military doctrine postulates a surprise attack from the West, and (based on one reading of major WP military exercises) a war that would last 10 to 20 days. The East German assumption is that the strategic objective of NATO forces, especially the FRG, would be to overrun and occupy the GDR as rapidly as possible, thus isolating East Germany from its allies,⁶ and to raise the price of retaking East German




Fig. 4--Defense expenditure: East Germany

(SOURCE: See Appendix C)

territory to an unacceptable level. Given the political insecurities of the GDR leadership, it is likely that planning against such a contingency drives much of the GDR military (and arms control) policy. Under such circumstances, for example, the GDR would have every incentive to internationalize the war to avoid any possibility that it could be confined to East German territory. National interests as well as the determining importance of Soviet strategic interests thus dictate the offensive character of GDR doctrine and strategy and in particular the precept that war must be carried immediately to FRG territory. Forward defense to the GDR means that "the aggressor will be crushed on his own territory--as our soldier's oath of loyalty says--and we are in a position to do this."⁷ According to a former NPA officer:

From an ideological point of view one accepts that the war will be a continuation of politics by other means. The assumption is that the West will attack first (i.e., will plot aggression). . . . This is the official and irrevocable line. . . . It is therefore very important that the political situation is assessed correctly and the first blow struck. This is very important. One could say that it is unimportant whether the war is just or unjust and it is not important to find out who is or is not the aggressor, but simply the fact that war is the continuation of politics by other means. Here the first strike is of primary importance.⁸

The officer went on to suggest that maneuvers would precede a war as a means of accomplishing mobilization and maximizing surprise.*

Such strategic assumptions also drive force posture. In view of the political risk of limiting a war to East German territory, the GDR resists the concept of an equilibrium of military force in Central Europe as a complement to the equilibrium of political forces conceptualized by the European Conference on Security and Cooperation and the East-West detente process of the 1970s. The NPA has termed the thesis of a military balance in Central Europe as a "deception of the imperialists for the obscuring of the real relationship of forces."⁹ A former officer summarized East German military doctrine and its implications for force posture as follows:

In the GDR and in the Soviet camp one talks about the superiority of forces and not about the parity of forces. Parity of forces is a purely Western concept. On the other side one speaks of a clear superiority of the Soviet camp and one does not leave any doubt about it. And the problem is defined in such a way that because of the superiority of the Warsaw Pact states, with the entire research and development network of the Soviet Union, etc., the West will be prevented from engaging in a war. Military superiority is considered the basis of deterrence.¹⁰

*"Maneuvers are begun because one is able to foresee developments to a certain extent, as was the case in Czechoslovakia." Another NPA defector noted with respect to East German doctrine that "it is said that Soviet tank divisions will be over the border within two hours in case of war."

Subordination to the USSR

The NPA's subordination to the USSR is more direct and more extensive than that of its Warsaw Pact allies. The bilateral GDR-USSR Status of Forces Agreement which regulates the GSFG in East Germany does not accord the GDR any rights in controlling the number of positions of Soviet Forces, as is the case, for example, in similar agreements with Poland and Hungary.¹¹ Nor are GSFG troop movements outside their immediate locations regulated, again in contrast to the Polish and Hungarian cases.¹² Furthermore, Article 18 of the East German agreement contains an emergency clause which provides that "in the case of a threat to the security of the Soviet Forces" in the GDR, the Supreme Commander of the GSFG, after consultation with the GDR government, "can take measures for the elimination of such a threat."¹³ In theory, the Supreme Commander of the GSFG has the authority to declare a state of emergency in response to external or internal conditions.¹⁴ No such proviso is included in other bilateral East European-Soviet status of forces agreements. While one can question the practical significance of such legal distinctions as these, they reflect the GDR's greater subordination to the USSR.

Another indication of the GDR's relatively greater subordination is the small scale of the indigenous defense industry. This may be explained by the small postwar defense industrial base and the extreme economic difficulties between 1953 and 1963, which would have discouraged investment in defense industries. The absence of any significant defense industrial capacity reinforces the USSR's tight grip on the GDR by controlling weapons acquisition, and enforces its military integration in the Soviet alliance and its direct dependence on the USSR.

Moreover, the NPA is the only East European military establishment wholly subordinated to the Warsaw Pact Command in peacetime.* This is to be explained in political terms, and in operational and planning terms as well. The NPA would probably be among the first

* The formal organization of the Warsaw Pact does not violate the principle of national command authority during peacetime with regard to other East European countries. See Appendix A.¹⁵

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EAST EUROPEAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS: THE WARSAW PACT NORTHERN--ETC(U)

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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
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Warsaw Pact units to be committed in the event of war. Precisely what authority the Soviets exercise over the NPA through the Joint Command is not clear. However, direct subordination appears to give the Soviets a relatively greater role in the day-to-day affairs of the East German military with respect to such matters as training.¹⁶

After 1969 the number of NPA officers seconded to the Warsaw Pact organization grew significantly, expanding in proportion to the six NPA divisions committed to the Pact. Many of the general staff functions performed on a national basis elsewhere in Eastern Europe are in the case of the NPA apparently performed within the Warsaw Pact organization in Moscow, thus facilitating USSR control of the NPA in comparison to other Eastern European forces.¹⁷ It is unlikely that the Joint Staff itself performs these functions, but rather serves as the vehicle for Soviet-East German coordination. Following the 1969 Warsaw Pact reorganization, bilateral Soviet-East German military contacts greatly increased.¹⁸ Such meetings cover the entire spectrum of military activities, including bilateral liaison of military scholars and historians and of staff officers involved in operational planning and military education. The number of NPA-Soviet contacts is apparently greater than the bilateral military contacts of other Warsaw Pact states with the USSR.¹⁹

Soviet presence in GDR military bodies is also more pervasive than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Soviet Colonel General Magomed Tankayev, the representative of the Warsaw Pact Supreme Command in the GDR, is physically present in the East German Ministry for National Defense. Through his person the authority of the Warsaw Pact is exercised through the NPA Main (i.e., General) Staff. This position accords the Soviet military authorities considerable influence in NPA decisions that would normally be considered on a national basis. Tankayev is concerned with planning, logistics, standardization, and exercises.²⁰ There are reportedly 80 Soviet staff officers also present in the GDR Defense Ministry, along with 3200 NPA officers and enlisted men, and 900 civilian employees.²¹ According to West German information, a Soviet general is usually present at high-level NPA meetings, and the Soviet military mission in the GDR routinely gets plans and proposals

developed within the NPA.²² In effect, the Ministry for National Defense doubles as the command and administrative authority of the NPA and the most important instrument of the Warsaw Pact in implementing Soviet military and military-political objectives in the GDR.

From the regimental level upward (and also in independent battalions) GSFG and NPA commanders work together in preparing exercises and maneuvers.²³ Joint training has increased considerably since 1969.* On the basis of available data, however, it has proved impossible to evaluate the extent or significance of the increase. Contacts between NPA and GSFG officers and men are arranged on the basis of a "regiment-next-door" program, evidently instituted in 1969 following the Pact reorganizations.²⁵ Some 400 NPA troop formations, units, and installations have "close relations with the 'regiment-next-door'."²⁶ Portrayed in official publications as extensive and successful,²⁷ this program of joint military training, political instruction, and military and sports competitions appears in fact to be considerably restricted and always carefully regulated.²⁸ Only a minority of NPA soldiers are able to participate in joint exercises.²⁹ Former NPA officers have described their joint training experiences with GSFG units as having contributed to a distance between the two armies, with the result that responsible officers on both sides were reluctant to encourage such contacts.³⁰ Indeed, an effort to expand joint training (as distinct from maneuvers) in the early 1970s appears to have encountered less than enthusiastic reception by NPA commanders. In an unusually frank statement the commander of the Neubrandenburg military district urged that the expansion of joint training had to be more widely accepted in the NPA.³¹ The ultimate objective of such contacts is to foster attitudes in the NPA of loyalty to the USSR and comradeship with Soviet troops, and to create the conditions for more effective integration in warfighting. But by available accounts, these goals have proved

* One East German source describes the experience of an NPA field communication unit; joint training with a Soviet radio unit which formerly took place once a year is now conducted every two to three weeks.²⁴

chimerical. "It is becoming ever more evident," according to Defense Minister Hoffmann, "that cooperation with the Soviet comrades in daily military life does not lead spontaneously to a new stage of internationalist thought and action, . . ."32

The Limits of Military Integration

Close military integration is the declaratory goal of the NPA leadership, and efficient integrated operations at the small-unit level are portrayed as commonplace in East German military literature.* Such accounts convey the impression of national forces fighting side by side at the company level, assisted by combined air support. Frequent references to the assignment of common military tasks to individual national armies and standardization of military technique and equipment in the Warsaw Pact support these impressions.³⁶

* One typical account, for example, describes the "offensive actions of our motorized infantry and armor units with air and fire support by Soviet tactical aircraft and artillery units, . . . amphibious airborne landings established with the transport vehicles of our Soviet friends, . . . the breaching of water obstacles by our troops thanks to Soviet bridging equipment. . . . A particular expression of the joint fulfillment of combat tasks by the allied armies is provided by the attachment and detachment of units and formations as well as of combat service and support units," suggesting that national units on the Warsaw Pact battlefield have a "floating" capability. Furthermore, "all troops and commands of the military coalition . . . act in all questions of combat operations on the basis of uniform concepts employed by all the operational and tactical units of the other national armed forces. . ."33

Defense Minister Hoffmann described fighting by integrated small units during the October 1970 Comrades-in-Arms maneuvers as follows: ". . . Bulgarian and Czechoslovak motorized infantry launched an attack while Soviet engineers built them a bridge in record time. . . . I saw how the Hungarian artillery took up a firing position in an almost inconceivably short time, while Romanian signal troops set up the necessary communication. I was very impressed by the very mobile operation of the Polish troops and officers and by the actions of pilots who intercepted enemy targets in the air to secure the landing maneuver."34 (This reference to participation by Romanian troops contradicts Romania's position that only staff officers participated in this, as other, joint maneuvers.) Another account of the maneuvers describes "the crossing of a water obstacle by a tank unit of the Polish People's Army supported by the troops of Czechoslovak People's Army and the Air Forces of the Allied Armies."35

Soviet incentives for close wartime integration between NPA and GSFG forces are perhaps greater than in other bilateral Soviet-East European military relationships. In the event of hostilities it is probable that as the first echelon forces they would be committed jointly and immediately. Also, because of its limited size and possible Soviet doubts about its political reliability, it is unlikely that the NPA would be assigned major independent missions. Under such circumstances the closest coordination of C³I and air defense would be essential to the success of operations. It is doubtful, however, that combined operations based on small unit integration of different national forces would be practiced extensively in wartime. On the whole, the limited evidence from the East German case suggests that the NPA forces would be configured to fight as national units up to the divisional level, that is, East German divisions would be included in a Soviet Army. Limited support operations such as transport and supply might be conducted by Soviet or other national forces, but the integrity of the divisional structure would be essentially maintained.

There are several practical reasons for this. Inadequate Russian language skills in the NPA appear to be one major obstacle to integrated operations by small units under wartime conditions. The NPA's objective is to have each officer capable of using Russian proficiently under combat conditions, but it is far from having been achieved.³⁷ On the basis of personal experience, former NPA officers were skeptical of the feasibility of using Russian as a command language in NPA-GSFG combined ground forces operations below the divisional level.³⁸ According to one, "We as a company never had anything to do with the Soviet army. That usually occurred at a higher level. At the company level everything had to be done in German."³⁹

Another probable reason that genuine integration of NPA-GSFG ground forces has not been more extensive is the concern shown by the GDR that the integrity of its national forces be maintained. Available East German comment acknowledges the necessity and benefits of military integration,⁴⁰ but only to a point. "We have always noted that the military defense of each individual socialist country takes its own national form."⁴¹ This point should not be overstated, but it does

suggest an approach to integration by the GDR in which support for or concessions to the military efficiency of the alliance must not jeopardize, either de jure or de facto, national military matters such as logistics, education, and support which are independently organized within the NPA units at least at the divisional level and below. According to a former NPA officer there are no guidelines or oversight by the Russians in this respect.⁴² It seems safe to conclude that command authority, at least at the divisional level and below, is likely to remain with national officers, even though effective authority at the Army Group or Front level would be Soviet.*

The urge to maintain a degree of national military integrity is apparent in periodic commentaries on the importance of independent efforts to develop doctrine and concepts. The message, cautiously expressed, is that the NPA must always depend on Soviet doctrine but not be subsumed by it. National peculiarities, such as appropriate aspects of German military history and traditions or the military-geographical situation of the country, need not be suppressed. The decisive role of the Soviet Union in military theory, in the words of Chief of Staff General Heinz Kessler, does not release the GDR from the need for

independent thinking and for the search for our own solutions for specific problems. On the contrary, only when we have basically assimilated the knowledge we have adopted can we apply this with the optimum use . . . it does not suffice to know the newest knowledge of the art of war; it is more important to be able to think independently in their categories and principles.⁴⁴

The Soviet Army is acknowledged as the "basic model," the "immutable basis," for the NPA:

* It should be noted, however, that according to official West German sources, agreement and plans presumably exist for attaching Soviet officers from the GSFG to NPA regiments as control officers in the event of war. At the divisional level a system of "directing officers" (*Richtungsoffiziere*) would be instituted whereby Soviet general staff officers would maintain regular liaison at the NPA divisional level between NPA division commanders and the Soviet theater command.⁴³

But does this mean that we need simply to copy Lenin's tenets and the experiences of the Soviet Union and its armed forces without using our own heads? . . . our particular conditions have been applied very attentively and the progressive military heritage of the German people has been developed.⁴⁵

The independent military traditions cultivated in the NPA draw upon Prussian military history and personalities. The highest military award in the NPA is called the Scharnhorst Order, after the Prussian military reformer. Monuments were erected in 1961 to Scharnhorst, as well as to the Prussian Generals Bluecher and Gneisenau. In 1956 the uniform of the Garrisoned People's Police (predecessor organization of the NPA), which resembled the Soviet uniform, was replaced with an NPA uniform strikingly similar to that of the World War II *Wehrmacht*.⁴⁶ In addition, the German peasant armies of the 16th Century, the Liberation Army of 1813-1814, as well as the armed uprisings of the "petit-bourgeois-democratic forces" in the revolution of 1848 are extolled as the fountainheads of the NPA.⁴⁷

None of this, however, infringes upon the general validity of basic Soviet military strategic concepts or alters the fact that as a military force the NPA is closely linked with the GSFG. Combat training corresponds for the most part to the programs of the Soviet army, and the NPA works closely with the GSFG in all aspects of it.⁴⁸ Combat procedures and equipment are standardized.⁴⁹ At the divisional level and below, the logistics system is in the hands of the NPA, but above this it is in many areas the responsibility of the Soviet military.⁵⁰ The emphasis on an individual East German military character does, however, temper the picture of thoroughgoing integration, small-unit flexibilities, and the efficiency of combined international operations conveyed in GDR military literature.

The most highly integrated component of the NPA is the 31,000-man Air Force and Air Defense Force; the latter, like other East European air defense forces, is incorporated in the Warsaw Pact Air defense system. Because such close coordination requires a single command language, all NPA Air Force and Air Defense Force officers learn Russian.⁵¹ Each unit of the NPA Air Force and Air Defense Force is

"twinning" with units of the GSFG, which suggests that they are subordinated to Soviet command.⁵² The 16,000-man NPA Navy (Volksmarine) is closely integrated with the USSR Baltic Fleet, as is the Polish Navy.⁵³ To facilitate joint operations, the Volksmarine is modeled on the USSR Navy. Integration includes extensive use of translated USSR naval norms, regulations, and instructional materials, as well as USSR naval staff regulations.

PARTY CONTROL OF THE MILITARY

The guiding force behind the social and political organization of the GDR is to preclude the "autonomization" of any potential interest group--political, economic, or military--which could challenge or directly influence Party authority. Particularly in the military, strong feelings of institutional identity, common interests, and exclusivist professional attitudes, combined with a monopoly of the means of violence, may breed autonomy or political assertiveness. The decisive factor in ensuring subordination and responsiveness to the Party leadership, a crucial factor in the army's performance in peace and war, is the efficacy of the Party's system of political control--its methods of supervision and indoctrination, within the military. The army is therefore the social institution where the apparatus and methodology of political control are the most refined, the most pervasive, and the most redundant.

The necessity for such a system reflects what in many respects is a "natural" antagonism between the Party's political objectives and specific military concerns: developing expertise and specialized competence, applying and exploiting new technologies and equipment, achieving flexibility and efficiency in organization, unencumbered command relationships, the optimal use of training time and methods, and cultivating professional pride. The overall objective of both Party and military is of course to ensure the latter's competence. But the simple fact that uniformed Party representatives share responsibility for military performance creates a situation of potential conflict with military commanders who theoretically have sovereign responsibility.


In theory, command authority in the NPA is indivisible. According to the East German version of the Soviet principle of "one-man command" (*Einzelleitung*), full responsibility is vested personally in each military commander for (1) military matters, including combat training, the technical competence of his troops and the maintenance of their equipment, (2) the political and moral condition of his troops, including political training and indoctrination, and other Party work, and (3) the security of his unit. In practice, this comprehensive investiture of authority in the commander is nominal. The commander's political deputy, his second in command, plans and supervises political work in the unit. Furthermore, the political deputy and his staff--the political apparatus (*Politapparat*)--along with the Party organizations at descending levels constitute a second chain of command which circumscribes the authority of the military commander by monitoring his work and decisions and which circumvents him in the event of disagreement. All decisions are the product of consultation, and are subject to appeal through a separate Party-political report and command system which parallels the military chain of command. Command authority (the responsibility for military matters) is therefore divided, the NPA Party apparatus formally charged with concurring in decisions of a strictly military nature. "There is no important question in the life of a unit," according to the most important theoretical military publication in the GDR, "that could be resolved without the Party."⁵⁴ Formally within the commander's purview, security is actually the responsibility of the State Security Service (SSD),* which deploys a clandestine counter-intelligence apparatus of officers and men throughout the ranks of the NPA.

Party functions in the military are designed to ensure the accountability of military commanders and other regular officers. Party membership is not the most important means of assuring conformity to Party authority in the army; the fact that 97 percent of officers belong to the Party may do little in itself to guarantee their loyalty and

*The SSD is subordinated not to the Ministry of National Defense, but to the Ministry for State Security.

responsiveness. Nor does it guarantee that areas of Party-military dispute will not develop. Membership does mean, of course, that officers and men are subject to Party discipline. Far more important in ensuring full political conformity, however, are (1) the independent nodes of Party-political authority in the military which are mutually reinforcing and which exist side by side with the hierarchy of military command, (2) the rigorous process of political and ideological indoctrination, and (3) the clandestine security controls of the SSD which permeate the military. An apparent revision of Party control procedures in 1972 stipulates that any army member, irrespective of rank, is permitted to submit petitions and complaints directly to the Party Central Committee without observing military command channels. Commanders are not authorized to demand information about the contents of such communications or to request an inspection. Every army member also has the right to appeal to higher superiors (presumably political) without observance of military channels in matters that concern a threat to security or fighting power.⁵⁵

Figure 5 illustrates the structure and system of Party-political control in the NPA. Each of the bodies shown to the left and to the right of the military hierarchy (under the Ministry for National Defense) is an integral part of the military, with the exception of the civilian Party organizations at the left of the chart. Occupying the topmost position of authority is Paul Verner, Politburo member and Central Committee Secretary for Security Affairs, a civilian who succeeded Erich Honecker in the security post when the latter became Party chief in 1971. Verner oversees the Central Committee (CC) Department for Security Questions headed (at least since 1972) by Colonel General Herbert Scheibe, formerly head of the NPA Air Force/Air Defense Forces. Scheibe's deputy is also a military officer, a vice admiral who has held the post since 1959. The Main Political Administration (MPA), formerly a part of the MND, probably has the status of a CC department, but is in fact subordinated to the CC Department of Security Questions. Similarly, other MND departments (e.g., the Bureau for Cadre Affairs) are presumed to be directly subordinated to counterpart organs in the CC Security Department.



*The MPA has dual status as a division of the Ministry of National Defense with the status of a Party Central Committee Department.
** *Politorgane* headed by the respective Deputy Commander for Political Questions.

Fig. 5--The structure of political control in the East German armed forces

The MPA, headed for two decades by Admiral Waldemar Verner (brother of Politburo member Verner) and since January 1979 by General Heinz Kessler, former Chief of the NPA Main Staff,⁵⁶ directs all political work in the NPA. To it are subordinated the political apparatus, the Party organizations, and the NPA Free German Youth (FDJ) organizations. The latter direct the leisure time of enlisted personnel and exercise political oversight; most younger members of the NPA are FDJ members. Political officers are assigned to the FDJ organizations at battalion and higher levels. The *Politapparat*, as Fig. 5 shows, is led by political deputies who are simultaneously deputy commanders and first Party secretaries of the Party organizations at their respective levels. Party organizations consist of all Party members at a given level and hold periodic plenary meetings. Local civilian Party committees are statutorily obliged to support and assist counterpart Party organizations in the NPA. The civilian secretary for security in the local Party reportedly participates in NPA Party meetings.

Significantly, there is no military counter-intelligence capacity subordinated to the Ministry for National Defense (as in the case of Poland). That function is performed by officers and men of "Administration 2000" of the Ministry for State Security distributed throughout the NPA. State Security Service (SSD) officers wear the uniform and insignia of the service to which they are attached. They usually carry a lower NPA service rank than their actual SSD rank in order to facilitate contact with troops and non-coms. They are not subordinate to NPA commanding officers. Indeed, they may not even be known to the military commander of the unit to which they are attached. Their identity is, however, known to the political deputy. SSD officers administer a network of informers; one former political officer observed that among every group of eight to ten soldiers there is at least one informer.⁵⁷

Each Party organization down to the platoon level has its own Party secretary who receives his instructions for political work through MPA channels. His responsibilities include organizing a Party cell, convening regular Party meetings, and working with Party members down to the individual soldier. During Party meetings the service rank of

Party members in attendance is of no formal consideration. In theory, even the commanding officer is divested of his rank, is subject to the criticism of his subordinates, and is obliged to engage in self-criticism. Each officer or enlisted man can and often does criticize military superiors on specifically military issues which pertain to the life of the unit. No matter how prosaic or how specialized, military subjects are always couched in ideological terms. For example, forthcoming military competitions between NPA units are formulated for discussion by the Main Political Administration in political-ideological terms and then sent down to the individual services where they are appropriately adapted. This imposed unity of the military and the political means that any disagreement over military matters, even between two technical officers, is ipso facto a political disagreement, thus assuring the Party's right to intervene. It is apparently commonplace that difficulties between regular officers over military issues are resolved at the Party level. Furthermore, a military offense can be interpreted as a Party offense with the imposition of Party penalties and sanctions such as expulsion from the Party or transfer to another military unit.⁵⁸

The NPA does not have jurisdiction over itself; it is not, as many military institutions are, self-governing. In such areas as promotions, military justice, and training standards and methods, the Party is in theory in a determining position of authority. The question is *to what extent actual authority accrues to the Party apparatus simply by virtue of its formal assignment*. There are no grounds for questioning its ultimate pre-eminence in the NPA. Nevertheless, how this system works in day-to-day military life is not simply a matter of the formal prerogative of NPA Party functionaries to direct and question the behavior of commanding officers. Evidence suggests that the efficiency of this elaborate apparatus of political control is subject to compromise in peacetime by the military culture itself. Those characteristics which in varying degrees mark most military organizations--a hierarchical structure, strict discipline exercised in a vertical, descending fashion, centralized command and control, a strong degree of institutional self-sufficiency and isolation from the rest

of society, an institutional self-awareness and separate identity, and above all internal autonomy--exert a strong influence on the life of the institution and on the Party within it. They are precisely those which the Party seeks to counter and control because they may dilute its complete subordination of the military.

A central issue in the NPA has been the effort to establish and maintain political authority in a setting where institutional dynamics and military pressures may conspire to undermine that authority. Available data on the institutional development of the army, including interviews with former officers and enlisted men, suggest that Party efforts to ensure accountability have been a continuing source of friction but have never coalesced into institutional resistance either within the armed forces or at the leadership level. Two years after the 1956 establishment of the NPA, Party authority over military commanders was evidently found wanting. A key directive acknowledged that the main task for the Party in the army was securing "collective consultation between the commanding officers and the political organs and Party executives on all important political and *military measures*."⁵⁹ The objective was to create a system of political checks on military commanders by institutionalizing an adversarial, but constructive, relationship between Party officers and commanders. Party organizations were given the task of "creating through the development of criticism and self-criticism, without *respect of persons*, a combative atmosphere in party assemblies, activists' meetings and conferences which would improve the implementation of party resolutions; critically judging the results of education and training, *the state of combat readiness, the official and social activities* of all army personnel and civilian employees as well as the results of orders obeyed; and offering suggestions on improving the work."⁶⁰ Such a broad, formal grant of authority to Party organs illustrates the extent to which the Party has tried to gain full control over specifically military matters and to overcome inhibitions associated with challenging superior military authority. One technique for achieving both, as indicated above, is the open scrutiny of the private lives of army personnel.

The proclivity of army members to respect the hierarchy of military rank as the legitimate source of institutional authority was not eliminated by formal provisions and informal mechanisms for the oversight of that authority. Thus the Party's concern with subordinating the commander and his military tasks more fully to political functionaries has been an issue of perpetual concern. A decade later a similar Party Instruction told political organs and Party organizations "to take a greater influence in all aspects of *military* life and strengthen individual *military* performances . . . the goal and test for the activity of the political organs and Party organizations is the fulfillment of the main *military* tasks of the NPA."⁶¹ These directives convey the Party's dissatisfaction with the actual implementation of authority in the military.

As noted above, despite adherence to the principle of individual command, the Party's mandate and authority are implicit. The political deputy is obliged to call to his commander's attention shortcomings in the latter's decisions or policies, especially when they "lack political motivation," negatively affect the morale of the troops under his command, or when insufficient attention is being given by the commander to indoctrination work.⁶² In the event that the commander refuses to accept the advice and direction of his political deputy, the latter has the option of appealing to his political superior.* One former political deputy with the rank of captain described the political deputy as an *eminence grise*, to whom considerable authority has been delegated by the Party: "He cannot give his commander orders, but he can advise him." If the commander disagrees, the political deputy turns to the political organ at his own or a higher level. A decision there is transmitted to the Party apparatus, thence to the commander and so "the circle closes. . . . Thus, I [as a political deputy] am not responsible to the military leadership, but to the political organ for everything that happens and for all decisions and offenses,

* In the words of one interviewee, "In my case this was the political deputy of the battalion, and my instructions to the commander [which he had refused to accept] were confirmed from above."⁶³

military and political, in my unit. . . . The commander, as a Party member and Party functionary himself, is in a way subordinated to the political deputy since he [the commander] is accountable at the Party meeting for his military decisions and for those related to the political and ideological education of his troops."⁶⁴

Despite the potential adversarial relationship between the political deputy and his commander, the common interests of the two exert a powerful force for cooperation and compromise. When serious matters are involved, for example a violation of service regulations, notification and responsibility usually proceed through both higher Party and military channels. The career of the political deputy, just as that of his superior, depends on how well his unit acquits itself militarily, above all in military competition and the achievement of performance standards. Because the deputy shares this formal responsibility with the commander, the incentives to accommodate one another are considerable and tend to mitigate institutional differences (Party versus military) that may exist. Moreover, the deputy is usually a qualified military specialist in his own right, and is in a position to appreciate decisions of the commander on their military grounds, which further narrows the margin for friction. In the view of former officers, political and regular, the system generally works and outward conflict is held to a minimum. The normal inclination appears to be to resolve disagreements between the commander and his deputy informally at the unit level. In short, an "arrangement" has developed which, as will be discussed, in itself may dilute the exercise of Party authority.

But even with these incentives to compromise, the situation of bifurcated command authority creates considerable scope for conflict between Party officers and commanding officers. For one thing, it is apparently not unusual that the commander's political deputy is of a lower rank than other officers or even non-coms in that unit, and yet he serves as their military superior. As a corporal, one interviewee had been the political deputy in a rifle company of 100 men. He was placed there, in his own words, because he was "the oldest in the company and enjoyed the trust of the soldiers on purely personal grounds. The Party then used this situation for its own purposes."

The rank of the political deputy can also exceed that of his commanding officer: the point to be stressed is that the authority of the political deputy derives from his function, not from his service rank. As a rule, in the event of the commander's absence the political deputy assumes command authority in the unit irrespective of the fact that there may be officers or non-coms in the unit of higher rank. According to interviewees, this is true even in combat situations, provided that the political deputy possesses the requisite military skills and training. This is usually the case since, as will be discussed, political deputies are identified and selected, among other reasons, for their military skills and training.

Characteristically, political officers and Party workers are drawn from the ranks of the troops, NCOs or officers; their introduction into military service, their education and training, and their experience have not been solely through a specialized political officer career track.* This approach to training political officers, *the attempt to fuse both military specialist and political functionary*, acknowledges that the source of genuine Party authority in the military, the prerequisite for effective political work, is military professionalism. Considerable importance is attributed to the political officer's being a fully qualified professional who, like his peers, has achieved a high level of competence and expertise in his military-technical area. "The more thoroughly he knows his military tasks," according to the Party's theoretical journal, "the more comprehensive his general military, specialized technical, and military-technical knowledge is, the better he will be able to organize political work on the basis of the commander's decisions. . . ."66 Not having achieved this makes the political officer's task of integrating himself and the Party into the military organization more difficult. It

* One such officer, who described his situation as typical, was trained as a technical officer--one of seven separate career officer branches--in the Air Force, served in that capacity for some years, and was then appointed as a political deputy in a battalion. The political officer is also a separate career track specified in the service career ordinances. Political specialization of course takes place, but seems to come later in one's career.⁶⁵ See the more detailed discussion below.

contributes, in the Party's view, to a tendency to regard indoctrination and other political work as grafted on to military life, and to regard political officers as interlopers. The fusion of skills seeks to avoid any actual or de facto decisions of responsibility for political and military tasks because of the limitations this might place on Party influence. "Resolute opposition" has been expressed to "any narrow-minded, departmentalized notion that would draw a dividing line between political education and military training."⁶⁷

THE OFFICER CORPS AND MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

The Officer Corps

Like its Polish counterpart, the East German officer corps was transformed in the 1960s. Its profile today is one of increasing military professionalism, close Soviet ties, and evident loyalty to the East German state. The following attributes of that profile help illuminate the issue of the reliability of the East German officer corps.

Social Origins. According to an authoritative source, 70 percent of the officer corps comes from the "working class," 5 percent from the peasantry, 6 percent from the intelligentsia, and 19 percent from white collar workers and "other social strata."⁶⁸ The fact that the overwhelming majority of officers comes from the "working class" may tell us very little, however. Given a process of social differentiation in the GDR over the last 20 years due partly to increased educational levels throughout society, it is doubtful that the sense of attitudinal homogeneity conveyed by the phrase "working class" actually corresponds to reality. The insistence with which the party holds to the idea of "working class" as a criterion for recruitment and advancement has ideological grounds, and apparently corresponds to an official belief that a "working class" background encourages loyalist political attitudes and elite unity and stability. That social homogeneity does not characterize the "working class" is suggested by what a former NPA officer had to say concerning the officer selection process:

This whole emphasis on the working class borders on the ridiculous. The educational level is constantly rising in the GDR. There are more and more college graduates. If one's father has become an engineer, that is to say he is no longer a worker, and if the son wants to study further, this is difficult since he is not a member of the working class. What is done in such cases is that the son attends high school at the same time that he learns a trade. He therefore gets his high school diploma and he also participates in production work so that technically he qualifies as a worker, and that's how the whole thing is circumvented.⁶⁹

Whether or not such a pattern is typical, indoctrination in military service itself probably inculcates loyalist attitudes more than "working class" origins.

Professionalization. That the NPA has developed into a more professional force, that its collective level of education and military expertise has risen dramatically, is evident. During the mid-1960s new and upgraded technical qualification and training standards were introduced, a prelude to and prerequisite for substantial force modernization.⁷⁰ Until that time the officer corps was comprised mostly of poorly educated men who volunteered or were recruited in wholesale fashion--largely on the basis of political criteria--in the mid-1950s during the army's initial rapid growth period.* In 1956 only 11 percent of officers had graduated from high school and only 2.6 percent had received any college-level education. Only 10 percent had graduated from the tenth grade (the *mittlere Reife*).⁷² In 1957, only 31 percent of officers had a technical school diploma.⁷³ By 1974, 22 percent of the officer corps had graduated from a college-level institution, another 66 percent had won a vocational degree, 75 percent of the entire army had finished a ten- or twelve-grade school education, and about 85 percent had been trained as skilled workers.⁷⁴ Beginning in 1969 all NPA officers were obliged to pass standardized examinations in three separate areas: a military-technical specialty,

*"[The] formation of the new officer corps [was] difficult. Many officers initially had a totally inadequate general education and deficient technical military training."⁷¹

administration and political education (sufficient to qualify an individual as a county Party secretary), and an equivalent civilian profession, most commonly as a pedagogue or an engineer. Advanced technical officer academies were established in the GDR only in 1971.⁷⁵ This constituted an upgrading of the four NPA officers schools established originally in 1963.*

Education in the USSR. Most, if not all, NPA general and flag rank officers have attended military academies in the USSR, usually the Frunze or the Academy of the General Staff, or both, for 2-to 3-year courses.⁷⁶ More NPA officers are evidently educated in the USSR than are officers of other East European armies; approximately 120 return to the GDR annually, having completed some form of military education in the Soviet Union.⁷⁷

Recruitment and Retention Policies. The relative scarcity of manpower in the GDR and the short-term retention of conscripts have placed a premium on systematic premilitary training.⁷⁸ A new law in 1973 provided for the "more comprehensive and more thorough" acquisition of military proficiency and military-technical knowledge by young people.⁷⁹ Besides receiving political education in the Society for Sport and Technology (GST), young people participate in one of four sections: sport shooting, multiple sports competition, motor sports, or communication sports. They also learn "military discipline, marksmanship, map reading, and first aid" among other skills. GST instructors are NPA officers or reserve officers. "The armed forces thus obtain qualified replacements for military specialists--motorized riflemen, military drivers, signal men, paratroopers, etc."⁸⁰ Approximately 90 percent of the population between the ages of 16 and 19 (some 222,000 in total) undergoes rigorous compulsory premilitary training.⁸¹ Those already committed to pursuit of a military career receive their premilitary training in the Free German Youth (FDJ) Collective of Young Officer Candidates.⁸² These FDJ clubs are intended

* The Ernst Thaelmann Officers School for the Army, the Karl Liebknecht Officers School for the Navy, the Franz Mehring Officers School for the Air Force, and the Rosa Luxemburg Officers School for the Border Troops.

to institutionalize the early identification and cultivation of officer candidates on the basis of intellectual and physical performance, and political-ideological participation and attitudes.⁸³ While it is possible to become an officer without having earned the *Abitur* (secondary school diploma), the recruitment effort is concentrated on the high schools and among high school graduates. This was increasingly the case in the early 1970s.⁸⁴

Recruitment and retention of officers have apparently become problem areas since the early 1970s due to the clogging of the ranks (particularly at the field grade level) which has prevented promotion of younger officers. In 1973 or 1974, according to former NPA officers, a new system of pensioning was introduced for officers who could not be assigned positions appropriate to their rank because of the surfeit of available officers and the scarcity of positions. As a result of this program, many older officers were promoted, typically to the rank of lieutenant colonel, and were then siphoned off into the reserves and subsequently pensioned.⁸⁵

Although direct evidence is not available that recruitment and retention have developed into a serious problem, the issue is important in that it may bear on the question of morale and, ultimately, on reliability. In particular, one is struck by the apparently high ratio of officers to troops in the NPA. For every 65 troops there are 35 superiors.* This is determined in part by the need to train and retain individuals with technical skills, a consideration which accounts for the especially high ratio of officers to men in the Air Force/Air Defense services and the Navy. The high ratio may also be a reflection of the clogging problem discussed above. Most important, the "over-officered" nature of the NPA provides, at least in the Party's view, an extra measure of reliability: oversight is more thorough and

* The overall figures are 28,200 officers (15 percent), 36,700 non-commissioned officers (20 percent), and 121,000 enlisted men (65 percent). Comparative figures for other Communist militaries are not available. The ratios in each of the services are as follows: ground forces: 13, 18, 69; border troops: 13, 15, 72; Air Force/Air Defense: 22, 25, 53; Navy: 17, 30, 53.⁸⁶

officers with a vested career interest in the service are more reliable than enlisted men who lack a long-term commitment. The need to recruit and retain more career officers is dictated by the increased importance of technical skills and the extra measure of reliability provided by a top-heavy military institution. The point is that both make promotion more difficult, and thus encourage dropouts. In the early 1970s provisions were instituted to encourage extended terms of service in all grades, officers and enlisted men.⁸⁷ For the first time mandatory rules were issued to government units and enterprises with respect to their responsibility toward employees serving in the NPA. The objectives were to ensure employment for servicemen after discharge, and to provide special promotions in their trade or in their studies for those who volunteered to serve longer than their stipulated term of service.⁸⁸

At the same time a more vigorous effort has been undertaken to channel young people into the military vocation at an earlier age because of the need for longer preparation,⁸⁹ and to accelerate and expand pre-military education. (In short, more sophisticated technology and the need to retain people have placed a new premium on pre-military education.) Prospective officers are urged to make the basic decision for a military career by the end of the ninth grade, that is, at the age of 14.⁹⁰ Moreover, the emphasis now appears to be on the long-term and earlier recruitment and preparation for the officer corps of the *new class*. A preference for "the sons of class conscious workers, of Party and state functionaries, . . . and of professional soldiers," seeks to ensure that the presumably loyalist attitudes of these groups are transferred to the officer corps.⁹¹

But there are problems. The reluctance of NPA members to serve longer terms has been acknowledged,⁹² and the entire recruitment effort has been criticized as the "campaign style actions of individual recruiters and military district commands,"⁹³ a method which must be replaced by more systematic techniques.⁹⁴

Transfer into the State and Party Apparatus. Service in the officer corps provides access to the middle and higher echelons of the state and Party apparatus--one of the most important factors likely to generate political commitment. It is apparently common practice that

officers whose service terms have been completed are recruited into equivalent state and Party functions.⁹⁵ It has proved impossible to ascertain the number of professional officers (as a percentage of the total officer corps) who by such lateral movement become state or Party officials. Former NPA officers, however, describe such a career pattern as typical. "As a rule," according to a former NPA captain, "Party workers who have worked for years in army Party work, let us say, someone who has retired at 55 with the rank of major or lieutenant colonel, will then be employed in a civilian sector either in the economy or at the Party level, or both. That is to say, he will continue to work in his field as a Party worker."^{*} Another former NPA member characterized the officer profession as a school which prepared its members for later work in society, likening it to "the Prussian noncommissioned officers at the time who served as policemen, village teachers, or in the administration until they were called back into the service."⁹⁷

As noted earlier, the officer's education prepares him for these subsequent functions. Successful completion of officer candidacy qualifies an individual as (1) a military specialist, (2) an engineer or teacher (normally in a polytechnical high school), and (3) as a secretary of a county level Party administration.⁹⁸ In short, a military career appears to enable horizontal movement to an official civilian position of similar status and rank. Because promotion in the officer corps depends upon the Party, the individual officer's political reliability has been scrutinized during his entire military tenure.

^{*} Another interviewee observed that, "Most retired officers become employed in some state function. In my case, after I got out of the NPA I went immediately to the city district Berlin-Pankow where I was in charge of economic projects. My task was to supervise ['voluntary' work] on various economic projects. . . . I also had the duties of liaison officer between the mayor and the security section of the Pankow City Hall. . . . When an officer leaves the army he has excellent opportunities to get a good position either in the personnel section [of an enterprise] as a chief of personnel, or else [as the enterprise security officer]." This latter position was established in 1972 in enterprises with 1000 or more employees.⁹⁶

His transition to an official civilian position is therefore securely in Party hands. The Party, in short, is the monitor of social mobility.

Considerable prestige apparently attaches to the officer's profession in the GDR. This is systematically cultivated. One former NPA captain claimed that, "In terms of official prestige, the political functionary is first, the state functionary is next, and then the officer, and then the academician . . . this official prestige is transferred to a considerable degree in the perceptions of the general population."⁹⁹ The margin for conflict between the military and the civilian leadership over issues of status, pay, and emoluments is therefore minimized by an overall policy that accords the officer relatively high benefits in each of these areas. The NPA captain quoted above observed that his wife, a specialist physician, was highly paid at 1000 marks per month, while he as an NPA captain earned 1300 marks per month.¹⁰⁰

The Challenge of Professionalism

Military professionalism, as discussed by Samuel Huntington, has three ingredients: (1) expertness, (2) corporate loyalty and unity, and (3) social responsibility--the tendency as individuals and as an organization to be subordinate to the state. The three are interactive; extensive training and the mastery of special skills, the hypothesis suggests, increase professionalist attitudes and create an inward-looking corps of officers whose energies and concerns naturally gravitate toward specific technical tasks and to achieving high competence in them, and away from policy issues that do not directly affect them. Political participation by the military tends therefore to be confined to representing its own needs to civilian authorities. The military is disinclined to engage in broader political questions or to challenge civilian authority.¹⁰¹ In short, the more professional an officer corps, the less likely it is to intervene in politics or to involve itself in policy matters beyond its immediate sphere of interests.

The NPA military leadership is not master in its own house. Responsibility for decisions normally the preserve of the officer corps--promotions, military justice, etc.--is shared by the Party.

The issue that professionalism raises in the NPA is, therefore, one of the compatibility of a professional force with its internal domination by the Party. Does the effort to make the Party an organic part of the military institution conflict with professional attitudes of expertness, and corporate loyalty and unity? Has a process of professional maturation in the NPA officer corps complicated the Party's internal domination of the military?

At the apex of the military establishment there is no evidence that the military leadership has attempted to insinuate itself into the political process. There has been no observable instance (a) of the military leadership having played a role in any non-military issues or (b) of a pattern of self-assertion on the part of the NPA leadership or individual general officers. The narrow scope of leadership politics in the GDR means that only three to five senior officers could exert direct political influence. It is entirely possible that in top Party councils they are advocates of military interests, such as weapons modernization or budget expansion, although there is no evidence of this. Such advocacy would not necessarily be inconsistent with Party supremacy. There is also no evidence that the military played any role in the replacement of Ulbricht as Party leader in May of 1971. Honecker's assumption of power, unexpected as it was, apparently passed without any special precautions or extraordinary measures being taken in the NPA.

Between 1962 and 1964, a virtual purge of the officer corps was conducted in which many were forced to leave its ranks because of their inability to qualify in technical, administrative, and pedagogic skills.¹⁰² Political reliability, while no less important, had been overtaken by the objective pressures of technology and force modernization. The shift away from simple political reliability as the dominant criterion in recruitment and advancement brought with it certain depoliticizing effects. The by-product of professionalism, in other words, seems to have been an increase in apolitical attitudes. At the same time--indeed for this very reason--the Party's role in the military acquired greater importance in ensuring the political integrity and loyalty of the officer corps. The tasks of guarding against the

development of the apolitical specialist, and of creating a breed of military officer who would combine military specialization with political commitment, became paramount.

Any simple dichotomy between political officers charged with essentially political responsibilities and regular military officers--the "Reds" and the "Experts"--obscures the complexity of Party-military relations. Military and political specialists within the NPA cannot be classified neatly according to a career track. Former NPA officers interviewed for this study indicated that substitutability of noncoms and officers between political and military functions is commonplace at least through the rank of captain. Many "Experts," as defined by their education, service experience, and military operational specialty, serve as "Reds" (i.e., political officers with designated political responsibilities). The interchangeability of officers between political and military functions, at least up to field grade rank, suggests that loyalties, attitudes, and interests are unlikely to be fixed simply through career association with "the Party" or "the Army."

When specialization as a political officer does occur, either in the form of further education or recruitment from the ranks, it takes place after the individual has acquired "Expert" qualification. The School of the Ministry for National Defense for Initial and Extension Training of Party Cadres turns "into Party workers officers who have proven themselves in their political and military work and have completed their military training."¹⁰³ Following graduation from an advanced school for officers and one or two years' service with the troops, officers are selected to attend the political high school for additional training.¹⁰⁴ Political cadres are "versatilely prepared" for functions as command and staff officers or Party and political cadre. The extent to which the individual political officer successfully combines these skills is doubtful, as the tone of some NPA commentary indicates.¹⁰⁵ Other candidates presumably selected from the enlisted ranks or the NCO corps who possess both skilled worker credentials and an *Abitur* follow a normal 3-year course, of which approximately 50 percent consists of political-ideological training and 20 percent military education. Graduates are granted the rank of

lieutenant, a civilian college-level diploma in the social sciences, and a "certificate of competency" which permits subsequent appointment as a secretary in a civilian Party district (*Bezirk*) leadership.¹⁰⁶

Military professionalism in the NPA--the emphasis on specifically military tasks at the expense of political work, and an attitude on the part of military specialists* (especially commanding officers) which tends to resent close supervision by the Party as interference--potentially weakens and may even thwart the exercise of Party control in the military, and, carried to the extreme, may foster its political neutrality. Awareness of the nature of the problem appears to be widespread in the officer corps.¹⁰⁸

In the interests of military competence and the NPA's effective absorption of the most modern military technology, the Party has sponsored technical and career specialization and in the process has encouraged professionalism. This has evidently spawned a tendency to accord pride of place specifically to military training and tasks. Such attitudes have been openly criticized. "An officer working . . . in the practical field does fulfill special tasks of applying military theory. This could give the impression [that] for solving such tasks successfully one might need special military knowledge and the experiences that go with it [but not] necessarily a knowledge of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, its ideological theoretical statements and methodological principles. Such views . . . constitute a gross error . . ."⁺ It may be inferred from such pointed remarks that an undercurrent of

* In the NPA "specialist officer" (*Fachoffizier*) is the unofficial designation for all officers who are not political officers, regardless of the branch for which they are trained.¹⁰⁷

⁺ Referring to debates in the USSR in the 1920s (and suggesting that the problem is common to all Communist militaries) the same article continues, "in the years during which Soviet military science originated . . . the party resolutely rejected the anti-Leninist views of the Trotskyites who claimed that military affairs were merely a trade, and that Marxism had no relevance to military affairs, that it would be perfectly adequate in military affairs to be a narrowly defined 'expert'; [that] one should proceed solely from the 'internal factors of military affairs.'"¹⁰⁹

sentiment exists in the officer corps which favors concentration on the development of purely military skills and organizational capacities that pertain to the application of armed force. These same sentiments would tend to regard the Party apparatus in the military, and political indoctrination, as incidental to and even an encumbrance upon the chief tasks of the military. *Militaerwesen* (compulsory reading for every officer) has cautioned against any such neglect of the political: "For an officer of a socialist army, an exact and thorough knowledge of the ideology and methodology of Marxism-Leninism, and concrete technical knowledge and practical experiences in the field of military theory and practice remain *an inseparable unity* Marxist-Leninist philosophy . . . is not, as V. I. Lenin emphasized, a universal means through which one could, without concrete expert knowledge, solve all practical questions."¹¹⁰ As the quotation suggests, the practical problem appears to be one of striking a balance between the need for specialist skills and the indispensability of political supervision and political work.

Any incompatibilities that exist between party control and military professionalism may be exacerbated as military tasks become more functionally specific. It is a matter of express concern that an increase in specialized skills, acknowledged as a trend, has diminished the substitutability of personnel in the NPA.¹¹¹ The process of increasing specialization has three probable, and from the Party's point of view, negative consequences. First, it may render the fusion of military and political skills less attainable. Second, interviews with recent NPA defectors suggest that such specialization tends to exaggerate attitudes that political work is superfluous. One officer spoke of "the tendency . . . for people to [focus] on their narrow specialization, to do their job well and not to be interested in anything else."¹¹² Third, it may encourage a more particularistic professional pride ("internal professionalization," as one former NPA career officer put it), the locus of which is one's specialized service group.¹¹³

The influence of such trends may be to exaggerate the contradiction between specialist skills and military prerogatives, on the one hand, and political indoctrination and Party authority on the other.

The hortatory tone of official comment and the regularity with which such a sensitive theme is treated suggest that it is a subject of concern to the Party.¹¹⁴ It would be wrong to exaggerate the importance of this military-political dilemma, especially as its extent is not clear. The problem is not one of general institutional opposition to the Party (which might receive expression at the leadership level) or a case of *serious* internal division within the NPA, but seems to be a more subtle process of tacit resistance by military professionals to the Party's direction of day-to-day military affairs. Few in the Party leadership would contest the need for higher levels of technical military competence; it is widely acknowledged that the optimal absorption and exploitation of advanced weapon systems and methods depends on the skill levels of those who use them. It is not surprising, however, that many in the military charged with the mastery of technical and organizational tasks might question the relevance of Marxism-Leninism to such applied matters. Because of the professional tendency to dissociate expertise from political values, the Party stresses the importance of ideology in addressing the practical problems of military affairs. "Marxist-Leninist philosophy prevents any overestimation or underestimation of various structural sciences . . . such as mathematics, cybernetics, information theory and game theory, operations research and others . . . and their possibilities, and protects against assuming positivistic conceptions."*

Inattention to Political Work. The apparent tendency on the part of regular officers (especially commanders) not to accord ideology its proper place in military affairs has received considerable attention. In the Party's view, because indoctrination serves to ensure reliability and to redress any apolitical attitudes of the specialist, its neglect is a matter of the utmost concern. A former political officer expressed it this way:

*"Positivism" is described as the emphasis on the expert to the exclusion of the ideological. One GDR military writer argues that only by proceeding from the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism can the NPA accept "valuable scientific insights from bourgeois scientists [and ensure that] alien ideological ballast is not accepted with it."¹¹⁵

They realize there exists a great danger if I, for example, have only specialist knowledge and am not politically motivated. There is a danger in this, especially in times of war. Could they really rely on such specialists? This is a question that the Party is asking, and that is the whole reason for concern with political-ideological motivation, and for the constant education and inculcation of hatred for the enemy.¹¹⁶

Furthermore, an emphasis on concrete technical knowledge at the expense of Marxism-Leninism courts the danger of "subjectivism": the tendency, as the Party defines it, of professional officers to arrogate to themselves a degree of authority which does not give the Party its due in military decisions.*

In 1976 a new directive on political work in the NPA was evidently issued which sought to overcome an apparent problem of excessive concentration on military issues within the framework of indoctrination sessions to the neglect of political-ideological subjects.¹¹⁸ Commanders have been admonished to devote more effective leadership to political work¹¹⁹ and criticized for an overly independent attitude toward such work, and for inconsistency in carrying out relevant orders which come from higher Party levels. In one case, some commanders had temporized in designating platoon and group agitators and platoon Party secretaries in accord with a Central Committee decision, in effect slighting a Party call for more ideological work. The opinion evidently held by some commanding officers was that "such work can be dispensed with because all unit members are Party members." Such desultory implementation of indoctrination was reproved as a breach of

*"Subjectivism," *Militaerwesen* warns (quoting a Soviet source), "originates when the subject wrongly assesses his possibilities of affecting the situation . . . the danger of subjectivism is especially great under the conditions of the armed forces where commanders and leaders have many rights vis-a-vis their subordinates. This is an error that many people [commanders] fall prey to who are inadequately formed ideologically, who are convinced of their own infallibility and extraordinary qualities, and unwilling to rely on the experience and creativity of the masses [the Party]." Overcoming all forms of subjectivism is primarily a task of political-ideological education . . .¹¹⁷

discipline which "reveals how necessary it is to enforce the Party's leading role in even the smallest units." There were still examples, evidently widespread, "in which this necessity is minimized."¹²⁰ The pattern of neglect in indoctrination was confirmed in interviews with former NPA officers. One interviewee volunteered that it was typical for soldiers and officers to ignore indoctrination activities in favor of their military specialty, particularly when the latter was demanding.¹²¹ Passive resistance to political training, particularly among young officers, has been openly criticized.¹²²

Another expression of the neglect of indoctrination work is its "superficiality and routine" nature.¹²³ Much political instruction is "a simple, formal enumeration of individual categories, guidelines and definitions of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, plus 'adorning' them with military examples."¹²⁴ The prosaic and unimaginative presentation of political materials in both content and methodology, as well as their insufficient preparation, has been blamed for creating apathy among NPA indoctrinees.¹²⁵

Co-optation. The inattention to political work is suggestive evidence that, with increasing professionalization, the norms of the military culture tend to dominate behavior within the institution and to militate against Party supremacy. This evidence suggests a tendency for political officers, especially political deputies, to be co-opted: to assume the professional attributes and goals of the officer corps of which they are a part, and to acquiesce in the military priorities of the organization and its commanding officers. Many, if not most, political officers are recruited from the ranks of Party members in the military--enlisted men, NCOs, and officers. Prior to assuming Party-political duties these individuals performed military functions. Called upon to perform Party administrative, supervisory, and pedagogic tasks they may bring to their new roles a professional perspective shaped by their prior training and experience. Thus it may be difficult to perform the tasks of an "outsider," which is the nature of much of the Party's work.* In 1975, NPA basic Party organizations

* Just such a situation was reflected in one commentary on the party structure in the NPA. "... party elections have brought about an entirely new composition of the leadership collectives. Every fourth

were ordered to expand political training activities. In connection with that order Colonel General H. Scheibe, Head of the Central Committee Department of Security Questions, complained that Party members assist "our army members to master complex *military* tasks. But it is apparent that not all take their important Party assignment seriously."¹²⁷

This and other evidence suggests that it is at the lower levels of the military organization, within the battalion and company, where specifically military concerns may tend to predominate, and that "political-ideological work" and the implementation of Party directives may tend to give way to or be subsumed by the sense of priority accorded military duties or activities. One sign of this tendency toward co-optation is the slighting of political work in favor of military work. Another illustration of Party co-optation is the tendency among some commanding and staff officers to chafe against criticism by Party members in Party meetings. Such criticism, encouraged by the Party, seems to be viewed by some as a transgression of rank which undermines military discipline.

There exist views here and there of an alleged contradiction between the NPA members' duty unconditionally to execute the commanding officer's orders and the opportunity the Party meeting affords for criticizing the activity of any communist . . . what is at issue, of course, is not inadmissible criticism of orders and instructions, but to uncover in time negligence and flaws in training and in service and in a communist's attitude, and to prevent their leading to significant mistakes. Any politically mature commanding officer is grateful for such criticism, for it helps him remove shortcomings in time and achieve success in his work.¹²⁸

The point is not that officers may chafe, but rather the apparent reluctance of Party members to engage in such tacit challenges to the commander's military authority and to acquiesce in "professional" attitudes that tend to prohibit criticism of his judgment or decisions.¹²⁹

secretary of the basic organization, every third Party group organizer, and every other Party executive member are for the first time exercising a function." These new party officials were criticized for not accomplishing "political-ideological work" properly and sufficiently.¹²⁶

Acquiescence may extend to support in some cases. No one in the Party, an article in *Militaerwesen* warns, must prop up a superior officer who is deficient in personal responsibility.

The membership meeting will not be a service briefing . . . [basic party organizations should] concretely assess the personal share every comrade (i.e., including superior and commanding officers) has in the resolution of political and military tasks by precisely evaluating his sense of responsibility. . . . [The] Party organization cannot and should not assume the duties of the superior officers.¹³⁰

This is interpreted as a warning against any tendency by political officers and Party members to fall in uncritically behind a military commander. Because of the nature of their position, some political officers and Party members may be more susceptible to co-optation than others. The political deputy, it will be recalled, shares responsibility with his commander for his unit's military performance; with an eye to his own career advancement, this gives him a vested interest in ensuring the unit's high achievement. One former NPA officer portrayed the political deputy as constantly "kicked from above" by the commander and by superior organs to make sure that military norms were fulfilled, and of course that political work was accomplished as well. The political officer, in this officer's experience, was more sensitive to the military obligations. "Whenever something is not functioning the political deputy is held responsible for it. He is held more responsible than the commander." At the same time, "political deputies and political *instructors* were very often in conflict," a possible reflection of different priorities inasmuch as the political instructor is charged more narrowly with carrying out indoctrination and political education.¹³¹

The Impact of Détente

While the enhanced professionalism of the NPA officer corps has reinforced the challenge posed by the military institution to total Party supremacy, recruitment, retention, and morale problems have apparently increased in part as the result of détente. According to

one writer in *Militarwesen*, recent advances in "peaceful coexistence in relations between states having different social orders [have led] to doubts concerning the necessity of strengthening our republic and the socialist commonwealth militarily as well as concerning the meaning and prospect of military careers."¹³² The head of the Party Central Committee Security Department authoritatively restated these concerns.* Prospective officer candidates had to be convinced of "the meaning and currently far-reaching prospects of the military career, even in view of the negotiations taking place in Vienna on the reduction of armed forces and armaments."¹³⁴ In the early 1970s political standards for officer recruitment were to be raised and made more stringent.¹³⁵ Another prescription was for more pre-military ideological work, and in the NPA itself acceleration of readiness and alert training.¹³⁶ A new and stronger disciplinary regulation was issued in the fall of 1972 which extended the army's authority over reservists and retired military personnel and increased the severity of punishment for a variety of offenses. District and regional military commanders were reportedly empowered to commend or punish trained reservists and retired military personnel no longer connected with military service.¹³⁷

Taken as a whole and viewed against the background of détente and reconciliation between the two German states, these prophylactic measures reflect a concern with the erosion of morale in the NPA. They are an indication, furthermore, of how sensitive the morale of the military institution is to external developments. The offensive concept of war and the ideological justification for armed force which the NPA has inculcated have been implicitly challenged by international developments. One revealing article in *Militarwesen*, for example,

*"In the implementation of our policy of peaceful coexistence, the class fronts and the class enemy are not always immediately recognizable for young Party members and especially for young army members. It is sometimes difficult for these young people to recognize the connection between the struggle for peaceful coexistence, strengthening of the military power of socialism and the struggle against the imperialist system and to draw conclusions from this for their own work."¹³³

points to the need to overcome the opinion of some student officers that

the justness or unjustness of war depends on which is the defending or the attacking side. . . . [It is necessary] to judge a war by its relation to the historical mission of the working class. . . . [It has been demonstrated] to student officers . . . that just and unjust wars cannot be judged by such criteria as 'Who is the attacker?', 'Who is defending himself?', or 'On whose land is the fighting taking place?'¹³⁸

It is evident that such questions as these exist among young officers and enlisted men and that, to some extent, they undermine the offensive concept of war which would carry the battle to West German territory.

CONCLUSIONS: THE ROLE AND RELIABILITY OF THE EAST GERMAN ARMED FORCES

The "youngest" of the Northern Tier military establishments, the East German National People's Army became a capable military force only in the 1960s. Its development at that time was permitted by and contributed to the evolution of the GDR from a Soviet protectorate to a state with at least the outward forms of international legitimacy. In the 1960s the NPA experienced the same process of equipment and personnel modernization that was manifest in the Polish and other East European armed forces. Although it is the smallest of the Northern Tier military establishments, the NPA has evidently assumed a significant limited role in Soviet planning for European military contingencies.

In terms of doctrine and organization, the NPA is programmed for a rapid offensive onto West German territory in the event of a European war. This role is fully responsive to Soviet interests. But the emphasis on a postulated West German attack testifies to the continuing national insecurities of the East German political and military leaderships. These sensitivities motivate the East German leaders to prevent at whatever cost a Soviet sellout of the GDR in adverse international circumstances. That motivation suggests that the East German leadership would seek to "internationalize" any localized military conflict. The national interests of the East German Communist elite thus

reinforce Soviet strategic considerations dictating a role for the NPA as a full-fledged member of the Warsaw Pact military coalition intended to conduct rapid offensive operations against West Germany in the event of European conflict.

The congruity of Soviet and East German Communist interests notwithstanding, the USSR maintains more pervasive controls over the NPA than over other NSWP armed forces. This is doubtless in large part the consequence of the presence of the massive Soviet forces on East German territory as reflected in the unique formal prerogatives granted to the Soviets in status-of-forces and other bilateral military agreements with the GDR. But the unique degree of direct Soviet control over the NPA may also be traced to specifically German circumstances, which alone account for the NPA's unique formal subordination to the military institutions of the Warsaw Pact and for the absence of an East German military industry. Of all the East European military establishments, the NPA appears to be linked most closely to the Soviet military. Yet these ties have limits; at the divisional level and below, the national integrity of the NPA would evidently be maintained in wartime just as in peacetime.

As in other Communist states, Party supremacy in the NPA is a *sine quo non* for the East German Communist leadership. The Party seeks to ensure that supremacy through multiple, interlocking Soviet-style instruments of political control in the armed forces. The development of a more professional military institution in the 1960s and 1970s has raised a challenge to total Party control. But, perhaps because of the absence of an acceptable national tradition that could serve as an alternative to ideology in focusing military loyalties, the East German Communist Party has evidently been more successful than its Polish and Czechoslovak counterparts in responding to the challenge of professionalization by fusing professional and political criteria, "Experts" and "Reds," within the NPA. The military leadership has been stable and subordinate; it has been free of internal divisions and autonomous tendencies characteristic of the Polish military elite. While there is some evidence of tension between professional and political officers at lower levels of the NPA, on balance

this friction seems to have been less pronounced than in other East European armed forces.

The evidently successful melding of the professional and the political within the NPA is testimony to the singlemindedness with which the GDR Party leadership has sought to counter the potential diluting of ideological and political commitment which greater professionalization and modernization portend. It is also evidence of the success of GDR military personnel practices intended to engender strong loyalties to the Communist system on the part of the officer corps. Policies favoring high pay, enrollments, advantageous post-military state positions, and the like appear to have resulted in high social prestige for the East German officer (in marked contrast to his Polish counterpart) and a substantial degree of commitment to the regime.

This assertion is not contradicted by the pattern of East German military defections, which is evidently the highest in Europe.¹³⁹ Over 90 percent of these defections have been from the border troops, which enjoy the easiest access to West German territory but which are subjected to the most stringent standards of indoctrination, training, and supervision in the NPA. The defection rate has steadily declined over the past 15 years as a consequence of stricter border zone security.¹⁴⁰ This suggests that the desertion rate of NPA regulars would be higher if circumstances permitted.

Motives for defection seem to have included generalized dissatisfaction with life and society in the GDR.¹⁴¹ Yet the great majority of defectors have been enlisted men, not officers. Very few higher officers (lieutenant colonel and above) have defected. Of the defecting officers, few have exhibited deviant political attitudes, with the important exception of a strong tendency toward dissatisfaction* with the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.¹⁴² Prior to their defections, most of the NPA officers were loyal to the system. This assertion is

* A former NPA captain confirmed that dissatisfaction with the invasion was widespread among "higher ranking officers," yet argued there was never any doubt that the NPA could be fully relied upon.¹⁴³

supported by a West German survey of over 800 East German military defectors who left between 1967 and 1972; it found that 95 percent of the officers "fully identified" with the regime, while 55 percent of the NCOs fully identified and 30 percent partly identified with the regime.*

European détente has created some morale problems within the NPA but has probably not significantly undermined the loyalist attitudes of the officer corps. These attitudes might permit the GDR leadership to use the regular armed forces against GDR citizens in a situation of domestic insurgency, but it would probably be reluctant to do so. To avoid straining the loyalty of the NPA and to avoid creating conditions for potential disobedience, it is likely that elite internal security units (the *Nachregimente* of the Ministry of State Security and the *Bereitschaftspolizei* of the Ministry of the Interior) would be used first. The Party leadership would be reluctant to commit regular forces because of the effect such a trauma would have on the military institution itself. Even though the NPA might acquit itself as the loyal instrument of the regime, such a crisis could fundamentally alter the attitudes of officers and Party-military relations overall; and the Party would run the risk that the NPA would inherit a more prominent political role. Such intervention would also inevitably sacrifice the social status and prestige of the NPA and vitiate the army's utility in performing its non-coercive, integrative social functions. In extremis, nonetheless, if domestic insurrection obliged the application of overwhelming force, the Party leadership would doubtless fully commit the NPA, probably with success.†

The European contingency of greatest concern to the USG is a massive and rapid Soviet offensive against Western Europe. Since the mid-1960s the NPA has been groomed by the GDR leadership and by its

* Of the former NPA enlisted men included in the survey, 35 percent accorded unconditional support to the regime, 35 percent expressed conditional support, and 30 percent expressed opposition.¹⁴⁴

† The former GDR officers interviewed for this study were convinced that the Party leadership would use the NPA as a last resort against domestic insurrection. They expressed no personal hesitation at being used in such a role.

Soviet mentors to participate fully in such an attack, in conjunction with Soviet forces. The NPA's wartime reliability--whether it would remain intact and fight with pertinacity against NATO forces to carry out its intended mission--is of course another matter. Whether the NPA would fight reliably is likely to depend on circumstances and particularly the success of its own and its allies' engagements. The issue is of obvious importance in terms of the disruptive effects that the collapse of NPA morale would have on the first echelon forces of a coalition offensive led by the USSR.

It is rare that an army is stronger than the state that it serves. Given the inherent political vulnerabilities of the GDR, neither its leadership nor the Soviets can be sanguine about the NPA's wartime reliability. Ultimately, wartime morale will rest on the attitudes of conscripts; hence the extreme sensitivity in the NPA to the problem of morale and the attention given to indoctrination. In the initial stages of a war, however, reliability would depend principally on the cohesion and morale of the NPA officer corps. The profile drawn in this study of the NPA officer corps, whose legitimacy derives not from potential stewardship of national values but from identification with the political-ideological foundations of the GDR, and which is evidently loyal to the GDR regime, suggests that the NPA would be likely to fight reliably in at least the initial stages of a European war.*

* One former NPA officer addressed the issue of reliability as follows: "It may perhaps sound ironic from our present point of view, since we are [in the West and not in the GDR]. However, in the event of a military confrontation, I believe that the hate cultivated [against the West and the *Bundeswehr*] will bring results. I would warn you against underestimating this problem. There will be shooting; nobody in the NPA would say, 'Those people are Germans.' They will fight; I am totally convinced of this. There will be people who will desert. However, one has to look at the system as a whole, and I am convinced that the NPA will fight. In terms of the purely military situation, when the commander stands behind me, I have to shoot. In terms of the psychological aspect of it, the soldier on the other side is a soldier of the *Bundeswehr*. That is of no interest to me at all. Again, I would like to warn anybody who says, 'Well, it's not going to be so bad, the National People's Army would think it over and would not shoot at its brothers and sisters.'"145

Nonetheless, given the continuing sense of German community in the GDR, in combat against West German forces the reliability of the NPA would be more problematic than that of other Warsaw Pact states. This is an issue of obvious concern to the GDR leadership. Every effort is made in indoctrination activities within the NPA to dispel the apparently persistent notion that armed conflict between the two German states would be tantamount to civil war. The issue is doubtless of equal concern to the Soviet Union, which has dictated an evolution of NPA force structure and would seek to shape the circumstances of war engagement so as to maximize reliability. In a European conflict, the NPA would fight together with GSFG in the first echelon of combat forces, where the premium would be on survival and success. In a "lightning war" NPA reliability would be enhanced, thus minimizing the doubts that would probably arise within the NPA in a war of attrition against the *Bundeswehr*. The utility and reliability of the NPA, just as of the Polish armed forces, may in short depend crucially on early success. The Soviet incentive to commit the NPA quickly in order to maximize reliability may contradict the commonplace assumption that the USSR would try to ensure the dependability of its allies by carefully preparing propitious political circumstances prior to war initiation. Rather, in the event of European conflict, Soviet incentives would seem to be to minimize mobilization time, to commit the NPA rapidly in conjunction with much larger Soviet forces, and to score early and decisive battlefield success.

NOTES TO SECTION IV

1. The following study is based upon East and West German publications; other Western publications; and interviews with former East German officers and enlisted men and West German experts on the GDR National People's Army. Interviews were conducted in November and December 1977.

2. Freimut Duve, ed., *Die Nationale Volksarmee: Ein Anti-Weissbuch zum Militaer in der DDR*, Reinbek bei Hamburg, Rohwold Taschenbuch Verlag, 1976, p. 139. (Hereinafter cited as *Die Nationale Volksarmee*.)

3. Ibid., p. 13, and interviews with West German specialists on the NPA. Hereinafter cited as "Specialist interviews."

4. *Die Nationale Volksarmee*, p. 25.

5. Jens Hacker, "Zwanzig Jahre Warschauer Pakt," *Osteuropa*, May 1975.

6. Cf., *Die Nationale Volksarmee*, pp. 33-35, and interviews with former NPA officers and enlisted men. Hereinafter cited as "Officer interviews."

7. Interview with the Party Secretary of an NPA Motorized Infantry Regiment, a Major, during the 1970 Comrades-in-Arms maneuvers. *Deutschlandsender* in German to Germany, October 14, 1970, FBIS, October 15, 1970.

8. Officer interviews.

9. *Volksarmee*, No. 31, 1975, p. 7, cited in *Die Nationale Volksarmee*, p. 38.

10. Officer interviews.

11. *Die NVA (1)*, Bonn, Federal Ministry of National Defense, 1978, p. 12.

12. For discussion see *Die Nationale Volksarmee*, p. 55.

13. "Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und der Regierung der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjet Republiken ueber Fragen, die mit der zeitweiligen Stationierung Sowjetischer Streitkraefte auf dem Territorium der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik zusammenhaengen," *Gesetzblatt der DDR*, I, p. 238, as cited in *Die NVA (1)*, p. 12.

14. Subsequent bilateral treaties, including the 1969 "Supplementary Agreement of the Cooperation of Forces," have not altered this clause.

15. Components of other East European forces may also be subordinated to the Warsaw Pact Command in peacetime. In the framework of the Warsaw Pact the Polish Navy, along with the GDR Navy and the Soviet Baltic Fleet apparently are subordinated to the Supreme Command of the Joint Baltic Fleet with headquarters in Leningrad.

16. H. Neubauer, "20 Jahre Warschauer Vertrag-Kampf-und Klassenbuendnis," *Militaerwesen*, April 1975, p. 33.

17. Specialist interviews.

18. For example, annual agreements were apparently instituted between the NPA MPA and the political administration of the GSFG which cover joint training measures for the purposes of "internationalist education." (FBIS, December 4, 1972.)

19. Specialist interviews.

20. Specialist interviews.

21. Specialist interviews.

22. Specialist interviews.

23. Officer interviews.

24. Article by Major General Joachim Goldbach, Chief of the Neubrandenburg Military District, *Volksarmee*, No. 19, May 1973.

25. Specialist interviews.

26. Heinz Hoffmann, *Volksarmee*, No. 51, December 1972, Supplement 15.

27. See for example, S. Braeunig, "Waffenbruederschaft im Soldatenalltag," *Militaerwesen*, April 1975, pp. 105a-108a.

28. *Die NVA*, p. 15, and officer interviews. A recent defector: "We had the opportunity in Eisenach to participate in a week of brotherhood-in-arms festivities with a company of Russians. This was a big occasion and we invited the entire company. However, they came with only 15 soldiers who were especially chosen for the purpose, and whenever we wanted to have a conversation with them the officer or political deputy simply interrupted it."

29. Heinz Hoffmann, "To Fulfill the Higher Demands With Our People," *Parteiarbeiter*, Berlin, Special Issue on Party Activists' Meeting, 1973, p. 18, cited in K. H. Schulz and P. Wolina, "Sozialistische

Waffenbruederschaft; ein wichtiges Prinzip der patriotischen und internationalistischen Erziehung," *Militaerwesen*, Editorial, April 1974, pp. 3-11.

30. According to one former East German officer, "We trained together with the Russians at the regiment level. We have already said that the training was very hard in the NPA. However, when we trained together with the Russians, we saw how hard the Russians trained [and that] we still had it much better. It was much harder with the Russians. If one compares the Russian soldier with the soldiers of the NPA, if one compares how the Russian soldier lives compared to the NPA, we had it much better. For example, we saw in the Schwarzwald how 127 Soviet soldiers slept in one room--127 who had no individual lockers but just a tiny night drawer where they kept their personal things and a long hanger where they kept their uniforms. One could say that what was valid for the Prussians earlier is also certainly valid for the Soviets, that he who has sworn allegiance to the Soviet flag once cannot hope to preserve his individuality. This is a problem of which [the authorities] should be careful because in the final analysis it has led to a certain distance between the NPA and the Soviet army which was not there ten years before. This is for the simple reason that in the Soviet soldier's consciousness certain doubts and conflicts have developed after he has seen how the NPA soldier lives within his barracks, what rights he has as a person in the army, etc. *As political deputies we were especially confronted with this problem. One aspect of the [German-Russian military] competition dealt with joint work and cooperation with the Soviet unit, and yet the political deputies of the Soviet army very often were reluctant to participate and not interested in meetings between Soviet soldiers and soldiers of the NPA, simply because the differences and contradictions would then come out in the open and that had negative consequences within the Soviet army.*" [Emphasis added.] Another officer commented that such contacts "naturally led to envy, especially when the simple Soviet soldier who sees that the German who was defeated [in the war] lives much better than he does [finds it hard] to regard the German as a brother-in-arms." Yet another NPA defector observed: "We had a group of Soviet soldiers on one occasion invited to our barracks and one could see in the faces of the soldiers how surprised they were when they saw our lockers and equipment, everything that we had. They simply could not understand that. Then we sat down to eat at tables that were covered with white tablecloths; everybody had a complete dinner set with the respective parts, plates, a cake plate, a salad bowl, etc. The Russians just sat at the table and didn't dare to touch anything, let alone eat, until the political deputy ordered them in a loud voice to start eating." (Officer interviews.)

31. Goldbach, *Volksarmee*, No. 19, May 1973.

32. Hoffmann, "To Fulfill the Higher Demands . . .," cited in *Militaerwesen*, Editorial, April 1974, pp. 3-11.

33. F. Peter, "20 Jahre Warschauer Vertrag - 20 Jahre Waffenbruederschaft der Tat," *Militaerwesen*, April 1975, pp. 101a-103a.

34. Heinz Hoffmann interview, *Neues Deutschland*, 17 October 1970.

35. East Berlin, ADN Domestic Service, October 14, 1970, FBIS, October 15, 1970.

36. Heinz Hoffmann, ADN Domestic Service, May 14, 1970.

37. It is a regular theme in GDR military publications that because the integration of national staffs and commands has increased, especially that of the NPA and the GSFG, mastery of Russian by NPA officers is regarded as the "decisive basis for joint leadership of troops, for the organization of cooperation as well as for the proper functioning of measures of combat support and combat service support. To train our commanders and staffs continually in this sector, requirements for the use of the Russian language are to be [included] in the various training exercises . . . the execution of appropriate measures for the improvement of Russian language knowledge [are to be undertaken]." (F. Peter, pp. 98a-104a.) Another article notes: ". . . the mastery of the Russian language is an important prerequisite for every [NPA] officer in the organization and leadership of joint actions in peace and war . . . the main purpose . . . is to enable them to understand orders, instructions, directions, and reports given in Russian concerning tactical actions, and to issue orders, instructions, directions and reports themselves in a simple and easily comprehensible form in the Russian language. The application of Russian language abilities in operational-tactical training is . . . confined to the specific subject of instruction. . . [and] formulations. . ." in particular operational areas. (G. Kell et al., "Hinweise zur Anwendung und Festigung der Russischenkenntnisse in der operativ-taktischen und spezialfachlichen Ausbildung," *Militaerwesen*, March 1974, p. 55.)

38. Many senior NPA staff and command officers are of course educated in Russian in the Soviet Union. Russian is also a part of the curriculum of military academies and other officer schools in the GDR. As one NPA captain put it, however, "On the upper command levels communication in Russian is possible, but not on the lower levels." (Officer interviews.)

39. Officer interviews.

40. It is an article of faith in most public commentary that "socialist integration in the military field is a decisive prerequisite for successful defense." (Lt. Col. G. Graebner, *Zeitschrift fuer Militaermedizin*, November 1972.)

41. Ibid.

42. Officer interviews.

43. Specialist interviews.

44. Heinz Kessler, "Militaergeschichte und schoepferisches militaerisches Denken," *Zeitschrift fuer Militaergeschichte*, No. 4, 1968.

45. Article by Heinz Hoffmann, *Neues Deutschland*, April 19, 1970.

46. Thomas M. Forster, *Die NVA - Kernstueck der Landesverteidigung der DDR*, 4th rev. ed., Koeln, Markus, 1972, p. 249. Hereinafter cited as Forster.

47. P. Heider and R. Falkenberg, "Die DDR-Wahrer und Fortsetzer des progressiven Erbes der deutschen Geschichte," *Militaerwesen*, September 1974, p. 28; *Zeitschrift fuer Militaergeschichte*, June 1972.

48. Cf. the interview with Major Gen. M. Bormann, Chief of the Rocket Troops and Artillery of the Ground Forces of the NPA, in *Voennyi vestnik*, Vol. 31, No. 2, 1975, pp. 118-121.

49. A former NPA officer: "This of course is true not only of the NPA, but of all armies in the Warsaw Pact. This is quite evident during maneuvers in which the different armies participate. Everything is run in the same manner, irrespective of whether it is the Polish army or the Czech army or the NPA, it is the same."

50. Specialist interviews.

51. Soviet officers reportedly sit on the command staff of the Air Defense Force and participate in all planning and exercises. All communication, including that of the pilots, is in Russian. The entire air traffic system also uses Russian for communication. See Lothar Willmann and Karl-Heinz Eyermann, *Mensch, Mut und Macht, East Berlin*, Deutscher Militaerverlag, 1971; D. Kalkreuth and Stefan Vogel, "Die Beherrschung der russischen Kommandosprache-ein Beitrag zur Erhoehung der Gefechtsbereitschaft," *Militaerwesen*, August 1977, pp. 49-51; *Die Nationale Volksarmee*, p. 32.

52. M. Lange et al., "Fuenf Jahre Offiziershochschule der LSK/LV 'Franz Mehring'," *Militaerwesen*, December 1975, pp. 98b-102b.

53. "It is now taken for granted in the course of exercises and maneuvers of either the Baltic Red Banner Fleet (Soviet), the Polish Maritime Fleet, or the Volksmarine." *Militaerwesen*, Vol. 21, No. 12, 1977, as quoted in Peter Joachim Lapp, "The Other German Navy, the GDR People's Navy in 1978," *Deutschland-Archiv*, Vol. 11, No. 5, May 1978.

54. A. Vogel, "Die Verantwortung der Grundorganisationen erhoehen-ein wichtiges Anliegen unserer Parteiarbeit," *Militaerwesen*, August 1974, p. 99b.

55. *IWE Tagesdienst*, West Berlin, August 14, 1972.

56. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 9, 1979.
57. Officer interviews.
58. Ibid.
59. From "Provisions of the Work of the Political Organs in the NPA of the GDR," June 17, 1958, p. 33, as cited in G. Lux, "Die fuehrende Rolle der SED in der Nationalen Volksarmee," *Militaerwesen*, April 1974, p. 81. [Emphasis added.]
60. Party instruction of June 17, 1958, p. 9, cited in Lux, p. 81. [Emphasis added.]
61. Party Instruction of November 14, 1967, p. 15, cited in Lux, p. 82. [Emphasis added.]
62. Officer interviews.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Cf. *National-Zeitung*, East Berlin, June 30, 1972, supplement dated July 1, 1972, p. 6.
66. Vogel, August 1974, p. 101b.
67. Ibid.
68. H. Scheibe, "Die Einheit von Volk und Armee-Kraftquell fuer den zuverlaessigen Schutz des Sozialismus," *Militaerwesen*, August 1974, p. 10.
69. Officer interviews.
70. "At the beginning of the 60s . . . conditions had matured which made it necessary to improve qualitatively the system of development of officer cadre." (H. G. Ernst, "Die Heranbildung junger Kommandeure der Landstreitkraefte an der Offiziershochschule 'Ernst Thaelmann'," *Militaerwesen*, December 1975, p. 98a.)
71. S. Heinze, "Die Formierung des sozialistischen Offizierskorps-ein Schluesselproblem beim Aufbau der NVA," *Militaerwesen*, February 1976, p. 52.
72. Ibid.
73. O. Pech, "Zur Kaderarbeit in der Nationalen Volksarmee und den Grenztruppen der DDR," *Militaerwesen*, February 1977, p. 14.
74. Heinz Hoffmann, *Neues Deutschland*, September 20, 1974; Heinz Hoffmann, "Unsere Errungenschaften sind zuverlaessig geschuetzt,"

Einheit, 9/10 October 1974. For additional figures see Dale R. Herspring, "Technology and the Changing Political Officer in the Armed Forces: The Polish and East German Cases," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Vol. X, No. 4, Winter 1977. See the comparative data in Appendix B.

75. *Die Nationale Volksarmee*, p. 10.

76. *Die NVA*, p. 114; specialist interviews.

77. Specialist interviews. Comparative figures are not available.

78. Because of the complexity of modern military technology " . . . it is not enough to acquire as late as during military service the knowledge and abilities required for mastering the weapons and military technical equipment Eighteen months of military service for this purpose is a very short time, with good pre-military training." (*Neues Deutschland*, February 14, 1970.)

79. *IWE Tagesdienst* (West Berlin), November 19, 1973, reporting an article in a recent issue of *Militaerwesen*.

80. The GST is led by an NPA major general and has 500,000 members between the ages of 14 and 20 years. The incentive to participate is strong since this is virtually the only way a young person can partake in such sports as parachuting and even driving. (Specialist interviews.) Individuals are trained as parachutists, radio communication specialists, military drivers, etc. (Officer interviews.) The essential role of the GST in preparing pilots and sailors in military skills is acknowledged explicitly in an article by Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces, Major General Wolfgang Reinhold. (*Flieger-Revue*, No. 2, 1973.)

81. East Berlin Domestic Service, December 3, 1976; *Informationen* (Bonn), No. 11, May 1974.

82. *Volksarmee*, No. 7, February 1974.

83. *Die NVA*, pp. 99-114.

84. Officer interviews.

85. *Ibid.*

86. *Die NVA*, p. 76; Forster, p. 130.

87. "Because of increasingly more complicated combat technology, it is objectively necessary to attract a relatively large number of volunteers to the armed forces who will commit themselves as soldiers with extended service terms or as professional-soldier noncoms, and officer candidates." (W. Eltze, "Dokument sozialistischer Jugendpolitik," *Militaerwesen*, November 1973, p. 21.)

88. Ibid., pp. 20-23.
89. H. U. Selke, "Berufsberatung fuer militaerische Berufe," *Militaerwesen*, September 1975, pp. 66-69.
90. Ibid.
91. H. U. Selke, "Zur langfristigen Gewinnung des militaerischen Kadernachwuchses," *Militaerwesen*, October 1974, pp. 63-64; see also IWE Tagesdienst (West Berlin), October 5, 1972.
92. W. Huebner, "Ueber die Bereitschaft und Faehigkeit zur Verteidigung," *Militaerwesen*, September 1975, pp. 19-26.
93. IWE Tagesdienst (West Berlin), October 5, 1972.
94. Selke, "Zur langfristigen . . . ," pp. 63-69.
95. *Die NVA*, pp. 99-100.
96. Officer interviews.
97. Ibid.
98. *Die NVA*, pp. 108-111.
99. Officer interviews.
100. Ibid.
101. For a critical discussion see S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962, p. 24. Finer rejects the thesis that professionalism encourages subordination, citing among other cases the past intervention of professional officers in Germany and Japan.
102. Specialist interviews.
103. Heinze, pp. 54-55.
104. Pech, p. 15.
105. Ibid., p. 16.
106. *Die NVA*, p. 111.
107. Cf. *East German Army Dictionary*, compiled by Ulrich Ruehmland, Bonn, Bonner Druck-und Verlagsanstalt, January 1972, p. 177.
108. One former captain in the Ground Forces described the development of the NPA in this way: "There are problems which have accompanied the transformation of the army which are historical. One can speak of revolutionary armies which coalesced spontaneously around the idea of the revolution. Such was the case in Cuba. These armies

are capable of an ideological enthusiasm which binds them together. The professional aspects of the military did not play a great role in these armies; everything had to be improvised because they simply did not have the equipment to do otherwise. Their cohesion and morale (and their responsiveness to political control) was guaranteed by their revolutionary enthusiasm. Now when the revolution has succeeded, the problem is to reorganize the revolutionary army into a standing army with all the advantages and disadvantages that go with it. There arises the problem of mastering complicated military equipment, and political enthusiasm is no longer sufficient. The proven revolutionary is no longer capable of mastering the new tasks and he has to be re-educated as was the case, for example, in the Polish People's Army in 1957-58 when a lot of old officers had to return to school to complete high school." (Officer interviews.)

109. E. Hocke, "Die marxistisch-leninistische Philosophie als weltanschauliche und methodologische Grundlage der sozialistischen Militaerwissenschaft," *Militaerwesen*, October 1974, pp. 37-38. [Emphasis added.]

110. Ibid.

111. "It is becoming more and more complicated to employ army members in other positions or functions. Not only does substitutability diminish but the necessity of early specialization increases in order to optimize military effectiveness: 'newly inducted members of the army--naturally under strict regard for their aptitude--must already be singled out for employment and functions for which they possess the best professional and preliminary prerequisites,'" (K. Lehmann, "Einige Aspekte der Entwicklung und effektiven Nutzung des Arbeitsvermoegens in den sozialistischen Streitkraefte," *Militaerwesen*, February 1977, pp. 92-93.)

112. Officer interviews.

113. Ibid. The same officer observed with respect to "internal professionalization" that "every activity, every individual function is becoming more and more of a scientific nature, that one cannot any more exchange people as easily; there is a certain specialization, professionalization going on which plays an increasingly greater role."

114. "This is in a special way a current matter in view of the higher demands . . . in the field of military science and the most rapidly possible translation of insights proven to be true in military practice. 'The fundamental changes in military affairs and the elaboration of new problems in the theory and practice of warfare require a still more thorough mastery over Marxist-Leninist methodology. It is impossible to carry out such a scientific elaboration successfully, to advance the theory and practice of military affairs, and to solve the problems of the development of military technology and the organization of the armed forces unless one applies the method of Marxist-Leninist dialectic.'" (Hocke, p. 39.) The internal quote is from A. A. Grechko, *The Armed Forces of the Soviet State*, Moscow, 1974, pp. 335ff.

115. Ibid., p. 40.

116. Officer interviews.

117. Hocke, p. 39. The internal quote is from the GDR translation of a Soviet work: *Military Theory and Military Practice*, Berlin, Authors' Collective, 1973, p. 179.

118. See the remarks by Defense Minister Hoffmann in "Wir verwirklichen die Beschlüsse des IX. Parteitages," *Militaerwesen*, January 1977, pp. 3-12.

119. K. Schulz, "Die Festigung der Einzelleitung-wichtige Voraussetzung fuer hohe Gefechtsbereitschaft," *Militaerwesen*, February 1977, p. 44.

120. "There are more and more younger men in the Workers' Militia who underestimate the enemy and therefore the need for ideological work." *Der Kaempfer*, May 1973. The controversy apparently focused on the Workers' Militia (*Betriebskampfgruppen*), but the problem is a general one in the military.

121. Officer interviews.

122. "Among some officers there is serious opposition regarding readiness for further [political] training" G. Flade, "Die jungen Offiziere der Funktechnischen Truppen tragen eine hohe Verantwortung," *Militaerwesen*, November 1975, p. 117b.

123. W. Rickert, L. Schmelzer, and R. Luderfinger, "Erfahrungswerte der politischen Schulung in der Volksmarine," *Militaerwesen*, January 1975, p. 106c.

124. Hocke, pp. 39, 40.

125. H. Reichel, "Die erzieherische Wirksamkeit erhoehen," *Militaerwesen*, August 1974, pp. 103b-104b.

126. H. Brunner, "Die Kontrolle - untrennbarer Bestandteil der Fuehrungstaetigkeit der Politorgane," *Militaerwesen*, July 1974, pp. 16-17.

127. H. Scheibe, "Wachsende Anforderungen an die Reife und Kampfkraft der Mitglieder und Kandidaten der SED in der Nationalen Volksarmee," *Militaerwesen*, May 1975, pp. 8-9. [Emphasis added.]

128. R. Kokott, "Die Parteiwahlen 1975/76 stellen hohe Anforderungen an alle Mitglieder und Kandidaten der SED," *Militaerwesen*, November 1975, p. 8.

129. A. Seefeld, "Einige Erfahrungen bei der Festigung der sozialistischen Beziehungen," *Militaerwesen*, May 1975, pp. 98a-100a.

130. Vogel, pp. 99b-102b.

131. Officer interviews.

132. Selke, "Zur langfristigen . . . ," pp. 64-65.

133. Scheibe, "Wachsende Anforderungen . . . ," p. 8.

134. Selke, "Zur langfristigen...", p. 65. See also Ernst Legahn, "Neue Rechtsgrundlagen fuer die wehrpolitische Erziehung und vormilitaerische Ausbildung der Jugend in der DDR," *Wehrforschung*, No. 4, 1974, pp. 107-109. Other examples of the effort to counteract negative ideological influences of détente include a pamphlet intended for NPA soldiers and issued by the NPA Main Political Administration in 1973 under the title "Wesen und Ziele der imperialistischen psychologischen 'Kriegfuehrung'," by Kurt Zeisler. As reported in *Internationale Sicherheit* (Koeln) No. 4, 1973, pp. 4-7, its theme is that no contradiction exists between military preparedness and détente, and that the nature and image (*Feindbild*) of the enemy, especially of the Bundeswehr, remain unchanged. Another example of the indoctrination materials prepared for use in the NPA to counter the less aggressive image of the enemy is the book *Sinn des Soldatenseins-Ein Ratgeber fuer den Soldaten*, also prepared by the NPA Main Political Administration and published in at least nine editions between 1971 and 1973. The theme is much the same as that in the pamphlet above, and is reported in detail in *Internationale Sicherheit* (Koeln), No. 9, 1975.

135. IWE Tagesdienst (West Berlin) October 5, 1972.

136. Selke, "Zur langfristigen . . . ," pp. 63-69.

137. As reported in *IWE Tagesdienst* (West Berlin), September 4, 1972. Little more is known about the measure, but according to the source it is designed to effect a "general increase of military discipline and order" in the NPA, and appears also to be an effort to strengthen discipline in the reserves.

138. K. Kubern and H. Loewe, "Erfahrungen bei der Herausbildung gefestigter Kenntnisse ueber den sozialpolitischen Charakter eines modernen Krieges bei den Offiziersschuelern," *Militaerwesen*, September 1975, p. 53.

139. *Soldat und Technik*, "Flight from the NPA," February 1970. Defection figures between 1960 and 1969 are as follows: 1960/148; 1961/285; 1962/455; 1963/317; 1964/134; 1965/194; 1966/158; 1967/112; 1968/54; 1969/132.

140. Specialist interviews.

141. Officer interviews.

142. According to a West German official closely associated with interviewing and processing NPA defectors. (Specialist interviews.)

143. Among "higher ranking officers the participation of the NPA in Czechoslovakia was seen in a negative light because of the fact that the Czechoslovak population did not see the soldiers of the NPA as brothers-in-arms, but rather first and foremost, as German soldiers like those who occupied Czechoslovakia during the time of Hitler. The uniform is very similar anyway and that caused a reaction among the population and the soldiers who were over there were confronted with this. There were swastikas painted on the tanks, etc. There were people who believed that the NPA should be kept out of such participation simply in order to preserve its prestige and its image as a brother-in-arms. This opinion was expressed in political deputies' circles The whole operation was directed by the Russian high command. Even our senior officers were surprised with orders and with actions that were not expected." (Officer interviews.)

144. Specialist interviews.

145. Officer interviews.

V. THE CZECHOSLOVAK MILITARY

THE NATIONAL SETTING

In August 1968 the Soviet armed forces, assisted by units from Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and Bulgaria, invaded Czechoslovakia and put an end to the liberalization efforts known as the Prague Spring. The suppression of Czechoslovak attempts to build a "socialism with a human face" had a traumatic effect on the country's society and institutions. Next to the Communist Party, which was the primary target of the Soviet action, no other institution was as deeply and negatively affected as the Czechoslovak People's Army (CPA).

Despite Czechoslovakia's lack of martial traditions and its record of military passivity, most notably in the 1938 German invasion and the 1948 Communist takeover, the CPA prior to 1968 had been assessed as among the most capable military establishments in Eastern Europe. This high regard probably stemmed from Czechoslovakia's reputation as a technologically advanced society possessing a substantial pool of well-educated and technically competent manpower and from the presence of a large and sophisticated arms industry.

Many observers considered the CPA not only the best equipped and trained Eastern European armed force but also--because of a long record of pro-Soviet political orthodoxy and the absence of a Russophobic tradition--the most reliable. After 1950 the Soviet Union had achieved complete domination over the Czechoslovak armed forces, exercising its control by means of more than 1000 military "advisers" posted down to the regimental level.¹ Soviet doctrine, organizational principles, service regulations, and uniforms were adopted as the CPA was transformed into a carbon copy of the Red Army.

Yet as early as 1966 the Czechoslovak officer corps was seriously split by the issues that came to a head in 1968. And it was not until six years after the invasion, in 1974, that the Czechoslovak media began to claim that the CPA had once again become a "firm link in the Warsaw Pact"; for nearly a decade, then, by official admission it had not been. An understanding of what transpired in the intervening

years is important, because it involved the almost disintegration of a Communist military establishment in peacetime and the slow and painful process of rebuilding it. The period was characterized by wide-ranging purges of the officer corps, an unprecedented voluntary exodus of junior officers, serious recruitment problems, low morale, and defiant anti-Soviet attitudes by Czechoslovak soldiers.² The degree of success with which the USSR and the present Czechoslovak leadership have been able to overcome the negative legacies of this period to a large degree determines the present combat worthiness and political reliability of the Czechoslovak People's Army, as a key member of the Warsaw Pact Northern Tier.

DOCTRINAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL EVOLUTION

Just as in the case of the other Eastern European socialist countries, the evolution of Czechoslovak military doctrine in the post-war period was decisively influenced by the Soviet military and political hegemony in the region. In the early 1950s, Soviet emphasis on conventional war capabilities and large standing armies prompted a massive buildup of the CPA and a drastic increase of the country's armaments production. While in 1950 the Czechoslovak armed forces consisted of 140,000 men in the regular army and 40,000 in the border guards and security troops, only a year later the respective figures were 250,000 and 150,000.³ Weapons production in Czechoslovakia's advanced armaments industry rose from an index of 100 in 1950 to 955 in 1953. In line with Soviet concepts of mobile defense, the CPA was assigned the wartime task of contributing one operational group of armies which was to be subordinated to the Soviet command.⁴

With the shift in Soviet theater warfare doctrine around 1960 and the emphasis on nuclear-supported massive offensive operations against Western Europe, the wartime mission of the CPA was modified. Now it was to be used to tie down NATO forces in southern Germany. In particular, Czechoslovak forces consisting of ten divisions were to form the first echelon of a southwestern front which was to operate along the axis Pilsen-Karlsruhe, and eventually reach the Rhein at the latter city.⁵

In the mid-1960s, Czechoslovak training was modified to reflect the new emphasis in Soviet doctrine on the possibility of a conventional phase at the outset of a European war.

It was at this time, in the mid-1960s, that the first cautious attempts were made to differentiate Czechoslovak military doctrine and organization from that of the USSR. Two major factors which apparently encouraged this development were (1) growing Czechoslovak disenchantment with Soviet hegemony in the Warsaw Pact and the imperative to follow Soviet defense concepts in disregard of specific Czechoslovak conditions and interests, and (2) crystallization of apprehensions among elements of the Czechoslovak military establishment about the impact on Czechoslovak security of the Soviet strategic reappraisal that raised the possibility of limited warfare in Europe. Romanian questioning of these Soviet military verities may have been the catalyst for this rethinking of defense in Czechoslovakia.

Addressing the first issue, a noted Czechoslovak military theorist asserted in 1967 that "the socialist character of the [Warsaw Pact] member states does not guarantee automatically a military alliance" and argued that if certain "key problems of national defense and security" were not solved in the Warsaw Pact, specific national conditions would create an "objective base for the appearance of certain phenomena and trends toward disintegration." He appealed for "implementing harmoniously national with international [Soviet] interests in the alliance."⁶

A major impetus to this interest in rethinking Czechoslovakia's role in the alliance was the increasing awareness of the dissipating German threat--a traditional and crucial determinant of Czechoslovak military policy. The CPA leadership was apparently actively involved in all foreign-political decisions dealing with the German question after the early 1960s. The relevance of this issue to the Czech military is also evidenced by the creation in 1966 of a special research institute of the Military-Political Academy in Prague, dealing almost exclusively with West Germany. Views on the diminishing German threat expressed by military researchers in the mid-1960s are said to have often conflicted with the official position of the Novotny

leadership, as for example during a symposium on contemporary German imperialism held in November 1966 in Karlovy Vary. These reappraisals of the relevance of the German question to Czechoslovak security and military policy were eventually expressed in a much more radical and open fashion in various documents of the Prague Spring, such as the Gottwald Memorandum (to be discussed later).⁷

Czechoslovak uneasiness about Soviet concepts of nuclear war was expressed in vague terms prior to 1968 and then openly enunciated during the Prague Spring. This uneasiness apparently first assumed significant proportions during wide-ranging debates among CPA officers triggered by the publication in 1963 of the second edition of Sokolovskii's Military Strategy, which was one of the first authoritative Soviet statements on the possibility of limited nuclear operations in Central Europe. The realization that in the event of a limited nuclear war the Czechoslovak Army would be sacrificed in the first few days (according to Warsaw Pact operational plans, the estimated losses for the Southwestern front were to run between 60 and 70 percent) affected adversely the attitudes of many CPA officers toward the Warsaw Pact.⁸ One commentary of 1967, for example, claimed that Czechoslovak military research into the character of future war, which had proceeded from Soviet concepts on nuclear war in the early 1960s, had proved "one-sided and untenable."⁹ The seriousness of the questioning of Soviet doctrine was indicated in a 1967 commentary that expressed concern that in a limited war, Czechoslovak territory would become a theater of war "without sufficient guarantees of nuclear defense." The analysis raised the possibility of national defections from the Warsaw Pact:

If the creators of Soviet strategic concepts today no longer consider it necessary to reply to an attack on one of the socialist countries with a nuclear strike causing wholesale destruction [of the NATO attacker], the Warsaw Pact member countries might ask some questions similar to those which some time ago caused De Gaulle to quit NATO.¹⁰

Such views do not appear to have been the expression of the disenchantment of isolated individuals, but rather to have reflected a much

wider sense of frustration with uncompromising Soviet hegemony in the Pact among the Czechoslovak military. Although the evidence is sketchy, it seems plausible that even the CPA top leadership may have been affected. According to a former CPA officer, for example, during the 1966 meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, the Czechoslovak delegation supported the Romanians' implicit rejection of Brezhnev's call for increased integration and discipline and argued for greater Eastern European participation in the Pact's planning and policy process.¹¹

Czechoslovak dissatisfaction with doctrine and organizational forms imposed by the USSR was not only of a declaratory nature but resulted in some practical attempts to redress the situation. According to a high ranking former CSLA officer, as early as 1965 military scientists developed a new Czechoslovak model of command structure and management of the armed forces.¹² Among other things the "model," which was said to have required a year and a half to prepare, attempted to find a solution to the problem posed by the disparity between Soviet requirements and the ability of the CSSR to fulfill them. Although details about this model are not available, it may be assumed that it reflected nationalist and implicitly anti-Soviet tendencies, and the striving of military professionals for a limitation of pervasive Party control of the armed forces. Indirect confirmation of this is contained in a post-invasion article by the Czechoslovak defense minister, who revealed that the Soviets had not been consulted during the formulation of the model.¹³

The Czechoslovak search for a national defense doctrine and limitation of Soviet control over military affairs gained momentum with Aleksander Dubcek's assumption of power as Party First Secretary in January 1968. The issue of national defense doctrine became the subject of public discussions. Promulgation of a specific Czechoslovak military doctrine, derived from independent judgments about national security interests, was seen as an essential attribute of national sovereignty under the political conditions created by the reform movement. The continuing absence of a national military doctrine was regarded as the major source of problems afflicting the Czechoslovak

army as evidenced in the following passage from the "Gottwald Memorandum:"

To refrain from formulating one's own military doctrine means to renounce one's own responsibility both in the national and international context. It is a surrender to spontaneity, it is depoliticization of military thinking and the source of the paralysis of the army. It is the fundamental source of a crisis in the army organism because it severs it from its own social structure of society. It arrests the metabolism between the army and society. It deprives the army of its significance for the national community since there is no constant confrontation with the objectives of this socialist national community.¹⁴

Now there were public appeals to define precisely military relations with the Soviet Union, which were said to have been marked theretofore by a "feeling of wrongdoing"; to restore the historical continuity of Czechoslovak military doctrine; and to solve those specific military issues that the Soviet Union "does not want to and cannot solve on our behalf."¹⁵

Although evidence is lacking that such generalizations were translated into specific proposals for changes in Czechoslovak operational doctrine and military organization, they portended at the least a decoupling of Czechoslovak doctrine from Soviet-defined "coalition warfare" and by implication called into question an automatic role for the CPA in a rapid and massive Soviet-led Warsaw Pact offensive against Western Europe. Official acceptance of these views was indicated by their reflection in the Action Program of the Ministry of National Defense issued on June 15, 1968, which listed as its two most important tasks "the creation of a Czechoslovak military doctrine" and "the reorganization of the entire defense system."¹⁶

The period of the Prague Spring also brought increased Czechoslovak assertiveness in the arena of Warsaw Pact coalition politics. The nature of Czechoslovak grievances vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact and the proposed rectifying measures could be sensed from a March 1968 speech of Defense Minister Dzur, in which he stated that Czechoslovakia had in the past merely followed Soviet directives without taking any initiative of its own; now, he suggested, it intended to become an active participant in Warsaw Pact affairs. To this end, he suggested "an international

composition" of the Joint Command; the creation of a "collective" consultative organ of the Joint Command as well as a "collective" military doctrine which, he asserted, was still nonexistent.¹⁷

Czechoslovak views on the Warsaw Pact and national defense were amplified in two of the most celebrated public documents to appear during Dubcek's tenure: the so-called "Memorandum" of the Klement Gottwald Military-Political Academy issued in May 1968,¹⁸ and the press conference of General Prchlik (then head of the Party Central Committee department responsible for military affairs) of July 15, 1968.¹⁹ The Memorandum contained a broad indictment of both Czechoslovak military policy and the coalition practices in the Warsaw Pact. It charged that Czechoslovak military development since the communist takeover had been "deformed" and had proceeded on the "basis of primitive logic, empiricism and historical analogies." It also criticized the subordination of Czechoslovak national interests in the military sphere to those of the Soviet Union and the former sectarian (Novotny) leadership and stated openly that military policy prior to 1968 had been conducted "exclusively in the interest of the coalition regardless of one's own sovereign interests." Further, it called into question the very rationale of the Pact and implied that it was used to enforce political cohesion rather than pursuing a strictly military logic.

Finally, the Gottwald Memorandum offered a rather radical departure from the earlier policies it criticized by arguing for a new military doctrine that would implicitly be based on geopolitical rather than ideological considerations. While it did not at any time advocate leaving the Warsaw Pact, it argued that Czechoslovakia should redefine its security interests as a Central European power and hypothesized that objective Czechoslovak security interests embraced the possible conclusion of bilateral security agreements with West Germany and other NATO countries with a view to the eventual neutralization of the country. More important than the document itself was the overwhelmingly positive reception it received among military officers; its authors were officially commended by top CPA commanders.²⁰

General Prchlik's statements to the media centered on criticism of Warsaw Pact practices and endorsement of a Czechoslovak national

defense doctrine. He openly denounced the total domination of Warsaw Pact organs, and the Joint Command in particular, by Soviet officers, adding that the East European representatives in the Pact "held no responsibilities nor had a hand in making decisions." Czechoslovak proposals for a more equitable relationship in the Pact had, he stated, so far been ignored. Addressing the issue of national defense doctrine, Prchlik noted preparations for the creation of a state defense council whose "primary task will be to discuss the necessity, possibilities, and necessary conditions for working out a Czechoslovak military doctrine."²¹ Many of the ideas and suggestions formulated in the above documents and in other forums were incorporated in important draft documents, in particular the action programs of the MND and the General Staff that were prepared for the (abortive) 14th Congress of the Communist Party. Czechoslovak national military doctrine, as proposed in these documents, envisaged the possibility of Czechoslovak participation not only in a conflict between the opposing blocs, but also conflicts in which Czechoslovakia would have to rely on its own resources. It suggested the curious possibility of bilateral military assistance among individual coalition members, without Soviet participation, in the case of armed conflict.²²

The Memorandum called for Czechoslovakia to prepare its own initiatives on disarmament and security in Central Europe, the central element of which would be the establishment of a nuclear-free zone and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the area.²³ This, of course, would have led to a radical transformation of the Warsaw Pact. The enactment of such a national doctrine was cut short by the Soviet intervention of August 1968.

The evolution of Czechoslovak attitudes toward national defense doctrine and the Warsaw Pact in the years prior to the Soviet intervention reveals the presence of surprisingly strong nationalist sentiments in the military establishment of a country which some 20 years after its inclusion in the Soviet bloc was considered one of its most loyal members. Had it been permitted to evolve further, Czechoslovak national military doctrine would have logically taken on a neutralist orientation and as such presented an even more serious challenge to Soviet military hegemony in the Pact than the Romanian military deviation. As it was, in mid-1968

the USSR organized almost continuous Warsaw Pact maneuvers in and around Czechoslovakia as an instrument of pressure against the Dubcek leadership. Some Czechoslovak military leaders, led by General Prchlik, evidently accepted the possibility of opposing militarily a possible Soviet incursion and may have drafted and submitted to the Politburo a military contingency plan to this effect.²⁴ These military dimensions of the Czechoslovak reform movement may indeed have been one of the most important motivating factors of the Soviet decision to invade.

Immediately after their occupation of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, the Soviets reestablished control over the CPA. This control, albeit less total than in the Stalinist period, was more complete and open than was the case elsewhere in Eastern Europe, including the GDR. Soviet control was accomplished by reinstituting the system of direct supervision characteristic of the 1950s. Immediately after the invasion, a shadow General Staff manned by Soviet officers was established at the headquarters of the Soviet Group of Forces and it took over the daily management of the CPA. Soon thereafter, Soviet officers assumed all important control positions in the Czechoslovak Ministry of Defense and Czechoslovak military officials were in fact prevented from exercising their official functions.²⁵

Prior to 1968, Czechoslovakia was the only Northern Tier country that did not have Soviet troops stationed on its territory. After the invasion, five Soviet divisions remained. The Soviet occupation was accompanied by measures that could only alienate the Czechoslovak military. During the initial phase of the invasion, CPA units were often disarmed and locked in their barracks. Later, many of the best military installations were taken over by the occupiers and Czechoslovak units were forced to camp out until new accommodations could be built.

With the reassertion of Soviet control after 1968, Czechoslovak military doctrine was again relegated to echoing Soviet doctrinal verities and pledges of allegiance to the principle of "collective defense of the socialist community." This principle explicitly predetermines Czechoslovakia's alliance with the Soviet Union and membership in the Warsaw Pact. According to it, the international character of socialist

defense implies international obligations on the part of all the socialist countries. The Czechoslovak defense system is an organic part of the Warsaw Pact defense system. The implied conclusion is that both the structure and the function of the Czechoslovak defense system, in their importance and obligations, go beyond its state borders and fully assume a coalition character.

Czechoslovak military doctrine thus reverted after 1968 to the uncritical acceptance of Soviet-defined "coalition warfare" that characterized the Czechoslovak doctrine of the early 1960s. There is no evidence of autonomous elements in Czechoslovak doctrine in the 1970s. In the event of a European war, the Czechoslovak army would evidently still be used in a Southwestern Front. However, this would no longer be a Front consisting only of Czechoslovak troops in the first echelon but would also include Soviet units and fall under direct Soviet command, possibly under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Central Front. This is clearly a sign of decreased Soviet confidence in Czechoslovak reliability.²⁶

Such limited confidence is also suggested by the relative stagnation of overt defense spending and by an absolute decline in the size of the Czechoslovak armed forces. As indicated in Fig. 6, the post-1968 reconstruction of the Czechoslovak military establishment has yet to involve significantly higher overt national defense expenditures. Limits on defense spending may be the result of domestic economic constraints, as in Poland, but they surely also reflect the inherent difficulties in rebuilding the Czechoslovak armed forces after 1968. This is in line with the continuing drop in total military power in the Czechoslovak armed forces, as opposed to the increases in Poland and the GDR, and its evidently limited modernization (see Appendix B).

PARTY CONTROL OF THE MILITARY

The issue of Party control over the military establishment became a major focus of the reform movement within the military and contributed to the development of serious cleavages in the CPA. Latent




Fig. 6--Defense expenditure: Czechoslovakia

(SOURCE See Appendix C)

conflict over this issue was evident long before the Prague Spring. Following its seizure of power in 1948, the Czechoslovak Communist Party regarded the establishment of its political hegemony in the armed forces as a primary objective. In pursuit of this goal, it set up an extensive system of political control modeled on the Soviet one (details of which have been discussed in Sections III and IV). Massive purges of military professionals deemed of dubious political loyalty followed; very often Party loyalty was achieved at the expense of military competence.

The first signs of dissatisfaction with the pervasive system of political controls in the Czechoslovak army began to be noticeable in the mid-1960s. Two basic attitudes toward the question of Party control seem to have coalesced in the CPA prior to 1968: liberal-reformist, and conservative. The former was espoused primarily by younger officers as well as officers with scientific backgrounds, many of whom were associated with the Military-Political Academy "Klement Gottwald" (KGA) and the Military-Historical Institute in Prague. A major target of their criticism was the practice of direct Party control and management of the Army which, they asserted, led to defense decisionmaking "by merely a narrow group of the Party and state bureaucracy" and resulted in problems in the military field, conflict situations, and "contradictions that were insolvable."²⁷

Although adherents to such a viewpoint within the military were both numerous and active in the mid-1960s, they were "frustrated by overwhelming resistance and bureaucratic inability" and their proposals "remained nothing but calls of a thirsty man in a desert."²⁸ Nonetheless, it is clear that a school of thought willing to challenge established Party Orthodoxies on defense questions was firmly established in the military prior to Dubcek's political victory in 1968.

The conservative position was argued by a number of older pro-Soviet stalwarts, mostly of general rank. Most of these conservatives were concentrated in the military department of the Central Committee and the Party organization of the Defense Ministry; they evidently enjoyed the support of Defense Minister Lomski. The conservatives found themselves in a precarious position once Dubcek and the reformers

emerged victorious over former Party boss Novotny in January 1968. It was at this crucial juncture that a group of conservative officers in high positions either contemplated or actually attempted to use military pressure to keep Novotny in power. Led by Generals Mamula (Chief of the Central Committee Military Department), Janko (Deputy Minister of Defense), and Sejna (Head of the Party organization in the Defense Ministry), they evidently organized provocative troop movements toward Prague during the Party plenum which decided Novotny's fate and also sent to the Central Committee a letter in support of Novotny which ended with an open threat of military intervention on his behalf.²⁹

The conservative plot was evidently foiled by General Prchlik, a prominent reformer and chief of the Main Political Administration. According to one account, Prchlik mobilized the key MPA officers and took "appropriate measures" to prevent the use of military units in support of Novotny.³⁰ Prchlik later headed an investigation of the alleged conspiracy which reportedly led to the removal of some of the most prominent conservatives from the Ministry of Defense. General Mamula was arrested, General Janko committed suicide, and Defense Minister Lomski lost his portfolio. General Sejna had fled the country earlier after a warrant for his arrest had been issued on a charge of embezzlement. Additional confirmation of the attempted interference of conservative military elements in political affairs was confirmed by General Pepich (the new head of the MPA), who reported that a "few officials" of the Defense Ministry had tried to "interfere with and to influence the deliberations of the CC" and warned that the army was designed to defend the country and "is not meant to be used to interfere with discussions within the Party."³¹

It may be noted here that the liberal-conservative cleavage in the Czechoslovak military over the nature of Party control of the military did not develop along institutional lines (i.e., Party apparatus/political officers versus professional officers) but rather on the basis of political-ideological orientation. Indeed, the institutional locus of the movement to limit Party control of the military was (just as in Poland in 1956) the Main Political Administration and especially its political academy.

After the failure of the conservatives in early 1968 to stem the tide of reform that was sweeping Czechoslovakia, Party-military relations entered a new stage. Prominent military reformers were installed in leading positions and promptly took issue with some of the most sacrosanct tenets of established Party practice in the military, and in so doing generated considerable support within and outside the armed forces. The reformers argued for a complete reconsideration of the traditional relationship between the military-professional and the political elements: a clear functional-role delineation between the two, and the establishment of a new interaction based on noninterference and institutional autonomy. The basic fault of the previous system of political control was seen as resulting from the Party desire for direct management of the army.

The most serious offense committed under the system of direct political control, according to the reformers, was pervasive Party interference in professional military prerogatives. As a way of rectifying these shortcomings of Party control, the reformers proposed (1) to define precisely Party and military functions in the Army, and (2) to separate them and make them totally independent of each other.

A thorough reorganization of the Party apparatus was envisaged. In essence, the reorganization would have abolished the institution of deputy commander for political work, the traditional Party watchdog in Communist armies. The new political structure was to consist of an independent Party organization and a "military-political apparatus." This new military-political apparatus, expected to exist down to the regimental level, was not to be subordinated to the Party but to the military commander. It was to provide political education, organize the soldiers' cultural-educational activities, and help in the solution of various social problems. Under this system the only remaining avenue of direct Party influence on command organs would be through Communists in these organs.³²

A surprisingly large part of these reform proposals was actually implemented in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The first conspicuous success of the military reformers was scored shortly after Dubcek came to power, when the Party Central Committee abolished its military department

(the "8th Department," heretofore the major organ of direct Party control of military and security affairs and a bastion of conservatism). Its functions were taken over by a newly established "Defense and Security Committee" which was subordinated to the National Assembly, not to the Party. This move was accompanied by an extensive purge of known conservatives from leading military bodies.³³ Party control over military personnel questions was broken as the cadre department of the Ministry of National Defense was transferred to the jurisdiction of the minister himself from that of the chief of the Political Administration; lower level personnel bodies were similarly reorganized.³⁴ The change was explicitly justified by the need to depoliticize cadre policy and to assure that professional ability would become the main criterion of selection.

A two-tier system of political work in the armed forces was introduced, consisting of the military-political apparatus just described and the Party organization itself. According to General Frchlik, the newly restructured Party organs in the armed forces were to be involved "primarily in the solution of conceptual problems of Party defense policy rather than direct management."³⁵ This reorganization, if carried through, would have limited political control over the military; it would probably have led to the transformation of Party armed forces organs at the highest level into institutions reflecting professional military interests.* The potential for such a radical departure from established norms of Party control over the military in a Communist society is also indicated by the open advocacy on the pages of Czechoslovak military publications of the establishment of labor union-like organizations for both military professionals and enlisted men, as well as an organization that was to defend the rights of non-members of the Communist Party and a youth organization truly representative of youths' interests rather than those of the Party.³⁶

* It should be noted that this separation of Party activities from the military's political apparatus, and subordination of the latter to the command echelon, was a practice implemented in Yugoslavia in 1953; in Yugoslavia it led to the domination of the political apparatus by the command echelon. Czechoslovak reformers explicitly invoked this Yugoslav precedent.

In the proposed reform of the Party organization in the army, a special emphasis was placed on the democratization of Party organs. Democratization of the Party organization in the military was in fact given priority in 1968. After several months of preparation, an all-military Party conference took place in July 1968, where for the first time an election by secret ballot was conducted. The conference elected a 49-member committee whose official task was to "gradually take over supervision of Party work in the armed forces."³⁷ At the same time, the reform movement implicitly undermined the heretofore immutable principle of Party membership as an essential precondition for advancement in the armed forces. The chief of the Main Political Administration stated that candidates for command positions in the armed forces should not be selected only according to Party membership; he "saw no reason [why] a higher post in the armed forces could not be held by a non-Party member or by a member of another political party."³⁸ That tolerance of non-Communist attitudes in the military had indeed become widespread is testified to by the fact that a "Club of Committed Non-Party Persons"* was allowed to operate in the armed forces and a trade union organization of officers began to function.³⁹

In sum, the reform movement in the Czechoslovak armed forces during the Prague Spring seriously undermined Party hegemony. Just how far the process went is suggested by a post-invasion Party report which claimed that in order to reestablish traditional Party control over the military after the Soviet intervention, it was necessary to rescind some 1515 military-related decisions and resolutions taken during Dubcek's tenure.⁴⁰

Several conclusions follow. First, it is evident that the Czechoslovak military professional remained resentful of political interference and was willing to assert openly the autonomy of the military establishment when the opportunity arose. Second, the fact that in some areas military officers became a cutting edge of the reform movement in Czechoslovakia suggests that military officers in Communist

* Non-Communist, quasi-political groups that arose in Czechoslovakia in 1968, challenging the Party's organizational monopoly.

societies need not be as apolitical or conservative as is often contended. Third, cleavages developed within the Czechoslovak armed forces; these divisions were not based on institutional affiliation but were institutionally cross-cutting. Fourth, a large part of the Czechoslovak military establishment appears to have firmly supported the reform movement, which implicitly challenged Soviet dogma and hegemony in the Warsaw Pact.

The Reimposition of Party Control

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia cut short all possibility of reform in Party-military relations and threw the armed forces into a state of unprecedented disarray. In the country at large, many key reforms of the Prague Spring were abandoned immediately, although continuation in office of almost all the pre-invasion leaders, evident uncertainty in the Soviet bloc over what the next step should be, and the openly expressed defiant mood of most of the population left hope that something could still be salvaged from the Prague Spring. In the armed forces, however, the crackdown was immediate. The most prominent reformers in the armed forces, such as General Prchlik, were dismissed under Soviet pressure and conservatives began to re-emerge in key military positions with the backing of their Soviet patrons. After August 1968, mass resignations from the officer corps by disenchanted officers helped the conservatives to reassert a dominant role in the armed forces earlier than in the Party itself, where the reformist element remained strong through mid-1969.

This situation created conditions conducive to a new military challenge to the political leadership, this time from conservative positions. The two most prominent representatives of this conservative tendency were Generals Frantisek Bedrich (the new head of the MPA) and Otakar Rytir (in charge of liaison with the Soviets) who after the invasion emerged as outspoken critics of moderate Party policy and adopted vigorous pro-Soviet positions on questions of politics, ideology, and military doctrine. Rumors of preparations for a military coup circulated in Prague in early 1969 and intensified after violent anti-Soviet demonstrations in Prague on March 28 (sparked by the Czechoslovak victory over the Soviet team for the world hockey championship), in which

many uniformed armed forces members participated. Shortly thereafter, the military council of the defense ministry condemned the disturbances, declaring that "the armed forces command does not intend to stand idly by watching the anti-Soviet tendencies which have been displayed in recent days. [It] will defend the political and class interests of socialism."⁴¹ An implicit threat by the new pro-Soviet armed forces leadership to intervene was also contained in an article by General Bedrich.

It is no longer possible to live and work in strained situations and crises. We are concerned with constructive work and elimination of political conflicts. Crisis tension and unrest only provide a hotbed for anti-socialist elements, for the realization of their intentions. And that we shall oppose.⁴²

Military leaders openly acknowledged disagreements with the Party leadership, declaring that "the armed forces command has an independent view regarding the solution of the present situation" and implicitly threatening the internal use of the armed forces:

To use the armed forces . . . within the country to defend the socialist state is permissible if the opponents are anti-socialist forces openly trying to reverse socialist development. . . .⁴³

In the end, these "putschist" tendencies were dampened and the conservative generals sidetracked as a consequence of Soviet backing for the new leadership of Gustav Husak (as opposed to elements in Czechoslovakia who wanted to impose an even harsher rule on the country after the 1968 invasion). The political activities of the conservative generals in early 1969 were nonetheless significant. It may be that they were encouraged by the Soviets in order to create an unstable situation and weaken the Dubcek leadership. Whether acting at Soviet behest or independently, it is clear that they pursued the political objective of undermining the weakened Dubcek leadership and creating the impression that the regime did not enjoy the support of the armed forces. This was a clear case of an attempt to use the armed forces

as an independent political factor--a situation with few precedents in the history of Party-military relations in Communist societies.

After April 1969, the new Czechoslovak political and military leadership and the USSR sought to reconstruct the CPA as a reliable instrument of Party policy. To this end they pursued five avowed aims:⁴⁴

1. The restoration of unchallenged Party control over the armed forces.
2. The restoration of the armed forces to its previous role as an instrument of Communist rule.
3. The renewal and reintensification of cooperation with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.
4. The improvement of political reliability and combat preparedness.
5. The reorganization of the Party apparatus in the armed forces in line with orthodox Marxist-Leninist principles.

The Party undertook a number of organizational steps in pursuit of these aims. The Central Committee's department for military affairs was reestablished in February 1969, following its abolishment in July 1968, to ensure close Party control of the apex of the military establishment. The military counterintelligence service, subordinated (as in the GDR) to the Interior Ministry and not the Defense Ministry, also played a key role. A related indication of unwillingness on the part of the Party leadership, and probably the Soviets as well, to rely excessively on the Czechoslovak military leadership was the retransfer of the border troops to the Interior Ministry in 1971. (In 1966 they had been shifted from the competence of the Interior Ministry to that of the Defense Ministry.) Widespread purges were carried out in the officer corps between 1969 and 1972, ending only in 1975.

The available evidence suggests, however, that the reconsolidation of Party control over the armed forces was not easy. Not until five years after the invasion did the new chief of the Party apparatus in the military claim that "direct supervision of the CPA by the Party

had been fully restored."⁴⁵ Political officers evidently played the major role in this reconsolidation of Party influence over the military, and this resulted in conflicts between professional officers and their political deputies. For example, a 1972 commentary in the major military journal sharply criticized commanders who were not interested in political work, "failed to cooperate with the political organs and Party organizations" and "did not feel the same responsibility for the ideological-political education of their subordinates as for their professional duties."⁴⁶ Another article complained that many commanders were in the habit of "dumping unpleasant work on the Party" and were only interested in professional tasks, paying no attention to political work. It concluded that "no success had been achieved in enforcing the responsibilities of the commander toward the Party."⁴⁷

Efforts to reassert Party control over the military were seriously hampered by an apparent critical shortage of political officers following the extensive purges in the post-invasion period. This shortage necessitated the mass recruitment of inexperienced personnel. According to an informed source, about half of the Party activists in the army did not possess the requisite education in 1973.⁴⁸ The situation evidently was no better even at military-political educational institutions. Seventy percent of the faculty of the Military-Political Academy Klement Gottwald, for example, consisted of graduate students, according to its chief, General Reindl.⁴⁹

Another serious problem was the difficulty the Party encountered in increasing Party membership among the armed forces. No figures on Party membership have been published since 1968, itself an indication of the problem. Constant exhortations to increase Party membership as "extremely urgent" and a "vital political task" suggest lack of success in this area. The situation appears to be especially unsatisfactory from the Party point of view among the younger officers. Moreover, the CPA press frequently complains that many officers join the Party simply for opportunistic reasons.

In short, more than ten years after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Czechoslovak Communist Party continues to experience considerable difficulties in its political activities in the army.

The Party's Private Army

Another possible indication of continuing Party doubts about the extent of its reconsolidation of control over the CPA and, in particular, reservations about the utility of the Czechoslovak armed forces for internal repression was the renewed emphasis after 1968 on the Party's own armed force, the People's Militia (PM). The Czechoslovak People's Militia is a military-political apparatus which in some ways is unique in the Soviet bloc; it is the only organization of its kind whose membership consists exclusively of Party members. Its commander in chief is the First Party Secretary, while all command slots are part of the Party nomenclature.

The People's Militia was formed by the Party in early 1948 from Party activists with the explicit function of serving as the Party's armed detachment in its bid for power. Since the regular armed forces remained garrisoned and inactive throughout that period, the PM emerged as the only organized armed force during the Communist takeover in February 1948 and was used successfully to suppress a number of anti-Communist demonstrations. Subsequently the Party devoted considerable attention to improving the military and political proficiency of the militia, and by 1968 there were some 80,000 PM members with at least basic military training.

The period of the Prague Spring found the militia under increasing attack, as many Czechoslovaks questioned the rationale and legality of an armed force owing its allegiance to the Communist Party instead of the state. This feeling of uneasiness and the fear that PM units could be misused was intensified in June 1968 when PM activists sent a telegram to the Soviet Embassy assuring it that they would not permit anyone to denigrate the "Leninist principles of socialist construction."⁵⁰ However, persistent demands for the abolition of the militia, or at least for its transfer from Party control to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense went unheeded, and after the invasion some of the PM organizations played an active role in the struggle against the remnants of liberalism.

The importance of the People's Militia increased dramatically after March 1969. Faced with demoralized armed forces and a destabilized internal political situation, the Party saw the PM as a useful

political-military instrument and a potential counterweight to the armed forces. As a result, a concerted effort to strengthen the militia, both quantitatively and qualitatively, was undertaken. A massive recruitment drive brought PM personnel strength from 70,000 in the wake of the invasion of 120,000 in 1972 and 140,000 in 1978.⁵¹ Considerable emphasis was directed toward improvement of the combat capabilities of the militia units. While before 1968 most units were equipped with light arms, in the 1970s heavier weaponry was introduced and various specialized units formed. Among the latter were antitank and air defense units. Larger territorial units have been formed, complementing the basic factory-level units.⁵² A new system of training was also introduced in 1973 which was to provide continuous political and military education. People's Militia commanders, according to the new initiative, were to undergo comprehensive specialized military training at regular military institutions, with special emphasis on "security training."⁵³ Numerous public statements by Party officials in the past few years confirm the impression that the Party considers the People's Militia an important instrument with which to ensure its rule.

The Military Role in Socialization

Another feature of the post-invasion reconsolidation of Party control in Czechoslovakia was increased stress on the premilitary training of youth, which had declined drastically by 1968. A novel feature of this type of education, begun at the end of the Novotny era but systematized after 1969, was the founding of military schools at the secondary and specialized level, including three specifically military gymnasiums. Military subjects are taught throughout the Czechoslovak civilian school system, and there is an obvious intention (pursued with varying degrees of intensity and presumably mixed with a good deal of cynicism) to project the armed forces as both defenders and models of patriotism.⁵⁴

Outside the educational system proper, the most important organization for premilitary training is the Association for Cooperation with the Army (SVAZARM). Founded in 1951, it grew considerably in

the 1950s and early 1960s, but declined prior to 1968. Subsequently, SVAZARM was reactivated as part of the spread of military education. In 1975 its president (General Rytir, shunted to that organization five years earlier) said that 80 percent of the soldiers doing their conscripted military service had been through SVAZARM.⁵⁵ In 1976, on its 25th anniversary, it boasted 631,000 members in more than 9000 organizations.⁵⁶

These are impressive numbers, but even official sources⁵⁷ are constrained to admit that the highest rises in membership in recent years have been in SVAZARM's sports clubs. In fact, SVAZARM is a huge (and prosperous) sports and recreational organization, only "para-military" in the broadest sense of the word. For example, it is the sole organization offering driving lessons, and it provides equipment and material for building model airplanes. Such activities are the bait that attracts the large membership. Whether the "serious" side of SVAZARM--the ideological-patriotic-military--has much effect is open to considerable doubt.

THE OFFICER CORPS AND MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

The overall capability of the Czechoslovak armed forces is strongly dependent on the professionalism and dependability of its officer corps. Yet the CPA officer corps has been the object of numerous purges, reorganizations, and conflicting pressures since the establishment of the CPA after 1948. The effect of these developments continues to be felt in the Czechoslovak armed forces today. An evaluation of their impact on command personnel is an essential precondition to any assessment of the CPA.

The Pre-Invasion Period

At the time of the Communist takeover in February 1948, the Czechoslovak officer corps consisted primarily of two types of officers: those whose service dated back to World War I, and those who had acquired combat experience during World War II fighting in Czechoslovak units on the Western Front or under Soviet auspices. A majority, especially in the higher echelons, were non-Communists

and basically apolitical. Thus one of the most urgent tasks facing the Party after 1948 in its desire to transform the armed forces into a "reliable shield of the Party" was the politicization of the officer corps, which, of course, often meant the purging of officers suspected of disloyalty. Between February and December 1948, 10 percent of general staff officers and 12 percent of all officers were dismissed.⁵⁸ Special targets of these early purges were officers who had served, often with great distinction, on the Western Front. In 1948 alone, 1000 of them, including 124 members of the air force command, were purged.⁵⁹ But these initial measures were just the beginning. At the end of 1949 a high Party official stated that because of the "prevalence of enemy agents" among the officers, "but for a few exceptions, the entire old officer corps must be replaced by new people."⁶⁰

The purge of the officer corps achieved its greatest momentum in the early 1950s, when military men began to figure prominently in the numerous show trials characteristic of the period. The victims of this period included many Communists suspected of ideological contamination or dubious militancy. Thus in 1950 the Party adopted "Law No. 85" which ordered the immediate release from the armed forces not only of all veterans who fought in the West but also of all members of the International Brigade of the Spanish Civil War.⁶¹ Defense Minister Svoboda, an Eastern Front combatant, was dismissed and later jailed, as were most of his collaborators. As late as 1954, in a series of show trials, eight CPA generals were sentenced to a total of 128 years in prison as "foreign spies."⁶²

These massive purges resulted in a dramatic lowering of the quality of professional military leadership in the Czechoslovak armed forces. To fill the gap the Party mobilized thousands of young activists, most of whom had no military expertise and only a rudimentary education. It was common practice at the time to give these activists both a high school diploma and an officer commission after one year only of military school. The extent to which these "Party officers" lacked the requisite military competence could be ascertained from a 1953 order of the defense minister, which obligated all CPA officers "to bring their military knowledge to the level of a military secondary school."⁶³

The professional and political lot of CPA officers began to improve slowly after 1956, as the process of de-Stalinization permeated the military establishment as well. This improvement was expressed primarily in a relaxation of the most oppressive practices of political control and interference with the activities of the professional officer. Extensive modernization of the armed forces undertaken in the late 1950s, which included the introduction of new Soviet-made as well as Czechoslovak-made equipment and accompanying structural reorganizations, increased the need for a more professional officer corps. The system of Czechoslovak military education was reorganized; new military schools, academies, and research institutes were founded. A new type of well-trained, professional and less ideological Czechoslovak officer emerged in the 1960s. For example, while in 1955 the percentage of educated officers in the CPA was too negligible to mention, in 1966, 21 percent possessed university education and 31 percent of these were engineers.⁶⁴

Yet this new element in the officer corps found its career advancement blocked by the predominance at middle levels of the military establishment of the political activists recruited on a mass scale in the early 1950s. During the Prague Spring of 1968, considerable debate was generated by the so-called "age hump" or deformation of the age structure of the officer corps resulting from the large number of commanders in their late thirties. The "Party officers" recruited for their political reliability who occupied most middle-level positions, lacked necessary qualifications and education for further advancement, yet were too young to retire. The continuing presence of this group in the armed forces seriously prejudiced the chances for promotion of younger and more able officers and as such was a major source of resentment.⁶⁵ This resentment was a major cause of the challenge to Party orthodoxies in the military field by the younger professional element of the officer corps in the mid-1960s.*

* Indeed these "Party officers" constituted a more severe problem for professional officers in the Czechoslovak case than was true in Poland or East Germany; in Poland, the 1956 crisis led to a precipitous purge of officers recruited on political grounds in the Stalinist period, while the East German military was only built up after the mid-1950s and thus largely escaped the problem.

The Czechoslovak Military Establishment After 1968

Soviet military suppression of the Prague Spring devastated the Czechoslovak officer corps. Following the 1968 events, the command cadre of the armed forces was decimated, demoralized, and subjected to pervasive political controls and direct subordination to the Soviets. In many respects this purge resembled the Stalinization of the early 1950s.

Following the political consolidation of the new pro-Soviet Husak leadership in mid-1969, a wave of purges swept the military. Figures on the exact number of purged officers are conflicting, but all indications point to wholesale dismissals of politically tainted officers. In the year after July 1969, between 4000 and 7000 officers were purged. Later figures evidently went much higher, since the purges were not completely terminated until 1975. According to a knowledgeable source, the conservative post-Dubcek army leadership demanded the elimination of 17,000 officers and was successful in pressing charges against 7000 of them. The Soviets reportedly had their own purge plans which included the dismissal of another 3000 officers.⁶⁶ The objective of purging 17,000 officers apparently was never achieved, probably because that would have meant the total disintegration of the army, but it is indicative of the number of officers suspected of harboring sympathies for the reform movement. All in all, it appears that some 11,000 officers and 30,000 noncommissioned officers were removed from the army. These included more than 20 generals, hundreds of colonels, and a majority of the military-scientific personnel of the CPA.⁶⁷

No less serious than the purges, in terms of its effect on the viability of the officer corps, was the voluntary mass exodus of officers from the army. The problem was particularly acute among young officers. A Czech military journal admitted in 1969 that 57.8 percent of all officers below the age of 30 had left the army at their own request in 1968 (most of them certainly after the invasion) and had done that "even if they must often take a risk."⁶⁸ This exodus paralyzed the military educational system. Fully 50 percent of the students in Czechoslovak military academies reportedly resigned by June 1969, and

military institutions were unable to attract even a fraction of the candidates they had had prior to the invasion.

There are indications that discontent was widespread even among those who did not leave. In an unusually candid comment on the flight of officers in 1969, a military journalist declared that "if all those who disliked certain things were to leave the army, we would have no army today."⁶⁹

The unprecedented demoralization and negative attitude toward the military profession that affected the officer corps in the wake of the invasion was also evidenced in a survey of officer attitudes published in late 1969.⁷⁰ According to the survey, while in 1967 88.2 percent of Czechoslovak career officers expressed their determination to stay in the army until retirement, in 1969 an amazing 74.4 percent answered that they would not have enlisted if "they knew then what they know now."

The drastic shortage of command personnel became the most serious problem of the Czechoslovak armed forces in the post-1968 period, a problem that according to all available evidence is still not resolved more than a decade later. It necessitated or contributed to a numerical reduction of the CPA by about a third. Particularly hard hit was the Air Force, whose personnel strength apparently was halved.⁷¹ The CPA airborne brigade, which is staffed exclusively by volunteers, for example, reportedly consisted of only one regiment in 1974.⁷² The seriousness of the problem was occasionally hinted at even in the now rigidly controlled military press. For instance, in 1969 a military journal reported that all performance evaluations of professional soldiers had been postponed because of lack of qualified personnel.⁷³ And in 1973, *Lidova Armada* complained that the critical shortage of qualified personnel at the Ministry of National Defense presented a serious problem even in the "implementation and observance of secrecy."⁷⁴

In the 1970s, just as in the early 1950s, the Party was forced to lower considerably the qualification requirements as well as the educational standards for officer candidates. It appears that in many cases educational requirements were simply dropped in order to facilitate recruitment. According to a 1975 source, 15 percent of

CPA officers and 65 percent of warrant officers had not completed high school.⁷⁵ In 1970 new military schools were opened that were to produce officers out of high school graduates in one year. Students who had not finished high school needed only a two-year course for an officer's commission. That both types of schools were still in operation in 1979 is a clear indication of the Party's failure to overcome the shortage of officers despite considerable incentives offered to prospective candidates, such as housing, automobile privileges, and substantial cash premiums. By one Western account, the shortage of CPA command personnel at present runs to some 20 percent in the Air Force, 30 percent in armored units, and 70 percent in the motorized infantry.⁷⁶

Nationalism and the Officer Corps

Another factor affecting the cohesion of the Czechoslovak officer corps since 1968 is the uneasy relationship and inherent rivalry between its Czech and Slovak national components. Throughout most of the CPA's existence, national tensions in the armed forces were generated by overwhelming Czech preponderance among professional soldiers and resulting Slovak resentment. The extent of Slovak unhappiness, however, is difficult to gauge since the subject was almost never discussed.

As with other controversial issues, the reform movement of 1968 brought about an open debate of Czech-Slovak relations in the armed forces and indicated the existence of a long-standing and serious problem. Slovak complaints against their Czech colleagues centered for the most part on the issue of Slovak underrepresentation in the officer corps and a perceived lack of advancement opportunities. Indeed Slovak officers did appear to be in the minority, especially among the higher ranks. For example, in 1968 only 20 percent of CPA colonels were of Slovak origin (although Slovaks made up more than one-third of the general population).⁷⁷ The situation was much worse in the higher command and administrative echelons of the CPA: In 1968 Slovaks accounted for 14.2 percent of the chiefs of services in the Ministry of National Defense, 9.2 percent of its chiefs of administration, and 8.3 percent of its department heads. In the Main Political Administration, only 7 percent of all cadres and 8.2 percent of administrative

chiefs were of slovak nationality.⁷⁸ Moreover, the Slovaks resented the fact that a majority of them had to serve in the Czech lands and expressed fears that they were being subjected to subtle denationalization.

Czech sources, too, admitted the existence of a national conflict in the CPA. In one case a Czech officer alluded to "biased selection" of Slovaks for military schools and training and saw the strained relations between Czechs and Slovaks in the armed forces as stemming from an "a priori mistrust of Slovaks," "Czech hegemonic mentality," and considerable resistance to the idea of equality in the CPA on the part of some Czech officers.⁷⁹

Tentative efforts to mitigate this problem were undertaken during Dubcek's tenure, including efforts to establish admission quotas to military schools for Slovak candidates and a system of dual staffing of some top administrative positions (i.e., a Czech head was to have a Slovak deputy and vice versa).⁸⁰ Politically much more explosive were reported attempts to introduce the idea of national units⁸¹ (which if pursued to its logical conclusion, would have led to two separate national armies). Judging by the severity of criticism to which this concept was subjected after the invasion, there must have been substantial support, especially in Slovakia, for such an alternative.

After the invasion, a Czech-Slovak state was established in late 1968, which gave the two nations considerable autonomy in administrative affairs. This seemed to boost Slovak assertiveness. The trend toward "Slovakization" of a number of leading political positions brought about by the ascendance of Husak, a Slovak, and his coterie was also reflected in the CPA. For instance, in addition to Defense Minister Dzur, all three heads of the Central Committee's military department since 1968 have been Slovak.⁸² There is some indication that this new Slovak assertiveness has come to be resented by many Czech officers. One report of 1969 reveals Czech officers' misgivings about their Slovak counterparts "trying to make political capital out of federalization."⁸³ Due to the paucity of recent evidence, the present state of Czech-Slovak relations in the CPA cannot be confidently ascertained. Nevertheless, given past experience and the troublesome nature of nationality conflicts generally, it is unlikely that the problem has been resolved.

CONCLUSIONS: THE ROLE AND RELIABILITY OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK ARMED FORCES

The virtual collapse of the CPA in the wake of the August 1968 Soviet invasion was the most important development in postwar Czechoslovak military history. A Communist military establishment of apparent professional competence and widely assumed political reliability came close to disintegration.

Outwardly pliant and reliable prior to 1968, the Czechoslovak armed forces contained a strong undercurrent of nationalism and anti-Sovietism that surfaced during the Dubcek period. This resentment appears to have been the consequence of Soviet hegemony in the Warsaw Pact, the subordinate status of the Czechoslovak military establishment, and the preclusion of national defense prerogatives. The apparent extent of the sentiment in the military that favored a national military doctrine portending a decoupling of Czechoslovak from Soviet security interests, and the wide support generated by some of the openly nationalist and intrinsically anti-Soviet doctrinal proposals, suggest that despite some 20 years of pro-Soviet indoctrination, an important element of the CPA officer corps preserved a national outlook. Soviet military thought, although nominally acknowledged, had not been internalized by many Czechoslovak military professionals.

The reform-minded officers of the CPA were on balance comparatively young; many possessed scientific-technocratic backgrounds. Although most were graduates of Soviet military academies, they openly challenged Soviet doctrine and Soviet interests. Yet the military elite was not unified. Orthodox and subservient pro-Soviet attitudes continued to exist, especially on the part of older, high-ranking officers who identified with Soviet objectives. On two occasions, in January 1968 and March 1969, groupings of pro-Soviet officers attempted to influence domestic Party politics; on both occasions, they were unsuccessful.

The momentum within the Czechoslovak military to reduce pervasive political controls portended the emergence of a more autonomous position for the military institution vis-à-vis the Party--potentially far more so than in present-day Poland. It was fueled by continued

resentment of military professionals at Party interference in their work, an indication that the objective of fusing professional competence with ideological military in every officer (evidently realized to a considerable extent in the GDR) had not been achieved in the CPA.

Many advocates of limiting Party control of the military came from the ranks of the CPA political apparatus, which calls into question the common assumption that the most significant cleavage in Communist military establishments is necessarily between the military professional and the political officer. One possible explanation for this phenomenon is the frustrations experienced in the 1960s by many younger and better educated officers--in political just as in line positions--whose careers had been blocked by the wave of Party activists recruited in the early 1950s.

The Soviet-led invasion of August 1968 ended the reform currents within the CPA. The Soviets reasserted their hegemony over the Czechoslovak armed forces and reintroduced orthodox Soviet principles of military doctrine and organization and Party control. The reimposition of Soviet control through direct Soviet participation in and supervision of a variety of military organs indicated the Soviets' lack of confidence in the CPA. Decreased Soviet confidence in the CPA after 1968 was also suggested by the CPA's reduced size and less autonomous putative wartime mission.

Today, the Soviets cannot be oblivious to the change in Czechoslovak popular attitudes as a consequence of the 1968 invasion. Traditional Russophile attitudes among the Czechoslovak peoples, whom Moscow could previously count as the only pro-Russian peoples in Central Europe, have all but disappeared. Nor can the Soviets estimate very highly the capabilities of the CPA. The Czechoslovak military establishment has yet to regain its pre-invasion size, cohesion, or quality. More than a decade after 1968, as a result of the waves of purges and resignations of officers, the CPA suffers from a serious shortage of trained professionals. Many new officers have little more professional education than was the case in the Stalinist period. The Soviets are faced in Czechoslovakia with a client military establishment that has yet to recover from the trauma of 1968. In view of these considerations, the Soviets must view skeptically the CPA's utility and reliability, both domestically and in a European conflict.

NOTES TO SECTION V

1. Cited in Peter Gosztony (ed.), *Paramilitaerische Organisationen im Sowjetblock*, Bonn-Bad Godesberg, Hohwacht Verlag, 1977, p. 78.

2. An official Party poll published in July 1969 revealed that 75 percent of draftees were against the strengthening of ties with the Soviet Union and 81 percent doubted the need to strengthen relations between the Czechoslovak and Soviet peoples. (*Tribuna*, July 9, 1969, cited in Robert Dean, "The Political Consolidation of the Czechoslovak Army," *Radio Free Europe Research*, April 29, 1971.)

3. Ibid., p. 79.

4. *A Revue*, July 12, 1968; interviews with former CPA officers, 1980.

5. Ibid.

6. Lieutenant Colonel Ladislav Kopecky, "Unity in Military Alliance," *Mezinarodni Politika*, No. 9, September 1967.

7. See Josef Hodic, "Military-Political Views Prevalent in the Czechoslovak Army 1948-1968," Research Project, *The Experience of the Prague Spring 1968*, Study No. 5, Vienna, July 1979.

8. Interviews with former CPA officers.

9. *Pravda*, Bratislava, November 1, 1967.

10. Radio Prague, March 6, 1968.

11. Hodic, "Military-Political Views," p. 18.

12. Interview with General Smoldas in *A Review*, November 22, 1968.

13. *Rude Pravo*, February 28, 1969.

14. Hodic, "Military-Political Views," p. 24.

15. Interview with a group of general officers discussing military doctrine, *A Revue*, No. 10, May 17, 1968.

16. *Pravda*, Bratislava, May 30, 1968.

17. Speech by Defense Minister Dzur to the all-army aktiv of Communists in Bratislava, *Obrana Lidu*, No. 3, March 1968.

18. The "Memorandum" was originally published on July 2, 1968, in *Lidova Armada*, and is reprinted in Hodic, "Military-Political Views," pp. 23-32.
19. Published in Robin Remington, *Winter in Prague*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1969, pp. 214-220.
20. Dean, p. 10.
21. Remington, p. 218.
22. Hodic, "Military-Political Views," p. 20.
23. Ibid.
24. According to Jiri Pelikan, a former high Czechoslovak official and CC member, the plan was drafted by General Prchlik and others and presented to the Politburo in July 1968. See V. V. Kusin (ed.), *The Czechoslovak Reform Movement 1968*, London, 1973, p. 58.
25. Interviews with former CPA officers.
26. Ibid.
27. Report on Press Conference with General Vaclav Prchlik, in Remington, pp. 214-215.
28. Ibid., p. 215.
29. Interview with General Samuel Kodaj, Radio Bratislava, March 24, 1968.
30. Ibid.
31. Remington, p. 50.
32. Interviews with former CPA officers.
33. A list of approximately 80 officials to be purged had been prepared by the Ministry of Defense. None of the purged former officials of the 8th Department was to be allowed to serve in Prague or to perform any important function. See Listy, Rome, No. 3, June 1976.
34. CTK International Service, May 7, 1968.
35. See interview with General Vaclav Prchlik in CTK International Service, April 21, 1968.
36. See "Moznost Zneužití Armady?" [Is it Possible to Misuse the Army?], *A Revue*, No. 9, 1968; and also Josef Novacek, "Ma Narodni Front Sve Mesto v Armady?" [Is There a Place for a People's Front in the Army?], *A Revue*, No. 12, 1968.

37. *Rude Pravo*, July 12, 1968.
38. *Lidova Democracie*, March 28, 1968.
39. Interview with Defense Minister Dzur, *Tribuna*, February 23, 1972.
40. See Colonel Cyril Rabusic, "Problems of Party-Political Work in the Czechoslovak People's Army," *Zivot Strany*, December 10, 1969.
41. *Rude Pravo*, April 3, 1969, cited in Dean.
42. Ibid., p. 20.
43. Ibid.
44. *Historie A. Vojenstvi*, No. 5, 1975.
45. Interview with MPA chief General Horacek, *Lidova Armada*, No. 7, 1973.
46. *Lidova Armada*, No. 5, 1972.
47. *Lidova Armada*, No. 16, 1972.
48. Interviews with former CPA officers.
49. *Lidova Armada*, No. 24, 1972.
50. Czechoslovak Situation Report, *Radio Free Europe Research*, June 26, 1968.
51. *The Military Balance*, London, IISS, for the respective years.
52. *Nova Svoboda*, January 25, 1975.
53. Czechoslovak Situation Report, *Radio Free Europe Research*, October 31, 1973.
54. There are frequent references to the need for qualitative improvements in this sphere, e.g., *Radio Prague*, September 12, 1975.
55. *Radio Hvezda*, June 14, 1975.
56. *CTK*, July 6, 1972.
57. Ibid.

58. CTK International Service, April 6, 1968.
59. Ibid.
60. Jiri Pelikan (ed.), *Das unterdrueckte Dossier*, Vienna, Europa Verlag, 1970, p. 62.
61. *Mlada Fronta*, April 7, 1968.
62. Pelikan, p. 133.
63. Gosztony, p. 81.
64. CTK International Service, June 2, 1966.
65. See "Personnel, Age Hump and Other Problems," *Obrana Lidu*, No. 30, July 27, 1968; see also *A Revue*, No. 4, 1969.
66. Interviews with former CPA officers.
67. See *Die Welt*, April 2, 1979, and *Listy*, No. 3, June 1976.
68. See *A Revue*, No. 10, 1969.
69. Ibid.
70. *A Revue*, No. 11, 1969.
71. *Listy*, No. 4, October 1974.
72. *Die Welt*, November 12, 1974.
73. *A Revue*, No. 3, 1969.
74. *Lidova Armada*, No. 13, June 1973.
75. I. I. Yakubovskiy, ed., *Boevoe sodruzhestvo bratskikh narodov i armii*, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1975.
76. *Die Welt*, April 2, 1979.
77. Milan Holub, "Slovenske Mamicky, Peknych Synkov Mate," *A Revue*, No. 12, 1968.
78. Ibid.
79. Major Vaclav Jelinek, [From Hegemony to Equality, a Thorny Road], *A Revue*, December 13, 1968.
80. *A Revue*, No. 12, June 1968.

81. See Interview with General Pepich, Chief of MPA, in *A Revue*, No. 12, 1968.

82. Eugen Turzo, a Slovak, has been in charge since May 1973. His predecessors were Michal Kudzej (February 1970-March 1973), a Ruthenian Slovak, and Michal Bencik (February 1969-February 1970), a Slovak, since February 1970 Prosecutor-General in Slovakia.

83. *A Revue*, No. 10, 1969.

VI. THE NORTHERN TIER AND SOVIET MILITARY POWER

THREE DISTINCT NATIONAL HISTORIES

The preceding sections have demonstrated the quite different institutional histories of the Polish, East German, and Czechoslovak military establishments. To recapitulate briefly, the Polish armed forces were created primarily from the Polish armies established on Soviet territory during World War II. Soviet domination of the Polish military in the early 1950s was more direct and heavy-handed than elsewhere in Eastern Europe at the time; the "nationalist" reaction was therefore all the greater in 1956. This reaction in turn confronted Gomulka and the Soviets with the challenge of rebuilding the Polish armed forces as an integral part of both the Polish Communist system and the Soviet military coalition. From the Soviet perspective, success in this endeavor was marred in the 1960s by tensions resulting from national sentiments within the military elite. Consolidation of a homogeneous professional military elite in the 1970s probably reduced some Soviet concerns about the Polish military but created others. For in the 1970s, in reaction to its "Soviet" past in the early 1950s, its very low social prestige thereafter, and the crisis of confidence resulting from its role in the December 1970 unrest, the Polish military has partially revived its traditional ethos as the guardian of national interests. While it has not questioned Party supremacy, the Polish military has achieved a degree of institutional integrity that challenges traditional Communist conceptions about control of the military. Both the national and the institutional aspects of this development must give the Soviets pause.

The East German military, in contrast, lacks a national tradition to espouse. Even in postwar East European terms, it is a "young" organization, established in the late 1950s and built up only after the Berlin Wall enabled the GDR to halt its manpower drain and begin internal consolidation. It has not experienced the internal conflicts characteristic of the Polish and Czechoslovak armed forces. The values of the East German military elite are synonymous with those of the

Party leadership, to which it has remained consistently and uniformly responsive. Developed as an East German military instrument by the USSR after the Stalinist era, and therefore without the blatant disregard for national sensitivities characteristic of the Polish experience, the relationship of the East German military elite to the USSR has been one of consistent and, by comparison, direct subordination. The Soviets probably have considerable confidence overall in the East German armed forces--more, perhaps, than with regard to any other East European military.

The history of the postwar Czechoslovak military institution has been still different. Although Czechoslovakia lacked a military tradition, its military establishment was nonetheless the least "Communized" of any in Eastern Europe at the time of the Communist takeover in 1948. It was thoroughly purged after 1948 and subordinated to Soviet direction in the early 1950s, but without the extensive and blatant Soviet involvement characteristic of Poland. The Czechoslovak military thus did not undergo dramatic "renationalization," as did the Polish army in the mid-1950s. Nationalist sentiments emerged first in the mid-1960s, as part of the Czechoslovak officer corps became a cutting edge of the Czechoslovak reform movement. The officer corps was subsequently divided into a majority reformist element backing the Dubcek leadership and a "conservative" minority in opposition. In August 1968 the Czechoslovak armed forces experienced the trauma of Soviet invasion, to the last unit loyally following orders from the country's political and military leadership not to resist. The consequence was a demoralization and disintegration of the officer corps on a scale comparable to that experienced by the Hungarian officer corps in the wake of the Soviet military suppression of 1956. The Czechoslovak military establishment has yet to recover from this trauma; efforts since 1968 to reconsolidate the Czechoslovak armed forces under direct Soviet supervision have proceeded slowly, and can hardly have engendered in the Soviets much confidence in the CPA.

CONCLUSIONS

These quite different institutional histories must be kept in mind in drawing conclusions about the opportunities for and constraints on

the Soviet ability to utilize the Northern Tier armed forces in a European war. The remainder of this section will formulate, in summary form, conclusions on this point that emerge from the preceding overview of the Warsaw Pact and from the three country studies.

National Military Doctrine, Organization, and Institutional Evolution

- o Doctrinally and organizationally, all Northern Tier countries are prepared for one kind of military role: participation in a rapid, massive, offensive strike into NATO territory, as postulated in Soviet doctrine. The respective national military and political leaderships appear committed to this mission. The only distinctly national aspect of defense organization--the Polish system of "defense of national territory"--reinforces this offensive orientation.
- o Modernization has increased the combat capability of the Northern Tier armed forces, especially the Polish and East German forces, in the past decade. During this period, the armed forces of Poland continued to increase in size, while in the GDR they maintained the force level of the mid-1960s and in Czechoslovakia they declined substantially after 1968. The forces of the Northern Tier countries are maintained at a high degree of readiness.
- o Since the mid-1960s East Germany has had the greatest "defense burden" of the Northern Tier states. It has evidently devoted the highest proportion of national income to military affairs, and has had the largest percentage of its population under arms. Some economic constraints on higher levels of Polish defense expenditures have been evident since the early 1970s. In Czechoslovakia defense expenditures have lagged, a probable reflection of Soviet reservations about the CPA.
- o Professionally capable, cohesive officer corps emerged in the GDR and Poland in the past decade; educational levels are highest in Poland. An analogous process in Czechoslovakia was cut short by the 1968 Soviet invasion. The Czechoslovak

officer corps has yet to recover from that trauma; it may be further weakened by Czech-Slovak frictions.

- o Modernization and professionalization have challenged pervasive Party control of the military establishment in all three Northern Tier countries, although the resulting conflicts have often not been expressed in the "Party vs. army" institutional terms often assumed. The Party's response has differed in each case. The East German Party has had considerable success in creating a cadre of "Red Experts" and in utilizing the military in a broader social role. Poland's reemphasis of the role of political officers in response to greater professional autonomy is tacit admission of the failure of the "Red Expert" approach; in Czechoslovakia the military professional is subject to strict political control and Soviet supervision.
- o Stable and cohesive military leaderships exist in the GDR and Poland. Stability and continuity have characterized the GDR military elite since its inception; in Poland the military elite has displayed continuity only in the last five years, following considerable turmoil in the 1960s. In the case of Czechoslovakia, top-level military conflict fractured the cohesion of the military establishment in the late 1960s; after 1968 the Soviets enforced renewed (but perhaps artificial) unity.
- o Significant autonomy of the military institution has developed in Poland; such a development was cut short in Czechoslovakia and has not manifested itself in the GDR.
- o Conscripts in the Northern Tier military establishments represent a cross-section of their respective societies. As such, however good their military training and discipline, they lack the at least partial ideological commitment of Communist elites to Soviet interests. Anti-Soviet attitudes are strongest among Czechoslovak and Polish conscripts, but they evidently exist among East German conscripts as well.

Multilateral and Bilateral Military Ties

- o The Warsaw Pact remains an instrument of Soviet hegemony, notwithstanding its 1969 reorganization. The Pact's multilateral military institutions fail to grant the East European military establishments a meaningful role as junior partners. Moreover, the Pact institutions evidently still lack wartime functions.
- o The Warsaw Pact in fact assumes that in wartime the Northern Tier armed forces would be combined with Soviet forces at the army level in joint Fronts subordinated directly to the Soviet High Command. Soviet reservations about the proposed Polish Front are indicative of Soviet concerns about the reliability of East European forces operating autonomously.
- o The Northern Tier military elites are entangled in a network of relationships with the Soviet military with few parallels among other elite groups, ensuring Soviet influence on those elites in military affairs. Direct Soviet influence on the East European military establishment is strongest in the case of the GDR and, since 1968, Czechoslovakia.
- o Professionalization of the Northern Tier military elites is likely to engender rising professional expectations vis-à-vis the Soviet military which are unlikely to be fulfilled and thus constitute a source of potential tension. In Poland and Czechoslovakia especially, such professional grievances would inevitably be linked with nationalist feelings. The issues of outdated weaponry and Soviet domination of Warsaw Pact institutions, planning, and doctrine have engendered East European dissatisfaction in the past.
- o The Czechoslovak experience demonstrated how quickly, in propitious political circumstances, national sentiments can re-emerge in an East European officer corps, initially behind a facade of outward pro-Sovietism. The Romanian military deviation is further testimony to this possibility. These cases must influence Soviet perceptions of the reliability of the East European military elites under wartime or crisis conditions.

Utility and Reliability in European Contingencies

- o State or national interests of the Northern Tier countries, as defined by their respective Communist leaderships, coincide with those of the USSR to differing degrees. GDR and Soviet interests coincide most closely, since the GDR leadership most fears potential wartime circumstances under which the Soviets might be constrained to make a deal with the West at GDR expense. Poland's national rationale for fidelity to the USSR has declined as the threat of West German irredentism has faded, but its geopolitical position locks it into central involvement in a European war. Its leadership might thus be motivated to contribute to, rather than attempt to stand aside from, a successful Soviet offensive. In both countries there is a commitment to clear Warsaw Pact superiority over NATO. Czechoslovakia's geopolitical incentives to minimize involvement in a Warsaw Pact war came to the fore in 1968; they are presently suppressed but presumably still existent.
- o Soviet "lightning war" strategy may constitute one of the strongest Soviet levers for ensuring substantial Northern Tier military participation in a European war. In this contingency, given Soviet concerns about the reliability of the East Europeans, it would be to Soviet advantage to minimize consultation and preparation time and achieve quick multinational involvement of forces and early battlefield success. In such circumstances the Soviets may realistically calculate that the motivation and opportunities for national political or military leaders to "opt out" of a Soviet war may be quite limited. Indeed, the Soviets may calculate that only a "lightning war" strategy permits them to rely so heavily on East European military forces for European contingencies.
- o Operationally, "coalition warfare" would evidently be difficult and create a number of vulnerabilities. The strategy postulates close multilateral coordination in the evident

absence of preexisting integrated command and control and logistics systems and on a scale that has never been exercised.

- o Multilateral participation in the invasion of Czechoslovakia notwithstanding, the Northern Tier military establishments may be of dubious utility to the USSR in intra-bloc "policing" actions. The unopposed operations of the Polish and GDR armed forces in the Czechoslovak invasion created severe morale problems. The Soviets would probably be reluctant to attempt a multilateral suppression of a national uprising in Eastern Europe such as the Hungarian Revolution; they would be even more concerned about the reliability of the East Europeans in a joint invasion of Yugoslavia.
- o In terms of the central European threat that is of most concern to NATO--a lightning Soviet offensive--on balance, the utility and reliability of the Polish and East German military establishments appear to be greater than is sometimes assumed, and much greater than that of Czechoslovakia.

Domestic Roles

- o The record of military involvement in Communist politics in the Northern Tier states is mixed. The GDR military elite has remained uninvolved even during such leadership crises as the replacement of Ulbricht. In attempting to remain aloof from conflict among the political leadership, the Polish military elite has assumed a limited autonomous role in the political process. Before and after 1968 conservative Czechoslovak military leaders sought to influence political decisions. "Bonapartism" is thus a justified concern of Communist Party leaderships.
- o The USSR has yet to utilize successfully even "pro-Soviet" military leaders in Eastern Europe as a counter-elite to influence the national political process. Such Soviet use of the Northern Tier military elites is unlikely.
- o The Northern Tier military establishments are generally unsuited to serve as instruments of domestic repression. The

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one effort to date to utilize the regular military in this mode, in Poland in 1970, was counterproductive.

Appendix A

MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF THE WARSAW PACT

The Warsaw Pact institutional structure was designed to serve Soviet political and military interests and facilitate Soviet control of the organization. Over the years it has also come to reflect some of the evolutionary changes and tensions in the Warsaw Pact. When the Warsaw Treaty was signed in 1955 only two institutions--the Political Consultative Committee and the Joint Command--were officially mentioned in the text. A year later at the 1956 Prague session of the Political Consultative Committee (PCC), the Joint Secretariat and a Permanent Committee for Recommendations on Foreign-Political Questions were formed. In 1961 consultations of Foreign Ministers were established. None of these organs, however, was particularly active in the initial period of the alliance's existence; indeed, their functions could not be ascertained with any degree of certainty.

During the 1960s, the USSR placed greater stress on the military aspect of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). At that time the East Europeans began to exert pressure on Moscow for improved access to and greater input in WTO military affairs. Probably as a response to these pressures, the Soviets began to consider institutional reforms that could allay some East European grievances, while at the same time assuring Soviet control. According to a Polish source, the 1969 reorganization enhanced both "consultation" and "operational direction" of the Joint Armed Forces.¹ These reforms were ratified by the PCC in March 1969 in Budapest and have remained in force to the present. The Budapest reforms have included the establishment of several new organs (the Committee of Defense Ministers, the Military Council, and the Joint Staff) and the reorganization and rewriting of the statutes of the Joint Command (see Fig. A.1).

The main organ of the Warsaw Pact is the *Political Consultative Committee*, comprising the top political leaders of the member states. Originally it was scheduled to meet twice a year; in fact it has met less than once each year. Significantly, the PCC did not meet at all

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EAST EUROPEAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS: THE WARSAW PACT NORTHERN--ETC(U)

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
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
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SOURCE: Adapted from Michael Csizmas, *Der Warschauer Pakt*, Bern, SOI, 1973.

Fig. A.1 --Warsaw Treaty Organization military command structure

during the periods of greatest crisis in Eastern Europe (1956-1958 and March 1968-March 1969). One reason for this may be that decisions in the committee are apparently made on the basis of unanimity, giving deviant states such as Romania the opportunity to stalemate it. While the PCC is nominally charged with deciding on the most important political and military issues of interest to the alliance, this is hardly the case in reality.

The *Committee of Defense Ministers* is one of the new WTO institutions formally established at the 1969 Budapest session, although the ministers have apparently been meeting periodically since 1961.² The Committee, which is described as the highest military organ of the alliance, includes the WTO commander in chief and the chief of staff among its members. Its sessions are also attended by the chiefs of the general staffs of the national armies. The work of the committee involves proposals and recommendations on WTO military matters. Illustrative of the kinds of military matters falling within the Committee's competence, its March 1971 session was devoted to WTO military infrastructure and command and control problems.³ One Eastern European source claims that before any of the Committee's decisions can be accepted by the Political Consultative Committee as binding, they have to be approved by the national governments.⁴ Soviet writers have emphasized that the Committee ensures "increased collegiality," i.e., a stronger East European voice in WTO decisionmaking.⁵

The *Joint Command of the WTO Joint Armed Forces* is, apart from the PCC, the only organ which was established at the founding session of the WTO. Originally it comprised the commander in chief and the ministers of defense of the Eastern European countries, who served as his deputies for WTO purposes. This arrangement may have been a source of dissatisfaction in Eastern Europe, since the defense ministers were subordinated to a Soviet officer (the commander in chief) who was only a deputy defense minister of his own country. This situation was rectified at the Budapest meeting, when national deputy ministers replaced the ministers as deputies to the WTO commander in chief.⁶ The Joint Command, according to a Soviet source, also includes the commander of the "coalition air defense forces."⁷ Since East European air defense

forces have long been integrated in the Soviet air defense system, this evidently makes the Soviet Air Defense (PVO) commander an ex-officio member of the Joint Command. The exact functions and responsibilities of the Joint Command are difficult to ascertain from available evidence. It is clear that the Joint Command has certain administrative and coordinating prerogatives, but there is yet no evidence that it has assumed wartime command and control functions. Malcolm MackIntosh has compared it to a traditional European "war office," which administers the armed forces but does not command them in war.⁸ Recent Soviet military writings have not contradicted the suggestive statement on the issue contained in Sokolovskii's authoritative *Military Strategy*.

Operational units, including armed forces of different socialist countries, can be created to conduct joint operations in military theaters. The command of these units can be assigned to the Supreme High Command of the Soviet Armed Forces, with representation of the Supreme High Commands of the allied countries.⁹

The *Joint Staff* is another WTO military organ which was established permanently in 1969.¹⁰ It reportedly contains East European deputy chiefs of staff and other officials. The staff has been described as the "administrative organ of the commander in chief and the working organ of the Committee of Defense Ministers."¹¹ It organizes sessions of the Committee of Defense Ministers and the Military Council.

The *Joint Armed Forces* (JAF) have existed on paper since the founding of the WTO; Article 5 provided for the assignment of national contingents to the Joint Command. Although it is not certain at what point in the organization's history this occurred, the Joint Armed Forces now evidently incorporate the Groups of Soviet Forces in Eastern Europe, the entire East German army, the Polish "operational army," and other unspecified Eastern European contingents.* The adoption at Budapest of a new JAF statute (details of which have not been

*It remains unclear which units of the Czechoslovak army are included in the WTO Joint Armed Forces.

published) and some ambiguous statements by Soviet officers in the early 1970s caused Western speculation that the Joint Armed Forces had been transformed into a supranational, integrated force. However, both Soviet and Eastern European sources have consistently stressed that the national contingents in the JAF remain under the command of the respective national WTO deputy commander and that they continue to be national entities.¹²

Indeed, it may be speculated that the new system reinforced the principle of national control, on several counts: It required a deputy minister of defense, not the minister himself, to serve as deputy WP commander in chief and relay directives from the WP commander in chief to the portions of his national armed forces "assigned" to the Warsaw Pact; the deputy minister remained physically in his respective national Ministry of Defense; he was directly responsible to his minister of defense; and--in Yakubovskii's words--he carried out directives of the WP commander in chief in "consultation" with his respective national political leadership.¹³ The new system also gave the East European states a formal position in WP command institutions more comparable to that of the USSR. All three Soviet commanders in chief of the WP had been simultaneously principal deputy ministers of defense of the USSR, and it may be speculated that East Europeans resented subordination of their ministers of defense to a Soviet deputy minister, even for the very limited purposes of the WP chain of command.¹⁴ There does seem to be at least verbal disagreement on jurisdiction over the JAF in some areas. For example, one Soviet military writer has argued that it is the WTO commander in chief who is responsible for the "level of combat preparedness, organization, technical equipment, deployment and direction of the Joint Armed Forces,"¹⁵ while a Bulgarian source has asserted that the "national contingents remain under the command of their national commands, which are responsible for their organization, equipment, combat readiness and combat preparedness."¹⁶ It would appear that the principle of national command of national forces in peacetime has so far been preserved in the WTO.¹⁷

Another new military organ created at the Budapest meeting is the *Military Council*, permanently chaired by the WTO commander in chief

and including the East European deputy commanders and the WTO chief of staff. Although little information is available about its functions, Western and Communist sources suggest that it was set up as a consultative organ of the WTO's senior military officers.¹⁸ The former Warsaw Pact chief of staff has described the Military Council as a "collective military body with consultative and recommendary functions" that reviews training and other matters.¹⁹ Soviet commentators stress that the Council's recommendations "are as a rule always realized in practice by all allied armies."²⁰ The Military Council meets twice a year; a year-end meeting to discuss WP accomplishments during the year seems to have become a tradition.

Finally, the *Technical Committee of the Joint Armed Forces* was established to coordinate WTO military research and development and weapons acquisition programs, in conjunction with COMECON's Military-Industrial Committee.²¹ It is evidently intended to facilitate Soviet control and supervision of the national Eastern European defense industries.

NOTES TO APPENDIX A

1. *Sprawy Miedzynarodowe*, May 1970.
2. *Organizatsiya na Varshavskiyat Dogovor*, Sofia, 1976, p. 77.
3. A. Ratnikov, *Krasnaya zvezda*, March 24, 1971.
4. *Organizatsiya*, p. 78.
5. A. S. Bakhov, *Organizatsia Varshavskogo dogovora*, Moscow, Nauka, 1971, p. 90; I. Yakubovskiy, *Voenna-istoricheskii zhurnal*, May 1975.
6. Marian Jurek and Edward Skrzypkowski, *Uklad Warszawski*, Warsaw, MON, 1970, p. 53.
7. See G. F. Vorontsov, *Voennye Koalitsii I Koalitsionnye Voiny*, Moscow, 1967, p. 287.
8. Malcolm Mackintosh, *The Evolution of the Warsaw Pact*, Adelphi Papers, No. 58, June 1969, p. 6.
9. Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy, *Soviet Military Strategy*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963, p. 495. But see page 19 for a possible contradictory Polish statement.
10. *Obrana Lidu*, November 22, 1969, reported that earlier the staff had been constituted on an ad hoc basis to support individual joint maneuvers. In April 1973, a WTO "Convention on Privileges and Immunities" was promulgated, evidently to regulate the position of the East European members of the WTO institutions in Moscow.
11. *Boevoe sodruzhestvo bratskikh narodov I armii*, Moscow, 1975, p. 145.
12. Jurek and Skrzypkowski, p. 63; *Sovremennye problemy razornuzheniia*, Moscow, 1970, p. 271; Ceausescu to the State Council and Council of Ministers, *Scinteia*, April 11, 1969.
13. Interview with former Commander in Chief Yakubovskii, *Smena* February 3, 1970.
14. Interview with Polish Chief of Staff Chocha, PAP in English, May 13, 1970.
15. Cf. Vorontsov, p. 287.
16. *Organizatsiya*.

17. Yakubovskiy, *Smena*, February 3, 1970.
18. Mackintosh; Jurek and Skrzypkowski, p. 54.
19. S. M. Shtemenko, *Agitator*, April 1975.
20. *Boevoe sodruzhestvo* .
21. M. Titov, *Krasnaia zvezda*, January 8, 1976.

Appendix B

SELECTED DATA ON NORTHERN TIER MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Table B.1
SELECTED DATA ON MILITARY CAPABILITIES: CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Population and Forces	1962	1967	1973	1978
Population	13,581,186 ^a	14,500,000	14,600,000	15,070,000
Military Service:				
Ground Forces		2 years	2 years	2 years
Air Force		3 years	27 years	
Navy				
Total Regular Forces:	185,000	225,000	190,000	186,000
Ground Forces	150,000	175,000	150,000	140,000
Motorized Divisions		10	5	5
Tank Divisions		4	5	5
Airborne Divisions		1	1 brigade	1 regiment
Artillery Divisions				
Air Force/Air Defense	35,000	50,000	40,000	46,000
Combat Aircraft		600	504	613
Internal Security and Border Troops	35,000	40,000	35,000	10,000 ^b
Total Military Forces	220,000	265,000	225,000	196,000

SOURCE: IISS, *The Military Balance*, for data for 1962, 1967, 1973, and 1978.

^a 1962 population data are from 1960.

^b Only border troops listed. No figures for Internal Security Troops.

Table B.2
SELECTED DATA ON MILITARY CAPABILITIES: GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Population and Forces	1962	1967	1973	1978
Population	17,280,000 ^a	17,200,000	17,000,000	16,830,000
Military Service:				
Ground Forces		18 months	18 months	18 months
Air Force		2 years	18 months	
Navy		2 years	18 months	
Total Regular Forces:				
Ground Forces	85,000	127,000	132,000	157,000
Motorized Divisions	65,000	85,000	90,000	105,000
Tank Divisions		2	4	4
Airborne Divisions		2	2	2
Air Force/Air Defense	9,000	25,000	25,000	36,000
Combat Aircraft		300	320	362
Navy	11,000	17,000	17,000	16,000
Internal Security and Border Troops	60,000	70,000	80,000	71,500
Total Military Forces	145,000	197,000	210,000	230,000

SOURCE: IISS, *The Military Balance*, for data for 1962, 1967, 1973, and 1978.

^a1962 population data are from 1960.

Table B.3
SELECTED DATA ON MILITARY CAPABILITIES: POLAND

Population and Forces	1962	1967	1973	1978
Population	29,527,000 ^a	32,000,000	33,272,000	34,950,000
Military Service:				
Ground Forces		2 years	2 years	2 years
Air Force		3 years	2 years	2 years
Navy		3 years	3 years	3 years
Total Regular Forces:	257,000	270,000	280,000	306,500
Ground Forces	200,000	185,000	200,000	222,000
Motorized Divisions		9 ^b	8	8
Tank Divisions		5 ^b	5	5
Airborne Divisions		1	1	1
Amphibious Assault Divisions		1	1	1
Air Force/Air Defense	45,000	70,000	55,000	62,000
Combat Aircraft		820	696	725
Navy	12,000	15,000	25,000	22,500
Territorial, Internal Security and Border Troops	45,000	45,000	73,000	95,000
Total Military Forces	302,000	315,000	353,000	401,500

SOURCE: IISS, *The Military Balance*, for data for 1962, 1967, 1973, and 1978.

^a 1962 population data are from 1960.

^b Armored Divisions.

Appendix C

SELECTED DATA ON NORTHERN TIER MILITARY EXPENDITURES

This appendix assumes that official defense expenditures are a meaningful category embracing overt military expenditures, with the exception of military research and development costs. It assumes, further, that for the specialized purposes of tracking relative changes in East European defense expenditures, an index of defense expenditures in local currencies as a proportion of national income (net material product) according to official East European data is more useful than an index constructed from Western dollar estimates of defense expenditures as a percentage of gross national product. It assumes, finally, that differential price changes in the six East European countries can be ignored.




Fig. C.1--Comparison of defense expenditure as percent of national income, Northern Tier countries




Fig. C.2--Comparison of defense expenditure as percent of state budget, Northern Tier countries




Fig. C.3--Comparison of defense expenditure in local currency (billions), Northern Tier countries

Table C.1
SELECTED DATA ON EAST EUROPEAN MILITARY EXPENDITURES
1962-1976

Year	Direct Defense Expenditures							
	As Percent of			In Local Currency--millions			Military R&D	
	National Income	National Product	State Budget	Personnel Costs	Operations, Maintenance, and Procurement	Total	Estimated Total (millions)	As Percent of National Income
Czechoslovakia								
1962	6.3	--	8.8	2047	6168	10854	1259	0.7
1963	6.5	--	8.6	2091	6356	10829	1380	0.8
1964	6.2	3.9	7.8	2454	5515	10217	1552	0.9
1965	4.7	5.7	6.8	2539	5357	7896	1722	1.0
1966	4.7	5.7	--	2520	6370	8890	1826	0.9
1967	4.5	5.7	7.1	2710	7446	10156	2083	0.9
1968	4.3	5.7	7.6	3014	7931	10945	2332	0.9
1969	4.2	5.6	6.8	3282	8752	12034	2038	0.7
1970	4.1	3.8	6.4	2795	9675	12470	2249	0.7
1971	4.0	3.7	6.1	3014	9958	12972	2384	0.7
1972	3.8	3.8	6.1	3128	10041	13169	2318	0.7
1973	3.8	4.0	5.8	3275	10529	13804	2527	0.7
1974	3.8	3.8	5.7	3530	11208	14738	2729	0.7
1975	3.7	3.8	6.4	3416	11717	15133	3000	0.7
1976	--	--	6.4	3162	12768	15930	3298	--
East Germany								
1962	3.6	--	4.9	472	2228	2700	135	0.2
1963	3.7	--	5.0	574	2226	2800	140	0.2
1964	3.6	2.5	5.1	593	2307	2900	140	0.2
1965	3.7	3.0	5.6	629	2271	3100	155	0.2
1966	3.6	3.3	5.3	670	2521	3200	160	0.2
1967	3.9	3.7	6.1	717	2883	3600	180	0.2
1968	4.9	5.7	8.1	812	4002	4812	241	0.2
1969	5.1	5.9	8.0	848	4381	5229	261	0.3
1970	5.3	5.1	8.2	838	4874	5712	286	0.3
1971	5.3	5.2	7.6	837	5182	6019	301	0.3
1972	5.2	5.1	7.2	858	5329	6217	311	0.3
1973	5.2	5.4	7.0	929	5642	6571	329	0.3
1974	5.0	5.4	6.5	957	5789	6746	337	0.3
1975	5.1	5.5	6.3	1058	6096	7154	358	0.3
1976	--	--	--	1126	6487	7613	381	--
Poland								
1962	4.3	--	7.4	4149	14229	18378	248	0.1
1963	4.5	--	8.2	4328	16367	20695	272	0.1
1964	4.5	3.5	8.0	4771	17110	21881	294	0.0
1965	4.4	5.1	8.1	4623	18632	23255	297	0.1
1966	4.4	5.3	7.9	4412	20801	25213	338	0.1
1967	4.4	5.4	8.2	4725	21713	26438	412	0.1
1968	4.6	4.8	9.3	4981	25351	30332	442	0.1
1969	4.9	5.0	9.5	5150	28369	33519	424	0.1
1970	4.6	4.1	9.0	4740	29344	34084	450	0.1
1971	4.3	3.9	9.4	5760	30994	36754	986	0.1
1972	3.9	3.3	8.5	6223	30748	36971	1274	0.1
1973	3.8	3.2	8.4	6885	33556	40441	1678	0.2
1974	3.6	3.0	7.3	7638	36092	43730	1876	0.2
1975	3.5	3.1	6.7	8909	38693	47602	2070	0.2
1976	--	--	7.0	9617	43311	52928	2504	0.2

Table C.1--continued

SOURCES: Defense expenditures as percent of national income and state budget were computed from data in the following sources:

National income, 1962-1970:

Thad P. Alton et al., *Estimates of Military Expenditures in Eastern Europe* (ACDA/E-207), March 1973, pp. 5-7.

National income, 1971-1976:

Europa Publications Limited, *The Europa Yearbook: A World Survey*, Vol. I, Part II, Europe, London, 1972-1977.

State Budget, 1962-1976:

The Europa Yearbook, 1963-1977.

Percent of gross national product 1962-1976, was obtained from:

The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*, London, 1966-1977.

Defense expenditures, personnel costs, operations, maintenance and procurement, plus estimated military R&D, were obtained from the following sources:

1962-1970:

Alton et al., *Estimates of Military Expenditures*, March 1973, pp. 31-36.

1971-1976:

Alton et al., "Defense Expenditures in Eastern Europe, 1965-1976," United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *East European Economies Post-Helsinki*, a compendium of papers, Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, August 25, 1977, pp. 275-276.

Appendix D

SELECTED DATA ON BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS
OF NORTHERN TIER OFFICER CORPS

SELECTED DATA ON BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF NORTHERN TIER OFFICER CORPS

COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP OF NORTHERN TIER OFFICERS

(percent per year)

	1945	48	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75
Poland	15	40	50		51			67					67					80					85		
GDR					74	79.5	86						96.3	96	95	96.1	97			98	98				
CSSR																75									

EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF NORTHERN TIER OFFICER CORPS

(Academic Degrees, percent per year)

	12	14	17	18	20	25	25	25	25	30	30	30	35	35	40	40	50
Poland																	
GDR									6			13	14	16		22	
CSSR																	

MILITARY TECHNICIANS OR ENGINEERS

(Degree Holders, percent per year)

	13	25	25	25	40	40	50
Poland							
GDR							
CSSR							

SOURCES: Dale Herspring, "Technology and the Changing Political Officer in the Armed Forces: The Polish and East German Cases," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Winter, 1977, p. 393; Dale Herspring, *East German Civil-Military Relations: The Impact of Technology 1949-72*, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1973, pp. 192-193, speech by Defense Minister Lomsky, CTK International Service, June 2, 1966, in FBIS USSR and Eastern Europe, No. 107/66, June 3, 1966; Polish and GDR media references.

Appendix E

OUTLINE OF THE ROMANIAN MILITARY DEVIATION*

Because Romania has raised the most serious successful challenge to Soviet interests in the Warsaw Pact to date, its defiance deserves careful examination. The Romanian military deviation is of particular relevance to a study of the Warsaw Pact Northern Tier in two regards. First, so long as Romania is able to adopt positions opposed to Soviet preferences and yet still participate in WTO councils, it constitutes at least a minor constraint on the USSR's ability to totally dominate the Warsaw Treaty Organization. This point was dramatically demonstrated in December 1978, when Romania evidently resisted (and publicized) Soviet demands for higher levels of WTO defense expenditures. Second, the Romanian military deviation derives from East European nationalism. While the situation of the Northern Tier countries is quite different, and while the USSR would presumably not tolerate a "Romania" in that area, the Romanian military deviation probably contains some elements that strike a responsive note among "nationalist" elements of other East European military establishments. Romanian efforts in the late 1960s to recast WTO institutions so as to allow greater East European participation found support in Czechoslovakia and perhaps in other East European countries as well.

The uniqueness of Romania's defiance of the USSR consists primarily in the fact that it has been motivated exclusively by nationalism. Unlike the Czechoslovak reform movement in 1968, the Romanians have shown no desire to tamper with Leninist ideology; they have opposed Moscow only when their perceived national interests have been disregarded or threatened.

Originally a reaction to Soviet plans of the early 1960s for an economic division of labor in COMECON that would have relegated the country to a mainly agricultural role, the Romanian challenge quickly

* This Appendix summarizes material contained in A. Alexiev, *Romania and the Warsaw Pact: The Defense Policy of a Reluctant Ally*, The Rand Corporation, P-6270, January 1979.

grew into a major deviation from accepted foreign-political and military-political norms of behavior in the Warsaw Pact. In the process, Bucharest implicitly, and at times openly, rejected some of the guiding principles of the Warsaw Pact as a military alliance and substituted for them a set of measures designed to reflect Romanian national interests. These have included promulgation of a new defense doctrine, reorganization of the defense system of the country, setting up an indigenous arms industry, and a new attitude toward military relations with Warsaw Pact allies and non-Pact countries.

The major innovation of the new Romanian defense doctrine has been the elevation of *national* defense as the guiding principle of the country's defense effort. In direct contradiction to Warsaw Pact doctrine based on Soviet-led coalition warfare, national defense is proclaimed in the new Romanian concept the exclusive prerogative of the nation-state and valid only within national territory. The type of war envisaged in the new doctrine reflects the changed threat perception of the country, and is of an exclusively defensive nature. The method of conducting a national war of defense is the transformation of any armed conflict on Romanian territory into a "people's war," a concept similar to the Yugoslav doctrine of total national defense but without precedent in the Warsaw Pact. In line with the emphasis on "people's war," the Romanians have reorganized their defense system by instituting an extensive net of paramilitary organizations and compulsory civilian participation in defense.

As an integral part of the Romanian deviation in the military sphere, the country has engaged in an intensive effort to achieve a degree of self-reliance in armaments and to decrease dependence on the Soviet Union. The major emphasis in this effort has been on weaponry suitable for the needs of "people's war," but production of high-technology equipment has also been initiated. Of particular interest are cooperative agreements with non-Warsaw Pact countries to produce items such as jet fighters (Yugoslavia), helicopters (France), jet engines (Great Britain), and missile boats (China).

Although remaining a nominal member of the Pact, Romania has striven to reduce its participation in the organization's affairs to

a minimum, while consistently rejecting, particularly after the Czechoslovak invasion, any Warsaw Pact right to interfere in the affairs of the member states. It has refused to participate in joint Pact maneuvers and has not allowed such maneuvers on its territory since 1962, except for limited staff map exercises. The issue of foreign troops on their territory is apparently so sensitive for the Romanians that they have not allowed Soviet troops (which were withdrawn in 1958) even to transit the country. Romania has stopped sending its officers to Soviet military academies and, according to the public testimony of former Czech intelligence officers, apparently limited intelligence cooperation with the Soviets as early as the mid-1960s. The fact that Romania continues to participate in the work of the Pact's organs has made it impossible for the Soviets to reach automatic consensus on every issue. Perhaps the greatest significance of the Romanian military deviation is the very fact that it has been tolerated by the Soviets for so long. It undermines the credibility of the Pact's claims to unity and common defense interests.

A final noteworthy attribute of the Romanian military deviation is that it has been supported and developed by the country's military establishment, which has evidently overwhelmingly backed Ceausescu's anti-Soviet policies despite 20 years of pro-Soviet socialization prior to the deviation. As such, it is a dramatic indication that nationalism can emerge as a potent force in the East European military establishments.