The Unchangeable War,
Abstract
The Army's doctrine, its tactics, its organization, its weapons -- its entire repertoire of warfare was designed for conventional war in Europe. In Vietnam, the Army simply performed its repertoire even though it was frequently irrelevant to the situation. Changes were proposed, repeatedly, but few changes were made. Our Army seemed to be prevented by its won doctrinal and organizational rigidity from making any changes in the way in which it has fought this war. Among the institutional obstacles to change are the belief that the changes proposed might not work; the conviction that what we are doing now is working satisfactorily; the belief that what has been needed is simply more of the same, therefore changes are not necessary; the belief that organizational changes are impossible in the midst of a war; the view that the war in Vietnam is an aberration and does not represent the future demands that the Army might have to face; the bureaucratic rejection of new doctrines as exotic and of marginal importance; the unaltered career incenties to continue what we are doing now; the sense of institutional loyalty that rejects external pressure for change even when it coincides with private convictions; the twelve-month tour, which condemns us to repeat our errors; adn the lack of a single commander to impose his will on the entire system.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 01, 1972
- Accession Number
- ADA095499
Entities
People
- Brian M. Jenkins
Organizations
- foreign affairs ministry