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**NORTH-SOUTH:
FOOTNOTES TO CHANGING
STRATEGIC CONDITIONS**

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Strategic issues research memo

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**NORTH-SOUTH: FOOTNOTES TO
CHANGING STRATEGIC CONDITIONS.**

by

10 John F. Scott

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
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FOREWORD

This memorandum is a search for clues to changes in the relations between nations of the industrial North and the developing South. Among the expectations reviewed are revolutions in those Southern nations where the trials of modernization are beyond the power of unpopular governments to nurture and control. The author concludes that the critical variable in our future relations with the South is ourselves—American perceptions of who and what we are, and what we want from and for the South.

The Strategic Issues Research Memoranda program of the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, provides a means for timely dissemination of analytical papers which are not constrained by format or conformity with institutional policy. These memoranda are prepared on subjects of current importance in strategic areas related to the authors' professional work.

This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'J. N. Merritt', with a horizontal line extending to the right and a small mark at the end.

JACK N. MERRITT
Major General, USA
Commandant

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

MR. JOHN F. SCOTT came to the Strategic Studies Institute in 1963. He holds a bachelor's degree in commerce and finance from Wilkes College and a master's degree in social science from Shippensburg State College. Mr. Scott has contributed to several Army studies on nuclear deterrence and strategy and has written several articles on the application of social science to national security problems for professional journals. Currently, Mr. Scott is a member of the Institute's Futures Group.

SUMMARY

Revolutions are the most dramatic acts to be expected of the drama of change and modernization in the nations of the southern hemisphere. Newness, weakness, and stress characterize southern governmental institutions. Ideologies explain differences among them and explain differences in the way their struggle and style are seen from the North. The form of a southern government is less important in the judgment of northern ideologies than the seen mobility of its objectives for itself and its consequences for international political economy.

The collection of nations we call the South and, more often, the Third World, yields objectively to the descriptive qualities of being many new nations, economically underdeveloped, and attracting the political and economic interests of the North. They have largely taken on a voice of assertiveness through the idea of a New International Economic Order, an assertiveness not matched by their collective power to shape ideas into institutions.

This essay advances three propositions about US foreign policy and strategy which may be contrary to the norms. First, the United States, with other powerful northern nations, is a revolutionary power, however unintended this result of relations with the fragile and sensitive developing world. Second, capitalism as a preferred form of economic organization does not guarantee political and civil rights to the people of the new nations. Third, the Third World's importance to the United States is more than a product of East-West great power competition. However, to the degree that we see the South in light of the opposites of these propositions, our policies and their consequences may be harmful to our own long-term interests. This injunction is less an assertion to be proved by trading anecdotes for or against, as it is a question of whether we are satisfied with the record of failure and success of our policies since 1945.

This entire approach centers on that critical variable that is ourselves. There is no ipso facto relationship between Third World crises, American interests, and possible American intervention. The more complicated and true image is the cold calculation of interests coupled with what the people will support and how long they will support it.

NORTH-SOUTH: FOOTNOTES TO CHANGING STRATEGIC CONDITIONS

I believe we should expect a continuation, perhaps even an increase, in the number of violent political changes in Third World countries in the next 20 years. Many Southern governments are weak and vulnerable to revolution. Too many lack popular support or economic success, or both, and cannot deter foreign and home grown agents of revolution. Too many which probably need to change to make things more tolerable to the people they rule can only be changed by violence—that is, they lack provisions for peaceful changes of government.

We have learned through our political and strategic interests that these changes matter to us. We have learned through our cynicism that even if "he may be an s.o.b., but he's our s.o.b.," isn't enough to base a foreign policy on because s.o.b.'s are no more immortal than the rest of us, perhaps they are even less so. We have

learned through our generosity that good intentions and good acts do not always work to our political and economic benefit in the short run.² We've learned, then, that Realpolitik tells us why one makes decisions, not which decisions are the best or most clever, and that altruism in economic development policy does not necessarily return as its own reward in the form of good feelings.³ Nonetheless, these possible changes in the South still matter to us.

At least three general classes of political and economic conditions in Third World countries can account for expected revolutions; some countries are afflicted with more than one of these:

- Some nations are still in their independence shakedown periods, trying to find a national identity. Examples are Angola, Zimbabwe Rhodesia, and Bangladesh and any other nation being reconstituted or gaining independence in recent years.

- Some will be subject to external aggression, but none fall exclusively in this class (Laos, Afghanistan are current examples).

- Finally, the largest group share the qualities of political immaturity and economic stress where there is unmanageable change or relative deprivation⁴ (expectations far ahead of realizations). We should note in this context that successful national economic growth can mean revolutionary change. The change in some countries will not be the result of stagnation or the lack of trying. Few Third World governments are strong enough to withstand severe blows to economic progress, especially those rare civilian governments in countries with a history of military rule.

IDEOLOGIES

We need to make other distinctions. Views of North-South relations are very much an exercise in ideological interpretation of facts and events supported by presuppositions. Nondemocratic governments are called totalitarian or authoritarian as the case may be. But these terms are not always used to label the extent of repression or enlightenment of a regime. Rather, they are "code words" for leftist and rightist dictatorial regimes.⁵ If one is far left, then Cuba may lack individual freedoms of any note, but the

people are eating. If one is far right, Somoza wasn't so bad and those people disappearing in Argentina are troublemakers anyway. What we miss in these questionable distinctions is that the rationale for suppression is exactly the same—to the Soviets, the dissident scientist is as much a threat to the good of the state as the terrorist is to the Argentine nation.

All the necessary persons will die in Argentina to assure that country's security A terrorist is not just someone with a gun or bomb but also someone who spreads ideas that are contrary to western civilization.⁶

Either President (1977) Videla of Argentina was misquoted or he sounds like he could have been a character in *Darkness at Noon*.

If here [the Soviet Union] we shoot a few thousand objectively harmful people, the humanitarians all over the world foam at the mouth.⁷

If we insist on making distinctions for the purpose of forming security and human rights policies, then we ought to be more interested in the character of a regime in some future when, and if, we must act to protect an interest. Don't expect the mothers of America to send their children to recruiting officers to save the regimes in either Cuba or Argentina.

Much as we might prefer to ignore ideological interpretations⁸ of North-South issues—and here I mean ideologies as they differ among people within developed countries of the North—our expectations and policies in the United States are probably going to reflect the prevailing ideologies of the Administration and the Congress. But fortunately for the purposes of prediction, new administrations with new ideas seem to have to fight the “momentum” of past policies. You can't just unrecognize China and reinstate Taiwan as the True China. Mr. Carter's human rights policies can be carried out, such as they are in this learning period we are in, because we have long had a latent human rights policy influencing our AID and assistance practices. Removing troops from South Korea is much more difficult.

Yet there are some clues to the future which are, shall we say, beyond ideology. These are strategic suppositions, unspoken assumptions about N-S relations, assumptions which may not ever be conscious influences on one's thinking. The examples given later were chosen as most important to the subject and tend to be shared by all but the ideological extremes in the United States.

PROPOSITIONS

But first, several propositions must be advanced as explanation of why there are North-South issues. These are offered without substantiation. They will give us the necessary foundation to discuss policy implications for the United States within the limited range of suppositions to follow.

Many New Nations. Between the early 1940's and 1971, 76 new nations achieved their sovereignty, as the State Department said,⁹ and we have had more since. Over 100 have appeared since the end of colonialism, "Western colonialism," in the words of Daniel Bell.¹⁰ Having seen these facts stated many times, and now having repeated them, one must ask of these naked numbers, so what? What do they mean? It depends on what one is talking about, what is at issue. More embassies, more paper work, more decisions about aid and assistance, more voters in the UN General Assembly, more and smaller economies many of which are too small to develop balanced and efficient economic activities. These kinds of implications—from nuclear proliferation possibilities to territorial disputes—are easy enough to list and the list might seem endless. But there is another implication, one that bears on how we think. The number is too big and the implications too complicated. We all have a predilection to want to simplify—we make "models" of international relations, after all. East and West was a wonderful simplification, as was Communist and Free World. No matter that not everyone in the West was in the West or that not everyone in the Free World was free. They were, and are, handy. So too North and South, rich and poor. They are equally as strained as those other designations, but one suspects that simplification and manageability are the real reasons behind them.¹¹ They are a problem only when we forget to modify some generalization by taking into account the specific countries to which it applies.

Underdevelopment. Many of the new nations, and many of the old, are poor compared to the levels of living in the industrial countries and even poor compared to the level of living that would be culturally consistent within their own countries. What culture has a taboo against eating, pure water, and health? But poor in this instance also means poor in potential for economic development. Although many developing areas have important and exportable natural resources, some poor countries have none. Not all of these

can overcome their natural disadvantages by becoming nations of bankers and shopkeepers.

Together, these poor nations cover a vast area of the world, they sit on raw materials used by the industrial North, they are located at places useful to the commercial and political interests of the North.

Stake. For any number of reasons and motives, the interest of the postwar North was drawn toward improving the economic lot of the South. The motives ranged from colonial ties, other traditional relations which predated the big war, to East-West politics, to access to resources and humanitarian concern.¹² In sum, the North developed a stake in the South.

NIEO. Beginning, arbitrarily, in the 1960's, the Southern nations of the UN began calling for a new international economic order¹³ to replace the one they see as dominated by Northern interests, power, and values. The new voice in the South wants an order based more on equity and less on reciprocity as the guiding ethic for who gets what and why.¹⁴

The questions of how serious the South is about the new order, and whether the nonaligned nations' call for it really expresses their collective wishes, might be answered by their actions in the coming decade. Perhaps more important today is the idea that the NIEO is a convenient rallying point¹⁵ for nations which see themselves as weaker than the northern nations with whom they will bargain over such things as terms of trade, the issue of sovereignty and foreign assets in their countries, debt, tariffs and nontariff barriers to trade, and representation in international decisionmaking bodies such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.¹⁶

Recession. Finally, the industrial nations of the North are currently having serious economic problems which will extend well into the 1980's and which will complicate the shaping of policies to deal with the South.

SUPPOSITIONS.

With these premises, then, some suppositions that guide US strategic policies and influence our entire range of policies toward the Third World can be reviewed as a way to look at possible changes in North-South relations.

The United States is not a revolutionary force in the Third World. First, we should pass over certain actions of the United

States in South Vietnam and the Dominican Republic by saying that they were not indications of a consistent policy of revolution. The issue raised here by the supposition is the indirect and dramatic influence the United States might have on the character of states having the qualities noted earlier—they are new, or economically weak, or their regimes lack popular support. The issue is unintended revolution—or, “not necessarily intended” revolution.

We might not even argue too much about the idea that assisting a developing country can move it to a stage of growth where satisfactions and expectations are so far apart for many of its people that disaffection can encourage revolution. Rather, the real issue is the political argument about whether the United States should try to influence the political character of another state. We hear and read that we should not impose our values on others;¹⁷ some cultures are “naturally” autocratic, and so on.

I suggest a new premise: that we do influence others in our official contacts in economic and military assistance—we push or pull things in certain directions. We would not be debating the pros and cons of imposing our human rights values on a righteously offended Brazil if we thought that policy had no effect. And we influence others sometimes whether or not influence is the *intended* result.¹⁸

The corollary to the new premise is that we should acknowledge this influence we generate and allow the knowledge to influence our policies. If it can be shown that some form of assistance to support order in the world does indeed support the continuation of a nondemocratic regime,¹⁹ then let's be clear about it. Certainly, we can argue that in the long run our support will lead to something closer to democracy because of the economic progress we encourage, but let's also recognize that along the way if there is a violent change in government, the new boys in charge might not take kindly to us, in spite of our good intentions.

The new and nondemocratic developing countries are ready for capitalism but not ready for democracy. We don't find policymakers and strategists suggesting alternatives to capitalism for the developing countries. Indeed, in some cases, economists in the North seem to propose even purer forms of capitalism for the LDC's than our own mixed systems in which market economies coexist with the welfare state. More to the point, the supposition seems to say that capitalism can lead to economic health, can give a

country a stake in stability and order at home and in international relations.

The peculiar aspect of this idea is that even if capitalism is foreign to the culture of a country, it can be good, while democracy, if foreign, is something one can only shove down resisting throats. This is because historical capitalism in the West grew, in retrospect, at the sacrifice of the many and the immediate benefit of the few for the longer run benefit of the many.²⁰ The British labor leader, A. Bevin, said as much once. He admitted that his father had to suffer with less than his due to allow capital to accumulate for reinvestment so that Bevin himself could have a better life. Yet, with doubts about how long that long run should be, Britain got a Labor party to make sure it wouldn't be too long. This ethic of sacrifice is missing in those countries adapting poorly to development—the ethic of deferring satisfactions, saving for tomorrow. One spiritual descendant of Gobineau even suggested that it was the nature of Black Africans to be unable to defer satisfactions, therefore someone had to make them do so, therefore someone—white, as luck would have it—should rule.

This supposition reminds us that we need not feel guilt (an emotion foreign to social Darwinism) that people in the countryside remain at or below subsistence levels of living while infant industries and a small middle class grow partly as a result of our assistance. The Soviets and other noncapitalists who are not at all unfamiliar with hypocrisy know capitalism and know what they are doing when they insist that human rights also include rights to economic well-being. Capitalism and Western values propose economic sacrifice for long-term growth and development while encouraging civil and political rights; Socialism and Communist values propose economic well-being and don't talk to me about the rest of the rights bundle until later. It is not altogether surprising that some Third World spokesmen see neither Western capitalism nor Eastern socialism as the answer.

The character of conflict in the Third World is East-West; the stakes are access to territory and resources. It is, perhaps, unfair to say that this is an unspoken presupposition of our foreign policies. Official spokesmen diligently address North-South economic issues and problems but they do so, in my mind, without conviction, without ever really being able to see the South outside of the big East-West contest.²¹ The supposition in its pure form is easier to

find in the literature of national security studies,²² including the DOD annual report. Many strategists even define the Third World in terms of East-West rivalry. Well, current events are on their side, but tomorrow we might have some new crisis that does not support their view.

We had strategic interests in raw materials, bases, straits, and overflight rights before the bipolar world was christened. But the coincident rise of the East-West conflict and the end of colonialism, and the subsequent postwar contest for the friendship and resources of the South surely gave the South the idea that their importance to us had a lot to do with that East-West rivalry. Various Third World leaders played on that theme to extract concessions from one side or the other—some still do.²³ Newsweek's Arnaud de Borchgrave has fashioned a small career publishing interviews with Third World iron men who deflect questions about why their own country is such a mess to lecture us on the duplicity of the Soviets and our own stupidity in not countering them with squadrons of advanced fighter planes and lots of money.

The supposition is harmful to us only if we hurt our own interests in the Third World by not seeing those countries as something apart from the East-West rivalry. Doing so would be an admission that they would present problems to us and to themselves regardless of East-West competition and that we would be as interested in them were there no great power competition.

One corollary supposition is that the United States and its Western allies have common security interests in the Third World such that they can act collectively to solve North-South security problems. The most interesting and prominent example of this is the idea of an expanded NATO—expanded in the sense of the territory included in the NATO charter for collective action.

Now, we should make a distinction here between dealing with specific cases and crises where collective action is ad hoc, and formal multilateral organizational arrangements such as an expanded NATO. No doubt some grouping of Western nations who are also NATO members can act together to resolve some specific crisis. But the supposition says that the Suez crisis and the 1973 oil embargo could have been met by a common NATO front.

The possibilities for common policy and action in an expanded NATO whose territory includes parts of the South are to be seen

more clearly by looking at NATO than at common interests, or not, in the Third World.

First, for action to be timely, important areas of foreign policy for any one member could be decided by a majority of other member states—or by an executive authority, or whatever. This is the sovereignty problem. To solve it, one has to be able to imagine the government of France acceding to the idea, and the US Congress agreeing that they will be notified after the fact of military intervention, however minor in scope. The Connelly amendment to the World Court accession (1950's) and the War Powers Act so recently in the news are precedents for doubt.

Second, no group of sovereign states can decide as quickly as any one whether and how to act in a crisis with little warning. This might seem to be the same thing as the first comment stated differently, but it is more. Here, the reference is to practical, physical and planning activities that go with reaction to a threat to a security interest.

Third, if any crisis threatening common interests might require prolonged (say one month or more) deployment of combined forces, chances are good that the NATO central region states won't want the drawdown from their forces.

Finally, most NATO states cannot afford, politically, to look like they are following the lead of the United States. We have worldwide interests, some of which they do not care to be associated with. Security is indivisible. Dominoes fall. How does an ally draw the line defining what is and what is not his problem as well as ours?

CONCLUSION

These propositions and presuppositions suggest an unexciting conclusion: that things will continue to be seen pretty much as they are seen today. The South has been given more emphasis, more prominence in our deliberations over the last four years, not transcending the East-West problem by any means, but not subordinated to it either. But that new look never really caught hold, and what there is of it won't last. The suppositions are not so much wrong as they are functional myths. We can't very well tell ourselves that we foster revolution, we should encourage some form of socialism, or that we could continue to enlist public

support for long-term development aid without the threat of Communism. What's more, the suppositions are not policies. We can continue to entertain them while making rather large shifts in policy toward the South.

So, on the one hand, the suppositions might be good predictors, but on the other hand, they are very sensitive to some intervening variables. On this latter score, there is a United States that would have given increased aid to bolster a besieged Somoza,²⁴ would not have let the Shah fall, and would not question the disappearance of those people in Argentina. There is another United States which would hurry through an appropriation for the Nicaraguan junta, would not have interfered with Allende, and would press even harder to embarrass the Argentine regime's magic act.²⁵ Both of these America's are in the US Congress. Whichever one wins in the next election will set the tone and temper of our policy toward the Third World in the 1980's.

What does this approach to North-South relations suggest about the demands that might be made on US military forces in the 1980's? The purpose of this essay is, after all, to look for strategic changes which could, presumably, have implications for the roles of US military forces in the future. And, as noted at the outset, these changes will be visible as Third World revolutions, placing in question, if not in jeopardy, the bases, resources, overflight rights, and other interests related to our strategic values.

In answer, one must emphasize the term *approach*. One need not deal in ambiguities as has been done here. A case can and has been made to highlight threatened interests by identifying them, their locations, and their vulnerabilities. Ipso facto, an interest threatened is an interest that should be protected, defended, or substituted for. In other words, the necessary policy is clear, and what we do in relations with the Third World should support that policy, or at least not be contrary to that policy. But would this kind of reasoning not lead to false expectations?

An American human rights policy, as one example of complications that cloud the unambiguous view, no matter how tartly condemned as self-destructive and unrealistic, is nevertheless real. It exists. Even if allowed to die of benign neglect, it will still be talked about and will influence apologists and critics alike a decade from now. It too is part of that "real world" that only self-proclaimed realists seem able to see. The unidentified woman on TV during the Maine primary elections, who said she did not think

that "puddle of oil" in the Middle East was worth losing one American life for, is as real as Henry Kissinger, if less influential—today.

It is now trite to say that elected officials in the United States have lost touch with the people. It is both trite and wrong with regard to policy toward the Third World. What those officials are out of touch with is the thinking of strategists who know more about strategic interests than they do about their own country.

This "approach," then, tends to dwell on that critical variable that is ourselves. There is no ipso facto relationship between Third World crises which threaten strategic interests and American intervention. That latter event will be a conscious decision based in part on the usual strategic considerations and, throughout the eighties, on expectations of what mission the people will support over the time it might take to complete that mission. It will be at least ironic if American strategists who see human rights as irrelevant to strategic objectives are the same people perplexed by the absence of public support for some possible future interventions.

Because America is so prosperous and strong, it is proper to be self-critical; we, compared to other nations, control our destiny. However, this is not to imply omniscience and sole responsibility for international fortunes and failures. In respect to the Third World, *most of the problems faced by the LDC's are of their own making*. Most, not all, of their problems are man-made, local, and social rather than natural, external, or commercial. There is some point in the development and modernization of any LDC at which the loans, gifts, and investments of the North will no longer be catalysts of progress unless the recipient nation reshapes itself to fit the level of modernization being achieved. In one sense, successful modernization means revolution. The developed countries of the North went through their own modernization, for the most part, without political revolution. They were able to adapt political institutions to change while keeping important segments of "traditional" society intact. While constitutional democracy is not a prerequisite for continued modernization, a "satisfied peasantry" probably is.²⁶ An aspect of this satisfaction is a broadening of political power to reach beyond the current power circles in developing societies. This many current regimes are reluctant to do, and this reluctance is one example of man-made, local, and social

explanations of their problems—and ours, in dealing with them.

Finally, these sets of expectations about the use of intervention forces in the Third World in the 1980's seem consistent with the problems and presuppositions discussed above.

First, our decisions about whether and how to influence the outcome of crises in Third World countries will continue to be based on short-term interests. Those troubled countries which have strategic resources and facilities coupled with a Communist threat will receive our attention. Generally, however, US military intervention in the Third World is extremely unlikely save for that perennial favorite, the Middle East.

Second, our reaction to crises and impending crises will be slow, guarded, and billed as a "Western" response, therefore demanding the attention and participation of other Northern allies.

Third, the grievances and problems seen by the nonaligned South should continue through the decade and possibly become more pronounced. We're going to insist on a mixed capitalist system in an interdependent world, and they're going to want a new order. Many Third World countries will not be any more friendly on UN votes than they have been; they will continue willingly to take grants in aid from us while voting against us.

ENDNOTES

1. Strobe Talbott, "The Dilemma of Dealing with Dictators," *Time*, (Essay), September 24, 1979, p. 47, recounts this epigram attributed to President Franklin Roosevelt speaking of Somoza's father.

2. Such conclusions range from the allegation that "MAP thus facilitates an expansion of the military in politics and the institutionalization of the coup d'état as an integral part of the political process . . ." in John S. Fitch, "The Political Impact of US Military Aid to Latin America," *Armed Forces and Society*, Spring 1979, p. 361, to P. T. Bauer and John O'Sullivan, "Foreign Aid For What?," *Commentary*, December 1978, pp. 41-48 where, in that irrepressible style that says everybody's a dithering fool except you and me, and I'm not sure about you—they excoriate all economic aid as no more than pearls before swine. Among other things, they claim aid does not serve the political and economic interests of the donors. Also, see reference 3, p. 59.

3. "New Storm Gathering Over US Foreign Aid," *US News and World Report*, March 31, 1980, pp. 59-60. "What discourages many lawmakers is that instability and anti-American hostility continue to flourish . . . despite US foreign aid expenditures of nearly 195 billion dollars since World War II." (p. 59)

4. Richard Olson, referring to the work of Ted Robert Gurr on relative deprivation, in "Economic Coercion in World Politics: With a Focus on North-South Relations," *World Politics*, July 1979, p. 486.

5. Perhaps a quintessential example is Michael Ledeen's review of Michael Harrington's *The Vast Majority*, in *Commentary* (March 1978, pp. 86-88). After quoting a Harrington phrase—"risk of authoritarianism" (in Tanzania), Ledeen later writes: "Harrington, in short, has chosen to ignore the central fact about the Third World: its exquisitely totalitarian political structure." (p. 87) Later, however, Ledeen makes the kind of observation that warns us against too quickly placing people in ideological "schools." For example, "the problem of distribution cannot be dealt with until there is a *democratic* revolution. For if you do not have political democracy, national wealth will not be distributed throughout the population." (p. 87)

6. Quoted as a frontpiece by Matthew Lippman, "The Protection of Universal Human Rights: The Problem of Torture," *Universal Human Rights*, October-December 1979, p. 25. The source is Stephen Kinzer, "Argentina in Agony," *New Republic*, December 23 and December 30, 1978, pp. 17-18.

7. Arthur Koestler, *Darkness at Noon*, New American Library, 1961, p. 140. The speaker is Ivanov, an interrogator of the novel's protagonist.

8. A good review of development ideologies is Robert W. Cox, "Ideologies and the New International Economic Order: Reflections on Some Recent Literature," *International Organization*, Spring 1979, pp. 257-302. A shorter and livelier focus on ideologies converted to foreign policy strategies in the United States is John Judis, "The Carter Doctrine: Henry Kissinger is Alive and Well and Living in the White House," *The Progressive*, March 1980, pp. 35-38.

9. *Department of State Newsletter*, April 1972, p. 16.

10. Daniel Bell, "World Disorder: The Structural Context of Crises," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1977, pp. 109-135.

11. The documentable reasons behind them are to be found in Hoyt Purvis, *The Third World and International Symbolism*.

12. Pedro Sanjuan could not resist writing, on this point, that "we seem compelled to define our foreign policy around the lofty purpose of helping others become as blessed as we think we are," in "To See Ourselves as Others See Us: Some Latin American Perspectives on US Policy," *Washington Quarterly*, Spring 1979, p. 60.

13. Phillippe LePrestre, "The North-South Conflict—From Game to Debate," *World Affairs*, Fall 1979, pp. 99-117.

14. Timothy Shaw, "Dependence to (Inter) Dependence: Review of Debate on the (New) International Economic Order," *Alternatives*, March 1979, p. 564.

15. "The fact of the matter is that the Third World has come to freedom and discovered that it is a rich man's world. It has discovered that its newly acquired independence is subject not only to the constraints that are imposed by deficiencies in its own development but also by other, and equally inhibiting factors that adhere in the world system itself The NIEO is . . . the battlecry, the set of concepts, and . . . the specifics of the alternatives we propose." Michael Manley (Prime Minister of Jamaica), Extracts from the Third World Inaugural Lecture in London, October 29, 1979, *West Africa*, January 7, 1980, p. 5.

16. These issues are recounted in LePrestre.

17. Raul S. Manglapus is not kind about our American debates over this point. "Among those who have welcomed the Carter stress on human rights are those who want the United States to . . . stop imposing American values on other peoples. For the United States is imposing its own pragmatic value of 'stability' at all cost for the sake of US economic and military interests every time it sends military aid to support a dictator who suppresses the will of the people, who polarizes his country and drives it . . . to civil war." "Democracy's Not a Western Invention," in *Human Rights and Foreign Policy*, ed. by Barry M. Rubin and Elizabeth P. Spiro, p. 15.

18. The channeling of developed nations' funds through multinational agencies such as the World Bank is at once an admission that aid does influence the politics of recipients and an effort to avoid responsibility for the consequences of aid. This is in part a fiction because the donors really have a veto over those indirect programs through their donation decisions, and through their representation in the institution. Yet, the indirect aid is "enlightened" in the sense of separating political motives from other incentives to help the Third World.

19. On this, we have one view which is that "once we understand that government-to-government aid cannot transform power relationships, but only reinforce what is there, it becomes clear that we must work to limit such aid only to countries where there is *already* under way a fundamental restructuring of decision-making power." Francis Lappe and Joseph Collins, "Aid as Obstacle," *The New York Times*, February 15, 1980, p. A29.

20. Herman Kahn, in his new book on the future, *World Economic Development, 1979 and Beyond*, says "it may well be necessary—or at least desirable—in many situations to turn to authoritarian methods, perhaps even for a time to some violence and repression . . . [but] in many cases it need only be temporary." (p. 493) The "necessary" structure, nature, composition or whatever of political and economic elements and how these elements interact in development and growth is probably the liveliest issue in development literature. One way around the problem is to avoid it by pretending that a country's political makeup is none of one's business (if an outsider) and advise that country on economic development programs which, presumably, will eventually help everybody.

Unfortunately, the argument that authoritarian methods and repression are necessary for growth and development, when stated by Western (Northern) partisans, subsumes the companion argument that only capitalist style development policies can really work. Otherwise, why not a Marxist style of development and repression? Repression is repression is repression. One must wonder if the repressed really care which label it is given.

Another view on this is worth noting: "The premise that one element must be sacrificed in order to attain the other has yet to be proved. There is no historical justification for the conclusion; the most that can be done among parties disagreeing over the issue is to trade examples back and forth . . . scanty evidence prevents generalizations in this area." Michael L. Michael, reporter, paraphrasing David Trubek in the Section on Economic Development and Human Rights in Brazil, Chile, and Cuba, American Society of International Law, Proceedings of the 67th Annual Meeting, *American Journal of International Law*, November 1973, p. 226.

21. "Preserving peace is centrally related to reducing tensions with the Soviet Union, but we must not let the Soviet relationship so dominate our foreign policy that we neglect or distort other important relationships.

"The new global issues, usually placed in a North-South context, relate to our consultation and cohesion with our traditional allies of the industrial world." Anthony Lake, "Pragmatism and Principle in US Foreign Policy," speech given June 13, 1977, p. 2.

22. Although hardly a rejection of the idea that North-South issues are important, Robert Pfaltzgraff's approach to discussing them in one article is interesting for its tone as well as content.

"It has been suggested that North-South issues will hold greater importance than East-West relationships in the global context. Such argumentation is not new. It has formed a basis for criticism of alleged shortcomings of US foreign policy for at least a generation." "Emerging Power Relationships: Implications for the American Military in the Late Twentieth Century," *Air University Review*, March-April 1977, p. 7.

23. One of the reasons some people in the North find it hard to love the South is that some of its spokesmen are so terribly snotty about almost everything. For example, "most Americans are happily unaware of the unusual degree to which the United States is isolated in international affairs," because of the US support of Israel. This is reminiscent of that famous British headline (approximated): Fog Covers Channel: Continent Isolated. The quote is from Mowahid H. Shah, "Camp David and Beyond: A View From the Third World," *Worldview*, January-February 1980, pp. 40-41.

24. My favorite in this context is this reference to turmoil in El Salvador: "The calculated result is that cops and soldiers have become jittery and trigger-happy. One huge demonstration was broken up by gunfire; 24 people were killed. The government is forced to meet violence with violence and so bring down upon itself new storms of criticism. The same well-contrived no-win situation confronts all of the many non-Communist governments in the world now under ideological siege by leftist extremists." Robert S. Strother, "The New Boys in the Bunker," *National Review*, November 23, 1979, p. 1496. It almost makes one feel sorry for those poor fellows who have to pull the triggers.

25. According to Pedro Sanjuan, with respect to Latin America, our attitudes bode worse than suggested by this stark division. "Castro and Allende are the arch-villains for the US conservatives, and Pinochet and Somoza are the arch-villains for

US liberals. But for the large majority of Americans within the mainstream of American politics, there are no enlightened leaders at all on the present Latin American scene."

26. A good account of the problems of modernization is in Anthony James Joes, *Fascism in the Contemporary World*.

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