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UTILITY OF LASSWELL VALUE ANALYSIS IN
AUTOMATED BEHAVIORAL INTELLIGENCE (ABI). Revision 1.

(SHORT TITLE: VALUE ANALYSIS IN ABI)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

1. In 1979 DARPA established a preliminary project designed to study the feasibility of an Automated Behavioral Intelligence (ABI) system.

ABI can best be defined as --

"encompassing the development and automated application of advanced life and social science methodologies to: describe, explain, and predict intentions and perceptions of foreign decision-makers, link these intentions and perceptions to behavior; and, where appropriate, assist, test, and train key U.S. personnel."

In pursuing this objective, DARPA has contracted with KAPPA Systems, Inc. (KSI) to accomplish an Assessment of the Possibility of Using Value Analysis in Defense-Related Intelligence Activities.

2. KSI's study has the objectives of assessing whether the social science methodology known as Lasswell Value Analysis can be employed to offer insights into the policy-relevant psychological traits and states of foreign decision-makers. Specifically, this involved the following tasks:

- conducting a value analysis as a limited prototype of one of the kinds of analysis to be identified and evaluated in the overall ABI research design;
- employing the value analysis to analyze verbal statements made by two foreign decision-makers over an appropriate time period using FBIS material;
- developing specific applications of value analysis within the context of the POLITICS system of automation and other means of operationalizing the ABI concept.

3. Lasswell Value Analysis is the end-product of over 25 years of research and development by the late Professor Harold Lasswell and his colleagues. As originally provided to DARPA during the mid-1960's, it was viewed as a technique to be associated with automated content analysis of verbal material. During the last ten years, it has also been applied to the content analysis of policy actions. Its basic purpose is to reveal the values and goal preferences allegedly

"hidden" in verbal material and policy actions, using a cross-cultural coding system capable of producing quantifiable results.

APPLICATION OF VALUE ANALYSIS TO VERBAL CONTENT

1. To investigate the application of Lasswell Value Analysis to verbal sources of data, a trial application of the technique was performed using four speeches delivered by two prominent Third World leaders--Col. Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi of Libya and President Anwar As-Sadat of Egypt--in the late spring of 1980. These speeches were selected for comparability of audience, theme, and occasion. Speech content was coded through a modification of the technique described by Lasswell and his colleague, Satish K. Arora.
2. As depicted in Figure E-1, the results of the value analysis displayed both commonalities and differences in the value emphasis evidenced by the two leaders. Commonalities include the emphasis by both on power and de-emphasis of wealth and skill in all speeches. Col. Qadhdhafi varied much less in value emphasis between his speeches than President Sadat did. Other differences indicated by value analysis include Col. Qadhdhafi's tendency to place much greater emphasis on power and well-being (i.e., security) values than President Sadat, and a tendency by President Sadat to frequently mention concerns of rectitude (morality and/or religion).
3. Achievement of high levels of intercoder reliability of value coding of material was not attained nor intensely sought; instead, consensus coding was used. The use of an improved version of an analytic aid known as the Value Dictionary combined with coder training should produce desired levels of intercoder reliability in the future. Lasswell and Namenwirth were able to develop the Value Dictionary approach (for U.S. Political party platforms) to the point where 96% of all words could be computer coded for value analysis.
4. For comparative purposes, an analysis of one of the speeches used in the experiment was performed by a retired career intelligence professional. When compared to the results of value analysis, both efforts were found to produce basically compatible findings. However, the value analysis provided a meaningful organizational framework for the analysis of the speech that was not present in the more subjective analysis.

APPLICATION OF VALUE ANALYSIS TO POLICY ACTIONS

1. The application of Lasswell Value Analysis to policy actions was investigated using the reported actions explicitly and implicitly attributed to Col. Qadhdhafi and President Sadat by FBIS Daily Reports - Middle East and North Africa for the three months from October 26,




Figure E-1. Correlation of Value Patterns: Speeches of Qadhdhafi and Sadat

S1	Q1	Sr	Qr	So	Qo	Tot
--	.90	.68	.65	.57	-.01	.49
--	--	.62	.65	.50	.16	.50
--	--	--	--	.19	-.26	.07
--	--	--	--	.10	-.23	.00
--	--	--	--	--	.15	
--	--	--	--	--	--	
--	--	--	--	--	--	

S1 = Values Sadat invests
 Q1 = " Qadhdhafi "
 Sr = Sadat receives
 Qr = " Qadhdhafi "
 So = Invested and received by dyads not including Sadat in the analysis of his actions.
 Qo = same as So but for Qadhdhafi
 Tot = sum of So and Qo
 numbers in matrix = correlation values

Figure E-2. Correlation of Value Patterns: Policy Actions of Qadhdhafi and Sadat, Oct. 1979-Jan. 1980

1979 to January 26, 1980, inclusive. Policy actions were coded using a variant on the WEIS event/action coding scheme, in which WEIS codes were translated into Lasswell value terms. In total, 31 policy actions of Col. Qadhdhafi and 60 policy actions of President Sadat were coded and analyzed.

2. Figure E-2 indicates that a very high correlation (.90) was exhibited between the value investments represented by actions the two leaders took during the three month period: both men stressed investments of enlightenment, respect, and power conferred on other domestic and foreign actors in their direct actions. This suggests that a fairly rigid pattern of value investments may be culturally forced upon charismatic leaders in the underdeveloped Third World. The low positive and negative correlations characterizing value investments in other interactions support this, but considerably more research using other leaders would be required for full verification.

3. There was also a very high correlation in values invested by the actions of others in Qadhdhafi and Sadat (.96). This may also be culturally conditioned, in part by FBIS-extracted reporting of events by national media in these countries which resulted in no negative value investments during this three-month period in either leader.

4. Significant differences appeared between the two leaders in terms of which foreign actors received value investments from their actions, either directly or indirectly. In particular, Qadhdhafi focused on relationships--both favorable and unfavorable--with PLO-related and leftist Third World actors. Sadat interacted with a wider variety of actors; in a number of cases, Sadat provided both positive value investments (benefits) and negative value investments (sanctions) to the same actor. Qadhdhafi did this in only one instance.

5. The findings of the value analysis could be readily displayed in the form of goal-trees for Qadhdhafi and Sadat; a form of cognitive mapping essential for the POLITICS component of ABI, as structured in the current Research Design for the ABI system. However, operational issues concerning time dependence, finer structure, and relative importance/instrumentality encodings, must be addressed before Lasswell Value Analysis of policy actions can be made fully compatible with the requirements for goal trees in POLITICS.

ASSESSMENT OF LASSWELL VALUE ANALYSIS (FINDINGS)

1. The results of the trial applications of value analysis to verbal material and reported policy actions, and previous research findings and discussions of value analysis, were subjected to relevant portions of a series of "gate" hypotheses mandated by the ABI research design and designed to indicate whether or not the technique has a sound theoretical and empirical basis, makes use of valid, replicable procedures in a laboratory (or other non-operational) environment, and can also be used effectively and reliably in an operational setting. The trial applications of value analysis supported Lasswell and other scholars in their beliefs that value analysis reflects a valid cognitive phenomena potentially useful for the study of foreign decision-makers and elites, and that inferences related to these phenomena can be made from appropriate speech texts and policy action chronologies. However, a considerably broader analysis is required to demonstrate conclusively the utility of value analysis for converting the cognitive phenomena into inferences concerning the intentions and/or perceptions of foreign decision-makers, under either non-operational or operational conditions.

2. This has been a preliminary study of limited scope. It is viewed as indicating a high probability that, with wider application (to other leaders in other cultures as well as to Sadat and Qadhdhafi over a longer period of time), value analysis:

- will reveal policy-relevant patterns of values and goals associated with specific political cultures, ideological perspectives, and/or leadership styles;
- will identify individual variations in value preferences (what values invested, in whom) and goals idiosyncratic to specific intelligence targets;
- will be a useful tool in building a predictive capability for the kinds of actions, values, and goals that a given individual is likely to pursue.

SECTION ONE

INTRODUCTION

SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION

1.0 NATURE OF THE RESEARCH TASK

The purpose of the research presented in this report is to assess the possibility of using Lasswell Value Analysis in defense-related intelligence activities offering insight into the policy-relevant psychological traits and states of foreign decision-makers. Specifically, this involved the following tasks:

- Conduct a value analysis as a limited prototype of one of the kinds of analysis to be identified and evaluated in the overall research design.
- Employ the value analysis to analyze verbal statements made by two foreign decision-makers over an appropriate time period using FBIS material. Analysis will include the following:
 - identify pertinent assumptions implicit in the use of value analysis as a means of monitoring the intentions and/or perceptions of foreign decision-makers;
 - assess the potential utility of value analysis in terms of information operationally useful in analyzing the cognitive and decision processes of foreign decision-makers;

- identify the problems which must be overcome before value analysis can become a credible, resource-effective tool in an operational environment;
- develop specific applications of value analysis within the context of the POLITICS system of automation to provide input to the system relating as a minimum to goals and personal traits; and
- prepare a final report.

These tasks were performed within the context of Automated Behavioral Intelligence (ABI). ABI can best be defined as

"encompassing the development and automated application of advanced life and social science methodologies to: describe, explain, and predict intentions and perceptions of foreign decision-makers, link these intentions and perceptions to behavior; and, where appropriate, assist, test, and train key U.S. personnel."

Developments in the ABI program subsequent to the definition of the above tasks suggest the desirability of accomplishing them in a manner producing results which are relevant with or without incorporation of the POLITICS system in ABI processes.

Although the ABI project of the Cybernetic Technology Division of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) provided both the funding and the context for the present study on Lasswell value analysis applications to national security, it should be noted that the findings of this study may be applicable to the use of Lasswell value analysis in other national security applications.

1.1 RATIONALE FOR DEFENSE APPLICATIONS OF VALUE ANALYSIS

It is easy to make broad statements concerning the policy-relevant psychological characteristics of individual foreign decision-makers that can be effectively supported by anecdotal evidence. Former Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, for example, is often described as having been "reckless" and "headstrong", and his actions in foreign and domestic policy are often cited as "proof". Similarly, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi is typified as "autocratic", primarily because her policies during the last years of her first administration tended to be autocratic. Such descriptions, while useful as capsule summaries of personalities, provide inadequate insights into the possible courses of action which the decision-maker may or may not take under given circumstances. Warren Phillips and David McCormick noted a specific application of this problem in a recent methodological paper:

"...A major question which has not been answered is how likely are the Soviets to actually attempt short mobilization limited objective actions in Europe... At the heart of the difficulty is understanding Soviet decisionmaking. We simply do not know under what circumstances the Soviets would believe that the environment is ripe for such a gambit. Certainly they have a number of images which may take precedence at different times in the Soviet bureaucracy. But we don't really know enough about any of the images to specify what they would identify as a crisis or as an opportunity of significant enough import to initiate such strategies. One alternative, to equate intent with capability is simply too costly. The juxtaposition--to assume that they would never attempt such policy--is too dangerous. But where do we turn to determine a more likely set of scenarios and to derive from them planning implications?"¹

¹Phillips and McCormick (1978).

Empirically-based social science and life science techniques, including Lasswell value analysis, have a potential role to play in responding to this problem. If such techniques can be made to function effectively in an operational environment, through Automated Behavioral Intelligence or other methods of application, they can reduce the often dangerous uncertainties involved in attempting to "get inside the head" of the widest possible range of foreign decision-makers over the widest possible types of issue areas and situational variables. In the case of the Lasswell value analysis technique, the principal objective is to establish measures of the decision-maker's preferred policy-relevant values; in other words, to borrow from Lasswell's own phrase, to determine the decision-maker's preference for who should get what, when, where, how, why, and from whom in terms of policy outputs.² In addition, the application of Lasswell value analysis to the reported statements and policy actions of foreign decision-makers provides insight into what issue areas are selected by the decision-maker for special attention, into how the decision-maker views the world (i.e., Weltanschauung), and into ends/means relationships among short- and long-term policy goals as perceived by the decision-maker. Additional techniques are required to reduce uncertainty about when the decision-maker is being untruthful, what are the patterns of decision-making exhibited by the target individual, and what are the relevant psychological and psychophysiological factors which affect the target individual's policy-relevant behavior.

1.2 METHODOLOGY APPLIED TO ASSESSMENT

To determine whether Lasswell value analysis can fulfill the role described above in the national security arena, four subtasks were required. First, existing literature on the subject of the Lasswell

²Lasswell (1936), Politics: Who Gets What, When, How.

value analysis technique, including examples of applications of the techniques and critiques of the techniques, were reviewed to:

- define the technique, its implicit assumptions, and its procedural "rules" for application;
- identify the kinds of research problems to which it has been applied;
- compare the Lasswell value analysis technique to its principal "competitor", the Rokeach value ranking scheme; and
- determine possible contributions of Lasswell value analysis to the ABI system as defined in the research design for ABI developed during the spring of 1980.

Second, based on the above, trial applications of Lasswell value analysis were performed, using FBIS Daily Reports - Middle East and North Africa as the data source. It was found that the coding scheme of Lasswell value analysis could be used in two distinct types of applications: detailed value analysis of major policy statements and time-series value analysis of policy actions. Both types of application were attempted in order to compare the problems and potential advantages of each. Finally, as called for in the ABI research design, the findings of the previous activities were matched against a set of "gate hypotheses" and associated evaluation criteria to determine whether Lasswell value analysis is a technique appropriate for further development within the context of Automated Behavioral Intelligence.³

³For definition and discussion of the role of "gate hypotheses" in evaluating ABI techniques, see Brownell, Stoil, and Thomann (14 May 1980), 2-2 through 2-13.

1.3 POTENTIAL IMPACT OF ASSESSMENT OF VALUE ANALYSIS ON U.S.
NATIONAL SECURITY

The direct impact of the assessment of Lasswell value analysis is related to the Automated Behavioral Intelligence Project, as follows:

- it defines and initiates development of a technique potentially useful on its own in indicating the most likely choice among certain possible alternative foreign decision-maker perceptions and courses of action,
- it determines whether Lasswell value analysis is an appropriate candidate technique to be included as an input into the final ABI system, and
- as a prototype assessment, it is one indicator as to whether the approach to assessment of social science and life science methodologies and techniques incorporated in the ABI Research Design is an appropriate approach to furthering the goals of ABI research and development.

SECTION TWO

LASSWELL VALUE ANALYSIS AND ABI

SECTION 2

LASSWELL VALUE ANALYSIS AND ABI

2.0 GENERAL

This section presents the findings of a review of existing literature on Lasswell value analysis, including critiques of the technique and published examples of its prior application, as well as subsequent discussion and analyses of the potential contributions of Lasswell value analysis to the Automated Behavioral Intelligence (ABI) system design. The results of these activities include a brief history of the development of the technique (Paragraph 2.1), a description of the coding scheme (Paragraph 2.2), a description of its applications to conceptual mapping of foreign decision-makers (Paragraph 2.3), a discussion of its potential role as an input to ABI (Paragraph 2.4), and a discussion of its potential role in creating goal-trees--automated conceptual maps--of foreign decision-makers for ABI (Paragraph 2.5).

2.1 ORIGINS OF LASSWELL VALUE ANALYSIS

The technique known as Lasswell Value Analysis (or the Lasswell Value Dictionary scheme) was devised in 1967-68 by the late Harold Dwight Lasswell of Yale University and J. Zvi Namenwirth, a sociologist

at the University of Connecticut, under National Science Foundation (NSF) and DOD/ARPA sponsorship.¹ The origins of the techniques can be found in two separate research activities initiated by Harold Lasswell and his associates during World War II (see Figure 2-1). The quantitative content analysis rules and procedures required for value analysis were first identified in the Experimental Division for the Study of Wartime Communications of the Library of Congress, in collaboration with Ithiel da Sola Pool, Nathan Leites, and others.² These rules and procedures were refined by the Revolution and the Development of International Relations (RADIR) Project of the Hoover Institute and Library during the late 1940's and early 1950's, with support from the Carnegie Foundation. The RADIR Project, however, was primarily concerned with application of quantitative methods to symbolic rather than value analysis.³ Concurrently, throughout the 1940's, Lasswell and British philosopher Abraham Kaplan collaborated on the development of a unified theoretical framework for political analysis, based on a concept of politics as the authoritative allocation of values. One result of this effort was the generation of a set of eight categories of values which Lasswell and Kaplan maintained were both inclusive and cross-cultural in nature.⁴ Fifteen years elapsed before Namenwirth and Lasswell, employed as subcontractors to R.J. Rummel on DARPA-sponsored research into cross-national indicators, combined these two independent research tracks into an automated content analysis technique now known as either the Lasswell Value

¹NSF Grant #614 and APRA Contract N0014-67-A0097-0007.

²Lasswell, Leites, et al. (1949), p. 16.

³Lasswell, Lerner, and da Sola Pool (1952), pp. 26-27.

⁴Lasswell and Kaplan (1952), pp. i-iv.




Figure 2-1. Historical Development of the Lasswell Value Dictionary.

Dictionary or simply as Lasswell value analysis (to differentiate it from Rokeach value ranking, an alternative form of value analysis developed circa 1969). The Value Dictionary technique was first used experimentally to analyze the changing political values reflected in the content of selected Republican and Democratic party platforms; this application required the researchers to compromise several of the "rules" of content analysis developed by Lasswell and his colleagues during the RADIR Project.⁵ Subsequent applications of Lasswell value analysis to verbal content and policy actions of decision-makers in lesser-developed countries returned to the original "rules" of content analysis while retaining the benefits of the Dictionary.⁶

2.2 THE LASSWELL CODING SCHEME

The operation of any content analysis methodology requires three elements:

- a data base capable of analysis;
- a scheme or methodology for coding the data consistently, into a format susceptible to some form of empirical analysis; and
- rules of procedure for analysis which will yield useful findings.

As stated above, the premise of the Lasswell value analysis technique is that politics can be viewed as the authoritative allocation of "values"--those things desired by individuals and institutions within a society. Most political goals and events can theoretically be

⁵Namenwirth and Lasswell (1970).

⁶E.g., Arora and Lasswell (1969) and Lasswell (1977). The application of the technique to policy actions led to a professional rift between Lasswell and Namenwirth, who nevertheless has continued to apply the Value Dictionary to the analysis of content as a sociological tool.

expressed in terms of the distribution of a value from one actor to another, which Lasswell describes as the "investment" of values, in anticipation of values to be received. Potentially, the "values" involved in such transactions could be anything conceivably desired by an individual or institution, from world domination to a good meal. Recognizing this, Lasswell and Kaplan developed a set of eight value categories, based on the following criteria:

"...The categories employed to designate the values must be inclusive. And the list should be short; otherwise, comparisons become unwieldy. The list needs to be related to the specialized fields of knowledge about politics and society, since the data obtained by various bodies of scholars can be conveniently incorporated and compared in this way...We have eight categories of culminating events in mind: the giving and receiving of power, enlightenment, wealth, well-being, skill, affection, respect, rectitude."⁷

These eight categories of values have been further defined as follows:⁸

- Power is the participation in decisions about severe sanctions, or the capacity to change outcomes.
- Enlightenment involves knowledge, insight, and access to information.
- Skill is the proficiency in any practice--in arts and crafts, in trades or professions.
- Wealth is income, including both goods and services.
- Well-being includes both health and safety, as well as security.

⁷Arora and Lasswell (1969), pp. 13-14.

⁸Dominguez in Lasswell (1977), p. 20. The eight value categories are often identified by the acronym PEWBSARD, for Power, Enlightenment, Wealth, Well-Being, Affection, Respect; and Rectitude.

- Respect includes status, honor, recognition, prestige, glory, or reputation.
- Rectitude comprises the moral values of virtue, goodness, and righteousness.
- Affection includes love, friendship, and loyalty.

One psychological element which divides decision-makers is their attitude towards these eight value categories. An ideologue, for example, could be defined as an individual who views Enlightenment and Rectitude as the most important values to be conferred on political followers; an opportunist could be defined as an individual who will redefine or give up Rectitude in order to obtain Power; a corrupt politician in U.S. society is one who will transfer Power to another individual in exchange for Wealth (which may or may not be cash). Through value analysis, these types of preferred value transactions could presumably be identified and could provide important insights into the motivations and probable courses of future action of policy-making individuals and institutions.

2.2.1 Value Analysis of Verbal Content. One application of Lasswell value analysis--the application used in the initial DARPA-sponsored research--is the analysis of the content of policy-relevant verbal materials, such as speeches, position papers, books and articles, etc. The purpose of this analysis is to identify the value relationships cited most frequently and with greatest emphasis by the speaker/author (including group and institutional authors), in terms of what types of values the speaker/author proposes to invest, to what end, at what time(s), for whose benefit (or detriment), and under what conditioning factors. This process, according to Lasswell, provides insight into the author/speaker's value preferences, perceptions of appropriate means to achieve goals, etc.:

"...the language of public communication, if examined with care and caution, can disclose many fundamental demands, expectations, and perceptions of identity. This is particularly true of public communication made by members of the political leadership, the elite. It may be that an element of conscious deception is present in many public statements. Language, however, deceives the deceiver; it cannot be stripped bare of its complex relationship to a total flow of subjectivity. Within limits, it remains an unwilling 'mirror of the soul'."⁹

For the analysis of content, Lasswell value analysis requires the coding of the following information:

- actor identities described in the content (self, other);
- value demands (in terms of the PEWBSARD categories); and
- expectations (the time period and/or conditioning factors affecting value transactions described in the content).¹⁰

Consider, for example, the following excerpt from President Jimmy Carter's State of the Union Address of January 1980:

"The maintenance of national security is my first concern, as it has been for every President before me. As I stated one year ago in Atlanta: 'This is still a world of danger, a world in which democracy and freedom are challenged, a world in which peace must be won every day.' We must have both the military power and the political will to deter our adversaries and to support our friends and allies. We must pay whatever price is required to remain the strongest nation in the world..."

⁹Arora and Lasswell (1969), p. 2.

¹⁰Based on Ibid, p. 15.

A value analysis breakdown of this excerpt is presented in Table 2-1. It reveals the following information concerning the image which the speaker, Jimmy Carter wished at that time to project:

- In this excerpt, at least, the speaker identifies himself as "one of the Presidents", rather than as a Democrat, as a world leader, or as an individual with unique concerns. In the context of the issue area of national security, he would appear to expect any U.S. President to share his concern.
- He views the Well-Being and Rectitude values of the World as important--rather than limiting his concern to the Well-Being and Rectitude of the U.S.--and perceives them as threatened by unnamed actors, described only as "our adversaries".
- He views it necessary for the United States to maintain more Power than other nations--not for the sake of Power itself, but to be able to invest Power in countering the Power of adversaries and in maintaining Well-Being and Rectitude for the World and our unnamed friends and allies.
- He views it necessary to subordinate all other possible value investments to the goal of maintaining more Power than any other nation.

In summary, value analysis of the statement reveals a stated willingness to use U.S. Power and influence anywhere that Well-Being and Rectitude (in terms of freedom and democracy) are perceived threatened, a view of international relations as divided between the adversaries of these values and their adherents (including our friends and allies), and a priority assigned to the maintenance of U.S. Power superiority over any other nation. It should be noted that verbal value expressions may not be reflected in actions. For this reason comparison of such value expressions with values expressed in policy actions is essential.

2.2.2 Value Analysis of Policy Actions. Lasswell and some of his associates--other than Namenwirth--have argued that policy actions, as well as statements, can be successfully coded by value analysis

TABLE 2-1. DETAILED LASSWELL VALUE ANALYSIS OF EXCERPT FROM STATE-OF-THE-UNION ADDRESS

STATEMENT IN TEXT	IDENTITY OF PRINCIPAL ACTOR	VALUE TRANSACTIONS AND CONDITIONING FACTORS
the maintenance of national security is my first concern, as it has been for every President before me.	Self (incumbent President) Every previous President	Invest effort to maintain national security, now and earlier. (Invest Skill to obtain Well-Being for the Nation, now and in the past).
As I stated one year ago in Atlanta, 'this is still a world of danger, a world in which democracy and freedom are challenged...	Not identified; presumably "our adversaries."	Attempt to reduce security, democracy, and freedom, in the past and today. (Invest Values to reduce Well-Being and Rectitude ⁴ of the World, now and in the past).
...a world in which peace must be won every day.	Not identified; presumably "we."	Obtain peace for the world every day. (Invest Values to maintain Well-Being and Rectitude ⁴⁴ of the World every day).
We must have both the military power and the political will to deter our adversaries...	We, later identified as "strongest nation in the world."	Maintain military and political power to counter the power of our adversaries. (Maintain Power to counter the Power of Adversaries).
...and to support our friends and allies.	We	Maintain power to provide security for friends and allies. (Maintain Power which can be invested in Well-Being for Friends and Allies).
We must pay whatever price is required to remain the strongest nation in the world.	We--the strongest nation in the world.	Pay any price to remain strongest nation. (Invest all Values required to maintain more Power than any other nation).

⁴Although "democracy" and "freedom" can be used to define political (Power) relationships, the speaker uses the words here as moral qualities, equivalent to saying that "goodness and virtue are challenged," hence they are classified as Rectitude values.

⁴⁴In value terms, "peace" is classified both as a Well-Being value--a.g., equivalent to security--and as a Rectitude value, since peace is viewed as a Judeo-Christian ideal. Not all world cultures would necessarily view "peace" as having a Rectitude dimension.

because they also involve value transactions between various individual and institutional actors. The transfer of arms in the form of foreign military assistance between one country and a weaker country can be coded as the transfer of Wealth with the expectation of increasing the Power and thereby the Well-Being (ability to provide for national security) of the weaker country; the use of propaganda statements to influence behavior can be coded as the investment of Enlightenment in order to obtain additional Power (the capacity to change outcomes). In analyzing such transactions, value analysis seeks to provide the capability of discerning patterns in value transactions which, in turn, can be used for descriptive and predictive purposes. A key problem with this use of the value analysis technique is that policy actions often do not include indications of value expectations: i.e., often a foreign decision-maker will not explicitly state why he causes his country to engage in propaganda, to increase national defenses, or to conclude a trade agreement with a foreign nation. For this reason, half of the value transactions involved in policy actions--the values anticipated by the decision-maker in return for causing values to be invested in another actor--must often be inferred or ignored in applying Lasswell value analysis.

2.3 ANALYTIC APPROACHES TO LASSWELL'S VALUE ANALYSIS OF PARTICULAR UTILITY TO ABI

Three approaches were considered to be of particular use in analyzing the results of Lasswell value analysis for ABI purposes. This paragraph covers the use of two of those approaches, value investment pattern summaries and summaries of positive/negative investments in foreign actors. The next three paragraphs deal with conceptual mapping based on value analysis and the evolution of this conceptual mapping into the third approach, development of goal trees for the POLITICS model.

Value investment pattern summaries for speeches are tabulated by dyad, and indicated as positive, negative and conditional (used in "if" statements, or in historical tense), since these can reverse meanings or refer to conditions no longer relevant. Their use in Section 3 is simple and self-explanatory.

Value investment pattern summaries for action analyses involve the values invested by the principal actors of concern (Sadat and Qadhdhafi in this case); values received by (invested by others in) the principal actors; and values invested and received by other actors in associated value transactions. These summaries, particularly with respect to the values invested and received by the principal actors, would be expected to be culture sensitive in two respects: they should reflect investment of those values most relevant in the cultural environment in which a given leader operates; and, to the extent that the texts analyzed are a function of any specific agency (e.g., national media), they are likely to reflect biases or constraints characteristic of those agencies.

Summaries of positive/negative investments in foreign actors, used with action analyses, would be expected to indicate the extent to which a foreign decision-maker indulges in "black and white" behavior--either all negative or all positive--towards specific foreign recipients, versus the extent to which he uses mixed strategies. It will also indicate which foreign actors tend to be the focus of his attention, although a complete mapping of such interests is likely to vary with time. Mapping of the foreign actor interests of several foreign decision-makers over the same time period, however, will give a comparison on a standard basis if their countries are immersed in essentially the same international environment.

The two approaches described in this paragraph should result in patterns which can be used as a measure of probable validity for alternative perceptions and courses of action. Any alternatives which do not conform to the patterns characteristic of the decision-maker are less probable. Retroactive analysis over a period of some years, to include trend analysis, should give a measure of that probability.


2.4 VALUE ANALYSIS AND CONCEPTUAL MAPPING

In his final published work on the subject of value analysis, Harold Lasswell devoted a lengthy chapter to the possible applications of value analysis in conceptual mapping of foreign decision-makers. This application was based on the premise that the PEWBSARD value categories, being both short and inclusive, facilitated comparisons of value expectations among decision-makers who widely differed in their policies, cultural attributes, and psychological attributes.¹¹ In theory, value analysis makes possible direct comparison between the policy-relevant conceptual maps of decision-makers as diverse as Attila the Hun, Abraham Lincoln, and Leonid Brezhnev, as illustrated in Figure 2-2.¹² In this illustration, the hypothetical end-goal (priority value) for all three individuals is Power; the differences between the three leaders' conceptual maps lie in the means used to obtain Power and for whom Power should be obtained. The principal advantages of this format of conceptual mapping can be summarized as follows:


¹¹Lasswell (1977), pp. 261-283.

¹²The conceptual maps portrayed in Figure 2-2 are, of course, extremely simplified and reflect neither the cognitive complexity of Brezhnev and Lincoln (and perhaps of Attila), nor an authoritative, empirical investigation of their value preferences.


Figure 2-2. HYPOTHETICAL CONCEPTUAL MAPS OF ATTILA THE HUN, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, AND LEONID BREZHNEV IN VALUE ANALYSIS TERMS*



Attila's hypothetical conceptual map indicates that he believed that his Skill (as a military and political leader) and his Respect values (i.e., his reputation as the undefeated "Scourge of God") were means to acquiring Power for the Hunnish tribes, which in turn would achieve the end-goal of acquiring Power for himself.



Lincoln's hypothetical conceptual map indicates his belief that the Wealth resources of the United States, the Rectitude (righteousness) values of the Union cause, and the Skill resources of himself and his generals would contribute to victory (Power) for the Union Army and that the Army, in turn, would achieve the end-goal of maintaining the authority (Power) of the United States Government.



Brezhnev's hypothetical conceptual map indicates that he views the Power of the Red Army and of the Soviet state as means, along with his own skills as leader, to increase the global authority (Power) and prestige (Respect) of the CPSU. Increasing the power and prestige of the CPSU, however, is also a means to achieve the end of increasing the global authority of the Politburo of the CPSU. The wisdom and experience-gained knowledge of his fellow members of the Politburo is also necessary to achieve this end-goal.

*Provided only for illustration of the Lasswell Value Analysis technique to cognitive mapping; examples provided are not meant to be authoritative.


- it defines priorities and linkages among preferred means and ends of the decision-maker;
- it identifies potential value conflicts and concurrent value preferences among several decision-makers;
- it can be expanded upon to include greater detail, newly-identified value linkages and preferences, changed preferences for ends and means, etc.
- it fulfills Lasswell's criteria of being cross-cultural and succinct;
- as illustrated in Figure 2-3, it can be used to depict the "conceptual map" of groups--such as adherents of a given ideology--as well as individuals.

The principal disadvantages of this format of conceptual mapping are the need for some understanding of the underlying concepts of value analysis on the part of the analyst and the current inability of the "map" to take into consideration the impact of radically different methods of reasoning (i.e., dialectic vs. Western multiple factor, cause-effect). The latter problem, however, is equally true for most attempts by Westerners to develop cross-cultural cognitive mapping techniques.

2.5 VALUE ANALYSIS AS AN INPUT TO ABI

As stated in Carbonell (1979), different "understanders"--analysts and decision-makers--develop different conceptions of the intentions--preferred means and end-goals--of foreign decision-makers. This principle forms one basis of the prospective ABI system design; either in its fully-automated, POLITICS-based format, or in the

FIGURE 2-3. CONCEPTUAL MAPS OF TWO IDEOLOGIES IN VALUE ANALYSIS TERMS




partially-automated format based on the Courses of Action and Perception Analysis (CAPA) concept.¹³ The function of inputs into ABI is to provide evidence confirming or disconfirming these alternative conceptions as the probable courses of action and perceptions of specific foreign target actors. The potential role of Lasswell value analysis coding in this process is to format inputs and alternative conceptions of foreign target actors characteristics so that confirmation/disconfirmation is facilitated. This role can be illustrated by using the example of the alternative conceptions of the preferred means and end-goals of the Soviet Politburo, as "understood" by a communist, a liberal, a Kremlinologist, and a conservative analyst (see Figure 2-4). In this example, each understander agrees that Power for the Politburo--as much as this value as can be obtained--is a goal of the Soviet Politburo. The distinction between the understanders' interpretations lies in whether this Power is to be invested to obtain some eventual end-goal for some other actor: in other words, is Power for the Politburo an ultimate goal, or is it only a means to some other ultimate end? The application of value analysis to the policy statements and policy actions of the Politburo and of the individual Politburo members would serve as evidence confirming or denying the various interpretations of the preferred values of the Politburo, and thus play an important role as an input to the ABI process.

2.6 VALUE ANALYSIS AND ABI GOAL-TREES


Some--although not all--of the information on foreign decision-makers stored in ABI, according to the present research design, is in

¹³An alternative to the ABI Automated Integrated Analysis (AIA) process using POLITICS. CAPA envisions use of several social sciences methodologies to develop probabilistic data on alternative sets of foreign decision-maker perceptions and planned courses of action.


FIGURE 2-4. ALTERNATIVE "UNDERSTANDER" PERCEPTIONS OF POLITBURO GOALS (simplified)




Marxist "Understander": argues that the Soviet Politburo wants power only to direct activities leading to increased wealth of the State and, eventually, to increased wealth, well-being, and security of the world's workers.



Liberal "Understander": assumes that all ruling elites ultimately act in the interests of their constituents and doubts that the Politburo really plans to "share the wealth" in true Marxist sense. Instead, argues that the Politburo wants to provide education (Enlightenment), security and welfare (Well-Being) to Soviet citizens, regardless of whether or not they are "workers" according to the Marxist definition of the term.



Kremlinologist "Understander": trained to view events in terms of their impact on elite politics, views the Politburo as a jungle of competing factions and personalities, whose current end-goal is to provide the means of strengthening the power and prestige of Brezhnev and his proteges.



Conservative "Understander": sees Politburo as a conspiracy of power-hungry ideologues and perceives power itself to be the end-goal of the Politburo's actions.

the form of conceptual scheme known as "goal-trees". The discussion of conceptual mapping in paragraphs 2.4 and 2.5 leads up to the construction of these goal trees, which provide richer, more sophisticated conceptual maps. The goal-tree format provides the basis for the POLITICS program used in the fully-automated version of the ABI system design; the format could also be used in a partially automated version, the of Action and Perception Analysis (CAPA) system. Lasswell value analysis, with its ability to express end-goals, long-range goals, preferred short-term goals, and actions constituting part of the goal-tree formation process to format incoming data parsimoniously and on a cross-cultural basis.

2.6.1 Comparison of Value Analysis and Existing POLITICS Goal-Tree Formats. Figures 2-5 and 2-6 demonstrate the application of value analysis to the goal-tree format. Figure 2-5 depicts the basic goal-tree for the Soviet Politburo as perceived by an American conservative, used in the original goal-tree format developed for POLITICS by Carbonell.¹⁴ It consists of actions and goals leading to the final objective of world domination by the Politburo, with interim goal preferences indicated by Relative Importance (RI) lines. Figure 2-6 uses essentially the same goal tree, but expresses the goals and means to achieve goals using the PEWBSARD coding scheme. Note that the PEWBSARD version does not explicitly state that "world domination" is the Politburo's goal: instead, it states that the American conservative views the Politburo as desiring as much power as its resources permit. Thus, during the late 1920's, when the USSR offered the

¹⁴Carbonell (1979), p. 73.




Figure 2 5. Soviet Goal Tree in US-Conservative Ideology, Using Current POLITICS Terminology.*

Legend: Solid lines show subgoal/goal relationships.
Dotted lines show relative importance (RI) relationships from less important to more important goals.

*Taken from Carbonell (1979), p. 73.




Figure 2-6. Soviet Goal Tree in US-Conservative Ideology, Using Lasswell Value Analysis Terminology

Legend: A=Affection, D=Rectitude, E=Enlightenment, P=Power, R=Respect, W=Wealth.

Politburo few resources compared to competing actors, the Power obtained by the Politburo was limited to control over most of the Soviet territory, the international communist movement, and the puppet regime in Mongolia. Assuming that the Politburo's end-goals (as identified by the American conservative) do not change, the same model would equally depict the Politburo's desire to seek domination over the solar system as well as "world domination", if future resources enable the hammer-and-sickle to be raised on other planets. Further, the goal tree using the PEWBSARD coding scheme makes certain linkages between goals explicit which are obscure in the original version; e.g., the rationale for aiding communist movements in the Third World.

2.6.2 Advantages of PEWBSARD-Coded Goal Trees. The principal benefits accruing, in theory, from the use of value analysis terminology in the construction of the goal trees required for ABI can be summarized as follows:

- increased rigor of goal tree formulation process;
- more simplified cross-cultural comparison of decision-maker goal trees, resulting from a standardized language for the description of end-goals, short-term goals, and means;
- a potential capability for constructing goal trees directly from value analysis inputs, based on analysis of policy statements or actions; and
- a potential capability for combining idiosyncratic values of specific decision-makers with the generalized goal-tree depiction of the preferred goals and means of their decision-making group (e.g., "fleshing out" goal trees of individual Soviet Politburo members or members of the Saudi royal family with goal trees describing the values of the Politburo or the royal family as a collective decision-making actor).

SECTION THREE

VALUE ANALYSIS APPLIED TO VERBAL CONTENT:
SPEECHES OF COL. AL-QADHDHAFI AND PRESIDENT AS-SADAT

SECTION 3

VALUE ANALYSIS APPLIED TO VERBAL CONTENT: SPEECHES OF COL. AL-QADHDHAFI AND PRESIDENT AS-SADAT

3.0 GENERAL

To investigate the application of Lasswell value analysis to such verbal sources as speeches, press conferences, interviews, etc., a trial application of this technique was performed using recent statements by two prominent Third World leaders: Col. Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi, Secretary-General of the Libyan General People's Congress and reputed dictator of the North African state of Libya, and President Anwar as-Sadat, President of the Egyptian Arab Republic and of that country's National Democratic Party.

3.1 ORIGIN OF THE SAMPLES

The statements used for this purpose were the following:

- a "political lecture" outlining Col. Qadhdhafi's view of the world situation, delivered on 20 April 1980 to a meeting of students and professors of the Qaryunis and al-Fatih Universities of Libya, at an unspecified location. The lecture was recorded and broadcast over the domestic radio service of Libya in Arabic; the excerpted portion was translated and published in the FBIS Daily Report - Middle East and North Africa of April 23, 1980.

- an analogous excerpt covering the world situation from President Sadat's May Day address of 1980, delivered to assembled workers at Al 'Arish, Sinai. The speech was broadcast live via relays on the Egyptian domestic radio service; the entire text was translated and published in the FBIS Daily Report - Middle East and Africa of May 2, 1980.
- an address by Col. Qadhdhafi on the anniversary of the evacuation of foreign bases from Libyan territory delivered at Ra's Lanuf, Libya, to an unspecified audience on 11 June 1980. The address was broadcast live on the Voice of the Arab Homeland in Arabic; the excerpted portion was translated and published in the FBIS Daily Report - Middle East and Africa of June 12, 1980.
- an address by President Sadat on the analogous anniversary of the reopening of the Suez Canal following the evacuation of Israeli forces from the Canal's west bank, delivered at Ismailia, Egypt to members of the Egyptian 2nd Field Army on 5 June 1980. The text of the address in its entirety was transmitted over the Egyptian MENA (Middle East News Agency) wires in Arabic, translated and published in the FBIS Daily Report - Middle East and Africa of June 6, 1980.

The full texts of the excerpts used for analysis are presented in Appendix A.

3.2 BACKGROUND ON THE TARGET DECISION-MAKERS

Both Col. Qadhdhafi and President Sadat depict themselves as Arab nationalist and socialists in the ideological tradition of the late President Nasser of Egypt. Coming to power at approximately the same time, their initial cooperation has since degenerated into open mutual hostility based on ideological as well as national differences.

3.2.1 Background on Col. Qadhdhafi

Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi was born in 1942, the son of a Bedouin chieftain.¹ Although he had no formal education until the age of 12, by 1960 he had completed secondary school and graduated from the Libyan Royal Military Academy. On September 1, 1969, then-Major Qadhdhafi was one of the leaders among the young Army who staged Libya's only successful coup d'etat. Although he holds no formal executive position in Libya's government, Col. Qadhdhafi has emerged as the principal spokesman and ideologist of the regime, and is believed to have effective dictatorial powers. He has aspired to a major role among the radical leaders of the Third World, while remaining a strong supporter of Libyan military and political cooperation with the USSR. His views on politics and economics, which he has termed "Third Wave" or "Third Phase" thought, have been collected in a volume known as the Green Book.

3.2.2 Background on President Sadat.

Anwar al-Sadat was born in a village near Alexandria in 1918, the son of a Egyptian clerk and a Sudanese mother. After attending Koranic primary school and vocational secondary school, he entered the Abbassia Military Academy in 1936, the first year enrollment was opened in middle class and lower class candidates. A classmate and close friend of Gamal Abd al-Nasser, he was one of the original members of the clandestine Free Officer Committee, formed in 1938 to overthrow the monarchy and oust British influence. His career as a revolutionary military officer and journalist was marked by a series of misadventures, including two prison terms, and culminated in circumstances which prevented his participation in the successful 1952 coup d'etat of the Free Officer Committee. Under President Nasser, he served in several

¹Other transliterations of the name include Qadhafi, Qaddafi, etc. Qadhdhafi is the transliteration from the Arabic preferred by the U.S. Library of Congress.

prestigious but powerless posts, such as President of the National Assembly and of the Arab Socialist Union (the predecessor of the National Democratic Party). In 1969, he was appointed Vice President of the Republic, succeeded to the Presidency on Nasser's death in 1970, and was reelected in 1970 and 1976. In 1971, he directed a purge of potential opposition within the Egyptian government, known as the "corrective revolution." President Sadat is fluent in English, German, Old Persian, and Farsi, as well as Egyptian Arabic; in addition to his political activities, he enjoys a reputation as a Koranic scholar and as an author of fiction and autobiographical works. Unlike Col. Qadhdhafi, Sadat has acquired a substantial personal fortune; again unlike Qadhdhafi, he is married (his wife is half-English in parentage) and has several children.

3.3 SUBJECTIVE ANALYSIS FOR COMPARATIVE PURPOSES

In order to provide some insight into whether value analysis of verbal material can provide insights not readily obtained without the use of the technique, a retired career military intelligence officer with 25 years experience was asked to study the Qadhdhafi speech of April 20, 1980, and indicate what his analysis would tell him about the author's personality and probable policy preferences. It should be noted that the resulting analysis was not necessarily representative of what an intelligence analyst with extensive background on Qadhdhafi would produce; nevertheless, it illustrates the types of insight which a trained and experienced analyst might uncover without the use of value analysis or similar ABI-related analytic aids.

3.3.1 Content of the Speech.

The analyst characterized the speech overall as "soft-sell propaganda," explaining that it included many simplistic statements, but that its points were clear and articulate. The tone of the speech was described as "not authoritarian . . . appears that while he has made up his mind, there is still a 'friendly' choice available to the listener between the US and the Soviet bloc . . . no veiled threats." The analyst emphasized that Qadhdhafi clearly did not like the West and expected only the worst if he actively opposed the United States due to ideological differences; Qadhdhafi also argued that his audience could only passively oppose the West. The Soviet bloc, on the other hand, was favored by Qadhdhafi (according to the analyst) because he perceived the Soviets as neither allied to Israel nor opposed to Qadhdhafi's revolution.

3.3.2 Qadhdhafi's Personality.

The analyst described Qadhdhafi as nationalistic and opportunistic, but definitely not a Marxist (because of the absence of traditional Marxist-Leninist "jargon" in his speech). The analyst also suggested that Qadhdhafi wished to appear as a wise and articulate leader, doing what is best for his country. He received the impression of arrogance, or at least a patronizing attitude toward the students, combined with a high degree of self-confidence. The analyst felt that Qadhdhafi was certain that the students would be receptive to his remarks; hence their simplicity and the lack of "depth" in the analysis of the world situation. According to the analyst, Qadhdhafi was probably very sensitive to the reactions of the audience, increasing the emotional pitch of the speech as the students warmed to the general condemnation of the West.

3.3.3 Subjective Analysis as a Holistic Approach.

One element of the subjective analysis that was readily apparent was the analyst's tendency to treat the speech in a holistic manner: in other words, the analyst received general impressions from the speech as a whole and then reviewed the content to find evidence confirming these impressions. This is not an unreasonable method given the time and resource constraints imposed on unaided analysts under pressure, when they must provide the "gist" of large amounts of material as quickly as possible.² Further, it encourages the analyst to develop his or her own criteria for confirmatory evidence; e.g., the absence of typical phrases used by Marxist-Leninists "confirmed" that, in the view of the analyst, Qadhdhafi is not a true Marxist. Comparison of these results with those found through value analysis will be found in paragraph 3.5.4.

3.4 LASSWELL VALUE ANALYSIS: METHODOLOGY

The methodology employed in analyzing the content of the four speeches through Lasswell value coding is derived from that outlined in Arora and Lasswell.³ This methodology requires that content be divided into thematic statements and that the "fundamental categories" of statement analysis be identified. In practice, we found that the most appropriate means for carrying out this procedure, in terms of replicability and speed, was to analyze statements by the following categories:

²In this case, the analyst was not placed under time pressure; the use of holistic approaches is probably habitual after so many years experience.

³Arora and Lasswell (1969), p. 15.

- conditioning factors, including time frame, "if" qualifications, description of the transaction as mandatory, etc.
- the identity of the "principal actor," i.e., the individual, group, institution, or country which initiates the value transaction described in the statement;
- the value investment itself, i.e., the nature of the values described as transferred or transformed in the statement, defined in terms of the PEWBSARD coding scheme;
- the intended recipient actor of the values, i.e., the individual, group, institution, or country which receives the values (or the negative values) described in the statement;
- linkages, if any, between the value transaction and the following transaction. These linkages were defined as the following possibilities:
 - expectation: the following transaction is an expected consequence of the preceding one, although not necessarily a desirable consequence
 - reciprocal: the following transaction represents the second part of an exchange of values initiated by the preceding transaction
 - transformation: the following transaction is the ultimate culmination of the preceding transaction and involves changing the PEWBSARD coding of the value from the original investment into another PEWBSARD value
 - sequential: the following transaction is related in time sequence without necessarily having a cause/effect relationship with the preceding transaction.

Although the coding process appears complicated at first glance, it was found to be relatively easy to use in practice. Complicated speeches could be coded, given practice, in less than an hour. A sample coding sheet illustrating this procedure is presented in Figure 3-1. Value coding of all four speeches is given in Appendix B.

3.4.1 Use of a Value Dictionary.

The original application of Lasswell value analysis performed for DARPA in the mid-1960's made use of an analytic aid known as a "Value Dictionary." The Value Dictionary provided the value coding for key words used in U.S. political party platforms, and could be employed in conjunction with the relatively unsophisticated GENERAL INQUIRER program then available to provide automated coding of 96% of the words in the platforms. The original of the entire Value Dictionary could not be located; excerpts from the Dictionary discovered in various manuscripts were found to be inappropriate for the terminology used by Arab nationalists such as Col. Qadhdhafi and President Sadat. At the same time, attempts to code without the aid of such a dictionary were found laborious and often contributed to discrepancies between coders. For this reason, giving consideration to Arab culture--particularly Islamic and radical political culture--a brief new Value Dictionary was constructed. It was useful in translating frequently-used concepts and themes into PEWBSARD values and other elements of statement analysis. A single Dictionary was found to be useful for both Sadat and Qadhdhafi; it is unlikely, however, that the same Dictionary could be used for all Third World leaders.

FIGURE 3-1. VALUE ANALYSIS CODING OF QADHDHAFI'S ADDRESS OF 20 APRIL 1980

Paragraph in Text	Conditioning* Factor(s)	Principal Actor(s)	Value Investments	Intended Recipient Actor(s)	Linkage to Next Item
#1	Mandatory Exclude, Future	Unspecified	E,P (-)B	Masses Masses	Transformation
#2	None None Mandatory None None	World Two Superpowers We (Libyans) We (Libyans) A Superpower (USSR)	P (-)B,B E A,P B,R	Two Superpowers Third World We (Libyans) A Superpower We (Libyans)	Expectation Expectation Reciprocation
#3	Mandatory None	We (Libyans) We (Libyans)	E A,P	We (Libyans) A Superpower	Expectation
#4	None None	Progressive Forces and Regimes in the Third World USSR	Unspec. Unspec.	USSR (Leftist Forces) Progressive Forces and Regimes in the Third World	Reciprocation
	None None	Rightist Forces and Regimes (reaction) U.S.	Unspec. Unspec.	U.S. (Rightist Superpower) Rightist Forces and Regimes	Reciprocation

3.4.2 Intercoder Discrepancy.

The brevity of the value dictionary as developed and, limitations on training time available, prevented attainment of desired levels of intercoder consistency. Typically, the coders would find themselves in agreement on the extent of the thematic passages appropriate for statement analysis and on the identification of the principal and intended recipient actors; nevertheless, differences in coding of specific statements were significant. Initially, only 15-25% of the verbal content was coded identically; towards the end of the brief trial application of value analysis, as training time and value dictionary comprehensiveness increased, the two coders achieved up to 60-70% intercoder correspondence. When working in concert, the two coders were able to reach a consensus on agreed coding of passages very quickly. The analysis of verbal content reflected in the following discussion resulted from such consensus coding. Further effort was not expended on improving coding consistency because primary focus in this study is on potential utility of the methodology, and past experience with an expanded value dictionary has indicated that higher levels of coding consistency are attainable with the Lasswell value analysis.

3.5 ANALYSIS: VALUE EMPHASIS AND PERSONAL STYLE


Having coded the speeches, the next step in the analysis was to determine which values were of particular importance to each of the two decision-makers, as revealed by the relative amount of emphasis placed on each of the PEWBSARD value categories in their remarks. In the discussions which follow, it is stressed that results are to be taken as illustrative of the potential of the methodology. Definitive answers would require analysis of a much larger number of speeches.

3.5.1 Value Emphasis of Col. Qadhdhafi: The Pragmatic Revolutionary.

As depicted in Figure 3-2, value emphasis in the two selected speeches of Col. Mu'ammr al-Qadhdhafi was relatively consistent, with a correlation factor of .79. This suggests that Qadhdhafi is fairly consistent in giving emphasis to certain values and not giving emphasis to other values in both a speech outlining his view of the world situation and a second speech celebrating Libyan revolutionary achievements. Power--its acquisition, transfer, or loss--can be described as the dominant value in both speeches: 49% of all values mentioned in the June 11 address and 39% of all values mentioned in the April 20 "political lecture" described some aspect of Power.⁴ The second most often-cited value category was that of Well-Being (i.e., security, safety and, in its negative aspect, harm and threat), which constituted 23% of the values described in the June speech and 19% of the values described in the April speech. Of particular interest is the lack of emphasis on such values as Enlightenment, Wealth, Rectitude, and Skill, which have been cited in earlier works as linked to a "modernizing" style in politics.⁵ It can be suggested that the emphasis on Power and Well-Being--in other words, that increasing one's own power and decreasing one's opponents' power as the source of security, happiness, etc., without regard to either Rectitude or material values--constitutes a "pragmatic revolutionary style" which is consistently displayed in Col. Qadhdhafi's two speeches. It would be expected that matters pertaining to other values, such as technology (Skill), economic (Wealth), education (Enlightenment), and religion and

⁴A majority of references to Power in both speeches related to negative investments of Power, i.e., an actor seeking to reduce another actor's influence.

⁵See, for example, Dominguez and Lerner in Lasswell, et al., (1977).



NOTE: See Appendix C for detailed data.

Figure 3-2. Value Emphasis in Speeches Analyzed
Arrows and numbers in *italics* indicate correlations.

morality (Rectitude) will not be of significant interest to Col. Qadhdhafi. On the other hand, his emphasis on Power and Well-Being would suggest that his primary concerns as a decision-maker will be in the military, security, and political arenas.

3.5.2 Value Emphases of President Sadat: The Moral Leader.

President Sadat differed far more in the value emphasis between his two selected speeches than did Col. Qadhdhafi; the correlation coefficient for the May Day address and the June 5th address was only .40. Of the PEWBSARD value categories, Power was consistently the most frequently mentioned, although it can hardly be described as dominant. The Rectitude values were also cited frequently in both speeches, Enlightenment values were cited frequently in the May Day address but were not mentioned in the June speech, while Respect values were frequently cited in June but less frequently in May. It appears that President Sadat displays different value emphases--and hence different leadership styles--in different contexts. The concern with Power, Rectitude, and, to a lesser degree, Respect, would suggest a basic style which can be described as "moral leadership." Matters of power and influence, prestige, and morality would probably be of greatest interest to President Sadat; economics and technology would be of considerably less interest. In analyzing an individual as complex as Sadat, however, additional research involving the analysis of additional verbal material would be necessary to verify these tentative findings.

3.5.3 Qadhdhafi and Sadat: Comparison

In comparing the four speeches analyzed in this trial application of value analysis, the highest correlations of value emphasis were obtained between the June 11th speech of Col. Qadhdhafi and the remaining three speeches. The subject of the June 11th address was the elimination of foreign imperialism from Arab lands; the speech was dominated by references to Power values and, to a much lesser extent, by references to Well-Being, Respect, Enlightenment, and Rectitude. The analogous Sadat speech, delivered six days earlier, was similar (correlation coefficient of .71), but indicated the following differences:

- Wealth values effectively substitute for Enlightenment values;
- lessened emphasis on Well-Being values; and
- significantly greater emphasis on Respect and Rectitude values.

The May Day speech, in which Sadat presented his view of the world situation, was also similar to Qadhdhafi's June 11th address in its value emphases (correlation coefficient of .69), with the following differences:

- significantly greater emphasis on the Enlightenment and Rectitude values;
- lessened emphasis on Well-Being values; and
- greater emphasis on Affection and Wealth.

It appears that the June 11th address Col. Qadhdhafi may include a "core" set of value emphases broadly applicable to charismatic, authoritarian leaders in many Arab or Third World countries. This core value emphasis is combined in the case of Anwar Sadat with flexibility in leadership style, by a lessened interest in Well-Being (i.e., security, safety), and by a greater emphasis on morality and, to a lesser degree, materialism. The core value emphasis was reflected with relative inflexibility in the case of Col. Qadhdhafi, who displayed a high degree of consistency in both speeches in terms of value patterns.

3.5.4 Comparison of Lasswell Application to Subjective Analysis.

The application of Lasswell value analysis to the April 20th address of Col. Qadhdhafi differed greatly from the application of subjective analysis by a retired intelligence professional described in Paragraph 3.2. In approach, the application of Lasswell value analysis can best be described as inductive, constructing an analysis from the component pieces of evidence, as opposed to the intelligence professional's deductive, holistic approach. In terms of findings, the following similarities should be noted:

- both the subjective analysis and the value analysis agreed that Col. Qadhdhafi was interested in doing "what is best" for Libya--but the value analysis refined "what is best" as security and excluded material benefits as part of what Qadhdhafi believes is important;
- both the subjective analysis and the value analysis agreed that Col. Qadhdhafi is pragmatic, in the sense that ideology--Rectitude--was not of central concern to him;

- both the subjective analysis and the value analysis agreed that Col. Qadhdhafi expects only the worst--i.e., negative value investments--from the West.

The application of value analysis, however, provided a meaningful organizational framework that changed the emphasis placed on certain elements at the address. Specifically:

- value analysis placed emphasis on the perceived benefits (value investments) coming to Libya from the USSR, e.g., Well-Being, Respect, and Affection;
- value analysis placed greater emphasis on the perceived loss of values by Arabs, Libya, and progressive forces caused by the United States--in other words, explaining Qadhdhafi's rationale for wishing to take power away from the United States; and
- value analysis placed emphasis on Col. Qadhdhafi's concern with Power values, which is somewhat muted in the subjective analysis.
- value analysis brought out very clearly the anti-PL0 element in Qadhdhafi's speeches, something easily missed in a holistic approach by an analyst.

3.6 IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE ANALYSIS OF VERBAL CONTENT FOR ABI

As noted earlier, the findings of the trial application value analysis to verbal content must be regarded as tentative; ideally, a much larger sample of speeches for both individuals should be analyzed to provide findings of acceptable experimental validity. Based on the trial application, however, certain tentative conclusions can be identified. First, Lasswell appears to be correct in stating that at least one type of individual trait relevant to political culture and perceptions--the emphasis an individual places on given values--is "hidden" in verbal content and can be revealed through the

application of value analysis. Hermann (1980) finds evidence that the amount of interest a decision-maker brings to a given policy area is a major predictive element in his or her future actions in that policy area; it can be hypothesized that the same principle is true for value categories. Thus, a decision-maker who places little emphasis on Wealth--material values--is unlikely to play an active role in economic matters; a decision-maker who displays little concern with Rectitude matters (either his own or that of others) is unlikely to be deterred from acting by appeals based on religion, international law, or generally accepted standards of fairness and morality. On the other hand, a decision-maker who places great emphasis on Respect values in public statements will likely evidence a concern with the attributes of status and appropriate honors (e.g., he or she may worry about the shape of a conference table); a decision-maker who displays a relatively high concern about Rectitude might be likely to shelter a deposed Shah as a matter of principle.

A second tentative conclusion is that the potential existence of leadership "styles" based on value emphasis may be a major asset in analysis, particularly for lesser-known target individuals. Once a set of styles has been defined, rapid association of a style and a target should be possible through value analysis as soon as a relatively small sample of verbal content is available.⁶

To summarize, Lasswell value analysis of verbal content has the capability of organizing data in order to focus on elements of verbal content that may reveal policy-relevant decision-maker traits. It can not provide the full range of detail needed for ABI, but it may make a substantial contribution to the ABI inputs on target individuals.

⁶In this respect, the use of value analysis derived leadership types would be similar to the use of the CIA's PAS technique, which classifies individuals according to a set of personality traits.

SECTION FOUR

VALUE ANALYSIS APPLIED POLICY ACTIONS:
REPORTED ACTIONS OF COL. AL-QADHDHAFI AND PRESIDENT AS-SADAT

SECTION 4

VALUE ANALYSIS APPLIED POLICY ACTIONS: REPORTED ACTIONS OF COL. AL-QADHDHAFI AND PRESIDENT AS-SADAT

4.0 GENERAL

To investigate the application of Lasswell value analysis to reported policy actions of target decision-makers, a trial application of this technique was performed using the actions of Col. Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi and President Anwar as-Sadat reported by FBIS Daily Reports - Middle East and North Africa during the three months from October 26, 1979 through January 26, 1980.

4.1 NATURE OF THE SAMPLE

FBIS coverage of foreign news sources provided a rich source of data on the reported actions of Col. Qadhdhafi and President Sadat during the three months under examination. In addition, FBIS coverage also reported a number of actions taken by the Libyan and Egyptian regimes which implicitly required actions by the respective leaders of those countries, such as severance of diplomatic relations, providing assistance to foreign countries and actors, etc. The period was of particular interest to observation of Muslim leaders, since these three months witnessed the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran

and the taking of hostages by Iranian revolutionaries, and the invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR. FBIS coverage of the activities of Col. Qadhdhafi included a gap in mid-November, apparently due to a hiatus in activity on the part of Col. Qadhdhafi. In total, 31 policy actions of Col. Qadhdhafi were identified and analyzed; 60 policy actions of President Sadat were identified and analyzed.

4.2 APPLICATION OF LASSWELL VALUE ANALYSIS: METHODOLOGY

The works of Harold Lasswell and his colleagues provided less guidance on the methodology to be used in applying value analysis to policy actions than was provided on the application of value analysis to verbal content. Lasswell's final work on the topic of value analysis, published in 1977, argued that such analysis was feasible and suggested some possible directions for further research.¹ The same work also provided examples of the application of value analysis for the comparative assessment of government performance in making policy directed toward economic, political, and social development.² Specifically quantitative applications of value analysis applied to policy actions, however, were not provided in this work. In practice, however, it was found to be possible to use the same general coding scheme for policy actions described in Section 3 as applicable to policy statements. To perform the coding, only the stated actions (or implied actions) of the decision-maker and the explicitly stated conditions, expectations, or other qualifying information contained in FBIS coverage of Qadhdhafi and Sadat were analyzed; the details of the coverage (including the detailed content of reported public

¹Lasswell in Lasswell, et al. (1977).

²See, especially, Dominguez in Lasswell, et al. (1977).

speeches) were treated as extraneous. This "purified" coverage of policy actions was then translated into the form of value transactions using the PEWBSARD coding scheme. To use as a Value Dictionary for coding events, the WEIS events/actions coding scheme was redefined in value analysis terms and expanded to include certain types of policy action not included in the original WEIS events list (e.g., engaging in public prayer). Although coding is relatively rapid, the same problems for coder consistency and requirements for an expanded value dictionary existed as for value analysis of speeches.

4.3 ANALYSIS VALUE EMPHASIS AND PERSONAL STYLE

The values were tabulated in terms of values invested by and values received by each of the leaders, and values invested/received in the dyads coded which did not involve the two leaders directly. These latter dyads are ones reflected integrally in the actions being reported, but ancilliary to rather than part of the leader dyads. The list of all coded actions for Sadat and for Qadhdhafi is given in Appendix D. These actions are analyzed in three ways: in terms of numbers of values invested and received (paragraph 4.3.1); in terms of positive and negative investments in foreign action targets (paragraph 4.3.2); and in terms of goal tree construction (paragraph 4.4).

4.3.1 Numbers of Values Invested and Received

The numbers of values invested and received are summarized in Figure 4-1. Appendix E provides detailed tabulations. A first and rather striking pattern is that nobody invests any negative values in either Sadat or Qadhdhafi. This suggests one immediate consideration in the use of value analysis coding from a source such

Positive Values	Which				
	Sadat Invests	Qadhdhafi Invests	Sadat Receives	Qadhdhafi Receives	Other Dyads Send and Receive
P	15	17	5	0	13
E	27	25	11	11	10
W	2	0	0	0	8
B	1	5	2	0	7
S	3	1	0	0	6
A	14	4	28	22	6
R	22	24	37	50	5
D	1	9	18	17	3
Unspecified	0	0	0	0	2
TOTAL	85	85	101	100	60
Negative Values					
P	3	4	0	0	10
E	0	1	0	0	1
W	1	0	0	0	2
B	0	0	0	0	6
S	0	0	0	0	1
A	1	0	0	0	4
R	3	5	0	0	9
D	6	3	0	0	4
Unspecified	0	0	0	0	1
TOTAL	14	13	0	0	39

FIGURE 4-1. VALUE PATTERN SUMMARY (EXPRESSED AS %)

as the FBIS. The reports which are the basis of the coding generally originate in the country ruled by the subject of the analysis--and in authoritarian countries such as Egypt and Libya, this means that one will probably seldom find anyone described as investing negative values in the leader. This is similar to the situation found in coding the speeches in the preceding section--in one of those, Sadat referred to the expulsion of the Arab League by Egypt, but not to the expulsion of Egypt by the Arab League. The high correlation of values received by the two leaders (Figure 4-2) thus appears subject to strong cultural environment influences--particularly press/government relationships.

Other patterns characteristic of these two leaders appear to be strongly conditioned by their cultural environment. A look at the values invested by Sadat and Qadhdhafi makes evident at a glance what is made explicit in Figure 4-2--the high correlation (.90) between them in terms of values invested. Sadat puts a bit more emphasis on affection (friendship, loyalty), Qadhdhafi on rectitude (moral virtues, righteousness), but there is really no significant difference between them. This suggests that perhaps a fairly rigid pattern of value investments is culturally forced upon charismatic leaders of underdeveloped, socialistic, Third World Arab Moslem nations. Determining just what the qualifying descriptors of such an environment are requires comparative analysis with a number of leaders from other countries and cultures; the antagonisms and differing East-West orientations of Sadat and Qadhdhafi do not show through in this particular aspect of value analysis. (They do show through in other analytic approaches discussed in subsequent paragraphs).

Figure 4-2 - Correlation of Value Patterns

	Si	Qi	Sr	Qr	So	Qo	Tot
Si		<u>.90</u>	.68	.65	.57	-.01	.49
Qi	--		.62	.65	.50	.16	.50
Sr	--	--		---	.19	-.26	.07
Qr	--	--	--		.10	-.23	.00
So	--	--	--	--		.15	
Qo	--	--	--	--	--		
Tot	--	--	--	--	--	--	

Si = Values Sadat invests
 Qi = " Qadhdhafi "
 Sr = Sadat receives
 Qr = " Qadhdhafi "
 So = invested and received by dyads
 not including Sadat in the analysis
 of his actions.
 Qo = same as So but for Qadhdhafi
 Tot = sum of So and Qo
 numbers in matrix = correlation values

For the value analysis to be useful for ABI purposes, patterns must appear which differentiate between leaders in terms of values which may be characteristic of different courses of action and perceptions. This appears likely from the data developed and consideration of other leader-culture characteristics. The leader investment patterns for Sadat and Qadhdhafi are very heavily weighted to a few values--enlightenment, respect (almost 50% to these two) and power values. Leaders from other cultures would be expected to put more emphasis on wealth and welfare, or perhaps in some cases (e.g., Soviet Bloc countries) on rectitude. Differences on orientation in power values of this nature could differentiate between possible courses of action--note how very different the patterns are for Sadat and Qadhdhafi versus the patterns for the dyads of which they were not a part.

Also of interest is comparison of value patterns of speeches with value patterns of actions. In terms of overall values reflected, there was no significant correlation (.62, .31 between Sadat's two speeches and his actions; .44, .10 for Qadhdhafi's). Of more interest and potential utility, and not accomplished in this study, would be analysis of action patterns following speeches, particularly of changes in action patterns following speeches.

4.3.2 Positive and Negative Investments in Foreign Actor Targets.

Figure 4-3 summarizes the positive/negative value investment patterns applied by Sadat and Qadhdhafi to foreign actors. This figure indicates that these two have entirely different sets of foreign actors as recipients of values, and that Qadhdhafi is much more "black and white" in his actions than Sadat in terms of investing only negative or only positive values in an actor. While Figure 4-3 reflects only

Figure 4-3. Positive/Negative Value Investment Patterns to Foreign Actors

Investment By

Recipient Actor	Negative Only Sadat Qadh.	Negative and Positive Sadat Qadh.	Positive Only Sadat Qadh.
Palestinians		Q	S
PLO	Q		
Al-Fatah	Q		
Begin		S	
Israel, Israeli Representative		S	
USSR, its representatives		S	
U.S., its representatives			S
U.S. hostages, Iran			Q
Peoples Republic of China			
Arab rejectionist States	S		
Khomeini, his regime*		S	
Rhodesian regime	S		
Sudan, its representatives			
Shah of Iran, supporters		S	
Afghan rebels			S
Rhodesian Patriotic Front			S
Moslem Oil States			
Anti-Fatah dissidents,			Q
reluctant actors			Q
Officials of Leftist			Q
governments			
Nigerians			S
Foreign Press			S
Others			S
	2	5	8
	3	1	6

*Only positive investment is of enlightenment.

22 actors, it reflects the investment of 146 values in 73 transactions, two thirds of them by Sadat. This is enough to indicate a focus by Qadhdhafi on PLO related and leftist Third World regimes, while Sadat displays much more Catholic interests. Analysis over a period of several years rather than three months would give a much better picture, but it is apparent from even this three month period that these two leaders have quite different foreign actor targeting patterns. Such patterns, particularly when extended more broadly based on analysis of longer periods, should be helpful in either framing or differentiating among relevant alternative perceptions and courses of action held by or planned by these leaders.

4.4 VALUE ANALYSIS AND THE FORMULATION OF GOAL TREES

A unique aspect of the value analysis of policy actions is that it identified which actors specifically benefitted in what manner from actions taken by the target decision-maker, and which actors were the subject of attempts by the target decision-maker to deprive them of values. In effect, the application of Lasswell value analysis to the policy actions highlighted the response to Lasswell's classic question, "who gets what, when, and how?" which he viewed as the essence of political goals.³ By presenting the value transaction dyads in which the target individual is the principal actor (either directly or indirectly), the analyst can quickly identify the value preferences of the target decision-maker in terms of what he or she actually provides to other actors. A sample table of such dyads, compiled for Col. Qadhdhafi's and President Sadat's policy actions during the three months under investigation is provided in Figures 4-4 and 4-5. A further iteration of the analysis is the formulation of

³Lasswell (1936) POLITICS: Who Gets What, When, How?

FIGURE 4-4. WHAT DOES COL. QADHDHAFI INVEST? IN WHOM?

Synopsis of policy action value transactions in which Col. Qadhdhafi was the principal actor.

VALUE	RECIPIENTS OF + VALUE	RECIPIENTS OF - VALUE
POWER	Libyan security forces (including urban militia, the armed forces, etc.) (3)	Palestinians (1)
	Libyan state authorities (3)	People's Republic of China (1)
	Libyan envoy (1)	Al-Fatah (2)
	Moslem oil states (1)	
	Anti-Fatah dissidents and the Palestinian "revolutionary committees" (2)	
ENLIGHTENMENT	Domestic revolutionary cadres (2)	
	Libyan security forces (2)	
	Moslem oil states (1)	
	Foreign diplomats (1)	
	Officials of leftist governments (e.g., Algeria, Syria, Grenada, Guyana) (5)	
	Foreign press (3)	
	Palestinians (1)	
WEALTH		
WELL-BEING	U.S. hostages in Iran (1)	Libyan citizens (1)
	Palestinian "revolutionary committees" (1)	Palestinians (1)
SKILL	Libyan armed forces (1)	-

FIGURE 4-4. (continued) WHAT DOES COL. QADHDHAFI INVEST? IN WHOM?

VALUE	RECIPIENTS OF + VALUE	RECIPIENTS OF - VALUE
AFFECTION	Algerian regime (1) Anti-Fatah groups (1)	-
RESPECT	Officials of leftist gov- ernments (9) Himself (2) Domestic revolutionary cadres (4) Palestinians (1) Anti-Fatah groups (2)	The PLO (1) People's Republic of China (1) Al-Fatah (2)
RECTITUDE	Domestic revolutionary cadres, institutions (3) Himself (2) Anti-Fatah groups (1)	The PLO (2)

Figure 4-5. WHAT DOES PRESIDENT SADAT INVEST? IN WHOM?

Synopsis of policy action value transactions in which President Sadat was the principal actor.

VALUE	RECIPIENTS OF + VALUE	RECIPIENTS OF - VALUE
POWER	Egyptian army (1)	Egyptian army (1)
	Members of the Egyptian public (incl. scientists, engineers, flood victims, etc.) (5)	National Democratic Party officials (2)
		Prime Minister Begin (1)
	Egyptian government officials (incl. press officials, local officials in the Sinai, etc.) (7)	
	National Democratic Party (NDP) officers (3)	
	Prime Minister Begin (1)	
	Israel, Israeli officials (2)	
	United States (1)	
	USSR (1)	
	Others (2)	
ENLIGHTENMENT	Egyptian army (1)	
	Members of the Egyptian public (6)	
	Egyptian government officials (2)	
	NDP officers (4)	
	Prime Minister Begin (2)	
	Israel, Israeli officials (4)	
	President Carter (1)	
	United States (3)	
	USSR (1)	
	Shah of Iran (3)	
	Khomeini regime (2)	
	Afghan rebels (2)	
	Other foreign actors, press (8)	

FIGURE 4-5. (continued). WHAT DOES SADAT INVEST? IN WHOM?


VALUE	RECIPIENTS OF + VALUE	RECIPIENTS OF - VALUE
WEALTH	Members of Egyptian public (1)	Members of Egyptian public (1)
	Others (1)	Egyptian government officials (1)
WELL-BEING	Members of Egyptian public (2)	-
	Shah of Iran, his supporters (2)	
SKILL	NDP officials (3)	-
	Prime Minister Begin (1)	
AFFECTION	Egyptian army (1)	Khomeini regime (1)
	Members of Egyptian public (1)	Sudan (1)
	Egyptian government officials (1)	
	Prime Minister Begin (6)	
	President Carter (2)	
	United States (2)	
	Individual Americans, other than President Carter (1)	
	Sudanese government, officials (2)	
	Shah of Iran (1)	
	Rhodesian Patriotic Front (1)	
	Other foreign actors (3)	
RESPECT	Egyptian army (2)	USSR (1)
	Members of Egyptian public (2)	Khomeini (1)
	Egyptian government officials	Rhodesian regime (1)
	NDP officials (1)	Sudan (1)
	Prime Minister Begin (6)	Arab "rejectionist states" (1)
	Israel, Israeli officials (3)	
	President Carter (2)	
	United States (1)	
	Individual Americans, other than President Carter (2)	

FIGURE 4-5. (continued). WHAT DOES SADAT INVEST? IN WHOM?

VALUE	RECIPIENTS OF + VALUE	RECIPIENTS OF VALUE
RESPECT	USSR (1) Other foreign actors (11)	
RECTITUDE	Rhodesian Patriotic Front (1) Other foreign actor (1)	Prime Minister Begin (1) Israel, Israeli officials (1) USSR (2) Khomeini regime (3) Rhodesian regime (1) Arab "rejectionist states" (1)

goal-trees from these dyads, accomplished by using the principal actor as the central figure in the goal-tree diagram, using other actors as peripheral components of the model, and using the value transactions as connecting indicators of interaction between the actors. In this manner, "goals" are defined as the transmission of values from one actor to another, as was illustrated in the examples provided in Section 2 of this report.

4.4.1 Qadhdhafi's Goal Trees. The goal tree for Col. Qadhdhafi, derived from the analysis of value transactions involving him as either the direct primary actor or the indirect instigator of the transaction is provided in Figure 4-6. It notes that he directly provided value benefits to the Libyan security forces (Power, Enlightenment, and Skill), to the Libyan state authorities and domestic revolutionary cadres (Power, Enlightenment, Respect, and Rectitude), to officials of leftist states and anti-Fatah organizations (Power, Enlightenment, Affection, Respect, and Rectitude), and to himself (Respect and Rectitude). He expected these beneficiaries to give positive values to domestic and Palestinian revolutionary committees and to himself. In contrast, the principal target for his attempts to employ negative values (i.e., sanctions) during this three-month period was the Palestine Liberation Organization; lesser targets (in terms of frequency of action directed against them) were the Palestinian people, the People's Republic of China, Egypt, and Libyan citizens. With some minor exceptions (notably the inclusion of the United Nations and Western journalists as targets of negative values), the Palestine Liberation Organization was also the expected target of Qadhdhafi's indirect policy actions. In effect, during the three-month period, Qadhdhafi's goal-trees exhibit a preference for:



*Includes Palestinian Revolutionary Committees.

FIGURE 4-6. COL. QADHDHAFI GOAL TREES DERIVED FROM POLICY ACTION DYADS

- providing benefits for revolutionary regimes and groups, with some expectation of receiving benefits in return; and
- directing sanctions, directly and indirectly, against other, non-Western institutions, including Communist China, the PLO, and his own citizens (if they failed to take actions he urged upon them).

With the exception of single actions directed against Egypt and the UN, Qadhdhafi's goal trees did not reflect any tendency for taking action against the West. In light of his militantly anti-imperialist rhetoric, this lack of action against the West and emphasis on actions against other radical actors was unexpected.

4.4.2 Sadat's Goal Tree.

Anwar as-Sadat's goal tree derived from his actions during this three-month period indicates considerable cognitive complexity, as illustrated in Figure 4-7. The principal beneficiaries of his policy actions in value terms are the Egyptian people and the Egyptian state, which both receive a full range of his ability to provide PEWBSARD values. Other major beneficiaries include the National Democratic Party (both directly from Sadat and indirectly through the Egyptian state) and the Muslim rebels in Afghanistan (both directly from Sadat and indirectly through the Egyptian people). Of particular interest is his expectation that Israel can be used to indirectly provide benefits to the Palestinian people and his expectation that the Egyptian army can be used to indirectly attack the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The goal tree also indicates a tendency for Sadat to maintain personal relationships of affection and respect, and antipathy towards various foreign actors, effectively




FIGURE 4-7. SADAT GOAL TREES DERIVED FROM POLICY ACTION DYADS

divorced from the actions of the Egyptian state (e.g., his personalized relationships with the United States, the Khomeini regime, and Israel). Finally, the goal tree illustrates the complexity of Sadat's relationships with various actors by noting that he is capable of both giving power to and removing power from the Egyptian army, and to the National Democratic Party.

4.4.3 Comparison of the Sadat and Qadhdhafi Goal Trees.

The two goal trees derived from value analysis of the policy actions of President Sadat and Col. Qadhdhafi graphically depict the differences between who is attempting to invest what in whom. Only three actors appear in both goal trees: the Palestinians (as a people), Egypt, and Libya (i.e., one of the "rejectionist states" in Sadat's goal tree); both the directness and the nature of the value investments to these three actors differ widely between the two leaders. Other noteworthy differences include:

- differences in value investments offered by the two leaders to their respective citizens;
- differences in value investments offered by the two leaders to the security forces of their respective nations;
- differences in cognitive complexity (Qadhdhafi's goal tree is less complex in structure than Sadat's possibly as a function of Qadhdhafi's stricter adherence to a simplifying ideological perspective).

4.4.4 The Goal Trees and Politics.

The goal trees produced through the application of value analysis to three months of policy actions reported by Col. Qadhdhafi and President Sadat do not provide the full range of information

required for the probabilistic prediction of courses of action by the two decision-makers through POLITICS. The goal trees succeed in illuminating the value preferences of the two leaders for the somewhat narrow range of situations encountered during the three months, and they may have a general applicability for a wider range of situations not encountered during this time period. For example, Sadat's goal tree suggests that he might cease to invest values to the advantage of Israel if Israel firmly denied his expectation of eventually providing Well-Being and Power to the Palestinians. On the other hand, if two value goals of either decision-maker were to conflict--e.g., if Third World leftist regimes were to unanimously support the Palestine Liberation Organization, contrary to the value preferences of Col. Qadhdhafi, the goal trees would be unable to indicate which valued goal the decision-maker would choose (e.g., would Col. Qadhdhafi eliminate his support for the leftist regimes or eliminate his struggle against the PLO?). To resolve this type of question, it is necessary to indicate relative goal preferences among the goals illustrated, such as whether Sadat views it as more important to provide benefits to the Egyptian people or the National Democratic Party, or whether Qadhdhafi views it as more important to provide Power to the Libyan security forces or to the Libyan state and revolutionary institutions. At present, this is an area where subjective interpretation of value preferences is required, thus leading to alternative goal trees based on the analysts' different views on the importance of various goals to the decision-maker. Given a larger data base, however (such as the analysis of policy actions over several years), greater objectivity may be obtained for responding to this issue.

A second problem inherent in the goal trees derived from the value analysis interpretation of three months of policy action is that it represents the value and goal preferences during a relatively limited time frame. Thus, the goal trees produced a "snapshot" of the value preferences of Col. Qadhdhafi and President Sadat which may not be applicable to other points in time. For example, Col. Qadhdhafi's sudden and intense antipathy to the Palestine Liberation Organization might not have appeared if his policy actions in the spring of 1979 were subjected to value analysis. The determination of which elements of the goal tree were present over time as opposed to transitory and present only during a given crisis or situation would again require analysis of a considerably longer time-set of policy actions than that attempted during this exploratory study.

4.4.5 Problems of Coding and Interpretation of Value-Based Goal Trees.

In addition to the problem areas cited above, there remain two additional areas which would have to be assessed in making Lasswell value analysis compatible with the goal-tree structure required for POLITICS and ABI. First, the present method of constructing goal trees from value analysis of policy actions encounters a problem of effectively coding contingent actions (e.g., Egypt will provide overflight authority to the U.K. (Power) if the Rhodesian negotiators successfully complete their tasks, but will not do so if the negotiations collapse), and policy actions which exclude certain value investments (e.g., Libya will no longer provide military assistance to the rebel forces in Chad, or, in value terms, excludes investment of Wealth to rebel forces). A consistent and internally logical method of transforming these policy actions into goal tree components must be incorporated

if Lasswell value analysis is to be used to create useful goal trees for the POLITICS process. This does not appear to be a major problem. It can probably be accomplished by formatting adaptations which would, however, have to be coordinated with the author of POLITICS.

The second difficulty involved in the use of Lasswell value analysis in ABI is the interpretation of value transactions into real-world terms, useful for the national security analyst's function. In reviewing the goal tree for Col. Qadhdhafi depicted in Figure 4-6, for example, an analyst would find it difficult to determine whether Qadhdhafi threatened Libyan citizens, arrested them, or killed them: all three actions are coded as an investment of negative Well-Being in value terms. The fact that the goal tree also indicates that Col. Qadhdhafi expects the Libyan citizens to contribute value investments to the Libyan security forces would suggest that arresting or executing the citizens is not a likely interpretation; however, the value transaction itself lacks sufficient specificity to define exactly how Col. Qadhdhafi expects to lessen the Well-Being of the citizens. Possible means of addressing the problem of specificity and interpretation of value analysis include expanding on the PEWBSARD categories to provide greater detail in the depiction of value transactions, or providing an issue-specific goal tree which details the exact nature of the policy action and a more generalized goal tree which uses the PEWBSARD coding scheme to provide an overview of a target subjects goals, values, expectations, and perceptions.

SECTION FIVE

VALUE ANALYSIS: GATE HYPOTHESES

SECTION 5

VALUE ANALYSIS: GATE HYPOTHESES

5.0 GENERAL

Hopple (1978) notes that research in ABI methodologies "requires a series of maps".¹ Value analysis is a technique for creating cognitive maps which Hopple considers to have excellent potential for ABI.² However, in order to provide confirmation of utility, the ABI Research Design calls for the validation of each ABI technique developed against a short sequence of gate hypotheses. These gate hypotheses are designed to cause each project to demonstrate that the techniques being developed have a sound theoretical and empirical basis, make use of valid, replicable procedures in a laboratory (or other non-operational--e.g., academic--environment), and, when appropriate, can also be used effectively and reliably in the operational environment. For a study such as this one, three "gates" were established. These required support of hypotheses which establish:

- Gate 1. The existence of a cognitive phenomenon potentially useful for ABI (two relevant hypotheses covered in paragraph 5.1).

¹Referred to as CP³, Command Psychophysiology.

²P. 117; based, however, on Rokeach's work. Section 2 explains why Lasswell was chosen for this study.

Gate 2. The feasibility of converting the cognitive phenomenon into inferences concerning intentions and perceptions under non-operational conditions (two relevant hypotheses covered in paragraph 5.2).

Gate 3. The operational feasibility and utility of the ABI process using the techniques developed to provide inferences as to intentions and perceptions (the study of value analysis has not yet reached this stage.)

5.1 GATE 1: THE EXISTENCE OF A COGNITIVE PHENOMENON POTENTIALLY USEFUL FOR ABI.

Two hypotheses relevant to this gate have been developed. They, and the status of their validation, are given in the following paragraphs.

5.1.1 Existence of a Cognitive Phenomenon of Potential Utility to ABI.

Hypothesis: If textual statements or actions are coded by transacted values in terms of Lasswell's values of power, enlightenment, wealth, skill, well-being, affection, respect, and rectitude, then it is possible to derive unique and meaningful information therefrom with respect to the originator of the text.

Validation Status: The Lasswell value analysis technique was demonstrated in Arora and Lasswell (1969), Namenwirth and Lasswell (1970), and Lasswell, et al (1977), as discussed in paragraph 2.1. These works demonstrated the existence of potential utility for value analysis in the analysis of policy-maker texts and, in the case of the last work cited, expressed opinions with respect to and some

application (by Dominguez) to policy actions. The application of this technique to policy actions is considered unwarranted by Namenwirth, who parted from Lasswell in this respect. As brought out in Section 4, the results of this project suggest that meaningful results can be gained from application of value analysis to policy actions. The manner of application is different from that discussed in the cited works, and with Namenwirth. Validation of the applicability to policy actions will require analysis covering several leaders from each of several cultures over a longer time span. The use of value analysis as discussed in Lasswell or Rokeach (e.g., Rokeach, 1973), involves, however, certain assumptions which limit its validity for various applications.

The basic assumption behind the use of value analysis is that decision-makers base their policy-relevant behavior largely on value preferences which exhibit considerable consistency over time. Various researchers have made varying claims concerning the extent to which values are held by an individual consistently: Rokeach, for example, argued that value preferences of an individual do not change substantially at all--i.e., the values instilled in an individual during childhood and adolescence remain in effect throughout adulthood. Lasswell and his students, in contrast, believed that the values held by an individual could change, even as an adult, but that such changes in value preferences usually related to the means preferred to achieve specific end-goals, and not changes in the end-goals themselves. Research in political socialization does not provide a simple answer to this question: most studies have concentrated on childhood and adolescent learning experiences in the belief that such experiences shape life-long values relevant to policy-making, but a few studies have argued that such early experiences are too divorced from

concerns of public policy to directly affect the policy-relevant values held in later years. In any case, ABI is concerned with discerning the values displayed over time by an individual as a decision-maker without necessarily relating them to childhood and adolescent preferences. A second issue in this basic assumption is whether the values exhibited in policy statements and policy actions are truly the values held by the decision-maker who made the statements of the actions. This issue divided Lasswell and Nemenwirth and ended their collaboration; Lasswell's position was that value analysis reveals underlying value preferences which are partially hidden by rhetoric or by the effects of bureaucratic politics in shaping policy actions. For ABI purposes, this issue is better addressed in terms of noting that a decision-maker's actions have impact based on what they are, not what he might wish them to be. Cultural constraints may force him to display certain values, whether he really holds them or not. Value analysis should tell us what values to expect him to display in his actions, which is what ABI is seeking to determine. A third issue which has been raised with respect to the basic theoretical assumptions of value analysis is the extent to which personally- or group-held value preferences actually shape behavior, as opposed to such factors as group decision-making procedures, personality idiosyncracies, and psychophysiological variables which value analysis cannot address. Again, value analysis will tell us what value preferences are inherent in the decision-maker's behavior--regardless of whether these are his preferences or forced upon him. Other types of analysis may help determine which are personally held and which are culturally or otherwise forced value preferences.

5.1.2 Capability to Make Appropriate Inferences from the Cognitive Phenomenon With Consistency.

Hypothesis: If an appropriate format, procedure, and value dictionary are used in coding and analysis of Lasswell's values, then consistent and meaningful inferences can be made from appropriate speech texts and policy action chronologies.

Validation Status: This is a two part hypothesis, one part dealing with speech texts, the other with policy action chronologies. The ability to make appropriate inferences from value analysis with respect to speech texts is established without challenge in the three texts cited with respect to the preceding hypothesis. The ability to do so consistently in an ABI context, however, is subject to further development of value dictionaries and coder training as noted in paragraphs 3.4.1 and 3.4.2. The ability to make descriptive inferences from policy action information is supported in one of those texts (Lasswell, et al., 1977). The findings of this study, as noted in Section 4, tend to support Lasswell by suggesting potentially useful inferences from policy action chronologies; but as noted in paragraphs 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, and in the discussion for the preceding hypothesis, a considerably broader analysis would be required to demonstrate requisite consistency, particularly in the face of Namenwirth's dissenting views (note, however, that Namenwirth has not been introduced to the specific types of applications suggested as potentially valid by the approach taken in Section 4).

5.2 GATE 2: THE FEASIBILITY OF CONVERTING THE COGNITIVE PHENOMENON INTO INFERENCES CONCERNING INTENTIONS AND PERCEPTIONS UNDER NON-OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS.

Two hypotheses relevant to this gate have been developed. They are only partially validated in this study, as noted in paragraphs 5.2.1 and 5.2.2. General problem areas relevant to operationalizing value analysis for ABI in the context of Gate 2 hypotheses are covered in paragraph 5.2.3.

5.2.1 Use of Value Analysis With POLITICS or Other Relevant Procedures.

Hypothesis: If value analysis is used in conjunction with POLITICS or with other relevant procedures to analyze foreign decision-maker perceptions and planned courses of action, then it can provide potentially useful input to the process of determining probable foreign decision-maker perceptions and planned courses of action.

Validation Status: For ABI purposes "potentially useful" is in the context of contributing input either to the POLITICS model process in terms of its existing algorithms or, independently of POLITICS, contributing information relevant to the relative probability of various alternative perceptions or planned courses of action. Sections 2 and 4 demonstrate the manner in which value analysis can be used to construct goal trees for POLITICS--or in separate manual analyses. Dr. Jaime Carbonell commenting on an earlier version of the goal trees, has summarized the further work which would be required to incorporate value analysis into POLITICS in this manner.

"Further study showed that while this approach is in principle quite feasible, in practice it would require extending Lasswell's value dimensions to introduce (1) Time dependence, (2) finer structure in the degree of desirability for each potential transaction, and (3) integrating the value-system into the relative-importance/instrumentality encodings of the goal trees. Given additional research effort, the integration of Lasswell's theory into the POLITICS paradigm could prove quite beneficial."

As Dr. Carbonell noted, this would

"incorporate a uniform goal representation across all goals in the tree, facilitating comparisons and allowing for incremental changes by the trained decision analyst."

5.2.2 Use of Value Analysis Alone.

Hypothesis: If value analysis is used alone to analyze speech texts or action chronologies, then it can provide potentially useful inferences concerning perceptions and planned courses of action of foreign decision-makers.

Validation Status: Sections 3 and 4 demonstrate the ability to define distinct value patterns characteristic of an individual's speech or actions. The extent to which these are individual, role, or culture dependent remains to be determined by examining leaders from other cultures, and until this is done a full assessment of their utility cannot be made. In addition, note was taken earlier of the need for some further work validating earlier hypotheses with respect to consistency of coding and making of inferences. This needs to be done to insure that the value patterns being detected are characteristic of the foreign decision-makers being analyzed, rather

than being methodological inconsistencies. Generally speaking, however, the results of this study demonstrate value patterns which, when appropriately manipulated, provide probabilistic information relevant to distinguishing between appropriate alternative perceptions or planned courses of action.³

5.2.3 Operational Problem Areas.

There are essentially three operational problem areas of concern in supporting the preceding two hypotheses. First, there is the question of whether sufficient material can be obtained, in the form of directly-attributed policy statements or actions, to perform value analyses on foreign decision-makers or interest. Given the preferences of many regimes to downplay the impact of individual decision-makers on policy--e.g., the Soviet regime's emphasis on collective decision-making and the relative anonymity of the policy-making elite in Ethiopia--it is quite possible this can be a limiting factor, although examination of FBIS and other potential sources, as well as consideration of potential classified sources, suggest insufficiency of material will be rare and normally apply only to certain relative unknowns newly ascended to leadership positions. Second, as is the case with other forms of content analysis, the Lasswell value coding scheme requires a certain amount of subjective insight on the part of the coder to achieve the desired results. The word "democratic", for example, refers to several different types of value expectations. To the political theorist, "democratic" refers to a form of distributing Power resources, in which Power is shared by all citizens. Political leaders, however, frequently use "democratic" as a synonym for "Rectitude"; e.g., in the excerpt from the State of the Union message presented in Section 2, "democracy" was evidently used synonymously with "morality".

³I.e., alternative perceptions or planned courses of action which reflect differences in embedded value patterns.

In Marxist-Leninist parlance, references to "democratic" are generally associated with a specific value transaction in which Enlightenment is transferred from the masses and is transformed into Power in the hands of the leadership; e.g., "the meeting was conducted according to democratic principles" to a Marxist would mean that representatives of the people expressed their opinions and their leaders made a decision accordingly. Thus, coding specific words in the PEWBSARD coding scheme requires subjective insight into what the words mean in value terms to the speaker. If Lasswell value analysis--or any other form of content analysis--is to be used effectively in ABI, this problem of coding must be resolved to provide credibility with reference to specific targets. This problem can be minimized by developing comprehensive value dictionaries and either automating coding or using carefully training coders. The third problem is a technical goal tree related one of handling certain conditional situations in value coding. It was covered in Section 4, paragraph 4, and should not be difficult to resolve.

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APPENDIX A

TEXT OF SPEECHES USED FOR TRIAL APPLICATION OF VALUE ANALYSIS
TO VERBAL CONTENT

TEXT OF POLITICAL LECTURE BY COL. al-QADHDHAFI OF APRIL 20, 1960

- #1 The masses must be involved in politics so that their complex of fear of politics will end. The ordinary citizen is dominated by such a complex.

As you are aware, the world is divided into two parts. This is the political map of the world. But the important thing is our relations with them, since it is an established fact that the world is divided between two superpowers. We, starting with the Jamahiriya and proceeding through the Arab homeland to the Third World--if we can use such an expression--are affected by this division of the world into two blocs. The effect is not small. Indeed, it is a grave one, so much so that it is one of being and not being. How are we to shape our relations with the two superpowers? We have to analyze things to see where our interests and dignity lie.

- #2
- #3 Neither of the two superpowers in the world are Libyan, Arab, African, Asian, or Latin American. In other words, neither of the two blocs belong socially or geographically to the Third World. We have to compare the two superpowers and, on the basis of this comparison, we can determine our relations toward this or that side.

Undoubtedly, the so-called progressive forces in the Arab homeland and in the Third World in general are linked with the USSR and Eastern Europe to varying degrees. The rightist forces in the world are linked to the United States and the Western camp.

- #4 These links stem from the nature of the regimes themselves: the rightist regime automatically finds itself closer to the rightist superpower in the world. On the other hand, the progressive regime finds itself automatically drawn to the leftist forces in the world. We are talking here in general terms.

We cannot find a country like Libya becoming a friend of the United States. We have tried to be friends of the United States as we are friends of the USSR. But it was an abortive attempt and contrary to the nature of things. In order to be a friend of the United States, you must not oppose U.S. policy in the world. But U.S. policy conflicts with the liberation movement and with progressive forces in the world. Thus you are bound to clash with the United States. All the agreements you conclude with it in the offices collapse in the field.

- #5
- #6 The United States is the leader of the capitalist camp. Thus we cannot become friends with America because we fight capitalism and are its enemies. The United States is the friend of the fascist forces in the world. So, if you are opposed to the fascist forces you are bound to clash with the United States. If the United States protects and prolongs the life of reaction in the world, and if you are a progressive force opposed to reaction, then you cannot maintain relations with the United States.

- #7 If the United States exhausts Arab oil and occupies the country that withholds oil from it, then the relationship between the Arabs and the United States cannot be one of friendship.

- #8 If the United States is the one that protects the Israelis, and if you fight the Israelis, then you would be fighting the United States. You cannot fight the Israelis and at the same time be a friend of the United States. The Israelis and the Americans are one and the same thing. If Arab forces were to enter the occupied territories, they would have to expect to directly clash with the United States' forces. But if Israeli forces were to enter Arab territory, the Israelis would not expect to clash with the U.S. forces. They entered the territories of Syria and Egypt but nothing happened. They almost reached the outskirts of Damascus, but did they expect the United States to drop atom bombs on them? If we reached the outskirts of Tel Aviv, we would expect the United States to drop atom bombs on us.

- #9 The United States bases its relations with the Arabs on their submission to U.S. policies, on refraining from hostility towards the Israelis, and nonopposition to U.S. policies in the region and the world, and particularly in the Middle East. Thus to be a friend of the United States, one must accept these conditions. One has to agree with U.S. policies in the world. These policies mean everything evil. They mean capitalism, reaction, rightism, striking against peoples, the suppression of revolutions and the liquidation of the liberation movement in the world. One must refrain from opposing the spread of the U.S. octopus and U.S. spheres of influence.

INITIAL PORTION OF COL. QADHAFI'S ADDRESS AT CELEBRATIONS OF THE 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE EVACUATION OF U.S. BASES FROM LIBYA, RA'S LAMUN, LIBYA, June 11, 1980

- #1 Brothers, we are today marking the 10th anniversary of the imperialist U.S. forces' (departure) from our land. We are celebrating this 10th anniversary at a place which used to be one of the U.S. military bases in Libya.
- #2 At this place where we are gathered here today there used to be a Coast Guard base which used to direct U.S. ships in the Mediterranean.
- #3 When the Libyan revolution was staged, there used to be more than one U.S. base in Libya; in addition to Wheelus field, there used to be four other bases.
- #4 Had it not been for the revolution which was staged by the Army, we would not have been able to remove the U.S. bases from Libyan territory. The Libyan people only then realized the extent of the U.S. presence in Libya. But many peoples now have U.S. imperialism on their land; they are suffering as the Libyan people did in the past. We believe that these peoples can only rid themselves of imperialist domination by a revolution.
- #5 Now you have become convinced that these states which enjoy false independence are still in fact colonized. They think that by having a king or a president they are independent; they are mistaken. It has become apparent to you and to history that these states which are satisfied with this limited independence are still being colonized. But, brothers, despite the victory which the Libyan people scored by their revolution over the forces of colonialism, this imperialism, regrettably, has not gone away far enough.
- #6 The Libyan people expelled imperialism in 1970; the Libyans expelled U.S. imperialism in 1970 from this land. But, regrettably, it returned in 1980 to the land of Egypt. The bases which left Libya in 1970 returned to Egypt, along the Libyan-Egyptian border in 1980.
- #7 For every step forward taken by the free and honorable forces in this Arab world, lackey forces took another step backward to cancel the forward step. Thus, contradictions in the Arab homeland are aborting each other. If a progressive step is taken in an Arab area, reaction and agents--the agents of imperialism--have taken a step forward. Evidence of this can be seen here--while we are today celebrating the 10th anniversary of the eviction of the U.S. forces. We feel sad and pained because these forces are not far from us; they left Libyan territory but now they can be found on Egyptian territory. Therefore, the battle against the United States, against imperialism, as far as the Arab nation is concerned, and not only as far as the Libyan people are concerned, is still on; it has not ended. It will end when imperialism is expelled from the entire Arab homeland. The freedom of the Libyan people is threatened so long as U.S. imperialism is on Egyptian territory. But the responsibility for overthrowing treason in Egypt is not confined to the Libyan people alone. In the first place it is in the hands of the Egyptian people and the Egyptian army. It is also the responsibility of the Arab nation. Egypt has become an aggressive base against the Arab nation. But today (we declare?) our alliance with the Egyptian people and army in order to topple treason in Egypt.
- #8 We have to tell the Egyptian army that we protect its rear--the Egyptian army concentrated along the Libyan border--and we want to tell it before the whole world that we will protect its rear if it wants to topple treason in Egypt. We cannot direct our rifles against the Egyptian army if it moves to the Egyptian capital to overthrow treason. But we will be compelled to train our guns on the Egyptian army if the latter carries out the orders of agent as-Sadat by attacking Libyan territory.
- #9 The overthrow of treachery in Egypt is no longer only a task for the Arab nation; it is also a task for the Islamic nation.
- #10 Thousands of Iranians who were formerly soldiers of the Shah and members of SAVAK gangs, who returned from the United States and who fled from the onslaught of the heroic Iranian people, are now in Egypt, where they are being trained in the use of arms to subvert the Islamic people's revolution in Iran. Therefore, the Egyptian regime has become the cat-paw of world imperialism led by U.S. imperialism. It now represents a real danger to the Islamic nation. That is why it is a holy jihad task for Muslims, especially the Iranian masses, to bring down the traitorous regime in Egypt.

PRESIDENT SADAT'S ADDRESS TO THE WORKERS ON MAY DAY, 1980, AL 'ARISH, SINAI - SECTION OF ADDRESS CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

#1 We began in 1971 with the corrective revolution and what followed it. Last year we met on 1 May on the Red Sea. The most splendid achievement since that meeting is our meeting today on this land, the liberation of 80 percent of Sinai, the oil, coal, and the agricultural land. What we primarily care for is Egypt's dignity, Egypt's will, and Egypt's unity and happiness.

#2 Some of our brothers in the Arab world think that money is everything. Not at all. We will not sell one grain of sand in Sinai or anywhere in the country from north to south for all the billions of this world. The billions of petrodollars cannot buy our will. The billions of petrodollars cannot buy Egypt's conscience, honor, and will.

#3 They are saying now that we have concluded a separate agreement with Israel. Well, what are we doing now? We are currently engaged in a battle with Israel, although, as I have told you, Israel and Prime Minister Begin have faithfully fulfilled all their commitments under the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, just as Egypt has done. What is the need for the battle we are engaged in today? It is for the sake of the Palestinians, for the sake of the Arab cause. They have been trying to mislead the Arab people by saying that As-Sadat is speaking on behalf of the Palestinians. Not at all. Egypt has always had an Islamic and Arab responsibility, and what I am doing today and what Egypt is doing today in this battle is to fulfill this responsibility, whether they like it or not. Egypt's responsibility today is to place the Palestinians on the start of the sound path through autonomy so they can decide their future by themselves. I am not speaking on behalf of the Palestinians, and I do not permit anyone to speak on behalf of the Palestinians at all. Only the Palestinians themselves are entitled to do this. They must speak for themselves, talk about their land, talk about their relations with Israel.

#4 Egypt's position is clear, and I stated it in the Knesset; in the press conference in Jerusalem after my visit to the Knesset; at Camp David; while we were concluding the treaty; and while I was visiting the United States 10 days ago. I state our position today. Our position is clear--Israeli settlements on Arab territory in the West Bank and Gaza are illegitimate. Arab Jerusalem is part of the West Bank and all changes made there are illegal.

#5 Our position is clear. I said this at the Knesset and at Camp David and when we were concluding the treaty. I said this again when I visited the United States recently. I say it again today. There is no room for nonsense or waste of time. However, there are still some in the Arab world who, regrettably, exist by the illusion of leadership at some times, and by hatred, ignorance, and plotting at others. They want to distort the position of Egypt.

#6 For your information, I will reply to them, God willing. I announced Egypt's reply to the Arab's decision to withdraw the Arab League from Egypt. The reply was the announcement of the establishment of the Islamic and Arab Peoples' League. If the Arabs request that the Arab League be restored again as the league of states--the league of those who plotted against Egypt, tried to starve it and attack it--then Egypt will reject their request. This was my reply to the withdrawal of the League. I will announce Egypt's decision on 14 May, God willing, to the severance of the diplomatic relations with Egypt and the attacks and slanders against it in international and other circles.

#7 As I told you, brothers and sisters, the workers of Egypt, each of my meetings with you has always been a starting point for a new stage in the history of Egypt, its building and achievements.

PRESIDENT SADAT'S ADDRESS TO THE EGYPTIAN ARMED FORCES AT ISMAILIA, EGYPT, JUNE 5, 1980, IN CELEBRATION OF ANNIVERSARY OF
REOPENING OF SUEZ CANAL

#1 I thank God, while meeting with you today to mark this great anniversary, that great nations can turn days of mourning into days of celebration and victory. Before 1973, June used to recall pain and bitterness, and I used to suffer severely until the day of your splendid performance--your heroic performance--in October 1973. Then came 5 June 1975, on which we celebrate the reopening of the Suez Canal. It is not a celebration merely for the reopening of the canal but for a splendid battle as well. The Suez Canal was closed after 1967 and Israel used to occupy its east bank. At the time, the Israeli prime minister said that Egypt could not reopen the canal without Israel's approval and without sharing the canal tolls, as though this was an acquired right.

#2 Then came the glorious October battle. By your heroic and splendid performance, you expressed the will, history, and dignity of your people as well as the dignity of our nation. The canal was reopened in 1975 by the Egyptian people's will embodied in your heroic and splendid action which was recorded in history and studied in military institutes throughout the world.

#3 The reopening of the Suez Canal was not merely a ceremony of reopening an international passageway to facilitate navigation across continents, but, as far as we are concerned, it was a historic victory of the will of Egypt through the performance of the sons of the armed forces in an immortal battle. Therefore, the reopening of the canal must be recorded as one of the Egyptian people's battles of victory throughout history. You embodied the will of the people in this battle. For this reason, Ismailia is observing 5 June as a national holiday. The Egyptian people and you are observing 5 June as an historic day marking the triumph of the people's will through their armed forces, through your sacrifices and through eliminating every disgrace and humiliation existing before the October War in Egypt and throughout the Arab nation as well. Five June has come. As I had told you, before the October battle, the first days of June were days of anxiety as far as I, you and our people were concerned. Today and all days in the future--God willing--will be a symbol of the people's will, a symbol of the armed forces' sacrifices and of the suffering of the people and of the Arab nation.

#4 Both we and the Arabs have regained self-confidence. Moreover, the world describes the Arabs as the sixth power in the world. In view of their differences, the Arabs, as usual, have once again returned to the state of loss and fragmentation when they believed they could isolate Egypt. However, they can only isolate themselves.

#5 Egypt is building. Last year Egypt regained 80 percent of Sinai with all the oil and resources it contains. The canal opened the battle of reconstruction in every direction. All this is taking place while others in the Arab nation, east and west, are experiencing a division of their peoples. This year, 1980, we shall complete the establishment of a firm state by abolishing martial law and the extraordinary measures. We recall everything that has happened since 1914--the days of the British tutelage--until today. We shall also rectify our history. All this would not have been possible without your battle. We have rectified the history of 100 full years starting from the Al-'Urabi revolution, to the struggles of Mustafa Kamil and Muhammad Farid, to the 15 May Revolution, to the 23 July Revolution. We have rectified the entire history and all the blemishes in the behavior of the rulers of this country. We have rectified all that has tarnished our future generations with one blow, your action on 6 October 1973. Today, as I have told you, construction will be completed and a state of firm structure will be established--the state of institutions, not the rule of the individual, but the state of the constitutional institutions in which constitutional legitimacy will replace revolutionary legitimacy. Constitutional legitimacy is represented in the revolutions of 23 July and 15 May. For the sake of this, I am bringing you the love and admiration of your people.

#6 Your 23 July Revolution has eliminated foreign imperialism and the corrupt rule of the corrupt monarchy as well as the rule of the parties that participated with the imperialists in corrupting the political life in Egypt. The 15 May Revolution came to rectify the course of the 23 July Revolution. The people's will has become dominant and the people will experience security, safety, and democracy forever. For the sake of this, and when construction is completed, we must begin the phase of reconstruction of the state as the best state in the world--a state that will have prosperity and democracy and will enjoy the dignity of man.

#7 Your revolutions on 23 July and 15 May and your magnificent, heroic October 1972 battle, which crowned all this, have rectified the history of your people over the past 100 years, God willing, forever. There will be no measures contrary to the dignity of Man and there will be no violations of the security and safety of the citizens. Our slogan today and in the National Democratic Party is that there will be a happy home for every male and female citizen on the land of Egypt, that food will be within the reach of every person and that equal opportunities will be available. Each individual will be able to prove himself, build for his children and coming generations, and fulfill his duties to the State. All this would not have been possible without your magnificent action and your revolutions in July and May.

APPENDIX B

CODING OF SPEECHES BY QADHDHAFI AND SADAT

VALUE ANALYSIS CODING OF QADHDHAFI'S ADDRESS OF 20 APRIL 1980

Paragraph In Text	Conditioning* Factor(s)	Principal Actor(s)	Value Investments	Intended Recipient Actor(s)	Linkage to Next Item
#1	Mandatory Exclude, Future	Unspecified	E,P (-)B	Masses Masses	Transformation
#2	None	World	P	Two Superpowers	Expectation
	None	Two Superpowers	(-)B,B	Third World	
	Mandatory	We (Libyans)	E	We (Libyans)	Expectation
	None	We (Libyans)	A,P	A Superpower	Reciprocation
#3	None	A Superpower (USSR)	B,R	We (Libyans)	
	Mandatory	We (Libyans)	E	We (Libyans)	Expectation
#4	None	We (Libyans)	A,P	A Superpower	
	None	Progressive Forces and Regimes in the Third World	Unspec.	USSR (Leftist Forces)	Reciprocation
	None	USSR	Unspec.	Progressive Forces and Regimes in the Third World	
	None	Rightist Forces and Regimes (reaction)	Unspec.	U.S. (Rightist Superpower)	Reciprocation
	None	U.S.	Unspec.	Rightist Forces and Regimes	
#5	Excluded	Country Like Libya (Libyans)	A	U.S.	Reciprocation
	Excluded	U.S.	A	Country Like Libya (Libyans)	
	Past	We (Libyans)	A	U.S.	
		We (Libyans)	A	USSR	Reciprocation
		USSR	A	We (Libyans)	
	Past	We (Libyans)	A	U.S.	Reciprocation
	Past	U.S.	(-)D	We (Libyans)	
	If	Audience (You)	A	U.S.	Reciprocation
	Mandatory, Excluded	Audience (You)	(-)P	U.S.	
	None	U.S.	(-)P	Progressive Forces	Reciprocation
	Mandatory	Progressive Forces	(-)P	U.S.	

*Present unless otherwise indicated.

Paragraph In Text	Conditioning Factor(s)	Principal Actor(s)	Value Investments	Intended Recipient Actor(s)	Linkage to Next Item
#6	None	Capitalist Camp	P	U.S.	Reciprocation
	None	U.S.	Unspec.	Capitalist Camp	
	None	We (Libyans)	(-)P,(-)B	Capitalism	Expectation
	Excluded	We (Libyans)	A	America (U.S.)	Reciprocation
	Excluded	America (U.S.)	A	We (Libyans)	
	None	U.S.	A	Fascist Forces	
	If	Audience (You)	(-)P,(-)A	Fascist Forces	Expectation
	Mandatory	Audience (You)	(-)P,(-)A	U.S.	
	If	U.S.	B,P	Reaction (Rightists)	Expectation
	If	Progressive Forces (You)	(-)P,(-)A	Reaction (Rightists)	Expectation
#7	Excluded	Progressive Forces	A	U.S.	
	If	U.S.	(-)W	Arabs	Sequential
	If	U.S.	(-)P,(-)B	(Arabs) Country That Withholds Oil	Expectation
	Excluded	Arabs	A	U.S.	Reciprocation
#8	Excluded	U.S.	A	Arabs	
	If	U.S.	B,P	Israelis	Sequential
	If	Audience (You)	(-)P	Israelis	Expectation
	Mandatory	Audience (You)	(-)P	U.S.	
	If	Audience (You)	(-)P	Israelis	Expectation
	Excluded	Audience (You)	A	U.S.	
	If	Arab (Forces)	(-)P	Israelis	Expectation
	Future	Arab (Forces)	(-)P,(-)B	U.S. (Forces)	Reciprocation
	Future	U.S. (Forces)	(-)P,(-)B	Arab (Forces)	
	If	Israel (Forces)	(-)P,(-)B	Arabs	Expectation
	Excluded	U.S. (Forces)	(-)P,(-)B	Israel (Forces)	
	Past	Israel	(-)P,(-)B	Arabs	
	Excluded	U.S.	(-)P,(-)B	Israelis	
	If	Arabs	(-)P	Israel	
	If	U.S.	(-)P,(-)B	Arabs	
#9	None	U.S.	A	Arabs (Conservative)	Reciprocation
	None	Arabs (Conservative)	P	U.S.	Reciprocation
	None	U.S.	(-)P,(-)R	Arabs (Conservative)	Sequential
	Excluded	Arabs	(-)P	U.S.	Sequential
	Excluded	Arabs	(-)P,(-)B	Israel	
	If	Audience (You)	A	U.S.	Expectation
	Mandatory	Audience (You)	P	U.S.	Expectation
	None	U.S.	(-)D	World	
	If	Audience (You)	A	U.S.	Expectation
#9	Excluded	Audience (You)	(-)P	U.S.	

VALUE ANALYSIS CODING OF COL. QUADHDHAFI'S JUNE 11 ADDRESS

<u>Paragraph in Text</u>	<u>Conditioning Factor(s)</u>	<u>Principal Actor(s)</u>	<u>Value Investements</u>	<u>Intended Recipient Actor(s)</u>	<u>Linkage to Next Item</u>
#1	Past	Unspecified	(-)P, (-)B	United States	Expectation
	Present	We (Libyans)	R	Unspecified	
#2	Past	Libya (Monarchy)	P	U.S. Coast Guard	Reciprocal
	Past	U.S. Coast Guard	P, E	U.S. (war)ships	
#3	Past (at the time of the revolution)	Libya (Monarchy)	P	United States	Reciprocal
		United States	(-)P, (-)R	Libya (Monarchy)	
#4	If, excluded,	Libyan Army	P	Revolutionaries	Expectation
	Past, excluded	We (Libyans)	(-)P, (-)B	United States	
	Past	Unspecified	E	Libyan people	Reciprocal
	Present	Other peoples	P	United States	
	If Mandatory	United States	(-)B	Other peoples	Expectation
		Other peoples	(-)P	United States	
		Other peoples	P	Revolutionaries	
	Present	Unspecified	E	You (Libyans)	Reciprocal
		States which enjoy "false indepen- dence"	P	Unspecified	
		Unspecified	(-)P, (-)R	States which en- joy false indepen- dence*	
		Exclude	Kings and presidents	P, D, R	
#5	Present	States which enjoy false independence*	(-)E	States which en- joy false indepen- dence*	Reciprocal
		Unspecified	P	Imperialism	

Paragraph in Text	Conditioning Factor(s)	Principal Actor(s)	Value Investments	Intended Recipient Actor(s)	Linkage to Next Item
#6	Past (1970)	Libyan people	(-)P, (-)B	U.S.	Reciprocal
	Present (1980)	Egypt	P	U.S.	Reciprocal
	Present (1980)	U.S.	(-)P, (-)R	Egypt	
		Free and honorable forces in Arab homeland**	P, B, R, D	Arab area	Reciprocal
		Reaction and agents of imperialism*	(-)P, (-)B, (-)R, (-)D	Arab area	
	Present	Egypt	P	U.S. (forces)	Transformation
		U.S. (forces)	(-)B	We (Libyans)	
	If, future	Arab nation	(-)P, (-)B	U.S.	Expectation
	Exclude, future	U.S. (imperialism)	(-)P, (-)B	Arab nation	Reciprocal
	Exclude, future	Arab nation	(-)P, (-)B	U.S. (imperialism)	
	Present	U.S. forces in Egypt	(-)B	Libyan people	
	Mandatory	Egyptian army and Egyptian people	(-)P	Treason(ous regime, i.e., Sadat regime)	Sequential
	Mandatory	Arab nation	(-)P	Treason(ous regime)	Reciprocal
		Egyptian army, peo- ple, & Arab nation	D	Egyptian army, people, and Arab nation	
		Egypt	(-)B	Arab nation	
	Present	We (Libyans)	E	World	Expectation
		Egyptian army and people	P, A	We (Libyans)	Reciprocal
		We (Libyans)	P, A	Egyptian army & people	Expectation
		Egyptian army and people	(-)P	Treason(ous regime)	
#8	Mandatory	We (Libyans)	E	Egyptian Army World (2 transactions)	Expectation
		We (Libyans)	B	Egyptian army	Expectation
		Egyptian army	(-)P	Treason(ous regime)	
	If	Egyptian army	(-)P	Treason(ous regime)	Expectation
	Exclude	We (Libyans)	(-)B	Egyptian army	
	If	Egyptian army	P	President as-Sadat	Expectation
#9		Egyptian army	(-)P, (-)B	Libya	Reciprocal
	Mandatory	Arab nation	(-)P	Treason(ous regime)	Sequential
	Mandatory	Islamic nation	(-)P	Treason(ous regime)	
		Arab, Islamic nations	P	Arab, Islamic nations	Expectation
#10		Egypt	P, B, S	Shah supporters	Expectation
		Shah supporters	(-)P	Iranian revolution- aries	Sequential
		Egypt	P	World, U.S. imperial- ism	Reciprocal
		World, U.S. imperialism	(-)P, (-)B	Egypt	
		Egypt	(-)B	Islamic nation	Sequential
	If	Muslims	(-)P, (-)B	Treason(ous regime)	Reciprocal
		God	D	Muslims	

*Can be coded as Western allies in the Third World

**Can be coded as Progressive forces

VALUE ANALYSIS CODING OF PRESIDENT SADAT'S MAY 1 ADDRESS

Paragraph in Text	Conditioning Factor(s)	Principal Actor(s)	Value Investments	Intended Recipient Actor(s)	Linkage to Next Item
#1	Past Past None	We (Egyptian people) Unspecified We (Egyptian people)	Values W, P, R, D R, P, D, B	Unspecified (Egypt) Egypt Egypt	Sequential
#2	None Excluded Excluded	Arab brothers Arab brothers Unspecified (Arabs) We (Egyptian people)	W/D (-)E W D, R, P	Unspecified Arab brothers We (Egyptian people) Unspecified (Arabs)	Transformation Reciprocal
#3	None None None None None Future None None None Future Excluded Mandatory	They (Arab brothers) We (Egyptian people) Israel (& Begin) Egypt We (Egyptian people) Palestinians & Arabs They (Arab brothers) Egypt Islamic and Arab people Palestinians Sadat Palestinians	(-)E (-)P D, P D, P (-)P P, B (-)E (-)P D P S & E/P S & E/P	Unspecified Israel Egypt Israel (& Begin) Israel Palestinians & Arabs Arab people Israel Egypt Palestinians Palestinians Palestinians	Sequential Reciprocal Expectation Transformation Sequential Transformation Transformation
#4	Past Past Past None None	Sadat Sadat Sadat Egypt Egypt	E E E (-)D (-)D	Israeli kneset The press United States Israeli settlements Israeli occupation policies	Sequential Sequential Expectation Sequential
#5	Past Past Present None None None	Sadat Sadat Sadat Some Arabs Unspecified Some Arabs	E E E (-)A, (-)E, (-)B P (-)E (-)B	Kneset (Israel) United States Egypt Unspecified Some Arabs Egypt	Sequential Sequential Transformation Transformation
#6	None Past Past None If None Future, Exclude Present Future	Sadat Arabs Arabs Egypt Arabs Arab League Egypt Unspecified Sadat	E (-)A, (-)P (-)P P P, A R, D P, A (-)A, (-)P E	Some Arabs Egypt Arab League Islamic and Arab People's League Arab League Enemies of Egypt Arab League Egypt Unspecified	Sequential Reciprocal Expectation Expectation Reciprocal
#7	None None	Sadat Unspecified	E, R Values	Egyptian workers Egypt	Expectation

VALUE ANALYSIS CODING OF PRESIDENT SADAT'S JUNE 5 ADDRESS

Paragraph In Text	Conditioning Factor(s)	Principal Actor(s)	Value Investments	Intended Recipient Actor(s)	Linkage to Next Item
#1	None	Sadat	A,R	Deity	Expectation
	None	Great nations (i.e., Egypt)	(-)B,B	Great Nations (i.e., Egypt)	
	Past	Israel	(-)P	Egypt	Expectation
#2	Past, If Excluded	Egypt	P,W	Israel	Reciprocation
	Past, Excluded	Egypt	P,W	Egypt	
#3	Past	Egyptian People	P,R/P,D,S	Egyptian Army	Transformation
	Past	Egyptian Army	(-)P	Israel	Transformation
#4	Present	World	R	Egyptian Army	
	Present	Egyptian People	P,R	Egyptian Army	Transformation
#5	Present	Egyptian Army	R,D	Egyptian People, Arabs, Egyptian Army	Transformation
	Present	Egyptian People	P,R	Egyptian Army	Transformation
#6	Present	Egyptian & Arabs	R,P	Egyptians & Arabs	Sequential
	Present	World	R	Arabs	
	Present	Arabs	P/(-)P,(-)D	Arabs	Transformation
	Present	Arabs	(-)B	Egypt	Sequential
	Present	Arabs	(-)B	Arabs	
#7	Excluded	Arabs	(-)B	Egypt	
	None	Unspecified	W	Egypt	Sequential
	None	Arab Peoples	(-)P	Other Arab Leadership	
	Present	We (Egyptian People)	P	Egyptian Civil Government	
	Future	We (Egyptian People)	R,D	Egyptian People	
#8	Past	We (Egyptian People) and Egyptian Army (two transactions)	R,D	Egypt	
	Present	Unspecified	P	Egyptian Civil Government	Expectation
	Present	Unspecified	(-)P	Revolutionary Institutions	Expectation
	None	Egyptian People and Sadat (two transactions)	A,R	Egyptian Army	
	None				
#9	Past	Egyptian Army (You)	(-)P	Foreign Imperialism, Corrupt Monarchy and Political Parties	Sequential
	Past	15 May Revolutionaries	D	Egyptian Regime	Expectation
	Present and Future	Egyptian People	P/B	Egyptian People	Transformation
	Mandatory	We (Egyptian People)	P,D	Egyptian State	Transformation
		Egyptian State	W,B,R	Egyptian People	
#10	Past	Egyptian Army (You)	D	Egypt	Transformation
	Exclude	Unspecified	(-)R,(-)D	Egyptian Citizen	Expectation
	Future	Egyptian Citizen	R	Egyptian Citizen	Sequential
	Future	Egyptian Citizen	B	Family	Sequential
	Future	Egyptian Citizen	B	State	

APPENDIX C

SUMMARY VALUE ANALYSIS CODING OF SPEECHES OF
COL. AL-QADHDHAFI AND PRESIDENT AS-SADAT

SUMMARY VALUE TRANSACTIONS IN QADHIAF'S ADDRESS OF APRIL 20, 1980
(Italicized transactions are excluded transactions)

Number of Interactions	Actor Transaction Dyads	P	-P	E	-E	W	-W	B	-B	S	-S	A	-A	R	-R	D	-D	Unspec. Values
1	World-Two Superpowers	1						1	1									
1	Two Superpowers-Third World																	
3	U.S.-Libyans											2					1	
1	U.S.-Progressive Forces		1															
4	U.S.-Capitalism, reaction, Fascism, rightists	1						1					1					2
2	U.S.-Conservative Arabs		1										1		1			
5	U.S.-Arabs		3				1		3									
3	U.S.-Israel(is)	1	2					1	2								1	
1	U.S.-World																	
1	Rightists (capitalist camp)-U.S.	1																1
2	Libyans-Libyans			2														
2	Libyan-A Superpower	2											2					
3	Libyans (countries like Libya)-U.S.											2	2					
1	Libya-USSR												1					
1	Libyans-Capitalism		1						1									1
2	Progressive Forces-USSR																	
2	Progressive Forces-(you)-U.S.		1										1					
1	Progressive Forces-(you)-Reaction		1											1				
1	Conservative Arabs-U.S.	1																
4	Arabs-U.S.		1															
3	Arabs-Israel(is)		1					1										
2	Israel-Arabs		2						2									
1	Superpower (USSR)-Libyans							1							1			
1	USSR-Libya												1					1
1	USSR-Progressive Forces																	
2	Unspecified-Masses																	
8	Audience (you)-U.S.	1	2										1	3	1			
1	Audience (you)-Fascist Forces		1															
2	Audience (you)-Israelis		2															
61	DISAGGREGATED TOTAL	9	6	18	3	0	0	1	4	8	0	0	8	11	3	1	1	5
		11	7	21	4	0	0	1	5	10	0	0	10	13	4	1	1	84
	AGGREGATED		39		4		1	19			0		26		2	2	2	*101
																		* 99

*Totals do not add to 100% due to rounding.

SUMMARY VALUE TRANSACTIONS OF COL. QADHAFI'S JUNE 11 ADDRESS
(Italicized transactions are excluded transactions)

Number of Interactions	Actor Transaction Dyads	P	-P	E	-E	N	-N	B	-B	S	-S	A	-A	R	-R	D	-D	Unspec. Values
1	Libyans-Unspecified													1				
2	Libyans-United States	1	1					1	1									
2	Libyans-World			2														
1	Libyans-Egyptian Army & People	1										1						
1	Libyans-Egyptian Army			1				1	1									
1	Libya (Monarchy)-United States	1																
1	Libya (Monarchy)-United States Coast Guard	1																
1	U.S.-Libya (Monarchy)		1											1				
1	U.S.-Other Peoples							1										
1	U.S.-Egypt		1															
1	U.S.-Arab Nation	1						1						1				
2	U.S. Forces (in Egypt)-Libyans							2										
2	Egypt-United States	2						1		1								
1	Egypt-Shah Supporters	1																
1	Egypt-Imperialism	1																
1	Egypt-Islamic Nation							1										
1	Egypt-Arab Nation							1										
1	Western Allies in Third World-Themselves*					1												
1	Western Allies in Third World-Unspecified	1																
1	Western Allies in Third World-Arab Area		1					1							1		1	
1	Progressive Forces-Arab Area	1						1						1		1		
1	Egyptian Army & People-Libyans	1										1						
4	Egyptian Army (and People) - Sadat Regime		4															
1	Egyptian Army-Libya	1	1					1										
1	Egyptian Army-Sadat	1																
1	Egyptian Army, People & Arab Nation-Themselves															1		
2	Arab Nation-United States	1	1					1	1									
2	Arab Nation-Sadat (Treasonous) Regime																	
1	Arab & Islamic Nations-Themselves	1																
2	Islamic Nation/Muslims-Sadat (Treasonous) Regime		2					1										
2	Other Peoples-U.S.	1	1															
1	Other Peoples-Revolutionaries	1												1		1		
1	Kings & Presidents-Western Allies in the Third World*	1																
1	U.S. Coast Guard-U.S. Ships	1		1														
1	Shah Supporters-Iranian Revolutionaries		1															
1	World & U.S. Imperialism-Egypt		1					1								1		
1	Daily-Muslims		1															
1	Unspecified-U.S.		1					1										
2	Unspecified-Libyans			2														
1	Unspecified-Western Allies in the Third World*		1												1			
1	Unspecified-Imperialism	1																
1	Libyan Army-Revolutionaries	1																
56	DISAGGREGATED TOTAL	216	119	6	1	0	0	3	4	12	1	0	2	2	4	2	3	1
	%	20	23	7	1	0	0	4	8	15	1	0	2	2	5	2	4	1
	AGGREGATED	49		9		0		23		1		2		9		6		
	TOTAL																	81
																		97 **
																		99 **

* States which enjoy "false independence".
**% Totals do not add to 100 due to rounding.

SUMMARY VALUE TRANSACTIONS OF PRESIDENT SADAT'S MAY DAY SPEECH EXCERPT
(Italicized transactions are excluded transactions)

Number of Interactions	Actor Transaction Dyads	P	-P	E	-E	W	-W	B	-B	S	-S	A	-A	R	-R	D	-D	Unspec. Values					
2	Egypt-Israel	1	1													1							
1	Egypt-Israeli Settlements																1						
1	Egypt-Israeli Occupation Policy																1						
1	Egypt-Islamic and Arab People's League	1																					
1	Egypt-Arab League	1																					
2	Egyptian People-Egypt	1						1						1		1		1					
1	Egyptian People-Arabs	1												1									
2	Egyptian People-Israel	1	2																				
1	Sadat-Palestinians	1		1						1													
2	Sadat-Israeli Knesset			2																			
1	Sadat-the Press			1																			
2	Sadat-United States			2																			
1	Sadat-Egypt			1																			
1	Sadat-"Some Arabs"			1										1									
1	Sadat-Egyptian Workers			1																			
1	Sadat-Unspecified			1																			
1	Arabs -Themselves			1																			
1	Arabs-Egyptian People			1																			
1	Arab Brothers-Arab People			1																			
2	Arabs-Arab League	1	1									1											
1	Arabs-Egypt															1							
2	Arab Brothers-Unspecified			1																			
1	"Some Arabs"-Egypt			1										1									
1	"Some Arabs"-Unspecified			1																			
1	Arab League-Enemies of Egypt													1		1							
1	Israel-Egypt		1																				
2	Palestinians-Themselves	2		1						1													
1	Palestinians & Arabs -Themselves	1						1															
1	Islamic & Arab Peoples																						
3	-Egypt	1	1											1		1		1					
1	Unspecified-Egypt	1												1		1							
1	Unspecified-"Some Arabs"	1																					
41	DISAGGREGATED TOTAL	310	6	110	5	1	2	0	2	1	1	0	1	1	3	1	4	0	1	7	2	66	
	AGGREGATED	15	9	215	8	2	3		3	2	2	3	2	2	5	2	6	8	1	1	3	*105	
			29	24		5			6				8									3	*101

*Totals do not add to 100 due to rounding.

SUMMARY VALUE TRANSACTIONS OF PRESIDENT SADAT'S JUNE 5 ADDRESS
(Italicized transactions are excluded transactions)

Number of Inter- actions	Actor Transaction Dyads	P	-P	E	-E	W	-W	B	-B	S	-S	A	-A	R	-R	D	-D	Unspec. Values
1	Sadat-Diety											1		1				
1	Sadat-Armed Forces							1	1					1				
1	Egypt (Great Nations)-																	
1	Egypt (Great Nations)	1																
1	Egypt-Egypt	1				1												
1	Egypt-Israel	1				1												
1	Israel-Egypt	1																
3	Egyptian People-Egyptian Army	3	1							1		1		3		1		
1	Egyptian People-Egyptian Civil Government	1						1						1		1		
2	Egyptian People-Egyptian People	1												1				
1	*Egyptian People-Egypt	1												1		1		
1	Egyptian People-State	1												1		1		
1	World-Egyptian Army	1												1		1		
1	World-Arabs	1												1		1		
1	*Egyptian Army-Israel	1												1		1		
1	Egyptian Army-Egyptian People, Arabs, and Egyptian Army	1												1		2		
2	*Egyptian Army-Egypt																	
1	*Egyptian Army-Foreign Imperialism, Corrupt Monarchy & Corrupt Political Parties	1	1															
2	Arabs-Arabs	1	1															
2	Arabs-Egypt	1						1	1									
1	Egyptians & Arabs	1												1				
1	-Egyptians & Arabs	1																
1	Arab Peoples-Other Arab Leadership	1																
1	15 May Revolutionaries																	
1	-Egyptian Regime													1				
1	Egyptian Citizen-																	
1	-Egyptian Citizen																	
1	Egyptian Citizen-Family							1										
1	Egyptian Citizen																	
1	-Egyptian State																	
1	Unspecified-Egyptian Civilian Government	1																
1	Unspecified-Egypt																	
1	Unspecified-Revolutionary Institutions	1																
1	Unspecified-Egyptian Citizen																	
1	Egyptian State-People							1						1				
36	DISAGGREGATED TOTAL	29	15	0	0	2	2	5	1	0	0	3	0	14	10	8	11	59
	AGGREGATED	3	15	0	0	3	3	8	2	2	0	5	0	24	2	14	22	98
		29%	2.8	0	0	7	7	15	5	2		5		25		17		100

*Totals do not add to 100% due to rounding.

APPENDIX D

CODING OF POLICY ACTIONS OF QADHDHAFI AND SADAT
10/26/79 - 1/26/80

VALUE ANALYSIS OF FBIS-REPORTED POLICY ACTIONS OF COL. QADHDHAFI, 10/26/79 - 1/26/80

REPORTED POLICY ACTION	CONDITIONING FACTOR(S)	PRINCIPAL ACTOR	VALUE INVESTMENTS	INTENDED RECIPIENT ACTOR(S)	LINKAGE TO NEXT ITEM
10.27 - Addresses foreign diplomats and U.N. officials, criticizing the current structure of the United Nations on UN Day.	None Implied	Qadhdhafi Foreign diplomats and UN officials	E (-)R, (-)A, (-)D	Foreign diplomats and UN officials United Nations	Expectation
11.1 - Attends ceremonies in Algiers celebrating 25th anniversary of Algerian revolution.	None	Qadhdhafi	R	Algerian revolutionary regime	
11.5 - Personally awards decorations to Raul Castro of Cuba and General Vo Nguyen Giap of Viet Nam.	None Implied None Implied	Qadhdhafi Cuban regime Qadhdhafi Vietnamese regime	R A, R R A, R	Raul Castro Qadhdhafi Vo Nguyen Giap Qadhdhafi	Expectation Sequential Expectation
11.7 - Exhorts Libyan police to establish internal revolutionary committees; honors revolutionary cadres as being virtuous minority.	None None None	Qadhdhafi Libyan police Qadhdhafi	E P, R, D E/D, R	Libyan police Revolutionary Cmtees. Revolutionary cadres	Expectation Transformation
11.10 - Orders creation of "town armies" (urban militia), threatens cancellation of draft exemption for citizens who fail to join "town armies."	None If, exclude None	Qadhdhafi Libyan citizen Qadhdhafi	P P, S, W, B (-)B	Urban militia Urban militia Libyan citizen	Expectation
- FBIS reported no policy actions or statements by Col. Qadhdhafi from November 11th through November 25th, inclusive.					
11.26 - Receives delegation from Iran; no details of meeting released.	None None	Qadhdhafi Khomeini regime	R R	Khomeini delegation Qadhdhafi	Reciprocal
11.29 - Participates in celebrations of World Day of Solidarity with the Arab People of Palestine, exhorts Palestinians to use more violent tactics and replace their organizational structure with Libyan-style revolutionary committees, as detailed in the Green Book.	None None None None None Implied	Qadhdhafi Qadhdhafi Palestinians Palestinians Palestinians Palestinians	R E (-)B (-)P P	Palestinians Palestinians Unspecified PLO institutions Palestinian Revolutionary Committees Qadhdhafi	Expectation Sequential Expectation Reciprocal Expectation
12.1 - Gives interview to Italian reporter in which he expresses view of world situation, argues that the Green Book is the way of the future, and promises to help the U.S. hostages in Iran.	None None Future Implied	Qadhdhafi Qadhdhafi Qadhdhafi Unspecified	E R, D B R, D	Western Press Qadhdhafi U.S. hostages in Iran Qadhdhafi	Sequential Sequential Expectation

*Actions in italics are not explicitly attributed to Qadhdhafi in FBIS coverage but implicitly require his action or approval.

VALUE ANALYSIS OF FBIS-REPORTED POLICY ACTIONS OF COL. QADHDHAFI, 10/26/79 - 1/26/80

REPORTED POLICY ACTION	CONDITIONING FACTOR(S)	PRINCIPAL ACTOR	VALUE INVESTMENTS	INTENDED RECIPIENT ACTOR(S)	LINKAGE TO NEXT ITEM
12.6 - Libyan militia (or security forces or students, depending on account) begins siege of PLO offices in Tripoli.	Implied None	Qadhafi Libyan militia	P (-)P, (-)B	Libyan militia PLO in Tripoli	Expectation
12.6 - Rejects formal protest from PLO against siege of Tripoli office.	None	Qadhafi	(-)D, (-)R	PLO	
12.9 - Libyan authorities order expulsion of senior PLO representatives in Tripoli.	Implied None	Qadhafi State authorities	P (-)P, (-)B, (-)S	State authorities PLO in Tripoli	Expectation
12.9 - clandestinely sponsors creation of Libyan-style Palestinian Revolutionary Committees to replace the PLO, and threatens to deport or arrest Palestinian students who fail to join the committees.	Implied If, exclude	Qadhafi Palestinian Revolutionary Committees Palestinians	P, B (-)P P, B	Palestinian Revolutionary Committees PLO in Tripoli Palestinian Revolutionary Committees Palestinians	Expectation Expectation Sequential Expectation
12.11 - Grants interview to French news agency for the purpose of condemning Yasir Arafat's "conspiracy"; refuses to comment or provide information on any other topic.	Future None None Exclude	Qadhafi Qadhafi French-speaking press Qadhafi	(-)P, (-)B E E/(-)R, (-)D E	French-speaking press PLO leaders French-speaking press	Expectation Transformation
12.11 - Receives leader of ruling party of Algeria to discuss creation of joint Libyan-Algerian committee on unification of the two nations.	None None Future	Qadhafi Algerian ruling party Algeria Libya	R, A, E R, A, E Unspecified Unspecified	Algerian ruling party Qadhafi Libya Algeria	Reciprocal Expectation Reciprocal
12.14.79-1.14.80 (dates approximate) - Inspects armed forces in eastern Libya, supervises military exercises in border area with Egypt, and works on defense plan with senior military staff.	None Implied	Qadhafi Libyan armed forces	P, E, S (-)B	Libyan armed forces Egypt	Expectation
12.16 - Libya orders closing of PLO office in Benghazi (where Qadhafi was visiting) and expels senior PLO officials from Libya.	Implied None None	Qadhafi State authorities State authorities	P (-)W (-)P, (-)B, (-)S	State authorities PLO in Benghazi PLO in Libya	Expectation Sequential
12.16 - Libyan authorities arrest PLO leaders in provincial town in retaliation for their refusal to form a Libyan-style revolutionary committee.	Exclude Implied None	Local PLO leaders Qadhafi State authorities	P P (-)B	Palestinian Revolutionary Committees State authorities Local PLO leaders	Reciprocal Expectation
12.19 - Threatens U.S. with an alliance of Moslem oil states if the U.S. fails to return the Shah's funds to Iran.	If, exclude If, exclude Future Future	U.S. U.S. Qadhafi Moslem oil states	(-)W W E, P P/(-)B	Shah of Iran Iranian revolutionaries Moslem oil states U.S.	Reciprocal Expectation Transformation

VALUE ANALYSIS OF FBIS-REPORTED POLIC: ACTIONS OF COL. QADHDHAFI, 10/26/79 - 1/26/80

REPORTED POLICY ACTION	CONDITIONING FACTOR(S)	PRINCIPAL ACTOR	VALUE INVESTMENTS	INTENDED RECIPIENT ACTOR(S)	LINKAGE TO NEXT ITEM
12.20 - Receives Syrian Foreign/Deputy Prime Minister for discussions.	None	Qadhdhafi	R, E	Syrian Deputy PM	Reciprocal
12.22 - Formally recognizes ousted al-Fatah members as "real" representatives of al-Fatah in Libya.	None	Qadhdhafi	P, R, D	Al-Fatah dissidents	Reciprocal
12.23 - Sends envoy to anti-Fatah Palestinian organizations in Lebanon, (PFLP).	Implied	Qadhdhafi	(-)P, (-)R, (-)D	Al-Fatah	Transformation
12.24 - Libyan security forces occupy PLO headquarters in Tripoli, seize files, and confiscate office equipment.	Implied	Libyan envoy	P, E	Libyan security forces	Expectation
12.26 - Libyan state authorities arrest and cancel visas of over 100 Palestinian students in Libya and order closing of all PLO offices.	Implied	Qadhdhafi	(-)W, (-)E	Anti-Fatah organizations	Expectation
12.28 - Receives leaders of Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and other anti-PLO organizations.	None	State authorities	P	Libyan security forces	Expectation
1.6.80 - Sends congratulations to final session of Libyan General People's Congress and surviving leaders of '69 coup. States that the sessions confirm correctness of Qadhdhafi's ideology.	None	State authorities	(-)P, (-)B	PLO in Libya	Sequential
1.6.80 - Libya severs relations with the People's Republic of China and the al-Fatah Palestinian organization.	None	Qadhdhafi	(-)W	State authorities	Sequential
1.13.80 - Holds press conference for Arab journalists in which he denounces al-Fatah and Western journalists, and endorses the Green Book as the salvation of all workers.	None	Qadhdhafi	R, A, E	PFLP and other anti-PLO organizations	Reciprocal
1.17.80 - Receives Prime Minister Forbes Burnham of Guyana and delivers to him a lengthy account of Libyan ideology.	None	PFLP and other anti-PLO organizations	R, A	Qadhdhafi	Sequential
1.21.80 - Receives Prime Minister Maurice Bishop of Grenada and delivers to him a lengthy account of Libyan ideology.	None	Qadhdhafi	R, D	General People's Congress	Sequential
		Qadhdhafi	R, D	Fellow revolutionaries	Sequential
		Qadhdhafi	E/D, R	Qadhdhafi	Transformation
		Qadhdhafi	(-)P, (-)R	People's Republic of China	Sequential
		Qadhdhafi	(-)P, (-)R	Al-Fatah	Sequential
		Qadhdhafi	E	Arab journalists	Expectation
		Qadhdhafi	(-)R, (-)D	Al-Fatah	Sequential
		Qadhdhafi	(-)R, (-)D	Western journalists	Sequential
		Qadhdhafi	R, D	Qadhdhafi	Sequential
		Qadhdhafi	R, E	Prime Minister Forbes Burnham	Sequential
		Qadhdhafi	R, E	Prime Minister Maurice Bishop	Sequential

VALUE ANALYSIS OF FBIS-REPORTED POLICY ACTIONS OF COL. QADHDHAFI, 10/26/79 - 1/26/80

<u>REPORTED POLICY ACTION</u>	<u>CONDITIONING FACTOR(S)</u>	<u>PRINCIPAL ACTOR</u>	<u>VALUE INVESTMENTS</u>	<u>INTENDED RECIPIENT ACTOR(S)</u>	<u>LINKAGE TO NEXT ITEM</u>
1.22 - Exhorts revolutionary committees at technical secondary schools in Benghazi to develop higher levels of awareness and understanding of the revolution.	None Future	Qadhdhafi Revolutionary students	E, R E, D	Revolutionary students Revolutionary students	Expectation
1.24 - Receives Prime Minister Maurice Bishop for second time; provides additional lecture on Libyan ideology.	None	Qadhdhafi	R, E	Prime Minister Maurice Bishop	

VALUE ANALYSIS OF FBIS-REPORTED POLICY ACTIONS OF PRESIDENT SADAT, 10/26/79 - 1/26/80
 (Actions in brackets are not explicitly attributed to President Sadat in FBIS but implicitly required his action or approval.)

REPORTED POLICY ACTION	CONDITIONING FACTOR(S)	PRINCIPAL ACTOR	INVESTMENTS VALUE	RECIPIENT ACTOR(S)	INTENDED	LINKAGE TO NEXT ITEM
<i>Late October - Authorizes publication of anti-Khomeini newspaper by Iranian emigre journalist in Egypt.</i>	None None Implied	Sadat Iranian emigres Iranians	P, B E (-)P	Iranian emigres Iranians Khomeini regime		Expectation Expectation Expectation
10.26 - Telephones deposed Shah of Iran in New York to inquire after health and to express concern.	None	Sadat	E, A, R	Deposed Shah		
10.30 - Delivers speech with numerous references to Islam and national unity to local officials in Sinai, outlining Government development plans for the region.	None Implied	Sadat Local Sinai officials	E R, A, D	Local Sinai officials Sadat		Expectation
10.31 - Leads public prayers for war dead at Sinai war memorial.	None Implied	Sadat Egyptian army	E, R R, D	Egyptian army Sadat		Expectation
10.31 - Visits flood-stricken area and orders state funds to be distributed among homeless victims. Receives enthusiastic response.	None None None	Sadat Flood victims Flood victims	P/W W/B A, R	Flood victims Flood victims Sadat		Transform. Transform.
11.5 - Receives Israeli officials and begins negotiations on Sinai oil distribution agreement.	None None Future	Sadat Israeli officials Israel	E, R E, R W	Israeli officials Sadat Egypt		Reciprocal Expectation
11.6 - Sends congratulatory telegram to President Brezhnev on anniversary of the Soviet October Revolution.	Routine function of office - not coded as value transaction					
11.6 - Issues executive directive cutting the Government transportation budget, eliminating use of automobiles for subinistrial officials, and eliminating gasoline allowance for all officials. Stated expectations are conservation of government resources.	None None	Sadat Egyptian officials	P/(-)W W	Egyptian officials Egyptian state		Expectation
11.8 - Telephones U.S. President Carter to inform him that Egypt will welcome the Shah; offers personal aircraft to transport the Shah to Egypt.	None None Future Future	Sadat President Carter Sadat Egypt Shah of Iran	E E W B, A A, R, D	President Carter Shah of Iran Shah of Iran Shah of Iran Sadat		Expectation Expectation Expectation Expectation
11.8 - Publicly condemns events in Iran as crimes against Islam, rejects friendship with Khomeini, exhorts Muslim leaders to join in condemnation.	None None Future	Sadat Sadat Muslim leaders	E, (-)D, (-)A E (-)D, (-)A, (-)R	Khomeini regime Muslim leaders Khomeini regime		Sequential Expectation

**Actions in italics are not explicitly attributed to President Sadat in FBIS coverage, but implicitly require his action or approval.*

VALUE ANALYSIS OF FBIS-REPORTED POLICY ACTIONS OF PRESIDENT SADAT, 10/26/79 - 1/26/80

REPORTED POLICY ACTION	CONDITIONING FACTOR(S)	PRINCIPAL ACTOR	VALUE INVESTMENTS	INTENDED RECIPIENT ACTOR(S)	LINKAGE TO NEXT ITEM
11.13 - Provides interview to London Times, expressing respect for Israeli Prime Minister Begin.	None None Implied	Sadat Sadat Unspecified	E R R	English-speaking world Prime Minister Begin Sadat	Sequential Expectation
11.13 - Provides interview to BBC in which announces that he plans to buried on Mt. Sinai (an act with significant religious & nationalist symbolism) and expresses his respect and affection for the West.	None None Implied	Sadat Sadat Unspecified	E A, R A, R, D	English-speaking world Western bloc Sadat	Sequential Expectation
11.14 and 11.15 - Meets with National Democratic Party leaders to discuss restructuring of the NDP in response to "negative aspects" of recent electoral victories (the "negative aspects" are not defined).	None None None	Sadat NDP leaders NDP leaders	E, S, R E, R E, S, R/P	NDP leaders Sadat NDP	Reciprocal Transform.
11.15 - Expresses support for U.S. moves against Iran following hostage-taking.	None None Future, implied Future, implied	Sadat United States Khomeini regime United States	P, A (-)P B A, R	United States Khomeini regime U.S. hostages Sadat	Expectation Expectation Expectation
11.15 - Extends state invitation to Prime Minister Begin of Israel.	None	Sadat	A, R	Prime Minister Begin	
11.15 - Publicly outlines taxation law proposal (and virtually guarantees passage) designed to redistribute Egyptian wealth.	None Future Future	Sadat Egyptian upper class Egyptian state	E, P/(-)W W W	Egyptian upper class Egyptian state Egyptian lower class	Transform. Expectation
11.15 - Expresses support for Egyptian Prime Minister's initiative in attacking Israeli treatment of the Mayor of Nablus, Palestine.	None None Implied	Sadat Sadat Israel	A, R (-)D and E B	Egyptian prime minister Israel Palestinians	Transform. Expectation
11.17 - Formally orders initiation of viaduct construction to carry Nile River water to Sinai for irrigation; also orders feasibility study for extension of viaduct to Jerusalem for use by pilgrims of three faiths.	None Future Future	Sadat Egyptian people Pilgrims	P/W, B W, S/B R, D	Sinai inhabitants Pilgrims Sadat and Egyptian people (2 Transactions)	Transform. Transform.
11.18 - Names high-ranking Egyptian diplomat as Ambassador to Moscow as part of effort to normalize relations with USSR.	None Future Future	Sadat Ambassador to Moscow USSR	P, R E, S/E, R A, R	Ambassador to Moscow USSR Egypt	Expectation Transform.

VALUE ANALYSIS OF FBIS-REPORTED POLICY ACTIONS OF PRESIDENT SADAT, 10/26/79 - 1/26/80

REPORTED POLICY ACTION	CONDITIONING FACTOR(S)	PRINCIPAL ACTOR	VALUE INVESTMENTS	INTENDED RECIPIENT ACTOR(S)	LINKAGE TO NEXT ITEM
11.18 through 11.19 - Delivers address eu- legizing achievements possible only through personal friendship with Prime Minister Begin and President Carter; promises extensive economic development in Sinai, justified in the name of Islam, and signs document trans- ferring authority in the Sinai from Egyptian army to local civilian officials.	None Future Future	Sadat Egyptian state Sinai inhabitants	E W A, D	Egyptian public Sinai inhabitants Sadat and Egyptian state (2 Transactions) President Carter Prime Minister Begin Egyptian Army Local Sinai officials	Expectation Reciprocal Sequential Sequential Transform.
11.22 - Appoints new, entirely civilian pro- visional Political Bureau of NDP.	Present Present Present Present	Sadat Sadat Sadat Sadat	A, R A, R P/(-)P P	Civilian members of NDP Former Politburo members NDP Political Bureau NDP	Reciprocal Expectation
11.24 - Chairs NDP Political Bureau meeting to provide guidance on party reorganization plan.	None None Future	Sadat Sadat NDP Political Bureau	P (-)P E, S P, E, S	NDP Political Bureau	Expectation
11.24 - <i>Permits NDP provisional Political Bureau to elect its own officers.</i>	None	Sadat	P	NDP Political Bureau	Expectation
11.27 - Praises Nile-Sinai viaduct in highly religious address at foundation stone cere- monies.	None Implied	Sadat Egyptian people	A, R A, R, D	Egyptian engineers Sadat	Expectation
11.29 - Sends message to UN on World Day of Solidarity with the Arab People of Palestine, urging support to the Palestine liberation movement.	None None None	Sadat Sadat United Nations	E R, A P, A	United Nations Palestinians Palestinians	Sequential Expectation
11.30 - Informs U.S. Government, reaffirming invitation to Shah to live in Egypt.	None None Future Future	Sadat United States Egypt Shah of Iran	E E B, A A, R, D	United States Shah of Iran Shah of Iran Sadat	Expectation Expectation Expectation
12.1 - <i>Meets with Cabinet, which then de- nounces the Iranian regime's handling of the hostage situation as a violation of Islamic and international laws.</i>	None None	Sadat Egyptian cabinet	P, E (-)D, E, (-)R	Egyptian cabinet Khomeini regime	Expectation
12.2 - Chairs NDP Political Bureau meeting to discuss party reorganization measures.	None Future	Sadat NDP Political Bureau	E, S P, E, S	NDP Political Bureau NDP	Expectation
12.5 - Sends Presidential Assistant to Ni- geria with personal congratulations for the newly-elected President and a detailed ex- planation of Egyptian foreign policy.	None None Implied	Sadat Sadat Nigerian President	P, R E, R A, R	Presidential Assistant Nigerian President Sadat	Transform. Expectation

VALUE ANALYSIS OF FBIS-REPORTED POLICY ACTIONS OF PRESIDENT SADAT, 10/26/79 - 1/26/80

REPORTED POLICY ACTION	CONDITIONING FACTOR(S)	PRINCIPAL ACTOR	INVESTMENTS	INTENDED RECIPIENT ACTOR(S)	LINKAGE TO NEXT ITEM
12.6 - Denounces Rhodesian regime as racist and illegitimate. Gives verbal support to Patriotic Front and describes the Front as imbued with revolutionary spirit. Thanks Great Britain for understanding the need to end fascist regime in Rhodesia.	None None Future If None	Sadat Sadat Patriotic Front UK Sadat	E/(-)D, (-)R E/P, A, R, D A, R, D (-)P A, R	Rhodesian regime Patriotic Front Sadat Rhodesian regime UK	Transform. Transform. Expectation Expectation
12.6 - Egyptian government announces support for Rhodesian negotiations and offers overflight privileges to US and UK for implementation of settlement.	None None If, future Future	Sadat Egyptian state US and UK Egyptian state	P E/P (-)P P	Egyptian state Rhodesian negotiators Rhodesian regime US and UK	Transform. Sequential Expectation
12.9 - Receives Sol Linowitz, U.S. negotiator, and thanks President Carter for sending Linowitz.	None None	Sadat Sadat	A, R A, R	Sol Linowitz President Carter	Sequential
12.10 - Announces exchange of ambassadors with Israel will take place on schedule and rejects protests ("hysterics..of rejection states").	None Future None	Sadat Israel Sadat	E, P/ R, P R, P (-)D, (-)R	Israel Egypt Rejectionist states	Transform. Sequential
12.10 - Informs press and information officials of proposed constitutional amendments aimed at strengthening civil liberties and democratic (non-Marxist) socialism.	None Future Future	Sadat Egyptian state Egyptian state	E B D	Press, information officials Egyptian citizens Egyptian state	Expectation Sequential
12.10 - Asks press to devise policy depriving critical journalists of their positions on the staffs of Egyptian newspapers.	None Future	Sadat Egyptian press	E/P (-)B	Egyptian press Critical journalists	Transform.
12.10 - Egyptian government responds to collapse of Rhodesian negotiations by retracting offer of overflight privileges for British aircraft.	Exclude Exclude	UK Egyptian state	(-)P P	Rhodesian regime UK	Reciprocal
12.13 - Appoints Board of Directors (primarily military and government officials) of Arab Organization for Industrialization.	None Future	Sadat Egyptian military and state officials	P, R P/W	Egyptian military and state officials Egypt	Expectation Transform.
12.16 - Receives Sudanese Minister of Communications.	None Implied Implied	Sadat Sadat Sudanese government	R, A, E R, A, E R, A	Sudanese Minister Sudanese government Sadat	Expectation Expectation

VALUE ANALYSIS OF FBIS-REPORTED POLICY ACTIONS OF PRESIDENT SADAT, 10/26/79 - 1/26/80

REPORTED POLICY ACTION	CONDITIONING FACTOR(S)	PRINCIPAL ACTOR	VALUE INVESTMENTS	INTENDED RECIPIENT ACTOR(S)	LINKAGE TO NEXT ITEM
12.18 - Sends message to scientific conference in Alexandria, praising Egyptian scientists and Egypt, and exhorting scientists to improve life of Egyptian people and support (his) foreign policy.	None	Sadat	E/R	Egyptian scientists	Transform.
12.22 - Grants interview to French television to denounce Khomeini as an anti-Islamic lunatic.	None	Sadat	R	Egypt	Expectation
12.23 - Sends message honoring Egyptian army and U.S. for their roles in forcing the evacuation of foreign invaders from Port Said.	None	Egyptian scientists	E, S/B	Egyptian people	Transform, Expectation
12.23 - Abolishes NDP women's auxiliary in order to integrate women into NDP structure.	None	Egyptian scientists	P, A, R	Sadat	Transform.
12.25 - Grants interview to well-known Egyptian television personality in which justifies policies by status as devout Muslim.	None	Sadat	E	French-speaking press	
12.28 - Egypt withdraws ambassador from the Sudan in retaliation for Sudanese withdrawal of ambassador from Egypt.	None	Sadat	(-)R, (-)D	Khomeini	
12.29 - Delivers long television address explaining his perspectives on the world situation and calling for respect for law, and for the rights of individual citizens.	Past	Egyptian army	(-)P, (-)B	Foreign invaders	Sequential
12.31 - Condemns USSR, urges U.S. action in Persian Gulf, condemns Khomeini as anti-Islamic, offers conditional support to US actions aimed at releasing hostages in Iran.	Past	United States	(-)P	Foreign invaders	Reciprocal
1.1 - Egypt ends economic boycott against Rhodesia in response to initiation of new Rhodesian transitional regime.	None	Sadat	R, A	Egyptian army	Sequential
	None	Sadat	(-)P	United States	Reciprocal
	None	Sadat	P	Women's auxiliary group	Expectation
	None	Sadat	P	Women members of NDP	Expectation
	None	Sudan	E	Egyptian people	Expectation
	None	Sadat	R, A, D	Sadat	
	None	Sudan	(-)A, (-)R	Egypt	Reciprocal
	None	Sadat	(-)A, (-)R	Sudan	
	None	Sadat	E	Egyptian people	Expectation
	None	Egyptian people	P, R	Egyptian state	Sequential
	None	Egyptian people	B	Egyptian citizen	Expectation
	Implied, exclude	Egyptian people	(-)P, (-)B	Sadat	
	None	Sadat	E, (-)D	USSR	Sequential
	None	Sadat	E	United States	Expectation
	Future	United States	P	Persian Gulf states	Sequential
	None	Sadat	E, (-)D	Khomeini	Sequential
	If	U.S.	(-)P	Khomeini regime	Expectation
	None	Khomeini regime	B	U.S. hostages	Expectation
	None	Egypt	P, A	United States	
	Past	Rhodesian regime	P	Transitional regime	Reciprocal
	Exclude	Rhodesian regime	(-)P	Rhodesian regime	Reciprocal
		Egypt	(-)W	Rhodesia	

VALUE ANALYSIS OF FBIS-REPORTED POLICY ACTIONS OF PRESIDENT SADAT, 10/26/79 - 1/26/80

REPORTED POLICY ACTION	CONDITIONING FACTOR(S)	PRINCIPAL ACTOR	VALUE INVESTMENTS	INTENDED RECIPIENT ACTOR(S)	LINKAGE TO NEXT ITEM
1.4 - Leads public prayers for Afghan martyrs, exhorts foreign Islamic leaders to comment on Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, convenes the NDP Political Bureau to discuss possible reactions to the invasion.	None Implied None	Sadat Sadat Foreign Islamic leaders	E/R, D (-)D, (-)R (-)D, (-)R, E	Afghan rebels USSR USSR	Transformation Expectation Sequential
1.6 - Offers military facilities to the US in the event that Persian Gulf regimes require military assistance.	None If Future	Sadat United States Egypt	E E (-)Values Values	NDP Political Bureau Sadat USSR Afghan rebels	Reciprocal Expectation Reciprocal
1.8 - Egypt severs diplomatic relations with Syria and South Yemen for their defense of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, orders reduction of Soviet diplomatic establishment in Egypt, offers training and financial aid to Afghan rebels and calls upon Egyptian citizens to make voluntary contributions to the Afghan rebels.	None Past Past, implied Past, implied None None None None None Future	Syria Syria South Yemen South Yemen Egypt Egypt Egypt Egypt Egypt Egyptian people	E, R, D (-)R, (-)D A, R, D (-)R, (-)D (-)R, (-)A (-)R, (-)A (-)R, (-)A W, S E W	United States Persian Gulf regimes United States USSR Afghan rebels USSR Afghan rebels Syria South Yemen USSR Afghan rebels Egyptian people Afghan rebels	Expectation Expectation
1.7 - Receives Prime Minister Begin at home	None Implied	Sadat Prime Minister Begin	R, A R, A	Prime Minister Begin Sadat	Expectation
1.8 - Engages in negotiations with Begin on Palestinian autonomy.	None None Future	Sadat Prime Minister Begin Israel	S, E, R, A/(-)P E, R, A, D, P P	Prime Minister Begin Sadat Palestinians	Expectation Expectation
1.9 - Accedes to Begin's desire to avoid further discussion of Palestinian autonomy and discusses Afghanistan with Begin.	None None None	Sadat Prime Minister Begin Sadat	P E, A, R E, A, R	Prime Minister Begin Sadat Prime Minister Begin	Expectation Expectation
1.10 - Holds joint press conference with Prime Minister Begin to praise Begin's friendship and embarrass him by revealing that Begin rejected a compromise solution.	None None Implied	Sadat Sadat Unspecified (U.S.)	E A, (-)D (-)R	World press Prime Minister Begin Prime Minister Begin	Transformation Expectation
1.13 - Publicizes agricultural and construction projects in Aswan by taking tour with extensive television coverage.	None Implied	Sadat Egyptian people	E R, A	Egyptian people Egyptian state	Expectation

VALUE ANALYSIS OF FBIS-REPORTED POLICY ACTIONS OF PRESIDENT SADAT, 10/26/79 - 1/26/80

REPORTED POLICY ACTION	CONDITIONING FACTOR(S)	PRINCIPAL ACTOR	VALUE INVESTMENTS	RECIPIENT ACTOR(S)	INTENDED	LINKAGE TO NEXT ITEM
1.18 - Egyptian security authorities force Muslim Brotherhood rally to change location and prevent rally participants from addressing topics other than Afghanistan.	Implied None	Sadat Egyptian security forces	P (-)P	Egyptian security forces Muslim Brotherhood		Expectation Expectation
1.22 - Receives Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman to discuss normalization.	Exclude None	Muslim Brotherhood Sadat Ezer Weizman	E E, R E, R	Egyptian people Ezer Weizman Sadat		Reciprocal
1.22 - Receives David Rockefeller	None	Sadat	R	David Rockefeller		
1.22 - Receives Deputy Prime Minister of Luxembourg.	Routine function of office	not coded as value transaction				

1.23 - Receives Romanian Prime Minister and exchanges formal compliments with Romanian President; signs previously-negotiated cultural exchange agreement.

Routine ceremonial function of office - not coded as value transaction

APPENDIX E

SUMMARY VALUE ANALYSIS CODING OF POLICY ACTIONS OF
QADHDHAFI AND SADAT, 10/26/79 - 1/26/80

VALUE ANALYSIS CODING OF COL. QADHAFI'S ACTIONS 10/26/79 - 1/26/80

Number of Inter- actions	Actor Transaction Details	P	-P	E	-E	W	-W	U	-U	S	-S	A	-A	R	-R	B	-B	Unspec. Values
9	Qadhafi - Libyan state organizations (police, militia etc.)	0		3						1								
5	Qadhafi - Libyan people, their organizations	2		1										4	2	3		
2	Qadhafi - Qadhafi																	
3	Qadhafi - "Anti-imperialist" Third World Regimes (not PRC), including Russian oil states	1	1	6								1		9	1	3	2	
3	Qadhafi - Palestinians																	
3	Qadhafi - PLO, ARAF, Palestinian Revolutionary Committees, Al Fatah dissidents, PFLP and other anti-PLG organs.	2		1								1		2		1		
6	Qadhafi - Arab Journalists speaking press, foreign diplomats, U.R. officials	1	1	3	1													Total
42	Subtotal QADHAFI Initiates (Percent)	12	4	18	1	0	0			2		1	0	2	0	10	4	0 0 72
		17	6	25	1	0	0			3		1	0	3	0	25	6	0 0 100
		22		26						7				3		31	11	0 100
5	"Anti-imperialist" Third World Regimes (not PRC) - Qadhafi			2														
1	Palestinians - Qadhafi																	
1	Anti-PLG group (see above) - Qadhafi																	
1	Arab Journalists - Qadhafi																	
1	Others - Qadhafi																	Total
9	Subtotal QADHAFI Receives (Percent)	0	0	2	0	0	0			0		0	0	4	0	9	0	0 0 16
		0	0	11	0	0	0			0		0	0	22	0	50	17	0 0 100
		0		11						0								0 100
8	State authorities - PLO in various locations.																	
3	Palestinian Students																	
3	Libyan internal groups - Libyan internal groups		4		1		3											
33	Palestinians (Palestinian Revolutionary Committees), PLO, Al Fatah, Others they support	2		1		1								1		2		
		2																
3	Palestinians, Local PLO Leaders - Palestinian Revolutionary Committee, Others they like																	
12	Others - Others	2	1	2		1								1	1	4	4	2
		2	1															Total
29	Subtotal - Others (Percent)	5	7	3	1	2	4			2		1	2	0	1	2	4	2 0 60
		10	14	6	2	4	8			4		2	4	0	2	4	8	4 0 100
		24		6		12				20								4 100
80	Grand Total (Percent)	17	11	23	2	2	4			4	10	2	2	6	1	29	8	2 0 140
		12	8	16	1	1	3			3	7	1	1	4	1	21	6	1 0 90
		20		19		4				10				5		26	12	1 100

*Include sign reversal associated with conditionals in this or preceding linked item, due to double conditioning factor (if exclude) signs not reversed with "exclude".
** % totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

VALUE ANALYSIS CODING OF PRESIDENT SADAT'S ACTIONS 10/26/79 - 1/26/80

Number of Inter- actions	Actor Transaction Dyads	P	-P	E	-E	W	-W	B	-B	S	-S	A	-A	R	-R	D	-D	Unspec. Values +
3	Sadat - Egyptian Army	1	1	1								1	2					
9	Sadat - Egyptian Public (incl) Scientists, Engrs Flood Victims)	3		6	2	1	1					1	2					
12	Sadat - Egyptian Gov't. (incl) offcls, press, local off., security forces)	8		4			1					1	4					
9	Sadat - NDP members	3	2	4								6	6					
8	Sadat - Begin	1	1	2								2	2					
4	Sadat - Israel, Israeli Officials	2		4								2	2					
3	Sadat - Pres. Carter	1		3								2	2					
5	Sadat - U.S.	1		3								2	2					
2	Sadat - U.S. Indiv.											1	1					
3	Sadat - USSR (incl ambassador)	1		1								1	1					
23	Sadat - Others	2		15		1		1				7	2	1	1	2	5	Total**
81	Subtotal SADAT Initiates (Percent)	22	4	41	0	3	2	2	0	4	0	21	2	33	5	2	9	0 0 150
		15	3	27	0	2	1	1	0	3	0	14	1	22	3	1	6	0 0 99
		17		27		3		1		4		15		25		7		0 99
1	Egyptian Army - Sadat							1*				5	1	5	3	1		
7	Egyptian Public - Sadat	2*										1	1	1	1			
1	Egyptian Gov't. - Sadat											3	3	3	1			
2	NDP members - Sadat			2								3	3	3	1			
3	Begin - Sadat	1		2														
2	Israel, Israeli Officials - Sadat			2										2				
0	President Carter - Sadat											1	1					
1	U.S. - Sadat																	
0	U.S. Indiv. - Sadat																	
0	USSR - Sadat																	
7	Others - Sadat											6	7	7	4			Total**
24	Subtotal SADAT Receives (Percent)	3	0	6	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	16	0	21	0	10	0	0 0 57
		5	0	11	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	28	0	37	0	18	0	0 0 101
		5		11		0		2		0		28		37		18		0 101
20	Egypt Internal - Egypt Internal	5	1	5	1*	5		4	1	4		2	3	3	2			
5	Egypt - USSR and its Arab Allies			2						2				4				1
14	Egypt (Egyptians) - Others	4	2*	2		5		3	1	2		3	1	2	1	1		1
4	Others - Egypt	1		4		1		3		1		4	1	2	5	3	4	
28	Others - Others	7*		4														
71	Subtotal - Others (Percent)	17	10	13	1	12	0	10	2	9	0	10	5	7	11	3	5	1 1 117
		15	9	11	1	10	0	9	2	8	0	9	4	6	9	3	4	1 1 102
		25		12		10		10		8		13		15		7		2 102
176	Grand Total (Percent)	12	14	60	1	15	2	13	2	13	0	47	7	61	16	15	14	1 1 324
		13	4	19	0	5	1	4	1	4	0	15	2	19	5	5	4	0 0 101
		17		19		5		5		4		17		24		9		1 101

*Includes sign reversal associated with conditional in this or preceding linked item.
** % totals may not add to 100% due to rounding.

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This report investigates the utility of employing a social science technique known as Lasswell Value Analysis within the context of Automated Behavioral Intelligence --the use of advanced techniques to analyze policy-relevant traits of foreign decision-makers. Trial application of value analysis was made to speeches and policy actions of two North African political leaders. The report findings indicate that value analysis should be useful to Automated Behavioral Intelligence and other intelligence analyses, but the development of the full extent of that utility requires application of value analysis to a number of culturally-diverse decision-makers.		