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

A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam

VOLUME IV
U.S. DOMESTIC FACTORS INFLUENCING VIETNAM WAR POLICY MAKING

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AWCI

9 March 1981

SUBJECT: Declassification of the BDM Study, "The Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam"

Defense Technical Information Center
ATTN: Ms. Betty Weatherholtz
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22314

1. Your organization was on the distribution list for the BDM study, "The Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam." The study was assigned AD numbers B048632L through 41L.

2. In December 1980, the Army War College Security Office notified all recipients of the study by telephone that it contained classified information and should be secured.

3. BDM now has revised the appropriate pages of the study to delete all classified information and has conformed to all other requirements required by the clearance review.

4. A revised copy of the study which is unclassified and approved for public release is inclosed. DTIC Form 50's are inclosed for assignment of new AD numbers.

Incls
as

Andrew C. Remson, Jr.
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A STUDY OF STRATEGIC LESSONS LEARNED IN VIETNAM. VOLUME IV. US DOMESTIC FACTORS INFLUENCING VIETNAM WAR POLICY MAKING.

This draft report is submitted to DAMO-SSP.

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FOREWORD

This study is a final draft submitted to DAMO-SSP for review in accordance with the provisions of Contract No. DAAG 39-78-C-0120.

This task is to identify and analyze lessons that should be learned from two decades of direct US involvement in the affairs of South Vietnam. This is Volume IV of the Study.

Volume I	The Enemy
Volume II	South Vietnam
Volume III	US Foreign Policy and Vietnam 1945-1975
Volume IV	**US Domestic Factors Influencing Vietnam War Policy Making**
Volume V	Planning the War
Volume VI	Conduct of the War
Volume VII	The Soldier
Volume VIII	The Results of the War

"The views of the authors do not purport to reflect the positions of the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense."

PREFACE

A. FOREIGN POLICY MAKING AND DOMESTIC FACTORS

In democratic states, public approval of foreign policy initiatives is an essential component in the long-term success of the policies. Without public support, governmental leaders will eventually be faced with the necessity of changing their policies or stepping down. The force of public opinion on a government is determined by a number of things, including the nature of the reaction to specific policies, the constitution of the state, the evolution of the state's governmental traditions, etc. This volume explores the impact of domestic factors on the US policy making during the Vietnam War era and upon the conduct of the war. Its purpose is to analyze the impact of domestic factors in order to establish a base for developing lessons that might be learned from the Vietnam War experience. The lessons that will be described in this volume will focus on the nature of the government's reaction to various segments of the public and will examine the impact the Vietnam war era had on the constitutional process of the United States.

Volume III of this study examines the influence of foreign affairs on the US policy-making process. It also describes in detail the process itself as it was manifested in the operations of the successive administrations that wrestled with the problem of US involvement in Southeast Asia from 1945 to 1975. Because of the state of the policy-making process during most of those years, the executive branch of the US government made foreign policy, with the Congress reviewing but also consistently approving policy initiatives. Only in the late 1960's and early 1970's did the Congress begin to take an active role in the making of policy. Because of the general dominance of the executive branch in making Vietnam-related policy, Volume III deals largely with the policy-making process within that branch of the federal government. This volume examines domestic factors that influenced both the executive branch and the Congress in policy-making. Consequently, it is closely linked to the discussion of the

policy-making process of separate administrations found in Volume III, but it also focuses on the development of congressional sentiment in response to changing public attitudes toward the Vietnam war policies being pursued by the executive branch.

Changing public attitudes toward the war produced acrimonious debate not only in the government but also amongst the general population. There were those who disagreed violently with the policies the government was pursuing, and those who associated attacks on policy with attacks on the entire US governmental process. Indeed, more radical critics of the war generalized their opposition into a call to upset the social as well as the political order of the country. This process of generalizing from either public defense of policy or public criticism of policy to wider positions concerning American government and society led to polarization of attitudes that went far beyond discussion of the war policies themselves. Increasingly in the 1960's and early 1970's, the war became the focus, a surrogate issue for other problems confronting the United States, problems including race relations, distribution of wealth, sexual inequality, etc. The challenge in analyzing the individual domestic factors that influenced the Vietnam war policy-making process lies in assessing their separate impacts while remembering the mutual interactions.

Examination of the relationship of important and widely based societal problems that became involved in the Vietnam war debate requires careful definition. Description of the problems and their separate evolutions over the years of US involvement in Vietnam would require volumes. To avoid overly long presentations of material and to focus on the purpose of this volume, the examination of the domestic factors that influenced Vietnam war policies will have two characteristics:

(1) The examination will be analytical, not descriptive.

(2) The analysis will focus on developing lessons that will be useful to the government and the US Army.

B. CONTEXT OF THE PROBLEM

Two key issues lie behind this study. Their scope and importance are such that this exploration of the impact of domestic forces on the Vietnam War policy-making process can serve as a base for defining the issues, but not for developing definitive analysis of them. The two issues are:

(1) The general importance of public sentiment to the foreign policy-making process.

(2) The related question of the importance of public support for war efforts.

These two questions are both linked closely to the nature of the American democratic system. In both, the fundamental concern is what the relationship of policies should be to the public's will. Another way of stating the first issue might be: what should be the impact of public opinion on the federal government's policy-making process? The experience of the Vietnam War indicates clearly that the subgroups in American society have varying degrees of impact on the policy-making process depending on the political balance within the government and the personalities of the decision makers themselves. This volume examines the relative importance of these subgroups in affecting policy making, as understood from examination of the particular historical circumstances surrounding the Vietnam War. The volume does not attempt to generalize from those circumstances to a description of the American political process, though it does provide insights to the complexity of that process.

The second issue, the importance of public sentiment in support of war efforts, is tied to the first. It is important to understand how changes in public sentiment may have affected the war policies. This examination leaves aside the larger question of whether a democracy like the United States has the societal strength to sustain a protracted limited war effort. This volume is restricted to discussion of the particular domestic forces that influenced Vietnam War policies.

Three factors make it dangerous to generalize from that experience to discussion of the nature of American democracy at war. They are:

(1) The lack of historical perspective on the war period. The changes that have taken place in the United States since the end of the war indicate that many of the problems that were observed during the war period and the issues that seemed of greatest importance at the time now occupy lower places on the nation's scale of priorities. The passage of another decade will allow for a far better historical perspective for assessing the impact of movements and the relative importance of issues of the 60's and 70's.

(2) Until very recently there has not been close, widespread examination of the Vietnam War era. There was general reluctance to look back at the time which witnessed extreme division of US society. As a result, many of the misconceptions that were developed in the heat of the movement are still widely held. It will take wide-ranging and intense scholarly efforts to correct many of these misconceptions.

(3) There has been considerable material published in recent years concerning the Vietnam War era by decision makers in the government and by military figures. General understanding of the period has not been developed well enough to be able to place large and important parts of this material in objective, historical perspective.

Thus, this volume explores the nature of the domestic forces that influenced the Vietnam War and traces the interaction of these forces without attempting to generalize from this to a wide-ranging discussion of the nature of American democracy. Nevertheless, the issues this study raises indicate that given the appropriate historical context and scholarly application, the Vietnam War era will prove to be singularly important for analyzing the American political system and the interaction of segments of US society.

C. METHODOLOGY

In pursuit of the analytical objectives of this volume, the study will examine (Chapter 1) first the broad nature of support for the war as it is understood at this time. Thereafter, the study will focus on changes within US society and upon the support for the war that existed among important subgroups of the American society (Chapter 2). This effort is designed to provide a base for later consideration of the impact various subgroups had on the policy-making process. Important to keep in mind is the fact that the impact of the subgroups upon policy making may be more indirect than direct and hence less immediately obvious. Particular emphasis will be devoted to the leadership elements of these subgroups where they can be identified. The study also examines (Chapter 3) the impact of the media both directly upon the policy-making process through influence on political figures and indirectly by examination of the impact media presentation of the news had upon the public. Economic factors that influenced the war and the role of the war in shaping the US economy are also analyzed (Chapter 4). The consideration of the impact of all these domestic US factors on the political system and the response of the political system to these factors is the key to understanding the importance of domestic factors in the formulation of the policies that were being pursued by the government (Chapter 5). The study concludes with examination of the impact the changing political mood of the Congress and the nation had upon the executive branch's authority in conducting foreign policy. Thus, the study traces the impact of individual domestic factors on the political system, upon the policy-making process and specifically upon the conduct of the Vietnam War.

D. HISTORICAL-CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIEW OF VOLUME IV

Figure IV-1 depicts the major domestic social, economic and political factors influencing Vietnam War policy making.



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Figure IV-1. Chronological - Histo


1963
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JOHNSON
NIXON
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JOHNSON SENDS 22,000 US TROOPS TO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
REPEAL OF SOUTHEAST ASIA RESOLUTION
NIXON TO PRC
PRESIDENTIAL REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON TEXT OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
WATERGATE
AMENDMENT TO FMS ACT
SOUTHEAST ASIA RESOLUTION
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE HEARINGS
NATIONAL COMMITMENTS RESOLUTION
MINING OF HAIPHONG ORDEPED
WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
HUGHES RYAN AMENDMENT ON CIA OPERATIONS
BOMBING AND MINING OPERATIONS IN AND OVER DRV
NON MOBILIZATION OF RESERVES
SOUTHEAST ASIA RESOLUTION
US TROOPS TO GVN
BOMBING OF DRV
DIEM OVERTHROW
SEEK NEGOTIATIONS
VIETNAMIZATION GRADUAL WITHDRAWAL NEGOTIATIONS
OPERATIONS IN AND OVER CAMBODIA
PARIS PEACE ACCORDS
CONGRESSIONAL AID CUTS
FALL OF PHUOC LONG
MARCH ON WASHINGTON
NATIONAL MOBILIZATION COMMITTEE DEMONSTRATIONS
NATIONWIDE PROTESTS
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KENT STATE
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MAY 2ND COMMITTEE ORGANIZE PROTEST
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10% SURCHARGE SIGNED INTO LAW
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R.F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATED
LABOR DISENCHANTED WITH VIETNAM POLICIES
SUMMER PROJECT
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Vietnam War demonstrated the important role played by domestic factors in foreign policy making. Social change, the US economy, the media, and the American political scene contributed to the shaping of US involvement in the war. Nevertheless, American domestic politics strongly influenced the course of US involvement in the war. While presidential politics determined the direction of US involvement through the 1960s, congressional reassertion of its constitutional function to advise and consent on foreign policy matters and more specifically on war-related issues characterized the 1970s. The following insights and lessons are derived from each of the five chapters of Volume IV.

INSIGHTS

Support for the war

- From 1950 to 1965, the American public was not particularly concerned with military events in Vietnam; only career US military and civilian personnel were involved on a comparatively low-key basis in Vietnam, and media attention and public opinion polls on the matter were insignificant. There was neither strong public support for nor opposition to USG policies and presence in Vietnam.

- With the escalation of the Vietnam War, general public support ebbed. Yet presidents were still able to evoke strong showings of public support in the opinion polls for decisive actions in specific stituations whether those actions were escalatory or deescalatory.

- Polarization of opinion on the war between the young and the educated people on one hand and the blue collar workers on the other is not apparent in the opinion polls. Indeed, the bitterness of public feeling is largely the result of the rhetoric of the leaders of both extremes. Blacks, however, did express consistently lower levels of support for the war than did the general population.

- Contrary to the widely held notion that the less educated a person is, the more easily influenced he is by the news media, the most volatile fluctuations in public opinion toward the Vietnam War occurred among the more educated segments of society.

- As during the Korean War, public support generally lessened over time as the fighting dragged out inconclusively and as the costs rose: public support for Vietnam differed from that shown for the Korean War, because in Vietnam it was more difficult to "prove" direct aggression or that "vital" US interests were at stake.

LESSONS

The American people have demonstrated that in spite of declining support for the war over time, they are willing to follow the president's leadership in specific crises when decisive and positive actions are taken.

A clear and certain presidential commitment to a particular foreign policy is essential to achieving public support for such policies.

Positive results are required for maintaining a high degree of popular support for US commitments to war or to contingency operations. In the absence of obvious success, American public support tends to decline gradually over time as casualties and other costs mount.

INSIGHTS

Changing Society

- The post-World War II years demonstrated that the American social and political systems were sufficiently flexible in meeting both domestic and foreign challenges.

- By 1968, however, the national consensus had shattered. Public dissent was expressed through urban riots and massive antiwar and antigovernment demonstrations by members of various subgroups of society.

- The US antiwar movement did not ever become a truly broad-based movement and remained identified to a degree with a radical and leftist constituency. It did give hope and encouragement to the Lao Dong leadership of the DRV, however.

- The period of the Vietnam War coincided with remarkable changes in American society, including: increasing mobility; declining family and community influence; increasing affluence for most; civil rights and civil disobedience; sexual and moral revolutions; women's liberation; education upheavals; anti-authoritarianism, etc. The Vietnam War and the dissent that arose from US involvement were not the cause of these social changes that were underway in the 1960s. The roots of these changes were extant long before the war. Yet US involvement in the war may have accelerated the spread of antigovernment sentiment.

LESSONS

Despite the apparent social upheaval of the 1960s and early 1970s, the American social and political systems proved flexible enough to adjust to that dissent.

The social fabric of the United States has changed significantly as has public appreciation of the government and the armed forces. Top-level decision makers must continue to evaluate the domestic context within which they are making decisions in crisis situations.

INSIGHTS

The Media and the Vietnam the War

- Media/government relations are adversarial by the very the nature of the two institutions. Politicians look at short-term--getting past the next election or the next sticky period with Congress. Media, on the other hand, are impatient and become bored easily with unspectacular gains or long lead times for policies to become successful.

- Presidential behavior and the plausibility of presidential policies are essential to understanding media treatment--with its Washington orientation--of the Vietnam War as a whole.

- Media reporting on the Vietnam War contributed to the broadening "credibility gap" between the executive branch and the public. Too often reporters in Vietnam conveyed to the American public news that demonstrated the weaknesses of presidential policies.

- Censorship in Vietnam was determined early in the war to be infeasible. With the advances in media technology, news could be transmitted quickly out of Vietnam without relying on military communications systems. Further, the imposition of news censorship would have called more public attention to the ongoing war, which the successive administrations preferred to downplay.

- The New York Times and to a lesser extent The Washington Post are considered the "validaters" of news provided by the wire services, AP and UPI. Further, these papers decide which news topics are important and thereby set a nationwide pattern. During the Vietnam War US decision makers were influenced to a great extent by the print media and specifically by these two major US papers.

- Since the "hawk" side of the debate had a diminishing number of "respectable" and vocal champions in Congress, the JCS position on what was needed "to win" rarely got aired; the debate in 1965-68 was depicted as a fight between the administration and its dovish critics.

LESSONS

Each major policy alternative must have respectable spokesmen in Washington for it to be reflected in the media, and these spokesmen must have an articulate, well-informed group in Congress, particularly if the issue is an alternative to administration policy.

News censorship is unlikely to be exercized in any future military situation in which the US is directly involved, short of a major war. Hence, it is important that military officials understand that it is the legitimate role of the media to investigate the news, including that which might embarrass a given commander.

To prevent acrimonious press-military relations during crisis situations, the military must emphasize media and public affairs education at all levels of military education.

To enable a public affairs system to function properly in the military services, every significant operation plan must include public affairs guidance, and this guidance must be transmitted swiftly to the appropriate commanders, staffs, and public affairs personnel. The latter must be carefully selected and educated and have the full support of the commander and staff. Not to provide clear public affairs guidance may lead a public affairs officer to dissemble a public impression of uncertainty concerning US foreign policy.

INSIGHTS

US Economy and the Vietnam War

- During the early and mid 1960s, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations took the strength of the US economy for granted and thus formulated substantial military programs with little reference to what turned out to be important economic limitations.
- Economic policies that were called for by the Vietnam War were not perceived to be politically viable. Either the war or the economy had to give, and with the political commitment of successive administrations "not to lose Vietnam," it was the economy that suffered.
- US presidents pursued a "guns and butter" policy in the 1960s. The long-term results were a degradation of both our national security posture and economic health.

LESSONS

Economic advisers to the president must be parties to the process for developing wartime military requirements, programs, strategies, and forecasts if they are to develop stable, realistic, and effective economic programs.

Short-term and relatively limited commitments of military force can probably be sustained and supported by the US economy without serious disruption to the civilian economy. Lacking confident predictions of the magnitude and duration of a military commitment, however, an administration should take steps early to educate both the public and the Congress of the likely economic and political consequences of a prolonged effort. In pursuing such an effort, the USG must "bite the bullet" by cutting back on other spending and by assuring an appropriate tax base.

INSIGHTS

Domestic Political Factors Influencing Vietnam War Decision Making

- Throughout the Vietnam War, each administration feared that the public would not support the president's policies if the full outline of those policies and the means employed toward their attainment became known.
- Although until 1969 Congress avoided a direct confrontation with the executive regarding the authority for war issue, many congressional leaders feared that in pursuing the Vietnam War the several presidents had broadened considerably their war-making powers, almost to the exclusion of Congress.
- Withholding from Congress of foreign policy-related information, historically, has enabled the executive branch to retain control over international relations; the Vietnam war demonstrated the need for increased cooperation and candor vis a vis Congress in foreign policy, and especially in war-related matters.
- Congressional passage of the War Powers Act and other similar legislation was a deliberate step to limit executive authority and to assert congressional prerogative in the foreign policy decision-making process.

LESSONS

Candor on the part of administration officials regarding the true nature of US foreign policies is essential to gaining the support of Congress and the public. Further, it is critical that policy makers formulate and articulate, clear, achievable, and understandable objectives and strategies.

Since a broad consensus on foreign policy ventures involving future limited wars is not likely to be forthcoming due to the heterogeneous and changing nature of Congress, the executive and Congress must develop institutional linkages such that appropriate strategies and policies can be debated and decided upon.

OVERALL LESSON

To pursue a limited war successfully, a US administration must have majority support from the Congress. Congressional support depends upon both the extent to which Congress agrees with the policies and the extent to which the president and his policies are credible. Further, the major foreign policies, especially war-related activities, must not be formulated in isolation from the development of domestic policies, since public and congressional support for the former is strongly influenced by the domestic situation. Presidential failure to consider and to mitigate the impact of foreign ventures upon the domestic environment may result in loss of credibility and the decline of public and congressional support, thereby causing the foreign policy venture to fail.

CHAPTER 1
SUPPORT FOR THE WAR

> Much as we may regret our lack of foresight in evaluating the probable conduct of the two Vietnams, the failure to foresee the internal difficulties at home is much harder to excuse. Indeed, our understanding of our ally and the foreign enemy, defective as it was at the outset, developed more rapidly than did our appreciation of the emergent domestic reactions. The Tonkin Gulf resolution, passed by Congress in 1964 with near unanimity, seemed to indicate such extensive support for our policy as to allay concern for the home front. It was not until 1967 that President Johnson and his advisers became deeply alarmed by the growth of antiwar agitation and by evidence of a widening communication gap between the Administration and the public. Somehow we had failed to observe the philosopher's injunction "know tnyself," and for this failure we were to pay a heavy toll in loss of national unity.1/
>
> Maxwell Taylor

> The preoccupation with the tradition of dissent, however, obscured another basic tradition of U.S. foreign policy, whose neglect has done more to turn public opinion against the war than any other factor. I mean the tradition of consent. Our system assumes a sense of participation by the people in the making of critical national decisions. When that sense of involvement is absent, when the public feels excluded from the judgments that are made in its name, a policy is doomed from inception, no matter how theoretically valid it may be.2/
>
> Bill Moyers

A. INTRODUCTION

The war in Vietnam was perceived by many in the United States to be a test of wills that set the US in opposition to a determined communist adversary. The conflict was seen not only as pitting military forces against each other, but also as involving a struggle between two social

and governmental systems. At issue were the questions of whether a totalitarian communist state would be able to outlast the United States by accepting the military punishment which superior American technology could inflict; or, whether the US will to continue the struggle would be sustained over the long period that would be required to convince the communist leaders in Hanoi that they could neither win the war nor succeed in their efforts to conquer South Vietnam.

As long as they maintained their own will to continue the fight, and as long as the survival of their regime was not militarily threatened, the communist leadership had substantial advantages. The control that they had over the society and economy of North Vietnam allowed them to continue to press on in the conflict even when they were dealt severe reverses in the South and even when the people of the North suffered from US air attacks. The US leadership faced a totally different problem. The will of a democratic state to continue in a war is dependent on two factors:

- Firm governmental commitment to the policies that are being pursued.
- Confidence among the general public that the war policies of the government are both necessary and appropriate to the circumstances and that those policies will succeed.

When they are well synchronized, the combination of official and public support for a war effort can marshal abundant strength for warfighting, as was demonstrated in Great Britain and the United States during World War II.

During the Vietnam War it was apparent to both the US government and the North Vietnamese leadership that the measure of support the American people accorded their government's policies would be a key element in the struggle between the two societies. Both the US government and the North Vietnamese sought to influence the nature of that support using separate and distinct techniques, and the question of whether the American public supported the war policies of the successive administrations became a dominant feature of American political debate. Hanoi's invitation to H. Salisbury, the Assistant Managing Editor of The New York Times, to visit

North Vietnam marked a significant turn in Hanoi's sophistication in dealing with the American public, as Salisbury's visit and subsequent articles served to make the Hanoi regime appear respectable.

There were at least three ways of determining the nature and extent of public support for the war. They were:

- Listening to the debate that was carried on in the United States concerning the war. This approach gave an impression of what the most vocal, and at times most articulate, elements of American society were thinking; but it was an inaccurate barometer of the general public's opinion.3/
- Assessing the public's attitude toward the war by evaluating the trends evinced by voting preferences. This too was inaccurate because voting for individuals, except in very specialized circumstances, reflects attitudes not about a single issue but concerning a range of positions expressed by a candidate.4/
- Evaluating the opinion polls that purported to measure the attitudes of the American public. The opinion pollsters have asserted that their craft matured as a science during the years of US involvement in Vietnam. Since neither of the other two methods of measuring the American public's reaction to the war was satisfactory, the polls came to occupy a new and important part in the US political landscape during the war.

Opinion polls that were taken during the war period provide a unique source of information concerning the public's support of the war, but the greatest caution has to be exercised in using them now to evaluate the nature of public support for the war that existed a decade ago. The polls and the trends they identified must be treated carefully for three reasons:

- The nature of the public's understanding of foreign policy issues.
- The inconsistencies of the polls themselves.
- The use politicians made of the polls to defend their policies.

In the first paragraph of his book, The Anguish of Change, Louis Harris asserts: "72 percent of our people had said [the Vietnam War] was a

'mistake' and 63 percent had said it was 'morally wrong'."5/ In fact, no such percentage of the American people had spoken on the issue. Mr. Harris might more accurately have stated: "our polls indicate that these percentages of the American people held these views."

It is dangerous to take the results of polls as an absolutely accurate reflection of the US public's attitude toward the war because of the varying levels of information held by the public concerning foreign policy issues.6/ Despite the fact that the US government had years to explain the war to the people and that the media reported the war in great detail to the extent that it has been called "the most reported war in history," widespread ignorance existed concerning even basic information about Vietnam and the war. Further, it is important to note that some of the public will take a position on an issue about which they know very little. Hence, it is valid to question the accuracy and even the importance of assertions by pollsters that the US public was taking specific stands on individual policies related to the war effort.7/

The second reason the polls do not provide a very accurate and meaningful description of the public's opinion on the war arises from the weaknesses of the testing instruments themselves, that is weaknesses which are directly linked to problems in the questions asked.8/ Depending on the way the questions were phrased, varying responses could be obtained from the population sample being polled. Typically more "hawkish" responses were elicited by questions that gave information about government policies, that mentioned the President's name and that employed emotion evoking words like "national defense" or "the nation's enemy." Since the reaction to the wording of a question can evoke dramatically different responses from the individuals being polled, great care has to be taken in assessing the meaning of the polls.

Finally, the polls are suspect as measures of the public's reactions to policies because of the use politicians have made of polls and the polling device. Politicians have consistently distorted the implications of polls to support and defend their policies.9/

Having discussed problems associated with opinion polls, it is necessary to note the importance of the data developed during both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. The polls cannot be taken as absolute measures of public support for policies, but they do provide a base for comparing attitudes in two ways - over time and in subgroups of the population. Thus, it is less important to assert that "22.9 percent of the US electorate" agreed with a statement than to note relative changes in opinion that have occurred. Moreover, the public opinion polls provide a way of examining the relative support for war policies that existed in important subgroups. Thus, as a base for describing the evolution of ideas, the opinion polls represent a significant resource.

B. HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR ASSESSING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR VIETNAM WAR POLICIES

1. World War II

At the end of the Vietnam War, writers tended to describe the effects of the war in hyperbolic terms that reflected the tension and disaffection of the moment rather than analysis of the place of the war in US history. One correspondent wrote:

> The United States is emerging from the Vietnam War, the largest, costliest, and most unpopular war in its history, with a badly battered image. 10/

Another writer wrote:

> It has been America's largest war, and it stands alone in our history in being rejected in the popular mind and in the recollections of most of its key participants as a grievous and wasteful mistake. 11/

It is important to examine the validity of these assertions in light of other wars the United States has fought in recent times in order to identify the points of differences between the nature of public support for

the Vietnam War on the one hand and World War II and the Korean on the other. This section will explore two aspects of this question.

- Whether the Vietnam War was the most unpopular war in recent US history, and
- Whether the opposition to the Vietnam war among the US public was unique.

Poll data concerning popular opinion about governmental policies during World War II are relatively scarce. In addition, the craft of poll taking itself was in its infancy and had not reached the sophistication that was claimed for it during the Vietnam War. There is strong feeling, nevertheless, that support for the war policies of the government during World War II was nearly unanimous. Polling information that is available, however, indicates that even during what was presumably the "most popular" of American wars, there was considerable difference of opinion concerning key aspects of the war. For instance, polls indicated that as late as June 1942 only 53 percent of the public felt it had a clear idea of what the war was about. In 1944 less than 60 percent could assert that they understood the goals of the war, and by 1945 80 percent could make that assertion. 12/

Public support for the government's war policies during World War II appears to have grown in response to three factors:

- Sense of participation in a righteous cause.
- Success of American arms.
- Relative brevity of the war effort for the United States.

The atrocities the Japanese had been committing in China from 1937 to 1941 convinced Americans that Japan represented not only a threat to US national interests, but also a barbarous force that endangered Western civilization. The attack on Pearl Harbor confirmed these suspicions. The Germans were similarly regarded by many Americans as enemies of civilization. Thus, the two main enemies of the United States represented evil incarnate to large numbers of Americans. In their evaluation of the Germans, the horror of the Nazi concentration camps came to Americans slowly. In 1943 only 47 percent of those polled were willing to assert that, "two million Jews have been killed in Europe since the war began."

By 1944 76 percent believed it was true that "the Germans have murdered many people in concentration camps," though only 4 percent could guess at the extent of the murders. By May 1945 when the war was over and the news magazines were full of pictures of the German atrocities, 84 percent of the people asserted that the Germans had killed "many people." 13/ Thus, in its beginning, and especially at its end, events demonstrated clearly to the American people the truth of the general belief about the nature of the war against the Axis powers. This force was singularly important in cementing support for the government's war policies among all classes of US society.

After initial reverses in the Pacific, and starting with the battle of Midway in July 1942, American forces began to win victories around the world. The success of American arms was perceived as proof not only of the valor of the American fighting man, but also evidence of the superiority of the American way of life.

The third element that was at the root of public support for the war was the relative brevity of the US participation. The fighting by US forces spanned 3 1/2 years. This experience, the brevity of the Spanish-American War, and the short term of US participation in World War I were significant factors in conditioning Americans to believe that wars could be brought to successful conclusions quickly by the application of American power.

The force of consensus concerning American goals in World War II was sufficient to maintain public support for the war policies in spite of the heavy casualties suffered by US forces and the impact the war had upon civilian life. 14/ Indeed, as the war came to its triumphant conclusion, the American people had an increasingly clearer perception about the nature of the conflict in which they had been engaged.

2. Korean War

The Korean War experience proved to be markedly different from that of World War II. Perhaps a critical difference between the two wars was the limited nature of the Korean War even though we fought under the UN flag. At the beginning of the war in June 1950, results of a Gallup Poll

indicated that 57 percent of those polled believed that the Korean conflict represented the opening round of World War III. The experience of watching the fascist powers attacking weak, smaller states before World War II had convinced many Americans that threats had to be met with strength. Thus, most Americans grimly approved of President Truman's early commitment of US forces to combat in Korea. Columnists Joseph and Stewart Alsop wrote: "The whole momentous meaning of President Truman's decision to meet force with force in Korea can only be grasped in the light of what would surely have happened if he had decided otherwise. For there can be no doubt that the aggression in Korea was planned as only the first of a whole series of demonstrations of Russian strength and Western weakness, designed to lead to the crumbling of the Western will to resist." 15/

In order to find a base for comparing popular support for both the Korean and Vietnam wars, it is important to identify questions that were consistently asked in the public opinion polls in both periods. In addition, the questions should be phrased in a way that provides opportunity for the respondents to express their opinion about the war. There should not be leading questions like, "Do you support our President's efforts to protect the national interests in Korea (Vietnam)?" A question which meets the consistence criteria is the 'mistake question.' During the Korean War Gallup asked "Do you think the United States made a mistake in going into war in Korea, or not?" Concerning Vietnam, Gallup asked, "In view of the developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the United States made a mistake in sending troops to fight in Vietnam?" The question was consistently asked by Gallup during both wars, and the trends evident in his findings were corroborated by the results obtained by other opinion poll organizations during the Korean War. Figure 1-1 indicates the nature of those findings and their relationship to events that occurred during the war. 16/

The figure indicates that initially public support for the Korean War was strong. That support was directly related to the United Nation's approval of US actions and the success of American arms beginning with the Inchon landing and the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter. The data

POLL QUESTION

A. DO YOU THINK THE UNITED STATES MADE A MISTAKE IN GOING INTO WAR IN KOREA, OR NOT?

B. DO YOU THINK THE UNITED STATES WAS RIGHT OR WRONG IN SENDING AMERICAN TROOPS TO STOP THE COMMUNIST INVASION OF SOUTH KOREA?

C. AS THINGS STAND NOW, DO YOU FEEL THAT THE WAR IN KOREA HAS BEEN (WAS) WORTH FIGHTING OR NOT? (SEE ENDNOTE 16)



4541/78W

SOURCE: Based on War, Presidents and Public Opinion

Figure 1-1. Public Support for War Policies During the Korean Conflict

indicate that public support for the war declined sharply after the Chinese Communists entered the war on North Korea's side and the United Nations forces were pushed back down the peninsula. More striking even than the drop of support for the war caused by the Chinese action is the constancy of opinion for the remaining two-and-a-half years of the war. 17/

During the early stages of the Korean war, President Truman was able to count on strong bipartisan support for the war effort. However, congressional support dissipated as public support also weakened. Truman's critics, largely in the right wing of the Republican Party, found a receptive and growing audience as battlefield events took a negative turn and the conflict turned into a bloody stalemate. 18/

In order to compare the public support for the Korean War with that which was evident during World War II, it is helpful to review the factors that influenced public support during World War II: 19/

- A sense of participating in a national crusade,
- Success,
- Time,
- Casualties, and
- Impact on civilian life.

The relative clarity of public support for President Truman's war policies seems to have dissipated as the war dragged on and the US forces were unable to produce a relatively constant string of successes that had characterized World War II. The Chinese intervention reduced the support for the war to a group that did not expect the war to be short, and that core of support seems to have remained constant for the duration of the war in spite of the mounting casualties and evident lack of martial success.

The Korean War lasted 3 1/2 years. The support for the war seems largely to have been impervious to events, though Figure 1-1 indicates a slight decline of support over time. Only at the end of the war when President Eisenhower acted to break the stalemate, did public support for the war appear to rise.

Casualty figures rose rapidly in the early stages of the Korean War as the conflict shifted up and down the peninsula. After mid-1951 when

the peace talks began, the casualty rate dropped. Thus, the establishment of the pattern of more or less constant support for the war coincided with a leveling of casualties.

Finally, civilian life was not as dramatically altered by the war as it had been during World War II. The war period was marked by increasing inflation, but unemployment dropped sharply. Thus, the Korean War had only limited impact on civilian life and was not a significant factor affecting public support for the war.

C. PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE VIETNAM WAR POLICIES

The nature and extent of public support for the Vietnam War is perceived by many to have been markedly different from the support accorded the Korean War. It is important to note differences and similarities that existed in that support and to analyze the factors that influenced the evaluation of that support in the years of the long US involvement in Southeast Asia.

Gallup opinion polls provide a basis for comparing support for the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The response to the question of whether Americans believed the government had made a mistake in sending troops to Vietnam is charted in Figure 1-2. 20/

Again, as with the Korean War opinion polls, it is dangerous to assign too high a value to the percentages indicated in the data. What is of the most interest is the relative support and opposition indicated in the polls over time.

Figure 1-2 indicates that support for the war was actually increasing among those polled in 1965. The polls indicate that support began to fall in late 1965, a decline that continued throughout the war. The weakening of public support was broken into two periods. The first was the rapid decline that occurred from late 1965 to late 1967. The opposition to the war rose as the support fell, and opposition reached new heights in late 1967. 21/ After this period of steep rise in approval of the war, opposition increased less rapidly, and similarly the decline in support for the



4541/78W

SOURCE: Based on War, Presidents and Public Opinion

Figure 1-2. Trends in Public Support for the Vietnam War

war was less precipitous. Nevertheless, the polls suggested that support for the war continued to decline gradually.

The question of whether Americans believed it was a mistake to become involved in Vietnam was designed to register public opinion about the war policy in itself. The question was determinedly non-political in its form because it did not ask whether the person being polled "supported the president" or supported specific actions undertaken by a president. Positive acts by presidents, whether they escalated or de-escalated the war effort gathered significant support from those being polled. For instance in March 1968 Gallup asked, "The North Vietnamese have said that if we agree to stop the bombing, they will agree to the peace negotiations. How do you feel -- should we stop the bombing or not?" 51 percent said they opposed stopping the bombing, while 40 percent favored a halt. Several weeks later, after President Johnson had announced his suspension of the bombing of more than 90 percent of North Vietnam, 64 percent said they favored the halt in bombing. The pattern of substantial public support for the positive specific actions of the presidents was repeated throughout the Vietnam War. 22/ While substantial numbers of Americans consistently followed the president's initiatives, whether they were escalatory or de-escalatory, support for a president on a specific action did not seem to affect the public's general attitude toward the war as measured by the "mistake" question. Thus, pollsters were developing two sets of data. One measured support for the war in itself, the other measured support for specific actions by the presidents. Because the latter category indicated stronger backing of specific war policies than the former, the presidents consistently pointed to these polls to silence their critics who argued that the war did not have the support of the American people. 23/

The similarities between the American public's reaction to the Korean and Vietnam Wars have been studied carefully. John Mueller argues that there is a close correlation between the declines in support for the two wars. By correlating logarithms of the number of casualties suffered at the time of the polls, he has come to the conclusion that while Americans wearied of the wars, they generally seem to have become hardened to the

wars' costs as they proceeded. Mueller does not argue that the American public related their support for the wars to the numbers of casualties themselves, but rather to the timing of the casualties. Thus, Mueller contends that the heavy casualties at the beginning of the Korean War had a greater impact on public opinion than the far larger numbers of casualties suffered by US forces in the latter part of the Vietnam War. Polls indicate that support for both wars slipped substancially in their initial stages as it became clear the wars would be long. Thereafter, the support for the wars seems to have stabilized, though the support for the Vietnam War drifted downward over the years. Nevertheless, there does not seem to have been a dramatic later decline in support for the Vietnam War in spite of the casualties after 1966. 24/

Alonzo Hamby notes that the poll data that is available concerning the public's attitude toward the Korean and Vietnam Wars confounds the impression that the opposition to the Vietnam War was more widespread. He observes that polls do not gauge the intensity of the feeling held by different groups, and argues that the impression of much greater opposition to the Vietnam War than the Korean War was directly related to the differences in political culture that had developed in the US during the late 1950's and 1960's. 25/

L. Elowitz and J. Spanier have concluded that there are significant similarities between the American public's reaction to the Korean and Vietnam Wars and that the US political system seems to "lock in" almost automatically even under less then optimal conditions. They argue that the trends in support for the Korean and Vietnam Wars indicate that once a president is caught between a rising level of public dissatisfaction with war policies and declining congressional support, there is little he can do to stem the erosion of his position. Elowitz and Spanier note that the Korean and Vietnam Wars had a similar impact on the political careers of Presidents Truman and Johnson. 26/

It should be emphasized that the decline of public support for the Korean and Vietnam Wars occurred when US forces were not winning military victories. The public appears to have reacted differently to the heavy

losses among US forces at the beginning of World War II. But support for that war was sustained by the increasing tide of US victories as the war progressed. Further, American support for World War II was sustained in part because of the sense that we were part of an international crusade. Had the Vietnam War been similarly perceived the public might have shown greater support.

While the numbers recorded in polls during the Korean and Vietnam Wars indicate that there were similarities in the public's overall reaction to the two wars, it is clear that the tone and style of opposition to the wars were strikingly different. In order to identify the roots of these differences it is important to examine the social and political contexts in which the oppositions to the wars was set. The balance of this chapter will examine briefly the trends in support of and opposition to the war that were recorded in politically significant subgroups of the population.

D. TRENDS IN SUPPORT OF AND OPPOSITION TO THE VIETNAM WAR AMONG SUBGROUPS OF THE US POPULATION

Examination of the trends in support of and opposition to the Vietnam War among selected subgroups of the US population provides a useful way to understand better public opinion and the perceptions and misperceptions on public opinion and the war. Many elements within subgroups claimed to represent the attitudes and wishes of their entire subgroups. For instance, radical student groups in their opposition to the Vietnam War claimed to represent the position of America's youth. It is important to describe the nature and extent of opposition and support for the Vietnam War which existed in politically important subgroups to be able to evaluate the claims of these vocal and assertive elements within each subgroup. Thus, with the example of the radical youths, it is important to assess the strength of their political position Did they represent the opinions and attitudes of millions of American students and young people, or did they represent the position of only a small segment of the youth subgroup?

Discussed below are the following subgroups which had elements within them that were politically active during the Vietnam War period:

- youth
- intellectuals
- blacks
- labor.

1. Youth

Among the subgroups of the US population that had significant political impact during the Vietnam War was youth, as defined by individuals between the ages of 18 and 24. It was this group that provided the college students and that filled the ranks of the Armed Forces. The 1960's began as a period dominated by a theme of youthfulness. The decade saw the passing of leadership from one generation to another. John F. Kennedy was acutely conscious of this passing, and he sought to stamp his administration with a look of strength and vitality that he perceived had been lacking in the older generation's conduct of the nation's affairs. Before his election he noted:

> Everyone thinks the significance of my winning in November would be to prove a Catholic could make it all the way to the White House. But the real significance will be that we will have by-passed a whole generation. Never again will anyone from Stevenson's generation be president. I think the establishment resents our youth as much as anything else. But it is time the vigor of youth took over.27/

Demographic characteristics of the nation also made youthfulness a dominant theme in the 1960's. In the 1960's the 18-24 year old age group was expanding more rapidly than the total populati··. The rapid increase in the young-adult popu'ation may be traced back to the rise in births during the 1940's, from 2.6 million in 1940 to a peak of 3.8 million in 1947. Beginning in 1958 the babies of the "baby boom" began to reach 18. The number of 18-24 year olds expanded from 15.3 million in 1958 to 22.8 million in 1968. The rising numbers of young adults and American affluence

of college students. College enrollments doubled to roughly 5.1 million undergraduate and graduate students during the decade. By 1969, of the people 18-24 years of age, 8 million were enrolled in or had graduated from college. 28/

During the Vietnam War era, the protests of young people against the war had a major impact on American politics and society. It is important to note here the general attitude of young people to the war to establish a context for evaluating the youth movement in more detail in the next chapter. The Gallup question of whether those being polled believed the US had made a mistake in intervening in the Vietnam War provides a basis for examining the attitudes of young Americans relative to other age subgroups of the population. Figure 1-3 indicates the responses of three subgroups of Americans divided by age. 29/ It is noteworthy that the youngest subgroup of pollees consistently supported the war policies at a rate higher than that for the other two subgroups. The data suggest that as American participation in the war wound down, support among the youngest subgroup declined at a rate close to that of the general population. 29/

If in general young adults held opinions about the war that were similar to the attitudes of the population, why did young people occupy such a notable place on the stage of political protest in the 1960's? The answer is that only a small minority of young people were active in the radical politics of protest and that the media were quick to pick up this radical dissent. Media attention upon these groups highlighted their activities as more important in the political/social environment than they really were. It seems, however that this minority was supported by a larger number of young people who agreed with some or many of the positions of the active radicals.

It is difficult to determine the numbers of individuals in both of these groups. Estimates of the numbers of the individuals who were politically active on the campuses range from 30,000 to 50,000, though these numbers do not indicate differences in the levels of activity. 30/ Nevertheless, among a constant 1968 student population of over 5 million, it is evident that the politically radical element was a very small minority. 31/



SOURCE: Based on War, Presidents and Public Opinion

Figure 1-3. Trends in Support for the War in Vietnam, by Age

A 1969 Fortune-Yankelovich survey suggested that behind the small and highly visible activist minority of young adults was a much larger and generally "invisible" minority of students who held similar dissident opinions and attitudes, but who as a rule did not act on these political convictions. The survey indicates that members of this group may have numbered in the range of 2.3 million out of a young adult population (aged 18-24) of 22.8 million. 32/ If these data are accurate, 10 percent of the youth were responsible for the vocal opposition to the war that was heard in the 1960's and that opposition was orchestrated by a small number of political radicals.

2. Intellectuals

The opposition of some intellectuals to the Vietnam War policies of the successive administrations drew strong public attention. This section seeks to establish a context for assessing the composition of the dissident intellectual group as a means of gauging its political strength.

The polling of Americans by Gallup concerning attitudes toward the Vietnam War indicated that there was no strong correlation between opposition to the war and the educational attainments of subgroups of the population. Figure 1-4 indicates trends in support of the Vietnam War policies that were evident among three subgroups divided by education. 33/ In general, intellectuals belong to the group of college graduates, but definition of "who is an intellectual" and computation of their numbers is a subjective task in which objective standards like academic degrees have little relevance. Relating the American historical tradition of intellectualism, one author suggests the following as a description of modern intellectuals:

> Three related concerns have traditionally characterized Western intellectuals: their espousal of moral conscience, their obsession with their own identity as intellectuals, and their relationship to power. All three preoccupations have dominated the U.S. intelligentsia since its emergence as a definable social group late in the nineteenth century. 34/



SOURCE: Based on War, Presidents and Public Opinion

Figure 1-4. Trends in Support for the War in Vietnam, by Education

In this overview, it is significant to note that the Gallup polls indicate that the large subgroup of which the intellectuals are a part held opinions and attitudes which were consistent with the attitudes held by the general population. Stated another way, neither youth nor education seemed, on average, to affect attitudes towards the war. If anything, the Gallup data indicates that the more educated an individual was in the 1960's and 1970's, the more likely he was to support the war policies. Nevertheless, the similarity of the curves of declining support in all three subgroups of the population divided by education indicates that difference in education was not a significant factor in shaping opinions toward the war. Thus, while some intellectuals may have protested the war, the data do not suggest their protest was representative of educated people in general. 35/

3. Blacks

In the 1960's the civil rights movement exploded into the consciousness of white America. Blacks demanded their rights as citizens, and some sought to separate themselves from white-dominated society by joining radical social and political organizations. The significant impact that the increase in black political activism and radicalism had on the style and substance of the Vietnam War protests and on the attitudes of Americans toward their Government is examined in a later chapter. This section examines only the attitudes and opinions of the black population to the Vietnam War in order to establish a context for assessing the impact of the black political movement on Vietnam War policy making.

Polls of the opinions and attitudes of blacks as a group have been notoriously inaccurate because of the general under-representation of blacks in census figures and because of the large percentage of blacks living in rural areas. 36/ While the weakness of the data on the evaluation of black attitudes concerning foreign affairs makes it difficult to identify accurately the development of black opinion over time, there are strong indications that significant changes took place in black opinion in the 1960's and 1970's. Blacks seem to have been moving from strongly isolationist attitudes in foreign affairs in the late 1950's, toward a more "internationalist" position than that of the general population. It should

be noted, however, that black opinion supporting US international activities is largely confined to support for non-military initiatives. In the 1960's blacks became more willing than whites to support foreign aid, trading with communist states, and the United Nations. However, blacks were considerably more likely to oppose the Vietnam War than whites, and blacks were particularly opposed to the extension of the fighting in Southeast Asia to Cambodia and Laos. 37/ Further, some blacks labeled the war racist, as minorities comprised a disproportional number of draftees. Earlier in the war, the black casualty rate was quite high, at 24 percent of all casualties in Vietnam. This rate was reduced considerably to approximately nine percent by 1970, but the accusations that the US was engaged in a racist war persisted. Thus, during the Vietnam War era, blacks were defining for themselves not only a new role in US domestic politics, but a particular view of foreign affairs as well.

4. Labor

On May 9, 1970, 300 construction workers, armed with lead pipes and crowbars, attacked student and other antiwar protestors in the heart of New York's financial district. Later that month a demonstration was organized to support President Nixon by the Building and Construction Trades Council Center of Greater New York. The organizers of the demonstration went to the White House to receive the President's thanks. On that occasion Nixon posed for photographers wearing a hard hat. These events and the constant, vocal support given the Vietnam War by some members of the organized labor leadership like George Meany, contributed to the development of an image of large-scale labor support of the Vietnam War. Most certainly, this alleged support was a large element in President Nixon's argument that the "silent majority" of hard-working, patriotic Americans supported his war policies.

Gallup did not ask his questions about whether the US made a mistake by becoming involved in Vietnam to a group of pollees who can be clearly identified as the laboring class. As a consequence, it is necessary to examine other subgroup divisions in order to determine the nature and extent of laboring people's attitudes toward the war. The change of

labor opinion in the course of the war should correlate with that of individuals who had lower educational levels. Figure 1-4 indicates the differences in support for the war that could be traced by educational subgroups. The figure suggests that the lower the educational level of those polled, the less likely they were to support the war. The figure also suggests that educational levels may have been a factor in the extent of support for the war at any given time, but that the trend in 1965 toward increasing support for the war policies was reflected in all three subgroups. Similarly, the decline in support for the war which followed was evident in all three groups with the better educated members of society changing their opinion most dramatically. The less educated seem to have changed their opinion least. These data indicate that there was no strong reserve of support for the war among US laborers that marked them as a group apart from the general population.

These conclusions drawn from examinations of less educated members of society used as a surrogate for laboring class individuals are consistent with surveys which were conducted occasionally of US labor attitudes toward the war. Thus, on January 3, 1968 Gallup poll report indicated that almost one half of the rank and file of organized labor felt that the war was wrong. 38/ That level of opposition to the war is extremely close to the opposition indicated in the general population (See Figure 1-2) in early 1968. These data lead to the conclusion that the large mass of American laborers seem to have held opinions that were consistent with the attitudes of the general population. 39/

E. ANALYTICAL SUMMARY - INSIGHTS

The data available from opinion polls taken in the 1960's and 1970's indicate that public support for the Vietnam War crested late in 1965. Thereafter, in notably gradual steps, the support ebbed, and the tide of opposition rose. By mid-1966 it was evident that the application of American military power would not produce a quick end to the war. The hopes that US airpower would cripple North Vietnam or break the will of its

communist leadership faded. At the same time, American fighting men were taking on ever-expanding roles in the land war on the Asian mainland.

Public support for the war itself ebbed, but the presidents were able to evoke strong showings of public support in opinion polls for specific action whether it was escalating or de-escalating. Thus, though support for the war as a policy was weak during the Nixon Administration, the President was able to elicit majority support for his strong military actions like the invasion of Cambodia or his negotiation efforts.

Examination of public opinion shows that the decline of support for the war, especially after the initial slump of late 1965-early 1966, was strikingly gradual; and, over the long-term, was not related to turns of events either on the battlefield or in the United States.

Another significant feature of the available public opinion data concerning the war is the similarity of opinion patterns among various subgroups of the American population. Thus, youth, intellectual, and laboring people all seem to have shared similar patterns of declining support for the war after late 1965. Blacks apparently consistently expressed lower levels of support for the war than the general population. This is significant because these three groups were depicted as being heavily polarized in their attitudes toward the war. Spokesmen on the left claimed to represent the youth and educated; spokesmen on the right claimed to represent the opinions of the laboring class. The observation that the attitudes of these three groups were similar indicates that the presumed polarization was not as deep as was depicted. Indeed, the bitterness of the public feeling of the time may be laid at the feet of the leaders of both extremes who tried to use the perceived polarization for their own political ends. This demonstrates the importance of moderate rhetoric in the discussion of political differences.

While they shared similar patterns (i.e., support began to ebb after 1965 and declined steadily thereafter), the more educated members of society were more volatile in their fluctuations of opinion than the less educated. This would seem to be contrary to the opinion that the "masses" in modern society are easily swayed by the news media and are susceptible

to persuasive orators, etc. An alternative interpretation would be that in their reservoir of common sense, the less-educated public, unlike their more educated neighbors, were never persuaded that the events in Southeast Asia threatened the interests of the Republic. Thus, their support for the war never reached the highs found among the more educated. Another interpretation is that the less-educated public does not read or comprehend as much information as the more-educated public, and therefore, is not affected by the media as much. The decline of support for the war was most precipitous among the more-educated.

F. LESSONS

The American people have demonstrated clearly that in spite of normally decreasing support over time they are willing to follow the president's leadership when it is associated with decisive and positive action. Essential, too, is the need for presidential certainty regarding policy. Lyndon B. Johnson's inability to commit the nation's resources to the war, for whatever political reasons, demonstrated that the center of power was uncertain. While domestic politics is the subject of Chapter 5, it is necessary to point out here that general public support for a war has little chance of coalescing when presidential commitment is not complete. The Vietnam War was never projected as the crusade that World War II was. For his own political reasons, President Johnson wished to play down the extent of our involvement in Vietnam. America's economic, industrial and manpower resources were never fully mobilized to fight the war. Presidential policies led the American public to believe that we could fight a limited war in a distant country and support massive domestic social programs simutaneously. The focus of American attention was directed inward until it became apparent through intensive media coverage that the American participation in Vietnam could no longer be underplayed by the government.

The American people tend to support decisions by which US military forces are committed to war or contingency operations, but in the absence

of quick and obvious success, that support begins to decline gradually over time as casualties mount or success appears to be remote or unachievable. Over the long term, carefully orchestrated attempts to build up public support for a government war policy have little permanent effect. It is results that count.

Spokesmen for extreme elements in the US, both left and right, do not reflect the opinions of the vast majority of Americans, nor do those spokesmen have any appreciable influence on attitudes and opinions of the general public. The opinion patterns of youth, educated people, laborers, and blacks (the major subgroups considered in this study) are remarkably similar, although the degree (percentage) of support or opposition for any given issue will differ between these subgroups.

CHAPTER 1 ENDNOTES

1. Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1972), p. 401.

2. Bill D. Moyers, "One Thing We Learned," Foreign Affairs, July 1968, p. 657.

3. See Chapter 5 for discussion of articulate spokesmen of both the right and the left.

4. Particularly in the age of television, the public image and personality of a candidate or a spokesman for any given issue(s) can influence the statistical pattern of voting to some degree.

5. Louis Harris, The Anguish of Change (N.Y.: W. W. Norton & Co., 1973), p. 3.

6. John E. Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion (N.Y.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1973), p. 2. For instance, in 1964 a cross section of the American public was asked, "Do you happen to know what kind of government China has right now - whether it is democratic or communist?" 28% admitted they did not know. By 1968 the self-confessed ignorance had dropped to 24%. Thus, when the public is asked questions concerning US-Chinese foreign policy issues, it is uncertain what credence can be placed in the polls results.

7. Michael Wheeler, Lies, Damn Lies, and Statistics (N.Y.: Liveright, 1976), p. 141 discusses the general lack of understanding of foreign affairs that is evident among large parts of the US population and is also reflected in the understanding of Vietnam-related questions. In March 1966, American participation in the Vietnam war was rapidly escalating and the war had dominated the news for two years. Nevertheless, a poll taken at that time indicated that only 47% of the American people could name Saigon as the capital of the South and only 41% could identify Hanoi as the capital of North Vietnam. See also:

   Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), discusses American public opinion on foreign policy issues. His excellent work examines changes in the "foreign policy mood" since the post World War II period. He further examines regional differences in public attitudes concerning foreign affairs.

   Barry Hughes, The Domestic Context of American Foreign Policy (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Co., 1978) pp. 23-24 comments that it is more accurate to talk about three "publics" instead of one. The first "public" consists of people who are unaware of all but the most major events in foreign affairs - like the launching of Sputnik - and have either no opinions or generally weak ones. Hughes indicates that this group is about 30 percent of the total adult population.

The next "public" consists of the 45 percent of the population who may be aware of major events, but are not deeply informed about them. The final "public" is the remaining 25 percent of the electorate which is generally knowledgeable and consistent concerning foreign affairs.

8. Wheeler, p. 141. Differences in the questions could result in widely varying responses from the pollsters' population samples. For example, in April 1975 Gallup reported that Americans favored giving the president authority to use US troops to evacuate American citizens from South Vietnam by a margin of 76 to 20%. The very next day Lou Harris reported that a 68 to 22 percent majority of Americans oppose sending any American troops into South Vietnam to help evacuate US citizens or Vietnamese allies whose lives may be endangered by a communist takeover. There were significant differences in the questions that were asked, but the wide disparity in the answers obtained underlines the danger of asserting that definite percentages of the population are convinced the government should or should not pursue a given policy.

9. Ibid., pp. 146-147. In 1970, after the invasion of Cambodia, the Gallop Poll took a survey of public opinions which indicated that 51 percent of the American people approved of President Nixon's decision in Cambodia. The Nixon administration claimed that the poll indicated conclusively that the people supported the president and they used the poll to attack critics of the invasion policy. However, the same survey asked about the action without mentioning the president and 58 percent said they disapproved of US military intervention in Cambodia while only 28 percent supported it.

10. William L. Ryan, "War Leaves U.S. With Bruised Image", Pacific Stars and Stripes, 30 January 1973, p. 11.

11. Oswold Johnsen, "The War At Home", The Washington Star, 1 May 1975, p. 12.

12. Mueller, p. 63.

13. Ibid., pp. 64-65.

14. This support remained strong despite casualties: US dead rose from approximately 25,000 in 1943 to over 135,000 in 1944 to over 280,000 in 1945. Statistics from Encyclopedia, World Books (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc.).

15. John E. Wiltz, "The Korean War and American Society" The Wilson Quarterly, Summer, 1978, pp. 126-139 indicates that the only discordant notes to the unanimity of public feeling came from the political right. Senator Robert A. Taft (R-Ohio) complained that President Truman had violated the Constitution by sending American forces into combat without the consent of Congress. The Chicago

Daily Tribute charged that communist aggression in Korea was an inevitable consequence of a decade of wooly headed and even treasonous appeasement of the Soviets by the Democrats.

16. Mueller, pp. 43-50. During the Korean War the polling was done by Gallup's American Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO) and The National Opinion Research Center (NORC). Question A was structured by AIPO whereas NORC designed questions B and C.

17. Ibid., p. 52.

18. Larry Elowitz and John W. Spanier, "Korea and Vietnam: Limited War and The American Political System", Orbis, Vol. 18, Summer 74, p. 516.

19. These factors were derived from the BDM authors' analysis of the key factors illuminated by various polls and interviews with combat officers who served in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. Several of the BDM study team and consulting team fall into the latter category.

20. Mueller, p. 56.

21. Specific reasons are often given for both gradual and precipitate loss of support for a war or a war-time president. The public opinion polls that reflect degrees of support, or lack thereof, are subject to error and bias. Further, many eminent historians and social scientists posit that the military forces are accorded a period of support at the outset of hostilities. Thereafter, unless positive results are achieved quickly, that support begins to erode with a momentum of its own, affected by international, domestic, and battlefield events. With respect to the reported decline in support in late 1965, General Goodpaster suggests that the Christmas bombing halt in 1965, coupled with over-optimistic claims that US troops might begin to withdraw from Vietnam by Christmas, proved damaging "to public understanding and support". The U.S. Army Military History Research Collection, Senior Officers Debriefing Program, Report of an interview with General Andrew J. Goodpaster on 9 April 1976, by Col. William D. Johnson and LTC James C. Ferguson, Section 4, pp. 47-48.

22. Wheeler, p. 144.

23. Harris, p. 57 provides a striking example of how presidents use the polls:

> Walter Jenkins, Johnson's closest aide during this period, called right after the post-Gulf of Tonkin poll had been published. He reported the president to be enormously pleased with the massive public backing given his action and especially with the passage of the congressional resolution.

This writer singled out a paragraph in the August 10 piece reporting the poll in the Washington Post which said, "The closing of ranks behind the President in this latest military crisis parallels national reaction during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and the landing of U.S. Marines in Lebanon in 1958 during the Eisenhower administration. In both instances, overwhelming majorities of the people registered immediate approval of presidential action. It was equally true, however, that as each crisis receded, national unity diminished and criticism again appeared" (Harris Survey July 1971).

Walter Jenkins always noted any such comments carefully, especially if they were caveats. His comment on the phone that day was prophetic, "Well, I'm sure you are absolutely right, but you know the boss. He won't forget this big show of support for a long time to come." Not only did Lyndon Johnson use the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution as legal justification for all his actions in Vietnam, but he would recall the 85% support figure for years afterward. Mistakenly, he thought that kind of lightning would strike at his beckoning many a time in the years ahead.

24. Mueller, p. 69. It should be noted that U.S. forces engaged in active ground combat for 7½ years in Vietnam and only for 3 years in Korea.

25. Alonzo L. Hamby, "Public Opinion: Korea and Vietnam", The Wilson Quarterly, Summer 1978, pp. 137-141. Hamby believes that the cultural differences were enormous. In the Korean war, protest was from the political Right, aimed at the no-win policy. In Vietnam it was the political Left that was outraged at alleged US moral depravity.

26. Elowitz and Spanier, pp. 512-521. These authors consider that both Presidents Truman and Johnson decided not to compete for another term in office mainly because of public sentiment, as they perceived it, against the ongoing war. Also, see Hamby, fn.p. 140.

27. Harris, p. 200.

28. Lawrence A. Mayer, "Young America: By the Numbers," Fortune, January 1969, p. 72.

29. Mueller, p. 139 and p. 275 (Table A-1). It would be inaccurate to assert that young people were "hawks" concerning the war; they did not exhibit a degree or intensity of support that would separate them from the rest of the population.

30. Ibid. and Daniel Seligman, "A Special Kind of Rebellion," Fortune, January 1969, p. 66.

31. Nathan Glazer, "The Jewish Role in Student Activism," Fortune, January 1969, p. 112. Glazer suggests that sociologist Seymour

Lipset's number of 30,000 may be too high. At Berkeley he estimates that there were only 200 to 300 activists among 29,000 students. Daniel Seligman notes that only .001 of American students paid dues to the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). He quotes a 1968 Harris poll that the activist population was somewhat less than two percent of all those in college. The disparity may lie in the somewhat dubious definition of an "activist", for certainly the "activists" gained many synpathizers.

32. Hughes, pp. 55-56 provides an important body of statistics that merits detailed examination by military historians - and by military recruiters:

> One study suggested that the Vietnam War, over a period of about ten years, may have created a new and pacifistic cohort group. Whereas 72 percent of college students surveyed in 1962 thought that the "United States must be willing to run any risk of war which may be necessary to prevent the spread of communism," only 25 percent believed that to be true in 1972. More significantly, in 1962 only 17 percent answered that it was "contrary to my moral principles to participate in war and the killing of other people," whereas 49 percent of the college students in the survey answered thus in 1972. The author's argument that Vietnam may become for this age group what "Munich" and appeasement became for the World War II generation, however, needs more study--for instance, people of all ages were affected by Vietnam, and it has not been proven that the Vietnam cohort was especially affected.
>
> In conclusion, however, it bears repeating that neither age nor sex differences in attitudes should be exaggerated. They generally prove considerably less important than educational, social status, or racial differences.

33. Mueller, p. 125 and Table A-1 p. 273. The opinion polls have no way of measuring the attitudes of intellectuals as a group. However, through examination of certain groups, some analysts believe that they have uncovered important trends. Concerning this issue, John Mueller analized the attitudes of Jews toward the war. Data indicate that while the Jews supported the government's policies during the Korean War, as a group, they were distinctly more opposed to the Vietnam War than the general population. Taking the Jewish population as a surrogate for the intellectual left, Mueller concludes that the pattern that is observable is that the Jewish vote represents the trend toward opposition to the war that existed among intellectuals in the 1960's and 1970's.

34. Sandy Vogelgesang, The Long Dark Night of the Soul (N.Y.: Harper & Row Publishers, 1974), p. 7.

35. Mueller, pp. 125,273.

36. Mueller, p. 147. Blacks represent only 10 to 15 percent of the population. Therefore, the size of the black sample in a national survey is rather small.

37. Hughes, pp. 47-48. Also see the 1967 study, Sidney Verba, Richard Brady, Edwin Parker, Norman Nie, Nelson Polsby, Paul Ekman, and Gordon Black, "Public Opinion and The War in Vietnam," The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXI, Number 2 (June 1967): 325-326 which indicated that differences in race was a strong indicator of attitudes toward Vietnam War policy. Blacks were significantly more opposed to escalation of the war than whites, and blacks were more willing to support de-escalation.

38. Philip S. Foner, American Labor and the Indo-China War (N.Y.: International Publishers, 1971), p. 57.

39. Sex also seems to have been a significant factor influencing attitudes toward the war. Women consistently expressed opinions less favorable to escalation than men, but only slightly more opposed to it. Women also were less opposed to withdrawal than men, but only slightly more in favor of it. Thus, while women as a subgroup were significantly less supportive of the war, their attitudes were not translated into political action and hence are not treated separately in this chapter.

CHAPTER 2
CHANGING SOCIETY

> With its massive and concentrated power, the Corporate State seems invulnerable to reform or revolution. Nevertheless, in the last few years, the State has been beset by deep troubles from within, from many different groups of angry and dissatisfied people. How is this possible, when the State's position is so unchallengeable, and its critics so weak, divided and lacking in a plan or theory of how to proceed? It is our theory that the State itself is now beginning its own destruction.1/

> It seemed that the great mass of people would simply flow through and over the marble buildings, that our forward movement was irresistibly strong, that had some been shot or arrested, nothing could have stopped the crowd from taking possession of its government. Perhaps next time we should keep going.2/

A. INTRODUCTION

During the Vietnam War years, important economic and social issues arose in opposition to the established American political, social, and economic order. Formerly quiescent subgroups of the population began to demand through demonstrations and marches that the American society be changed. Three groups were particularly active in making demands: the blacks, the youth, and the intellectuals. Their energies were brought together in the civil rights movement of the late 1950's and early 1960's, and in subsequent years the style of the civil rights movement was adopted by the antiwar movement until the end of the Vietnam War.

The activism of some members of these subgroups conveyed a feeling inside and outside their movements that the United States was on the brink of significant social, economic, and political change. The old Democratic-linked coalition that had been established by Franklin D. Roosevelt came under particular stress during these years. The Republican Party sought to

use that opportunity to build a new political majority of subgroups of the population which were unsympathetic to the antiwar movement. Particularly important to the Republican coalition were the blue-collar workers. It was hoped that the South and the traditional Republican followings among the middle and upper classes and the farmers would constitute the new majority.

Thus, the blue-collar workers together with the blacks, youth, and intellectuals became the center of political and social interest during the Vietnam War years. This chapter examines the activities of the vocal extremists of these groups and the social movements they represented. The purpose is to examine the relationship, if one exists, between the Vietnam War and those movements, to examine the impact of the war on the movements, and to study the influence those movements had on the development and execution of the Vietnam-related policies.

B. SOCIAL CHANGE IN POST-WORLD WAR II AMERICA

The social and political turmoil of the 1960's was in sharp contrast to the relatively stable conditions of the 1950's.

In the 1960's, the growing incidence of violence and crime, the increase in racial tensions, the massive antiwar demonstrations, and explosive development of a youth counterculture, among other things, led many older Americans to question whether the nation was going to survive.

Post World War II American foreign and domestic policies were founded in a consensus that had developed during the Great Depression and had become fixed during the war years. Elements of that consensus were: (1) belief that the federal government should take an active role in balancing economic forces and (2) an acceptance that the United States had to be active in world affairs to frustrate Soviet attempts at world domination. These dual visions of the federal government at home and abroad dictated a vast expansion of the powers and capabilities of the federal government.

The allied success in the war against both Germany and Japan and the evident affluence of Americans as compared to the rest of the world's population filled Americans with pride in their accomplishments and confidence that problems could be overcome by the applications of American "know-how" and money. The kinds of self-congratulatory expressions that were evident prior to the social changes of the 1960's are typified by an article written by Andrew Hacker. In 1963, just days after the assassination of President Kennedy, he wrote:

> Our problems are those of success, and our failures are visible because we are continually conscious of the standards we have set and failed to meet. 3/

The reasons he gave for our great success were:

(1) Commitment to a democratic society that was founded on classlessness, and

(2) Technical innovation that was the foundation of America's affluence and economic opportunity.

These two elements seemed to promise equal opportunity for all within the context of an ever expanding industrial base and technological innovations that would steadily improve the standard of living of all Americans. A corollary to the belief in the positive power of technical innovation was faith in American abilities to manage economic and technical forces to obtain desired results. Americans pointed with pride to the manifestations of success that this system had produced. Among them were:

- A vast increase in the number of students on college campuses as GI's entered college. Education was viewed as a right and the key to opportunity for all. The availability of education to a broader segment of society suggested that American society would become increasingly a meritocracy where the rewards would be redistributed according to ability. 4/
- The union of federal power and modern science which was consummated with the federal development of the US aerospace and computer industries to meet defense needs. 5/

- Sudden advances in the communication fields through the development of television and advances in computers and telephone technology.
- The development of the interstate highway systems and vast expansion of commercial airlines which allowed rapid travel throughout the nation.

These developments were indicative of thoroughgoing change that was taking place in American society. Personal opportunities grew and popular expectations increased. The growing wealth of the general population in the postwar period allowed greater freedom of choice.6/ More Americans chose to move to the suburbs. Between 1950 and 1970 the number of suburban dwellers expanded rapidly.7/ Because of the availability of cheap fuel for automobile transportation and the development of the interstate highway system, the suburbs of the old central cities expanded into the countryside until they began to meet each other and form vast population centers that were dubbed megalopolises.8/ By the 1960s, service and white collar jobs increased while the percentages of blue collar and farm jobs shrank.9/

These societal changes were evidence that the United States was entering a new age which some called "a new American Revolution."10/ This revolution created a new technological culture which had distinct characteristics. They included:

(1) More goods produced at less cost thereby freeing labor for work other than production of goods
(2) The development of a new class of engineers and technicians
(3) Emphasis upon functional relations and quantitative analysis
(4) Transportation and communications systems that increase economic and social dependence
(5) Rapidly changing esthetic perceptions of space and time 11/

In the early 1960s the old power elite which had dominated the United States during and after World War II was being challenged by a new elite that was associated with the new scientific-defense industries of the west

and south. The old elite had been composed primarily of men from the eastern seaboard with legal, corporate, and banking connections. Together, they had laid the foundation of the pragmatic liberal consensus that governed American foreign and domestic policies in the 1940s and 1950s. In the 1960s and 1970s the power of the old elites was to be challenged in both political parties by groups that had their political, social, and economic power rooted in a new American order.

In 1960, the apparent direction of American social and economic development seemed set. There was a consensus that America had every right to be proud of its social and economic system. Illustrative of this consensus was the 1960 presidential campaign during which both Richard Nixon and John Kennedy lavished praise on the American system. The major issue seemed to be whether the system could be made even better than it was.12/

The record of the speeches of that campaign is evidence of how unprepared politicians and the American public at large were for the social and political conflicts that would emerge in the 1960s when influential and articulate elements in the United States would attack the very system that both Nixon and Kennedy had defended so strongly. Those elements would challenge the wisdom of pursuing the course of technological development that had been set in the 1950s, would castigate the achievements of the American economic system as creating a mass society of possessive, manipulated consumers, and would deny the premise that the American political system was essentially classless. In the 1960s, challenges that rose against the new technological civilization came from three sources: black Americans, the collegiate youth, and the intellectual community. Some leadership elements within those three subgroups sought to rally these constituencies as political forces of social change. On the other hand, some leadership elements in the American labor movement, which constituted the fourth major subgroup under study sought to rally their followers as forces for social and political stability. It is important to examine the calls for social change as they evolved in each of these four constituencies.

C. THE VIETNAM WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY

1. Blacks

In 1960, American blacks were generally excluded from the benefits of the technological society. Their struggle to change their political and economic position began in the 1950s and reached a peak in the late 1960s. Many black leaders, even conservative black leaders, feared that escalation of US involvement in Vietnam signaled a decline in the economic resources that could be allocated to meeting the needs of America's poor blacks. They began to associate their movements with the antiwar movement, and they called for an end to American participation in the war in Southeast Asia. Examination of the black struggle is important because it constitutes a principal social trend in US society and because it contributed in several important ways to the antiwar movement:

(1) The civil rights movement contributed a distinct style of civil disobedience, with mass demonstrations that became a part of the antiwar movement

(2) The civil rights movement contributed substance to the antiwar movement by introducing the theme that the American system, represented by the local and state governments and its actions, is unjust and immoral

(3) The violence which dominated the later part of the black struggle contributed directly to the loss of national confidence that many Americans experienced in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

The civil rights movement was divided into two phases distinguished by time and geography.13/ The early phase was centered in the South under the leadership of men like Martin Luther King, Jr. Blacks sought to gain a role in Southern political life, a role that had been denied them since the end of reconstruction. The second phase began in the North in 1965. Concentrated in urban ghettos in the central cities of the nation, blacks acted violently to assert their presence in Northern political and economic life.

The civil rights movement reflects deep undercurrents of black social and political history. The modern expression began in 1955 when a black woman in Montgomery, Alabama refused to take a seat at the back of a bus, where blacks were customarily required to sit. Her action was strongly defended by Martin Luther King, Jr. In 1960, the first of the "sit-ins" occurred at a Greensboro, North Carolina, Woolworth's lunch counter. From 1960 to 1965 the civil rights movement was dominated by the interracial nonviolent approach of King who attempted to mobilize black and white support in demonstrations that would focus national and international attention on the plight of blacks in the South. King's objective was to break the political stranglehold of the whites on the repressive state governments throughout the region. The movement led by Martin Luther King has its greatest success in the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The coalition of organizations King had stitched together had within it serious divisions and disagreements that would disrupt the unity of the civil rights movement.

Three issues were at the heart of the growing division. Could the movement remain nonviolent in the face of violence? Could the black leadership continue to work with whites? Was the movement pushing for reform or revolution? King continued to answer that the movement could remain a nonviolent, interracial, reformist force, but more radical elements in the movement were developing far different responses to those questions.

The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) was never a mass membership organization. At the height of its activity there were no more than one hundred and fifty SNCC staff workers in the field in the whole of the South. Four-fifths of the staff workers were black, mostly from working-class families, assisted by a small but tenacious group of whites.14/ SNCC had developed a voting rights strategy in 1961 to obtain registration of black voters in the South and thereby break the white racist hold on local and state governments. In 1964 SNCC launched the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party. Nearly a thousand white youths, many

from uppermiddle class northern homes, (who probably had not been exposed to ghetto-living and racism as it existed in the North) went to the South to participate in the project. That experience brought these young whites face-to-face with the brutal reality of Southern racism. Three of the participants were murdered. That experience became a turning point for many of these youths. It also became the root experience from which many of the activists in the antiwar movement would come to view government as corrupt and immoral.15/ Many of the young enthusiasts who participated in the project took with them a nascent radicalism that rejected the respect for authority that had been part of their upbringing.

The project also marked the beginning of the end of close cooperation between whites and blacks in the civil rights movement. The whites brought to their work superior organizational experience, yet the blacks sought to remain in control of their own struggle for freedom. From the time of the 1964 Mississippi Summer Project, the tension that had been building between blacks and whites was increasingly resolved by the blacks pulling away from the whites and asserting their identity in their own organizations.

The split of SNCC from the interracial, nonviolent approach of Martin Luther King occurred over the year following the 1965 Selma march. In the eyes of the SNCC participants King was found wanting in courage to confront governmental power. The whole approach of peacefully joining hands with whites was questioned. Following the Selma March, radicalism was sweeping through SNCC unchecked by adherence to King's civil rights approach.

SNCC was also resolving the question of whether whites could participate in the essentially black struggle. The separation within SNCC between whites and blacks was effected especially by Stokely Carmichael, who argued in 1966 that the whites in the civil rights movement were an extension of white colonialism.

The new radicalism of the SNCC members found audiences as the blacks in the cities outside the South began their annual summer riots. In

1965, 1966, 1967, and 1968, the riots tore through American cities.16/ The rise of the black militancy, and the beginning of these riots were forces that tore apart the civil rights coalitions that had been so effective in pressing for legislation. Another factor was the Vietnam War, for opposition to the war was found not only among black militants, but also among the more conservative blacks who together with white liberals had been the mainstay of the coalition.

Martin Luther King's opposition to the war developed in mid to late 1965. King denounced the war in a volume published on New Year's Day, 1966. By 1967, King had decided that although his vocal opposition to the war would make many new enemies, the war issue could no longer be avoided. He began to attack the US war policies with ever-increasing strength. At the time of his assassination in 1968, King stood as one of the most outspoken opponents of the war.

The civil rights coalition was shattered by 1968. It had splintered on questions of white participation, radicalism versus reformism, and the Vietnam War. The civil rights movement was the starting point for the antiwar movement, and the opposition to the war expressed by both conservative and radical black leaders was a significant force in shaping the movement. Chapter 1 noted that available evidence indicates that the US black population was more opposed to the war than the general population. This response may reflect the almost universal opposition to the war that developed among black leaders in 1965 and 1966. This opposition did not result in a mass support among blacks for the predominantly white antiwar movement.

2. Youth

The youth movement/counterculture provided the foundation for the antiwar movement. The youth movement was sudden and had an impact that was unexpected by most Americans. This section examines the nature of this movement, its relationship to the Vietnam War, and finally its contributions to the anti-Vietnam War movement.

The youth movement had two aspects: political and cultural. Both aspects focused on rejection of the established patterns of American

life, and both were closely intertwined, though distinctly different. The movement clearly reflected the youthful idealism of Kennedy's Camelot and was manifested first in the surge of volunteers for the Peace Corps. The political side of the movement rejected what was perceived as the political hypocrisy of the American political system that excluded blacks from participation in the democratic forums of the state. Later, the political focus of the movement centered on ending a war that was perceived to be immoral.

Founded in the rejection of the political values that were part of the political youth movement, the cultural movement called upon young Americans to reject the lifestyles of their parents and to adopt wholly new sets of values and standards of behavior. It is important to view these two aspects of the youth movement as distinct, because in the first years of political activism, i.e., roughly 1965 to early 1967, the cultural aspect played a relatively minor role. It is likely that this cultural development became a hindrance to the political side of the revolutions, thereby weakening the political effectiveness of the antiwar movement by restricting the movement's appeal to leftist segments in American society who could identify with the call to reject accepted values.

Chapter 1 of this volume discussed the number of young people who were involved in the antiwar movement. Ironically, the younger segment of the population supported the war policies slightly more then did the general public. While those who actually participated in the antiwar movement were relatively small in number, their views were shared by two to three million other youths in the late 1960s, or 10 to 15 percent of the total youth population.17/

With a restricted base like this, why did the youth movement gain such attention? Three answers are suggested:

(1) The movement was highly visible because it was concentrated in the areas surrounding the elite campuses in the country, and hence, it received wide coverage by the media.

(2) The movement found its proponents in what would seem to have been the most unlikely constituency, the children of America's upper-middle class.

(3) More important, the youth movement gained the attention of the nation because it fastened upon the Vietnam War as an issue in American politics that had to be examined.

The Vietnam War became for many youths a surrogate cause, incorporating other concerns about the ills of American society. As some youth activists took up the Vietnam War as representative of broader problems within the US, and as the elite academic institutions began to question the premises of US involvement in Vietnam, the antiwar movement gained momentum. Institutions like Harvard became centers of dissent against the war and lent a measure of respectability to the antiwar movement that it did not have before. Antiwar activities at these centers also attracted media attention to the movement.

Section B of this chapter discussed the directions in which American society was moving in the early 1960s and reflected on the self-congratulatory attitude of those times. The promise of ever-increasing wealth provided by technological innovations in US industry was thought by Americans who had endured the Depression to be the realization of all hopes and aspirations. No one was less prepared to see youth reject that dream then the American upper-middle class who were among the chief beneficiaries of US industrial power.

To many Americans, the antiwar movement on the campuses was viewed as a cowardly exercise to justify draft dodging. Sam Brown, a prominent activist in the antiwar movement, now agrees that there was unquestionably a connection between the war protest and avoidance of the draft by individuals. For a long time, Brown sought to deny this connection, but the contemporaneous falling off of support for the antiwar movement and the ending of the draft in 1972 was forceful evidence to Brown of the relationship between the two.18/ Of course, by 1972, US involvement in the war was declining and consequently it is not surprising to find active protests also waning. This chapter makes no judgment about the motives of the participants in the movement as a whole. Its purpose is to examine the impact which the movement had on the Vietnam War-related policy making.

Toward that end, the balance of this section is devoted to exploring the origins and development of the political aspects of the youth revolution and describing briefly key elements in the cultural manifestation of that revolution.

Two significant organizational expressions of the youth movement were the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and the Mississippi Summer Project of SNCC. The SDS was founded in Port Huron, Michigan in June, 1962 19/ They issued a 65-page statement that has often been called the manifesto of the New Left. The statement read in part:

> We are people of this generation, bred in at least modest comfort, housed now in universities, looking uncomfortably to the world we inherit.
>
> When we were kids, the United States was the wealthiest and strongest country in the world...many of us began maturing in complacency.
>
> As we grew, however, our comfort was penetrated by events too troubling to dismiss. First, the permeating and victimizing fact of human degradation, symbolized by the Southern struggle against racial bigotry, compelled most of us from silence to activism. Second, the enclosing fact of the Cold War, symbolized by the presence of the Bomb, brought awareness that we ourselves, and our friends, and millions of abstract "others" we knew more directly because of our common peril, might die at any time.20/

The SDS sought to rally the youths on the campuses of American universities to struggle against perceived ills in society and to establish new goals for society.

The second significant event in the formation of the youth revolution was the Mississippi Summer Project which brought a thousand Northern white students from major universities face to face with the brutality of Southern racism. As observed above, both the black and the white participants in the Project emerged radicalized, i.e., shaken from their belief that the political system functioned to enforce the nation's laws.21/

Before the Vietnam War became an issue there was the budding nucleus of a youth movement that had most of the characteristics observed in the full-blown movement of 1967-1969. These characteristics involved:

(1) A sense of alienation from the objectives and accomplishments of American society.

(2) A belief in the immorality of power as exercised by authorities in the United States.

(3) A sense of moral superiority over the acquiescence and passivity of most citizens.

(4) A fully developed repertoire of demonstration, sit-in, bus-in, etc. techniques inherited from the civil rights movement

(5) A unique style of dress, comportment, and social behavior that set the participants in the movement apart from the rest of society.

The embryonic youth movement spread across the country's elite college campuses with the antiwar movement which rapidly came to dominate the rhetoric and activities of the revolution. The movement grew in pace with the Vietnam-related military escalations of the Johnson Administration. It first became nationwide in response to the landing of 3,000 US Marines at Danang and began to crest and ebb in 1968 as President Johnson backed away from further escalation. The movement declined as the Nixon Administration began rapidly withdrawing Americans, and by the fall of Saigon in 1975, the movement had all but disappeared as a mass, nationwide phenomenon. The rising tide of the movement and the Johnson Administration's policy of gradual escalation paralleled each other. The impact of the escalation on the antiwar movement is evident.

Figure IV-1 at the begining of this volume depicts the major antiwar demonstrations that took place during the Vietnam War in conjunction with the political and military events that sparked the demonstrations.

From its very beginning, the antiwar movement, and the demonstrations that were its most visible manifestation, forced a number of key questions:

(1) What was the nature of the Vietnam War, i.e., was the war a symptom of larger failures in American politics and society?

(2) What was the objective of the antiwar movement? Should the movement be directed primarily at ending the war or resolving the larger questions facing Americans society?

(3) What was the appropriate strategy for the antiwar movement? Should the demonstrations remain nonviolent in the spirit of Martin Luther King's crusades, or should violence be used to end violence?

(4) Should communists and extreme radicals participate in the movement? Should the movement exclude elements whose political positions are repugnant to the great majority of Americans?

Throughout the Vietnam War years, differing elements within the antiwar movement sought to answer these questions. It is the thesis of this chapter that many of the decisions that were made concerning direction of the movement led it increasingly to the left and thereby reduced its appeal to the general population and even to many segments of the earlier peace movement.22/

The first major antiwar demonstration, March 24-25, 1965 at the University of Michigan Teach-in, sought to hear both sides of the escalation question and to develop a coherent response. The success of the Ann Arbor experience brought scores of campuses around the country to stage their own teach-ins. Characteristically, by the time the teach-in idea had spread to Berkeley, on May 21, and 22, 1965, the California students moved the topic of the discussion one step farther than the rest of the country from concentration on Vietnam War policy to examination of the Vietnam War as a symptom of deeper things wrong with America.

In the 1960's, youth's rejection of traditional authority and their acceptance of new standards and lifestyles established the fundamental element of the "generation gap." That gap made understanding and

sympathizing with the young difficult for older Americans. The association of this counterculture style with the antiwar movement made acceptance of the ideas of the antiwar movement also extremely difficult for the vast majority of Americans. Thus, the connection of the counterculture with the antiwar movement contributed significantly to the location of the movement at the extreme left of the American political spectrum.

3. Intellectuals

American intellectuals as a subgroup within American society are more difficult to define. They have been described as "the gatekeepers of ideas," as those with "a moral commitment to the values of a society" or as simply "brilliant."23/ In less lyric terms, intellectuals are those segments of the educated population which pursue academic or other forms of "intellectual" work. Clearly, they do not represent a monolithic body and the entire spectrum of opinion on the war could be found within the intelligentsia. However, important members of this subgroup followed a course similar to the young in their reactions to the war.

A number of American intellectuals had in 1932 endorsed the Communist Party candidate for President of the United States. Supporters included Ernest Hemingway, John Dos Passos, James T. Farrell, Richard Wright, Katherine Ann Porter, and other notable persons.24/ However, in the next 20 years, the flirtation of American intellectuals with communism declined drastically so that by the time the McCarthy purge was over in 1954, scarcely any intellectuals would identify with communist goals. Instead, the majority of the intellectual community joined the bulk of the population in uniting against fascism and then transferring that unity of spirit to the struggle against "international communism."

Meanwhile, the 20 years after World War II were the golden age of American universities. The flood of federal aid to the universities, expanded enrollments, and opportunities for individual grants from the government provided university professors with never-before-equalled opportunity and prosperity. This government-financed age of opportunity provided an atmosphere of domestic progress, which led American intellectuals

to believe that the American economic and social system had eliminated the possibility of serious social conflict at home and that the most urgent danger to the nation was from communism abroad.

The election of John Kennedy in 1960 was an extraordinary event for American intellectuals who saw members of their own group, including luminaries like John K. Galbraith and Arthur Schlesinger, move from Harvard to Washington. Many like Robert Frost believed that they were witnessing the dawning of a new "Augustan Age" in which intellectuals would be given access to the power of the federal government which they were trained to manipulate toward solving domestic and international problems. In fact, the relationship between intellectuals and the Kennedy administration was significantly less eventful. Intellectuals got research contracts, government appointments, consultantships, and foreign travel; and they gave an intellectual tone to the administration. The intellectuals tended, however, to be influential only as their ideas fitted the needs of their patrons, and they tended to be forced into the role of technician while real decisions were made by politicians. The assassination of Kennedy did not break the connection between the Democratic administration and the liberal intellectuals who had the run of domestic departments of the government as recruits, consultants, and idea men as they funded studies that identified ways of solving problems through application of federal resources.

This close affiliation between the liberals of the Democratic Party and the American intellectual community left the intellectuals ill-prepared to move into opposition against the government concerning the Vietnam War. Intellectuals criticized the Tonkin Gulf actions of President Johnson, but Barry Goldwater offered no hopes for the intellectuals, and there was general support for Johnson until after the November election.

The attack on Pleiku and the US response of bombing North Vietnam brought a quick souring of relations between the White House and a large

portion of the American intellectual community. Opposition to the bellicosity of Goldwater had been one of the major factors that had recommended Johnson. Once it had fallen from grace with the intellectuals, the Johnson administration never recovered. Every effort by the administration to buttress its position was rejected by the intellectuals as misleading. For instance, the State Department's White Paper on February 27, 1965 meant as a seventy-one page expose of North Vietnamese infiltration brought this response from the New Republic editors:

> The best that can be said about the State Department's White Paper on Vietnam is that it is entirely unconvincing. The worst is that it is contradictory, illogical and misleading. It has a desperate purpose: to prepare the moral platform for widening the war.25/

The strength of the antiwar movement was provided by the youth of the college campuses, but they were dependent upon intellectuals like Wilhelm Reich, Eric Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, and Paul Goodman for putting the conflict in universal perspective. As the movement spread from campus to campus in 1965 it gathered to it spokesmen like Anatol Rapopport, Kenneth Boulding, and Arnold Kaufman who were leaders of the original Ann Arbor Teach-in, yet whose views varied considerably.

The rupture between the American intellectual community and the Johnson administration poisoned the 1965 White House Festival of the Arts and pushed the controversy regarding the war beyond the boundaries of polite behavior. Individual artists invited to the festival joined in a common front of opposition to the president's war policy and refused to attend. Johnson was furious. He blamed hostility toward his policies on the fact that he was a Southerner and declared that the intellectuals would never give him a chance no matter what he did "Some of them insult me by staying away and some of them insult me by coming."26/

The intellectuals continued to provide themes to the young activists through 1965 and into the first doldrum of the antiwar movement in 1966. The turn of the youth to resistance rather than protest in 1967 provided a fresh outburst of expressions by intellectuals in support of

the antiwar movement. Nevertheless, the youth and the intellectuals were moving farther from the center of American politics. Susan Sontag noted in another context:

> ...Revolution in the Western capitalist countries seems to be an activity expressly designed never to succeed. For many people, it is a social activity, a form of action designed for the assertion of individuality against the body politic. It is a vital activity of outsiders, rather than of people united by a passionate bond to their country.27/

From the beginnings of their opposition to the war policies of the Johnson administration, intellectuals identified those policies as immoral. This presumption of American immorality became increasingly the theme upon which many influential intellectuals hammered. Mary McCarthy argued that the role of intellectuals was to make Americans understand the immorality of what the government was doing. She linked this indictment of the Johnson administration with denunciation of the whole American political system. Reflecting on the "uselessness of our free institutions to stop the Vietnam War," she wrote:

> A feeling of having no choice is becoming more and more widespread in American life, and particularly among successful people, who supposedly are free beings. In national election years, you are free to choose between Johnson and Goldwater and Rommey or Reagan...Just as in American hotel rooms you can decide whether or not to turn on the air conditioner...but you cannot open the window.28/

Although momentarily heartened by Johnson's March 31, 1968 announcement that he would not run for another term, intellectuals like the other participants in the antiwar movement were driven to despair by the defeat of Eugene McCarthy and the assassination of Robert Kennedy. In the end some radical leftists within the broader community of intellectuals became so disenchanted with the promises and actions of the Democratic liberals that they turned to vote for Richard Nixon on the premise that his

election would render inevitable the purging of the Democratic Party and allow a radical transformation of its philosophy and structure. The triumph of the antiwar wing of the Party in 1972 with the nominations of George McGovern confirmed the salience of this perspective. But, following McGovern's defeat, a "centrist" reaction set in.

4. Labor

Unlike organized labor in the 1930s, labor as a distinct social and political group in the 1960s was no longer considered a threat to the establishment. The communist element within labor had been purged by then. Walter Reuther who briefly had espoused socialism in the 1940s and later became president of UAW remained the primary left-liberal spokesman in organized labor. By the 1960s, labor leaders participated fully in presidential politics and each president during the Vietnam war years of the 1960s and 1970s traded favors for the support of labor.

The focus of organized labor in America had changed, centering less upon radical social/political change and more upon the issues of wages, jobs, hours and working conditions. For many Americans, trade unions became synonymous with George Meany, the long-time leader of the AFL-CIO, and labor appeared to many as the "defender of the status quo." The character of the AFL-CIO had changed as industry in America shifted from emphasis on labor-intensive production to automation. Such alteration in the nature of American industry was accompanied by an increase in service industries, and a consequent growth of white collar workers within the ranks of labor, and subsequently within the unions. Although union members made up a shrinking minority of the total labor force, with prosperity, the AFL-CIO came to represent to a far lesser extent the disadvantaged and poor whom unions had traditionally served. That organized labor was becoming more and more middle class was clear. By 1970,

> the median income of the rank and file was $12,350, much higher than the $8,440 annual pay for nonunionized people in comparable jobs. Fully 46 percent lived outside cities, mainly in the suburbs. Although 78 percent of all blacks were in jobs eligible for union membership, only 35 percent of these blacks were in fact in unions.29/

The direction and character of the AFL-CIO was much influenced by the personality of George Meany, who initially focused on the domestic issues of pay and jobs and on the foreign issue, defense against communism. It is to this constituency that President Nixon appealed for support throughout his presidency, for he had included organized labor represented by Meany, within his "new majority."

The following section examines the position of labor on the Vietnam war issue. An accurate examination of this issue must note differences between leadership and rank and file positions, further recognizing that "labor" cannot be characterized as a monolithic body.

In 1965, it appeared that labor fully supported President Johnson's decision to engage US forces in Vietnam. Basic economic concerns may have been operative as the war meant a gearing-up of industry and hence more certainty in the job market. The AFL-CIO Sixth Constitutional Convention held in 1965 heard numerous speeches by senior administration officials and by George Meany lauding the president's handling of the Dominican crisis. The meeting then turned to the Vietnam War. What little concern there was for a deepening US involvement in Southeast Asia came from two black labor leaders who forecast that American resources that had been allocated to the 'Great Society' program would soon go instead to support our Vietnam endeavors. Cleveland Robinson, black delegate to the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, secretary-treasurer of District 65, and vice president of the Negro American Labor Council presented the problem:

> I join with Brother Randolph in my fears that this present conflict, now raging in Vietnam will be used as the excuse to curtail even the little we are now getting.30/

Nevertheless, the compromise resolution issued by the AFL-CIO granted labor's approval of the administration's Vietnam policies as it "endorsed in advance all measures the administration might deem necessary to halt Communist aggression and secure a just and lasting peace."31/

This action contributed significantly to youth alienation from labor. For a time, labor was excluded from the antiwar movement and it seemed as though the style of student-worker alliance which had formed on occasion in Europe had no future in America. Labor was perceived by the leftist students as comprised of extreme conservatives whose political inclinations were rightist.

By 1969, however, there were increasing indications of discontent with US policies in Southeast Asia within the labor movement, and some efforts were made by student antiwar activists to alter the movement's stategies. New Left rhetoric had begun to dominate the peace movement, and there were some antiwar organizers who began to recognize that the movement's leftist and pro-Hanoi tendencies were repugnant to much of labor. The New Mobilization Committee was born with the understanding that the movement must broaden its base by moderating itself through rejection of the radical views of the New Left. A Trade Union Committee was formed to support organized labor in working to end the war, and students began to join workers in strikes and picket lines as a way of demonstrating their solidarity with labor. Fledgling alliances developed and ads were placed in major city newspaper proclaiming labor's oppositon to the war. The Alliance for Labor Action had gained five million members and comprised the UAW, the Teamsters and Chemical Workers. Finally on Moratorium Day, October 15, 1969, and on November 15, 1969, antiwar demonstrations displayed the new worker-youth alliance in action as thousands of laborers joined in the marches.

What has been termed a significant 'labor manifesto against the war' was a full-page ad that was placed in the Washington Post on February 25, 1970. Signed by 123 union members, including the leaders of 22 unions, the manifesto read:

> We urge all trade unionists to joint with their fellow Americans to demand an immediate withdrawal of troops and cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, to begin putting our money where it counts - at home.32/

The ad was sponsored by the Labor Peace Committee which represented the AFL-CIO and the Alliance for Labor Action. The manifesto was considered to be of great importance as it noted a change in position of many unions that previously has supported US Vietnam policies. By 1970, many members and labor leaders of major unions had spoken out against the war.

Regardless of the fact that tens of thousands of laborers had marched in the antiwar demonstrations during 1969, the brutal confrontation of students and construction workers in the Wall Street area in May of 1970 is remembered vividly by many Americans, serving to perpetuate the myth and stereotype of all labor as rightist, and violently pro-Vietnam.

Then on May 20, a large pro-war demonstration took place in which numerous laborers marched. The event had been organized by Peter J. Brennen, the president of New York's Construction and Building Trades Council. On the following day, Brennen received a telephone call from President Nixon who expressed his thanks for the recent demonstration of support. Within a week Brennen was invited to visit Nixon at the White House in Washington. One element of Nixon's constituency seemed to be solidly in place, and the silent majority was created as a creature of political rhetoric.

The relationship between the antiwar movement and labor was characterized by misunderstanding, poor organization and finally by poor timing. In 1965, youth and student activists regarded labor as being staunchly conservative. This impression was conveyed largely by the resolution passed by the Sixth Constitutional Convention of the AFL-CIO. By the late sixties when the movement organizers realized the need for greater public support, the movement had become strongly skewed by New Left rhetoric. It is ironic that the movement organizers rejected labor too early and yet recognized too late the importance of building such a coalition of interests.

There is ample evidence to support the suggestion that by 1970, organized labor had become largely a middle class social group. Interestingly enough a selection of Harris Surveys on a range of topics taken in

the early 1970s demonstrates great similarity of responses between the general American public and the labor union members polled. Figure 2-1 presents the survey results. It is not at all clear from these data that union members fit the stereotype of arch-conservatives. It would seem both from these data and from a statistical study of who comprise the majority of Americans that labor union members typify this majority. The study referred to above was conducted in 1967, by a social scientist from MIT, Robert C. Wood. Wood demonstrated that the majority within American society was made up not of "the agitator, not the dissident, not the intellectual, not the educated housewife, nor the conscience-striken executive - but the working American."33/

> Statistically, he is a white employed male... earned between $5,000 and $10,000. He works regularly, steadily, dependably, wearing blue or white collar. This definition of the "working American" involves almost 20 million American families. The working American lives at the "grey area" fringes of a central city or in a close-in or very far out cheaper suburban subdivision of a large metropolitan area. He is likely to own a home and a car, especially as his income begins to rise.34/

It was this group that the antiwar activists had eventually tried to mobilize and it was to this group that Nixon turned for support. What is clear is the fact that only a very small percentage of this population was represented by the hard hats' activities on Wall Street on May 9, 1970, and further as was demonstrated in Chapter 1, the degree of public support was very similar to the support extended by the majority of labor.

D. ASSESSMENT OF THE ANTIWAR MOVEMENT

The antiwar movement drew its strength from the spread of the youth counterculture that paralleled the escalation of the Vietnam War especially during the years of the Johnson administration. The movement had taken much of its style and many of its techniques from the civil rights movement

ISSUE	UNION MEMBER OPINION	GENERAL PUBLIC OPINION
1970		
BUSING TO ACHIEVE RACIAL BALANCE	OPPOSED 78% TO 16%	OPPOSED 76% TO 18%
LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA	OPPOSED 79% to 18%	OPPOSED 80% TO 14%
STIFFER PENALTIES FOR DRUG PUSHERS	SUPPORTED 71% TO 23%	SUPPORTED 73% TO 20%
'MAKE PEOPLE ON WELFARE GO TO WORK	SUPPORTED 90% TO 6%	SUPPORTED 89% TO 6%
WAGE-PRICE FREEZE	SUPPORTED 52% TO 27%	SUPPORTED 52% TO 34%
CUT DEFENSE SPENDING	SUPPORTED 60% TO 29%	SUPPORTED 58% TO 30%
FEDERAL PROGRAM TO GIVE JOBS TO UNEMPLOYED	SUPPORTED 89% TO 7%	SUPPORTED 90% to 7%
MORE FEDERAL FUNDS FOR POPULATION CONTROL	SUPPORTED 85% TO 9%	SUPPORTED 83% TO 9%
INCREASED FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION	SUPPORTED 80%	SUPPORTED 76%
1972		
INCREASE AID TO POOR	SUPPORTED 63% TO 27%	SUPPORTED 58% TO 30%
HEALTH INSURANCE PLAN	SUPPORTED KENNEDY PLAN 51% TO 25%	SUPPORTED 48% TO 30%
DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS	SUPPORTED 55% TO 35%	SUPPORTED 51% TO 40%
RENEWED BOMBING OF HANOI	OPPOSED 52% TO 37%	OPPOSED 57% TO 37%
1973		
RECOGNITION OF CUBA BY US	SUPPORTED 50% TO 36%	SUPPORTED 51% TO 33%
CLOSER RELATIONS WITH USSR AND PRC	SUPPORTED 77% TO 12%	SUPPORTED 77% TO 13%

4541/78W

SOURCE: Louis Harris, The Anguish of Change, pp. 142-46

Figure 2-1. Comparison of Union Member/General Public Opinion

which was declining as the antiwar movement began to grow. The movement also drew strength from the radicalized American intellectuals who during the war years separated themselves from the liberal consensus which had dominated their political perspectives since World War II. This is a principal theme of Vogelgesang's book, The Long Dark Night of the Soul. The connections of the antiwar movement with these groups in American society were its source of vitality, but at the same time they drove the movement to the far left of the American political spectrum, weakening its political effectiveness, and ultimately stifling its growth.

The antiwar movement that began in 1965 quickly drew to it radical elements that grew increasingly powerful. The purpose of many of these groups was not simply to end the war, but also to use the antiwar movement as a wedge to force fundamental changes in US society. As their power within the antiwar movement grew, those groups not only loaded the movement with leftist political, economic, and social objectives, but hardened the movement with an image that was unacceptable to most Americans. Because of that image, the movement was unable to mobilize the general lack of support the Vietnam War had among the American public after 1968 (See Chapter 1). Whereas American people had become as a whole more antiwar, they had also become even more antiprotester.

The limitations of the US antiwar movement were evident to those who participated in it and those who sought to use it. Sam Brown, Coordinator of the Vietnam Moratorium of 1969, recounted a significant meeting as follows:

> When I visited the North Vietnamese and NLF representatives in Paris last February (1969), they made it clear that they had never counted on the American left to end the war. Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, the foreign minister of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (of the NLF), remarked that she found student radicals very sectarian and reluctant to touch political power. She continued that the confused assortment of political objectives on the left - from legalizing marijuana to over throwing the government to providing free abortions - dilutes the political impact of the peace movement. The result, she suggested, is that the Vietnamese people and American soldiers carry the

> burden of American social problems. Insofar as unrelated issues are tied to the peace movement, weakening it, Vietnamese people and American soldiers die every day because the peace movement has exported the costs of American social problems to Asia.35/

Sam Brown assessed the strengths and weaknesses of the antiwar movement and he and his fellow organizers attempted in the 1969 Moratorium demonstrations to develop a style and pattern that did not alienate the majority of Americans who had been thoroughly repelled by the behavior and programs of radical antiwar elements. These efforts were in large part successful, but the moderate tone of the protest demonstration caused more radical elements to distrust the Moritorium organizers and to blackmail them. Brown relates:

> The weekend of November 15 came off well, even with the Weathermen in town. On Thursday their leaders came to the Moritorium requesting an "expression of fraternal solidarity" in the form of $20,000. In return, they offered to give us an expression of fraternal solidarity by making the case for non-violence at the Weatherman strategy sessions. We refused. The next night there was a great deal of window-breaking around Dupont Circle and an assault on the South Vietnamese embassy (reportedly led by a police agent known as Tommy the Traveler). The police responded with tear gas and billy clubs.36/

Brown concluded that the essential problems of the antiwar movement were defining its moral base and making that definition known in the wide voting public, who alone had the electoral strength to change the government's war policies. Brown argued that the antiwar movement had defined political morality in a fashion that had permitted participation by radical groups offensive to the majority of Americans. The antiwar movement had tried to retain the assumed moral purity of the movement by arguing that as long as the common denominator of opposition to the war was present, all groups, no matter how radical, would be welcome. The movement expected the public to separate, for instance, Jerry Rubin's style and the Black Panthers' platforms from Rubin's opposition to the war.37/ Brown

concluded that the antiwar demonstration did not succeed in dramatizing the moral aspects of the war and that the presence of so many radical elements gave the public a contorted image of the movement.38/

However, the "morality-of-the-war" issue was the point that seems to have separated the antiwar movement from the rest of the American people. Therefore, there is room to question the wisdom of stressing that very point as a strategy for expanding the political base of the movement among "middle Americans."39/ Studies have shown that the young and intellectual elites were definitely persuaded that from 1965 on the war was an immoral exercise of American imperialism.40/ Some extrapolated from this belief to an indictment of the whole of the American political, social, and economic system. However, the assumptions of the immorality of the war never did reach wide acceptance outside those groups. Instead, the growing opposition to the war among the general public, especially in 1967-1969 (see Chapter 1), was based on the simple conclusion that the war didn't seem worth the price. Some measured the war in terms of the numbers of US dead and wounded. Others assessed the war's value in terms of the enormous resources being expended on it. Still others believed that the war was dangerously dividing the nation. Although not out of a sense of moral guilt, they concluded that the war had been a mistake.

Neither the youth leaders who mobilized the demonstrations nor the intellectuals who provided the rhetoric and the rationale for the antiwar movement were in positions to make political capital out of the growing public disenchantment with the war. Surely the positions of the early Teach-Ins in 1965 could have provided a non-radical base for tapping that mainstream discontent, but by 1967-1968 the movement had moved far to the left of what most Americans considered politically acceptable.

As the antiwar movement moved farther and farther to the left, amid leadership struggles and the splintering and resplintering of organizations, it became increasingly antiestablishment in its direction. Every

evil within American society was associated with corruption by radicals within the movement. For instance, recalling the 1967 Newark riots, Jack Newfield said:

> One cannot speak of Black Power, or the riots or even Vietnam, in a departmentalized vacuum. They are all part of something larger. We have permitted political power in America to pass from the people to a technological elite that manipulates the mass media and boasts nuclear weaponry. Representational democracy has broken down.41/

Members of the antiwar movement chose one of three approaches to tackling that perceived problem. One was to enter the system and correct the imbalance. The second was to topple the system and replace it with something presumably better. The third was to withdraw from contact with the "defiling system" in order to maintain the moral purity of one's position. Increasingly as the war continued, especially after the coming of the Nixon administration and the sense of despair which engulfed the antiwar movement as the war continued and US bombing increased, intellectuals and young who for one reason or another could not bring themselves to support revolution, turned to the third option. Some of those who chose this latter course of political withdrawal considered those who tried to work within the system "tainted" by association with the administration and expressed these feelings forcefully.42/ With attitudes toward politics that did not permit participation in the political system spreading among antiwar intellectuals, it cannot be surprising that they were so politically inept and ineffective, thus justifying Madame Binh's disdain for the American left who were "reluctant to touch political power."

Some have argued that no matter how confused and contradictory the antiwar movement was, it created the necessary conditions for the shift in official policy from isolation to disengagement and was a key ingredient in Johnson's March 1968 announcement that he would not seek another

term.43/ That announcement sparked a momentary joy in the antiwar movement which had seemed so ineffective. One writer declared:

> Surely a major reason for Johnson's decision was a belated but strong response to growing public pressure and disenchantment. The complaints one heard about American campuses that dissidents aren't listened to, and have no choice but "alienation" or exile or urban guerrilla tactics, seem now to be utterly wrong or, at the very least wildly premature.44/

This exultation was shortlived as the politics of 1968 unfolded and Richard Nixon triumphed.

By 1968, the antiwar movement represented a small, splintered constituency that was rapidly exhausting itself through a political momentum that was progressively isolating itself from the country. Johnson was a consummate politician, skilled at assessing the power of political forces and balancing them against each other. Unquestionably the antiwar movement was only one element behind Johnson's decision. Chapter 5 will examine other elements in the equation, including Eugene McCarthy's strong showing in the New Hampshire primary, Robert Kennedy's entrance into the presidential race, mounting economic problems, the shattering of the liberal consensus, and the personal pressures exerted by LBJ's wife.

President Johnson's successor was attuned to the challenge and opportunity that the pressure of US social issues presented to him. Nixon attempted to establish a new Republican majority out of the ruins of the old Democratic coalitions.

E. THE MILITARY IN AMERICAN SOCIETY

The traditional relationship between the military and American society was shaped by geopolitical and historical factors. However, World War II wrought decisive changes in the foreign policy objectives and the military capabilities of the major world powers including the United States; these changes had a profound effect on the position of the military in American

society. Then, with the war in Vietnam, the relationship between the military and the society at large underwent yet another significant transformation. That change, like the others described in this chapter, is part of the "Vietnam experience" which is to this day influencing American attitudes and policies.

1. The Traditional Relationship

Throughout the early centuries of white settlement in North America, the geostrategic position of North America ensured that the defense needs of the residents were irregular. Neighboring nations were weak and the Americans relatively safe from Great Power intervention on account of their natural barriers, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Threats to security came primarily from the Indians rather than from regular, modern armies, although there were occasional clashes with French and Spanish forces in the new world.

The Colonists evolved a system of self-defense based on an armed civilian population and local militias which were suited to countering the Indian threat but neither designed nor intended to fight a conventional army.45/ Furthermore, the English settlers of North America brought with them an ingrained suspicion of large standing armies, which stemmed both from the economic burden of maintaining such armies and from the fear that standing armies could be used against domestic opposition as well as against foreign enemies.46/ When the War of Independence broke out, that fear was confirmed, and the Colonists found themselves fighting British regulars with ill-trained militia and short-term citizen soldiers. Thus, after the war was brought to a successful conclusion, the young nation was left with reinforced distrust of professional armies and confidence in its ability to meet its defense needs with a small army capable of rapid expansion through short-term, citizen enlistments in times of crisis.

Throughout the 19th Century, the United States continued to enjoy relative security founded in its geographic position and the weakness of its neighbors. The need for a powerful army was further reduced by American foreign policy which stressed minimizing foreign entanglements.47/ The attention of the nation focused upon continental expansion and economic

growth - activities in which the military was not a fundamental component. Agriculture, industry and commerce were the principal occupations of Americans, and Americans took pride in economic accomplishments more than in military prowess. Even the symbols of American greatness tended to be such commercial achievements as the construction of clipper ships or the transcontinental railroad. For the individual, fame and fortune were also more likely to be attained via economic activity rather than through a military career. Inevitably, therefore, the prestige of the small standing army was far from high. Professional enlisted soldiers were generally viewed as "undesirables," little better than criminals and Indians. Meanwhile, although it was generally socially acceptable, the officer corps failed to attract a substantial number of the national elite in the same way that, for example, the German Army did. Not only was there more money and status in other careers in the US but American elites had developed no sense of responsibility to bear arms in the national defense in marked contrast to European elites.48/

To meet those crises that did require military responses, the United States continued to rely upon short-term citizen soldiers, primarily volunteers. Furthermore, despite the resort to conscription in the later years of the Civil War, which precipitated antidraft riots, the principle of national reliance upon a volunteer army was not abandoned.49/ Ad hoc measures to answer specific needs was, essentially, the order of the day, leading some historians of the nineteenth century to contend that "the United States never had a military policy worthy of the name" but rather "blundered through [its] wars at enormous and unnecessary cost in life and money...."50/

2. World War I

The First World War represents the first major break with the above pattern. Although the Spanish-American War had signaled a new direction in American foreign policy away from isolationism and toward both imperialism and greater global participation generally, its impact on the military in American society was comparatively slight; the war was not only fought with short-term volunteers, but fought so quickly and so apparently

successfully that it seemed to exonerate the ad hoc military system. Yet even before the Americans entered the First World War the need for conscription had been recognized and a new relationship between the military and the Republic had started to form.51/ When war was actually declared, a draft act was easily passed and enforced, and the war was fought primarily with conscripts unlike any previous war in American history.

However, World War I was followed by widespread disillusionment, bitterness and a pacifist backlash of unusual intensity. There had long been a pacifist strain in American society; it went hand in hand with isolationism and dated back to the period following the War of 1812. It had resurfaced even before the Mexican American War was over, and the long, bloody trauma of the Civil War had left many Americans with no taste for war at all. But the pacifism of the 1920s and 1930s is noteworthy for its intensity, the breadth of its appeal, and its expression in official as well as popular actions. Furthermore, although pacifism in the United States is closely associated with isolationism, the pacifism following the First World War was international and gained credibility through such instruments as the League of Nations, which the US did not join, the Washington Naval Conference and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. These international efforts had the unfortunate effect of encouraging the "false but comforting assumption that peace and security could be easily obtained without costs or obligations on the part of anyone."52/

The domestic corollary of these international sentiments was revulsion against not just war but the military also. In the years directly following the war it was politically impossible to pass a peacetime conscription act, and West Point experienced 50% vacancies. Meanwhile, the Army shrank to a level of just 150,000 in 1920 and 119,000 in 1927 - nearly as small as the 100,000-man Reichwehr which Germany considered an unbearable national insult despite its much smaller population.53/ American military men, furthermore, remained outside the mainstream of American society.54/

As the international situation worsened, the United States responded with increasingly adamant expressions of "neutrality" of which

the Neutrality Act of 1937 was the most stringent, and even the outbreak of the war in 1939 did not produce a rapid expansion of the Armed Forces - although plans for such expansion were laid. Not until September of 1940, with the continent of Europe lost to the democracies and increasing pressure from Japan in the Far East, did the United States pass its first peacetime conscription act.55/

3. World War II

The attack on Pearl Harbor changed American attitudes towards the war, the military and, ultimately, the entire relationship between the military and American society. Pearl Harbor itself and technological achievements such as the development of long-range rockets and nuclear weapons demonstrated that the oceans no longer offered the United States the geostrategic protection which they had long been assumed to provide. The massive mobilization of manpower put nearly 16 million Americans in uniform during the course of the war, four times the number that had served in WW I, or one in every eleven Americans.56/ Equally significant, the full-scale mobilization of American industry forged a partnership between the military and industry that was to outlast the war.

As the war drew to a close, the United States was faced with an unprecedented global environment. For the first time in its history, the US was the leading world power with only one potentially serious rival - the Soviet Union. Britain and France were too exhausted, bankrupt or otherwise unable to perform their pre-war international roles. If the power vacuum created by the weakness of France and Britain and the collapse of Germany was not to be filled by the Soviet Union, then the United States would have to assume global responsibilities. In short, the United States could not afford to return to its usual post-war isolationism and pacifism.

But, with the war's end, riots erupted at US military bases around the world as servicemen clamored for release from active duty. Shortly thereafter, efforts were made to liberalize the Services, and reforms were imposed on the Army by an outside agency known as the Doolittle Board.57/

4. Korea

In the period 1946 to 1950, the conventional forces were reduced, leaving the US ill-prepared for the hostilities that broke out in Korea in June 1950. The Korean "police action" required a massive buildup of general purpose forces, and thereafter a peacetime military establishment of 1.5 million men - far in excess of pre-war levels - and a mentality of defense preparedness was maintained. Furthermore, attention was given to equipping and arming our military establishment with modern weapons thereby feeding the symbiotic relationship between the military and industry. The Korean War tended to reinforce both American defense conscicusness while further strengthening defense industry. By 1967 about 20 percent of the adult male population was composed of veterans and 1.5 million, or 103 out of every 1000, workers in the US worked in defense-related industry.58/

5. The Impact of Vietnam (See Volume VII, The Soldier).

As the war in Vietnam dragged on into the late 1960s, escalating yearly, the altered importance and prominence of the military began to come under increasing attack from other sectors of society. Some intellectuals and young people interpreted the growing influence of the military as an expansion of the military into civilian life or a militarization of society and therefore perceived the growing "military-industrial complex" as a threat to traditional American values, perhaps recalling former President Einsenhower's warning about that complex.

The lack of apparent military success in Vietnam undermined confidence in the military. Casualties began to mount, antiwar sentiment continued to grow and the Vietnam War was increasingly viewed as unnecessary, illegal and immoral. Soon the military profession also began to seem immoral to many. In some cases, hostility toward military service took the form of "...the characterization of the armed forces as the embodiment of all that is evil within American society."59/

These sentiments were less radical and less unique then most of the young people who held them thought. As far back as the Mexican-American War, Americans had protested against immoral wars.60/ The pacifism of the Vietnam era was not substantially different from the pacifism

which followed World War I. It can, in fact, be argued that the backlash against foreign wars which has traditionally followed American involvement in such wars, was only delayed by the Cold War after World War II, and set in the 1960s. Likewise, the Vietnam era reaction against the military - including the return to an all volunteer army - is more in line with traditional American attitudes towards the military than was the post-WW II attitude. Unfortunately, the traditional American hostility toward large, conscript, standing armies and disrespect for the military profession may not be suited to the altered international and technological environment in which the United States currently finds itself.

F. INSIGHTS

In 1964, the United States was ill-prepared to deal with the social issues that were brought to the forefront throughout the country. The relatively placid domestic scene from 1945 to 1960 had established consensus as the presumed "normal" American social pattern. The system showed considerable flexibility in meeting challenges like the civil rights movement of the 1950s and threats from abroad. The shattering of consensus over the Vietnam War issue shook the nation to its roots and by 1968, with the urban riots, public assassinations, campus riots, massive antiwar and antigovernment demonstrations, etc., there seemed to have been genuine reason to question the vitality of the nation and its institutions. Since that time this nation has continued its dialectical evolution and absorbed many elements of the challenge that was posed in the 1960s. The nation is more stable now, but it is also vastly changed in the way that it perceives itself, individuals within it, and its place in the world.

Support for the military in the United States is fickle at best. It is highest in periods of popularly recognized defense threats, but declines rapidly when no threat is apparent or if military actives go on for too long without a decisive end in sight. This contrasts with the attitudes of other nations, notably Germany, which sustained respect for its military despite the cataclysmic defeat in W.W.I and immense national suffering in W.W.II.

G. LESSONS

This evolution suggests lessons that might be derived from the war. For politicians in government faced with social disruption and political dissent, the experience of the 1960s and 1970s involved the extreme importance of stepping back to put the elements of the situations into perspective. It also should teach politicians that the nation can suffer grievously if dissenters feel excluded from the political system.

For the dissenters themselves, the example of the antiwar movement isolating itself on the left should indicate the importance of developing carefully thought-out programs to achieve political objectives, programs that must include appeals that are acceptable to the center of American politics.

The ultimate flexibility of the American social and political system in adjusting to the powerful forces of the 1960s and 1970s should provide a lesson that will be of great value in the nation's ability to deal with future domestic pressures.

CHAPTER 2 ENDNOTES

1. Charles Reich, The Greening of America (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 171. Reich discusses the self-destruction of the "Corporate State" as the prelude to the emergence of a new level of understanding which he terms "Consciousness III."

2. S. Vogelgesang, The Long Dark Night of the Soul (New York: Harpers & Row, Publishers, 1974), p. 125.

3. Andrew Hacker, "What Kind of Nation Are We?" New York Times Magazine, December 8, 1963, pp. 23-24.

4. Angus Campbell and Philip Converse, The Human Meaning of Social Change (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1972), pp. 324-325. The authors point out that there is a strong correlation between education and political participation. This study indicates that the higher the educational attainment of an individual, the more likely he is to be attentive to the political process, knowledgeable about its operation, and desirous of participating in the political system. Campbell and Converse provide the following graph showing the increasing levels of education in the US.



In 1968 the Federal Government was assuming 24 percent of the total cost of college education in the United States. It was estimated that that percentage would "need to rise" to 33 percent in order to provide the kind of universal opportunity that was desired by educational planners.

5. Kermit Gordon, Agenda for the Nation (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1968) p. 256. The funding of the new defense industries came not simply from purchases of equipment from individual companies, but also from the development of the enormous federal scientific research establishment through funding of university research as well as the establishment of a series of "national laboratories". They included the Argonne Laboratory at Chicago, the Radialis Laboratory at Berkeley, the Lincoln Laboratory at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in California, etc.

CHANGES IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND IN EMPLOYMENT

Percentage of Families with Income of:	1959	1963	1959-1963 Change	1967	1963-1967 Change
Over $15,000	3.1	5.4	+2.3	12.2	+6.8
$5,000-$15,000	52.3	58.3	+6.0	62.7	+4.4
Under $5,000	44.6	36.2	-8.4	25.1	-11.1

Based on "Consumer Income," Current Population Reports, Department of Commerce, August 5, 1968, pp.2-7. The data in this table are based on income only, prior to deductions for taxes. However, the report states, "Even after allowance for changes in consumer prices, family income has risen by 3-1/2 to 4 percent in each of the last 4 years" (p.1).

6. Ibid., p. 258

7. R. Weber, ed., America In Change: Reflection on the 60's and 70's (London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972) p. 42 presents census data from the US Department of Commerce which reflects the population shifts from the farm to urban and suburban areas.

Farm, city, and suburban populations 1940-1970

	Farm	Central City	Suburb
1940	31,000,000	43,000,000	27,000,000
1950	23,000,000	50,000,000	37,000,000
1960	16,000,000	57,000,000	56,000,000
1970	10,000,000	65,000,000	76,000,000

Note: Rural nonfarm dwellers, and urban residents outside of metropolitan areas, are not included. Some farm dwellers are also included in the suburban category. Definition of central city and suburb for the years 1940-1960 are according to the 1960 Census. The 1970 figures reflect some slight changes in the definitions that were used in the 1970 Census.

8. Ibid. Weber also depicts the changing urban concentrations. In 1960 population density was focused along the Eastern seaboard, the Great Lakes, coastal California and Puget Sound, with interland concentrations in the Colorado Piedmont.



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9. Manpower Report of the President, Department of Labor, Washington, D.C., April 1968, p. 232, reflects the following:

CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT IN PERCENTAGES

	White-Collar	Blue-Collar	Service	Farm
1958	42.6	37.1	11.9	8.5
1967	46.0	36.7	12.5	4.8

10. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages (New York: The Viking Press, 1970), p. 198. See the discussion of this approach to viewing the changes in American society. The author calls the 1776 revolution the political one, the second being the industrial revolution that began in the late 19th century.

11. Ibid., pp. 203-204.

12. During the first few weeks of the campaign Kennedy declared: "I think the question before the American people is: are we doing as much as we can do...? If we fail, their freedom fails... I am not satisfied as an American with the progress that we are making... This is a great country but I think it could be a greater country." Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 224.

13. There are two major streams in black thought that fed into the civil rights movement. Each represents an approach to the problem of black exclusion from the mainstream of American life. The first of these streams is represented by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) which is not a mass organization, but rather seeks to focus the political power of the black economic and educated elite. To a considerable degree, the NAACP was founded as a reaction to the "uncle Tomism" of Booker T. Washington. The NAACP from its inception worked to establish civil rights for black Americans and to win a place for them in the mainstream of American society. To a large degree the NAACP has been dedicated to rooting out white discrimination and ending unequal treatment of blacks. Thus the NAACP and similar organizations like the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and the Urban League have sought to deal with the blacks' problem by attacking the problem of white racism and discrimination.

    The second stream that had fed into the black struggle emphasized that rather than forcing whites to accept blacks, it was in the interests of American blacks to draw apart from the whites and to establish a country of their own. Marcus Garvey, a West Indian black founded the first and in many ways the most successful mass-based black movement. He appealed to the black pride in themselves and their accomplishments noting that now the black problem was one of reestablishing a black identity rather than trying to submerge blacks in the dominant white population through acculteration. Garvey called for the organization of a black African state by American blacks.

    Garvey's program ended in bankruptcy and jail, but he had played a significant role in helping black Americans reassert their broken bonds to Africa and an African identity. The separatist ideas Garvey espoused are echoed in the doctrines of the Black Muslins who have raised political programs to the levels of religious doctrine. See Charles E. Silberman, Crisis in Black and White (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 125 and 131.

14. Ibid., p. 187.

15. Mario Sairo, a leader of the youth movement declared the purpose of the demonstrations:

> Last summer I went to Mississippi to join the struggle there for civil rights. This fall I am engaged in another phase of the same struggle, this time in Berkeley. . . In Mississippi an autocratic and powerful minority rules, through organized violence, to suppress the vast, virtually powerless majority. In California, the privileged minority manipulates the university bureacracy to suppress the students' political expressions. That "respectable" bureaucracy is the efficient enemy in a "Brave New World". . .

> There is a time when the operation of the machine (American society) becomes so odious, makes you so sick at heart, that you can't take part; you can't even tacitly take part, and you've got to put your bodies upon the gears and upon the wheels, upon the levers, upon the apparatus and you've got to make it stop. And you've got to indicate to the people who run it, to the people who own it, that unless you're free, the machines will be prevented from working at all. (Powers, p. 34).

16. Massive movements of blacks from the South to the Northern cities had taken place in and after World War II. In 1920 blacks had been a rarity in the North outside of New York, Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia and there they were no more than 5-10 percent of the population. In the 1950s and 1960s an average of 147,000 black people left the South each year. Between 1940 and 1970 more than 4.5 million moved out of the South. In 1970, Washington, D.C. was 71 percent black. Gary, Indiana was 53 percent black, etc. In New York alone there were 1.8 million blacks and 1.2 million in Chicago. Godfrey Hodgson, America in Our Time (New York: Vintage Books, 1976), pp. 55-61.

17. Daniel Seligman, "A Special Kind of Rebellion," Fortune, January 1969; see also other articles in this issue entitled "A Special Issue on American Youth."

18. An essay by Sam Brown that appears in Anthony Lake, The Vietnam Legacy (New York: New York University Press, 1976).

19. The momentum for the formation of the SDS came from Michael Harrington, a member of the League for Industrial Democracy, an "old left" institution, which was seeking to revitalize itself through establishment of a youth organization. Initially the SDS was dominated by the University of Michigan students, although students from a dozen campuses attended the inaugural convention of the SDS. Hodgson, p. 278.

20. Ibid., p. 279.

21. More students from the San Francisco Bay area than from any other region participated in the Mississippi Summer Project. The youth movement found its first mass demonstration apart from the civil rights movement at the campus of the University of California at Berkeley. Thereafter, Berkeley came to be regarded as the vanguard of the youth movement. The issue that led to demonstrations of up to 7,000 students was a university attempt to restrict political activities on the campus. That attempt led to the formation of the Free Speech Movement and a confrontation with the university.

The development of student political activism in the Bay area was a major factor in the early adoption by many of the students of the style and aspirations of the Beat Movement whose center was the North Beach area of San Francisco. The alienation the Beats felt for the technological American that was everywhere rising around them was highly compatible with the feelings of political apartness being expressed by the students at Berkeley. Berkeley was the coming together of inspiration from SNCC and from the Beats. It was there that the substance and the style of the youth revolution first flowered, symbolized by the development of the de rigeur of the 1960s, the levi jackets and work boots of SNCC and the army fatigues and long hair of the Beats.

22. On April 17, 1965 the SDS organized a demonstration in Washington against the war and twenty thousand people participated. The SDS through this vehicle established itself among the front ranks of the antiwar organizations and made itself a power broker among the feuding factions of the movement. Moderate peace groups feared that the inclusion of communists in the demonstration would discredit the movement. The SDS refused to exclude groups like the May Second Movement, the Progressive Labor Movement, or the W.E.B. Du Bois Clubs, the communist party's instrument for attempting to capture the student movement. (Powers, p. 73)

The April demonstration had been marked by peaceful protest that, despite the participation by communists was compatible with the ideas of moderates. In mid-1965, however, the organizations within the movement began to turn to civil disobedience as a means protesting the war. In July, at a New York demonstration the first draft card was burned. In August, 350 Washington demonstrators were arrested for disorderly conduct during a protest outside the White House. On August 5 and 6 and again on the 12th large demonstrations were held in Berkeley as students attempted to stop troop trains moving through town toward the Oakland Army terminal.

The demonstrations of the fall culminated in a Washington demonstration organized by the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE). This demonstration was important because it marked a definite break between the thrust of the antiwar movement and the liberals who had been the staunch allies of many of the demonstration participants in the civil rights movement.

From this position, the liberals who had stood for large government programs to aid the blacks and poor and who had believed in their sophisticated ability to manage the nation's economy to insure endless prosperity became the object of scorn of the antiwar movement. Through their carefully programmed gradual escalation of the war, the liberals and their think-tank oriented planning, manipulation of forces, and quantified assessment of "human factors" came to be regarded by participants in the antiwar movement as forces for evil rather than good.

The major demonstrations of 1966 were held on March 26 when protests took place in a dozen cities. The largest of the demonstrations, 22,000 strong, was in New York. The rest of 1966 was focused on attempts to influence the President's Vietnam policy through the 1966 election. Those elections were a clear setback for the Democratic Party which lost forty-seven House seats and three Senate rests to the Republicans. However, the antiwar movement could not claim that the rate reflected a repudiation of Johnson's Vietnam War policies. With the evidence of failure to influence policy making, the antiwar movement was in one of its recurring slumps.

In 1967 two sets of demonstrations, April 8-15 and October 19-21 were the largest demonstrations yet organized and also marked a turning to massive resistance to the war policies. Vast crowds assembled in New York and San Francisco in April. The New York crowd was (very conservatively) numbered at 100-125,000 by the police and the San Francisco marchers filled the 65,000 Kezar Stadium. The antiwar movement participants were angered by the government's dismissal of the importance of the demonstrations and sought in the October fall offensive to find new ways to command the government's attention. The resistance tactics that were agreed upon worked a change in the antiwar movement.

Four major street actions occured in 1967 which were designed to provoke violence. Middle-class, middle-age participants played almost no part in these activities which were organized entirely by young people. The acceptance of planned violence was a symptom of the failure of the antiwar movement of the young because it illustrated how little had been achieved in three and a half years of demonstrating. Between 50 and 75-thousand young people joined the Saturday October 21 demonstrations in Washington. There was a traditional rally at the Lincoln Memorial and then a march to the Pentagon across Arlington Memorial Bridge. Once across the bridge the SDS people and New York radicals broke from the police lines to the River Entrance Plaza of the building and some twenty-five crashed into the Pentagon itself. Through Saturday night and Sunday the demonstrators held their positions in front of the Pentagon. Sunday night the demonstration permit expired and the troops began to clear the Plaza.

The "storming of the Pentagon," as it is known in the movement legend, marked the high water mark of the resistance stage of the antiwar movement. In fact, even as the young demonstrators surged toward the Pentagon, the movement itself was exhausted, frustrated, and splintered. Groups like the Vietnam Moritorium Committee were able to organize massive demonstrations in the fall of 1969 and in response to the expansion of the war into Cambodia in 1970 and 1971. However, the movement had spent itself. A sense of frustration and division permeated the young people and fed their sense that the government would respond to their call to withdraw from Vietnam. For a time in

1968 antiwar students were heartened by the belief that their demonstration had driven President Johnson from the White House. There was genuine hope that Eugene McCarthy or Robert Kennedy would triumph in the Democratic convention, become president and end the war. The victory of Richard Nixon and the continuation of the war for another four years frustrated that last hope.

23. Definition of who is an intellectual is a subjective assessment. One could characterize intellectuals as a group by their publications, and by the academic institutions with which they have been associated. Robert A. Nisbet offers these characteristics to describe intellectuals. They see themselves as (1) "gatekeepers of ideas and fountainheads of ideologies" who generalize from particular problems to universal solutions. (2) They have a moral commitment to the purity of the values of society. (3) They delight in the play of the mind and relish it for its own sake. (4) They are brilliant. Robert A. Nisbet, "What Is An Intellectual?" Commentary, December 1965, pp. 93-94.

24. Hodgson, p. 94.

25. Vogelgesang, p. 65.

26. Powers, p. 66.

27. Vogelgesang, p. 126.

28. Ibid, p. 128.

29. Louis Harris, The Anguish of Change (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1973), p. 139.

30. Philip S. Foner, American Labor and the Indochina War (New York: International Publishers, 1971), p. 31.

31. Ibid, p. 33.

32. Ibid, p. 76.

33. Hodgson, p. 413.

34. Ibid, p. 413.

35. Sam Brown, "The Politics of Peace" The Washington Monthly (Aug 1970): p. 24-46.

36. Ibid, p. 36.

37. Ibid, p. 25.

38. Ibid, p. 29.

39. H. Schuman, "Two Sources of Antiwar Sentiment in America," American Journal of Sociology 78 (Nov 1972): p. 528.

40. N. Podhoretz, "Vietnam and Collective Guilt," Commentary 55, March 1973, p. 5.

41. Vogelgesang, p. 129.

42. Podhoretz, pp. 5-16, see also Vogelgesang's, The Long Dark Night of the Soul.

43. Thomas Powers argues that "Opponents of the war often argued whether it was better to work within the system or in the streets, but in fact success depended on pursuing both strategies simultaneously. Without those few intellectual leaders who first opposed the war on grounds of policy or morality, there would have been no broad movement. Without a movement, national division over the war would not have needed a point of crisis in 1967; and without the crisis, there would have been no effective political challenge to Johnson's power at the one moment when he had to back away from the war, or commit the country to a vastly increased effort with a dangerous potential." Powers, p. 318.

44. Vogelgesang, p. 141.

45. Walter Millis, Arms and Men: A Study of American Military History (New York: The New American Library, 1956). pp. 19-20.

46. Ibid., pp. 14 & 34, Millis contends that: "The Colonies had rebelled not only against the political 'tyranny' of the King's ministers but also against irresponsible military power represented by the royal 'standing armies'."

47. Daniel M. Smith, in his history The American Diplomatic Experience (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972) pp. 35-36, points out that George Washington's farewell admonition against permanent alliances was directed specifically against American sentiment for an alliance with France; however, it was often interpreted by subsequent generations as a justification for isolationism and became an enduring thread of American foreign policy especially in the 19th century.

48. Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978), p. 82.

49. Millis, pp. 120-121.

50. Emory Upton as paraphased in Millis, p. 125.

51. Millis, pp. 206-209, 212.

52. Smith, p. 332.

53. Millis, pp. 217-218.

54. Stephen E. Ambrose and James A. Barber, Jr. eds., The Military and American Society (New York: The Free Press, 1972), p. 3.

55. Ronald A. Bailey, The Home Front: U.S.A. (Alexandria, Va., Time-Life Books, 1978), p. 43.

56. Ibid., p. 42.

57. General Jimmy Doolittle, Former Commander of Eighth Air Force, headed the board which resulted in a marked liberalization within the Army. One result was the requirement that officers wear uniforms of the same material worn by enlisted personnel.

58. Martin B. Hickman, The Military and American Society (London: Collier-MacMillan Ltd., 1971), pp. 5 & 60.

59. Ambrose and Barber, p. 309.

60. Smith, p. 127. Smith explicitly compares the Mexican and Vietnam War experiences, describing the similarity of domestic reaction to the wars as they continued past the point of enthusiastic support.

CHAPTER 3

THE MEDIA AND THE VIETNAM WAR

> ...The President pushed hard for us to tighten the rules under which correspondents could observe field operations in person.
>
> Those responsible for information policies of the Government were, therefore, squeezed hard - between the desire of the Administration to downplay the war for a whole variety of military and political reasons, and the desire of reporters on the ground to tell all to the American people.
>
> Pierre Salinger - Press Secretary 1/

> Few realized that the Vietnam War was the first war ever fought without some sort of official censorship.
>
> This situation thrust upon the news media a responsibility unto itself - one never experienced hitherto-fore. As an institution, in my opinion, it failed the test.
>
> Gen. William Westmoreland
> COMUSMACV 2/

A. INTRODUCTION

The revolution in communications and media technology coupled with the US decision in early 1965 against exercising censorship resulted in the Vietnam war being the "most reported war in history." Such intensive coverage of the war by numerous veteran and novice reporters both in Washington and in Vietnam caused unease among some US government officials who felt that the style and tone of much of the reporting about the war were not in the best interests of US policies in the region. Many also felt that the reporters in Vietnam numbered far in excess of what would have been adequate to provide full coverage of the war to the American public.

Government-media relations during the war are best understood using the broader concept of "crisis-information transfer in a free society." Crisis-information transfer concerns the release of information to the public at times when only incomplete information is available. In a free

society, however, informing the public is important, and the media can be expected to probe for whatever information may be available from all possible sources. The problems which are naturally characteristic of this 'transfer' of information through bureaucracies to the public via the media were exacerbated by the emergence of a government credibility gap in the early years of US involvement in Vietnam. The expresssion 'credibility gap' described the government's growing problem in explaining the objectives and progress of US involvement in the Vietnam war to the media and to the American people. The 'gap' first appeared during the Kennedy administration and was widened considerably during the Johnson administration. Media/government relations fared no better during the Nixon administration; indeed, they were characterized by intense and mutual distrust. Some journalists charged various administrations with exercising "news management" and "news manipulation", and in turn, the administrations found the media guilty of news distortion of varying degrees.

Measurement of the media's impact upon US conduct of the war and public opinion is difficult. No doubt the media had an impact on the public's perception of the war, both its purpose and progress, but public opinions are not derived solely from the news. Environmental factors, built-in prejudices, social and peer pressures, education backgrounds--all weigh heavily in developing individual beliefs and opinions. More important is the nature of the media's influence on the policy-making processes within government.

The Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations and their treatment of and by the media provide interesting and thought-provoking examples of government/media relations during a protracted crisis--the Vietnam War.

Conflict between the US government and the news media began in the early 1960's despite the foundations of close, supportive reporting of military actions by the news media that had been laid during World War II. That tradition had continued through the Korean War and to the beginning of US involvement in Southeast Asia. During the post World War II years, the news media were changing rapidly as the objects and beneficiaries of the "communications revolution." At the same time, the media were undergoing

corporate structural changes that concentrated control of the expanding and highly profitable news-gathering resources of the nation. This chapter examines briefly the changes in the post-World War II media to establish a context for evaluating the impact of reporting on the Vietnam war.

B. CHANGING MEDIA IN A CHANGING SOCIETY

The US media have changed within the context of a changing American society. The overall changes which took place in the media included the following: communications technology, corporate concentration, the media as a business, and news presentation. The evolution of the media in America is examined as it establishes a context for assessing the changes in news media reporting and specifically in US media reporting of the Vietnam war.

1. Technological Changes

A technological revolution has swept the news gathering and news presentation industry since World War II. During World War II, news presentation was dominated completely by the newspapers and radio and was supplemented by the newsreel films shown at movie theaters. This comfortable dominance was upset by the birth of the television industry in 1946. Within a decade, television was serving an estimated 100 million persons; subsequently, it has become available to virtually every American. Nineteen sixty one was a key date for television news because in that year public opinion polls indicated that, for the first time, a majority of Americans received their news information about world events primarily from television. 3/ Television dramatically increased access to news. Instead of reading news that had been passed from reporters to newspaper editors, the public was able to view news events as they were taking place. Through the use of television signal transmitting satellites, it became possible to transmit rapidly and vividly images of these events around the world. 4/ Thus, the communications technology allowed Americans to see small segments of the Vietnam war and to receive the simultaneous analysis offered by news reporters. It should be noted that during most of the Vietnam war, what

the public saw on television more often were films of the war; live-on-the-scene reporting was infrequent with several notable exceptions such as the coverage of Tet in 1968. It is often said that TV brought the war into the living rooms of the American people, while in fact only small parts of the war could be relayed to the people. It was manifestly impossible to cover all of the war, and the reporters reported on the small segments of the war in which they came to be included. Further, the selection process that developed in Vietnam for identifying what should be broadcast to the United States provided the television industry with direct control of the image of the war Americans would receive.

The objectivity and accuracy of that process have become the focus of the debate concerning the role of TV in reporting war. Critics argue that the broadcasts misrepresented the nature of the war by over-dramatizing isolated events that were not representative of the actual war in Vietnam. One media expert commented that "there was television in Vietnam, and there was Vietnam in Vietnam, and there were no similarities between the two." 5/ Television was developing rapidly during the war, and the unprecedented task of reporting the Vietnam war in which set-piece battles were rare presented severe challenges to TV producers. The kinds of stories that could be produced in the earlier stages of the war were self-limiting because of the absence of minicameras. Instead, the cameras were large and had to be set up by teams. The result was that with several notable exceptions such as the 1968 Tet offensive, TV reporting was not usually "hot-breaking news," but more like feature reporting. 6/ Accessibility, viewer interest, and technical problems in filing became important criteria in the selection of competing alternatives for filming and broadcasting. This selection process left the TV producers open to the critics' charges of "news management" and distortion.

The press coverage of the war was also deeply influenced by the communications revolution. International teletype and telephone systems allowed more rapid transmission of material to newspaper editors than had been possible in World War II or the Korean war.

2. The Media as a Business/Corporate Concentration

Since World War II, the news media of the United States have become increasingly concentrated, as publishing families used their enormous profits to buy out their competition. The result has been a rapid concentration of power in a highly competitive, localized industry of large city dailies and their publishers. In 1910, there were 2,200 US dailies published in 1,200 cities. In 1972, there were 1,750 dailies published, and only fifty-three percent of urban areas had their own newspapers. 7/ In 1910, most urban areas had competitive newspapers, but by 1945, forty percent of daily circulation in the US was noncompetitive. By 1961, that proportion had risen to almost sixty percent. The number of American cities with competing daily newspapers declined from 552 in 1920 to 55 in 1962. Cities with only one daily newspaper increased from 55 percent of the total to 84 percent by 1960. 8/ By 1972, the number of major cities with competing newspapers had shrunk to less than three percent. 9/

In the early 1960's, deals were struck between the powerful publishing families that controlled major dailies in cities like Los Angeles, San Francisco, Washington, and Philadelphia. The Chandlers, with the Hearsts, Annenbergs and The Washington Post interests, embarked on deals that increased cooperation among them rather than sharpened competition. By January 1962, one third of the total circulation of US newspapers was controlled by just twelve managements. In the early 1960's, the Chandlers succeeded in killing the last of their competition in the Los Angeles circulation area (8 million) and stood at the center of a vast book-publishing, agricultural land, oil lease, urban real estate empire. 10/ In the 1960's, The Washington Post expanded its penetration of the Washington, D.C. market so that it had four levels of coverage including Newsweek magazine, its own television and radio stations, and the newspaper itself.

The publishing empires that controlled the newspapers in 1962 were overwhelmingly conservative in their political outlook and heavily dominated by Republicans. The endorsements of candidates by newspapers indicate the extent of this conservative stance. In 1960, eighty-four

percent of the nation's newspapers endorsed Richard Nixon. In 1968, eighty percent endorsed Nixon in his race against Humphrey. The endorsement of presidential candidates is one measure of newspapers' political leanings, and the evidence of the strong conservative bias of US newspapers is corroborated by examination of endorsements of congressional candidates by US papers. That examination indicates total conservative dominance in endorsements in cities like Los Angeles, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Detroit. In New York, which is often depicted as a hot-bed of radical journalism, congressional districts supporting liberal-voting congressmen have support from no more than half the papers. 11/

At the time when US participation in Vietnam was growing, the newspaper empires had committed themselves to supporting the Executive Branch in the execution of its policies. Thus, The Washington Post dutifully echoed the Eisenhower administration's first report that the U-2 had been shot down over the Soviet Union while it was on a routine weather observation mission, and The New York Times withheld publication of information about the Bay of Pigs invasion at the request of the Kennedy administration. The evolution of the publishers' role as critic of government policy occurred slowly during the Vietnam war.

The concentration of newspaper control was reflected in the television industry by the development and expansion of the two major networks, CBS and NBC (in the 1960's, ABC had only half as many viewers as CBS or NBC). Concentration of ownership of television stations was held by law to a maximum of five stations, but the major networks controlled the news presentations in all their affiliated stations. Thus, even though the local stations prepared local news programs, they remained dependent on the network news systems for their national and international news coverage. The control exercised by certain individuals at the TV networks (the Sarnoffs of NBC, William Paley at CBS, and Leonard Goldenson at ABC) raised them to the ranks of the families that controlled US newspapers (the Oches and Sulzbergers of The New York Times, the Meyer family at The Washington Post and Newsweek, and the Luces, Chandlers, Hearsts, and Annenbergs). In the 1960's, no more than a dozen news organizations dominated by noted

individuals and families controlled the news that was received by the American people.

3. News Presentation

The quiz show scandals of 1959 and 1960 were a turning point in television programming and specifically in the importance assigned to news presentation. Shows like "The $64,000 Question" and "Twenty-One" had come to dominate television ratings, and they demonstrated the intellectual bankruptcy of the US television system. In response to both public demonstration of the "TV wasteland" and to their own self-criticism, the networks altered their policy of de-emphasizing the news and began to devote more time to public-service news broadcasting. Between 1958 and January 1959, the three networks had put out only ninety-four hours of public-service broadcasting, and little of that had been prime-time. 12/ Two years later, in a comparable period, the output had jumped to one hundred and fifty-one hours.

In 1963, CBS lengthened its nightly news presentation from fifteen minutes to thirty, and the other networks followed suit. This was a move dictated not only by a desire to provide the public with more news coverage but also to help finance the expensive news documentaries which had low viewer audiences by expanding the newsrooms' best sellers, the nightly news programs.

The expansion of news coverage provided the television industry with opportunity for broader coverage of news events. There were three basic formats for covering the news. The presentation of on-the-scene footage, studio interviews of key newsmakers, and documentaries. The first format dominated the news presentations, and there was a distinct lack of analysis to help the viewer grasp the meaning of the series of short film clips he was offered. 13/ The result was that news reporting featured a series of clips depicting American cities burning after the ghetto riots, short reports on assassinations, and other crises and neglected to provide accompanying analyses of events. Analysis of the Vietnam war by the networks whose resources were limited depended principally on The New York Times, which is recognized throughout US journalism as the validater of

news. By November of 1965, CBS and NBC expanded their Saigon news bureaus and at the end of 1967, they had staffs of two dozen employees each and annual budgets of around $2.5 million. This increased commitment by the networks to reporting the Vietnam war guaranteed that every night viewers in the US would see film clips of infantry search-and-destroy missions, bombardments, napalm raids, etc., accompanied by interviews with optimistic US government officials.

In the mid-1960s in the United States, only a handful of newspapers supported both national and foreign reporting staffs of their own or employed well-informed and influential commentators whose articles were syndicated to other papers. Interpretation of foreign and defense policy and events was often left to the Post and Times which had large Washington and international staffs and were thereby better equipped to conduct in-depth analysis. 14/ Of the two, the Times, with over five hundred editors and correspondents, provided the most comprehensive coverage. 15/ The relative difference in the resources of the Times and the Post compared with other newspapers gave those two organizations positions of powerful influence in the presentation of news to the American public.

C. GOVERNMENT-MEDIA RELATIONS

The evolution of government/news media relations during the Vietnam war was linked directly to the approaches taken by successive administrations toward the news media. This section traces the evolving relationship during the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon years. The so-called "credibility gap" which developed during the Kennedy years and which widened during the Johnson years became a centerpiece of government/media relations. Each of the three presidents had his own style of "handling" the press, and each had his successes and failures in manipulating press reactions to his policies. While government/media relations had always been adversarial to some degree due to the nature of the two institutions, this adversarial relationship was escalated to new levels of mistrust and even hostility

during the Vietnam war years. The credibility gap developed both in Washington and in Saigon as newsmen noted apparent discrepancies between stated government policies and the activities that they observed in the field. As respected newsmen began to question the credibility of the US government, their papers' policies toward the Vietnam War began to change.

In the analysis which follows, emphasis is placed upon the style of presidential interaction with the media, since the president is key to setting the tone of government/media relations. Peter Braestrup, an authority on the media and the Vietnam war writes "the media need a coherent President." He continues:

> ...it is imperative that in any war, a coherent strategy be decided on early, that it be understood throughout the government, and that it be manifested in both presidential words and actions. Simplicity has its virtues, above all, in dealing with the media... policy contradictions, incoherence, and shifts make the media lose confidence even sooner than does the general public...Thus, presidential behavior and the plausibility of presidential policy are key to understanding media treatment (with its Washington orientation) of the Vietnam war as a whole. 16/

1. Kennedy Administration Media Relations

President Kennedy's interest in the press was personal and of long standing. His ability to express himself on television was the deciding difference in his race for the presidency against Richard Nixon in 1960. Kennedy was an avid reader, and during his administration, the newspapers and magazines came to occupy a particularly important position. Government officials could be certain that articles concerning their particular fields of interest which appeared in The New York Times, The Washington Post, Washington Evening Star, New York Herald Tribune (officially banned from the White House at one point but still read by the President), Time, or Newsweek, would be read by the president. This knowledge of the President's reading habits provided cabinet members and other government officials with an important communication link to the president. 17/

During the Kennedy years, correspondents had unprecedented close personal contact with the President. Joseph Kraft and Joseph Alsop wrote speeches for Kennedy. Charles Bartlett and his wife brought Jacqueline Bouvier (herself a reporter) and John Kennedy together, and Sylvia Porter wrote a draft of Kennedy's 1963 tax reform speech for television. Walter Lippman persuaded Kennedy to change the reference to Russia in his inaugural address from "enemy" to "adversary." 18/ Younger publishers, editors, and columnists tended to share the style, attitudes, and interests of the new elite and to share their upper-middle class and academic backgrounds. The close ties of the press to the Washington "Camelot" elite provided a common basis for an understanding and affection reflected in Kennedy's large press conferences. This factor was an important element in understanding how the credibility gap developed as it did outside the influence of Washington - in Saigon - during the Kennedy years.

President Kennedy was a master of television presentation. He recognized the importance of this medium in presenting his views to the nation because it allowed him to bypass the printed page and "go over the heads of the press" to "reach out to" the American people directly. 19/ Kennedy recognized that TV was an instrument particularly suited to building national consensus for the executive branch's policies. During his administration, Kennedy developed a distinct style of using TV to explain and promote his policies.

In spite of his close affinity for reporters and his interest in the power of the media, initial signs of the credibility gap vis-à-vis US policies in Southeast Asia developed during Kennedy's term of presidency. The administration wanted to "play down" the involvement in Vietnam for two basic reasons:

(1) The Bay of Pigs invasion and the Berlin Crisis which had necessitated calling up the reserves and sending another division to Europe had demonstrated enough bellicosity, and

(2) The United States was exceeding the limits of military presence in Vietnam as dictated by the 1954 Geneva Agreements which the US had not signed, but had agreed to abide by under specified conditions (see Volume III).

The administration sought the cooperation of the press in downplaying the extent and nature of US involvement in Vietnam. 20/

The journalists in Vietnam did not cooperate. For example, by liberal interpretation of the Geneva Agreements, the United States could have 692 military personnel in the Republic of Vietnam. By 1962, the number was in excess of 10,000. Media reports of the size and nature of US involvement in Vietnam angered President Kennedy, and his administration took direct action to control media coverage of the US involvement. The effect of this action was described by Homer Bigart in The New York Times' house magazine:

> [We] seem to be regarded by the American mission as tools of our foreign policy.
>
> Those who balk are apt to find it a bit lonely, for they are likely to be distrusted and shunned by American and Vietnam officials. 21/

In 1963 media coverage of demonstrations and grisly self-immolations staged by militant Buddhist sects also served to disrupt relations between the media and the US government. The Buddhists provided selected US and foreign newspersons sufficient advance notification of antigovernment events to assure extensive coverage that would benefit their cause. As one US advisor to the ARVN commented, the more important reporters," ...got engraved invitations to the spontaneous demonstrations and barbecues." 22/

The management of news sources to influence the kind of news coming out of Vietnam became official US policy as stated in a State Department classified message from the US Information Agency to the US Mission. A paraphrase of the cable reads:

> It [Saigons #1006] stated that - news stories which criticized the Diem Government could not be "forbidden," but they only increase the difficulties of the US job.
>
> Newsmen should be advised that trifling or thoughtless criticism of the Diem government would make it difficult to maintain cooperation between the United States and Diem.

> Newsmen should not be transported to activities of any type that are likely to result in undesirable stories. 23/

Actions taken by the Mission in compliance with these directives could only sour government/press relations.

In 1963, relations between the correspondents and the Mission deteriorated dramatically. In reporting about the battle of Ap Bac, David Halberstam of The New York Times, Malcolm Browne of AP, and Neil Sheehan of UPI had described the poor performance of the South Vietnamese troops and the loss of five US helicopters. 24/ A month later, a classified memorandum by John Mecklin, the Director of the US Information Service in Vietnam, in which he described his view of the kind of reporting being done in Vietnam fell into the hands of the correspondents. While the memo was not completely negative concerning the press' handling of events, the sections that were leaked described press reports as being "irresponsible, sensationalized and astigmatic." 25/ The deterioration of US government/media relations was exacerbated by US reporters' early experiences in South Vietnam during Diem's rule. Unfamiliar with the openness of government press relations in the US, Diem was uncomfortable with the aggressive and critical western style of the US press corps. In efforts to cut off further criticism of him and his regime, Diem imposed some restrictions on the foreign press within South Vietnam. The US Mission's policy, described as "sink or swim with Ngo Dinh Diem," coupled with the president's caution contributed to a loss of candor and severely strained US government-media relations.

From Washington, the government sought to obtain cooperation from the press. Newsweek had been bombarded by official complaints about Francois Sully's "negative attitude toward Diem and his sister-in-law." Material critical of the progress of the war sent to Time by Charles Mohr was softened, but not in response to government pressure, for Luce, the managing editor, was pro-Diem. The White House brought pressure on The New York Times to have David Halberstam removed from Vietnam. 26/ All of these activities intensified the resolve of the few correspondents to tell the story in Vietnam as they saw it. In addition, the official reactions to

their reporting highlighted the reporters' contention that the government was not telling the truth concerning US involvement in the war in Vietnam. General Westmoreland has argued that the joint award in 1964 of Pultizer prizes to David Halberstam and Malcolm Browne "confused reporting with influencing American foreign policy." The General maintained that other reporters followed the line of criticizing the US military role thinking they would improve their chances of recognition and reward. 27/

Thus, by the mid-1960's correspondents in the field had come to believe that the US Mission was not telling the truth to the people. They believed that they were uncovering systematic attempts to deceive and that they faced a US government that sought to manipulate the facts to deceive the people. 28/

2. The Johnson Administration

The credibility gap that had developed in Vietnam during the Kennedy years widened dramatically in Washington during the Johnson administration. Johnson was the exact opposite of Kennedy in his relations with newspaper people. Unlike Kennedy who felt at ease with reporters, Johnson was insecure in his dealings with people whom he perceived to be "men of culture." Doris Kearns recorded Johnson's bitter recollections after his retirement:

> Actually, he believed, it was the intellectuals who hated him: "The men of ideas think little of me, they despise me"...It was not he who wanted to injure them; it was they who wanted to injure him and were responsible for his failure. In retirement, Johnson sincerely believed that he would have been the greatest President in this country's history had it not been for the intellectuals and the columnists - the men of ideas and the men of words. 29/

While he felt that he was despised by the media, Johnson believed that he could manipulate media reporting. He said:

> Reporters are puppets. They simply respond to the pull of the most powerful strings...Every story is always slanted to win the favor of someone who sits somewhere higher up. There is no such a thing as an objective

> news story. There is always a private story behind the public story. And if you don't control the strings to that private story, you'll never get good coverage no matter how many great things you do for the masses of the people. There's only one sure way of getting favorable stories from reporters and that is to keep their daily bread - the information, the stories, the plans, and the details they need for their work - in your hands, so that you can give it out when and to whom you want. 30/

Johnson sought to orchestrate the media coverage of his presidency by strictly controlling media access to him. Personal interviews were granted as rewards for favorable reporting whereas interviews were denied as punishment for reporting which was critical of Johnson and his policies. Despite Johnson's uneasiness with the press, his first year in office produced remarkably sympathetic treatment from the press. Shortly after assuming the presidency, Johnson embarked upon a campaign to gain the friendship and respect of the press. He courted the favor of the press by inviting newsmen to his ranch in Texas, by holding lengthy luncheon sessions and by spending hours with media executives. One year after he entered the White House, however, the honeymoon ended as Johnson criticized the press for accentuating the negative aspects of his relations with our NATO allies. He intimated that this sort of coverage was endangering US national security interests. 31/

Johnson was extremely sensitive to 'negative' stories and he took great offense when the press criticized him or his policies. He responded to the press criticisms of 1965 with increasing anger. Irritations continued to mount throughout Johnson's administration as he administered personal slights to reporters and spurned their criticism of him and his policies. 32/

August 1965 marks a watershed in the history of media coverage of the war as well as in the deterioration of government-media relations. Morely Safer's on-the-scene film story of the US Marines burning the huts of villagers at Cam Ne and surrounding areas drew a strong reponse from the administration. According to Safer, the US Marines had orders to burn the hamlets to the ground if they received so little as one volley of fire from

the area. One hundred and fifty huts were leveled in retaliation for a burst of gunfire. Standing in front of the burning hamlet, amid the cries of fear as people rushed to safety, Safer spoke without a script, informally. He said:

> If there were Vietcong in the hamlets they were long gone, alerted by the roar of the amphibious tractors...the women and the old men who remain will never forget that August afternoon...
> Today's operation is the frustration of Vietnam in miniature. There is little doubt that American firepower can win a military victory here. But to a Vietnamese peasant whose home means a lifetime of backbreaking labor it will take more than presidential promises to convince him that we are on his side. 33/

Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs criticized the Safer report, claiming that no American newsman would have reported this incident like Safer, who was a Canadian citizen although employed by CBS. Tensions between media and the government were growing and Sylvester did much to damage relations. His style of dealing with the press is characterized by a callous remark made to a group of reporters in Saigon, "Look, if you think any American official is going to tell the truth, then you're stupid!" In 1967 Johnson finally replaced Sylvester with P. Goulding, but by then, the 'credibility gap' had blown wide open.

In December 1966, The New York Times began publication of a series of articles from North Vietnam by its assistant managing editor, Harrison Salisbury, which flatly contradicted administration assertions that the bombing of the North was solely against military targets. In spite of this publication, there was no unified stand against the war on the Times' board of review editors, yet no other newspaper had given as much space to the antiwar movement in 1966 and 1967. 34/ The Times editorial page (separate from its news department) was "dovish" from early 1966, urged peace negotiations, praised Fulbright, and generally sympathized with the non-Marxist academic critics of the administration's war policy. But Times columnists were less dovish in 1965-67. While the Times

could no longer be counted as a supporter of his policies, other major news organizations, including major newspapers, Life, Look, Time, and Newsweek, CBS and NBC continued to support Johnson.

In late 1967, Johnson acted to strengthen his media support and to reverse the decline in public support for his war policies, support which had fallen below the 50 per cent mark.35/ Johnson responded with a torrent of administration pronouncements designed to show the American people that the Johnson policies were slowly leading to a successful conclusion of US involvement in Vietnam. There was "progress" until the 1968 Tet offensive, as reported, showed that the strength and will of the communists had not been broken and that the optimistic official reassurances of late 1967 were at best ill-founded and at worst lies.

In November 1967, Johnson had called a meeting of the Wise Men, the administrators for his Vietnam policies. Repeatedly, they stressed the solid progress that was being achieved in Vietnam. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker stated:

> A year ago, [the population in South Vietnam] was about 55 percent under government control. Now the Vietnamese figure is 70 percent. Ours is a little more conservative. We say 67 percent. About 17 percent according to our figures is under VC control, and the rest is in contested areas. 36/

Ambassador Robert Komer and Vice President Hubert Humphrey also contributed to the media campaign. 37/

One of the most influential voices Johnson added to those who emphasized the successes was General William Westmoreland who was called to Washington to provide reassurance of the administration's policies. In response to questions after his speech at the National Press Club in Washington, Westmoreland declared:

> ...it is conceivable to me that within two years or less, it will be possible for us to phase down our level of commitment and turn more of the burden of the war over to the Vietnamese armed forces, who are improving, and who, I believe, will be prepared to assume this greater burden. 38/

In his January 17 State of the Union message, Johnson summarized the successes of the last year, noting that South Vietnamese elections had been held, the enemy had been defeated in battle after battle, and the numbers of South Vietnamese living in areas under government control had risen sharply. 39/ Johnson expressed his determination to pursue his policies in Vietnam until they reached fruition. He stressed his efforts to establish peace, and he sought the assistance and support of the American people in achieving his goals.

Nothing in Johnson's message or in the words of his advisers and administrators prepared the American people for the Vietcong attack on the principal cities of Vietnam beginning on January 30, 1968. The story of that battle is told by Don Oberdorfer in his book Tet, and the media reaction to the events of January-March 1968 is recounted in detail in Peter Braestrup's book, Big Story. Braestrup demonstrated that the Tet offensive was presented by the media as a serious defeat for the Allies. He notes that historians agree that the offensive was, to the contrary, a serious defeat for the communists. 40/ The media fastened on early interpretations of the meaning of Tet and did not take opportunities for correcting the initial impressions of Allied defeat. Instead they became increasingly preoccupied with the siege of Khe Sanh, and centered upon the melodrama that remained after the Viet Cong had retreated from the cities 41/.

For Johnson, the Tet offensive marked a dramatic decline in his relations with the major US news media which cast heavy doubt on prospects for ending the war and on Johnson's handling of the war. The result of this massive defection of the media and the political reverses which Johnson experienced in early 1968 culminated in his withdrawal from the political arena.

The Tet offensive itself demonstrated the very weaknesses of US government assurances that the war was winding down. The 'surprise' of many US government officials at Tet demonstrated before the press and the American public that government credibility, specifically Johnson's credibility was weak. Thus, when the press in Vietnam reported on Tet, surprised officials in Washington reacted on the basis of media reports. The

example of Tet highlights the problems associated with information transfer in times of crisis. Early and dramatic media reports from the scene which could not be confirmed or denied immediately by the Department of Defense Public Affairs Office carried considerable weight with US government officials in Washington. Major General Winant Sidle, Army Information Chief in Vietnam during Tet, notes:

> It was apparent in Saigon that [the government] panicked. We sent all sorts of cables telling them it [Tet] was all over in four days. But they wouldn't believe us. 42/

Although Johnson had the option of launching another media offensive to demonstrate that the Tet offensive had been a severe defeat for the communists, that response would have been out of character for him. 43/ Doris Kearns wrote of Johnson's aversion to conflict:

> They [individuals expecting Johnson to stand and fight] failed to weigh his most consistent pattern of behavior: his profound aversion to conflict; his reliance, in the face of potentially disruptive situations, upon bargaining if at all possible; his terror of campaign speeches, where the size of the audience was beyond the reach of his personal abilities and skills. 44/

Johnson did not stand and fight. After the first Tet attacks, he retreated, leaving the Vietnam debate to others. He did not address the nation on television until March 31 when he announced a bombing halt and his decision not to seek another term in office. He retired convinced that the intellectuals and newspaper columnists had denied him his place in history.

3. Nixon Administration Media Relations

Traditionally, American presidents have tried to manipulate the news media while remaining highly sensitive to criticism emanating from the media. During the Nixon administration, both of these features of presidential media relations intensified sharply. President Nixon had long considered the reporters and news analysts to be his political enemies. His administration launched repeated attacks against the news media, and

throughout Nixon's term of office, media-government relations were rancorous.

Ironically, for all the expressed bad feeling between Nixon and the news media, few presidents have ever received as much positive press support in the early stages of their administration. 45/ Nixon's "honeymoon", the custom of leaving a new president largely free of press criticism, lasted some nine months instead of the customary four months. 46/ In spite of this generally positive support, Nixon perceived the press to be an obstacle to the accomplishment of his political objectives, and he began early in his first term to plan his assault on the media.

Nixon's animosity to the news media was deeply rooted. By 1952, the time of the famous "Checkers" speech when Nixon responded to charges of campaign irregularities, Nixon had come to see the people of the news media as barriers to his efforts to reach the American people. In his book, Six Crises, Nixon wrote:

> My only hope to win rested with millions of people I would never meet, sitting in groups of two or three or four in their living rooms, watching and listening to me on television...This time I was determined to tell my story directly to the people rather than to funnel it to them through press accounts. 47/

Nixon's "Checkers" speech was an important political turning point for him as it taught him the importance of the new television media. The 1960 election underlined that importance when he was defeated by Kennedy who also developed a keen sense of using television to his advantage. The televised debates with Kennedy were a key element in Kennedy's narrow victory margin. By 1962 with his defeat in the California gubernatorial contest, Nixon's relations with the news media had reached a low point when he declared that the press "wouldn't have Dick Nixon to kick around anymore." 48/

When he assumed the presidency in 1969, Nixon brought with him a strong belief that the men who controlled the news media were his enemies and that only by appealing directly to the people could he reach his objectives. Instead of reading a large number of newspapers as Kennedy had,

Nixon preferred to have a summary of the news prepared for him. Increasingly throughout his presidency, Nixon turned away from press conferences in which he answered questions from representatives of the news media to presidential speeches in which he could appeal "directly to the American people." 49/ Nixon developed a style and format for these presentations that proved highly effective in dealing with his political opposition in the Congress during his presidency and throughout the Watergate crisis of 1973-1974. 50/

Nixon's rigid approach to the media culminated in a series of direct assaults on his perceived enemies in the news media, especially against the television news commentators. The first salvo of the attack on the media came from Vice President Spiro Agnew in November 1969 at the time of the Vietnam Moratorium march in Washington. Agnew maintained that:

> As with other American institutions, perhaps it is time that the networks were made more responsive to the view of the nation and more responsible to the people they serve. 51/

Concerning the news coverage of one of Nixon's speeches on Vietnam, Agnew argued:

> When the President completed his address - an address that he spent weeks preparing - his words and policies were subjected to instant analysis and querulous criticism.
>
> The audience of 70 million Americans - gathered to hear the President of the United States - was inherited by a small band of network commentators and self-appointed analysts, the majority of whom expressed, in one way or another, their hostility to what he had to say.
>
> It was obvious that their words were made up in advance. 52/

The attack on the network commentators was part of a White House plan to counter adverse media coverage of the Nixon administration. 53/ The assault was renewed in the summer of 1971 with efforts that centered on an FBI investigation of CBS correspondent Daniel Schorr. Again, after the

1972 election victory, the attack was renewed. The purpose of these attacks was to neutralize the media elements that were perceived as supporting the Democratic Party and which blocked the President's appeals to what Nixon and Agnew identified as the "silent majority." 54/

The impact of the Nixon-Agnew attack on the media was heightened by self-examination within the news establishment that had begun after the 1968 Democratic convention. In part, this introspection stemmed from the difference of political philosophies between the publishers and the reporters. As noted above in the discussion of the media relations during the Kennedy administration, while Kennedy did not have wide support among the publishers, he was close to many of the Washington reporters in both political philosophy and in cultural outlook. By 1968, the reporters of the large metropolitan dailies considered themselves doves regarding the Vietnam War, and many of them sympathized with black leaders. At the time of the 1968 convention, news media analysts began to question whether the press was in step with the rest of the nation or whether it was espousing views to the left of the majority and turning away from objective reporting toward advocacy. 55/ This kind of introspection, and fears among publishers that reporters had overstepped their bounds in advocating positions on the American left, led to a dramatic turnabout in 1968-1969 in the approach the media took toward reporting the Vietnam War and the antiwar movement. 56/

Unquestionably, the Nixon-Agnew assaults on the media strengthened this trend. The difference in television presentation of the antiwar movement was shown dramatically in the coverage given Agnew's second attack on the media for being unfair to Nixon. All three national television networks broadcast live this second Agnew assault on the media, but a day and a half later when between three to five-hundred-thousand American citizens gathered in Washington, D. C. to demonstrate against the war, CBS and NBC did not have cameras on hand to record the event. NBC presented only five minutes of live coverage. 57/ Perceptibly, the coverage of the antiwar movement and the war began to change. Though the war would continue for another five years, the US news media seemed to agree that the

time had come "to phase out" the war as the issue that had dominated news coverage in the 1960's. 58/

During the Nixon administration, it appeared that only intrepid reporters stood on guard against tyranny. Covering the news media's role, James Reston wrote: "The main charge against the press in general, though not against the few newspapers that exposed the deceptions of Vietnam and Watergate, is not that the press was too aggressive, but that it was too timid or lenient or lazy." 59/ The press rose slowly to the Pentagon Papers story, to the My Lai story, and, indeed, to the Watergate story. It was subject to manipulation by administration figures like Henry Kissinger who gave only "background" news conferences - not for attribution - and to manipulation by officials who believed in leaking information on a selective basis. In general, the media seemed to have become highly sensitive to the criticism fired against it by the Nixon-Agnew press attacks.

Nixon, for all his long feud with the media, did not suffer as Johnson had on the Vietnam issue. Unlike Johnson, Nixon's adminstration did not claim "progress" toward an ill-defined military goal. US policy on Vietnam was clearly understood; "talk and withdraw." In 1972, when Hanoi launched its Easter offensive, no Washington Tet-style crisis occurred because there was no surprise. Secretary of Defense Laird and others had warned of an impending attack in contrast to Johnson who kept it to himself. Further, the attacks did not follow an administration "progress" campaign and the administration reacted promptly with renewed bombing and the mining of the harbor at Haiphong. There was less intra-administration confusion on Vietnam to seep over to Congress and to the media. 60/

D. IMPACT OF MEDIA COVERAGE ON THE WAR

There is a belief that is strongly held by some of the American public that the style and tone of media coverage of the war contributed significantly to the defeat of US policy in Vietnam. Echoing this opinion, an American military correspondent wrote:

> In this war - at least as seen by most experienced soldiers - US television has wittingly, or unwittingly,

> served a considerable part as a weapon for mass destruction of national will and morale. Some would say that, in the Vietnamese War, we have in fact been defeating ourselves by television. 61/

According to this view, the news media, particularly television, eroded the spirit of the American people, an erosion that was reflected in the loss of political support for the war in the Congress. The argument continues that this was a primary and direct contributor to the defeat of US policy in Vietnam. A corollary of this argument states that biased television coverage of Vietnam became a major factor in the domestic perception of the war, thereby reducing the morale and will of the American people to support the war.

Chapter 1 of this volume examined the trends that were evident in the rising public opposition to the war. The chapter argued that the key elements in the decline in support for the war were the length of the war, casualties, the lack of definable success, and the confusion about national purpose in pursuing the war. The charts of public opinion that were presented in that chapter indicate that opposition to the war, as measured by public opinion polls, rose rapidly until 1968-1969 after which US withdrawal began increasing and opposition to the war rose at a slower pace. It should be remembered that only after the Tet offensive of 1968 did the national television networks, the major news magazines, and many major city newspapers move away from support for President Johnson's war policies. Until that time, media opposition to the war had been centered largely in a few, influential newspapers. 62/ Indeed, the news media continued after 1968 to speak with mixed voices. They failed to develop a unified call for outright withdrawal from Vietnam, a call that conceivably might have had significant influence on the degree of public support for the war. 63/

The Tet offensive had various impacts on the different audiences that listened to the nightly accounts of the battle. Figure 1-4 of Chapter 1 indicates that among the less educated members of US society the support for the war actually increased during the Tet offensive. Among the more educated Americans, those most likely to be influenced by the news media support for the war dropped precipitously during the offensive. This

comparison is used to demonstrate the effect of media reporting on selected segments of public opinion. In both cases, it is important to note that after the initial shock of the offensive, the opinion trend lines indicating support or opposition to the US war policies returned to the trend lines that had been established earlier. Thus, the immediate public reaction to Tet proved to be an isolated fluctuation of opinion lacking in long-term significance.

On the other hand media reporting of Tet appears to have had a major effect upon US policymakers. This group was affected significantly by news coverage of the offensive as evinced by the decisions that were taken on the basis of that news. The change of opinion concerning US-Vietnam policies among US policymakers was to alter substantially the US government's Vietnam War policies.

Within the government, Clark Clifford, the new Secretary of Defense, was gradually coming around to the point of view of his predecessor, Robert S. McNamara, that the war as it was being fought could not be won. The influence of the Tet reporting by the media was felt strongly by the government bureaucracy in which media focus plays a peculiarly important role in shaping response to events. 64/ Concerning the impact of Tet on the nation's decision making elite, Don Oberdorfer wrote:

> More dramatic was the impact of Tet on opinion leaders and the political and economic elite, many of whom had their doubts before but had not expressed them. Suddenly, the doubts were reinforced by the evidence of North Vietnamese and Vietcong power and determination, and their expression became legitimate, appropriate and surprisingly widespread. "In the Pentagon, the Tet Offensive performed the curious service of fully revealing the doubters and dissenters to each other, in a lightning flash," wrote Townsend Hoopes, who was Under Secretary of the Air Force at the time. President Johnson, who never could quite fathom what had happened, said after Tet that even his "stalwarts" had been depressed and that "the voices just came out of the holes in the wall and said, 'Let's get out.'" 65/

Of particular importance in the case of the Tet offensive was the reaction of the elite decision makers who comprised Johnson's panel of advisers called the "Wise Men." Their change of opinion concerning the viability of the US policy, coupled with fast-breaking political developments including Senator Eugene McCarthy's strong showing in the New Hampshire Democratic primary and the announcement by Robert Kennedy that he would seek the presidential nomination, were decisive in shaping President Johnson's reaction to Tet and to his own political future. In a real sense, Johnson's political career may have been a victim of the political reactions that had been stimulated by the reporting on Tet which initially presented the offensive as a significant defeat for the United States. It is equally possible that Johnson's own failure to respond in a strong "presidental" manner to the Tet attacks helped to create a "crisis of confidence" in Washington, and encouraged his foes to move out against him.

The credibility gap which developed began in the Kennedy administration and widened during the Johnson administration. The media and the public were led slowly to the belief that government declarations could not be trusted, and the deceptions and half-truths which were told about the war were gradually proven false during the course of the war as documented by the Pentagon Papers. Concerning the necessity of avoiding the kind of credibility gap that weakened US policy in Vietnam, Bill Moyers, Johnson's Press Secretary, wrote:

> So much for the tension between public opinion and public officials. It should be obvious that a President faces no quest more difficult than the search for an accurate reading of how far and how fast he can lead the people. As difficult as the task is, he must try. He must try because there are questions on which governments dare not act without evidence of genuine support. When policies and laws outdistance public opinion, or take public opinion for granted, or fail to command respect in the conscience of the people, they lose their "natural" legitimacy.
>
> As with any rootless condition, the democratic experience then becomes infected with malaise. People feel estranged from their government, seemingly powerless to alter the way things are. They may challenge

> policy, usually in demonstrations, but their chances of changing policy are slim. Their impotence leads either to numbed apathy or, more dangerously, to outright hostility.
>
> This is what happened over the last twenty-four months in this country as opposition to the war in Viet Nam swelled to an overpowering crescendo. It did not happen, in my opinion, primarily because some people thought the war immoral, and some thought it illegal and some thought it simply unwinnable at an acceptable cost. I think it happened because a majority of people believed the war undemocratic - waged in violation of the tradition of consent which is fundamental to the effective conduct of foreign policy in a free society. 66/

E. THE QUESTION OF CENSORSHIP

As US involvement in Vietnam progressed, the issue of news censorship was brought to the fore. A team of military news experts was sent to Vietnam to study the question. It was decided that under the circumstances news censorship could not be enforced. Instead in 1965, the Army issued a "guidance document" on press censorship which was adhered to with few exceptions. It was recognized that the imposition of censorship in Vietnam would have contributed significantly to the credibility gap discussed above.

There were other important reasons why censorship was rejected under the conditions of the Vietnam conflict. The war was not an all-out war, but was initially labeled an insurgency and later a conventional limited war. US support, while great, never reached the proportions of a total commitment of national resources. Hence, the imposition of censorship would have been incongruous with President Johnson's desire to minimize the attention focused upon the war. Further, since the Republic of Vietnam was a sovereign nation, the option of censorship should have been theirs.

Approximately one-half of the correspondents in Vietnam were foreign, and they would not have been bound by US censorship regulations. If foreign news representatives "scooped" US news personnel, especially on a regular basis, it is likely that the credibility of the military, the

government, and the censorship effort could have suffered seriously. Moreover, the mini-cameras, television, and radio communication networks available to news reporters made it highly unlikely that reporting about a war like Vietnam would have been altered significantly by the imposition of censorship. In addition, the Vietnam War experience indicated that while information which was embarrassing to the US government and the military services was published or broadcast, there is no evidence that the security of US personnel was directly threatened by that activity. 67/

The US news media are not designed to serve as proponents of US policy initiatives. They would do a disservice to their audiences and their government if they failed to exercise critical judgment about those policies in their reporting to the American people. Certainly, there are important political and military reasons for not always releasing information to the public, however, each "operational executive order...must, should, has to include public affairs guidance." Mr. Jerry Friedheim, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs stressed the importance of providing to all civilian and military officials adequate public affairs guidance. 68/

F. THE MEDIA AND THE MILITARY SERVICES

During the Vietnam War, the style and personality of the president in responding to the media directly affected the 'government's' credibility, but American public affairs and government press officers in the US and in Vietnam also had great influence on the media-government relations. A poorly informed public affairs officer may dissemble before pointed questions from the press. This is far more harmful to the government's credibility than either a qualified statement of the facts as presently known or a "no comment." Clearly, the media comprise an important institution within US society, and will be present in any future conflicts in which the US becomes involved.

Without question, there is a basic adversary relationship between the military officer and the press that is caused by the deep differences in

nature and character of the two institutions. It is characteristic of newsmen to try to gain as much information for a story as time before their deadlines permits. This may mean that newsmen will act even if they have only half of the facts. On the other hand, military officers prefer to withhold release of information until they have all the facts. It is important to recognize that military officers probably will never have sufficient facts to permit them to report comfortably about an event. Yet, they will have to provide judgment to their superiors, on the basis of available information. Information normally flows more rapidly through media or public affairs channels than through official administrative or operational channels. A former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs described the rapid flow of unclassified information filed by correspondents and public affairs officers as having caused problems on numerous occasions. 69/

This situation highlights a major problem which many civilian and military officials do not fully grasp. In Vietnam, unlike Korea or World War II, the media were equipped with highly sophisticated transmitting equipment and with a large number of press people in-country. The first information that was reported could be telecommunicated immediately to US audiences. There are dangers in this style of reporting, for US policy-makers may be influenced in their decision making by the initial reports which, in a crisis environment, are at best only fragmentary. "If the system doesn't cough up the facts fast enough, the political leaders are going to react on the basis of the initial news reports on the scene." 70/ Media reporting and the official response to Tet illustrates the problem. Since the Tet offensive occurred at the same time as the Thule, Greenland incident and the North Korean seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo, the US Department of Defense was unable to provide adequate or informed public affairs coverage of Tet.

Commanders and other officers must recognize the need for keeping their superiors apprised of crisis situations. It was not unusual for COMUSMACV personally to be awakened in the middle of the night in Saigon by a call from Washington, D.C. urgently demanding clarification of news

reports on incidents that had not yet been reported through official channels. 71/ Commanders must also develop strong working relationships with their information officers. 72/ Credible, well-informed information officers can markedly improve press-government relations. Therefore, it is essential that the military services assign talented people to this function. 73/ It is equally important that commanders and their staffs at all levels know and understand the role of the media and the groundrules existing in the situation. The military services through their education systems must take heed of the fact that the military has a responsibility to deal with the press in a way that is "consistent with the legitimate need for keeping the public informed but with consideration for the safety of the men and women of the armed services involved." 74/

G. ANALYTICAL SUMMARY AND INSIGHTS

It should be noted that only the major print media (The New York Times, The Washington Post. The Los Angeles Times, Time and Newsweek) maintained sizeable foreign staffs or paid much attention to foreign news. Not until the Vietnam War became a domestic story, in the sense that a large number of American troops were engaged there (in 1965), did the rest of the media start putting permanent correspondents into the arena in Saigon, and many contented themselves with vistors.. The point is that the media's ability to provide resources and manpower, not to mention time and space, to any sustained story is extremely limited, especially overseas.

In their own operational workings, the major media look heavily toward The New York Times. The Times' editor looked toward the liberal professoriate for ideas, issues, and fads on matters of foreign and defense policy in the 1950s, and 1960s, and early 1970s. This tendency has eased--but it accounts for the early approval by The New York Times "of containment" in Vietnam and the later unease and search for a negotiated solution (on the editoral page). The New York Times is also influenced by its locale, where a large liberal constituency exists among the upper-middle-class readers. Academe tends to be left of center; so do many upper-middle-income professionals in New York; the Times is attuned to all these elements. Yet, the

Times is important primarily as an agenda-setter for the other media, not as an attitude-shaper. Its attention to the Vietnamese "boat people" for example helped put that subject on the menu. Its editorial opposition to the war helped make other critics respectable, but did not tilt Time or Newsweek in 1966-67.

One should not ignore the "class" bias of the major media. Print media tends to be directed at the college-educated upper-middle-class. The TV is aimed at a much wider middle American audience but attempts to be as journalistic as the major print people. It is unlikely that the major media (as opposed to AP and UPI, the great feeders of all media) will ever share the tastes and values of most members of Congress or of most people in the Pentagon.

Washington correspondents and columnists enjoy a special advantage in the coverage of wars and other US foreign entanglements. They are already there, and they represent no added expense. The Washington dateline has a kind of authority; they are covering well known characters--the president, senators, friends and foes, hawks and doves, cabinet members and other prominent figures. Hence, over time, Washington reaction or policy stories got more TV time and newspaper space on Vietnam than did reporting out of Vietnam itself. The politics and policy stories, featuring as they did the presidents and their critics, had more appeal to editors/TV producers than did seemingly repetitious stories about faraway places. That tendency thereby magnified the president's behavior, as perceived by the media, and tended to emphasize Washington/domestic rhetoric and reaction to trends and events rather than the trends and events themselves. That was portrayed in extreme form during the 1968 Tet crisis, but it persisted throughout the war. Presidential performance, the reaction of Congress, and the "atmosphere" within the administrations tended to have the upperhand as stories were chosen.

As US troops went ashore in 1965 despite prior press and congressional complaints over the president's obfuscation of US activities in Indochina, there was still a general consensus on the need to "halt aggression" in Southeast Asia. Even the most critical newsmen in Saigon did not question

the need for US involvement; they criticized tactics, Diem, secrecy, weaknesses and other operational aspects. The early 1966 Fulbright hearings gave respectability to criticism of the US policy in Vietnam. The New York Times pressed hard for "negotiations." If the major media did not become "dovish", they gradually became more critical and more willing to print the critics' views. The uproar over Cambodia should not obscure the fact that by early 1971 the antiwar movement had largely died as draft calls ebbed and US troop cuts took effect. The opposition was in Congress, and it did not become decisive until after US troops had withdrawn in 1973 and after Watergate.

Politicians look at the short-term--getting past the next election or the next sticky period with Congress. The media are impatient by nature and easily bored with unspectacular gains or long lead times for policy to bear fruit. It may put the burden on the military leadership to direct the attention of the political leadership toward the long-term military consequences of action or inaction, and thus to press for a the choice of a decisive strategy which in turn is necessary for political coherence, media understanding, and public support--an extremely difficult task for the military in the American political context.

Presidential behavior and the plausibility of presidential policy are the key to understanding media treatment--with its Washington orientation--of the Vietnam war as a whole. Because the "hawk" side of the debate had no "respectable" or vocal champions (as does the hawk side of the SALT debate) in Congress, the JCS position on what was needed to "win" rarely got aired; the debate in 1965-68 was depicted as a fight between the administration and its dovish critics (at least until George Wallace came along in late 1968). Hence, a second point must be noted; each major policy alternative must have a respectable spokesman in Washington for it to be reflected in the media and this spokeman must have an articulate, well-informed group in Congress, particularly if the issue is an alternative to administration policy. No such group existed to reflect the JCS view on Vietnam in 1965-68.

H. LESSONS

- News censorship is unlikely to be exercised in any future military situation in which the US is directly involved, short of a major war.
- Volatile reaction by ranking officials to embarrassing news releases tends to exacerbate existing problems and to widen any gaps in relations with the media; establishing forthright public affairs policies and ensuring the best possible relations with the media normally minimizes embarrassing releases and security violations.
- Crisis-information transfer in a free society may worsen the naturally adversarial relations between media and the government or other bureaucracy involved because of their separate and independent chains of communication which provide different data at different speeds and because of the different purposes for which the information is intended. This phenomenon is most pronounced in serious emergencies that extend over long periods of time.
- To prevent acrimonious press-military relations during crisis situations, the military must emphasize media public affairs education at all levels of military education, to include senior NCO schools and officers' basic and career courses, command and staff colleges, and war colleges. Public affairs officers and commanders and their staffs must understand that it is the legitimate role of the media to investigate the news, including that which might embarrass a given commander, subject to security considerations, and that the approaches of the media and the military will naturally differ, but that this difference need not lead to strained relations.
- It is not the job of the Department of State or the Department of Defense to set up a comprehensive information service for the media--it is the job of the media to collect the news. Instead,

the various government agencies must concentrate and perfect their role as clarifiers of information regarding their operations. The public affairs network must employ the best possible people to ensure that the system functions well and that a 'credibility gap' does not develop as a result of poorly informed, poorly trained officers resorting to dissembling or cover-up instead of answering questions honestly or explaining their confidential nature.

- To enable this system to function properly in the military services, every significant operation plan and applicable standing operating procedure must include public affairs guidance, and this guidance must be swiftly transmitted to the appropriate commanders, staffs, and public affairs personnel.

CHAPTER 3 ENDNOTES

1. "Salinger Tells How Kennedy Tried to Hide Vietnam Build-Up," U.S. News and World Report, Sept. 12, 1966, p. 103.

2. "Uncensored Press Failed Viet Test, General Says . . ," The Washington Post, April 23, 1978. The US decision not to censor media reporting from Vietnam was made early in 1965 at a public affairs conference in Hawaii. Public affairs officials from the Departments of State and Defense participated together with information officers from PACOM and MACV.

3. Godfrey Hodgson, America In Our Time (New York: Vintage Books, 1976), p. 140.

4. "Television News and the Vietnam War," panel discussion at the Smithsonian, speakers Braestrup, Lichty, Fouhy, and Gouralski. April 2, 1979. Tape recorded in part by BDM study team members with permission of the Smithsonian Institution. Tape 1 Side 1.

   Morley Safer's film story of US Marines burning the homes of villagers at Cam Ne (CBS News, Aug. 5, 1965) was a watershed in T.V. coverage. The film introduced the new application of T.V. coverage with recorded sound, thereby allowing the audiences to experience a kind of cinema. Safer's report was the first dramatic example of participatory journalism.

5. Ibid., Side 2, Tape 2.

6. Dr. William M. Hammond, Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, Interview by BDM on June 28, 1979.

7. Ben H. Bagdikian, The Effete Conspiracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 10.

8. Hodgson, p. 138.

9. Bagdikian, p. 10.

10. Hodgson, p. 139.

11. Bagdikian, pp. 146-148.

12. Hodgson, p. 144. Documentaries such as Freed's studies of the Cold War and, in 1963, Murrow's classic Harvest of Shame, were the first fruits of this public relations effort.

13. Ibid., p. 147.

14. Ibid., p. 141.

15. By January 1968 there were nearly 500 newsmen and newswomen of varying nationalities in Vietnam. Of these, Americans numbered about one hundred and eighty.

16. Peter Braestrup in a letter to BDM on "The Media and the Vietnam War," 14 September 1979. Mr. Braestrup was associated with the New York Times from 1960 to 1968 as a reporter, editor, and Bangkok Bureau Chief. He was with The Washington Post as Saigon Bureau Chief (1968-69 and 1972), covering the Pentagon and Capitol Hill in 1970-71 for the Post.

17. Ben H. Bagdikian, "Oracles and Their Audiences," Columbia Journalism Review, Winter, 1967, p. 23.

18. Ibid.

19. Bagdikian, The Effete Conspiracy, pp. 97-100.

    Bagdikian describes the impact the president achieved in a typical television address of 1962 which was viewed by approximately 35 million Americans. Parts of his speech circumscribed by criticism appeared in 312 morning papers with 24 million readers the next day.

20. "Salinger Tells How Kennedy . . .," U.S. News and World Report, p. 103.

21. P. Knightley, The First Casualty (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), p. 375.

22. The advisor, LTC John Paul Vann, was serving as the senior US Army Advisor in II CTZ in 1963. He returned to RVN in 1965 in a civilian capacity initially with USAID and finally with CORDS until his death in a helicopter crash in 1972. The occasion of the remark on "barbecues" was his address to a group of scholars from the School of International Studies, University of Denver, on June 7, 1966. His remarks were tape recorded by Professor Vincent Davis who made the tape available to BDM for purposes of this study.

23. Gay Le Roy Werner, "The Credibility Gap - 1966. Prestige Gatekeepers View Government Handling of Vietnam Information" (Masters Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1967), pp. 31-32.

24. General Paul Harkins, then COMUSMACV, in a letter to BDM dated 29 August 1979, discussed the Battle of Ap Bac:

> We mustered some regular forces and dropped in a couple of battalions of paratroopers, who were the best troops the South Vietnamese had. Unfortunately, they dropped late in the afternoon and by the time they had picked up and folded their "chutes" - as we had taught them to do in training - it was too dark to attack that evening. They did attack the next A.M. and had the town back by noon.

Harkins contends that descriptions of the battle by Halberstam and others were based on a press briefing given by John Paul Vann, US advisor, in which Vann berated the South Vietnamese troops. With respect to the time spent folding chutes -- it should be noted that parachutes were in short supply and any left in the drop zone would quickly be gathered up by local scavangers. Therefore, quick recovery of chutes was considered to be essential.

25. Werner, p. 38.

26. Knightley, pp. 379-380. Diem, however, expelled Newsweek correspondent Francois Sully in September 1962. See James Pronson, The Press and the Cold War (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1970, pp. 192-203.

27. "Uncensored Press Failed Viet Test, General Says," (Westmoreland) The Washington Post, 23 April 1978.

28. The credibility gap was widened in December, 1962, by the statement of Arthur Sylvester, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, who said concerning official deceptions, "It would seem to be basic, all through history, that a government's right, if necessary, is to lie to save itself when it's going up in a nuclear war. This seems to me basic."

29. Doris Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream (New York: Signet, 1976), p. 44.

30. Ibid., pp. 258-259.

31. Bagdikian, The Effete Conspiracy, p. 129.

32 The attacks against Johnson did become personal. In his small book Lyndon Johnson's Credibility Gap, James Deakin of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch linked the growing distrust of Johnson to his personality. Deakin slammed Johnson for his excessive secrecy and his attempts to keep the media off guard, but even more stingingly he attributed the gap to the "striking disparity" between Lyndon Johnson's public image and his private character. Deakin argued that in his private character Johnson was the archetypical "American Yankee" whose language was "heavily animalistic and scatological." He maintained that this in itself was not a problem, but Johnson insisted in presenting "himself publicly as a sort of Mary Poppins in the White House" pp. 12, 13, 25.

33. "Television News and the Vietnam War," Panel Discussion at the Smithsonian. op.cit. Tape 1, side 1.

34. Peter Braestrup, Big Story (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1977), 2 Volumes, Vol. 1, pp. 48, 49. Braestrup maintains that despite the antiwar editorial stance of some of the senior editors, there was no pressure on the Saigon bureau to conform to a "line." Whatever biases crept into the individual stories that appeared in the Times were those of the reporter, not of the copy desk. However, when the Tet offensive story broke in 1968, the antiwar or anti-Johnson ethos in New York was an important factor in the selection of Vietnam-related stories for page one.

35. Kearns, p. 350.

36. Braestrup, p. 54.

37. Ibid., pp. 54, 55.

38. Ibid., p. 57.

39. Ibid., p. 62.

40. Ibid., p. 705.

41. Mr Daniel Henken, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs recalled why a full official report of Tet was not issued to the press immediately. The DOD Public Affairs office was swamped when the Tet offensive began. Not only was the office collecting information and releasing reports on the seizure of the Pueblo, but the Thule, Greenland incident involving the loss of a nuclear weapon occurred within the same general timeframe. This kind of confusion at the top levels of DOD Public Affairs elevated the press reports to a level of importance as officials in Washington lacking official reports responded to Tet on the basis of early press reports. The near-simultaneous crises coupled with the confusion and lack of reliable official information or assessments of the Tet debacle caused

authorities in Washington to turn to early press reports for their information. Confusion was rampant. BDM interview with Mr. Daniel Henken on 5 July 1979.

42. Jay Finegan, "Study Says Poor Reporting Distorted Vietnam War," Army Times, August 1979.

43. Walter Bunge, Robert V. Hudson, and Chung Woo Shu, "Johnson's Information Strategy for Vietnam: An Evaluation," Journalism Quarterly, Autumn 1968, pp. 417-425.

    The authors argue that Johnson could have made far better use of the media resources at his disposal and could have mounted an effective counteroffensive.

44. Kearns, p. 355.

45. Of dailies that endorsed a presidential candidate in the Nixon-Kennedy campaign of 1960, 84 percent endorsed Nixon. When Nixon ran against Hubert Humphrey in 1968, 80 percent endorsed Nixon. These endorsements came not only from small town newspapers, but also from major metropolitan journals. All of the dailies in Los Angeles, Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, and Philadelphia supported Nixon in 1968. Bagdikian, pp. 145, 146.

46. "Reflections," New Yorker, October 1973, p. 122.

47. Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row), pp. 225-227.

48. In 1969, the first year of his presidency, Nixon held eleven news conferences--in contrast with 1961, in which President Kennedy held twenty, and 1964, in which President Johnson held twenty-seven. And in 1970 Nixon held only three by mid-summer. But the number of other appearances on television had increased dramatically. The amount of prime time the White House was demanding from the networks for carefully staged presidential appearances and the amount of air time devoted to questioning the president had reached such desperate proportions that some in the network management decided they ought to take some sort of action to moderate the trend. The custom of allowing the principal opposition party to present its rebuttal to presidential pronouncements developed at this time.
    "Annals of Television: Shaking the Tree," New Yorker, March 17, 1975, p. 46.

49. Erwin Knoll, "The President and the Press: Eliminating the Middle Men," The Progressive, March, 1970. The effectiveness of the technique was amply demonstrated on January 26, when Mr. Nixon took to the airwaves to defend his veto of the $19.7 billion Labor-HEW appropriations bill. A presidential press conference was scheduled for that

date, but it was postponed to give Mr. Nixon a chance to make his case without the unwelcome intrusion of reporters' questions. The time requested by the White House was nine p.m., which--on a Monday evening--allowed the president to fall heir to the large nationwide audience of the "Laugh-In" show.

The audience, which may have amounted to fifty million, responded to the president's brief, heavily political speech and to the dramatic flourish with which he signed the veto message right there on camera. According to Semple, "a private survey conducted by the White House staff estimated that 55,000 telegrams arrived on Capitol Hill after the speech, largely supporting the president. The survey also estimated that Congressional mail, which had been running ten to one against the president's position, soon started running five to one in his favor." The veto, of course, was sustained.

50. "Spiro Rips Unelected Elite", Pacific Stars and Stripes, Nov. 16, 1968.

51. Ibid.

52. "Annals of Television: Shaking the Tree," New Yorker, March 17, 1975. This article describes the October 17, 1969 memorandum, "The Shot-Gun Versus the Rifle" sent by special assistant to the president Jeb Stuart Magruder to Nixon's chief of staff H. R. Haldeman. Magruder's recommendations for countering media criticism of the president included, (1) establishing an official monitoring system through the FCC, (2) using the antitrust division to investigate (coerce) the media, and (3) using the Internal Revenue Service to look into target media organizations.

53. This "silent majority" political initiative will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. A memorandum of Patrick Buchanan in another area noted the objective of Nixon's directives to "several of us to give thought to how to combat the institutionalized power of the left concentrated in the foundations that succor the Democratic Party" Ibid., p. 46.

54. Joseph Kraft, in Hodgson, p. 375.

> Are we merely neutral observers, seekers after truth in the public interest? Or do we, as the supporters of Mayor Richard Daley and his Chicago police have charged, have a prejudice of our own?
>
> The answer, I think, is that Mayor Daley and his supporters have a point. Most of us in what is called the communications field are not rooted in the great mass of ordinary Americans--in Middle America. And the result shows up not merely in occasional episodes such as the Chicago violence but more importantly in the systematic bias towards young people, minority groups, and the kind of presidential candidates who appeal to them.
>
> The most important organs of press and television are, beyond much doubt, dominated by the outlook of the upper-income whites . . .

55. Bagdikian, pp. 148, 149.

> One reason most publishers have felt sullen under the Agnew attacks is that they believe he's right. They, too, think there is a radic-lib conspiracy among their reporters. The typical American newspaper publisher lives in agony knowing he is paying people to report political events he'd rather not see. In some places he asserts himself and there is no nonsense: the news is pure Republican party line. In most places the poor publisher feels restrained because he has a reporter's union, or there are powerful Democratic officeholders who might make business trouble for him. And there is the tradition of fairness that he doesn't want to accused of violating, at least not in public. But when Agnew spoke, hundreds of publishers must have thought: "Spiro. I hear you talking."

56. "Reflections", New Yorker, October 1, 1973, pp. 123-124.

57. Robert J. Northshield, who was executive producer of the Huntley-Brinkley NBC news program from 1965 to the end of 1968 said:

> The executive producer sits down every morning to plan his show. He aims at having five segments. He talks to Brinkley in Washington, to other guys. And very often his feeling is, "Oh God, not Vietnam again. By early 1969, that feeling was very marked. The trend was away from Vietnam. About the time, in early 1969, when we got tired of combat footage, we said, "Let's get some pacification footage", and that was soft stuff, so it went out at the tail end of the show. So straighta-way people got the impression that the war was less important. The American voter is willing to vote for Nixon now because the voter, who is also the viewer, thinks that Nixon has ended the war . . . And he has ended the war, because you don't see the war on the tube anymore.

The executive producer of the ABC evening news in March 1969 dictated the same kind of turnabout for his correspondents when he wrote, "I have asked our Vietnam staff to alter the focus of their coverage from combat pieces to interpretive ones, pegged to the eventual pullout of American forces. This point must be stressed for all hands." Hodgson, p. 378.

58. "Reflections", New Yorker, October 1, 1973, p. 124.

59. Braestrup, Letter to BDM, September 1979.

60. Col. R. D. Heinl, Jr., "American TV Helps to Destroy National Will and Morale", Pacific Stars and Stripes, April 30, 1970.

61. In a piece written for Peter Braestrup's book concerning the Tet Offensive entitled Big Story, Burns W. Roper wrote:

> When viewed in the larger perspective of the entire war, Tet appears to have been "one more incident", one that reminded the public that the war was not going well--that the confident predictions out of Washington had to be taken with a grain of salt--and that helped move public opinion along in the antiwar direction in which it had been moving for nearly three years (and in which it continued to move for another three). . .
>
> The impact of Tet on the general public was nearly identical to the impact of various other foreign crises that have ended up badly. The first reports of Tet caused the public "to rally round", engendered frustration and anger, and in a desire to intensify the war--an increase in hawk sentiment. Subsequently, as the Tet "disaster" unfolded in debate and in the media, opinion turned in the opposite direction and became increasingly antiwar. Burns W. Roper, "What the Public Opionion Polls Said," in Braestrup, p. 703.

62. Robert MacNeil, "The News on TV and How It Is Unmade", Harpers, Oct. 1968.

Concerning the reluctance of television to "take a stand on Vietnam", MacNeil wrote,

> My complaint is that it took television so long to tell the American people frankly how disastrously the war was going. By the time the industry did, and then almost to a man, in February 1968, the evidence was so overwhelming that a good proportion of the public had made up its mind anyway.
>
> The Vietnam war is a good case over which to argue the morality of television's refusal to take an editorial position. It is true that some stations do present editorials, chiefly on local issues. The networks do not, but it i time they did.

63. Concerning the impact of the news media on the Washington decision-making system, Ben H. Bagdikian wrote,

> The most direct influence of political columnists is on a few hundred men in that most untypical of American cities, Washington.
>
> There are--to guess wildly--fewer than 400 men whose reading of syndicated columns produces palpable effects. This list includes the President of the United States and his immediate staff, the Secretaries of State and of Defense and their closest subordinates, key men in the bureaucracies, a few men in Congress, the effective members of the working press in the capital, top men in the foreign embassies, and an assortment of special brokers of power. Columnists who are not published in

Washington have little effect on National policy. Ben H. Bagdikian, "Oracles and Their Audiences," Columbia Journalism Review, Winter, 1967, pp. 22-23.

64. Don Oberdorfer, The Washington Post Magazine, January 29, 1978, p. 10-F.
Of particular importance in shaping the Congress' reaction to any news event are two newspapers, the Washington Post and the New York Times and a few of the more serious magazines. Most of the Congress doesn't seem to watch television, except almost incidentally. -- Barry Zorthian, "Impact of the Press on Foreign Policy Today", National Interdepartmental Seminar, July 21, 1970.

65. Bill Moyers, "One Thing We Learned," Foreign Affairs, July 1968.

66. Hammond, interview June 29, 1974, Dr. Hammond has researched, analyzed, and written several papers on the subject of media coverage of the Vietnam War.

67. Jerry Friedheim, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, BDM Interview, July 3, 1979.

68. Henken, Interview, July 5, 1979.

69. Friedheim, Interview, July 3, 1979.

70. Colonel Robert M. Cook, USA (Ret) former Inspector General of USMACV (1968-1972). BDM Interview, August 30, 1979.

71. Friedheim, Interview, July 3, 1979.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

CHAPTER 4

US ECONOMY AND THE VIETNAM WAR

> In the entire postwar period the steady expansion of trade and investment, and the more or less steady growth of the international economy have been intimately related to the power and the stabilizing force represented by the United States. To a degree not as yet fully analyzed, loss of confidence in the underlying structure of the world economy is associated with the questioning, among other things, of American power.
>
> James R. Schlesinger
> Secretary of Defense, 1975 1/

> . . . all modern war, limited or general is total: military, diplomatic, psychological, and economic. National planning must orchestrate all components to accomplish the aims of policy. A nation may score points militarily and diplomatically, as has the United States, but suffer fatal setbacks in psychological and economic warfare.
>
> John J. Clark
> Professor of Finance
> Drexel University 2/

A. INTRODUCTION

World War II solved the basic problem which the New Deal had only begun to address: mass unemployment. Early in 1940 some 10 million American workers, one out of four, were unemployed. In contrast, by the late 1940s Americans were enjoying unprecedented prosperity at home and an unprecedented domination of world economic affairs. Even the slow growth and periodic recessions of the 1950s seemed almost insignificant in light of the US's general level of prosperity and overwhelming international position. The prevailing optimism was nowhere more evident than amongst the neo-Keynesian proponents of the "New Economics," men such as Walter Heller and Paul Samuelson who were to shape national economic policy during the Kennedy and Johnson years. The means were at hand, or so the advocates

of the New Economics maintained, to eliminate or at least minimize cyclical problems such as those which had plagued the 1950s. Indeed, through the mid 1960s the record bore out the apparent truth of this confident assertion.

The record since 1965 has shown that this confidence was premature. A new era of slow growth, unemployment (low by the standards of the 1930s, but painful nonetheless), and inflation has highlighted the limits to our understanding of economics and the political difficulty of applying even what is known. In addition, the US's international economic position has gradually become less prominent. This shift, which was largely inevitable, reflects such developments as the speed and extent of the European and Japanese economic recoveries and the massive post-1973 transfer of wealth to certain oil-producing countries. The US economy continues to be preeminent, but no longer is it overwhelmingly so. What is more, the piece-by-piece abandonment of the international economic arrangements established after World War II has meant that the US can no longer enjoy certain of the political and economic prerogatives enjoyed between 1945 and the mid 1960s. 3/

While there is no simple explanation for many of the economic developments of the last 15 years, it is clear that the assumption of the early 1960s that the US could have both guns and butter, that the costs of involvement in Vietnam could be borne without sacrificing domestic economic goals, was wrong. 4/ The government's failure to develop consistent and effective policies to mitigate the impact of the war on the civilian economy was an important cause of the economic difficulties experienced by the United States during and after the Vietnam War. Generalizing further, it can be seen that this failure is an example of the growing disparity between the US's international politico-military role and its ability, or at least its political willingness, to foot the bill domestically.

B. THE US ECONOMY PRIOR TO 1961

1. An Overview 5/

As was mentioned above, in 1940 there were some 10 million unemployed American workers. In 1941, immediately prior to the US's entry into World War II and after eight years of the New Deal, there were still some eight million unemployed. A couple years later mass unemployment was a thing of the past. Prosperity was everywhere, with farm income, for example, doubling in four years. As Godfrey Hodgson described it,

> The war boom brought record corporate profits . . . , but it also meant an end to hard times for most other sections of the population. Even allowing for inflation, real wages jumped by 44 per cent in the four years of the war. The proportion of families living on incomes of less than two thousand dollars a year fell from three quarters to one quarter of the population. 6/

During the four years of US involvement in World War II, national income, national wealth, and industrial production all doubled or more than doubled. For the sake of comparison, it is instructive to note that during the same period the Soviet Union's already much smaller industrial capacity was cut by more than 40 percent. Every other industrial country also came out of the war poorer and weaker than it went in.

After the second atomic bomb was dropped over Japan, Winston Churchill remarked that "America stands at this moment at the summit of the world." Economically, and not just militarily, this remained true after the war. In 1947 the US produced about half of the world's manufactures: 57 percent (or 90 million tons annually) of its steel, 43 percent of its electricity, 62 percent of its oil, 80 percent of its new cars. After four years of war that had done serious damage to the economies of its closest competitors, the US emerged as the only country with capital to invest in new plants. In the late 1940s the average American's income was 15 times greater than that of the average continental European. The housing and domestic appliance markets were booming. The US was dominant in such key

industries as aviation, chemical engineering, and electronics. And what is more, in 1949 the US held over half of the world's monetary gold--a supply valued at $24.6 billion, or over eight times the holdings of its nearest competitor.

The magnitude of the post-World War II economic boom is illustrated by the growth of the gross national product. In 1929, the last year of the pre-depression boom, GNP reached $103 billion. By 1933 it had slumped to $55 billion; and even by 1940 it had climbed back only to $99.7 billion. By 1945, however, it had shot upwards to $210 billion, reaching $284 billion by 1950 and $500 billion by the end of 1960. Indeed, this was wealth on a scale unprecedented in world history. 7/

Except for a slight pause immediately prior to the Korean War, economic growth in the United States continued at an unusually rapid rate for eight years after World War II. This period of economic exuberance ended, though, with the sharp recession of the winter of 1953-54, a period during which industrial production actually declined by 10 percent. At this point Eisenhower turned increasingly for economic advice to Dr Arthur Burns, the chairman of Eisenhower's Council of Economic Advisors whom Nixon later made chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. Burns, despite his general economic conservatism, advocated a modest course of Keynesian spending. Traditional Republican economic orthodoxy such as that championed by Secretary of the Treasury George M. Humphrey was thereafter in retreat, but the remaining Eisenhower years were still punctuated by two more recessions, the first in 1957-58 and the second in 1960-61, as is illustrated by Figures 4-1 and 4-2, which show fluctuations in GNP and unemployment between 1954 and 1961. Not surprisingly, the state of the economy became an important issue in the 1960 presidential election. When the Democrats won, they were therefore committed to moving quickly to improve the economy's performance, with the Eisenhower years providing the yardstick they would use to measure the effectiveness of their policies.



NOTE: Based on Seasonally Adjusted Quarterly Data

Figure 4-1. Real Gross National Product, 1954-1961

UNEMPLOYMENT AS PERCENT OF CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE: SEASONALLY ADJUSTED

4541/78W

Figure 4-2. Unemployment Rates, 1955-1961

2. Anti-Inflation Policies During World War II and the Korean War

Decisive government actions were taken during both World War II and the Korean War to put the US economy on a wartime footing while minimizing the inflationary impact of war production. These policies were essentially threefold. First, steps were taken to reduce civilian demand and thus free a larger share of national production for war use. These steps included the imposition of special taxes to curb the spending power of the civilian population and, during World War II, the rationing of key commodities. Second, the federal government subsidized expansion of the nation's industrial base. And third, wage and price controls were used to complement the anti-inflation impact of wartime tax increases.

These policies were successful in shifting and expanding supply to meet wartime needs. At their World War II peak, war expenditures accounted for fully 41 percent of US GNP. At the height of the Korean War, war expenditures accounted for 13 percent of GNP. Over the long run, however, these policies were less successful in preventing inflation. Figure 4-3 illustrates how the consumer price index rose sharply during both World War II and Korea, as it had during previous wars. These price increases partly reflected the existence of slack in the economy immediately prior to both wars, but the fact that wartime inflationary pressures were much more than just a cyclical phenomenon is indicated by, amongst other things, the rapid inflation that followed relaxation of wage and price controls. These post-war bursts of inflation were followed, in turn, by short recessions during which the economy readjusted to reduced military demand. 10/

It should be noted that mention of efforts to counter inflationary pressures created by World War II and the Korean War is intended to lend perspective to the discussion of the Vietnam War years that follows. While it gives an indication of how difficult it is to keep a lid on inflation while conducting a war, it is not intended to question the value of the anti-inflation measures themselves. Doing so would require a detailed analysis of the economy, the economic impact of war-related production, the



Figure 4-3. United States: Consumer Price Index (BLS), 1800-1977 All Items

relative merits of taxation, rationing, and wage and price controls as mechanisms affecting demand, the timing of the implementation of these measures and the economic effect of this timing, etc. Thus the failure of efforts to eliminate war-related inflation during and after World War II and the Korean War in no way leads to the necessary conclusion that all such efforts are useless. Quite to the contrary, it is almost universally accepted that the absence of such measures (and, in particular, the failure to increase taxes) during the Vietnam years seriously compounded the economic problems that were developing in this country during the 1960s.

C. THE KENNEDY YEARS

In his first state-of-the-union address, President Kennedy declared that:

> We take office in the wake of seven months of recession, three and one half years of slack, seven years of diminished economic growth. . . . Our recovery from the 1958 recession, moreover, was anemic and incomplete. Our Gross National Product never regained its full potential. Unemployment never returned to normal levels. Maximum use of our industrial capacity was never restored. . . The most resourceful industrialized country on earth ranks among the last in economic growth . . . This Administration does not intend to stand helplessly by . . . 12/

Adding to the domestic reasons for an activist economic policy by the new administration was that slow US economic growth was being labeled by the communists as evidence of the US economic system's inherent weakness, with Khrushchev boasting that by 1970 the Soviet Union would out-produce the US. 13/ In 1961, however, the appropriate way to get the US economy "moving again" was not at all clear.

1. The Development of Tax-Cut Legislation, 1962-64

When Kennedy first took office he gave evidence of being an economic conservative, a fact which, in part at least, reflected Republican campaign charges that Kennedy was an anti-business "spend thrift." Thus,

for example, Kennedy nominated Douglas Dillon, a Republican who had been Under Secretary of State under Eisenhower, to be the new Secretary of the Treasury, and sought to fight the battle against the fourth post-World War II recession within the bounds of a balanced budget. 14/ However, it soon became apparent that such policies were too timid to provide the necessary boost to the US economy, a point driven home by the "Kennedy stock market crash" of 1962. The administration's fiscal policies thus became more aggressively interventionist, initially by means of increased government expenditures. For the first time in US history the government intentionally tried to run a recession deficit in order to increase employment and growth. But by the end of 1962 Kennedy became convinced that even this was not enough; what was needed was a massive tax cut. 15/

Calling for a tax cut when there was already a budget deficit was indeed a dramatic departure from the economic orthodoxy of the 1950s. Not surprisingly, then, this step was only taken after an extended debate pitting, to simplify things greatly, Walter Heller's advocacy of a large tax cut against John Kenneth Galbraith's advocacy of increased federal spending (coupled, if necessary, with wage and price controls) and Douglas Dillon's advocacy of more conservative measures. Heller's view prevailed, with Kennedy deciding not only to push for a tax cut, but to seek a $10 billion cut in 1963 rather than just a "quickie" cut designed to push the economy past the "pause" it was experiencing in 1962. 16/

Kennedy's program to stimulate the economy ultimately took the form of two successive tax breaks: the investment credit of 1962 and the tax cut discussed above, which finally passed early in 1964. Each of these tax reductions was to be accompanied by the closing of loopholes favoring those with high incomes, but these reforms never got through Congress, a fact which Kennedy's liberal economic advisers accepted as a necessary evil. They figured, in any event, that the boost to the overall economy resulting from the tax cut would benefit all, even if it did benefit the rich more than the poor. Together, the two measures cut personal and corporate income taxes by 20 percent, a tax reduction estimated at about $15 billion. Consumers spent their increased take-home pay; unemployment

continued to decline; business investment increased; and, given the increased tax base created by economic growth, the federal budget deficit even turned into a surplus. The economy's improved performance following the tax cut is illustrated by Figure 4-4, which shows annual changes in GNP between 1951 and 1972.

It is difficult to prove the link between the Kennedy-Johnson tax cut and the unprecedented peacetime economic growth of the mid 1960s. Thus, for example, Milton Friedman, the guiding light of the "monetarist" school of economic thought, denies the value of interventionist fiscal policies in the 1960s, saying that:

> . . . so far as I know, there has been no empirical demonstration that the tax-cut had any effect on the total flow of income in the U.S. There has been no demonstration that if monetary policies had been maintained unchanged . . . the tax-cut would have been really expansionary on nominal income. It clearly made interest rates higher than they otherwise would have been. But there is no evidence that by itself it was expansionary on income.17/

In the mid 1960s, however, liberal economists were convinced that they had accomplished a major feat of economic assessment and policy implementation. 18/ Lyndon Johnson was heir to this perception as well as to the reality of economic prosperity from 1964 to 1968.

2. Kennedy's Economic Program and US Involvement in Vietnam

US involvement in Vietnam increased dramatically during the Kennedy years. However, due to the political sensitivity of figures recording the growth of this involvement, the administration pursued a policy of burying the costs of the conflict in the Defense Department and CIA budgets. Only in 1964 did US operations in Vietnam become an identifiable budget-line term offering a more-or-less comprehensive indication of our involvement. That Kennedy got away with this economically resulted from the war's relatively small claim on men and materiel as well as the economy's ability, during this period of expansion, to accommodate war-related demand. During these years, the US could indeed have both guns and



Figure 4-4. Actual and Potential GNP, 1951-1972

butter. The dangerous precedent was . ing set, though, of taking for granted the economy's ability to absorb war-related costs and, as a consequence, of not carefully coordinating the formulation of military and economic policy.

A second, more specific precedent which was also set by the Kennedy Administration was the financing of a special crisis, in this case the American military buildup in Berlin, without levying additional taxes. As Walter Heller described the establishment of this policy:

> A low point was reached in the summer of 1961 when Kennedy, flying in the face of modern economics, tentatively decided on a tax increase of $3 billion to finance the Berlin buildup in spite of the still yawning gap between the economy's actual and potential performance. The Council [of Economic Advisors], though ably represented by Sorenson in meetings of the National Security Council . . . , fought a lonely and losing battle against the decision until a narrow corridor of power . . . was opened by O'Donnell. His sympathetic intercession provided access to the President on this issue and enabled us to set forces in motion that brought a reversal of his tentative decision. Another strategically placed ally, Paul Samuelson, helped the cause with a timely visit to Hyannis Port on the weekend just before the final decision. 20/

With the Berlin Crisis as precedent and the economy only beginning to take up the slack accumulated during the 1950s, there was never serious talk within the Kennedy Administration of raising taxes to pay for the costs of our growing involvement in Vietnam. In this case, at least, sound economic policy complemented the political imperative of underemphasizing our growing involvement in Vietnam. With different economic circumstances and vastly increased war-related costs after 1965, the economic consequences of attempting to pay for the war without cutting civilian demand would be far less pleasant.

D. JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION ECONOMIC POLICIES AND THE VIETNAM WAR

Lyndon Johnson wanted to be the greatest president of the 20th century, or, if that proved to be impossible, at least the greatest president since FDR. This was no small order; but Johnson was no modest man With his own extraordinary talents, plans for the "Great Society," and the unprecedented prosperity of the mid 1960s, Johnson had a chance of achieving his goal. Certainly Vietnam would not stop him. When US involvement in Vietnam skyrocketed in 1965, Johnson set out to have the war, the Great Society, and unparalleled prosperity all at the same time. 21/

It certainly did not seem that the economy would provide problems for the new administration. Unemployment, which stood at nearly 7 percent when Kennedy came to office, was, by the summer of 1965, down to 4.5 percent. GNP had soared from $500 billion in 1961 to over $650 billion in 1965. According to Executive Branch economists, possibly $25 billion of this increase was due to the Kennedy-Johnson tax cuts. What is more, by the summer of 1965 the economy had been through 50 straight months of expansion, with the consumer price index having risen by less than 2 percent in each of the preceding three years. 22/

The truth of the matter was that the economy could have afforded guns and butter at the same time, only not quite as much of each as Johnson tried to provide. If war expenditures were taken as a given, the administration had to chose between excess demand (i.e., inflationary pressure), a cutback in either private-sector spending or the government's domestic programs, or a "pay-as-you-go" tax base. Not coming to terms with these tradeoffs soon enough led ultimately to the unfortunate combination of all three undesirable options: cutbacks in the war on poverty and other Great Society programs, increased taxes, and inflation. 23/

1. Escalation in Vietnam: Guns, Butter, and Inflation

On July 27, 1965, the decision was made to send the 101st Airborne Division to Vietnam. This was the day, according to Johnson himself, when accomplishing the dream of the Great Society began to conflict with US obligations halfway around the world. By November and December of that

year a number of economic policy-makers in Washington began warning that the economy's splendid performance in 1964 and 1965 was in danger of producing inflationary pressures. This advice led to two developments. First, the Federal Reserve Board raised the discount rate from 4 percent to 4.5 percent in an effort to restrict growth of the money supply. This was a significant break from the Federal Reserve Board's consistent backing of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations' expansionary economic policies, and indeed drew criticism from both the White House and Congress. The second development was that in January 1966 the Council of Economic Advisors submitted a report to Johnson saying that he could not have both the war and the Great Society without either a tax increase or inflationary pressure. Johnson chose not to act on this advice because of its implications for the domestic legislation he wanted to get through Congress in 1966, with Robert McNamara and others arguing privately that an admission of the war's true cost would kill any chance of this domestic legislation being passed. This decision was made easier by the fact that most economists, not having a clear indication of the war's cost, continued to be optimistic about the economy's ability to sustain both the administration's domestic and international programs.

Johnson did at this time ask for, and get from Congress, a minor increase in excise taxes, but it was not until December 1966 that he admitted that the administration had seriously underestimated the cost of the war, with his estimate of the error being $10 billion. He therefore asked Congress for a 6 percent tax surcharge in January 1967, but dropped this request when the economy subsequently showed signs of slowing down. It was not until August 1967 that he asked Congress for another tax increase, this time a 10 percent surcharge.

By late 1967 inflation had taken a firm hold on the economy, but Congress was by no means eager to accept Johnson's prescription for handling it, with Wilbur Mills, chairman of the crucial House Ways and Means Committee, surfacing as the administration's primary antagonist on the issue. After Johnson's January call for a 6 percent surcharge, Mills challenged the necessity of such a tax increase and insisted on thoroughly

investigating the proposal. The administration had fallen into a trap of its own making. It had purposely hidden the true magnitude of the war's costs and insisted that the country could afford both the war and the Great Society. Moreover, throughout 1965, 1966, and 1967 it had repeatedly insisted that the military battle was being won and that our involvement would therefore be of limited duration and scope. This led to a loss of credibility with Congress and the public, to miscalculations by misinformed economic planners, and, as in the case of Mills, to a hesitation to believe that there was a pressing need for fiddling with the country's economic well-being. When it became clear by late 1967 that something did, in fact, need to be done to combat inflation, conservative members of Congress, with Mills as their spokesman, insisted that any tax increase be linked with cuts on the domestic side of the budget. When the 10 percent tax surcharge was signed into law on June 28, 1968, nearly three years after the decision making such an action inevitable, or at least necessary, it came at the price of a commitment to trim $6 billion from the government's domestic expenditures. Johnson was losing not just the war, but the Great Society too. 25/

With too little being done too late, not even the eventual combination of domestic budget cuts, increased interest rates, and the 10 percent tax surcharge was sufficient to stop the inflation rate from rising. The inflation rate was 3.2 percent in 1967 (up from below 2 percent annually in 1963, 1964, and 1965), 4 percent in the early months of 1968, and 4.6 percent for all of 1968. In 1969 it topped 6 percent. Unlike prior to World War II or the Korean War, there was little slack in the national economy in 1965 when the US began escalating its war effort in Vietnam. As increased demand for war-related production caused intense competition for available industrial capacity, a classic case of demand-pull inflation developed. By the end of 1968 this problem was compounded by the expectation of continuing inflation adding a cost-push element to inflationary pressures. Between 1960 and 1964 the public debt increased by $27.7 billion; between 1964 and 1968, with the government financing much of the war effort with expanding budget deficits, the public debt grew by

$41.1 billion. (A year-by-year picture of the public debt's growth is provided by Figure 4-5.) This growing debt was financed by a rapid increase in the money supply, a phenomenon reflecting and, to some extent, adding to the inflation of the late 1960s. 26/

2. The Decline of the US International Economic Position

Given the impact of World War II on our principal international competitors and the underlying strength of the US economy, there was little reason in the late 1940s or the 1950s to predict that complete US domination of the international economic system would only be temporary. In fact, such a US role had been given a stamp of approval by the international community at forums such as the Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks conferences, with, for example, the dollar's position as a reserve currency being formalized. The world's money was backed by the dollar and not just gold, with the US being able to settle its balance-of-payments deficits by simply allowing foreign countries to hold dollars.

Despite the fact that this system was designed, in part at least, to facilitate the flow of American wealth to other countries, throughout the early post-war period there existed a troublesome "dollar gap," with world demand for dollars far exceeding their supply. By the 1960s, however, the dollar shortage of the late 1940s and 1950s had turned into a dollar glut. There were a number of reasons for this important turnabout, including the spectacular economic progress of Western Europe and Japan and their improved competitive position vis-à-vis the US, the cost of American civilian and military aid programs (the Marshall Plan, economic aid to third-world countries, military aid to our NATO allies, etc.), the cost of US military operations abroad (in Europe, Korea, Vietnam, etc), increasing US inflation in the mid 1960s, and the large outflow of direct foreign investments by US corporations taking advantage of lucrative overseas business opportunities. The US balance of payments reflected these developments by becoming increasingly troublesome, with US gold reserves dropping dramatically in the 1960s (see Figure 4-6). 27/

Even given a perennial balance-of-trade surplus, these expenses were such that the accumulated balance-of-payments deficit for the period



Figure 4-5. US Government Budget Deficits, 1956-1968



Figure 4-6. US Balance of Payments and Gold Reserves

from 1945 to 1964 was $35 billion. While balance-of-payments deficits (which averaged $1.5 billion per year from 1950 to 1956) were seen in the 1950s as a logical and not-to-be-worried-about consequence of the US's constructive international role, by the early 1960s other countries, and especially France, sensed that the US was becoming seriously overextended and began demanding gold for their accumulated dollars.

And indeed, the US's international position had changed dramatically since the war. Despite the fact that US foreign aid benefitted the US as well as its recipients (by creating markets for US exports, adding to the overseas investment opportunities of US firms, etc.), the size of post-war aid programs inevitably put a certain amount of strain on the system, especially with regard to the balance of payments. During the 20 years following the war the US spent, in all, some $67 billion on military assistance and direct overseas military expenditures, and some $77 billion on economic aid. At the same time, the US share of overall world trade shrank as Japan and countries in Western Europe vastly increased their share. In 1948 the US share of world trade had been an amazing 48 percent. By 1964 it was 25 percent and by 1969 it was only 10 percent. US agricultural production continued to provide a product in constant international demand, as it had since colonial times. Similarly, US production in certain high-technology areas such as the computer and aerospace industries maintained a clear, albeit diminishing, edge over foreign competition. But in the middle range of manufactures US industries found it increasingly difficult to compete against foreign concerns, with, for example, the US share of world steel production falling during the 20 years after the war from 57 percent to 22 percent and the US share of automobile production falling during the same period from 75 percent to 33 percent.

One of the Kennedy administration's first actions was to announce a package of measures designed to correct US balance-of-payments problems, problems reflected by the international gold crisis in October 1960 and, over the last three Eisenhower years, a drop in US gold reserves of $8.75 billion. The Kennedy prescription was to decrease government spending

abroad and encourage US commercial exports. Coupled with certain additional measures in 1963, these efforts were successful to the extent that the trade balance did improve by over $5 billion by 1964. 29/

By this time, however, the trade account was not the only problem area in the balance of payments. As was mentioned above, balance-of-payments deficits in the 1940s and 1950s were a matter of conscious government policy, with capital-account deficits created by US aid programs, military expenditures, etc. outweighing perennial trade-account surpluses. By the mid 1960s, though, these capital-account deficits had become a matter of supply and demand and not government policy, with US-based multinational corporations exporting increasing amounts of capital to establish overseas manufacturing operations (because of cheaper labor costs, etc.) and the "Eurodollar" market drawing surplus capital away from US-based financial institutions (primarily because of higher interest rates). Adding to these problems after 1965 was the Vietnam War, which boosted overseas government spending and led to inflation which undermined the competitive position of domestically produced goods, thus encouraging imports and discouraging exports.

In early 1965 the Johnson Administration introduced "voluntary" restraints on the export of capital, with tighter controls following soon thereafter. The balance of payments responded favorably to this treatment, but as had been the case after Kennedy's earlier measures this improvement was only temporary. Pressure again began to build on the dollar, culminating, between November 1967 and March 1968, in some $3 billion of gold being sold in a futile effort to stem the worldwide rush away from the dollar. As Paul Samuelson put it, "time had run out on the precarious gold-and-dollar standard." 30/

Something had to be done immediately; and officials from the world's 10 leading nations settled, in March, on creating a new two-tier gold system in which the open-market price of gold would be set by supply and demand while official accounts between governments would be settled through gold payments made at parities set by the International Monetary Fund. The gold stock for this second, "official" tier was frozen at its

1968 level; and gold payments from central banks to the free market were suspended. In a second reform, the IMF introduced "paper gold" in the form of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), a new reserve asset created by international fiat. Since the IMF could increase the supply of SDRs at any time, they provided a mechanism for solving the liquidity problems created by freezing the stock of "official" gold at its 1968 level. (An explanatory note: Since the international economy and the volume of international monetary transactions grow over time, it is also necessary for the reserves backing these transactions -- be they gold, dollars, or SDRs -- to increase in quantity. Otherwise, international trade would be inhibited in the same way that domestic transactions would if there were not enough money to pay for the items people sought to buy or sell. 31/) These reforms were recognized as being temporary, and indeed the 1970s did bring further changes in the system, but they worked well as a stopgap arrangement.

The international monetary crisis of 1968 had thus been weathered, but it was clear that the United States, after over 20 years of reigning supreme in international monetary affairs, would thenceforward have to settle for a first-amongst-equals position. As was mentioned before, this dramatic shift in the US's international status was largely inevitable since the lopsided system created in the wake of World War II had to be replaced, sooner or later, by a more balanced international economic order. But this shift was also a result of specific American policies, probably the most important of which was the decision to escalate the Vietnam War. Reviewing the problems underlying the US's diminishing international economic position in the late 1960s and the 1970s, Godfrey Hodgson therefore wrote that: "All these troubles--buoyant imports, lagging exports, sluggish investment leading to mediocre productivity--could be traced to one great cause: inflation. And inflation was caused by the Vietnam War." 32/

E. NIXON ADMINISTRATION ECONOMIC POLICIES AND THE VIETNAM WAR

1. An Overview, 1968-1972

The Nixon Administration came to office determined to provide a conservative antidote for the US's economic problems, wanting, in particular, to bring inflation under control and reduce government involvement at all levels of economic activity. Not surprisingly, though, the administration's actual economic policies reflected little of the clarity and simplicity of these goals, with Nixon announcing three different economic "game plans" between 1969 and 1971. While each of these changes in economic policy accomplished certain limited goals, each also had negative long-term effects. 33/

Nixon's Game Plan I (1969-1970) was designed to counter inflation, which in 1968 had reached the "unbearable" level of 4.6 percent, reduce the growth rate of federal outlays for domestic programs, and, more generally, reduce federal activism in economic affairs. The problem, as it turned out, was that these deflationary policies took hold at the same time as the following other measures began to have a dampening effect on economic activity:

(1) The tax surcharge imposed by Johnson in mid 1968 began to cut into consumer spending, as it had been designed to do.

(2) The Federal Reserve Board, combatting the same inflation as Nixon, raised its discount rate in 1969 to 6 percent. In another development designed to counter inflationary pressures, the prime lending rate rose to an unprecedented 8.2 percent.

(3) With the beginning of troop withdrawal from Vietnam, the administration cut overall defense spending $8.6 billion for fiscal year 1970.

(4) The cutback in defense spending resulting from the war's winding down contributed to a 20 percent reduction in the overall backlog of industrial orders while bringing about cuts in defense-industry jobs.

The coincidence of these developments, some planned and some unplanned, created a drop in total demand, not just defense-related demand. The result was economic overkill which helped bring on a deep recession in 1970 and 1971, the first in 10 years, during which unemployment rose by 75 percent.

What is more, inflation got worse, not better. Inflation in 1970 was higher than at any time in the 1960s, as is illustrated in Figure 4-7. Nixon contributed to this continuing inflation by announcing that he would not interfere with the private sector's freedom to raise prices and wages, a policy which fueled increasingly large wage demands. The country was stuck in a cost-push inflationary spiral in which expectations of inflation led to large wage demands which, in turn, led to the price increases necessary for paying increased labor costs while protecting corporate profit margins.

The political consequences of the coexistence of inflation and recession (stagflation) were brought home to Nixon by the poor showing of Republican candidates in the 1970 elections. Reacting to this political threat, in late 1970 Nixon came out with Game Plan II (1970-1971), which was designed to stimulate the economy and end the recession. The administration, for example, pressured the Federal Reserve Board to increase the money supply's growth rate by lowering the discount rate. Prime interests rate fell accordingly.

The drop in interest rates called for by Game Plan II prompted an outflow of capital from the United States and thus seriously damaged the US balance of payments. In addition, in 1971 the US experienced the first of the trade deficits that were to plague it throughout the 1970s. While the 1971 trade deficit totalled only around $2 billion (see Figure 4-8), it marked the final passing of an era in which trade surpluses helped finance expensive military and foreign-aid programs. By the summer of 1971 the payments situation had again reached a crisis stage, which led first to the decision to abandon gold convertibility (i.e., the US would no longer honor demands that dollars be exchanged for gold at an official parity) and then, in December to a sharp devaluation of the dollar. With these decisions the last vestiges of the Bretton Woods monetary system were put to rest.



Figure 4-7. Consumer Price Index (% Change)



Figure 4-8. US Balance of Trade Surpluses and Deficits, 1951-1972

Meanwhile, the stagflation which continued to grip the economy during the course of Game Plan II caused Nixon's advisors, who were looking towards the 1972 presidential election, to depart radically from their previous economic strategies and institute, through Game Plan III (1971-1972), wage and price controls. These were maintained into 1972 and did serve to curb inflation, at least temporarily, before being lifted to allow for economic growth prior to the 1972 elections. This growth came at the expense of renewed inflation, but that was something to be dealt with after the election by a new series of measures designed to damper growth and inflation.

2. Nixon's Economic Program and US Withdrawal from Vietnam

As was indicated above, the Nixon Administration sponsored a series of inconsistent stop-gap economic policies which ushered a bumping and sagging economy through the years of US withdrawal from Vietnam. The reduction of US troop strength in Vietnam led, as one would expect, to a sharp decrease in the budgeted cost of the US war effort, as is illustrated in Figure 4-9. The major war-related economic challenge faced by the Nixon Administration was therefore to factor the reduction in aggregate demand caused by the Vietnam wind-down into its overall plans for ensuring domestic economic welfare. As was noted above, Game Plan I was distinctly ill conceived in terms of accomplishing this goal. Instead of easing the economy through a period of adjustment to peacetime conditions, fiscal and monetary overkill helped to lead the country into an abrupt recession. The administration found itself on an economic roller coaster, with Game Plans II and III being more oriented towards averting economic and political disaster than towards the effective reprogramming of war-related industrial activity for peacetime production. 37/

F. INSIGHTS

During the early and mid 1960s the Kennedy and Johnson administrations took the strength of the US economy for granted, and thus formulated



Figure 4-9. Relationship of Budgeted Cost of Vietnam War and US Troop Levels

aggressive military and diplomatic programs with little reference to what turned out to be important economic limitations. Defense spending at the height of the Vietnam War accounted for 9 percent of GNP, of which the war itself accounted for only 3 percent. Because of the relatively small size of this commitment it was not necessary to mobilize the economy in a manner similar to that necessary during World War II or even the Korean War. By doing the opposite, though, and almost completely disregarding the impact of the war on the domestic economy--not, for example, even instituting a significant tax to compensate for the war-related increase in aggregate demand until 1968-- the Johnson Administration (with an assist from Congress) added to the economic problems the US had to face in the late 1960s and the 1970s. Regardless of the war and the presence or absence of war-related economic planning, the US was going to be faced with such problems as a diminishing international economic role (in relative, if not absolute terms), the end to an era of cheap energy, and the trend towards the increased production of services relative to goods. To these were added a legacy of inflation which plagues us today even more than at the height of the Vietnam War. Some economists even argue that we are now faced with a situation in which "the Phillips curve has shifted to the right," which is to say that the amount of unemployment associated with a given level of inflation has increased. This is sobering news indeed for those working towards achieving the goal of full employment (even defining full employment as, say, 3 or 4 percent actual unemployment) at zero inflation.

The truth of the matter is that the economic policies made necessary by the Vietnam War were not politically viable. Either the war or the economy had to give and, given the political commitment of successive administrations "not to lose Vietnam," it was the economy that was sacrificed. In retrospect this seems shortsighted, but given the structure of the US political system it is difficult even now to see how the decision could have been otherwise.

And finally, the US economic experience during the Vietnam War years illustrates the relationship between the domestic and international economy. The international monetary system established after World War II

was bound to change sooner or later, but the economic consequences of the Vietnam War certainly led to the demise of this system sooner than would otherwise have been the case.

G. LESSONS

Political, diplomatic, and military policy making have taken precedence over economic policy making in the US system, and this was particularly true during the Vietnam war years; yet clearly economic considerations must share equal importance if political and military programs are to survive over the long haul.

Politically convenient budget assumptions, such as predicting the war's end at the end of a fiscal year, warps fiscal planning, particularly if fiscal planners are omitted from participation in the key decisions.

Candor in presenting political, military, and economic policies is essential early in any potential crisis situation to gain support of the majority of the public and to avoid credibility gaps and serious downstream economic dangers.

Short-term contingency commitments of military force can probably be sustained and supported by the US economy without major disruption to the civil economy, assuming that the duration of the emergency can be predicted with confidence or that the personnel and materiel commitment is limited; but, lacking confident predictions of the magnitude and duration of a military commitment, an administration should take early steps to educate the public and the Congress of the likely consequences of a prolonged and costly effort. In this context, the military leaders, notably the Joint Chiefs of Staff, must provide realistic estimates of the situation and assure that those estimates are given attentive hearing by their civilian superiors.

As a general rule, fighting a war without making adjustments in national economic policy will have an adverse effect on a country's economic well being, and public support is essential if those adjustments are to be made; to support the adjustments, the public must first support the cause and view it as important.

CHAPTER 4 ENDNOTES

1. Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "The Economics of Defense," The Washington Post, January 31, 1975.

2. John J. Clark, "Vietnam's Lessons In Defense Economics," Royal United Services Institute (London: RUSI, 1972).

3. Those arrangements and the government's inability to formulate appropriate economic policies eroded the monetary system that had been created at the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 and consequently the role of the United States in international monetary affairs. Thus, the way in which US Vietnam war policies were pursued was a key factor in destroying a major element of the powerful post-World War II position of the United States.

4. The chain of events that occurred was not inevitable. Candid public discussion about the goals of political-military programs, supported by a committed political constituency, could have resulted in early economic sacrifices (i.e., increased taxation) to pay for the war. It was the political judgment at that time, however, and probably with considerable justification, that the public might not have supported administration policies had they been candidly articulated.

5. A note on economic data and endnotes: It is not unusual for different sources to give different figures for items about which common sense tells us there should be agreement. The reasons for this range from differing statistical methods to plain sloppiness. While this is frustrating, what is most important for a review such as this is a general feeling for economic fluctuations and overall trends, not questions of whether one person's quantification of a given phenomenon differs somewhat from someone else's. For the sake of expedience, sources are not cited for each economic statistic quoted in this chapter. Instead, an emphasis is placed on indicating general sources to which readers can turn for additional or more detailed information. Thus, for example, the following are useful sources for information about the pre-1961 period:

   Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, Annual Volumes.

   Frederick Lewis Allen, The Big Change: America Transforms Itself, 1900-1950 (New York: Harper, 1952).

   Godfrey Hodgson, America In Our Time (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1976).

   James L. Sundquist, Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Years (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1968).

Samuel Eliot Morison, Oxford History of the American People (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965).

Congressional Quarterly Service, Federal Economic Policy, 1945-1965 (Washington, D.C.: CQS, 1973).

6. Hodgson, supra note 3, p. 50.

7. From the first quarter of 1945 to mid-1966, national security expenditures were reduced almost $70 billion, an amount equal to one-third of 1945's GNP. The level of unemployment, however, rose only to the four percent zone from its abnormally low level during the war. And the total decline in GNP was only $17 billion. Other demands for output increased during this period by more than $50 billion. Again, in the post-Korean war cutback, defense spending was reduced by $10 billion over a period of eighteen months, about three percent of the GNP. These cutbacks did contribute to the 1954 recession. From, peak to trough, GNP declined about two percent, and unemployment briefly approached the six percent level. By the end of 1954, however, output had regained peak 1953 levels and was moving upward rapidly. Paul W. McCracken "After Vietnam, What Next for the Economy?" Challenge. August 1967, p. 31.

8. Department of Commerce and Council of Economic Advisors.

9. Department of Commerce, Department of Labor, and Council of Economic Advisors.

10. There are numerous works which lend perspective to their discussions of the Vietnam War by providing information about the economic policies adopted during and immediately after World War II and the Korean War. Two which were particularly useful in the preparation of this chapter are:

Robert Warren Stevens, Vain Hopes, Grim Realities (New York: New Viewpoints, A Division of Franklin Watts, 1976).

Paul W. McCracken, "After Vietnam, What Next For The Economy?", Challenge, August 1967.

11. Department of Commerce, "Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970"; and Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

12. Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 44-45.

13. Kennedy was seriously concerned about these boasts, though his worries were reduced somewhat when Walter Heller pointed out that if the US boosted its growth rate to 4.5 percent the USSR could not catch up until the year 2,010, even given a very high sustained growth rate in the USSR. This is discussed in Hobart Rowen, The Free Enterprisers - Kennedy, Johnson, and the Business Establishment (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1964), p. 162. For an updated general discussion of Soviet growth and the likelihood of the USSR overtaking the US in real GNP, a good place to start is Paul Samuelson's classic textbook, Economics, Tenth Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976), pp. 877-884. The best guess today is that it is possible that the USSR might match US GNP at some point after the year 2000, but it will be long indeed before it can hope to match the US in per-capita GNP. Moreover, since less-developed economies tend to be able to sustain higher growth rates than those which are more developed, it is entirely possible that as the Soviet economy develops its growth rate will become slower, in which case the gap between the US and the USSR economies might narrow at an increasingly slow rate, if at all.

14. During the campaign, for example, Nixon charged that the Democrats were soft on inflation and condemned "the concept of artificial growth forced by massive new federal spending and loose money policies," Sundquist, supra note 3, p. 33. See also: Rowen, supra note 10, which on p. 19 quotes Eisenhower as saying, in his 1961 budget address, "If...we deliberately run the government by credit cards, improvidently spending today at the expense of tomorrow, we will break faith with the American people and their children."; and Walter Heller, New Dimensions of Political Economy (Cambridge, Massachussets: Harvard University Press, 1966), which on p. 30 quotes Seymour Harris as saying that Kennedy at first seemed "alergic to modern economics."

15. The various books from which information about Kennedy's program was drawn include:

Sorenson, supra note 9.

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965).

Sundquist, supra note 3.

Hodgson, supra note 3.

Stevens, supra note 7.

John Kenneth Galbraith, Economics and the Public Purpose (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973).

Heller, New Dimensions, supra note 11.

Walter Heller, Perspectives on Economic Growth (New York: Random House, 1968).

Walter Heller, The Economy: Old Myths and New Realities (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1971).

16. Dillon, along with Federal Reserve Chairman William McChesney Martin and Under Secretary of Treasury for Monetary Affairs Robert V. Rossa, held the position in the Kennedy years of advocating more conservative economic policies. At the other end of the administration's economic spectrum was John Kenneth Galbraith, who advocated heavy public-sector spending to remedy inequities in American society and provide more equitable access to the fruits of prosperity. Galbraith argued that the private sector was incapable of making broad economic decisions taking into account the wider interests of the society. He advocated increased federal intervention in economic affairs, including imposition of wage and price controls, and he argued strongly against trying to raise economic productivity by tax cuts. Walter Heller, another liberal, gradually became the guiding light of Kennedy's economic program. He argued that the tax structure developed during World War II to restrict demand was weighing down the economy and causing the slow growth and cyclical recessions that characterized the years after the Korean War. Heller felt that the government should undertake a large tax cut. See Rowen, The Free Enterprisers... p. 162, Heller, New Dimensions..., pp. 29-36, and Galbraith, Economics and the Public Purpose, p. 306.

17. This quotation from Friedman is found in Heller, New Dimensions, supra note 11, p. 32. For more on the general debate about the merits of interventionist fiscal policies, see Milton Friedman and Walter Heller, Monetary vs. Fiscal Policy (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1969).

18. Walter Heller, for example, has argued that the tax cut spurred a $24.4 billion improvement in GNP by the second quarter of 1965, a $7 billion net increase in tax receipts for the federal government, and a $1.5 billion net increase in the receipts of state and local governments. Heller, Perspectives, supra, note 12, pp. 44-46.

19. Stevens, supra note 7, p. 44.

20. Heller, New Dimensions, supra note 11.

21. The Johnson administration sought to present itself as the heir to the Kennedy legacy for distinctly political reasons that will be described in Chapter 5. The Kennedy heritage included a budding military commitment in Southeast Asia, the beginnings of a war on poverty, and commitment to carrying on the liberal fiscal policy begun during the Kennedy years.

Johnson endorsed and expanded all three of these elements of the Kennedy heritage, a decision that ultimately put severe strain on the US economy and accelerated the United States' decline in international monetary affairs.

22. There are, of course, innumerable works on Johnson's economic policies and the economic effect of the Vietnam War. Persons interested in further reading might begin by looking, for genera. statistics about the economy's year-by-year performance, at the annual Economic Report by the Council on Economic Advisors (Washington, D.C.: USGPO). This is an invaluable, though not entirely unbiased, source. Another important government publication is: US Congress Joint Economic Committee, Economic Effect of Vietnam Spending, Hearings, (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1967). Other useful sources, including many of those used in the preparation of this section, include:

Arthur M. Okun, The Political Economy of Prosperity (New York: W. W. Norton, The Brookings Institution, 1970).

Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971).

Heller, New Dimensions, supra note 11.

Heller, Perspectives, supra note 12.

Heller, The Economy, supra note 12.

Murray L. Wiedenbaum, Economic Impact of the Vietnam War (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, 1967).

John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1976).

John Kenneth Galbraith, Economics and the Public Purpose, supra note 12.

Sundquist, supra note 3.

Hodgson, supra note 3.

Stevens, supra note 7.

David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972).

US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The Military Budget and National Economic Priorities, Hearings (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1969).

Jacob K. Javits, Charles J. Hitch, and Arthur F. Burns, The Defense Sector and the American Economy (New York: NYU Press, 1968).

Melman Seymour, ed., The War Economy of the United States (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971).

URPE, "The War and Its Impact on the Economy," The Review of Radical Political Economics, August 1970.

Tom Riddell, "The 676 Billion Quagmire," The Progressive, October 1973.

"Deflating the Fears of a Recession," Business Week, October 22, 1966.

Clark, "Vietnam's Lessons In Defense," supra note 2.

Robert McNamara, "The Defense Program and the Economy," testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, January 27, 1964.

Melvin Laird, "Priorities and Resource Allocation," testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 20, 1970.

Committee for Economic Development, "The National Economy and the Vietnam War," Chapter I of a Statement on National Policy by the Research and Policy Committee of CED, April 1968.

William Bowen, "The Vietnam War: A Cost Accounting," Fortune, April 1966.

"Business Feels First Pressures," Business Week, July 24, 1965.

"A Tough Ground War Multiplies the Costs," Business Week, July 24, 1965.

"Escalating at a high pace," Business Week, December 4, 1965.

"Taking War In Stride," The Economist, August 21, 1965.

Walter Heller, "Getting Ready for Peace," Harpers, April 1968.

Robert Lekachman, "Death Of A Slogan - The Great Society 1967," Commentary, January 1967.

Peter Braestrup, "Vietnam Found Second Most Costly US War," The Washington Post, July 11, 1971.

23. The Johnson administration argued that the war in Vietnam would be of short duration with relatively small impact on the booming US economy. Through 1967 the administration claimed that the military battle was

being won and that it was not necessary to derail the extraordinary performance of the civilian economy. Those formulating economic policy were not privy to details concerning the scale of the effort that was projected for the Vietnam conflict. The lack of candor by the president and his key political-military advisors concerning the costs of the war had two results: economic planners were ill-prepared to adjust the civilian economy to the military realities the nation was facing, and the administration's credibility suffered seriously before the Congress and the public. See Halberstam, pp. 338, 595, and 604 and US Congress Joint Economic Committee, Economic Effect of Vietnam Spending, p. 5.

24. Samuelson, p. 340.

25. The political underpinnings of economic policy must never be overlooked. Thus, for example, the 87th Congress (1961-62) dealt harshly with Kennedy's attempts to pass legislation dealing with the problems of unemployment, education, civil rights, medical care, and environmental protection. The 88th Congress (1963-64) treated Lyndon Johnson somewhat better, passing, for example, the Civil Rights Act and the Economic Opportunity Act in 1964. Similarly, the 89th Congress (1965-66) passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and generally acquiesced to Johnson's running of the Vietnam War. Ultimately, however, not even Johnson's phenomenal political skills and his willingness to compromise with congressional heavyweights such as Mills were sufficient to save him from conservative criticism of the Great Society and liberal criticism of the Vietnam War.

26. While inflation was in part attributable to the war, the war was in fact often blamed as much because it was a politically expedient thing to say. By doing so, policymakers could absolve themselves of blame for their own post-Vietnam mismanagement of the inflation problem. Many of the sources cited above, in note 22, discuss the inflationary impact of the Vietnam War. To these can be added other useful references including:

Edwin L. Dale, Jr., "The Inflation Goof," The New Republic, January 4, 1969.

Richard L. Strout, "How Vietnam brought inflation," Christian Science Monitor, October 11, 1974.

Arthur M. Okun, et al., Inflation: The Problem It Creates and the Policies It Requires (New York: NYU Press, 1970).

Robert Eisner, "War and Taxes: the Role of the Economist in Politics," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 1968.

Robert Eisner, "Fiscal and Monetary Policy Reconsidered," American Economic Review, December 1969.

Robert Eisner, "What Went Wrong?", Journal of Political Economy, 1970.

27. The literature about the declining US position in the international economy is huge. An excellent starting point for persons desiring an understanding of the variables involved is Samuelsons's textbook, Economics, supra note 10. Other sources of particular interest, numerous of which were used in the preparation of this section, include:

Peter G. Peterson, A Foreign Economic Perspective, Volume I of The US in the Changing World Economy (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1971).

Fred L. Block, The Origins of International Economic Disorder (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).

Eliot Janeway, The Economics of Crisis: War, Politics, and the Dollar (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1968).

R. Segel, The Decline and Fall of the American Dollar (New York: Bantam Books, 1974).

Stevens, supra note 7.

Hodgson, supra note 3.

N. R. Danielson, The United States Balance of Payments (International Economic Policy Association).

Robert W. Stevens, The Dollar in the World Economy (New York: Random House, 1972).

"The Dollar and Bretton Woods, A Post-Mortem," Bankers' Magazine (Boston), Spring 1973.

"The Public Sector of the Balance of Payments," Economics and Business Review (University of Nebraska), Fall 1974.

Leonard Dudley and Peter Passell, "The War in Vietnam and the US Balance of Payments," Review of Economics and Statistics, November 1968.

28. Department of Commerce and Samuelson, p. 691.

29. This, of course, is a simplification of the actual history of efforts to deal with balance-of-payments problems. Thus, for example, the Eisenhower Administration tried to cut the costs of overseas US

military efforts, to tie US aid to purchases of US goods, and to encourage the US government to "buy American." The Kennedy Administration, besides the policies already mentioned, encouraged foreign investment and tourism in the US, lowered the duty-free exemptions enjoyed by American travellers returning to the US, and cried to manipulate interest rates to discourage the export of capital. See, for example:

Sorenson, Kennedy, supra note 9, pp. 405-412.

The Banker, December 1960, pp. 779-784.

John F. Kennedy "Message on Balance of Payments and Gold," reprinted in Harris, ed., The Dollar in Crisis (1961), pp. 295-307.

30. As was the case in the discussion of Kennedy's efforts to handle balance-of-payments problems, this description of Johnson's efforts to help the dollar is very much a summary. For further information about the Johnson program see:

Block, supra note 21.

Levitt, Silent Surrender (1970), p. 10., for a discussion of the 1965 tightening of controls.

The Banker, February 1967, pp. 97-98, for a discussion of the 1966 tightening of controls.

The Banker, February 1968, p. 100, for a discussion of the 1968 tightening of controls.

Stevens, supra note 7, p. 214, explains also that "The Johnson Administration had been forced to impose the first-ever mandatory controls on the outflow of US private capital on January 1, 1968, when it also asked Congress to impose a penalty tax on foreign travel by Americans. At the time, the 1968 crisis was called a loss of confidence in the gold value of all currencies, but since all were tied to gold via the gold convertibility of the dollar, it was fundamentally a dollar crisis."

The 1968 Tet offensive by the DRV figures importantly in the economic equation. The British had been forced to devalue the pound in November 1967, and pressure began to build on the dollar as individuals and institutions around the world began to cash in a small part of the vast sums of dollars that had been collecting overseas while the US financed its expansive foreign policy under the terms of the Bretton Woods Agreements. The Tet offensive and the inability of the Johnson administration to obtain taxes to pay for the war reduced international confidence in the US government's ability to conduct its affairs.

Between November 1967 and March 1968, three billion dollars worth of gold was sold by banks in a futile effort to stem worldwide rushes to gold and away from the dollar. See Stevens, p. 112.

31. For a further discussion of problems relating to international liquidity, see Kindleberger, Balance-of-Payments Deficits and the International Market for Liquidity (1965).

32 Hodgson, supra note 3, p. 258.

33. Persons interested in further reading about Nixon's economic policies can choose from a large selection of works. First, as with the Johnson and Kennedy years, the Council of Economic Advisors' annual Economic Report of the President (Washington, D.C.: USGPO) is invaluable. Other sources which were particularly helpful in the preparation of the present chapter include:

Leonard Silk, Nixonomics (New York: Praeger, 1972).

Roger Miller and Raburn Williams, The New Economics of Richard Nixon: Freezes, Floats, and Fiscal Policy (Scranton, Pennsylvania: Harpers Magazine Press, 1972).

Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1976).

Rowland Evans, Jr., and Robert D. Novak, Nixon in the White House (New York: Random House, 1971).

Richard P. Nathan, The Plot that Failed: Nixon and the Administrative Presidency (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1975).

Lester Sobel, ed., Inflation and the Nixon Administration (New York: Facts on File, 1974, 1975).

Stevens, supra note 7.

34. Stevens, supra note 7, p. 126.

35. "Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1972," Table 1281, p. 776; and Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Report of the President, January 1973, Table C-88 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1973), p. 295.

36. Ibid., passim.

37. Most of the sources cited in note 33 discuss not only the general economic policies of the Nixon Administration, but also the specific connection between these policies and the Vietnam wind-down. Other sources which could be referred to by persons interested in further reading about the economic implications of withdrawal include:

Bernard Udis, ed., Adjustments of the U.S. Economy to Reductions in Military Spending, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Document E-156, December 1970.

Paul W. McCracken, "After Vietnam, What Next for the Economy?", Challenge, August 1967.

"And Suppose the Fighting Stops," The Economist, November 9, 1968.

Walter W. Heller, "Getting Ready for Peace," Harpers, April 1968.

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CHAPTER 5
DOMESTIC POLITICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING VIETNAM WAR DECISION MAKING

> I know no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion. 1/

Thomas Jefferson
Letter to William Charles Jarvis
September 28, 1820.

> I am convinced that congressional embarrassment at the failure to weigh all the factors involved in the Tonkin resolution has been responsible for the burgeoning assertiveness of the movement in the Senate at long last to curb the war-making power of the President. 2/

Jacob Javits

A. INTRODUCTION

US Vietnam war policies were formulated in response to the evolving situation in Southeast Asia and to other international pressures. The changing US domestic political environment was also a strong influence on the nature and style of the war-related decisions of the successive administrations that struggled with the intractable problem of the Vietnam war. The presidents who had to make decisions pertaining to Vietnam were reacting not only to the recommendations of their advisors who were cognizant of international pressures, but also to the less abstract domestic political problems of preserving political alliances and of expanding their political bases. The Vietnam war demonstrated the extent to which foreign policy decision making had become centralized in the presidency. It is essential to an understanding of the decisions taken by the presidents during the Vietnam war to describe the domestic factors influencing presidential politics and their relationships to the war related decisions.

During the 1950's US policy toward Vietnam was not really a domestic issue, and there was widespread support for the general policy of containment of communism. In the decade and a half from 1960 to 1975, the US domestic political environment underwent transformation of far-reaching consequences for US foreign policy. Of particular importance during that time was the breakdown of the bipartisan support for the foreign policy developed by the executive branch. The consensus that had developed during the 1950s, the Cold War era, had begun to fragment in the mid and late 1960s. At the same time, the American left which had disappeared in the early part of that decade as a force shaping foreign policy reemerged. These events were accompanied by a substantial lessening of the political power of the American right, especially after the 1964 defeat of Senator Barry Goldwater. These shifting tides of American politics directly affected both the presidential and congressional responses to the Southeast Asian situation. Thus, US Vietnam policies were formulated to meet perceived international requirements, and, at the same time, were shaped by domestic political forces.

B. PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS

1. Kennedy Administration

a. Domestic Politics - Overview

The Kennedy administration entered office with a serious political challenge ahead. On the one hand President Kennedy had won the 1960 presidential elections or a platform that promised both broad domestic reform and a stronger US presence in international affairs. On the other hand the administration came to power with a very narrow margin of only 100,000 popular votes. A small number of votes in key states like Illinois would have produced an electoral college victory for Richard Nixon. The political dilemma was to fulfill the broad campaign promises without the political base that would have been established in a powerful election victory.

The lack of political power available to John Kennedy was particularly evident in the domestic legislation he sought to obtain from Congress. Kennedy sought priority action in five areas - minimum wage, education, area redevelopment, housing, and medical care for the aged. 3/ These did not represent innovative programs. They had been part of the Democratic legislative agenda during the Eisenhower administration. The approach taken by the Kennedy administration concerning these issues was essentially moderate as was the approach taken on other issues like civil rights. In efforts to make progress in some of these areas, the Kennedy administration was forced to compromise with the conservative forces in the Congress. The compromise with those forces, and especially with the Southern Democratic bloc, guaranteed that new landmark liberal domestic legislation would not be passed during Kennedy's first term. 4/

Chapter 2 reviews the alliance that existed in the early 1960s between the liberal wing of the Democratic Party and the intellectuals. The commitment of large numbers of intellectuals to the Kennedy administration was particularly evident. 5/ There was a strong sentiment among intellectuals, many of whom became involved in the antiwar movement during the Johnson administration, that they were on the inside and in a position to influence Kennedy's policies. When Kennedy was assassinated, this attitude was reflected by Norman Mailer who said, "For a time we felt the country was ours. Now it's theirs again..." 6/

The members of the Kennedy administration came into office with strong self-assurance that these policies would produce positive improvement in US domestic and foreign affairs. Arthur Schlesinger described the sense of triumph embodied in the establishment of the Kennedy administration in these words:

> One could not deny a sense of New Frontier autointoxication; one felt it oneself. The pleasures of power so long untasted, were now happily devoured. 7/

The confidence that radiated from the White House was based on a perception of US power that looked forward to "inevitable victory" in

the struggle with communism. 8/ The principal task before the administration was the organization of the military and technological power of the United States to achieve its purposes overseas.

b. President Kennedy's Personal Policy Predilections

Kennedy started with the premise that US domestic problems could be solved by the expansion of the economy which was giving greater opportunity to the American people. 9/ Consequently, he did not respond with any sense of urgency to domestic issues like those raised by the civil rights movement. Instead, he argued that it was important to pursue a moderate civil rights policy and await the development of a more favorable legislative environment after the 1964 elections before pushing strongly for civil rights legislation. Black leadership showed that it was willing to follow Kennedy's political strategy in this issue. 10/

While Kennedy demonstrated lack of drive in the development of domestic reform legislation, he focused his attention on strengthening the US role in foreign affairs. He sought to repersonalize the office of the presidency and maintain direct control of policy making that had become formalized and institutionalized under Eisenhower (See Vol. III). Early in his administration Kennedy had been disappointed in the performance of the State Department. At the time of the Bay of Pigs crisis he became convinced that the department was full of individuals committed to avoiding conflict, individuals who were consequently unwilling to use armed force to achieve policy objectives. He sought thereafter to concentrate policy making power in the hands of individuals who would support him in the use of force. 11/ Throughout his administration, Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense, provided Kennedy with this support, and at times the Defense Department dominated policy making almost to the exclusion of State (See Vol. III).

The attacks on Kennedy's policies came not from an active left that sought to focus attention on the shortcomings of domestic social and economic conditions, but from the political right which argued that the president was not being sufficiently tough with the communists. 12/

c. Impact on Vietnam Policy Making

The domestic political opposition from the right was a significant force in pressuring Kennedy to use what he perceived to be sufficient force in dealing with the communist threat. Sensitive to criticism that Khrushchev had bullied him at the Vienna summit, Kennedy sought to demonstrate his worth by acting forcefully in Southeast Asia. 13/ Kennedy's personal involvement in every stage of policy making necessarily limited the amount of time that could be devoted to any of the problems facing the country. The crises in Cuba, the Congo, and Berlin occupied a far larger share of Kennedy's attention than the Vietnam situation. In 1963, when the crises in Saigon led to the overthrow of Diem, Kennedy regretted that he had not given Vietnam more of his attention. Thus, the concentration of domestic political opposition from the right to Kennedy's foreign policy played a significant role in buttressing Kennedy's own predilection for involvement in foreign affairs and for using force to oppose perceived communist expansion. Had opposition come from the left, it seems likely that Kennedy would have paid more attention to the implications of the commitments he was making in Vietnam.

2. Johnson Administration

a. Overview

Lyndon Johnson's administrations are best understood if divided into two phases: the first ran from 1963 to 1966 and the second from 1966 to 1968. The first phase may be characterized as the time of achievement for the enactment of the Great Society program. The second was overshadowed by the debilitating political and economic impacts of the Vietnam war.

In the first phase Johnson set out to build a strong, workable majority in both houses of Congress. He did not have a national constituency of his own when he became President, but his remarkable expertise as a parliamentarian (that is, as a Member of Congress and as Senate Majority Leader), allowed him to begin immediately to deal more effectively with the Congress than had Kennedy. 14/ Using the post-assassination sentiment skillfully and manipulating his ties with the Southern bloc that

had slowed or stopped Kennedy's liberal legislative initiatives, Johnson set out to fulfill the promises Kennedy had made in his campaign but had been unable to realize because of congressional opposition. The Kennedy legacy in domestic policy had two central aspects:

(1) A program of social reform bills that was designed to bring federal aid to disadvantaged Americans.

(2) An economic program that was designed to stimulate the economy and provide the prosperity which was necessary to sponsor the expensive social works program that under Johnson came to be known as "The Great Society."

After the 1964 elections and the overwhelming defeat of B. y Goldwater and the Republican Party, Johnson had established his personal national political constituency and had won a majority in both houses of Congress, which allowed him to press on with further civil rights and social reform legislation. However, as discussed in Chapter 4 Johnson's failure to take action to finance the war through increased taxes led to mounting inflation. These changing economic conditions and the white reaction to the ghetto riots of 1965-1968 began to erode the political base Johnson needed to advance his domestic reform program. That base included the old Roosevelt alliance of liberal intellectuals, labor leaders, blacks, and Southern Democrats. As tension developed between the black and white elements of this coalition and as the liberal intellectuals began to shift away from Johnson because of his Vietnam war policies, the president, who had established a commanding political position in the 1964 election found his political base under attack from both the right and the left.

Some observers maintain that the erosion of the Democratic "grand coalition" was rooted less in the war itself than in the so-called "social issue". That issue was centered around the attention that was lavished on the poor at a time when the working middle class was under financial pressure from the inflation stemming from Johnson's inadequate and inappropriate fiscal response to the financial requirements of the Vietnam war. 15/ In the late 1960s and 1970s the Republican Party

sought to exploit the dissatisfactions of the traditionally Democratic-voting working class through a new coalition of the "unyoung, unpoor, unblack." 16/

In the second phase of Johnson's presidency, the Democratic Party was being fragmented by antiwar elements of the party, chiefly intellectuals who were pulling to the left while the other elements dissenting against the domestic social policies were pulling to the right. This condition was markedly different from the political pressure Kennedy had faced. Kennedy had had relatively little personal interest in domestic politics and his personal policy choices were complemented by his political opposition on the right which entered political debate on foreign policy issues.

Johnson faced not only political opposition to his foreign policy in Southeast Asia and the Dominican Republic, he also was confronted with growing criticism of his domestic policies. Most important, after the overwhelming defeat of Barry Goldwater, the opposition to Johnson's foreign policy from the right evaporated. From that time until the emergence of spokesmen like Senator Henry Jackson of Washington in the 1970s, the right did not have credible representatives who argued for a stronger approach to communist actions in Vietnam. Thus, Johnson's policies were assaulted from the left: the traditional balance to the political debate from the right was missing in the 1965-to-1968 period. Johnson had always sought to take a moderate course in handling the Vietnam situation. His determination to escalate the war gradually was partially rooted in the fear that he might trigger intervention by the Chinese or the Russians. 17/ He was also fearful that a lack of restraint would stimulate a domestic demand for increased escalation from the political right. 18/ His war policies had consequently been developed through an approach that he perceived to be the middle course between failure to act decisively and over-reaction. He was ill-prepared for the collapse of right wing criticism of his policies. Without that balance his policies were exposed to attack only from the left, and he found himself painfully exposed as representing the right end of the debate which was fragmenting his political coalition. Had credible,

articulate spokesmen for a more aggressive policy shared a political presence in that debate, Johnson's impressive skills at political maneuvering might have allowed him broader scope for maintaining his position in the center of the debate. The absence of those credible spokesmen to the right of Johnson can, however, be linked to the massive defeat of Goldwater which Johnson had largely engineered. 19/ Thus, the irony of Johnson's increasingly untenable political postion in late 1967 and 1968 was that the overwhelming character of his 1964 victory played a direct role in altering the nature of foreign policy debate by weakening the right. The result was that Johnson had eliminated the balancing factor he required to maintain his middle of the road postion.

b. Johnson's Personal Policy Predilections

Johnson, unlike Kennedy, came to office with the expressed intention of making his mark in American history through his domestic legislation. 20/ In addition, unlike his immediate predecessor, Johnson lacked experience and interest in foreign affairs. Nevertheless Johnson sought to continue the Kennedy legacy of actively resisting perceived communist advances. To accomplish that purpose and to maintain the kind of continuity he felt was required after Kennedy's assassination, Johnson sought to retain the foreign policy advisors Kennedy had assembled. 21/ By pursuing the Kennedy approach to foreign policy he won the support of these former Kennedy advisors. In addition, Johnson got congressional action on the stalled civil rights, and economic stimulus bills, and on other liberal measures. Thus he won further support from former Kennedy supporters and confirmed his leadership of the broad Democratic coalition.

In addition to establishing his national political constituency through effective handling of men and legislation early in his presidency, Johnson sought to protect his position by preventing Robert Kennedy from moving into a strong leadership role within the Democratic Party. 22/ Johnson was fearful that Robert Kennedy would seek to take up the causes of his fallen brother and rally the Kennedy Democrats around him. 23/ To prevent this, Johnson sought to make himself, not Robert Kennedy, the heir to John F. Kennedy's legacy. Johnson's actions of

retaining the Kennedy personnel in his administration and pursuing the Kennedy domestic and foreign policies served not only to provide the country with continuity in the crisis atmosphere surrounding the Kennedy assassination, they also served to block political adventures that otherwise might have initiated by Robert Kennedy.

Johnson entered office without a national constituency. It is revealing that he was seldom comfortable appealing to the masses of American voters. He was a parliamentarian who was singularly gifted with talents for maneuvering among other parliamentarians and obtaining specific objectives. He was, however, limited in his understanding and ability to evoke long-term support for his position from the people at large. His approaches to both the 1964 and 1968 presidential campaigns indicated his limitations in developing and exploiting grass roots organizations on a national scale. 24/

In all his dealings with other politicians, Johnson sought to obtain his desired goals by maneuver and manipulation. This tendency explains his peculiar relationship with the press. Instead of approaching the press in large open press conferences as Kennedy had, Johnson sought to win press support through small group discussions with reporters where he could exercise his powerful persuasive abilities.

Kennedy and Johnson thus adopted strikingly different to political styles. Kennedy for his part sought to stand as the leader of all the people and to appeal directly to them by passing a Congress which he saw as an obstruction to obtaining his ends. Johnson for his part sought to obtain his goals through the tactics of parliamentary maneuver that had been so successful for him in his role as Senate Majority Leader. 25/

c. Impact on Vietnam War Policy Making

Johnson kept the Kennedy foreign policy advisors and depended upon them for maintaining continuity. While this may have eased problems of transition at a time of considerable national uncertainty following the assassination, and while it prevented Robert Kennedy from rallying the Kennedy people to his political banner, it also meant the loss of an opportunity for reviewing the fundamental premises of the US presence

in Southeast Asia that might have accompanied the establishment of a new administration.

Johnson's fear of the power of right wing sentiment among the American people was a strong factor in the gradual nature of his escalation. Johnson believed that unless care was taken, such public sentiment could serve as a stimulus for wildly aggressive actions in Vietnam that might precipitate a Chinese or Soviet intervention. 26/ He believed that it was his duty to maintain a check on those forces through moderation in action and also through moderation in the way he presented the war to the people lest they mistake his call for supporting the war as a summons to a patriotic crusade against communism. 27/ He also believed that Robert Kennedy might be reckless enough to evoke this response from the American people by accusing him of not having been sufficiently tough with the communist Vietnamese. 28/

In his fear of rightist sentiment Johnson was reacting to the political realities that had dominated foreign policy criticism throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s, namely that the United States was not being sufficiently strong in resisting communist advances. After 1965, however, opposition to foreign policy came not from the right but from the left, and Johnson proved unable to adjust to the attacks that were being made from that direction.

In pursuing what he believed to be the Kennedy foreign policy, Johnson alienated elements of the left wing of his party; and in successfully implementing many of the Democrats' social programs, he also stimulated criticism of his domestic policies from the right wing within the party. Thus, he was unable to count on the left for continuing support of his social programs or on the right for support of his war policies. In the last year of his administration Johnson presided over the fragmentation of the old Democratic coalition. Moreover, his commitment to the Kennedy tax-cut economic stimulus was a decisive factor in Johnson's reluctance to seek appropriate financing for the Vietnam war. In short, the pattern Johnson established in pursuit of the Kennedy legacy elicited unexpected political responses which undermined simultaneously his war policies, his social policies, and his economic policies.

Faced with mounting criticism of his domestic and foreign policies from both the right and the left of American politics, Johnson proved unable to assume the role of national leader and to separate himself from his training and experience in parliamentary manipulation. 29/ At the time of the Tonkin Gulf resolution, Johnson was not candid with the American people of the Congress. Moreover, in his planning he hoped to achieve an early military victory in Vietnam and he concluded that it was unnecessary to be candid with his economic advisors. At the time of the Tet offensive, Johnson shrank from the role of unifier of national sentiment in renewing the US commitment in Vietnam. Instead, he stepped back from conflict with his adversaries on the advice of his small group of "Wise Men." Thus, it seems that the very talents that made Johnson so effective as a parliamentarian and which were the very foundations of his rise to national office were stumbling blocks for Johnson as President in the definition of policy and the summoning of national support behind them.

3. The Nixon Administration

a. Overview

The constituency that elected Richard Nixon in 1968 provided him with a firm base for dealing with the Vietnam War, a base that was fundamentally different from Johnson's. Johnson had been attacked by the intellectuals in the left wing of his party over his war policies and by defections from his right wing because of his social programs. Nixon had no left wing to placate, and he was able to approach the problem of the war from a more homogeneous political base than was Johnson. Indeed, Nixon sought to separate himself and his policies from the vocal American political left and build a new political majority of the center and right. 30/ This strategy stripped the American left of the strong position they had occupied under Johnson. Johnson had been required at least to listen to their point of view in order to maintain the cohesiveness of the coaliton he was leading. It cannot be asserted that his policies were adjusted to meet the demands that the left made of him, but Johnson nevertheless was highly sensitive to criticism of his policies from within his own party. Only this sensitivity can explain the intense reaction Johnson had to

criticism by only a few Democrats like Fulbright at a time when the public support for his war policies was high. Johnson's defensiveness in 1966 and 1967 and in his ability to break with the left wing of his party also prevented him from moving firmly to the right and marshalling American public sentiment for a crusade in Vietnam. The clarity of Nixon's political base gave him the opportunity to withdraw American troops and at the same time to appeal to patriotism and national honor to gain support for his policies.

While Nixon's political base allowed him considerable latitude in dealing with the Vietnam war, he experienced continuing difficulty in defining his domestic policies. 31/ This lack of definition and the philosophy described as "pragmatic conservatism" were at the root of the rapid fluctuations that took place in the administration's economic policies as they were tailored to meet changing economic and political conditions. Nevertheless, there was an internal consistency in Nixon's policies which angered liberals and the left in American politics because of both his war policies and his domestic policies. As he pursued both aspects of policy making Nixon was to continue building his new majority by isolating dissent on the left.

In dealing with the press, Nixon's political base also provided him with opportunities that had not been open to Johnson. In spite of his heavy editorial support, Nixon had launched a campaign through Spiro Agnew against the press, especially against the New York Times and the Washington Post (See Chapter 3). Johnson had sought to win press support through courting individual reporters. Nixon instead attacked his enemies and sought to isolate them with his enemies on the political left. While Nixon's political strategies provided him with partisan gains in the 1972 election, they also exacerbated the tendency in American politics during the Vietnam war to polarize left and right political opinion.

b. Nixon's Personal Policy Predilections

Richard Nixon, like John Kennedy, set out to make his mark in foreign affairs. In this effort he was assisted by Henry Kissinger with whom he had compatible views on foreign policy objectives and strategies.

Nixon was convinced that he had to demonstrate to Hanoi that he had the political strength to take actions that were unpopular with the antiwar movement. He sought to throw Hanoi off balance both by his ability to pursue his policies over a long term and also by his ability to take unexpected, strong action to support his policies. Nixon's tendency to go into seclusion with a few trusted advisors when making crucial decisions emphasized the personal responsibility he accepted for his unpopular decisions. 32/

Nixon's domestic political position supported his individualistic approach to policy making regarding the war. Since his constituency did not include the American left wing, as had Johnson's, Nixon could generally ignore their opinions about his policy. His own constituency, on the other hand, supported his withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam and did not demand access to the process of effecting that withdrawal. As a result, in his first term Nixon had relatively greater freedom of action in dealing with Vietnam-related problems than had Johnson.

In his second term, both Nixon's foreign policy and domestic policies were shaped by the growing threat posed by the Watergate scandal. The independence in foreign policy making that Nixon enjoyed in his first term began to erode in direct relationship to the erosion of his domestic political base.

c. Impact on Vietnam War Policy

Nixon pictured himself as resolute and individually responsible for supporting the courage of the military in executing difficult decisions. In his diary for December 17, 1972:

> I have called Moorer to be sure to stiffen his back with regard to the need to follow through on these attacks. I suppose that we may be pressing him too hard, but I fear that the Air Force and the Navy may in carrying out orders have been too cautious at times in the past, and that our political objectives have not been achieved. 33/

The relative strength of his domestic political position and his belief that the North Vietnamese enemy considered US military actions

to be reflections of his personal strength of will led Nixon to direct efficient and decisive military operations in Indochina unlike any undertaken by Johnson. At the time of the 1972 December bombing Nixon reflected this perception when he told Kissinger, "We'll take the same heat for big blows as for little blows. If we renew the bombing, it will have to be something new, and that means we will have to make the big decision to hit Hanoi and Haiphong with B-52's. Anything less will only make the enemy contemptuous." 34/ Thus, Nixon sought to convey to Hanoi that he had both the political strength to take bold new intitatives and that he was willing to advance to bombing levels not reached by Johnson. The success Nixon enjoyed in these demonstrations during the first years of his administration made all the more dramatic by his inability to carry through on his policies when his political base had been eroded by Watergate.

The political weakness of the president became directly linked in the minds of US political figures with his inability to pursue the course he had established when the Peace Accords had been signed in January 1973. 35/ The temporary domestic political weakness of Nixon directly affected the presidency's foreign policy-making powers through the War Powers Act of November 1973.

4. The Ford Administration

a. Overview

Gerald Ford became President with an exceptionally weak political base. He had been appointed to the office of vice president, and he was made president upon the resignation of Richard Nixon. Thus, he had not stood for national election, and he did not have a nationwide political base of his own. In addition, Ford entered office at a time when the Congress was asserting its role in foreign-policy making to a degree unprecedented in this century. Although Ford benefited from the sense of relief that followed the ending of the Watergate hearings and the departure of Richard Nixon, throughout his administration he was hampered by strong congressional input to his policy making.

b. Personal Policy Predilections

Like Lyndon Johnson, Gerald Ford had built his political career as a parliamentarian. He regarded himself as particularly astute in gauging domestic political trends; however, he recognized his need for expert opinion regarding foreign policy. Thus, immediately after taking office, Ford reappointed Henry Kissinger to the positions of Secretary of State and National Security Adviser to the President. 36/ Concerning their relationship, Ford wrote in his autobiography:

> It would be hard for me to overstate the admiration and affection I had for Henry . . . Our personalities meshed. I respected his expertise in foreign policy and he respected my judgment in domestic politics . . . I think we worked together as well as any President and Secretary of State have worked throughout our history. 37/

Ford's reduced political base in the wreckage of the Republican Party after the Watergate scandal, the continued presence of Henry Kissinger in the administration, and Ford's disinclination to undertake new directions in foreign policy, dictated that US foreign policy with regard to Southeast Asia would continue on the course laid down during the Nixon years.

c. Impact on Vietnam Policy Making

Ford was caught in the unenviable position of attempting to pursue a course of action in Southeast Asia that had been established by Nixon who had a broad and firm political base when the policy was set. Ford's limited political base did not allow him to marshal the force necessary to ensure North Vietnamese compliance with the Paris Accords. As the communists became aware of the inability of the Ford administration to react either by resumed bombing of the North through increased aid to South Vietnam, the communists were emboldened to take increasingly stronger military action in the spring of 1974. In spite of Ford's direct pleas to the Congress, the congressional leadership refused to legislate the funds required for supporting South Vietnam. 38/ Congressional dominance in setting limits to US support for South Vietnam coupled with the domestic

political weakness of the Ford adminstration were dominant factors in the inability of the US to maintain the policy established by Nixon.

C. CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING

1. Introduction

In a recent study on the role of Congress in foreign policy making, the Congressional Research Service concludes that "the present relationship of Congress to the executive-dominated foreign policy process, is, in essence, that of an outsider, subject to all the psychological inhibitions and practical constraints that that position ordinarily implies." 39/ Since World War II, a clear trend of increasing executive control of American foreign policy and related decision making has been discernible, and the Vietnam war demonstrated clearly the extent to which Congress had become isolated from the foreign policy decision-making process. That the Tonkin Gulf Resolution had passed both houses of Congress with little debate in 1964 caused many members to reconsider their oversight and consultant responsibilities as the Vietnam conflict escalated into a full-scale, undeclared war involving the US.

The Vietnam war pointed out congressional loss of control regarding war powers and caused many members to reexamine their legislative roles and functions and the extent to which they were being met. By the late 1960s, Congress was indeed an outsider with respect to the foreign policy process.

2. Bipartisan Foreign Policy and Isolation of Congress

World War II marked a high point during the years of bipartisan foreign policy making. With the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor, there was a general rallying of support within Congress for the president's policies. Bipartisan politics can be dated from Roosevelt's decision to place Republicans in the positions of Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy. Bipartisanship flourished during and after the second World War. 40/ Not all members of Congress approved of the new bipartisan foreign policy however, and Senator Robert A. Taft noted: "There are some who say that

politics should stop at the water's edge. I do not at all agree . . . There is no principle of subjection to the Executive in foreign policy. Only Hitler and Stalin would assert that.." 41/ Bipartisanship served the Truman administration well in the early years, permitting the president a free hand in matters of foreign policy in spite of the fact that he faced a Republican Congress. Bipartisanship was called into question, however, in the late 1940s, when US policies in the Far East proved unsuccessful. The decline of the old bipartisan consensus became marked with President Truman's failure to consult with Congress regarding American involvement in the Korean War, yet,for the most part during the Cold War years, Congress accepted a strong presidency, and did little to counter presidential initiatives in the foreign affairs arena. The legacy of bipartisanship set the precedent for broadened powers of the executive in foreign policy matters, and the model of the strong executive was in place. 42/

By the early 1960s, Congress had become increasingly isolated from foreign policy making. America had entered an "age of crises" following World War II, thereby providing the rationale for strong presidential control. 43/ In general, Congress concerned itself with domestic policies and programs, and congressional involvement in foreign matters was confined to specific issues and programs and not to ongoing debate regarding US foreign policy. Instances of congressional participation in foreign relations include discussion of appropriations, passage of resolutions and treaties, etc.; each was largely issue oriented. Passage of the Formosan, Middle East and Cuban Resolutions are cases in point. Passage of the Formosan Resolution by Congress in 1955 occurred with little opposition or debate. The debate surrounding the proposed Middle East Resolution in 1957 was especially intense as Senators Ervin and Fulbright in particular feared that passage of a liberally worded resolution might be construed by the president as a sign of congressional support for US participation in armed conflict within the region 44/. Although the wording of the resolution was altered to reflect such concerns, President Eisenhower was unconstrained in his policies regarding the region. The Resolution could hardly be called a contribution to the policy making process, as Eisenhower sent troops to Lebanon in 1958 without even consulting with members of Congress.

The Cuban Resolution of 1962 invited debate as it was first proposed because it permitted the president to use "armed force to prevent exportation of communism to the rest of the hemisphere." This was considered by several congressmen to be far too great a relinquishment of power by Congress to the president, and the resolution was changed to reflect instead a statement of policy Despite congressional interest in being included in policy making, subsequent actions taken by Kennedy regarding Cuba were pursued regardless of congressional concerns and without consultation.

3. Congress, the President and the Vietnam War

Many domestic factors influenced the conduct of the war in Vietnam, but only the US Congress had the political power to end it. Congress did not move through direct and unified action until after the 1973 ceasefire. Until that time, a series of indirect moves within Congress served to demonstrate the growing opposition to the war among the legislators. Direct measures of congressional control include the functions of Congress to oversee and to approve budgets as well as that of Congress as lawmaker, and the principal indirect means whereby Congress brings about change involves the political pressure and bargaining power which Congress has. It was not direct congressional action that finally brought US participation in the war to a close. Rather, as congressional opposition to US involvement grew, President Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger set out on a deliberate course to extricate US forces while strengthening the RVNAF. The skilled hand of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird also figured prominently in the administration's ability to execute its programs over a four-year period in the face of increasing congressional opposition to the war. Certainly, the increasing number of antiwar votes over time within Congress demonstrated growing dissent: antiwar votes increased from five roll call votes taken in 1969 to thirty-five in 1972.

When J. F. Kennedy won the presidency by only a slim margin in 1960, he was confronted with the challenge of gaining the control of Congress. Quite apart from his foreign policy ventures, Kennedy needed the

assurance that his proposed domestic policies and programs would be passed in Congress. With former Senate Majority Leader Johnson serving as the vice president, there was now a gap in the congressional Democratic leadership. That leadership was essential to the formulation of a consensus for passage of presidential programs. Tom Wicker's account in his book JFK and LBJ of Congressman Sam Rayburn's efforts to increase the size of the Rules Committee to assure a Democratic majority and hence, the introduction and passage of Kennedy's programs illustrates how narrowly Kennedy won control of the House. 45/ With the death of Sam Rayburn, the control of Congress by the Democrats had almost completely disappeared. 46/ Rayburn had been a powerful leader within the House - his position derived from long experience in the House and from his sense of himself as a peer of the President. 47/ His death was a blow to the House itself which lost a degree of prestige that Rayburn's strong leadership had provided. The unravelling of the once strong democratic party control within Congress left congressional politics in disarray.

Although when Lyndon Johnson came to the presidency he had considerable experience as a parliamentarian and he won bipartisan support in Congress for the Southeast Asia Resolution, his control over Congress was declining. 48/ Senator Fulbright and several other of Johnson's former colleagues and allies in the Senate were becoming disenchanted with the president's policies in Vietnam. 49/ Senators Mansfield and Fulbright began to call for increased efforts toward negotiation as a preferred Vietnam policy, and in 1966, Senator Fulbright conducted the first congressional inquiry of US policies in Vietnam. Fulbright intended that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings would serve as "both an organ for Senate deliberation and a forum of public education." He intended further, that the hearings might shape "a true consensus in the long run, even at the cost of dispelling the image of a false one in the short run." 50/ On the subject of the hearings, Fulbright continued:

> It is our expectation that these proceedings may generate controversy. If they do, it will not be because we value controversy for its own sake but

> rather because we accept it as a condition of intelligent decision-making, as, indeed, the crucible in which a national consensus as to objectives may be translated into a consensus of policy as well. 51/

In fact, the televised hearings did have the effect of granting a kind of respectability to opposition to the war and to the administration's policies. Yet, while criticism could be heard within Congress regarding the president's Vietnam policies, congressional votes on the war continued to reflect support for the president's actions. Although there was considerable discussion in Congress concerning the constitutional and international legal bases for presidential actions in Vietnam, Congress consistently supported the president's appropriations for the war. The Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report notes that "from 1965, when the first Vietnam supplemental was enacted, through the end of 1972, between 95 and 96 percent of the members of Congress present and voting approved the war-related appropriations bills on final passage . . ." 52/ One might ask, why was Congress so silent in opposing the war in view of the growing concern over the aggrandizement of the president's war-making powers? There was among many members of Congress, particularly within the House, a sense that the President should be backed in war time. There was an unwillingness to challenge the presidency on war-related powers to the extent that Congress was inhibited from seeking to curb the apparent broadening of presidential powers. Another and related restraint on congressional action to end the war was the strong sense that Congress could not abandon American soldiers at war. The political implications of this are clear as congressmen thought of their constituents, many of whom were either in Vietnam or had relatives or friends who were fighting or who were held as POWs there. 53/

It was not until after the election of Richard Nixon to the presidency that congressional action to reduce US involvement in Vietnam was initiated. By then Johnson had already set the course of Vietnam policies in a non-military direction, and Nixon's plans were to include a way of winding down the war. On June 25, 1969, the House of Representatives agreed to a Senate bill immediately cutting off funds for US bombing

in Cambodia. That bill was vetoed but the effect of this pressure was to force Nixon to compromise with the Congress at a later date. In December 1969, the Senate passed the Church proposal which was incorporated into the defense appropriations bill of December 1969 by a vote 73-17. The proposal barred the introduction of US combat troops into either Laos or Thailand. Congress was soon disappointed to find that they had chosen the wrong countries as Nixon ordered US troops to Cambodia to clear enemy sanctuaries. Nevertheless, when this bill was finally signed into law, it marked a major shift in congressional politics regarding the war. With the incursion into Cambodia in the spring 1970, numerous antiwar proposals were introduced in the Senate, and although they were not passed into law, the congressional call for disengagement was becoming more pronounced. 54/ Antiwar sentiment in Congress had been growing, but it was not until the summer of 1973 after the January ceasefire agreement that Congress could unite to vote to end the war. Congress attached to a supplemental appropriations bill the provision that US military operations in Indochina be ceased officially on 15 August. After considerable debate, involving the Congress and the executive branch, the bill was passed and signed into law, thereby setting the date for the war's end.

Although US troops had withdrawn from South Vietnam in 1973, congressional opponents of the war argued convincingly against Congress against provision of increased military aid to Vietnam in 1974. The one billion dollar ceiling imposed by Congress on aid to Vietnam was $600-million short of the administration's request. Congress had achieved general agreement that less rather than more aid to Vietnam was desirable. Congress again used the power of the purse in 1975 by rejecting President Ford's request for $300 million for Vietnam.

4. An Era of Congressional Restriction of the Presidency

Congressional hearings on war powers commenced on March 8, 1971. The hearings culminated in the passage of the War Powers Act on November 7, 1973 over President Nixon's veto.

Congressional isolation from the decision-making process on the use of US troops abroad was ended. The War Powers Act limited to 60 days

the president's authority to commit US troops overseas. The bill further required that the president report to Congress on the matter of troop commitment within 48 hours of deployment. The War Powers bill caused considerable debate within Congress over precisely how restrictive it actually was. Some congressmen like Senator Eagleton, originally a key proponent of the war powers bill, felt that the bill as proposed would provide instead of restriction on presidential war-making authority a "predated declaration of war to the President." 55/ Nevertheless, the momentum garnered by the desire of many congressmen to rebuke Nixon personally resulted in passage of the bill. 56/

Congressional pursuit of a greater role in oversight of foreign policy issues did not stop with passage of the War Powers Act, however, and 1974 marks a watershed in congressional regulation of what was considered before to be matters of executive privilege. The Congressional Budget Act, the Foreign Military Sales Act and the Amendment to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act all of 1974 place Congress closer to the executive in decision making concerning budget policies, arms sales abroad and CIA operations in foreign countries, respectively. 57/

D. AUTHORITY FOR WAR

1. Introduction

For the duration of US involvement in the Vietnam War, American presidents have found legal justification in international and constitutional law for American participation in the conflict and for their own actions in command of US forces in the region. Legal justification for US participation in the war under international law is presented in the legal memorandum prepared on March 4, 1966 by Leonard Meeker, Legal Adviser to the Department of State. 58/ Comprehensive examination of US actions under international law appears in John Norton Moore's book Law and the Indochina War. The subject of this section concerns the constitutional bases for presidential actions regarding our involvement in the Vietnam war.

The American constitutional process which relies on the system of checks and balances such that both the executive and legislative branches of government must participate in policy making is nowhere more apparent than in the war-making powers defined in the Constitution. Whereas most issues are referred to once in the Constitution, war-making and the armed forces receive great attention.

> -Article I, Section 8 - Gives the Congress power to "declare war," order reprisal," raise and support Armies" for no more than two years at a time "provide and maintain a Navy," make rules which will regulate and govern the military forces, and provide for organizing the militia and calling it up so that insurrections can be suppressed and invasions repelled.
>
> -Article I, Section 10 - Forbids the states, with out congressional consent, from keeping military forces in time of peace and from engaging "in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay."
>
> -Article II, Section 2 - Makes the President the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States.
>
> -Article IV, Section 4 - Provides that the central government shall guarantee "a Republican Form of Government" to every state and "Shall protect each of them against Invasion." 59/

While the American Constitution set forth the framework within which policy decisions could be made, past events have demonstrated the importance of precedents and the range of interpretations of the war-making powers. The statement of Mr. Justice Holmes, that "...the life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience", has never been more apt than in the interpretation of the War Powers Resolution. 60/ US involvement in the Vietnam War became a focal point for examining presidential and congressional roles in the use of US armed forces overseas. Debate arose as various legal experts presented differing interpretations of congressional and presidential authority for war. Some legal analysts have argued that

during the Vietnam War congressional legislative authority was disregarded in favor of the Executive prerogative in decision making. Professor Wormuth and Senator Fulbright are proponents of this opinion and have gone so far as to picture American involvement in Vietnam as exemplifying presidential usurpation of power. By contrast, legal expert, John Moore argues that there are no easy 'bright-line distinctions' regarding presidential and congressional authority on war-related matters. 61/ Certainly, there has been tremendous disagreement among scholars on the subject of the limits of presidential power, and for many years Vietnam was the central focus of these debates. 62/ Increasingly, during the Vietnam War, presidential decisions regarding the war were made without consultation with Congress. As presidential policies for involvement began to demonstrate the futility of American efforts, Congress began to reassert its authority in foreign policy and war-making affairs. The following pages trace the evolution of precedents leading to the considerably broadened presidential authority for war, peaking during the Vietnam War, and the eventual imposition of restrictions upon presidential authority by C[illegible].

Review of Precedents for Broadening Presidential War-Making Powers

By the mid 1800s, the struggle between congressional legislative authority and the Executive prerogative on matters of foreign policy was ongoing Since that time, the following four broad categories of precedents have contributed significantly to the broadening of presidential war-making powers: 1) Exercise of presidential authority as Commander-in-Chief to assign American troops overseas, and to protect them once overseas: 2) Tightening of control over information by the President, leaving Congress uninformed on many foreign-related matters; 3) Presidential appeal to the nation for unity of purpose in times of crisis, thereby leading to increasing centralization of decision making in the presidency; 4) Demonstrated past congressional failures in foreign policy making.

Examples of presidential failure to consult with Congress on the matter of sending American armed forces into areas of potential combat are evident as early as the 1840s. At that time, President Polk sent American

troops into disputed territory near Texas and Mexico, thereby lending the strength of precedent to later presidential control of diplomacy. Increasingly in early American history, presidents unilaterally sent American troops to control local situations (control of American Indians, etc.) thereby eroding the congressional position in war making. US intervention in China in 1900 was accomplished at President McKinley's command without consultation with Congress, marking the start of 'presidential employment of armed forces overseas.' 63/ The growing use by US presidents of US armed forces overseas, nevermindful of Congress, laid the foundation for the broadened interpretation of the authority of the Commander-in-Chief that was apparent throughout the Vietnam War. Examples of the application of presidential prerogative in the use of armed forces overseas abound in the twentieth century. Without seeking the consent of Congress, presidents have sent troops to Panama in 1903, to Mexico in 1916, to the Formosan Strait in 1955, and to Lebanon in 1958, to name only a few instances. 64/ Further, US involvement in the Korean War was accomplished without a congressional declaration of war, a clear precedent to the undeclared war in Vietnam.

A second factor that contributed to the expansion of presidential war-making powers concerns the not infrequent withholding of information by the Executive Branch from Congress on war-related matters. Throughout the 1800s, presidential control of information was deemed a presidential prerogative. Such tightening of control over information had the effect of "securing a monopoly over diplomacy and of enlargement of the theory of defensive war." 65/ Denial of information to Congress by the Executive persisted and received presidential support by Eisenhower who, in a letter to the "Secretary of Defense on May 17, 1954, made the most absolute assertion of presidential right to withhold information from Congress ever uttered to that day in American history." Eisenhower wrote, "It is essential to efficient and effective administration that employees of the Executive Branch be in a position to be completely candid in advising each other on official matters . . . it is not in the public interest that any of their conversations or communications, or any documents or reproductions,

concerning such advice be disclosed." 66/ Subsequently, there are examples of presidential withholding of information from Congress prior to US intervention overseas. The Cuban missile crisis and the Dominican intervention are two such examples.

A third factor which has served to broaden the president's war making powers concerns the nature of the world environment and the US position therein. In times of crisis, a president can appeal to the people and to Congress for their support for presidential unilateral action. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor served to rally Congress in support of President Roosevelt's policies. The international tensions of the Cold War era and the need to counter Soviet strength with strong American political leadership further served as argument for a strong and centralized presidency in foreign politics in the post-World War II period. Senator Fulbright in his book The Arrogance of Power writes that in this age of crises, national responses have come from the Executive Branch which, it is argued, has the ability to respond with speed and with secrecy when necessary. Congress, on the other hand, is handicapped by a lack of information and, perhaps more important, its difficulties in achieving political consensus. Further, as a result of the communications revolution of the last two decades, it has become possible for presidents to contact directly foreign leaders or US troops overseas, thereby enabling a president to make command decisions on political and military matters, thereby undermining the authority of the local commander.

A final factor which contributed to a broadening of presidential war powers concerns the past failures of Congress in trying to direct foreign policy. On two occasions, in 1919 and in 1939, the Congress attempted to direct US foreign policy. However, the short term and small constituencies of Congressmen in the House militates against the ability of Congress to evolve and pursue consistent and coherent foreign policy. Writing about the activity of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in the summer of 1939, Walter Lippmann wrote: "It was then that the emasculation of American foreign policy reached its extreme limit - the limit of total absurdity and total bankruptcy!" 67/

Together, the above four factors provided ample precedent and occasion for the broadening of presidential war-making powers. Congress lacking sufficient information, lacking both experience in the daily activities of foreign policy making and not infrequently interest in such matters had all but abdicated its oversight responsibilities when the Vietnam War began. 68/

3. Presidential Authority for War - The Case of Vietnam

Presidential authority for US involvement in Vietnam rested upon two legal points which were broadly interpreted by the different administrations: 1) the authority of the President as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief to command the US armed forces and to protect American lives overseas; and 2) Congressional consent as demonstrated in 1964 by passage of the Southeast Asia Resolution and by repeated authorization of defense procurement requests. Further, there were precedents to the broadened interpretations of presidential authority for war demonstrated during the Vietnam war.

a. Kennedy Administration

While Kennedy inherited a situation in which US involvement in Southeast Asia was increasing, his attention to foreign affairs was, not surprisingly, focused on the continuing prospect of confrontation with the Soviet Union in Europe and in the Western Hemisphere. The Cold War had shaped American foreign politics and responses, and the dominant foreign policy problems of the administration centered around the Berlin issue and the Cuban missile crisis. Nevertheless, the US involvement in Southeast Asia grew as increasing numbers of "advisors" were sent to Vietnam under such arrangements as offered by military assistance agreements and as the CIA expanded its covert operations in the area. While the military assistance arrangements were sanctioned by Congress through its passage of assistance legislation and annual appropriations, the US conduct of covert activities were pursued "under the Eisenhower precedent and with tacit congressional consent, and were immune to legislative scrutiny." 69/ Of course, when the American 'advisors' who had been sent to train the South Vietnamese army actually became involved in combat operations, as on

occasion, they did, there was no congressional authorization or consent to sending American soldiers into war. At that time, however, there was little concern in Congress for US participation in Indochina, and Kennedy was able to expand presidential war-making powers without encountering congressional opposition. Although the legal bases for US activities in South Vietnam became blurred as the 'functions' of the 'advisors' broadened to include combat on occasion, US involvement derived from the US commitment to stem the spread of communism world wide, a policy for which Congress was supportive.

b. Johnson Administration

When President Johnson sent ground combat troops to Vietnam in early 1965, he was certain of his legal authority to commit US forces in defense of South Vietnam. His authority did not derive from the Southeast Asia Resolution that had been hurridly moved through Congress in August 1964 but from his role and position as Commander-in-Chief. While passage of the resolution conferred upon him congressional 'political' support for any actions that he might have to take, it never served in Johnson's mind as legal basis for US troop involvement in South Vietnam. Johnson requested passage of the resolution for his own political reasons which have been examined in Section B of this chapter. The legal basis for troop involvement became murky, however, when Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach declared that the resolution together with SEATO constituted "the 'functional equivalent' of a declaration of war" by Congress. He continued that the President had 'fully' met his obligation "'to give the Congress a full and effective voice.'" To cloud the issue even further Katzenbach later commented that the resolution was actually less important as justification since the president alone had the authority vested in him by the Constitution to involve US forces. 70/ These statements by the Executive branch concerning presidential authority for war generated legal disputes and angered many members of Congress who strongly opposed Katzenbach's interpretation of the meanings of resolution and of SEATO. In no sense had Congress meant by passage of the resolution to sanction a full-scale war in Southeast Asia.

c. Nixon Administration

The Nixon Administration, relying upon the legal support of such advisers as Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist, maintained that US actions in Vietnam were justified under the Commander-in-Chief clause of the Constitution. Unlike Katzenbach within Johnson's administration, no effort was made to find legal justification for President Nixon's decisions regarding Vietnam in either SEATO or the Southeast Asia Resolution. Heavy reliance was placed instead upon the position of the president as Commander-in-Chief. Nixon saw no need to secure congressional approval as he explained the incursion into Cambodia in 1970, "The legal justification . . . is the right of the President of the United States under the Constitution to protect the lives of American men." 71/ Opponents of the president's Vietnam policies in Congress found this argument one that provided the president full command of the war. No one would argue for a policy which might endanger American troops, yet such a justification permitted the president to continue US involvement. Such legal justification are circular arguments for involvement: US troops overseas must be protected, so materiel must be sent to the troops, and hence the war will continue. It then becomes very difficult for Congress to terminate the war. 72/ Despite the fact that Nixon's Vietnam policy was one of US withdrawal, the US incursion into Cambodia brought a resurgence of the legal arguments. Was the president acting within his constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief? Or perhaps had Congress been denied its constitutionally granted authority to declare war? Legal scholars renewed their debates on presidential authority to make tactical decisions during a war and on the authority of Congress to terminate the war. Nixon, however, continued to rely solely on his interpretation of a strong central presidency, and as late as April 1973, following the withdrawal of US troops, Nixon invoked his position as Commander-in-Chief responsible for the enforcement of Article 20 of the Paris agreement as justification for the continuation of the air war in Cambodia. 73/ When the Congress was jolted from passivity by the continuing war over Cambodia, it finally began to reassert itself through exercise of the power of the purse and through

passage of the War Powers Act, thereby curbing the president's much expanded war-making powers.

4. Precedents and Authority for War

The importance of precedents to the Vietnam-related actions taken by each of the three presidents discussed above cannot be overemphasized. There were clear precedents for a broadened interpretation of presidential authority in war-related affairs. In addition to the legal precedents discussed above, important moral issues also served as bases for US involvement in the region. The US objectives in the early 1950s of preventing the spread of communism and promoting independence of the world's colonies evolved into compelling moral reasons for aiding the South Vietnamese. Prevention of communism's drive to dominate the world, protection of US security through a free Asia, and the maintenance of US pledges of assistance to our allies assumed a high level of importance to US policy makers in the early period of US involvement in Vietnam (1960-1965). These issues were especially important to American presidents in light of the memory of earlier foreign policy miscalculations such as the 'appeasement' at Munich and the 'loss' of China. These American objectives assumed a moral tone in their expression by some US leaders, and may be construed broadly as moral bases for US involvement in Southeast Asia. As the war progressed and as US participation in the conflict grew, opponents of the war reversed this 'moral' argument for involvement as they fastened upon the "immoral" nature of US activities in Vietnam. Those who believed that the US conduct of war in Vietnam was immoral argued the immorality of the following: destruction of the land, land which was critical to the survival of the largely peasant population, through US defoliation and bombing; use of antipersonnel weapons and napalm "designed to maximize the pain and suffering of human targets;" 74/ imposition of US culture upon Asian peoples thereby causing serious social dislocation among the South Vietnamese within their own nation - branded as colonization by America. Just as the legal bases for US involvement came under attack by scholars, the moral bases for our involvement also were subject to dispute.

Chapter 2 of Volume III examines important historical precedents to US entry into the Vietnam War. The moral bases for our involvement derive largely from these precedents and the early interpretation of the relationship and importance to the US of Southeast Asia. The legal bases for US involvement are examined above and are equally dependent upon the legal precedents of broadened interpretations regarding presidential authority for war. John Moore summarizes the two principal phases of the constitutional debate about US involvement in South Vietnam:

> The first swirled around the independent power of the President to commit the armed forces abroad and the constitutional effect of the Southeast Asia Resolution. This phase reached its peak during 1966 and 1967 with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on Vietnam and on National Commitments.
>
> The second phase was triggered by the constitutional issues surrounding the Cambodian incursion and reached a peak in a flurry of legislative activity during the summer of 1970 and the spring of 1971. The issues in this second phase of the debate were much broader, extending to the authority of the President to make command decisions incident to an ongoing war and the authority of Congress to terminate hostilities and to limit the President in the conduct of hostilities, as well as the earlier issues. 75/

Despite the fact that many members of Congress privately voiced concern over the broadening of presidential war powers, few members wanted to unite in opposition to the president's policies in order to bring the war to a close. It was not until US troops were withdrawn that significant congressional actions were taken. The first such move originated in the House which voted in the spring of 1973 to cut off funds for military activity in Laos and Cambodia. Several months later, Congress passed the War Powers Act which required that the president seek congressional approval of any troop commitment overseas extending beyond a 60-day limit. These actions together with congressional cuts in aid to South Vietnam in 1974 and early 1975 mark a sharp departure from earlier congressional attitudes toward the presidency and the conduct of the war.

E. SUMMARY ANALYSIS AND INSIGHTS

The efforts of Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon to produce a settlement in Vietnam that would be compatible with larger US foreign policy results, produced a series of tragic ironies for all three of the presidents. Each of these men sought to ensure domestic political backing and public support for his policies, but in the end those policies became the most divisive elements the United States had experienced in this century.

Kennedy had sought in his presidency to reassert the moral leadership of the United States as the leader of the Free World. He had proclaimed during his campaign that the United States would bear any burden to ensure that freedom prevailed against tyranny around the globe. Tragically, these lofty goals were extraordinarily difficult to realize in the complicated situation Kennedy found in Southeast Asia, and his administration became implicated in acquiescing to the coup d' etat that ended in the assassination of President Diem of South Vietnam. Moreover, at the same time Kennedy was enunciating noble goals for US foreign policy, he was attempting to "downplay" the size of the commitment he was making in Southeast Asia by trying to quiet reporters who attempted to describe what they were observing in Vietnam.

Johnson also set out in his presidency to realize the enactment of far-reaching and humanitarian legislation. To ensure the passage of that legislation, Johnson sought to cover up the depth of the US involvement in the conflict in Southeast Asia. In accomplishing his purpose, he could not be candid about either military planning or the economic costs that would be entailed in the involvement. The result of this obfuscation was a rapid unravelling of Johnson's political position as elements within his coalition began to dissent from his policies. Johnson had sought to continue and expand the social welfare programs Kennedy had begun. He also had sought to pursue the economic policies Kennedy had helped design but failed to enact. Finally Johnson set out to maintain the forceful application of US military power that Kennedy had seen as essential to the accomplishment

of US foreign policy objectives. In retrospect, the incompatibility of Johnson's separate goals is apparent; one by one each of the three elements of his program failed as he cut back on his cherished Great Society programs and sacrificed domestic price stability in the hope that the war would be short. In the end, the domestic political debate that his policies engendered, the economic and social failures associated with his policies, and his failure to produce a quick military resolution of the Vietnam situation put such extreme political pressure on Johnson that he felt obliged to retire from public life.

Johnson had sought to occupy the middle ground in any debate and to use his manipulative skills as a parlimentarian to influence political outcomes. It is ironic that Johnson's demonstrably successful 1964 attack on the political right personified by Barry Goldwater was an important element in his political difficulties in 1967-1968. Without a strong, credible, and vocal right to offset the growing power of the left in American politics, Johnson's political balance was upset, and he himself came to represent the most hawkish element in the political debate about the course that should be taken in Vietnam.

Nixon's administration was also marked by political ironies concerning his intended political programs. Nixon had sought to drive the political left into a corner while he occupied the right and center of American politics. This allowed him to command a "new majority" that he hoped would be an element in arresting and then reversing the growing ascendancy of the Democratic Party. Nixon succeeded in developing a political base that made him immune to liberal and left-wing criticism - the criticism that had hardened Johnson in his attempts to resolve the Vietnam situation. In the end, however, when his political enemies identified Nixon with the Watergate scandal, they succeeded in bringing him down. The result was that the political base which Nixon had assembled also collapsed, and neither he nor Ford could pursue the established course of withdrawing US forces from Vietnam while supporting the South Vietnamese.

Throughout each administration one element was similar: the fear that the American people would not support the policies that were being followed

if they knew both the complete outline of those policies and the means employed in their attainment.

The Vietnam war experience illustrates that if the government embarks on future limited war policies, it is important that the American people be told the objectives, and the extent of the involvement. Unless this is done with extraordinary candor, it is certain that the experience of Vietnam and Watergate will stimulate further degradation of the credibility of the government. There is no certainty that there will be consensus among the American people that those policies are the wise or desirable ones., and it may be expected that those policies will become the object of partisan attacks. Nevertheless, if the government has presented its position candidly, the debate will not center on the question of whether the government has lied, but rather on the wisdom of the course it is pursuing. Wisdom could prevail.

In an age in which limited wars and undeclared wars have established precedents, American presidents have some special domestic factors to consider. While it is true that situations often arise such that great secrecy and speed are called for in dealing with them, the president has a certain responsibility to inform members of Congress and ultimately the American public regarding these matters. Congressional response to what it understood to be a dangerous broadening of presidential war powers and a certain lack of candor in executive interaction with Congress on the subject of the war came in the form of a range of restrictions placed upon the president and more broadly upon the executive branch of government. Much of the restrictive legislation that was passed in Congress after direct US involvement in Vietnam carried a very clear message - In the future, Congress would exercise a much greater oversight role in US operations overseas.

Historically, one of Congress's major disadvantages in advising and consenting on matters of foreign policy has been the lack of adequate information on which to make decisions. Executive control of information on foreign affairs has considerable precedent. The tremendous build-up of congressional staffs and of legislative research bodies is part of the

congressional response to the information problem. Nevertheless, Congress continues to have problems in foreign policy matters. Because of congressional exclusion from the decision-making process (hence, exclusion from sources of information due to the institutional framework for decision making) and because of congressional involvement in a multiplicity of concerns, Congress has tended to be concerned mainly with specific programs and issues. Certainly not every congressman has shown interest in the foreign affairs of the country. For many congressmen the only direct exposure to foreign relations issues takes place in floor discussion and debate on specific programs.

Finally, such a large and diverse body as Congress is not a forum in which consensus is easily achieved. Even during the Vietnam war there was little consensus regarding the appropriate policies. Instead there was a general interest in deterring a head-on collision with the executive. With the decline of both the bipartisanship of the World War II years and of the Democratic leadership within Congress, the consensus that could have been forged between Congress and the presidency in the 1960s never occurred. President Johnson's lack of candor with Congress regarding Vietnam and the fragmentation of congressional politics had disrupted Congress. From 1966 onward, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee headed by Senator Fulbright sought to develop a consensus within Congress, to constrain the president. The strength of this Committee in drawing public and congressional attention to the issues of the war and presidential use of his war powers served to give respectability to a point of view that opposed administration policies in the war. In a sense, the Committee through its hearings publicized the more general need for Congress to regain control of its oversight responsibilities regarding US foreign relations. Ultimately those hearings contributed to congressional reassertion of its authority and fiscal powers in matters of foreign policy.

F. LESSONS

With the decline of bipartisan foreign policy, the old consensus that had bound the executive and legislative branches together in general agreement on foreign policy matters ceased to exist. The Vietnam war was fought without an enduring consensus - for the initial approval of presidential policies was found by 1968 to have been grounded on insufficient information. Throughout the war, presidential candor with both the legislators within Congress and the American public was found lacking, and the credibility of American presidents was debated as much as the wisdom of the course of US Vietnam policies. Several lessons have been learned concerning the ability of the US to participate in limited wars. First, there is a need for candor within the executive branch in explaining presidential policies to the Congress and to the public. Without such candor, the Congress is unable to meet its constitutional duties. Secondly, in an age of limited wars, it is necessary that the executive and Congress develop the political framework within which debate can be conducted on the wisdom of a specific course of action. It is most essential that this debate be founded on presumed credibility. It is unlikely in the future that consensus politics will occur, or that the president will be provided complete authority to pursue war-related policies abroad. Congressional reassertion of its role in foreign policy making developed as a result of the apparent broadening of presidential power during the Vietnam war. Hence, it is necessary that the Congress and the executive strive toward maintaining the system of checks and balances in foreign policy making as were stipulated originally within the Constitution.

CHAPTER 5 ENDNOTES

1. Senator J. William Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), p. 57.

2. Honorable Jacob K. Javits, Who Makes War: The President Versus Congress (New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1973), pp. 259-260.

3. Tom Wicker, JFK and LBJ (New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1968), p. 88.

4. David Halberstam, The Best and The Brightest (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 65. The first major struggle of the new administration was a battle to expand the House Rules Committee. In this test of strength Kennedy was triumphant, but in the process of winning that victory he exposed the essential weakness of his legislative position, and the divisions in his party. Thus, Kennedy's enemies had reason to be encouraged in their opposition to his more liberal legislative initiatives.

5. Jim Heath, Decade of Disillusionment (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), p. 10-11.

6. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1965), p. 1027.

7. Ibid., p. 213.

8. Halberstam, p. 123.

9. Heath, pp. 63-64.

10. Ibid., pp. 112-114.

11. Hugh Sidey, A Very Personal Presidency (New York: Atheneum, 1968), pp. 149-150.

12. Halberstam, p. 68. Kennedy was criticized by the right for not having exercised sufficient strength in the Bay of Pigs crisis.

13. Halberstam, pp. 76-77. Also see p. 262 reflecting Kennedy's concern about the reaction of the US political right.

14. Tom Wicker, p. 162.

15. Godfrey, Hodgson, America in Our Time (New York: Vintage Books, 1976), p. 254. From 1958 to 1964 the average weekly earnings, after tax, of the average production worker with a family of four, measured in uninflated dollars rose from sixty-eight dollars to seventy-eight

dollars. From 1965 to 1969 there was no real advancement in those weekly wages. This occurred at a time when businessmen were reaping higher profits, the incomes of professionals were rising, and the media reflected what the government was doing for the poor, and above all for the black poor.

16. Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, The Real Majority (New York: Coward, McCann, and Geohegan Inc., 1970), p. 143. Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg maintain that throughout the 1968 elections the central issue was not the war, but what they term the "social issue," i.e. the perceived inequities arising from the government's social reform programs.

17. Doris Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream (New York: New American Library, 1946), p. 295.

18. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise of Power (New York: The New American Library, 1966), p. 565.

19. Wicker, pp. 35-36. The impact that the overwhelming Goldwater defeat had upon spokesmen of the right is illustrated by the case of Goldwater's campaign director who, thereafter, was unable to find suitable employment.

20. Evans and Novak, p. 133.

21. Kearns, p. 185.

22. Halberstam, pp. 490, 494-496.

23. Kearns, pp. 208-211.

24. Evans and Novak, p. 466; Kennedy had begun assembling the best-oiled, most efficient campaign organization of all time a full year before the 1964 election. Johnson had other ways of operating and he paid slight attention to the organizational system that has been characteristic of the Kennedy political campaign. Even after he had been nominated at Atlantic City in 1964 Johnson had not appointed an overall campaign director. Wicker, p. 68; in 1966-1967 Johnson neglected party organization and he was consequently ill-prepared for the 1968 presidential primaries.

25. Wicker, p. 61.

26. Kearns, p. 148.

27. Ibid.

28. Kearns, p. 295.

29. Ibid., p. 328-29. Also see Jim Deakin, Lyndon Johnson's Credibility Gap (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1968), p. 11 for a discussion of the importance of candor in government and the negative impact of Johnson's secrecy in his credibility with the press and the people.

30. Scammon and Wattenberg, pp. 117-118, 143.

31. Robert Woodward and Carl Bernstein, The Fall of a President (New York: Delacourt Press, 1974), pp. 121-126.

32. Ibid., pp. 16, 34-35.

33. Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), pp. 735-36.

34. Ibid., pp. 733-734.

35. Ibid., p. 997. Gerald Ford made this connection in 1973 by linking Nixon's failing political strength with the success of Edward Kennedy in cutting back aid to South Vietnam. Ford made a "clarification" on this matter, but the linkage had been publicly established.

In his biography, A Time To Heal, Ford reiterates his belief that there was indeed a direct link between Nixon's political decline and presidential ability to enforce the Accords. Gerald R. Ford, A Time To Heal (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, Inc., 1979), pp. 249-250.

36. Ford, p. 30.

37. Ibid., p. 129.

38. Ibid , p. 128.

39. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Congress, Information and Foreign Affairs, September 1978, p. 87.

40. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency (New York: Popular Library, 1973), p. 132.

41. Ibid., p. 133.

42. Congress, Information and Foreign Affairs, pp. 22-23.

43. Fulbright, pp. 53-54.

44. Congress, Information and Foreign Affairs, pp. 36-37.

45. Wicker, pp. 39-81.

46. Paul Y. Hammond, Cold War and Detente (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.), p. 178.

47. Javits, p. 239.

48. Hammond, p. 227. This decline occurred despite the fact that Johnson brought thirty-eight more Democrats to the House, thus giving them a greater than two-to-one ratio over the Republicans. The Senate, which was already largely Democratic, gained two more seats.

49. Evans and Novak, pp. 562-563.

50. Fulbright, p. 57.

51. Ibid., p. 58.

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55. Eagleton, pp. 218-219.

56. Ibid., p. 220.

57. Further discussion of each of these acts and of additional legislation is provided in The Making of American Foreign and Domestic Policy, "The Reassertion of Congressional Power: New Curbs on the President," edited by Demetrios Caraley and Mary Ann Epstein, 1978.

58. Leonard C. Meeker, "The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Vietnam" in U.S. Congress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, War Powers, Hearing. 1973.

59. Eagleton, pp. 8-9.

60. John Norton Moore, Law and the Indochina War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 539.

61. Ibid., pp. 540-541.

62. Numerous law review and other analytic articles during the late 1960s and early 1970s were devoted to examination of presidential and congressional authority pertaining to US participation in the Vietnam War. See also Moore, pp. 541-543.

63. Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency, p. 96.

64. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Documents Relating to the War Power of Congress, the President's Authority as Commander-in-Chief, and the War in Indochina, 91st Congress, 2d session, 1970.

65. Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency, p. 61.

66. Ibid., p. 157, The congressional information problem is examined in depth in a publication by the Congressional Research Service entitled Congress, Information and Foreign Affairs, 1978.

67. Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency, p. 105.

68. For a complete discussion of congressional abdication of overall foreign policy oversight in favor of concentration on specific foreign affairs-related programs, see Congress, Information and Foreign Affairs.

69. Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency, p. 177.

70. Ibid., p. 182.

71. Ibid., p. 186.

72. The US Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs requested that the Congressional Research Service examine the power of Congress to terminate the war and its implications. See Congress and the Termination of the Vietnam War, April 1973.

73. Eagleton, p. 154.

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PANEL DISCUSSIONS

The following persons participated in the BDM Senior Review Panel meeting on September 7 and 8, 1979 at The BDM Westbranch Conference Center. Members of the panel provided a critique of the original drafts for this volume and offered detailed comments during the panel discussions.

Braestrup, Peter. Editor, Wilson Quarterly. Former Saigon Bureau Chief for the Washington Post and author of Big Story.

Colby, William E. LLB Former Ambassador and Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS, and former Director of Central Intelligence.

Davis, Vincent. Dr. Professor and Director of the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, The University of Kentucky.

Greene, Fred. Dr. Professor, Williams College. Former Director, Office of Research for East Asian Affairs, Department of State.

Hallowell, John H. Dr. James B. Duke Professor of Political Science, Duke University.

Hughes, Thomas L. LLD. President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Former Director for Intelligence and Research, US Department of State with rank of Assistant Secretary of State.

Johnson, U. Alexis. Chairman of the Senior Review Panel. Career Ambassador. Former Under Secretary of State and former Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Thailand, and Japan, and (in 1964-65) Deputy Ambassador to Maxwell Taylor in the Republic of Vietnam.

Sapin, Burton M. Dr. Dean, School of Public and International Affairs, The George Washington University. Former Foreign Service Officer.

Thompson, Kenneth W. Dr. Director, White Burkett Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia.

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INTERVIEWS

The following interviews, conducted by members of the BDM study team, provided either general or specific information useful in Volume IV:

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