Wartime Interoperability Problems Posed by Differences in South Korean and United States Army Tactics.
Abstract
This study attempts to determine if there are serious problems which could result in time of war from differences in tactics used by Republic of Korea and United States ground forces. Although the Republic of Korea has adopted a form of American tactics, such factors as terrain, weaponry and the North Korean threat have dictated modifications in doctrine by the South Korean Army. The specific tactical forms analyzed in this study include the offense and defense, airborne, airmobile and amphibious operations, and several types of unconventional warfare operations. Investigations reveals that there are many similarities between U.S. and R.O.K. doctrine, but that there are also several major differences, some of which are significant enough to cause needless casualties. A worst-case combat scenario is presented to demonstrate the possible effects of tactical differences. The study concludes that the differences in R.O.K. and U.S. tactics are significant and warrant corrective action prior to combined combat operations. Differences in map symbology, equipment and force organization which could hamper combined operations are also highlighted. The study recommends that U.S. forces in Korea be trained in Korean tactics, and that this concept be expanded to include U.S. forces elsewhere which have contingency missions for the area. The study further recommends that a U.S. Army field manual which explains the differences in tactics be published for reference. Finally, since analysis reveals that problems are minimized at lower echelons, it is recommended that cross-attachment of Korean and American units be accomplished at the lowest level possible. (author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 06, 1980
- Accession Number
- ADA094211
Entities
People
- James M. Simpson
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College