Wage Leadership in Construction.

Abstract

Wage leadership is the theory that wage increases in one sector lead to imitative increases elsewhere. In this paper we test this theory in a large industry where wage leadership is supposed to be dominant--construction. Alternate theories of wage determination (excess demand, real wage bargaining) are also tested, along with the efficacy of the 1971-73 wage controls. (Author)

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jan 01, 1981
Accession Number
ADA094797

Entities

People

  • James M. Jondrow
  • Robert A. Levy

Organizations

  • Center for Naval Analyses

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Materials and Manufacturing Processes

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Bargaining
  • Benefits
  • Coefficients
  • Commerce
  • Compensation
  • Construction
  • Engineering
  • Equations
  • Fringe Benefits
  • Hypotheses
  • Leadership
  • Professional Development
  • Standards
  • Statistics
  • Unemployment

Fields of Study

  • Economics

Readers

  • Industrial Economics
  • Military History of the United States in the 20th Century.
  • Regression Analysis.