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THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOVIET USE OF SURROGATES IN
MILITARY RELATIONS WITH THE THIRD WORLD, WITH
PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON CUBAN PARTICIPATION
IN AFRICA

10 Gavriel D. Ra'anani

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PREFACE

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This Paper does not purport to be an exhaustive account of the Soviet use of surrogate forces in relations with the Third World, nor does it present a series of case studies of Cuba's role in Angola, the Ogaden, and Shaba. Rather, it attempts to analyze the cause, nature, and effect of "operations by indirection" (Soviet style), especially in Africa. It is hoped that this study will shed some light upon the evolution of the Soviet use of proxies in an active combat role. ←

Gavriel Ra'anan, a Ph.D. candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, wrote this study during the summer of 1978, which he spent at The Rand Corporation as a summer intern in the Social Science Department. He is author of a book, *Yugoslavia After Tito -- Scenarios and Options*, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1978.

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I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW--SOVIET USE OF SURROGATE
ARMS SUPPLIERS AND OPERATIONS CENTERS

THE MIDDLE EAST, 1947-48

Disregarding such classical European instances as the dispatch of the International Brigades to Spain, Soviet use of surrogates in military relations with the Third World extends back at least to 1948, when, soon after the February coup in Prague, the Soviet Union authorized the secret transfer of weapons simultaneously both to Israel and Syria.¹ This occurred during a period when Stalin perceived the Soviet Union to be fairly weak; in much the same manner that he had discouraged the activist Yugoslavs from direct confrontations with the West over Trieste and Carinthia during the first two years after the war, he now inveighed against an overtly provocative policy in Greece:

What do you think, that Great Britain and the United States-- the United States, the most powerful state in the world-- will permit you to break their line of communications in the Mediterranean Sea! Nonsense. And we have no Navy. The uprising in Greece must be stopped, and as quickly as possible.²

Not that the Soviet Union failed to seek some entries to the Mediterranean. The postwar demands that Stalin had made with respect to the Dardanelles/Bosphorus, the Dodecanese (Rhodes), and finally his request for a U.N. mandate in former Italian colonies, particularly Tripolitania,³ indicated that the Soviet leadership was attempting to acquire a watery road from Odessa to Tripoli, providing a new perimeter of influence for Russia's Black Sea ports. But Soviet demands were not met, and the USSR, exhausted by World War II, accepted that verdict.

Presumably Moscow's desire to supplant departing colonial powers applied to the Middle East as well as to former Italian colonies (France was ousted from Syria in 1943, Great Britain was to leave Palestine in May 1948). By granting secret arms transfers transacted through intermediaries, the USSR could invest in a venture that might pay dividends in terms of obligations incurred by newly acquired

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clients (and resultant economic, military, and other favors that might flow therefrom). Moreover, the war-devastated USSR and Eastern European satellites could well use the hard currency likely to accrue from arms deals.

The USSR could not afford to challenge British or American power directly. As early as September 1947, Jewish emissaries from Palestine were seeking arms in Eastern Europe. The Czechs were sympathetic, but Benes, apparently aware of his tenuous hold on power, was afraid to act. Ana Pauker of Romania expressed sympathy but claimed to lack the weapons required. Poland simply refused. Almost immediately after the Prague coup, it was decided there that the Jewish "Yishuv" in Palestine should, in great secrecy, be supplied with Czech weapons (at that stage including rifles, grenades, ammunition, ZB-37 machine guns, and some explosives).⁴ Apparently, the USSR was not willing to test the West directly in an area viewed as vital to it (as reflected in Stalin's dicta regarding Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean). Moscow's concerns were intensified, in this instance, by the locus of conflict, immediately in the vicinity of the Suez Canal.

If captured, Czech arms would not implicate the USSR directly, and if the Israelis fared poorly, the USSR could withdraw without losing face. Most of the arms were delivered by air, although the Yugoslav port of Rijeka (or Fiume) eventually did serve as a conduit for shipment of some of the goods, which had transited Hungary. The Yugoslav government had been the least pro-Israeli regime in Eastern Europe, both as a member of UNSCOP⁵ and during the U.S. General Assembly vote on partition of Palestine.⁶ Given that Yugoslav relations with Moscow were deteriorating at this point (as indicated by the subsequent accounts published both by Djilas and Dedijer of the Soviet-Yugoslav altercations early in 1948),⁷ Moscow had to apply considerable pressure to persuade the Yugoslavs to comply. In view of the extreme secrecy surrounding shipments to the Middle East, the Russians apparently thought they could get away with supplying both sides at once.

According to Meir Mardor, on March 30, the Czechs made available to Jewish emissaries a small airport near Prague, from which DC-3s, obtained by the Palestinian Jewish leadership from Western sources,

could lift materiel to the Middle East. Within days after the first DC-3s were dispatched to Palestine, the Jewish intelligence network learned that the vessel *Lino*, fully loaded with Czech weapons destined for Syria, had departed Rijeka for Beirut. The *Lino* was forced to stop for repairs in Bari on the Italian Adriatic coast. Apparently this vessel had left a few days before the DC-3 flights and was timed to arrive almost simultaneously with the Israel-bound weapons.

The USSR was hedging its bets by sending some Czech arms from a remote air field to Israel, others to Syria through Rijeka and Beirut, all in the hope of keeping weapon shipments to either recipient secret from the other side and from the West. Had the *Lino* not broken down, this ploy might have succeeded, at least for some time. However, the Jewish emissaries suspected the vessel's real mission, and its enforced stopover in Bari enabled them to sabotage it, subsequently hijacking most of the weapons for themselves. This incident was confirmed by a "public" trial during 1949, in which Syria prosecuted some of its citizens for having been "bribed" in connection with the Bari incident.⁸ It is not known whether "Czech" shipments of arms to Syria were resumed immediately.

In late April and early May, the Jewish forces in Palestine were sent ten (eventually 25) Me-109s manufactured in Pilsen's famous Skoda works.⁹ These were dismantled and packed into the Israeli DC-3s and newly acquired DC-4s, all in secrecy, in the same airport in Czechoslovakia. When Israeli DC-3s broke down, the Czechs lent their customers a Czech transport plane for the lift. Although the Jewish pilots originally flew straight to Palestine, subsequently they flew via Ajaccio in Corsica. When the French complained, these pilots started using a remote Yugoslav airfield (made available through Soviet pressure) as a refueling base.

GUATEMALA, EGYPT, INDONESIA, 1954-58

The establishment of such elaborate routes, clearly designed to maximize secrecy and avoid precipitating a military confrontation with the West, was to be repeated. In 1954, the United States discovered that the Soviet Union was sending Guatemala's leftist Arbenz regime

Czech weapons produced at Skoda, shipped in Swedish-registered vessels, embarking from Stettin (Szczecin), Poland.¹⁰ This discovery was a major element in the subsequent U.S. maritime interdiction, the American-sponsored invasion, and eventual downfall of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala. Moscow's elaborate precautions had failed this time to escape Western detection.

According to one account, fear of repetition of the Guatemalan scenario, including American intervention, led the Egyptians and their Soviet suppliers to engage in an elaborate deception-disinformation ploy, designed to cover up a February 1955 arms deal concluded in principle by Nasser with a "Czech trade delegation."¹¹ The objective was to make it appear that the deal had been arranged some seven months later than was the case, and Nasser could seem to have offered the West first refusal to supply Egypt with arms. In fact, however, the quantity and quality of hardware Nasser requested from the United States was so substantial as to have radically altered the balance of power in the Middle East if granted and thus to have violated one of the basic tenets of the 1950 tripartite U.S.-French Declaration, intended to "freeze" the regional status quo.¹² Having been "rebuffed" by the West during the spring of 1955, the Egyptians proceeded to claim that they were turning to "Czech" weapon producers only as a second choice.¹³

This ruse having proved more successful than expected (with subsequent Western self-flagellation over the "unnecessary loss" of Egypt), the USSR followed up on the elaborate charade with "Czech" and "Polish" military sales to Indonesia's Sukarno regime in 1956-58, featuring Egyptians training the Indonesians in the use of new weapons, and using the Yugoslav harbor of Rijeka as the port of shipment.¹⁴ This approach was necessitated by East-West considerations similar to those involved in the Egyptian arms deal. Sukarno felt he had to delude the West into thinking that it had been offered first chance to arm Indonesia, demanding military assistance it could not realistically be expected to fulfill. After Western rejection it was deemed reasonably safe (because Nasser had been left unpunished) to receive "East European" arms (that had been agreed upon in principle, before an "offer" was made to the West).¹⁵

GHANA, GUINEA, MALI, CONGO, 1957-70

During this period, the Soviet Union began to deal with West African states recently granted independence. In 1957, the USSR signed an economic agreement with Ghana's Nkrumah and, reportedly, offered him some weapons.¹⁶ In March and April of 1959, the Soviet Union used surrogate (Czech and Polish) vessels to convey Czech arms and advisors to Guinea (then the most radical of former French African colonies), as a "gift."¹⁷ Subsequently, Guinea's Sekou Touré claimed that he had requested, through Liberia's President William Tubman, that President Eisenhower send him one or two thousand rifles.¹⁸ The United States replied that it had suggested direct negotiations on the matter, but had never received a response.¹⁹ Perhaps having already agreed to the Soviet Bloc "gifts," Touré panicked and dropped the matter when the United States began to show interest.

In August of 1959, the USSR announced a credit agreement in the amount of \$35 million for purchase of "industrial machinery."²⁰ Perhaps this was related to the Czech and Polish military "presents." The weapons received from the Soviet clients amounted to 8000 small arms and three armored cars, not an entirely insignificant amount at that time by the standards of the region.²¹ In July of 1960, the Czechs reportedly began flying reconnaissance missions over U.S. bases in Spain, in the guise of a commercial run from the Guinean capital of Conakry to Prague. The Russians themselves maintained a low profile; Soviet, Czech and Chinese personnel, amounting to some 165 men, were said to be operating in Guinea, of whom only 25 were Soviet citizens. More seriously, however, reports surfaced that a November 1960 agreement would allow Soviet submarines to dock in Conakry.²² By 1961, a few MiG-15s, MiG-17s, and T-34s were brought in (by Soviet vessels), as part of a policy of infiltration into West Africa.²³ How much Sekou Touré's expulsion of the Soviet ambassador to Guinea (December 1961) invalidated these arrangements is unclear.

In any case, Sekou Touré did not break completely with the Soviet Union. Moscow and Conakry maintained their economic relationship; however, Guinea, which in 1961 was part of the pro-Soviet Casablanca bloc in Africa (as opposed to the more pro-Western Brazzaville group)²⁴

began to flirt with Peking.²⁵ Consequently, Conakry's relationship with Moscow deteriorated until 1965, and its ties with China became quite intimate during the early 1960s. For a brief period, during 1964, Guinea even was deleted by Soviet ideologists from the holy trinity of Ghana, Guinea and Mali, which Moscow had hailed as *the* three "revolutionary democracies" par excellence, epitomizing the progressive ("non-capitalist") path to be followed by Third World leadership.²⁶ Sekou Touré experimented with different economic systems, culminating in 1964 with a shift leftward in domestic policy.²⁷

The Soviet leaders also became involved in a low key arms relationship with the Congo (Leopoldville), then controlled by their friend Lumumba, to whom they and the Czechs, in 1960, sent some Ilyushin transports, jeeps, and military trucks.²⁸ In September and that year, Lumumba was purged by President Kasavubu and General Mobutu; Czech and Soviet diplomatic representatives were ousted from the Congo.²⁹ Following this episode, and Lumumba's death, an extended period of cooperation developed between Nkrumah and Sekou Touré, as part of the Casablanca bloc that was backing Gizenga (Lumumba's successor as Moscow's man), who had established himself at Stanleyville in the northern Congo. The Nkrumah-Sekou Touré relationship, if anything, became even closer after Gizenga's defeat. When Nkrumah himself was ousted from power in 1966, he was given sanctuary in Guinea and was allowed to operate from there against the successor regime in Ghana.

Nkrumah's Ghana never did become a major recipient of Soviet bloc weapons. It received some light arms, Il-18 transports, and Mi-4 helicopters in 1961 and, in 1964-65, more light weapons, including Czech rifles, and light artillery.³⁰ However, Nkrumah developed a very close relationship with Moscow (and, at one time, with Peking) and, starting in 1962, allowed Ghana to serve as an important center for Soviet bloc operations.³¹ It is known that bloc weapons were transferred via Ghana to Angola and, probably, to the Congo. In fact, after Nkrumah was ousted, the bloc network of activities was shifted to Conakry, where Nkrumah had taken up residence in exile.³² Advisers, security service personnel, and military instructors from all over the Communist world had come to operate out of Accra and other localities

in Ghana, ultimately, over 1000 Soviet and over 400 Chinese citizens were to be involved in these activities, supplemented from the very beginning by many East Germans and, eventually, by significant numbers of personnel from other Warsaw Pact countries, and from Cuba, North Korea, and even Yugoslavia.^{32a} These operatives trained insurgent forces, provided instructions and communications channels for intelligence agents, and sent many Africans to Moscow for further training, and other Africans were dispatched to East European states or to Cuba, with the remainder opting for the PRC.³³ After Nkrumah was ousted in February of 1966 and fled to Conakry, Sekou Touré (fearing a repetition in Guinea of the coups that had overthrown his fellow leftists Ben Bella and Nkrumah) asked Cuba to create a personal bodyguard for his protection.³⁴

By the end of 1965, Soviet-Guinean relations had become warmer, and, with Nkrumah attempting to regain power in Accra, Soviet aid to the deposed leader was channeled through Conakry.³⁵ However, some of the Soviet leaders were becoming disenchanted with "revolutionary democrats" and cautioned against extensive Soviet involvement in the ventures of the exiled Nkrumah. By 1965-66, Khrushchev was out of power and his successors were less than enthusiastic about the reliability of African "national democracies."³⁶ However (because of Sekou Touré's commitment to the anti-colonial struggle in Portuguese Guinea and Soviet willingness to aid the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC)), Soviet relations with Guinea were improving, so that, in 1968-70, the USSR renewed arms shipments to that country. The upshot of this relationship was to be the famous "Conakry Patrol."

Although Ghana's Nkrumah and Mali's Modibo Keita were viewed for a long while as Moscow's favored instruments of policy in West Africa, the USSR never seemed able to exploit either country for the establishment of a significant Soviet military presence (as opposed to utilizing them, or at least Ghana, as surrogate semi-covert operations centers).³⁷ Sekou Touré, who had proven to be a far more difficult customer from Moscow's point of view, nevertheless eventually granted the Soviet Union air and sea facilities at Conakry,³⁸ which, although intended to

protect his regime against coups supported from abroad, certainly were perceived by Moscow to be of considerable value. Moreover, Conakry subsequently was to be used as a refueling base by the Cuban surrogate forces of the Soviet Union, who were flying to West Africa to assist the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) in combat. Admittedly, given that Amilcar-Cabral (the head of the PAIGC in neighboring Portuguese Guinea) was Sekou Touré's close ally, this move probably was inspired by the parallel interests of Guinea and the USSR rather than being viewed in Conakry as a concession to Moscow.

ALGERIA, MOROCCO, 1960-68

In the beginning of the 1960s, the USSR became involved in the complicated affairs of the Maghreb. Moscow began to supply Morocco with weapons in 1960 (including Il-28 bombers, MiG-17 fighters, and, in 1962, some T-54 tanks).³⁹ At the same time, in a delicate maneuver designed to avoid undermining the chances of wooing De Gaulle away from NATO,⁴⁰ Moscow decided covertly to ship (small) arms to Algeria, using Morocco, Tunisia, and the UAR as conduits. After Algeria achieved independence in 1962, the USSR felt free to supply the Algerians openly with MiG-15s.⁴¹ However, having succeeded in evading the dilemma of having to choose between France and Algeria, the Kremlin encountered the flareup of a border conflict between Morocco and Algeria.

Morocco had been part of the Casablanca bloc (including Algeria, the UAR, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali) that was slanted toward the USSR, as opposed to the Brazzaville group, which was Western-oriented (and supported the Leopoldville leaders, Mobutu and Kasavubu).⁴² This aspect became irrelevant, however, after the May 1963 unification of the two African blocs to form the OAU. Of course, ideologically, the radical Algerians were far closer to the Russians (particularly once Ben Bella came to power) than was Morocco's King Muhammad V or his son, Hassan II. However, in strategic terms, from Moscow's point of view, Morocco is a far more important state than its eastern neighbor.

Just off the Atlantic coast of Morocco the Canary, Madeira, and Azores Islands, which, during the last two decades, have become increasingly important as potential way stations for U.S. resupply of Central Europe or the Middle East in a conflict. By 1963, the ever more tenuous nature of the Portuguese hold on Africa was becoming evident. In that year, the PAIGC initiated an armed revolt in Portuguese Guinea.⁴³ In Angola, the pro-Soviet MPLA and Holden Roberto's UPA already constituted significant forces; Bakongo (UPA) uprisings had started there as early as 1961.⁴⁴ During that year, the USSR and Czechoslovakia apparently were running guns to rebel forces in Angola (presumably the MPLA), via Ghana.⁴⁵ The MPLA leader, Neto, enjoyed a close relations with the PAIGC chief, Cabral;⁴⁶ the MPLA, which had come into being in the late 1950s, was established in the hinterland behind the capital, Luanda, while Roberto's forces had sanctuary at bases in the nearby Congo (protected by his kinsman, Mobuto).⁴⁷ Thus, there was considerable potential for exploiting Portugal's dispersion of forces across Africa (as well as potential destabilization of a Spain that seemed destined soon to enter the post-Franco era) to gain control of the Azores-Madeira-Canary Islands, provided the Soviet Union was able to acquire nearby coastal facilities.

In this context, Moroccan friction with Spain concerning the future of Spanish African possessions adjacent to Morocco could be put to profitable use. Even if the Moroccan dynasty proved suspicious of Soviet intentions, there was good reason to maintain close relations with the Moroccan military elite, because a "Nasserite" coup in that country seemed quite probable. (In fact, several left-wing military coups *have* been attempted in Morocco, with a major revolt almost succeeding in 1971).⁴⁸ Thus, the USSR had cause to shun actions likely to jeopardize military relations with Morocco. Consequently, a covert Soviet agreement to supply further military aid to Algeria apparently was given in the first week of October 1963.⁴⁹ On October 14, 1963, the border war between Morocco and Algeria started. A week later, the first of three Cuban vessels laden with arms for the Algerians, reportedly T-34 tanks and four MiG-17s (originally given to Havana by Moscow), arrived in Algeria.⁵⁰ It was only after an

Algerian-Moroccan ceasefire had been signed that Soviet weapons were sent directly and overtly to Algeria. During the next two years, the USSR transferred to Algeria 30 MiG-17s, four MiG-21s, 100 T-34s and 50 T-54s.⁵¹ However, although Morocco broke relations with Cuba during the border crisis, it continued to maintain official links with Moscow, if on a rather tepid basis.⁵² Moreover, Rabat received further shipments of T-54 tanks in 1967-1968, all from Czechoslovakia.⁵³ Relations with Morocco never have returned to the cordiality of 1961-62, but Moscow has been able to maintain close friendship with Algeria without turning Morocco into an inveterate enemy. (In fact, Soviet-Algerian relations may be regarded as intimate, and the arms flow from Moscow to Algiers has been continuous and of significant proportions since 1964.)

NIGERIA, 1967-70

The next major Soviet military involvement in Africa (in this case, specifically the Sub-Saharan portion), was to consist of the significant assistance rendered to the authorities in Lagos during the Biafran secession struggle of May 1967-January 1970.⁵⁴ Nigeria, a state of increasing importance to the West, in part because of its energy production capacity, presented a battlefield in which the USSR would have to proceed with extreme caution.⁵⁵ Early in July of 1967, the United Kingdom (Nigeria's one-time "motherland" and traditional supplier) announced that it would not deliver airplanes to Lagos.⁵⁶ However, on August 10, London confirmed that it was permitting the dispatch of small arms that were as "defensive as possible."⁵⁷ Soon after the second British announcement, Nigeria received Warsaw Pact aircraft (the one item that Britain would not send to Lagos;⁵⁸ during the Biafran war, London was to supply not only light arms but also Saracen armored personnel carriers, Saladin armored cars, and anti-aircraft guns).⁵⁹

Although Warsaw Pact weapons reportedly arrived in Nigeria on August 15, 1967, their presence was acknowledged publicly only on August 26.⁶⁰ In fact, negotiations may have been initiated as early as March, when Edwin Ogbu signed a cultural cooperation agreement in

Moscow.⁶¹ As in the Egyptian and Indonesian cases during the 1950s, announcement of a prearranged arms deal with the Soviet bloc apparently was delayed to go through the motions of a futile attempt to obtain similar weapons from the West. (Like Cairo and Jakarta at an earlier stage, Lagos may have desired to alleviate possible international repercussions that could be expected if Nigeria were perceived suddenly to be switching over to the Soviet Union as its *main* arms supplier.)

Many Westerners felt the plight of the Ibos could be resolved most simply through the creation of an Ibo homeland in Biafra. It was therefore not difficult to anticipate Western rejection of requests by the Nigerian Federal Authorities in Lagos for combat planes to be used against Biafra. (In fact, an extended debate took place in Britain whether to send *any* arms to Nigeria, and some support was voiced even for arming Biafra.)⁶² The timing of the public acknowledgment in Lagos of the arrival of Warsaw Pact hardware made it appear that the Soviet Union had been approached only after the UK (and, earlier, the U.S.) had rejected Nigeria's bid for planes. Moreover, although the Nigerian government must have known for several weeks in advance when Soviet weapons would arrive, the deal was not announced until *after* the British had committed themselves publicly to a continuation of their low-level arms relationship with Lagos. Having turned down Lagos' request for aircraft, Washington could hardly complain if the role of arms supplier to Nigeria now was filled, in apparent concert with a *NATO* member state, by Warsaw Pact countries (the initial shipments of planes included only *Czech* Delphin L-29 trainers/fighters, although Soviet MiG-17s evidently were dispatched soon afterward). The L-29s apparently were disassembled and then flown in by Soviet Antonov transports, along with Russian and East European technicians.

Subsequently, the Egyptian, Algerian, Czechoslovak, and Polish air forces dispatched more Soviet-made aircraft to Nigeria, including Il-28 bombers. Altogether, Nigeria received about 12 L-29s, up to 41 MiG-17s (many from Algeria and Egypt), a few Polish MiG-15s and perhaps five Il-28 bombers, of which three were Egyptian and Algerian. There also were reports of a few Su-7s and MiG-19s, possibly of

Egyptian origin. These statistics may be slightly inflated.⁶³ It is difficult to assess the size of these deliveries. At least some of the Egyptian and Algerian planes were sent "on loan." At the conclusion of the conflict, the Nigerian Air Force possessed between three and six Il-28 bombers, eight Delfins, ten P-149 armed trainers, eight MiG-17s, and possibly a few MiG-15s.⁶⁴ However, between aircraft that were loaned only for the duration of combat and attrition, the total number of planes made available to the Nigerian federal authorities during the war is likely to have been substantially in excess of the 30-odd military aircraft still in Nigerian possession when the fighting ended.⁶⁵

The role of surrogate forces in Nigeria went well beyond the supply of arms. Early during the war, Egyptian pilots flew missions in Egyptian planes on loan to Nigeria and painted with Nigerian markings. This may have been because much of the cream of Nigerian air force had been ethnically Ibo; in any case, none of the Nigerians had flown Soviet-made aircraft before. It can be argued that Arab sentiments strongly favored the anti-Ibo Hausa-Fulani elements of Nigeria's Moslem North, so that the loan or transfer of Egyptian and Algerian planes could have been decided upon independently of Moscow. However, as President Sadat revealed in March of 1976, his earlier attempts to obtain spare parts for his MiG-21s from India (co-produced by the Indians under Soviet license) proved fruitless, because the arms agreement with the USSR prohibited any transfer to third parties by New Delhi without Moscow's permission.⁶⁶ This concept of barring third party transfers appears as a standard clause in American arms transactions and is probably the case also with Soviet-Arab hardware deals from their inception in the 1950s onward. The role of Soviet collusion became more evident during the spring of 1969, when East Germans and other East Europeans simply took the place of Egyptian pilots in Nigeria.⁶⁷ This marked a new escalatory stage in the Soviet use of surrogate forces.⁶⁸

HARBINGERS OF THE FUTURE

Apparently for the first time, Warsaw Pact military elements were used in active combat in the Third World, although not visibly on the ground.⁶⁹ This phenomenon soon would appear when, in a policy switch, the USSR allowed Soviet pilots to fly patrol over the Suez Canal during the last phase of the 1969-70 "War of Attrition." The public became aware of this development when the Israeli Air Force ambushed such a patrol on July 30, 1970, and downed four or five Soviet-piloted MiG-21s.⁷⁰

During the next round of the Middle Eastern conflict, in 1973-74, the Soviet Union not only used surrogate elements as pilots but, according to one source, used the Cubans in an active ground combat role, thus introducing two escalatory innovations.

II. CUBA AND THE USSR--A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE?

EARLY CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA

Cuba's role in Africa is unlike that of any other Soviet surrogate to date.¹ Unlike East European states, Cuba is not subject to Soviet military occupation, as were Prague and Budapest. Nor is it a partitioned country involved in an ongoing conflict with its next door neighbor over national unification, thus requiring military aid from Moscow itself, as is the case with Pyongyang. Castro is not beholden to the Kremlin for his seizure of power and its extension by military conquest, as is Hanoi. Nevertheless, the Cubans have committed to African ventures an armed presence of over 40,000 men, equivalent in population to an American force of over 850,000. These Cuban expeditionary units are dependent for combat upon intimate Soviet logistical support. This development is all the more remarkable inasmuch as not so very long ago, for instance in 1968, Soviet-Cuban relations were quite poor.

Serious Cuban military involvement in Africa began long before Havana decided to back Agostinho Neto's MPLA against two rival African groups, Holden Roberto's FNLA and Jonas Savimbi's UNITA.

Previous Cuban participation in African affairs was less prominent, and perhaps more sporadic, than at present and generally less effective. Cuba first embarked upon military relations with African elements in 1961, when rebels from Zanzibar came to Cuba for paramilitary training.² Many of the "graduates" of the course subsequently participated in the successful January 1964 Zanzibar coup.³ During the early 1960s, similar training was given in Cuba to Cameroonian and Senegalese revolutionaries.⁴ Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was engaged in a somewhat frustrating campaign to win the allegiance of key African leaders already in power, such as Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah, Mali's Modibo Keita, and Guinea's Sekou Touré.⁵ These Soviet efforts paid only limited dividends during the years that followed: Nkrumah was overthrown in 1966 and Keita in 1968, while Sekou Touré had expelled the Soviet ambassador by December of 1961.⁶ Of course, Moscow's

most conspicuous (short-term) failure occurred in the Congo (Zaire), where Lumumba was toppled in 1960. Nor was the Soviet-supported Gizenga regime in Stanleyville successful. However, Cuba was developing a close working relationship with Guinea during the 1960s, when Conakry was used as a contact spot and control point for African trainees taking courses in guerrilla tactics in Cuba.⁷

Thus, over a decade ago, Moscow found "Third World" Cubans more successful than overtly Soviet elements (the former proving clearly more acceptable to African sensitivities). Castro, himself very light-skinned, has referred on many occasions to Cuba's *Latin and African* roots,⁸ an emphasis that presumably is intended to help legitimize his regime's African ventures. Reportedly a disproportionate number of Cuban soldiers in Africa are dark-skinned.⁹

In 1966, Sekou Touré invited Che Guevara to assist in establishing and training an elite corps to serve as the Guinean leader's praetorian guard.¹⁰ Apparently at the behest of PAIGC leader A. Cabral, Guevara recently had led a Cuban mission to Brazzaville to help defeat a pro-Western regime in Leopoldville.

CUBAN-SOVIET TENSIONS

It was during this period also that Cuban-Soviet relations began to show signs of apparent strain. As Cuba became more closely involved in sub-Saharan African affairs, the Soviet Union was suffering some setbacks in relations with Havana and the non-Arab portions of Africa.

Cuba's role in the international communist movement at that juncture was fairly neutral, with Havana aligning itself clearly neither with Peking nor Moscow, but adopting a policy most readily identifiable with the tone of the January 1966 Tricontinental Conference. At that gathering, the North Vietnamese, North Koreans, and Cubans demanded support for revolutionary endeavors in the Third World.¹¹ A prominent spokesman at the Tricontinental Conference was Amilcar Cabral, the leader of PAIGC.¹² The Castro line with respect to Latin America (in implicit contrast to the Soviet line) was clearly stated:

If. . . it is understood once and for all that sooner or later all or almost all peoples will have to take up arms to liberate themselves, then the hour of liberation for this continent will be advanced. What with the ones who theorize, and the ones who criticize those who theorize while beginning to theorize themselves, much energy and time is unfortunately lost; we believe that on this continent, in the case of all or almost all peoples, the battle will take on the most violent forms.¹³

The Cubans felt that the Soviet Union had indicated weakness in the 1962 Missile Crisis and demonstrated insufficient resolve during the conflict in the Dominican Republic and in Vietnam (so, for that matter, had China); thus, the best course for communist leaders to adopt, according to Havana, was the sponsorship of a series of armed insurrections and incursions ("many Vietnams," as Guevara put it),¹⁴ which would divert the United States from Vietnam and limit American efficiency by dissipating U.S. power all over the globe. Cuban moves in Africa, the resolutions of the Tricontinental Conference and the Guevara mission to Bolivia were consistent with this policy.

In 1967, Castro indicated that Cuba would act independently of the Moscow-led portion of the world communist movement in dealings with Latin American revolutionaries.¹⁵ The issue distinguishing the position adopted by the Tricontinental Conference from the attitude of the Soviet leadership was the role of revolutionary guerrilla movements in the Third World. The Castro-Che Guevara position amounted to support for revolutionary movements (at least in Latin America) whereas the Soviet Union (and communist parties loyal to it) accommodated noncommunist Third World regimes, particularly those more friendly to the USSR than to the West or China. In some cases, local regimes were supported at the price of eliminating the indigenous communist parties; for example, in 1965, Moscow sacrificed the Egyptian Communist Party to curry favor with the Nasser regime.¹⁶

In 1964, at the so-called Havana Conference, it had appeared that this issue has been settled by means of a compromise formulation, whereby the Russians supported selected guerrilla groups and the Cubans supported the mainline Muscovite communist parties (rather than pro-Chinese and other "schismatic" groups). At the time, this compromise

infuriated the Chinese leadership and drove a wedge between them and Castro. Soon afterward, the Cubans deviated from the Havana compromise, much to Moscow's chagrin. A focus for new Russo-Cuban disagreements was Venezuela, where the Cubans, in a policy strongly identified with Che Guevara personally, backed the revolutionary FALN, and the Muscovite Venezuelan Communist Party assumed a quiescent role.¹⁷ At that point, the Cubans could have made a major shift and committed themselves to the Chinese side in the Sino-Soviet rift, particularly because Cuban ideological positions, both in domestic and foreign policy (heavily influenced by Guevara), were not dissimilar from Maoism. (See App. A.) However, Havana, probably repelled by the internal turmoil in China and aware of the limits of possible military or economic assistance from Peking, decided to remain neutral.

Following the 1966 Conference, Cuba became a main supporter of the PAIGC, operating out of Conakry and Senegal.¹⁸ The Soviet predominance in operations and supply (dating back to 1964) was replaced by a significant Cuban presence, after Amilcar Cabral issued a request for Cuban aid at the Tricontinental Conference.¹⁹ A few Cubans were even killed in skirmishes in Portuguese Guinea.²⁰

Cabral had developed a close relationship with Sekou Touré in Guinea, and was an old friend of Neto in Angola and a founding member of the MPLA. In 1965, a Cuban mission that was to train the MPLA had been dispatched to Brazzaville. Subsequently, a Guevara-trained unit of 700 Cubans helped to suppress an attempted coup there. Only after President Massamba-Debat was deposed in the fall of 1968 were the Cubans evicted from the Congo.²¹

The divergence between the Kremlin and Cuba, although primarily over Latin American issues, possibly was exacerbated by Cuba's close relations with Sekou Touré and with the PAIGC, when Moscow was not yet fully *persona grata* with either. For several years these African recipients accepted Soviet military aid, much of it "laundered" through Czechoslovakia, but preferred Cuban personnel (especially from 1966 onward). Because Cuba had its problems with Moscow at the time, the Cuban presence in Africa may have been a mixed blessing for the Kremlin. African participants in the struggle over the Portuguese

colonies were being trained in various portions of the communist world, including the USSR, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Cuba.²² However, these Africans apparently felt strongest identification with Cuba. Members of the PAIGC even wore Cuban military jackets and hats.²³ Perhaps it was during this period that Moscow began to realize the potential advantages of a rapprochement with Cuba that would enable the Kremlin to operate through a willing Cuban surrogate in Africa.

At the August 1967 meeting of the Latin American Solidarity Organization, Castro pushed through a resolution condemning Soviet policy in Latin America as a betrayal of Latin American revolutionary movements. Although this document was not published officially, it "leaked" out almost immediately.²⁴ A serious confrontation seemed to be brewing.

Early in 1968, Cuban-Soviet relations reached their nadir. The bloody termination of Guevara's Bolivian venture in October 1967 (simultaneously provocative and ineffective) jeopardized Soviet relations with Latin American states, undermined Latin American communist parties, and even could have led to a military confrontation with the United States in an arena hardly of Russia's choosing. Furious with Havana, the USSR severely cut back oil supplies to Cuba.²⁵ This was followed by the revelation, early in 1968, of an alleged Soviet plot to depose Castro.

It is possible that Castro was exploiting Soviet-Cuban difficulties as a pretext for eliminating a rival, the (Muscovite) faction led by Anibal Escalante.²⁶ Certainly, that group otherwise would have been strengthened by the manner of Guevara's death, which vindicated previous Soviet assertions to the effect that Cuba's policies constituted adventurism (a very pejorative term in the Marxist vocabulary). In that sense, Escalante's purge probably was a sign of Castro's anxiety concerning his own position. He had not been undermined to the extent that Escalante could remove him, but the continued existence of the Muscovite faction was beginning to pose a distinct threat. Given Cuba's economic disorders, Castro could hardly afford strong adversaries in Havana. An extended oil embargo could have destroyed what remained of the Cuban economy.²⁷

In exchange for an increase in oil and other economic concessions, the USSR demanded several major conditions. Included among these were complete endorsement of Soviet policies, the subservience of the Cuban intelligence network (the DGI) to the KGB, and the acceptance of 5,000 Soviet specialists to supervise the Cuban economy. Presumably, the functions of this group also were to include surveillance of Castro to ensure that he behaved himself. Thus the Cuban shift back to intimacy with the USSR was hardly voluntary, if this analysis is correct.

CUBAN-SOVIET RAPPROCHEMENT

The death of Che Guevara in 1967 may well have pointed out the futility of limited Cuban actions on behalf of revolutionary forces unsupported by the USSR. In 1968, the Soviet Union demonstrated a toughening of its foreign policy line with the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Unlike Peking (which voiced support for the Czechoslovak people),²⁸ Havana supported the invasion. Castro emphasized that Warsaw Pact aid would be expected for Vietnam or Cuba too, if their revolutions were endangered, as Czechoslovakia was alleged to be (by "German-American collusion").²⁹

The rape of Prague appears to have signaled a turning point in Cuban-Soviet relations. It is unclear whether support for the invasion was an indicator of a new Cuban policy or the invasion helped bring about such a new policy by holding out the possibility that a more activist Soviet regime might give greater support to Cuban activism. Nevertheless, the invasion did coincide with indications that the Soviet-Cuban rift had begun to mend.

The Soviet oil embargo against Cuba must have had even greater effect than these foreign policy considerations. Apparently, the USSR had become sufficiently concerned over Cuban ideological revisionism, specifically with the provocative Guevara mission to Bolivia, to confront Havana both with the carrot of renewed Soviet activism, and the stick of Soviet restrictions on oil exports to Cuba. At the same time, the USSR began to replace some of Cuba's obsolete military equipment, after a three-year hiatus in shipments.³⁰

In July of 1969, the first major Soviet naval visit to Cuba in many years took place.³¹ Subsequently, such visits were institutionalized, as have been TU-95 (Bear) reconnaissance flights from Cuba over the Caribbean³² and the South Atlantic (in the latter case, in conjunction with flights from the USSR and Conakry).³³

Since then, not only has Cuba cooperated closely with the USSR in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Middle East, but it has become one of the major proponents of the Soviet regime's domination of Eastern Europe. An interesting sample of Castro's ideological perspective was presented during an extended interview with Barbara Walters in 1977. He described Czechoslovakia under Soviet subjugation as having "very close relations in the economic, political and ideological fields" with the USSR but nevertheless still being "totally independent." Although these points had been reiterated frequently by Castro in addresses to his own domestic audience, the Walters interview is significant in that there were potential gains to be made from disinforming American viewers with regard to Cuba's military, political, economic, and ideological links to the USSR. Nevertheless, he was extremely frank, almost defiant during the interview, in asserting the strength of these ties.

Asked whether Russia was a free country, he replied, "I think it is the freest of all countries" (presumably freer than Cuba too). He condemned Solzhenitsyn as "a mediocre writer (whom) the West converted into an international hero."³⁴

Of greater significance was his reaffirmation of the Cuban foreign policy line of recent years regarding the PRC, which he asserted "is carrying out a foreign policy that betrays the international revolutionary movement."³⁵

In addition to backing the Soviet Union against the Chinese "revisionists" on the "left," Castro also has implicitly supported the USSR against the "Eurocommunists" on the "right." Frequently Cuban officials have referred to the importance of operating according to the dictates of "proletarian internationalism."³⁶ Use of this term, identified with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the "Brezhnev Doctrine," is anathema to the Eurocommunists. Apparently, the latter

made omission of this phrase a major condition for signing the communique summing up the June 1976 East Berlin meeting of European Communist Parties.³⁷

1968-70 might be termed a transitional period in Soviet-Cuban relations. In 1968 Castro came out strongly in favor of the USSR over the invasion of Czechoslovakia and in 1969 the Soviet Navy initiated deployment in the Caribbean, paying a port call to the Cienfuegos naval base.³⁸ In spring of 1970, Soviet naval air was allowed to refuel in Cuba for the first time; by 1972, it was allowed to fly regular reconnaissance missions from the island.³⁹ Most important, Soviet materials for construction of a submarine base in Cienfuegos were delivered in September of 1970.⁴⁰ Perhaps not entirely coincidentally, Cuba's friend in Guinea, Sekou Touré, began to allow Soviet naval visits in February 1969, culminating in the December 1970 Conakry Patrol, granted to the Soviet Union after a Portuguese-inspired coup almost eliminated the Guinean leader.⁴¹

Although the Soviet Union appeared to be making gains with respect to Castro, and apparently in relations with his friends or clients in West Africa, Castro still seems to have been trying to avoid an irrevocable commitment to the USSR. He continued the radical attempt, initiated in 1966, to collectivize agriculture, centralize the economy, eliminate material incentives, and even phase out the use of money, all to be accomplished in a brief period of time.⁴² This Cuban version of the Great Leap Forward was likely to prove anathema to the Russians, who had just been through an ideological confrontation with Peking over the issue of whose system would lead to Communism first. As was the case with the left wing Maoist-Trotskyite Cuban foreign policy of the early and middle 1960s, this economic plan was inspired by Che Guevara and opposed by the pro-Soviet faction.⁴³

By the second half of the 1970s, Castro's unqualified support for Soviet foreign policy, as expressed in the Walters interview and in the Cuban media, hardly indicates that Soviet-Cuban policies in Africa, or elsewhere, still diverged significantly. Whether the Cubans or the Soviet Union initiated the strategy of surrogate operations is academic, because it serves the purposes of both parties. However,

North Korean and North Vietnamese (and Soviet) personnel were used in the Middle East before Cuba's participation there and elsewhere, so a logical inference would be that Moscow originated the concept.⁴⁴

Moreover, the subsequent use of East Germans and other Warsaw Pact participants (who certainly cannot be viewed as independent parties) in Africa and the Middle East, to the advantage of the USSR, imply the same conclusion.

It is unclear whether Havana's favorable reaction to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was merely an indicator of a new Cuban policy with regard to Moscow or actually was a factor in changing Castro's previous approach.

By 1970, other factors came to the fore. The economic situation in Cuba, almost totally reliant on the vicissitudes of the world market for sugar, was in very poor shape after the 1970 "Great Sugar Harvest" failed to yield desired results (falling short by 15 percent).⁴⁵ Apparently labor morale was low, as indicated by a high rate of absenteeism. The situation was serious enough to merit a public *mea culpa* by Castro and a cataloging of the failures of the radical phase in Cuban economics.⁴⁶

During the next eight years the Soviet Union was to assume the burden of carrying Cuba's financial debt (to the tune of over \$5 billion),⁴⁷ while subsidizing Cuban sugar at several times the market price. Havana's failure to propel Cuba into economic self-sufficiency left the state with little choice but to adopt a traditional "path to socialism." The concomitant to this acknowledgment was complete economic dependence on the USSR. After the bold assertions of upcoming economic accomplishments during the early and mid-1960s, Castro may have felt it necessary to assert Cuba's machismo in the international arena to galvanize the state and restore his own credibility. After the Bolivian episode, a further move in Latin America was hardly feasible; moreover, operations in Africa could meet both Cuban and Soviet needs. There, the United States would be less likely to react with a military confrontation than in a Latin American venture, and the Soviet Union could more easily assist the Cubans, particularly logistically.

Finally, the emergence in 1970 of Allende's government in Chile probably indicated to Castro that the Soviet line on Latin American "national liberation" was more likely to prevail on that continent. The fall of Allende in 1973 may have warned Castro of the precarious nature of any Communist government in the Western Hemisphere (including his own) and thus reemphasized his need for greater intimacy with the Soviet Union. To guarantee Cuba's economic, and perhaps military, viability and to insure implementation of his definition of the "Brezhnev Doctrine," Castro would have to cooperate, and even collaborate closely, with the USSR.⁴⁸ To a considerable degree, of course, the outcome of the Chilean episode constituted an ex post facto vindication of the Guevara line; however, by 1973, Castro had already committed himself to the USSR, not only in terms of trade, but also ideologically. Having shifted away from a radical position, he could hardly swing back again so soon and still maintain his personal credibility.

ECONOMIC FACTORS

There is no question that, in the short run, the policy of cooperation with the USSR has benefited the Cuban economy (although part of the problem had been caused by the Soviet oil cutback in the first place). According to one report, the USSR was paying 400 percent of world market price and buying one-half of the Cuban sugar harvest in 1976, when the world price plummeted; moreover, it was supplying Cuba with all of its oil at considerably less than world prices.⁴⁹ The USSR is buying Cuban nickel at greater than world market prices and is helping Cuba to develop its infrastructure (particularly in the Holguin area of Oriente province). However, in the long term, the Cubans may regret these practices. They are due to begin repayments in 1986, by which time they may be locked into a position of total dependence on Comecon.⁵⁰

A good index of the change in Soviet policy toward Cuba since 1968 is the amount of oil that the USSR has been shipping to that country. Between 1966 and 1968, Soviet shipments increased from 5.1 to 5.3 million tons (m.t.) per annum, a modest increase of less than

4 percent. During the same period, Moscow increased its global oil exports from 73.6 to 86.2 m.t., over 17 percent. However, after 1968 (when Castro supported Moscow on the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the "Brezhnev Doctrine"), the situation changed dramatically. In 1969, Soviet oil shipments to Cuba increased about 9 percent, while Soviet global exports went up only 5 percent. Between 1968 and 1974, Soviet shipments to Cuba increased over 43 percent, whereas worldwide exports rose less than 35 percent. Clearly 1968 was a pivotal year in Cuban-Soviet oil relations.⁵¹

CUBAN INCENTIVES

The 1970s found Cuba in need of economic assistance and, perhaps, of an opportunity to reassert the Castro regime's virility. In Latin America, however, Castro stood in danger of encountering both U.S. and Soviet opposition. In Africa, the Soviet Union was seeking new points of entry without fearing a confrontation with America. Consequently, the Cuban venture in Africa, starting with Angola, constituted the natural confluence and culmination of three factors:

1. Cuban ideological predilections, as embodied in long-term policies toward Africa and Latin America;
2. Castro's need to bolster the regime's (and his own) fading image and, perhaps, the morale of the people, a decade after the revolution. After the failures of Guevara's adventures and Castro's equivalent of the Great Leap Forward, Castro could not afford another blunder. A spectacular showing abroad would bolster his image, both in Havana and in the international arena;
3. The phenomenon of increased Soviet-Cuban cooperation based on complementary needs and capabilities. Havana did not need to win a conflict in Latin America so much as a Cuban victory *somewhere*,⁵² in the name of a cause compatible with the regime's ideology, such as "proletarian internationalism." The Russians needed a new entry into non-Arab Africa, as well as something concrete to offer prospective African leaders. However, Moscow had good reasons for wishing to avoid direct embroilment.

Appendix A

IDEOLOGY IN CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONS DURING THE 1960s
AND ANALOGIES TO THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT

The analogy between Cuba in the mid and late 1960s and China during the late 1950s and early 1960s is quite revealing. The Chinese left felt betrayed because of Soviet unwillingness to cooperate more fully with Peking during such episodes as the Taiwan Straits crisis.⁵³ The Cuban leftists felt that the Soviet Union was too soft with respect to promoting National Liberation Movements in Latin America. Some of the Chinese communists apparently resented Soviet aid to non-communist states (such as India and Egypt). Similarly, certain elements in Cuba disapproved of Soviet "business as usual" relations with the Venezuelan and other "non-socialist" governments in Latin America. Between 1968 and 1970, Castro even mimicked the "Great Leap Forward" in an attempt to increase Cuba's production levels. This effort to break loose from Soviet economic domination failed, and today Castro probably is tied to the USSR economically as much as ever.

The similarities end there. Unlike the PRC, Cuba abuts on the United States; therefore, it could not entirely abandon the Soviet umbrella. Havana does not share Peking's historical experience with both Russian and Soviet expansionism at its expense; and Cuba does not have the size, population, military capability, economic potential, or natural resources to attempt a completely independent foreign policy. (Of course, China's capability to do so may be called into question, because of the limitations of its technological base.)

Cuban-Soviet divergence in the mid-1960s was occasioned at least in part by Castro's objection to a policy to which even the Soviet Union has resorted only sporadically. The Soviet line in the 1960s was not so very different from positions adopted during the Third Comintern Congress, when the "United Front" was adopted as the line for that period, and the utility of an alliance with the national bourgeoisie was stressed. This approach led the USSR to preside over

the elimination of the communist parties of Turkey and China during the 1920s.

The question of the appropriate role of non-ruling communist parties played a significant part in the tumultuous Zhdanov-Malenkov factional (and succession) struggle after World War II, with Zhdanov and his major spokesman (the Chairman of Gosplan, N.A. Voznesenskii) calling for communist-led uprisings in Europe, and E. Varga, the Director of the Institute of World Economics and World Politics (who appears to have been closer to Malenkov), calling for a more conservative and cautious policy. In early 1948, representatives of the Yugoslav leadership, closely tied to the Zhdanov line and probably aligned with the Zhdanov faction, called for uprisings in Asia at a meeting in Calcutta of the World Federation of Democratic Youth (a communist front organization) and of the Indian Communist Party Congress during the same visit. The Zhdanov-Voznesenskii line predominated briefly but led to major setbacks both in Asia and Europe that seem to have contributed to the 1948-50 purges of Zhdanovites in the USSR and the expulsion from the Cominform of the activist Yugoslavs in June 1948. The Zhdanovite line has not regained ascendancy since; the USSR has preferred intimate relations with non-communist single party regimes in power to loyal and consistent support for communist parties out of power.⁵⁴ Moscow is likely to maintain this approach for some time to come. Because of the results of the Kremlin's posture, elements in Peking and in Havana have voiced displeasure at the preference frequently given by Moscow to non-communist regimes over communist leaders. Certainly the lack of Soviet support for China in the Sino-Indian border dispute and the major arms shipments to Egypt and Indonesia (two non-communist states), as well as to India, at the very time when China felt it was not being supplied adequately by its Soviet "allies," eventually led to Peking's disenchantment.⁵⁵ For practical as well as Maoist doctrinal reasons, therefore, Moscow's conduct in the Third World could not be acceptable to the Chinese Communist Party. Moreover, the Kremlin's cynical behavior invited denunciation on charges of "opportunism," particularly when Moscow decided to shore up pro-Soviet regimes in Egypt and

Algeria by colluding in the elimination of their local communist parties (which had been steadfastly Muscovite in their attitude).

A major cause of the cool relations between Havana and the USSR in the 1960s stemmed from the Soviet disinclination to push the United States too overtly and too hard in the Western Hemisphere where tough American reaction was most to be expected. The Cubans probably found Soviet backbone to be conspicuously wanting during the final phase of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1965 turmoil in the Dominican Republic (when the United States intervened to avert the creation of a "second" Cuba). The conflict of interests, during this period of Soviet strategic weakness, between Russian caution and Cuban adventurism well could have led to a major confrontation, had Che Guevara not been killed in Bolivia in 1967. It was there that Guevara was going to initiate the first of "numerous Vietnams," easing military pressure on Hanoi.

Guevara's death resulted in a weakening of the more radical faction in Havana and increased the confidence of the "Muscovite" elements in Cuba, perhaps nudging Castro and his brother Raul away from the Guevara line.⁵⁶

Peking too had witnessed internal factional struggles, based on the issue of how closely to adhere to Soviet policy to reap the benefits of Soviet aid and support. In the Chinese case, in each instance, the "modernizers" (Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih in 1953-54,⁵⁷ P'eng Teh-huai and Huang K'e-ch'eng in 1959,⁵⁸ and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Liu Shao-ch'i, and Lo Jui-ch'ing in 1965-1966),⁵⁹ wished to "tilt" back somewhat toward the Soviet Union (so that China might avail itself of the arms, technology and industrial capacity that the USSR could provide). But they were beaten (although Teng and Lo subsequently staged a comeback). Prolonged isolation may have been worthwhile for Mao, because China never has been economically as reliant upon the USSR as Cuba, particularly with regard to petroleum. Nor is China's economy completely tied to one commodity, unlike the domination sugar exercises over Cuban trade.⁶⁰ Finally, China is an imposing power by virtue of mere size, population, and resources (even if many are untapped). Cuba projects no such aura, except insofar as Che Guevara and Fidel Castro were built up as romantic heroes of the far left.

Appendix B
ECONOMICS IN CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

Officially, the CMEA policy is defined as:

a process of the international socialist division of labour, the drawing closer of their economies and the formation of modern, highly effective national economic structures, of a gradual drawing closer and evening out of their economic development levels, a formation of deep and enduring ties in the basic branches of the economy, science, and technology, an expansion and consolidation of the international market of these countries, and an improvement of commodity-money relations.⁶¹

The principle of "International Socialist Division of Labor" upon which CMEA now is based requires each member state to concentrate its productive capacity in the few sectors of the economy in which it has comparative natural advantages. The result is that less-developed and smaller states are likely to become totally dependent on the remainder of the community to supply them with most of the products that do not come within their areas of specialty. For Cuba, application of this concept would mean continued and perhaps increased dependency upon the vicissitudes of the global sugar market (even though the Soviet Union is assisting some Cuban industrial projects), because it would discourage badly needed diversification of the economy. Consequently, the Cubans would have to rely on the largesse of more advanced CMEA states with regard to important industrial products, and upon Soviet indulgence in subsidizing Cuban sugar, whenever the world market price declines. Moreover, in 1986, Cuba's debts to the USSR will be due, currently estimated at well over \$5 billion, despite Soviet willingness to accept Cuban sugar at inflated prices in exchange for Soviet oil.⁶²

Another question mark hovers over Cuba's dependency upon the Russians for spare parts and servicing of Soviet-built Cuban industrial facilities and their products.

Even if Castro cooperates politically with Moscow, what will happen in the 1980s, when the Soviet petroleum tap may begin to run dry? It is highly doubtful whether Cuba will be regarded as important as East European states when the Kremlin has to determine its priority list of customers for Soviet oil.

It is a very serious question, therefore, just how much Castro has mortgaged Cuba's economy, and what leverage he has to counter the Soviet economic stranglehold, should Havana's and Moscow's political preferences diverge again.

III. ANGOLA

THE NATURE OF THE COMPETING MOVEMENTS

The largest political group in Angola probably is Jonas Savimbi's UNITA, representing the Ovimbundu, some 40 percent of the Angolan population who live in the southwest of the country. Savimbi was aided by the South Africans during the fall of 1975, which may have undermined his credibility outside the country, although apparently not among his own people.

The FNLA, led by Holden Roberto, represents ethnic elements constituting about 20 percent of Angolans, essentially the Bakongo people who live in the north and span both sides of the Zaire-Angola border.

The MPLA represents the area around Luanda, inhabited by the Mbundu. They have had a long association with Moscow and with other left wing groups, most notably the PAIGC.

In January of 1975, representatives of the MPLA, the FNLA, and the UNITA met at Alvor, Portugal, and agreed temporarily to share power.¹ Elections were to be held in November of that year. However, the arrangement fell apart within a few weeks and, according to one account, as early as the spring of 1975 elements of the Cuban task force in Syria were shuttled secretly to Angola.²

Soviet-Cuban intervention on behalf of MPLA leader Neto simply was a case of minority regional or ethnic group being assisted in the elimination of its rivals. The major difference between Soviet assistance to Nigeria in 1967-70 and to the MPLA in 1975-78 was that in the former instance the majority was being helped to suppress a minority, whereas in Angola a minority was being assisted in suppressing the majority. In Nigeria, the Soviet Union had no particular *ideological* reason for backing the Lagos regime. In Angola, there has been an evident organizational link between Moscow and the MPLA, but ideological motivations for intervention hardly have been clear-cut. Holden Roberto's credentials as an "anti-imperialist leader" were no less impressive than Neto's. Savimbi may have shown a less radical tinge, but he represented an ethnic group (the country's

largest), and not any particular class. In fact, Neto's MPLA probably contains a larger "upper class" component than the other two movements.

U.S. REACTIONS

In January of 1975, the United States had supplied the FNLA with insignificant amounts of financial aid (\$300,000). When the situation in Angola deteriorated, Secretary Kissinger arranged for an additional \$30,000,000 to be funneled covertly to the FNLA and UNITA.³ The post-Watergate, post-Vietnam U.S. Congress cut off all aid to Angola through an amendment by Senator Dick Clark.⁴ This action may well have been perceived by the USSR and its associates as a *carte blanche* for escalating their military presence in Africa. In January of 1976, the month after the Clark Amendment passed, the Soviet Union started airlifting troops directly from Cuba (on Il-62s) rather than transporting them by ship from the Middle East, or relying on the Cubans to airlift themselves in old Bristol Britannias.⁵

When the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Andrew Young, said the Cuban presence constituted a "stabilizing influence" in Africa, it probably confirmed Moscow's perception of American indifference or impotence in the face of Soviet activism in Africa. The subsequent dispatch of Cuban forces to the Ogaden in Ethiopia and their role in Shaba might well have occurred in any case; nevertheless, it would be interesting to know the precise role in these decisions of apparent signals of U.S. weakness.

It is not clear to what degree American policy has been influenced by the major financial interests in Angola and Cabinda of Gulf Oil and to a lesser degree of Boeing.⁶ Gulf Oil has contributed major revenues to Angola throughout the turmoil of the last few years; recently, the MPLA authorities have become the beneficiaries of this financial support. A bond of sorts may have been created as a result, but it is difficult to evaluate just how much such economic interests may have contributed to the normalization of relations between Washington and the MPLA in the summer of 1978.

ZAIRE'S ROLE

Zaire's ruler, Mobutu, has been Holden Roberto's main supporter, However, in the summer of 1978, Mobutu apparently agreed to terminate his assistance to Roberto.⁷ Zaire is almost entirely landlocked and has relied traditionally upon ports in Angola and Mozambique. That factor gives these two countries leverage over Zaire, with its economic dependence on the export of minerals, particularly copper and cobalt. Such leverage is enhanced by the Cuban military presence in Angola and Castro's demonstrated ability to exploit that presence to aid and abet separatists in Shaba province, where most of Zaire's mineral resources are situated. Thus the traditionally pro-Western Mobutu is being cajoled into helping the MPLA defeat his friend Roberto to terminate the conflict along the Zaire-Angola frontier, with its deleterious economic repercussions.

It is taking very long for the MPLA to complete its victory, despite Soviet help and the presence of the Cubans. Probably this reflects the composition of the MPLA, representing an ethnic minority in Angola.

IV. ADVANTAGES TO THE USSR OF USE OF SURROGATE FORCES IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

CUBAN PLUSES

It is doubtful that news of a Soviet victory over "imperialist forces" in Angola or elsewhere would accomplish much in the way of bolstering the image of Soviet leadership, or legitimizing Soviet arbitrary rule domestically. A smaller state might be able to assert itself in Africa, and even claim major victory, without appearing to be a bully boy.

A Soviet force is likely to have a far more abrasive effect upon Angolans and other Africans than, for example, Cubans, many of whom are at least partly of African ancestry. Soviet emissaries have a long history of haughty, aloof, even arrogant behavior. One observer has quoted an Angolan official to the effect that

the Soviets . . . usually demand rooms in the best hotels or well-furnished houses with air conditioning and new stoves and refrigerators, which cost us a lot of our precious foreign exchange, whereas we can put five or six Cubans in a hot one-bedroom apartment with mattresses on the floor and we will never hear a complaint.¹

After Che Guevara was killed in Bolivia and the failure of the much-vaunted 1970 sugar harvest to attain predicted levels, Castro may have believed a display of machismo was necessary. With the condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia by the French, Italian, and Yugoslav Communist parties (although Cuba endorsed the move), Moscow may not have been too eager to be seen sending Soviet expeditionary forces overseas. Furthermore, Soviet troops were reported to be demoralized when they encountered hostility from the Czechoslovak people whose "socialist system" they were supposed to be "saving," an additional disincentive to direct use of the Red Army abroad.

Before the 1976 East Berlin Conference of European Communist Parties, the USSR went to great lengths to include the recalcitrant PCI, PCE, and League of Communists of Yugoslavia, probably to create a unified front to the Chinese Communist Party.² Thus, the Russians

were unlikely to go out of their way to provoke further controversies with these parties, particularly if Moscow could achieve its objectives without incurring additional problems.

In its guise as a "Cuban" operation, the Angolan incursion received Tito's support, to the point of allowing Soviet arms shipments bound for the Cubans in Angola to overfly Yugoslavia;³ the Italian Communist Party also gave explicit and even enthusiastic support to the Cubans and refrained from adverse comment on the Soviet logistical role in the venture.⁴

It is questionable whether the "Eurocommunists" would have been quite as supportive if Soviet rather than Cuban forces had to shoulder the bulk of the fighting in Africa. Admittedly, if Moscow were to regard a particular action as essential, the feelings of the Italians or the PCE would be given short shrift. However, *direct* Soviet intervention was *not* essential in Africa. Moreover, it is doubtful whether a Soviet overseas expedition to a primitive tropical region could be carried out without adverse effect upon the morale of Soviet fighting men (and, eventually, their dependents back home).

Were the operation to bog down, the result most likely would be a disastrous decline, both in the regime's credibility, and the image of the Red Army. Thus, although Castro had little to lose from an African encounter, the Soviet Union had little to gain from direct participation in combat. Consequently, backing the Cubans held the prospect of reaping the strategic benefits of Havana's new foothold in Africa--if all went well.

In the event that the campaign proceeded less than smoothly, the Soviet leadership would not incur much of the blame; after all, inexperienced Cubans were claiming to be operating of their own accord. Moreover, joint ventures, based on Soviet logistical support, would provide an opportunity to solidify the rapprochement with Cuba that had developed after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Cuban intelligence network apparently is subservient to the Soviet apparatus, so presumably the Cuban presence (as well as a sprinkling of Soviet

and East European elements) would net the KGB some extremely useful contacts.⁵ A key Soviet consideration is probably that Cuban involvement was far less risky than direct Russian involvement, in terms of jeopardizing Moscow's ability to maintain detente in a form palatable to the United States.

THE U.S. FACTOR

If the Soviet Union were to become an overt actor in an armed overseas venture, a legal problem is the June 22, 1973 *Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War*, which states that "the parties [the two signatory states] agree. . . that each party will refrain from the threat or use of force against. . . the allies of the other party and against other countries in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security."⁶ This codified the "Basic Principles" endorsed by the two superpowers, acting on behalf of the two opposing blocs, on May 29, 1972, during the Moscow Summit.⁷ (These "Principles" committed the parties to refrain from exploiting crisis situations, particularly in the Third World, for unilateral gains.)

Presumably the Soviet Union embarked upon the detente process believing it had something to gain from agreements on such topics as SALT. Certainly one way of jeopardizing negotiations was blatant violation of this understanding. Not only would that strengthen the influence of important circles in the West that already harbored deep suspicions of Soviet intentions, but it was bound to deprive the Western arms control lobby of much of its political ammunition.⁸ After all, it would be hard to argue that the Soviet Union was negotiating in good faith in SALT if it were simultaneously violating the two protocols governing the general behavior of the two powers.

MIDDLE EAST PRECEDENTS

Some analysts have argued that the Soviet Union violated both the letter and the spirit of these agreements even with the more covert aspects of its conduct during the period leading up to and including the October 1973, War in the Middle East, well beyond the first

ceasefire.⁹ When these analyses appeared, the full extent of the use of proxy forces on the side of the Arab states during this period was not widely known. It now appears that the USSR first resorted to surrogates to a really significant extent during 1973-74. Although the Vietnam conflict was still in full tilt, North Vietnamese personnel reportedly were brought in to defend Syrian air space over Damascus and North Korean pilots to fly over Egypt (ultimately to engage Israeli planes in that sector).¹⁰

Cubans, North Koreans, and North Vietnamese, of course, do not represent members of the Warsaw Pact. East Germans, however, have been active but not as combat troops. Resort to non-Warsaw Pact elements, as viewed in Moscow, presumably would implicate the Soviet Union far less than active combat participation of forces from countries formally allied with the USSR and, in most cases, occupied by Red Army units and subordinated to Soviet military command.¹¹

Four months before the outbreak of the 1973 war, Brezhnev is alleged to have requested direct Cuban military participation (particularly of armored units) in the forthcoming conflict. If this *Foreign Report* account is correct, the request took place approximately one month after the June 23, 1973, Washington accord was signed; in that case, the USSR apparently initiated resort to proxies when the agreement was still brand new and was bound to be taken into consideration in planning Soviet foreign policy. (It may be that the Cubans were intended only for special situations, as they had not yet arrived when the October War started or when the first ceasefire, on October 22, finally stopped Israeli forces a few miles from Damascus.

During the next few weeks, in a hectic campaign of reconstruction of the wrecked Syrian military machine (entirely at Soviet expense), additional North Vietnamese (pilots) were reportedly brought in and Soviet and East German engineers and officers rebuilt the Syrian artillery and anti-air defenses. Two full Cuban armored brigades reportedly were airlifted from Cuba (by Cubana Aviación Airlines normally used for commercial flights); the Cubans themselves unloaded tanks, trained Syrian tank corpsmen, and used the opportunity to learn new combat methods (derived from the lessons of the October war) from Soviet and

East German officers.¹² During this period, members of Palestinian Arab paramilitary units, who had been (and continue to be) trained in Cuba, served as interpreters.¹³

Soon after Israel and Egypt signed a "disengagement agreement" on January 18, 1974, Cuban forces reportedly joined a Syrian armored division on Mt. Hermon. Tanks at the front carried mixed Cuban-Syrian crews (usually Syrian signalmen and drivers and Cuban commanders and gunners--apparently a precursor to the identical allocation of duties between Cubans and Ethiopians in the Ogaden). Early in the morning of February 4, 1974, the Cuban/Syrian tank forces, in conjunction with a barrage from artillery units (reportedly commanded by East German and Russian officers), began firing on Israeli forces. Thus started the "War of Attrition" on the Golan Heights (which was to last until the May 31, 1974, Syrian-Israeli "Disengagement Agreement"). Seven hours after the Cuban/Syrian offensive of February 4 started, the Israelis counterattacked. According to available reports, during the next few hours 18 "Syrian" tanks were destroyed.

The United States, along with Israel, apparently kept secret the reports that the Israeli Army was engaged in combat with more than just Syrian forces.¹⁴ It remains a major question whether, or to what extent, U.S. reaction might have been different had there been Soviet troops in the Syrian tanks.

Significant airlifts of Cuban forces reportedly were observed during late February and early March, precipitating a partial Israeli mobilization of reserves and shift of tanks to the Golan front, commanded by General Rafael Eytan. According to one unconfirmed account, during the February-May 1974, "War of Attrition," the Cubans suffered casualties of approximately 180 killed and 250 wounded, whereas the Israelis lost 68 dead and 178 wounded. If so, contrary to popular belief, the Cubans as early as 1974 had confronted a mechanized "enemy" army in combat (in addition to a subsequent, brief encounter with South African forces in Angola). Apparently, Havana's forces did not conduct themselves as well as they might have hoped. Once they were withdrawn from the front, Cuban forces reportedly spent considerable time with Soviet officers (who had observed in detail the course of the February-

May conflict), discussing the mistakes of the "War of Attrition" and, (in conjunction with Syrian forces) engaging in exercises based on the lessons of the fighting.¹⁵

AFRICAN FOLLOW-UP

One night early in the spring of 1975, Cubana Aviación planes apparently were put to work again, this time ferrying Cuban soldiers from Syria to Angola. Subsequently, some Cuban officers were reported once again to be involved in the Middle East, this time aiding Palestinian Arab elements against Syrian army units in Lebanon, during that country's "civil war."¹⁶ (It remains unclear to what extent this action meshed with Soviet policy.)

Having noted that the United States seemed willing to tolerate Cuban activities in the Middle East so soon after the June 22, 1973, agreement, Moscow must have been tempted to foster Cuban participation in combat on a grander scale (if in a less prominent environment). Consequently, the Cubans drastically augmented their previously very limited presence in Angola. Then, emboldened by success, Cuba felt free to intervene in Ethiopia in fairly large numbers when the Soviet Union's precarious balancing act between Somalia and Ethiopia proved no longer tenable in 1977-78.

A Somali Minister confided to Arnaud de Borchgrave that, in 1973, five years before the Cuban expeditionary force's arrival to join the Ethiopian army in the drive against the Somali military effort to "liberate" the Ogaden, Castro had offered Somali President Muhammed Siad Barre the use of Cuban troops to help pluck the Ogaden from Ethiopia.¹⁷ (At that time, of course, Soviet-Somali relations had been fairly intimate.)

V. POSSIBLE COSTS TO THE USSR OF SURROGATE
OPERATIONS, AND OTHER SOVIET CONSIDERATIONS

In the *Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement*, published by Peking in 1965 to air its grievances, two of the key complaints pertained to Russian willingness to "fight to the last Chinese soldier" in Korea and to Soviet reluctance to extend a protective shield over China so that a "War of National Liberation" could be launched against Taiwan. Peking referred in the same breath to "The Korean War against U.S. aggression in which we fought side by side with the Korean comrades and our struggle against the United States in the Taiwan Straits." (In this context, Korea could be analogized to Angola, and Taiwan to Venezuela or Bolivia.) The Chinese described their role in Korea essentially as surrogates for the USSR "We ourselves preferred to shoulder the heavy sacrifices necessary and stood in the first line of defense of the Socialist Camp so that the Soviet Union might stay in the second line."¹

Of course, analogies may be taken too far. It is not clear to what degree the Chinese entered the Korean conflict with genuine hope that the Kremlin would assist the PLA in a Taiwan "liberation" campaign. It would be overstating the case to define the PRC's relationship to the USSR during the early 1950s as that of a mere proxy, but the Chinese probably believed that Moscow's perception of Peking was precisely that. Russia's failure to back the Chinese adequately (as far as Peking was concerned) *followed* China's Korean sacrifices, whereas Havana's unsuccessful Bolivia venture *preceded* Cuba's surrogate role in Africa. However, should Castro, emboldened by African successes, insist on Soviet participation in future Latin American ventures in payment for favors rendered. Moscow might find itself in something of a quandary. Precisely for the reasons that render support for surrogate forces preferable to direct Soviet intervention, the Politburo might consider major Soviet operations in the Western Hemisphere too risky. Moreover, even providing Soviet logistical infrastructure for such ventures in this portion of the world would be regarded by the Kremlin as a dubious proposition because of the same considerations that have kept the USSR from

probing too deeply into Latin America since 1962. Moscow well remembers U.S. reactions to the Guatemalan affair in 1952 and to the disorders in the Dominican Republic in 1965. not to mention the Cuban Missile Crisis itself and perhaps, the fall of Allende. Moreover, the Kremlin does not wish to jeopardize other Soviet interests in such matters as SALT or M(B)FR.

The USSR cannot very well discourage Castro from glorifying his African successes to justify the cost in Cuban blood. However, Moscow also cannot afford to let Havana develop unrealistic perceptions either of its own military capabilities or of its political role.

One error committed by the Soviet Union in connection with the role of the Chinese forces in Korea was compelling Peking to reimburse Moscow for the weapons that the USSR sent to the Korean front. While the Chinese were shedding their blood on the Korean battlefield, the Soviet Union was war profiteering at Peking's expense, as the *Polemic* pointed out so bitterly:

As for Soviet loans to China, it must be pointed out that China used them mostly for the purchase of war material from the Soviet Union, the greater part of which was used against U.S. aggression. The Chinese people...made great sacrifices and incurred vast military expenses. The Chinese Communist party has always considered that this was the Chinese people's ...internationalist duty and that it is nothing to boast of. For many years we have been paying the principal and interest on these Soviet loans, which account for a considerable part of our yearly exports to the Soviet Union. Thus, even the war material supplied to China in the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, has not been given gratis.²

Apparently, this practice engendered no little resentment in Peking.

It is not clear whether the USSR has learned a lesson from its experiences with the PRC or has realized merely that Cuba could not conduct a successful African campaign without the Soviet Union supplying weapons and "lift" at its own expense. Regardless of the motivation for Soviet behavior, Cuba's expeditionary force has been the beneficiary of the aftermath of the Korean episode and no cause seems to have been given, at least so far, for recriminations against Moscow on Cuba's part.

Cuba's response to the invasion of Czechoslovakia was to support the doctrine of "proletarian internationalism" and to insist that Moscow should apply this "Brezhnev doctrine" also in the event that the West attempts to undermine other existing communist regimes:³

The statement by TASS explaining the decision of the governments of the Warsaw Pact says in its final paragraph: The brother nations firmly and resolutely oppose their unbreakable solidarity against any threat from abroad. They will never permit anyone to snatch away even a single link of the socialist community. We ask: Does this statement include Vietnam? Does this statement include Korea? Does this statement include Cuba? Does it consider Vietnam, Korea, and Cuba as links in the socialist camp that cannot be snatched away by the imperialists?

On the basis of this declaration, Warsaw Pact divisions were sent to Czechoslovakia, and we ask: Will Warsaw Pact divisions be sent to Vietnam also if the imperialists increase their aggression against the country and the people of Vietnam ask for this aid? Will Warsaw Pact divisions be sent to the Korean Democratic Republic if the Yankee imperialists attack that country? *Will Warsaw Pact divisions be sent to Cuba if the Yankee imperialists attack our country, or simply if, in the face of the threat of an attack by the Yankee imperialists, our country requests it?* (Emphasis added.)

This constituted an overt attempt to push the Soviet Union into an even tougher position with regard to the West. Similarly, at one stage, the PRC tried to prod Moscow to extend its nuclear shield to cover the Chinese in a confrontation with the United States in the Taiwan Straits. The PRC referred to the Communist bloc "headed by the USSR," and to the Soviet Union already "building communism," to point out both the obligation and the capability of the USSR to assert its power in support of the interests of other communist regimes.⁴

Liberal Cuban use of the term "proletarian internationalism," although supporting the Russian stand in the dispute with the Eurocommunists, could prove troublesome to Moscow if Havana attempted to apply it in an area not of Moscow's choosing.

Regardless of whether Havana feels that it has earned rewards for its performance in Africa and the Middle East, Castro probably has little flexibility left to act independently of the Soviet Union, in view of the enormous economic debt Havana owes Moscow, Cuba's dependence on the USSR for arms,⁵ for raw materials and, particularly, the Soviet

subsidization of the Cuban economy, and the integration of Cuba into CMEA.⁶ Thus, Castro may find himself very disgruntled from time to time but with no alternative to Soviet dominance.

There has been some question as to the feasibility of the Soviet Union "turning off" the Cuban military machine now that it has been activated. For example, the Shaba incursion of 1978, resulting in massacres of civilians and the consequent entry of West European protective forces, probably distressed the Soviet leaders, who like conveying an aura of vast power and forward thrust, but not necessarily of open brutality; even less can Moscow wish to activate a Western response-mechanism through bloody incidents in Africa. Presumably, one of the Soviet reasons for using proxies is to make it awkward for the West to react on the ground, because it might seem humiliating for a developed state to have to fight with Cubans and Africans. The political difficulties engendered by American involvement in Vietnam bear witness to that aspect.

An instance when such considerations might not apply would be a *prima facie* case of humanitarian assistance in the wake of the slaughter of women, children, and clergy, as occurred in the copper-rich Shaba Province of Zaire, where the French felt compelled to intervene, purportedly on humanitarian grounds. Even this episode, however, did not necessarily lead to an unequivocal Soviet setback. Tanzania's Julius Nyerere, an influential African statesman not traditionally viewed as pro-Soviet, condemned the French and Belgian reaction, but did not comment on the invading forces who provoked the European response.⁷ His statement, and the lack of O.A.U. consensus on the issue, minimized the damage suffered by Soviet and Cuban interests. Although the degree of Cuban involvement in the Shaba incursions has not been fully established,⁸ Moscow is unlikely to have been entirely delighted at the way events unfolded there. It is unlikely that the Cubans would have assumed any major commitments in Africa without assurance of Soviet support. But that does not necessarily mean Soviet day-by-day supervision of tactical developments under battlefield conditions.

The Soviet Politburo initially may have viewed its rapprochement with Cuba not so much in terms of surrogate warfare in Africa, but

rather in the context of Moscow's political/ideological struggle with China. It must be remembered that the major clashes with China along the Amur-Ussuri occurred soon after the invasion of Czechoslovakia,⁹ at a point when Moscow probably was as isolated in the communist world as it has ever been.¹⁰ At the June 1969 Moscow Conference of Communist Parties, Yugoslavia, Albania, China, North Korea, and North Vietnam were among the absentees. Cuba cagily sent only an observer delegation.¹¹ The message was clear--Castro is willing to back Brezhnev (as demonstrated by Cuba's general support for the invasion of Czechoslovakia), but, in return for full Cuban loyalty, the USSR must pay a price.

Although this line mirrored the P.R.C.'s in the late 1950s and early 1960s, there was a fundamental difference. As indicated by the famous episode in March 1953, the "doctored" photograph of Mao and Malenkov in *Pravda*, once Stalin died Mao was regarded as the senior personality in the international Communist movement. Malenkov thought, presumably, that Mao was a potential kingmaker even within the USSR. Castro has never achieved comparable stature. Moreover, by virtue of its size and population, the P.R.C. commands more respect and poses a greater challenge to Soviet "hegemonism" than Cuba. During the late 1960s, Castro's policy, both domestically and in foreign affairs, had an extremely left-wing tinge, perhaps comparable to Chinese excesses in the late 1950s.

A rather backward state with a population of 9-1/2 million, dependent economically on one or two commodities, cannot be genuinely autonomous unless it is willing to pay the extremely high social costs inherent in such a policy. The example of poverty-stricken Albania hardly invited imitation on Castro's part. The failure of Cuba's "Great Leap Forward" was acknowledged in July of 1970, when Castro announced that the goal of a ten million ton sugar harvest had not been achieved.¹² This address was followed by a broadening of the government, featuring the rise of members of what was described by one analyst as the "technocratic" faction led by Carlos Raphael Rodriguez (Deputy Prime Minister responsible for Foreign Relations), who, unlike Fidel Castro or his brother Raúl, originally was a member of the Popular Socialist Party, rather than of the guerrilla element.¹³

These "pragmatists" leaned toward the USSR, hoping that Cuba could avail itself of Soviet military, industrial, and consumer goods and technology. Although some in this group were ex-members of the Muscovite PSP, others had been junior participants in the guerrilla revolution, who subsequently were trained by the USSR to assume technocratic positions.¹⁴ The cooptation in the Cuban "establishment" of this faction, which was not identified with the turmoil of the abortive radical reforms of the late 1960s, helped to stabilize the government and reduce some of the pressures on Castro. Although this group might not have been strong enough to topple him, it certainly could damage his credibility. By promoting some of its members, Castro was giving them a stake in stabilizing the situation.

There appears to have been compromise involving all the factions. Certainly Cuba is far closer to the Soviet Union now than a decade ago, and Havana is reaping some of the short run economic and technological benefits of allegiance to the USSR. Nor can it be asserted that the F.A.R. (Cuba's military apparatus) is missing any opportunity to sharpen its claws in the name of "proletarian internationalism," even if the site of operations is chosen by Moscow. The "Fidelistas" have been able to continue "revolutionary" activity (although one might well ask just why the MPLA necessarily should be viewed as more "progressive" than may be to the taste of those still loyal to Che Guevara's theories.)

To a great extent, the three factions have apparently coalesced around a position that is neither ideal for, nor anathema to, any of them. The present "line" probably is closer to the preferences of the "Pragmatists" and "Raulistas," than of the "Fidelistas." However, Fidel Castro's problems in 1970 left him with little choice but to cooperate with the others. Given the circumstances, he has come out with his prestige intact, if not enhanced. Whether the mortgaging of his country's economy and his acquiescence in Soviet control over the security service ultimately will hurt him, is another matter.

The creation of the new "coalition" in Havana seems to have strengthened links with the USSR because many of the newly promoted personalities, most prominently Rodriguez, had developed considerably

more intimate relations with the Russians than had Castro himself. This factor apparently helped to bridge the remaining gaps between Havana and Moscow, as the Cubans reorganized their political system under the slogan of "Institutionalization of the Revolution," moving toward a system resembling that of the USSR. The cult of Fidel was all but eliminated. Moreover, the Cuban economy was reoriented toward closer cooperation with the USSR, culminating in 1972 in the admission of Cuba to C.M.E.A.¹⁵

The cumulative cost to Castro personally of these various moves cannot be considered insignificant. Having "routinized" socialism and moved away from his own cult, and having planted himself firmly within the Soviet camp, his own domestic and diplomatic position and Cuba's international standing were bound to have suffered. Castro, moreover, needed Soviet aid to redress some of Cuba's economic problems (particularly the dearth of domestic energy production and the vicissitudes of the sugar market). Thus, he was shackled by serious constraints, discouraging any attempts to assert Cuban, or his own, independence with regard to Moscow. After U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic and Guevara's death (and, ironically, at the very time when left-wing governments took over in Peru and Chile and later in Guyana and Jamaica, indicating a general upsurge in radicalism), Castro had to shelve his dreams of fostering Cuban-led guerrilla movements throughout Latin America.¹⁶ Part of the Soviet-Cuban accommodation implicitly was that Castro should not disturb relations between the Soviet Union and existing governments (whether moderate or leftist) in the Western Hemisphere.¹⁷

VI. THE USSR AND AFRICA

An assessment of Soviet goals in Africa is difficult and speculative at best. It may be assumed that there are economic aspects to Moscow's policy, at least negatively--denial of strategic resources to the West. Long term prospects of actual Soviet control of those resources also may be a consideration; however, the Soviet Union will not lack many of the minerals exported by Africa in the immediate future.¹ In terms of strategically important raw materials, one area of Sub-Saharan Africa is of single importance; Southern Africa (including Angola, Rhodesia, South Africa and Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia), with its vast yields of diamonds, chrome, platinum, coal, gold, copper, cobalt, vanadium, manganese, fluorspar, uranium, nickel, and other minerals.² From a geostrategic viewpoint, however, the focal area is the Horn of Africa, with all of its implications for the security of the Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf region (and its oil).

The Soviet Union is a major producer, and in many cases an exporter, of almost all of these minerals (the major exceptions being uranium and fluorspar). However, the United States imports major quantities of ferromanganese, platinum group metals, vanadium, and antimony, as well as all of its chrome and vermiculite, from Southern Africa.³

The Soviet strategy of denial is emphasized by Admiral S. G. Gorshkov's preoccupation with disruption of sea lines of communications (SLOCs) as a major aspect of the Soviet fleet's mission.⁴

The strategic importance of Southern Africa to the West is fully understood by the Russians, who stress the vulnerability of the sea lines of access to Europe and the United States from the Southern Hemisphere, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean, as well as the importance of the minerals in the region.⁵

As was pointed out earlier, the Soviet Navy is interested in African ports from anti-submarine warfare (ASW), interdiction, and reconnaissance standpoints. From November 1970 through November 1977, Conakry, Guinea served as a Soviet reconnaissance facility, particularly during the worldwide Soviet combined exercises (called "Okean 1975"). The Russians flew simultaneous reconnaissance missions out of

Cuba and Guinea, spanning the South Atlantic.⁶ The Horn of Africa (at the time of intimate Soviet relations with Somalia) was equally useful for coverage of the approaches to the Indian Ocean, considered by some to be the "soft underbelly" of Soviet strategic defense. Major Soviet ASW efforts focus on this region because the southern portion of the USSR is vulnerable to American SLBMs with a range of 4,000 nautical miles.⁷

A "surrogate presence" in the Horn of Africa, added to Moscow's special relationships with South Yemen and Iraq,⁸ can enable the USSR to hold hostage the major oil production centers of the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf, as well as the (now) secondary oil access route to Europe via the Red Sea and Suez. New weapon ranges and accuracies have created a technological "choke point" between West Africa and Northeast Brazil, rendering vulnerable the primary oil tanker route, around the Cape of Good Hope into the Atlantic, particularly given a Cuban presence in Angola and, perhaps, renewed Soviet facilities in Conakry, Guinea.⁹

To look at such regions as Southern Africa or the Horn in geographic isolation is artificial. The era of the airleift has eliminated the concept of security based solely upon geographic distance from areas controlled by adversaries. Moreover, perceptions regarding the capability, will, and determination of a regime to use force in support of political goals may be more relevant in shaping the policies of adversaries and third parties than the real intentions, the actual efficacy of ground operations, or the objective strength of the state in question. In Europe, the process whereby the USSR exerts leverage by influencing perceptions may be termed "Finlandization." There is no reason to doubt the applicability of the same concept to Africa or to the Middle East. Moves in Angola, for example, supported by and identified with the USSR, if carried through with impunity and without visible costs, inevitably affect the thinking of leaders in states as far north as the Mediterranean and as far east as the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The shadow cast by apparent Soviet power becomes longer still when one considers developments around the Horn of Africa, with Cubans (and Warsaw Pact elements, most notably East Germans) operating with the aid of prepositioned munition in South Yemen and utilizing air facilities as far away as Iraq.¹⁰

In this connection, Tanzania appears to have tilted toward the Soviet Union in recent years, and Morocco, traditionally friendly to the West, has concluded an arrangement with the USSR that King Hassan termed the "contact of the century." The published agreement is impressive: Rabat is committed to supply the USSR with at least five million tons of phosphates annually (at prices to be renegotiated periodically); in exchange, the Soviet Union will allocate at least two billion dollars to development of the infrastructure of Morocco's phosphate industry, including laying a 60-mile long railroad from the inland mines of Meskalas to Essaoira, an Atlantic port the USSR is helping to develop. However, official sources in Rabat let it be known that there were "political understandings" between the two governments, whereby the USSR would remain neutral in the competition between Morocco and a more traditional Soviet client, Algeria.

Far more alarming, if true, would be the claim by *Foreign Report* asserting a significant unannounced military aspect to the deal. Reportedly, the Soviet Union has agreed to transfer to Morocco a coastal defense system (particularly over-the-horizon radar and heavy artillery), fighter planes (including MiG-23s), and subsequently some armor.

Algeria has sought reassurances from Moscow after the release of an ambiguously phrased Soviet-Moroccan Fisheries Agreement, which did not specify whether all area claims by Morocco were included in the accord. (Regardless of whether the alleged military aspects of this arrangement materialize, the economic and political features do indicate somewhat of a Moroccan shift toward Moscow.) It is unclear what effect these Soviet-Moroccan arrangements may have on Soviet-Algerian relations. At this juncture, at any rate, there has been no indication that the Maghreb will experience replication of developments on the Horn of Africa, where the Soviet Union "exchanged" Somalia for Ethiopia. An important indicator of trends in the Maghreb will be provided by the type of facilities (if any) that Soviet vessels may be granted at Essaoira. No data are available for assessing whether, or to what degree, recent developments in Moroccan-Soviet relations constitute a function of suspicion in Rabat that the West has no will to resist the Soviet Union in Africa. Although an analyst may not assume

that the Cuban and other proxy force operations in Africa and the Middle East have intimidated Rabat to the point of adopting a new foreign policy posture, the "surrogate" factor may have played some role in swaying Moroccan and other policymakers.¹¹

THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT AND AFRICA

Although Cuban incursions do not by themselves endanger West European or PRC territory, the perception that the Soviet Union can bring proxy force to bear with impunity, even in remote spots, is unlikely to inspire confidence in the efficacy of the Western security system. Communist China, the "sixteenth member of NATO," with a more constant investment of effort in Africa perhaps than most European states, may have greater incentive (in terms of Chinese credibility) to foster opposition to the USSR. After all, Peking steadily, if not vigorously, has "shown the flag" in Africa, as a major component of its foreign policy.¹²

The West cannot rely on this factor. Since the early 1950s, time and again China has witnessed the emergence of factions favoring the policy of economic and military modernization through cooperation with the USSR. At present, a group advocating such views has not been established in Peking (although, conceivably, the reemergence of Teng Hsiao-P'ing and Lo Jui-ch'ing may portend eventual shifts in policy). A feeling in Peking that events in Africa and elsewhere had shown the West to be a "paper tiger" could only support advocates of a limited rapprochement with Moscow. Certainly, the apology offered to China by the Soviet Union, following the spring of 1978 border incident, indicates that some leaders in Moscow may be attempting to patch up Sino-Soviet relations.¹³

In the meantime the USSR almost certainly continues to view the United States as its primary adversary; therefore, Moscow must give fairly constant consideration to competition with Peking in Africa. The Russians hardly can compete with the Chinese in cultivating relations with developing states on the basis of a common "third world experience," as perceived by the governments and peoples of the region. Cuba can pass more easily as a "third world" state, by virtue of both

racial and economic criteria. Although many Cubans do have black ancestry, most top officials in Havana more closely resemble the membership of the Soviet Politburo. Nevertheless, the Cuban leaders have attempted to create the image that their state contains roots that are as African as they are Latin. The combination of Soviet-manufactured arms and Cuban technicians and advisors probably is more palatable to non-aligned states than Soviet weapons accompanied by Russian experts. Soviet advisors frequently have been considered "clannish, impatient and ethnocentric" and have revealed a tendency to treat their hosts/clients as "difficult children."¹⁴

MARITIME ASPECTS--FISH

A subsidiary, but not insignificant, interest of the USSR in Africa relates to the major fishing grounds off the African west coast. The Soviet catch in the South East and East Central Atlantic (adjacent to the states in which the USSR has been particularly active politically--Ghana, Guinea, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, the Congo), accounted for 1.6 million metric tons of fish in 1974, or some 17 percent of all the fish caught by the USSR, both in inland waters and on the high seas. In 1967, this area contributed only 7 percent of the total Soviet catch, little more than one quarter of the haul for the region seven years later--providing a larger average annual increment than any other Soviet fishing ground during the period 1967-1973.¹⁵

Fishing has to be a major consideration in Russian maritime policy. Fish provides about one-third of all Soviet animal protein production. Moreover, the Soviet production cost per pound of fish is about one-half that of beef.¹⁶ The fishing industry is nearly immune to natural disasters and thus provides a hedge against the vicissitudes of the Russian climate.

Fishing also plays its role in Soviet diplomatic and trade relations with developing states. Not only does the USSR sell fish to the Third World,¹⁷ it also helps develop local fishing industries as part of its foreign assistance program.¹⁸ Of particular importance is the role that Soviet fishing and commercial fleets play in a military

context. Trawlers, in addition to serving non-military purposes, frequently supplement the Soviet Navy by providing surveillance, planting sensors for anti-submarine warfare, and serving command, control, communications and intelligence functions.

VII. SURROGATE ACTIVITIES AND THE EXPANSION
OF THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE NETWORK

A key component of Soviet-Cuban intimacy has been the cooption of the Cuban intelligence network (the D.G.I., or Direccion General de Inteligencia) into the KGB. This development is likely to mean not only new and expanded Soviet entries in Latin America and Africa,¹ traditional areas of Cuban influence, but even in the West, where some young radicals may find the Cuban image more appealing than that of the stereotypically stony-featured, grim KGB or East European intelligence agent.² Cuban agents also have been quite active in Hong Kong, which could facilitate Soviet intelligence functions in Asia, particularly with respect to the PRC.³ The Cubans, moreover, have close working relations with the Basque E.T.A., the F.L.Q., the I.R.A. and the P.L.O.⁴ Thus, low-key, indirect Soviet contacts with terrorist groups can be maintained through the Cubans, so that the USSR can avoid the stigma attached, at least in the West, to support of terrorism.

The Cubans, moreover, are not the only significant Soviet proxy in the Middle East and Africa. Although the USSR uses various East European and other Communist elements (e.g., North Koreans and North Vietnamese), increasingly the burden on Cubans in these regions is being eased through the employment of East Germans, particularly in the realm of intelligence.⁵ Ladislav Bittman, a former leading official in the Czechoslovak intelligence network (dealing with "disinformation") who fled to the West in 1968, estimated that satellite countries augmented Soviet intelligence by about 50 percent.⁶ Presumably, he did not include Cuba as a "satellite," because his role in the Czechoslovak STB terminated with the invasion of his country in 1968, before the Havana-Moscow rift had mended. With the various Warsaw Pact intelligence outfits, therefore, inclusion of the D.G.I. almost as a functional arm of the KGB should make the "Cuban connection" a major asset for Soviet intelligence.⁷

The implications for Castro of having his intelligence network subordinated to the KGB/GRU are quite deleterious. Not only does this undermine his image as an independent actor, but it gives the USSR enormous leverage over him should he deviate from the Soviet line.

According to some estimates, perhaps five of the 50 or so D.G.I. agents trained annually in the USSR are intended to spy *for the KGB within* the Cuban network.⁸ Regardless of whether the USSR were prepared to intervene directly against a recalcitrant Castro, Soviet agents in Cuba might well be able to give operational support of various kinds to the Muscovite elements there. Certainly, this would give Castro reason to pause, prior to defying Moscow.

Some of Russia's economic assistance to Cuba involves development of the Cuban fishing industry.⁹ Assuming that Cuban trawlers perform the same types of services for surveillance and ASW as do their Soviet counterparts, this program should serve to enhance Soviet naval activities in the Caribbean, and from West Africa to the Canary Islands.¹⁰

One of Cuba's foreign activities during past years has involved forming palace guards for insecure regimes (e.g., Sekou Touré's Guinea, Manley's Jamaica). Presumably, this enhances the Cuban influence on such leaders and could be manipulated by the KGB to Moscow's advantage. However, Sekou Touré's suspension of Soviet reconnaissance flights from Conakry in the fall of 1977 indicates the limits of such leverage.¹¹

VIII. EAST GERMAN AND OTHER SURROGATES

Once it was established that Cubans, North Koreans, and North Vietnamese could assume active proxy roles without serious "costs" to the Soviet Union, to detente, and to the surrogates themselves, it was apparently decided to ease the burden on the Cubans (and perhaps to test the resolve of the West) through escalation of the challenge to NATO. This took the form of significant augmentation of the number and upgrading of the role of Warsaw Pact personnel in the Third World.¹ Most notable in this respect are East German elements in Africa, now numbering some three thousand. The G.D.R., and not the Cubans, masterminded the 1978 incursion in Shaba, according to one source.² The Germans also have been quite prominent in Mozambique, where they constitute the personal body-guard and secret police of President Machel and have been arming Zimbabwe guerrilla forces.³ G.D.R. personnel, moreover, are very active at present in the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar), where they are attempting to create conditions that may eventually convert the island into a dependable Soviet base in the Indian Ocean.⁴ Moreover, East German and Czech technicians and engineers currently are involved in a joint Soviet-Libyan venture in Chad, specifically building military facilities.⁵ Such a base, if manned by a serious Warsaw Pact force, could be a threat to the Sudan and Egypt (unlikely at this time). Although less visible than the Cubans, the East Germans are quite active in Ethiopia, training troops and secret police, among other functions.⁶ The movement of East Germans into Angola, mostly in an administrative capacity, presumably has freed Cuban elements stationed there to move into Ethiopia.⁷ In all likelihood, the East Europeans, like the Cubans, have assumed a significant role in intelligence and indoctrination activities within the countries to which they are assigned.⁸

East German and other East European countries have played important subsidiary roles in Soviet policy toward the Third World by means of supply of industrial products, economic and military aid, and technical training, in addition to helping to build infrastructure.⁹ At this juncture, the Warsaw Pact elements in Africa do not begin to compare in size and importance to the Cuban presence. However, should the

assumption of new duties by the East Europeans continue, they too could reach the rank of full-scale proxies, marking a distinct new escalatory phase in Soviet surrogate operations in the Third World.

THE CASE OF SOUTH YEMEN

Perhaps the single most notable instance of actions by the G.D.R. on behalf of its Soviet patron has occurred in South Yemen. Reportedly, at least 1,350 East Germans are based in that country, of whom, allegedly, about 600 perform intelligence functions, and approximately 750 are military personnel. The East Germans, together with some 500 Cubans, are subordinate to a Soviet group consisting of more than 1500 military, communications, and intelligence officers. The Soviet-led elements have set up three key base facilities in that small country. Al-Mukalla is a subsidiary base, with an air field and seaport; the other two facilities are more important.¹⁰

Socotra Island contains a major complex of deep anchorage areas, command, control, communications, and surveillance facilities, and, it has been rumored, even a capability to house ballistic missiles.¹¹ The USSR is believed to have moved missiles to Somalia on a previous occasion, so this last item, if correct, may become important.

The Soviet facilities in Aden are likely to prove especially significant because of several considerations: To start with, the P.D.R.Y. has unambiguously committed itself to the "radical" cause and sent some 3000 soldiers to Ethiopia, to help fight against South Yemen's colleague in the Arab League, Somalia, in the Ogaden.¹² This was a large contribution from a state with a total military force numbering only some 21,000 men.¹³ The Russians are busily shipping military hardware to the P.D.R.Y.,¹⁴ but it is doubtful whether all of it is in reward for South Yemen's help in Ethiopia. It is far more likely that much of this materiel will be added to the prepositioned stockpiles at the Aden base awaiting future contingencies by Cuban and perhaps East German military personnel (either operating out of S. Yemen or airlifted into the prospective battlezone from Angola or other locations).¹⁵ The P.D.R.Y. has apparently become the central Soviet command post for the Horn of Africa and Persian Gulf region.¹⁶

Most ominous for Saudi Arabia is that the P.D.R.Y. stockpile in the south is complemented by an Iraqi stockpile to the north. Egypt and the Sudan also must take account of the potential "squeeze play" between surrogate forces supplied from the P.D.R.Y. stockpile in the east and prepositioned weapons in Libya to the west.¹⁷

It is hardly necessary to add that these concentrations of materiel also make the Israelis very nervous. Indeed, one Israeli argument in favor of keeping control of the air base near Rafiah in the Sinai has been that it is one of the few air fields in the region that would be at the disposal of the United States for lifting men and materiel to potential conflict sites to counter forces operating from the Soviet-controlled facilities in South Yemen, Libya, and Iraq.

Most recently, according to *Al-Anba*, published in Kuwait, the East Germans have been involved in intrigues in both South Yemen and its northern neighbor the Yemen Arab Republic. Reports regarding the assassination of the North Yemeni President, Lt. Colonel Ahmad al-Ghashmi, on June 24, 1978, indicate that the envoy carrying the package that took al-Ghashmi's life as well as his own may in fact have been an East German agent. According to this account, the assassination in part was intended as a diversion from a power struggle within the P.D.R.Y. (which had started just before the attempt), perhaps even with the aim of provoking North Yemen into a war that country was bound to lose. Primarily, however, it was designed to liquidate al-Ghashmi, because he had allegedly been cooperating with U.S. and Saudi intelligence and was permitting those two countries to develop a base at Karaman Island, located immediately across from Eritrea, and conveniently situated for intervention in ethnically divided Djibouti.¹⁸

Some 400 Afar students from the Djibouti region are being trained in Cuba, probably with the aim of spearheading a Cuban and Ethiopian-backed anti-Somali Afars "liberation" campaign.¹⁹ If the French garrison in Djibouti declined to fight (not an unlikely development in view of African reactions to French assistance in Zaire), the strategically situated harbor of Djibouti could well end up under Soviet control. Soviet and surrogate elements, with S. Yemen already under their influence, then would have a firm grip on the entrance to the Red Sea.

The upshot of the turmoil within South Yemen was the death of the country's leader, Robayi Ali, who was replaced by Ali Nasser Mohammed Hasani. Robayi Ali apparently had become disgruntled with the accretion of Soviet control over his state, from which Vladimir Sharaip, a member of the Soviet security services, was running the massive Soviet/East European/Cuban intelligence network for the Horn and Gulf. Robayi Ali apparently tried to oust several political opponents more intimate with Moscow than he himself. Robayi Ali's purge attempt failed, he was killed and replaced by Hasani, a more unequivocally pro-Moscow figure. Hasani and P.D.R.Y. Defense Minister Lt. Colonel Ali Antar supposedly obtained a commitment by Moscow to intervene against any North Yemeni invasion backed by the United States and the Saudis. Because "invasions" can be fabricated, this is an ominous note for the future of North Yemen.²⁰

LOGISTICS

The degree of coordination required for efficient operation of the Soviet/surrogate/client network requires a great deal of effort and even more practice.²¹ In addition to such major naval maneuvers as Okean-75, the USSR also conducted an important exercise in December 1977 simulating airlifts of supplies and men, including the use of prepositioned fuel (in South Yemen and Mozambique) and weapons. Based on the demonstrated capabilities of the Soviet air force during that exercise, using An-22 and Il-76 transports the USSR could airlift three divisions to prepositioned stocks of materiel in Iraq and Libya in as little as eight or ten hours. Thus, before the United States had time to react, the USSR could establish a significant "presence" (Soviet or surrogate) in a conflict locale.²²

For the most part, the bloc's capability to conduct major airlifts depends on the USSR, because neither its satellites nor Cuba have long-range heavy transports (such as the Antonov-22 and the Ilyushin-76). However, it would be incorrect to say that these countries have *no* airlift capacities. In addition to some obsolescent transports, they possess commercial airliners that can and have been used by the Russians during the prolonged airlift starting late in 1975, when a major Cuban presence was established in Angola.

From November 1977 to June 1978, it is reported that the Soviet Air Force flew as many as 10,000 operational flights (including many within the boundaries of the USSR). Nearly half of these are thought to have been in support of Soviet activities in Africa. Up to 100,000 tons of military hardware were dispatched to Africa and the Middle East (valued at up to four billion dollars). Some 45,000 troops were shipped or flown to, or around, Africa: 25,000 Cubans were brought to Ethiopia (10,000 from Angola and another 15,000 from Cuba), 10,000 more were flown from Cuba to Angola to replenish depleted garrisons, and some 10,000 Russians, East Europeans, and South Yemenites were dispatched to Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique and other African destinations. In addition, some of these forces were rotated or relieved, and, of course, a regular supply line of food and equipment was maintained.²³

Unquestionably, the Soviet Union has a logistical network so large and elaborate that no combination of surrogates and clients could replicate it. At the same time, the USSR can maintain a low profile (avoiding damaging implications for East-West relations) by letting its proxies conduct field operations by themselves, as far as possible. The ideal, of course, would be to equip surrogates to the point of military autonomy, but this might exceed their absorptive capacity technologically and deprive Moscow of its cherished leverage. The development of a major Iraqi "lift" capability could enable Baghdad to sway the balance in a Middle Eastern or other serious military conflict, assuming that Soviet-Iraqi differences over the Eritrean issue do not lead to a rift.²⁴

The USSR has sold four Il-62Ms to Cuba.²⁵ Although ostensibly commercial airliners, in fact these are precisely the planes the USSR used in the airlift of Cubans to Angola.²⁶ Each flight ferried some 150 Cuban soldiers across the Atlantic.²⁷ The Cubans also managed some of their own airlift, on old British-made Bristol Britannias.²⁸ The augmentation of the Cuban "lift" capability could ease the burden on the USSR. However, in a major conflict, four Il-62Ms probably would be insufficient to alter the situation dramatically. Moreover, Cuba itself is almost totally reliant on Soviet, or at least Soviet-controlled, materiel. An "independent" Cuban capacity could operate only with Soviet indulgence, although the USSR might prefer to represent the situation in a different light.

Most Soviet transport of hardware, particularly armor, has to be dispatched by sea. During the October 1973 War, over 80 percent of arms to Egypt and Syria (as measured in tonnage) was sent by sea. Of course, this factor enhances still further the importance of prepositioning heavy materiel. In recent African campaigns, the USSR has made considerable use of sea transportation, including French-built *Akademik*-class and Finnish-built *Inzhenier*-class containerized vessels. The *Akademik*-class vessels carried armored vehicles and other weapons to the region. The *Inzhenier*-class ships, by agreement with Helsinki, could not be used to transport weapons but ran the Middle Eastern routes of other vessels, releasing them for transportation of hardware.²⁹

STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION

A West European journal recently outlined the organizational hierarchy of the Soviet-Cuban decisionmaking apparatus for Africa.³⁰ Reportedly, General Sergei Sokolov, First Deputy Minister of Defense, is the officer in charge of coordinating the Cuban network. His representative in Africa is said to be General Vasilii Ivanovich Petrov, Deputy Chief of Staff of Soviet Army Aviation, who had commanded Soviet troops during the 1969 border clashes with the PRC (and is a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU). Petrov has assigned a number of senior Soviet officers to Cuba, where they formed a "permanent joint military organization," including the Castro brothers, the pro-Moscow Foreign Minister Rodriguez, and Vice Minister of the Interior General Enio Leyva (presumably representing Soviet and Cuban intelligence). This group communicates with Oscar Oramas Oliva, Cuban ambassador in Luanda and a political commissar of sorts. He, in turn, transmits orders to commanders at the front. Thus, although it is not clear how the division of responsibilities is allocated on the joint military organization, it must be assumed that General Sokolov's Soviet representatives have considerable say in decisions made in Havana, and, undoubtedly, prior knowledge of any policy determinations regarding Africa. In addition, the Soviet "apparat" has considerable personnel in Africa, including KGB and D.G.I. officers subordinate to Moscow, as well as (reportedly) Soviet commanders, such as General Koliyakov in Libya,

General Petrov, and it is suspected, General Grigorii G. Barisov in Ethiopia.³¹ Thus, the Cubans have little, if any, opportunity to present Moscow with a fait accompli in Africa, assuming even that they would wish to do so.

It is reported also that Soviet ties in Lisbon, dating back to the period of Portuguese leftist turmoil, have expedited Soviet-surrogate operations in Africa. The Portuguese capital is said to have been a clearing house for D.G.I. and KGB officers being dispatched to Africa.³² More important, despite official Portuguese government objections, Cuban flights, bound for Angola with troops and arms, were allowed to refuel at Santa Maria Island in the Azores early during the Angolan War.³³ This occurred because the Portuguese Foreign Minister at that time, Major Melo Antunes, a left-wing supporter of the MPLA, arranged with officials on the Islands to permit refueling.³⁴ This episode demonstrates some of the uses the USSR can make of sympathizers in areas not directly connected with the conflict in question. If Portugal has served as a useful arena for such activities, so too might Italy, with significant left-wing forces both in and out of power (including local police).

IX. THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY
AND THE "NONALIGNED"

1975 saw acceptance of Cuba's role in Angola by most of the OAU, as well as by Yugoslavia. However, the summer of 1978 witnessed a turnabout by much of the OAU, Indonesia, and Yugoslavia, with reservations being voiced concerning the Cuban presence in Africa and Havana's role as a "nonaligned" state being questioned privately.¹ This turn of events might be explained in terms of a number of factors:

The Shaba incursion, in which Cuba certainly had some role, backfired completely.² The massacres of civilians led to a renewed European presence in Africa, which OAU members certainly did not want. Although some Africans thought that Cuban forces on that continent might be of help in the context of South Africa, Rhodesia, and Namibia, most would probably decline the whole package, if a by-product of the Cuban presence were to be the reintroduction of the troops of former colonial powers.

Quite apart from the Shaba incursion, the OAU is heavily influenced by Arab and Moslem elements. Plans to hold the 1979 nonaligned conference in Havana have provided adherents of the Arab League with an excellent opportunity to punish the Cubans, and implicitly the Russians, for abandoning the Somalis in the Ogaden and the Eritrean separatists, both of which enjoy wide Arab support (and had been aided, before the coup, by the communist countries). This Soviet about-face ultimately led to the severing of ties between Somalia and the USSR (and subsequently Cuba, which tried to "mediate" between the two belligerents).

One of the most prominent spokesmen in the OAU calling for condemnation of Cuba and boycott of the Havana Conference was Sudan's President Jaafar al-Numeiri, whose country supports (and stands to gain from) the Eritrean insurgency in Northern Ethiopia.³ Whether, in fact, Cuban intervention contravened the basic principles of the OAU is unclear. On the one hand, the Organization in theory supports the principle of the inviolability of state boundaries. Moreover, the recognized government of Ethiopia asked the Cubans in. On the other hand, the group opposing Cuban operations has been trying to assert the principle of African solutions to African problems and has made it clear that no outside intervention (Cuban or French) is acceptable.⁴

Nigeria, an increasingly important state because of its OPEC status, has taken a position somewhere between the two opposing sides:

To the Soviets and their friends I should like to say that having been invited to Africa in order to assist in the liberation struggle and consolidation of national independence, they should not overstay their welcome. Africa is not about to throw off one colonial yoke for another.⁵

Nigeria played a major role, side by side with Cuban forces, in the operations against UNITA in Angola, starting in 1976. By the first part of the following year, some 5,000 Nigerian troops were reported to have been stationed in Angola.⁶ Thus, it is hardly surprising that Lagos has attempted to modify opposition in the OAU to Cuban-Soviet involvement on the African continent, stressing its innocent beginning and not specifying just where and at what stage these non-African forces would begin "overstaying" their welcome. Anti-Cuban elements in the OAU were unable to pass any meaningful resolutions on the issue.⁷ There is a movement underfoot to boycott the 1979 Non-aligned Summit Conference in Havana on the grounds that Cuba has demonstrated that it is a de facto member of the Warsaw Pact and hardly "nonaligned."⁸ However, it is doubtful how much momentum the boycott will gain. For instance, the Foreign Minister of Tanzania, Benjamin Mkapa, has announced that his country would attend the Havana Conference.⁹ (Following the development of a close relationship between Tanzania and the PRC during the 1960s and early 1970s, Julius Nyerere, Tanzania's influential leader, appears to have shifted toward the USSR). Mkapa's announcement came in the wake of increasing cooperation over the Rhodesia issue among Moscow, Havana, and Dar-es-Salaam. The Tanzanian President, on June 8, 1978, *defended* Soviet/Cuban intervention in Africa while *attacking* the purely reactive French-Belgian role.¹⁰ The Cuban incursion into Angola may have helped to dissuade Tanzania from relying primarily on the far-off PRC. After all, cooperation with the USSR seemed to pay concrete dividends in terms of military aid, in the form of both sophisticated weaponry and surrogate combat forces.

Following the Shaba incident and the general failure of the West to oppose the USSR and its surrogates in Africa, the Zairian leader Mobutu stated: "There is the total surrender of the West before the aggression of the Russians and Cubans. They can do anything at all in Africa. In the West there are only pious wishes."¹¹

Mobutu probably was referring as much to Western failure to back Holden Roberto's FNLA in Angola as to the subsequent incursion into Shaba. Mobutu, of course, feels strong affinity for the FNLA, with which he has both ethnic links and family ties (Roberto is his brother-in-law).¹²

The Chinese have not had a military presence in Zaire since their mission to aid the FNLA was wound up in July of 1975, when the OAU declared its neutrality on the Angola issue. However, Mobutu appears to have shifted toward Peking recently.¹³ In June of 1978, the Chinese agreed to grant symbolic aid to help the Zairian Navy (a very insignificant force).¹⁴ Whether more substantial assistance to Zaire will follow is another question. China's inability to transfer state-of-the-art weapons is a simple function of her technological inadequacies. As for the Soviet Union, Mobutu has dismissed the Moscow leadership as "modern-day czars." However, the Russians may take solace in the fact that Mobutu tends to vacillate when it comes to policy. Two weeks after condemning the inability of the West to act in Africa, he stated that the United States "has always been among our best friends and best allies" and that when "we have had problems, the United States has come to our rescue."¹⁵ Thus Mobutu has not yet given up on the West. However, as long as Zaire finds itself next door to well-armed Soviet surrogate forces in Angola, barring major Western and Chinese aid, it may be difficult for Mobutu not to take Nyerere's path of accommodation with the USSR.

The position of Cuba as a member, not to mention as a leader, of the nonaligned world, recently has been impugned by Yugoslavia and Indonesia, among others.¹⁶ Just how much this will disturb the Cubans and their Soviet patrons is unclear. Coming on the heels of Belgrade's acquiescence in the overflight of Yugoslav territory by Soviet planes airlifting military materials to Angola, this marks quite a shift.¹⁷

It is entirely possible that the Tito references to Cuba's role in Africa are an attempt to help African adversaries of Havana to undermine Cuban leadership of the nonaligned countries as well as Belgrade's reaction to events in Africa.¹⁸ After all, Tito, as the senior leader of the nonaligned movement is hardly likely to welcome the aspirations of the "young" upstart who shows signs of wishing to lead the non-aligned bloc at the 1979 Havana summit meeting.¹⁹

Tito's role as the venerable head of a global "progressive" bloc is needed to enhance the regime's prestige and lend it an aura of legitimacy. Moreover, the more Yugoslavia is identified with the non-aligned movement, the greater the disincentive of the Warsaw Pact (at least, so Tito hopes) to take advantage of a potential post-Tito succession crisis to impose a pro-Moscow regime in Belgrade.²⁰ The July 1978 gathering of the nonaligned in Belgrade terminated with complete lack of consensus on the Cuban issue. The Havana Conference is unlikely to become subject to an official boycott, although some countries have stated that they will not attend.²¹ In all probability, barring further developments, most of the nonaligned states will send delegations, and the damage caused to Castro's aspirations by his African ventures will turn out to be marginal.

Throughout the period of the Belgrade gathering, Castro insisted that the nonaligned states had natural allies in Cuba and the USSR. Thus, Moscow has a considerable stake in his successful assertion of his claim to be a leader of the nonaligned (which appears to have been impaired only slightly).²² In all likelihood, Third World policies will continue to be based upon each leader's military and economic aspirations and requirements (and upon the willingness and ability of potential suppliers to meet such requests), rather than upon the resentments of Somalia and other states aggrieved by recent Soviet and Cuban actions. Western reaction to Cuban/Soviet initiatives will be contingent upon the willingness of African states to request aid from the West. In this context, Mobutu's cooperation with French and Belgian military elements was no more approved by fellow Africans than was the MPLA's or Ethiopia's intimacy with Cuba and other Soviet surrogate forces.

X. DOMESTIC EFFECTS OF FOREIGN VENTURES

In May of 1972, Fidel Castro stated:

With the same love with which our fighters have been ready to fight for Cuba, they are disposed to struggle in the support of any revolutionary people, of any brother country. So, we shall be united in peace, we shall be united in struggle, we shall be united in combat and we shall be united under any circumstances.¹

This pronouncement, which might be termed the "Castro Doctrine," has implications as wide as the Brezhnev Doctrine. Moreover, the same point has been repeated by other members of the Cuban regime:

Our troops will go anywhere in the world and to any country with a formally established government of revolutionary character, which asks Cuba for help against imperialist aggression.²

The Castro government has asserted Cuba's willingness to fight abroad, with the qualification that Cubans be allied with "revolutionary" or "anti-imperialist" forces. Castro is free to attach labels as he pleases, so this leaves him with wide room for maneuver.

It is unclear to what degree the Cuban people identify with this attitude. Although the Cuban army is a volunteer force, there have been some indications of dissent concerning the necessity for Cuban military involvement in a distant continent (even if Che Guevara described Africa as potentially the most fruitful area for revolution).³ Although casualty figures are not announced in Havana, (the dead are buried abroad, and most of the wounded are treated in Warsaw Pact states), it is impossible for the Cuban regime to hide its losses. The relatives are bound to discover the truth, sooner or later. One recent U.S. government estimate has claimed that some 1,500 Cubans have been killed in Africa and perhaps three times that number injured.⁴ These statistics have to be evaluated in the context of the fact that almost 48,000 Cubans are believed to be stationed in Africa, over 40,000 of whom are thought to be military or para-military personnel.⁵ (These figures do not include the substantial number of Cubans based in the Middle East.)

The same proportion applied to the U.S. population would be between 900,000 and one million U.S. soldiers. The Cuban casualty figures cited above would extrapolate to some 33,000 dead and about 100,000 wounded, in terms of America's population. The Cuban venture has therefore approached Vietnam proportions. To a significant degree, Cuba has overcommitted itself in Africa; Russians are reported to have been substituted for Cuban pilots sent abroad. There are indications that the presence in Cuba of Russian military and other personnel, now estimated at about 10,000 (necessitated at least in part by the drain on Cuban military manpower) grates on many Cubans.⁶

Although Cuba is very much a closed society, nevertheless discontent has surfaced--particularly questioning why it should be necessary for Cubans to be killed or maimed in far-off lands. Reportedly, Castro is about to receive major new shipments of arms from the USSR, including additional MiG-21s and perhaps for the first time MiG-23s.⁷ It is not clear whether these constitute payoff for services rendered or are meant to help improve the image of the Cuban armed forces and, thus, indirectly, to raise Castro's stock at home, in view of growing disenchantment on the island with his prolonged and costly ventures abroad.

Although the East German Africa contingent of about 3,000-4,500 men amounts only to about one-tenth the Cuban presence on that continent, the GDR has almost twice Cuba's population. Yet, East Germans too have begun to question whether a new "Afrika Korps" is appropriate for a state stigmatized internationally both for its Nazi past and its hard-line, almost Stalinist, present. Domestic grumbling on this topic appears to have been significant enough to merit a television campaign to play down the military aspects of East German activities in Africa and the Middle East. Similarly, in diplomatic contacts, Pankow has attempted to play down its overseas buildup.⁸

This study has assumed that the USSR substituted surrogates for direct Soviet intervention in the Third World because of two primary considerations: In terms of foreign policy (to avoid overt action likely to provoke direct confrontation with the United States) Moscow appears to have succeeded fairly well until now. With regard to

domestic difficulties with overseas ventures, if current trends persist the Kremlin may find that it has merely transferred problems on the Soviet scene to other Communist states for *their* leaders to confront. This may pose eventual foreign policy and military difficulties for the USSR as leader of the whole "camp." At the present stage, however, Cuba's and East Germany's domestic difficulties, insofar as they derive from their surrogate operations, still are marginal. Consequently, any countervailing force causing Moscow to terminate or curtail active utilization of surrogates in the near future would have to emanate from the West.

END NOTESChapter 1.

1. Most of the details of the "Czech" arms transfers of 1948 are taken from Meir Mardor, *Schlichoot Alumah (Secret Mission)* Marachot, Israeli Defense Forces, 1957, pp. 183-294, *passim*. Mardor (in conjunction with Ehud Avriel) was in charge of negotiating for Czech arms on behalf of the Jewish Palestinians in 1948, and his is a first hand account. Unfortunately it has not been published in English.
2. Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, Harcourt, Brace and World, New York, 1962, p. 182. It may be no coincidence that soon after this statement, Andreii Zhdanov, the most prominent hard-liner in the Soviet leadership, would fall into disfavor, subsequent to which he died in mysterious circumstances. Almost all of the major "Zhdanovites" within the USSR and in Eastern Europe would be purged and some even killed soon afterward. Included among the victims was N.A. Voznesenskii, Zhdanov's chief ideologist (in the field of political economy), and thus the man supplying justification for an activist Soviet policy. Stalin was not willing to confront the allies directly. The failure of the Third World revolts following the World Federation of Democratic Youth Conference in Calcutta was proof of the Malenkov-Varga argument that the Third World was not yet ripe for revolution and that the USSR was to remain inactive in the developing areas, until the mid-1950s, feeling too weak to confront the West. For elaboration of this aspect refer to pp. 25-27. Korea may be considered an exception; however, the Russians were extremely careful not to get involved directly, but rather to let the PRC handle the fighting. It was only when Malenkov was clearly out of the picture, in the mid to late 1950s, that Soviet interest in the Third World showed active resurgence.
3. James B. Reston, "Big Three Snarled on Italian Empire, Iran, Dardanelles," *The New York Times*, August 5, 1945, p.1; N.G. Mavris, the President of the Dodecanesian National Council, "Dodecanesians Seek Rights," Letter to the Editor, *The New York Times*, August 8, 1945, p. 22.
4. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *The Arms Trade With the Third World*, Humanities Press, New York, 1971, p. 529, as confirmed by Mardor.
5. United Nations Special Committee on Palestine Report to the General Assembly--Annexes, Appendices and Maps to the Report of 31 August, 1947, London 1947, pp. 79-102.
6. General Assembly, Second Session, A/P.V. 128, November 29, 1947.

7. Vladimir Dedijer, *The Battle Stalin Lost*, Grosset and Dunlap, New York, 1970; and *Tito*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1953; for Djilas, see note 2.
8. Associated Press, "Public Trial in Syria Alleges Some Had Been Bribed," March 23, 1949 and *Al-Ayam*, March 24, 1949; Mardor, *passim*.
9. The Messerschmitts were sold for \$190,000 apiece, including spare parts and ammunition, a lot of money at that time for an obsolescent plane. (The per copy costs of the comparable Western plane, the Spitfire, including all equipment, was only \$45,000 in 1943. W.F. Craven and J.L. Cate, *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, Vol. VI, *Men and Planes*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1957, p. 360 n. Although inflation might have pushed up the value by 1948, this would be offset by the increasing obsolescence of the weapon.) Thus the Soviet Bloc received nearly \$5 million for the Messerschmitts alone and probably a considerable sum for the other weapon supplies sent to Israel. How much it received from the Syrians is not known. However, given the state of the postwar economies of Eastern Europe, the total of several million dollars in hard currency may well have been a major incentive for the deals. More important, this policy was in line with the Malenkovite anti-British (hence, in Palestine, pro-Jewish) policy. Ironically, the Egyptians had Spitfires. Thus the Battle of Britain was refought in the Middle East with the Israelis flying the Messerschmitts.
10. "Communist Arms Unloaded in Guatemala by Vessel from Polish Port, US Learns," *The New York Times*, May 18, 1954, p. 1; Walter H. Waggoner, "US Wants Rio Pact Inquiry on Arms Sales to Guatemala," *The New York Times*, May 19, 1954, p. 1; Waggoner, "Latin Cargo Upsets President," *The New York Times*, May 20, 1954, p. 1.
11. Uri Ra'anani, *The USSR Arms the Third World: Case Studies in Soviet Foreign Policy*, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1969, p. 133.
12. Ra'anani, pp. 8, 22.
13. Ibid., pp. 76-81.
14. Ibid., pp. 186-225.
15. Ibid., p. 205.
16. Waldemar A. Nielson, *The Great Powers and Africa*, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1969, p. 213.
17. Jack Raymond, "Rising Red Influences in Guinea Stir US Concern About Africa," *The New York Times*, April 4, 1959, p. 1; Thomas F. Brady, "More Red 'Gifts' Landed in Guinea," *The New York Times*, April 22, 1959.

18. Thomas F. Brady, "US Said to Spurn Guinea Arms Plea," *The New York Times*, April 30, 1959, p. 1.
19. Dana Adams Schmidt, "Guinea Arms Bid Explained by US," *The New York Times*, May 1, 1959, p. 5.
20. Robert Legvold, *Soviet Policy in West Africa*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1970, p. 64.
21. SIPRI, *Arms Trade Register*, MIT Press, 1975, p. 77.
22. Benjamin Welles, "Guinea Said to Give Soviets a Navy Base," *The New York Times*, December 8, 1960, p. 1.
23. SIPRI, *The Arms Trade with the Third World*, p. 621.
24. Claude E. Welch, Jr., "The Organization of African Unity," in Helen Kitchen (ed.), *Africa: From Mystery to Maze*, Lexington Books--D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington, Mass., 1976, pp. 197-198.
25. Legvold, pp. 148-155.
26. Ibid., pp. 177-178.
27. Ibid., pp. 235-239.
28. Henry Tanner, "Envoys of Soviets Leave the Congo," *The New York Times*, September 18, 1960, p. 1.
29. Henry Tanner, "Kasavubu Tells Russians and Czechs to Quit Congo; UN Assembly Summoned," *The New York Times*, September 17, 1960, p. 1.
30. SIPRI, *The Arms Trade with the Third World*, p. 626-627; Davidson, p. 103.
31. Legvold, pp. 213-216, 161-162.
32. Ibid., p. 627; W. Scott Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-66*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1969, p. 157; US Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security laws, *Communist Global Subversion and American Security, Vol. I, The Attempted Communist Subversion of Africa Through Nkrumah's Ghana*, Washington, D.C., 1972, pp. 144-148.
- 32a. Ibid., p. 3.
33. Legvold, p. 250. Nkrumah enjoyed good relations with China until June 1965 coup in Algeria against Ben Bella. The hasty endorsement by Peking of the (successor) Boumedienne regime in Algiers caused Nkrumah to lash out verbally against Peking.

34. Wolfgang Berner, "Kubanerinterventionen in Afrika und Arabien," *Aussenpolitik* 3/76, 27. Jahrgang, 3m Quartal, pp. 325-331.
35. *Communist Global Subversion and American Security*, pp. 144-146.
36. Legvold, pp. 267-268, pp. 275-290.
37. SIPRI, *The Arms Trade Register*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1975, p. 80. Mali, before Keita's fall in 1968, did receive a handful of aging MiG-15s and T-34s from Moscow.
38. Graham Hovey, "Guinea's Halting of Soviet Flights Leaves US in a Quandary on Aid," *The New York Times*, November 19, 1977, p. 2. At the end of 1977, these privileges were suspended.
39. SIPRI, *The Arms Trade with the Third World*, p. 593.
40. Neilson, pp. 196-197.
41. SIPRI, *The Arms Trade with the Third World*, p. 585, *The Arms Trade Register*, pp. 66, 69-70.
42. David E. Albright, "Soviet Policy," *Problems of Communism*, January-February, 1978, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, p. 23.
43. Legvold, p. 161; Davidson, p. 102; Berner, p. 328. The PAIGC enjoyed the support of Guinea and Senegal. It received Czech and Soviet arms and Cuban training. Colin Legum, "The African Environment," *Problems of Communism*, January-February, 1978, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, (pp. 1-19), p. 6. In 1963, Ben Bella was featured on the rostrum during the annual May Day Celebrations in Moscow, a great honor for a non-Communist.
44. Thomas H. Henriksen, "Angola and Mozambique: Intervention and Revolution," *Current History*, November 1976, Vol. 71, No. 421, p. 153.
45. Davidson, p. 117.
46. Ibid., p. 101.
47. Henriksen, pp. 153-154.
48. "Soldiers Attack Moroccan Palace; King Keeps Power," *New York Times*, July 11, 1971, p. 1.
49. On October 5, Boumedienne had concluded an agreement in Moscow for a \$100 million loan. During that visit that he probably arranged the details of the arms shipments to be dispatched subsequently. "Soviet Loan Accord for Algeria Signed," *The New York Times*, October 6, 1963, p. 6.

50. The UAR also was involved in extending substantial military aid to Algeria in 1963, including the dispatch of 1,000 combatants to participate in the conflict. However, Egyptian incentives are more likely to have emanated from Nasser's Pan-Arab aspirations in the Maghreb than to have been a mere function of Soviet policy goals. Cuba, for its part, was hardly likely to send its own weapons to Algeria (despite ideological sympathies) so soon after the missile crisis, unless Castro was assured beforehand of Russian backing in case of US reaction and of Soviet replacements for hardware lost. Thus Havana may be assumed to have been acting on behalf of the USSR, probably at Moscow's prompting. Egypt's precise role is more difficult to elucidate, although there is little doubt that the Soviet Union approved Cairo's action, as Moscow is known generally to include no-transfer clauses in its weapons packages (and Egypt's arsenal, at that stage, was almost totally Soviet-supplied). Grose, "Armaments Race by East and West in Africa Feared," *The New York Times*, October 30, 1963, p. 1. "Russian-Built Tanks Landed in Algeria," *The London Times*, October 28, 1963, p. 1; "Cuba Said to Ship Arms to Algeria," *The New York Times*, October 27, 1963, p. 1.
51. SIPRI, *The Arms Trade with the Third World*, p. 586; *The Arms Trade Register*, p. 67.
52. Peter Grose, "Morocco Breaks Ties with Cubans over Algerian Aid," *The New York Times*, November 1, 1963, p. 1; "Morocco Resumes Cuba Tie," *The New York Times*, January 14, 1964, p. 28. William J. Durch, *The Cuban Military in Africa and the Middle East: From Algeria to Angola*, Center for Naval Analyses, Professional Paper #201, Arlington, Virginia, September 1977, p. 15. During the clash, Cuba dispatched training personnel, as well as weapons, serving as an additional provocation to Rabat.
53. SIPRI, *The Arms Trade Register*, p. 70.
54. John J. Stremlau, *The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-70*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1977, p. xv. Actual combat did not ensue until July 6, 1967. Of course, during this period, the Soviet Union continued to be a major arms supplier to Arab North African states, particularly Egypt, Somalia (which joined the Arab League), and Algeria.
55. Ibid., p. 66 n.
56. Ibid., p. 79 n. Presumably, because the source refers to the "start of war" and not to the announcement of secession, it refers to July and not late May.
57. "Britain Allows Nigeria Arms," *The New York Times*, August 11, 1967, p. 5.
58. Benjamin E. Welles, "US Scores Soviet on Arming Nigeria," *The New York Times*, August 22, 1967, p. 7.

59. Needless to say, the more involved London became in its supplier role, the more weapons Moscow could afford to send, because the United States could not very well criticize Leonid Brezhnev while ignoring Harold Wilson; and Presidents Johnson and Nixon hardly could afford to fall out with NATO allies during the Vietnam War. At the same time, as indicated by President Johnson's warning upon discerning the build-up of Soviet troops along Romania's borders, immediately after the invasion of Prague ("Don't unleash the Dogs of War"), Vietnam or not, there was only so far that the United States would allow itself to be pushed. SIPRI, *The Arms Trade Register*, p. 87.
60. Alfred Friendly, Jr., "Nigeria Assails US View of War," *The New York Times*, August 27, 1967, p. 15.
61. Legvold, pp. 320-323.
62. SIPRI, *The Arms Trade with the Third World*, pp. 239-240.
63. Taken from SIPRI, *The Arms Trade Register*, pp. 82-83.
64. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance*, London, 1970-71 edition, pp. 50-51; 1971-72 edition, pp. 36-37.
65. SIPRI, *The Arms Trade Register*, pp. 82-83.
66. "As-Sadat Interviewed by German Media," Cairo *MENA* in English 2230 GMT, March 26, 1976, in *FBIS*, Daily Report Middle East and North Africa, March 31, 1976, Vol. V., No. 63 Annex #23, p. D1.
67. Stremlau, pp. 333-334.
68. Soviet and surrogate military aid to Nigeria apparently did not go unrewarded. By early 1977, as many as 5,000 Nigerian effectives were reported to be in Angola, involved in mopping up operations in support of the MPLA in Southern Angola, where UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) still was a force to be reckoned with. Although Nigeria assisted the MPLA primarily because UNITA received help from South Africa, the situation benefitted the Soviet Union's effort to obtain influence in Africa. The main transfer point for the Nigerian troops was in the Cape Verde Islands. This part of the operation was arranged by the President of Guinea-Bissau. "Nigeria's Garrisons in Angola," *Foreign Report*, February 16, 1977, No. 1475, pp. 1-2; *Africa Research Bulletin*, Political, Social and Cultural Series, May 15, 1978, Vol. 15, No. 4, p. 4819; "Angola: UNITA Renews its Challenge," *Africa Confidential*, August 19, 1977, Vol. 18, No. 17, pp. 3-4. Thus, collaboration of the spiritual descendents of Cabral and the PAIGC both with Moscow and the MPLA has continued well beyond the demise of the Portuguese presence in the region.

69. Czechoslovak cooperation in the Nigerian operation ceased with the ouster of Novotny. On May 27, 1968, the Czechs, now under Dubček, joined a number of states that had imposed an embargo on arms shipments to the Nigerian government (Stremlau, p. xvii). This was one of two instances in which Czechoslovakia openly deviated from Moscow on foreign policy issues during the "Prague Spring," the other being the pro-Israeli radio broadcasts of Vera Stovickova. A few Soviet advisers had taken part in counterinsurgency missions during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Royalist Yemenites claimed to have shot down some Soviet pilots during the mid-1960s. Alvin Rubinstein, *Red Star on the Nile*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1977, p. 105.
70. The use of surrogate arms suppliers frequently proved a precursor to more overt and direct military links with the USSR itself and, in some instances, eventually to a Soviet military "presence" (e.g., Egypt 1970-72). Lawrence L. Whetten, *The Arab-Israel Dispute, Great Power Behavior*, Adelphi Papers, No. 128, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977, p. 19.

Chapter 2.

1. For the purposes of this study, Cuba will be termed a "proxy" or "surrogate" of the Soviet Union, as will North Korean, North Vietnamese, and (non-Soviet) Warsaw Pact forces and weapons transfers. The assumption is not that these states necessarily are operating entirely at the behest of the Soviet Union. Certainly in the case of Cuba, some of the initiative may have come from Fidel Castro. Nevertheless, the surrogate forces deployed in the Third World are working in cooperation with the Soviet Union, enjoy Soviet logistical support, their efforts are being subsidized by the Russians, and many of the benefits of their campaigns accrue to the USSR. Moreover, the Brezhnev regime can achieve almost as much in the way of strategic, diplomatic, economic, and perceptual gains by operating through its proxies as it would through direct deployment of Russian troops. However, some of the undesirable consequences of Soviet intervention in less developed states may be mitigated by the indirect (or proxy) approach. Perhaps, the key element is leverage, be it in the form of military occupation or reliance on military or economic aid (or any combination thereof), which the Soviet Union has over the states acting in its stead. Thus, the surrogates are compelled to cooperate with the USSR, regardless of their policy preferences. In some cases, they might wish to do so, but this does not exempt them from the label.
2. Tad Szulc, "Cuba Began Role in Zanzibar in 1961," *The New York Times*, January 23, 1964, p. 1.
3. Robert Conley, "Cuban-trained Guerrillas Directed Zanzibar Revolt," *The New York Times*, January 19, 1964, p. 1.
4. Berner, p. 326.
5. Robert Legvold, *passim*.
6. Soviet relations with Guinea ebbed and flowed during the 1960s. During 1964, Guinea was "demoted" ideologically. In August, the USSR ceased to mention the Sekou Touré regime in the same breath with Ghana and Mali, all three countries having been identified as the most "progressive" in Africa since the early 1960s. Uri Ra'anan, "Moscow and the Third World," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XIV, No. 1, January-February 1965, p. 28. Two months later, Guinea was omitted from the list of five states in Africa approaching the stage of "building socialism." Legvold, pp. 197-198. In February 1965, Guinea was elevated again, partly because of a domestic policy change in Conakry and partly because of a more receptive attitude toward Moscow by Sekou Touré, who believed Khrushchev had attempted to interfere in Guinean affairs, whereas the new Soviet leadership had not yet had an opportunity to prove itself. *Ibid.*, pp. 235-239.
7. Berner, p. 326.

8. *Foreign Report* No. 1429, February 25, 1975, "Russia's Wars by Proxy" pp. 1-3; Hugh O'Shaughnessy, "Castro's Long March to Pretoria," *London Observer*, February 26, 1978, p. 14.
9. "What Are We Fighting For?" *The Economist*, April 29, 1978, Vol. 267, No. 7026.
10. Berner, p. 328.
11. D. Bruce Jackson, *Castro, the Kremlin and Communism in Latin America*, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1969.
12. Berner, p. 328.
13. Castro's concluding speech at the Tricontinental Congress as cited by Jackson, p. 83.
14. William E. Ratliff, *Castroism and Communism in Latin America, 1959-76*, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C.; and Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, California, Policy Study No. 19, November 1976, pp. 124-144.
15. Jackson, p. 5.
16. Shimon Shamir, "Marxism in Egypt," in *The USSR and the Middle East*, Michael Confino and Shimon Shamir (eds.), Halsted Press, John Wiley and Sons, New York; and Israel Universities Press, Jerusalem, 1973, pp. 294-303.
17. Jackson, pp. 28-34.
18. Berner, p. 328.
19. William J. Durch, *The Cuban Military in Africa and the Middle East: From Algeria to Angola*, Center for Naval Analyses, 1977, p. 24.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
21. Berner, pp. 328-329; Durch, pp. 20-21.
22. *Communist Global Subversion and American Security*, p. 3.
23. Basil Davidson, *The Liberation of Guiné*, Penguin Books, Baltimore, 1969.
24. Jean Huteau, "Committee Approves Criticism of Soviet Policy," Paris AFP in English 0135, G.M.T., August 10, 1967, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, Latin America, August 10, 1967, Vol. VI, No. 155, p. AAAA8.
25. Brian Crozier, *Soviet Pressures in the Caribbean*, Conflict Studies, No. 35, May 1973, pp. 13-14.

26. Edward Gonzalez, "Castro: The Limits of Charisma," *Problems of Communism*, July-August, 1972, Vol. XXI, No. 4, p. 21. Muscovites consisted primarily of former PSP members, as opposed to Fidel's guerrilla forces. The major survivor of the 1967-1968 purge of Muscovites is Rodriguez, still in liaison with Moscow. John Barron, *KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents*, Bantam Books, New York, 1974, p. 205.
27. Edward Gonzalez, "Castro and Cuba's New Orthodoxy," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1976, Vol. XXV, No. 1, pp. 2, 7.
28. Harold C. Hinton, *The Bear at the Gate*, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., and Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 1971, Policy Study No. 1, 1971, p. 21.
29. "Castro Comments on Czechoslovak Crisis," Havana Domestic Television and Radio, 0102 G.M.T., August 24, 1968, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, Daily Report for Latin America, August 26, 1968, No. 167/68, pp. 01-020.
30. Leon Gouré, "Cuba's Military Dependence on the USSR," in James D. Theberge (ed.), *Soviet Seapower in the Caribbean: Political and Strategic Implications*, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1972, pp. 78-80.
31. James D. Theberge, "Soviet Policy in the Caribbean," in Theberge (ed.), pp. 9-10.
32. Drew Middleton, "Soviets Reported Tracking US Ships in Caribbean," *The New York Times*, February 21, 1971.
33. John W. Finney, "Soviets Said to Use Guinea to Observe US Shipping," *The New York Times*, December 6, 1973.
34. Barbara Walters, "An Interview with Fidel Castro," *Foreign Policy*, No. 28, Fall, 1977, pp. 46-47.
35. At the July 1978 nonaligned conference in Belgrade, Cuba's Foreign Minister, Carlos Raphael Rodriguez, expressed his "solidarity" with Albania in its differences with China. David A. Andelman, "Same Players, New Sides in Age Old Balkan Games," *The New York Times*, August 6, 1978, News of Week in Review, p. D 2. Thus, Cuba appears to be wooing China's erstwhile ally. If the Cubans should play the role of intermediary between the USSR and Albania successfully, the Soviet Union would collect the dividends, both ideological and strategic. (The port of Valona is the key to control of the Straits of Otranto and thus to the Adriatic. Moreover, Soviet airbases in Albania could extend Warsaw Pact air power over the entire Mediterranean.) Finally, the implications for Yugoslav security of Soviet bases in Albania would be serious, particularly in view of the troublesome Albanian minority in the Kosovo and Macedonian regions.

36. "Commentary Reaffirms Proletarian Internationalism," February 6, 1978, *FBIS*, Latin America 78/27, p. Q 2.
37. David K. Shipler, "European Reds Back Autonomy for each Party," *The New York Times*, July 1, 1976, p. 1.
38. Ernst Halperin, "Soviet Naval Power, Soviet-Cuban Relations and Politics in the Caribbean," in Theberge (ed.), p. 87.
39. Norman Polmar, *Soviet Naval Power*, National Strategy Information Center, New York, 1972, pp. 50-51.
40. Finney, December 6, 1973.
41. Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN (Ret.), *On Watch*, Quadrangle, New York, 1976, pp. 332-333.
42. Carmelo Mesa-Lago, *Cuba in the 1970's*, University of New Mexico, Press, Albuquerque, 1974, p. 6.
43. Ibid., pp. 6-7.
44. A distinction is drawn here between the sporadic, small-scale injections of Cuban personnel in Africa during the 1960s, usually in less than a full combat capacity (and apparently unprompted by Moscow) and massive Cuban military ventures in the second half of the 1970s, requiring major Soviet "lift" and other logistical assistance. It is the latter type of operations that deserve the heading of "surrogate" in the fullest sense.
45. Gonzalez, "The Limits of Charisma," p. 16.
46. Gonzalez, "Castro and Cuba's New Orthodoxy," pp. 5, 24.
47. Stephen Kinzer, "Report and Comment--Cuba," *The Atlantic*, May, 1977, Vol. 239, No. 5 (pp. 6-13), p. 10.
48. Gonzalez has suggested that the development of "detente," and American dedication to the maintenance of relations with Moscow provided Castro with enough confidence in Cuba's internal security to feel safe in dispatching a quarter of the Cuban Army across the Atlantic. Thus, it can be argued that detente encourages adventurism in marginal regions, even if discouraging direct confrontation. (Personal communication.)
49. "Fidel Castro Speaks at Rally," Havana Domestic Radio and Television Service in Spanish 0235 G.M.T., in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, September 29, 1976, Vol. VI, No. 190, Annex 139 (pp. 7, 10; see also quotation on page 33).
50. Edward Gonzalez, "Cuban Foreign Policy," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1977, Vol. XXVI, No. 6, p. 4.

51. These statistics have been derived from Robert W. Campbell, *Trends in Soviet Oil and Gas Industry*, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1976, pp. 76-77.
52. In fact, in 1964, Guevara had termed Africa "one of the most important, if not the most important, battlefields against all forms of exploitation in the world." William J. Durch, *The Cuban Military in Africa and the Middle East: From Algeria to Angola*, Center for Naval Analyses, Arlington, Virginia, September 1977, p. 18.
53. Ruth B. McVey, "The Southeast Asian Revolts," in Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton (eds.), *Communism and Revolution*, pp. 145-184. Still another interesting analogy is provided by Tito's ventures with respect to Trieste, Carinthia, and Aegean Macedonia, and the strains that these policies, as well as radical Yugoslav pronouncements at the 1948 Calcutta Conference of the World Federation of Democratic Youth (Tito's version of the "Havana Conference") caused between a cautious Stalinist USSR and an activist junior member of the Communist bloc.
54. The Zhdanov-Malenkov struggle is dealt with in great detail in a manuscript by Gavriel D. Ra'anani, *The Zhdanovshchina Soviet Factional "Debates" over International Policies, and the Tito Affair*.
55. "Who Backs the Indian Aggressor?" *Jen-min Jih-pao*, September 18, 1965, *Peking Review*, September 24, 1965, in William E. Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Relations 1964-5," *China Quarterly*, January-March, 1966, No. 25, p. 116.
56. Castro probably believed that, to prevent a dangerous shift in the domestic "balance," he had to purge Anibal Escalante and his "microfaction" early in 1968.
57. O.B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, *Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1945-70*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1975, p. 126.
58. Donald Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-61*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1962, pp. 189-194.
59. For details on the 1965-66 factional struggles in the PRC refer to Thomas M. Gottlieb, *Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism and the Origins of the Strategic Triangle*, The Rand Corporation, R-1902, November 1977; Harry Harding and Melvin Gurtov, *The Purge of Lo Jui-ch'ing: The Politics of Chinese Strategic Planning*, The Rand Corporation, R-548-PR, February 1971; Uri Ra'anani, "Peking's Foreign Policy 'Debate,' 1965-6," in Tang Tsou and Ping-ti Ho (eds.), *China in Crisis*, Vol. II, University of Chicago Press, 1968, pp. 23-72; Donald Zagoria, "The Strategic Debate in Peking," *ibid.*, pp. 237-268.

60. Mesa-Lago, pp. 29-60.
61. The Comprehensive Programme for the Further Extension and Improvement of Cooperation and the Development of Socialist Economic Integration by the CMEA Member Countries, CMEA Secretariat, Moscow, 1971, p. 15, as cited in K. Popov, "The Process of Socialist Economic Integration," *Foreign Trade* (Moscow), 2, 1976, pp. 2-7.
62. Cuba, which obtains 80 percent of its foreign currency earnings from sugar, was hit seriously when sugar prices on the world market plummeted from 65 cents a pound, two years ago, to 7 cents a short time later.

What prevented an economic catastrophe was the assistance provided by other communist countries. Under recent barter agreements, the Soviet Union buys about half the Cuban sugar crop, at 30 cents a pound, while supplying Cuba with all of its oil consumption at rates well below current world market prices. "Paper Reviews Results of Cuban Link with CEMA," *Bridgetown Advocate News*, in English, January 24, 1977, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, Daily Report on Latin America, February 1, 1977, Vol. VI, No. 21, Annex 10, pp. S1-S3.

Chapter 3.

1. Bayard Rustin and Carl Gershman, "Africa, Soviet Imperialism, and the Retreat of American Power," *Commentary*, October 1977, Vol. 64, No. 4, p. 34.
2. "Castro's First Middle East Adventure: Part II," *Foreign Report*, March 15, 1978, No. 1527, p. 6.
3. Rustin and Gershman, p. 34: "Angola Calls the Shots," *To the Point International*, November 21, 1977, p. 16.
4. Brian Crozier, *The Surrogate Forces of the Soviet Union*, Conflict Studies No. 92, February 1978, p. 2.
5. Durch, p. 48; Gabriel Garcia Marquez, "Operation Carlota," *New Left Review*, April 1977, p. 130.
6. *United States-Angolan Relations*, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, May 25, 1978, pp. 37-39, 54-55; Rustin and Gershman, p. 35.
7. John Borrell, "Cuban Troops and Angola," *The Christian Science Monitor*, August 18, 1978, p. 3; "Angola-Zaire: Improved Relations," *Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly on Strategic African Affairs*, Vol. II, No. 33, August 25, 1978, p. 2.

Chapter 4.

1. Gerald J. Bender, "Angola, The Cubans, and American Anxieties," *Foreign Policy*, No. 31 (pp. 3-30), pp. 10-11.
2. David K. Shipler, "European Reds Back Autonomy for Each Party," *The New York Times*, July 1, 1975, p. 1.
3. "Tito Said to Dismiss Recent Soviet Overture," *The New York Times*, December 14, 1974.
4. Giuseppe Are, "Italy's Communists: Foreign and Defense Policies," *Survival*, Vol. XVIII, No. 5, September/October 1976, pp. 213-214.
5. See Ch. VII.
6. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements--Texts and History of Negotiations*, 1977 edition, Washington, D.C., pp. 151-154.
7. "Texts of Nixon-Brezhnev Declaration and of Joint Communique at End of Visit," *The New York Times*, May 30, 1972, p. 18.
8. Secretary Vance's insistence that SALT is to be decoupled from all other issues from a purely political point of view is only partly relevant. The Kremlin cannot be unaware of the significance of the question just how much political ammunition important senatorial skeptics concerning SALT may derive from Soviet operations in various regions, if a controversial agreement should emerge from current negotiations. Bernard Gwertzman, "Vance is Assailed for Soviet Talks in Face of Trials," *The New York Times*, June 11, 1978, p. 1.
9. Foy D. Kohler, Leon Gouré, and Mose L. Harvey, Eugene Rostow, Uri Ra'anan and others.
10. "Castro's First Middle East Adventure: Part I," *Foreign Report*, March 8, 1978, No. 1526, pp. 4-7; Von Gerd Linde, "Das Arsenal des Yom-Kippur-Krieges," *Wehrforschung*, June-July, 1975, No. 4, pp. 109-113; Berner, p. 330; "Foreign Soldiers Said to be Aiding Arabs," *The London Times*, December 6, 1973, p. 6; Eric Marsden, "Cubans New Factor in Israel-Syria Impasse," *The London Times*, April 2, 1974, p. 2.
11. Foy D. Kohler, Leon Gouré, and Mose L. Harvey, *The Soviet Union and the October 1973 Middle East War--The Implications for Détente*, Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1974; Uri Ra'anan, "The USSR and the Middle East: Some Reflections on the Soviet Decision-making Process," *Orbis*, Fall 1973, Vol. XVII, No. 3, pp. 94-977.

12. "Castro's First Middle East Adventure: Parts I and II"; Dorch, pp. 28-30; Von Gerd Linde, pp. 111-112; "Foreign Soldiers Said to be Aiding Arabs"; Marsden, p. 2.
13. Yehoshua Tadmor, "Cuban Said Active in Middle East," *Tel Aviv Davar*, in Hebrew, pp. 1-2. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, Daily Report-Middle East and North Africa, Vol. V, No. 108, June 5, 1978, p. N8.
14. "Castro's First Middle East Adventure: Part I," p. 6.
15. "Castro's First Middle East Adventure: Part II."
16. Ibid.
17. In March 1977, Castro attempted to mediate in an effort to bring about a "socialist federation," including Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti and South Yemen, thereby maintaining both Ethiopia and Somalia as important Soviet entry points in Africa. Approximately one month later, when this attempt had stalled, Cuban advisers were sent into Ethiopia. F. Stephen Larrabee, "Somalia and Moscow's Problems on the Horn of Africa," *Radio Liberty* 158/77, July 5, 1977, pp. 10-11.

Chapter 5.

1. "Two Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace," Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU, November 19, 1963, pp. 221-256, in *The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement*, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1965, p. 246.
2. Letter of CCP CC to CPSU CC, February 29, 1964, *People's Daily*, *Peking Review*, May 9, in John Gittings, *Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute 1963-7*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford, 1967, p. 85.
3. "Castro Comments on Czechoslovak Crisis," Havana Domestic Television and Radio Services, in Spanish 0102 G.M.T., August 24, 1968, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily for Latin America*, Vol. VI, No. 167, p. 020.
4. Uri Ra'anani, *The USSR Arms the Third World--Case Studies in Foreign Policy*, pp. 109-113.
5. Not to mention that the USSR has been manning the island's air defenses, because of the overextension of Cuban forces. William Beecher, "Cuba Can Easily Dispatch More Troops, US Believes," *The Boston Globe*, June 15, 1978, p. 24.
6. See App. B.
7. "Tanzanian Leader Defends Soviet Role in Africa," *The New York Times*, June 9, 1976, p. A4.
8. John Goskko, "Turner Gives Evidence on Hill," *The Washington Post*, June 6, 1978, p. 1; "Rafael Rodriguez Refutes Carter Statements on Shaba," Havana Domestic Service in Spanish 1600 G.M.T., May 27, 1978, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, Daily Report on Latin America, May 30, 1978, Vol. VI, No. 104, p. Q1; Richard Burt, "Lessons of Shaba: Carter Risked Serious Credibility Gap," *The New York Times*, July 11, 1978, p. 2.
9. For a discussion of the border clash in the context of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, see Hinton, *The Bear at the Gate*.
10. Henry Kamm, "Soviet Doctrine Scored by Italians," *The New York Times*, June 12, 1969, p. 1; "World Reds End Moscow Parley," *The New York Times*, June 18, 1969, p. 1.
11. It must be recalled that, during this period, Cuba was in the midst of an attempt to achieve a major economic breakthrough. Had Havana succeeded, Castro would have been in a far better negotiating position with respect to Moscow.
12. "Castro Speaks," Havana Domestic Television and Radio Services, in Spanish 1506 G.M.T., 26 July 1970, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report for Latin America and Western Europe*, Vol. VI, No. 147, Supplement 19, pp. 4-33.

13. Edward Gonzalez has identified three basic factions at that stage:
 1. The "pragmatist" group led by Raphael Rodriguez. This group consists mostly of ex-PSP members and technocrats, who, like some of the "modernizers" in China, see technological development through Soviet aid as a feasible path for their country, even if this implies some concessions to the USSR.
 2. The "Raúlistas" led by Fidel Castro's brother, the First Vice President and Minister of the Armed Forces (FAR), have what Gonzalez calls the "military mission tendency," which asserts the need for Cuba to assert itself in favor of revolutionary elements through use of its armed forces.
 3. The "Fidelistas," followers of Fidel Castro, stress the need to help foster revolution and "anti-imperialism," mostly in the Third World, by a suitable combination of means. Gonzalez, "Complexities of Cuban Foreign Policy," pp. 6-10.
14. Ibid., p. 8.
15. Edward Gonzalez and David Ronfeldt, *Post Revolutionary Cuba in a Changing World*, The Rand Corporation, R-1844-ISA, December 1975, pp. 3-21.
16. As indicated by Soviet passivity concerning the overthrow of the Allende regime, the USSR still felt that it was not a good idea to provoke the US in the Western Hemisphere. James D. Theberge, *The Soviet Presence in Latin America*, National Strategy Information Center Strategy Paper #23--Crane and Russak, New York, 1974, p. 81.
17. Crozier, *Soviet Pressure in the Caribbean*, pp. 13, 17-18; Gonzalez and Ronfeldt, pp. 20-22. In combined operations, the USSR has shown itself capable of spanning the 1950 nm wide "choke point" between West Africa and South America, as demonstrated during the "Okean," 1975 maneuvers. Geoffrey Kemp, "The New Strategic Map," *Survival*, Volume XIX, No. 2, March/April 1977, p. 55. One of the keys to Soviet interest in the Caribbean area (quite apart from the fact that it constitutes the sensitive "southern flank" of the rival superpower) is that surveillance of the mid-Atlantic can be maintained by simultaneous Soviet flights from African and Caribbean airports (with obvious implications both for ASW and for interdiction of transatlantic reinforcements bound for NATO's "Central Front"). Although Cuba has served this function in recent years, airfields in Guyana would be better located for such a task.

Chapter 6.

1. Of course, the USSR must consider East European needs, as well as its own (and its allies do tend to draw down Soviet surpluses even of raw materials with which the Soviet Union is well endowed).
2. David Rees, *Soviet Strategic Penetration of Africa*, Conflict Studies, No. 77, November 1976, pp. 16-17.
3. Economic data taken from *Minerals Yearbook 1974, Vol. III, Area Reports: International*, US Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Washington, D.C., 1977, *passim*.; Alan B. Smith, "Soviet Dependence on Siberian Resource Development," as well as John Farrell and Paul Erickson, "Soviet Trade and Payments with the West," both contained in *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective--a compendium of papers--Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of the United States*, Washington, D.C., 1976.
4. As cited in Rees, p. 4.
5. Anatoly Gromyko, "Neo-Colonialism Maneuvers in Southern Africa," *International Affairs* (Moscow), December 1977, #12.
6. Captain William H.J. Manthorpe, Jr., USN, "The Soviet Navy in 1975," *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1976, Vol. 102, No. 5/879, p. 207; *Prospects for Soviet Oil Production* (April 1977) and *Prospects for Soviet Oil Production--A Supplemental Analysis* (July 1977), two CIA studies available through Docex Project, Library of Congress; Leslie Dienes, "Energy Crunch Ahead?" *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1977, Vol. XXVI, No. 5, pp. 41-60.
7. Dennis Chaplin, "Somalia and the Development of Soviet Activity in the Indian Ocean," *Military Review*, July 1975, Vol. IV, No. 7, pp. 3-9.
8. Recent differences between Baghdad and Moscow over Ethiopia (where Iraq has been supporting Eritrean guerrillas) and over the execution of Iraqi communists have not eliminated the confluence of interests between the two states concerning Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, nor their large-scale arms transfer relationship--recent French-Iraqi arms deals notwithstanding. "Russia, Iraq Said Divided on Horn of Africa Policy," *International Herald Tribune*, August 2, 1978, p. 1.
9. Okean 75, and Soviet mid-Atlantic surveillance, in conjunction with Cuban-based Tu-95 (Bear), provide an earnest of Soviet interest in developing interdiction capabilities in this region. In case of combat on the European "Central Front," US resupply efforts could be disrupted and oil shipments to Europe, around the Cape route, could be blocked. At present, Europe receives about 57.5 percent of its petroleum consumption from the Persian Gulf, and

well over 60 percent of its oil imports. Vice Admiral William J. Crowe, USN, "Persian Gulf: Central or Peripheral to United States Strategy?" *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, Naval Review Issue, May 1978, Vol. 104, No. 5/903, pp. 184-210.

The sensitivity of Western Europe to the oil issue has been evident since the Yom Kippur War. This fact has not eluded Soviet analysts. Moreover, were the Soviet Union not attempting to woo Japan away from its rapprochement with the PRC, the Soviet analysts might have added that 72 percent of all oil reaching Japan also originates in the Gulf, being routed through the Indian Ocean. V. Sofinsky and A. Khazanov, "The Horn of Africa in Imperialism's Strategy," Moscow, *Novaya Vremia*, February 10, 1976, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, Daily Report for the USSR, February 16, 1978, p. H 8. The PRC and the US are less vulnerable on this issue, although the US, barring more effective energy regulation, soon may become more so; China's prospects for energy autarchy appear reasonable, because of the availability of hitherto untapped indigenous resources. Thus, in the 1980s, when the Soviet Union may be a net importer and the PRC an exporter of petroleum, the approaches to the Indian Ocean will increase still further in strategic value, both in the NATO-Warsaw Pact and Sino-Soviet contexts. CIA, *Prospects for Soviet Oil Production*, April 1977; *Prospects for Soviet Oil Production--A Supplemental Analysis*, July 1977; Dienes, "Energy Crunch Ahead."

10. "Russian Arms for Western Allies," *Foreign Report*, April 26, 1978, No. 1532, pp. 7-8; *Africa Diary*, July 15, 1977, Vol. XVII, No. 27, p. 8553; *Africa Research Bulletin*, Economic, Financial and Technical Series, February 28, 1978, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 4582-4583; May 31, 1978, Vol. 15, No. 4, p. 4682; September 30, 1978, Vol. 15, No. 8, page 4829; Pierre Vellas, "La Diplomatie Marocaine dans l'Affaire du Sahara Occidental," *Politique Étrangère* 43 année, numero 4, 1978, pp. 417-428.
11. "Russian Arms for Western Allies," p. 8.
12. George T. Yu, "China's Impact," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1978, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, pp. 40-50; "Peking's Diplomacy," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1973, Vol. XXII, No. 2, pp. 16-24.
13. David K. Shipler, "Soviet Union Apologizes to China for Patrol that Crossed Border," *The New York Times*, May 13, 1978, p. 5.
14. Bender, p. 11.
15. The prevailing custom regarding offshore fishing, with the failure of the Law of the Sea Conference to limit the "conservation zone," is for littoral states to claim exclusive fishing rights in the waters within two hundred miles from the shore. Thus, the USSR is particularly interested in close relations with coastal states, since, in order legally to fish within this restricted area, it needs to obtain licenses. Milan A. Kravajna, "The Soviet Fishing Industry--A Review," in *Soviet Oceans Development*,

US Senate Committee on Commerce, Washington, D.C., October 1976, pp. 403-409.

16. Commander Richard T. Ackley, USN (Ret.), "The Fishing Fleet and Soviet Strategy," *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 101, No. 7/869, pp. 31-33.
17. Robert J. Blackwell, "US-USSR Bilateral and Technological Maritime Developments," *Soviet Oceans Development*, p. 388. Soviet maritime policy by no means consistently favors Russian clients in the Third World. For example, Guinea-Bissau's fishing agreement with the USSR allows Soviet trawlers to catch and then can tuna off the coast of West Africa, only to sell it back subsequently to Guinea-Bissau, packaged with inscriptions stating "caught in Russian waters." David Lamb, "Africans Get Guns from East, Butter from West," *The Los Angeles Times*, July 17, 1978, p. 1.
18. Ackley, pp. 36-38.

Chapter 7.

1. For example, in the Caribbean, Cuban agents have been given responsibility for organizing and running the internal security apparatus of Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley's government. Given a very unstable Jamaican economy and Soviet control of the DGI, the USSR thus may be provided with significant leverage in dealing with the Manley government. J. Daniel O'Flaherty, "Finding Jamaica's Way," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1978, No. 31 (pp. 137-158), p. 149.

As early as 1965 Cuban elements, working in conjunction with Kwame Nkrumah, the leader of Ghana (deposed in February 1966), reportedly trained insurgents and agents hostile to other African regimes, Sierra Leone in particular. One of the main disembarkation points for these trainees was Conakry, Guinea, where Nkrumah was later given sanctuary. Thus, at a period when Russian relations with Sekou Touré were not at their best, Cuba was deeply involved in joint plans with the West African leader to undermine other regimes. Cuba's role as a subversive element in Africa, therefore, antedates the Soviet-Cuban rapprochement by several years. *Communist Global Subversion and American Security*, Vol. I, *The Attempted Communist Subversion Through Nkrumah's Ghana*, pp. 3, 75, 131.

2. John Barron, *KGB*, Bantam Books Inc., New York, 1974, pp. 28-30; Brian Crozier, "The Surrogate Forces of the Soviet Union," *Conflict Studies*, February 1978, No. 92, p. 9.
3. "Cuba's Hand in Argentina and Hong Kong," *Foreign Report*, April 7, 1976, No. 1435, p. 8; Barron, p. 259.
4. "Cuba Reportedly Trained Basques at Algerian Camp," *The New York Times*, July 7, 1978; Barron, pp. 27-30; Castro's First Middle Eastern Adventure," Parts I and II; "Middle East: How Much Can Castro Do?" *Foreign Report*, August 18, 1976, No. 1452, pp. 6-7.
5. Crozier, *The Surrogate Forces of the Soviet Union*, pp. 9-10.
6. Ladislav Bittman, *The Deception Game*, Syracuse University Research Corp., Syracuse, New York, 1972, p. 142.
7. In view of the closer Cuban ties to several Latin American states, and of the residual intelligence sources left over from Cuba's radical phase, when it was helping to train Peruvian, Colombian, Brazilian, Venezuelan, and Dominican guerrillas. O'Flaherty, pp. 146-150; Gonzalez, "Castro and Cuba's New Orthodoxy," p. 18; George W. Grayson, "Cuba's Developing Policies," *Current History*, February 1972, Vol. 72, No. 424, p. 51; "Cuba's Caribbean Probe," *Foreign Report*, October 6, 1976, No. 1458, pp. 6-7.

Cuba has somewhere in the vicinity of one-quarter of its 165,000 man army in Africa, in addition to some 3000 civilians. Angus Deming, et al., "The Cubans in Africa," *Newsweek*, March 13, 1978, Vol. XCI, No. 9, p. 36. These forces are spread out over

some 16 states in Africa (and there is a reported East German "presence" in Chad, bringing the total to 17. "Wenn Elefanten Kämpfen, Leidet das Gras," *Der Spiegel*, Jahrgang 32, Nr. 22, May 29, 1978, p. 130. "Qaddafi's Secret Base in Chad," *The Foreign Report*, October 26, 1977 (pp. 4-5), p. 4; "Chad - Internal Security Developments - Relations with Libya," *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, May 12, 1978, Vol. XXIV, No. 1635, pp. 28976-28978. Moreover, to this total can be added the Cuban and Warsaw Pact elements in South Yemen, Iraq, and, reportedly, in Lebanon, which have a bearing on the Horn and on Arab North Africa. Finally, the previous presence of Cubans and East Germans in Somalia undoubtedly enabled both to make contacts that probably were to be maintained despite the present rift with Somalia. Thus, the Soviet intelligence network for Africa and the Middle East is bound to have expanded considerably by virtue of the surrogates. *Al-Anba* (Kuwait), July 14, 1978, translated from Arabic; "Behind the Coup in Aden," *Foreign Report*, July 5, 1978, No. 1541, pp. 2-6. "Running Guns to Lebanon," *Foreign Report*, August 11, 1976, No. 1451, pp. 1-2.

8. Barron, pp. 205-208; Crozier, "The Surrogate Forces of the Soviet Union," p. 9.
9. Kravanja, "Soviet and Cuban Fisheries in the Caribbean," in Theberge, *Soviet Seapower in the Caribbean: Political and Strategic Implications*, pp. 154-160.
10. Carl G. Jacobsen, "The Civilian Fleets," in *Soviet Oceans Policy*, pp. 257-305, *passim*.
11. Graham Hovey, "Guinea's Halting of Soviet Flights Leaves US in a Quandary on Aid," *The New York Times*, November 19, 1977, p. 2.

Chapter 8.

1. Activists representing Warsaw Pact countries and forces in the Third World cannot but be perceived in the West as a greater challenge than Cubans or personnel from Asian communist states. Not only are they Europeans and represent more highly developed countries, but there can be no mistaking the direct Soviet control over major foreign policy decisions, particularly of a military, para-military, or intelligence nature, in member countries of the Warsaw Pact. Although the distinction may be more apparent than real between Cuban soldiers fighting in Ethiopia (while Soviet pilots patrol Cuban skies) and East German officers and military/intelligence experts actively engaged in Africa and the Middle East (while 32 Soviet divisions control the GDR, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia), the effect of East European (particularly East German) military and paramilitary personnel in Africa is far more likely to jar the West than are the Cubans. Moscow cannot be sure whether such escalation will shock the West, provoking a tough reaction, or whether it will merely deepen the feeling of impotence in the face of increased Soviet boldness. In the latter case, the Kremlin would hope to see the Chinese eventually throw up their hands in exasperation at the West and reluctantly move back somewhat toward Moscow.
2. Elizabeth Pond, "East Germany's 'Afrika Korps,'" *The Christian Science Monitor*, August 26, 1978.
3. Martin McCauley, "GDR Involvement in Africa," *Soviet Analyst*, December 8, 1977, Vol. 6, No. 24, pp. 6-7.
4. "Madagascar Footnote," *Foreign Report*, March 15, 1978, No. 1527, p. 8.
5. "Qaddafi's Secret Base in Chad," p. 4; "Chad - Internal Security Developments - Relations with Libya," pp. 28976-28978.
6. McCauley, "Ethiopia Mourns an East German," *Soviet Analyst*, June 15, 1978, Vol. 7, No. 12, pp. 4-5.
7. To this, the fact must be added that some 1,000 Bulgarians have taken up positions as advisers and technicians in Angola. Many even have been able to bring families with them. Both Bulgarians and East Germans have been among the casualties suffered in the ongoing conflict with UNITA forces. "Bulgarian Casualties in Angola," *Foreign Report*, February 15, 1978, No. 1523, p. 8.
8. For insight into the role of satellite states in augmenting the Soviet intelligence network, see Barron, *KGB*, especially pp. 193-223; and Bittman, *The Deception Game*, *passim*.
9. Stephen H. Miller, "Iron Curtain Nations Reported Joining Soviet Drive in Africa," *The Los Angeles Times*, July 5, 1978, p. 13.

10. *AL-Anba* (Kuwait), July 14, 1978, translated from Arabic; "Behind the Coup in Aden," *Foreign Report*, July 5, 1978, No. 1541, p. 4.
11. These activities are linked to the impressive network of Soviet surveillance satellites. Russia's capability to coordinate major combined operations through the use of satellite reconnaissance was demonstrated during Okean 1975, a worldwide combined naval exercise, which made extensive use of Cosmos 723 and 724, launched especially for the occasion. (Manthorpe, p. 207.) This exercise involved coordination between bases in Cuba, Guinea, and the Indian Ocean (presumably including South Yemen). More recently, Cosmos 988 was used during Ethiopia-Somali Combat in the Ogaden, both to facilitate battlefield coordination and to improve communications between the theater command and Moscow. "Chopper War in the Ogaden," *Foreign Report*, February 15, 1978, No. 1523, p. 3.
12. Peter Vanneman and Martin James, "Soviet Thrust into the Horn of Africa: The Next Targets," *Strategic Review*, Spring 1978, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 38-39, note 1. Since the withdrawal of the Somalis from the Ogaden, the South Yemenite forces appear to have been removed from the conflict arena. The Cubans, too, have downgraded their participation with respect to Eritrea, possibly because of the embarrassment caused by their helping subdue a rebellion with which they had been strongly identified previously (unlike the Ogaden, where Cuba had not become involved publicly with the secession movement). "Going it Alone," *Foreign Report*, June 21, 1978, No. 1539, p. 6.
13. *Military Balance 1977-8*, p. 42.
14. "PDRY Major Armed Forces Buildup," *Weekly Report on Strategic Middle Eastern Affairs*, January 18, 1978, Vol. IV, No. 2, p. 1; "Saudi-PDRY: All Quiet on the Border," *Weekly Report on Strategic Middle Eastern Affairs*, March 12, 1978, Vol. IV, No. 10, p. 4. The Soviet Union and East Germany currently are engaged in a buildup of the armed forces of the PDRY and hope almost to double these forces to some 40,000 men, most of whom will serve in the Army. The Air Force, however, will be the recipient of 50 MiG-21s, although it is doubtful just how many will be flown by Yemenite, rather than Cuban pilots.
15. Lawrence Whetten, "The Soviet-Cuban Presence in the Horn of Africa," *Royal United Services Institute Journal of Defense Study* (RUSI), September 1978, Vol. 123, No. 3, p. 41; Edgar O'Ballance, "The Cuban Factor," *Ibid.*, p. 49; "Russia's Airlift: Warning to the West," *Foreign Report*, December 21, 1977, No. 1517, p. 3.
16. *AL-Anba*; "Behind the Coup in Aden," p. 3.
17. "Qaddafi's Secret Base in Chad," *The Foreign Report*, October 26, 1977, p. 4.

18. *Al-Anba*; "Behind the Coup in Aden," pp. 2-5.
19. "French Fears of Djibuti," *Foreign Report*, February 15, 1978, No. 1523, p. 4.
20. *Al-Anba*; "Behind the Coup in Aden," pp. 2-5. The PDRY also has been engaged in an ongoing conflict with Oman, which has close ties to Iran. However, probably because of the ambiguous relationship between Moscow and Teheran, Soviet backing of S. Yemen against Oman has not been overt. Eric Page, "Fighting Persists on Oman's Border," *The New York Times*, January 18, 1976, p. 6.
21. Surrogates may be defined, in this case, as states that have sent combat elements overseas in coordination with the USSR at least in part because they are obligated to do so because of political or economic aspects of their relationship with Moscow or, as in the case of Eastern Europe, because they are dominated by Soviet military might. In the case of Cuba, a combination of economic, ideological, and military considerations (e.g., the need for Soviet military support) probably determines its policy. A client, presumably, would be an entity such as the MPLA or the Ethiopian Dergue that accepts a Soviet or surrogate presence or other military and intelligence support for the achievement of its goals. South Yemen is both a surrogate (in Ethiopia) and a client with respect to its own quarrels, against Oman for example.
22. "Soviet Test Airlift to Africa Reported," *The Boston Globe*, June 23, 1978, p. 31; "Russia's Airlift Warning to the West"; "Chopper War in the Ogaden"; O'Ballance, "The Cuban Factor," p. 49; Whetten, "The Soviet-Cuban Presence in the Horn of Africa," p. 41.
23. Whetten, "The Soviet-Cuban Presence in the Horn of Africa," p. 41; O'Ballance, "The Cuban Factor," p. 49; "Russia's Flying Armada," *Foreign Report*, June 7, 1978, No. 1537, pp. 1-3.
24. Iraq reportedly has been offered an unannounced number of Il-76s. *Defense and Foreign Affairs Digest*, February 1978, Vol. VI, No. 2, p. 25. Given the stockpiles of materiel in Iraq (including large numbers of T-62 and T-54 tanks, MiG-23-"Flogger B", as well as Scud and, possibly, Scaleboard surface-to-surface missiles), this could prove significant in the context of the regional balance. "Russia's Secret Deal with Iraq," *Foreign Report*, October 13, 1976, No. 1459, pp. 1-2; "More Soviet Planes for the Middle East," *Foreign Report*, March 9, 1977, p. 3; *Military Balance 1977-8*, p. 36.
25. "Il-62M for Cuba," Havana Domestic Service in Spanish 1700 G.M.T., February 10, 1978, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report for Latin America*, February 14, 1978, Vol. VI, No. 31, p. Q 3.
26. Marquez, "Operation Carlota," pp. 128-129.

27. The Il-62Ms flew via Conakry, or possibly Guinea-Bissau, for refueling purposes. Although the present status of the "Conakry Connection" is unclear, Guinea-Bissau appears still to be available for such operations. Needless to say, most Cuban soldiers and the greater portion of hardware came by sea to Angola. *Durch*, p. 48.
28. *Durch*, p. 48.
29. John Fullerton, "The Strategic Power of Soviet Shipping," *Defense and Foreign Affairs Digest*, June 1978, Vol. VI, No. 6, pp. 33, 39.
30. "Magazine Outlines Soviet-Cuban Organization," Madrid E.F.E. in Spanish 1221 G.M.T., May 26, 1978 (review of French weekly *Vendredi, Samedi et Dimanche*), *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, Daily Report on Soviet Union, May 30, 1978, Vol. III, No. 104, p. H1; Graham Hovey, "Brzezinski Asserts that Soviet General Leads Ethiopia Units," *The New York Times*, February 25, 1978, p. 1; Kim Willenson et al., "Red Stars Over Africa," *Newsweek*, March 13, 1978, Vol. XCI, No. 11, p. 39.
31. "Russian Foreign Legion in Ethiopia," *Foreign Report*, January 18, 1978, No. 1579, p. 1, "Chopper War in the Ogaden," p. 3.
32. "Magazine Outlines Soviet-Cuban Organization in Africa."
33. Marvine Howe, "Cubans' Flights for Angola Fuel at Azores Despite Ban," *The New York Times*, January 18, 1976, p. 1.
34. "Portugal: Antunes on the Way Out," *Foreign Report*, February 4, 1976, pp. 5-6.

Chapter 9.

1. John Darnton, "Harmony Amid Discord," *The New York Times*, July 21, 1978, p. A 3; Flora Lewis, "Tito in Warning on Role of Cuba in African Strife," *The New York Times*, July 26, 1978, p. 1; David Andelman, "Nonaligned Nations End Divisive Talks; Plan Cuba Meeting," *The New York Times*, July 31, 1978, p. 1.
2. John Darnton, "Nigeria Asks Soviets Not to Overstay," *The New York Times*, July 20, 1978, p. 1; Karl Lavarencic, "Africa Applauds as Nigeria Tells Soviets not to Linger," *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 21, 1978, p. 1. The initial CIA report concerning the 1978 Shaba incursion led President Carter to condemn Cuban involvement and Castro to deny Havana's complicity in the affair. Although questions have been raised concerning the precise degree of Cuban control over the mission, sufficient doubts exist in Africa concerning Castro's veracity to persuade many to assume Cuban responsibility for the incursion. This factor cannot but be helpful to the anti-Havana faction in the OAU. David Binder, "Castro Says he Told U.S. He Tried to Halt Invasion into Zaire," *The New York Times*, June 11, 1978, p. 1.
3. Larrabee, "Somalia and Moscow's Problems on the Horn," *passim*.
4. "The OAU and Shaba," *Foreign Report*, June 28, 1978, No. 1540, p. 6.
5. Darnton, "Nigeria Asks Soviets Not to Overstay."
6. "Nigeria's Garrisons in Angola," *Foreign Report*, February 16, 1977, No. 1475, pp. 1-2; *Africa Research Bulletin*, Political, Social and Cultural Series, May 15, 1978, Vol. 15, No. 4, p. 4819; "Angola: UNITA Renews its Challenge," *Africa Confidential*, August 19, 1977, Vol. 18, No. 17, pp. 3-4.
7. The resolutions passed in the July of 1978 OAU Foreign Minister's meeting were nonspecific and, in some cases, mutually contradictory (one stressing that Africa "was the responsibility of Africans," another asserting that any African state had the "right to appeal to any other country for help, if its security and independence is threatened"). Darnton, "OAU Draft Assails Foreign Troops Use," *The New York Times*, July 16, 1978, p. 7.
8. Louis B. Fleming, "Africa Boycott of Cuba Talks Seen," *The Los Angeles Times*, July 27, 1978, p. 1.
9. "African Group Avoids Deep Split by Skirting Issue of Outside Forces," *The New York Times*, July 27, 1978, p. 1.
10. "Tanzanian Leader Defends Soviet Role in Africa," *The New York Times*, June 9, 1978, p. A 4.

11. "Views on SALT, Zaire 'Predicament'," *The Washington Post*, June 4, 1978, p. 17.
12. *Facts on File Yearbook*, March 6, 1976, Vol. XXXCI, p. 163.
13. Colin Legum, "The Soviet Union, China and the United States in Southern Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1976, Vol. 54, No. 4, p. 751.
14. "Zaire: PRC to Train Navy," *Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly Report on Strategic African Affairs*, June 29, 1978, Vol. II, No. 25, p. 2; "Zaire: PRC FM Visits," *Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly Report on Strategic African Affairs*, June 8, 1978, Vol. II, No. 22, p. 1.
15. Reuters, "Zaire Charges Soviets Aided Rebels," June 10.
16. David Andelman, "Nonaligned Nations End Divisive Talks, Plan Cuba Meeting," *The New York Times*, July 31, 1978, p. 1.
17. "Tito Said to Dismiss Soviet Overtures," *The New York Times*, December 14, 1976, p. 7.
18. The President of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia stated on July 25, 1978, that, "We are witness to attempts to establish in the vitally important regions of the nonaligned world, primarily in Africa, new forms of colonial presence or of bloc dependence, foreign influence and domination. We should be united in resisting such endeavors." "Tito Hits East and West Intervention in Africa," *The Los Angeles Times*, July 26, 1978, p. 11.
19. Louis B. Fleming, "Tito Trying to Halt Cuban Takeover of Non-aligned," *Atlanta Journal*, August 13, 1978, p. 12.
20. Gavriel D. Ra'anan, *Yugoslavia After Tito*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1977, *passim*.
21. Louis B. Fleming, "Compromise on Site for Talks is Victory for Cuba," *The Los Angeles Times*, July 31, 1978, p. 1; "Nonaligned Nations Divided over Cuban Role in Africa, Fail to Reach Agreement," *The Los Angeles Times*, July 30, 1978, p. 5.
22. Louis B. Fleming, "Moscow Is Your Friend Cuba Assures Conferees," *The Los Angeles Times*, July 29, 1978, p. 1.

1. "Sanoyah Address," Conakry *Prela*, in Spanish to *Prela* Havana 2031 G.M.T., May 7, 1972, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, Middle East and Africa, May 9, 1972, Vol. 5, No. 5, p. 11.
2. "Armed Support to Revolutionary Countries Reaffirmed," Paris, in Spanish 0134 G.M.T., February 21, 1976, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, Latin America, February 24, 1976, p. Q1. But was the MPLA a "formally established government"?
3. Most accounts stress that volunteers are eager to escape boredom, racism, or unemployment. Moreover, there are major incentives in the way of promotions and new job opportunities upon a volunteer's return to Cuba, as well as the glory of being viewed as a war hero.
4. "Cuban Death Toll Put at 1,500," *The Los Angeles Times*, July 20, 1976, p. 12.
5. The distinctions between military and civilian personnel often are blurred, a factor that may account for discrepancies between various estimates of the size of Cuban military personnel in Africa. The estimate referred to most frequently is 40,000. "Africa: Cuban Personnel Count," *Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly Report on Strategic African Affairs*, May 4, 1973, Vol. II, No. 17, p. 1; William Beecher, "Cuba Can Easily Dispatch More Troops US Believes," *The Boston Globe*, June 15, 1978, p. 24.
6. "The Moscow Connection," *Time*, July 7, 1978, Vol. 112, No. 2, p. 39.
7. "Cuba: Threat of Forces Increase Is Passed to US," *Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly Report on Strategic Latin American Affairs*, August 11, 1978, Vol. IV, No. 30, pp. 1-2.
8. Ellen Lentz, "East Germans' Role in Africa Debated," *The New York Times*, August 2, 1978; Elizabeth Pond, "East Germany's 'Afrika Korps'," *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 26, 1978; Pond, "East Germans Look to Africa," *The Washington Post*, July 8, 1978; Raymond Carroll, "The Afrika Korps," *Newsweek*, June 19, 1978, Vol. XCI, No. 25, p. 44.