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DEFENSE ATTACHE SAIGON: RVNAF QUARTERLY ASSESSMENT, 3RD QUARTER--ETC(U)
MAY 74 J E MURRAY, W A WILLIAMS

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End Quarter FY 74

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SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal - RVNAF Quarterly Assessment

Commander
U.S. Support Activities Group
Nakhon Phanom, RTAFB
Thailand

The attached assessment is forwarded in compliance with JCS Secret message, 072105Z Mar 73, subject: Continuing SEA Reports (U).

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as

WALTER A. WILLIAMS
Colonel, USAF
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FOREWORD

It may be true that an Army fights on its stomach, but it also fights for it, too. Hunger is an inspiration.

Whatever the strategic ideological purpose of the war, its practical tactical one, particularly in the Delta, in this last quarter was, rice.

The rice war is also a price war. A two edged sword that helped and hurt. It forced the enemy for want of food to come to the ARVN guns, but gnawed at ARVN morale for want of the wherewithal for food. The pay for married soldiers, sailors and airmen is simply not enough.

Seventy-five percent GVN inflation in one year is an NVA ally, unsettling as the flowering SA-7's, the harassment of the refugee centers, the six reserve divisions north of the DMZ, the continued influx of troops, tanks and artillery, improvement of roads, extension of pipelines, upgrading of the Dong Ha port and the degrading loss of Tonle Cham Ranger Camp after 418 days of siege.

Tactically, however, overall, RVNAF was triumphant. Ever improving. While the enemy overran outposts and ambushed two 32d Regiment battalions of the ill-starred 21st Division, the ARVN 7th aided by the 7th Ranger Group, won GVN's greatest victory since An Loc and Quang Tri, avenging at Tri Phap the debacle that signalled to the U.S. in 1963--the ARVN could not then go it alone.

If there is any casualty in this war, it is Statistical Analysis, especially the efficacy of the odious "body count." If some statistics are suspect, some nevertheless deserve respect. Especially when the possibility of being dead right may add up to being dead.

In this war, at this time, one cannot miss the literal meaning of the phrase "deadly routine."

The life-crucial time of the day for the ARVN soldier is routinely 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon as he returns from his daily stint in the field, assembles to cook rice and clusters with his fellows for massacre by mortar. The

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urge to cluster also takes its toll with mines and booby traps. Four and five, instead of one or two, are killed or wounded with each explosion.

Needless to say, training, or more to the point, retraining is the prescription of the day, with a lesson-learning warning to the U.S. soldier. The buddy system means stay close. But not too close...

While sudden end to the continued bloodletting is hoped for, each side is not misled by this mirage. Each prepares for protracted ordeal.

Both sides are tidying up, and systematizing. The NVA is strengthening its reserves, cleaning out its field hospitals, pulling in air transport from China, standardizing weaponry (turning in captured U.S.), and even developing its own version of Rest and Recuperation. Whereas the work horse, or rather winged horse, of our R&R was the Boeing 707, the wheeled equine of the NVA R&R is the Molotova truck.

With the RVNAF Vietnamization is progressing steadily. The first in-country class of Huey pilots (41 of them) graduated. And the first eight F-5E's are flying. The Ranger reserve concept led to triumph at Tri Phap and Duc Hue. Over 384,000 refugees are now resettled. The spanking new Infantry Training Center at Bearcat is complete, and the railroad quadrangle between key logistic pivots: Newport, the Army Arsenal, Long Binh and the Property Disposal Center at Saigon Island, came at the timely moment of fuel crisis and fund shortage.

The funding famine saw ARVN requisitions suspended for four months and VNAF restricted to priority needs; MOGAS was cut almost 20% and ammo to $18 million a month, the lowest since the Cease-fire. This despite some of the most desperate fighting. Withal the RVNAF has girded itself for the management battle. Fortunately, it isn't phased by whatever the nature of the multi-faceted conflict. Military commanders are getting more economy conscious. They are learning how to ease the squeeze.

For instance, Lieutenant General Truong, Commanding General of I Corps reports: "A thousand rounds of incoming used to be enough to drive us out of a position. By contrast, we would pour 100,000 shells and bombs on a communist position and they would still be there.

"The difference is that they were digging holes and we were using sandbags. Well, sandbags cost 11 cents apiece and holes cost nothing. So now we dig holes and we dig them deep. We mean to stay."

They will stay. If we give them shovels and whatever else they need. And they need practically everything except adrenalin. They have plenty of that.

JOHN E. MURRAY
Major General, USA
Defense Attache

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A	Attack
AA	Anti-Aircraft
AAA	Anti-Aircraft Artillery
AAD	ARVN Associated Depot
AB	Air Base
ABF	Attack(s) by Fire
ABN	Airborne
AC&W	Aircraft Control and Warning
ACA	Aircraft Clearance Authority
ACC	Army Calibration Center
ACFT-A/C	Aircraft
ACI	Analytical Critical Inspection
ACO	Administrative Contracting Officer
ACOS	Assistant Chief of Staff
AD	Air Division/Air Defense
ADP	Automatic Data Processing
ADTAT	Air Defense Technical Assistance Team
AFDL	Auxiliary Floating Dry Dock
AFM	Air Force Manual
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AGE	Aerospace Ground Equipment
AGP	Auxiliary General Purpose
AIM	Air Intercept Missile

AIMI	Army Intensified Management Item
ALC	Air/Army/Area Logistics Command
AMC	Air/Army Material Command
AMSF-V	Area Maintenance Supply Facility-Vietnam
AO	Area of Operations
AOB	Air Order of Battle
AOSAF	DAO Air Force Division
AOSND-L	Navy Division Logistics
APL	Auxiliary Personnel Lighter
ARDF	Airborne Radar Direction Finding
ARL	Auxiliary Landing Craft Repair
ARMCOM	*Armament Command*
ARTY	Artillery
ARVN	Army Republic of Vietnam
ASA	Assistant Secretary of the Army
ASB	Advanced Support Base
ASC	Allowance Source Code
ASL	Authorized Stock List
ASPB	Advanced Support Patrol Boat
ATC	Air Training Command/Center-Armored Troops Carried
ATCK	Attack

ATLC	Air Technical Logistics Command
AUTH	Authorized
AVGAS	Aviation Gasoline
BA	Base Area
BBLS	Barrels
BC	Transportation Barge
BCE	Base Civil Engineer
BCM	Base Construction Material
BDA	Bomb Damage Assessment
BILI	Basic Issue Item List
BN	Battalion
BOA	Basic Ordering Agreement
BOH	Balance on Hand
BOM	Bill of Materiel
BS	Bachelor of Science
BW	Boston Whaler
CCB	Command Communications Boat
CD & LD	Community Defense & Local Development
C-E	Communications Electronics
CENCOM	Combined Central Highway and Waterway Committee
CETS	Contract Engineering Technical Services
CEMT	Command Equipment Management Team
CFST	Contract Field Service Team

CG	Commanding General
CHD	Cablehead
CIC	Corps Interrogation Center
CINCPAC	Commander-In-Chief, Pacific
CINCPACAF	Commander-In-Chief Pacific Airforce
CINCPACFLT	Commander-In-Chief, Pacific Fleet
CLC	Central Logistics Command
CMA	Communications Management Agency
CMD	Command/Capital Military District
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CO	Company
COMM	Communications
CONUS	Continental United States
COR	Contracting Officer's Representative
C&P	Care and Preservation
CRDC	Central Reconstruction & Development Council
CRIP	Coastal Radar Improvement Plan
CRS	Coastal Radar System/Site
CS	Crew Served
CSB	Combat Salvage Boat
CTC	Central Training Command
CTF	Commander Task Force
CY	Calendar Year
D/S	Direct Support

DA	Department of the Army
DAO	Defense Attache Office, SGN RVN
DASD	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
DC	Direct Current
DCDRLOG	Deputy Commander Logistics
DCSLOG	Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics
DER	Destroyer Escort Radar Picket
DET	Detachment
DFSC	Defense Fuels Supply Center
DIELIEM	Korean Contractor Based in Vietnam
DIFM	Due In For Maintenance
DIRCON	Director of Construction
DIV	Division
DLI	Defense Language Institute
DMJM	Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Mendenhall
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DODAC	Department of Defense Ammunition Code
DOI	Director of Intelligence
DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam
DSU	Direct Support Unit
DTC	Division Training Center
DTE	Dial Telephone Exchange
EBD	Engineer Base Depot
ECD	Electronic Combat Detachment
ECCOI	Eastern Construction Company International

ECL	English Comprehension Level
ECP	Engineering Change Proposal
ELTP	English Language Training Program
EM	Enlisted Man
EMO	Equipment Management Office
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EOQ	Economic Order Quantity
ERC	Electronic Repair Center
FAA	Federal Aviation Agency
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FAX	Facsimile
FB	Fuel Barge
FEC	Federal Electric Corporation
FE	Facilities Engineering
FNC	Floating Naval Club
FSN	Federal Stock Number
FTR	Fighter
GM	General Motors
GP	Group
GPWD	General Political Warfare Department
GVN	Government of Vietnam
HAZCON	Hazardous Condition
HELO	Helicopter

HES	Hamlet Evaluation System
HP	Horse Power
HQ	Headquarters
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IBM	International Business Machines
ICCS	International Commission for Control and Supervision
ICS	Integrated Communications System
IIMS	Intensive Items Management System
ILC	International Logistics Command
INF	Infantry
IRAN	Inspect and Repair as Necessary
ISB	Intermediate Support Base
IST	Instructor In-Service Training
ITO	Installation Transportation Office
JCRC	Joint Casulty Resolution Center
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JEIM	Jet Engine Intermediate Maintenance
JGS	Joint General Staff
JOC	Joint Operations Center
JSOP	Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
KBA	Killed by Air
KC	Khmer Communists
KIA	Killed in Action

K	Thousand
KM	Kilometer
LAW	Light Anti-Tank Weapon
LCM	Landing Craft Mechanized
LCMMS	Landing Craft Mechanized Mine Sweeper
LCPL	Landing Craft Personnel Large
LCU	Landing Craft Utility
LCVP	Vehicle/Personnel Landing Craft
LDPC	Logistics Data Processing Center
LEI	Life Extension Inspection
LOC	Line(s) of Communication
LOGAIR	Logistic Air Support
LOX	Liquid Oxygen
LSB	Logistics Support Base/Branch
LSI	Lear Siegler Incorporated
LSIL	Large Infantry Landing Ship
LSM	Landing Ship Medium
LSM/H	Landing Ship Hospital
LSSL	Large Support Landing Ship
LST	Landing Ship Tank
LTL	Interprovincial Road
LVTR	Landing Vehicle Tracked Retriever
M&S	Maintenance & Supply

M/T	Measurement Ton
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MARCORPS	Marine Corps
MASF	Military Assistance Service Funded
MATTS	Military Air Terminal Transportation Services
MCP	Military Construction Program
MED	Materiel Exploitation Division
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
MEDTC	Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia
MEMI	Master Equipment Management Index
MEW	Maintenance Engineering Wing
MHE	Materiel Handling Equipment
MI	Military Intelligence
MILSTAMP	Military Standard Transportation Movement Procedure
MILCON	Military Construction
MLMS	Motor Launch Mine Sweeper
MMC	Medium Maintenance Center/Material Management Center
MOGAS	Motor Gas
MOI	Method of Instruction
MOND	Ministry of National Defense
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
MR	Military Region

MRMC	Maintenance Repair & Minor Construction Program
MRO	Manual Release Order
MRTTH	Military Region: Thua Thien-Hue
MS	Master of Science
MSC	Military Sealift Command/Minesweeper Coastal
MSD	Military Security Department
MSM	Minesweeper, Mechanized
MSR	Minesweeper, River
MSRCO	Master Ship Repair Contract Office
MSS	Military Security Service
MTN	Military Telecommunications System
MTT	Mobile Training Team
MTS	Mobile Training Set
MWV	Ministry of War Veterans
NGFS	Naval Gunfire Support
NM	Nautical Miles
NMMA	National Materiel Management Agency
NORM	Not Operational Ready - Maintenance
NORS	Not Operational Ready - Supply
NPC	National Police Command
NRTD	Not Reparable This Depot
NRTS	Not Reparable this Station

NTC	National Training Center
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
OASA	Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army
OASD	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
OB	Operating Base/Order of Battle
OCE	Office of Civil Engineer
OIC	Officer In Charge
OJT	On-The-Job-Training
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OPR	Office Pricing Responsibility
OPCON	Operational Control
OPTAR	Operational Targets
OR	Operational Ready
OST	Order and Shipping Time
(P)	Province
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PAR	Precision Approach Radar
PACOM	Pacific Command
PACCOMMAREA	Pacific Communications Area
PA&E	Pacific Architects and Engineers
PBR	Patrol Boat River
PCE	Patrol Craft Escort
PCE	Patrol Craft Fast

PDM	Periodic Depot Maintenance
PF	Popular Force
PG	Post Graduate
PGM	Patrol Gun Boat Motor
PHOTINT	Photo Intelligence
PI	Photo Interpretation
PLL	Prescribed Load List
PM	Preventive Maintenance
PMS	Planned Maintenance System
POI	Program of Instruction
POL	Petroleum Oil and Lubricants
POLWAR	Political Warfare
POM	Program Objectives Memorandum
PPBS	Planning, Programming and Budget System
PQAP	Petroleum Quality Assurance Representative
PRB	Publications Review Board
PRC	Portable Radio Communications/Peoples Republic of China
PRG	People's Revolutionary Government
PSDF	People's Self Defense Force
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
PSYWAR	Psychological Warfare
PW	Prisoner of War
QA	Quality Assurance
QL	National Road

RAMMS	Republic of Vietnam Logistics Data Processing Center
RB	Refuel Barge
RCN	Referenced Control Number
RECCE	Reconnaissance, Flight
RECON	Reconnaissance, Ground
REGT	Regiment
REP	Representative
RF	Regional Forces
RGR	Ranger
ROK	Republic of Korea
RPC	River Patrol Craft/Reparable Processing Center
RR	Rail Road
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
RVNAFLS	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Language School
S/T	Short Ton
SA	Surface to Air/Small Arms
SAALC	San Antonio Air Logistics Center
SAAFO	Special Assistant to the Ambassador for Field Operations
SATP	Security Assistance Training Program
SBD	Signal Base Depot
SCD	Special Collection Department
SCUBA	Self Contained Underwater Breathing Apparatus

SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
SIMS	Single Integrated Military System
SMALC	Sacramento Air Logistics Center
S/NFD	Secret/No Foreign Dissemination
SOC	Special Operations Center
SOP	Standard Operating Proceduce
SP	Self-Propelled
STCAN	From (French designed river Patrol craft)
STCP	Sector Tactical Command Post
STS	Specialty Training Standards
SVN	South Vietnam
TA	Table of Allowance
TACAIR	Tactical Air Support
TC	Training Center
TCTO	Time Compliance Technical Order
TDY	Temporary Duty
TF	Territorial Forces
THAI AM	Thai American
TMDE	Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment
TMS	Training Management Center
TNG	Training
TOC	Tactical Operations Center

TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TOW	Tube Launched, Optically Tracked, Wire Guided Missile
TSC	Tandem Switching Center
TSN	Tan Son Nhut
TTB	Technical Translation Branch
TWV	Tactical Wheeled Vehicle
UB	Utility Boat
UHT	Undergraduate Helicopter Training
UMD	Unit Management Document
UPT	Undergraduate Pilot Training
US	Unites States
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USAID/AID	United States Agency for International Development
USARPAC	United States Army, Pacific
USEF	Unidentified Size Enemy Force
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
USSAG	United States Support Activities Group
VAA	Vietnamese Army Arsenal
VAC	Vehicle Authorization List
VARS	Visual Air Reconnaissance Search
VC	Viet Cong

VDA	Vietnam Dredging Agency
VDP	Vehicle Deadlined Parts
VF	Voice Frequency
VN	Vietnam
VNAF	Vietnamese Air Force
VNAF-ELS	Vietnamese Air Force English Language School
VNMA	Vietnamese Military Academy
VNMC	Vietnamese Marine Corps
VNN	Vietnamese Navy
VNNA	Vietnamese Naval Academy
VNNSC	Vietnamese Navy Supply Center
VNNSY	Vietnamese Navy Ship Yard
WHEC	High Endurance Cutter
WIA	Wounded in Action
WLV	Floating Radar Site
WPAFB	Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
WPB	Patrol Boat
WRALC	Warner-Robins Air Logistics Center
YFR	Refrigerated Covered Lighter
YLLC	Salvage, Light Lift Craft
YOG	Yard Oiler
YR	Floating Repair

YRBM	Repair, Berthing and Messing Barge
YTL	Small Harbor Tug
YTM	Medium Harbor Tug
YW	Barge Water

CHAPTER 1

THREAT ASSESSMENT

1. (C) BACKGROUND: During the past quarter, the Communists increased their combat capability in the South by continuing personnel infiltration and an unprecedented level of logistical shipments. In the North, they constituted a strategic reserve that could be committed quickly to the South. Their strategy appears to include economic development in the North, development of "liberated areas" in the South, and reinforcement of the forces in the South for at least the duration of 1974. Meanwhile, the enemy retains the option of conducting major attacks or initiating a general offensive.

2. (S) NORTH VIETNAMESE DEVELOPMENTS:

a. Statements by high party and DRV officials during the first quarter of 1974 place major emphasis on reconstruction and development in the North. At the February session of the National Assembly, convened to promulgate the Resolution of the 22nd Plenum of the Party Central Committee, Vice Premier and Politburo Member, Le Thanh Nghi, delivered the most comprehensive report on economic matters at an Assembly session since 1965. He announced the DRV's plans for economic revitalization and recovery during 1974 and 1975 and listed the priorities of the 1974 State Plan as follows:

(1) Rapidly finish healing the wounds of war.

(2) Strive to rehabilitate and develop the economy.

(3) Continue to build the technical and material foundations of socialism.

(4) Consolidate the socialist regime.

(5) Stabilize the living conditions of the people.

(6) Consolidate defense.

(7) Endeavor to fulfill the duty to the heroic South.

b. The 1974 State Plan and Guidelines through 1975 are intended to lead up to a five-year plan (1976-1980) and a 10 to 15 year development plan is under consideration.

Whereas earlier economic planning was essentially a year-to-year effort to use whatever resources were available after war-related needs were met, this latest planning will require sustained, dependable inputs of resources over a period of years.

c. The targets and scope of the 1974 State Plan mark it as the most ambitious and comprehensive plan in the history of the DRV, envisioning a 21 per cent increase in gross national product. The goals are to be achieved through these measures:

(1) Fifty per cent increase in state investment in capital construction.

(2) Increased availability of skilled labor through:

(a) Eighty-three per cent increase in recruitment of technical worker trainees.

(b) 22.3 per cent increase in vocation school enrollment.

(3) Intensified enforcement of socialist laws.

(4) Greater efforts to improve management and planning.

(5) Combining the economy with national defense.

d. In mid-March, Vice Premier Nghi appeared to give even more emphasis to reconstruction. "We should not tend toward leisure and comfort...nor should we be too bent on maintaining vigilance and making preparations for war and thus become unsteady and undecided in mobilizing all forces and latent capabilities to intensively perform the task of economic restoration and development..."

e. The emphasis on reconstruction and development does not mean that the long-standing goal of taking over the South has been discarded. Nghi asserted that the reconstruction program for 1974 and 1975 is essential to "forwarding the revolution in South Vietnam."

f. During 1973, the DRV concentrated on rebuilding its lines of communications, its military rear service capability, its strategic reserves and its combat

capability in the South. All are at unprecedented levels. The DRV apparently believes it can now begin to turn at least partial attention to the economy in the North and still maintain its support to the south.

3. (S) LOGISTICS: In logistics activity, over 60,000 tons of supplies have been moved either into or through Quang Tri Province over the past three months. Approximately fifty per cent was arms and ammunition. The enemy now has enough supplies on hand in South Vietnam to conduct attacks similar to 1972 for well over a year. Except for localized distribution problems, logistics is not a limiting factor on enemy capabilities.

4. (S) INFILTRATION:

a. Below is DAO Saigon's estimate of infiltration activity during the first quarter of 1974 compared with the same period in 1973:

	1973	1974
DMZ/MRTTH	11,700	200
MR-5	6,000	6,200
B-3 FRONT	10,200	14,100
COSVN	22,700	35,000
TOTAL	51,600	55,500

b. Of particular interest this year is the NVA's unprecedented emphasis on infiltration to COSVN. The following table depicts the relative percentage of its past infiltration effort to COSVN:

YEAR	STRENGTH	% OF COUNTRY TOTAL BOUND FOR COSVN
1968	71,100	30
1969	44,800	42
1970	27,700	52
1971	35,100	53
1972	37,000	25
1973	25,900	34
1974 (to date)	35,000	63

c. The replacements enroute to COSVN and B-3 Front this quarter raise the manning of combat units to desired offensive strength levels and provide a replacement pool for future losses. The units in MR-1 (MRTTH and MR-5) are probably now manned at near authorized

strengths.

d. The 55,500 personnel arrived or in the system are significant compared with other years and in the context of the relatively low level of activity since the Ceasefire.

e. The high level of infiltration starting in January this year and the high proportion of men going to the B-3 Front and COSVN increase force levels in these areas well beyond that needed to replace current combat losses. By the end of the Lao dry season in June, the manning levels will be higher than before the 1972 country-wide attacks.

f. The most significant change in infiltration is the cut in travel times. Shown below is a comparison of travel days required before and after the Ceasefire:

AREA	PRE-CEASEFIRE (ON FOOT)	POST-CEASEFIRE (BY TRUCK)
DMZ	20	4
MRTTH	35	12
MR-5	60	15
B-3 FRONT	60	20
COSVN	90	40 (Est.)

g. Concerning exfiltration, the NVA returned 47,000 personnel to the North in 1973. During the first quarter of 1974, the NVA exfiltrated 35,500 personnel: January - 13,600; February - 13,900; March - 8,000. Although the exfiltration rate for March has slowed, it is still twice the average monthly rate for 1973. The majority of exfiltration this year appears to be sick and wounded. This is because trucks are available and roads are free of interdiction.

h. Since early January, the NVA has apparently been infiltrating the equivalent of one armor and one artillery regiment to the South. Although complete data is lacking, DAO feels that there are about 100-150 tanks, mostly T-54's involved in this effort. These tanks probably are to be used as replacements and will upgrade the NVA's armor capability.

	IN-COUNTRY OCT 72	INFILTRATED	TOTAL
DMZ/MRTTH	60-65	185-200	245-265
MR-5	5-10	105-110	110-120
B-3 FRONT	10-15	115-120	115-135
COSVN	25-30	165-170	190-200
TOTAL	100-120	560-600	660-720

i. At least 30 guns of which 21 are 130MM, recently were detected moving through S. Laos. Although the final destination is not known, they will probably be given to existing artillery battalions. DAO's estimate of enemy guns (122-130MM) in SVN:

	IN-COUNTRY OCT 72	INFILTRATED	TOTAL
DMZ/MRTTH	50-60	130-140	180-200
MR-5	5-10	65-70	70-80
B-3 FRONT	20-25	20-25	40-50
COSVN	0-5	80-85	80-90
TOTAL	75-100	295-320	370-420

NOTE: Armor and artillery infiltration totals shown above represent only those detected in the regular infiltration system. They do not represent the total estimated to be in-country which are based on additional information. For complete estimates of armor and artillery strength, refer to the individual Military Region summaries which follow.

5. (S) STRATEGIC RESERVE:

a. A major reconstitution of North Vietnam's strategic reserve forces occurred in 1973. The 308B, 308th and 312th Divisions were joined in the north by returning elements of the 316th Division from Laos and the 320B Division from MR-1. In addition, the 341st Division was reformed in southern Quang Binh Province. Another Division -- the 968th in Southern Laos -- is considered part of the strategic reserve, but it recently deployed one of its regiments -- the 9th -- into SVN. Additional deployments of elements of the Division are expected.

b. The NVA has established a Front Headquarters in Thanh Hoa (P). Three divisions, which have previously been deployed to SVN -- the 308th, 312th and 320B -- are apparently subordinate to the Front. In addition, an Air Defense Task Force, possibly subordinate to this new Front, has been created in the Thanh Hoa area. It will provide an integrated air defense system for the Front. The reason for the formation of the Front at this time is unknown, but in 1970 the 70B Front which was formed some 200 kms south of Thanh Hoa, later deployed to the Quang Tri Province-Laotian Border area and engaged in heavy combat. At present the indicators which might suggest that the new front will deploy to the South have not been noted. Despite this, there is no requirement in NVN for a front headquarters.

c. Due to improved logistics networks and motorized transport, Hanoi's six reserve divisions -- 308, 308B, 312, 316, 320B and 341 -- with a deployment strength of approximately 50,000 personnel, could be committed to the conflict in the South in record time.

6. (S) AIR DEFENSE:

a. During the past quarter, the NVA continued to shift AAA units. The 219th and 246th Regiments moved into Quang Tri Province from NVN while the 216th, 230th, 241st, and 280th Regiments deployed from Quang Tri to NVN. Additionally, the 591st Regiment is now believed to be operating in-country in the Route 9 area along the RVN-Laos border. In the Que Son Valley, reporting indicates the presence of the 571st Regiment which was probably formed in late 1973 from the 572nd Tank/Arty Regiment.

b. Two AAA regiments deployed to MR-2 during the quarter. The 234th Regiment deployed to the Dak To area in Kontum Province, replacing the 593rd Regiment which deployed southward to the Plei Trap Valley in Pleiku Province. Recent intelligence indicates the 593rd Regiment may be moving eastward toward Pleiku City. The 232nd Regiment also deployed to MR-2 and is now in the Ia Drang Valley area. This regiment replaced the 546th Regiment which is now deployed along the border area in western Darlac Province.

c. Enemy air defense by region:

	MR-1	MR-2	MR-3	MR-4	TOTALS
DIVISIONS	1	0	1		2
REGIMENTS	21*	4	2	0	27
BATTALIONS	82	16	11	0	109
WEAPONS**	1,200	240	160	0	1,600

* Includes one SAM Regiment

** Includes 12.7, 14.5, 23, 37, 40, 57, 85, and 100MM weapons.

7. (S) ENEMY THREAT AND INTENTIONS BY REGION:

a. DAO Saigon has recognized the need to define the levels of enemy offensive operations in SVN. These definitions are used in the discussions of regional threats and intentions. Our definitions are expressed in terms of scope and objective.

(1) A General Offensive is a coordinated country-wide offensive, the purpose of which is to force the capitulation of the GVN. Historically, only the offensive of Tet '68 seems to qualify. In scope, that offensive was country-wide and in objective, it struck at the seat of the government.

(2) A Phased Offensive is one that seeks the same final objective as the general offensive but seeks to achieve it over a longer period of time through the attack and seizure of secondary objectives. The cumulative effect of a series of successful attacks would eventually cause the collapse of the military, economic and political structure of South Vietnam.

(3) Major attacks are defined as coordinated offensive operations within the frame-work of the phased offensive.

(4) Limited attacks are offensive operations to seize secondary military and political objectives in order to expand area, population and resources control and to undermine GVN military, economic and political well-being. They are also important elements in the phased offensive.

(5) Small-scale attacks are offensive operations against minor objectives to create and maintain disorder and tension in GVN controlled and contested areas, support proselyting, cover movement, tie down RVNAF and collect resources. These operations are the lowest level of offensive action within the frame-work of the phased offensive.

b. MILITARY REGION 1: In Military Region 1 during the past quarter, enemy activity was low and no major changes were detected in the threat:

DIVISIONS	4 (Plus 1 AD)
REGIMENTS	33 (Plus 22 AD)
COMBAT PERSONNEL	95-105,000
ADMIN PERSONNEL	30- 35,000
TOTAL	125-140,000

A re-evaluation of the organization of NVA armor units in MR-1 has resulted in increased armor strength estimates.

	PREVIOUS	PRESENT
201st Regt (4 Bns)	100-140	135-145
202nd Regt (3 Bns)	75-105	110-120
574th Regt (3 Bns)	75- 85	110-120
TOTAL	250-330	355-385

While detailed reporting has been limited on armor units and strengths, infiltration of armor from the North and recent reporting indicates that armor units are being upgraded to full strength.

(1) In all major threat areas of MR-1, the enemy has achieved the following:

(a) Development of an integrated LOC network and logistics system for movement of men and materiel to forward areas.

(b) Development of formidable air defense system that deters effective ARVN reconnaissance and air strikes against key logistic complexes and military positions.

(c) Unit strengths and logistical bases at optimum levels for major attacks.

(d) Large amounts of both armor and artillery in forward staging areas.

(2) Throughout MR-1, enemy activity is presently confined to small scale attacks. North of the Hai Van Pass, military activity is virtually at a standstill as enemy forces continue developing extensive logistical networks and building a formidable air defense capability. In Quang Tri Province, north of the Thach Han River and in the A Shau Valley in Thua Thien, there are now major logistic areas capable of supporting a general offensive.

(3) In the northern reaches of MR-1, the threat to RVNAF defenses in the Quang Tri City area consists of 10 infantry regiments, 6 artillery regiments and one armor regiment with some 35,000 personnel. There have been very few enemy initiated attacks. The enemy remains preoccupied with reconnaissance, logistic, road building and agricultural activities. The most significant OB development has been the deployment of the line regiments of the 325th Division from the Cua Viet area to an area west and southwest of Quang Tri, indicating increased enemy emphasis on the western approach to the city. A new regimental entity, the 47th, has been created from miscellaneous battalions and subordinated to the 325th to replace regular 325th Division elements in the Cua Viet area.

In northern MR-1, the enemy has the capability to launch a major attack at any time. Moreover, he would not have to conduct limited attacks in the area preparatory to a major one. A decision to attack from north and west of the present defense line would likely involve the commitment of most of his maneuver forces in northern Quang Tri in an effort to secure the lowlands of the province. Reserve forces in NVN would probably be deployed southward in the event of major attacks.

(4) The threat to Hue consists of five infantry regiments, two artillery regiments and one armor regiment with some 22,000 combat personnel. However, an envelopment around the Quang Tri defenses toward the south, coordinated with another effort based from the A Shau Valley toward the Hue area, could seriously threaten Hue. As in the Quang Tri area, enemy forces at present are concentrating primarily on logistics, roadbuilding, and agricultural activity. The enemy is

constructing a road branching north from Route 5A32, which, when completed, will provide an additional approach to both Quang Tri and Hue. A major attack designed to capture the city of Hue would require at least one additional division.

(5) The enemy threat to Danang consists primarily of the forces deployed in the Que Son Valley, (i.e. three infantry regiments, one artillery regiment, and one armor regiment with some 15,500 combat personnel). It appears that the 711th Division has been reconstituted and the 1st NVA Regiment has deployed back to its original AO. Recent reports indicate that Front 4 elements are preparing for attacks. The scope of current planning is unknown but it is doubtful that major attacks will be initiated. We expect a series of limited attacks originating from the Que Son Valley against government outposts. The objective of these attacks is to counter GVN pacification and economic blockade. An attack on Danang would require reinforcement of the 711th Division in the Que Son Valley by at least one more division. Reporting suggests that various local force units in VC Quang Da Province would be amalgamated into one or perhaps two regiments. To date, such a development has failed to materialize, but if it were to occur, it would be a significant indicator of possible intentions to conduct major attacks in the area.

(6) To the south in VC MR-5, activity is at a higher level, particularly in contested areas adjacent to Route 1. Quang Ngai Province is the scene of the most significant activity. Front 4, its 711th Division, and MR-559's Group 471 are developing bases in the Que Son Valley and along the Song Giang River Corridor. MR-5 rear service elements and Group 471 are extending and improving LOC's into Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh Provinces. An objective for major attack in southern Quang Ngai Province is the vicinity of Sa Huynh. The Communists would require at least a division in order to create a credible threat here. There are indications that the 2nd NVA Division is being reconstituted in this area.

(7) Available intelligence on enemy intentions in MR-1 indicates that for the near future the enemy will continue selective small-scale attacks. The low level of offensive action north of the Hai Van Pass is not expected to change substantially in the near future.

Nevertheless, the enemy is building a significantly reinforced offensive capability opposite Hue. The possible formation of a new front based on the 324B Division, the appearance of the new 16th Artillery Regiment, and the constant flow of ammunition trucks and other supplies into forward positions are all indicators of offensive intent. In VC MR-5, Quang Ngai Provincial units are reportedly under instructions to regain areas lost to the GVN since the Ceasefire. While Quang Ngai has seen a substantial level of activity recently, there is no firm evidence of impending major attacks. Additionally, we have seen no evidence that NVN is committing its reserve divisions, but elements could be in Quang Tri in less than a week after starting movement. The most opportune time for the Communists to launch major attacks in MR-1 is after April when the coastal areas of MR-1 become dry.

(8) Our estimate of the enemy's short-term intentions throughout the region are as follows:

(a) Continue building and streamlining of force structure.

(b) Develop political and economic base in "liberated" areas.

(c) Construct and upgrade LOC's.

(d) Defend against ARVN incursions into "liberated" areas.

(e) Establish logistics and fire support bases well forward to support future offensive operations.

(f) Conduct reconnaissance and harassing actions against ARVN outposts, military installations and LOC's.

c. MILITARY REGION 2: In MR-2, the enemy force structure is as follows:

Divisions	3
Regiments	16 (Plus 4 AD)
Combat Personnel	40-45,000
Admin Personnel	20-25,000
Total	60-70,000
Armor	115-135
Artillery	60-75

(1) During the past quarter enemy activity increased sharply in Kontum and remained moderately heavy in Pleiku and Binh Dinh. In Kontum Province, the threat consists of the 304th Infantry regiment, one artillery regiment and one armor regiment with some 10,000 combat personnel! Activity has been heavy northeast of Kontum City where the enemy is attempting to clear ARVN forces to complete a new road and cover movement of troops southward. Since February, the 10th NVA Division has moved eastward to control the operations. In other order of battle developments, the movement of the 593rd AAA Regiment into the Plei Trap Valley, and its replacement in central Kontum by the 234th AAA Regiment have been confirmed. Information from ralliers and PW's has indicated major enemy attacks during April, but evidence on enemy intentions is still somewhat contradictory. Current infiltration indicates, that the enemy in Kontum will have the manpower necessary to initiate major offensive activity by the end of April. The following indicators point to major attacks in the near future:

(a) Movement of artillery and armor into B-3 Front.

(b) Unprecedented movement of supplies into B-3 Front (10,000 tons of ordnance since January 1974).

(c) Construction of new road bypassing Kontum City on the east.

(2) In Pleiku Province, the situation has remained relatively stable in the traditional threat area of Thanh An District; however, a recent increase in LOC interdiction activity has taken place during recent weeks along QL-19 in northeast Pleiku following the movement of elements of the 95B Regiment into the area. There are indications of enemy reinforcements moving into this area from Kontum. It appears that the enemy intends to make significant efforts to close QL-19 in Le Trung District in the near future. In other order of battle developments, the 9th Regiment/ 968th Division which infiltrated into Pleiku Province in early February, has deployed in the Duc Co area and there is reliable information that the 9th Regiment may be subordinated to the 320th Division. Additionally, recent intelligence confirms the replacement of the 546th AAA Regiment/ Group 470 in the Ia Drang Valley by the newly infiltrated 232nd AAA Regiment, allowing the 546th Regiment to deploy southward to cover the enemy's Route 14 complex in western Darlac Province.

(3) In Binh Dinh Province, enemy activity has been at a very low level. The 3rd NVA Division is apparently still experiencing serious food shortages and corresponding troop morale and discipline problems. The 141st Regiment/2nd NVA Division has apparently rejoined its parent unit in Quang Ngai Province following six month's duty in Binh Dinh Province reinforcing the 3rd Division. The 12th Regiment/3rd Division Headquarters has returned to the Tam Quan area in its old area of operation. Recent reports indicate that the long-dormant 21st Regiment/3rd Division is located west of Bong Son, apparently rebuilding. Reports of movement of elements of the 2nd and/or 12th Regiments southward to the An Khe Pass area on QL-19 have not been confirmed. Major offensive activity is not expected in Binh Dinh Province in the near future but the enemy may deploy additional forces to the An Khe Pass area to support B-3 Front interdiction efforts on QL-19 in Pleiku.

(4) In Quang Duc Province there has been a drawdown of COSVN forces. The 174th Regiment/5th Division deployed back to Tay Ninh Province in early February. The move of the 174th and the low level of enemy activity during late February indicate that COSVN has either delayed or called off reported plans for an increase in activity designed to draw in and tie down ARVN forces.

(5) In MR-2 the enemy has conducted and will continue to conduct limited attacks in varying degrees throughout the region. The enemy has conducted limited attacks in all four major threat areas (Binh Dinh, Kontum, Pleiku, and Quang Duc).

(6) The enemy is nearly prepared in the B-3 Front area to conduct major attacks. The objectives of such attacks would be the following:

(a) Major province capitals, particularly Kontum, Pleiku and Ban Me Thuot.

(b) Cut and hold major national highways, particularly QL-1, QL-14, and QL-19.

(c) Disrupt GVN governmental control and economic activities.

(7) The enemy still needs combat replacements which he will have by April. However, his capability to

sustain coordinated attacks on major GVN political/ military objectives and to hold the objectives once seized would probably require the introduction of additional force. The most likely candidate would be the remainder of the 968th Division from southern Laos. Major attacks in the Central Highlands would attract nearly all ARVN forces in MR-2 to the Pleiku/ Kontum area.

(8) Enemy intentions in the region over the short term appear to be:

(a) Conduct major operations in Kontum.

(b) Interdict/harass major LOC's, particularly QL-19.

(c) Protect/develop logistics installations.

(d) Prepare for major attacks in B-3 Front.

(e) Rebuild forces in coastal areas.

d. MILITARY REGION 3: In MR-3, enemy force structure is as follows:

DIVISIONS	3	
REGIMENTS	21	(Plus 2 AA)
COMBAT PERSONNEL	37-39,000	
ADMIN PERSONNEL	28-33,000	
TOTAL	65-72,000	
ARMOR	190-200	
ARTILLERY	80- 90	

(1) Over the past quarter, military activity in the region has remained at low level. Although enemy forces have the ability to apply military pressure throughout the region, they have continued to maintain a defensive posture. He has limited his combat actions to small-scale attacks and defense against RVNAF operations. In rear areas, emphasis has been placed upon expanding storage facilities and base areas, improving roads, constructing defenses and rebuilding troop strengths. He has moved armor and long range artillery into forward areas. Reports

indicate increased emphasis on combined infantry, armor and artillery tactics.

(2) The threat to the Saigon/Bien Hoa area is represented by some 25,000 enemy troops positioned mainly in northern part of the region, supported by increasing amounts of armor, artillery and AAA.

UNIT	STRENGTH
3 Infantry Divisions	11,500
4 Infantry Regiments	3,500
2 Artillery Regiments	1,700
5 Sapper Groups	5,300
Independent Battalions	2,500
Total	24,500
Armor	100-150
Artillery	50- 60

(3) Enemy forces could also use the Parrot's Beak as a potential staging area for attacks from the west. The recent reported firings of enemy artillery in the vicinity of Lai Khe and Trung Lap emphasize the susceptibility of fixed installations to accurate, concentrated artillery fire. Although the enemy would have to make substantial advances along the Saigon River Corridor to bring Saigon within artillery range, moderate advances north and northeast of Bien Hoa would enable enemy gunners to fire upon vital air and logistical support centers in the vicinity of Bien Hoa/Long Binh. Communist forces in this area are not capable of seizing Saigon or Bien Hoa.

(4) Although the threat to Tay Ninh, shown below, is secondary to the Saigon/Bien Hoa area, loss of Tay Ninh would have serious military and political consequences for the GVN.

UNIT	STRENGTH
5th NVA Division	5,000
9th NVA Division (-)	4,000
C-50 NVA Regiment	800
2 Sapper Groups	3,400
101st NVA Regiment	800

1 Artillery Regiment	800
Local Force Battalions	1,500
Total	16,400

(5) Recent intelligence has revealed that all three regiments of the 5th NVA Division have moved from northern Tay Ninh to the Parrot's Beak-western Hau Nghia Province area. Units from the division, along with local force elements, are apparently trying to eliminate GVN presence west of the Vam Co Dong River as part of a COSVN-wide effort to "regain" territory lost to the GVN since the Ceasefire. Securing this area would facilitate Communist infiltration into both MR-3 and MR-4. In northern Hau Nghia, a similar buildup of 9th NVA Division forces has been noted. The 9th Division is apparently charged with regaining areas south of the Ho Bo/Boi Loi Woods. The congregation of elements of these two divisions near Route 1 also provides the enemy with the capability to temporarily interdict Route 1 and isolate Tay Ninh for short periods. Enemy forces in the vicinity of Tay Ninh are not capable of taking Tay Ninh City but may be able to eliminate GVN control in areas near the Parrot's Beak and Base Area 356.

(6) The potential threat to isolated GVN enclaves remains high. The enemy can mass forces against any of the following positions: Phuoc Binh, An Loc, Tonle Cham, Don Luan, and Chon Thanh. Tonle Cham, the most endangered outpost, has been the target of significantly increased enemy shellings in the past two months, to include several rounds of 122/130MM artillery fire and AT-3 missiles. Enemy objectives in the vicinity of Chon Thanh and An Loc appear to be limited to preventing ARVN from expanding defensive perimeters. Although Phuoc Long Province affords the enemy his best chance to seize a provincial capital in the region, he has made no serious attempts to do so.

(7) Finally, the recent deployment of four battalions of the 367th Sapper Regiment to War Zone D and the subsequent redeployment of the 274th and 33rd NVA Regiments into southern VC MR-1 provide the enemy with the capability to apply additional pressure against strategic targets and LOC's in Bien Hoa, Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces. Previously the 367th Sapper Regiment had conducted successful attacks in the Phnom Penh area and probably is targeted against GVN installations in Bien Hoa/Long Binh area.

(8) Although the enemy has significantly upgraded his military capability in the region, he has shown little or no progress in regaining lost territory or in political achievement. His lack of success may have prompted him to issue instructions for a "strategic raids" campaign to be carried out in the spring. These raids could take the form of limited attacks using up to a division size force with tanks. Possible targets of limited attacks are Tonle Cham, Suoi Da, Chi Linh, Rach Bap, Trang Bang and Trung Lap. The enemy has the ability to concentrate his forces to insure some degree of success, such as eliminating Tonle Cham or eliminating specific objectives in contested areas. However, RVNAF's ability to resupply and reinforce most threatened areas casts doubt on the enemy's ability to achieve much long term success with limited attacks.

(9) Because of the sensitivity of the Saigon area, even limited attacks carry the threat of escalation. This realization may restrain the enemy from initiating any major operations until he is ready for a general offensive. It is highly doubtful that the enemy would make any serious effort to attack Saigon except as part of a general offensive since the GVN would reinforce Saigon with the maximum number of available forces.

(10) If the enemy were to initiate major attacks in MR-3, or were impelled into major actions by the GVN, the most probable target areas would be Phuoc Binh/ Song Be, An Loc, Don Luan, Chon Thanh, Tay Ninh, Tri Tam and Bien Hoa. Although some limited success is possible, the Communist could not take and hold Tay Ninh or Bien Hoa. Moderate gains in the Saigon River Corridor or north of Bien Hoa, however, would allow enemy artillery to move within range of Saigon or the Bien Hoa Air Base. Tay Ninh is already within artillery range.

(11) In a general offensive, Saigon, Bien Hoa and Tay Ninh would be primary objectives. Currently arriving infiltrators could bring enemy forces up to desired levels by May and provide them with a reserve of some 15,000 men to replace initial losses. Recent ralliers indicate that some of the newly arrived 20,000 infiltrators have been integrated into tactical units.

(12) In the near term, enemy forces are expected to continue small scale and limited attacks. Should they persist in efforts to reopen supply corridors

to the northern Delta, however, attacks can be expected in western Hau Nghia and Long An Provinces, possibly supported by attacks in northern Hau Nghia and Tri Tam.

(13) Recent photography indicates that additional armor, artillery and possibly AAA pieces are destined for COSVN. Available information, however, does not suggest major attacks for MR-3 in the next couple of months, but attempts by the enemy to carry out the intentions shown below (and GVN counter operations) could result in escalation from limited to major actions at any time. Enemy near-term intentions are:

(a) Increase combat capability and defense of "liberated areas".

(b) Emphasize economic and political development in the "liberated" and contested areas.

(c) Establish supply corridors in western Hau Nghia and Long An Provinces.

(d) Undermine GVN influence and economy.

e. MILITARY REGION 4: In MR-4 the enemy strength and force structure is:

DIVISIONS	0
REGIMENTS	13
COMBAT PERSONNEL	19-21,000
GUERRILLAS	10-13,000
ADMIN SERVICES	8-10,000
TOTAL	37-44,000

(1) Since November 1973 two of the three major Communist threat areas, the Seven Mountains of Chau Doc Province and Dinh Tuong Province, have come under heavy RVNAF pressure. The first of these, BA 400 in Chau Doc, has been eliminated as an operating base area. Only remnant forces of the 101st Regiment (900 men) and three understrength independent battalions (total 200 men)remain in the area and those avoid contact with RVNAF.

In the second, Dinh Tuong Province, enemy forces (shown below) have been rendered much less effective due to constant losses; more than 2,000 KIA since 1 December:

UNIT	STRENGTH
24th NVA Regiment	800
DT-1 NVA Regiment	800
Z.15 NVA Regiment	850
Z.18 NVA Regiment	900
Independent Battalions (5)	750
TOTAL	4,100

Supply problems caused by combat expenditures and RVNAF seizures, appear to be significant.

(2) Only in Chuong Thien Province has the enemy maintained his threat potential:

UNIT	STRENGTH
95A NVA Regiment	900
18B NVA Regiment	1,100
D-1 NVA Regiment	1,100
D-2 NVA Regiment	1,150
Independent Battalions (4)	500
TOTAL	4,650

In this province and localized pockets of Kien Giang, Ba Xuyen and Phong Dinh Provinces, the Communists have gradually eroded RVNAF presence and control in outlying areas. Since the late December highpoint, VC/NVA units have maintained momentum and eliminated or forced the evacuation of several OP's. A number of classical relief column ambushes have been executed. Despite a formidable presence in outlying contested areas, the enemy does not currently pose a threat to strategic objectives in the lower Delta. Without more manpower and increased supply input, he cannot significantly alter the political/military landscape in the near future. In all provinces, Communist forces are capable of striking selected minor targets such as OP's, troop elements and GVN installations. RVNAF ability to react with superior strength precludes ventures to seize and hold major objectives. The enemy is currently faced with an additional problem: the increased difficulties in transporting supplies. This is due to KC/NVA hostilities along supply corridors in Cambodia, as well as to aggressive RVNAF operations against supply contingents moving down

Routes 1-A, 1-B and 1-C.

(3) Strategically, Communist forces have lost ground in GVN MR-4, although not without inflicting moderate casualties. Communist forces could not conduct successful major attacks in the Delta for the following reasons:

(a) Nature of terrain.

(b) Lengthy, unmechanized supply lines.

(c) Expanse of contested areas.

(d) Numerical and tactical superiority of RVNAF.

(e) Lack of armor and tube-artillery.

Such undertakings would stand only slim chances of success and, if directed against any province capitals, would almost certainly be defeated. Confronted with setbacks and normal operational demands, the enemy is preoccupied with holding what he has.

(4) In the unlikely event NVN orders a general offensive, forces in the Delta would try to tie-down ARVN's three divisions to preclude their redeployment to other MR's. This would require an all-out effort to hit the following:

(a) Troop positions and assembly points.

(b) Airfields.

(c) Major highways.

(d) Major municipalities.

It is within his capability to conduct such attacks. The overall impact would be dependent upon the course of events on other battlefields. If ARVN deployments out of MR-4 were not made, Communist losses would be high with no corresponding gains. On the other hand, the enemy could slow down ARVN's deployment, and inflict high losses, but overall success would have to be evaluated against the gains in the other MR's.

( ) Enemy forces will probably limit themselves to military initiatives which support these near term objectives:

(a) Defend base areas and LOC's.

(b) Harass and divert RVNAF.

(c) Improve and expand procurement systems.

(d) Improve and increase combat capabilities and troop strength.

(e) Establish secure zones along the border to facilitate infiltration and supply movement.

Small gains rather than decisive victories will remain the focus of enemy intentions.

3. (S) INTENTIONS:

a. All evidence suggests that the Communists will not launch a general offensive during the next quarter. Recent COSVN guidance emphasizes that a general offensive would be both politically and militarily unfavorable at this time. The Communists seem intent on building up forces in the South. However, they retain the capability to launch major attacks on very short notice. Necessary materiel is in-country and cached in forward bases; infiltration is bringing units up to desired combat levels; improved LOC's enable the movement of men and materiel to forward positions in record time; improved command and control facilities have been established and necessary reconnaissance of key objectives has probably been accomplished. Additionally, more armor and artillery has been deployed to the South than ever before, much of it deployed in forward positions and more on the way South. The Communists have not abandoned their goal of seizing control of the South, nor do they believe that the objective can be obtained without strong military measures. A recently captured document in Binh Thuan Province emphasized, "Our basic policy has not changed...we should grasp the standpoint: the revolution in South Vietnam can only win by means of armed violence in close coordination with the political violence of the masses."

b. In the North, most information indicates that, after emphasizing the rebuilding of the military machine in the year after the Ceasefire, the Communists are now devoting some attention to reconstruction and economic development. Our estimate is that the poor economic situation in the North has forced Hanoi to do so or face some deterioration of its power base. Communist propaganda has repeatedly referred to the Ceasefire Agreement as a great victory, but this great victory, achieved by enormous sacrifices, has not unified Vietnam, has not brought peace and has not brought a better life to the people of the North. As Le Thanh Nghi recently stated: "Now that peace has been restored, the need to improve the people's living condition is a large and urgent one." Nghi emphasized that the war has been the major cause of these difficulties. Elsewhere he points out that economic reconstruction and development of the North is an essential stepping stone to obtain the ultimate goal in the South:

"We must understand that the task of restoring and developing the northern economy in 1974 and 1975 is part of the initial step in the process of socialist industrialization, aimed at creating necessary conditions for building the socialist north on an increasingly larger scale and at an increasingly rapid rate, in order to strengthen the revolutionary forces throughout the country and to create a good basis for aiding the revolutionary struggle to achieve independence and democracy in the South."

c. Recent reporting from the South also indicates that the situation is not yet right for a general offensive. The Communists, while underlining the current GVN economic difficulties, have admitted that certain important GVN strengths have not been eroded:

(1) Control of populated areas and LOC's.

(2) Effective police force and local administration.

(3) Ability to use manpower and resources in its areas of control.

(4) Large, well-armed military machine.

d. Meanwhile, while emphasizing their own strengths, such as a strong army deployed forward, improved logistics and an expanded LOC network, the Communists have also recognized that their serious weaknesses must be eliminated:

(1) Weak infrastructure.

(2) Little population under control.

(3) Poor party organization.

(4) Parasitic economic relationship of PRG areas to GVN controlled areas.

e. Current Communist goals appear to be:

(1) Reconstruction and redevelopment in the North.

(2) Continued improvement in combat capability in NVN and SVN.

(3) Strengthen and rebuild infrastructure and political organization in the South.

(4) Exacerbate GVN political, economical and military problems by selective attacks, presence and political means.

With regard to the last point, the Communists will probably employ selective attacks throughout the country to weaken RVNAF forces and achieve limited objectives such as obtaining more fertile land and population, or improving their military position. By its very presence, the Communist threat fosters instability, forbids demobilization of RVNAF and discourages foreign investment, all of which exacerbate already serious GVN economic problems. Additionally, recent activity seems designed to destroy public confidence in the GVN, especially in the U.S. While important discussions are occurring in Washington over the continued commitment to SVN, the Communists have been emphasizing their adherence to the Ceasefire, and their apparent pacific intentions by presenting a "New" 6 Point Peace Plan. The only new wrinkle in this plan is a time table. The recent propaganda on the delivery of the F-5E's emphasized the "increasing"

U.S. military effort at a most sensitive time and was intended in part, to persuade a reluctant Congress to disapprove the whole increased Vietnam aid package. Thus, while economic aid received by the North continues at record levels, the GVN is to be denied the aid it requires to remain viable.

f. In the South, the increasing success by ARVN against key Communist strongholds such as the Seven Mountains and Tri Phap, have degraded enemy offensive capabilities in MR-4. Food shortages have been reported from nearly every region. Communist forces are concerned about the GVN success in the economic blockade and in pacification efforts -- called "nibbling operations". We believe that one of the reasons for the 1972 offensive was the Communist realization that Vietnamization was working and that RVNAF was becoming more effective. Emphasis on redevelopment in the North will probably have an adverse effect on morale in the South. The southern Communists, who have been struggling for 20 years, will probably once again see their cause being deferred for the benefit of the North. Finally, he may learn that limited attacks against the GVN dissipate combat strength piecemeal. RVNAF counter offensives, including air attacks against rear areas, may become even more effective in time. These factors considered, if the enemy concludes that time is working against him, he may feel compelled to launch a decisive offensive sooner rather than later.

g. In summary, we expect that combat activity, to include major attacks in the South, will increase: major attacks in the three northern military regions, limited attacks in the Delta. Meanwhile, a more aggressive and effective RVNAF will precipitate more activity. A threat of gradual escalation into a general offensive is an ever-increasing possibility as action initiated by one side triggers a reaction or retaliation by the other side. A general offensive, although specifically planned by neither side, could grow out of a series of major attacks and counter-attacks. Additionally, we should avoid excessive reliance on the historical concept that general offensives occur during the southern Laos dry season.

Considering the facts that (1) the logistics are in place in South Vietnam, (2) that a reserve of six divisions in the North are available for rapid deployment during any season of the year, and (3) that a dual LOC system exists to support infiltration during any season of the year, we do not rule out the possibility of a general offensive beginning in the summer months.

CHAPTER 2

FRIENDLY SITUATION

1. (C) OVERVIEW: There was an increase in activity during this quarter. In Military Region (MR) 1, Quang Ngai Province experienced the most incidents with numerous small scale enemy attacks and ABF reported. Action was at a higher level in contested areas adjacent to major Lines of Communication (LOC) in the coastal lowlands. In the central highlands of MR 2, major contacts occurred with enemy forces attempting to seize territory and extend their LOC. In MR 3, significant contacts were reported in Hau Nghia Province and heavy shellings were directed against Tonle Cham in Tay Ninh Province. RVNAF took control of VC Base Area 470 (Tri Phap), but suffered a defeat along the An Xuyen/Kien Giang border in MR 4. Countrywide, VNAF increased its TACAIR support and preemptive strikes. There was a sharp increase in use of AC-119 suppressive fire support starting in March. Terrorist attacks increased in all regions.

2. (C) MILITARY REGION 1.

a. Activity north of the Hai Van Pass, Thua Thien Province, was generally light and the military situation remained stable. In the Bo River corridor NW of Hue, activity decreased. Only occasional minor incidents were reported. Most incidents resulted from extensive patrolling by Airborne and 1st ARVN Division units. The national rail line from Danang to Hue was interdicted seven times during the period. Traffic was halted for only short periods. Increased and alert patrolling by Regional Forces have, on several occasions, prevented interdiction of this LOC. Reduced communist military activities in GVN-controlled areas in the northern provinces contributed to the low level of activity.

b. Activity south of the Hai Van Pass increased. Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces remained relatively quiet with only minor, scattered incidents reported. However, in Quang Ngai Province, a sharp increase in incidents occurred in the contested areas adjacent to QL-1 and in western Son Tinh District where a major resettlement program is underway.

c. Throughout [illegible] forces reacted to small scale enemy attacks and were subjected to periodic shellings. In the coastal lowlands south of Hai Van Pass, Regional Force (RF) units continued their efforts to secure the rice producing areas in anticipation of the coming harvest.

b. In mid-January, the Paracel Islands were invaded by the People's Republic of China (PRC). During the land/naval battle, VNN lost all communications with GVN forces on Robert, Money, and Pattle Islands. Extraction of the personnel stranded on these islands was not attempted because of superior PRC forces. As a result, these islands were lost to the PRC. RVNAF suffered 19 KIA, 42 WIA and 54 MIA. These missing personnel are presumed dead. HQ 10, a Patrol Craft Escort, was destroyed. [illegible], High Endurance Cutter, sustained heavy damages while HQ 5, suffered only light damages. HQ 4, a Destroyer Escort Radar Picket, also sustained light damages. The VNN destroyed two Kronstadt Class Escort, 350 ton, ships and damaged two unknown type ships. The exact enemy losses are unknown, however, they were [illegible] to be higher than those of RVN.

(TAB A, Page 2-1)

3. (C) MILITARY REGION 2.

a. In the central highlands, GVN forces conducted area denial operations with partial success. There was an upsurge of activity, at least in Kontum City as ARVN and territorial forces made attempts to interdict the communist supply road which runs east from Vo Dinh approximately 23 km, and then extends southward to the Dak Bla River in the vicinity of Kon Solak, and southward to QL-19 in Pleiku Province. Heavy casualties were inflicted on both sides: RVNAF suffered 25 KIA, 43 WIA, and lost 45 SA, and 2 trucks destroyed; 433 enemy were reported killed, 12 SA and 51 CS weapons captured. In Pleiku Province, ARVN units remained in defensive positions west of Pleiku City and no concerted attempt was made to reoccupy the Plei Me Camp. ARVN and territorial forces blunted enemy attempts to interdict LOC in Kontum, Pleiku, and Binh Dinh Provinces.



MAJOR ABF
MINOR ABF
MAJOR CONTACTS
MINOR CONTACTS
MR 1
80
60
40
20
6
13
20
27
3
10
17
24
31
7
14
21
28
7
14
21
28
4
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR

Figure 2-1

b. The enemy has stepped up harassment of convoys along QL-19 near the Mang Yang and An Khe Passes. On 15 March, a major ABF against a 62 ARVN truck convoy ten km west of the Mang Yang Pass resulted in the loss of one trailer with ten tons of 105mm ammo. All trucks, including 19 damaged (mostly flat tires), arrived at Pleiku without further incident. A second incident occurred 27 March, 11 km east of An Khe against a 66 truck convoy. Eighteen trucks continued on to Pleiku, 12 trucks returned to Qui Nhon, and 36 trucks were caught in the killing zone. A relief force from the 264 RF Bn later escorted the 36 trucks to Binh Khe.

c. On 6 March, elements of the 23d Division, in Darlac Province, conducted an operation 14 km northwest of Ban Don (Trang Phuc), to deny the communists free access to the Dak Krong River crossing point on Route 615, and to interdict this route to the south. The 44th and 45th Infantry Regiments effectively interdicted this LOC and destroyed three enemy bridges under construction at the Dak Krong River. The 23d Division elements sustained 9 KIA, 66 WIA, and captured 12 SA and 2 CS weapons. The enemy lost 115 men. To the south, the situation in Quang Duc remained stable with only minor activity occurring.

d. The 23d Division launched an operation 7 March using four regional force units, the 202d, 229th, 230th and 249th RF Battalions, supported by the 3/8th AC Troop, in Binh Thuan Province. The operation was designed to clear the Phan Thien/Thien Giao/Ham Thuan triangle area of enemy sapper elements and artillery units which have periodically attacked Binh Tu resettlement site. Friendly casualties included 22 KIA, 18 WIA, 2 MIA, 1 civ killed, 29 wounded, and 2 SA weapons lost. The enemy sustained 137 killed and 22 SA weapons captured. The remainder of the coastal provinces remained relatively quiet during the period.

e. VNAF TACAIR support against enemy LOC and the use of gunships against troop concentrations throughout the MR, have proven successful.

(FIGURE 2-2)



MR2
MAJOR ABF
MINOR ABF
MAJOR CONTACTS
MINOR CONTACTS
100
80
60
40
20
6 13 20 27 3 10 17 24 31 7 14 21 28 7 14 21 28 4
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR

Figure 2-2

4. (C) MILITARY REGION 3.

a. Activity in MR 3 increased. ARVN was active in southern Tay Ninh, northern Hau Nghia, and northern Phuoc Tuy Provinces and responded well to enemy initiated actions. The sharp upsurge in enemy initiated incidents during the last week of March occurred around Go Dau Ha, Tay Ninh Province, and Duc Hue, Trang Bang and Cu Chi Districts, Hau Nghia Province. These incidents included intensive shelling of government positions, sapper and infantry attacks and several terrorist attacks against civilians. In Phuoc Tuy Province, an increase in incidents occurred along LTL-2 extending from Duc Thanh District southward to Phuoc Le (Ba Ria) in Long Le District.

b. During the period 1-12 February, elements of the 18th and 25th Infantry Divisions conducted an operation in northern Hau Nghia and southwest Binh Duong Provinces. The operation, designed to clear the traditional enemy stronghold in the Boi Loi/Ho Bo woods area north of QL-1, resulted in 94 enemy killed, one detained, 40 SA and three CS weapons captured.

c. In late March, the 83d RGR Bn at Duc Hue camp was attacked by a large enemy force which penetrated the perimeter. However, a ranger counterattack inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. Although the defenders sustained 29 KIA, 27 WIA, and 5 MIA; the rangers killed 95 enemy and captured 21 SA and 16 CS weapons, including one 75mm recoilless rifle. VNAF flew numerous support missions during this period and the enemy responded by firing 18 SA-7 missiles during the last four days of March. VNAF lost two A-1 fighter bombers and one O-1. Another O-1 was reported missing.

d. The 92d RGR Bn continued to occupy Tonle Cham. The Tonle Cham ranger outpost, located in Tay Ninh Province, in the Saigon River corridor, is astride an enemy infiltration and resupply route. The outpost was subjected to increased enemy shellings in the past two months, to include 122/130mm artillery fire and AT-3 missiles. Paragraph 3a(14) Chapter 5, provides additional information on Tonle Cham.

e. Sapper activities continue and reports indicate that the VC/NVA will attempt to increase activity in spite of ARVN/VNN efforts to clear the waterways

between Saigon and Vung Tau. POL and ammunition depots are particularly vulnerable. In view of the increased tempo of activities, the MR 3 Commander declared a 100% alert for all ground forces in the region.

(FIGURE 2-3)

5. (C) MILITARY REGION 4.

a. Activity in MR 4 continued at a high level with the month of February exceeding December 1973, as the highest incident level since the Cease-Fire Accords. Terrorist attacks against local gatherings accounted for high civilian casualties with March being the highest terrorist level recorded since the initial ceasefire agreement.

b. A three month clearing operation established RVNAF control over Nui Gia, in the Seven Mountains area. With the Ranger Command reorganization, the 7th, 9th and 21st Division AOs were adjusted to compensate for departure of the Rangers.

c. Dinh Tuong Province was the most active in the Delta. During the quarter, enemy effectiveness was considerably reduced in this province. RVNAF forays into Tri Phap to clear VC Base Area 470 accounted for most of the heavy contacts. The operation in the Tri Phap (Tri-Border) area began 12 February 1974. Elements of the 7th Infantry Division shifted west toward VC Base Area 470, as elements of the 9th Infantry Division moved east toward the Kien Phong/Kien Tucng border. The 7th Ranger Group (32d, 58th, and 85th Ranger Battalions) moved from MR 3 to MR 4, OPCON to the 7th Infantry Division. To prevent this incursion, enemy units pressured lines of communication and outposts to draw GVN Forces from Tri Phap. Casualties to both sides have been heavy. ARVN reported 852 enemy killed, 389 SA and 56 CS weapons (including 5 x 122mm rocket launchers), and over 5 tons of ammo captured. Friendly casualties (not including ABF casualties) have been reported as 47 KIA, 266 WIA, and 2 MIA. The operation is currently in the consolidation phase consisting of outpost construction and preparation for permanent resettlement. The battle of Tri Phap is one of the most successful ever conduct by ARVN forces working alone. The Tri Phap area was incorporated into the newly organized Hau My District, Dinh Tuong Province.

d. Kien Giang was the next most active Province. In western Kien Giang Province, enemy units attempted to reopen infiltration routes. The 9th Division's 16th Regiment and territorial elements were used effectively




Figure 2-3

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in February and March, in heliborne operations to seal off the northern end of Infiltration Route 1C in the vicinity of the Chau Doc panhandle/Khmer border area. Friendly forces suffered 22 KIA, 20 WIA, 6 MIA, and 32 SA, 2 CS weapons, and 6 radios were reported lost. One 105mm How was damaged. Six VNAF UH-1 helicopters were hit by small arms fire; one was destroyed and five damaged. The enemy lost 83 killed, and 21 SA and 40 CS weapons captured. Although contacts were heavy, ARVN sweep operations effectively blocked this infiltration route from Cambodia.

e. In southeast Kien Giang and northern An Xuyen Provinces, ARVN security operations in the U-Minh Forest area were opposed by aggressive VC/NVA units. An outpost, situated adjacent to the Trem Trem Canal, was overrun 16 February. The outpost was occupied by an RF unit, supported by an artillery platoon. Friendly losses were reported as 12 KIA, 9 WIA, 35 MIA, and 103 SA, 3 CS weapons, five PRC-25 and one GRC-34 radio lost, and two 105mm Howitzers damaged. No enemy losses were reported. Subsequently, elements of the 32d Regiment conducted a sweep operation along the An Xuyen/Kien Giang border 25 February. The 2d and 3d Battalions fell into a well planned and executed ambush resulting in 22 KIA, 46 WIA, 49 MIA, and five CS and 103 SA weapons and five PRC-25 radios lost. No enemy losses were reported.

f. Throughout the Delta, outposts were shelled and attacked as enemy forces attempted to open rice supply routes. During the month of February, 49 outposts were temporarily abandoned due to enemy pressure or overrun and subsequently retaken. Retaking of outposts proved costly as friendly units frequently fell prey to ambush.

g. Terrorist activity continued in the region with village and hamlet chiefs the primary targets. Numerous grenade incidents were reported at local gatherings, as well as abductions of small groups. Mekong LOC remain open and all Phnom Penh convoys transited with only minor incidents.

(FIGURE 2-4)

6. (C) SUMMARY/CONCLUSIONS. It is becoming apparent that the enemy will initiate larger scale offensive actions in MR 2 and 3. There were few significant changes for RVNAF during the second quarter. The Military Regions experienced relative stability as ARVN and Ter-



MR 4
MAJOR ABF
MINOR ABF
MAJOR CONTACTS
MINOR CONTACTS
600
400
200
100
50
6
13
20
27
DEC
3
10
17
24
31
JAN
7
14
21
28
FEB
7
14
21
28
MAR
4
APR

Figure 2-4

ritorial Forces held their own and, in some cases, displayed strengths not evidenced in the past. It is too early to gauge the impact of recent command changes, but indications are more than favorable. Military discipline and morale will impact heavily on RVNAF ability to cope with increasing enemy pressure throughout RVN. The enemy air defense system continues to limit VNAF's capability throughout RVN. Since 1 January 1974, VNAF suffered 3 aircraft destroyed by SA-7 missiles. Figures 2-5 and 2-6 reflect type aircraft loss and location of SA-5 incidents. The VNN continued riverine operations, resupply missions and coastal surveillance duty with little interference from the enemy. A summary of significant battles is shown in Figures 2-7A, 2-7B, 2-7C and 2-7D. Statistical data, including trends for the reporting period, are shown in Figure 2-8, 2-9, 2-10A, 2-10B, 2-10C, 2-10D, 2-11 and 2-12.

Figure 2-5


SA-7 CEASEFIRE RECAP JAN-MAR 74

	DTG	PROVINCE	AIRCRAFT	*	LOCATION	RESULT
MR-1		NONE				
MR-2		NONE				
MR-3	251730 JAN	PHUOC LONG	C-7	(1)	32KM SW PHUOC BINH	LT DMGE, NG CAS
	260928 MAR	TAY NINH	F-5	(1)	VIC TONLE CHAM	NEG
	271820 MAR	HAU NGHIA	A 1-H	(1)	10KM E DUC HUE	A/C DEST; PILOT KIA
	280600 MAR	HAU NGHIA	AC119K	(4)	5KM NE DUC HUE	NEG
	281615 MAR	TAY NINH	L-19	(1)	10KM SW HIEU THIEN	A/C DEST; PILOT & OBSVR WND
	290400 MAR	HAU NGHIA	AC119K	(3)	5KM W DUC HUE	NEG
	291930 MAR	TAY NINH	A1-H	(1)	11KM SW HIEU THIEN	A/C DEST; NEG CAS
	292030 MAR	HAU NGHIA	AC119K	(5)	2KM S DUC HUE	NEG
	292400 MAR	HAU NGHIA	AC119K	(1)	10KM W DUC HUE	NEG
	302210 MAR	HAU NGHIA	AC119K	(2)	10KM E DUC HUE	NEG
MR-4		NONE				

* Number of missiles fired

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REPORTED SA-7 FIRINGS IN RVN 28 JAN 73 - 31 MAR 74



	MISSILES FIRED				
	MR 1	MR 2	MR 3	MR 4	TOTAL
28 JAN 73 THRU 31 DEC 73	4	23	29	22	78
1 JAN 74 THRU 31 MAR 74	0	0	20	0	20
TOTAL	4	23	49	22	98

Figure 2-6

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1974

MAJOR ENGAGEMENT WON-LOST LEDGER

MR	DESCRIPTION	LEDGER
1	Paracel Islands	Lost

Im mid-January, the Paracel Islands were invaded by the People's Republic of China (PRC). The general engagement of four VNN ships against numerous PRC naval units, supported by aircraft, was the first major VNN sea battle. In the face of superior enemy forces, Robert, Money, and Pattle Islands were lost. One VNN patrol craft escort was destroyed, one high endurance cutter sustained heavy damages while a second, was lightly damaged. A destroyer escort radar picket also sustained light damages. RVNAF suffered 19 KIA, 42 WIA and 54 MIA. The missing personnel are presumed to be dead. PRC lost two 330 ton Kronstadt Class Escort ships, and two additional unknown type ships were lightly damaged. PRC personnel losses are unknown.

2	Dak Krong River	Won

NW of Ban Don, Darlac Province, the 44th and 45th Infantry effectively interdicted communist infiltration route 615 and destroyed three bridges under construction at the Dak Krong River. The 23d Division elements sustained 9 KIA, 66 WIA and captured 12 SA and 2 CS weapons. The enemy lost 115 men. The route remains closed thus preventing an enemy build-up in NW Darlac.

2.	Binh Thuan Resettlement Area	Won

In a move to prevent VC encroachment into resettlement villages north of Phan Thiet, territorial forces launched attacks against

Figure 2-7A

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the VC Provincial Committee plus four VC battalions. The 202nd, 229th, 230th and 299th RF Bns and 3/8th AC Troop participated in this action. Friendly casualties included 22 KIA, 18 WIA, 2 MIA, 1 Civ killed, 29 wounded and 2 SA weapons lost. The enemy sustained 137 killed and 22 SA weapons captured. Four VC battalion base camps and one hospital complex were destroyed. Remnants of the four VC battalions took refuge in mountain retreats.

2 Communist Supply Route, Kontum, 16 March — Won

The 23d Ranger Group and Territorial Forces blocked extension of the communist supply route running east and south from Vo Dinh. The enemy used large scale ground attacks and ABF but were unable to dislodge friendly forces. RVNAF casualties were 25 KIA, 43 WIA, 45 SA lost and 2 trucks destroyed. Enemy losses were 433 KIA, 127 SA and 51 CS weapons captured.

3 Ho Bo/Boi Loi Woods Operation — Won

Elements of the 18th and 25th Inf Div launched a clearing operation during the period 1-12 Feb. The mission was to clear the Ho Bo/Boi Loi Woods stronghold and eliminate NVA forces north of QL-1 in Hau Nghia and southern Tay Ninh. Closely coordinated actions caught enemy forces by surprise, forcing them to leave base areas and cached supplies behind. Intelligence reports indicate that the 101st Independent Regiment was rendered ineffective. Ninety-four enemy were reported killed, one detained and three CS and 40 small arm weapons captured. GVN suffered 31 KIA and 165 WIA. VNAF flew 335 A-1, A-37 and F-5 sorties during the operation and reported 35 KBA, 34 secondary explosions, five hectares of cultivation and two AA weapons destroyed.

3 Duc Hue Base Area - Hau Nghia — Won

The base was attacked by enemy units following a heavy shelling on 27 March. The

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camp was penetrated by the attacking force; however, the 83d Ranger Bn counterattacked and repulsed the enemy. The Rangers sustained 29 KIA, 27 WIA and 5 MIA. The enemy suffered 95 killed and lost 21 SA and 16 CS weapons, including one 75mm recoilless rifle. Effective VNAF TACAIR and gunship support was counterd by the firing of 18 SA-7 missiles during the last four days of the quarter. VNAF lost two A-1 fighter bombers and one O-1 aircraft. A second O-1 was reported missing.

4 Tri Phap Operation — Won

GVN forces cleared VC/NVA Base Area 470, more commonly known as Tri Phap. Casualties were heavy on both sides as ARVN reported 852 enemy killed, 389 SA and 56 CS weapons (including five 122mm rocket launchers) and over 5 tons of ammo captured. Friendly casualties (not including ABF casualties) have been reported as 47 KIA, 266 WIA and 2 MIA. The operation is currently in the consolidation phase consisting of outpost construction and preparation for permanent resettlement. The battle of Tri Phap is one of the most successful ever conducted by ARVN forces working alone.

4 Route 1C Kien Giang — Won

Enemy units attempted to reopen infiltration route 1C in western Kien Giang. The 9th Division's 16th Regiment and territorial elements were used effectively in February and March of 1974 in heliborne operations to seal off the northern end of Route 1C in the vicinity of the Cau Doc panhandle/Khmer border area. Friendly forces suffered 22 KIA, 20 WIA, 6 MIA, and 32 SA, 2 CS weapons and 6 radios were reported lost. One 105mm Howitzer was damaged. Six VNAF UH-1 helicopters were hit by small arms fire; one was destroyed and five were damaged. The enemy lost 83 killed, and 21 SA and 40 CS weapons captured. Although contacts were heavy, ARVN sweep operations effectively blocked this infiltration route from Cambodia.

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4 An Xuyen, Kien Giang Border Incident Lost

An outpost, situated adjacent to the Trem Trem Canal, was overrun on 16 February. The outpost was occupied by an RF unit supported by an artillery platoon. Friendly losses were reported as 12 KIA, 9 WIA, 35 MIA; and 103 SA, 3 CS weapons, five PRC-25 radios and one GRC-34 radio. Two 105mm Howitzers were destroyed. No enemy losses were reported. Subsequently, elements of the 32d Regiment conducted a sweep operation along the An Xuyen/Kien Giang border on 25 February. The 2d and 3d Battalions fell into a well planned and executed ambush resulting in 22 KIA, 46 WIA, 49 MIA and five CS, 40 SA weapons lost. No enemy losses were reported.

Figure 2-7D

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


Figure 2-8

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


Figure 2-9

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SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE
MR 1

WEEK	NOV 2	NOV 9	NOV 16	NOV 23	NOV 30	DEC 7	DEC 14	DEC 21	DEC 28	JAN 4	JAN 11	JAN 18	JAN 25	FEB 1	FEB 8	FEB 15	FEB 22	MAR 1	MAR 8	MAR 15
INCIDENTS	113	79	70	116	94	58	97	84	81	73	58	47	47	43	61	79	97	89	74	83
MAJ / MIN ABF	15 / 54	9 / 44	7 / 38	17 / 45	17 / 36	6 / 15	14 / 26	7 / 23	11 / 27	7 / 24	3 / 18	2 / 13	3 / 8	2 / 9	3 / 18	14 / 13	11 / 35	12 / 31	10 / 29	14 / 30
MAJ / MIN CTX	5 / 39	1 / 25	1 / 24	5 / 49	0 / 41	2 / 35	7 / 50	5 / 49	2 / 41	1 / 41	2 / 35	1 / 31	1 / 35	4 / 28	0 / 40	2 / 50	2 / 49	2 / 44	4 / 31	1 / 38
EN ARTY INCOMING	1,068	718	548	1,694	1,356	293	917	421	545	451	443	146	128	134	182	619	640	561	935	605
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	6,932	3,932	3,537	7,305	4,753	2,383	5,389	4,659	3,006	3,532	2,960	2,278	2,563	2,571	2,373	2,524	2,790	2,343	2,199	2,536
SCH / FLN VNAF SORTIES	126 / 0	126 / 0	138 / 0	126 / 0	126 / 2	126 / 2	126 / 2	126 / 0	18 / 10	126 / 0	146 / 4	154 / 0	150 / 0	154 / 0	154 / 0	154 / 0	152 / 0	154 / 0	154 / 4	154 / 0
K / W FRD CAS	60 / 225	18 / 44	25 / 159	76 / 302	37 / 137	17 / 100	63 / 185	32 / 101	27 / 156	44 / 139	24 / 123	19 / 68	29 / 112	17 / 144	21 / 129	44 / 199	27 / 145	38 / 140	16 / 107	40 / 119
K / D EN CAS	145 / 2	55 / 3	120 / 3	174 / 15	100 / 1	80 / 14	141 / 32	120 / 3	122 / 4	110 / 2	91 / 0	60 / 4	93 / 3	71 / 6	68 / 1	97 / 1	97 / 2	102 / 8	79 / 1	98 / 4
K / W CIV CAS	11 / 38	2 / 16	3 / 5	10 / 14	5 / 21	1 / 3	8 / 21	16 / 29	9 / 13	3 / 13	16 / 61	12 / 13	7 / 9	16 / 33	7 / 13	21 / 19	18 / 42	9 / 17	11 / 17	10 / 34

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Figure 2-10A

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SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE
MR 2

WEEK	2 NOV	9 NOV	16 NOV	23 NOV	30 NOV	7 DEC	14 DEC	21 DEC	28 DEC	4 JAN	11 JAN	18 JAN	25 JAN	1 FEB	8 FEB	15 FEB	22 FEB	1 MAR	8 MAR	15 MAR	21 MAR
INCIDENTS	117	96	106	113	141	86	93	106	97	100	107	108	70	118	111	114	108	87	110	169	
MAJ/MIN ABF	10 / 29	17 / 20	12 / 21	10 / 18	21 / 19	2 / 14	8 / 21	10 / 15	5 / 25	5 / 10	15 / 11	25 / 25	2 / 17	16 / 19	13 / 21	7 / 30	5 / 22	3 / 10	8 / 17	15 / 25	
MAJ/MIN CTX	4 / 74	0 / 59	5 / 68	7 / 78	11 / 90	4 / 66	0 / 64	3 / 78	4 / 63	4 / 81	7 / 74	5 / 53	4 / 47	4 / 79	5 / 72	4 / 72	3 / 77	2 / 71	83	10 / 119	
EN ARTY INCOMING	834	604	623	530	1,058	150	449	560	244	246	622	2,745	232	956	485	559	353	164	378	1,343	
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	27,757	26,151	20,975	22,870	27,635	26,852	24,226	25,227	18,781	24,145	23,158	20,488	18,714	25,496	26,433	22,545	16,028	11,535	14,254	17,676	
SCH/FLN VNAF SORTIES	426 / 194	426 / 191	496 / 342	532 / 408	536 / 604	448 / 399	496 / 342	526 / 212	550 / 353	560 / 300	546 / 437	550 / 306	548 / 257	542 / 232	540 / 183	512 / 297	528 / 137	526 / 281	528 / 196	524 / 154	
K/W FRD CAS	35 / 106	37 / 90	39 / 176	52 / 211	33 / 213	35 / 180	42 / 99	59 / 116	40 / 153	34 / 127	69 / 168	17 / 185	42 / 75	66 / 189	27 / 135	23 / 131	21 / 144	16 / 69	108	81 / 271	
K/D EN CAS	144 / 5	111 / 2	257 / 3	139 / 0	281 / 1	260 / 1	154 / 0	135 / 0	247 / 4	228 / 3	392 / 0	280 / 1	196 / 0	269 / 3	325 / 14	275 / 2	158 / 0	134 / 4	258 / 2	462 / 7	
K/W CIV CAS	0 / 9	2 / 1	1 / 14	2 / 7	3 / 1	4 / 7	1 / 0	1 / 6	2 / 3	5 / 24	0 / 0	9 / 11	5 / 23	1 / 2	1 / 4	7 / 0	4 / 29	3 / 5	0 / 3		

Figure 2-10B

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SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE
MR 3

WEEK	2 NOV	9 NOV	16 NOV	23 NOV	30 NOV	7 DEC	14 DEC	21 DEC	28 DEC	4 JAN	11 JAN	18 JAN	25 JAN	1 FEB	8 FEB	15 FEB	22 FEB	1 MAR	8 MAR	15 MAR	21 MAR
INCIDENTS	108	82	87	117	122	168	128	129	134	104	83	47	69	127	119	85	89	91	88	73	
MAJ ABF	9	1	7	4	10	7	9	7	10	12	14	5	6	24	18	11	14	12	13	12	
MIN ABF	28	20	21	35	48	35	46	45	51	40	32	16	24	37	40	32	25	26	28	31	
MAJ CTX	3	1	5	1	3	3	6	3	3	6	1	2	2	5	2	3	0	5	2	1	
MIN CTX	68	60	54	77	61	123	67	74	70	46	36	24	37	61	53	39	50	48	45	29	
EN ARTY INCOMING	374	75	278	237	542	356	484	573	667	762	635	212	273	1230	1428	537	1,020	731	612	803	
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	14,022	13,106	17,484	13,060	14,510	15,013	32,023	13,635	15,527	22,652	13,577	9524	8202	23,168	13,320	8,909	9,321	11,590	13,729	11,662	
SOV VNAF SORTIES	372	470	432	548	477	336	476	514	463	509	399	368	406	526	484	432	376	390	376	376	
PLN VNAF SORTIES	300	253	295	438	363	308	369	358	273	320	264	156	160	315	351	267	216	265	238	114	
W FRD CAS	22	0	33	32	41	59	66	50	52	103	16	5	52	36	45	37	33	35	14	23	
W FRD CAS	65	36	99	127	120	200	186	143	124	220	79	32	73	151	170	60	136	103	109	96	
K/D EN CAS	51	36	64	78	65	146	115	77	97	110	47	19	113	161	103	65	64	118	119	25	
K/D EN CAS	2	9	3	3	3	3	5	1	5	4	0	4	0	3	12	1	2	8	2	1	
K/W CIV CAS	7	4	4	13	12	15	15	4	10	4	3	2	3	3	8	8	5	16	8	4	
K/W CIV CAS	20	14	6	35	22	40	40	11	17	8	15	3	23	6	23	25	22	15	21	28	

Figure 2-10C

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SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE
MR 4

WEEK	NOV 2	NOV 9	NOV 16	NOV 23	NOV 30	DEC 7	DEC 14	DEC 21	DEC 28	JAN 4	JAN 11	JAN 18	JAN 25	FEB 1	FEB 8	FEB 15	FEB 22	MAR 1	MAR 8	MAR 15
INCIDENTS	305	257	331	387	328	226	442	564	355	264	361	485	353	331	276	551	465	391	323	308
MAJ ABF	24	19	26	28	16	11	15	35	20	13	13	27	23	16	11	32	27	17	11	18
MIN ABF	105	75	150	147	132	97	207	234	178	116	173	245	169	183	130	282	235	177	149	155
MAJ CTX	7	3	7	6	10	11	8	13	7	10	9	15	12	7	7	12	11	8	11	15
MIN CTX	169	160	148	206	170	107	212	282	150	125	166	198	149	125	128	225	192	188	152	120
EN ARTY INCOMING	1,140	1,078	1,658	1,540	1,477	847	1,653	2,553	1,639	1,102	1,448	2,382	1,749	1,650	1,018	2,523	2,303	1,450	1,065	1,247
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	20,030	15,108	19,295	16,035	17,758	14,236	20,223	31,193	24,639	18,913	25,856	26,906	26,285	19,267	18,317	36,982	44,112	31,905	30,431	33,137
SCH VNAF	170	154	154	206	184	178	241	198	170	202	178	182	178	174	168	166	158	154	154	150
FLN SORTIES	129	68	48	152	121	119	178	169	124	101	148	134	134	135	140	143	173	103	108	72
K FRD CAS	56	43	92	58	38	82	93	182	76	48	43	110	80	71	116	105	123	111	33	47
W FRD CAS	225	207	339	350	281	275	300	576	272	201	218	391	292	313	182	425	372	241	238	198
K EN CAS	232	130	266	145	217	382	270	240	96	214	238	241	352	233	298	392	295	195	291	233
D EN CAS	6	3	0	2	1	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	5	5	0	22	4	0	0	0
K CIV CAS	22	8	20	23	16	5	13	20	1	16	7	28	20	20	5	18	21	14	41	43
W CIV CAS	89	45	52	19	40	23	42	54	5	18	23	72	37	15	41	54	110	13	109	105

Figure 2-10D

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KILL RATIO 1973

MONTH	FRD	EN	RATIO
JAN	1684	8798	5.22
FEB	1544	8610	5.58
MAR	1767	6893	3.90
APR	1096	2858	2.61
MAY	1087	3070	2.82
JUNE	1096	3628	3.31
JUL	902	3215	3.56
AUG	1166	3807	3.26
SEPT	634	2158	3.40
OCT	1102	3134	2.84
NOV	719	2244	3.12
DEC	989	3001	3.03

KILL RATIO 1974

MONTH	FRD	EN	RATIO
JAN	821	3035	3.70
FEB	821	3324	4.05
MAR	976	3465	3.55

Figure 2-11

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


Figure 2-12

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CHAPTER 3

ASSESSMENT OF RVNAF INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES

1. (S/NFD) J2/JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

a. Organization:

Figure 3-1

b. Personnel. The authorized strength of J2 was reduced from 320 to 289, and actual strength showed a decrease of 14 officers and one NCO from the last reporting period.

	AUTHORIZED	ACTUAL
Officers	157	121
NCOs	102	87
EM	30	32
TOTAL	289	240

c. Operational Effectiveness.

The operational effectiveness of the office of the J2 continues at a high level. A contributing factor is the personal integrity and professional competence of the J2 who has been in office since May 1971. He has effectively organized his staff and manned it with experienced, competent personnel.

2. (S/NFD) UNIT 306:

Figure 3-2

a. Organization. Unit 306 is the new designation of the Military Intelligence Center, which was established on 1 July 1973 with five divisions replacing the former intelligence centers. Based on a decree from the Prime Minister directing cover designators for all intelligence units, the Unit 306 Commander (Deputy J2) issued an order on 29 March 1974 changing

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


Figure 3-1

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


Figure 3-2

* ALSO SERVES AS DEPUTY J2.

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all divisions within the unit tc numerical designators. The new division designators are as follows: Division 1 (Intelligence), Division 2 (Document Exploitation), Division 3 (Military Interrogation), Division 4 (Materiel Exploitation) and Division 5 (Administration/ Support).

b. Personnel. The strength figures represent a loss of 31 officers and NCO's and a gain of 7 enlisted personnel.

	AUTHORIZED	ACTUAL
Officers	169	133
NCOs	164	128
EM	124	126
TOTAL	457	387

c. Operational Effectiveness.

(1) Division 1 (Intelligence): Division 1 is the most effectively managed and productive element of Unit 306; its Target Branch is particularly outstanding. The Chief of the Target Branch is hard-working, aggressive, and technically qualified. His subordinates are well-trained, competent and motivated. The Division Chief personally devotes a great deal of time to this Branch. Its products are professional. The Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) Branch has recently been augmented by two DAO-hired Computer Specialists. Their functions are to re-program IDHS files for use in the IBM 360-50 and train IDHS Branch personnel in the use of this equipment. The present IDHS Branch Chief is not properly qualified and was assigned to this position when the Branch was inoperable due to lack of trained personnel. The Division Chief has requested the transfer of the Branch Chief but the decision is still pending. Division 1 has one Company Grade Officer receiving commercial training on the IBM 360-50.

(2) Division 2 (Document Exploitation): The increase in the level of enemy contacts has gradually

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CMD G2 Section can process large quantities of information. Its estimates have proven timely and accurate.

4. (S/NFD) CORPS AND DIVISION G2's:

a. Organization. The Corps G2 has three sections: Intelligence, G2 Air, and Interrogation. It is supported by a Military Intelligence Detachment. The Interrogation Section operates the Corps Interrogation Center (CIC) which includes a Headquarters Element and Operations, Historical and Interrogation Sections. The Military Intelligence Detachment consists of Document Exploitation, Technical Intelligence, Interrogation, Order of Battle (OB), Imagery Interpretation and Collection Sections. Division G2's have two sections: Intelligence and G2 Air; they are also supported by Military Intelligence Detachments.

b. Personnel. Actual strength figures are not available but Corps G2's reportedly have personnel shortages. These shortages have not had a discernible impact on mission accomplishment. The Corps G2 is authorized a total of 54 officers, and 112 enlisted men as follows:

Hqs Element - 11 officers, 14 EM; Corps Interrogation Center - 24 officers, 41 EM; Military Intelligence Detachment - 19 officers, 57 EM. The Hqs element of the Division G2 has 9 officers and 10 EM while the Military Intelligence Detachment consists of 12 officers and 47 EM.

c. Operational Effectiveness.

(1) The Corps G2's appear to be highly qualified, career intelligence officers. The key staff positions are manned by experienced and fairly well-trained personnel. Corps files and holdings are generally complete, accurate, and maintained on a timely basis.

(2) At the Division level, the collection and analytical functions are fairly well coordinated. Intelligence is disseminated to tactical consumers on a timely basis and it is accepted with due credibility.

Briefing and situation rooms are well equipped in comparison to other staff offices. Files and holdings in general are adequately and effectively organized and maintained. Division G2's are giving less than full support to the exploitation of captured documents and materiel. Units capturing documents and materiel frequently hold them for excessive periods of time which precludes more thorough and effective exploitation at higher echelons.

5. (S/NFD) MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE (MSS):

a. Organization. The MSS is commanded by Brigadier General Vu Duc Nhuan. It is subordinate to the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) of the Joint General Staff (JGS). Despite MSS subordination to a staff element within the Ministry of Defense, it reports directly to, or receives tasking directly from, the highest levels, including the Office of the President and the Prime Minister. The Headquarters element (Military Security Directorate) is located in Saigon and is composed of 440 officers and men. The remainder of the personnel are assigned to either military units or to regular MSS units throughout South Vietnam. There is a detachment of 50 officers and men at the Headquarters of each Military Region and in the Capital District. A field office of 30 personnel is maintained in each province and in the major cities. A contingent of six personnel makes up the sub-field offices within each district. Also, units of 20 and 25 officers and men are assigned to Corps and Divisions, respectively. MSS personnel are attached to regiment, battalion, company and platoon level.

b. Personnel.

	AUTHORIZED	ACTUAL
Officers	1,107	1,034
NCOs	2,455	2,126
Enlisted	1,263	1,225
TOTAL	4,825	4,385

There have been no significant strength changes since last quarter.

c. Equipment and Facilities.

The Central Records Facility represents a new effort to combine background information and the results of investigations at one central location as well as at the MSS Military Region Headquarters. The Facility is not a modern, automated system, but it makes possible the expediting of national-level name trace actions. The MSS wanted to exchange ten two-way Mustang radios, which are too bulky and heavy for surveillance purposes, for smaller, compact radios which cost approximately $1,000 each. The MSS was informed that it would have to submit its requirement, with appropriate justification, through the Military Assistance Program.

d. Operational Effectiveness.

(1) MSS efforts have been successful in assisting the government in maintaining a level of political stability. Through its field components, it has greatly enhanced internal security through overt as well as covert counterintelligence operations. In furtherance of the countersubversive mission, MSS has provided valuable information concerning identification of the VC infrastructure. It has the capability to detect and report imminence of hostility information in any of the four Military Regions. The MSS is co-equal in power and prestige with the National Police and the Central Intelligence Organization.

(2) It has a decentralized organization which exercises considerable autonomy and flexibility in providing lateral support to tactical elements. For example, when the MSS at the Military Region level provides information to the Corps Commander, it generally informs the Directorate but at a later date and without all the details. If the information is of interest to other Military Regions, the Directorate publishes a report.

(3) During the reporting period, the MSS initiated two new bilateral operations with military intelligence

elements in RVN for the purpose of satisfying Order of Battle collection requirements in MR-3. It is also making plans to establish additional bilateral operations in MRs 1, 2, and 4 in the near future. On 23 February, the MSS implemented a new policy designed to keep military intelligence elements in RVN better informed. It involves the continuous screening of all incoming intelligence reports and messages for immediate transmission to consumers.

(4) In addition to furnishing information, the MSS has provided many special services to U.S. Intelligence, including the issuance of MSS passes, performance of national level file checks, and coordinating clearances of indigenous personnel.

6. (S/NFD) UNIT 101:

a. Organization. Under the operational control of J2, Unit 101, JGS/RVNAF, organizes, directs and controls in-country and cross-border military intelligence collection operations. The unit consists of a Headquarters in Saigon headed by a Colonel, an Administration Section, and Operations, Support and Political Warfare Branches. Unit 101 has six field detachments and 26 teams operating throughout the country which control 91 agent nets and 251 coded assets. [Approximately one-third of the coded assets are VC/NVA defectors-in-place.] Detachment 60, with headquarters in Saigon, is responsible for coverage of the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN). Detachment 67, Saigon, provides coverage for MR-3 with the exception of the Capital Military District. Detachment 68 has headquarters in Can Tho and is responsible for MR-4. Detachment 69, with headquarters at Thu Duc, provides coverage for the Capital Military District and conducts cross-border, third-country operations.

b. Personnel. Authorized strength of the unit was reduced from 920 to 874. Its actual strength increased by 24 personnel during reporting period.

	AUTHORIZED	ACTUAL
Officers	---	329
NCOs	---	257

	AUTHORIZED	ACTUAL
EM	---	164
TOTAL	847	750

c. Equipment and Facilities.

Most of the unit's equipment is serviceable and replacements of spare parts are available. The unit has second echelon maintenance capability for all its equipment. Maintenance above that level is obtained through ARVN support channels. Unit facilities both at headquarters level in Saigon and at detachment and team locations throughout the country are excellent.

d. Operational Effectiveness.

Unit 101 maintains liaison with US Army Special Activities, Thailand. One project officer is assigned at the headquarters level and provides technical and financial assistance. The unit's monthly production of intelligence reports is approximately 1,500. The Unit is responsive to ARVN requirements from all consumers. The unit receives financial assistance through US Military Intelligence Contingency Funds which amount to approximately $6,000 monthly. Cost effectiveness is excellent, however, Unit 101 could not continue to function without this US financial assistance.

7. (S/NFD) VIETNAMESE NAVY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION:

a. N-2.

(1) Organization. The N-2 is an operational staff for the Chief of Naval Operations with four main branches: Administrative/Personnel, Hydrographic Mapping, Intelligence, and Exploitation. Its mission is to analyze information received from the Special Collection Detachment, naval forces at sea, naval coastal zone headquarters and other RVN intelligence agencies and to provide estimates of Communist intentions.

(2) Personnel.

time, the CMD is covered by Collection Team 6 which is also responsible for the Rung Sat Special Zone. The overt element consists of 28 Naval Intelligence Liaison Officers who are assigned to the various military regions, sector and/or sub-sector headquarters. In many cases the Liaison Officers function in a dual capacity. In addition to contact with official intelligence collection sources, they also work as covert collection officers and manage the agent handlers in their area. The covert activities will be taken over by Intelligence Collection Officers when SCD has sufficient trained personnel. This should improve the effectiveness of the collection activity and operational security.

(2) Personnel.

	AUTHORIZED	ACTUAL
Officers	---	50
Petty Officers	---	129
Seamen	---	19
TOTAL	121	198

The increased effectiveness of SCD in recent months has pleased the Chief, Naval Operations who has authorized the assignment of the additional personnel by borrowing spaces from other units. SCD now has 77 more personnel than the authorized TO&E of 121. It is planned to increase actual strength still further to 234.

(3) Equipment and Facilities.

The SCD internal communications system was improved during this quarter. All collection teams now have single sideband AM radios permitting voice communication with Headquarters. But this equipment is not adequate for transmission of lengthy intelligence reports. The teletypes of Naval Coastal Zone and Riverine Force Headquarters are available to the Collection Teams, but other traffic frequently holds up

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supplement the limited air photo coverage of air strikes. Efforts to direct HUMINT sources to meet BDA requirements on some pre-planned target areas in the northern sector of MR-3 are beginning to prove productive and now comprise 15% of VNAF's total collection.

(4) The VNAF Special Collection Unit has an authorized strength of 15 and an assigned strength of 9.

(5) The U.S. provides all of the unit's operational funds. Without this financial assistance, the unit could not operate.

b. PHOTINT.

(1) VNAF's photo intelligence is limited by the number of aircraft and their susceptibility to ground fire. Six RF-5s and four of the 12 authorized RC-47s are assigned to photo collection. These aircraft provide minimum coverage of MRs 2, 3, and 4. The RC-47 can obtain good photography but is too vulnerable to ground fire in most target areas to be used for BDA. The RF-5 operates under the major handicap of its 70mm camera, which is unsuitable for BDA. There is little or no coverage of MR-1 due to the high air defense threat. The RVN relies on the U.S. for photo coverage of MR-1.

(2) VNAF can produce duplicate positives, select prints and photo mosaics. Its capacity to produce paper prints is limited. Laboratory standards have deteriorated in recent months. The poor quality of VNAF aerial photo prints have resulted in unsatisfactory imagery interpretation. U.S. technical assistance has been requested. VNAF imagery interpretation personnel meet US professional standards.

(3) No VNAF aircraft possess Radar Lock on Warning (LOW) gear. This limits operations in high threat areas. VNAF recce could function in Cambodia and possibly in the Laos Panhandle.

9. (S/NFD) SIGINT:

a. The J7 is responsible for RVNAF SIGINT Collection.

This agency provides timely tactical intelligence to field commanders through its 11 ARVN Special Technical Detachments assigned to the 11 ARVN Infantry Divisions. SIGINT support teams are assigned to Airborne, Marine, and Ranger units. This collection effort is aided by four centers situated in Danang, Pleiku, Saigon, and Can Tho.

b. The J7 Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) Program is progressing at a steady pace. There are presently 32 (2 not operational) EC-47 aircraft in the ARDF Program. Twenty-six of these aircraft are stationed in Saigon and fly eleven missions a day; the remaining aircraft are based at Danang and fly four missions a day. Mission reductions due to airframe maintenance and weather continue to be a problem.

c. Overall RVNAF SIGINT collection continues to make progress in the analytical and reporting fields. Present limitations include a shortage of personnel and the need for additional secure communication systems. Equipment shortages have been addressed and are on order.

10. (S/NFD) NATIONAL POLICE COMMAND (NPC):

The Special Assistant for Security has the responsibility of keeping the National Police Commander informed of all events affecting GVN security. All significant information involving security is channeled into this office, mostly in the form of after action reports. The Section performs its mission effectively, and is an excellent and timely source of after action type information and trend reports.

11. (S/NFD) SUMMARY:

RVNAF intelligence services benefit from personnel who, on the whole, are highly competent, dedicated professionals. Some of the intelligence activities would have to be drastically reduced or eliminated without US funding assistance. Intelligence training is being conducted on a satisfactory level despite severe budgetary limitations, but deterioration can be eventually expected unless additional funds are made available. DAO liaison with the RVNAF intelligence services continues to improve, and the input which they provide is generally satisfactory and timely.

CHAPTER 4

RVNAF FORCE STRUCTURE

1. (S) JOINT JGS/DAO FY 75 FORCE STRUCTURE REVIEW.

a. The annual combined Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Joint General Staff/Defense Attache Office (RVNAF JGS/DAO) fiscal year 1975 RVNAF Force Structure Review proposals were approved by CINCPAC message 252201Z January 1974. A Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) message, 151544Z March 1974, was received which rescinds the requirement for submitting separate annual RVNAF force structure reviews. Future RVNAF force structure changes are to be addressed in the Planning, Programming and Budget System (PPBS) cycle and included in the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) and Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) submissions. Additionally, JCS stated an urgent requirement for a separate time-phased RVNAF force reduction plan which considers as a minimum the phased reductions of 100,000 men per year for three years, starting in calendar year 75, outlined in the MOND Four-Year Plan. JCS stated the plan must be developed in close consultation with RVNAF, JGS and emphasized that the reduction plan is for planning purposes only and does not alter previous guidance on maintaining a 1.1 million man RVNAF force structure.

b. Force Structure Section, DAO, working in close consultation with the Organization Division, JGS, completed and published a Force Structure List FY 74-75 reflecting a summary of the force structure changes for FY 75. Copies of this list were distributed to JCS, DA, CINCPAC and all PACOM service components, JGS and service divisions in DAO.

CHAPTER 5

VIETNAMESE ARMY

1. (C) AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED STRENGTH. Depicted authorized and assigned troop strengths include all combat support, and combat service support units assigned to the divisions.

(Figure 5-1)

2. (S) AREAS OF OPERATION AND UNIT LOCATIONS.

a. MR 1 is subdivided into five Areas of Operation (AOs). From north to south, AOs are assigned as follows: VNMC Division, Airborne Division, 1st Division, 3d Division, and 2d Division.

b. MR 2 is subdivided into two division AOs. From north to south, the AOs are assigned to the 22d Division (Kontum-Pleiku) and 23d Division (Quang Duc-Darlac). Neither of the divisions have subordinate elements in any other MR 2 provinces.

c. MR 3 is subdivided into four AOs and the Capital Special Zone (the area encompassing Saigon). Combat units assigned to AOs are as follows: Ranger Command, 5th Division, 18th Division, and 25th Division.

d. MR 4 is subdivided into three AOs. Combat divisions assigned to AOs are as follows: 7th Division, 9th Division, and 21st Division.

(Figure 5-2)

e. The locations of tactical units at the regimental level and above are depicted for each MR.

(Figures 5-3, 5-4

5-5 and 5-6)

AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED STRENGTHS


AS OF 28 FEB 74

DIV	AUTH	OFF	NCO	EM	ASSGN	% AUTH
1st	17102	1185	3545	11726	16456	96
2d	14159	987	2701	9046	12734	90
3d	14159	988	2899	9178	13065	92
5th	14159	984	2701	9345	13030	92
7th	14175	926	2755	8445	12126	86
9th	14175	985	2532	8498	12015	85
18th	14159	951	2707	9363	13021	92
21st	14175	908	2661	8668	12237	86
22d	17233	1153	3080	10385	14618	85
23d	14168	964	2625	8411	12000	85
25th	14220	937	2637	10569	14143	99
Abn	13684	1046	2816	9820	13682	100
Rgr	34418	2193	5789	24330	32312	94
Mar	14438	1091	2344	11436	14871	103
TOTAL	224424	15298	41792	149220	206310	92

Figure 5-1

AD-A094 488 DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON DC F/G 15/7
DEFENSE ATTACHE SAIGON: RVNAF QUARTERLY ASSESSMENT, 3RD QUARTER--ETC(U)
MAY 74 J E MURRAY, W A WILLIAMS

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AREAS OF OPERATION




Figure 5-2

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ARVN

MR 1




Figure 5-3

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ARVN
MR 2




Figure 5-4

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ARVN




Figure 5-5

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


Figure 5-6

3. (C) COMBAT ARMS.

a. Combat Divisions.

(1) The Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC), long regarded as an elite fighting unit, remained committed to a static defensive role in Quang Tri Province. Small unit patrols throughout the Area of Operation (AO), without significant contact, and infrequent enemy attacks by fire have been the only combat activities. Division units, including the attached 15th Ranger Group, have been primarily concerned with improvement of defensive positions and construction of antitank barriers. The 15th Ranger Group, with three organic battalions, was attached to the Division in early January to replace the 51st Infantry Regiment. Protracted commitment to a static defensive role has resulted in some disciplinary problems, however, morale remains high. Units are fully occupied with training activities. Battalions began a new cycle of rotation through the Dong Da Training Center in January after a three month interruption due to heavy monsoon rains. Battalions are also rotated to Saigon for Rest and Recuperation (R&R) since most Marine dependents are located there. An effective Combined Action Program continued to improve the performance and readiness of Popular Force (PF) and Peoples' Self Defense Force (PSDF) units throughout the AO. Long standing supply problems are being resolved. The Division is considered a highly effective combat unit. Commitment to a defensive posture is expected to continue for the foreseeable future.

(2) The Airborne Division, like the VNMC Division, is committed to a defensive posture. Although highly mobile and aggressive, this elite unit has experienced light combat activity. Recently, a battalion from the reserve brigade was deployed to Phu Loc to provide security for the railroad. Due to extended commitment to a defensive posture, the Airborne Division has also begun to experience disciplinary problems. In addition to improving defensive positions, division units have constructed an antitank system along the southern flank of the AO. Division units participated in civic action programs and initiated a training program for PF and PSDF units. The program of rotating battalions to Saigon for R&R where most dependents are

located, was continued. Internal training and rotation of battalions through Dong Da Training Center also continued. Regional Force (RF) battalions have been integrated into the defensive scheme, permitting formation of a reserve brigade. Like the VNMC, the Airborne Division is expected to continue in a defensive posture. The mobility of the division permits units to be available for temporary deployment to any significant threat area. Despite problems inherent in using an aggressive unit for static defenses, the Airborne Division remains an effective combat unit.

(3) The 1st Division is less committed to static defense than the Airborne or VNMC Divisions. Three of its four regiments have been engaged in frequent contacts and attacks by fire along the western and southwestern approaches to Hue and along the southern approaches to Phu Bai. The 3d Regiment is now in reserve after a long deployment on the Bo River Valley outpost line. The 51st Regiment, a well-trained, aggressive unit, was deployed to the Bo River Valley to replace the 3d Regiment. The highest number of casualties has been reported by 54th Regimental Units southeast of Phu Bai. One battalion of the 3d Regiment was deployed under operational control of the 54th Regiment to assist in controlling the large AO. Small unit leadership has improved throughout the Division as a result of this combat experience and continued rotation of battalions through the Dong Da Training Center. The 1st Division continues to improve steadily and is considered combat effective.

(4) The 3d ARVN Division was rated highest among all ARVN divisions by the Inspector General. However, this was an administrative determination. Combat activity has been limited to small unit patrol and company/battalion - size sweep operations to protect Danang and the coastal lowlands from enemy infiltration. Considerable effort was expended in clearing the rocket belt around Danang and to pacification within the AO. An active program to upgrade the capability of PF and PSDF units is in progress. Control has been maintained in the western areas of the AO and along enemy infiltration routes into the lowlands. Protection of the lowland population has been assigned to territorial units. Although not severely tested since the 1972

offensive, the 3d Division has used the time profitably to increase combat readiness and is considered combat effective.

(5) The 2d ARVN Division has again experienced the highest level of combat activity in MR 1. The 4th, 5th and 6th Regiments have been committed to clearing operations along traditional infiltration routes, protection of resettlement areas and LOC security. Strong enemy response has kept units in Son Tinh, Mo Duc and Duc Pho Districts occupied. Contact with the enemy has consisted primarily of minor engagements and attacks by fire. Due to the difficult task of maintaining security in areas of traditional heavy enemy activity, units have conducted internal training up to battalion level, but have been restricted from rotating battalions through formal training in the Division Training Center. Enemy forces have been contained west of QL-1 in the northern districts and control has been maintained in the southern districts. Units are considered combat effective and capable of defeating any enemy attempt to expand their areas of control. An effective leave policy permitted rotation of units through training, operations and leave cycles.

(6) The 22d Division has been committed to almost continuous combat since December 1973 when the entire division was moved from Binh Dinh to the central highlands. Initially assigned to a defense oriented role, the regiments had to be prepared to reinforce RF and Ranger units when they were unable to contain enemy forces in the outlying areas of Kontum and Pleiku. The Division has been effective in combat against several enemy incursions during the past three months, and has conducted aggressive patrols and sweep operations to maintain the security of critical areas. Cautiously moving into western Pleiku Province, purportedly to retake Le Minh (Plei D'Jereng), two regiments of the 22d inflicted heavy casualties on enemy units. They were able to support a brief reentry into the camp and protect the recovery of the reconnaissance unit which entered the camp and escorted several civilian families back to Government of Vietnam (GVN) control. Division units have demonstrated excellent mobility while responding to enemy activity in widely separated areas. Air, artillery

and armor support were used effectively. Heavy commitment to combat has resulted in high casualties within some units. Recent enemy initiatives have required a high degree of readiness and rapid response to threatened areas. The division has been equal to its assigned task. The high level of enemy activity and large AO has precluded accomplishment of formal training objectives. However, units have conducted local training and concentrated on defense against armor. The Division is considered combat effective.

(7) The 23d Division has repeatedly demonstrated its capability to respond rapidly to enemy initiatives. When enemy forces reacted to an RF clearing operation along QL-14 in western Quang Duc Province, units moved rapidly by air and land, stabilizing the situation and partially restoring interdicted Lines of Communication (LOC). After critical Provincial LOC were restored, two regiments redeployed to Darlac. Offensive operations were undertaken in the western area of the province to blunt an enemy attempt to develop LOC's in the area to facilitate movement along the western periphery of the highlands. Enemy roads were effectively interdicted. After a brief standdown, the 45th Regiment deployed back to Quang Duc to conduct operations against enemy forces to restore GVN control. The 44th Regiment rapidly deployed to reinforce the 22d Division when enemy attacks threatened Kontum and Pleiku Cities and QL-19, the critical LOC from the coast. Due to continuous commitment to combat, and frequent redeployments, the Division has been unable to rotate units through formal training but has been able to conduct local battalion level training stressing combined operations with armor and antitank defense. The Division has sustained substantial casualties while inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy and has demonstrated an increased capability to utilize air, artillery and armor support. The Division is considered combat effective.

(8) The 25th Division continued its progress toward improved combat readiness. Division units were tested in combat for the first time since 49th Regiment units were soundly defeated in Khiem Hanh District, Tay Ninh Province in October 1973. Under new leadership, training has been emphasized and extensive tank defenses have been constructed in the Division AO. Small unit leaders gained valuable experience in an operation conducted in the Phu Hoa/Ho Bo Woods area of western Binh Duong/

northern Hau Nghia 1-12 February. Two regiments, the 46th and 50th, performed effectively, as did the division headquarters and supporting armor and artillery units. The 49th Regiment has remained in Tay Ninh for the past few months providing security for the province capital. Battalions of the 45th Regiment have been rotated to the 46th and 50th Regiments, and have participated in clearing operations in southern Tay Ninh and northern Hau Nghia Provinces. The Division conducted training as the security situation permitted and has achieved its highest level of readiness to date. Especially notable was the improved ability to respond to intelligence, and renewed confidence in its ability to defeat the enemy. The Division is considered combat effective.

(9) The 5th Division, now in its fifth month under new command, has yet to demonstrate significant improvement in aggressiveness. Division units have concentrated on training and morale has improved. Early in the quarter, the 8th Regiment moved from Chon Thanh to Lai Khe. A base camp had been maintained in Chon Thanh for a year while the regiment provided security for that area. Upon its transfer to Lai Khe, the 5th Division AO was contracted and Chon Thanh District, Binh Long Province was reassigned to the Ranger Command. One battalion of the 7th Regiment was deployed to northern Phuoc Long to provide security for the province capital. Battalions of the 9th Regiment have operated in Phu Giao District, Binh Duong Province and demonstrated improved effectiveness during several minor engagements with enemy forces. The 5th Division is considered to have improved and progressed in preparation for a more active combat role. The Division is still marginally combat effective and will remain so until its units have been fully tested in combat with the enemy.

(10) The 18th Division maintained its reputation as the most effective unit in MR-3. Its three regiments have responded rapidly to intelligence and performed aggressively in every engagement with the enemy. The 52d Regiment participated with the 25th Division in the Phu Hoa/Ho Bo Woods operation 1-12 February. Upon return to its AO, the regiment resumed a security role. Two regiments, the 43d and 48th, deployed to Phuoc Tuy Province to reinforce RF units when enemy activity increased along LTL-2. Both regiments were engaged in sustained combat in Phuoc Tuy and Long Khanh

Provinces as the quarter ended. Their quick response restored control in Phuoc Tuy Province. The two regiments have inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. The Division is well led at all levels of command; and artillery, air and armor have been used effectively. While committed to security and protection missions, especially in maintaining surveillance in the Bien Hoa Air Base rocket belt, the battalions have been aggressive and proficient. Due to its high degree of readiness, the Division has been continually committed in response to enemy threats.

(11) The 7th Division has been fully committed during the entire quarter. Operations south of QL-4 inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy during December and January. Having determined that the enemy was vulnerable, the Division launched surprise operations into the traditional enemy stronghold around Tri Phap Village, in southern Kien Tuong Province. Penetration was achieved and heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy. A division equivalent force remains in the area to preclude any enemy attempt to reenter Tri Phap in force. Use of supporting arms throughout the operation was excellent. Although not without cost to the division, the Tri Phap operation was the most successful by any ARVN unit since 28 January 1973. Enemy supply and infiltration activity in the northern Delta was severely disrupted. Division units have demonstrated excellent mobility while deploying into northern Kien Tuong to screen against expected enemy reinforcement attempts. Continued commitment to operations has precluded formal cyclic training. The sharp decrease in enemy activity following the Tri Phap operation allowed units to rest and replace combat losses.

(12) The 9th Division has established itself in its new western Delta AO, which was assigned in late November after redeployment of the Rangers from MR-4. The Division as a whole cannot be assessed accurately since, for a significant portion of the quarter, the 14th and 15th Regiments have been under operational control of the 7th and 21st Divisions respectively. The 14th Regiment was particularly successful in participating with the 7th Division in Tri Phap. When the 9th Division deployed to the west, the 15th Regiment remained in Chuong Thien Province under the operational

control of the 21st Division. Units of the regiment have periodically returned to 9th Division operational control to conduct operations along the Khmer frontier in northern Kien Phong and Kien Tuong Provinces. The regiment has been moderately successful in Chuong Thien Province and during short deployments into nearby Ba Xuyen Province in response to intelligence. The regiment is below the standard of the 14th and 16th Regiments. The 16th Regiment demonstrated excellent mobility in responding by helicopter to intelligence on enemy movements in western Kien Giang Province. Additionally, the regiment has maintained effective control in Chau Doc Province. Units have been shifted quickly when enemy threats developed in the AO. Thus far, enemy attempts to reestablish infiltration routes have been countered with its available resources. Units are all combat effective and can be depended upon to respond rapidly to enemy threats.

(13) The 21st Division remained the weakest division in MR-4. During most of the period, the Division has operated with four regiments, although units of the 15th Regiment, 9th Division have deployed out of the AO for short periods. Organic regiments, the 31st, 32d and 33d, have demonstrated increased mobility, but have been only marginally successful in contacts with the enemy. Two battalions of the 32d Regiment were rendered ineffective when ambushed in the U-Minh Forest while attempting to relieve beleaguered RF units. The regiment was redeployed to Long My to recuperate. The 31st and 33d Regiments have not been involved in any significant engagements during the quarter. However, these units move frequently and are fully committed to maintaining security. Territorial and PSDF units continued to bear the brunt of enemy attacks which have usually occurred in areas away from regular ARVN units. Only one battalion went through formal training due to operational committments during the quarter. There have been indications of improvement. However, until training is given a higher priority and small unit leadership can be developed, the 21st Division can be considered only marginally effective.

(14) Ranger Command.

(a) The Ranger command completed its reorganization on schedule (31 December 1973). The authorized strength remains at 37,027. The reorganization standardized existing Ranger Groups, tactical commands, and battalions. (The Ranger Groups and tactical commands previously had no standard organization.) Ranger battalions varied in size from 461 men to 683 men. The new organization provides for 2186 man groups with each containing three 683 man battalions. The reorganization reduced the number of ranger elements from seven Ranger Groups and five tactical commands with 54 battalions to 15 Ranger Groups with 45 battalions. The concept of employment is to deploy these ranger units along enemy controlled areas to impede infiltration, expand GVN areas of influence, harass rear areas and eventually reestablish GVN control of international borders in MR's 1, 2 and 3. Battalion base areas are organized with one company as base defense and the remaining two companies actively patrolling and conducting tactical operations within a ten km radius of the camp. Each MR will retain one Ranger Group as a reaction force to assist deployed battalions if they become heavily engaged. Territorial forces reinforced by ARVN units have assumed responsibility for defense of the border in MR 4. The respective MR commanders are responsible for the command and control of the ranger elements assigned to their MR's. Deployment is as depicted in Figure 5-7.

(b) Major General Giai, CG Ranger Command, stated that it is too early to assess any meaningful changes of the Ranger Command. The reorganization and standardization of the ranger battalions have been accomplished. The Ranger Command is currently working on doctrinal studies and attempting to achieve 100% in battalion level training. To date, five Ranger battalions have not been sent to training centers in RVN. The objective was to complete training of all battalions prior to completion of the reorganization, 31 December 1973. Training is essential because prior to reorganization, many of the

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RANGER DISPOSITIONS




Figure 5-7

so-called Rangers were in fact Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG). These forces worked with the U.S. Special Forces, primarily along isolated outposts throughout RVN and lacked battalion level experience. Four of these five battalions are located in MR 2 (the 82d, 88th, 89th, and 95th) and the fifth, is the 92d from MR 3. The MR commanders have been unable to release these units for training due to operational requirements.

(c) General Giai stated that the MR commanders periodically misuse the rangers and consequently, fail to obtain maximum results. Securing bridges and roads, as well as other conventional missions, are examples. He frequently meets with the MR commanders to discuss these problems and believes that he will enjoy better rapport with them as time goes by. He stated that the Corps Commanders enjoy total command and control of all forces assigned to their respective MRs.

(d) General Giai commented that his ranger units could be task organized to form brigade/regimental-size units and serve as a relief for the committed regiments within the MR. By assuming a Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR), the relieved element could serve as Corps reserve, undergo training, or R&R. The MR must provide augmentation in terms of combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS). Ranger Group Headquarters are primarily tactical command and control elements and do not possess the necessary assets to support a regimental equivalent. He stressed that he does not advocate forming division size units out of his rangers.

(e) The general assessment of the Rangers in MR 1 remains unchanged. Ranger units, under OPCON to the division, complain about the inadequate logistics support, static defensive posture, as well as leave policies.

Complaints have increased during the quarter. Morale has been affected and the Rangers now have the highest desertion rate in MR 1, replacing the 1st Division from the previous quarter. The 11th Ranger Group has been replaced in Quang Ngai by the 12th Group, which is now the Mobile Reaction/Reserve Force. Strength and replacements have not changed appreciably. During this quarter, however, training has largely been conducted at battalion level in the field, in lieu of formal training at the Dong Da Training Center.

(f) The Ranger elements in MR 2 experienced the highest number of incidents in RVN. During the period 16-17 March, the 22d RGR Group, consisting of the 95th and 62d RGR Battalions were engaged in a spoiling action against the enemy troops and logistics buildup northeast of Kontum City. The Rangers sustained 8 KIA, 23 WIA and reported 1 enemy killed. On 20 March, the 63d RGR Bn was attacked by an USEF, 10 km northwest of Plei M'rong, resulting in 25 enemy killed, 1 CS and 7 SA weapons captured. The 68th suffered negative casualties. The Ranger Groups are primarily employed in the central highlands; the 23d and 24th in Kontum (P), the 22d and 25th in Pleiku (P), and the 21st in Quang Duc (P). Along the coastal provinces, the 4th and 6th RGR Groups are deployed in Binh Dinh (P) and the 34th and 90th RGR Battalions in Khanh Hoa (P). Throughout the reporting period, the numerous enemy contacts resulted in 222 enemy killed, 1 detained, 79 SA and 13 CS weapons captured.

(g) With the exception of the 92d RGR Battalion stationed at Tonle Cham, the ranger elements in MR 3 experienced only moderate contacts and incidents during January through mid-February. On 10 February, the 64th RGR Battalion, as part of a task force, was attacked by a large force. The perimeter was penetrated by the attacking force; however, the rangers immediately counterattacked and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. Although the defenders sustained 29 KIA, 27 WIA, and 5 MIA, the rangers killed 95 enemy and captured 21 SA and 16 CS weapons including one 75mm recoilless rifle.

(h) The Tonle Cham ranger outpost is located on the Saigon River corridor and interferes with the VC/NVA infiltration and resupply route. The camp came under

siege in March 73 and received heavy ABF daily through mid-June. A let up was noted from June until early November when ABF and minor probes were resumed. Attempts to rotate the Rangers were aborted after losing a CH-47 and a UH-1H at the camp. To date, the enemy has fired almost 20,000 rounds, initiated 59 attacks, 11 attempts to infiltrate the camp, and attempted to breach the defenses by digging tunnels from 500 meters out. The camp is of great concern to the new MR 3 Commander. Plans for abandonment or relief of the camp are under consideration. (Tonle Cham capitulated on 12 April 1974).

(1) Since reorganization, MR 4 has had no ranger units permanently stationed in the delta. The 7th Ranger Group, OPCON to the 7th Infantry Division since mid-March, performed impressively during the Tri Phap operation.

b. Artillery.

(1) The overall operational ready rate for the 175mm S.P. gun remains at an acceptable level of 90%. This exceeds the world wide operational ready standards of 83% established by DA.

(2) Requirements for periodic weapon calibration and die stamping breeches continues to be a deficiency that needs corrective action.

(3) PLL's for this weapon exceed actual requirements. Efforts are being directed for balancing repair parts stocks at user levels.

(FIGURES 5-8A and 5-8B)

UNIT	HOW 105MM			HOW 155MM			GUN 175MM		
	AUTH	OH	UNS	AUTH	OH	UNS	AUTH	OH	UNS
MR 1									
10th How 155mm Bn				18	18				
20th How 155mm Bn				18	17	1			
30th How 155mm Bn				18	18				
44th How 155mm Bn				18	18				
20 Arty Plts How 155mm(TF)	40	40							
9 Arty Plts Rgr Grps	18	18							
3 Arty Bns/1st Inf Div	54	54							
3 Arty Bns/2d Inf Div	54	52	2						
3 Arty Bns/3rd Inf Div	54	53	1						
101st How 175mm Bn							12	10	2
102d How 175mm Bn							12	10	2
105th How 175mm Bn							12	12	
3 Arty Bns/Airborne Div	54	53	1						
3 Arty Bns/Marine Div	54	54							
SUB-TOTAL.....	328	324	4	72	71	1	36	32	4
MR 2									
103d How 175mm Bn							12	9	3
37th How 155mm Bn				18	17	1			
220th How 155mm Bn				18	18				
3 Arty Bns/22d Inf Div	54	54							
63d How 105mm Bn	18	18							
69th How 105mm Bn	18	18							
230th How 155mm Bn				18	18				
Arty School	14	14		6	6		2	2	
National Military Academy	2	2							
3 Arty Bns/23d Inf Div	54	54							
60 Arty Plts How 105mm(TF)	120	120							
9 Arty Plts Rgr Grps	18	18							
SUB-TOTAL.....	298	298	0	60	59	1	14	11	3

Figure 5-8A

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UNIT	HOW 105MM			HOW 155MM			GUN 175MM		
	AUTH	OH	UNS	AUTH	OH	UNS	AUTH	OH	UNS
MR 3									
180th How 155mm Bn				18	18				
50th How 155mm Bn				18	18				
250th How 155mm Bn				18	18				
46th How 155mm Bn				18	15	3			
Ordnance School	2	2		1	1		1	1	
3 Arty Bns/5th Inf Div	54	52	2						
3 Arty Bns/18th Inf Div	54	43	11						
3 Arty Bns/25th Inf Div	54	46	8						
61st How 105mm Bn	18	18							
44 Arty Plts 105mm (TF)	88	80	8						
7 Plts Arty Rgr Grps	14	11	3						
104th How 175mm Bn							12	10	2
SUB-TOTAL	284	252	32	73	70	3	13	11	2
MR 4									
70th How 155mm Bn				18	18				
90th How 155mm Bn				18	18				
210th How 155mm Bn				18	18				
47th How 155mm Bn				18	18				
67th How 105mm Bn	18	14	4						
68th How 105mm Bn	18	15	3						
3 Arty Bns/7th Inf Div	54	52	2						
3 Arty Bns/9th Inf Div	54	53	1						
3 Arty Bns/21st Inf Div	54	49	5						
64 Arty Plts 105mm (TF)	128	126	2						
SUB-TOTAL	326	309	17	72	72				
MAINT FLOAT/REPAIR		161			78			24	
GRAND TOTAL	1236	1345	53	277	350	5	63	78	9

Figure 5-8B

c. Armor.

(1) Readiness condition of combat vehicles has declined since the previous report, but remains within reasonably acceptable limits.

(FIGURE 5-9)

(2) Action is underway to provide pinpointed technical assistance to units experiencing increases in deadline rates. Efforts to improve readiness posture of combat tanks will be concentrated in MR II. Technical assistance for all combat vehicles and self-propelled artillery will be increased. Additional local national personnel are currently undergoing training for this purpose.

(3) Plans to obtain assistance from AMC for in-country training in maintenance of M-48-A3 tanks were cancelled. Additional assistance will be provided by use of DAO sponsored contract technicians (Third Country Nationals).

d. Materiel Handling Equipment (MHE). Readiness position of MHE remains below acceptable levels. Primary reason is that a good portion of the fleet is worn extensively and requires cyclic overhaul or replacement. ARVN is finalizing a plan to accomplish this. Training of mechanics and operators is progressing satisfactorily. Following recent completion of an intensified course at the 1st AAD, where 94 personnel were trained, the contractor is now providing instructions at 2nd AAD for orgnizational and support maintenance. Thus far, 54 personnel completed training in operator and organizational maintenance. A course in support maintenance is presently underway.

UNIT	APC M113			TANK M41A3			TANK M48A3		
	AUTH	OH	UNS	AUTH	OH	UNS	AUTH	OH	UNS
I Armor Bde	6	6							
4 Armor Cav	42	37	1	17	16				
7 Armor Cav.	42	42	4	17	17	2			
11 Armor Cav.	42	40	4	17	17	2			
17 Armor Cav.	42	40	2	17	17	2			
20 Tank Sqdn	12	12	1				54	54	1
MR-1 Sub-Total	186	177	12	68	67	6	54	54	1
II Armor Bde	6	6							
3 Armor Cav.	42	40		17	14	1			
14 Armor Cav.	42	41	8	17	17	2			
19 Armor Cav.	42	36	10	17	14				
8 Armor Cav.	42	39	2	17	14	3			
21 Tank Sqdn	12	12	3				54	52	9
MR-2 Sub-Total	186	174	23	68	59	6	54	52	9
III Armor Bde	6	6							
1 Armor Cav.	42	40		17	17				
5 Armor Cav.	42	42	2	17	17	4			
10 Armor Cav.	58	55	5						
15 Armor Cav.	42	43	2	17	18	2			
18 Armor Cav.	42	40	1	17	17	1			
22 Tank Sqdn	12	12	2				54	53	6
Armor/Ord School	18	17		10	10	3	10	10	1
MR-3 Sub-Total	262	255	12	78	79	10	64	63	7
IV Armor Bde	6	6							
2 Armor Cav.	58	58	9						
6 Armor Cav.	58	52	3						
9 Armor Cav.	58	54	11						
12 Armor Cav.	58	58	6						
16 Armor Cav.	58	57	12						
(No tanks in MR-4)									
MR-4 Sub-Total	296	285	41						
Maint. Float/Repair		191			50			102	
TOTAL	930	1082	88	214	255	22	172	271	17

Figure 5-9

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Storage Operations, 13 Inventory, 19 Document Control, 8 Quality Assurance, and 13 Care and Preservation.

(2) At present there is an eight (8) man Depot Operations Technical Assistance Team from AMC/PAC at the 1st AAD. This team is providing technical guidance, assistance and recommendations for the overall improvement on storage operations. The team is also providing detailed procedures and document flow systems for the 1st and 2nd AAD's. The team has a tentative departure date of 31 July 1974.

c. Status of Ammo. (January to March 1974)

(1) Available beginning of quarter:

Short tons:	105,034
Dollars:	198,786,824

(2) Issues during quarter:

Short tons:	47,636
Dollars:	64,447,927

(3) Receipts:

Short tons:	77,182
Dollars:	109,780,364

(4) Adjustment loss (in transit between depots in country):

Short tons:	720

(5) Adjustment gains (due to new price increase):

Dollars	25,752,613

(6) On hand end of quarter:

Short tons	133,860
Dollars	269,871,874

(7) Stockage objective:

Short tons:	146,515

d. Shortfall.

(1) Logistics/Management. Middle management in both the Logistics Data Processing Center (LDPC) and logistics operation at NMMA remains deficient. Command action is still being recommended for overall upgrading of supply positions in an attempt to acquire

numerous supply people who have been trained at US supply activities, as well as the Central Training Institute. In addition, the following management actions are being continuously emphasized:

(a) Continue technical assistance in the area of requirements and distribution, with RVNAF personnel performing all operations, thereby gaining the experience needed to be self-sufficient.

(b) Training on subject matter that is required for future program needs, i.e., excess, conversion to National NATO Stock Number System, computation of supply control studies, etc.

(c) Continue training on the use of the advance computer systems from the standpoint of programmers and systems analysis.

(d) Special classroom training in operation, emphasizing basic supply operations and stressing quality control.

(2) Depot Operations: The entire operation is still understrength and undertrained. Current operational status follows:

(a) Same as last report.

(b) MHE: 107 pieces of MHE are operational from a total of 178 assigned to 1st AAD LB. There has been a total of 5 MHE operator classes and total of 52 students graduated. This brings available operators to 102. Additional classes are scheduled for April 1974.

(c) Care and Preservation (C&P): One officer trained in C&P was transferred to Dept of Highways on 27 Mar 74. At present one officer and 61 personnel are in training. Work has been completed on the installation of additional conveyors, and on minor improvements that will simplify work. C&P is completely operational.

(d) Storage operations: 1st AAD has approximately 800 lines that require identification. This is an increase from last report which is due to questionable items being received from 40th Engineer Base Depot.

(e) Shipping Operations: There continues to be considerable amounts of material ready for Unit Pick-

up and awaiting transportation from the Installation Transportation Office (ITO). Considerable emphasis has been placed on this area and some improvement noted.

(f) Training: Contract DAJB04-74-C-0018 was awarded to Eastern Construction Company Incorporated (ECCOI), on 12 Sep 73, to provide 17 Technical Assistants for 1st AAD. Since that time effective training has been rendered in the operations, and maintenance of material handling equipment with 7 classes completed consisting of 59 personnel. Additional classes are scheduled for April 1974.

(3) Ammunition Deficiencies.

(a) Ammunition Deficiencies: (Terms usages: DODAC-Department of Defense Ammunition Code: BOH = Balance on-hand).

1	DODAC	A071 Cartridge, 5.56 Milimeter
	BOH	165.6 Million Rounds
	Stockage Level	193.3 Million Rounds
	% Stockage	85
2	DODAC	H557 Rocket 66mm, Heat
	BOH	70.9 Thousand Rounds
	Stockage Level	208.6 Thousand Rounds
	% Stockage	34
3	DODAC	C226 Cartridge, 81 Milimeter Mortar, Illuminating
	BOH	46.9 Thousand Rounds
	Stockage Level	175.3 Thousand Rounds
	% Stockage	27
4	DODAC	G881 Grenade, Hand, Frag.
	BOH	1,043.6 Thousand Rounds

Stockage Level 2,226.1 Thousand Rounds

% Stockage 47

The above figures represent the fourth quarter report for the month ending 31st of December 1973.

5. (C) MAINTENANCE.

a. Field Maintenance.

(1) End Use Surveillance visits performed since April 1973 totaled 285. These visits are being curtailed to permit rendering of increased technical assistance and performance of studies involving usage rates of repair parts and causes of failures for major secondary items. Shortage of personnel is restricting performance below satisfactory level. This is expected to improve within 45-60 days.

(2) Command emphasis continues to be exerted for improving state of maintenance. Specific actions identified in previous report are underway. In addition, action is completed to acquire additional DAO sponsored contractor personnel (Third Country Nationals) and DAO direct-hire local nationals to provide increased technical assistance.

(3) The Commander, CLC has now appointed an assistant for maintenance who is responsible for the maintenance program throughout ARVN. Expect this major action will yield good results through increased command attention to maintenance matters.

(4) The operational readiness (OR) rate in ARVN is fluctuating. The following shows changes since previous report:

	O/R (FY74)		
	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr
Materiel Handling Equipment	55%	65%	63%
Tactical Wheeled Vehicles (TWV)	65%	74%	79%
Combat Vehicles	80%	80%	84%
Artillery	95%	97%	97%
Communication & Electronics (C&E)	94%	96%	95%

b. Depot Maintenance.

(1) Engineer Equipment. Progress continues to be made toward the attainment of self-sufficiency in the areas of rebuild and technical supply, although the following problems persist, which require technical assistance:

(a) Limited number of personnel capable of fully understanding US Technical Manuals.

(b) Inability to establish comprehensive training programs.

(c) Lack of proficiency at the middle management level.

(d) Quality assurance and control.

(2) Maintenance Facilities. Conversion to production line methods is now underway in many areas, while the remainder of operations continue to be accomplished in bays. Plans are also being developed for the accomodation of new items to the Depot Rebuild Program, as well as to provide for related test equipment.

(3) Technical Supply:

(a) Intensive efforts in identifying location and inventorying technical supply stock, coupled with a detailed and comprehensive review of Bill of Materiel (BOM) requirements for the 3rd and 4th Quarters FY74 program, has allowed reduction in requirements of more than $550,000.00. Requisitions were adjusted accordingly. The BOM requirements for the 1st and 2nd quarters FY75 program are currently being reviewed.

(b) 6,100 lines of repair parts have been declared as excess and reported to the National Materiel Management Agency (NMMA) for disposition instructions. Since the excess has been reported, a new reporting format has been adopted. Using the new format, 1235 lines have been reported but disposition instructions have not been received.

(c) Shortages of warehouse storage space is hindering the warehousing of repair parts and is causing a backlog. It is anticipated that adequate warehouse space will be

available during the early part of April 1974. All of the technical supply stock will be rewarehoused when the additional space is made available.

(d) A wall to wall inventory of Technical Supply stock was completed on 7 January 1974. The Locator Inventory Count has been provided the National Materiel Management Agency to be incorporated into the Republic of Vietnam Automated Materiel Management System (RAMMS). Majority of assets on hand at the rebuild facility have been posted to the automated RAMMS asset balance file, however, some items with invalid stock numbers or non-standard identification are currently not compatible for input. The noncompatible numbers are subject to exception process procedures for proper validation requirement.

(4) Vietnamese Army Arsenal (VAA).

(a) Self-sufficiency: Current assessment of self-sufficiency, in terms of skills, has been improved to the extent that there has been a reduction of 10 US technician positions. Total self-sufficiency has been achieved in the areas of small arms, batteries, and fire control. However, there is a slippage, in terms of equipment required to perform depot rebuild, of ordnance major items in the power train, tire and material handling equipment shops. Each of these areas are discussed separately under sub-paragraph (c) Maintenance Facilities, below.

(b) Shop Supply: A location survey is approximately 50% complete in the supply area. A shop supply inventory is being conducted in each shop to determine which parts should be pushed for the 4th quarter rebuild program. This will determine actual quantity on hand, parts really required, and produce a stock adjustment which will be used to make corrections to the computer data bank.

(c) Maintenance Facilities.

(1) Power Train Shop: Self-sufficiency slippage from 31 October 1974 to 31 December 1974. Finalized shop layout is not expected until 1 May 1974 with a complete change over to the new layout by 1 Jun 1974. New test equipment has been constructed for CD-500 cross drive transmission and training will start during the week of 15 April 1974.

(2) Tire Shop: Self-sufficiency slippage from 31 October 1974 to 31 December 1974. To increase production capability by 25%, the present shop must be upgraded by the addition of new equipment. A request for this equipment has been submitted for funding ($126,000). Upon receipt of this equipment, additional training will be required.

(3) Materiel Handling Equipment Shop (MHE): Self-sufficiency slippage from 31 October 1974 to 31 December 1974. A new layout of the existing shop has been made to better utilize the present space and additional personnel have been requested. Additional test equipment and tools have been obtained or are on requisition.

(d) Phase II Upgrade and Foundry Installations:

(1) The objective of this upgrade is to provide the RVNAF with the capability to rebuild and test in-country combat vehicles (including battle damaged) and track shoes.

(2) The foundry installation is to provide self-sufficient in-country industrial manufacturing capability for production of short supply items, non-supply items, and repair parts line stoppers for ordnance and MHE.

(3) Status of new combat vehicle, artillery and track shoe shops:

Study period & advertise contract	May 73 to Apr 74
Construction & Installation	May 74 to May 75
Training Period	Jun 75 to Aug 75
Begin Production	Sep 75

(4) The foundry installation design was completed and contract advertised in October 1973. Due to lack of response, the contract was amended and readvertised with award to the DIELIEM contractor. (Work is on schedule and a September completion date should be met early in September 1974.)

(5) Drawings have been completed for the design of a 3KM test track. No dates have been established for start of construction.

6. (S) PETROLEUM OIL AND LUBRICANTS (POL):

a. RVNAF petroleum supply contracts were expanded during the 3rd QTY FY74 to encompass fuels, lubricants, kerosene and asphalt. All contracts have been consummated and are operating smoothly.

b. Costs of petroleum and petroleum related products have soared in line with world market prices. All RVNAF supply contracts costs are competitive with DFSC posted or actual contract prices. In several instances RVNAF fuel costs were below DFSC posted prices.

c. The new concept of procuring POL for RVNAF has been so successful that DFSC, CINCPAC and DAO have jointly agreed to continue the system after embargos are lifted against the US.

d. This decision and the fact that DFSC fuel will no longer be used in RVN resulted in the withdrawal of all US Petroleum Quality Assurance Representatives (PQAR's). The responsibility for quality and quantity inspection of POL materials has been transferred to RVNAF. This is an untried program that may require revision in the future.

e. Supply contracts and RVNAF conservation programs have resulted in depot stocks of POL to gain and maintain a 60 day level. Asphalt contracts have allowed resumption of construction on the ARVN LOC program. Sufficient quantities of asphalt have been offered to meet requirements of the revised ARVN LOC Program (14 million gallons in lieu of previous program requirements of 20 million gallons).

7. (C) PORT OPERATIONS.

a. On 29 March 1973, RVNAF assumed responsibility for military port operations, less Military Standard Transportation and Movement Procedures (MILSTAMP) documentation functions. These are being accomplished by US contractor (Alaska Barge and Transport Company). Stevedore services are provided by ARVN military personnel and Vietnamese under contract with ARVN. Total tonnage handled through ARVN operated ports during period 1 April 1973 through 31 March 1974 amounted to 462,939 measurement tons (M/T) inbound and 21,648 M/T outbound for RVNAF; 59,932 M/T inbound, and 60,488 M/T outbound of US interest cargo.

b. Shortfall.

(1) During the 2nd Quarter FY74 the RVNAF intracoastal cargo movement capability became saturated to the point whereby a reported 30,000 M/T backlog developed. This backlog, involving all ports, was composed of normal resupply items and return of unserviceable vehicles and components to repair facilities near Saigon. On 4 Jan 74, the Military Sealift Command (MSC) time charter Seatrain Florida moved 7,285 M/T from Newport to Da Nang and 3,357 M/T moved on 18 February 1974 from Da Nang to Newport on the SS Transcolorado. RVNAF offered an additional 7,261 M/T of cargo for movement during the 3rd quarter: Da Nang to Newport 5,001 M/T; Newport to Da Nang 1,527 M/T and Newport to Qui Nhon 733 M/T.

(2) Cargo handling operations aboard vessels is improving but remains substandard when measured against the Military Sealift Command standard of 1500 M/T per day. The average daily cargo handling rate of 1,177 M/T for the 3rd quarter FY74 shows continued improvement over the 959 M/T rate attained during the 2nd quarter FY74. Efficiency in cargo operations will be stressed at every opportunity to the Commander, Central Logistics Command and terminal supervisory personnel.

(3) Port operations throughout the country must continue to be a subject of prime concern for the appropriate CLC Staff elements.

8. (U) RVNAF FACILITIES ENGINEERING SELF-SUFFICIENCY PROGRAM.

a. Satisfactory progress toward achievement of the goal of RVNAF Facilities Engineering Self-Sufficiency continued during the third quarter of FY74. During the period, systems engineering, deep well renovation, and fire prevention and protection were added to the self-sufficiency program. RVNAF personnel, assisted by the DAO technical assistance contractor, began the first phase of the systems engineering program by compiling base data at nine ARVN military installations.

b. An ARVN deep well renovation team was activated under the operational control of the Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE). Equipped with a complete trailer-mounted rotary drilling machine with related equipment, the team has the capability to renovate existing wells and to drill new wells. During this period, two wells

serving DAO Headquarters were renovated and drilling of a new well commenced. One well was renovated at Di An and a schedule has been established for renovation of wells at three other installations in the 3rd ALC.

c. A survey to determine quantity, type, location and condition of fire prevention and protection equipment was completed. Findings of this survey are expected to result in actions aimed at upgrading ARVN fire fighting capabilities.

d. A total of 65 Single Integrated Military System (SIMS) sites are included in the FE self-sufficiency program. RVNAF personnel operate and maintain the installed electric power generation and air conditioning equipment at these communications centers without assistance other than periodic visits by technical assistance teams. During the past 3 months there was a steady decline in the number of HAZCONS (hazardous conditions threatening interruption of communications facilities). Also during the period there was continued improvement in the supply of spare parts.

e. During this quarter, OCE assumed management of the Bulk Construction Material (BCM) Program. Limited contractor assistance was provided to expedite the attainment of self-sufficiency in this program. Results to date appear worthy of mention; of the total issues to tri-service customers of the FY73 and FY74 BCM allocation, 26% have occured since OCE gained control - a period of 6 weeks.

f. Construction of a replacement power plant at An Son (ROK) Valley was completed and the plant was placed in continuous operation on 4 Feb 74. Two GM Electro-Motive 1500 kw generator units removed from the old power plant are awaiting surface retrograde to the United States. The new plant is equipped with three Schoonmaker 500 kw generators and related switchgear. This equipment was excess to requirements at other RVNAF fixed power plants and was removed and overhauled by RVNAF personnel prior to installation at An Son. The An Son Valley replacement plant was constructed by RVNAF crews assisted by the DAO technical assistance contractor.

g. A special crew of ARVN personnel, assisted by the DAO technical assistance contractor, was organized to rebuild six of the eight Fairbanks Morse AR-3 diesel engines which serve the Cam Ranh Main Power Plant. Work

on the first unit [illegible] on 16 March 1974. The [illegible] completion date for rebuild of all 6 engines is [illegible]-September 1974.

h. Positive results in the ARVN power conservation program continued to be obtained, although power consumption decreased at a much slower rate than in the preceding quarter. At seven ARVN sites consisting of nine power plants, peak and average loads on 31 Dec 73 were 10.4 megawatts and 7.6 megawatts respectively. On 31 March 1974, the peak and average loads were 10.1 megawatts and 7.3 megawatts respectively. To further reduce power consumption and costs, a comprehensive survey of RVNAF bases and power plants throughout the Republic of Vietnam was begun during the quarter. The purpose of the survey is to identify requirements of the tri-services, determine plant capacities and condition of equipment, and also determine the feasibility of conversion to commercial power. This survey is expected to lead to the consolidation of requirements of the tri-services in each area, which in turn is expected to enable elimination of some power plants and removal of excess power generation equipment which will either be rebuilt to form a maintenance float or, if not economically repairable, cannibalized for serviceable parts.

(Figure 5-12)

i. The transformer changeout program at Da Nang, Phu Bai and Cam Ranh has been completed. A total of 3,340 excess transformers have been removed from the RVNAF power distribution systems. RVNAF has initiated a transformer changeout program at An Son Valley Installation, with assistance provided by the DAO technical assistance contractor.

9. (U) DEPENDENT SHELTER PROGRAM.

a. During the quarter, the ARVN OCE started construction on 318 buildings, while completing 315. An analysis of the total program revealed an average of 317 completions per quarter, which equates to 63% of programmed quarterly construction requirements.

b. The basic hinderance to program progress is lack of US furnished material. The CY72 program has only received 77% of required material and the CY73 program but 23%. ARVN CE units as well as civilian contractors are available for construction.

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


Figure 5-10

c. The program has similarly been shorted financially. Half of the FY73 funds were withheld and none of the FY74 funds have been committed. Further program setbacks may be expected due to the recent decision of the Government of Vietnam to cut 100% of their portion of the funds supporting the program.

10. (U) ARVN LOC PROGRAM

a. During the past three months, continued delays have been experienced in construction projects under the ARVN-LOC Program. Only 20 kilometers of roads and 78 meters of bridges were completed during this period. Almost no paving was done. The problems encountered were logistical in nature. The prime constraints were lack of POL, asphalt quarry expendables, transportation and rock delivery. See figures 5-11, 5-12 and 5-13.

b. There are presently eight active projects within the ARVN-LOC Program. These projects and their current status are outlined below:

(1) Ong Bo Bridge: This is the only ARVN-LOC Project assigned in MR I. The bridge, which is on QL-1, is a 96 meter structure that is now 20% complete.

(2) LTL-7 Junction QL-14 to Cheo Reo, 55 kilometers. The project consists of upgrading and restoring the highway. The 202nd Engineer Combat Battalion is responsible for the highway construction, and 215th Light Equipment Company is responsible for production of crushed rock and asphalt at the Phu Cuong Industrial Work Site. Construction completion is estimated at 52 percent.

(3) QL-14: Dao Thong, to junction LTL-7 198 kilometers. The project consists of upgrading and restoring the highway. The 65th Engineer Construction Battalion is responsible for the highway construction, and the 605th Heavy Equipment Company is responsible for production of crushed rock and asphalt at the Ban Me Thuot Industrial Work Site near Bridge 6. Two new industrial work sites are being opened. The project is 24 percent complete.

(4) QL-20: Dalat to the MR II/MR III Border, 157 kilometers. The project consists of upgrading and restoring 94 kilometers of highway in two sections. The 61st Engineer Construction Battalion is responsible for



ARVN - LOC
BRIDGES WORK TO PLACE
(METERS)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
1200
LTL 07
QL 14
QL 20
QL 1
LTL 13
LTL 25
LTL 27
LTL 80
QL 4
18
0
0
16
0
0
2
13
221
155
138
280
82
408
461
953
1,156
REMAINING PROGRAM — 3,683 meters
COMPLETED AS OF 28 FEB 74 — 270 meters
WORK IN PLACE (COMPLETED)
WORK TO PLACE (SCHEDULED)

Figure 5-11

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


Figure 5-12

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


Figure 5-13

the highway construction and production of crushed rock and asphalt. The project is 61 percent complete.

(5) LTL-2: Junction QL-1 to 38 kilometers south of Junction QL-1. The project consists of upgrading and restoring the highway. The 51st Engineer Construction Battalion is responsible for the production of crushed rock and asphalt at the Nui Le Industrial Work Site on QL-1. Construction completion is estimated at 63 percent.

(6) QL-4: Bac Lieu to Ca Mau, 66 kilometers. The project consists of upgrading and restoring the highway. The 71st Engineer Construction Battalion is responsible for the highway construction and operation of rock offload ports at Bac Lieu and Ho Phong. The 705th Heavy Equipment Company is responsible for production of asphalt at the Industrial Work Site at Ho Phong. The project is 36 percent complete.

(7) LTL-70: Ap An Dien to Tra Vinh, 31 kilometers. The project consists of upgrading and restoring the highway. The 73rd Engineer Construction Battalion is responsible for the highway construction, for production of asphaltic concrete at the Tra Vinh Industrial Work Site, and for the operation of the rock offload port at the industrial work site. Construction completion is estimated at 84 percent.

(8) LTL-80: Junction QL-4 Vinh Long to Vam Cong Ferry, 45 kilometers. The project consists of upgrading and restoring the highway. The 73rd Engineer Construction Battalion is responsible for the highway construction. Construction completion is estimated at 22 percent. A rock offload port is operated by the 73rd Battalion at the Tan Xuan Industrial Work Site near Sa Dec.

c. At the beginning of 1974 DAO controlled asphalt for the program had been reduced to zero as a result of contract default. As a result, the 2 inch wearing course was indefinitely postponed. The RVN arranged an interim asphalt procurement with Shell Oil. Funds available will purchase only one-third of the requirement and CENCOM has been requested to provide guidance for redesign around available assets of asphalt product.

11. (U) AMASF/MILCON PROGRAM. During the quarter, responsibility for management of this program was transferred from DAO to the US Army Support Command, Thailand.

12. SUMMARY.

a. Supply. ARVN still relies strongly on US technical assistance in areas of data processing, requirements and distribution, depot operations, and future programs. Command action is still being recommended for overall upgrading of supply positions to acquire US trained Vietnamese personnel. Middle management personnel at LDPC and NMMA remains deficient. The 1st AAD remains undertrained and understrength. ECCOI is holding formal classroom training in many phases of depot operations but more time is needed to develop a good cadre.

b. Transportation. ARVN has shown significant improvement in the cargo handling aspect of port operations. Mid-management level personnel are now demonstrating an interest that has been lacking previously. Due to this interest stevedores and other port personnel are more productive. Improved attention to detail and cost avoidance is obvious. Progress has been made and must continue. The recently organized joint DAO RVNAF transportation study committee will contribute greatly to the improvement of water terminal operations by identifying and resolving problems and inefficiencies.

c. Field Maintenance. Artillery operational ready Rate is at an acceptable level although weapon calibration continues to be a deficiency. The readiness condition of combat vehicles has declined but remains within acceptable limits. Materiel handling equipment is experiencing a high deadline rate due to non-standardization of MHE and non-availability of repair parts. The program to utilize local nationals and third country Nationals for technical assistance personnel is progressing satisfactorily.

d. Ammunition. The ARVN ammunition supply posture at the end of the 3rd Quarter was short by 9% of their stockage level. Three items are well below the cease fire level. Two of these are due to manufacturing problems at the procurement plants. The shortage of grenades, when computed on the cease fire level, is excessive. However, the balance on hand, when computed against the 90 day stockage objective, is within 90%.

[illegible]. Petroleum. Because of various embargoes imposed against US fuel contracts supporting RVNAF, they (RVNAF) have gained fuel supply through their own contracting. RVNAF contracts are funded by the US through MASF. Reductions in POL support level resulting from embargos, conservation programs and product availability will cause a cost prevention of $2.7 million in FY74. Asphalt to maintain ARVN LOC programs is also being procured by RVNAF contracts to satisfy road construction requirements.

CHAPTER 6

VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE (VNAF)

1. (U) INTRODUCTION: The VNAF strengths, weaknesses, logistics, equipment status, OR rates and the DAO assessment are presented in the following paragraphs.

2. (S) AUTHORIZED STRENGTH AND ASSIGNED PERSONNEL READINESS:

a. Current overall VNAF manning is as follows:

PERSONNEL	AUTHORIZED	ACTUAL	PERCENT
Officers	10207	7583	76
Enlisted	54702	54188	98
Civilian	917	693	76
Total	65826	62464	95

(Figure 6-1)

b. VNAF pilot manning, which largely reflects manning of other crew positions, is considered sufficient to fly available VNAF aircraft on a sustained surge basis. The 2,593 squadron pilots represent 61 percent of the authorized manning. Figure 2 reflects the current manning by type of aircraft/mission. The special air mission unit figures have been omitted.

c. Personnel readiness of the rated force can be roughly determined by reference to Figure 2 column labeled assigned OR/TNG. This figure, however, refers to aircrews which are in continuation/upgrade training. The majority of the aircrews are capable of performing basic combat missions.

(Figure 6-2)

3. (S) AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY: The authorized Air Order of Battle (AOB) is shown by military region. The AOBs closely represent the areas of operation with the exception of the support aircraft in the 5th Air Division which operate throughout the country.

(Figures 6-3, 6-4, 6-5 and 6,6)

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Figure 6-1

VNAF PERSONNEL BY ORGANIZATION

UNIT/DIVISION	OFFICER *AUTH	OFFICER ASGN	ENLISTED *AUTH	ENLISTED ASGN	TOTAL MIL AUTH	TOTAL MIL ASGN	CIVILIAN AUTH	CIVILIAN ASGN
VNAF HQS	851	522	1945	1716	2796	2238	99	35
Air Medical Center	74	31	162	95	236	126	9	4
Air Ops Comd	438	262	859	642	1297	904	0	0
AC&W Group	148	127	879	786	1027	913	1	1
Air Log Comd	396	246	5939	5109	6335	5355	98	342
Air Tng Cen	494	268	1163	982	1657	1250	23	7
TSN Prop Const Area	15	14	66	44	81	58	0	0
Air Adm Unit	17	14	117	112	134	126	0	5
Detached Pers	87	59	98	87	185	146	0	0
1st Air Division	1324	743	6938	5494	8262	6237	150	95
2nd Air Division	1172	650	5751	5747	6923	6397	70	21
3rd Air Division	1315	829	7579	5816	8894	6645	137	63
4th Air Division	1357	813	7503	5603	8860	6416	120	19
5th Air Division	1308	986	6642	5448	7950	6434	163	93
6th Air Division	1211	647	6292	5286	7503	5933	47	8
Sub Total	10207	6211	51933	42967	62140	49178		
Pipeline		1372	2769	11221	2769	12593		
Total	10207	7583	54702	54188	64909	61771	917	693

* The authorized figures reflected for officer and enlisted personnel have been extrapolated from the latest VNAF data provided and will be subject to change as firm requirements are established. The total military authorized figure is accurate.

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VNAF PILOT/COPILOT MANNING

TYPE A/C	AUTH	ASSIGNED OR/TNG	TOTAL ASSIGNED	%
A-37	350	211/47	258	74
A-1	123	77/0	77	63
F-5	197	93/37	130	66
Total Ftr/Atck	670	381/84	465	69
C-7	135	103/46	103	76
C-130	118	97/34	97	82
Total Cargo	253	200/80	200	79
UH-1	1983	965/126	1091	55
CH-47	180	97/54	151	84
Total Helo	2163	1062/180	1242	57
Liaison (U-17, O-1, O-2)	324	277/0	277	85
AC-119K	59	61/19	61	103
AC-119G	59	59/33	59	100
AC-47	53	50/26	50	94
Total Gunship	171	170/78	170	99
RC-119 L	43	27/19	27	63
EC-47	95	87/37	87	92
RC-47	44	34/21	34	77
U-6	10	10/0	10	100
Total Recce	192	158/77	158	82
T-37	31	28/0	28	90
T-41/01	27	45/0	45	167
UH-1	16	8/0	8	50
Total Training	74	81/0	81	109

Figure 6-2

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


Figure 6-3

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



Figure 6-4

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VNAF

BIEN HOA
3rd AIR DIVISION

23 WING	43 WING
112 25 O-1	221 38 UH-1
7 U-17	223 38 UH-1
124 25 O-1	231 38 UH-1
7 U-17	245 38 UH-1
514 24 A-1	251 38 UH-1
518 24 A-1	237 16 CH-47
63 WING	259E 12 UH-1
522 25 F-5A/B	
7 RF-5	
536 18 F-5 AND 6 F-5E	
540 24 F-5	
542 24 F-5	
544 24 F-5	

TAN SON NHUT
5th AIR DIV

33 WING	
314 4	VC-47
4	UH-1
2	U-17
716 12	RC-47
2	EC-47
2	C-47
8	U-6
718 20	EC-47
431 16	C-7
259G 12	UH-1
53 WING	
819 18	AC 119G
821 10	AC 119K
435 16	C-130
429 16	C-7
437 16	C-130

Figure 6-5

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


Figure 6-6

4. (C) VNAF AIRCRAFT INVENTORY:

a. A firm base line has been established for the VNAF aircraft inventory by type, location and tail number. Status as of 31 March 1974 is as follows:

TYPE	AUTH	RECD 1-28-73	ON HAND	ATTRITED (1)	OTHER LOSSES
A-1	72	79	70	9	3 (2)
A-37	240	248	233	15	10 (2)
AC-119G	18	23	23		
C-119G		21	13		8 (3)
AC-119K	18	22	20	2	
C-130	32	32	32		
O-1	165	239	190	14	46 (4)
O-2	35	35	32	3	
T-37	21	24	24		
U-6	8	10	9	1	1 (2)
U-17	58	85	85		1 (2)
C-123		19	0		19 (5)
C-7	48	56	54	2	1 (2)
T-41	18	24	24		
CH-47	64	70	69	2	3 (2)
UH-1	842	860	797	62	27 (2)
F5A/B/RF/E	152	151	138	13	8 (2)
C-47 ALL	66	76	67	5	5 (6)

Legend:

(1) Losses which have been verified by JGS.

(2) Damaged or lost aircraft not verified by JGS as of 31 March 1974. Totals included in possessed column.

(3) Eight aircraft transferred from VNAF to USAF.

(4) Thirty-five aircraft transferred from VNAF to USAF. Eleven aircraft damaged or lost not verified by JGS as of 31 March 1974.

(5) Nineteen aircraft transferred from VNAF to USAF.

(6) Four aircraft transferred from VNAF to USAF. One aircraft damaged or lost not verified by JGS as of 31 March 1974.

b. VNAF aircraft losses since the cease fire are categorized by type, date and reason as follows:

TYPE	DATE LOST	REASON LOST
CH-47	3 Jun 73	Shot down in Tay Ninh area.
CH-47	26 Dec 73	Shot down.
A-1	19 Feb 73	Combat operation 1223 hours at coordinates AT 997.075; engine stopped and pilot ejected.
A-1	3 Mar 73	Shot down at Bien Hoa.
A-1	28 Mar 73	Shot down at Tong Le Chan.
A-1	29 Mar 73	Shot down at Tong Le Chan.
A-1	20 Apr 73	Shot down in Tan Chau area.
A-1	12 May 73	Missing on combat flight.
A-1	15 May 73	Shot down in Kontum area.
A-1	27 Dec 73	Crashed at coordinates XT 805.460.
A-1	11 Jan 74	Crashed in Kontum area.
F-5	28 Jan 73	Shot down in combat.
F-5	30 Apr 73	Shot down in Di An area.
F-5A	9 Jun 73	Hydraulic system became inoperative; pilot ejected 1700 hours at coordinates XT 982.212.
F-5A	10 Jun 73	Engine stalled out; pilot ejected.
F-5A	28 Sep 73	After take off engine became inoperative; pilot ejected 1645 hours at coordinates AT 975.690.
F-5A	15 Oct 73	Lost on mission.

TYPE	DATE LOST	REASON LOST
F-5A	6 Nov 73	Rocket damage at Bien Hoa.
F-5A	6 Nov 73	Rocket damage at Bien Hoa.
F-5A	6 Nov 73	Rocket damage at Bien Hoa.
F-5A	14 Nov 73	Engine caught on fire shortly after take off; pilot ejected at coordinates YT 095.164.
F-5A	28 Nov 73	Nose wheel problem developed on take off; aircraft ran off runway at Bien Hoa AB.
F-5A	29 Nov 73	Lost speed on landing approach, crashed short of runway at Bien Hoa.
RF-5	10 Sep 73	Engine failure during take off; aircraft ran off runway at Bien Hoa.
C-7	7 Jul 73	Transportation mission, 1830 hours, near Phu Quoc; No. 1 engine became inoperative; ineffective reaction by pilot.
C-7	4 Nov 73	Main landing gear collapsed; aircraft crashed.
EC-47	26 Oct 73	Attempted emergency landing after loss of engine power; was unsuccessful at 1740 hours, Tan Son Nhut.
AC-47	11 May 73	Left engine inoperative at take off; aircraft burned at Phan Rang airfield, 0705 hours.
AC-47	9 Jun 73	Right engine caught fire during take off; aircraft ran off runway and crashed in rice field at 1625 hours Quang Ngai airfield.
AC-47	24 Dec 73	Crashed at coordinates BT 302.214.

TYPE	DATE LOST	REASON LOST
RC-47	9 Sep 73	Shot down.
O-2	18 Jul 73	At 1930 hours, coordinates BS 647.786, emergency landing unsuccessful after engine failure.
O-2	6 Aug 73	Emergency landing unsuccessful after engine problem developed at Hoi An airfield, 0830 hours.
O-2	17 Jan 74	Crashed in Kontum area.
C-119K	2 Mar 73	Inclement weather, unable to locate runway; crew bailed out in Da Nang area.
C-119K	24 May 73	Shot down in Cu Chi area.
UH-1	29 Jan 73	Shot down in combat.
UH-1	31 Jan 73	Shot down.
UH-1	31 Jan 73	Shot down in combat.
UH-1	3 Feb 73	Combat operations, 1100 hours near Phan Thiet Air Base, engine became inoperative; emergency landing unsuccessful.
UH-1	10 Feb 73	Shot down at coordinates BS 760.500.
UH-1	15 Feb 73	Crashed and burned; reason undetermined.
UH-1	15 Feb 73	Shot down in combat.
UH-1	19 Feb 73	Shot down, coordinates YD 083.143.
UH-1	27 Feb 73	Combat operations at coordinates BT 529.120, 0740 hours; unfavorable weather condition; aircraft lost at sea.

TYPE	DATE LOST	REASON LOST
UH-1	3 Mar 73	Shot down at Tay Ninh.
UH-1	5 Mar 73	Pilot got air sick while flying at low altitude at 1630 hours, coordinates YS 035.655.
UH-1	8 Mar 73	Training mission; aircraft taxied into parked aircraft, 1000 hours, coordinates BT 069.732.
UH-1	8 Mar 73	Training mission; instructor crashed into parked aircraft, 1000 hours, at coordinates BT 069.732.
UH-1	13 Mar 73	Shot down at Bong Son.
UH-1	1 Apr 73	Combat operations, flying at 50 foot altitude; unknown materiel failure, 1810 hours, at coordinates WS 165.320.
UH-1	1 Apr 73	Shot down in combat.
UH-1	7 Apr 73	Liaison flight; tail rotor broke and aircraft crashed, 1500 hours, at coordinates WR 480.790.
UH-1	11 Apr 73	Shot down in Phong Toy area.
UH-1	14 Apr 73	Shot down in Phu Cu area.
UH-1	16 Apr 73	Shot down in Bong Noc area.
UH-1	16 Apr 73	Shot down in combat at coordinates WR 480.640.
UH-1	20 Apr 73	Shot down.
UH-1	15 May 73	Shot down in Bien Rang area.
UH-1	16 May 73	Shot down at coordinates 497.740.

TYPE	DATE LOST	REASON LOST
UH-1	20 May 73	Shot down in Tong Hoa area.
UH-1	24 May 73	Shot down in Tuy Phuoc area.
UH-1	25 May 73	Shot down in Phuoc Vinh area.
UH-1	26 May 73	Shot down at coordinates XR 038.522.
UH-1	5 Jun 73	Shot down in Phuoc Long area.
UH-1	8 Jun 73	Shot down in Trung Lap area.
UH-1	8 Jun 73	Shot down in Trung Lap area.
UH-1	10 Jun 73	Shot down at coordinates AC 131.850.
UH-1	15 Jun 73	Shot down at coordinates 627.924.
UH-1	16 Jun 73	Shot down at Nong Son.
UH-1	26 Jun 73	VIP flight, encountered cross winds during take off, 0830 hours, coordinates BS 922.108.
UH-1	5 Jul 73	Shot down at Phung Duc.
UH-1	18 Jul 73	Dong Tam airfield, 0800 hours, refueling accident; aircraft caught on fire and was destroyed.
UH-1	21 Jul 73	Shot down at coordinates 587.599.
UH-1	27 Jul 73	Liaison mission, coordinates AP 820.725, 1630 hours, loss of power; emergency landing unsuccessful.
UH-1	10 Aug 73	Shot down.
UH-1	10 Sep 73	Shot down in Hai Yen area.

TYPE	DATE LOST	REASON LOST
UH-1	10 Sep 73	Operation mission, Chu Lai airfield; pilot error, crashed while attempting landing.
UH-1	11 Sep 73	Shot down in Ca Mau area.
UH-1	12 Sep 73	Combat operations, inexperienced pilot; emergency landing attempted 0830 hours, coordinates BT 221.360, unsuccessful.
UH-1	17 Sep 73	Shot down in combat.
UH-1	28 Sep 73	Combat operations, 0815 hours; tail rotor broke off, emergency landing unsuccessful. Materiel failure.
UH-1	28 Sep 73	Liaison flight, 1550 hours, engine exploded; emergency landing unsuccessful. Materiel failure.
UH-1	30 Sep 73	Shot down in Le Minh area.
UH-1	17 Oct 73	Lost on mission in Bac Lac area.
UH-1	18 Oct 73	Shot down.
UH-1	20 Oct 73	Shot down.
UH-1	7 Nov 73	Hijacked.
UH-1	7 Nov 73	Shot down at coordinates ST 986.165.
UH-1	28 Nov 73	Destroyed by rockets in Phan Thiet area.
UH-1	4 Dec 73	Shot down at Thoi Binh.
UH-1	15 Dec 73	Shot down.
UH-1	21 Dec 73	Shot down.

TYPE	DATE LOST	REMARKS
UH-1	26 Dec 73	Shot down.
UH-1	31 Dec 73	Shot down.
UH-1	1 Jan 74	Crashed at Le Minh.
UH-1	10 Jan 74	Shot down.
UH-1	28 Jan 74	Crashed in Cu Hanh area.
A-37	28 Jan 73	Shot down in combat.
A-37	28 Jan 73	Shot down in combat.
A-37	1 Feb 73	Shot down in combat.
A-37	4 Feb 73	Shot down in combat.
A-37	16 Feb 73	Ran off runway, crashed and burned at Binh Thuy.
A-37	15 Mar 73	Engine lost power on take off; aircraft ran off runway and burned, 1540 hours, at Nha Trang.
A-37	27 Apr 73	Missed runway, crashed; 100% destroyed.
A-37	23 Jul 73	Pilot inexperienced, flew in to clouds and lost direction, bailed out at 1045 hours, coordinates XS 188.349.
A-37	2 Aug 73	Shot down, coordinates ZA 118.984.
A-37	1 Sep 73	Shot down in Phu Cat area.
A-37	17 Sep 73	Training mission at coordinates BT 094.570; aircraft did not recover after dive while performing firing.

TYPE	DATE LOST	REASON LOST
A-37	2 Nov 73	Crashed at Quang Duc area.
A-37	8 Dec 73	Shot down in combat.
A-37	26 Dec 73	Crashed at Quang Duc area.
A-37	16 Jan 74	Shot down.
O-1	29 Jan 73	Shot down at Quang Tri area.
O-1	8 Feb 73	Shot down in Cai Cai area.
O-1	14 Feb 73	Shot down in combat.
O-1	10 Mar 73	Phu Bai AB 1200 hours, inexperienced and unqualified pilot, unsuccessful landing.
O-1	19 Mar 73	Convoy guard mission, 1415 hours at coordinates ZT 064.766; engine lost power, unsuccessful emergency landing.
O-1	4 Apr 73	Shot down, coordinates 068.118.
O-1	12 May 73	Convoy escort at 1155 hours near Dalat, engine failure; emergency landing unsuccessful.
O-1	13 Jun 73	At 0740 hours, coordinates YU 167.074, engine became inoperative; emergency landing unsuccessful.
O-1	6 Aug 73	At 1600 hours, aircraft crashed at Da Nang while attempting to take off.
O-1	8 Aug 73	Shot down in Phan Thiet area.
O-1	20 Aug 73	Hard landing at Phu Bai airfield, 1700 hours.
O-1	2 Sep 73	At 0950 hours in the De Duc area aircraft attempted landing and crashed into barbed wire fence.

TYPE	DATE LOST	REASON LOST
O-1	14 Nov 73	Shot down in Tay Ninh Area
O-1	17 Nov 73	Shot down at coordinate ZY 604,395
[illegible]	7 May 73	Damaged at Highway One

5. (C) OPERATIONS

a. VNAF Flying Hour Program:

(1) A comparison of programmed flying hours with actual hours flown, during the third quarter of fiscal year 1974, is reflected in the following schedule:

ACFT TYPE	JANUARY PROG	JANUARY ACTUAL	FEBRUARY PROG	FEBRUARY ACTUAL	MARCH PROG	MARCH ACTUAL
C-119G/G	680	1136	720	991	1280	846
AC-119K	720	573	720	521	720	724
AC-47	520	569	480	513	480	681
[illegible]-47	2325	2193	2325	[illegible]	1860	2109
[illegible]-47	975	471	900	416	780	501
[illegible]-47	300	215	300	96	160	150
C-130	1430	1015	1430	1145	1300	1428
C-7	1640	1193	1640	1206	1680	1472
O-1	14380	9414	14380	9453	9720	10812
O-2	1540	1690	1540	1398	1350	1355
U-6	490	485	560	447	440	512
U-17	2730	2120	2730	2080	1890	2327
A-1	2080	1805	1840	1797	1760	1939
F-5	1775	1078	1850	1413	1850	1575
A-37	4550	3786	4625	2782	4600	3017
T-37	630	243	660	595	420	729
T-41	1260	1179	1260	1224	990	1545
UH-1	38325	28129	38890	26777	30710	29911
CH-47	2915	1344	2805	1071	1530	1259

(2) JGS was apprised of the many significant considerations given to authorized flying hour allocations, and the importance of respecting the approved programs. It was requested that Military

[illegible] apprised of the flying hour [illegible] impact of their requisitions when calling for air support. The USAF and DA, for the most part, have not provided the VNAF with [illegible]ly flying hour allocations in a timely manner. Action should be taken at all levels to ensure timely issuance of the programs to permit proper RVNAF planning. Normally, operational requirements dictate these programs; however, officials in the RVNAF appreciate the limitations imposed by the funding constraints. Budget considerations should be given the DAO and VNAF for use in developing VNAF recommended flying hour programs. This action would assure minimization of past and current disparities, and would greatly assist USAF and Army system managers.

(3) Commando Gopher: The Defense Attache advised JGS of the "Commando Gopher" program, which is a three year project to restore all VNAF Navigational Aids and Aircraft Control and Warning Systems to technical order specifications. JGS was requested to ensure expeditious reporting of in-flight noted discrepancies and to take appropriate supply and maintenance actions to effect early correction. These actions will assist in preventing the need for future expensive projects.

(4) Precision Approach Radar, PAR-2: The required waveguide section for installation of the PAR-2 at Tan Son Nhut AB has been repaired by FAA and returned. PACOM/MARMA is acquiring the intercom set, ground cable and junction box required to complete the installation. The projected installation starting date is 1 September 1974. A spare PAR-2 set has been located. An inventory of the set has not been taken to ascertain the degree of completeness; however, a cursory inspection indicated that most items are present. This unit will enhance VNAF's ability to provide logistic support for the operational PAR-2.

(5) Weather Recorder Facsimile Equipment: VNAF and CINCPACAF have approved replacing Weatherfax RJ-4 Facsimile with AN/UXR-2 equipment; however, due to funding constraints procurement has been delayed. Contract responsibility has been transferred to the DAO S&E Division, but the Air Force Division still gives liaison support.

6. (S) AERIAL RESUPPLY:

a. There are 25 RVNAF outposts and bases dependent on aerial resupply for continued effectiveness. Of this total, 13 are located within MR I, five within MR II and seven within MR III. MR IV has no requirement for aerial resupply. Figure 6-7 depicts the approximate locations of all sites.

b. To accomplish the aerial resupply requirements, VNAF flies 568 sorties per month lifting 1043 tons of assorted supplies. This effort supports 34,916 military and civilian personnel located at the resupply points. A variety of delivery methods is used which include the CH-47 and UH-1 helicopters, C-7A and C-130 fixed wing aircraft and air drops. Figure 6-8 is a summary of RVN aerial resupply.

7. (C) VNAF BASES:

a. VNAF Base Civil Engineering (BCE).

(1) Overview: The overall view of VNAF BCE functions can be summarized as improving satisfactorily. To date, the organizations have made considerable improvements as shown by key management indicators, i.e., manning, facilities, equipment, training and documentation. It must be noted that the rating given is for the overall organization and is based on a summary evaluation of all factors at each of the nine VNAF bases. At some bases regression in a specific area has occurred while at the same time improvements have been made in previously unsatisfactory areas. Level of effectiveness still remains to be improved; however, it is anticipated that this will be achieved by the wise utilization of time and intensified management efforts. A discussion of the factors affecting the bases follows.

(2) Manning: BCE overall manning is still below the authorized strength. The total civilian and military personnel authorized are 711 civilian and 3810 military. At present, there are 124 civilians and 3339 military personnel assigned. The total authorized strength is not adequate to maintain the bases, which is recognized by the VNAF and AOSAF. VNAF have requested authorization for a total of 2183 civilian positions which will be composed of one third skilled craftsmen and two thirds unskilled laborers.

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


Figure 6-7

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AERIAL RESUPPLY SUMMARY

	Sites	Population Mil	Population Civ	Population Total	Sorties Per Month	Total Tons Per Month	Type Delivery
MR-1	13	226	7,925	8,151	236	360	12 HELO 2 Fixed Wing
MR-2	5	2,626	7,626	10,252	196	204	7 HELO 2 Fixed Wing
MR-3	7	13,650	52,863	66,513	136	479	3 HELO 3 Fixed Wing 1 Air Drop
COUNTRY-WIDE	25	16,502	68,414	84,916	568	1,043	

Figure 6-8

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[redacted] has not been approved, but efforts [redacted] approval continue. Realignment or reduction [redacted] be made by selected skills, from base [redacted] being accomplished. This will improve the overall economy of the BOS operation by eliminating [redacted] skill shortfalls. Present civilian augmentation provides relief at eight of the nine VNAF bases in seven different critical skill areas. The proposed FY71 contract will continue to provide [redacted] augmentation for those skills which are unfirmanned. The contract will not provide for unskilled laborers which makes it imperative that civil service positions be obtained.

(3) Facilities: Facilities at all VNAF bases, except Binh Hoa, are adequate to meet immediate mission requirements. Expansion of the aircraft maintenance effort at [redacted] necessitated the construction of 25 additional [redacted] of the Military Construction Program. These facilities were needed to complete the [redacted] portion of the ATLC training program. As of the end of this quarter, 15 of the 29 projects have been completed with the remaining units scheduled to be completed during the next quarter.

(a) In addition to the MCP Program, the 68-project MAP program is progressing satisfactorily. Presently, all 31 projects [redacted] construction are scheduled for completion by the end of June 1971.

(b) The condition of facilities at the VNAF bases is not as satisfactory as desired and several programs are underway to correct these conditions. Removal of unneeded buildings is being accomplished which will decrease the need for maintenance manpower. Consolidation of functions at the various bases is also underway. In addition to the VNAF efforts to maintain the bases, assistance is being obtained from contractor personnel. The primary emphasis is on OJT in various critical skills; however, a side benefit of the effort is that additional maintenance labor is realized. It is planned to consolidate the existing three augmentation contracts into one overall contract. A statement of work [redacted] this effort has been completed.

(c) In the area of Preventative Maintenance (PM), the VNAF is now in the process of implementing a simplified version of USAF Manual 85-1. This manual has been tentatively approved by the VNAF and is being evaluated by each of the BCE organizations. Implementation of the PM program, outlined in 85-1, will eliminate much of the downtime being encountered as a result of equipment failures.

(4) Equipment:

(a) A review of the VNAF BCE functions found that sufficient service equipment is on hand to perform the majority of functions assigned, if distributed among the nine bases. The major problem relating to service equipment is in obtaining replacement parts needed for maintenance and/or repair. Efforts to resolve this problem are being carried out. A program to identify spare part requirements and to obtain a bench stock of critical items is underway. A list of such items has been completed for the ATLC BCE, and will be accomplished at the other bases as rapidly as possible.

(b) Spare parts for installed equipment (air conditioners) are also a problem area, but is being resolved. The prototype effort for solving the problem is being accomplished at the ATLC BCE. These two areas are of critical importance in the successful fulfillment of the BCE mission and will continue to be monitored by the Air Force Division.

(5) Training: To date, 3111 VNAF personnel have been trained in the different skills of Civil Engineering. The orginal plan covered training of approximately 4054 personnel. At present 861 VNAF trainees have received training under the following contracts: Kentron Hawaii Ltd - Power Production #0056 and Kentron Hawaii Ltd - Operation and Maintenance #0072. At completion of these contracts, the number of personnel trained in the different skills will be 3972. This should be an adequate number of trained personnel to accomplish the BCE workload. There is still a need for upgrade training of middle and upper supervisory personnel and in programming and work control areas of the BCE functions. Training of the middle and upper level supervisors should be accomplished by the VNAF through

the VNAF training command and such a program is being [illegible]. Programming and work control training will continue to be accomplished by OJT under the present FY73 contracts.

(6) Fire Protection:

(a) The overall fire protection posture of the VNAF fire protection organizations continues to improve. The most important contributing factor to this improvement can be credited to the competitive contest between each base. This contest is judged quarterly throughout the calendar year. Binh Thuy AB, which was rated unsatisfactory during the month of September 1973, is now considered an excellent organization. The contest is based upon training in organization preventative maintenance, crash rescue, egress and the care and maintenance of the fire apparatus.

(b) As part of the effort to improve the VNAF fire protection, personnel have been visiting each base to exercise the equipment and crews. Positive action to correct found deficiencies is taken during each staff visit. Deficiencies which cannot be corrected during the visit are directed to the VNAF for official follow-up and corrective action. The need for continuous improvement has been identified by these visits. Areas of consideration are:

(1) Aircraft egress training: The locally developed directive will improve the overall aircraft egress training.

(2) Munition notification: Procedures have been developed to ensure the fire department receives accurate and timely notification of munition movement.

(3) Fire truck maintenance program: As the OPR, the VNAF Fire Chief is now taking an active part in the overall fire truck maintenance program. This action includes an aggressive preventative maintenance organization, safe operation of all fire department vehicles and proper reporting of deficiencies to the assigned mechanics.

(4) Repair parts for 4-ton fire truck: Parts for the C-11A crash truck remain a supply problem. A continuous effort is being made to identify parts having a high failure rate in order to establish an adequate bench stock.

(5) CB nozzle: Research by WPAFB to obtain suitable nozzles for 10 and 20 gallons CB fire extinguishers is underway and is expected to be resolved shortly.

(6) Fire protection activities will continue to receive close observation during all staff visits. Each base fire chief has been advised that a continuous upgrading of the overall fire protection posture is required.

(7) General: A program in which ARVN construction battalions will be used to construct VNAF projects was initiated. In this program, the design effort will be accomplished by the Air Force Division Civil Engineering Section, and the projects turned over to the Army Division for completion by the ARVN. Considerable savings (estimated in excess of $500,000) are anticipated by using the ARVN in lieu of contractors.

b. VNAF Energy Conservation: Significant reductions have been made in the use of fuel, electricity and special/general purpose vehicles as follows:

(1) All flights were cancelled to carry VNAF personnel home on leave and trainees to school.

(2) Only required fuel to operate equipment considered mission essential, i.e., bomb lifts, crash / rescue equipment, generators and communications equipment, has been allocated by JGS.

(3) Measures have been applied to redistribute POL assets in-country to cope with fuel restrictions.

(4) Air conditioners were removed, and transformers and distribution lines reduced through consolidation and removal of facilities. This action resulted in a savings of $247,000 in electricity costs during October-December 1973.

(5) Water normally used was saved by shutdown of water plants which resulted in $6000 savings during October-December 1973.

(6) A program was developed to consolidate existing power plants and transformers. Annual savings of about $100,000 will be realized as results of this action.

(7) Sixty cycle power will be used instead of 50 cycle. Annual maintenance and repair cost savings are estimated to be $20,000.

(8) VNAF and DAO, with PACAF equipment management team assistance, surveyed vehicle authorizations with the following results:

ACTIVITY	FROM	TO	REDUCTION
1st Air Div, Da Nang	1687	561	1126
3d Air Div, Bien Hoa	1314	515	799
ATLC, Bien Hoa	888	405	483
Total	3889	1481	2408

c. Funds Management:

(1) Action is now being initiated to hire two local national budget analysts to begin integration of local nationals into the MASF/MAP programming effort. An extensive effort is being planned during the next quarter to further involve the VNAF in our programming and, more importantly, into the priority reviews of VNAF requirements against diminishing resources. This is a first priority effort driven by both the reduced dollar resources available and the necessity to train VNAF personnel in MASF/MAP programming efforts.

(2) Stronger requirement validations and approval authority, as cited in VNAF Manual 67-1, Chapter 23, were imposed. This applies to all types of funds-generated requirements, especially off-line and message requirements. Controls are approximately 95 percent effective.

(3) Recent changes to the [illegible] program will not permit a certain type of requisitioning thru the remotes without producing fund management notices for review.

(4) Emphasis placed at all levels of command of current funding procedures, priorities and restraints has reflected in a belt-tightening, mission essential, conscious VNAF that projects an improved funding posture for the fourth quarter.

d. Contract Management:

(1) Contract Administration Services are being performed on 34 contracts (11 firms) with an estimated FY74 expenditure of $36.3 million. Major effort under these contracts is to provide training to VNAF personnel to attain self-sufficiency.

(2) A Contract Administration Seminar Course was completed by Contract Management personnel. Seminars were attended by DAO, VNAF and Air Vietnam personnel. A total of seven U.S. and 10 Vietnamese successfully completed this five volume accredited course, which was in session over a period of six months.

(3) An option to call up an additional 38 personnel was exercised on the (Northrop) contract for O&I maintenance and OJT on the RF/F-5 aircraft. The additional personnel are to assist in the phase in of later model aircraft and will be phased out as rapidly as possible.

(4) Contract Management personnel visited all VNAF bases to review contractor compliance and training progress. Significant improvements were noted over previous visits, i.e., student attendance has increased, bilingual material is now available, housekeeping and safety is being stressed and general enthusiasm in training was expressed by VNAF management personnel.

(5) A freeze was placed on the phase out of contractor personnel on selected contracts during February and March pending a complete review of requirements for the remainder of FY74 and the first half of FY75. The freeze has been lifted and a revised phase out will commence in April.

(c) To improve contract administration visibility, a plan was developed to locate contract management personnel at Da Nang and Nha Trang. Implementation of this plan is contemplated during the next quarter. Additionally, the staff at Bien Hoa was increased by relocation of an ACO and a contract administrator to the existing staff.

8. (U) MAINTENANCE SUPPORT:

a. Corrosion Control Program: At the direction of CINCPACAF, AFLC/AFSC corrosion engineers and technicians conducted a survey within VNAF, during 21-27 October 1973, to determine the status of the VNAF corrosion control program and the condition of aircraft. Results of the survey indicated excessive aircraft corrosion, a lack of corrosion control equipment and materials, inadequate control and wash rack facilities and totally inadequate utilities at the wash racks. An in-depth survey conducted by the Air Force Division, during January and February 1974, confirmed the findings of the CONUS team and projects were established to improve the posture of the program.

b. Facilities: Civil Engineering has the corrosion control program projects established and funded to repair and construct wash racks at five VNAF bases (TSN, BNH, DNG, CTO and NHA). The estimated completion date is December 1974. Projects to repair and construct wash racks at the remaining VNAF bases (PHC, BTY, PLK, and PHR) have been established but not funded. Funding will be in FY75, with an estimated completion date of July 1975. No projects have been established at this time to repair existing paint facilities at BNH, TSN, PLK, PHR and PHC or to construct facilities at BTY, CTO, NHA and DNG.

c. Equipment and Materials: All the necessary equipment and material for operation of the paint facilities and wash racks has been identified and is being requisitioned. Included are portable air compressors, pumps and generators, for use on wash racks so that cleaning of aircraft can be accomplished prior to the repair/construction/completion of wash racks. Estimated receipt of equipment and materials is July 1974.

d. Resources and Procedures: A program is being developed for hiring dependent VN's to augment manning of wash racks at all bases. This program is time phased with the availability of equipment, materials and facilities. A corrosion control monitor program and aircraft cleaning/wash cycle have been developed and submitted to VNAF for implementation. Estimated implementation date is June and July 1974 respectively.

e. Training: Additional training aids, such as 35mm slides, corrosion training films and charts are available to VNAF. In addition, a program is being developed to upgrade technicians in (AFSC 535X0) corrosion control.

f. Technical Data: All required technical data has been identified and is being requisitioned by VNAF. May 1974 is the estimated date for receipt of the data.

g. F-5A Aircraft: The F-5A aircraft Operational Readiness (OR) rate continues to improve. On 16 March 1974, 56 aircraft were OR as compared to 31 in mid-January. This improvement is primarily a result of an intensive management effort to produce serviceable J-85-13 engines. Serviceable engines on hand have increased from a low of 93 (5 January 1974) to a current level of 162.

h. UH-1 Power Train: The overhaul facility at Bien Hoa completed the prototype of all power train components on 1 March 1974. It is estimated that this facility will produce 25 to 30 percent of total VNAF requirements, while in a training mode during FY75, and be completely self-sufficient in FY76.

i. F-5A Wing Spar Cracks: A report was received showing that 17 of the 20 F-5A aircraft sent to Ping Tung, Taiwan, under Project Peace Basket were discovered to have cracks in the main wing spar. A program was initiated to x-ray all VNAF F-5A aircraft wing spars at the Bien Hoa depot. The first prototype aircraft was X-rayed on 27 March 1974. A subsequent repair program is being developed.

j. Aircraft Repair Group: Forty-eight VNAF students have been certified through the UH-1H helicopter training program. In addition, 17 students are in training with an estimated completion date of 4 May 1974. The F-5 aircraft training program started on 29 January 1974 with 30 VNAF students participating. These students will be certified on approximately 3 May 1974. The A-37 aircraft training started on 4 March 1974 with 17 VNAF students participating. Certification of these students should occur on approximately 24 May 1974.

k. Vehicle Rebuild Group:

(1) On 1 January 1974, this unit converted from a contractor operation to VNAF; however, the operation is being augmented by eight US and 235 LN contractor personnel.

(2) Construction of the 18,000 square foot parts storage building is nearing completion. The metal has been erected and only pouring of a cement floor and installation of electrical wiring remain to be accomplished.

l. Manufacture and Repair Group:

(1) A LOX plant get-well project was established with the following action items completed to date:

(a) Completion of emergency back-up water supply at the Bien Hoa plant.

(b) Receipt and installation of a new 150 HP compressor motor at the Bien Hoa plant.

(c) Receipt and installation of a new Freon compressor at the Tan Son Nhut plant.

(d) Receipt and installation of a new compressor connecting rod at the Da Nang plant.

(e) Establishment of a routine preventative maintenance program at all three plants.

(f) Receipt and distribution of required technical data.

(1) Receipt of materials required for a VNAF [illegible] training program.

(2) Electroplating Shop: All new equipment required for support of the Power Train Shop has been received and installation is 50 percent complete with an estimated turn-on date of 1 May 1974. After completion, the shop will have the capability to support all known aircraft and engine work loads. Progress has been made toward completion of the new building for the Sheetmetal, Plastics and Heat Treating Shops. The target date is estimated as 1 May 1974 for completion of the building and 1 July 1974 as the facilities turn-on date.

m. Accessory Repair Group:

(1) The third quarter FY74 saw the completion of the building for the Hydraulic, Landing Gear and Oil Cooler Shops. Plant Services of the Industrial Engineering Group is in the preparation phase for operation on 1 July 1974. The fuel systems building is nearing completion.

(2) The Accessory Repair Group is in communication with WRALC, SMALC and SAALC regarding a group of 80 actuator, motor and screwjack line items to be overhauled at the Bien Hoa Maintenance depot. This is a joint engineering study to determine the least amount of testing equipment to be purchased for the Electric Shop. In addition, the Engineering Services of the Industrial Engineering Group is working on a project to design, fabricate and prepare procedures for adapters to be used on a universal test stand that is now on hand in the Electric Shop.

(3) Acquisition of technical data is progressing with all known technical orders required on order, and about 80 percent on hand.

n. Quality Control Group: The Quality Control Manual and Quality Control Plan developed during the past quarter has been found unacceptable by the Maintenance Engineering Wing (MEW), AOSAF-LMD, and Maintenance Section, AOSAF-LM. The entire package was considered too sophisticated for the immediate VNAF requirement. A more simplified package in now being

formulated. The VNAF has need of a standardized inspection procedure applicable to all shops. Upon establishment of these procedures, a more sophisticated quality control program, involving quality assurance procedures, can be initiated. Therefore, the approach utilized at this time is to engage the VNAF in a workable inspection process that will provide later for a quality assurance program.

c. Production Control Group: Establishment and control of a good bench stock program has been a major problem in the past. Bench stock personnel were under the jurisdiction of each individual shop chief, and Material Control had only monitoring responsibility. A proposal to correct the bench stock program was presented to the VNAF and accepted. The 74 bench stock personnel will be administratively transferred from each individual shop chief to Material Control. Material Control will have full control and responsibility for bench stock personnel and the bench stock program. A bench stock OJT program is tentatively scheduled to begin 1 April 1974 which is dependent upon the transfer of 15 ESL positions from Plant Services to Production Control.

d. Management Improvement Program:

(1) A program designed to improve the management capabilities within the VNAF material areas is being implemented. This program was designed primarily to provide guidance and assistance to Maintenance and Supply Wing Commanders and staffs in establishing goals, identifying problems, providing solutions and directing the materiel effort. A sound management program is essential for VNAF to attain self-sufficiency. The shortage of trained personnel, especially at the middle management level, creates additional problems that will be overcome in time. The present concept is to ensure the best possible program is provided to adequately manage present resources in manpower and materiel. Efforts are being directed toward achieving this goal.

(2) There are many management tools already available that can be of assistance in the day-to-day management of the materiel effort. Computer products, MDR summaries, maintenance data, status charts and

[redacted]

[redacted] Quality Review Boards: Team effort [redacted] toward the establishment of [redacted] all air divisions. Several teams [redacted] these boards are already in being; however, they [redacted] not functioning as they should. Through the [redacted] establishment and proper operation of these boards, we [redacted] improve base level repair. There are [redacted] items that should be well within the [redacted] level repair capability. A well functioning [redacted] board can identify these items, determine [redacted] and take action to [redacted] deficiencies, technical data, repair kits, tools and [redacted] equipment to provide trained [redacted] repair capability. A well organized [redacted] team will greatly reduce [redacted] repair requirements [redacted] on the AFLC, and [redacted] result in improved depot level support. [redacted] emphasis is being placed on this [redacted] action thus far to our proposals is [redacted].

[redacted] Inventory of Items: [redacted] is another [redacted] area [redacted] considerable emphasis. [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] prior to schedule maintenance is [redacted] [redacted] This has resulted in excessive [redacted] for aircraft and equipment undergoing phase [redacted] time change items, kit kits, and kits and pieces are not available in a timely manner prior to the required inspection. A well organized and smooth running pre-lock meeting should eliminate this problem and reduce flow time. All Air Division teams [redacted] implementing this concept.

[redacted] Scheduling Effectiveness: This is an area requiring considerable effort at the management level. [redacted] the present system, it is difficult, if not impossible, for maintenance management to schedule [redacted] effectively. Operational requirements exceed the [redacted] maintenance capability, hence all aircraft [redacted] cannot be flown fully. This makes it extremely difficult for maintenance to maintain an [redacted] of [redacted] aircraft [redacted] and a backlog [redacted].

In addition to this problem, unscheduled maintenance is not performed adequately due to mission requirements and a considerable number of delayed discrepancies are carried forward into phase inspection. This also extends phase time and compounds the problem. Team efforts are being directed into this area; however, this problem cannot be solved by maintenance alone, since the full cooperation of operations will be required. Efforts are being expended to establish controls over the flying hour and sortie requirements. Improved overall management can greatly improve the maintenance capability, in spite of the present shortages in other areas.

t. JEIM Facilities: There remain problems to be resolved in this area throughout the Air Divisions. The Queen Bee program is receiving a second look due to the cost involved. Special tool requirements will not be resolved until a firm Queen Bee program is established. In spite of problems still facing VNAF in this area, progress is being made. Production is increasing and day-to-day problems are being resolved. The improvement in overall operation during this quarter within the 3d Air Division JEIM facility is outstanding and shows what can be accomplished under firm management with the full cooperation of all concerned. The effort expended has greatly reduced the J-85-13 engine backlog and increased the F-5 aircraft operationally ready rate to an all time high. This record will stand as an example to all Air Divisions. It is well worthy of note that the record achieved by the 3d Air Division was accomplished with available resources only. The one additional ingredient was aggressive management.

u. AGE Maintenance: AGE Maintenance is an area requiring top level management interest. The contractor AGE repair teams are performing in accordance with contractual requirements; however, supply support is hampering production efforts. In many cases the lack of required parts is due to improper requisitioning procedures on the part of maintenance rather than a lack of necessary items. In several instances, parts requirements identified by the AGE team survey, were not requisitioned. This resulted in the AGE repair team having to take requisitioning action after their

arrival [illegible]. Improved management and supervision should rectify these problems. AGE maintenance must receive the same emphasis as that placed on the aircraft maintenance program. Actions are being directed toward this goal through the overall management improvement program.

9. (C) MAJOR EQUIPMENT STATUS:

a. Current aircraft status rates are depicted in Figures 6-9 through 6-25 . In the following paragraphs, significant maintenance achievements and conditions are addressed by type of aircraft.

(1) A-1 Aircraft: Eight aircraft were processed through IRAN and six crash battle damaged aircraft repaired. The fuel cell modification (2135 TCTO 1A-1-532) is being accomplished at ATLC with the remainder to be completed by July 1974. ALE-20 Flare Mod 2775 TCTO 1A-574 is being accomplished by contractor personnel (Lear Siegler, Inc.) The remaining two aircraft will be modified upon receipt of missing kit parts. Modernization of Communications (Modification 2723) trial kit installation was accomplished by contractor (Lear Siegler, Inc.) personnel on one A-1H and one A-1G aircraft. Follow-on modifications will be accomplished upon receipt of kits, technical data changes, and drawings.

(2) U-17 Aircraft: Modernization of Communication modification (TCTO 1U-17-501) will be accomplished by LSI when firm kit delivery and group B equipment is received.

(3) C/AC/EC/RC/VC-47 Aircraft: Three aircraft have undergone Analytical Condition Inspection (ACI) with two remaining to be completed during FY74. Work is being accomplished by the Chinese Air Force in Taiwan.

(4) C-130 Aircraft: As of 9 April 1974, four aircraft have completed PDM/Wing Modification at Lockheed Air Services in Singapore. The program for FY74 is 12 aircraft. The wing modification consists of a beef-up in accordance with TO 1C-130-872. The ALE-20 Flare Modification has been completed by the contractor (LSI). Fuel leak problems, previously encountered, are being corrected by VNAF. A BOA has been established with Air America for future problems.

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



Figure 6-9

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Figure 6-10



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


Figure 6-11

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


Figure 6-12

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


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



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Figure 6-15



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Figure 6-16

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



Figure 6-17

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Figure 6-18




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
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Figure 6-19



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
Figure 6-20



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
Figure 6-21



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Figure 6-22



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


Figure 6-23

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



Figure 6-24

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(5) C/AC-119 Aircraft: Five aircraft are programmed for ACI at the Air Vietnam Contract Facility. Two aircraft are presently in work and the flare modification (ALA-20) has been accomplished by the contractor field team on all but six aircraft undergoing repair at Air Vietnam. Two C-119 aircraft modified elements are held in abeyance per WRALC instructions. One AC-119 crash/battle damaged aircraft, located at Tan Son Nhut, is programmed for repair at Air Vietnam. One AC-119 crash /battle damaged aircraft is at Da Nang AB being repaired by VNAF. The propeller modification (TCTO 1C-119-688) has been accomplished on all AC-119 aircraft.

(6) UH-1 Aircraft: Of the 39 aircraft programmed for 2200 hour periodic inspection to be accomplished at Air Vietnam, 17 have been input, 10 have been completed and seven are still in work. The other 22 aircraft have been terminated from the contract due to cancellation of the 2200 hour periodic inspection program. ATLC is also accomplishing 2200 hour periodic inspections: one ACI; 140 fuel cell modifications (69 completed); 80 gunship modifications (44 completed); and 16 combat battle damaged aircraft repaired. The IRS modification is to be contracted to Air Vietnam for the entire VNAF UH-1 fleet. A contractor (Parsons Corporation) is accomplishing the rotor blade portion of the modifications at ATLC.

(7) CH-47 Aircraft: Two of the 18 aircraft programmed for 1800 hour periodic Life Extension Inspection (LEI) are in work. It is anticipated that eight aircraft will be generated during the remainder of FY74. Termination action has been requested for 10 of the LEI programmed aircraft. Two ACI's have been programmed, one is in work. Two combat battle damaged aircraft were programmed to be repaired at Air Vietnam and an additional two are in work. Action is being taken to contract the Funnel Cover Modification on four aircraft to Air Vietnam. The ALE-20 Flare Modification was accomplished on 20 aircraft. The remaining aircraft will be completed upon receipt of missing kit parts. Heat shields have been manufactured and are being installed to correct a deficiency resulting from exhaust heat on the electrical conduit. The target date for completion is May 1974.

(...) A/B Aircraft: Fifty-six aircraft have been programmed for corrosion control. Work is being done [illegible] in house and 25 aircraft have been completed to date. Four combat battle damaged aircraft have been repaired and AIM-9E Capability Modification (TCTO 1E-5-[illegible]) has been completed on 34 aircraft.

(...) A-37B Aircraft. Seventy-four aircraft have been programmed for wing modification at Air Vietnam. Eighty aircraft have been completed and 15 are in work. Four AOI's will be accomplished, with three presently in work. Fifty-two aircraft are programmed for corrosion control at ATLC and 20 of these have been completed as of 1 April 1974. ALE-20 Flare Modifications were accomplished on 194 aircraft by the contractor (LSI) with the remainder scheduled for completion upon receipt of sufficient kit parts (23 kits are short cases, switches, and dispensers). Estimated completion date is July 1974. Radio (AN/ARC-51-109) swap out modification on 62 aircraft is being accomplished as equipment is being received by [illegible] LSI. Target for completion is May 1974. ECP [illegible] Wing Three Spar Replacement is being finalized, kits now being manufactured and jigs are being shipped. Estimated availability is second quarter of FY75.

(...) C-7 Aircraft: Eighteen aircraft are programmed for corrosion control and six for ACI. Six of the corrosion controls have been completed; two ACI's and seven corrosion controls are currently in work. The program is being accomplished by Thai Am. Five weather damaged aircraft are in repair at Phu Cat and six at Da Nang. [illegible] flare modifications were accomplished on all but nine aircraft. The remainder will be completed upon receipt of kits.

(11) A-37 Aircraft: All 24 aircraft previously in storage at Phan Rang have been removed and are being used for pilot training at Phan Rang AB.

(...) F-5E Aircraft:

a. It is intended that all units be activated at Bien Hoa AB and then deploy to their permanent locations. Seven F-5E squadrons (18UE), totalling 126 aircraft, are programmed for the VNAF at the following locations:

[illegible]	[illegible]	ACTIVATION DATE
[illegible] AD	Bien Hoa	May 1974
[illegible]th AD	Da Nang	September 1974
[illegible]8th AD	Da Nang	January 1975
[illegible]40th AD	Bien Hoa	July 1975
[illegible]42d AD	Bien Hoa	November 1975
[illegible]4th AD	Bien Hoa	January 1976
[illegible]22d AD	Bien Hoa	February 1976

(5) Eight J-85-21 spare engines are scheduled for each squadron. Deliveries of these engines should be concurrent with the aircraft.

(6) Currently, six each F-5E aircraft are in country and assigned to the 536th Air Defense Squadron at Bien Hoa. Initial spares and AGE delivered is approximately 60 percent of the total required; however, the VNAF has been able to fly the six aircraft and have not had an aircraft NORS since they arrived. Programmed flying hours are projected as 35 hours per aircraft per month. A complete F-5E program review is scheduled for June 1974.

(13) Aircraft repair input to contractor programs during the past quarter:

ACFT	PROJECT	PROGRAM	INPUT	OUTPUT
[illegible]	[illegible]	5	1	1
C-7	Corrosion Control	24	6	4
C-119	ACI	5	1	0
A-37	Wing Mod	74	26	12
UH-1H	2200 hour PE	17	0	7
UH-1[illegible]	Life Ext	8	1	1
CH-[illegible]	ACI	2	1	0
C-[illegible]	PDM	12	4	2

10. (U) TRANSPORTATION:

a. The VNAF gained momentum throughout the third quarter CY74. With the Air Force Division providing the guidance to self-sufficiency, VNAF transportation became a profitable system dedicated to the performance of airlift and coastal port operations, vehicle operations and maintenance management.

[illegible] Air [illegible] Facilities Architects and Engineers providing [illegible] guidance and assistance in the operation of the 5th AI cargo terminal, VNAF transportation is now within sight of attaining a complete proficiency of the Tan Son Nhut cargo terminal. Final contractor withdrawal will occur on 30 June 1974.

c. The VNAF cargo terminals are currently 100 percent manned according to the present UMD. A UMD revision is being studied by VNAF J34, and although manning has increased, no official authorization has been approved. Contractor manning has been reduced to 18 people who are looking "over the VNAF shoulders" to provide transportation technical assistance.

d. The airlift [illegible] operation applies to basic transportation principles in that requirements are validated, consolidated and tagged by the Central Logistics Command and are given to scheduled aircraft. Priorities are determined by demand which is dictated by the hostile activity in the respective military regions. LOGAIR requirements are passed on a daily basis from the MACV in the field to VNAF Headquarters, Chief of Transports, where they are evaluated and assigned accordingly. There aircraft are dedicated to the LOGAIR system, i.e., one C-130 A and two C-7A's.


e. The following figures represent VNAF cargo and passengers moved in country:

ACTIVITY	CARGO	PASSENGERS
Bien Hoa AB	[illegible] S/T	5,580
Tan Son Nhut AB	3543.5 S/T	93,317

f. Commando Wheels: On 1 January 1974 the VNAF assumed responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the Commando Wheels facilities. The VNAF is performing production control, material management production, quality assurance functions, power production, fire department, security and facilities maintenance. The 150 man VNAF vehicle overhaul squadron is augmented by 269 LN's and eight US Army contract (LOI). The LN's perform production and the US provide technical assistance. Initially, productivity [illegible] but has been increasing recently and should [illegible] same level as last year by June.

AD-A094 488 DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON DC F/G 15/7
DEFENSE ATTACHE SAIGON: RVNAF QUARTERLY ASSESSMENT, 3RD QUARTER--ETC(U)
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g. Spare Parts Redistribution: All VNAF bases are inspecting the vehicle repair parts warehouse to determine if the parts on hand match the vehicles on base. Due to a redistribution of vehicles, some bases have inventories of spares for which they have no vehicles. These excess parts are being identified and shipped to the ATLC Bien Hoa where they can be used to fill outstanding requisitions. Spare part warehouses in the motor pool area are undergoing the same inspection with two additional criteria: (1) to create a bench stock; and (2) to ship excess stock to base supply.

h. Storage of Excess Vehicles: VNAF Headquarters has issued an instruction defining the policy, procedure and responsibilities of placing vehicles in running storage. A goal to place 25 percent of current general and special purpose vehicle fleet under this program was established. The VNAF vehicle fleet currently consists of some 5800 vehicles located at the nine VNAF bases and ATLC. VNAF has placed approximately 650 vehicles in running storage and identified an additional 500 to be processed. Some of the vehicles are VDP and will require repair before being placed in storage. For the larger bases, it is planned to augment the VNAF vehicle maintenance personnel with LSI personnel from the Satellite Repair Teams as required. Non-availability of repair parts will hamper the progress of this program.

i. One of the primary reasons the VNAF transportation squadrons are finding difficulty in maintaining their vehicle fleet is that certain key elements of AFM 66-12 and 77-1 are not properly implemented. Although the basic managerial framework has been retained, as outlined in these manuals, with which to manage vehicle assets, it has been over simplified to the point of being non-functional. The following key elements of AFM 66-12 and 77-1 are being stressed by management teams and taught to the various transportation squadron commanders with the objective of being implemented into the VNAF Transportation system: Maintenance Control, Cannibalization, Base Repair Capability, Operator Training, Preventative Maintenance, Supply Support, Reports and Analysis, and Vehicle Utilization Board.

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j. Base Repair Capability: The inability to obtain proper support from base activities drastically limited the base repair capability; all shop facilities must be available to send users through the proper channels of support. Correct documentation requesting the repair of components parts, proper identification of tools, and correct routing of the repairable item must be carried out by all involved sections. Management teams continue to promote better communications between Transportation Squadron Commanders and all base support facilities in order to promote and obtain a team spirit in getting the job done.

k. Preventative Maintenance: The Preventative Maintenance concept continues to be stressed to all Transportation Squadron Commanders. In order to minimize downtime, vehicle failure and disruption of the vehicle maintenance work schedules, preventative maintenance is a key management requirement in attaining self-sufficiency. Transportation Squadrons are hindered by the lack of centralized dispatch/control of assets to user organizations. This disallows a systematic scheduling program which would ordinarily make vehicles available for inspection, lubrication and repair at predetermined intervals. In an attempt to rectify this situation, a modified preventative maintenance system has been initiated at some air divisions. Under this management system, all vehicles are inspected for discrepancies prior to receiving fuel. In addition, the date of the last lubrication is checked against the vehicle registration number. If the vehicle has no discrepancies and does not require lubrication, it receives fuel. This modified preventative maintenance approach is limited in scope and a broader concept continues to be suggested to all Transportation Squadron Commanders, as well as Air Base Support Group Commanders.

11. (C) AIR TECHNICAL LOGISTICS COMMAND:

a. Supply and Transportation Center:

(1) Manning: The ATLC Supply and Transportation Center is currently 85 percent manned (authorized 1077 and 928 assigned). A critical shortfall is in NCO assigned strength i.e., only 183 are assigned against

431 authorized spaces. On-going training programs are expected to advance skill levels and to allow some relief; however, the NCO shortage will have a critical affect on depot operations into the near future.

(2) Inventory Control: The wall-to-wall inventory of ATLC assets has been completed, with the exception of items requiring inspection actions to determine identity and condition. A 10-man AFLC RADS team is presently screening these items for debit adjustments under special inventory procedures, as they are identified. The team has inspected 3736 items with the following results: (1) 241 items with a dollar value of $56,233 were changed from serviceable to reparable condition; (2) 23 items were condemned as being beyond economical repair with a dollar value of $21,606.46; and (3) 743 items were disposed of for lack of identification.

(3) Storage Facilities: A survey has been completed on outside storage to determine items requiring repacking and/or recrating. Quality checks of warehouses to determine locator accuracy is continuing. Since this program began in November 1973, 12 warehouses have been checked which reflected an average warehouse location accuracy of 89.1 percent, in comparison to a 67 percent prior to the validation and 83.6 percent prior to the wall-to-wall inventory.

(4) Personnel: A total of 52 warehousemen and 15 packers and craters have been hired to augment the WNAF work force under contract (PA&E F62772-73-C-0042). Primarily these additional personnel will be utilized to rewarehouse and inventory Base Support assets. The contract expiration date is 30 June 1974.

(5) Reparable Processing:

(a) Two new programs are ready to be implemented in the RPC area to effect better control and visibility of unserviceable assets at ATLC. One listing shows the condition of the packaging and the correctness or absence of the documentation of each unserviceable item as it is received at ATLC by the RPC from the air divisions. It also serves to provide a count of the number of items received from each air division. This information was not available previously. There are still some minor difficulties in the program which should be overcome by April 1974.

(5) The ATLC/RPC reparable balance listing is a supplemental listing to the R26 DIFM list. The DIFM list indicates those items which are in maintenance being reworked and the reparable balance list will indicate those items of a low repair priority which are stored in an unserviceable warehouse. The RPC is physically prepared for this program. Processing lines have been established, a warehouse built, storage bins erected and a locator deck is in place for recording incoming materials. This program will be input immediately after a DIFM reconciliation has been completed. The implementation of these two programs will provide complete visibility of unserviceable assets located at the ATLC. It will also provide faster processing at the RPC by separating the fast moving items and providing a physical view of each maintenance shop's backlog of low priority repair items.

c. VNAF Equipment Management:

(1) Allowance Source Codes (ASC) and Tables of Allowance (TA) assigned by CONUS and authorized for VNAF shops are incompatible with actual requirements. In some cases, the TA is incorrect for the assigned function.

(2) A preliminary survey of 1st and 3d Air Divisions by PACAF/DAO/VNAF reflected a 95 percent line item discrepancy. The vehicle authorization and in-use quantities are believed to be extremely inflated. A CEMT review will reduce these quantities by establishing a Vehicle Authorization List (VAL) which will eliminate many vehicle requirements and result in savings on repairs, fuel and parts.

(3) In the past, VNAF shop personnel, supply organizations and base commanders have been reluctant to turn in excess equipment for fear they may need it later and not be able to get it. Base reviews by base personnel will not reduce equipment to the minimum mission essential quantities desired.

(4) It has been recommended that VNAF assign dedicated personnel on a permanent basis for an

annual survey in order to establish experience and knowledge required. The Air Force Division will assign counterparts to assist the VNAF team and possibly recall the PACAF CEMT team for a base review to ascertain the finer points for a successful survey. DAO and VNAF team leaders will be assigned to instruct, assist and report to their organizations.

(a) Personnel assigned will have experience in the following areas:

	VNAF	DAO
Flight Line/Intermediate Maintenance	2	1
Organizational Maintenance	1	1
Vehicle/Transportation Maintenance	1	1
Ground Powered AGE	1	1
Civil Engineers	1	1
Equipment Supply Records	2	1
Avionics	1	1

(b) A few hours of classroom training will be needed to assure knowledge of:

1 Air Force Regulation 0-10, Index of Allowance Source Codes.

2 Master Equipment Management Index (MEMI).

3 Custodian Authorization/Custodian Receipt Listing (R14). Before leaving on a survey, a R14 listing for the specific base should be prepared and studied by the team. During the survey, the team will annotate changes, delete and add items to the listing and give copies to the shop custodians, Base Supply EMO, VNAF Headquarters and ATLC EMO for follow-on processing action and review.

(c) A survey of one base each month of two weeks duration is to be scheduled commencing in May 1974. This will allow assigned personnel to return to their previous positions while survey findings are analyzed and updated. This time period was also recommended to minimize the financial hardship on VNAF team members.

c. Materiel Management Center:

(1) Manning: Overall VNAF military and civil service manning was at 88 percent at the end of the quarter. Officer strength was only 57 percent (93 authorized vs 54 assigned) and NCO strength was at a critical low of 33 percent (371 authorized and 123 assigned). Subsequent to completion of on-going training programs, airman skill levels should rise effecting some improvement in the Material Management Center's (MMC) NCO strength. The officer shortage continues to be critical with no immediate relief in sight. MMC Civil Service manning is currently 100 percent (51 authorized and assigned). Vietnamese contractor augmentation of 101 personnel is scheduled to continue thru December 1974.

(2) VNAF Air Munitions Status:

(a) The air munitions resupply pipeline is fully operational. Expenditure rates have experienced a definite decline during this quarter and dropped from 5.2 to 3.8 million with an average of 4 million per month.

(b) VNAF AIM-9 Missile Status: Of the 302 missiles authorized, 138 are serviceable. There are 138 short components consisting of fuzes, warheads, guidance and control units. Twenty-four of these components are due in, which will bring the serviceable quantity to 162.

(c) VNAF objectives for improving munitions serviceability include a technical inspection to verify true munitions serviceability status. Upon completion of inspections, a renovation/reconditioning program will be placed in effect. Improved storage capabilities will be programmed, based on the outcome of the facilities inspection now being performed.

(3) Base Supply:

(a) The ATLC Base Support Supply was transferred under the Commander of the Supply and Transportation Center during March 1974. The Base Supply offices were physically relocated to an area near the flight line.

(b) Problems with Base Construction Materiel (BCM) were analyzed by VNAF and DAO during this quarter. The system now used was implemented in 1973 and an initial lack of inter-service coordination caused confusion. For example, $184,000 of ATLC BCM had been allocated in April 1973; however, requisitions against these funds were not submitted until October 1973. Requisitions against funds allocated in March 1974 were submitted prior to 1 April 1974. The BCM support should improve during this calendar year.

d. Seek Point: VNAF personnel are in training at four locations, i.e., Bien Hoa, Pleiku, Dalat and Hue. This training consists of both formal classroom and OJT and is being conducted by Sierra Research Corporation. During the past quarter, the following Seek Point events occurred:

(1) The site at Binh Thuy was relocated to Hue.

(2) Permanent towers were constructed for radar antennas at Pleiku and Hue, and all sites were surveyed.

(3) A joint conference with VNAF/DAO/PACAF and CINCPACAMA personnel was held at Bien Hoa on 4 February 1974. Many systems problems were discussed with action items being assigned to the appropriate organizations.

e. AIMI (Item) Support:

(1) The VNAF had officer representation at the 3d quarter US Army Aviation Intensively Managed Items (AIMI) Conference held in St Louis, 10-14 March 1974, and also at the WRALC pre-conference meetings. Problems with AIMI support is expected to continue into the near future.

(2) VNAF attendance should have a positive effect toward understanding helicopter support problems and amplification of importance of complying with worldwide programs, i.e., expeditious return of reparables. Continued VNAF participation in future conferences is considered imperative to ensure improved management of helicopter spares requirements versus funding constraints.

f. Common Item Support: VNAF fill rate on common item requisitions from the National Materiel Management Agency (NMMA) remained low at approximately 27 percent. Of the 3070 VNAF requisitions submitted during this quarter, only 827 were filled; 2216 were back ordered and 27 cancelled. VNAF ATLC is planning to effect a monthly reconciliation with NMMA beginning in May 1974; hopefully this will purify back ordered records. The VNAF also will include BCM when EOQ assets are up loaded into the new "C" computer system. This will greatly aid management visibility and VNAF control of interface with ARVN storage sites.

g. Computer Events:

(1) During the third quarter, computer downtime, due to equipment/component malfunction, has been reduced.

(2) The overall computer utilization on all three systems combined averaged 83, 88 and 91 percent per month. A breakdown by system reveals an average monthly utilization of: (1) "E" primary system 77, 95 and 93 percent; (2) "B" primary system 78, 86 and 87 percent; and (3) "E" secondary system 94, 84 and 85 percent. Utilization fluctuations reflected on the "E" system was due to preventative maintenance, power outages, bad weather and IAS fastrand problems. The IAS fastrand problem was related to a burned out coil on an air-condition voltage stabilizer and a hot air spot behind the fastrand. The voltage stabilizers have been repaired and VNAF/DAO Civil Engineers are taking action to eliminate the hot air spot area. Fluctuations on the "E" secondary system was due to the same conditions mentioned on the "B" system with exception of the IAS fastrand. Delay in receiving parts from CONUS to repair the file loader on the "B" system was another factor. Bunker Ramo engineers now have an adequate supply of spare parts. The "E" primary system was not affected by the voltage stabilizer problem.

(3) Utilization of the DCT 2000 during January and February 1974 was 0 and 24 percent respectively; however, it increased to 85 percent in March 1974. The downtime during these months was due to three separate

[illegible] cables between [illegible] AB. [illegible] data was airlifted to and from Clark AB during this period. Currently, no excessive downtime is being experienced.

(4) Partial shipment of the first of two "C" configured IOSS-II computer system arrived at Bien Hoa AB on 13 March. A stable line voltage regulator urgently required to support the two new systems was received from Ubon on 14 March. Two 150V back-up generators were installed to support additional air conditioning and lighting requirements. The second "C" system is scheduled for delivery in May 1974. Following installation of both systems and resolution of required dedicated communication lines to bases, VNAF will begin to up load base SOQ supply records.

12. (C) JGS ASSESSMENT OF VNAF:

a. As a result of a recent visit to Air Divisions by a joint JGS-VNAF team, the following areas of consideration were identified:

(1) Problems pertaining to the support of fighters, helicopters, flareships and cargo movement at Corps/Military Regions.

(2) Corrective measures to maintain a lasting combat effectiveness of Air Divisions.

(3) Insuring the proper distribution and use of flying hours of all types of VNAF aircraft.

b. Fighters:

(1) A large number of Infantry units requested firepower from TAC air support to strike suspected targets without having accurate intelligence information. The results were not as successful as expected, thus wasting bombs and ammunition. Additionally, continued abuse of fire support from TAC Air Squadrons occurred as follows.

(a) Some combat operational units tried to use all daily sorties planned for them at the last minute of the day to strike inappropriate targets because they feared that if those sorties were not used completely during the day, they would not receive any sorties the following day.

(b) Some Corps/Military Regions decided to use extra sorties/TAC air support from respective Air Divisions without having JGS approval. The above fact has hindered the authorization for operational use of extra flying hours, by the AOC/VNAF HQ, to provide special interzone air support when directed by JGS.

(c) Tactical air capability has been completely used by Corps/MR's in combat operational support; therefore, there were no more aircraft available for advanced and practical training of pilots under BOBS' guidance.

d. UH-1 Helicopters:

(1) Most Corps/MR's have over used the planned flying hours for UH-1 helicopters, which caused problems in the maintenance of aircraft and in the advanced training of pilots in the unit.

(2) Command helicopters assigned daily to selected units were not fully utilized because they were on stand-by status instead of flying. These helicopters were usually returned to their original units very late (after 2000 hours), which hindered the daily maintenance and assignment of another mission to the pilots. In addition, a nubmer of units have used command helicopters with a selected crew as their own property. This action required the crew to standby 24 hours per day, some aircraft were reconfigured as VIP aircraft. The above facts create problems for air squadrons in arranging and assigning ACFT equally to an operational, training or liaison mission. Noteworthy is that the VNAF is putting great effort into training of operational personnel for newly activated air squadrons.

(3) Night medevacs performed for operational units are faced with difficulties, since some of these units are not aware of how to safely provide landing instructions into a landing zone.

(4) Under pressure from a number of unit commanders, UH-1 helicopters are employed in transporting and supplying POL for some armored units.

(5) User units do not properly apply all safety measures while loading helicopters with explosives and war trophies captured from the enemy.

d. Helicopters (CH-47):

(1) A number of units are still using the CH-47 helicopter for supply when other means of support are available.

(2) Units to which CH-47 helicopters are assigned for use have used very old cargo nets, unsuitable for the mission of carrying goods outside the aircraft. An unforeseen accident may cause a loss of goods during movement.

(3) A number of units have used cargo nets to secure empty containers which are very light and subject to weather conditions. As a result, helicopters lose stability while flying and an unforeseen accident could easily occur.

e. Flareships:

(1) The mission of flareships is to illuminate the battle field. However, user units frequently fail to utilize the fire power of flareships to perform close air support.

(2) AC-119 aircraft which are being used for the purpose of discovering and destroying the enemy and their vehicles during night movement, should be authorized to react immediately to destroy the enemy completely, instead of having to report and then wait for confirmation. Presently, time is lost and the enemy has enough time to have convoys turn out their lights or move to another location.

f. Cargo:

(1) The control of passengers and trucks on airstrips at most airports, has been conducted properly and as directed.

(2) Night missions were carried out on airstrips and at local airports, which did not have signal lights or correct safety measures, thus endangering the aircraft and crew.

(3) The mission of transporting coffins of KIA personnel met with difficulty when the aircraft involved landed at airports with no military air terminal and representatives of the unit or next of kin did not appear for pick up. Under those circumstances, the pilot and the crew had to wait and cancel their next mission.

(4) Aviation safety and hijack-control measures have not been of great concern to user units and operational agencies.

g. Corrective Measures:

(1) Try to use all flying hours, within the quota prescribed by JGS, the proper types of aircraft and the ammunition issued monthly to the Air Divisions. In case that requirements are considered vital and irreplaceable, requests for a supplemental quota must be submitted to JGS for consideration, along with sufficient justification.

(2) Tactical Air Support should be requested only after all organic fire power and crew served weapons of the units involved, including artillery and naval artillery, have been used without achieving the desired effect.

(3) Regarding helicopters, strict application of all provisions of directives and other issued instruction for the use of command helicopters should be limited and they should be assigned only for each mission for command purposes. Arrangements should be made for individual helicopters to carry out more than one command or liaison mission during the day, instead of standing by for 24 hours, except for those attached to Corps/MR commanders.

(4) Cargo aircraft and flareships (AC-47, AC-119G, AC-119K) have the capability both of dropping flares and of providing supporting fire power. As a result, ground units should maintain proper coordination with air units for planning and providing support, particularly for posts and stations. This will facilitate destruction of the enemy during his night movement.

(5) Operational agencies and units responsible for the airports must be directed to take charge of repair; periodic maintenance, security control and correction of deficiencies pertaining to loading, unloading and transport of passengers. They must also guide units in for landing using a portable light system on airstrips where no lights are available, so that airports can provide the maximum aircraft safety.

(6) Anti-hijack and security control measures must be strictly applied during the use of military air transportation, as outlined in the memorandum (1889/TTM/TCTV/CV-1) dated 15 March 1974.

(7) Based on the number of hours to be flown by each type of aircraft, air transportation is converted into estimated costs in accordance with rates listed in Figure 6-26. Cost factors will change depending on the rate of exchange and the cost of POL, machines and spare parts. If the rate of exchange continues to increase, funds which have been approved for other projects will have to be diverted, causing other problems in the RVNAF logistical support plan.

h. Flying Hours:

(1) Based on funds approved, estimated flying hours needed for all types of aircraft in each quarter must be coordinated with DAO.

(2) On the 20th day of each month, an estimate of the daily support capability of the Air Divisions and the quota for flying hours, required for the following month for Corps/MR's, is to be prepared and forwarded to JGS (J3).

(3) AOC/VNAF should be directed to manage the flying hour quota given to Corps/MRs, take follow-up action and intervene promptly when overuse occurs.

(4) On the 10th day of each month, the number of authorized and actual flying hours for each Corps/MR (from the previous month) must be reported to JGS (J3).

RATES FOR 1 FLYING HOUR OF VNAF AIRCRAFT

Types of Aircraft		Cost of 1 Hour *US Dollars	VN Piasters
Fighters	A-1	$ 336	198.240$
	A-37	162	95.580
	F-5A	385	227.150
	F-5E	400	236.000
Helicopters	CH-47	$ 163	96.170$
	UH-1	130	76.700
Observation	O-1	$ 62	36.580$
	O-2	80	47.200
	U-6	99	58.410
	U-17	85	50.150
Cargo's	C-7	$ 219	129.210$
	C-130	369	198.240
Armed Cargo's	AC-47	$ 169	99.710$
	AC-119G	292	172.280
	AC-119K	292	172.280
Air Recon	EC-47	$ 169	99.710$
	RC-47	169	99.710
	RC-119	169	99.710
Liaison	VC-47	$ 169	99.710$
	T-37	$ 162	95.580$
	T-41	50	29.500

* The rate of exchange for one U.S. dollar was 590$ Vietnamese piasters, as of March 1974.

Figure 6-26

13. (C) CONCLUSION:

a. The Vietnamization Program continues to be one of the priority efforts of the US Air Force. Significant progress has been made during the past year with major delivery programs completed, the VNAF force structure expanded from 52 to 66 squadrons and sortie rate accomplishments reached new highs. Other noteworthy improvements of VNAF operation are: JEIM production capabilities, upgrading the CEM System, resource data base and upgrade of fire and rescue equipment.

b. Efforts must now be directed toward improving the VNAF's capability to operate effectively with reduced levels of US support. In meeting these objectives, the following have been designated as areas which require priority efforts.

(1) Increasing the efficiency and responsiveness of the VNAF Supply System.

(2) Increasing the maintenance capability for aircraft engines and facilities.

(3) Upgrading ATLC depot overhaul capability.

(4) Training VNAF in required logistics skills.

(5) Improving the VNAF's logistics manpower management.

(6) Providing effective support and timely activation of F-5E squadrons.

(7) Providing contractual efforts to support essential VNAF requirements where support was previously performed for the U.S.

CHAPTER 7

VIETNAMESE NAVY (VNN)

1. (C) PERSONNEL:

a. Authorization. The 31 March 1974 VNN manpower authorization remained at 40,181, with 5,714 officers, 13,643 petty officers, and 20,824 enlisted personnel.

b. Strength. The actual strength as of 31 March 1974 was 39,564 composed of 5,838 officers, 13,399 petty officers, and 20,327 other personnel, including midshipmen, recruits, and pipeline personnel.

2. (C) PERSONNEL READINESS:

a. The personnel readiness of the VNN continues to be characterized by such factors as responsiveness to emergency situations, high combat morale, willingness to face personal danger, and active use of formal training programs. The aggressiveness and personal courage of the VNN sailor against a greatly superior enemy force at sea was dramatically illustrated during the quarter. The general engagement of four VNN ships with numerous PRC naval units supported by aircraft at the Paracel Islands Group was VNN's first major sea battle. In this bold action 19 Navymen were killed, 42 wounded, and 54 listed as missing and believed dead.

b. During the quarter the VNN reported a total of 1,225 personnel entering and 788 completing in-country training courses, with an average of 1,953 personnel in training throughout the period. Participation in off-shore training courses included 31 officers and 11 enlisted beginning and five officers and 18 enlisted personnel completing training.

c. Although the daring and fighting spirit of the blue water sailor became a special source of VNN pride this quarter and formal training facilities are well utilized, general personnel readiness deficiencies are evident. Numerous longstanding shipboard maintenance problems indicate, for example, that underway training and command attention to various preparedness factors are often inadequate. In addition to the general maintenance problem, inspection of ships damaged during the Paracel battle indicated that proper damage control measures were not taken and that damage control training is deficient. There are also indications that shipboard material readiness and training shortcomings generally

impact upon the normal state of crew morale. In cases in which ships do not receive proper technical and logistical support, the morale and confidence of commanding officers and ship's officers is found to significantly deteriorate. With the mounting responsibilities and pressures attached to increasing VNN technical self sufficiency, morale and confidence of officers aboard complex modern naval ships are more vulnerable than ever. This is particularly true where technical and logistical support is lacking. These problems have a predictable effect on crew morale and performance of routine tasks. Finally, a special morale problem, particularly aboard Fleet Command ships, is seriously inadequate food with minimal opportunity to conduct food supplement projects (discussed below at paragraph 7d). These problem areas are gaining increased attention within VNN. AOSND is emphasizing development of command management programs needed to cope with these factors and upgrade general operational readiness.

3. (C) EQUIPMENT STATUS OF SHIPS AND CRAFT:

a. The authorized number of ships and craft remains at 1,547 as of 31 March 1974.

b. Actual strength is normally reported as somewhat above the authorized figure, but varies from month to month due to combat losses, salvage of previously reported losses and faulty reporting from the field. The N4 project to purify records and reconcile the actual number of craft on hand with inventory records by HQ number was recently completed and should improve future craft accountability. Latest available figures for VNN craft are provided on pages 7-3 through 7-7.

c. From the beginning of the ceasefire (28 January 1973) through 31 March 1974, 50 miscellaneous craft have been lost or sunk by enemy action. Many of these craft have either been salvaged or are awaiting salvage. Latest reports of these losses are as follows:

CRAFT TYPE	NUMBER OF UNITS
WPB	1
COMMANDMENT	7
PBR	13
MONITOR	2
ATC	1

SHIPS AND CRAFT OF VNN

COASTAL SURVEILLANCE AND PATROL CRAFT

DER (Destroyer Escort Radar Picket)	2
WHEC (High Endurance Cutter)	7
PCE (Patrol Craft Escort)	7
PGM (Patrol Gunboat Motor)	20
WPB (Patrol Boat)	25
PCF (Patrol Craft Fast)	104
Yabuta Junk	148
Kien Giang Junk	6
Command Junk	32
Coastal Raider - Ferro Cement	90
TOTAL:	441

RIVER PATROL CRAFT

ATC (Armored Troop Carrier)	79
ASPB (Assault Support Patrol Boat)	73
CCB (Command Communications Boat)	9
Commandement	13
LCM Monitor (Landing Craft Mechanized)	23
LCM Refueler	15

Figure 7-1

RIVER PATROL CRAFT (CONT)	
LSIL (Landing Ship Infantry Light)	3
LSSL (Landing Ship Support Large)	4
Monitor	11
Monitor Zippo	7
PBR (Patrol Boat River)	295
RPC (River Patrol Craft)	27
STCAN (Fom)	38
TOTAL:	597

HARBOR AND MINE DEFENSE CRAFT	
LCMMS (Landing Craft Mechanized Minesweeper)	5
LCPL (Landing Craft [illegible] Personnel Large)	23
MLMS (Motor Launch Minesweeper)	10
MSM (Minesweeper [illegible])	7
MSR (Minesweeper River)	6
Picket	19
Vedette Y 3000	1
Vedette I 3600	15
Vedette S 3700	1
TOTAL:	87

LOGISTICAL AND SUPPORT CRAFT

AGP (Auxiliary General Purpose)	2
ARL (Landing Craft Repair Ship)	1
APL (Auxiliary Personnel Lighter)	2
Water Barge	1
CSB (Combat Salvage Boat)	4
FNC (Floating Naval Club)	1
LCM-3	23
LCM-6	106
LCM-8	49
LCM Fire Boat	1
LCM Pusher	12
LCU (Landing Craft Utility)	15
LCVP (Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel)	45
LCVP Pusher	5
LSM (Landing Ship Medium)	5
LSM/H (Hospital Ship)	2
LST (Landing Ship Tank)	6
Skimmer	29
UB 50 (Utility Boat)	2
UB 100	6
YFR (Refrigerated Covered Lighter)	1

LOGISTICAL AND SUPPORT CRAFT (CONT)

YLLC (Salvage Light Lift Craft)	3
YOG (Yard Oiler)	6
YR (Floating Repair)	1
YRBM (Repair, Berthing and Messing Barge)	4
YTL (Small Harbor Tug)	9
YTM (Medium Harbor Tug)	3
Flag Officer Barges	3
RB (Refuel Barge)	4
YW (Transport Craft)	1
FB (Fuel Barge)	5
BW (Boston Whaler)	56
Viper	6
BC (Transportation Barge)	7
WLV (Floating Radar Site - HQ 304)	1
TOTAL:	427

GRAND TOTAL: 1552

* Figures do not include sunken craft which may be salvaged.

CRAFT TYPE (CONT)	NUMBER OF UNITS (CONT)
LCM-6	4
LCM-8	1
YABUTA JUNK	7
LCVP	1
STCAN	5
PICKETT	2
PCF	3
LCM-3	2
PCE (lost during engagement with PRC)	1
TOTAL:	50

4. (C) LOGISTICS:

a. General. Implementation of the joint DAO/VNN Logistics Development Plan for resolution of logistics programs representing weaknesses in attainment of VNN self-sufficiency, promulgated on 30 June 1973, is continuing. The status of the 72 programs as of 31 March 1974 was as follows:

Programs completed	10
Programs cancelled	2
Programs on Schedule	27
Programs behind Schedule	10
No Progress Report	2
Programs with insufficient data to determine status	21
Programs Established	None
TOTAL:	72

b. LSB/ISB/ASB Technical Management.

(1) The Coastal Radar Improvement Plan (CRIP)

continues to achieve a gradual phased upgrading of the effectiveness of the Coastal Radar System. Some significant results of the program during the quarter were:

(a) Repair and overhaul are still being delayed due to lack of parts. Parts needed for overhaul will be stocked for issue at the Electronics Repair Center (ERC), Nha Be.

(b) The March 1974 Operational Target (OPTAR) for ERC Nha Be was increased to $25K. This increase was required to provide funding for Coastal Radar System (CRS) procurement.

(c) A list of deficiencies and recommended remedial actions developed during Phase II of the CRIP has been compiled and submitted to the VNN Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).

(2) Preventive Maintenance System (PMS) Team field visits during the quarter revealed continuing PMS mismanagement. The most problem of PMS disappointments was found to be a consistent lack of command attention to PMS. This was apparent through general inaction, insufficient PMS Training at the local unit level, and general disregard for a full range of VNN directives on PMS. Efforts to gain assignment of a VNN Commander or Lieutenant Commander to head the VNN PMS Support Office continue to be unsuccessful. Additionally, continuing efforts to indoctrinate selected VNN officers in PMS documentation and management have encountered problems of minimal motivation. Recent PMS Team visits to both ships and shore bases, also were found unsatisfactory or marginal. These difficulties and recommendations for corrective action continue to be reported and discussed with cognizant VNN officers and base commanders.

(3) The VNN CNO has directed the establishment of a "Warship Armament Study and Improvement Committee". This group is assigned the task of developing recommendations for improved weapons systems and weapons systems management to enhance VNN combat capabilities. Frequent seminar-like meetings of this committee began in mid-March and will continue through mid-April.

(4) Project ENHANCE installations of 40mm and 20mm gun mounts have been completed on six WHEC's and two DER's. This program will be completed with installation on the remaining WHEC during her next regular overhaul (currently

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[illegible] personnel in the program [illegible] equipments for graph-trend [illegible] maintenance and performance is [illegible]. A total of 145 VNN personnel have received this training.

(6) Funding has been received for on-the-job training of antenna riggers to support repair work on the VNN Communication Station, Cam Ranh Bay. A list of requirements for antenna repair parts is being developed, and a determination has been made as to which antennas will be rehabilitated. The target date now set for the start of this program is 1 June 1974.

(7) An inventory is being made of Ordnance publications and Ordnance items which the VNN feels require translation. Additional copies required for the translations will be procured. These documents will be [illegible] as they are obtained.

(8) Of seven ATC LCM-8's planned for overhaul during CY 73, two were completed during the quarter. The other five have been under overhaul for an average period of over 20 weeks, although the standard schedule calls for completion in 14 weeks. The completion average of the five remaining craft is less than 85%. The CY 74 program calls for eight LCM-8's to have started overhaul by early March, but only six are now underway. Base commanders were directed in March 1974 to improve both the quality and quantity of their overhauls. Reporting of Logistics Support data has greatly improved and the data is now better than 98% accurate.

(9) Over the past two years (31 March 1972 - 31 March 1974) a total of 176 VNN craft have been sunk. Of these, 139 have been salvaged. There are currently 29 sunken craft awaiting salvage, while a total of eight sunken craft are considered not salvageable.

[illegible]. Vietnamese Navy Shipyard (VNNSY).

(1) Capital improvement work within the shipyard includes the completion of work on seawall repair and [illegible] of sanitary facilities at the Ferro-Cement shop. Work on pier extension has begun with preliminary maintenance dredging.

(2) To satisfy a need for improved accounting of VNN Shipyard (VNNSY) cost data, a young VNN officer with

[illegible] data processing has been assigned to [illegible] applications. This move is ex[illegible] to management improvement in the [illegible]

[illegible] enhance the delivery of critical items within [illegible], automated material status listings continue [illegible] weekly and ship superintendents continue [illegible] material problems weekly. These problems are [illegible] researched and receive special expediting action.

[illegible]. Construction and Base Maintenance.

[illegible] The total number of U.S. Navy sponsored dependent housing units completed is 5,039 out of a revised total of 5,1[illegible] planned units. Revised standard designs for units to be built under the RVNAF Dependent Shelter Program are now under review in DAC Navy Division to assure that design changes recommended by the VNN have been incorporated into the drawings. The funds to support [illegible] have not yet been released by CINCPAC.

[illegible] The program to upgrade the power supply at all 15 [illegible] Radar Stations is progressing. Replacement generators have been delivered to all sites. All but seven have been installed. Additionally, four one week [illegible] operator training courses designed to support [illegible] have been completed.

[illegible] Project completions during the quarter include the following:

(a) Commercial water facilities at Ca Mau ISB.

(b) Pavement and drainage improvements at Newport.

(c) Seawall modifications at the VNN Shipyard.

5. [illegible] SUPPLY.

[illegible] The VNN Supply Officer's school commenced its first classes on schedule on 4 February 1974. The first class has [illegible] students and will last nine weeks. A minimum of four classes are scheduled for CY 74.

[illegible] An in-depth supply inspection of the Vietnamese Naval Supply Center [illegible] was completed during the quarter. General improvement in management and operating procedures as compared to a year ago was evident. The inspection found; however, that most junior VNN

supply officer [illegible] perform an active managerial role. Longer tour lengths, second tours at VNNSC, improved format training courses, and continued close involvement of U.S. supply consultants are are considered necessary to upgrade junior VNN supply officer managerial skills. An additional finding was that the reduced material availability experienced in recent months apparently results from reduced air shipment channel volume, a reduced stock safety level, and increase in CONUS procurement lead time. These factors are representative of the effect of decreased U.S. support. Although improved, VNNSC management skills have been unable to offset the loss.

c. Average Order and Shipping Time (OST) for VNNSC stock replenishment items during the quarter was about 110 days. This figure represents improvement in CONUS processing time and VNNSC receipt processing.

d. Average supply effectiveness for the quarter, substantially improved over the previous quarter, was reflected as follows:

DEMANDS	ISSUES	NIS	NC	EFFECTIVENESS NET	EFFECTIVENESS GROSS	AR*
43,420	35,332	4,845	3,243	87.3%	81.6%	93%

* Accommodation rate = Percent of requisitions received for carried items.

6. (S) OPERATIONS:

a. Coastal Surveillance System.

(1) VNN reported boarding 133,571 craft during the quarter, which resulted in 306 craft and 1,387 persons being detained for various reasons.

(2) The readiness rate of the Coastal Radar Stations averaged 86.6%, which is a significant increase from the last two quarters. An average of 1.7 of the 16 stations were down per day. Total contacts detected during the quarter were 7,612, of which 6,870 were tracked. A total of 102 Filter King exercises were conducted to test the system, of which 74 were considered satisfactory for a detection rate of 72.5%. The readiness rate has improved substantially over the last two quarters, which is considered a reflection of the Coastal Radar Improvement Plan (CRIP) progress. While the Filter King exercises detection rate dropped markedly as compared with last quarter, this rate typically decreases with an increased volume of exercises.

(5) Visual Air Reconnaissance Search (VARS) flights were requested on 609 occasions, but only 301 were actually flown. Additionally, 36 air support missions were requested and 16 provided.

b. Material Readiness. Average material readiness rates developed by the Navy Division for blue water ships were 73.8% for the Ocean Flotilla, 73.3% for the Coastal Flotilla, and 77.2% for the Logistics Flotilla. The average material readiness rate for brown water craft during the quarter was 80.9%.

c. Tempo of Operations. Average figures for the tempo of operations and days away from home port for major fleet units for the quarter are as follows:

SHIP TYPE	TEMPO OF OPERATIONS	AVERAGE NUMBER OF DAYS AWAY FROM HOME PORT
DER	37.1%	47
WHEC	49.2%	76
PCE	37.9%	69
LST	25.5%	18

NOTE: Above figures exclude ships which were undergoing regular overhaul during a majority of the period.

d. Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS). VNN ships provided NGFS for tactical operations on 12 missions. A total of nine ships were assigned to these missions at various coastal areas as requested by field and territorial ground forces, as well as other naval commands. Expenditures included 160 rounds of 3", 40 rounds of 81mm, 1530 rounds of 40mm, 1290 rounds of 20mm, and 1285 rounds of 50 caliber ammunition.

e. Combat Operations. During the quarter VNN units were involved in 89 fire fights, 14 mining incidents, six attacks by fire and one sapper attack-in addition to the January sea battle with PRC craft in the Paracel Island Group. These actions led to a total of 207 VNN casualties (of which 34 died), with 54 additional personnel listed as missing in action (from the Paracel battle) and believed dead. Following the usual pattern, incidents within RVN were initiated by both sides and included unprovoked attacks by enemy forces as well as

enemy reaction to joint RVNAF security operations in which VNN units participated.

f. Mekong convoys. During the quarter 13 regular and two special convoys were escorted to the Cambodian border with no incidents in RVN territory.

g. Cargo moved by LST's under operational control of the Central Logistics Command was as follows:

MONTH	AMOUNT (SHORT TONS)	NUMBER OF TRIPS
JANUARY	4990	13
FEBRUARY	4350	12
MARCH	2712	7

7. (S) SHORTFALLS:

a. Basic limitations of VNN continue to include inadequate defenses against North Vietnamese aircraft and missile forces, limited amphibious warfare capability and a shortage of [illegible] other transportation assets. Air defense capabilities have, however, been improved somewhat by the [illegible] installation of 40mm and .50 cal gun mounts on [illegible] and two LSM's. These vessels [illegible] Shortfalls apparent restrict [illegible]

b. A [illegible] significant shortfall, related to the [illegible] role of VNN, is the speed limitations which [illegible] the pursuit and interdiction capability of [illegible] ships. This problem, which frequently becomes apparent even in relation to commercial vessels skirting RVN territorial waters, results from design limitations in the case of some ships and maintenance deficiencies in others. Partial relief is sought [illegible] emphasis on engineering maintenance and material readiness efforts.

c. Technical [illegible] logistical programs generally do not support the [illegible] equipment capabilities at levels to be expected at this stage of VNN development. While [illegible] gains in these areas is widely evident, cumulative training, technical experience, etc., is not systematically reflected in the overall VNN readiness posture. This shortfall is approached by AOSHD as a broad command management problem with

relative importance will gradually increased as VNN's technical capabilities develop.

d. A final major shortfall is the mundane but nevertheless urgent problem of food aboard VNN ships. RVNAF messes are maintained by individual food allowances which are universally recognized as pitifully inadequate. Traditionally, however, messes at shore bases are supplemented by a variety of means such as unit fishing, farming, and livestock raising projects. While past studies have identified general food deficiencies throughout VNN and the rest of RVNAF, these deficiencies are considered to have special urgency aboard Fleet Command ships. The operating schedules of VNN Fleet Command Ships minimize the opportunity for food supplement projects, which makes the blue water Navy uniquely vulnerable to this problem. The effects of this situation are compounded by the unstable Vietnamese economy and spiraling food prices. The result is that the VNN blue water sailor is believed to have the most inadequate and unhealthy diet within RVNAF and is least able to gain relief from these straits. The VNN swine farm project seeks to partially relieve the problem, and the topic is presently being studied by AOSND in search of a more general solution.

3. (C) CAPABILITIES:

a. The present capability of the VNN remains sufficient to meet the current operational requirements of the VNN mission.

b. The ability of VNN to make effective use of available capabilities in both equipment and trained personnel assets is often disappointing. There are general indications that progress in command management areas is not keeping up with progress toward VNN's technical self sufficiency. This is evident in such areas as utilization of trained personnel, and management of maintenance and other technical support programs. Although these are traditional problems, VNN's progress toward technical self sufficiency is increasing the need for improved management performance at all levels. Failure to meet these developing pressures and challenges typically impacts upon often fragile areas of morale, confidence and readiness posture. Command management is thus seen as a subject of increasing relative importance at all levels within VNN (not just at the "middle management" level). In addressing this

broad but critical area, AOSND is seeking primarily to support development of "closed circuit" programs which link together clearly identified requirements and functional responsibilities. An important step in that direction has proven to be the seminar-like meetings of the recently established "Warship Armament Study and Improvement Committee". While many topics are raised, these meetings are helping to define both individual requirements and supporting responsibilities needed for improved operational readiness.

CHAPTER 8

VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS (VNMC)

1. (C) PERSONNEL:

a. Authorization. The total VNMC personnel authorization as of 31 March 1974 was 15,882 Marines, with 964 officers, 2,490 non commissioned officers (NCO's), and 12,428 other enlisted. These figures represent a ten percent increase in the manning level approved by the Joint General Staff (JGS) in December 1973.

b. Strength. The VNMC reported a current on board strength of 14,993 Marines at the end of March 1974. This figure includes 988 officers, 2,334 NCO's, and 11,671 other enlisted Marines. Deducting 1,709 personnel in recruit training status leaves an on board strength of 13,284 Marines. The personnel authorization and current strength of the VNMC is indicated by grade as follows:

RANK	AUTHORIZED	ASSIGNED
Major General	1	0
Brigadier General	1	1
Colonel	9	5
Lieutenant Colonel	34	18
Major	75	33
Captain	262	137
First Lieutenant)		285
Second Lieutenant)	582	143
Warrant Officer)		366
Master Sergeant	49	50
Gunnery Sergeant	326	201

RANK (CONT)	AUTHORIZED	ASSIGNED
Staff Sergeant	787	824
Sergeant	1328	1259
Corporal	2213	1096
Lance Corporal	1755	1739
Private First Class	2898	4733
Private Second Class	4118	4103
Pipeline	1444	
TOTAL	15,882	14,993

2. (C) PERSONNEL READINESS:

a. During the continuing period of comparative lull in the general tempo of operations, the VNMC personnel readiness posture continues to be reflected by such factors as alertness, troop morale, and training. The VNMC Division remains highly alert, troop morale is high, and training is both active and excellent in quality. During present conditions, training programs are especially tangible reflection of VNMC personnel readiness. Both internal and external training programs receive emphasis at the highest command levels with very positive results. Early in the quarter, the VNMC Mobile Training Team completed its scheduled on the job training (OJT) program for all nine infantry battalions. The specialized technical training provided on a short term basis by this program has proven to be of valuable assistance to each battalion commander. A recent series of visits and inspections of the VNMC Training Center by the Chief, VNMC Logistics Support Branch, DAO, revealed distinctly impressive professionalism exhibited by VNMC officers and NCO's conducting all phases of training. The center is maintained in outstanding condition, its program is well organized, and it produces excellent results. The operation of this center is considered to represent a positive example for other RVNAF services.

b. [illegible] Marines were [illegible] with 1,31[illegible] entering training [illegible] ability programs. There are [illegible] graduates of the formal school in the U.S. While both internal training and training support [illegible] Central Training Command has been outstanding, off-shore training is plagued by the lack of English language capability within the VNMC. Those that have qualified for attendance [illegible] studies, however, have proven to be valuable assets [illegible] the VNMC. A crash English language instruction program has been initiated to help cope with the English deficiency in VNMC.

c. The VNMC continues to stress amphibious training within its various internal programs and progress in this area is a primary goal of the VNMC Commandant. While limited sealift assets have restricted support for such a program, a hopeful sign [illegible] increased VNN interest [illegible].

3. (C) [illegible]:

a. The overall maintenance program within VNMC experienced a sharp improvement during the quarter with the recent receipt of a large quantity of long overdue spare parts.

b. Progress in [illegible] equipment maintenance improved during the quarter. [illegible] maintenance efforts have also improved with the recent return of technicians from training. Additionally, improved communications maintenance capabilities are expected to result from receipt of some technical manuals which have been ordered by U.S. communications consultants.

c. During an inspection of motor transport items of equipment recently issued by MRVN to the VNMC, serious deficiencies in workmanship and maintenance were noted.

4. (C) LOGISTICS:

a. A dramatic milestone toward improved maintenance and logistic support was the recent receipt of about twenty tons of equipment and parts that had been on requisition for over a year. This achievement followed the perserverance of a U.S supply consultant in tracing the status of over [illegible] requisitions.

b. The use of Microfiche Readers and the availability of more accurate Federal Stock Number (FSN) listings have greatly improved the VNMC requisitioning and accountability system. Use of the Microfiche system has significantly reduced the errors in FSN's and nomenclature which abort requisitions.

c. The overall VNMC supply management program continues to improve. Outstanding VNMC requisitions are beginning to be filled by the ARVN logistics system and some critical support areas are improving. The internal VNMC supply system continues to be rated as excellent.

d. A particularly encouraging development was ARVN responsiveness in replacing the single battery charger which the VNMC is authorized in support of its TOW missile sections in Military Region I (MR I). The battery charger broke down and was subsquently air evacuated to Saigon, replaced from ARVN controlled maintenance float system, and its replacement returned to the VNMC in MR I in less than 36 hours.

5. (C) OPERATIONS:

a. There continued to be no significant change in the operational posture of the VNMC Division during the quarter. The Division continues to occupy its extended defensive positions in northern MR I with its nine organic infantry battalions reinforced by the 15th Ranger Group consisting of three light infantry battalions. The Division's assigned area of operations (AO) encompasses over 1600 square miles of very diverse terrain facing three North Vietnamese Army (NVA) divisions in defensive positions to the north and west. All three enemy divisions occupy their positions in depth with Main Force Viet Cong units disposed in front of the regular forces. Only minor enemy contacts, however, occurred during the quarter. VNMC casualties were 14 KIA, and 55 WIA.

b. The 12 civic action platoons continue to operate in their assigned villages and hamlets, living with the civilian population. The primary civic action effort was the urgently needed rice distribution to the destitute population within the VNMC AO.

6. (C) SHORTFALLS:

a. Amphibious assault training continues to be a shortfall. Although the topic receives priority emphasis within VNMC, a lack of sufficient sealift assets restrict VNN support.

b. While the level of maintenance and spare parts support by ARVN is improving, and has in some instances been excellent, it continues to be generally disappointing. The level of this support has been the principal limitation to VNMC operational readiness.

c. Due to a lack of personnel with sufficiently high English language capability, several valuable off-shore training courses have had to be cancelled. A related training problem has been the lack of sufficient technical training manuals that have been translated into Vietnamese. Both of these problems are receiving priority attention.

7. (C) CONCLUSIONS:

a. Despite some significant maintenance and logistical support shortfalls, the VNMC Division remains one of the most effective and combat ready fighting units of RVNAF. Morale is high and operational readiness is excellent. The pride, professionalism, and cohesion of the VNMC, as well as its very noteworthy internal training programs, are an excellent example for the rest of RVNAF.

b. The effort to gain satisfactory spare parts and maintenance support from the ARVN logistics system must receive continuing emphasis.

CHAPTER 9

TERRITORIAL FORCES

1. (C) REGIONAL FORCE/POPULAR FORCE (RF/PF):

a. This chapter presents an updated view of the Republic of Vietnam Territorial Forces (TF) and significant changes and/or modifications in their organization, mission, and employment that reflects progress or regress since the previous quarterly assessment. This assessment is based upon a compilation of staff and field activity reports from the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), the Defense Attache Office (DAO) and a reduced US Embassy field operations staff, to determine whether or not the RF/PF have, or are, effectively adjusting to the current ceasefire situation, militarily, politically and psychologically. Cognizance is taken of continuing heavy enemy pressure and ceasefire violations that have occurred during this quarter.

b. General Background (RF/PF). A significant change was recently initiated by the Government of Vietnam (GVN). It includes an additional subdivision in the military territorial organization chain of command. This decision initiated a plan by which approximately 7,800 RF officers and NCOs will be assigned to nearly 2,600 sub-subsectors throughout the country, in an effort to extend, consolidate, and reinforce security down to the village/hamlet level.

(FIGURE 9-1)


2. (C) REGIONAL FORCES (RF):

a. No significant change since the previous assessment.

b. Present RF strength is over 301,000 men; a decrease of 6,000 from that reported in the previous assessment. This represents a reduction of approximately 11,000 men from a CY 73 peak strength of 312,000 in August. Cause for this decrease stated

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SCALED DOWN VERSION OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
OF REGIONAL FORCE/POPULAR FORCE (RF/PF)



-/-/-/- Command and Control
——— Supervision and Coordination, Resource Management Coordination, Plans and Directives, TO&E, and Program Objectives for MR/Sector Implementation.

NOTE: (a) Chief, JGS, is additionally Commander of all ARVN Forces.
(b) Infantry Branch includes Regional Force/Popular Force.
(c) RF/PF are OPCON to Sector Commander. RF Asgd Primarily to Sector/Sub-Sector Operations, PF Asgd to Village/Hamlets and are OPCON to Village Chiefs.
(d) Sub Sub-Sector was added in a recent change in GVN policy. (Mond and RVNAF Reorganized by Presidential Decree No. 0614-a/TT/SL, 1 July 1970)

Figure 9-1

in the previous assessment remains unchanged, with the exception that there has been a significant increase in desertions during this quarter. Refer to Chapter 12 for additional information. There is little reason to believe that the RF will reach authorized strength of 324,799, but rather it is expected there will continue to be a steady decline in their ranks, particularly as increasing combat personnel losses, increasing desertions, normal attrition, and a gradual thinning out process takes its toll.

(Figure 9-2)

c. In the previous assessment the dissolution of the RF/PF Central Improvement Committee was discussed. Although the Central Improvement Committee, and similar committees down to and including sector, subsector and special zones, have been dissolved, the JGS still maintains its membership on the GVN Central Reconstruction and Development Council (CRDC), presided over by the Prime Minister. The Chief/JGS is represented on this Council by the Assistant Chief of JGS for Community Security, Development and Pacification. This Council is responsible to the President of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) for establishing programs and policies of the Four-Year Community Defense and Local Development (CD&LD) Plan, which is updated each year. The J-3/JGS is charged with the responsibility of formulating policies and directives to be implemented by Corps/MR Commanders and Sector Commanders on employment/deployment of the RF/PF in support of territorial security of the rural populace, and support of territorial security programs outlined in the GVN CD&LD Plan. Progress in providing this territorial security varies from Corps to Corps and ranges from poor to good, which is basically unchanged from the previous quarter. There appears to be nothing in motion at this time that will significantly improve this situation.

d. Organization.

(1) There have been structural changes and consolidation of existing RF unit strengths during the quarter, due primarily to increasing combat



REGIONAL FORCES
ASSIGNED STRENGTH
PRESENT AUTH STRENGTH : 324,799
in Thousands
310
305
300
295
290
303.752
307.443
306.412
303.194
301.015
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
CY 1974

Figure 9-2

losses, continuing high rates of desertion and continuing redeployment of RF battalions and supporting units outside their assigned sectors to reinforce ARVN. Principal changes consist of: reduction in TO&E strength of the RF rifle company and separate company from 119 to 118, reduction in TO&E strength of the RF battalion from 561 to 556 men, and a reduction in number of battalions under the command and control of the Sector Tactical Command Post (STCP) from five battalions to four.

(2) The most significant change in RF operational policy during this quarter has been the creation of Sub-Subsector Headquarters by the GVN. As directed, the JGS proposed a plan to the Ministry of National Defense (MOND) by which the RF authorized strengths from top to bottom will be traded off (or reduced) to provide the necessary manpower to fill the space requirements for this newly created administrative subdivision.

(3) The accepted Sub-Subsector Plan calls for an RF force of approximately 7,800 men; 5,200 officers and 2,600 NCO's, that, in six separate phases, will be eventually assigned to nearly 2,600 sub-subsectors throughout the country to execute the activation plan as prescribed by JGS and MOND. The sub-subsectors (village/hamlet complexes) are to be selected on the basis of the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) ratings, starting with the lesser security rated villages, i.e., D and E, then gradually increasing to the more secured C, B and A rated villages/hamlets.

(4) Figure 9-3 depicts the proposed JGS activation schedule of the sub-subsector plan, outlining the number of Sub-Subsectors in each Military Region (MR) that are scheduled to be activated during each of the six phases. Figures 9-4 and 9-5 outline the organization of the Sub-Subsector headquarters and Sub-Subsector signal communication system.

e. Mission. (Restatement from previous assessment). "The RF support the GVN national goals and nation building programs at the rural level by providing and maintaining adequate territorial security, and conducting mobile offensive, reconnaissance and intelligence operations against enemy main force and Viet Cong (VC) local force units. JGS has directed MR Commanders to continue to place command

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Figure 9-3

SCHEDULE OF EXECUTION OF THE PLAN FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF SUB SUB-SECTORS AT THE VILLAGE LEVEL

(STATUS OF VILLAGES BASED ON THE HAMLET EVALUATION SURVEY DURING NOV 1973)

	Phase 1 Mar 74	Phase 2 Apr 74	Phase 3 May 74	Phase 4 Jun 74	Phase 5 Jul 74	Phase 6 Aug 74	Total Sub Sub-Sectors
MR 1	122 Village E	100 Village E	125 Villages C & D	116 Village B	110 Village A		573
MR 2	100 Village E	117 Villages D & E	126 Villages B & C	125 Village B	134 Village A	100 Village A	702
MR 3	124 Villages C,D,E	100 Village B	94 Villages A & B	100 Village A	100 Village A		518
MR 4	161 Villages C,D,E	150 Village B	145 Village B	110 Village A	110 Village A	124 Village A	800
Total, Sub Sub-Sector	507	467	490	451	454	224	2.593

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ORGANIZATIONAL CHART SUB SUB-SECTOR HEADQUARTERS





Figure 9-4

Note: The RF Command Element of the Sub Sub-Sector consists of 2 Officers and 1 NCO. The Strength/Supply NCO is furnished by the village PF.

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SIGNAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEM/SUB SUB-SECTOR HEADQUARTERS



REMARKS: TOE indicates that 1 PF Platoon has 2 AN/PRC-25 and 1 Antenna RC.292

Figure 9-5

[illegible] in intelligence collecting, effective and improved surveillance and analysis of enemy movements, to be used as a basis for attacking the enemy when he is moving into GVN controlled areas, and to [illegible] nighttime patrols and ambushes. COMMENT: The degree to which this mission is being effectively and efficiently implemented by Corps/MR Commanders, tactical and sector commanders, and RF leadership cadres, varies generally from MR to MR and from sector to sector and depends to a great deal on the local situation that confronts the RF. The same major problems that have been outlined in previous assessments continue to plague the RF system, and remain basically unchanged as well as uncorrected. Unless there is significant improvement in overall leadership, at all levels of command, and unless necessary steps are taken to rectify shortcomings and inadequacies in overall logistical and operational support, these problems will continue to adversely affect and degrade overall RF operational capabilities.

f. Ceasefire Situation. Information that was outlined in previous quarterly assessments remains basically unchanged, and if anything, territorial security of the rural countryside has worsened. Enemy forces continued to intensify their efforts at applying moderate to heavy pressure against territorial force units, outposts, LOC's, static defense lines, and subsector headquarters, as reflected in MR field reports. Infiltration and harassing attacks against lightly defended rural populated areas resulted in increased civilian casualties during the quarter. The enemy continued to increase his efforts to subvert GVN control at the village/hamlet level, particularly in areas where RF units have been deployed outside their normal Areas of Operations (AOs) to reinforce ARVN forces.

(1) ARVN tactical commanders continued to request MR Commanders to reinforce their combat units with Regional Forces. The first quarter CY74 reflected an increase of approximately 25% in deployments of RF units outside their assigned sectors, according to JGS field reports. During this quarter, 40 battalions and 14 rifle companies were deployed outside their home sectors to reinforce ARVN, or

other sector RF units. The largest number of these RF units continued on redeployment status in Quang Due and Binh Dinh Provinces (MR 2), and Dinh Tuong and Chuong Thien Provinces (MR 4). MR 3 an area that was relatively quiet in the 4th quarter CY 73, became a hotbed of enemy offensive activity during this quarter, as one battalion and 14 separate RF companies were redeployed along major infiltration routes, lines of communications (LOCs) and defensive perimeters leading to and around the Saigon Capitol area. Undoubtedly, as Corps/MR Commanders continue to realign, consolidate and deploy ARVN combat forces in their tactical areas, increasing nŭbers of RF units and supporting forces will be expected to fill the void created with the departure of ARVN Regular Forces.

(2) During the first quarter CY 1974, the enemy initiated a total of 5,494 incidents against territorial forces, and inflicted a total of 7,271 casualties. This reflects an increase of 720 and 1,541 respectively, since the previous assessment. Of this total, 3,965 incidents and 4,643 casualties occurred in MR 4. Field commanders have been generally critical of RF/PF combat operational performance. However, during the past six months combat personnel losses have been significantly increasing. If there is validity in field reporting, the kill ratio between RF/PF units and enemy forces has been running more than 3 to 1 in favor of the RF/PF.

g. Concept of Employment.

(1) Overall performance would improve with more frequent stand downs from operations for rest and recuperation, a more rigid policy for rotation of units deployed outside their home sectors, and more frequent visits of appropriate JGS and MR staff officers to insure that TF policies are being implemented. Enforcement of territorial security policies and prudent employment of the TF continues to be a metter of command emphasis.

(2) A review of redeployments of RF for the first quarter CY 74 reflects that while some units have been returned to their home sectors from prolonged deployments, many others have remained on continuous operations outside their assigned sectors

for as long as six months. This is in contravention to established JGS policy that permits MR Commanders to redeploy RF units outside their assigned sectors only for periods from ten days to a maximum of three months.

(3) RF field operations employ 45 Sector Tactical Command Posts (STCPs), 360 battalions which include 1,440 RF rifle companies, and 372 separate companies, throughout the 44 provinces of the four MRs. Additionally, RF are manning and maintaining a total of 1,252 various size outposts (down slightly from December 1973), ranging in size from major operating bases of battalion level down to and including squad size. The problems of command and control of such a large and well dispersed force inhibits solution of complex logistical, maintenance and operational problems.

3. (C) POPULAR FORCE (PF).

a. No significant change in organizational statement. Current strength is reported at over 196,000; a decrease of approximately 2,000 from that reported in the previous assessment. Monthly strength of the PF has varied only slightly since September 1973, although their combat losses have increased significantly, attesting to the fact that the PF experience little trouble in replacing losses. Authorized strength remains at 206,000 consisting of 6,699 29-man platoons. Actual number of platoons was reported at 6,587 of which 6,356 were deployed, the remainder held in zero balance reserve, allowing spaces for pipeline replacements.

(Figure 9-6)


b. There has been no significant change that would alter PF performance in manning and maintaining a large number of interlocking outposts throughout the country. More than one-third of their operational strength is still used for this purpose. This has caused a degradation of their primary mission to provide territorial security, defend the villages/hamlets prevent internal VC infiltration and protect resources, lines of communication and vital installations.

c. Overall PF performance generally remains from poor to good, with occasional isolated cases of excellent performance against the enemy, as enemy

Figure 9-6

9-15

POPULAR FORCES
ASSIGNED STRENGTH



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attacks against PF positions significantly increased during the quarter over that reported during the 4th quarter 1973. Although overall performance remains basically unchanged from the previous assessment, total PF battlefield performance (if MR reports are accurate) reflects that PF continue to inflict nearly twice the number of enemy casualties that they sustain. JGS sources stated that more frequent command inspections of PF positions have been conducted during this quarter than during the previous quarter. JGS/J-3 continues to monitor the PF program for the Chief/JGS and has conducted an increasing number of field visits to insure compliance with JGS directives. JGS/J-3 stated that, depending upon the security situation, a fixed number of PF platoons will be visited each month in compliance with visits to RF units. The JGS/IG also indicated the RF/PF Inspection Division is now in the process of completing its annual inspections, results of which will be available for next quarterly assessment.

4. (C) EQUIPMENT STATUS AND MAINTENANCE.

Central Logistics Command (CLC) sources stated that the RF/PF Quarterly Logistical Status Report will not be available for publication until after this assessment, as it is still being reviewed by a JGS review panel prior to submission to the Chief of Staff/JGS. CLC reports, however, that inadequacies that were once a prevalent problem in the PF system have been significantly improved.

5. (C) LOGISTICS.

Same as 4 above. The DAO will continue to pursue improvement of the logistics situation of the RF/PF.

6. (C) TRAINING.

Status of RF/PF training is covered in Chapter 11.

7. (C) DESERTIONS.

Status of RF/PF desertions and absenteeism is covered in Chapter 12.

9. (C) RF/PF RECRUITMENT.

No significant change from previous assessment.

9. (C) MORALE.

This subject is covered in Chapter 12.

10. (C) SHORTFALLS.

a. There has been no significant change in previous reported shortfalls during this quarter. The following, however, capsulizes some of the more prevalent shortfalls previously reported that continually plague the RF/PF:

(1) Inadequate and inequitable logistical support of RF/PF continues to be a pressing problem, although JGS/CLC states that this support is gradually improving. Logistical support of RF/PF units that man and maintain approximately 5,500 widely scattered outposts remains a serious problem due to extremely limited surface transportation and dedicated air assets required to furnish essential and adequate tactical support. A significant number of these outposts are situated in areas that can only be supported by helicopters.

(2) The RF/PF continue to be plagued by many of the same problems reported in previous assessments: a high rate of desertions and absenteeism, poor morale, inadequate subsistence allowance (when compared to an ever increasing cost of living), a lack of adequate and effective leadership, inadequate unit refresher training and leadership training, and often inconsistent equipment and maintenance support. In varying degrees, these problems continue to contribute to mediocre RF/PF performance and low state of combat readiness. In view of this, the Chief/JGS continues to place command emphasis on MR Commanders and Sector Commanders to upgrade and improve the TF program.

(3) Inconsistent and ineffective command and control of the RF/PF at all levels still remains a problem, as MR Commanders, in increasing frequency, redeploy RF units outside their home sectors for prolonged and unspecified periods of time. The JGS

[illegible] that [illegible] time limitations that RF units may be redeployed outside their home sectors is being contravened by MR Commanders, as is evidenced by [illegible] of the JGS monthly deployment reports.

[illegible] COMBAT PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE FORCE (PSDF).

a. Interministerial Directives #02383/QP/NC/4-247/[illegible]TV, dated 14 Mar 74 has placed the Combat Peoples Self Defense Forces (PSDF) under JGS for tactical support, logistics and training. Acting quickly under this authority the new Chief of Staff/JGS issued a memorandum (#1025/TTM/P331/K, dated 23 March 1974) directing measures to reduce PSDF weapons losses and more effectively employ these forces in the defense of villages/hamlets and wards. This memorandum focuses attention on and provides guidance for correcting the following:

(1) Failure to properly screen and monitor the PSDF ranks for infiltration of insurgent or VC elements that have largely been responsible for undermining and subverting local authority, contributing to losses of PSDF weapons and equipment, and proselyting PSDF members.

(2) Failure of military and civilian authorities to insure proper distribution, maintenance, and accurate accountability of weapons, and for not establishing adequate measures or controls to prevent these weapons from falling into enemy hands.

(3) Lack of organization and careful selection of PSDF leadership, hindering effective supervision, direction and management of the PSDF mission to help provide effective village/hamlet security.

(4) Military Regions (MRs), Sectors, Special Subsectors, Subsectors, and Sub-Subsectors are directed to implement the memorandum as follows:

(a) Restructure and realign the present PSDF organization into smaller cells and combined teams within the village/hamlet complex, to allow faster reaction to emergency situations. Selection of prior combat experienced military personnel or qualified PSDF cadre to be assigned to positions of Cell, Team or Combined Team Leaders.

[illegible] with National [illegible] to screen [illegible] enemy agents, and [illegible] to prevent infiltration into the [illegible] of enemy [illegible] city-rich [illegible] inhabited [illegible].

[illegible] Establish, through the chain of command, improved methods of tactics and training, particularly in the areas of guerilla warfare and strategic intelligence, to achieve maximum reduction in losses of personnel and weapons. Such tactics and training should be tailored to the local area and situation, and include cell and [illegible] dispersement, concealment, ambushes, sniping and harassing fire, and use of booby traps against local or VC units attempting to infiltrate populated areas.

c. The [illegible] of the memorandum aims at [illegible] the long standing problem of loss of RSDF weapons to the enemy through a variety of malpractices and the [illegible] lack of concern by those responsible down through the many chain of PSDF command. It seems obvious that the new Sub-Subsector Headquarters outlined in paragraph 9a above, will become directly involved in ensuring that the memorandum is executed, particularly in regard to proper maintenance and safeguarding of PSDF weapons at the using level. When the PSDF have been employed in the past, they have effectively [illegible] to village/hamlet security. When they have been misused, poorly supervised or left to their own initiative, they have too often become an easy source of weapons to the enemy and have contributed to a false sense of local security which has in reality left local freedom of movement and initiative to the enemy in pressuring the rice roots level populace. The new JGS memorandum is a long overdue and welcome step towards PSDF problem correction.

12. (C) SUMMARY.

a. The substantive inputs to previous quarterly assessments of territorial forces remain basically unchanged. There continues to be slow but noticeable progress in logistical and maintenance support of the

[illegible] the ALOs and MR are valid. [illegible], progress has remained slow, but JGS [illegible] to address these problems, and MR Commanders continue to be prodded by JGS to improve [illegible] RF/PF performance and support.

[illegible] RF/PF continue to be a significant fighting force for South Vietnam when employed and supported [illegible]. Their principal and legitimate role of defending the rural populace against enemy encroachment is essential to ensuring that the GVN can successfully carry out national policies of rehabilitation and reconstruction, and village self-development, self-defense and self-government. Long term redeployment of RF/PF outside their assigned base areas for the purpose of defending ARVN perimeters, LOC's installations, outposts, etc., continue to cause [illegible] deterioration in RF/PF mission objectives.

[illegible] Joint Chief, JGS, continues to direct [illegible] emphasis on upgrading and improving the territorial forces. MR Commanders and Sector Commanders are being urged to recognize and resolve problems that have long plagued RF/PF operational performance.

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ANNEX J

ASSESSMENT OF RVNAF COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS RELIABILITY

1. (U) COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS (C-E) SELF-SUFFICIENCY: The concept of "Increased reliance on RVNAF technicians to maintain their C-E assets" has resulted in RVNAF gradually gaining experience necessary for self-sufficiency. During the past quarter, as an example, 22 ARVN emergency technical assistance teams were dispatched without being accompanied by US contractor personnel. Plans are to rely more heavily on RVNAF technical assistance personnel and to drawdown US contractor support commensurate with RVNAF demonstrated proficiency. In this connection, present plans are to drawdown Area Maintenance Supply Facility-Vietnam (AMSF-V) contractor support from 48 to 2[illegible] technicians by 1 September 74.

2. (U) COMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT AGENCY (CMA):

a. Currently, RVNAF CMA is provided technical support by 27 US contractor personnel. This contract will expire on 16 January 75. At that time, it is projected that RVNAF-CMA will be self-sufficient in all areas except engineering. Plans are to furnish only five US contractor personnel beyond contract expiration date to provide additional on-the-job training (OJT) engineering support to upgrade RVNAF engineering capability.

b. The RVNAF CMA operational evaluation reports during this period reflected many of the same deficiencies previously reported, namely: inadequate preventive maintenance, defective components that have been removed from equipment but not evacuated to the AMSF-V for repair, and inadequate "Prescribed Load List" (PLL) being maintained at some Integrated Communications System (ICS) sites. Significant discrepancies noted during this quarter were that no re-route plans exist at the underseas cableheads for the underseas cable systems and test equipment has been evacuated for repair without follow up action to determine status.

3. (U) SINGLE INTEGRATED MILITARY (TELECOMMUNICATIONS) SYSTEM (SIMS):

a. Reliability.

The RVNAF is responsible for management, operation and maintenance of the SIMS with US provided technical

assistance. The reliabilities attained during this reporting period were as follows:

JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH
99.97%	99.95%	99.95%

SIMS reliability remained high and relatively stable. The upward trend from the September 1973, all-time low of 99.48 percent is attributed in part to the ARVN Signal Department's newly organized Quality Assurance (QA) program and the increased self-sufficiency.

(Figure 10-1)

b. Undersea cable systems.

(1) The RVNAF operate five Cablehead (CHD) terminals. The German multiplex equipment at the cable heads has functioned well. Assessing RVNAF maintenance capabilities at these terminals is difficult due to the high reliability of the equipment.

(2) During past cable outages, RVNAF personnel have experienced difficulties in locating undersea cable faults. Additional training is being provided to cablehead personnel in isolation and fault location.

(3) Difficulties previously experienced by the cable repair ship CS Neptune in gaining entry to Vietnamese coastal waters has been resolved between the American Embassy and the GVN.

(4) A cable break occurred in the 439L "G" Link, Vung Tau - Vayama cable system on 18 February 1974. One group (77006), consisting of five channel groups, was altrouted through the ICS (NHA/PKU/WRN). The time required for the ARVN personnel to accomplish the altroute of communications as a result of this break was 15 hours compared to 72 hours for a previous break which occurred 23 November 1973.


(Figure 10-2)

c. Tandem Switching Centers (TSC).

(1) The condition of the four RVNAF TSCs ranged from poor (Tan Son Nhut) to fair (Can Tho) in FY74. RVNAF personnel have sufficient expertise to adequately

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Figure 1-1



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

UNDERSEAS CABLE SYSTEMS
439 L AND 484 N
LAOS
THAILAND
V I E T N A M
GRN HILL
WARIN
SATTAHIP
PLEIKU
QUINHON
PHNOM PENH
BOKOR
KOMPONG SOM
NHA TRANG
CAM RANH BAY
SAIGON
VUNG TAU
DANANG
8 OCT 73
BEACH CUT
439L-C
439L-E
439L-B
25 SEP 73
TO PHIL.
484 N
16 NOV 73
BEACH CUT
439L-A
439L-D
439L-G
5 NOV 73
22 JUN 73
23 NOV 73
15 APR 73
CABLE BREAKS SINCE MAR 1973
RVNAF OWNED AND OPERATED CABLES
US OWNED AND OPERATED CABLES

Figure 10-2

operate and maintain these sites; however, site conditions did not reflect their capabilities. Visits to TSCs revealed the following:

(a) Inadequate Supply Support. The three VNAF operated tandems (Tan Son Nhut, Da Nang and Nha Trang), in particular, were adversely affected by poor supply support. This was because VNAF operated TSCs had to submit requisitions through VNAF supply channels instead of requisitioning directly from the AMSF-V. This long supply chain proved detrimental to VNAF Operation and Maintenance (O&M) efforts. The problem was compounded by a shortage of TSC peculiar items such as relays and printed circuit boards at the AMSF-V. The RVNAF are aware of the situation and a joint CMA, ARVN and VNAF investigation team is studying this problem. Despite these efforts, it is expected that supply will remain a problem for a least the remainder of this FY.

(b) The RVNAF were reluctant to report Hazardous Conditions (HAZCONs) and request higher echelon maintenance. Again, this was especially true of VNAF tandems. VNAF tandems were reluctant to request help since all higher echelon maintenance assistance had to come from the ARVN. For example, the TSN TSC was allowed to deteriorate to a poor condition before pressure from DAO and RVNAF JGS/J6 forced them to declare a HAZCON. Telephone call completion rates subsequently improved due to technical assistance provided by AMSF-V and the ARVN Signal Dept. Critical repairs and adjustments were accomplished by the RVNAF without the assistance of US contractor technicians. This is indicative of the increase in RVNAF maintenance assistance capabilities. Correction of some deficiencies was delayed due to non-availability of repair parts.

c. Poor maintenance practices. Regular preventive maintenance and routine equipment repair were not being properly performed. The RVNAF are capable of operating and maintaining tandems at acceptable levels; however, stronger supervision is required to improve the overall maintenance posture.

d. Dial Telephone Exchanges (DTE).

(1) The RVNAF operate 26 DTEs as part of SIMS. DTE capacities were engineered to satisfy previous Free World Military Forces (FWMF) communications requirements. Consequently, most of the DTEs have an excess capacity and

equipment that is [illegible] effectively used. The RVNAF are aware of [illegible] associated with the DTEs and are: 1) conducting engineering studies to determine the best way to reduce DTE sizes 2) investigating the supply problem and 3) placing increased emphasis on following proper maintenance procedures.

(2) Inside Plant (I/P).

(a) Most RVNAF telephone personnel have passed site qualification tests. However, condition of some DTEs left doubt as to whether this knowledge was being applied. Frequent observation revealed that some DTE personnel were unfamiliar with many maintenance routines required for daily operations.

(b) Difficulties were encountered in obtaining required supplies. Jumper wire, essential to operations, was a critical item. DTE personnel were re-using discarded jumper wire by splicing short segments together to obtain the required length. This is an example of the RVNAF willingness to [illegible] the mission.

(3) Outside Plant (O/P).

(a) Many telephone outside plants have deteriorated to the point [illegible] are unreliable. This is [illegible] the rainy season. To correct the situation, the RVNAF have established an Inspect, Repair as Necessary (IRAN) program for improving [illegible] systems.

(b) Only the Pleiku II pre-IRAN survey was accomplished during the reporting period. Other pre-IRANs and IRANs were rescheduled due to many circumstances. Among these were:

(Figure 10-3)

1 Transportation - Difficulties were encountered in obtaining transportation for repair and inspection teams. Pre-IRAN [illegible] was not as fast as it should have been due to vehicle and gasoline shortages. Further, material shipments from Tan Son Nhut to Pleiku and Da Nang were delayed due to the lack of air transportation.

2 Supply - Materials furnished by USAF for Tan Son Nhut, Da Nang and Pleiku IRANs were insufficient to correct deficiencies due to further deterioration of cable plants since the original pre-IRAN surveys. Addi-



CABLE IRANS
EST PRE-IRAN START COMPLETION
ACTUAL PRE-IRAN START COMPLETION
EST IRAN START/ COMPLETION
ACTUAL IRAN START/COMPLETION
SLIPPAGE
TAN SON NHUT AB (VNAF)
DANANG AB (VNAF)
PLEIKU AB (VNAF)
BIEN HOA AB (VNAF)
BINH THUY AB (VNAF)
SAIGON TRUNK CABLE (ARVN)
1
30
15
15
2
10
15
1
29
15
15
15
10
25
25
25
15
15
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
1974

Figure 10-3

tional materials required were not available in country and IRAN start dates were delayed. The Saigon trunk cable IRAN was also delayed for lack of materials. This problem was elevated to the RVNAF JGS/J6 level and responsible staff elements instituted a search for the materials. Representatives of DAO, RVNAF JGS/J6 and ARVN Signal Department located outside/inside plant materials in a storage area at the AMSF-V. The material had been in open storage and some of the items had been damaged by exposure to the elements. It was noted that the materials were not carried on RVNAF inventory records, therefore, requisitions were not filled.

e. QA Program.

(1) ARVN Signal Department has two QA teams made up of five members each and each QA team is composed of three sections. They are the Integrated Communications System (ICS) section (microwave radio, multiplexers, and tech control), tactical section (tactical communications equipment), and the DTE/TSC section. As of 31 Mar 1974, the TSC portion of the DTE/TSC section was not yet functional.

(2) The extensive contractor technical assistance and training effort in support of the QA program are to be phased out during the 1st quarter FY75.

f. Air conditioning and power generating equipment.

(1) Surveillance visits to SIMS sites to evaluate the status of air conditioning and power generating equipment revealed the following:

(a) Deficiencies, previously reported, still exist in the areas of power generation and air conditioning. Problems resulting from the energy crisis have had an adverse affect on the progress of RVNAF self-sufficiency, e.g., non-availability of lubricants and solvents, low fuel reserve and lack of water due to the utilities conservation procedures.

(b) Many power plant operators, although they have completed formal training and an adequate period of OJT, have not increased in their efficiency. In some instances emergency procedures have been ignored.

(c) Logs, charts and records continue to be maintained sporadically and improperly.

(2) Many site OICs and NCOICs are not effective leaders. They do not demand good maintenance habits, nor honest and accurate entries in the various operation and maintenance logs. They tend to regard the power plant and air conditioners as incidental to the communications functions and still do not know how to "tie it all together."

4. (C) SELECTED C-E EVALUATIONS:

a. Tactical communications complexes.

In MR 4, communications failures at isolated RF and PF outposts during enemy attacks have been observed. Generally, these failures have been attributed to inadequate physical protection for communications facilities. Emphasis will be placed on adequate bunker and sandbag installations similar to those used previously by US special forces personnel at remote camps.

b. Sensors.

During this reporting period, surveys were initiated to determine sensor requirements for perimeter defense of vital installations with emphasis placed on POL and ammunition dumps. Surveys should be completed during the next quarter, and the new requirements estabished.

c. VNAF Ground and Air/Ground Radio Equipment.

Equipment appears to be adequate to RVN needs. Technicians, in general, have the ability, training, and technical knowledge to operate and maintain the equipment. However, poor logistic support precludes the VNAF, in many instances, from performing required maintenance/repair in a timely manner. Inoperative equipment, down for repair, adversely affects both operations and maintenance. Consequently, it is difficult to evaluate in depth RVN capability to operate and maintain the equipment. The VNAF has a very good nucleus of trained qualified personnel; however, due to the number of VNAF C-E facilities that must be manned the required number of skilled personnel cannot be provided at all locations.

d. Weather Facilities.

Basically, the VNAF are proficient in the operation and maintenance of the various weather equipment and systems. Training on the MKR-9 Muirhead recorders was completed 31 March 1974. RJ-4 weather fax equipment is being satisfactorily operated and maintained. Telautograph equipment has been a constant operation and maintenance problem. However, problems are identical to

those experienced by USAF prior to withdrawal. Deteriorated cable plants which preclude obtaining the necessary quality circuitry and lack of repair parts are the major problems. Nearly all units are now out-of-service, either due to defects or no requirement by the VNAF. Units are in storage at local communications squadrons.

5. (U) LOGISTICS.

a. Maintenance.

(1) AMSF-V

(a) The production of repaired components at AMSF remained relatively constant over the quarter. A significant increase in the deadline rate is anticipated during the next quarter due to the fund constraints which has shut off parts procurement since 31 December 1973. The status of unserviceable components at AMSF is depicted on the chart.

(Figure 10-4)

(b) The current backlog of 609 items at AMSF represents 1.3 months workload based on the monthly completion average of 482 items for the past 12 months. The monthly maintenance shop backlog at the AMSF includes those items deadlined for parts.

(Figure 10-5)

(c) AMSF "call-out" teams consisting solely of ARVN technicians performed maintenance at several SIMS sites. All sites visited were removed from HAZCON status by ARVN personnel. The increased proficiency and confidence developed by this action has had a heartening effect on AMSF operations.

(2) 60th Signal Base Depot.

(a) Contractor personnel are providing formal and practical training to the ARVN personnel. This training is designed to raise the ARVN self-sufficiency in performing higher echelons of C-E equipment repair and maintenance. A recently organized Quality Assurance and Quality Control activity will also provide an additional capability within the depot for ensuring a higher level of performance and a higher quality of maintenance.




Figure 10-4

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


Figure 10-5

The estimated level of the ARVN self-sufficiency in depot maintenance at the 60th SBD by major equipment areas is as follows:

EQUIPMENT	SELF-SUFFICIENCY LEVEL
Ground Surveillance Radar	65%
Radio	65%
Telephone	75%
Teletype	70%
Test, Measuring and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE)	70%
Photographic	65%
Modules	70%
Sensors	65%

The 60th SBD presently has limited space, tools and test equipments for total support of a depot repair and rebuild program. Additional space will be available upon completion of the transfer of major equipment items and supplies to the AAD at Long Binh. The required tools and test equipments will be authorized under a revised TOE.

(b) Presently, personnel skills are inadequate to satisfactorily manage and execute depot maintenance functions. To correct this deficiency, contractor personnel have trained 42 students. An additional 138 students are in formal training on 5th echelon rebuild of C-E equipments. Contractor training assistance is being programmed through FY-75. Prior to the end of FY-75 the SBD will phase in ARVN instructors to ensure continuity of training programs and a continued availability of trained personnel after contractor phaseout. Contractor personnel also provided OJT and technical assistance in bench repair of C-E equipment.

(c) Operations at the 60th SBD are considered satisfactory as of the end of this quarter. The program is expected to be impacted adversely during the 4th quarter due to lack of repair parts.

(d) The Depot Maintenance Rebuild Program is currently 10 percent behind FY-74 programmed goals. Shortages of repairable assets and repair parts have caused the shortfall in this program.

(Figures 10-6, 10-7)

(e) The sensor facility at the 60th SBD is capable of performing 3d and limited 4th echelon maintenance on sensors and ancillary equipment. 5th echelon capability does not exist at the present time. Army Materiel Command has been requested to conduct a study on the feasibility of performing depot maintenance in RVN.

(3) Radars.

The quantity of deadlined radars varied during this quarter. Problems noted in the previous quarterly assessement still exist. The RVNAF are aware of these problems, and are attempting to correct them. A four month class is scheduled to commence on 29 April 1974 at the Vung Tau Signal School.

(4) Starlight scopes.

Modification instructions for the AN/PVS-2 have been distributed to the using units. Medium Maintenance Centers (MMC) have been instructed to turn in all unmodified starlight scopes to the DS support shops for modification. Approximately 90 percent of the units have been modified to date.

(5) Repair and Return (R&R) program.

(a) NMMA Maintenance Division revised their FY75 Repair and Return (R&R) program for radars, radar subassemblies and radar modules. The repair and return program for radar subassemblies and modules for the AN/PPS-4&5, which is presently being done off-shore (CONUS), is being revised. As a result, the function of R&R will be done in-country by the 60th SBD. CONUS R&R for AN/MPQ-4A Counter Mortar Radar Sets will be continued.

(b) The response on the return of sensor items has decreased considerably since the cease fire agreement but is not seriously affecting the sensor maintenance program. There are also approximately 60 devices deadlined due to non-return of R&R items. Requisitions for

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60th SIGNAL BASE DEPOT
MAJOR COMPONENTS REBUILD PROGRAM
MAR 1974

TYPE EQP.	QTY SCHED	QTY COMP.	% COMPLETE
RADIO	3,245	2,147	66
VHF, CARRIER, MW	1,085	721	66
WIRE	237	216	91
AUDIO-VIS	81	24	30
PHOTO	17	1	6
TMDE	397	244	61
TELETYPE	169	70	41
RADAR	37	14	38
TOTAL PROGRAM	5,268	3,437	65




Figure 10-6

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60th SIGNAL BASE DEPOT
MODULE REBUILD PROGRAM
MAR 1974

MODULES	QTY SCH	QTY COMP	% COMPLETE
AN/PRC-74	200	80	40
AN/GRC-106	395	125	32
AN/PRC-25	14,320	5,396	38
AN/VRC-12	6,740	2,447	36
TOTAL MODULES	21,655	8,048	37

Figure 10-7

UNCLASSIFIED

the repair parts have been submitted through the National Material Management Agency (NMMA). NMMA also is following up on the return of R&R items.

b. Depot Expansion and Improvement.

(1) The review of the updated depot upgrade plan has been completed by the 60th SBD. All facility layouts have been reviewed, changes and corrections have been made, and layouts have been redrawn. A revised list of TOE equipments for this plan is being compiled and the final plan should be completed and forwarded to ARVN Signal Department by 30 April 1974.

(2) The movement of equipment and supplies from the 60th SBD Storage Division to the Associated Army Depot at Long Binh began on 12 March 1974. To date, 189 line items with a combined weight of 107 tons have been moved. Major items such as the Military Telecommunications Network (MTN) equipments, photographic supplies and repair parts made up recent shipments. This move is scheduled to be completed in 90 days.

c. Supply.

(1) The NMMA system is improving. An inventory of selected Intensive Items Management System (IIMS) assets was conducted during January 1974. The inventory consisted of approximately 700 items of electrical hardware, telephone, telegraph equipment, wire, cable and test equipment. The results showed an improved correlation between stockage and computer inventory over FY 74.

(2) To correct their DSU weaknesses the ARVN is stressing training of logistics specialists. Logistics support teams are being organized to provide guidance and evaluate performance in the areas of due-in data and editing.

(3) The AMSF provided supply support to SIMS and the Army Calibration Center (ACC). There are indications that the supply effectiveness as depicted is inaccurate. Changes in management and revisions in reporting procedures should increase the confidence level of the effectiveness data.

(Figure 10-8)



AMSF SUPPLY EFFECTIVENESS (ASL ITEMS)
PERCENT
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
CY-73
CY-74
DEMAND ACCOMMODATION
DEMAND SATISFACTION
CLC OBJECTIVE 85%
85
88
74
70
66
65
66
70
51
71
55
51
17

Figure 10-8

(4) Receipts from expediting actions initiated in September 1973 accounts for the reduction in total due-outs to SIMS sites.

(Figure 10-9)

(5) Refrigerated Storage of Dry Batteries. A visit to the cold storage facilities at Long Binh on 4 March 1974 revealed defective refrigeration units, identified in the last quarterly report, had been removed for repair. Dry batteries previously in open storage had been moved inside. Also, recapping rubber had been removed from the refrigeration chamber and dry batteries requiring refrigeration were stored in the chamber.

(6) AN-PRC-25 batteries.

(a) As a result of the suspension of all requisitions at ILC, RVNAF supply of batteries for the PRC-25 tactical field radio is in particularly poor position, with runout projected to occur in June at the present consumption rate of 178,000 batteries per month. In order to assure continuity of operations during the four months lead time required to procure and deliver batteries to RVNAF, following availability of FY75 funding in July, 712,000 batteries will be required in July, at an estimated cost of $3.1 M.

(b) As a result of this poor position RVNAF were requested to consider a reduction of 25% in monthly consumption, which would reduce consumption to 134,000 units per month. With this reduction, effective mid April, the requirement for continuity of operations is reduced to delivery of 496,000 units in July at a cost $2 M. Inputs from RVNAF Division Commanders indicate the reduction in consumption will greatly reduce flexibility of operations and may not permit sustained operations. However, RVNAF is attempting to make the best of a poor situation. Figure 10-10 shows both the current and projected position of due-in and on-hand batteries and the quantities required at current and reduced consumption levels.

(Figure 10-10)

d. In-Country Procurement:

(1) This program is being plagued by limited in-country manufacturing capabilities, world wide shortages of raw materials, local manufacturers looking for excessive



SIMS SITES SUPPLY STATUS IN COUNTRY SUPPORT
NUMBER OF ITEMS
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
CY-73
CY-74
6226
7817
7658
4864
5419
4480
3834
2487
3210
1771
1619
2837
2680
1514
1342
1299
1886
1051
1010
873
705
TOTAL DUE OUT
TOTAL REQNS RECD
TOTAL ITEMS SHIPPED

Figure 10-9



AN PRC-25 RADIO BATTERIES
AMD=134,000
COST= $2M
AMD=178,000
COST= $3.1M
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
FY 74
FY 75
600
512
488
464
308
286
712
(496)
536
534
402
356
268
178
AMD 178
AMD
134
174
108

Figure 10-10

profits and ironbound contracts, reluctance to invest private capital in an unstable economy, and the lack of assurance that capabilities to produce do exist.

(2) Contracts for production of telephone cable awarded during FY-73 had to be terminated because the contractor could not meet delivery dates and certain specifications. Resolicitation actions have been initiated but no awards had been made as of 31 March 1974.

(3) Of two contracts awarded for the production of dropwire, one was terminated due to inability to deliver. A contract option was exercised and the total quantity due was assigned the second contractor.

(4) Failure of local C-E equipment manufacturers to improve the reliability of their products could have a serious impact upon the RVNAF in the accomplishment of their combat mission if complete dependence is placed on this source of supply.

e. Test Measuring and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE).

(1) The ARVN are considered to be self-sufficient in the calibration and repair of SIMS TMDE. The phase out of contractor assistance in January 1974 has had no significant impact upon or caused noticeable degradation in SIMS TMDE support to date. The ARVN have requested additional training in the microwave calibration area. The C-E Division is evaluating this request.

(2) The ARVN TMDE automated recall system is not accomplishing the task as planned. The lower unit commanders are delinquent in forwarding their equipment to the ACC for calibration. Command emphasis is necessary to assure the capabilities of the ARVN TMDE automated recall system are fully utilized.

(3) There is still a lack of visibility of TMDE, although improvements have been made in this area. During the title transfer of communication sites to the RVNAF, there was a considerable amount of TMDE transferred, but few equipment serial numbers were recorded Since title transfer, many items of TMDE have been shuffled back and forth on hand receipts and as a result, many of these equipments cannot be located. The Central Logistics Command (CLC) had recently requested that reimbursement and account adjustment be made for 92 items of TMDE believed to have been lost. Investigation by representatives of

the C-E Division resulted in the location of all except 13 items. Action is continuing to reconcile the remaining shortages.

(4) Management and control are improving each month. Also, major emphasis is being placed upon developing a more complete technical library.

6. CONCLUSIONS.

a. RVNAF C-E personnel are becoming technically competent on the O&M of SIMS and tactical equipment/sites/systems. They are self-sufficient in some areas such as calibration and sensors. With experience, RVNAF technicians will acquire the technical skills required to maintain all RVNAF C-E equipment/sites/systems at an adequate operational level.

b. In general, RVNAF technical expertise is increasing; however, ineffective middle management is hampering self-sufficiency. Many site OICs and NCOICs are not providing the leadership required to effectively implement preventive maintenance programs. 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance capabilities do exist; however, approved maintenance procedures are not always being followed.

c. Assuming the RVNAF do acquire the technical and managerial expertise required to operate, maintain and manage their C-E assets, self-sufficiency will never be realized until supply support is improved. Maintenance ability and capability is being increased at all levels. Since the effects of FY74 funding constraints have become apparent, the supply support is expected to be less effective. With the depletion of the CONUS- RVN pipeline, operational readiness of both fixed and tactical C-E equipment/sites/systems will decrease. The supply situation is expected to become critical by the end of FY74.

7. SUMMARY.

a. The objectives of the C-E Division are to increase the RVNAFs capability to attain and maintain:

(1) SIMS ICS reliability at 99.98%

(2) Effective tactical C-E systems.

(3) Supply effectiveness at 85% or higher.

(4) Effective and efficient maintenance capability.

(5) Complete self-sufficiency of RVNAF C-E personnel.

b. It is not technically or economically feasible to continue operation of the SIMS in its present configuration. The SIMS, designed to accommodate past communications requirements, is oversized and overequipped for current and foreseeable future RVNAF requirements. Efforts are underway to reconfigure and/or reduce ICS, DTE, TSC, and tactical capacity to tailor the systems more closely to RVNAF needs.

c. Site conditions do not necessarily reflect skill levels of RVNAF technical personnel. RVNAF O&M capability is limited by diverse factors such as engineer support (power/air conditioning), transportation, supply and leadership.

d. Depot level maintenance capability continues to increase. With adequate support, the RVNAF will become self-sufficient by the end of FY75.

CHAPTER 11

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES (RVNAF) TRAINING

1. (C) OFFSHORE TRAINING.

a. Army of Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).

(1) Objectives of the ARVN Fiscal Year 1974 Security Assistance Training Program (SATP) remain the same as previously reported.

(2) The following is a brief summary of the ARVN FY74 SATP as of the end of FY3/74:

FY74	SPACES	COST
Beginning Program FY3/74	492	$1,975,802
Additions	12	
Deletions	15	
Current Program	489	2,053,712

(3) ARVN operational requirements necessitated making 12 additions to the program during FY3/74 as follows:

ADDITIONAL TRAINING REQUIRED	ADDITIONAL SPACES
Limited Training Program	8
FY73 University Carryover Students	4

(4) The spaces originally programmed and the additions made to the program produced a total figure of 504. Fifteen of these spaces were deleted from the program as follows:

REASON	DELETED SPACES
English language disqualification	3
Chief Naval Operations (CNO) cancellation of training	2
Unnecessary English training	10

(5) The following offshore training courses were attended by ARVN personnel during FY3/74:

TYPE OF TRAINING	COURSE	SPACES/STUDENT CODE
Operations	Map Compiling	1/E
Operations	Photo Compiling	1/E
Operations	Combat Area Survey Radar Mechanic OJT	2/0
Comm/Elec	Fixed Station Technical Controller	1/E
Comm/Elec	Combat Area Survey Radar Mechanic	2/0
Comm/Elec	Radio Systems Officer	2/0
Maintenance	Electronic Instrument Repair	3/E
Maintenance	Engineer Equipment Repair Technician	2/0
Maintenance	Harbor Craft Engineering Officer	3/0
Maintenance	Refrigeration Equipment Repair	2/E
Maintenance	Refrigeration Equipment Repair OJT	2/E
Maintenance	Calibration Technician and Specialist	2/0
Logistics	Logistics Executive Development	2/0
Logistics	Defense Depot Operations Management	3/0
Logistics	Army Integrated Materiel Systems Management	3/0
Logistics	Basic Automated Data Processing Systems Analysis	3/0
Logistics	Adv Automated Data Processing Systems Analysis	3/0
Logistics	Cargo Officer	1/0

TYPE OF TRAINING	COURSE	SPACES/STUDENT CODE
Logistics	Observer Logistics Training	2/0
Logistics	Computer Programmer	2/E
Logistics	Supply Management Officer	2/0
Logistics	Petroleum Officer	2/0
Professional	Adjutant General Officer Advanced	2/0
Professional	Financial Management	8/0
Professional	Language Instructor Refresher	17/0
Professional	International Defense Management	8/0
Professional	Senior Foreign Officer Intelligence	1/0
Professional	Engineer Equipment Officer	2/0
Professional	Medical Observer Training	3/0
Professional	Language Instructor	6/0
Professional	Food Inspection Procedures Advanced	2/0
Professional	Math Refresher Post Graduate	3/0
Professional	Computer Management Post Graduate	2/0
Professional	Operations Research Systems Post Graduate	1/0
Professional	Infantry Officer Advanced	5/0
Professional	Signal Officer Advanced	2/0

TYPE OF TRAINING	COURSE	SPACES/STUDENT CODE
Professional	Observer Training Overseas	10/0
Professional	Civilian University Training	65/0*

* Includes 52 carryover students from FY73.

(6) The number of students sent to Continental United States (CONUS) for training in FY3/74 is as follows:

MONTH	QUANTITY	COST
January	62	$174,230
February	20	89,270
March	20	70,785
TOTAL	102	$334,285

(7) Statistical summary of FY74 ARVN offshore training as of the end of FY3/74 is as follows:

COURSES COMPLETED	COURSES IN PROGRESS	TOTAL
174	194	368

(8) The increasing ability of ARVN to effectively plan for offshore training was again demonstrated during FY3/74 as no spaces were cancelled due to unit operational requirements.

(9) Significant developments during FY3/74. The Pacific Command Army FY75 Security Assistance Training Workshop approved 221 students to attend 383 courses at a cost of $906,120 during FY75. Total funding in FY74 for the remaining years of CONUS university students was also approved at the Workshop.

(10) With the successful conclusion of the 3rd QTR, continued success during the remainder of FY74 is anticipated and no major problems are expected for the ARVN FY74 SATP.

b. Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF).

(1) The Fiscal Year 74 objectives for VNAF

remains as stated in the previous assessment. Offshore training listed below represents the current program. As the needs of VNAF change, adjustments are made to reflect those changing requirements. Also, the program has changed to reflect the lack of qualified candidates and the academic elimination of trainees.

Type Training	Students Programmed	Total Cost
Aircrew	868 (106)*	$25,914,350
Operational	90 (20)*	231,110
Comm/Electronics	48	260,680
Maintenance	122	241,910
Logistics	38	102,250
Administrative	10	41,880
Professional/Specialized	85	2,759,930
Orientation Tour	8	10,720
Other Costs	-	810,380
	1269 (126)	$30,373,210

* Filled by students already in CONUS.

The total cost of the VNAF SATP for FY74 shows a $436,000 decrease from the level of 31 December 1973. This was due primarily to the early elimination of pilot trainees. Also, there was a $51,000 reduction in the program brought about by deleting CONUS English language training for 49 students. These students have achieved the required English Comprehension Level (ECL) in-country for direct entry into CONUS technical training.

(2) In FY 3/74, 288 students were programmed and 278 students were processed for CONUS training. The cancellation of ten spaces brings the total number of spaces cancelled to twenty for this FY. These cancellations were the result of VNAF being unable to provide qualified candidates. This was brought about by failure to identify candidates and place them in language training in time to qualify. Not all courses were cancelled when qualified candidates were not

available. During the current FY there were 30 training spaces rescheduled for later entry dates so candidates could have more time to qualify. Following is a list of CONUS training spaces programmed/filled through the 3rd quarter FY74.

	FY 2/74		FY3/74		Total	
	Prog	Filled	Prog	Filled	Prog	Filled
Rotary Wing Aviator	234	234	126	126	360	360
UH-1 Instructor Pilot	16	16	-	-	16	16
UPT-T-41/T37	195	195	45	45	240	240
F-5E Instructor Pilot	30	30	8	8	38	38
Operational	39	34	55	54	94	88
Communications/Elec	41	36	7	4	48	40
Maintenance	69	69	16	12	85	81
Logistics	18	18	7	7	25	25
Administration	2	2	0	0	2	2
Professional/Spec	58	58	16	14	74	72
Orientation Tours	0	0	8	8	8	8
Total	702	692	288	278	990	970

(3) Student elimination for academic reasons has increased from seven as of 31 December 1973 to 29 as of 31 March 1974. Twenty of those eliminated were cadets in the Undergraduate Helicopter Training (UHT) and Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) programs (13 eliminated for English language deficiency and seven for flying deficiency). The academic elimination rate was lower than expected when the FY74 SATP was planned.

(4) The UPT and UHT programs for VNAF students are progressing satisfactorily and in light of the low attrition rate, it is possible that some UPT spaces may be cancelled in FY4/74. When the FY74 UPT program was planned, it was estimated that the elimination rate would be approximately 25 percent. Based on performance thus far, the elimination rate will be approximately 16 percent. The low attrition rate appears to be the

result of VNAF providing better qualified candidates. Training Management Section (TMS) has increased the ECL requirement from 55 to 65 for cadets entering CONUS English language training. Also, the ECL requirement for entry into the UPT or UHT programs is 80 in FY74 as compared to 75 in FY73. Closer screening of candidates in-country and the increased ECL of candidates have helped reduce the elimination rate. This reduction in the elimination rate and the resulting decrease in the numbers sent to UPT will reduce the cost of the VNAF SATP for FY74.

(5) The ARVN has assumed the responsibility of training VNAF students in certain fields common to both services, i.e. civil engineering, police training, accounting, etc. This action will release VNAF instructors for duty in their respective specialties and shift the requirement for offshore instructor training from VNAF to ARVN. TMS has cancelled two VNAF instructor training spaces in the power production specialty as a result of the transfer of responsibility.

(6) Over the past three years, a total of 34 VNAF student nurses were sent to CONUS university training. Since September 1973, three of these students have quit school and supposedly remained in the U.S. through marriage to U.S. citizens. This has caused considerable concern among VNAF officials since this can place the entire program in jeopardy if this problem reoccurs. VNAF has recommended the program be shortened if possible to help solve the problem.

c. Vietnamese Navy (VNN).

(1) Representatives of TMS attended the FY75 PACOM Navy Security Assistance Training Workshop in Taipei, Taiwan during 4-7 February 1974 to present the VNN Offshore Training Program. The workshop panel closely scrutinized each line of training to ensure that it contributed to strengthening the leadership structure of RVNAF and the improvement of the in-country training base.

(2) A generic breakout by students, spaces, and dollars for the VNN FY75 SATP is as follows:

GENERIC CODE	STUDENTS	SPACES	COST
NIB Operations	9	11	$19,280
NIC Comm-Elec	23	44	67,520

NID Maintenance	10	17	19,030
NIE Logistics	11	23	25,940
NIF Administration	3	22	9,320
NIG Professional	64	89	313,530
NIP OJT Afloat Training O/S	40	102	38,620
NIU Overseas	0	2	1,700
	160	310	$494,940
N3G English Language (Defense Language Institute Rep)			28,200
N7F Student Support, CONUS			
Total VNN Program	160	310	$526,250

(3) The following offshore training courses were attended by VNN personnel during FY 3/74:

NAME OF COURSE	SPACES/STUDENT CODE
Engineering BS	2/0
International Defense Management	3/0
International Navy Officer Candidate	10/0
English Language/Medical Department Diving Officer	1/0
Senior Foreign Officer Amphibious Warfare	1/0
Naval Staff	1/0
Foreign Officer Supply/Functional Supply	5/0
Observership Medical Officer/Clinical Laboratory	1/0
English Language/Engineering Science/ Operations Research/Systems Analysis PG MS	1/0

Limited Training Program	1/0*
Special Gunnery Training Package	2/0
Destroyer Department Heads (Foreign Officer)	1/0
Observership Medical Officer/General Surgery	1/0
Senior Foreign Officer, Naval Shipyard Management	1/0
Construction Electrician Class-B/ Instructor Class-C/Course ALFA	1/E
Data Processing Technician Class-A/Basic Programming Concepts-ENL/IBM 360 Computer System Programmer	1/E
Machinery Repairman Class-B/OJT Tech/Admin CONUS Shop Procedures/Instructor ALFA	1/E
Basic Electricity and Electronics/Gunners Mates Class-A, Phase I and II	2/E
Hull Technician Class-A, Phase I and II	2/E
Hospital Corpsman Class-A/Physical/ Occupational Therapy Technician Class-C	1/E
Engineering Aids Class-A	1/E
English Language/SCUBA Diver/Surface EOD/(Foreign Student)/Instructor ALFA	1/E
Basic Electricity and Electronics/ Construction Electrician Class-A	1/E
Limited Training Program	6/E*

* VNN additions to FY74 SATP

(4) A total of five VNN officers and 18 VNN enlisted personnel returned from attending the following CONUS offshore training courses during FY 3/74:

NAME OF COURSE	SPACES/STUDENT CODE
Observership Medical Officer/Internal	1/0
Naval Staff Course	1/0
Engineering BS	1/0
Military Comptrollership (Planning, Programming, Budgeting Systems)	1/0
Limited Training at Guam	1/0
Electronics Technician Class-B/Instructor Class-C, Course ALFA/OJT Afloat Training CONUS	2/E
English Language Training	1/E
Fire Control Technician Class-A, Phase I and II	2/E
Limited training at Guam	6/E
Storekeeper Class-A, Instructor ALFA	5/E
Teletypewriter Maintenance Mod 28 ASR Class-C/Instructor ALFA	2/E

(5) Three VNN CONUS courses were cancelled during FY 3/74 due to inability to provide language qualified candidates. Following are the courses cancelled and number of spaces affected:

NAME OF COURSE	SPACES/STUDENT CODE
Financial Management	1/0
Destroyer Department Heads (FO)	1/0
English Language/SCUBA Diver Surface EOD/Naval EOD (Foreign Student) Instructor ALFA	1/E

(6) Fourteen VNN courses were rescheduled during FY 3/74 affecting 46 officer and six enlisted spaces. Courses were rescheduled to allow sufficient leadtime for processing 40 officer students for orientation and indoctrination cruises and to allow VNN to provide language qualified candidates.

(7) No appreciable progress was made in obtaining language qualified candidates for CONUS courses during FY 3/74 as compared with FY 2/74, however, 126 candidates were tested at the Armed Forces Language School. One hundred twenty six candidates are presently enrolled in language training on a full time basis to ensure qualified candidates for FY 4/74 and FY 1/75 courses.

(8) The processing of students by the VNN has improved over that of FY 2/74. Early identification of students and timely publication of mission orders have enabled VNN to proceed on schedule.

d. Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC).

(1) Representatives of TMS attended the FY75 PACOM Marine Corps Security Assistance Training Workshop in Taipei, Taiwan during 4-7 February 1974 to present the VNMC Offshore Training Program.

(2) A generic breakout by students, spaces, and dollars for the VNMC FY75 SATP is as follows:

GENERIC CODE	STUDENTS	SPACES	COST
NIB Operations	14	19	$25,380
NIC Comm-Elec	3	5	3,830
NIF Administration	0	6	1,760
NIG Professional	68	78	162,490
Total VNMC Program	85	108	$193,460

(3) The following offshore training courses were attended by VNMC personnel during FY 3/74:

NAME OF COURSE	SPACES/STUDENT CODE
Basic Course USMC/OJT Marine Corps CONUS Unit Training	4/0

(4) Nine VNMC CONUS courses were cancelled during FY 3/74 due to inability to provide language qualified candidates. Following are the courses cancelled and number of spaces affected:

NAME OF COURSE	SPACES/STUDENT CODE
Utilities Officer USMC	1/0
Motor Transport Officer Orientation/ OJT MARCORPS CONUS Motor Pool	1/0
Operations/Air Transportability Planning OJT MARCORPS CONUS Battalion Staff Procedures	2/0
Engineer Equipment Officer USMC OJT MARCORPS CONUS Motor Transport Co/Bn Operations	2/0
OJT MARCORPS O/S Phib/Opns, Planning and Staff Procedures	2/0

(5) Four VNMC courses were rescheduled to allow VNMC to provide language qualified candidates. Seven enlisted spaces were affected by this program change.

(6) VNMC is still experiencing difficulty in releasing candidates for language training due to combat operations, however, six officers and 10 NCO's are presently enrolled in the Armed Forces Language School on a full time basis. Hopefully these candidates will attain requisite ECL scores for FY 4/74 and FY 1/75 CONUS courses.

2. (S) IN-COUNTRY TRAINING.

a. ARVN

(1) (C) General.

(a) The 1974 ARVN training program was unveiled during January-- somewhat later than the 1973 program which was released in October 1972. The 1974 program's late release resulted in some confusion and hesitancy on the part of the various training centers in trying to develop their internal programs to meet their 1974 training requirements.

(b) In overview, the main difference between the 1974 and 1973 programs is the increase in course lengths as ARVN enters the transition phase between war and peacetime training. Basic training which was formerly eight weeks is now ten weeks. Programs of Instruction (POI's) for the Command and General Staff College and the Infantry Officer Basic Course have also been lengthened to include additional training.

However, if hostilities were to reach a higher level it would probably necessitate the need to return to the shorter wartime POI's from the present transition POI's. The programmed figure for new recruits of 203,000 is similar to that of 1973. The 99 ARVN infantry battalions programmed to be cycled through the unit training program is up 10 battalions from 1973, and after an initial introductory effort last year, there is a good chance that 1974 programmed figure can be reached. The course length for unit training will remain at 5 weeks. Programmed service school instruction for 1974 of 54,000 students is almost 20,000 below the 1973 programmed figure. However, it is within 3,000 of the actual 1973 student input of 57,144.

(2) (C) National Training Centers (NTC's).

(a) Recruit Training. 193,000 recruits are scheduled to be trained at the NTC's in 1974, about 1,000 less than in 1973. Actual 1973 recruit input at the NTC's was only 156,000,with the rest of the 190,000 recruit total being supplied by the Division Training Centers (DTC's). This year however, with a heavier unit training load being placed on the DTC's, the NTC's will have to bear the burden of training all but 10,000 of the 203,000 programmed recruit input. Actual input for the first quarter ran well less than half of the amount necessary to meet programmed levels-- only 21,089 against a programmed level of 48,000.

(b) Other Individual Training is programmed to be 17,500 at the NTC's. This will include courses in long range reconnaissance and advanced individual leadership and infantry training. Over 600 Air Force personnel are included in the 1974 individual training program at the NTC's.

(c) Popular Forces (PF) Training. A total of 73,000 PF are scheduled to receive training at the NTC's in 1974. 42,000 of these will undergo the 12 week basic training course. PF cadre training will include about 1,000 platoon and deputy platoon leaders and about 8,000 squad leaders. Five week platoon refresher training will be conducted for 750 PF platoons, totaling 22,000 men. Chi Lang Training Center alone will train 250 PF platoons. For the Jan-Mar quarter, PF recruit input totaled 7,153 while 101 PF platoons totaling 2,827 men began the platoon refresher course. PF training is the longest of any given at the NTC's. The training is high quality and has resulted in a continuous upgrading of the PF since the 1970 decree that placed the PF under ARVN control.

(d) People's Self Defense Forces (PSDF) Leaders Course: The NTC's are programmed to train 20,000 PSDF cadre in 1974. This training consists of a four week POI. For the first three months of 1974, 4,859 have entered the course.

(e) Regular Forces - Unit Refresher. The NTC's will also shoulder a large part of the non-ARVN unit training responsibility in 1974. This training will include the entire range of units from the elite Airborne, Marine and Rangers down to the PF. The chart below lists the unit training scheduled for the NTC's.

TYPE OF UNIT	NUMBER
Ranger Battalions	32
Marines	5
Airborne	4
Regional Forces (RF) Battalion	91
Infantry Recon. Companies	16
Separate RF Company	92

With the integration of RF battalions into the Northern Defense Perimeter area of operations of both the Marines and Airborne, it is possible that more than the present total of nine airborne and marine battalions can be cycled through the unit training program.

(3) (C) Service Schools.

(a) 1974 programmed figures for Service training are down considerably from 1973. However, they are in line with the 1973 actual student input.

(b) The figures below detail the programmed student input for 1974 along with the actual figures for the first quarter. One major trend has been the inclusion of more Air Force and Navy personnel into the service schools which have catered largely to ARVN's needs in the past.

SERVICE SCHOOLS	1974 PROGRAMMED	1974 ACTUAL (Jan-Mar)
National Defense College	40	0
Command & General Staff	300	0

National Military Academy	987	[illegible]
POLWAR College	2459	[illegible]
Infantry School	4405	1250
NCO School	5084	1244
Armor School	1065	520
Artillery School	2837	622
Women Armed Forces Corps School	360	88
Junior Military Academy/ Vung Tau	1400	0
Junior Military Academy/ Pleiku	400	0
Ordnance School	2387	356
Quartermaster School	1213	83
Medical School	2249	742
Intelligence School	2404	154
Military Police School	2734	226
Military Band School	687	65
Transportation School	6015	1293
Signal School	3035	654
Engineer School	3291	727
Administration and Finance School	1210	174
Adjutant General School	4545	424
Armed Forces Language School	1400	484
Logistic Management School	500	164
Social Service School	210	0

Martial Arts & Physical Training Sch	780	0
Dog Training School	373	14
POLWAR Training Cadre	1850	243
	54220	9749

(c) Eight RVNAF service schools were visited during FY 3/74. They were: the Engineer School (including the Engineer Technical Course), Intelligence School, Military Medical School, Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Academy, Ordnance School, Political Warfare (POLWAR) Cadre Training Center (TC), Quartermaster School and the Transportation School. These visits bring the total number of RVNAF service school visits for FY 74 to fourteen. All schools were rated excellent. Three, the Military Medical School, NCO Academy and POLWAR Cadre TC, do not have sister school relationships with U.S. Army service schools. The remarks pertaining to the general efficiency of the service schools made in the Quarterly Assessment for FY 2/74 apply to the visits made during this reporting period.

(4) (S/NFD) INTELLIGENCE TRAINING:

(a) Organization. The Cay Mai School is subordinate to the RVNAF Central Training Command. It has three divisions: Administrative/Support, POLWAR and Training.

(b) Personnel.

	AUTHORIZED	ACTUAL
Officers	--	57
NCOs	--	47
EM	--	51
Civilians	--	7
TOTAL	208	162

All instructors must have graduated from the Cay Mai School and received instructor training there. The Commandant and his staff are well-trained and competent.

(c) Facilities and Equipment. The equipment at the school is inadequate, outdated and in poor condition. For example, the only camera is ten years old; the viewgraph is inoperable. Most of the instruction is given from charts since other training aids are almost nonexistent.

(d) Operational Effectiveness. The well-rounded curricula taught at the school use U.S., British and French intelligence doctrine and includes officer, NCO and enlisted basic and intermediate intelligence, security, collection, photo interpreter and agent handler courses. The student enrollment is 353. In spite of serious budgetary problems, the Commandant and his staff have done an outstanding job of operating the school. The average yearly budget is 2,400,000 piasters, which averages cut to less than 5 cents per student per day. This is obviously inadequate. No U.S. funds are contributed for support of the school. The Commandant has stated that there are no funds available to support other training programs. No out-of-country training is currently being conducted. J2/Joint General Staff (JGS) has requested about 150 billets, but the request has bogged down in the Central Training Command (CTC). Since the requirement to attend the Foreign Officer Intelligence School at Ft. Huachuca, Arizona was changed to include only officers without prior intelligence training, the J2/JGS withdrew the names of the eight officers who were originally scheduled to attend as they had previous training. However, CINCPAC is planning an advanced course for foreign intelligence officers which is scheduled to begin this year in Hawaii. The J2/JGS intends to submit the names of these same officers for this course. Besides the training provided at the Cay Mai School, intelligence training (approx 450 hours) is given at the unit level each year.

(S) (C) ARVN Unit Training. The ARVN unit training program is off to a fast start in 1974. As of 31 March, 14 infantry battalions have completed period II training at their respective division training centers. This is an excellent improvement, considering that in 1973 only 28 battalions were able to complete their Period II training. At the present rate of training and if enemy activity does not necessitate a curtailment, the unit training program has an excellent chance of meeting its goal of cycling 99 of the 105 infantry battalions through Period II training. As of March, each division except the 5th and 7th had cycled one battalion through Period II training. The chart below lists the 14 ARVN infantry battalions and the other regular units that have completed

the 8 week Period II training.

UNIT TRAINING STATUS
January - March 1974

	Phase II
I Corps	
1st Inf Div	
3 Infantry battalions	3
2nd Inf Div	
1/41 Infantry battalion	1
3rd Inf Div	
1/2 Infantry Battalion	
2/57 Infantry battalion	2
II Corps	
22nd Inf Div	
1/42 Infantry battalion	
3/40 Infantry battalion	2
23rd Inf Div	
1/44 Infantry battalion	1
III Corps	
18th Inf Div	
3/43 Infantry battalion	1
25th Inf Div	
3/50 Infantry battalion	
2/46 Infantry battalion	2
IV Corps	
9th Inf Div	
2/15 Infantry battalion	1
21st Inf Div	
3/31 Infantry battalion	1
8th Marine battalion	1
1st Airborne battalion	1
79th Ranger battalion	1
Total:	17 Bns

(6) (C) Anti-Armor Improvements.

(a) A major Light Anti-Tank Weapon (LAW) retraining program was undertaken during the quarter in response to a letter from General Vien based on the recommendations of the U.S. anti-armor team visit in November 1973. All ARVN divisions underwent a thorough anti-tank retraining program with emphasis being placed on the formation and training of LAW tank killer teams in each platoon. A trip to I Corps in February 1974 revealed that anti-tank training was receiving top priority. Tank killer training was being carried out at each training site visited. Hoa Cam Training Center was training local force units of RF and PF and new recruits in anti-armor tactics and the LAW. Dong Da Training Center has recovered several destroyed communist tanks and is using these tanks for anti-tank target practice. Training at Dong Da was conducted for Airborne, Marines, RF and PF units in the area. The division training centers of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Divisions were providing mobile training teams (MTT's) to help the regiments develop the tank killer teams at platoon level. The training appeared to be excellent and instilled a great degree of confidence in the troops.

(b) Tube Launched Optically Tracked Wire Guided (TOW) missile training has undergone a close scrutiny and the decision has been made by CTC to upgrade the level of training received by the TOW instructors. It is felt that most of the crew operational deficiencies found in the field can be attributed to inadequate instruction. A meeting was held on 1 April 1974 at TMS with members of CTC and Hughes Aircraft Co. to develop an improved POI for the instructors to include lessons learned and common field problems found with the system.

(c) The POI will expand the TOW instructors knowledge and TOW crews will then be recycled through the three training centers that instruct on TOW's. CTC stated that it now has approval to fire 40 missiles for TOW training. Twenty-two of these are alloted to CTC for use and eighteen to be equally divided between I, II and III Corps for crew refresher training.

(d) Unit anti-armor training and preparations of anti-armor defenses have exceeded the efforts of the formal anti-armor training improvement efforts. This was especially noted along the Northern Defense Perimeter and in III Corps. The Northern Defense Perimeter takes on the appearance of a real bastion. Apparently, when General Trung, the I Corps Commander was quoted by UPI

as saying the following he meant it:

"A thousand rounds of incoming used to be enough to drive us out of a position. By contrast, we would pour 100,000 shells and bombs on a communist position and they would still be there.

The difference is that they were digging holes and we were using sandbags. Well, sandbags cost 11 cents a piece and holes cost nothing. So now we dig holes and we dig them deep. We mean to stay."

(e) Most positions visited were dug six feet deep and going deeper. Some positions were cut out of sheer rock. Numerous LAW's were seen at each position and there appeared to be an air of confidence in ARVN's ability to stop the enemy's armor. Numerous tank barriers, traps and anti-tank mine fields have been set up. The integration of RF battalions into the front lines with the Airborne and Marines allows for the creation of a more adequate reserve force and greater defense in depth.

(f) Overall ARVN has made great strides in improving their anti-armor capability during the first three months of 1974. They appear capable and confident of being able to stop the enemy's armor.

(7) (C) Air Defense Improvements.


(a) In early January 1974, a CONUS air defense technical assistance team (ADTAT) made an assessment of ARVN's AD capability and submitted a report including short and long term recommendations for the improvement of ARVN AD.

(b) The JGS accepted the team's recommendations and on 22 February 1974 General Vien issued a memorandum to the Corps Commanders directing that immediate action be taken to comply with the majority of the ADTAT's recommendations. Since 22 February 1974 much of JGS's attention has been focused on the enemy's armor threat and inspecting ARVN's anti-armor capabilities. No major improvements in AD capability have been reported. Ground work has been laid for major improvements in the April-June quarter.

(c) Starting with General Vien's letter, it has been directed that the Corps Commanders shift their AD assets from a ground defense role back to a primary AD mission. In consonance with this, General Vien has also ordered

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the redeployment of assets from poorly selected positions and from low priority installations to improved positions around key installations. Further, he has ordered the commanders to develop a continuous maintenance and training schedule in accordance with the unit training program outlined in JGS Directive 380-1.

(d) To improve training, a 5 week POI has been developed by the artillery school exclusively for AD. The POI has been approved by the Artillery Command and is awaiting final approval from CTC for implementation. Two M-55 quad 50s are being shipped from Long Binh to the artillery school at Duc My. These should arrive at the school by 10 April 1974. This will provide the school with a capability to provide training on the two main AD weapons. Unfortunately, training at the school is still limited to use of ground targets which do not provide realistic training.

(e) On the maintenance side the Vietnam Army Arsenal (VAA) has undertaken the task of building their own electrical harnesses for the M-42 duster. While production of these harnesses is painstakingly slow, it represents an encouraging effort to overcome this very inhibiting problem.

(f) Coordination is being made with the JGS Liaison Section to obtain a monthly progress report on AD from JGS. This will indicate DAO concern and press ARVN to move forward with improvements.

b. (C) VNAF.

(1) On 31 March 1974 there were 4448 VNAF personnel in all types of VNAF conducted training, excluding US contractor administered training. During this quarter 3880 VNAF personnel entered formal training, and 4472 personnel graduated. A total of 113 personnel were eliminated from training for various reasons. A total of 2124 VNAF personnel entered On-the-Job Training (OJT) during this quarter while 1202 personnel completed the OJT program. Currently 2124 personnel are undergoing OJT.

(2) The following is a summary of personnel in formal training for the quarter ending 31 March 1974.

Pilot Training	Entry	Eliminated	Graduated	In-Training
T-41, T-37 UPT	43	0	0	133

UH-1 UHT	84	4	79	170
Advance 0-1	0	0	10	0
Total	127	4	89	303
Observer (FAC)	57	0	0	57
Technical Schools				
Air Tng Cen (ATC), Nha Trang (NHA)	148	10	354	266
3rd Air Div, Bien Hoa (BNH)	11	1	36	10
5th Air Div, Tan Son Nhut (TSN)	30	4	24	58
Air Log Comd (ALC), BNH	5	1	233	0
Sub-Tech Sch, TSN	138	27	491	181
Sub-Tech Sch, BNH	87	3	180	148
Total	419	46	1318	663

Communication & Electronics	Entry	Eliminated	Graduated	In-Training
ATC, NHA	60	3	225	145
HQ VNAF, TSN	36	1	77	36
Total	96	4	302	181
General Service Schools				
ATC, NHA	350	1	237	173
3rd Air Div, BNH	35	3	35	80
5th Air Div, TSN	71	20	93	71

ALC, BNH	68	19	321	425
Total	524	43	686	749
Civil Engineering Schools				
ALC, BNH	133	4	385	89
3rd Air Div, BNH	27	0	30	58
Total	160	4	415	147
Crew Training & Aerial Gunner				
2nd Air Div, NHA	0	0	7	0
Air Command & Staff School	72	0	0	72
Basic Military Training	301	12	460	152

(3) Most of the VNAF in-country training remained stable. The significant changes which have occurred since the 31 Dec 73 quarterly report are:

(a) The T-37 UPT continues to encounter maintenance problems at Phan Rang Air Base. The Not Operational Ready Maintenance (NORM) rate for this quarter averaged 44.4% of 24 T-37 aircraft assigned, while the Not Operational Ready Supply (NORS) rate averaged 6.3%. It should be noted the T-37 aircraft had high airframe and engine time when they arrived in-country and a high NORS/NORM rate was expected. Coupled with this is the fact that the T-37 aircraft maintenance personnel had no prior experience. Five US contractor personnel were assigned to perform organizational and intermediate T-37 maintenance. They were assigned on or about 15 February, and since that time the NORM average has been 41.0%. The first half of this quarter the NORM average was 47.0%. The contractor personnel are giving the VNAF maintenance personnel OJT. The high NORM rate during this quarter was the prime factor causing a reduction in pilot training flying hours. Two UPT classes are now in training at Phan Rang, and most of the T-37 flying hours are devoted to the first class in an attempt to graduate them as soon as possible.

(b) The UH-1 co-pilot training program is on schedule

with a total of 79 students graduated this quarter. The only other significant data not covered in the 31 Dec 73 quarterly report is on the UH-1 helicopters. The pilot training squadron is furnished UH-1 helicopters by the operational squadrons. The number of helicopters furnished are 10 per day for training, plus one as back-up. Two other UH-1 helicopters are furnished for use as command and control. This same ratio prevails at each of the UH-1 helicopter pilot training sites.

(4) The F5E Mobile Training Set (MTS) will remain at Bien Hoa Air Base for the VNAF use in their formal maintenance training on the F5E aircraft. Eight of the personnel on the Contract Field Service Team (CFST) departed on or before 28 Feb 74. The CFST was responsible for training the first class of VNAF students. The second class of VNAF students were taught by CONUS-trained VNAF instructors with the CFST monitoring. The third class started training 14 March 1974, and this program became a VNAF conducted training program. Six members of the CFST were extended one month to train VNAF instructors and students in the use of test equipment peculiar to the F5E aircraft. These CFST personnel departed on or before 31 March 1974. The VNAF students on completion of formal maintenance training will enter OJT.

(5) VNAF has, for CY 74, approximately 2738 personnel programmed for ARVN conducted training. The various ARVN schools that will be training VNAF students are Medical, Adjutant General, Intelligence, Military Police, Administration and Finance, Engineering, Transportation and Signal. Additional VNAF students will be programmed at a later date.

(6) The in-country pilot training programs ranges in quality from excellent to marginal. The Advanced O-1 and the UH-1 helicopter pilot training continues to remain excellent, while the T-37 UPT is marginal. Student pilot input is on schedule.

(7) The overall quality of all other VNAF formal in-country training programs is satisfactory. The student input lags the projected input by approximately 15% for this quarter. The VNAF were authorized an increase in their recruiting program. Later the new recruits will enter formal training and this will bring student input closer to the projected input.

b. (C) VNN.

(1) During FY 3/74, VNN embarked on its CY 74 train-

ing plan. The plan envisions updating all Programs of Instruction (POI), developing command management capability, improving training at unit level, developing instructor training, and maximum utilization of VNN training facilities and RVNAF service schools.

(2) In addition to routine in-country training during this period, VNN started a nine-week Supply Officer course which is scheduled to graduate in April 1974. The course curriculum was developed with the aid of materials procured from Naval Supply Center - Oakland by Navy Division. Further, a Gunfire Control curriculum, not hitherto taught by VNN, is in the formative stages of development and classes are expected to start next quarter. In addition to the foregoing, VNN has stressed anti-armor, anti-aircraft and Method of Instruction (MOI) training during FY 3/74.

(3) Training completed during FY 3/74 is reported by VNN Training Bloc as follows:

(a) One thousand one hundred fifty-nine officers and enlisted men completed formal individual training during FY 3/74.

(b) One officer graduated from the College of Architecture of the University of Saigon.

(4) The two-year midshipman course at the Vietnamese Naval Academy (VNNA) continues routinely with no change since the last quarterly assessment.

d. (C) VNMC

(1) VNMC continues to conduct its fundamental (officer/NCO orientation/refresher, squad/team leader, and recruit) training at the VNMC Training Center while receiving most of its MOS training at the RVNAF service schools.

(2) Reports received from VNMC through the DAO VNMC Logistics Support Branch indicate that 1413 VNMC personnel completed formal individual training during FY 3/74.

3. (U) IN-COUNTRY ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRAINING PROGRAM (ELTP)

a. Intensive ELTP.

(1) The ELTPs at the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Language School (RVNAFLS) and at the VNAF English Language School (VNAF-ELS) are not operating at capacity. The students are taught English to assist them in taking part in CONUS training. English is also taught to Armed Forces personnel who have to understand manuals and directives pertaining to US equipment. With the drawdown of CONUS training for RVNAF personnel, the pressure on intensive ELT is tapering off and the emphasis shifts to non-intensive ELT. Unfortunately, slackening of the pace is affecting supervision of instructors and students and the quality of instruction.

(2) The Defense Language Institute (DLI) Language Training Detachment has initiated Instructor In-Service Training (IST) sessions in the two intensive ELTP schools and is tightening the student progression control through close monitoring. Slow progression of students demotivates both instructors and students.

(3) The large number of ECL screening tests administered by the DLI team has caused serious overexposure of these tests. Replacement Tests were ordered and received. Regardless, testing will have to be reduced to a minimum. Plans are underway to require a student who fails an ECL test to enroll in regular ELTP for at least 30 days before being retested.

Overexposure of tests results in inflated ECL screening grades, washback of the student at Lackland and possible premature return to Vietnam. This causes loss of investment and training spaces.

(4) Ten military instructors of RVNAFLS have been temporarily reassigned to other duties. Nine civilian instructors have been hired for 4 hrs teaching duty a day. Total instructor strength at RVNAFLS is 88 while VNAF-ELS manning is 39.

(5) A breakdown of intensive ELTP data for FY 3/74 follows:

ARVN	196	(at RVNAFLS)
VNN	86	"
VNMC	59	"

VNAF	872	(at RVNAFLS)
VNAF	302	(at VNAF-ELS)

(6) Number of ECL Tests administered: 838 at RVNAFLS.

(7) Number of students sent to DLI, Lackland AFB, Texas for additional language training:

ARVN	0	(20 to Instructor Courses)
VNN	3	
VNMC	0	
VNAF	216	

(8) Number of Students sent direct to US training installations:

ARVN	105
VNN	45
VNMC	4
VNAF	62

(9) Two visits have been made to the VNAF-ELS to monitor the ELT there and make professional evaluations

b. Non-Intensive ELTP.

(1) With the decrease in U.S. training spaces, the in-country non-intensive English training is receiving n emphasis. RVNAF personnel will have to use US equipment and read US T.O. for a long time. Vietnam National Military Academy (VNMA) cadets designated as VNAF officer candidates are now studying DLI Flying Terminology texts to assist them in their in-country flying training.

(2) The non-intensive schools outside Saigon suffer from minimum contact with US personnel. This contact is necessary for maintenance of English language proficiency. The DLI team is trying to work out some provision whereby regular contacts can be arranged through the Embassy or the Vietnam American Association with films and tapes.

The termination of US funded subscriptions such as Time, Newsweek and other magazines has a further deteriorating effect on Vietnamese exposure to the English language.

(3) A commercial US text, English for Today, is used in the Vung Tau and Pleiku schools as directed by the Ministry of Education for high school programs. The texts have a major deficiency in that tape recordings to go with the lessons are not available.

(4) Student load figures and laboratory positions have not changed materially in the non-intensive programs since last quarter.

4. (U) TECHNICAL TRANSLATION BRANCH (TTB)

a. The TTB augments the JGS/CTC capability for translated technical materials. Throughout FY 3/74, the TTB had expected the assignment of 30 military translators to replace DAO funded local nationals. Only nine were assigned.

The proposed introduction of qualified translators in TTB between 1 Jan and 1 Feb was scheduled as follows:

Suggested TO&E Sent to J-3	Mil	Civ	Proposed Assignment to TTB 1 Jan / 1 Feb	Actual
Central Training Command	20	17	10	9
Central Logistic Command	18	8	10	0
Air Force	19	5	6	0
Navy	22	0	4	0

Funds to pay civilian translators and lack of qualified military translators in all Armed Services indicate that the suggested TO&E for a centralized technical translation branch will not materialize during the remainder of CY74.

b. Production of translated copy fell appreciably due to a 35 percent reduction in DAO translation

personnel who were not replaced by trained RVNAF translators. Work output in FY 2/74 totaled more than 11,300 pages of translations, while the FY 3/74 production dropped to 8,500 translated pages. As shown below, TTB's reduced translation output is still in excess of what the CTC Publication Review Board (PRB) reviewed and programmed for printing.

Backlog of materials to be translated at TTB	139	(Books,	tng manuals,	POI's)
Technical manuscripts translated in FY 3/74 at TTB and now at PRB for review	49	"	"	"
Translated copy returned to TTB from PRB after review	19	"	"	"
Translation awaiting pick-up by PRB for review	53	"	"	"
Finished Camera Masters awaiting pick-up by PRB for printing	33	"	"	"

The PRB is chaired by the Chief of CTC whose regulatory policies state that manuscripts must be returned by board members within 60 days for final changes and printing. However, the PRB cannot enforce its policy on its members. The lack of interservice cooperation in planning and programming is underscored in the FY 3/74 PRB accomplishments shown below.

	Number	Returned to TTB	Sent to Printers
Central Training Command	15	4	4
Central Logistics Command	34	7	0
Navy	20	6	0
Air Force	13	2	0
	84*	19	4

*This figure does not include the backlog of more than 150 manuscripts dating from 1969 to 1973, which the PRB members now say are obsolete.

c. The TTB will continue to provide technical translation assistance to the JGS Publication Review Board until DAO funding is discontinued, 30 June 74. After that time, the TTB will disband. In place of a tri-service centralized translation branch staffed by military translators, separate Army, Navy and Air Force translation sections will be loosely affiliated under the PRB. These separate Armed Forces Translation Sections may be able to accomplish what the tri-service PRB was never able to do.

5. (U) CONTRACT TRAINING

a. Contracts Monitored by DAO C&E Division.

(1) Federal Electric Corporation (FEC):

(a) During the months of January, February and March two members of the FEC Training Staff conducted the following training programs:

(1) On-site Link Quality Monitor/Carrier Intensity Recorder OJT at the Can Tho Integrated Communications System (ICS) site for eleven students.

(2) On-site OJT for patching and wiring at the Vung Tau Signal School Annex for twelve students.

(3) On-site OJT for patching and wiring for a total of eight students at the ICS sites located at Gia Dinh, Phu Lam, Vung Tau, and Long Binh.

(b) Personnel assigned to the Dial Telephone Exchange sites at Saigon and Gia Dinh have also received OJT during this three month period.

(c) Since the close of the official Area Maintenance Supply Facility - Vietnam (AMSF-V) personnel training program, informal type training in various areas is being accomplished as follows:

(1) Daily technical/OJT training is accomplished in the following shops:

Tropo/Microwave Equipment/Systems

Multiplex Equipment/Systems

Technical Control Facilities

Antenna Systems

Supply Warehouse Operation

Stock Research

Shipping and Receiving

Data Processing Procedures/Operation

Records Control

All management level personnel received side by side technical assistance from contractor management personnel, resulting in improved ARVN management of AMSF-V functions.

(2) Personnel who are not assigned to call out, are utilized in production and receive over-the-shoulder training/assistance. This is on a daily basis, with the number of hours of training depending directly upon the availability of ARVN personnel.

(3) During FY 3/74 one cable splicing specialist team of two men was assigned to assist the 297th Communication Squadron (VNAF). Assistance/training was provided in performing a Pre-Inspection and Repair as necessary (Pre-IRAN) program at Pleiku AB. Although not a specific training program, over-the-shoulder training and assistance was provided to the VNAF cable plant technicians during this period. Pre-IRAN tasks involve visual plant inspection; electrical continuity and insulation tests of cable systems; Main Distribution Frame and Central Office cable vault inspection; Preparation of Bill of Materials required to accomplish repair work; research of federal stock numbers and material item identification; and preparation of Pre-IRAN reports.

From one to three VNAF personnel performed the Pre-IRAN with AMSF-V assistance.

(2) Eastern Construction Company INC. (ECCOI):

(a) ECCOI instructors are providing formal and

practical training to the ARVN. This training has been designed to elevate the ARVN technical competence in the area of 5th echelon maintenance capability.

(1) Recent reorganization of the Quality Assurance and Quality Control function will provide additional assistance to the depot in assuring a higher degree of performance and will result in an improved quality of maintenance.

(2) ECCOI instructors have completed training of 42 students. An additional 138 students are in formal training for 5th echelon rebuilding of several types of signal equipment. In addition, instructors have provided technical assistance and informal over-the-shoulder training to 203 repairmen at the depot and field locations.

(3) One ECCOI instructor is assigned to the Signal School at Vung Tau. Instruction is provided to the ARVN students to improve maintenance performance, production, and assure that a comprehensive maintenance program is realized and maintained for ARVN tactical radar systems.

b. Contracts Monitored by DAO Air Force Division.

(1) Contractor Training at Bien Hoa: The VNAF Chief of Maintenance has expressed satisfaction with the Logistics Training Plan, he indicated satisfactory progress in most areas. Status is as follows:

(a) Power Train: All areas of Power Train are now operational. Remaining parts and bench stock shortages are being corrected. Training is underway with 63 students in training and 9 have been graduated. At least 1 of each of the 15 line items have been produced and delivered. Two CONUS specialists will arrive shortly to assist in training in the transmission and non-destructive test areas.

(b) Plant Services: Training is presently being conducted in 8 Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSC's) within these areas; 86 personnel are in training; excellent records administration prevails, and the program is well organized. Training objectives should be achieved within scheduled timeframe. Twenty two trainees have completed training.

(c) Accessory Repair: Fifty trainees are undergoing training in the Electrical Shop and 6 have graduated. This shop lacks essential tools, equipment, and supplies. Training in the following areas has had a delay in implementation due to construction of new facilities and provisions for new equipment. Pneudraulics, environmental, egress, fuel systems and oil cooler facilities are scheduled to be completed in June 1974.

(d) Manufacture/Repair: Training in this area is mostly of the projection/OJT type in the following areas: Machinist, Welding, Plating. Crash/Battle Damage, Sheet Metal, and Airframe. The lack of facilities for heat treatment, plastics, fiberglass and welding, hampers training. A total of 159 trainees are in training and 77 have completed their training.

(e) Aircraft Repair: The majority of aircraft repair is in a production rather than a training mode; however, formal training is being conducted on F-5, A-37 and UH-1H aircraft. This training consists of classroom as well as OJT. The previous crowded conditions have been improved by completion of the cargo aircraft nose docks and all contractor training should be completed on schedule. A total of 23 trainees are in training and 50 trainees have completed their training.

(f) Production Control and Management Services: There are no major problems in these areas, and training is proceeding smoothly. 134 trainees are in training and one has completed his training.

(g) Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E) trained Vietnamese civilians are currently being utilized as an augmented group to assist with OJT for new VNAF personnel. A total of 309 trainees are being trained at Bien Hoa Air Base and of this total approximately 265 students have completed their training at this time. Recently 180 additional trainees have been authorized for training, consisting of 20 trainees from each of the 9 VNAF bases.

(h) Parsons Rotor Blade shop is going well with 31 students now in training and 3 have graduated. This formal training is in addition to the shop OJT. Implementation of preliminary training on scrap blades has proven outstanding. Approximately 20 students can be assigned to this orientation area for training in basic

blade repair techniques without the possibility of damaging potential servicable blades. Upon completion of this basic training they have developed a degree of skill in blade repair that makes them a useful part of the Rotor Blade shop.

(i) Lycoming Jet-Engine: Training is being administered in all areas by Contractor Engineering Technical Services (CETS) personnel (production/OJT type). Training is progressing well, although lack of parts, tools, and equipment hinder training. CETS reports a shortage of trainee in-put. A total of 34 trainees are in training and 101 have completed their training.

(j) General Electric Jet Engine: This area goes well. Latest VNAF assessment shows the need for training only 26 more students. Training and contractor phase out is on schedule. A total of 22 trainees are in training and 97 have completed their training.

(k) Kentron Power Production: There is very little training involved in this activity. With self-sufficiency realization very close; no training problems exist. A total of 16 trainees are in training and 29 have completed their training.

(2) Contractor Training at Da Nang Air Base.

(a) Lear Siegler, Inc (LSI) currently is authorized to train 343 trainees. One hundred and fifty nine have completed their training and 190 are currently in training. Shortages of special tools, equipment, parts and supplies continue to plague training and production. Shortages of technical data is also a problem in the helicopter shops. Lesson plans need to be improved and action has been taken to rectify this problem. Many students are being certified as qualified, but this is doubtful due to the shortages of tech data, parts, supplies, equipment and in some cases tools.

(b) VNAF has indicated that further contract assistance would be required after 30 June 1974.

(c) Overall training has improved since the last quarterly review.

(d) PA&E supply and Civil Engineering, as well as Kentron power production, have well integrated training programs. No training problems exist.

(3) Contractor Training at Nha Trang Air Base.

(a) LSI Training at Nha Trang is exceeding the projection of the Logistics Training Plan. The current number of students in training is 56, and 92 students have been certified. The goal is to train and certify 143 VNAF personnel by the end of FY74. LSI attributes success in training to the fact that students are assigned to them full-time (39 to 40 hours per week).

(b) LSI's Training effort at Nha Trang is OJT oriented, with theory as required. A problem area was noted in the Corrosion Control Shop, where lack of tools and supplies has been detrimental to training. LSI records indicate six completions in the Corrosion Control Shop. Due to the negative factors in training, quality is to be questioned.

(c) The Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE) shop has six students assigned to training, and there is ample dead-line equipment to conduct training; however, lack of parts degrades training. There is a shortage of batteries and spark plugs. Facilities remain poor.

(d) CETS training is affected by retarded training administration. AVCO Lycoming has made progress in CETS training in the form of developed lesson plans and is providing two hours of training per day.

(e) In terms of meeting Logistics Training Plan requirements, training at Nha Trang is outstanding . However, due to parts and tool shortages, overall training at Nha Trang is rated satisfactory. The need to develop more effective communication with the VNAF remains an outstanding requirement.

(4) Contractor Training at Tan Son Nhut Air Base.

(a) During FY 3/74, LSI had 137 VNAF personnel in training in accordance with Logistics Training Plan requirements. Their current training effort is averaging 50% classroom and 50% practical OJT. Classroom training, with exception of three AFSCs, is conducted in the respective shops.

(b) An augmentation effort by LSI in the C-7 hangar appears exceptional, with classroom training and LSI/VNAF relationships considered commendable. There are some shortages, which require correction, in the Sheet

Metal and Corrosion Control Shops, i.e., spare parts and chemicals.

(c) PA&E supply is not conducting classroom training. Their work force is integrated with VNAF and they work side by side. PA&E Civil Engineer training is considered very good at Tan Son Nhut and a total of 33 VNAF have been certified during this quarter. The Kentron power production effort is likewise good and a total of 33 VNAF are in training.

(5) Contractor Training at Phan Rang Air Base.

(a) LSI has 93 trainees, currently in production/ OJT type training within 11 AFSCs. This is a result of the heavy operational mission requirements utilizing the A/T37 aircraft. The average production type training, per trainee, is four hours per day, with efforts by LSI and VNAF to increase this time as much as possible. The Maintenance and Supply (M&S) Wing Group are working on a 24-hours on/24-hours off basis.

(b) Within the areas of Fuel Systems, Electrical, Sheet Metal, Jet Aircraft Mechanic, and Jet Engine, training is progressing on schedule with no major problems. Training in Corrosion Control is lagging, but problems in this area should be resolved by 30 June 1974. In the AGE Shop, most of the support equipment is not being utilized due to lack of part and supplies, i.e., spark plugs, batteries, etc. Training records and progress charts are well maintained.

(c) J-85 Engine Training is being hampered by lack of tools and equipment. A total of 17 trainees are in training.

(d) The Kentron Power Generator and Civil Engineering Training is completed. The Power Generator function has been turned over to the VNAF. Civil Engineering has a total of 77 trainees which have completed their training.

(e) The Cessna (A/T-37), General Electric (J-85 Engine), and Teledyne (J-69 Jet Engine) are initiating training programs which heretofore had been solely relegated to technical advisement. Lack of tools, supplies and equipment are hampering their training effort.

(f) Further compromise between ATC and 2d Air Division to consolidate their efforts, manpower, facilities, equipment, supplies, etc., is required in order to enable this group to continue functioning at the present rate of efficiency.

(6) Contractor Training at Pleiku Air Base.

(a) LSI currently has 66 students in training and a cumulative total of 44 graduates. A total of 116 trainees are authorized by contract. Previous training problems have been resolved. Corrosion control is still a big problem due to the lack of water. General housekeeping in the Periodic hanger is atrocious; this is a repeat discrepancy.

(b) The Engine Area's training function stands out well at Pleiku because of the manner in which it is being conducted by the senior LSI instructor. There is enthusiasm and a well-organized effort in training in this functional area of training.

(c) The CETS training program covering UH-1H training requires additional organization to resolve problems related to acquisition of training aids and technical data. Also, the need for acceleration of the CETS training effort at this time at Pleiku is important to the meeting of training requirements within the specified time-frame. Similarly, Lycoming CETS requires up-grading of its organization and effort in training at Pleiku.

(d) Kentron has not started their Civil Engineering training. They are having difficulty in obtaining base passes. If not corrected, one third of contract time will have expired.

(7) Contractor Training at Binh Thuy Air Base.

(a) At Binh Thuy, LSI contract personnel are manned to authorized strength. Their trainee input is presently 126 personnel in training, with 79 trainees having completed their training. LSI has programmed its entire training commitment through Jun 74, and at present are well on schedule on contract training requirements.

(b) LSI has made favorable strides in developing training facilities at Binh Thuy, and is providing for

existing requirements in training aids, charts, handout materials, etc. Problems which exist: the need to update individual training records, standardization of lesson plans, and writing bilingual descriptions of AFSCs, are being corrected.

(c) Improved relationships between the VNAF and contractors are being achieved through training meetings. Such problem areas as instructor duties, student attendance, supplementary classroom training, issuance of work orders to trainees, etc., are being favorably resolved.

(d) Cessna, Boeing, Lycoming, and General Electric CETS representatives at Binh Thuy are performing commendably in developing respective training functions, and appear to be establishing confidence among the VNAF in their abilities and leadership.

(e) In the AGE Shop, there are 6 trainees in training. Commonly, there is a shortage of spare-parts, i.e., spark plugs, batteries etc. Overall, the AGE Shop is well-organized and operational. The maintenance activity is performing well, but some problems are caused by the responsibility of assisting Can Tho field maintenance and supply functions.

(8) Contractor Training at Phu Cat Air Base.

(a) LSI currently has 171 students in training. This is 16 more than projected by the Logistics Training Plan. Their training effort averages one hour of classroom work to seven hours practical OJT. Part of their students are available in the morning and part in the afternoon. This is because the VNAF need to man their shops 24 hours a day. This is accomplished with a work schedule of 24 hours on and 24 hours off.

(b) Training in the UH-1H Helicopter Shop is progressing very well. All of the trainees have completed training on approximately 85% of the Speciality Training Standard (STS) items. Training in the Engine Shop is very limited, with an acute need for special tools. The OJT program in the Instrument Shop is found to be thriving and successful.

(c) The overall training effort at Phu Cat is progressive and energetic, with evidence of exceeding the projection of the Logistics Training Plan. LSI Training

Managers are impressive in their attempts to improve training at Phu Cat AB.

(9) Contractor Training at Can Tho Air Base.

(a) LSI has 30 trainees in 2 AFSCs: Electrical and Rotor Wing. On the UH-1H Helicopter, trainees are receiving approximately 2 hours of formal training each weekday and 4 hours each Saturday. Operational commitments require a 24-hour shift which adversely affects training during the limited time allotted.

(b) The building and classrooms renovated at Can Tho for training purposes have been supplied with all necessary equipment, materials, and training implements, and are considered excellent for formal training. LSI personnel have made contributions of time, effort, and expense to develop the training establishment and are to be commended for the attention they are giving to both program and students.

(c) Major problems were identified in these shops: AGE, Electrical Fuel Systems, Corrosion Control, Engines, Hydraulics, and Instruments, where training facilities are sub-standard. These problems are due to the recent transfer from Soc Trang. Efforts are being made to correct these deficiencies. There is an outstanding requirement in each shop area for technical orders, manuals, supplies, equipment and tools.

(d) Overall, LSI is doing a commendable job in training personnel and assisting the VNAF in resolving the aforementioned problems.

(10) Contractor Training at Bien Hoa Air Base (3d Air Division).

(a) There are currently 32 LSI contract personnel assigned to the 30th M&S Group conducting training within 7 AFSCs for approximately 157 trainees. Training in these areas is showing improvement over the past and many problems in the shops are being resolved. An outstanding contributing factor to the improvement of training at Bien Hoa (3d AD) is the provision of a new, efficient group of LSI managers and training administrators. The favorable turn-over of key training personnel is expected to make a highly favorable impact on training in the future.

(b) A negative aspect to training is the relatively poor condition of classrooms and training facilities, i.e., no student chairs, no desks, poor lighting, no blackboards and poor ventilation. A request has been made for funds to construct new, improved classrooms.

(c) The Wing Group Commander expressed interest and satisfaction with the Logistics Training Plan and its contents (as it applies to Bien Hoa, 3d AD).

c. Contracts Monitored by DAO Navy Division.

(1) The VNN Logistics Support Branch (LSB) had two contracts with training classes during FY 3/74:

(a) PA&E (Contract No. DAJB02-73-C-0011)

(1) Military students.

(2) No students entered training during FY 3/74.

(3) No students completed training during FY 3/74.

(4) No students remained in training on 31 March 1974.

(5) Objective: To provide technical and educational assistance to develop and implement a training curriculum for all levels of VNN logistics management.

(6) Assessment: Although this contract completed in January 1974, all training had been concluded in December 1973. As reported last quarter, the program was successful in importing basic principles of management and management practices to VNN personnel; the contract met its objective.

(b) Potomac Research, Inc. (Contract No. N00024-73-C-5431)

(1) Military students.

(2) 12 students entered training during FY 3/74.

(3) 24 students completed training during FY 3/74.

(4) No students remained in training on 31 March 1974.

(5) Objective: To teach VNN personnel how to maintain and overhaul the diesel engines that drive their craft.

(6) Assessment: The Diesel Engine Overhaul School at LSB Nha Be continues to be the single most important logistic training facility in the Vietnamese Navy. Contractor involvement in this training course has been completed, and the course is conducted entirely by VNN personnel without assistance from U.S. contractor instructors. In successfully Vietnamizing this training course, the contract met its objective.

(2) The VNN Logistics Support Branch no longer has any active, ongoing contractor training efforts. Therefore, no input will be submitted by AOSND-L for the FY 4/74 Quarterly Assessment.

d. Contracts Monitored by DAO Army Division.

(1) Eastern Construction Company, Incorporated.

(a) Under Contract DAJB04-74-C-0018, formal instruction and on the job training was provided in the following areas:

(1) Organizational and support level maintenance of major weapons sytems and combat vehicles.

(2) Maintenance management techniques at the organizational and support levels, to include the effective utilization of organic reports and data.

(3) The employment of special tools and test equipment (organizational and support levels).

(4) Supply operations and management (organizational, support, and depot levels).

(b) Assessment: Effective, although a lack of training aids and incomplete reference material continue to present minor disruptions. As has been previously reported, these difficulties are minimized thru improvisation and satisfactory instruction is rendered.

(2) Hughes Aircraft Company.

(a) Under Contract DAJB02-73-C-0009, training in TOW System direct support maintenance was provided both in periods of formal instruction and during on the job training. Additionally, Hughes personnel participated in an inspection tour conducted by the RVNAF IG and provided informal instruction and technical assistance during visits to units in the field.

(b) Assessment: Although the instruction provided by the Hughes engineers is considered to have been satisfactory, present planning calls for termination of the contract at the end of the current Fiscal Year, with replacement of the Hughes personnel by two AMC Missile Maintenance Technicians. It is estimated that this action will result in an annual savings of approximately $121,000.

(3) Dynalectron Corporation.

(a) Under Contract DAAK01-70-C-5873, formal instruction in Material Handling Equipment (MHE) operator and organizational maintenance was expanded to include the northern portion of RVN at the 2nd Associated Depot in DaNang. Similar training was provided at the 1st Associated Depot, Long Binh, during the first half, FY74.

(b) Assessment: Observed to be highly effective with an ancillary benefit of a reduction in the number of deadlined MHE assets.

(4) Vinnel Corporation.

(a) Under Contract DAJB11-72-C-0333, continued on the job training was provided at the 40th Engineer Base Depot in the following general areas of the depot maintenance operation.

(1) Rebuild of major end items and secondary components.

(2) Quality assurance and production control.

(3) Depot supply management.

(b) Assessment: Observed to be effective.

(5) PA&E.

(a) PA&E conducted formal training for RVNAF personnel under the RVNAF Facilities Engineering Self-Sufficiency Program at contractor operated training centers in Da Nang and Long Binh during third quarter FY74. Sixteen classes were completed with 173 students graduating. Courses taught included Prescribed Load List Management, Facilities Engineering Management, High Voltage Switchgear Repair and High Voltage Line Repair.

(b) PA&E also conducted an OJT program of signif-

icant magnitude in the repair and overhaul of large generators and air conditioners at the 40th Engineers Base Depot and the Medium Maintenance Centers in each of the five Area Logistics Command. A total of 291 trainees are participating in this program and training is progressing satisfactorily.

(c) On site OJT is also being conducted for approximately 100 ARVN personnel in power plant operations and maintenance at the Newport Power Plant, the Cam Ranh Main Force Plant and the Cam Ranh Navy Transmitter Site Power Plant. Trainees at all three sites continue to show improvement.

(d) In addition, OJT in logistics management and in the operation, maintenance and repair of facilities, to include installed equipment and utility systems, is being conducted at the 13 Military Property Construction Offices located throughout Vietnam. More than 2,000 ARVN personnel are benefiting from the OJT.


(6) Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Mendenhall (DMJM).

Under the ARVN-LOC program, the technical assistance contractor, DMJM, is conducting OJT in operation of construction equipment, bridge design, materials and soils testing. Approximately 500 ARVN personnel are benefiting directly and indirectly from this OJT.

(Figures 11-1, 11-2, 11-3, 11-4, 11-5, 11-6, 11-7 and 11-8)

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ARVN SERVICE SCHOOLS



Pleiku:
Jr Military School

Phu Cuong (Binh Duong):
Engineer School

Saigon:
Admin and Fin School
AG School
ARM Force Language School
Intelligence School
Mil God School
National Defense College ***
Ordnance School
POLWAR Cadre TC
QM School
Social SVC School
Transportation School
WAFC School
Medical School ****

Duc My:
Artillery School

Qui Nhon

Dalat:
POLWAR Col **
Phan VNMA
Rang

Bien Hoa:
C&GS Col (Long Binh)
LOG Mgt School *
Armor School (Bear Cat)

Vung Tau:
Power Gen & Air Cond Main School
Jr Military School
MP School
Signal School

Thu Duc:
Infantry School
Band School
Martial Art and PHY Trng School

Note:
* Monitored by CLC, JGS
** Controlled by General POLWAR Dep, JGS
*** Monitored by JGS
**** Monitored by RVNAF Surgeon General

Figure 11-1

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ARVN TRAINING CENTERS




Figure 11-2

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VNN AND VNMC TRAINING CENTERS AND SCHOOLS




Figure 11-3

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UNCLASSIFIED

VNAF
TRAINING CENTERS AND SCHOOLS




Figure 11-4

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BREAKDOWN OF REPLACEMENTS SENT TO MR'S FROM NATIONAL TRAINING CENTERS DURING:

1973

MR	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
1	1836	1493	2375	2361	1654	2234	2637	2642	2961	1708	1318	1342
2	2540	1977	2388	1647	1382	2491	1968	1639	1846	1912	2230	2205
3	1340	2079	1010	1265	2567	2080	2227	1933	2080	1975	1701	1710
4	2493	2497	2205	2224	2088	3510	2056	1626	3410	2585	2759	2372

1974

1	1014	761	811
2	1654	4050	939
3	722	420	[illegible]
4	1502	1242	949

Figure 11-5

UNCLASSIFIED

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REPLACEMENTS DURING 1973

	TRAINING CENTERS	RECRUITED & TRAINED LOCALLY	TOTAL
MR I	24561	21936	46497
MR II	24225	8056	32281
MR III	21967	21224	43191
MR IV	29825	14898	44723
RANGER	NONE	15164	15164
TOTAL	100578	81278	181856

Figure 11-6

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UNCLASSIFIED

BREAKDOWN OF REPLACEMENTS RECRUITED AND TRAINED BY UNIT IN 1973

MR	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
1												
1st Div	146	179	226	212	266	306	244	558	265	303	359	265
2nd Div	182	211	417	280	431	530	528	748	341	536	272	161
3rd Div	95	54	152	228	247	273	309	663	221	388	370	237
ABN	401	588	1677	1046	606	698	522	452	518	11	0	74
MARINE	368	761	915	226	277	264	305	255	227	296	55	191
2												
22nd Div	133	204	378	232	260	342	332	639	351	518	345	327
23rd Div	157	175	509	431	273	422	381	330	354	333	270	360
3												
5th Div	179	338	620	466	422	355	412	355	719	1452	99	27
18th Div	291	787	1036	1208	928	964	886	749	161	10	0	0
25th Div	394	936	1809	1122	1141	991	1032	601	133	4	0	0
81st ABN	0	0	155	133	3	96	80	72	34	24	0	0
4												
7th Div	279	435	916	761	699	676	813	791	719	336	374	460
9th DIV	169	220	406	361	221	268	223	454	285	537	485	332
21st Div	199	182	424	400	474	286	253	423	177	397	303	160
RANGER	434	351	1586	2189	935	1710	1514	2308	1391	1329	576	841

Figure 11-7

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BREAKDOWN OF REPLACEMENTS RECRUITED AND TRAINED BY UNIT 1974

MR	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH
1			
1ST DIV	188	377	406
2ND DIV	58	548	496
3RD DIV	217	459	466
ABN DIV	57	348	685
MARINE	114	747	684
2			
22ND DIV	170	464	471
23RD DIV	181	513	549
3			
5TH DIV	42	134	1120
18TH DIV	0	168	842
25TH DIV	0	0	491
81ST ABN GRG	0	0	0
4			
7TH DIV	299	798	684
9TH DIV	224	195	480
21ST DIV	89	295	266
FOR ALL MR's			
RANGERS	455	1826	1941
AF	0	0	0
VNN	0	0	350
RF	2146	5344	5966
PF	538	2090	3449

Figure 11-8

CHAPTER 12

RVNAF PROGRAMS, PLANS AND MORALE

1. (U) INTRODUCTION. Chapter 12 contains topics concerning all services including:

a. Lines of Communication (LOC)

b. Military Construction (MILCON)

c. RVNAF Retirement Plan CY74.

d. RVNAF Morale

e. RVNAF Medical Evacuation

f. Chieu Hoi Program

g. Terrorism

h. Refugee Program

i. Reduction Program - Bulk Petroleum

2. (C) LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

a. Waterways. The approximate 5,000 kilometers of navigable waterways in RVN, primarily in MR 3 and 4, continue to increase in importance as a major means of communication and transportation. Much of the recent rice harvest in the Delta area was transported along the river and canal network. The Vietnamese Navy (VNN) has been generally providing a satisfactory level of security along the main waterways with no major incidents directed towards commercial shipping. e.g., the Mekong River Convoys to Cambodia. However, the enemy continues to direct a moderate level of activity against the VNN "Brown Water Navy," i.e., the Waterway Patrol and Riverine Forces. Waterway improvement and dredging operations continue at a satisfactory rate. The Vietnamese Dredging Agency (VDA) reported that 798,400 cubic meters of silt and debris was removed during the last quarter, as compared to 841,735 cubic

meters during the previous quarter. Although a greater amount was reported in the previous quarter, it is thought (by the USAID project managers) that this quarter's report is more accurate and, therefore, compares favorably.

b. Railways. Republic of Vietnam (RVN) railroad operations were drastically curtailed from the start of the quarter. Trains have ceased to run on approximately 400 km of track, primarily due to a lack of security. Almost all of the track that has become inoperative lies within MR 2 and to a lesser extent in MR 3. Most railroad (RR) reconstruction was also halted because of the withdrawal of security forces. There is slightly more than 200 km of track left in operation (Figure 12-1). Pursuant to a Presidential decision, the Joint General Staff (JGS) authorized the Corps Commanders of MR 2 and 3 to: "Withdraw all forces presently assigned to provide security for railway reconstruction camps and to utilize them in local security programs." Subsequently, the Vietnam Railway Authority determined that Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and Territorial Forces were generally not providing adequate security for regular RR operations as well, at least not in MR 2, and suspended them accordingly. This is the first time in recent history that this portion of the railway has not operated. Indications are that there are more than security considerations involved. During CY 1973 there was considerable discussion in the GVN regarding the economic feasibility of maintaining the vulnerable RR. This, too, has apparently influenced the decision of the President. Moreover, there are definite possibilities of commercial and other vested interests at stake, e.g., truckers, bus operators and similar concerns; which also may have influenced the GVN in this regard. The predictable impact of limited RR operations is that the GVN and Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) will suffer the higher costs of highway transportation and road maintenance, while RR equipment and track deteriorates from the lack of use. Despite the limited stretches of operational track, traffic on the RR during the last quarter exceeded that of the previous quarter. Traffic was reported as follows:

Metric tonnage	Passengers
12,928	1,601,075



REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
MAP SHOWING
VIETNAM RAILWAY SYSTEM
AS OF 31 MARCH 1974
MAIN LINE:
SAIGON TO DONG HA 1.109Km
SPUR LINES LEGEND:
BIEN HOA TO LOC NINH 117Km
THAP CHAM TO DALAT 84Km
MUONG MAN TO PHAN THIET 12Km
DIEU TRI TO QUI NHON 10Km
NGA BA TO BA NGOI 5Km
BA REN TO AN HOA 20Km
TOTAL 1.357Km
STEEL BRIDGES OVER 20M 112
CONCRETE BRIDGES OVER 10M 221
TUNNELS 27
17th PARALLEL
DONG HA Km 620
QUANG TRI Km 633
MY CHANH Km 651
HUE Km 688
DA NANG Km 791
TAM KY Km 864
AN HOA Km 20
QUANG NGAI Km 927
MY HOA Km 1062
PHU CAT Km 1070
DIEU TRI Km 1095
QUI NHON Km 10
VAN CANH Km 1123
TUY HOA Km 1197
NHA TRANG Km 1314
NGA BA Km 1363
DALAT Km 84
BA NGOI Km 5
THAP CHAM (PHAN RANG)
SONG LONG SON Km 1462
MA LAM Km 1530
LONG BINH
BIEN HOA Km 1699
MUONG MAN Km 1550
LONG KHANH Km 1648
SAIGON Km 1730
PHAN THIET Km 12
CHOLON Km 5
GIA RUYNH Km 1613
LAOS
CAMBODIA
SOUTH CHINA SEA
LEGEND :
OPERATIONAL
UNDER RECONSTRUCTION
DISCONTINUED SINCE FEB 1965 DUE TO FLOOD DAMAGE AND INSECURITY
DISCONTINUED SINCE 31 DEC 1973 DUE TO LACK OF SECURITY FORCES
REHABILITATION - 50% COMPLETED-1973 WORK STOPPED 1974 - DUE TO LACK OF SECURITY FORCES
RAILROAD STATION
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY

Figure 12-1

3. (U) MILITARY CONSTRUCTION.

a. The Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF)/ Military Construction (MILCON) Program provides for construction and major rehabilitation of RVNAF facilities.

b. The AMASF/MILCON program is administered by USARSUPTHAI. All work is done by fixed-price contractors. Problems arise for Vietnamese contractors when offshore procurement is required due to long lead times and complicated importing procedures set by the GVN.

(1) Funded Projects Under Construction:

Infantry School - Bear Cat	CWE $3,667,000
450 Bed Hospital Part A - Saigon	1,037,000
Hospital Equipment	500,000
Clothing Factory - Go Vap	312,000
Arsenal Foundry - Go Vap	195,000
54th Construction Bn - Hoc Mon	185,000
	$5,896,000

(2) Funded Projects Under Design/ Advertisement:

Arsenal Phase II - Go Vap	$985,000
450 Bed Hospital - Part B - Saigon	850,000
534th Ammo Depot - Bien Hoa	30,000
536th Ammo Depot - Tay Ninh	228,000


(3) Funded Projects on Hold: Eleven other Ammunition Depot upgrades have been funded on Construction Directive Lot 190, dated 28 November 1973, however, the $4.2 million programmed for this work has not been released for construction.

c. Inflation during the first three quarters of FY74 has posed severe problems for construction contractors in Vietnam. The price of cement has inflated from VN$610 to VN$2400 per bag. There are periodic shortages due to inability of local manufacturer to meet demand. The price of reinforcing steel and other construction materials has increased rapidly; likewise, the price of POL products has skyrocketed.

(Figure 12-2)

Figure 12-2

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFLATION AND OPERATIONAL EXPENDITURES



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4. (U) RVNAF RETIREMENT PLAN CY 74.

a. As mentioned in previous assessments, the RVNAF Demobilization Plan for CY 74 is based on three new Laws: #58, 59 and 486. Laws #58 and 59 were signed 26 December 1972 and Law #486 was signed 26 May 1973 by President Thieu. Law #58 prescribed age limits for Regular Force personnel, Law #59 prescribed age limits for Reserve Force personnel and Law #486 prescribed age limits for Regional Force personnel.

(Figures 12-3, 12-4 and 12-5)

b. The last assessment reported 40,035 personnel to be demobilized during CY 74. The number of personnel demobilized during the first quarter CY 74 is shown in Figure 12-6 and is 10,751.

c. There has been no change in the military pension regulations covered in the previous quarterly assessment. Seniority pensions are granted to all service personnel who complete 25 years of civil and military service. Extra credits toward the 25 year eligibility can still be obtained from the special category service or circumstances formerly enumerated.

d. The scope of responsibility of the Ministry of War Veterans (MWV) remains unchanged. The MWV approved budget for CY 1974 is 32,246,119,000$VN; an increase of 7,452,022,000$VN over the CY 1973 budget. All 44 Provincial City Service Centers are staffed and functioning throughout the country.

5. (C) RVNAF MORALE.

a. JGS has indicated that RVNAF morale is gauged by the following indicators: Leadership, desertion rate, discipline, present for duty versus assigned strength, troop appearance, equipment losses, conduct of troops on and off duty, combat effectiveness, and Esprit de Corps (e.g., Defense of Tonle Cham).

b. JGS issued a series of memorandums which revealed that a significant quantity of Peoples Self Defense Forces' (PSDF) weapons were lost to the enemy. The memorandums stated that the majority of weapons were lost due to lack of vigilance and close control within the ranks, failure to properly screen members to discover enemy infrastructure personnel, and the lack of proper organization and leadership at all echelons. An analysis of enemy contacts and attacks by enemy forces on the PSDF indicated that more weapons were

AGE-LIMITS PRESCRIBED IN STATUTE FOR REGULAR PERSONNEL

Reference: Article 191, Decree #058-TT/SLU, dated 26 December 1972

GRADE	Age-Limits		
	A	B	C
Private, PFC, Corporal, CFC	39	40	42
NCO	42	45	47
2LT, 1LT	43	46	48
Captain	44	47	56
Major	45	48	51
Lieutenant Colonel	46	49	52
Colonel	48	52	55
Brigadier General, Major General	50	54	57
Lieutenant General	52	56	58
General	54	58	
General of the Army	56	60	

Age Limit A: Applies to flight, frogmen and submarine personnel.

Age Limit B: Applies to:

- Army : Personnel Combat Arms and Combat Support Arms.
- Navy : Marine seafaring personnel and personnel serving with shore establishment not pertaining to age limit C.
- Air Force : Personnel not pertaining to age limits A&C.

Age Limit C : Applies to:

Specialist personnel in the Armed Services.

Figure 12-3

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AGE-LIMITS PRESCRIBED IN STATUTE
FOR RESERVE PERSONNEL

Reference: Article 119, Decree #059-TT/SLU, dated 26 December 1972

G R A D E	Age-Limits		
	A	B	C
Private, PFC, Corporal	42	43	45
NCO	45	48	50
2LT, 1LT, WO	46	49	51
Captain	47	50	53
Major	48	51	54
Lieutenant Colonel	49	52	55
Colonel	51	55	58
Brigadier General, Major General	53	57	60
Lieutenant General	55	59	61
General	57	61	
General of the Army	59	63	

NOTE: When reaching the above age limits, in-service personnel must be discharged.

Figure 12-4

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AGE-LIMITS PRESCRIBED IN STATUTE
FOR REGIONAL FORCE PERSONNEL

Reference: Article 173, Decree #486-TT/SL, dated 26 May 1973

	Age-Limits	
	Combat	Specialist
Private, PFC, Corporal, Sergeant	41	43
NCO	46	48
Aspirant, 2LT, 1LT	47	49
Captain	48	51
Major	49	53
Lieutenant Colonel	50	55
Colonel	53	58

NOTE: When reaching the above age limits, Regional Forces personnel must be discharged.

Figure 12-5

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DEMOBILIZATION DURING FIRST QUARTER CY 74

a. Over Age Personnel.

	OFF	NCO	EM	TOTAL
Regular Forces	961	2,315	137	3,413
RF	202	733	363	1,298
PF	0	0	30	30
Total	1,163	3,048	530	4,741

b. WAC Contract Expiration and Retirement - 102.

c. Category #2. Physically unfit.

Regular Forces	202	387	1,445	2,034
RF	9	130	883	1,022
PF	0	0	525	525
Total	211	517	2,853	3,581

d. Category #3. Disabled.

Regular Forces	121	172	643	936
RF	8	133	214	355
PF	0	0	36	36
Total	129	305	893	1,327

e. Grand Total of all Categories.

Regular Forces	1,284	2,874	2,225	6,383
RF	219	996	1,460	2,675
PF	0	0	591	591
WAC	0	59	43	102
Total	1,503	3,929	4,319	9,751

Figure 12-6

lost than personnel casualties reported. Soldiers abandoning their units and leaving their weapons behind during combat operations or abandoning their outposts when attacked by enemy forces were reasons cited. Another explanation was that "phantom" soldering and "gold bricking" practices still exist and PSDF units take advantage of enemy contacts to report casualties for adjustment of strength figures.

c. Another aspect of morale addressed was the lack of military discipline within RVNAF. Specifically, the poor appearance of the soldiers, coming to work late and departing early, as well as frequent absences without proper authority were cases cited. Unit Commanders were admonished for not applying military disciplinary sanctions, but to the contrary, excused the violators or reprimanded them only as a matter of form.

d. The memorandums established guidelines for corrective measures and instructions for implementation at all levels of command throughout RVNAF.

e. Military discipline in MR 1 declined further this quarter as evidenced by police reports and the concern of the MR 1 Commanding General. The most frequently mentioned cause was the economic situation. Some commanders also felt that another important factor was the limit imposed on their latitude in administering punishment. The economic situation induced soldiers to leave restaurants without paying, steal livestock, and to pilfer goods and money from travelers. The National and Military Police have not been intimidated and have usually apprehended the offenders. The disciplinary procedure has been more difficult to control. Commanders have been able to impose only 30 days restriction, which most troops view as a respite from duty. More arduous punishment must be reviewed by a board, and subsequently reviewed by the Joint General Staff in Saigon prior to administration. According to many officers, the JGS has usually reduced sentences. JGS Memorandum No. 1175, cited in paragraph b, above, may help alleviate this problem.

f. Morale of RVNAF units in MR 4 appears to be less affected by economic problems than in other military regions. Although military personnel and their families certainly suffer from inflation, coupled with low salaries, most sources agree that the effect on morale so far, has been minimal because of the abundance and relatively low price of food in the delta. Command level RVNAF officers, however, are concerned

about the problem and the gradual erosion of morale which will probably occur if the situation persists. Commanders and troops agree that increased salaries will not solve the problem because of rising prices, but most feel that vast changes in the commissary system will be required if relief is to be realized through that channel. As presently constituted, the commissary system offers little or no saving over outside purchases. In some cases, such as sugar, short measuring actually makes the commissary more expensive than the outside market. The most significant manifestation of the economic problem has been the increased pressure on troops to seek outside work. Moonlighting has been a contributing factor to the overall low present for duty strength. So far, RVNAF troops in MR 4 seem to accept economic hardship as the inevitable result of war, and their poverty has not yet been translated into hostility toward the government. Although some bitterness has been expressed toward what is seen as lack of interest on the part of command-level officers, PF's in particular, seem to feel that their problems are being ignored and that their situation is worse than that of the other services. Reports of corruption persist, including the payment by rear-service troops of their combat allowance (4500$ VN/month) to regimental commanders in return for staying out of combat. A deserter from the 21st Infantry Division gave this practice and failure to be granted semi-annual leave as reasons for his desertion.

g. The effectiveness and morale of territorial forces are closely related to the area of assignment. RF battalions, assigned outside the provinces to which they are organic, suffer much higher desertion rates than when assigned within their home provinces. To alleviate these problems, CG, 21st Infantry Division, has ordered strict adherence to his schedule for rotating RF troops back to their home provinces. He further claims that this policy has helped to improve morale, but non-organic battalions in Chuong Thien, in particular, continue to suffer lower morale and much higher desertion rates than when stationed in their own provinces.

h. A major cause of irritation among the PF troops is the complaint that the PFs continue to be assigned to insecure areas, while the better trained and equipped RFs are assigned to more secure areas. The MR 4 Commander has repeatedly ordered an end to this practice.

i. One of the most important missions of the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) is to create and maintain the loyalty of the RVNAF to their leaders, nation, and national ideology. To fulfill this endeavor, many intermediate objectives must be achieved. Foremost among these is the creation of an environment within which a soldier can be expected to be loyal. If a soldier is overly concerned about his food, pay, or living conditions, is worried about his family or feels that he is not being treated fairly then any motivational or indoctrination program will not succeed. The GPWD is making every effort to improve the soldier's lot. Some examples currently underway include dependent welfare programs, lectures, movies, radio and TV, magazines and newspapers and sports/entertainment programs. Social service support is provided to all military personnel and their dependents. Examples of welfare support programs include assistance in kind, assistance in cash, education, medical and maternity care, youth activities, and self-help programs.

j. Desertions among RVNAF stabilized during the quarter. The overall trend for RVNAF reflects an increase; however, VNAF, VNN and the Airborne desertion rates decreased during the period.

DESERTION RATE (PERCENT)

BRANCH	SEP-NOV	DEC-FEB	CHANGE
ARVN	2.31	2.38	+ .07
VNAF	.23	.19	- .04
VNN	.26	.22	- .04
VNMC	1.74	2.16	+ .42
RF	1.49	1.72	+ .23
PF	.57	.67	+ .10
RANGER	5.71	5.72	+ .01
AIRBORNE	2.87	1.84	- 1.03

k. RVNAF desertion trends are shown in Figure 12-7



DESERTION RATES
REGULAR FORCES
REGIONAL FORCES
POPULAR FORCES
18000
16000
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR
1973
1974

Figure 12-7

6. (C) RVNAF MEDICAL EVACUATION (MEDEVAC). The primary vehicle for emergency MEDEVAC in RVNAF is the UH-1 helicopter. During the eight months from July 1973 - February 1974, MEDEVAC constituted approximately 7.7% of VNAF total helicopter operational flying. VNAF has 103 UH-1 helicopters assigned to the MEDEVAC mission. Use of these assets for their intended purpose is sporadic and varies among military regions depending upon MR Commander emphasis. The value of rapid casualty movement is its impact on medical success and morale. Except during adverse weather conditions, aerial MEDEVAC is the most efficient means available, both day and night. LTG Trung in MR 1 currently makes the best use of MEDEVAC, followed by the Commanders of MRs 2, 3, and 4, respectively. More command emphasis by the latter group will be necessary before this valuable asset is fully utilized. A breakdown of helicopter MEDEVAC for 1973-1974 is as follows:

MONTH	SORTIES	HOURS	WIA MEDEVAC
28 Jan-28 Feb 73	1788	886	1884
Mar	1711	857	3093
Apr	1788	829	1347
May	3544	1795	1003
Jun	1809	1120	3482
Jul	2239	931	2770
Aug	3221	1773	3333
Sep	3922	1807	2766
Oct	2378	967	2941
Nov	4073	1997	1697
Dec	4844	2331	2689
Jan 74	3771	1775	2552
Feb	3606	1636	2540

7. (C) CHIEU HOI PROGRAM. Since its inception in 1963, the Chieu Hoi program has been credited with some 223,400 ralliers for the RVN. Figures 12-8 and 12-9 depict the 11 year history of one of the more successful programs undertaken by the GVN.

8. (C) TERRORISM. Terrorist acts have taken a heavy toll since 1 January 1968. To date, approximately 31,710 governmental and nongovernmental civilians have been killed and 74,015 wounded. It is interesting to note that since the initial ceasefire, there has been an increase in the number of governmental civilian casualties, while on the other hand, nongovernmental civilian casualties have significantly decreased.

(Figure 12-10)

9. (C) REFUGEE PROGRAM. Refugees have had a significant impact on the GVN. The refugee problem began in 1954 and continues with no end in sight. ARVN currently has plans for assisting refugee relocation in seven provinces within MRs 2, 3, and 4. ARVN plans for assistance for these sites varies from 28 to 300 days in terms of manpower and equipment support. The GVN has already allocated 8,800 hectares of land and funded over 349,000,000$VN for the relocation and support of the refugees. This program will affect over 173,000 people. Of these, approximately 61,000 Vietnamese were already residents of the selected refugee sites. Statistics reflecting the overall refugee status are shown in Figures 12-11 and 12-12. Figure 12-13 depicts sites.

10. (S) REDUCTION PROGRAM - BULK PETROLEUM (POL).

a. The petroleum support program to RVNAF was interrupted by the Arabian embargo against sale of POL to the United States. Supplies to RVNAF via commercial oil companies ceased on 12 Nov 73 with the cessation of imports to RVN.

b. Action was taken prior to the embargo to reduce RVNAF consumption of POL consistent with measures being taken world-wide in light of the energy crisis.

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


Figure 12-8

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


Figure 12-9

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Figure 12-10

TERRORISM CASUALTIES

	PERIOD				CHANGE/MO	
	1 JAN 68-28 JAN 73		28 JAN 73-31 MAR 74			
	KILLED	WND	KILLED	WND	KILLED	WND
OFFICIALS, CADRE PSDF AND NP	5,355	9,266	1,234	2,291	NC	↑8%
CIVILIANS	21,920	53,159	3,201	9,299	↓36%	↓24%
TOTAL	27,275	62,425	4,435	11,590		

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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


Figure 12-11

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



Figure 12-12

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* HECTARAGE NOT YET DETERMINED

Figure 12-13

c. Because conservation of POL was stressed and enforced, the embargo found RVNAF with the following days of supply on hand country wide:

MOGAS	DIESEL	AVGAS	JP4
40	7	24	30

d. To sustain operations without interruption because of fuel shortage, sufficient Diesel fuel was borrowed from commercial oil suppliers to meet requirements. Emergency shipments of POL were made from PACOM and by 15 Dec 73 there was sufficient fuel to maintain normal consumption through Dec 73 and on 1 Jan 74 have 30 days reserve stock on hand. We also repayed borrowed Diesel fuel stocks.

e. Imposed conservation initiated jointly by RVNAF and DAO on RVNAF resulted in the following quantity reductions with monetary savings shown:

(1) Consumption:

DAILY CONSUMPTION	MOGAS (BBLS)	DIESEL (BBLS)	AVGAS (BBLS)	JP4 (BBLS)	TOTAL (BBLS)
JUL 73	3,240	10,287	2,337	8,080	23,944
SEP 73	3,067	9,667	1,800	4,800	19,334
NOV 73	2,927	8,703	1,499	4,880	18,009

(2) Percentage reduced from July consumption:

	MOGAS	DIESEL	AVGAS	JP4	OVERALL
SEP 73	5%	6%	23%	41%	19%
NOV 73	10%	15%	36%	40%	25%

(3) Monetary savings forced by the conservation program. Computations made using as a basic cost the July support level.

MOGAS	DIESEL	AVGAS	JP4	TOTAL
$78,750	$478,800	$443,470	$1,048,320	$2,049,290

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CHAPTER 13

JGS COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. (C) CHAIN OF COMMAND.


a. Previous quarterly assessments covered the organization for national defense within the Government of Vietnam (GVN) from the President as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, down to the Military Regions/Corps (MR/Corps). Those assessments provided information that covered the relationship between the Joint General Staff (JGS) and the Vietnamese Air Force and Navy (VNAF & VNN), the Airborne and Marine Divisions, and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) combat branches; the Artillery, Armor and Ranger Commands. This quarterly assessment continues to outline how the JGS functions in relation to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, J-3/JGS, and the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD). As stated in previous assessments, the JGS primarily manages rather than exercising command and control. The J-3/JGS ensures that JGS policies, directives, plans and doctrine are correctly interpreted and effectively implemented by field commanders. The function of the GPWD is somewhat different and less rigid. The Chief, GPWD, receives minimal command guidance from the Chief/JGS and in normal operations prepares and proposes plans to the Chief/JGS for approval. Frequently, the Chief, GPWD, receives instructions directly from the President or through the Minister of National Defense (MOND). Some GPWD programs and operations are coordinated with and influenced by the Ministry of Information and Open Arms. However, GPWD does not respond to guidance or directives from this Ministry unless passed through the MOND or dictated by the President. This illustrates that control of GPWD is held at the highest level of government. An exception is that some GPWD Political Warfare (POLWAR) Battalions are assigned to support field operations and are controlled by the MR/Corps Commanders.

b. The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations is organized and staffed as shown in Figure 13-1. The ACofS, J-3 Operations operates basically within the framework of well-defined and strictly adhered to guidelines as determined by the Chief/JGS, the Chief of Staff/JGS, and the Assistant to the Chief, JGS for Operations (when so delegated). The J-3/JGS assesses and reports combat operations and enemy initiated ceasefire violations. Additionally, the J-3 coordinates plans and policies with other JGS staff elements, commands and branches, and Corps/MR Commanders. The chart at Figure 13-2 depicts the operations relationship from the JGS down to sector (province). The operations elements at each level in the chain of command are not extensions of J-3/JGS, but are organic and responsible to their respective commanders.

(1) It has taken the JGS, and particularly the Office of ACofS, J-3, the better part of CY 73 to adjust to the restrictions [illegible] of Engagement established by the Ceasefire Agreement. One of the more significant functions now performed by the J-3/JGS under the Ceasefire Agreement is the monitoring, recording and reporting of all enemy initiated ceasefire violations, and the resultant [illegible] friendly/enemy personnel and equipment losses. These statistics are considered to be the official JGS record and are released to the GVN, the press and the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS).

(2) The J-3/JGS, under direction of the Chief/JGS, maintains a 24-hour-a-day staffing capability. This is accomplished primarily by a series of rotating operations teams who man and maintain the Joint Operations Center (JOC), plus a staff of senior officers who remain on-call to respond quickly to unforeseen emergencies. The JOC is in constant communication with Corps/MR Tactical Operations Centers (TOCs), tactical field commanders and sector commanders. Ceasefire violations, major enemy offensive operations and RVNAF activities are recorded and briefed.

COMMAND AND CONTROL
JOINT GENERAL STAFF, RVNAF



DCS/Operations

Figure 13-1

SIMPLIFIED ORGANIZATION CHART
DEPICTING OPERATIONS FUNCTIONS
WITH RVNAF




Figure 13-2

(3) J-3/JGS Operations is directed by an ARVN brigadier general with the title of Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, J-3/JGS. The J-3 staff has a total TO&E strength of 506; 263 officers, 177 NCO's and 66 EM. Figure 13-3 outlines the J-3/JGS organization. Assigned to the J-3/JGS are representatives from each of the Armed Services, Commands and Branches, and from J-2 and J-6 (as mentioned in previous assessments, the entire Joint General Staff is "Joint" in name only, being predominantly Army, with only minimal representation from other services). The J-3/JGS is subdivided into two major elements. The Assistant for Studies and Plans monitors three divisions and 16 branches. The Assistant for Operations consists of four divisions and 18 branches. This assessment will cover the general mission and major functions of the J-3/JGS in relation to the general policy and decision-making processes of the Chief/JGS. The JOC and Special Operations Center (SOC) will not be addressed in detail at this time. The JOC was covered in a previous assessment. The SOC primarily monitors the use of electronic detection devices and provides instructions and guidelines on such devices to Electronic Combat Detachments (ECDs). These ECDs are deployed throughout RVN with the Corps and Division to emplace sensors and monitor sensor activations.

(4) Stated General Mission of J-3/JGS.

Organize, coordinate, supervise and monitor all matters pertaining to RVNAF plans and operations.

(5) Functions of the J-3/JGS.

(a) Establish general operating instructions and recommend employment of units.

(b) Develop plans for the RVNAF. Coordinate inter-zone movements, plan and direct special joint service operations.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS
J-3/JGS, RVNAF ORGANIZATION CHART




Figure 13-3

(c) Establish, coordinate and monitor schedules of activations, inactivations and reorganizations of all RVNAF units.

(d) Establish force structure requirements, and review and publish TO&Es.

(e) Prepare and publish mission orders and standing operating procedures (SOPs) for RVNAF.

(f) Monitor pacification and development programs established by the GVN. Coordinate and monitor policies concerning military support of pacification and development. The Assistant Chief of JGS for Community Security, Development and Pacification is the JGS representative on the GVN Central Reconstruction and Development Council (CRDC). JGS responsibility is to insure territorial security to GVN programs and rural populace.

(g) Coordinate [illegible] tactical air support procedures and ANGLICO [illegible] in the RVNAF.

(h) Responsible for all matters regarding chemical weapons.

(i) Monitor [illegible] RVNAF units throughout the country.

(j) Monitor [illegible] situation throughout the country and report [illegible] situation to higher authorities.

(k) Assess RVNAF combat proficiency on a monthly, quarterly and annual basis.

(l) Provide staff assistance to the JGS/RVNAF Inspector General inspection teams to assist in inspecting, evaluating and reporting unit combat capability.

(m) Record and report operational statistics and losses at all levels of RVNAF.

(n) Organize shows of force and military ceremonies.

(o) Study and recommend training policies and concepts based on combat operational experience.

(p) Monitor joint service training.

(q) Study, prepare and publish battefield lessons learned.

(r) Supervise operations of the Joint Operations Center and Special Operations Centers.

(6) It can be seen from the mission and functions of the Office of the J-3/JGS, that the scope and nature of the JGS operations organization does not entail involvement with the active day-to-day detailed planning and conduct of combat operations in the field. Corps Commanders are given assets to accomplish their missions and they plan and execute combat operational plans. The Chief/JGS, through the J-3/JGS establishes the broader guidelines, plans and policies within which all commanders administer, support and employ their units. The Corps [illegible] are accountable to the President, as he has the exclusive appointment and removal authority over the Corps Commanders.

c. Prior to [illegible] PW, it should be noted that there [illegible] PW cadre. One type is directly [illegible] another is located in regular military units, schools, training centers, or support organizations [illegible] by the Commanding Officer [illegible] assigned. The Political Warfare [illegible] officers in GPWD and its subordinate organizations and the officers on the POLWAR staffs of all units/organizations at regimental level and above. The POLWAR officers at company and battalion level are members of the branch of the unit to which assigned, and their POLWAR duties are considered secondary. Political Warfare as it exists in South Vietnam (SVN) encompasses the areas of troop and dependent welfare, recreation and entertainment, indoctrination and motivation, civil affairs and civic action. Psychological warfare (PSYWAR) activities are directed at the accomplishment of the 3rd GPWD mission indicated below.

(1) The following statement of the GPWD missions shows why operational control is exercised by the highest level of government. The stated missions are listed in the order of operational priority and allocation of available [illegible].

(a) To create and maintain the loyalty of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces to their leaders, nation and national ideology.

(b) To gain and maintain the support of the civilian populace in both friendly and enemy controlled areas.

(c) To destroy the loyalty of enemy troops to their leaders, nation and national ideology.

d. The General Political Warfare Department is a major subdivision of the RVNAF Joint General Staff with the Chief, GPWD, [illegible]ving as Deputy Chief of Staff for POLWAR.

(S--)

e. Although [illegible]ized as a joint service organization, it is [illegible] an army lieutenant general, and the staff is [illegible]ly army at the present time. GPWD consis[illegible], six deputies/special assistants, [illegible] (T/O&E Units), a POLWAR College, [illegible] and operational units.

(1) The deputies/special assistants include: Deputy Chief for Troop Action, responsible for developing long range troop motivation and indoctrination programs; Deputy Chief for Public Action and Enemy Action, responsible for long [illegible]ublic action and PSYWAR programs; Deputy Chief for RF/PF, responsible for developing POLWAR activities within the Regional and Popular Forces; Deputy Chief for [illegible] of War (POW) Affairs, responsible for co[illegible] political warfare and indoctrination activities [illegible] camps; and Special Assistant for Planning, [illegible] for long range organizational program and [illegible]. These special staff members report direct[illegible] Chief, GPWD.



DCS POLWAR
CHIEF, GPWD
DEPUTY CHIEF GPWD
DEPUTY CHIEF FOR CIVIC ACTION AND ENEMY ACTION
DEPUTY CHIEF FOR POW AFFAIRS
DEPUTY CHIEF FOR RF/PF
DEPUTY CHIEF FOR TROOP ACTION
SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR PLANNING
SUBORDINATE UNITS
CHIEF OF STAFF
ADMIN BR.
BUDGET BR
SPORTS BR
INFO AND PUBLIC RELATION BR
POW BR
PLANS BR
ORGANIZATION BR.

Figure 13-4

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


Figure 13-5

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(2) The Staff [illegible] Organization Branch, responsible for TO&E [illegible] and general POLWAR organizations; Plans [illegible] responsible for preparing long range POLWAR [illegible]; POW Branch, responsible for supervising [illegible] indoctrination within the terms of Geneva [illegible] 1949; Information and Public Relations Branch, responsible for administration of military unit sports programs and managing teams which enter international competition; Budget Branch, responsible for the GPWD portion of the Ministry of National Defense budget; and the Admin Branch, responsible for routine administration of GPWD. This coordinating staff reports to the GPWD Chief of Staff. It should be noted that the staff does not include an office responsible for coordination or control of supply activities. [illegible] elaborated upon in shortfalls and assets.

(3) The depar[illegible]tes are TO&E units and include: Polit[illegible]tion and Training, responsible for t[illegible] programs, to include operati[illegible]ing Center; PSYWAR Department, [illegible] communications media supporting al[illegible] include Voice of Freedom Radio (gr[illegible]; Military Security Departm[illegible]ces (MSD/MSS), responsible fo[illegible]tion, counterespionage, [illegible] and security investigations; So[illegible]partment, responsible for insuring the [illegible] family; and the Chaplaine[illegible] serving the religi[illegible] and their dependents. [illegible] located in close proximity to GFPWD he[illegible] and are under the direct command and control [illegible].

(4) The POLWAR [illegible] concentrates on producing company level POLWAR [illegible] also conducts Basic and Intermed[illegible] officers' courses.

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(5) The operational elements of GPWD include five POLWAR Battalions and the mass communication media controlled by the PSYWAR Department. The mission of the POLWAR Battalions is to provide POLWAR support to the RVNAF. This includes troop education, motivation, indoctrination, civic action, and PSYWAR support, accomplished by PSYWAR platoons for tactical operations. Four of these battalions are assigned, one each to the Corps/MR areas and are under the operational control of the Corps Commanders. The companies organic to the battalions are further assigned in direct support of the combat divisions. The battalions and companies receive operational policy guidance from GPWD. Command and control relationships are depicted in Figure 13-6.

(6) The PSYWAR [illegible] operation requires amplification as [illegible] activities contributing to the accomplishment [illegible] GPWD missions. The primary objectives [illegible] Department are to develop broad thematic [illegible] and doctrine for national PSYWAR [illegible] programs, to supervise implementation [illegible] and to provide media support for the [illegible] systems. The PSYWAR Department asset[illegible] offset printing facility, a motion picture [illegible] high-wave broadcast radio systems [illegible] transmitters.

(7) The [illegible] newspaper is ostensibly a commercial [illegible] offices located in downtown Sai[illegible] by the Republic of Chi[illegible] equipment are not TO&E authorized. [illegible] self-sustaining with revenue obtain[illegible] advertisements and sale of papers. The newspaper [illegible] 20,000 copies daily.

f. With the [illegible] the Vietnamization program and espe[illegible] subsequent ceasefire agreement, the [illegible] concept has increased in importance. [illegible] of GPWD to motivate all RVNAF and [illegible] to continue resisting commu[illegible] to convince them that South Vietnam[illegible] accomplish this with limited foreign [illegible] ceasefire increased the importance of [illegible] ration and unification. Additionally, [illegible] awal of US Psychological Operation (PSYOP) [illegible] passed the total PSYOP responsibility to GP[illegible] especially true in PSYWAR activities [illegible] conducted.

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


Figure 13-6

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g. The importance of POLWAR and the magnitude of the operation can be indicated by the number of personnel involved. GPWD TO&Es provide for 7,374 military spaces. These figures do not include personnel not assigned to GPWD serving in a POLWAR capacity, or the many civilian employees on the Ministry of National Defense Payroll.

2. (C) SHORTFALL AND ASSESSMENT.

a. Shortfalls enumerated in previous quarterly assessments remain valid. The Joint General Staff (JGS) primarily coordinates RVNAF resources. While the Chief/JGS and the JGS headquarters staff exercise little day-to-day command and control, they continue to allocate resources to Corps/MR Commanders. Increased enemy pressures during the reporting period have compelled the JGS to attempt to acquire more valid and rapid reporting from the field. The new Chief of Staff/JGS has taken initial steps to transform the JOC from its present status as a high-level, low-geared "message center" into a probing and searching organization. The "whys" and "wherefores" behind reported incidents are beginning to be sought, and lessons learned are being analyzed for distribution to the field. It is a beginning, but much must be done to overcome the continuing lack of accurate and timely information from the field. Most of reports remaining entirely at the disposal of the Corps/MR Commanders. There are other significant and welcome indications that the new Chief of Staff/JGS (LTG Khuyen) is personally attempting to [illegible] standing problems in RVNAF. Prime examples are three recent memorandums he drafted for signature by the Chief/JGS. The first concerned measures which would significantly reduce the number of weapons lost to the enemy by the civilian Peoples Self-Defense Force. This memorandum is covered in Chaper 9 and discussed in part within Chapter 12. Second, noting that discipline and disciplinary sanctions were deteriorating within the RVNAF, LTG Khuyen initiated JGS action to correct the situation. In a memorandum (#1175/TTM/1PCTT/PC/QK, 3 April 1974) to all major commands and elements of the RVNAF, the JGS issued comprehensive instructions on intensification and implementation of military disciplinary action. These instructions are basically a reiteration of current regulations, particularly **Article 1 of Decree Law #11-TT/SLU, "Major Offenses"**, dated 2 September 1972. They are significant when

considering the recent emphasis placed on strict adherence by commanders to their enforcement. Article 1 covers such offenses as rebellion, joining or supporting a Communist organization, mutiny or surrender, desertion or abandoning post, rape, threatening or taking human life or property, protecting or condoning organizations engaged in theft, gambling or prostitution, bribery, improper use of influence, illegal transfer of funds, black market and narcotics operations, embezzlement of public funds and misappropriation of government property, with emphasis on weapons, ammunition, clothing and equipment, and POL. Implicit in the referenced memorandum is the intention of the JGS to enforce military justice at all levels within the RVNAF, including the highest levels of command. Commanders must take action against violators within 24 hours; reports must be prepared and submitted as quickly as possible, with copies furnished to the Adjutant General Division of JGS by the fastest means. When so notified, investigative agencies must initiate investigations within 24 hours. The text of the guidelines provides explicit examples of minor and major military behavior and discipline violations, along with the necessary and proper action to be taken. Recognizing that strict law enforcement measures will create a certain amount of dissension and encounter a degree of resistance, the memorandun directs command emphasis on crime prevention and improved military conduct through basic instructions and information programs. The GPWD is directed to increase indoctrination efforts with the theme "Prevention is better than Cure." Finally, noting with great concern the considerable loss of Regular and Territorial Force weapons and equipment in CY 1973 and the first months of 1974, the new Chief of Staff again initiated action to place major command emphasis on the leadership and role of small unit commanders regarding the protection of weapons, clothing and equipment. In Memorandum #1235/TTM/P342, dated, 4 April 1974, unacceptable examples of why weapons losses often exceed casualties are cited and the implementation of explicit preventative and corrective measures is directed. This memorandum provides extensive and detailed guidance and stresses wide dissemination. Emphasis is placed on the local commander's ability and responsibility to improve his unit's preparedeness and effectiveness. He is urged to more thoroughly control and conserve the use of weapons

and equipment. Moreover, he is expected, through leadership and personal example, to develop confidence, loyalty and a willingness to fight among his troops. Noteworthy is the top-level pressure directed at Corps, Divisions and Sectors to develop plans and exhibit command interest in the execution of the memorandum which is directed at the development of basic and fundamental leadership at the small unit level.

b. The Chief of GPWD enjoys a certain degree of autonomy and freedom of action in his dual missions of POLWAR support to RVNAF and Assistant Chief/JGS for POLWAR. In this capacity he has failed to identify and prevent duplication of efforts. Examples of this exist within the areas of enemy psychological warfare analysis and the integrated use of mass media communications. Other GPWD shortfalls are in the logistics and maintenance areas. These include shortages of mission equipment, inadequate expendable and spare part supplies and inadequate budgetary allowances. The large amount of nonstandard commercial equipment authorized and on hand in GPWD complicates and compounds the logistical problem. This equipment and associated expendable supplies are POLWAR peculiar and are not found in other RVNAF organizations. This precludes support from established supply and maintenance support organizations. The most critical problem is the long-term lack of valid GPWD budget input data and the resulting overall inadequacy of the GVN budget allocated to GPWD. GPWD personnel do not have the knowledge or expertise required to develop anticipated spare parts requirements and equipment attrition factors on which to base budgetary requirements. As indicated earlier, the GPWD staff does not include a supply activity to coordinate analysis and solution. Each unit administers its own supply program and requests support through the logistical channels in the area of assignment. Additional shortfalls include limited analytical and research intelligence capabilities to effectively plan PSYWAR campaigns or to measure the effectiveness of programs.

CHAPTER 14

DAO DISTINGUISHED VISITORS

1. JANUARY 1974:

DATE(S)	DV	TITLE
9-10 Jan	Mr. Peter J. Burlinson	Technical Representative, INSTAPAK Corporation
9-11 Jan	Col. D. Tadich	Deputy J-2, United States Support Activities Group (USSAG)
9Jan-22Feb	Mr. C.K. Lammers	Chief, Pacific Audit Division, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) (Audit)
14-16 Jan	BG Joseph R. Ulatoski	Commander, Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC)
14-18 Jan	Col. A.L.Meredith	Research and Development, (R&D) Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC)
	Col J.C.Gibbs	R&D, CINCPAC
15-17 Jan	Col. Albert N.J. Weidhas	Commander, Detatchment (Det) K, 5000th Military Intelligence Group (MIGP)

DATE(S)	DV	TITLE
15-18 Jan	Mr. Carl Weiss	Transportation Division, CINCPACAF
17 Jan	Mr. Wolfgang J. Lehmann	Consul General Military Region IV
24-25 Jan	Capt Charles M. Mayes	United States Coast Guard
20-24 Jan	Col R.J.Huebner	CINCPAC, J-8
21-22 Jan	RADM R. E. Fowler, Jr.	Director for Logistics CINCPAC
26-31	Capt (USN) O.A. Porter, Jr.	Head, Foreign Assistance Plans and policy Section, Plans Division, CINCPACFLT
26Jan-13Feb	Sir Robert Thompson	British Author
28-31 Jan	Col. Edmond F. Gregg, Jr	CINCPAC Policy Branch, South-east Asia

2. FEBRUARY 1974

1-3 Feb	MG J. Bellamy	Assistant Chief of Staff (ACOS), J-3, USSAG
2-5 Feb	RADM L.R. Vasey	USN Retired

DATE(S)	DV	TITLE
3-6 Feb	Mr. William A. Paz	Civilian Personnel Director, CINCPACFLT
4-6	BG William C. Weaver	Commander, US Army Communications Command, Pacific
4-7 Feb	Mr. William F. Coakley	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD)
	Mr. William A. Pankonin	Chief, Civilian Personnel Policy Division, CINCPAC
5-7 Feb	BG Joseph R. Ulatoski	Commander, JCRC
5-7 Feb	Col. Albert N.J. Weidhas	Commander, DET K, 5000th MI Gp
6-7 Feb	Col Braxton Carter	USSAG, J-4
6-8 Feb	MG Ira A. Hunt, Jr.	Deputy Commander USSAG
6-8 Feb	BG Hilding L. Jacobson	ACOS, USSAG, J-2
6-8 Feb	Col P. Lee Mason	Editor-in-Chief, Pacific Stars and Stripes
7 Feb	MG Leroy J. Manor	Commander, 13th Air Force

DATE(S)	DV	TITLE
13-14 Feb	Mr. James Meyer	Assistant to Commander Pacific Exchange
13-14 Feb	BG Joseph R. Ulatoski	Commander, JCRC
13-22 Feb	Mr. Joseph P. Welsch	DASD (Audit)
14-18 Feb	Dr. Roger E. Shields	DASD (Economic Affairs)
15-17 Feb	HON Eugene E. Berg	Assistant Secretary of the Army (ASA)
	Lieutenant General (LTG) Fred Kornet	Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics (DCSLOG) Department of the Army (DA)
	MG Homer D. Smith	Deputy Commander Logistics (DCDRLOG) Headquarters Army Materiel Command (HQAMC)
	MG Alton G. Post	DCSLOG, United States Army, Pacific (USARPAC)
	Col William E. Eicher	HQ AMC
	Col Robert C. Hawlk	Executive, OASA

DATE(S)	DV	TITLE
15-17 Feb	Col William L. Waugh	DCSLOG, DA
17-21 Feb	LTG William E. Potts	Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
17 Feb	MG J.R. Cleland	Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia (MEDTC)
18-19 Feb	Col Ray L. Burnell, Jr.	Defense Attache, Phom Penh
22-25 Feb	Gen Ferdinand J. Chesarek	USA Retired
24-26 Feb	BG Joseph R. Ulatoski	Commander, JCRC
26-28 Feb	CAPT (USN) D. Ruebsamen	Commanding Officer, Military Sealift Command, Far East
27Feb-2Mar	HQ USAF	
	LTG William W. Snavely	Deputy Chief of Staff, Systems and Logistics (DCS/S&L)
	BG John R. Spalding	Director Logistics Plans & Programs

DATE(S)	DV	TITLE
	HQ AIR FORCE LOGISTICS COMMAND (HQ AFLC)	
	MG G. Rhodes	Chief of Staff
	Col G. E. Hoffman	Director International Logistics
	Col H. C. Long	Director Mission and Management Support
	PACIFIC AIR FORCE (PACAF)	
	MG Ralph T. Holland	DCSLOG
	BG William D. Gilbert	DCS Civil Engineering
	Col. R. J. O'Leary	Staff Member
28 Feb-3 Mar	Col C. W. Boyd	Chief, CINCPAC Force Planning Division J-531
3. MARCH 1974:		
1-2 Mar	BG Joseph R. Ulatoski	Commander, JCRC
2 Mar	Mr. George Norman	Chief, Food Branch HQ Army & Air Force Exchange Service
4-5 Mar	BG Joseph R. Ulatoski	Commander, JCRC

DATE(S)	DV	TITLE
4-12 Mar	Col A.L.Meredith	R&D CINCPAC
5-9 Mar	Col Albert N. J. Weidhas	Commander, DET K 5000th MI Gp.
7-8 Mar	Col R. W. Bagnard	Chief, Operational Intelligence Division, J-2, USSAG
8-9 Mar	Col. R.O. Rowland	Chief, Personnel Services, J-11, CINCPAC
20-21 Mar	RADM Wallace R. Dowd	Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command
	RADM R. Rieve	Fleet Supply Officer, CINCPACFLT
22 Mar	BG Joseph R. Ulatoski	Commander, JCRC
24-28 Mar	Dr. H. Paul Ecker	Executive Director, Naval Management Systems Center
27-29 Mar	Col. V. Dimauro	Deputy Commander, JCRC
27-29 Mar	Mr. R. Linsenmeyer	Chief, Scientific Analysis Gp, CINCPAC

DATE(S)	DV	TITLE
29-31 Mar	Mr. F. Tapparo	Director, Asia Division OASD
31 Mar-5 Apr	Mr. K. Riner	Defense Contract Audit Agency

CHAPTER 15

DEFENSE ATTACHE ASSESSMENT

1. (S) GENERAL. The RVNAF improvement and problem ledger again reflects significant progress and residual problems. Enemy infiltration and introduction of supplies and equipment have continued while the GVN is developing its capabilities with reduced US aid.

2. (S) INDICATORS OF IMPROVEMENT.

a. The RVNAF have been able to contain several threats posed by the enemy during this quarter and the beginning of the 4th Quarter. Most significantly, the RVNAF have taken initiatives against the enemy which have caused severe disruption in traditional enemy strongholds. Not unexpectedly, this has resulted in strong enemy response.

b. The high point of the quarter, and the entire ceasefire period, was the penetration of the Tri Phap Village area in Kien Tuong Province commencing 13 February. This achievement was a long awaited reversal of the Ap Bac Battle, just to the northeast of Tri Phap, fought on 2 January 1963. On that day, a 200 man guerilla force inflicted heavy casualties on a 2500 man ARVN unit, supported by armored personnel carriers and US helicopters. The capability to penetrate Tri Phap was developed over a long period of time. In December and January, ARVN operations were conducted south of QL-4 to eliminate the enemy interdiction threat to that vital route to Saigon. Heavy casualties were inflicted on enemy units. Discerning enemy vulnerability, units of the 7th and 9th Divisions penetrated Tri Phap Village and have remained in the area for two months. Enemy efforts to draw ARVN forces from the area have been ineffective. MR-4 established a new political district, Hau My, under administration of Dinh Tuong Province and is proceeding with plans for resettlement of civilian refugees.

c. In the Western Delta, ARVN heliborne operations in response to intelligence have been timely and effective in countering enemy attempts to develop an alternate infiltration route into the Delta.

d. In MR 3, a 12-day 25th Division operation supported by armor, artillery and air into the Ho Bo Woods area (northern Hau Nghia, western Binh Duong) also achieved surprise. The enemy was successfully deceived into expecting a thrust north up QL-13. When ARVN units began movement to the northwest from Cu Chi, Hau Nghia, the enemy avoided contact and abandoned the area, leaving significant caches of weapons and food behind. Enemy attempts to re-enter the area, commencing in late March and early April, have been contained by armored task forces. The capability to activate and exercise effective command and control of these units has been an important development.

e. Use of armored units in support of offensive operations is occurring more frequently in MR 2 and MR 3, and with success. Losses have been sustained but not without inflicting greater losses on the enemy.

f. In the central highlands, ARVN forces have also demonstrated a capability to contain enemy initiatives. The 22d and 23d Divisions have responded well and conducted effective operations in attempts to seize the initiative from the enemy. Long-range patrols were used more effectively to gain information and interdict enemy lines of communication.

g. Most evident in the Delta, RF units have also increased their mobility and broken away from their traditional defensive posture. There are good indications of improved combat capability in the coastal provinces of MR 2.

h. VNAF has been heavily committed during the quarter. Fixed wing aircraft have provided daily support to tactical units, AC-119 gunships have supported units in contact at night and strikes against enemy facilities and truck convoys around the frontier periphery of MR 2 and MR 3 have been utilized more frequently to disrupt enemy logistics traffic.

3. (S) PROBLEM AREAS: The problems discussed in the last quarterly assessment were the most significant, and continue so. The prosecution of the war has not been curtailed but is made more difficult by their existence.


a. Corruption will always be a problem. The government is attempting to take steps to relieve the effects of inflation, which in turn has compounded the corruption problem. The plight of the individual serviceman, with his low pay, long commitments to combat and the consequent separations from his family, is not a new problem. Some officials and military leaders at all levels, identified as corrupt, have been replaced. Some form of in-kind issue of food and/or pay is under consideration. Some units have taken immediate steps such as growing their own food in base camp areas. Until some visible relief is attained, the problem will continue.

b. Supply and maintenance still require extensive effort. Progress has been achieved, but prospects for final resolution still depend on training and experience. There were indications of improvement in supply distribution; ammunition and food are provided to combat units on a more timely basis. These efforts must be maintained while distribution of spare parts and maintenance of major items of equipment is improved.

c. Coordinated employment of infantry and supporting arms has been more evident during the quarter. Armor especially is being given an offensive role. Training is restricted by reduced allocations for fuel and continuous infantry commitment to combat. The successes achieved in Tri Phap, Ho Bo Woods and in the Central highlands are heartening, but all units are not equally capable and proficient.

d. Leadership changes appear to have had a good effect in many units and provinces. The excellent results achieved by preplanned offensive operations in MR's 2, 3, and 4 are strong indicators of improvement. Swift execution of plans, particularly evident in Tri Phap, is not universal.

4. (S) SUMMARY. The experience of the past three months has seen significant gains. Every enemy threat was met with resolve and repulsed as the intensity of combat increased. Perhaps most important, RVNAF has met every reduction in US support with a stoic determination to continue the fight.


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