A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam. Volume I. The Enemy
Abstract
The chapters of this volume describe several key insights concerning the Communist Vietnamese in the period 1945-1975. These insights relate to decisions that were made and events that occurred, from which can be derived lessons concerning the Vietnam War. By their very nature, insights are specifically focused on the people, places, and historical events associated with Southeast Asia in general and, in this volume, particularly with the Communist Vietnamese. Lessons, on the other hand, must have a more general application if they are to be of value in the future. The lessons from Vietnam are not new to warfare. In the main they are lessons from earlier conflicts that were forgotten, misunderstood, or misapplied. Not surprisingly, however, a few lessons were applied properly. Because lessons are general in nature they usually appear to be platitudes. So, too, do the principles of war or the observation of von Clausewitz, or Napoleon, or Sun Tzu. This executive summary sets forth some insights and lessons that emerge solely from this volume -- The Enemy. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Nov 30, 1979
- Accession Number
- ADA096424
Entities
Organizations
- Braddock Dunn & McDonald