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**STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE  
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania**

**SALT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN POLICY**

**by**

**Edward A. Corcoran**

**30 June 1980**

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## FOREWORD

This memorandum considers the challenge to US policy of encouraging some changes in Soviet basic principles without undermining the Soviet leadership. The issue at hand is the relationship of SALT and human rights. The author views them as being inextricably linked, over the long term, because a secure peace in the world depends upon the evolution of the Soviet Union toward a more open society. He concludes that a concern for human rights is a vital component of the long-term solution to the problem which SALT seeks to manage in the short term—development of a positive US-Soviet cooperation in solving the many perplexities facing the international community.

The Strategic Issues Research Memoranda program of the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, provides a means for timely dissemination of analytical papers which are not necessarily constrained by format or conformity with institutional policy. These memoranda are prepared on subjects of current importance in strategic areas related to the authors' professional work.

This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.



DeWITT C. SMITH, JR.  
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#### **BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR**

LIEUTENANT COLONEL EDWARD A. CORCORAN joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1978 after a tour in Korea. An Ordnance officer with a background in missiles and special weapons, he holds a doctorate in political science from Columbia University and is a member of the Foreign Area Officers Program for the Soviet Union. Past assignments have included service in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence in Headquarters, US Army Europe, and as a liaison officer to the Soviet Commander-in-Chief in East Germany.

## **SALT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN POLICY**

During the 1970's, both the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and human rights have emerged as major elements of US foreign policy. This paper seeks to develop the interrelationships of these two elements against the background of overall US strategy.

A basic model of strategic interrelations sets national strategy at the apex, directing all the powers of a nation toward its national purpose—those enduring aspirations for security, well-being and development which are determined by cultural and ethical values. This national purpose finds finite expression in national goals which define those highly desirable conditions by which the nation seeks to implement the values shared by its polity.<sup>1</sup>

Based on its national strategy, a country develops its domestic and foreign policies, setting courses of action compatible with the national purpose and oriented on national objectives—specific intermediate goals, generally quantifiable, which are judged to contribute to the achievement of ultimate national goals.

Foreign policy draws its direction from a nation's grand strategy.

a complex of economic, psychological and politico-military means. Grand strategy involves geostrategic balance, alliance diplomacy and spheres of influence as a nation seeks to control its opponents and obtain its national security objectives. It looks beyond the attainment of more immediate objectives toward a lasting peace. Military strategy is a specialized and supportive component, seeking attainment of objectives through the use or threat of force, as envisioned by the broad design of the grand strategy.

The national purposes of the United States and the Soviet Union are the starting points for their respective strategies. For the United States, ultimate purposes are not often articulated. The Declaration of Independence states the philosophy that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, to effect their safety and happiness, and expands on its central theme that government must be responsive to its citizenry. The Preamble to the Constitution gives more specific goals to "establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty;" later amendments spell out specific individual rights. Beyond such time-honored declarations, there are few comprehensive, authoritative statements of US purpose. US Presidents occasionally talk in terms of the national goals. Although not binding on subsequent administrations, such statements are, at least, authoritative commentary from the highest levels of the US Government. President Nixon, in his second inaugural address, committed the country to work for a peace which could endure for generations to come, so that we can

make life better in America—to insure better education, better health, better housing, better transportation, a cleaner environment—to restore respect for law, to make our communities more livable—and to insure the God-given right of every American to full and equal opportunity.<sup>2</sup>

Similarly, President Carter in his inauguration speech looked forward to the time when we in the Nation

had renewed our search for humility, mercy, justice...torn down the barriers that separated those of different race and region and religion...found productive work for those able to perform it...strengthened the American family...insured respect for the law and equal treatment.... These are not just my goals, but the affirmation of our Nation's continuing moral strength and our belief in an undiminished, ever-expanding American dream.<sup>1</sup>

Such US goals can be compared to the statement in the New Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that

the supreme goal of the party is to build a Communist society on whose banner will be inscribed: 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs...' Communism accomplishes the historic mission of delivering all men from social inequality, from every form of oppression and exploitation, from the horrors of war, and proclaims peace, labor, freedom, equality and happiness for all peoples of the earth.'

Comparing these, there is no striking divergence in the long-term goals of either society, though there is a noticeable difference of emphasis--the United States stresses individual liberty as an integral element of the national purpose, while the Soviet Union stresses collective action. From this difference of emphasis extends a major cleft in the national policies of both countries.

US statesmen have traditionally spoken of personal liberty as the basis of a free enterprise system in which a man's home is his castle and concrete individual rights take precedence over all but the most clearly established public needs. Internationally, the United States has moved to a belief that its strength, history and concern for human dignity give it a special place in the world. The US moral sense dictates a clear-cut preference for those societies which share an abiding respect for individual human rights and looks for lasting peace built upon principles of partnership, strength, and willingness to negotiate.

By comparison, group responsibility has been ingrained in the Russian character during centuries of collective life in the traditional Russian village. Combining this enduring Russian cultural outlook with the writings of Karl Marx, Soviet society stresses the individual's responsibilities to the centrally-directed Socialist system. There is no principle of popular participation in policymaking; the basic writings of the Soviet founding fathers are considered as almost infallible writ. Soviet policies also foresee a global role, built on historic concepts of Russian messianism and expressed in Marxist-Leninist terms as the vanguard state in an eventual triumph of communism over capitalism, a triumph preceded by an increasing struggle and perhaps a final spasm of desperation by a doomed capitalist world. The basic principle of this foreign policy is peaceful coexistence, which is peaceful in the sense that it seeks to avoid open war, but which foresees true world peace only with the eventual Communist triumph. This outlook

also resonates with longstanding Russian cultural feelings which view struggles in black and white terms of who will destroy whom—there will be an eventual winner and a loser; compromise is acceptable only as a temporary expedient under the force of circumstances and in no way as a permanent solution.

Thus, both the Soviet Union and the United States foresee active world involvement despite crucial differences in their concepts of national goals and means. They emphasize opposite ends of the spectrum which runs from individual freedom to collective responsibility. Nevertheless, theories have been proposed which consider the many common problems facing industrial societies in both the United States and the Soviet Union and conjecture the eventual convergence into similar societies operating more toward the middle of the spectrum. The Soviets have derided these theories as fantasies and reaffirmed their own views of constant struggle on the path of that eventual Communist victory postulated in Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

This concept of constant struggle and inevitable victory is probably the basic point at issue between the United States and the Soviet Union, as it drives the Soviet grand strategy which in turn forms the main opponent for US grand strategy. This Soviet grand strategy reflects a strong concern, even obsession, with defense and for recognition of its global leadership role.

Politically, Moscow has been implementing this strategy with an active diplomacy, using the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to obtain international recognition of its position in East Europe, and a wide variety of bilateral and multilateral agreements to formalize its expanding worldwide influences.

In support of this foreign policy, Moscow directs a constant criticism of capitalist exploitation of man and of the dangers of Western militarism, unabashedly attacking internal policies though no longer calling for replacement of Western governments with Socialist successors. This criticism is consistent and well-integrated—all branches of the official Soviet apparatus harmonize their own chords into the same unified themes. Worldwide, individual Communist voices have grown increasingly discordant on many issues; there is still basic harmony in the major themes of Capitalist exploitation and the need for constant vigilance and struggle on the road to the inevitable Communist victory.

Economics is also carefully integrated into Soviet strategy. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) subordinates the East European economies to the Soviet economy. *Outside the bloc*, Soviet and East European economic assistance to Third World countries is carefully planned to provide maximum political impact in crucial areas of the world. From the West, the centralized Soviet economy draws three major benefits: agricultural products (to cover periodic shortcomings in its own food production capabilities), technology (ranging from entire modern industrial plants to sophisticated computers) and credits (allowing the Soviet economy to develop now at the cost of later repayments).

The military strategy which supports this Soviet grand strategy is not a responsibility of the military but rather is developed at the highest political levels. Its primary purpose is to insure the survivability of the Soviet state. Since the late 1940's, it has maintained Soviet control over a cordon sanitaire in East Europe, while developing the Warsaw Pact into one of the strongest integrated military forces in the world. Here, massive Soviet military deployments not only provide a robust defense against any attack from the West, but also form a major threat against NATO Europe. Moscow, however, has been unable to deal as satisfactorily with the Chinese threat. Except for the single buffer state of Mongolia, sizable Soviet defensive forces must deploy within their own borders, a workable, if not an ideal, solution. Complementing these conventional deployments, a sustained Soviet effort to attain strategic parity with the United States has not only generally succeeded, it has also built up a large momentum which shows no signs of slowing and which threatens to place the West in a decidedly inferior military position in another decade.<sup>5</sup>

Having achieved a reasonably stable defensive posture, the Soviet military strategy has increasingly turned to its secondary task of supporting the worldwide advance of communism with a new confidence in its developing force projection capabilities. In support of their activist ideology, the Soviets have been prepared to use military capabilities to promote their political goals, be it consolidating control over East Europe, suppressing unrest there, or as a base for providing massive military support to Third World clients.

This combination of the momentum of the Soviet military buildup and their historical readiness to use military force against weaker opponents has understandably raised Western misgivings

concerning global stability in the coming decade.

Overall, the Soviet grand strategy has been reasonably adept at integrating its diverse components into an internally coherent cluster of means and policies. Without giving the Soviets exaggerated credit for having a detailed master plan of world conquest, their goal orientation has provided a long-term consistency to their strategic operations.

The US grand strategy, on the other hand, is much less integrated, lacking a clear positive goal comparable to the Soviet concept of a world Communist society. As a consequence, the US grand strategy is generally defensive and reactive. In the postwar period, the overall strategy of containment was aimed at halting the spread of communism; at least it had some conceptions of a desired world order. Since the decline of this strategy, there has been no clearly formulated replacement, but rather a broad general concept of detente. Although not codified into an integrated strategy, detente seeks to avoid open East-West conflict and to develop interdependence with a general expectation (or hope?) that there will be an eventual decline of Communist militancy and the growth of real cooperation. There is not, though, any systematic analysis of exactly what it is that the United States hopes to achieve, nor any comprehensive conception of how to turn the Soviet Union into an active partner. There is, in other words, no real strategy.

The Western position is greatly complicated by the fact that it is the position of an alliance whose members have many common interests, but also many divergent ones, and are often strongly protective and defensive of their sovereign prerogatives. Although the United States is the dominant partner, it exercises no direct control over the other member states and finds its leadership hampered by the dearth of strategic goals and concepts.<sup>6</sup> As a result, there is not even the semblance of an integrated Western grand strategy, and individual states often work at cross-purposes.

This is nowhere more evident than in international economics, where Western nations are often insensitive to the political implications of their trade policies, showing a clear tendency "to let the legitimate quest for commercial advantage in Eastern markets overshadow the need to develop and pursue a purposeful strategy."<sup>7</sup> The United States has occasionally used economic pressures on the Soviet Union for political objectives, most conspicuously in the Senate refusal to grant most-favored-nation trade status before getting specific commitments on Jewish emigration.

Notably, however, this Senate action was in direct opposition to administration policy; it graphically illustrates the lack of integration of US efforts. The grain sales of 1974-76 also prompted extensive postmortems and resulted in the establishment of more coordinated negotiating procedures, but the impetus was generally monetary—did the Soviet Union stack the negotiating deck to secure an artificially low price, and would it impact adversely on US agricultural markets?<sup>8</sup>

Technology transfer has drawn much attention in recent years and has also been the subject of extensive congressional attention, mainly because of its military implications.<sup>9</sup> At times, specific agreements have been held up (as the transfer of a third generation computer to the Soviet news service), but there is clearly no overall US direction.<sup>10</sup> In fact, there is an increasingly commercial approach to the problem, a feeling that if US businessmen do not get a contract, then it will go to some other Western country.<sup>11</sup> In the context of East-West trade, our allies are rivals.

The psychological aspects of Western strategy are as disorganized as their economic aspects. Although the Communist world has major weaknesses in this area (for example, in human rights, military budgets, nationality policies), the West has no integrated approach to capitalize on them. The US official Country Plan for the Soviet Union heavily stresses actions to correct Soviet distortions of American life, but contains no positive themes critical of shortcomings in Soviet society and ideology.<sup>12</sup> Such criticism of Communist systems is left to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, whose quasi-governmental status was only acknowledged in the early 1970's and which operates almost as an embarrassment to the US Government. If the West enjoys some advantages in the basic psychological comparison of the two systems, it is clearly at a disadvantage in the practical and institutional application. The Soviet Union uses a wide variety of systems, from tourism to radio broadcasting, for its psychological operations and has no compunction about actively and openly calling for changes in Western society. The West has responded with some pressures to ease the flow of ideas, including the unusually coordinated Western insistence on human rights principles in Basket Three of the Helsinki Act. This Western initiative, though, has been noticeably weakened by widespread Soviet violations, by Western sensitivity to Soviet complaints of interference in internal affairs, and by the lack of

any program on what to use this exchange of ideas to accomplish; the US drive on rights has been only erratically tied to other issues and has often been attacked as moralistic and abrasive.<sup>13</sup> Complementary actions, such as a Western insistence that the Soviets halt radio jamming, are wanting; it even appears very unlikely that there will be any Western position on this subject at the upcoming World Administrative Radio Conference (the first in 20 years).<sup>14</sup>

Against this background of worldwide political, economic, and psychological struggle, US military strategy plays the decidedly defensive role in stopping the Soviet Union from using military force to gain its own objectives. Even in the immediate postwar period, when the United States had overwhelming military power, there was no attempt to make gains by force of arms. Since then, the strategies have been purely passive and reactive, as shown by their very names, from Massive Retaliation to Flexible Response—military initiative has been ceded to the Soviet Union. In this situation, resources put into military use do not contribute to the achievement of the US long-term strategic goal—world development in a spirit of freedom and cooperation. Nevertheless, military forces are necessary because the country obviously cannot reach long-term goals if it ceases to exist in the short term.

In this setting, the United States seeks to maintain an overall East-West strategic balance to contain Soviet military initiatives until political, economic, and psychological forces can resolve disputes. Assessments of this strategic military balance begin, of course, with counts of manpower and equipment, and estimates of their capabilities, but must also appraise the implications of a wide range of imponderables. The utility of, say, a carrier task force versus a mechanized division completely depends on the circumstances of the conflict. Projections of such possible circumstances involve broad economic and political considerations which unavoidably impact on the military balance.

The most powerful component of this strategic military balance is the nuclear balance; its shadow falls over all the other components. Even minor, spontaneous conflicts have a potential to escalate to direct superpower confrontations, perhaps unwanted by either side, but nevertheless threatening a use of the nuclear arsenals. Similarly, conventional conflicts in Europe, Middle East or Korea could escalate into a nuclear war unwanted by either side.

Avoidance of strategic nuclear war is central to US military strategy.<sup>15</sup> Paradoxically, however, US strategy relies on nuclear

forces to help right conventional force imbalances, particularly in Europe; the threat of ultimate nuclear employment stands behind US military operations worldwide. One critical question has no clear answer—under what conditions would the United States find nuclear war preferable to retreat? In general, US military strategy foresees such a war only in the face of a direct threat to vital US interests (such as the freedom of Western Europe) or as a response to nuclear attacks on the United States. Nevertheless, the US emphasis on deterrence and the complex NATO nuclear release procedures help create an impression that it is not prepared to fight a nuclear war, but only to threaten one. Europeans already question whether the United States would actually initiate an intercontinental nuclear exchange to save Western Europe, whose loss would certainly be a serious blow to the United States, but hardly as serious as widespread nuclear devastation. The ultimate dilemma becomes how to deter nuclear war while seriously preparing to fight it, how to insure that such preparations make war less rather than more likely. Furthermore, deterrence itself is based on US theories of what will deter the Soviets; unfortunately, Soviet theoreticians rarely show any sympathy for these US views.<sup>16</sup> In the final analysis, though, deterrence is not political. Besides the strategic nuclear balance, it rests on a large number of other factors, including alliance politics (both NATO and Warsaw Pact), theater nuclear capabilities, internal political stresses, Soviet ideological concepts which discourage major risks because they foresee an ultimate victory without them, and Soviet desires not to jeopardize their impressive postwar economic achievements. Political, economic and psychological considerations overshadow military ones.

Arms control is one approach to managing this potential for vast destruction, by limiting both the size of the nuclear arsenals and the field of potential conflict. Arms control, however, does not solve any basic problems, it merely shifts the focus of the struggle, reducing the chances of nuclear war and stabilizing the strategic balance until....Until what? Until the balance fails? Or until nonmilitary solutions can be found, bringing the focus once again on political, economic, and psychological considerations. Unfortunately, as long as two opponents each possess nuclear weapons, there is no way to insure that they will not be used. Arms control cannot do it, nor can striving for a military superiority which can only create an arms spiral resulting in greater instability

at higher armament levels.

Against this broad background of national strategy, its components and problems, SALT has a wide variety of implications. The primary question on SALT is, does it contribute to the attainment of ultimate US goals? Clearly, if SALT reduces the dangers of nuclear war, while nurturing a spirit of cooperation with the Soviet Union and encouraging a shift of resources from military into social areas, then SALT is useful. On the other hand, if SALT results in a strategic nuclear balance unfavorable to the United States and merely diverts Soviet resources from strategic nuclear programs to improvement in other force elements, it could inhibit US military options and encourage Soviet military activism, ultimately increasing the threat of nuclear war. Comprehensive assessments of SALT have to estimate its impact on both the short-term and long-term probability of conflict.

Of course, the strategic nuclear balance is the starting point for any SALT assessment, but even in this relatively quantifiable subject, there is a wide range of imponderables. Strategic parity in itself can be a source of considerable uneasiness, as it is obvious to either side that rough parity plus a first strike by the opponent equals inferiority for the defender. Such a prospect is particularly disturbing for the United States in light of Soviet doctrinal stress on surprise and preemption, their apparent development of a reload capability and their emphasis on accurate, high yield warheads able to destroy US ICBM's in their silos. This could leave the United States with a number of undesirable options, such as developing a launch-on-warning strategy (which increases the possibility of accidental nuclear exchange) or reliance on a poststrike force of vulnerable bombers and relatively inaccurate submarine launched missiles, useful mainly for countervalue targeting (if the United States has suffered a Soviet counterforce strike against its ICBM force, would a US President initiate a countervalue strike against Soviet cities in the face of sure Soviet counterretaliation against US cities?). In fact, because of the asymmetry of the two forces and the differences in strategic doctrine, overall assessments are very scenario dependent; either side can easily postulate cases in which an opponent's first strike leaves the defender in a decidedly inferior position.<sup>17</sup> For this reason, neither side is really satisfied with parity. In Spykman's words,

The truth of the matter is that states are interested only in a balance which is in their favor. Not an equilibrium, but a generous margin is their objective. There is no real security in being just as strong as a potential enemy; there is security only in being a little stronger.<sup>18</sup>

The desire to be "a little stronger" is what drives arms races. Speaking of the Soviets, one American diplomat remarked:

They seem to have a different idea of what's a proper balance than we do.... They may feel that if NATO has enough power to repel a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, that is an *imbalance*. And they may feel the same way about the strategic situation.<sup>19</sup>

The Soviet strategic buildup is mute testimony that they do feel the same about the strategic situation, but this is not so different from American assessments of the strategic balance in terms of what if the Soviets strike first.<sup>20</sup> Even moderate US views call for "strategic forces which can be *at least* equal to those of the Soviet Union."<sup>21</sup> This mistrust of parity, though it is universal, makes assessments of the strategic balance an often emotional issue.

First strike capability is an important aspect of the balance, yet there are so many imponderables, expressible in a wide variety of scenarios, that definitive answers are simply not possible. The SALT negotiations have attempted to set limits on these capabilities, but the accuracy and yields credited to the Soviet ICBM force give them a disturbing lead in this area. Nevertheless, the United States has hesitated to develop a force which could be construed as having its own first strike capability, fearing that it would threaten a delicate stability and simply push the Soviets to greater efforts, resulting in no relative improvement to the US position. The recent announcement of US intentions to develop a mobile MX missile system brought immediate Soviet complaints that it would not be "compatible with the SALT II treaty."<sup>22</sup> This shows not only Soviet concern—which could easily lead to increased efforts on their part—but also shows disagreements on interpretation of SALT II even before it was signed.

Assessments of the nuclear balance are further complicated by questions of which systems to balance. The SALT negotiations cover only specifically defined categories of weapons systems. However, a number of other systems affect the overall nuclear balance, including US, British and French theater nuclear systems; from the viewpoint of the Soviet Union, a number of systems based in Western Europe are strategic, since they are capable of striking

the Soviet homeland. Similarly, a number of US analysts have criticized the exclusion of the Soviet BACKFIRE bomber from the SALT totals, since it is capable of reaching the United States with aerial refueling; Soviet assurances that it would not be used in this fashion have hardly served to quiet these critics. Perhaps more significant is the fact that the BACKFIRE has a decidedly greater military significance in a seapower role (where its presence adds measurably to Soviet capabilities) rather than as an intercontinental bomber (where it only marginally improves the already impressive Soviet strike capability). The question of the BACKFIRE raises several major problem areas.

For one, there is no clear line between theater and strategic systems, particularly from the viewpoints of the Soviet Union and of our NATO allies. A number of theater systems (BACKFIRE, SS-16, FB-111, and now the cruise missile) can be adapted to an intercontinental role. But when SALT assessments begin to consider the impact of such theater systems, this opens a whole new field of problems, including conventional force balances and chemical/biological weapons.

Secondly, strategic nuclear systems are only one component of the strategic balance.<sup>23</sup> The ability to control the seas and project power, including the nuclear strike capability of carrier task forces, is certainly another major component. So too, are defensive systems. One reason the BACKFIRE is disturbing to the United States is that the US air defense system has been basically dismantled. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has an extensive and sophisticated system which poses a major threat to US bombers and certainly impacts on any assessment of the strategic balance. Beyond that, defenses against ballistic missile attack would certainly give either side a decided advantage. Missile defense systems were effectively eliminated by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, but developments in laser or particle beam technology have a potential to reopen the entire question. The question of passive defense is even more imponderable. The Soviet Union has an extensive civil defense system and a wide dispersion of industrial plants, partly done for military reasons. While the effectiveness of this passive defense is debatable, it unquestionably would give the Soviet Union some advantages over the United States in a major nuclear exchange.<sup>24</sup>

Thirdly, it is very difficult to assess the impact of multicapable

systems and new developments which do not fit previous categories. The basic problem is the inexorable advance of military technology.<sup>25</sup> No matter what the wording is in a definition of strategic weapons or in a *restriction on new weapon systems*, it appears inevitable that technology will eventually produce a system which falls outside the definition, but which is able to affect the strategic balance, particularly in terms of specific war scenarios. The result is that agreements become increasingly complex—how to measure a first strike capability, how to define strategic systems, what specific limitations to put on individual systems (throw-weight, accuracy, range, etc.). The more complex agreements become, the more difficult they are to measure and verify. Arms control agreements that rest on specific balances of designated systems can only serve short-term goals and will result in continual tinkering and balancing of increasingly complex considerations as restrictions in one area shift military expenditures into other areas. In the long run, arms control depends on general political cooperation.

Verification itself is a major problem, even when dealing with relatively quantifiable agreements themselves, significant with SALT I and, as noted above, already a problem with SALT II.<sup>26</sup> Beyond this initial problem of interpretation is the problem of how to determine if the other side is intentionally violating some aspect of the agreement in order to gain an advantage. Intelligence can be relied on to alert the United States to any substantial Soviet program in violation of SALT II which would secure them a significant strategic advantage, but the scope of verification goes far beyond simple matching of missile silos against treaty numbers. Procedures must insure that the overall verification provides adequate protection. While it rests on a practical base of intelligence data, it must assess the whole picture of international politics, the indications of Soviet foreign policy and defense decisionmaking, the growth and problems of the Soviet economy and its psychological mobilization. Then it must allow for broad consultations on the meaning and implications of specific circumstances and allow for negotiations and discussions to clarify ambiguities, correct accidental violations and provide reassurance that suspicions are unfounded. Finally, each side must be prepared to handle what it considers as violations of the spirit of the treaty. For all of these, it must be ready to respond with an appropriate array of possible answering sanctions. In the end, verification is

affected not only by Soviet strategic weapons, but by political, economic and sociological threats to our safety and welfare in the years to come.<sup>27</sup> And once again the circle returns to the ultimate importance of broad political, economic, and psychological questions, that is, to questions of overall grand strategy.

While military budgets can stabilize the international situation in the short run, and arms control measures can build on this stability to reduce the threat of open conflict, ultimate solutions lie beyond both their ken. The confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union will remain a dangerous one as long as the two sides have "fundamentally different visions of human society and human destiny."<sup>28</sup> Lasting solutions to the threat of war depend on changes in basic conceptions, not with any expectation of a simplistic convergence on a common socio-political system, but on peaceful coexistence in the broadest Western sense—working "to engage the Soviet leadership in a network of more cooperative relationships"<sup>29</sup> in attacking the common problems of mankind.

Attainment of such a goal seems unachievable without a Soviet recognition that the Marxist-Leninist philosophical underpinnings of Soviet society, while they may provide valuable insights into human social and political behavior, are theories rather than infallible pronouncements. As such, they are subject to critical analysis and require evaluation in the light of changes in the world circumstances. Specifically, these changes have negated any inevitability of continuing struggle or ultimate triumph of one system over the other. Formulation of a US grand strategy must include a critical analysis of Soviet doctrine, identifying those aspects which undermine development of real cooperation and trust between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States can then take the lead in developing an integrated Western strategy to induce the Soviets to subject Marxist-Leninist theories to critical analysis and to reassess those elements obstructing trust and cooperation.<sup>30</sup>

The military component of such a Western strategy must necessarily be a defensive one, seeking to block Soviet military pressures. At the same time, a clear defensive stance not threatening to the Soviets can help induce them to shift resources to civilian use. Complementing such a defensive military posture must be active economic, political, and psychological strategies, integrating US-Soviet relations in a comprehensive approach to

broad problems of global interdependence and Third World development.

In regard to the Soviet Union, it is the psychological struggle that is critical—the US goal, after all, is a change in Soviet attitudes. This is also where the Soviets are most vulnerable. There is strong popular demand in the Soviet Union for improved living conditions,<sup>31</sup> with a corresponding potential to develop pressures for decreased military expenditures. Many nationality, religious and professional groups are seeking broader voice in the conduct of their own affairs,<sup>32</sup> a voice which can serve as a force for moderation in external as well as internal politics. At the same time, there is widespread skepticism and even cynicism within Soviet society on its Marxist-Leninist ideology. The Soviet leadership, though, faces a fundamental dilemma because the legitimacy of its position is still justified in terms of this doctrine. Nevertheless, the regime does draw much support from sources besides doctrine, including its extensive improvements in Soviet living standards and its international prestige as a superpower. The leadership, though, is understandably reluctant to shift its claim to legitimacy from a known basis in ideology to an untested one of broad popular support. Such skepticism is magnified in regard to East Europe, where there are broad pressures for change and strong undertones of pro-Western and anti-Russian feelings.<sup>33</sup> The spectre haunting the Kremlin is that a freer East Europe would align itself with the West and create a massive security problem for the Soviet Union.<sup>34</sup>

In the long run, though, a more open Soviet society engaged in broad international interaction is the only guarantee of a lasting peace. US policy can offer the Soviet leadership assistance in developing broader bases of internal legitimacy and international stability through a policy of active cooperation with the West. For this, a free exchange of ideas and an internal atmosphere of open discussion is essential. It has to be a prime objective of a US strategy aimed at developing a more open Soviet society, with a leadership confident of popular support and actively cooperating in international efforts at solving fundamental social problems. From this point of view, the United States should express support for Soviet dissidents not as tools to undermine the Soviet leadership, but as precursors of a broader internal dialogue through which the Soviet leadership can develop its own lasting solutions for internal problems.

Such an approach has wide economic implications for the Soviet Union. Certainly a shift of resources out of the military sector could form the basis for significant improvements in the quality of Soviet life, however their society wishes to define that; a lessening of ideological controls could also allow a more rational approach to other economic problems. But such major changes would also upset the secure position and routines of the economic and military bureaucracies, requiring creative approaches to a broad range of problems. Here, the West can offer significant assistance with both technology and experience, assisting the Soviet Union in developing a more consumer-oriented economy while avoiding some of the problems now plaguing Western societies, such as an overreliance on fossil fuels, shortages of mass transport and integration of minorities into active social partnership.

Inevitably, though, any major shift in the Marxist underpinnings of Soviet society would threaten the position of leaders tied with Stalinist (and post-Stalinist) crimes; of leaders having a vested interest in the military, secret police and party bureaucracies; of those closely associated with defense production; and of those who hold messianic views of a Soviet or Russian mission or who believe in wringing maximum advantage from what they perceive as a position of Soviet dominance. Clearly, any basic social change with negative implications for such a broad spectrum of national leaders will be neither easily nor quickly effected. Nor can one expect the leadership itself to initiate such a change itself, or in response to external pressures. Rather, pressures for such internal changes need to come from below, and for this, human rights and the free movement of ideas called for in the Helsinki Final Act are not merely a minor refrain or moral appendage of Western policy, but a critical means of building eventual active cooperation between East and West. While a Western strategy of seeking changes in basic Soviet attitudes may threaten the individual position of specific Soviet leaders, cooperation in other fields, such as economic development, would allow more Soviet leaders to build a base of internal support which could eventually dispense with controls built on ideology and a police state mentality.

Internal Soviet politics will play a decisive role in Soviet actions. But international politics can do much to encourage an outcome favorable to long-term peace and cooperation by integrating the Soviet Union as an active and cooperative participant in the in-

ternal system, not just in the United Nations and its specialized agencies, but broad economic and political interdependence with constructive Soviet participation in attacking problems of worldwide significance.

In summary, attainment of long-term US goals requires cooperation with the Soviet Union. The current goals of US military strategy—avoidance of nuclear war and defense of the United States and its allies from Soviet threats—are completely compatible with such cooperation. But a passive defense strategy cannot by itself achieve the long-term US goals; international political, economic and psychological initiatives are essential to any overall US strategy. Arms control can support the strategy, but in the long run its significance is not in the limiting of specific types of military hardware, but in building the basis for long-term cooperation. And, in fact, the administration sees the “truest significance” of the SALT negotiations “as part of a process...[moving] closer to the goal of stability and security in Soviet-American relations.”<sup>35</sup> But such a dialogue, by itself, is neither a help nor a hindrance—it needs a strategy to fit into, a strategy which is also badly needed for the United States to assert a positive leadership role in world affairs. Such a strategy need not be overblown or in grandiose detail, but neither can it be simply passive. It must specify and interrelate positive objectives. In regard to the Soviet Union, changes in some basic Soviet attitudes are an essential factor in long-term cooperation. A free exchange of ideas and a universal regard for human rights is essential if a dialogue is to have some promise of spurring Soviet reevaluations of those points of Marxist-Leninism which provoke continuing US-Soviet friction. This requires careful balancing of US policies. As Charles Frankel has noted, many US official statements on human rights can be taken as an attack on basic principles of the Soviet system and on the Soviet leaders right to rule.<sup>36</sup> The challenge for US policy is now to separate these two, how to encourage some changes in Soviet basic principles without undermining the Soviet leadership. Dialogue can help provide the first, but the second can come only from broad economic and political cooperation. In the short term, there is no overarching requirement to link human rights with SALT, or with other specific US-Soviet issues; both the administration and many commentators have worked hard to avoid such linkage.<sup>37</sup> But in the long run, they are inextricably linked, as a secure peace in the world ultimately depends on the evolution of the

Soviet Union toward a more open society.<sup>18</sup> In the final analysis, a concern for human rights is a vital component of the long-term solution of the same problem which SALT seeks to manage in the short term—the problem of how to develop a positive US-Soviet cooperation in solving the immense global problems facing the international community.

## ENDNOTES

1. For a more detailed outline of how the various components of strategy interrelate, see: John M. Collins, *Grand Strategy*, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1973, pp. 1-16.
2. Richard M. Nixon, "Second Inaugural Address," *Vital Speeches*, February 15, 1973, p. 267.
3. Jimmy Carter, "Inaugural Address," *Vital Speeches*, February 15, 1977, p. 259.
4. "The New Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," *Essential Works of Marxism*, ed. by Arthur Mendel, New York: Bantam Books, 1965.
5. The shifting balance is clearly shown in the yearly issues of *The Military Balance* by the International Institute for Strategic Studies and in John M. Collins, *Imbalance of Power*, San Rafael, California: Presidio Press, 1978. The momentum of the Soviet buildup, though, is not quite as dramatic as it is often pictured—see: Les Aspin, "What Are the Russians Up To?," *International Security*, Summer 1978, pp. 30-52.
6. European leaders regularly express concern over the lack of US strategy. See, for examples: Raymond Aron, "The Vienna Non-Event," *The Washington Post*, June 28, 1979, p. 21; and Francois deRose, "SALT and Western Security in Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1979, pp. 1065-1074.
7. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, "The United States and the Soviet Union," *Vital Speeches*, May 15, 1976, p. 462.
8. "A Grain Deal—But No Oil," *Newsweek*, November 3, 1975, pp. 73-74.
9. Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Russia's Trade Coup," *Newsweek*, July 26, 1976, pp. 52-53; "Controlling Export of Technology," *Aviation Week*, March 26, 1979, p. 30; "Will the House Beef Up USSR Military Capability?" *Human Events*, June 2, 1979; US Congress, House, Committee on Science and Technology, *Key Issues in U.S.-U.S.S.R. Scientific Exchanges and Technology Transfer*, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1978.
10. Both the computer sale and extensive oil technology sales were first held up in response to Moscow trials of dissidents. Both transactions were eventually approved; the computer less than one a week after the Soviets announced that they would buy from an alternate supplier—France. See *The Washington Post*, April 6, 1979, p. 28. Administration officials are sharply divided on what approach to take (see *The Washington Post*, August 30, 1978, on disagreements over the oil equipment sales and comments on congressional reaction in "Export Controls: Ineffective Weapons," *The Journal of Commerce*, April 23, 1979). For major articles in the current debate see: Jonathon B. Bingham and Victor C. Johnson, "A Rational Approach to Export Controls," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1979, pp. 894-920; and Samuel P. Huntington, "Trade, Technology and Leverage: Economic Diplomacy," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1978, pp. 63-80.
11. J. P. Smith, "Business Irked by Curbs on Oil Technology Sales to Soviet," *The Washington Post*, November 20, 1978, pp. 29, 34; Richard Burt, "Technology Sales Rules Under Fire," *The New York Times*, June 18, 1979, pp. D1, D4.
12. International Communications Agency, *Country Plan for the Soviet Union*, Washington, DC, August 1978.
13. Robert Rand, "Helsinki Plus Three," *Radio Liberty Report* No. 170/78, August 1, 1978; Julia Wishnevsky, "The Helsinki Conference and Human Rights in

the USSR," *Radio Liberty Report* No. 83/77, April 11, 1977; "Moral Policeman to the World?," *US News and World Report*, March 14, 1977, pp. 17-28; "Americans Think Trials Should Not Stop SALT," *The Baltimore Sun*, August 13, 1978, p. 8.

14. "The Great Information War," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1979, pp. 120-164.

15. David C. Jones, "Strategic Issues," *Air Force*, April 1977, p. 32.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 31-33; see also: Charles M. Kupferman, "The Soviet World View," *Policy Review*, Winter 1979, pp. 45-67; Fritz W. Ermarth, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," *International Security*, Fall 1978, pp. 138-155; Robert Legvold, "Strategic 'Doctrine' and SALT: Soviet and American Views," *Survival*, January/February 1979, pp. 8-13; Raymond L. Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," *International Security*, Summer 1978, pp. 112-147.

17. R. J. Rummel, "Detente and Reality," *Strategic Review*, Fall 1976, pp. 31-43. For an opposing Soviet view, see: R. Simonyan, "Strategicheskoye pozitsii Pentagona i bezopasnost' narodov (The Strategic Views of the Pentagon and the Security of Peoples)," *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnoye Otnosheni*, November 1978, pp. 16-26.

18. Nicholas Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics, the United States and the Balance of Power*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1942, p. 21.

19. James Reston, "The View From Vienna," *Armed Forces Journal International*, May 1979, pp. 19-35.

20. Jack F. Kemp, "Congressional Expectations of SALT II," *Strategic Review*, Winter 1979, p. 19. Emphasis added.

21. *The New York Times*, June 8, 1979, pp. A1, A5; June 11, 1979, p. A4.

22. Edward N. Luttwak ("SALT and the Meaning of Strategy," *The Washington Review*, April 1978, pp. 16-28) gives a thorough discussion of this point, including a detailed evaluation of the BACKFIRE controversy. See also: Joseph J. Wolf, "The Growing Dimensions of Security," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Spring 1978, pp. 89-110.

23. *Soviet Civil Defense* (Washington: Director of Central Intelligence, July 1978) outlines the extensive system, as does: Peter Kruzhin, "The Streamlining of Civil Defense in the USSR," *Radio Liberty Research* No. 415/76, September 22, 1976. William O. Staudenmaier ("Civil Defense in Soviet and American Strategy," *Military Review*, October 1978, pp. 2-14) discusses its role in strategy. A recent congressional study concluded that because of Soviet civil defense efforts, their losses would be smaller in a strategic nuclear exchange, but their recovery might well lag that of the United States (*The Washington Post*, May 15, 1979).

24. Edgar Ulsamer, "Defense Technology: Moving Into Space," *Air Force*, June 1979, pp. 46-51; David R. Griffiths, "Beam Weapon Impact Called Uncertain," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, April 30, 1979, pp. 28-29; Malcolm W. Browne, "Weapon That Fights Missiles Could Alter World Defense Focus," *The New York Times*, December 4, 1978, pp. A1, D11; Christoph Bertram, "Arms Control and Technological Change," *Adelphi Papers* Number 146; Edgar Ulsamer, "Invisible Airplanes and Super-Smart Weapons," *Air Force*, April 1977, pp. 59-63.

25. Colin S. Gray, "SALT: Time to Quit," *Strategic Review*, Fall 1976, pp. 14-22; David S. Sullivan, "The Legacy of SALT I: Soviet Deception and U.S. Retreat," *Ibid.*, Winter 1979, pp. 26-41; Kemp, pp. 22-23; for an opposing view, see Raymond L. Garthoff, "SALT I: An Evaluation," *World Politics*, October 1978, pp. 1-25.

27. William Colby, "Verifying SALT," *World View*, April 1979, pp. 4-7 (an adapted version was later published in *The Washington Post*, April 15, 1979). Colby's views are rebutted by John D. Lofton, Jr., "Intelligence Gap Traps SALT-Seller Colby," *Human Events*, June 2, 1979, p. 7, but supported by Les Aspin, "The Verification of the SALT II Agreement," *Scientific America*, February 1979, pp. 38-45. President Carter claims overall verification is adequate (*The Washington Post*, May 1, 1979); skeptics easily point to specific areas where intelligence data appears weak (e.g., Kemp, p. 22).

28. "Carter's Speech to Congress Asking Approval of Treaty," *The New York Times*, June 19, 1979, p. A13.

29. Sonnenfeldt, p. 462.

30. Ray S. Kline ("New Grand Strategy for the United States," *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 1, No. 1 and 2, 1979, pp. 1-11) proposes "selective alliance building" as the core of a new strategy but sets no positive goals for this strategy. Others see no need for a grand strategy, believing contingency plans can suffice (see: Drew Middleton, "Specialists Debate a U.S. Global Policy," *The New York Times*, December 27, 1978). The need for global orientations is clear in Wolf, p. 105-110; Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1979, pp. 975-986; and J. A. Graf Kielmansegg, "Europe's Heightened Role in Global Strategy," *Strategic Review*, Winter 1979, pp. 49-55.

31. David K. Shipler ("Russians Covet Affluence of U.S., but Are Wary of its Political Setup," *The New York Times*, June 14, 1979, p. 1, and "Soviet Collectivism Is Giving Way to Trend Toward Private Interests," *Ibid.*, June 13, 1979, pp. 1, 10) gives a current, on-the-spot commentary on these feelings.

32. There is a tremendous volume of literature on this subject in recent years. One good overview is Rudolph Tokes, *Dissent in USSR*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1975. Although the Soviet government has reacted harshly toward the dissenters, the vast majority of them are seeking change within the system.

33. See for example: Michael Dobbs, "Pope's Polish Trip Buys East European Catholics," *The Washington Post*, June 12, 1979, p. A10; David K. Shipler, "Western Influence Growing in East European Countries," *The New York Times*, May 14, 1979, pp. 1, 12, and "East Europeans Show Disdain for Soviet Life," *Ibid.*, May 15, 1979, pp. 1, 12.

34. These feelings, which led to the massive military interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, are still clearly evident. David K. Shipler, "Soviet Stresses Warsaw Pact's Role Is to Quell Revolts," *The New York Times*, May 8, 1976; "Brezhnev's Nightmare: Breakaway in Europe," *U.S. News and World Report*, August 1, 1977, pp. 28-30.

35. "Carter's Speech to Congress," p. A13.

36. Charles Frankel, *Human Rights and Foreign Policy*, New York: The Foreign Policy Association (Headline Series Number 241), October 1978, p. 58.

37. "Rights, SALT Not Tied, Vance Says," *The Monterey Peninsula Herald* (from Associated Press), June 29, 1977; Arthur Collins, "SALT II, Linkage and National Security," *The Baltimore Sun*, April 13, 1979, p. 17.

38. Frankel, p. 59; see also James Chase's comments ("How 'Moral' Can We Get?" *The New York Times Magazine*, May 22, 1977, p. 48) on the need to link "our concern for human rights to other fundamental aspects of foreign policy."

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