AD-A096 335 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA F/G 15/6
DOMESTIC DETERMINANTS OF AMERICAN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DOCTRINE: I--ETC(U)
DEC 80 M A HELGESON

UNCLASSIFIED NL

1 OF 2



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California

(9) Master's THESIS,

(6) DOMESTIC DETERMINANTS OF AMERICAN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DOCTRINE: 1965-1980.

by

(10) Marc Arnold Helgeson

(11) Dec[redacted]80 (12) 121

Thesis Advisor: D. S. Yost

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. AD-A096335	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Domestic Determinants of American Strategic Nuclear Doctrine: 1965-1980		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Master's Thesis; December 1980
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) Marc Arnold Helgeson		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		12. REPORT DATE December 1980
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 120
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS(if different from Controlling Office) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE

16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)

18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

American strategic doctrine, belief systems, deterrence, domestic determinants, mutual assured destruction, operational code, technological dynamism, Vietnam War.

20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

This thesis examines the hypothesis that American strategic nuclear doctrine since 1965 has been significantly influenced by multiple domestic variables. This analysis begins with an examination of the changes in American strategic doctrine, as expressed in the Secretary of Defense's annual statement, between 1965-1980. The relationships which precipitated these changes are explored in terms of the following domestic variables:

DD FORM 1 JAN 73 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE
S/N 0102-014-6601 |

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

(1) American perceptions of the Soviet threat
(2) Strategic weapons system development
(3) American public opinion
(4) The personalities of key American policy-makers
(5) The Vietnam War

Because of the complex inter-relationship between these variables, the modification of strategic doctrine can be accomplished only incrementally and thus rapid doctrinal change is virtually beyond the control of "grand strategists."



Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

Domestic Determinants of American Strategic Nuclear Doctrine: 1965-1980

by

Marc Arnold Helgeson
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
A.B., University of California, Los Angeles, 1971

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 1980

Author _____

Approved by: David S. Yost
Thesis Advisor

Second Reader

Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

Dean of Information and Policy Sciences

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the hypothesis that American strategic nuclear doctrine since 1965 has been significantly influenced by multiple domestic variables. This analysis begins with an examination of the changes in American strategic doctrine, as expressed in the Secretary of Defense's annual statement, between 1965-1980. The relationships which precipitated these changes are explored in terms of the following domestic variables:

(1) American perceptions of the Soviet threat

(2) Strategic weapons system development

(3) American public opinion

(4) The personalities of key American policy-makers

(5) The Vietnam War

Because of the complex inter-relationship between these variables, the modification of strategic doctrine can be accomplished only incrementally and thus rapid doctrinal change is virtually beyond the control of "grand strategists."

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. AIMS, METHODS, AND CHANGES IN U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DOCTRINE---------- 7

A. INTRODUCTION---------- 7

B. THE VARIABLES AND THE STRUCTURE----------10

C. AMERICAN STRATEGIC DOCTRINE: 1965-1980--------13

II. AMERICAN DETERRENCE THEORY & PRE-1965 STRATEGIC DOCTRINE----------22

A. INTRODUCTION----------22

B. DETERRENCE DEFINED----------22

C. DETERRENCE THEORY AND DOCTRINAL FORMULATION----25

D. MUTUAL DETERRENCE AND ASSURED DESTRUCTION------29

E. DETERRENCE THEORY/DOCTRINE: CIRCA 1965--------31

III. THE DOMESTIC DETERMINANTS: DIRECT RELATIONSHIP TO STRATEGIC DOCTRINE----------33

A. INTRODUCTION----------33

B. THREAT PERCEPTIONS----------33

1. Definition and Measurement----------38

2. Perceptions and Strategic Doctrine---------45

C. THE PUBLIC OPINION VARIABLE----------47

1. The Surveys----------49

2. The Impact on Doctrine----------53

D. THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY----------56

E. PERSONALITIES AND THEIR EFFECT ON STRATEGIC DOCTRINE----------63

1. Robert McNamara's Operational Code---------- 64

2. Henry Kissinger's Operational Code---------- 68

3. James Schlesinger's Operational Code-------- 72

4. Jimmy Carter's Operational Code------------ 75

F. THE EFFECTS OF THE VIETNAM WAR---------- 77

G. A SUMMARY OF THE DETERMINANTS---------- 82

IV. THE INTER-RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN DOMESTIC DETERMINANTS---------- 83

A. THREAT PERCEPTIONS---------- 83

B. TECHNOLOGY---------- 85

C. PUBLIC OPINION---------- 86

D. PERSONALITIES---------- 88

E. VIETNAM'S MULTIPLE EFFECTS---------- 92

V. CONCLUSIONS---------- 95

FOOTNOTES----------101

BIBLIOGRAPHY----------113

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST----------120

I. AIMS, METHODS, AND CHANGES IN U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

A. INTRODUCTION

In June 1977, in a speech regarding national security and the international environment, the Director of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Leslie Gelb, reflected on the Carter Administration's approach to international relations and doctrines:

> The general approach of this Administration in the first four months was not to try to mass this diparate, diverse, and sometimes incomprehensible foreign policy universe into a new strategy. There is no Carter Doctrine, or Vance Doctrine, or Brown Doctrine, because of a belief that the environment we are looking at is far too complex to be reduced to a doctrine in the tradition of post-World War II American foreign policy. Indeed, the Carter approach to foreign policy rests on the belief that not only is the world far too complex to be reduced to a doctrine, but that there is something inherently wrong with having a doctrine at all.[1]

In little more than three years, however, events would alter this determination to conduct foreign policy without the constraints of a "doctrine." In his statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee regarding American nuclear strategy Secretary of State Edmund Muskie asserted:

> ...I am particularly concerned with the ways in which our strategic doctrine bears on our overall foreign policy...

> ...the countervailing strategy is not a radical departure from previous policy. It is rather the result of a gradual evolution of our doctrine over a period of years in a response to changing conditions and new knowledge.[2]

Similarly, "changing conditions and new knowledge" have also focused the attention of an increasing number of Americans on questions of doctrine for foreign policy in general and for strategic nuclear weapons in particular. In February 1980, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian seizure of the American Embassy in Teheran, the Gallup Opinion Index indicated that "international problems" was the "most important problem" to the majority of those surveyed. This marked the first time since 1973 that an international response had out-polled a domestic one.[3] The 1980 Presidential campaign focused heavily on questions related to foreign policy and defense. In short, Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59), referenced in Secretary Muskie's policy statements above is but a single indicator of an increased public concern regarding the adequacy and basic determinants of American strategic nuclear doctrine.

Two fundamental questions follow which this thesis will attempt to address them. First, what are the determinants of American strategic nuclear doctrine? Secondly, can these determinants be manipulated by policy-makers to alter strategic doctrine?

The determinants of strategic doctrine, to paraphrase Samuel Huntington, have a "Janus-like quality." Like military

policy, strategic doctrine "...exists in two worlds. One is international politics, the world of the balance of power, wars and alliances...[t]he other world is domestic politics, the world of interest groups, political parties, [and] social classes..."[4] Of these two major categories of determinants, however, this thesis focuses on the domestic determinants. The international determinants, such as alliance politics, foreign domestic politics, and the strategic programs of one's principal adversary, are generally beyond the direct influence of a nation's principal policy-makers. Domestic determinants, on the other hand, can theoretically be more directly manipulated by a "grand strategist" in pursuit of a satisfactory strategic doctrine. This thesis will attempt to determine to what degree such manipulation is possible.

This thesis will examine the domestic determinants of American strategic nuclear doctrine to test the following hypothesis:

American strategic nuclear doctrine since 1965 has been significantly influenced by multiple domestic variables. Because of these variables and their complex inter-relationships, the deliberate, modification of strategic doctrine is extremely difficult and can be accomplished only incrementally. Thus, rapid doctrinal change is beyond the control of "grand strategists."

B. THE VARIABLES AND THE STRUCTURE

The following five domestic variables were selected as most worthy of thorough description and analysis:

(1) American perceptions of the Soviet threat.

(2) Strategic weapons system development and the concept of technological determinism.

(3) The effects of the Vietnam War.

(4) Domestic public opinion.

(5) The effects of the key policy-makers.

Detailed justifications for selection of each variable are provided in the body of the thesis. The principal a priori reasons for their initial selection follow.

While intertwined with the international dimensions of doctrinal development, American perceptions of the Soviet threat and the domestic causes of these perceptions are crucial to an understanding of the other domestic variables. Since 1945, American perceptions of relative Soviet aggressiveness have been among the key elements of defense planning.

The effects of weapon system development on strategic doctrine was chosen because of the "chicken or the egg dilemma" which it presents the analyst. Does doctrine bring about the development of specific weapons systems to meet the strategic posture set forth by the doctrine or do weapons systems require doctrinal justification during their development and/or after their deployment? This two-way relationship between technological development and deterrence posture may, in Donald

Snow's words, "follow or force a country to adopt certain doctrines" and necessitates a continuing reassessment of both doctrine and weapons requirements.[5]

The Vietnam War was chosen for analysis because of its potential direct and indirect impact on the other variables, specifically on defense program funding, public opinion, and on the "world-views" of key personalities in American decision-making. Ole Holsti and James Rosenau have noted the intriguing possibility that:

> The Vietnam War was a watershed event in the sense that it has given rise to sharply divergent views on the nature of the international system and the appropriate international role for the United States.[6]

Analysis of the effects of the Vietnam War will include the war's effects on the American leadership, the American public and on defense budgeting.

The public opinion variable, like Vietnam, was selected for analysis because of its potential wide-ranging effects on the political leadership and its indirect effects on doctrinal support and program funding. To quote Huntington:

> If public opinion significantly influenced military policy, it did not do so directly but rather through the images which governmental leaders had of public opinion... Governmental leaders projected onto the public their own values and concerns.
>
> Images of what the public desires thus mirror what public officials want.[7]

Huntington's depreciation of the ability of public opinion to affect events directly aside, the concern of the political

leadership with measures of opinion, such as polls, since the late 1960s is an indicator of public opinion's importance. Although an inprecise measure, the Gallup Opinion Index is used for public opinion analysis in this thesis.

Finally, this thesis includes an analysis of key personalities involved in the decision-making process surrounding strategic doctrine. Four personalities have been chosen for review because of these individual's apparent impact on the doctrine associated with their tenure in office. These key individuals are Secretaries of Defense McNamara and Schlesinger, Secretary of State Kissinger, and President Carter.

Thus, five sets of domestic variables were selected for analysis in this thesis to provide information to support or disprove the basic hypothesis above. The thesis itself is composed of four chapters in addition to this introduction. The thesis includes a review of the change in American strategic doctrine, as expressed in the Defense Secretary's annual statements, between 1965-1980; a description of the evolution of American deterrence theory; a description and analysis of the five domestic variables; and, finally, an analysis of the inter-relationships of these variables and some concluding remarks.

A necessary preliminary to the evaluation of the impact of domestic variables on American strategic doctrine over the fifteen year period under examination is a review of American

doctrine during that period. The next section of the thesis examines American strategic nuclear doctrine to specify the changes that occurred between 1965 and 1980.

C. AMERICAN STRATEGIC DOCTRINE: 1965-1980

The Secretary of Defense's annual report to the Congress may be accepted as the principal enunciation of American strategic doctrine. Although these reports serve a variety of purposes, one of their primary functions is "to formulat[e] policy goals and communicat[e] them to the public, to Congress, and... members of bureaucracies..."[8] They are therefore useful as a broad overview of the subject. Additionally, since these statements are required on a routine, annual basis, they provide a reliably continuous indicator of official articulations regarding strategic doctrine.

I have chosen to examine the statements for fiscal years 1965, 1969, 1975, and 1981 for reasons peculiar to each year. 1965 was the final year before the conduct of the Vietnam War replaced strategic nuclear objectives as the principal consideration in the Secretary's report. For example, while the FY 1965 Annual Report addresses both nuclear doctrine and initial operations in Vietnam, the entire "operational highlights" chapter for FY 1966 is devoted to combat operations in Vietnam.[9] FY 1969 was chosen because of its submission at the height of America's Vietnam involvement and because, according to Graham Allison, this year was the first

in which the concept of "damage limitation" was removed as a primary doctrinal concern.[10] FY 1975 was not only the year in which Secretary Schlesinger's "selective targeting options" concept was enunciated but was also the first full year since FY 1965 where funding of American involvement in Vietnam was not a consideration. Finally, FY 1981/PD-59 is addressed as the culmination of strategic doctrine under the Carter Administration.

In his Fiscal Year 1965 report, Secretary of Defense McNamara announced that the American strategic forces program was designed around two basic concepts:

> 1. To deter deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States and its allies by maintaining a highly reliable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage on any single aggressor, or combination of aggressors, even after absorbing a surprise first strike.
>
> 2. In the event such a war nevertheless occurred, to limit damage to our population and industrial capability.[11]

In short, the 1965 strategic doctrine expressed both the concept of "assured destruction," or the survivable and enduring ability to "inflict unacceptable damage" on the enemy, and the concept of "damage limitation." McNamara envisioned the latter concept as an offensive as well as defensive one in which strategic offensive forces, such as bombers, could be employed against enemy offensive forces prior to the latter's use. The 1965 Doctrine was announced during a period of clear American superiority over the Soviets in all strategic systems which

could directly threaten the United States. In 1965 the Institute of Strategic Studies' (ISS) Military Balance estimated that the United States maintained an almost three to one superiority in intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers.[12] This superiority in strategic forces allowed the United States the luxury of the 1965 doctrine.

In 1968, the strategic balance had shifted to the point where a revision of strategic doctrine was necessary. First, in 1967 the United States had stabilized its strategic forces at 1054 ICBMs, 656 SLBMs, and 465 heavy bombers upon completion of the strategic build-up commenced in the early days of the Kennedy Administration.[13] The Soviets, on the other hand, had continued expanding their ICBM force to an estimated level of between 900-1000 launchers.[14] Although the United States still retained a four to one advantage in bombers and SLBMs, this near equality of ICBM forces was noted by McNamara in his FY 1969 statement. Referring to the Soviet ICBM force he stated:

> To put it bluntly, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States can now attack the other, even by complete surprise, without suffering massive damage in retaliation... It is precisely this mutual capability to destroy one another, and, conversely, our respective inability to prevent such destruction, that provides us both with the strongest possible motive to avoid a strategic nuclear war.[15]

In his statement, although not renouncing the concept of "damage limitation" totally, McNamara had certainly addressed it in terms of cost effectiveness. He continued:

> This is not to say that defense measures designed to significantly limit damage to ourselves... might not also contribute to our deterrent. Obviously they might... [b]ut for a "Damage Limiting" posture to contribute significantly to the deterrent in this way, it would have to be extremely effective... and... we now have no way of accomplishing this.[16]

Thus the changing balance and the Soviet's ability to limit damage to themselves had apparently combined to remove "damage limitation," as a primary objective, from American strategic doctrine. The ability to visit "assured destruction" on the adversary was now "mutual." According to William Van Cleave, "[m]ore emphasis in public statements (and in target and force planning) came to be placed on Assured Destruction [which was] now based on the judgemental criterion of 'unacceptable damage'."[17] The American doctrine now espoused a policy of "self-restraint," one in which strategic forces were stabilized to avoid challenging the Soviet's assured destruction capability. This policy eschewed the goal of superiority and replaced it with one of parity. Following the enunciation of this doctrine, and the installation of the Nixon Administration, the arms control process which would produce Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agreements (SALT I and II) commenced.

By 1974, the Soviet strategic build-up continued unabated in spite of American hopes that unilateral American restraint

in nuclear arms production and the SALT process would entice the Soviets to slow down. By mid-1974, the Soviets had increased ICBM and SLBM force levels to 1575 and 660 launchers respectively while similar American forces remained unchanged from 1967.[18] Secretary Schlesinger, like his predecessor McNamara in 1961, had inherited a doctrine which implied a tendency to "target Soviet cities initially and massively and that this [was] the principal option that the President would have."[19] In Schlesinger's mind this "situation of essential equivalency" raised the concern of what to do should deterrence fail. Schlesinger's response to this imbalance was a doctrine of "selective targeting options" which retained the concept of "assured destruction" with some specific modifications. Schlesinger stressed the need for increased flexibility. While reaffirming the continuance of assured destruction as a viable strategic concept, Secretary Schlesinger criticized those who relied solely on its "simple but arcane calculations" and announced the existence and requirements for "large-scale pre-planned options other than attacking cities...despite the rhetoric of assured destruction."[20] Schlesinger's strategic doctrine proposed a wide-range of pre-programmed targets such as hard and soft strategic targets, airfields, and cities, in addition to placing an emphasis on weapons of high accuracy and low yield. To enhance deterrence, Schlesinger wrote,

> we may also want a more efficient hard-target-kill capability than we now possess: both to threaten specialized sets of targets... with greater economy

> of force, and to make it clear to a potential enemy that he cannot proceed with implority to jeopardize our own system of hard targets.[21]

The doctrine espoused was one which acknowleged the "essential equivalence" of U.S. and Soviet forces and stressed reliance on a diversified, survivable American strategic force which would provide the President with a "wide range of options" yet avoid "any combination of forces that could be taken as an effort to acquire the ability to execute a first-strike disarming attack against the USSR."[22]

The "countervailing strategy" announced by Secretaries Brown and Muskie in 1980 is, in essence, a continuation of the Schlesinger options. The strategic balance of 1980 revealed Soviet superiority in numbers of ICBM and SLBM launchers and a rapidly vanishing American lead in independently targetable weapons. In his report Secretary Brown claimed that American nuclear forces were "in a state of rough quantitative parity" with those of the Soviet Union.[23] Brown, as had Schlesinger, reiterated the limitations of assured destruction as an "all-purpose standard of deterrence." Brown stressed that the United States:

> ...must have forces and plans for the use of our strategic nuclear forces such that ... our adversary would recognize that no plausible outcome would represent a success--on [sic] any rational definition of success.[24]

The "countervailing strategy" of the FY 1981 statement and of PD-59 stressed multiple strategic options in the face of strategic parity.

Although the above sketch of American strategic doctrine from 1965 to date is not intended as an exhaustive discourse on the subject, it does indicate a series of trends and changes in that doctrine. First, during these years, declared doctrine has moved from a total anti-city counter-value posture to one stressing multiple counter-force options. Secondly, during this period there has been a total shift from a concept of "damage limitation" which included air defense, offensive action, and civil defense to one in which the concept is virtually excluded. Third, this shift to counter-force options has occurred concurrently with a significant shift in the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union from one of three to one U.S. superiority to "parity," if not U.S. inferiority. It appears ironic, on the surface at least, for the United States to have adopted this more demanding counter-force role in the face of increasingly adverse force levels.

It is appropriate at this point to include a brief caveat regarding analysis of declaratory policy and a short disclaimer regarding concepts of the US/USSR strategic balance.

First, when dealing with articulated policy, such as DOD annual reports, the reader must be aware that while declared policy with respect to strategic doctrine might be altered by different administrations, the targeting policy to support that doctrine may not. An interesting case study by Desmond Ball contrasting the counter-force doctrines of McNamara and

Schlesinger concludes that Schlesinger's counter-force options of "'small packages of target sets' [were] little different from the numerous sets of options generated... during the fall 1961 revision of the SIOP [Single Integrated Operations Plan]."[25] However, even though targeting may not change as a result of a shift in articulated policies, a change in declaratory policy remains significant because of the determinants of why a particular time was chosen to imply that the nation's strategic philosophy had changed. Indeed, a declared change in official attitudes on strategic nuclear policy can be representative of other important changes in foreign policy.

Secondly, it would be foolish to ignore the importance of certain external factors, the changing US/USSR strategic balance for example, in the determination of strategic doctrine. As William Van Cleave and S. T. Cohen note, "changes in the strategic balance, the undiminished determination of the USSR to expand and modernize its strategic capabilities, and clear, strongly held differences in Soviet strategic doctrine and concepts have forced changes in U.S. strategic thinking."[26] However, as noted above, this thesis is devoted to an examination of domestic issues involving strategic doctrine. The question of the effect of the strategic balance on strategic nuclear doctrine is beyond the scope of this thesis.

This thesis attempts to investigate the domestic determinants of these changes in American strategic doctrine. In the following chapters the aforementioned variables shall be analyzed to determine their effects in this doctrinal shift. The following is not intended to be an exhaustive examination of the variables but rather a survey enabling the reader to draw inferences regarding their possible causative relationships to doctrine. As previously noted, this thesis shall also seek to demonstrate the complexity of variable interrelationships and the obstacles to deliberate doctrinal change.

Before proceeding with an analysis of the five domestic variables, the pre-1965 intellectual origins of American deterrence theory must be clarified. The following chapter, therefore, describes American deterrence theory, the "root" of the strategic doctrines described above.

II. AMERICAN DETERRENCE THEORY & PRE-1965 STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

A. INTRODUCTION

The dividing line between theory and doctrine is not always clear. The previous chapter examined the changes in American strategic doctrine which occurred between 1965 and 1980 but did not deal with the theoretical base of the 1965 doctrine. However, if subsequent doctrinal change is to be understood, the concepts which led to the formulation of the initial doctrine must first be identified. This chapter has two objectives. First it will examine the theoretical formulation of what Bernard Brodie called "the dominant concept of nuclear strategy-deterrence."[27] Secondly, this chapter will examine how that theory was translated into doctrine in the twenty years following the Second World War. Through this review the relationship between American deterrence theory and its expression in terms of strategic doctrine shall be clarified. This brief review shall serve as a prelude to the discussion of domestic determinants which follows.

B. DETERRENCE DEFINED

As previously noted, American strategic doctrine since the end of the Second World War has had at its core the concept of deterrence. This concept is a static one stressing

the restraint of an opponent's actions through fear of retributive punishment. Citing the dictionary definition of "deter," Thomas Schelling explains that this definition:

> corresponds to contemporary usage: to turn aside or discourage through fear; hence, to prevent from action by fear of consequences.
>
> Deterrence involves setting the stage - by announcement, by rigging the trip-wire, by incurring the obligation - and waiting. The overt act is up to the opponent.[28]

The concept of deterrence, however, is not unique to the "nuclear age" and history abounds with numerous examples of restraint of an opponent's action through fear of excessive potential costs. Russell Weigley in referring to pre-World War II American coastal fortifications and the "early and puny" American Navy, asserts that the military policy of the United States has "always encompassed some reliance on... armed forces for purposes not adequately delineated by defining strategy as the use of combats."[29] Both these military forces, Weigley concludes, served a deterrent function by making attacks on American coasts or shipping unattractive through the threat of losses which would make such attacks "too costly to be worth attempting." However, with the advent of nuclear weapons, some of the theoretical assumptions, which linked deterrence to counter-military actions only, have been rendered irrelevant. In his Adelphi Paper, "Rationality in Deterrence," Stephan Maxwell draws the conclusion that nuclear weapons in concert with airpower and

missiles provide the deterrer with the capability to act directly against an enemy's population. In his words,

> Nuclear weapons, unlike conventional weapons, could be used in a way that defeated their purpose by provoking an annihilating response from the opponent. Classical strategists had to consider the limits to effective military action imposed by factors of materiel, or geography, or morale, or skills of generalship. The new military technology reduced or eliminated the importance of these factors, only to introduce a far more pervasive limiting factor, the factor of interest.[30]

The validity of Maxwell's conclusions regarding the relative value of the classical elements of strategy aside, the point remains that the coming of the atomic age brought with it a signifcant shift in theory regarding the employment of military forces. In his 1946 work, The Absolute Weapon, Bernard Brodie acknowledged this condition when he wrote, "[t]hus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them."[31]

The fundamental requirements of an effective deterrent posture according to Phil Williams, are factors involving communication, capability, and credibility.[32] First, the adversary must be made clearly aware of both the prohibited actions and the costs which will be incurred should the prohibition be ignored. Secondly, an effective deterrent assumes not only the deterrer's physical capacity to inflict unacceptable damage but also presumes a degree of rationality on the

part of the challenger. In short, the deterrer's adversary must be capable of making "cold and sober calculations, weighing and balancing the potential costs and gains of any action."[33] Finally, the deterrent threat must be credible, the threat must be believable. These requirements, as previously stated, combine to form a strategy dependent upon non-use. Rather than the pre-World War II American strategies which depended on employment of military force to achieve military and political ends, the new strategy was to be employed in a different manner. To quote Brodie again, "the sanction [was]... not designed for repeating action. One use of it [would] be fatally too many. Deterrence [meant] something as a strategic policy only...[if] the retaliatory instrument upon which it relies [would] not be called upon to function at all."[34] In sum, postwar American deterrent theory has been "based upon the conviction that total nuclear war should be avoided at any cost."[35]

C. DETERRENCE THEORY AND DOCTRINAL FORMULATION

In the first years following the Second World War, although it was acknowledged that atomic weapons had altered the character of future warfare, several theorists saw this alteration as only a "compression of the World War II strategic bombing campaigns"[36] and not as one which would require an immediate reformulation of strategic doctrine. As Henry Kissinger noted, "we added the atomic bomb to our

arsenal without integrating its implications into our thinking ...[w]e saw it merely as another tool in a concept of warfare which knew no goal save total victory, and no mode of war except all-out war."[37]

The acceptance of deterrence theory as an official doctrine and the development of an appropriate policy to embody that theory in the immediate postwar period was slowed by the fact that only the United States possessed the "ultimate weapon," and because it was believed that the Soviets were years away from development of a similar capability. This

> absence of any challenge to this specific capability seemed to imply little need to analyze that capability. The deterrent function of the bomb seemed almost automatic, and seemed to be more of a fact than a problem needing analysis.[38]

George and Smoke also assert that until 1950 the preconditions for a sound and analytical deterrence theory were lacking. The absence of a perceived, credible threat to the American homeland by the Soviet Union coupled with an acceptance of Douhet's concept of the potential effectiveness of strategic bombing[39] made the "elaboration of the requirements for strategic deterrence"[40] seem unnecessary. However, by the 1950s, a number of domestic and external determinants would combine to force the transition of deterrence from theory to doctrine.

By 1950 American perception of the Soviet threat had changed as a function of the loss of the American nuclear monopoly, the "loss" of China, and conflicts with Soviets in

Berlin and elsewhere. This concern with Soviet motives led to the establishment of an inter-department staff headed by Paul Nitze. This group produced what Senator Henry Jackson would later term "the first comprehensive statement of national strategy," NSC-68. This document not only expounded the thesis that communism must be contained, but also spelled out the requirements and provided an "overall definition of goals and a general statement of methods oriented primarily to the needs of the Cold War... a response to existing and future conditions."[41] In short, NSC-68 linked the concepts of deterrence and containment together to form the nucleus for American strategic doctrine.

The intervention of the Korean War and the transfer of Presidential authority from the Truman to the Eisenhower Administration prevented the actual implementation of the new American strategic doctrine. However, in early 1954 when Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, announced that "the administration had made 'a basic decision' to adopt a rational security policy that would 'depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing,"[42] the shift from theory to doctrine had begun. This statement of "Massive Retaliation" was based on the premise that fear of nuclear assault by the United States would be sufficient to deter the Soviet Union from further expansionistic arms. The Eisenhower Administration's strategic doctrine stressed an increased reliance on nuclear vice conventional forces in pursuit of deterrence. This move,

however, was occasioned as much by domestic political factors to cut military costs as it was by total acceptance of the theory of deterrence. In the words of Jerome Kahan:

> It must be kept in mind that much of the conflict between the Eisenhower administration and its critics was fueled by domestic political factors, and that U.S. weapons decisions were therefore influenced by the need to compromise with the Congress. Nevertheless, central to the great strategic debate of the late 1950s was a fundamental substantive disagreement ever the nature of deterrence in the nuclear age.[43]

This debate revolved around the stability of the strategic balance and the adequacy of American strategic programs. Administration opponents, such as Albert Wohlstetter, would state that the "balance of terror" was less stable than assumed[44] and argued that "U.S. systems should be structured so that Soviet military planners would be persuaded beyond all reasonable doubt of the impossibility of destroying a major portion of our nuclear force."[45]

Ultimately, the critics of the Eisenhower Administration's strategic policy stressed its failure to meet two of Williams' requirements of deterrence. First the ambiguity of "a time and place of our choosing" failed to communicate to the Soviets the exact limits of the prohibition. (This failure was deliberate, of course, from the Administration's point of view.) Secondly, over time, the doctrine would lack credibility in the face of the perception of increased Soviet ability to strike the American homeland. Questions could

be raised, as they still are, as to what interest would occasion the employment of massive retaliation. This lack of specificity affected the doctrine's credibility.

D. MUTUAL DETERRENCE AND ASSURED DESTRUCTION

With the assumption of office by President Kennedy and the installation of Robert McNamara as Secretary of Defense, the United States entered into a new era of strategic deterrence theory. Although, as stated in chapter one, the United States maintained clear superiority to the Soviet Union in terms of strategic weapons, in 1961, the perception existed that the Soviets could still inflict significant damage on American cities. This outlook was supported by the belief that the technology of the offense had greatly outstripped that of the defense. This view was expressed in 1961 by Fredrick Gareau who wrote:

> For the defense to protect its cities by military means from these weapons of unprecedented horror, it must intercept all or virtually all of the offense's bombers or missiles. This we are told is impossible.[46]

McNamara, although accepting the reality of mutual deterrence early on, did not immediately embrace publicly the doctrine of "assured destruction." The most notable public expression of McNamara's initial concept of deterrence was made in his famous Ann Arbor, Michigan address in 1962. Therein he set forth his concept of deterrence through

"Flexible Response" based upon counter-force targeting and damage-limitation. This theory of deterrence, as paraphrased by William Van Cleave, was:

> based upon the ability to limit damage in case of war, which would be accomplished by U.S. possession of the means to destroy an enemy's military capability and by targeting restraint (vis-a-vis cities) on our own part...
>
> Clearly, cost-effectiveness arguments against damage limiting had not yet [in 1963] impressed the Secretary, nor had the notion that MAD [Mutual Assured Destruction] partly was synonymous with strategic stability.[47]

Ultimately, arguments of the lack of "cost-effectiveness" of active defense systems persuaded McNamara to eschew the doctrine of "damage limitation." In his book, The Essence of Security,[48] the former Secretary of Defense would reflect on a deterrence doctrine based on the "cornerstone... [of deterrence of] deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States or its allies."[49] In short, the success of the assured destruction doctrine would depend on:

> (1) A highly reliable and credible ability to inflict unacceptable damage on one's opponent
>
> PLUS
>
> (2) The rejection of potential defense of cities, population, and industry.

Thus the "McNamara strategy," in essence made American cities "hostage," recognizing, in Schelling's words, "the importance of cities... and proposed to pay attention to them in the event of major war."[50]

To translate the deterrent theory of assured destruction into actual policy for force procurement, the Systems Analysis Branch of the Department of Defense was tasked to develop a "theory of requirements - a conceptual framework for measuring the need and adequacy of... strategic forces."[51] Efforts to determine the "minimum-deterrent," (the forces necessary to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviets after absorbing a surprise first-strike), commenced early in the Kennedy Administration and continued until the end of 1966. Through a series of calculations, encompassing such factors as number of targets involved, weapon yield, accuracy, etc., requirements were established which allowed translation of doctrine into capabilities. By 1966, "assured destruction" had been *quantified*.[52]

E. DETERRENCE THEORY/DOCTRINE: CIRCA 1965

Thus, after twenty years of formulation, internal and external events produced the deterrence theory of "assured destruction." Since 1945 the general American concept of nuclear war has been defined by what Foy Kohler calls "articles of faith" steming from a perceived massive destructiveness of nuclear weapons. This viewpoint concludes that because of the perception of massive lethality of nuclear weapons, there can be no victor in nuclear war, thus the only rational course for nuclear powers is deterrence.[53] Eventually these "articles of faith" produced the theory of assured destruction based upon:

> (1) The possession of invulnerable retaliatory forces and the political will to employ them.
>
> (2) A multiplicity of forces to ensure the survival of at least a "minimum deterrent" capable of wreaking unacceptable damage.

By 1965 these prerequisites of assured destruction had resulted in the creation of the "Strategic Triad" of land-based ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers and of a strategic force-level predicted by "cost-effective" systems analysis. By 1965, however, also came an increasing acceptance of the logical successor to assured destruction. This theory assumes that:

> if each side has a similarly protected and invulnerable force, there will be no opportunity and therefore no incentive for either to buildup a so-called counter-force capability. In this situation, an attack is deterred by the certain knowledge that it will be followed by a devastating reply.[54]

Thus by 1965 mutual deterrente through Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) was the theory underlying American strategic nuclear doctrine, a condition which exists in 1980. However, as noted in chapter I of this thesis, although the theory has remained constant, the public articulation of the doctrine's meaning and applications continues to change in response to internal and external stimuli. The next chapter of this thesis will examine the effects of the five selected domestic determinants of the doctrine.

III. THE DOMESTIC DETERMINANTS: DIRECT RELATIONSHIP TO STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

A. INTRODUCTION

The previous chapters of this thesis have primarily investigated the theoretical dimensions of American strategic doctrine and not the variables which lead to doctrinal formulation or change. This chapter will directly address the five domestic determinants identified in chapter I. In this chapter, each variable will be outlined in an attempt to determine its direct effect on the changes in strategic doctrine which occurred between 1965 and 1980. The purpose of this chapter will be to identify the direct impacts of each individual variable, as much as this is possible, and not to dwell on how change was effected by their inter-relationships. These complex inter-relationships will be addressed in the concluding chapters of the thesis.

Threat perceptions will be discussed first because each of the remaining four variables is to some degree dependent upon the "nature of the threat."

B. THREAT PERCEPTIONS

In dealing with "threat perceptions" it is often difficult to segregate the internal from external dimensions. Because policy-makers deal with an external force, they are, to some

degree, constrained regarding the options available to directly effect that force. However, there are also internal dimensions of threat perceptions. As Endicott and Stafford state:

> ... the perception of threat is a major determinant in the establishment of a national strategy...[for] once the perception of the threat is incorporated in the general public, congressional support for measures to increase security gains momentum.[55]

Alteration of domestic public opinion, and an indirect relationship with increased defense spending, are but two examples of the scope of the effect of the threat perception variable. Carl Marcy has made a similar point: "[i]n a democratic society... perceptions or, regrettably, misperceptions, if widely held, become the basis for policy."[56] Indeed, as the two previous chapters have demonstrated, American strategic doctrine since 1945 has been directly influenced by the actions of the Soviet Union and assessments made by the American political leadership of Soviet intentions and capabilities.

There, of course, have been numerous examples of misperception regarding the Soviet threat since the end of the Second World War. The bomber and missile "gap" debates of the late 1950s are only two examples of this. Part of this difficulty stems from disagreement over what indicators are the most important measures of Soviet capabilities and intentions. For example, in 1975, Foreign Policy carried a lengthy debate by Albert Wohlstetter, Jeremy Stone, and others on the topic of the existence of an "arms race" between the United States and

the Soviet Union. One of the few conclusions reached in this series was that made by Michael Nacht who wrote that "the world of strategic weaponry is dynamic and complex, subject to examination using a variety of inadequate and frequently contradictory indicators."[57] A more recent example of difficulty in measurement concerns the determination of levels of defense spending by the Soviet Union. The 1976 decision by the CIA that the Soviets were devoting 11-13% of their GNP to defense expenditures, vice the 6-8% previously predicted,[58] indicates once again the complexity of measurement and the interpretation of results.

Difficulty arises, however, in the measurement of how a "threat" is perceived by a nation's general populace and by its political leadership. To quote George Gallup,

> [a]ccuracy of American perceptions of the Soviet Union depends almost entirely on reports supplied by the press and on the published remarks of political leaders of the United States. The attitudes of The American People are based chiefly upon these perceptions so gained.[59]

Thus, perception of the Soviet threat is filtered through a number of conceptual lenses before it is presented to the American public. "Raw data," measuring Soviet defense expenditures, hardware development, and so forth, are filtered through the various bureaucracies and agencies, such as the CIA, the uniformed services, and the State Department, where the threat is perceived in terms of actual external occurrences and internal organizational biases. From the agencies, the

"filtered" information is consolidated by the National Security Council (NSC) and presented to the President for decision-making purposes. The President's perceptions are shaped by his own world views and the positions taken by his advisors. Without developing the question of small-group dynamics with respect to presidential decision-making, let it suffice to say that these advisors can offer support to the President in his choice as well as an image of legitimacy for the final decision. It should be noted that most presidential advisors are chosen for their close relationship with the President and their positions may primarily reinforce his viewpoint.[60]

The resultant perception is presented to the public via the news media in official pronouncements, interviews and "leaks." The filtering process of threat perception is diagramatically represented in Figure 1, following.

This thesis, therefore, will deal with two measures of threat perception. First, public statements of major policy-makers, such as the President and the Secretary of State, shall be examined to determine how threat perceptions have been authoritatively articulated. Secondly, public opinion measurements shall be examined to determine the correlation of that rhetoric with the views of the American people. These measures shall then be compared with the Department of Defense annual statements to determine the degree to which rhetoric and public opinion parallel shifts in strategic doctrine and the degree to which doctrine may be determined by the threat.


SOVIET REALITIES
% GNP for Defense
Hardware
Military Doctrine
Rhetoric
Actions
Etc.
Intelligence Community
State Department
Defense Department
N S C
President
Media
Public
K E Y
Perceptions
Official Statements/ Pronouncements
"Leaks"

Figure 1

1. Definition and Measurement

In 1965, the public articulation of the threat showed the tension of the "ending" Cold War. In the Spring of that year, statements by Secretary of State, Dean Rusk reflected concern over Soviet naval harassment of American warships and Soviet provision of war supplies to the North Vietnamese.[61] However, as the year progressed, a relaxation developed in East-West relationships through an acceptance of multiple centers of power in the communist world. In The Faces of Power, Seyom Brown reflects on this period by writing,

> [i]n 1965-1966 the writings of Brzezinski and others, speeches by Administration spokesmen... all... signaled the early phases of an adjustment of United States policy premises to the more pluralistic world we claimed to want...[62]

The total atmosphere of this period of tension and expanding contacts between East and West is best captured in a statement made by Dean Rusk before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in August 1965. The Secretary of State allowed that,

> [t]here is no question that our relations at the present time are under strain. There is no question that the dangerous situation in Southeast Asia has intefered significantly with the search for further points of agreement which many of us had hoped we could find following this signature of the nuclear test ban treaty.[63]

In short the Soviet threat, as articulated in 1965, remained serious although the outlook appeared hopeful for increased contacts and lessened tension.

This tone of optimism continued through 1968. At the height of American involvement in Vietnam, the official image of the Soviet Union was much less threatening than that depicted in the early 1960s. Speaking in June 1968 at Glassboro State College, President Lyndon Johnson recalled his summit meeting with Soviet Chairman Alexei Kosygin in Glassboro a year earlier and stated,

> This has been a time of unusual strain and difficulty. But what period in our history has been more productive in promoting cooperation between our two countries?
>
> Many feared that the War in Vietnam would prevent any progress...[b]ut despite the predictions and the difficulties, we have agreed upon a treaty outlawing armaments in outer space. We have negotiated a treaty banning the spread of nuclear weapons...[a]nd we are moving toward other agreements.[64]

The importance of the maintenance of this perception of "cooperation" between the United States and the Soviet became readily apparent in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Although Johnson would later refer to the Soviet action as a "callous, outrageous assault,"[65] in the months which immediately followed the Soviet action the Administration's articulated position appeared to almost explain away the invasion. In December 1968, when asked, during a television interview, if the August invasion signaled a return by the Soviets to a policy of confrontation with the West, Secretary Rusk responded,

> [it has] become apparent that it is too late in history for opposing blocs to pursue a policy of total hostility, that an effort must be made to find points of agreement.
>
> There are reasons to believe that the Soviet Union is prepared to continue to try to find points of possible agreement, despite the fact that the Czechoslovak matter was a major interruption from the point of view of the rest of us. I don't have the impression that the Soviet Union is seeking a major confrontation.[66]

Thus through 1968, the Johnson Administration sought to portray a less threatening image of the Soviet Union to the American public. The changed strategic balance may have been part of the reason behind the rhetorical shift, as might have been the need to portray the Johnson Administration as progressing down the "road to peace" during a time when that Administration was receiving severe criticism for its Vietnam policies. Another plausible explanation is that Administration spokesmen viewed such events as the Glassboro Summit, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the initial overtures which would lead to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) as evidence that the Soviet Union was truly interested in a more cooperative relationship with the United States. Additionally, the Sino-Soviet split, described by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in his annual statement to Congress in 1968, may have also downgraded the potential of the Soviet threat to some administration policy-makers. McNamara's perception of the threat was articulated as follows:

> On the whole, the strident behavior of the Peking regime has caused the Soviet leadership--both Khrushchev and his successors--to confront the fact that they, too, have an interest in stability that has to be balanced off against continued adherence to ideology.
> ....
> The Soviets since 1962 have generally taken a less militant approach [to "world revolution"]... The Soviet leadership has demonstrated some restraint in their support for North Vietnam and in support of insurgencies in some other areas of the world.[67]

Thus, at the end of the 1960s, the Soviet Union was perceived as still a threat to American security interests, but also as a nation with mutual interests with the United States in the preservation of the established order. The key to further cooperation and less confrontation with the Soviet Union was, in McNamara's words, the "task of creative statemanship for the West."[68]

This spirit of cooperation, later labeled "détente," would persist through the 1970s, and be heralded as a "new period of relationships."[69] As in the late 1960s, mutual agreements such as SALT I, the 1971 Berlin Accords and an increasing economic involvement between the two nations was perceived as further evidence of mutual interest and improving relations. Administration spokesmen continued to present the American people with both the benefits and the limitations of détente. In 1974 Assistant Secretary of State, Arthur Hartman presented a paper which acknowledged that "...habits formed

by both sides during twenty years of confrontation are not easily set aside. We recognize, moreover, that there is not a uniform perception in this country... of the meaning of detente."[70]

A positive perception of the Soviet Union, as it had in 1968, carried over into the Secretary of Defense's Annual statement. Although specific in his warnings of an increasing Soviet conventional and nuclear capability and cautionary regarding reliance "solely on fond hopes or soft words"[71] to meet this threat, Secretary Schlesinger was generally optimistic regarding future prospects for long-term mutual agreements. Schlesinger perceived the Soviets in 1974 as sober, prudent and having mutually recognized that "there is no good alternative to peaceful cooperation."[72]

The first three years of the Carter Administration produced little shift in the articulated perception of the threat on the part of Administration spokesmen. In his landmark address on U.S.-Soviet Relations, presented at the 1978 Naval Academy Commencement, President Carter referred to a "competitive" relationship between the two superpowers and, although acknowledging some "significant differences" between the United States and the Soviet Union, concluded that he was

> convinced that the people of the Soviet Union want peace. I can't believe that they could possibly want war.[73]

Following the December 1979 Invasion of Afghanistan, however, the perception of a competitive yet cooperative relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union was severely altered. The rhetoric of President Carter's 1980 "State of the Union" message shows a profound shift in official perceptions and is most significant when compared with Secretary Rusk's post-Czechoslovakia statements from 1968. The perception articulated by President Carter was one of the serious threat posed by the Soviet Union. In his "State of the Union" address in January 1980, President Carter announced:

> We sought to establish rules of behavior that would reduce the risk of conflict and we searched for areas of cooperation that could make our relations reciprocal and productive.
> ....
> But now the Soviet Union has taken a radical and aggressive new step... [t]he implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could pose the most serious threat to peace since the Second World War.[74]

With Carter's "State of the Union" speech of 1980, articulated perceptions of the Soviet threat had come full circle from a period of "hopeful optimism" in 1965 to the "most serious threat to peace since the Second World War" in 1980. This perception, articulated by the political leadership, was generally shared by the general populace, most likely because of the effectiveness of the leadership in conveying their perceptions to the public

Although the effects of public opinion on strategic doctrine will be dealt with later in this chapter, it is useful at this point to utilize some measures of public opinion to determine if a correlation existed between the leadership and public perceptions of a changing relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Official perceptions indicated a relaxation of tensions from 1965 to 1974, a mixture of cooperation and competition through 1979 and a sharp return to "Cold War" rhetoric in 1980. The 1978 report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Perceptions of US/USSR Relations provided two measures of the public's perception of the threat posed by the Soviet Union. In the first, George Gallup using a Stapel Scale survey to rank-order "favorable ratings" of various countries by Americans produced the following results:

Year	Percent "Favorable Rating" for USSR
1966	17%
1973	45%
1976	21%

(Gallup concluded that the fall in rating between 1973 and 1976 was due, in part, to a "widespread feeling" that the Soviets had gotten the better of the United States in SALT I)[75]

The second measure, provided by Charles Marcy in the same Senate committee report, linked perceptions of the Soviet Union with "fear of communism." The results of his survey indicated:

Year	Fear of Communism (positive response)[76]
1964	86%
1974	69%
1976	74%

The conclusions which may be drawn from the above, taken together with the official statements, are that some degree of tension existed in American perceptions of the Soviet Union throughout the 1965-1980 period. Between 1965 and 1974 decreasing tensions, positive official rhetoric, and mutual agreements led to more positive perceptions of the intentions of the Soviet Union by the general populace. Although the official perception of the Soviet Union, as articulated by Secretary Schlesinger and President Carter remained increasingly positive until the invasion of Afghanistan, the perception of the general public, indicated by the "fear of communism" and "favorable impression" indices, became less positive regarding the Soviet Union as early as 1974. It was not until 1980 that the Administration dramatically altered its position.

2. Perceptions and Strategic Doctrine

The primary concern of this section is the effect that threat perception has on strategic doctrine. This relationship is apparent in the proposed force levels found in the Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, for it is here, since 1969, that the military dimensions of the threat are publicly articulated.

The FY 1965 Report does not contain a specific statement of the threat, but the public rhetoric of the period shows little change from the Cold War period. There are few changes in strategic forces as the FY 65 program generally carried on the strategic build-up commenced in 1961.

The FY 1969 Report, however, specifically addressed the ideological and military dimensions of the communist threat. The doctrine of "mutual assured destruction" was fostered by a perception that the Soviets shared a number of mutual interests with the U.S. (not the least of which was a "justly-held fear of nuclear war")[77] and a growing Soviet strategic arsenal. Likewise the perception of increased militancy on the part of the Chinese was used to partially justify deployment of a limited Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) system to counter that potential threat.

The FY 1974 Report, although optimistic in several respects regarding future grounds for mutual restraint, specifically dealt with the closing nuclear and conventional gaps. Uncertainty regarding Soviet intentions[78] and certainty regarding increased military capabilities contributed to the "flexible targeting doctrine" to counter a perceived Soviet advantage. Likewise, conventional options, specifically naval force expansion, were stressed to offset perceived asymmetries. The strategic doctrine/threat perception relationship here appeared to be a need to redress the military balance to prevent the Soviets from perceiving lack of American resolve.

Regrettably it is difficult to prove a relationship between threat perception and doctrine in the early years of the Carter Administration due to the lack of consistent perception or doctrinal articulation. The Soviet Union was generally perceived as benign by the Administration until 1979 and only then was an attempt made to link threat perception to publicly articulated strategic doctrine. However, the establishment of the countervailing strategy in Secretary Brown's FY 1980 Defense Budget shows the beginning of a shift in perceptions which would be complete by January of 1980 and the President's "State of the Union" message. Since 1965, threat perception on the part of the political leadership has been conveyed to the general public through official rhetoric and statements. However, public opinion can also be a determinant of strategic doctrine, a factor which shall be addressed in the following section.

C. THE PUBLIC OPINION VARIABLE

As noted in the first chapter of this thesis, the effects of public opinion on attitudes and doctrine are somewhat indirect, a fact which is further complicated by sampling techniques which have some inherent limitations. In 1976, Bruce Russett and Miroslav Nincic referred to these limitations when they wrote that:

> [w]arnings against the uncritical reading of percentages from public opinion surveys are very common, and appropriate. Responses

> are heavily influenced by transitory factors such as question wording, salience of an issue at the moment, the position (or absence of a position) by government and opinion leaders, and the respondents' mood. An individual who disapproves of a hypothetical course of action when asked his opinion by a pollster may react very differently if the President of the United States actually initiates or proposes the action.[79]

Likewise, polling techniques such as the Gallup Poll's in-home interview, to a degree, have a "status-conferring" effect with respect to the respondent who may give an opinion on a subject in which he has neither interest nor knowledge.[80]

However, regardless of their imperfections, public opinion polls remain valuable to the degree that they reflect the public's mood on given questions of national security. While public opinion per se may have little direct effect on strategic doctrine or military force levels, the images of the public mood held by governmental decision-makers may effect these concepts dramatically. Although not a supporter of the concept that public opinion can direct defense policy, Samuel Huntington wrote in 1961 that, if

> ...public opinion significantly influenced military policy, it did not do so directly but rather though the images which governmental leaders had of public opinion and the extent to which they were able to persuade other leaders that their images were accurate.[81]

Political leaders are keenly aware of the need for accuracy in their perception of public attitudes for, as Russett infers, there are "penalties" for misperception, i.e. the loss of political office.[82]

Four questions related to national security shal be examined to determine the opinions of the public and the relationship of these attitudes to strategic doctrines.

1. The Surveys

The measures chosen for evaluation are responses to questions regarding "the most important problem facing the nation today," the adequacy of defense spending, the willingness to use force to achieve political ends, and finally the willingness of the public to employ nuclear weapons.

Since 1950 some variant of the question "what do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?" has been asked by the Gallup Poll at least annually with the exception of 1952 and 1961.[83] Until 1973, without exception, the highest ranking problem related in some way to national security. Most responses were general, such as "fear of war" or "relations with Russia." However, between May 1965 and September 1972 the single most important problem to the majority of Americans surveyed was the Vietnam War.

In 1973, there occurred a significant shift of concern. With conclusion of American combat involvement in Vietnam

came a preoccupation with internal matters. In the spring of that year the "most important problem" was "domestic order and stability," according to 37% of those surveyed.[84] Increasing oil prices, inflation, and decreasing standards of living in America combined to ensure a domestically-related response ("high cost of living," "energy," etc.) until January 1980. According to Russett, this 1973 shift of opinion relected that the "Cold War sense of urgent threat [was] gone from most American's political consciousness"[85] and that there had been a "loss of the popular backlog of anti-communism."[86]

It took the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and President Carter's "State of the Union" message to break this trend of internal preoccupation. The February 1980 Gallup Opinion Index indicated in a survey conducted between 25 and 28 January 1980 that 44% of those surveyed responded that "international problems/foreign affairs" constituted the "most important problem facing the nation" at that time, reflecting as Gallup concluded, "widespread and growing concern over Soviet military actions in Afghanistan."[87] This "widespread concern" with international problems would fade by March 1980 when "inflation/high cost of living" would poll 74% and "international affairs" would drop back to 17%.[88]

Willingness of American to support higher levels of defense spending follows generally the same pattern as the "most important problem" index. Whereas in the 1950s, less

than 20% of those surveyed favored cuts in defense spending. Between 1968 and 1974 a total of ten Gallup opinion Polls indicated that more than 50% of the respondents favored some cuts in defense appropriations.[89] Following September 1974, however, this opposition to defense spending gradually decreased, being exceeded by both the responses "too little" and "about right" in July 1977.[90]

American responses regarding the employment of conventional and nuclear force offer significant insight into American willingness to use force in pursuit of foreign policy objectives. Results of a 1969 Louis Harris survey and a 1975 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations poll reveal that Americans are highly selective in their willingness to use force abroad. Use of force appears determined by the nature of the threat and the country being invaded. The primary conclusion drawn by Russett and Nincic from these sruveys is that Americans appear to be willing to use force in support of those nations, such as Canada, Mexico, Great Britain, or West Germany, which are physically or socio-culturally "close" to the United States.[91] However, in conmparing the relative "isolationism" of Americans in the periods of 1938-1941 and 1969-1975, Russett and Nincic also concluded that:

> ...in a number of instances, the highest percentage of Americans willing to use American troops in defense of any of these countries in the recent period is lower than the lowest such percentage in the earlier period.[92]

Russett and Nincic also concluded that the trends of relative isolationism in the 1970s tend to parallel public resistance to additional military spending. The authors state that this generally less favorable disposition towards further defense spending and military intervention was a product of internal changes in the United States, the Vietnam War, and detente.

However, it is in the area of nuclear weapons where the most significant potential ramifications of public opinion exist. Prior to 1963, American concern with nuclear war was at its peak. In a 1973 Foreign Policy article, Rob Paarlberg evaluated American attitudes toward nuclear war through content analysis of the periodical literature. Measuring the total of nuclear war-related articles he found that these peaked with a total of 450 in 1962, declined through 125 in 1965, finally "bottoming-out" at 60 articles in 1971.[93] Paarlberg concluded that thir trend away from confronting the question of nuclear war was a clear example of "issue avoidance" on the part of a populace "pushed beyond the threshold of public distress."[94] While Paarlberg's interpretation of the American public's reluctance to deal with the question of nuclear war may not be totally correct, opinion surveys indicated an extreme reluctance to employ nuclear weapon. Referring again to the Russett and Nincic results, one becomes aware that the general public is extremely hesitant to employ nuclear weapons. The 1969 survey results reflected in Table 3 of their article show that only

an invasion of Canada or Mexico produced a greater than seven percent affirmative response regarding use of nuclear weapons.[95] Equally telling was the response to a 1970 Harris poll in which only 26% of the respondents could conceive of any circumstances which would necessitate nuclear war.[96] These results led Russett and Nincic to conclude that "public willingness to employ nuclear weapons on behalf of allies is extremely low, much lower than willingness [in the 1950s] to employ forces at all."[97]

2. The Impact on Doctrine

As noted above by Huntington and others, the public's impact on doctrine is indirect. However since 1965, concern with the public's attitude has, to a degree, shaped the development of strategic doctrine. As Russett noted, it would be difficult for political leaders to ignore the anti-military spending attitudes reflected in the polls between 1968 and 1974, especially when a break-down of the respondents indicated a high percentage of those favoring cuts in military spending were members of professional groups, and of high income and education. To quote Russett,

> ...anti-military spending attitudes [were] concentrated precisely among those most likely to take an interest in international affairs, to vote, to make campaign contributions, and otherwise to be politically active.[98]

As shall be shown later, these anti-spending attitudes would be manifested in the creation of anti-military, spending blocs in the House and Senate.

Additionally, concern with domestic reluctance to embrace a new strategic doctrine may also inhibit the announcement of a new strategic doctrine. In his paper regarding the return to the 1962 "Ann Arbor" counter-force strategy in the form of the "Schlesinger Doctrine," Desmond Ball suggests that at least part of the reason for delaying its announcement until 1974 was because the

> ...domestic American political situation ruled out any earlier public announcement. The weapons developments associated with the new strategy would have to be justified in light of the post-SALT I environment and, although not banned by the May 1972 accords, would have opened the Administration to charges of bad faith... [and] would perhaps seem inconsistent with the proclaimed détente and President Nixon's generation of peace."[99]

Likewise, the low level of American support for the use of nuclear weapons in general can impact on the credibility of the deterrent expressed in specific doctrine. Reflecting on Schlesinger's attempt to offset a low-level of popular support for commitment of troops outside of the Western Hemisphere with the assertion of a readiness to use nuclear weapons, Russett and Nincic wrote that

> the irony is that such action would run directly counter to the wishes of the American public as expressed in opinion surveys. The use of nuclear weapons... would be approved by only a very small percentage of the populace.[100]

This lack of popular support for the use of nuclear weapons in most circumstances could complicate the post-hoc political

justification of their employment. However, one must also recall that the public's opinion may be radically different during an international crisis than it is in a series of living-room interviews. It is also important to consider the so called "main-steam" effect. This model hypothesizes that as members of the public become more informed regarding specific political policies, through exposure to influences such as the mass media, they begin to form greater attachment to the official policy and develop a greater degree of conformity between their positions and official policy.[101] Both of positions above show the potential for a major shift in public opinion to the support of official policy in times of crisis regardless of previous levels of popular support of that policy.

The conclusion drawn from the above is that although public opinion effects strategic doctrine indirectly its most important function is the establishment of boundaries for doctrinal and foreign policy formulation. Perceptions formed by decision-makers regarding the public's willingness to financially or morally support a specific force level or doctrine limit the leadership's ability to operationalize doctrine. During the 1960s and early 1970s, American concerns for national security, measured in willingness to support increased defense spending, the relative importance of foreign affairs, and public attitudes regarding the use of force, decreased. The resurgence of the public's support

for the first two of these measures occurred only in the latter part of the 1970s and fluctuates significantly with changes in the internal and international environments. The most significant effect of public opinion on strategic doctrine, however, resulted in conjunction with declining popular support for the Vietnam War, a relationship which will be dealt with in the concluding chapter of this thesis.

However, strategic doctrine is also a function of the weapons systems developed to operationalize that doctrine, a point which shall be examined in the next section.

D. THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY

Since the advent of nuclear weapons and the major shifts in strategic doctrine which occurred between 1945 and 1965, American strategists have debated regarding "technical dynamism," or the role of technology in the determination of doctrine.[102] One school of thought maintains that rational calculations, based upon strategic doctrine, determine the weapons development process. On the other hand, writers such as John Morse maintain that rapidly advancing technology provides its own impetus and that doctrine must at times be radically altered to accommodate technological progress. In 1975 Morse proclaimed,

> ...technology is the driving force that demands frequent and often drastic changes in approaches to military problems.

> The assumption that current military thinking, strategies, and concepts determine the development of new weapons and weapon systems is not always valid... progress in technology has... substantially altered some of the assumptions on which existing strategic and operational concepts, force structures, and the organization of military units and services are based.[103]

Coupled with this concept of technical dynamism is the fact that the weapons procurement process is not only complicated by the inter-relationship of doctrine and technology, but also by the impact of bureaucratic politics. As Ted Greenwood acknowledged in 1975,

> [t]he real world of policy-making is complex and multi-faceted. Large numbers of actors, both individual and institutional, have stakes in and participate in the decision-making process for any expensive or important weapons system. Each has its own interests and perspectives, its own routine and style of operation, its own political environment.[104]

The purpose of this section is to investigate the concept of technical dynamism in order to determine to what degree the weapon system choices and the strategic doctrine between 1965 and 1980 determined one another. To accomplish this the literature of the subject will be reviewed and the case of the MIRV will be investigated as a potential example of technology determining both the systems and the strategic doctrine.

In classical cases involving the advent of a new technology, such as the invention of atomic weapons, the ability

of technology to radically alter strategic thought cannot be denied. However, most cases of weapons system development since 1945 have not been quite so clear cut. Since the end of the Second World War, a large and sophisticated technology-based industry has developed to serve both civilian and military concerns. This worldwide "explosion" of scientific knowledge has generated pressures for "insurance" to develop and employ the latest nuclear weapons and delivery system technology, regardless of strategic doctrine, to avoid "falling behind" the Soviet Union technologically. These pressures to deploy a given technology as soon as it is "sweet" were reflected by Robert McNamara, who wrote:

> [t]here is a kind of mad momentum intrinsic to the development of all new nuclear weaponry. If a weapon works - and works well - there is a strong pressure from many directions to procure and deploy the weapon out of all proportion of the level required.[105]

Weapons development and procurement in the United States, according to James Kurth, are based on four broad criteria. First is the strategic criterion or rational calculations determining the forces required to operationalize the nation's strategic doctrine. Secondly, there are the bureaucratic pressures from individual military and scientific institutions as they compete among one another in support of weapon systems which will either provide them a larger share of available assets or enhance traditional

mission structures. Finally there are the economic and the "democratic" imperatives for system development, although Kurth admits these latter criteria are of greater importance in the selection of conventional aerospace systems, such as aircraft,[106] than they are with strategic weapons.

The development of the Multiple Independently-targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) system strongly reflects both the strategic and bureaucratic imperatives. Officialy, MIRV was developed and justified inaccordance with the counter-force targeting doctrine and to assist in penetration of a developing Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system. In Hearings on Military Posture conducted by the Congress in 1969 and in the FY 1969 Appropriations Hearings, Air Force and Navy spokesmen claimed that increased requirements for improved target coverage in the late 1950s, "sanctioned and reenforced" by the counter-force targeting doctrine of the 1960s, led to the development of MIRV, which was seen as an "economical means of increasing the target coverage of the ballistic missile force."[107] Thus the "multiple triggers" of a Soviet ABM threat, an expanded target list, and the justification of strategic doctrine presumably led to the development of MIRV.

However, various interpretations of MIRV's development indicate that much more was involved than adherence to strategic doctrine and an expanded target list. First, according to Ted Greenwood, as the need for a hard-target kill capability became more intriguing in the later McNamara years

years and as the concerns regarding ABM penetration lessened, MIRV became a more attractive system because of its ability to destroy "time-urgent targets like the long-range weapons of the enemy."[108] Secondly, referring back to MIRV's initial conception, the available evidence leads one to conclude that at least part of the reason for MIRV's genesis came from a need to "elaborate challenges U.S. designers of ABM would have to face in meeting an attack that employed penetration aids."[109] Thus, to paraphrase Herbert York, MIRV and ABM researchers developed a sequence of challenge and response to provoke one another to further system development.[110] As Allison and Huff describe this sequence,

> The technical community seems to have been driven by the "sweetness' of the technology and the researchers' competitive instinct... This competion... generates what we might label an intranational action-reaction phenomena.[111]

Thus, at least in the case of MIRV, technological competition seems to have been the primary "trigger" in the system's development rather than the creation of a system to match the nation's strategic doctrine. However, although MIRV was justified in terms of strategic doctrine it does not appear to have determined it. The role of doctrine in such cases is important; however, as Greenwood states,...

> ...strategic views are merely one of several criteria that a decision-maker uses to choose among the vast panoply of programs that continually drift up through the system for his review... strategic perspectives...play a role in determining which programs survive and which do not.[112]

In spite of this, force development since 1965 appears more a function of justifying old systems rather than developing new strategic doctrine in terms of the latest technology. Although Allison, Huff, and Greenwood have demonstrated the potential for technology to trigger its own development, as in the case of MIRV, this is only part of the relationships between technology and strategy. The true relationship is more along the lines of the three-way relationship proposed by Donald Snow in his article, "Current Nuclear Deterrence Thinking."[113] A deterrent strategy will impose parameters on development, availability of certain technologies will create the need to reassess doctrines or systems (as was the case when increasing missile accuracy raised the spectre of ICBM vulnerability). Finally in the case of unforeseen weapons innovation, such as MIRV, there is the requirement for doctrinal justification after the fact.

However, one must also consider that on some occasions, technology may have been suppressed because of doctrinal considerations. William Van Cleave, referring to the development of Poseidon, asserts that "quandary of MIRV and MAD was eased by deliberately avoiding effective hard target MIRVs... and designing them mostly to offset ABM and to increase soft target coverage."[114] Likewise Albert Wohlstetter concludes that in spite of technologiecal momentum, the policy-maker's ability to choose between projects has resulted in "a very long list of development projects... cancelled after much spending but before deployment."[115]

One must also consider that the results of "intra-national" competition in the weapons' industry are not totally bad and can, in fact, produce better, more survivable systems. In an environment where the adversary's developmental intentions may not be clear until a new system is deployed, such competition may be the best "insurance" against technological surprise available.

Finally, future technological developments may, in fact, assist in operationalizing a declaratory posture. Recent and expected advances in cruise missile technology have great potential for providing the incoming Administration with the necessary assets for the counter-force targeting requirements established in the countervailing strategy of PD-59.

Thus, for the most part doctrine and technology interrelated. While there is the potential for a major reassessment and redirection of strategic doctrine resulting from a technological innovation, for the most part American weapon system development between 1965 and 1980 resulted from attempts to develop or justify forces in terms of doctrine. As indicated by Greenwood, the role of the decision-maker is of great importance in the selection of the systems needed to operationalize a given strategy. What he does not mention is the importance of the individual in the formulation of strategic doctrine in the first place. The following section of this chapter will address the role of the major personalities of the last fifteen years and how their belief systems affected the strategic doctrines associated with them.

E. PERSONALITIES AND THEIR EFFECT ON STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

The potential of the individual policy-maker to influence public opinion, articulate doctrine, and affect selection of specific weapons cannot be ignored. In Ted Greenwood's words,

> The management, techniques, and style of the Secretary of Defense affect the degree of control he exercises over the weapons acquisition process and his policy preferences can affect the type of weapons developed and deployed.[116]

Likewise, the belief system of a major actor can determine the structure that his policy preferences will take. This "image of the world," held as a general set of beliefs and premises regarding fundamental issues of history and the effects of politics on these issues, forms what Alexander George refers to as the "operational code" of the policy-maker.[117] As Harvey Starr writes in his analysis of Henry Kissinger's "operational code,"

> Decision-makers, as all other human beings, can act only in terms of their image of the world... they as subjected to a wide variety of psychological processes that affect perception and behavior. As a result of these processes, an individual possesses a belief system composed of images which are the products of past experiences, values, attitudes, personality factors, and the like... such factors are important in a decision-maker's selection of a problem, in his identification of the alternatives to solving that problem, and ultimately the choice of a path of action to meet that problem.[118]

This use of the "operational code" to predict how an actor will react or to explain how a decision-maker chose a specific

alternative is useful to the analyst in understanding the effect of the individual or policy-making as a whole. In this section, the "world-views" or belief systems of Robert McNamara, Henry Kissinger, James Schlesinger, and Jimmy Carter shall be determined through an analysis of some of their writings and public speeches and through the use of secondary sources that perform related analyses. An attempt shall then be made to demonstrate how these operational codes affected the policy preferences of these individuals with respect to strategic doctrine in order to determine the effect that an individual policy-maker might have on doctrinal development. The operational code approach is not perfect in its ability to determine the effect of an actor on policy. As Alexander George wrote, while

> knowledge of the actor's approach to calculating choices of action does not provide a simple key to explanation and prediction... it can help the researcher and the policy planner to 'bound' the alternative ways in which the subject may perceive different types of stimulus and approach the task of making a rational assessment of alternative courses of action.[119]

1. Robert McNamara's Operational Code

McNamara's worldview between 1965 and 1968 as reflected in his speeches and in his book The Essence of Security was based on the principles of internationalism, the futility of nuclear war, and cost-effectiveness.

His internationalism stemmed from a belief in the existence of multiple centers of world power and a break-down of the communist world movement. His goal for the foreign policy of the United States was

> the hope of helping to create, in keeping with the principles of the United Nations Charter, a world in which even the smallest state could look forward to an independent existence, free to develop in its own way... free from fear of armed attack of political domination by the more powerful nations.[120]

McNamara also believed that it was impossible to be an isolationist in a world of nuclear weapons, economic interdependence, and the "gap between communist promise and communist reality."[121]

McNamara's view of nuclear war, expressed in numerous public statements, was that no reasonable nation could hope to achieve victory in such a war. Once the nuclear powers had the means of mutual destruction the question of superiority became less significant. In his analysis of the McNamara years, Henry Trewitt concludes that,

> McNamara had come to believe that nuclear superiority was a meaningless advantage once competiting powers had the forces of mutual destruction. The attempt to preserve it, he felt, could only continue an endless and meaningless arms race.[122]

McNamara's belief system regarding nuclear war and deterrence has already been presented in this thesis. In summary, his writings in Essence of Security and elsewhere indicate that to him nuclear deterrence achieved by an assured

destruction capability, was the cornerstone of American strategic theory. However, McNamara also felt that a part of that theory should also be a move towards disarmament as a continued build-up of arms was not only foolish but, in fact, counter-productive. McNamara's beliefs regarding nuclear war were best summarized when he wrote,

> However foolish unlimited war may have been in the past, it is now no longer merely foolish, but suicidal as well.
>
> In the end, the roof of man's security does not lie in his weaponry, it lies in his mind. What the world requires ... is not a new race toward armament, but a new race toward reasonableness.[123]

In addition to his beliefs about "reasonableness," McNamara also maintained several beliefs on how a major organization should function to be effective. His belief system also included the concept of "cost-effectiveness." Both Henry Trewitt and David Halberstam[124] provide numerous anecdotes of McNamara as a man who attempted to control the defense bureaucracy through concepts of cost-effectiveness and planned budgeting to force "the reasoning of the services on basic issues into the open for analysis and debate."[125]

McNamara's belief system profoundly affected his approach to strategic doctrine. His concept of assured destruction, based on the basic "rationality" of the actors and mutual desires for avoidance of nuclear war, became the measure by which American strategic forces were procured. Using

mathematical models a "cost-effective" strategic force was developed to ensure the destruction of two-fifths of the Soviet population and three-quarters of their industrial capacity even if United States forces absorbed a surprise first strike from the Soviet Union.[126] These forces were developed, at McNamara's direction, with an eye towards enhancing the assured destruction capability. Systems which met this criterion, such as MIRV, were selected, those which did not, such as the B-70 bomber, were rejected on deferred. Thus, as Enthoven and Smith recount, there was also a movement towards reduction of vulnerability which brought about reliance on minuteman and Polaris and a reduction in the American bomber force.[127] Finally, McNamara's beliefs regarding nuclear war and cost-effectiveness led him to reject defensive systems which provided less than 100% effectiveness capabilities. The case of ABM is an excellent example of this. McNamara felt that "any such system can obviously be defeated by an enemy's simply sending more offensive warheads... the Soviets would clearly be... motivated to increase their offensive capability as to cancel out our defensive advantage."[128]

Thus, McNamara's views on the futility of nuclear war, the reasonableness of man, and cost-effectiveness, in part, contributed to the strategic doctrine developed during his tenure as Secretary of Defense. As noted earlier, the concept of "assured destruction" has formed the theoretical

base for strategic doctrine since 1965, and McNamara's concept of the strategic TRIAD remains intact, more or less, to this day. McNamara's operational code was reflected in his systems choices and in his approach to doctrine, both correlated with threat perceptions of the day - an emerging detente.

2. Henry Kissinger's Operational Code

Of the four personalities analyzed in this chapter, Henry Kissinger is the one whose worldview is most easily identified. His vast collection of academic writings and official statements since the early 1950s reveal a continuity of themes which runs through his latest work, The White House Years.[129] In his analysis of Kissinger's "operational code" Harvey Starr stated that this plethora of writing and the remarkable continuity of beliefs expressed the therein made Kissinger an excellent personality for the application of the operational code model.

Kissinger's worldview is broken down by Starr into three basic beliefs which run throughout Kissinger's works. First, Kissinger's view of life is one "which pits the forces of chaos against the forces of order."[130] In this turmoil two types of nation-states develop, the "legitimate" states which support the status quo and the "revolutionary" states which seek to upset it. Because of the nature of security however, if one state is to be absolutely secure, the other states in the international system must be insecure. Additionally

Kissinger also believes that if many nations seek peace (i.e. "avoidance of war") that the world is at the mercy of the most ruthless power.

Kissinger views leaders as falling into one of three categories, the "conquerers," the "prophets," and the "statesmen." It is from the latter group that mankind can transcend perpetual chaos and the individual can have some effect on his destiny. Kissinger felt that a statesman can influence history by "grasping the proper historical moment through acts of vision and courage."[131] To do so, he must be free from the constraints of domestic opinion and the governmental bureaucracy. This premise somewhat contradicts the "Spenglerian" image of Kissinger put forward by former Chief of Naval Operations, Elmo Zumwalt,[132] and others. However, it appears that Kissinger felt that an individual statesman could, in fact, affect history.

Finally, there are Kissinger's views on nuclear war. In his book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Kissinger clearly and emphatically rejected the doctrine of "massive retaliation," stating:

> A reliance on all-out war as the Chief deterrent will sap our system of alliances in two ways: either our allies will feel that any military effort on their part is unnecessary, or they may be led to the conviction that peace is preferable to war even on terms almost akin to surrender.[133]

Kissinger felt the need for a doctrine which defined the purpose of nuclear weapons and their potential uses to allow some level of rational choice.[134] In 1957 he wrote

> The basic requirement for American Security is a doctrine which will enable us to act purposefully in the face of challenges which will inevitably confront us...since our policy is so explicitly based on deterrence, our doctrine must pay particular attention to determining how the other side calculates its risks. Deterrence is achieved when the opponent cannot calculate any gain from the action we seek to prevent.[135]

Those positions remained essentially unchanged in 1979 when Kissinger wrote The White House Years although he was not satisfied that "assured destruction" was a realistic doctrine. In his words,

> for the first time a major country saw an advantage in enhancing its own vulnerability. 'Assured destruction' was one of those theories that sound impressive in an academic seminar but are horribly unworkable for a decision-maker in the real world...[136]

Kissinger set about to operationalize his world views on strategic doctrine primarily in his relations with the Soviet Union through the process of detente. According to Harvey Starr,

> these policies included the idea of embedding the Soviet Union within a growing web of economic, technological, and political interdependencies so that it would have an increasing stake in the stability and survival of the international order. This process was meant to reinforce the 'legitimate' nature of the Soviet Union.[137]

In short, Kissinger set about to be the "statesman," seizing the opportunity of history to affect destiny. Kissinger used negotiations to attempt to achieve this goal of "re-socializing" the Soviet Union, to persuade them to "set aside ambitions to make advances elsewhere in the world at the expense of the West."[138] Through negotiation he appears to have been attempting to set limits on the behavior of both sides and to bring the Soviet Union to accept his basic premise that in order for all states to have some degree security, absolute security must be sacrificed.

In The White House Years Kissinger recounts his success in modifying the strategic doctrine of assured destruction through the concept of "strategic sufficiency," to base strategic doctrine on a "rationale, rather than by reflex."[139] Although the actual modification of plans and strategy by this declaratory change is open to question,[140] this attempt to modify doctrine to conform to his world views is apparent.[141]

Thus Kissinger's world view, or belief system, was operationalized through his attempt to resocialize the Soviet Union and to change the criteria of "assured destruction." However, Kissinger's affect on strategic doctrine was indirect in that force levels were affected by the limitations resultant from his negotiations with the Soviet Union, and not from his direct involvement with the system.

3. James Schlesinger's Operational Code

While not as well-known as either McNamara or Kissinger, it is safe to say that James Schlesinger had a dramatic effect on American strategic doctrine through his appeals for selective targeting options and increased conventional procurement found in the FY 1975 Defense Budget. Also, like the two personalities previously examined, Schlesinger's belief system profoundly affected his approach to policy.

One of the best expressions of Schlesinger's beliefs is found in his 1976 article "A Testing Time for America."[142] Referring to the United States as the "only political counter-weight to the military and political power of the Soviet Union,"[143] Schlesinger stated his beliefs regarding power.

> Power remains the ultimate sanction in dealing with potential conflict. Where power exists and is respected it will not have to be exercised. Through power one can deter the initiation of an unfavorable chain of events. To be sure, military power is not the only kind of power, but it remains an irreplaceable element in the total mix of power...[144]

Schlesinger's beliefs, stemming from these above, were that the United States had a duty to participate in the international system not only because of its inheritance of the "post-World War II mantle of world leadership," but also because "at no point since the 1930s [had] the Western world faced so formidable a threat to its survival."[145]

Schlesinger felt that because of an underestimation of the Soviet defense effort that a major re-examination was required of the adequacy of American strategic policy. Schlesinger found several theoretical flaws in American doctrine, believing that M.A.D. not only lacked credibility, but also posed potential "Strangelove" scenarios of accidental nuclear war.[146] Schlesinger also believed, in 1973, that achievement of nuclear parity by the Soviet Union had altered the strategic balance on which M.A.D. was based.

Schlesinger also recognized domestic limitations to the amount of military power that the public would be willing to support as well as the apparent contradictions between power and idealism. Addressing each of these issues, he wrote:

> In a democracy such as the United States, foreign policy will reflect domestic politics. Our internal preoccupations and our political divisions of recent years have at least suggested a growing infirmity of American policy.[147]
>
> ... there is no incompatibility between a strong military posture and idealism ... only through the security afforded by adequate military strength can we assure reasonably free play to our own aspirations.[148]

According to Kinnard, when Schlesinger entered office he brought with him two goals, first, to undo the Vietnam legacy and secondly to revise U.S. strategic policy. In the FY 1975 Budget, Schlesinger set about to improve conventional force levels, increase funds for research and development, and in short, increase spending in the areas of defense "investment

capital." Schlesinger also set about to alter America's declaratory strategic posture through articulation of his "counter-force" targeting options. Schlesinger's lack of faith in M.A.D. and the mathematical and cost-effective models which "spawned" it was demonstrated by his support for the B-1 bomber through which he intended to off-set the Soviet missile advantage resulting from SALT I as well as complicating Soviet resource allocation for defense systems. Schlesinger's distain for cost-effectiveness in systems procurement is clearly shown in an October 1974 Miami Herald article in which he stated,

> America's strategic nuclear forces were bought not for their specific cost-effective contribution to target destruction, but for their broad contribution to that panoply of power that maintains deterrence.[149]

Finally, Schlesinger was skeptical of detente because of his basic belief system, believing that the Soviets were using the process to gain dominance over the West and would not become entangled by the Western system.

Schlesinger's tenure as Secretary of Defense is another clear example of how an individual's belief system can affect his policy choices and how an individual's actions can impact on strategic doctrine. The declaratory shift to counter-force targeting remains intact today through PD-59. Additionally, the strategic and conventional force structures and programs initiated by Schlesinger's Defense Department directly impacted on the strategic options

available to the Carter Administration as well as providing a "yardstick" by which that Administration's success, or failure, can be determined.

4. Jimmy Carter's Operational Code

Shifts in views during his Administration complicate the task of determining Jimmy Carter's belief system. Limited writings and lack of continuity in his public statements make it difficult to apply the operational code approach to him. However, from various sources a generalized picture of Carter's world views emerges. First, most of the authors surveyed indicate that Carter is a man of high moral principles who set about, in Alexander George's words, to "embue U.S. foreign policy with a renewed moral purpose."[150] Secondly, that prior to entering office and for at least the first two years of his Presidency, Carter believed that it was necessary to reduce significantly the nuclear arsenals of both the super-powers.[151] Third, as a former engineer, Carter was possessed of a technician's mindset having "confidence in the possibility of mastering difficult problems and of finding 'comprehensive' 'solutions' for them."[152] Finally, Carter's belief in the basic rationality of mankind (as articulated in his 1978 Naval Academy speech, previously quoted) combined with his former submarine officer background to produce a view of nuclear war which he presented in an Aviation Week article prior to his election in 1976. In that article Carter is quoted as saying,

> There would be no possibility under the sun that a first-strike capability could be adequate in preventing massive destruction of the country that originated the strike...There is no way to prevent a massive retaliatory strike because for all practical purposes atomic submarines are invulnerable.[153]

This world view was clearly translated into policies in the early days of the Carter Administration. Carter's attempts to give American foreign policy a new moral dimension are apparent in his initial support for "human rights." Secondly, his belief that the world has too many nuclear weapons was operationalized in his unilateral actions with respect to American strategic programs (such as closing the Minuteman production line and canceling the B-1 bomber program) and his request in 1976 for a "feasibility study" to evaluate the effects of reducing the American deterrent force to between 200 and 250 delivery vehicles.[154] This belief that there was a world-wide need to reduce nuclear weapons combined with his belief that the Soviet Union shared the same interests as the United States regarding prevention of nuclear war was manifested in the so-called SALT "comprehensive proposal" of March 1977.[155] Finally, Carter's technician's mindset effected the way in which he approached problems. According to his former speech writer, James Fallows, Carter tended to "view... problems as technical, not historical..."[156] and became preoccupied with their details. Because of this he failed to "project

a vision larger than the problem he [was] tackling at the moment..."[157] - an approach that promoted confusion on the part of his subordinates and a muddled policy.

Thus, Carter's restricted world view and fundamental belief system produced an affect on American strategic doctrine by stagnating and confusing it. Unilateral actions with respect to strategic programs restricted their development while lack of guidance from the Chief Executive confused governmental spokesmen, allies, adversaries, and the American public. The FY 1980 Defense Budget is a product of this lack of guidance with its support for SALT, multiple targeting options, and "launch-on-warning." Like his predecessors, Jimmy Carter affected American strategic doctrine but through lack of direction rather than by direct modification.

F. THE EFFECTS OF THE VIETNAM WAR

An analysis of the determinants of strategic nuclear doctrine between 1965-1980 would be incomplete without an evaluation of the role which the Vietnam War played on policy. Surprisingly, this is one area which has been ignored by most analysts. Therefore it is difficult to determine the direct effects that the war might have had. By drawing inferences from several sources it appears that the Vietnam War affected funding for defense programs, directly impacting on Research and Development; produced a permanent "anti-defense lobby" in Congress; and brought about a shift of

attention from central strategic systems, such as ICBMs, to matters directly associated with effectively prosecuting the war.

The figures below indicate funding, in constant dollars, for strategic forces and for research and development during the fiscal years which encompassed the Vietnam War:

(Figures in Billions of Dollars)

FISCAL YEAR	TOTAL BUDGET*	STRATEGIC FORCES	R & D
1964	50.6	8.5	4.8
1968	75.5	7.2	4.2
1973	80.4	7.2	6.4
1974	87.1	6.8	7.0

*Budget Authority

Source: Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1975, Table 1, p. 235, year for constant dollars not indicated.

The above figures indicate that in spite of a rising defense budget from 1964 to 1974, spending in the area of strategic forces declined while research and development expenditures remained roughly constant until the end of direct U.S. participation in the war in 1973. Part of the reduction of strategic force spending is due to the fact that most of the systems procured during the force modernization and expansion of the early Kennedy years had come on line recently and were not in need of upgrading or replacement. The area of research and development is another matter, however. A review of the FY 1969 Defense Budget, chosen because of its presentation at the height of the war, reveals several pieces of evidence which indicate a shift of R & D efforts from

strategic systems to respond to the situation in Southeast Asia. In the twelve pages devoted to R & D in the FY 69 Budget only a single program, POSEIDON, is a completely strategic program. The other programs have either multi-mission applications (AWACS and Electronic Warfare equipment, for example) or, like VSTOL aircraft and "heavy-lift" helicopters, are purely general purpose systems. Additionally, in his prepared statement, Dr. John Foster, Head of DDR & E, cites the efforts of PROVOST, an R & D program developed to "...respond quickly to new technical problems arising from combat operations in Southeast Asia."[158] Foster went on to cite that during FY 1968 the PROVOST program met its goal of operationally testing over twenty items per quarter and that DOD was fully satisfied with the program. The direct impact of this redirection of effort was the potential slowing of technological development in areas other than those underway prior to 1965 (such as ABM and MIRV) as priorities shifted to general purpose research such as those covered by PROVOST.

At the same time strategic budgets were shrinking, anti-defense "lobbies" were growing. As Edward Laurance concludes, the "general climate of support for executive defense policies in 1947-1967 disintegrated by 1968 and remained that way through 1975."[159] Laurance supports his conclusions through a content analysis of witnesses before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Prior to 1969, the committee interviewed zero non-DOD witnesses, and heard no witnesses advocating

cuts in defense spending. In 1969, this pattern was radically altered as 32 non-DOD witnesses gave testimony, and 21 of these witnesses recommended cuts in defense spending. In 1971, five of the six non-DOD witnesses offered testimony in support of cuts in defense spending.[160] However, this shift to non-DOD sources of information was only part of the change in congressional attitude. The atmosphere regarding defense matters is best described in Henry Kissinger's account of the debate on the FY 1971 Defense Budget:

> by... December 1970, Congress had made its mind to cut an additional $2.1 billion even though Nixon had already reduced it by $5 billion... but even this does not measure the pervasive anti-military atmosphere, the hostility to defense spending, the probability that any new military programs would lead to bitter fights...
>
> ... at a time when the Soviet build up required urgent reexamination of strategic doctrine and of forces, the energies of the Executive were consummed by a rearguard action to preserve a minimal arsenal. Pentagon planners were forced to concentrate on preserving the existing force structure rather than adapting it to changed circumstances.[161]

What the Vietnam War had done was to draw the attention of the Congress to the matter of defense policy, "in the form of 'end-the-war'amendments and the rise of opposition groups whose anti-defense flavor went far beyond Vietnam-related issues."[162] In sum, Congress was now conditioned, at least until 1975, to question and debate military matters rather than defer to the recommendations of the Defense Department and the Executive on military matters.[163]

Finally there are generalizations of the War's effects which cannot be conclusively proven, yet still should be addressed. In his book From Superiority to Parity, Harland Moulton writes,

> The decision taken by the United States in July 1965 to escalate the war in Vietnam... was to have substantial influence on Congress's, the Executive's, and Secretary of Defense McNamara's attitudes and options regarding the selection, funding, and deployment of advanced strategic nuclear offensive forces during the years from 1965-1969. The deeper the nation's immersion in Vietnam, the more McNamara consumed his prodigious energies in the details of the conflict...[164]

Moulton speculates that preoccupation with the struggle in Vietnam led McNamara to conclude that the United States had purchased more strategic systems than needed for "assured destruction," a conclusion McNamara articulated in both the FY 1969 Budget and in Essence of Security. Moulton also speculates that McNamara's attentions were shifted from central systems and that his rejection or deferral of decisions on such systems as ABM, Minuteman III, the B-70, etc. are evidence of this attitudinal shift. Other authors speculate that the shift in funding during the war years from "capital investment" activities such as overhauls to operational needs and Vietnam-related developments led to a reluctance on the part of services, such as the Navy, to commit themselves to greater strategic expansion in the face of deteriorating general purpose forces.[165]

The major direct effects of the Vietnam War with respect to strategic doctrine appear to be fiscal and attitudinal, affecting the funding and development of future strategic systems and the doctrine necessary to employ them. The Vietnam War led to a questioning of the priorities of defense spending while establishing conditions, as described by Moulton and Kissinger, which redirected the attention of those responsible for establishing and implementing doctrine to the day-to-day conduct of the war and attempting to retain the "forces-in-being" from anti-defense pressure in Congress.

G. A SUMMARY OF THE DETERMINANTS

The domestic determinants, examined above, each had a direct effect on strategic doctrine between 1965-1980. However, the direct effects of the individual determinants are but one facet of their ability to affect doctrinal change. The interrelationship between these variables can also significantly impact on strategic doctrine. This area will be examined in the next chapter.

IV. THE INTER-RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN DOMESTIC DETERMINANTS

In the previous chapter, the direct impact of the five domestic variables on strategic doctrine was examined without discussion of the impact of variable inter-relationships. The hypotehsis postulated in chapter one, however, speculated that complex inter-relationships between the variables might complicate doctrinal formulation for the "grand strategist." To determine the effects of the inter-relationships this chapter will first identify the inter-relationships uncovered by the previous analysis. The potential effects of these inter-relationships of future doctrinal formulation are then assessed.

A. THREAT PERCEPTIONS

As noted earlier, the concept of threat perception not only directly interfaces with the external environment but also has a direct inter-relationship with the personality and public opinion variables. As has been demonstrated, the national leadership articulates its perception of the external threat in terms of both external indicators and domestic public opinion boundaries. Indicators evaluated by Charles Marcy and George Gallup, previously cited, indicate the perceptions of the American public regarding the threat posed by the Soviet Union shifted during the period surveyed

and roughly corresponded with an increasingly optimistic and then pessimistic articulation of the perceived threat presented by the political leadership. A similar trend is shown below regarding a shift in attitudes regarding the possibility of nuclear attack against specific American cities:

> Question (1961): "If we should have an all out nuclear war, do you think this locality would be one the Russians would particularly want to bomb, or not?"
>
> Question (1976): "Do you think your city or community might be a target for a nuclear attack?"

RESPONSES[166]

Region	1961	1976
East	60%	45%
Midwest	59%	35%
South	31%	34%
West	67%	53%
National Average	54.2%	41%

The attitudes reflected in the polls above indicate, again, that perception of the threat by the general populace decreased as the rhetoric of the political leadership became less strident.

An additional linkage can be drawn between a shift in threat perception and the Vietnam War. Arguing that the war brought about a shift away from the generally accepted paradigm of "containment," Michael Nacht writes:

> It is now commonly agreed that the Vietnam War was a disaster, for the South Vietnamese people and for the United States, and should not be repeated. What has prompted this dramatic shift ... to the equation of Vietnam with everything that is undesirable

> in American foreign policy? Clearly, in the early 1960s Americans held certain views and retained certain images about international politics and about themselves that they no longer accept. The agony of the Vietnam experience produced this change.[167]

The Vietnam War and threat perception inter-reacted with one another in an additional way not considered by Nacht. As the leadership's articulated position with respect to the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China became less strident and move optimistic, and as events such as SALT I and President Nixon's visit to Peking occurred, the public began to question the validity of a war to "stop the spread of communism" in Vietnam. This incongruity between policies and perceptions led the public to conclude, as Laurance states, "that a victory in Vietnam was [not] essential to the security of the United States."[168] Additionally, reduced perception of an external threat, occasioned in part by optimistic rhetoric vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, the process of detente, and the high expense of the Vietnam War, may have also contributed to an unwillingness on the part of the American people to fund high-cost strategic programs and their research and development.

B. TECHNOLOGY

The analysis of this thesis leads this author to the conclusion that although technological development may have, in fact, been influenced by the other variables, such as the

style or beliefs of a given Secretary of Defense or President, it has little impact other than its direct impact in shaping the available force structure. In some cases this variable may have no inter-relationship, as was the case with the personality of Henry Kissinger. Although Kissinger acknowledged the basic effect of the nuclear revolution on strategy, his opinions regarding technology's impact in spawning more warheads through MIRV and similar systems was summed up by his July 1974 statement following the final Nixon-Brezhnev summit in which he exclaimed:

> One of the questions which we have to ask ourselves as a country is what in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it, politically, militarily, operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?[169]

In short, Kissinger appears to have believed that short of a technological break-through of the magnitude of nuclear weapons, statesmanship would outweigh technological advances in the determination of strategic doctrine.

C. PUBLIC OPINION

The direct and indirect effects of this variable on doctrine have already been discussed with respect to threat perception. However, the inter-relationship of this variable with other the domestic factors can also significantly affect the formulation and implementation of strategic doctrine.

Huntington's conclusion that what the public thinks on specific issues is not as important as what the political leadership perceives they think has already been discussed. The conclusion drawn from this analysis is that public opinion sets the boundaries with respect to the options available to the political leadership.

Public opinion obviously set the boundaries with respect to the Vietnam War because of the inter-relationship of these two factors. As troop commitments and additional casualty figures increased, public belief that the war was not a mistake decreased as indicated below.[170]

YEAR	SIGNIFICANT EVENTS	IN COUNTRY FORCE LEVEL*	THE WAR AS A MISTAKE
1965	Danang Landing (March) Increased Draft Call Up (July)	184,300	"No": 61%
1968	"TET" (January) Bombing Halt (October)	549,500	"No": 42%(Feb) 37%(Oct)

*As of 31 December

While the "no" responses above did not indicate a shift to direct opposition to the war, they did indicate dwindling popular support for official policy. Likewise, as Laurance proposes, an indirect reaction of the public to the Vietnam War was reflected in the development of an anti-defense "bloc" within the Congress. He states:

> The election and reelection of legislators critical of defense programs, with the support of the public... created a congressional bloc which provide[d] a continuous source of non-DOD policy

> alternatives. Their presence as a legitimate bloc add[ed] to the public's lack of fear of external threat.[171]

Thus, in this instance, the public opinion variable inter-related with the Vietnam War and perception of the external threat resulted in the development of a congressional bloc whose voting patterns reduced funding of defense-related projects in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Public approval/disapproval of specific weapons systems can also have potential impact on the development or deployment of new systems, as positive on negative public reaction is perceived by decision-makers and legislators. Public fascination with a new system, such as particle beam weapons, coupled with a fear of Soviet advantages unless the latest technology is exploited, can combine to create a degree of public support necessary to ensure project funding. At the other end of the spectrum, public outrage such as that in Utah and Nevada in response to the proposed MX deployment can cause public leaders to delay, review, or cancel the offending project.[172]

Thus, public opinion has a wide-ranging effect on the other four variables inter-relating with them to indirectly impact on strategic doctrine.

D. PERSONALITIES

The influence of personalities on the variables of public opinion and threat perception has already been noted.

Therefore, this section will address the effect of personalities on weapons technology and the Vietnam War. Additionally an example shall be presented of how personalities in conflict can impact on doctrine.

Examples of individuals and their decisions on technology are many. Greenwood, for example, states:

> [T]here can be little doubt that McNamara's own policy preferences had major impact on the MIRV programs. It was his concern that Soviet ballistic missile defense might jeopardize the American deterrent that led to authorizing engineering development of MIRV in the FY 1966 budget. It was his desire to improve counter-force capability that led to the accuracy improvement program for Poseidon. It was his opposition to an expanded Minuteman force, new manned bombers, and ballistic missile defense systems that made MIRV a politically advantageous system... the decisions that were executed were McNamara's and their purpose was to further the goals that he thought at the time were worth pursuing.[173]

Likewise, Carter's rejection of the B-1 bomber and his termination of ICBM production provide other examples of the inter-relationship between an individual's belief systems and technology with an ultimate impact on strategy. However, the ability of an individual to redirect technology is generally limited. Although McNamara rejected the manned bomber (B-70) in the mid-1960s, his authorization of continued R & D ultimately resulted in the B-1. Carter's rejection of the B-1 also did not terminate manned bomber research. Additionally by shifting emphasis from the B-1

to cruise missiles, by his decision, Carter may have (ironically) stimulated weapons R & D more than he hindered it and in a direction inimical to his own arms control goals. Thus while an individual appears able to channel development efforts, he generally cannot stifle them, and in some cases decisions regarding a program by one individual can be reversed by his successor.

One inter-relationship not previously addressed in this thesis is that regarding the inter-relationship of multiple personalities with one of the other variables. An excellent example of this is found in the circumstances regarding the Kissinger-Schlesinger confrontation over threat perception and appropriate response which occurred in 1974 and 1975 and which led to Schlesinger's removal from his position as Secretary of Defense. As indicated earlier in this thesis, both men had precise ideas regarding the nature of international relations and the role of power in those relations. Although the two men agreed on a number of substantive positions, and were not as diametrically opposed as some might suggest, they disagreed regarding the speed with which the SALT negotiations should proceed, the value of SALT to the Soviets, and the degree of firmness that the American negotiating posture should assume. While Kissinger, on the one hand, was willing to offer the Soviets a number of economic incentives and risk an unfavorable SALT agreement to further the process of detente, Schlesinger proposed a

"hard-line" with respect to the Soviets to "persuade them that their best interest lay in a reasonable agreement with the United States."[174] Basically, these two individuals conflicted because of their basic belief systems and their perceptions of the world system. The result was hardening of positions between the two and the articulation of two separate "doctrines," one of detente from Kissinger and another of "counter-force" from Schlesinger. Schlesinger's ouster as Secretary of Defense as a partial result of his personality clashes with Kissinger and Ford, may also have impacted on long-term support for conventional and strategic force build-ups by focusing public attention on the Ford Administration's internal debate regarding strategic doctrine. While the public may not have fully understood the ramifications of the Schlesinger firing in context with the fall of Vietnam and Kissinger's pressures to intervene in Angola, the public was made aware, through the media, of the separate positions of the principal actors. The Schlesinger firing and similar factors gave support to the "hard-line" challenge of Ronald Reagan in the 1976 primary campaign. This conservative pressure resulted in higher defense appropriations by the Ford Administration in response to criticism that detente was weakening the country. The roots of the present public questioning of the value of detente may have begun with this conflict of personalities.

E. VIETNAM'S MULTIPLE EFFECTS

Some of the indirect effects of the Vietnam War on doctrine through the war's impact on public opinion, military spending levels, and research and development have already been noted in this thesis. Likewise, Kissinger's memoirs, previously cited, indicate how the defense establishment became preoccupied with the conduct of the war and with preparing arguments against reduction of defense funds to the neglect of strategic doctrine development for the long-term. The last chapter dealt also with the redirection of R & D funding to operational uses or to research supporting conventional instead of strategic development programs and on strategic weapons research. The effects of Vietnam on public opinion and perceptions of the external threat have also been addressed herein.

Some additional ramifications for strategic doctrine remain. First, the potential long-term effects of the war on the perceptions of <u>future</u> American leaders appear to be substantial. Holsti and Rosenau, in their survey of the Vietnam War's effects on belief systems and consensus, conclude that Vietnam's after-effects could "shape the world-views of American leaders in the same way Pearl Harbor did..."[175] an earlier generation. Their research reveals that the war had a significant effect on the belief systems of future leaders[176] yielding, among other things, a general consensus against unilateral action, although a consensus

also exists that if force should be required, it should be applied quickly and should maximize political rather than military goals. However, Holsti and Rosenau conclude that:

> the findings appear to reflect at least a mood of caution and skepticism about the use of force to cope with future conflicts.[177]

Another long-term effect of the Vietnam War regarding further public opinion constraints on the political leadership in its ability to implement strategic doctrine has been suggested by Lunch and Sperlich:

> a number of changes have already occurred in the aftermath of the war. Greater skepticism regarding government claims, more resistance regarding government plans, and considerable popular alienation from the symbols of the American political system by the American people have followed the end of American involvement in Vietnam. Attitudes and predispositions such as these make political leadership difficult, particulary if skeptical constituents impose constraints on the executive.[178]

Thus, the conclusion can be drawn from the above that the Vietnam War inter-reacted with all of the other variables addressed in the above thesis to not only effect the strategic doctrine of the war period but to effect a degree of attitudinal change on the part of the American public and the political leadership that produced, in Michael Nacht's words, "[a] transfer of allegiances away from containment... without moving toward any alternative... during the years since the fall of Vietnam, we have witnessed an unsuccessful

search for a new set of guidelines to given American foreign policy."[179] It appears that the most significant result of the war and its inter-relationship with the other domestic variables has been a questioning of the basic foundation of "containment," on which post-World War II American strategic doctrine is based.

V. CONCLUSIONS

In the preceding four chapters five domestic determinants of American strategic nuclear doctrine have been examined for direct and indirect impact on that doctrine. In this examination the following conclusions were drawn.

First, each of the domestic determinants has some direct impact on the formulation of America's national strategic doctrine, while all but technology have an indirect impact through inter-relationships with the other determinants. An external threat, filtered through domestic perceptions, impacts on strategic doctrine when the external and internal environments are prioritiezed by the national leadership. In a means as indicated by figure 2 these perceptions are analyzed and articulated to the public. The public, however, also perceives the external threat in a way which may or may not coincide with the perceptions of the national leadership. Through the process of priority establishment this disparity is generally resolved to produce a strategic doctrine. Public opinion, through its impact on public officials, sets the boundaries for strategic doctrine by indicating willingness to support, fund, or generally permit the employment of assets or the deployment of forces. Technology, in turn, cultivated by a semi-autonomous research community, directed by the leadership, shapes the forces available for deployment.

AD-A096 335 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA F/G 15/6
DOMESTIC DETERMINANTS OF AMERICAN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DOCTRINE: I--ETC(U)
DEC 80 M A HELGESON

UNCLASSIFIED NL

2 OF 2



END
DATE FILMED
4-81
DTIC



Figure 2. The Filtering Process

The belief systems of the leadership affect their perception of the threat and shape their responses to it. These personalities may however be limited by the impact of other belief systems on their own or by the effects of public opinion or bureaucratic actors. Finally, the Vietnam War may in fact have been the seminal event of the last quarter century with regard to direct and indirect impact on strategic doctrine. The war:

(1) Affected public consensus regarding the leadership's wisdom and regarding levels of adequacy for defense spending.

(2) Resulted in a limitation of research and development activity for new strategic programs between 1967-1973.

(3) Limited the ability of the national leadership to unilaterally revise strategic doctrine or system procurement by increasing the scrutiny of defense programs and requiring a greater degree of justification of those programs.

Finally, the war brought about a "restructuring" of the basic containment paradigm and a reluctance on the part of the public and the upcoming leadership to employ force in instances which previously may have been considered in the national interest.

As mentioned earlier, this has not been an exhaustive evaluation of the domestic issues with potential impact on strategic doctrine, therefore there are areas left for further research and study. A more detailed analysis is

called for regarding the role of the bureaucracies on the five domestic determinants. Additionally, it would be worthwhile to investigate the trends of threat perception since the Second World War to determine to what degree the leaders articulate the threat to the public and to what degree they reflect the public's opinion. Finally, the role of the Vietnam War deserves a more thorough evaluation. For example, the war's role in establishing the conditions which resulted in Schlesinger's articulation of "counter-force options" in 1974 requires further scrutiny.

The conclusions above have an impact on the ability of future policy makers to affect strategic doctrines through policy choices. In a recent Washington Post article, "Defense with a Capital 'D'," Senator Sam Nunn called for the development of a "broad [bi-partisan] consensus on national security strategy to cope with the threats of the decade ahead."[180] Senator Nunn called for the implementation of measures within the defense community, such as higher pay, reevaluation of force levels, and a revision of defense priorities, to solve the problems of strategic relations with the Soviet Union. While the Senator's recommendations are valid and a positive step towards solution of the present conditions, the evidence presented in this thesis indicates that much more must be done to turn things around than just "replacing the... one-year budget process," or taking a "fresh look at our use of technology."[181] As has been noted,

the public still retains the Vietnam legacy of reluctance to employ force, especially in conditions where the threat is vague. What is needed, therefore, in addition to Senator Nunn's recommendations, is a national consensus regarding the exact nature of the threat. There is a need for public enlightenment (a function of the political leadership) as well as a realization that there are domestic limitations regarding what the public is willing to accept as a valid threat.

By way of conclusion it is a appropriate to return to the basic hypothesis. The evidence above indicates that the hypothesis is supported by the impact of the five domestic variables on strategic doctrine. Additionally, there is support for the hypothesis that a complex inter-relationship exists between these variables to complicate the task of the "grand strategist." However, a grand strategy is feasible if it is truly "grand," by taking into account these domestic limitations and by allowing sufficient time to reasonably educate the public in the nature of the threat and to develop a domestic consensus regarding how to meet that threat. The "grand strategist," (the personality variable) must set about to define the perceived threat within the allowable boundaries of public opinion. The threat must then be clearly articulated to the public so that, to a degree, the public and the leadership concur regarding its nature. Technology must be directed so that, without stifling the healthy aspects of intra-national competition or preparedness for the "unexpected,"

technical developments may produce weapon systems which coincide with national strategy rather than requiring justification by it. Finally, the strategic doctrine should be presented to the public in a way that will allow public enlightenment and consensus formulation. A frank, open, and honest debate of national priorities and requirements will go far to erasing one of the major domestic legacies of Vietnam, skepticism regarding governmental motives and actions.

Thus by mobilizing the first four domestic variables, the "grand strategist" (i.e. the "fifth variable") may also be able to mobilize the nation behind a national strategic doctrine. It should be noted that action, such as recommended above would be a challenging task. The formation of consensus regarding foreign policy goals has occurred only rarely in American history, such as during the Second World War and in the late 1950s and early 1960s. However, failure to build such a consensus should not be taken as a sign of "weakness" or "decline" but rather as a reaffirmation of the pluralistic nature of the domestic American society, a fact amply demonstrated by the information presented in this thesis. The sign of "decline" would be in the failure to attempt to mold a national consensus for a strategic doctrine, and instead allow these pluralistic domestic forces to produce a drift into ad hoc strategic thinking.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Leslie H. Gelb, "National Security and New Foreign Policy," Parameters Vol. VII, No. 3, (1977), pp. 73-80.

[2]Statement by Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 16, 1980, Current Policy No. 219, United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, DC, pp. 1-2.

[3]Gallup Opinion Index #175, February, 1980. p. 11., However, it is also worthy of note that in March 1980, "inflation/high cost of living" had once again superseded "international problems" as the most important problem.

[4]Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics, New York: Columbia, 1966, p. 1.

[5]Donald M. Snow, "Current Nuclear Deterrence Thinking: An Overview and Reviews," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 23 No. 3, September, 1979, pp. 447-448.

[6]Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, "Vietnam, Consensus, and the Belief Systems of American Leaders," World Politics, Vol. XXXII, No. 1, October, 1979, p. 5.

[7]Huntington, op. cit., pp. 248-250.

[8]Henry S. Rowen, "Formulating Strategic Doctrine," in Commission of the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, Adequacy of the Current Organization: Defense and Arms Control, Vol. 4, App. K, Washington: GPO, 1975, p. 232.

[9]See DOD Annual Report for FY 1966, Washington: GPO, 1967, pp. 3-12.

[10]Graham T. Allison, "U.S. Strategic Offensive Forces in the 1960s," in Adequacy of Current Organization, op. cit., p. 143.

[11]Statement of the Secretary of Defense, DOD Annual Report for FY 1965, Washington: GPO, 1967, p. 12.

[12]The Military Balance 1965-1966, London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1965. The institute estimated the following force levels:

	ICBMs	SLBMs	Bombers
US	854	496	630
USSR	270	120	200

[13]The Military Balance 1967-1968, London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967, p. 45.

[14]Graham T. Allison, (1975), op. cit., Table 4, p. 143.

[15]U.S. Department of Defense, "Statement of the Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1969-73 Defense Program and 1969 Defense Budget," Washington: GPO, 1968, pp. 45-46.

[16]Ibid., p. 47.

[17]William R. Van Cleave, "The U.S. Strategic Triad," in James E. Dornan, Jr., ed. The U.S. War Machine, New York: Crown, 1978, p. 62.

[18]Thomas W. Wolfe, The SALT Experience, Cambridge: Ballinger, 1979, Table 5-1, p. 97.

[19]James Schlesinger quoted in Van Cleave, op. cit., p. 65.

[20]U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Defense Department Report FY 1975, Washington: GPO, 1974, p. 39.

[21]Ibid., pp. 40-41.

[22]Ibid., pp. 44-45.

[23]U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report Fiscal Year 1981, Washington: GPO, 1980, p. 67.

[24]Ibid., p. 65.

[25]Desmond Ball, "Deja Vu: The Return to Counterforce in the Nixon Administration," California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, December 1974, p. 46.

[26]William R. Van Cleave and S. T. Cohen, Tactical Nuclear Weapons: An Examination of the Issues, New York: Crane Russak, 1978, pp. 86-87.

[27]Bernard Brodie, "The Development of Nuclear Strategy," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 4, Spring, 1978, p. 65.

[28]Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, New Haven: Yale, 1966, p. 71.

[29]Russell F. Weigley, The American War of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, Bloomington: Indiana, 1973, pp. 366-367.

[30]Stephen Maxwell, "Rationality in Deterrence," Adelphi Papers, No. 50, August, 1968, p. 1.

[31]Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon, New York: Harcourt: Brace, 1946, p. 76.

[32]For a concise review of these requirements see, Phil Williams, "Deterrence," in Baylis, et. al., Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies, New York: Homes & Meier, 1975, pp. 70-76.

[33]Ibid., p. 73.

[34]Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959, pp. 272-273.

[35]Ibid., pp. 268-269.

[36]Rowen, op. cit., p. 222.

[37]Henry A. Kissinger quoted in Weigley, op. cit., p. 368.

[38]Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, New York: Columbia, 1974, p. 24.

[39]Giulio Douhet, an Italian aviation officer in the First World War, was one of the early proponents of strategic bombing against civilian and industrial targets in order to achieve victory through destruction of civilian morale. His book, Command of the Air (1921), contains this basic theory and is often cited by proponents of air-power. Although Douhet's assertion that civilian morale could be shattered by aerial bombardment was not borne out by the strategic bombing campaigns of World War II, some scholars believe that the massive destruction of a nuclear campaign supports his thesis. An excellent summary of Douhet's life and theories is found Edward Meade Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavetti to Hitler, Princeton: Princeton, 1943, pp. 485-503.

[40]George and Smoke, op. cit., p. 24.

[41]Huntington, op. cit., p. 51.

[42]Kahan, op. cit., p. 12.

[43]Ibid., pp. 68-69.

[44]See Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 37, January 1959, pp. 211-234.

[45]Kahan, op. cit., pp. 68-69. (Emphasis added)

[46]Frederick H. Gareau, "Nuclear Deterrence: A Discussion of the Doctrine," Orbis, Vol. V, No. 2, Summer 1961, p. 183.

[47]Van Cleave, op. cit., p. 61.

[48]Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office, New York: Harper & Row, 1968.

[49]Ibid., p. 52.

[50]Schelling, op. cit., p. 191.

[51]Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough?: Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, p. 170.

[52]For a complete discussion of the development of this "theory of requirements" see Enthoven and Smith, Ibid., pp. 165-196.

[53]Foy D. Kohler, SALT II: How Not to Negotiate with the Russians, Washington: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1979, p. 5.

[54]Jerome B. Wiesner, "Comprehensive Arms Limitation Systems" in, Donald G. Brennan, ed., Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security, New York: George Braziller, 1961, p. 125.

[55]John E. Endicott and Roy W. Stafford, Jr., eds., American Defense Policy, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1977, p. 37.

[56]Charles Marcy, in United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Perceptions: Relations Between the United States and the Soviet Union, Washington: GPO, 1978, p. 311.

[57]Michael Nacht, "The Delicate Balance of Error," Foreign Policy, No. 19, Summer 1975, p. 170.

[58]Paul Cockle, "Analyzing Soviet Defense Spending: the Debate in Perspective," Survival, Vol. 20, September/October 1978, p. 209.

[59]George Gallup, in Ibid., p. 306.

[60]For an in-depth discussion of the role of advisors in presidential decisionmaking see Alexander George, Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice, Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1980, chapter 4.

[61]Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "Face the Nation," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LII, No. 1344, March 29, 1965, p. 446.

[62]Seyom Brown, The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Johnson, New York: Columbia, 1968, p. 323.

[63]Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "Consular Convention with USSR," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LIII, No. 1366, August 30, 1965, p. 376.

[64]Lyndon Johnson, "Commencement Address at Glassboro State College," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LVIII, No. 1513, June 24, 1968, p. 813. (emphasis added) It is interesting to note that one of those who predicted problems in improving US/USSR relationships because of the Vietnam War was Johnson's own Secretary of State, Dean Rusk.

[65]Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-1969, New York: Popular Library, 1971, p. 489.

[66]Dean Rusk, "Face the Nation," December 1, 1968, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LIX, No. 1539, December 23, 1968, p. 647. (emphasis added)

[67]Robert McNamara, FY 1969 Annual Statement, op. cit., p. 7.

[68]Ibid.

[69]Arthur A. Hartman, "U.S.-Soviet Detente: Perceptions and Purposes," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXX, No. 1823, June 3, 1974, p. 597.

[70]Ibid., p. 600.

[71]James R. Schlesinger, Annual Defense Department Report FY 1975, op. cit., p. 3.

[72]Ibid.

[73]Jimmy Carter, "Naval Academy Commencement Address, June 7, 1978," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 78, No. 2016, July 1978, p. 14. Some of the "significant differences" between the two systems noted by the President were: use of aggressive strength for political advantage and intolerance of internal opposition.

[74]Jimmy Carter, "The State of the Union, 1980," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 80, No. 2035, February 1980, supplement.

[75]George Gallup, op. cit., p. 306.

[76]Charles Marcy, op. cit., p. 312.

[77]FY 1969 Defense Department Report, op. cit., p. 2.

[78]FY 1975 Defense Department Report, op. cit., p. 29.

[79]Bruce Russett and Miroslav Nincic, "American Opinion on the Use of Military Force Abroad," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 91, No. 3, Fall 1976, p. 415.

[80]Charles Lawing, Changing Concern for U.S. National Security, unpublished thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 1978, p. 57.

[81]Samuel Huntington, op. cit., p. 248.

[82]Bruce Russett, "The Americans' Retreat from World Power," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 90, No. 1, Spring 1975, p. 17.

[83]Lawing, op. cit., Table V p. 60, and Appendix C, pp. 118-125.

[84]Russett, op. cit., p. 4.

[85]Ibid., p. 8.

[86]Ibid., p. 10.

[87]Gallup Opinion Index, No. 175, February 1980, p. 9.

[88]Gallup Opinion Index, No. 177, April/May 1980, p. 25.

[89]Russett, op. cit., p. 3.

[90]Gallup Opinion Index, No. 175, February 1980, p. 10. The July 1977 responses were:

Too little: 27%
Too much: 23%
About right: 40%

By January 1980, however, there was a complete reversal in opinion regarding the adequacy of defense spending. The responses of the 25-28 January survey were:

Too little: 49%
Too much: 14%
About right: 24%

[91]Russett and Nincic, op. cit., pp. 416-417. Note responses in Table 1 and 3.

[92]Ibid., p. 413.

[93]Rob Paarlberg, "Forgetting about the Unthinkable," Foreign Policy, No. 10, Spring 1973, p. 138.

[94]Ibid., pp. 138-139.

[95]Russett and Nincic, op. cit., p. 416, Table 3.

[96]Ibid., p. 145.

[97]Ibid., pp. 429-430.

[98]Russett, op. cit., p. 4.

[99]Desmond Ball, op. cit., p. 47.

[100]Russett and Nincic, op. cit., p. 430.

[101]William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani, "Knowledge and Foreign Policy Opinions: Some Models for Consideration," in John C. Mueller, ed., Approaches to Measurement in International Relations: A Non-Evangelical Survey, New York: Meredith, 1969, pp. 56-57.

[102]William J. Evans, "The Impact of Technology on U.S. Deterrent Force," Strategic Review, Vol. IV, No. 3, Summer 1976, p. 41.

[103]John H. Morse, "New Weapons Technologies: Implications for NATO," Orbis, Vol. XIX, No. 2., Summer 1975, pp. 497-498.

[104]Ted Greenwood, Making the MIRV: A Study in Defense Decision-Making, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1975, pp. 141-142.

[105]Ibid., p. 79.

[106]James R. Kurth, "Why We Buy the Weapons We Do," Foreign Policy, No. 11, Summer 1973, pp. 33-35.

[107]Graham T. Allison and Richard Huff, "MIRV," in Commission of the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 153.

[108]Greenwood, op. cit., pp. 62-63.

[109]Allison and Huff, op. cit. p. 153.

[110]Herbert York in Ibid.

[111]Ibid.

[112]Greenwood, op. cit., p. 65.

[113]Snow, op. cit., pp. 448-449.

[114]Van Cleave, op. cit., p. 64.

[115]Albert Wohlstetter, "Legends of the Strategic Arms Race: Part II: The Uncontrolled Upward Sprial," reprint from Strategic Review, Winter 1975, p. 44.

[116]Greenwood, op. cit., p. 145.

[117]Alexander George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No.2, June 1969, pp. 190-222.

[118]Harvey Starr, "Kissinger's Operational Code," Unpublished paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, March 1980, p. 3.

[119]George, op. cit., p. 200.

[120]Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office, New York: Harper and Row, 1968.

[121]Ibid., p. 6.

[122]Henry L. Trewitt, McNamara, New York: Harper and Row, 1971.

[123]McNamara, Essence of Security, op. cit., p. 67.

[124]David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, New York: Random House, 1972.

[125]Trewitt, op. cit., pp. 86-87.

[126]Department of Defense FY 1969 Annual Report, op. cit., p. 56.

[127]Enthoven and Smith, op. cit., pp. 167-168.

[128]McNamara, Essence of Security, p. 64.

[129]Henry Kissinger, The White House Years, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 197.

[130]Starr, op. cit., p. 12.

[131]Ibid., p. 25.

[132]Elmo R. Zumwalt, On Watch: A Memoir, New York: Quadrangel, 1976.

[133]Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957, pp. 240-241.

[134]Ibid., p. 403.

[135]Ibid., p. 405.

[136]Kissinger, The White House Years, p. 216.

[137]Starr, op. cit., p. 17.

[138]Alexander George, Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980, p. 257.

[139]Kissinger, The White House Years, p. 217.

[140]Desmond Ball, op. cit.

[141]It should be noted, however, that a number of Kissinger's public statements while serving as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State (1969-1977) show less consistency than his writings before or since. His statement "What in the name of God is strategic superiority..." in July 1974 as well as a number of agreements concluded during SALT (such as incentives to encourage the Soviets to place their missiles in the SLBM force) could lead one to conclude that, in spite of his doctrinal position, he supported MAD through his actions. Starr argues that positions such as the July 1974 statement show Kissinger's realization of the changed strategic balance and thus demonstrate a logical progression of his thought process. However, the July 1974 statement could also suggest Kissinger's inability to implement his pre-1969 doctrine.

[142]James R. Schlesinger, "A Testing Time for America," Fortune, Vol. XCIII, No. 2, February 1976, pp. 75-77 and 147-153.

[143]Ibid., pp. 76-77.

[144]Ibid., p. 77.

[145]Ibid., p. 75.

[146]Douglas Kinnard, "James R. Schlesinger as Secretary of Defense," Naval War College Review, Vol. XXXII, No. 6, November-December 1979, p. 23.

[147]Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 153.

[148]Ibid., p. 77.

[149]Kinnard, op. cit., p. 29.

[150]George, Presidential Decision-Making, p. 161.

[151]Desmond Ball, "Developments in U.S. Strategic Nuclear Policy Under the Carter Administration," ACIS Working Paper No. 21, February 1980, p. 2.

[152]George, Presidential Decision-Making, p. 159.

[153]Ball, Developments, p. 3.

[154]Ibid.

[155]For an excellent description of the comprehensive proposal and the Soviet reaction to it see Thomas Wolfe, The SALT Experience, pp. 221-224.

[156]James Fallows, "The Passionless Presidency: The Trouble with Jimmy Carter's Administration," The Atlantic, May 1979, p. 44. Fallows also faults Carter for restricting his view of history to "Vietnam" and "Watergate," suggesting that a wider historical perspective may have assisted him in evaluating both potential domestic and international pitfalls.

[157]Ibid., p. 43.

[158]FY 1969 Defense Department Annual Report, p. 151.

[159]Edward J. Laurance, "The Changing Role of Congress in Defense Policy-Making," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 20, No. 2, June 1976, p. 222.

[160]Ibid., p. 228.

[161]Kissinger, The White House Years, p. 214.

[162]Laurance, op. cit., p. 246.

[163]A minor example of this shift in attitude is the format of the Annual DOD Report. Through fiscal year 1968 the Annual Report was of "paperback size" and ran less than 400 pages and essentially summarized the spending of the past year. However, with FY 1969 the Defense Budget was presented as a proposal with specific justifications in terms of threats and mission requirements. The FY 1981 budget was an oversized volume, 326 pages in length.

[164]Harlandi B. Moulton, From Superiority to Parity: The United States and the Strategic Arms Race, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973, p. 283.

[165]See, for example, Greenwood, op. cit., p. 56.

[166]Question (1961): George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971, New York: Random House, 1972, p. 1734.

Question (1976): "The Gallup Opinion Index," #139, February 1977, p. 13.
It is also worthy of note that this is a similar question has not been asked since -976.

[167]Michael Nacht, "The War in Vietnam: The Influence of Concepts on Policy," ACIS Working Paper, No. 26, July 1980, p. 2.

[168]Laurance, op. cit., p. 246.

[169]Michael Nacht, "The Delicate Balance of Error," Foreign Policy, No. 19, Summer 1975, p. 163.

[170]John E. Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973, p. 54.

[171]Laurance, op. cit., p. 247. (emphasis added)

[172]Domestic public opinion regarding strategic weapon systems can also be effected by external sources as was indicated by domestic anti-neutron bomb activities following the Soviet propaganda "blitz" regarding this "capitalistic weapon which destroyed people and not buildings."

[173]Greenwood, op. cit., p. 145.

[174]Wolfe, op. cit., p. 162. Wolfe's account of the Schlesinger-Kissinger controversy is a relatively dispassionate one, providing insights into the belief-systems and positions of both participants.

[175]Holsti and Rosenau, op. cit., p. 2.

[176]Holsti and Rosenau draw attention specifically to foreign service and military officers who entered service during the war and only now are entering middle and upper decision-making levels.

[177]Holsti and Rosenau, op. cit., p. 45.

[178]William M. Lunch and Peter W. Sperlich, "American Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam," The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. XXXII, No. 1, March 1979, p. 43. Lunch and Sperlich rightly qualify their statement by noting that postwar skepticism did not result totally from Vietnam, although the war was a major contributory factor to it.

[179]Nacht, The War in Vietnam, p. 22.

[180]Sam Nunn, "Defense with a Capital 'D'," Washington Post, October 31, 1980, p. 15.

[181]Ibid.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Books and Articles:

Almond, Gabriel A., "Public Opinion and National Security Policy," in Morton Berkewitz and P.G. Beck, eds., American National Security: A Reader in Theory and Policy, New York: The Free Press, 1965.

Ball, Desmond, Deja Vu: The Return to Counterforce in the Nixon Administration, paper presented at the California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, December, 1974.

_____ "Developments in U.S. Strategic Nuclear Policy Under the Carter Administration," ACIS Working Paper, No. 21, February 1980.

Baylis, John, Ken Booth, John Garnett, & Phil Williams, Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies, New York: Holmes & Meier, 1975.

Brown, Seyom, The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Johnson, New York: Columbia, 1968.

Beard, Edmund, Developing the ICBM: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics, New York: Columbia, 1976.

Brodie, Bernard, "The Development of Nuclear Strategy," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 4., Spring 1978, pp. 65-83.

_____ Strategy in the Missile Age, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959.

Cockle, Paul, "Analyzing Soviet Defense Spending: the Debate in Perspective," Survival, Vol. 20, September/October 1978, pp. 209-219.

Endicott, John E., and Roy W. Stafford, Jr., eds., American Defense Policy, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1977.

Enthoven, Alain C., and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough?: Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969, New York: Harper & Row, 1971.

Evans, William J., "The Impact of Technology on U.S. Deterrent Forces," Strategic Review, Vol. IV, No. 3, Summer 1976, pp. 40-47.

Fallows, James, "The Passionless Presidency: The Trouble with Jimmy Carter's Administration," The Atlantic, May 1979, pp. 33-48, and June 1979, pp. 75-81.

Feld, B. T., T. Greenwood, G. W. Rathjens, and S. Weinberg, eds., Impact of New Technologies on the Arms Race, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1971.

Foster, Richard B., "From Assured Destruction to Assured Survival," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1980, pp. 53-74.

Gamson, William A., and Andre Modigliani, "Knowledge and Foreign Policy Opinions: Some Models for Consideration," in John C. Mueller, ed., Approaches to Measurement in International Relations: A Non-Evangelical Survey, New York: Meredith, 1969.

Gareau, Fredrick H., "Nuclear Deterrence: A Discussion of the Doctrine," Orbis, Vol. V, No. 2, Summer 1961, pp. 182-197.

Gelb, Leslie H., and Ricahrd K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked, Washington, DC: Brookings, 1979.

_____ "National Security and New Foreign Policy," Parameters, Vol. VII, No. 3, 1977, pp. 73-80.

George, Alexander, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2, June 1969, pp. 190-222.

_____ Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice, Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1980.

_____, and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, New York: Columbia, 1974.

Gray, Colin S., "What Rand Hath Wrought," Military Review, May 1972, pp. 22-23.

Greenwood, Ted, Making the MIRV: A Study in Defense Decision Making, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1975.

Halberstam, David, The Best and the Brightest, New York: Random House, 1972.

Halperin, Morton, and Jeremy J. Stone, "Comments," Foreign Policy, No. 16, Fall 1974, pp. 88-92.

Holst, Johan Jorgen, "Is There a Strategic Arms Race?," Foreign Policy, No. 19, Summer 1975, pp. 155-163.

Holsti, Ole R., and James N. Rosenau, "Vietnam, Consensus, and the Belief Systems of American Leaders," World Politics, Vol. XXXII, No. 1., October 1979, pp. 1-56.

Hoffman, Stanley, Primacy or World Order: American Foreign Policy Since the Cold War, New York: McGraw, Hill, 1978.

Huntington, Samuel P., The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1966.

Jervis, Robert, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Johnson, Lyndon B., The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-1969, New York: Popular Library, 1971

Kahan, Jerome H., Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy, Washington: Brookings, 1975.

Kalb, Marvin, and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1974.

Kinnard, Douglas, "James R. Schlesinger as Secretary of Defense," Naval War College Review, Vol. XXXII, No. 6, November-December, 1979, pp. 22-34.

Kissinger, Henry A., Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957.

_____ The White House Years, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1979.

Kohler, Foy D., SALT II: How Not to Negotiate with the Russians, Washington: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1979.

Kurth, James R., "Why We Buy the Weapons We Do," Foreign Policy, No. 11, Summer 1973, pp. 33-56.

Laurance, Edward J. "The Changing Role of Congress in Defense Policy-Making," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 20, No. 2, June 1976, pp. 213-253.

Lowe, George E., The Age of Deterrence, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1964.

Lunch, William M., and Peter W. Sperlich, "American Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam," The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. XXXII, No. 1, March 1979, pp. 21-44.

McNamara, Robert S., The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office, New York: Harper and Row, 1968.

Mandelbaum, Michael and William Schneider, "Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy," in Kenneth A. Oyo, Donald Rothchild, and Robert J. Lieber, Eagle Entangled: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Complex World, New York: Longman, 1979.

Maxwell, Stephen, "Rationality in Deterrence," Adelphi Papers, No. 50, August 1968.

Morse, John H., "New Weapons Technologies: Implications for NATO," Orbis, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Summer 1975, pp. 497-513.

Moulton, Harland B., From Superiority to Parity: The United States and the Strategic Arms Race, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973.

Mueller, John E., War, Presidents and Public Opinion, New York: Wiley and Sons, 1973.

Nacht, Michael L., "The Delicate Balance of Error," Foreign Policy, No. 19, Summer 1975, pp. 163-177.

_____"The War in Vietnam: The Influence of Concepts on Policy," ACIS Working Paper, No. 26, July 1980.

Nitze, Paul H., "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 2, January 1976, pp. 207-232.

Nutter, G. Warren, Kissinger's Grand Design, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1975.

Paarlberg, Robert, "Forgetting About the Unthinkable," Foreign Policy, No. 10, Spring 1973, pp. 137-140.

Potter, William C., "Coping with MIRV in a MAD World," Paper prepared for the Arms Control and Disarmament Program, Stanford University, December 1976.

Russett, Bruce, "The American's Retreat from World Power," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 90, No. 1, Spring 1975, pp. 1-21.

_____ and Miroslav Nincic, "American Opinion on the Use of Force Abroad," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 91, No. 3, Fall 1976, pp. 411-431.

Schelling, Thomas C., Arms and Influence, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.

Schlesinger, James R., "A Testing Time for America," Fortune, Vol. XIII, No. 2, February 1976, pp. 75-77 & 147-153.

Snow, Donald M., "Current Nuclear Deterrence Thinking: An Overview and Review," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3, September 1979, pp. 445-486.

Starr, Harvey, "Kissinger's Operational Code," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, California, March 1980.

Trewitt, Henry L., McNamara, New York: Harper and Row, 1971.

Van Cleave, William R., "The U.S. Strategic TRIAD," in James E. Dornan, Jr., ed., The U.S. War Machine, New York: Crown, 1978.

_____, and S. T. Cohen, Tactical Nuclear Weapons: An Examination of the Issues, New York: Crane Russak, 1978.

Warner, Edward L., "Douhot, Mitchell, Seversky: Theories of Air Warfare," in Edward Mead Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1941, pp. 485-503.

Weigley, Russell F., The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1973.

Wiesner, Jerome B., "Comprehensive Arms-Limitation Systems," in Donald G. Brennan, ed., Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security, New York: George Braziller, 1961, pp. 198-233.

Wohlstetter, Albert, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 37, January 1959, pp. 211-234.

_____, "Legends of the Strategic Arms Race: Part II: The Uncontrolled Upward Spiral," Strategic Review, Winter 1975, (reprint), pp. 31-48.

York, Herbert F., "Military Technology and National Security," in Scientific American, Progress in Arms Control?, San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1979.

_____, Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970.

B. Government Documents:

Commission for the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, Adequacy of Current Organization: Defense and Arms Control Vol. 4, App. K, Washington DC: GPO, June 1975.

United States Department of Defense, Annual Report for FY 1965, Washington: GPO, 1967.

Annual Report for FY 1966, Washington: GPO, 1967.

Report of the Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1969-1973 Defense Program and 1969 Defense Budget, Washington: GPO, 23 February 1968.

Report of the Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget and the FY 1975-1979 Defense Program, Washington: GPO, March 1974.

Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the Congress on the FY 1981 Budget, FY 1982 Authorization Request and FY 1981-1985 Defense Programs, Washington: GPO, January 1980.

United States Department of State Bulletin

United States Department of State, "Secretary Muskie on U.S. Nuclear Strategy," Current Policy, No. 219, September 16, 1980.

"The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks," Current Policy, No. 72A, May 1979.

United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Perceptions: Relations Between the United States and the Soviet Union, Washington: GPO, 1978.

C. Periodicals:

The Defense Monitor

Los Angeles Times

The New York Times

The Washington Post

D. Miscellaneous:

Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1965-1966, London: ISS, 1965.

The Military Balance 1967-1968, London: ISS, 1967.

Charles W. Lawing, Changing Concern for U.S. National Security, M.A. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 1978.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

		No. Copies
1.	Defense Technical Information Center Cameron Station Alexandria, Virginia 22314	2
2.	Library, Code 0142 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	2
3.	Department Chairman, Code 56 Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	1
4.	Professor Edward J. Laurance, Code 56Lk (Thesis Advisor) Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	2
5.	Professor David S. Yost, Code 56Yo (Thesis Advisor) Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	2
6.	Professor Michael Clough, Code 56Cg Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	1
7.	LCDR Marc A. Helgeson, USN (Student) 8801 Dianne Place Springfield, Virginia 22152	1
8.	Professor Randolph Siverson Department of Political Science University of California Davis, California 95616	1
9.	LCDR Peter Smith, USN USS W.S. SIMS (FF-1059) FPO, New York 09587	1


DATE
ILMED
-8